The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:16 am

PART 9 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

Notes:

271. Ibid.

272. Memo from JPRA/CC (Col Randy Moulton) to JPRA J3/J7/PRA, [delete] Support to [delete] / Project 22B (August 13, 2002) at 1.

273. Ibid.

274. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007).

275. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

276. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

277. [Delete] A standard operating procedure was drafted in November 2002, several months after the BSCT was established. It described BSCT tasks including: consulting on interrogation approach techniques, conducting detainee file reviews to construct personality profiles and provide recommendations for interrogation strategies; observing interrogations and providing feedback to interrogators on detainee behavior, flow of the interrogation process, translator and cultural issues and possible strategies for further interrogation; and providing consultation/training on specific behavioral science interviewing and observational techniques that promote productive interrogation. The November SOP also stated that the BSCT "does not conduct medical evaluation or treatment of detainees and does not participate in determining medical treatment protocols for detainees." While the Committee does not know whether the SOP was ever approved, it comports with what BSCT members told the Committee about their activities. JTF GTMO-BSCT Memorandum for Record, BSCT Standard Operating Procedures (November 11, 2002); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

278. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

279. Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007).

280. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (July 2, 2007).

281. Ibid.

282. Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney (July 15, 2002).

283. Committee staff interview of [Delete] (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

284. Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 8; Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 14.

285. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

286. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007) at 4.

287. Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

288. Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008).

289. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (July 2, 2007).

290. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6; Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007).

291. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6.

292. The ICE Chief told the Committee that interrogators identified only "a couple of nebulous links." Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

293. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007).

294. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

295. [delete] JTF-170 J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures (August 20, 2002) (emphasis in original) (Detainees being interrogated will "remain seated and secured to the floor. DETAINEES WILL NOT BE PLACED IN STRESS POSITIONS"); see also Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

296. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

297. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

298. Ibid.

299. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

300. [Delete] COL John Custer, [delete] CJCS External Review of Guantanamo Bay Intelligence Operations (U) (September 2002) (hereinafter "Custer Report"); see also Briefing Slides, GTMO Review: Joint Staff External Review of Intelligence Operations at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba (September 10, 2002).

301. Custer's team included subject matter experts from Fort Huachuca, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

302. With respect to personnel, Custer cited a dearth of linguists, noted a lack of cultural training among interrogators, and called the entire mission "woefully undermanned." Custer Report at 2.

303. Ibid. at 11.

304. Ibid. at 12.

305. Ibid. 11-12.

306. Ibid. at 2.

307. Committee staff interviews of MAJ Sam McCahon (June 15, 2007); COL Britt Mallow (May 7, 2007); Timothy James (May 18, 2007).

308. Responses of COL Britt Mallow to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006). Two other witnesses also told the Committee that the term "Battle Lab" was used by Major General Dunlavey to describe GTMO operations. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of Tim James (May 18, 2007).

309. Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (November 15, 2006).

310. Ibid.

311. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

312. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

313. Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton, Col John Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner and Christopher Wirts, [Delete] USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (September 24, 2002) (hereinafter "USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002)").

314. JPRA to USCINCSOC, Request JPRA Support, DTG: 052135ZSEP02 (September 5, 2002).

315. [Delete] Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation Training for [delete] [delete] Officers (July 16, 2002); Committee staff interview of Dr. Gary-Percival (July 25, 2007).

316. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 79.

317. Email from Christopher Wirts to JPRA Staff (August 8, 2002).

318. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 14; Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 25.

319. Memorandum from Joseph Witsch to JPRNCC, JPRNCD, JPRNCOS, JPRNOSO, Plan of Instruction (POI) for USASOC Training Support (U) (August 28, 2002).

320. [Delete] Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation of Captive, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort Bragg (September 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Exploitation of Captive").

321. Ibid. at 4.

322. Compare JPRA, Exploitation of Captive with JPRA, Exploitation Draft Plan.

323. JPRA, Exploitation of Captive.

324. Hearing to Receive Information Relating To The Treatment of Detainees, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong. (September 6, 2007) (Testimony of Joseph Witsch) at 12, 34 (hereinafter "Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007)").

325. JPRA, Exploitation of Captive.

326. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 16.

327. JPRA, Exploitation of Captive.

328. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 18.

329. Ibid. at 25.

330. JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa'ida Resistance, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort Bragg (September 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa'ida Resistance").

331. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 26.

332. Ibid. at 27.

333. JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa'ida Resistance.

334. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 30.

335. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 14.

336. Committee staff interview of GTMO Interrogator (November 6, 2007).

337. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 92.

338. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

339 Committee staff interview of (September 12, 2007).

340. Committee staff interview of GTMO Interrogator (November 6, 2007).

341. Ibid.

342. LTC Banks added that he was not present for all of the training sessions. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (June 15, 2007); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 79; Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 99.

343. Committee staff interview of LTC Morgan Banks (June 15, 2007).

344. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 8.

345. Written statement of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

346. Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Moulton, Col Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner, Mr. Wirts, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002).

347. Ibid.

348. Ibid.

349. Ibid.

350. Ibid.

351. [Delete] Memo from Joseph Witsch to Christopher Wirts, (U) Concerns with JPRA Involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom Exploitation o/Detained Unlawful Combatants (October 1, 2002).

352. Ibid.

353. JTF-GTMO Distinguished Visitors Roster (September 27, 2002). Col Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27, 2002). While the September 27, 2002 trip report states that the visit occurred on September 25th, Jack Goldsmith, another senior official on the trip, recounts that the visit took place on September 26, 2002. Goldsmith notes that Patrick Philbin. then-Chertoff Chief of Staff Alice Fisher, and "several Pentagon lawyers" also went on the trip. The Terror Presidency at 99-100.

354. Col. Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27,2002).

355. Ibid.

356. Ibid.

357. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

358. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 139-42.

359. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

360. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).

361. Written statement of MN Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

362. Ibid.

363. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11.

364. Ibid.

365. Committee staff interview of MN Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). However, in testimony to the Army IG, MAJ Burney said he did not know whether the memo incorporated tactics from the Fort Bragg training. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11.

366. Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 12, 2007).

367. [Delete] MAJ Paul Burney and [delete] Memorandum for Record, Counter-resistance Strategies (October 2, 2002) at 1 (hereinafter "BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies").

368. Ibid. at 2.

369. Ibid.

370. Ibid.

371. Ibid.

312. Ibid.

373. Ibid. at 2-3. There is evidence that stress positions were used at GTMO prior to the BSCT memo. Lt. Col. Ronald Buikema, who served at Guantanamo from January 2001 until June 2001 as the JTF-170 J2 and Commanding Officer of the Joint Interagency Interrogation Facility (JIIF) indicated in his response to a Navy IG questionnaire that stress positions were used in some interrogations at GTMO. Email from Lt. Col. Ron Buikema to Victoria Gnibus (July 21, 2004).

374. BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 3 (emphasis in original).

375. Ibid.

376. Ibid. at 4.

377. Ibid. at 4-5.

378. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview of [delete] (September 13, 2007).

379. BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 6.

380. Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney and [delete] (October 2, 2002).

381. Ibid.

382. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 2. The meeting minutes stated that questions and comments from the meeting were paraphrased.

383. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 145-47.

384. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3.

385. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3.

386. Ibid.

387. Ibid.

388. Ibid.

389. Ibid. at 2.

390. Ibid

391. Ibid. at 3. It is unclear how and when JTF-170 personnel became aware of the use of sleep deprivation at Bagram, though LTC Beaver told the Committee that she had seen a version of a standard operating procedure for interrogations in use at Bagram on a classified DoD internet system.

392. Ibid.

393. Ibid. at 5.

394. Ibid. at 3.

395. Ibid.

396. Ibid.

397. According to the meeting minutes, the CIA lawyer added "The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. The US did not sign up to the second part, because of the 8th amendment ... That gives us more license to use more controversial techniques." Ibid.

398. Ibid. at 5.

399. Ibid. at 3.

400. Ibid.

401. Ibid.

402. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies at 4.

403. 11 CounterResistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. LTC Beaver said that she had learned about the wet towel technique from a Navy doctor who had been assigned to the Hospital at Guantanamo and who described to her its use at the Navy SERE school. It is unclear, however, to whom LTC Beaver is referring. The Committee interviewed a Navy Lieutenant Commander who was deployed to GTMO and who had previously worked at the Navy SERE school at the Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine. The Lieutenant Commander told the Committee that he discussed with JTF-GTMO staff physical pressures used to teach students at SERE school how to resist interrogations. However, the Lieutenant Commander was not deployed to GTMO until November 2002. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October 11, 2007); see Committee staff interview of (August 22, 2007); Travel voucher.

404. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4.

405. Ibid.

406. Ibid.

407. Ibid. at 3.

408. Email from Mark Fallon to MAJ Sam McCahon et al. (October 28, 2002).

409. [Delete] LTG Joseph Inge, DEPSECDEF Inquiry Regarding Location of Interrogation Plan for ISN 063 (August 24, 2006) at 5 (hereinafter "Inge Report'').

410. Email from MAJ Paul Burney to LTC Morgan Banks (October 4, 2002).

411. Ibid.

412. Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney (October 4, 2002).

413. Memo from COL John Hadis (JTF-GTMO Chief of Staff to SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005), attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006).

414. Khatani was identified as a possible twentieth highjacker after it was determined that he had tried to enter the U.S. in August 2001 but was detained at the Orlando, Florida airport and later deported. When Khatani arrived at the Orlando airport. Mohammed .Atta was waiting. JTF-GTMO, Analyst Support Summary (March 18, 2003), attached as Tab 22 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006).

415. Inge Report at 5.

416. Memo from COL John Redis (JTF-GTMO Chief of Staff to SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005), attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006); Inge Report at 5.

417. Memo from J. K. Sieber (CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD Interrogation Techniques Issue (September 23, 2002).

418. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

419. The memo was provided to the Committee as an appendix to the AR-15-6 Report completed by Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt and Brigadier General John T. Furlow into FBI allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay (hereinafter "Schmidt-Furlow Report''). The memo is unsigned but contains a handwritten notation "////signed on 1 Oct 02////." Committee staff requested the Department of Defense provide a signed copy or advise the Committee of any reason why the Committee should not rely on the document. The Department provided neither.

420. Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to JTF-160 Commander, Interrogation Plan for ISN 063 (October 1, 2002), attached as exhibit 40 to Schmidt-Furlow Report.

421. Ibid.

422. Ibid.

423. Ibid.

424. Ibid.

425. Ibid.; Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October 11, 2007); see also Memo from J. K. Sieber (CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD Interrogation Techniques Issue (September 23, 2002) ("the JTF 170 SJA had not been briefed on the plan prior to her contact with the FBI SSA. When she learned of the plan, she sought guidance from up her chain of command and also sought guidance from DOD legal and other intelligence agencies. She wants to ensure that even if these techniques are not legally objectionable, her chain of command is aware that these types of techniques are being utilized and that the personnel on the ground are properly trained to conduct these techniques.")

426. Committee staff interview of MG Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

427. Summarized witness statement of David Becker (March 3, 2005), exhibit 21 to Schmidt-Furlow Report; summarized witness statement of ENS Mary Travers (February 23, 2005), exhibit 33 to Schmidt-Furlow Report; summarized witness statement of Agent Robert Morton (January 20, 2005), exhibit 36 to Schmidt-Furlow Report; summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20, 2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow Report. 428. Summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20, 2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow Report.

429. Army IG, Interview of David Becker (September 20, 2005) at 30.

430. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

431. Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 13.

432. Responses of LTC Jerald Phifer to questionnaire of VADM Church (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those written answers whether LTC Phifer was referring to the use of dogs in JTF-170's October 2002 interrogation of Khatani or in the subsequent interrogation of Khatani that began in late November.

433. Committee staff interview of Major General Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).

434. Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2002).

435. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

436. Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2002).
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:17 am

PART 10 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

IV. GTMO Seeks Authority to Use Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U)

A. GTMO Requests Counter-Resistance Techniques Influenced by SERE (U)


(U) On October 11, 2002, just days after the JTF-170 moved Khatani back to the Navy Brig and shortly after meeting with the Chief Counsel of the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center Jonathan Fredman, LTC Phifer submitted a memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Dunlavey requesting approval to use "counter-resistance" interrogation techniques. [437] LTC Phifer's memo was largely drawn from the October 2, 2002 memorandum that the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) had written upon their return from the JPRA training at Fort Bragg. [438] The memo requested approval for three categories of progressively more aggressive interrogation techniques, many of which were similar to techniques used at SERE schools to increase U.S. soldiers' resistance to illegal enemy interrogation. [439]

(U) Of the three categories of proposed techniques, those in Category I were the least aggressive. Category I proposed yelling at the detainee and using certain "techniques of deception," such as using multiple interrogators or having an interrogator "identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees." [440]

(U) The proposed Category II techniques were more aggressive and included several techniques similar to those used in SERE schools, such as stress positions, isolation, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, using a hood during transport and questioning, removal of clothing, and using detainees' individual phobias to induce stress. [441]

[Delete] An August 19, 2002 email from LTC Beaver reflected discussions among JTF-170 staff about stress positions, which she said resulted in an agreed upon policy of "no stress positions" at GTMO. [442] When asked how stress positions came to be included in LTC Phifer's memo, given the agreement referenced in her earlier email, LTC Beaver said that she did not know, but added that LTC Phifer later advocated for their use. [443] LTC Beaver said that she relied on Mr. Becker and LTC Phifer to decide which techniques to put in the memo and that she never commented or changed their drafts. [444]

(U) The proposed Category III techniques in the October 11, 2002 request were the most aggressive and included the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences were imminent for him and/or his family; exposure to cold weather or water; the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation; and the use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing. [445] According to the October 11, 2002 memo, Category III techniques "and other aversive techniques, such as those used in U.S. military resistance training or by other U.S. government agencies" would be utilized to interrogate "exceptionally resistant detainees," which LTC Phifer estimated as "less than 3%" of the detainees held at GTMO. [446]

(U) Two of the Category III techniques in LTC Phifer's memo - the use of phobias and the use of the wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation - were not derived from the October 2, 2002 BSCT memo. [447] CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman, however, had reportedly discussed both of these techniques during his October 2, 2002 meeting with GTMO personnel, noting that the use of phobias was "very effective" and that the use of the "wet towel technique" makes a body react as is if it's suffocating. [448] Mr. Becker told the Committee that he (the ICE Chief) may have recommended adding those two techniques to the request for authority. [449]

(U) LTC Phifer said that he drafted his memo with Mr. Becker. [450] Mr. Becker, however, told the Committee that he was provided a draft only after it was nearly complete. He said that he thought the techniques memo was "stupid," though he did not share his view with LTC Phifer at the time. [451] LTC Phifer told the Committee that he was uncomfortable with the idea of using some of the techniques in his memo but that MG Dunlavey pressured him to finish the request. [452]

B. GTMO Staff Judge Advocate Conducts "Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques" (U)

(U) The October 11, 2002 techniques memo was accompanied by a cover memo and legal brief written by GTMO's Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) LTC Diane Beaver. The cover memo stated simply that ''the proposed strategies do not violate applicable federal law." [453]

(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she drafted the legal brief with her staff over the course of the 2002 Columbus Day weekend. [454] She told the Committee that she had not seen either of the legal memoranda produced by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel on August 1, 2002 and that she did not receive input on the legal brief from anyone outside of GTMO. The minutes of the October 2, 2002 meeting with CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman, however, reflect that LTC Beaver was present when he discussed the Torture Convention (and the federal law implementing the treaty). In that discussion, Mr. Fredman described "severe physical pain" as "anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body parts." [455] The idea that "severe physical pain" constituting torture had to rise to the level of "organ failure, impairment of bodily functions or even death" had been discussed in the OLC legal memo of August 1 2002, known as the First Bybee memo. [456]

(U) LTC Beaver began her analysis of the "aggressive" techniques by stating that the "detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay ... are not protected by the Geneva Conventions." [457] LTC Beaver stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense "had not adopted specific guidelines regarding interrogation techniques for detainee operations at GTMO" and she dismissed the longstanding guidance on interrogation of detainees contained in the Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52 as not binding. [458]

(U) In her memo, LTC Beaver stated that U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture restricted only those cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts that were also prohibited by the "current standard articulated in the Eighth Amendment" against "cruel and unusual punishment." [459] The memo concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques would be consistent with the Eighth Amendment standard so long as any force used could "plausibly have been thought necessary ... to achieve a legitimate governmental objective and it was applied in a good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." [460]

(U) LTC Beaver also concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques would not violate the federal anti-torture statute so long as they were not specifically intended to cause severe physical pain or suffering or prolonged mental harm. LTC Beaver conducted her analysis with the "assum[ption] that severe physical pain [would not be] inflicted" and "absent any evidence that any of these strategies [would] in fact cause prolonged and long lasting mental harm." [461] LTC Beaver told the Committee that she did not conduct any research to determine whether the use of the techniques described in the accompanying request for authority would, in fact, result in long-term mental harm. [462]

[Delete] [delete] The October 2, 2002 BSCT memo, however, had specifically cautioned that the techniques "could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health of the detainee ... [and that] physical and/or emotional harm from the ... techniques may emerge months or even years after their use." [463]

(U) LTC Beaver also found that some of the proposed tactics would constitute a "per se violation" of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article that prohibits military personnel from committing assault, and could violate the Article that prohibits military personnel from communicating a threat. [464] As a result, LTC Beaver said it would be "advisable to have permission or immunity in advance from the convening authority for military members utilizing these methods." [465] In a November 4, 2002 letter to the Joint Staff J-5, the Marine Corps commented on the SJA's recommendation to convey "permission or immunity in advance," noting that "[w]e are unaware of any authority that would allow a convening authority to give 'permission or immunity' in advance to commit a criminal violation." [466] Likewise, military lawyers from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School later said that LTC Beaver's "proposal to immunize interrogators, given that a number of the proposed techniques in issue constituted violations of the UCMJ, was not only unprecedented, but lacked any basis in law." [467]

(U) Based on her legal review, LTC Beaver recommended that the "proposed methods of interrogation be approved," but that interrogators be trained to use the methods and that "interrogations involving category II and III methods" undergo a legal, medical, behavioral science, and intelligence review prior to commencement. [468]

(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she called the SOUTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate COL Manny Supervielle, likely on Sunday, October 10, 2002 and sent SOUTHCOM a draft of the legal memo that same day. [469] She said that she told COL Supervielle that she "really needed some help" but that she received no comments from SOUTHCOM prior to submitting the final memo the next day. [470] LTC Beaver said that she also talked to the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CAPT Jane Dalton and asked for her help, but was told that she should talk to COL Supervielle. [471] CAPT Dalton said that she did not recall that conversation with LTC Beaver. [472] LTC Beaver also told the Committee that MG Dunlavey did not comment on drafts of the memo and that she did not discuss it with him after it was completed. [473]

C. Chain of Command Considers the Requestf or Interrogation Techniques as CITF and FBI Raise Objections (U)

(U) On October 11, 2002, MG Dunlavey submitted LTC Phifer's memo and LTC Beaver's legal analysis to General James Hill, the Commander of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). He also sent his own memo requesting approval to use the interrogation techniques. [474] MG Dunlavey wrote:

I am fully aware of the techniques currently employed to gain valuable intelligence in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Although these techniques have resulted in significant exploitable intelligence, the same methods have become less effective over time. I believe the methods and techniques delineated in the accompanying J-2 memorandum will enhance our efforts to extract additional information. Based on the analysis provided by the JTF-170 SJA, I have concluded that these techniques do not violate U.S. or international laws. [475]


(U) On October 25, 2002, GEN Hill forwarded the JTF-170 request to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Richard Myers, with a memorandum stating that "despite our best efforts, some detainees have tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods." [476] He continued: "[O]ur respective staffs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Task Force 170 have been trying to identify counter-resistant techniques that we can lawfully employ." [477] When later asked, GEN Hill could not recall whether SOUTHCOM produced a written opinion analyzing the GTMO request separate from LTC Beaver's opinion. [478]

(U) As to techniques in the GTMO request for interrogation techniques, GEN Hill said that he "did discuss the topic of SERE training in a general manner with MG Dunlavey." [479] Years later, in a June 3, 2004 press briefing, GEN Hill noted the influence of the Fort Bragg trip and SERE school techniques on the request, stating:

The staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to our SERE school and developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided and looked at, said were OK. I sent that list of techniques up to the Secretary and said, in order for us to get at some of these very high-profile, high- value targets who are resistant to techniques, I may need greater flexibility. But I want a legal review of it and you to tell me that, policy-wise, it's the right way to do business. [480]


(U) In his October 25, 2002 memo, GEN Hill stated that, although he believed Categories I and II techniques were "legal and humane," he was uncertain about techniques in Category III and was "particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death of the detainee or his family." [481] Nevertheless, GEN Hill said that he "desire[d] to have as many options as possible at [his] disposal" and asked that Departments of Defense and Justice attorneys review the Category III techniques. [482]

(U) One SOUTHCOM Assistant Staff Judge Advocate LTC Mark Gingras testified to the Army IG that lawyers for SOUTHCOM had concerns about Category II and Category III techniques. [483] Regarding the GTMO request for techniques, LTC Gingras told the Army IG:

As lawyers we're talking about adherence to the rule of law being important, and that's what we're trying to tell everybody as we travel around the world to these other countries. That's paramount to democracy. And so suddenly we look like we're brushing this aside or we're twisting the law. The feeling was that decision makers within the Pentagon didn't much care about that. They cared about winning the War on Terrorism. And if that meant you had to pull out fingernails you'd pull out fingernails, figuratively speaking. [484]


D. Military Services React to GTMO Request/or Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) On October 30, 2002, after receiving Gen Hill's memo and the GTMO request, the Joint Staff J-5 requested that the military services comment on the request. [485]

(U) On November 1, 2002, the Air Force responded, expressing "serious concerns regarding the legality of many of the proposed techniques" and stating that "some of these techniques could be construed as 'torture,' as that crime is defined by 18 U.S.C. 2340." [486] The Air Force memorandum added that, with respect to potential prosecutions, the use of Category III techniques would "almost certainly" result in any statements obtained being inadmissible. [487] The memorandum stated that admissibility of evidence obtained using Categories I and II techniques, the latter of which included stress positions, the use of dogs, removal of clothing, and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, among other techniques, would be "fact specific, but the same concerns remain." [488] The Air Force memo continued: "Additionally, the techniques described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely... Implementation of the proposed techniques would require a change in Presidential policy." [489] The memo stated that the Air Force "concurs in the need to conduct an in-depth legal and policy assessment, as recommended by [the SOUTHCOM Commander], prior to implementation of the proposed counter-resistance interrogation techniques." [490]

(U) On November 4, 2002, the Navy responded to the Joint Staff's request for comment, stating that it "concur[red] with developing a range of advanced counter-resistance techniques," but recommending "a more detailed interagency legal and policy review be conducted on the ... proposed techniques." [491]

(U) That same day, the Marine Corps submitted its written comments, which concluded that "several of the Category II and III techniques arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to possible prosecution." [492] The Marine Corps memo stated that the use of the techniques would also create "exposure to criminal prosecution under the UCMJ." [493] Again, Category III techniques included the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences were imminent for him or his family, exposure to cold weather or water, use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation, and non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking and light pushing. [494] Category II included such techniques as stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, the use of a hood during questioning, 20 hour interrogations, removal of clothing, and the use of detainee phobias, such as dogs, to induce stress. The memo also stated the Marine Corps "disagree[d] with the position that the proposed plan is legally sufficient." [495]

(U) A few days later, the Army submitted comments from both the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) and the CITF. [496] The Army's cover memo stated that "Army interposes significant legal, policy and practical concerns regarding most of the Category II and all of the Category III techniques proposed" and that the Army "concurs in the recommendation for a comprehensive legal review of this proposal in its entirety by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice." [497] The OTJAG's memorandum, which was attached, stated that Category III techniques "violate the President's order [on humane treatment] and various UCMJ articles" and that the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family and the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation "appear to be clear violations of the federal torture statute." [498] The OTJAG memorandum also stated that Category II techniques of stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and using individual phobias to induce stress "crosses the line of 'humane' treatment, would likely be considered maltreatment under Article 93 of the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], and may violate the Federal torture statute." [499] The memo continued that removal of clothing and forced grooming "may be considered inhumane" if done only for interrogation purposes and stated "if we mistreat detainees, we will quickly lose the moral high ground." [500] The Army concurred with GEN Hill's request for a legal review before techniques were adopted. [501]

(U) Military lawyers were not the only personnel to object to GTMO's request for aggressive techniques. CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon told the Committee that it was CITF's view that the techniques proposed by JTF-170 would actually strengthen, rather than weaken, detainee resistance. He explained:

Our view was that employing techniques that validated [the detainees] prior training and adverse views would serve to harden resistance and reinforce what they had been told to expect... We pointed out that SERE school tactics were developed to better prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations and not as a means of obtaining reliable information. CITF was troubled with the rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations would be the basis for the utilization of techniques to obtain information. [502]


(U) CITF's legal view was reflected in a November 4, 2002 memo from CITF Chief Legal Advisor MAJ Sam McCahon, which was also attached to the Army's response to the Joint Staff. MAJ McCahon wrote:

[Category] III and certain [Category] II techniques may subject service members to punitive articles of the UCMJ... CITF personnel who are aware of the use or abuse of certain techniques may be exposed to liability under the UCMJ for failing to intercede or report incidents, if an inquiry later determines the conduct to be in violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice or 18 U.S.C. §2340. [503]


(U) MAJ McCahon also raised concerns about the impact of the techniques on evidentiary proceedings:

One detainee subjected to these techniques could taint the voluntary nature of all other confessions and information derived from detainees not subjected to the aggressive techniques. [504]

(U) MAJ McCahon added that "oth the utility and legality of applying certain techniques" in the October 11, 2002 memo are "questionable," and recommended that CITF personnel not participate in or even observe the use of aggressive techniques. [505] MAJ McCahon concluded:

I cannot advocate any action, interrogation or otherwise, that is predicated upon the principle that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are not aware of how we conduct our business. [506]


(U) MAJ McCahon told the Committee that his memorandum prompted a subsequent meeting at the Pentagon. [507]

(U) When the October 11, 2002 GTMO request arrived in the DoD General Counsel's office, DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson said that she was asked to provide her thoughts on the request. Ms. Davidson said that she had a brief conversation with Mr. Haynes where she told him that the GTMO request needed further assessment. [508] Mr. Haynes stated that he did not "recall that specifically." [509]

[b]E. Department of Defense General Counsel Quashes Joint Staff Legal Review (U)


(U) When the October 11, 2002 GTMO request arrived at the Joint Staff, CAPT Jane Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it was "obvious to [her] that there were some legal issues" with the request. [510] She said that techniques in Category II of the request "needed to be looked at closely" and that Category III techniques "had significant, significant concerns." [511] CAPT Dalton found LTC Beaver's legal analysis ''woefully inadequate" and said it relied on a methodology and conclusions that were "very strained." [512] Rather than simply deny the request, however, CAPT Dalton said that "she owed it to the combatant commander to do a full and complete review." [513] She subsequently directed her staff to set up a secure video teleconference with representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Army's intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and GTMO to find out more information about the techniques in the request and to "begin discussing the legal issues to see if we could do ... our own independent legal analysis." [514]

(U) CAPT Dalton recalled making Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers aware of the concerns expressed by the military services. [515] The Chairman said, however, that he did "not specifically recall the objections of the Services being raised" to his attention at that time. [516]

(U) CAPT Dalton also recalled that her staff briefed the DoD General Counsel's office about the concerns submitted by the military services and that the General Counsel himself "was aware of the concerns." [517] In a February 2008 interview, DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson recalled that the service comments were made available to the General Counsel's office. [518] DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes stated, however, that he "did not recall seeing" the memos at that time and "didn't know they existed." [519] He stated that he did not recall being informed by anyone that the military services had concerns about the legality of Category II techniques in the request and that he did not have a "specific recollection" of CAPT Dalton making him aware that there were concerns about the legality of techniques in the GTMO request. [520]

(U) According to CAPT Dalton, after she and her staff initiated their analysis, CJCS GEN Myers directed her to stop that review. CAPT Dalton said that GEN Myers returned from a meeting and "advised me that [DoD General Counsel] Mr. Haynes wanted me ... to cancel the video teleconference and to stop" conducting the review because of concerns that "people were going to see" the GTMO request and the military services' analysis of it. [521] According to CAPT Dalton, Mr. Haynes "wanted to keep it much more close hold." [522] When CAPT Dalton "learned that [the DoD General Counsel] did not want that broad based legal and policy review to take place," she and her staff stopped their review. [523] This was the only time that CAPT Dalton had ever been asked to stop analyzing a request that came to her for her review. [524]

[Delete] CAPT Dalton recalled that prior to being directed to stop the review, her staff had begun writing draft comments on the GTMO request. [525] An undated draft of a memorandum from GEN Myers to SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill, analyzing the October 11, 2002 GTMO request, stated "We do not believe the proposed plan is legally sufficient." [526] The draft memo stated that "several of the Category III techniques arguably violate federal law, and could expose interrogators to possible prosecution" under the federal anti-torture laws. [527] The draft stated that techniques in the request "may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely" and recommended an "in-depth technical, policy, and legal assessment" of the techniques prior to their implementation. [528]

(U) GEN Myers said that he had "no specific recollection" of discussing with CAPT Dalton her efforts to conduct an analysis of the October 11, 2002 GTMO request. [529] He said that while he "did not dispute" asking her to stop working on her analysis and acknowledged that Joint Staff records indicated that she did stop work on her analysis, he had "no recollection or doing so" and did "not recall anyone suggesting" to him that she stop her review. [530] DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes said that while it was "possible" that the issue could have come up in a conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he did not "recall that specific conversation" or expressing any opinion of any kind with respect to CAPT Dalton's review. [531]

F. GTMO and JPRA Plan for Additional Interrogation Training (U)

[Delete] While GTMO's request for approval to use aggressive interrogation techniques was pending, JPRA staff was developing an agenda for possible follow-up training for interrogation personnel at GTMO.

[Delete] In mid-October 2002, JPRA developed a plan of instruction to provide training on the techniques to GTMO interrogators. [532] The training plan was virtually identical to a draft agenda developed for the Fort Bragg training of GTMO personnel that took place in September, which included instruction of the ''use of physiological pressures." [533]

[Delete] (FOUO) David Becker, the GTMO ICE Chief, told the Committee that once they received authority to use the techniques in the October 11, 2002 memo, GTMO interrogators would need training on the techniques. [534] A draft message order circulated between GTMO and JPRA staff in late October requested "mission critical training support" for "approximately [delete] personnel" at GTMO. [535] The draft message order stated that the training would "provide the necessary tools ITF-GTMO interrogators require to accomplish their mission critical tasks. [536]

[Delete] [delete] A November 15, 2002 staff memo to the Joint Staff J-2 stated that JTF-GTMO had requested training on the SERE school techniques and that the trainers were expected to arrive in the first week of December. [537] The JPRA Operational Support Office (OSO) Chief Christopher Wirts told the Committee that the requirement for JPRA to provide the training was never approved and that his agency never conducted the training. [538] However, in January 2003, two instructors from the Navy SERE school, John Rankin and Christopher Ross, travelled to GTMO to train interrogators on the use of physical pressures, including slapping, walling, and stress positions. [539]

_______________

Notes:

437. Memo from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies (October 11, 2002) (hereinafter LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies').

438. MAJ Burney told the Army IG that the October 11, 2002 memo "wasn't the exact same document that we had written but the general structure and overall organization-a lot of the things did remain intact from our original brainstorm to what was eventually requested." Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007) at 11.

439. The October 11 memo also stated that "current guidelines for interrogation procedures at GTMO limit the ability of interrogators to counter advanced resistance." LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter- Resistance Strategies".

440. Ibid

441. Additional Category II techniques included use of falsified documents or reports, interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth, use of 20 hour interrogations, removal of all comfort items (including religious items), switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs, and forced grooming. Ibid

442. Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques (March 7, 2005) (hereinafter "Church Report," at 109 (citing email from LTC Beaver (August 19, 2002)).

443. LTC Beaver told the Committee that LTC Phifer advocated the use of stress positions in the interrogation of Mohammed al Khatani (discussed below). Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

444. Ibid.

445. LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies.

446. Ibid.

447. The use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning appears to describe waterboarding. The Navy is the only service that used waterboarding in SERE training. which it ceased in November 2007.

448. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 5 (The CTC Chief Counsel explained that if a "well-trained individual is used to perform" the "wet-towel technique," it can "feel like you're drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you're suffocating but your body will not cease to function.")

449. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

450. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).

451. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

452. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).

453. Memo from LTC Diane Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (October 11, 2002).

454. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

455. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 3.

456 Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002).

457. Memo from LTC Diane Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter- Resistance Strategies (October 11, 2002) (hereinafter" LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies").

458. The SJA concluded that because the techniques in the Army FM 34-52 are "constrained by, and conform to the Geneva Conventions and applicable international law," and that the Geneva Conventions do not apply as a matter of law, the Field Manual was "not binding." See LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 1.

459. LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 2.

460. Ibid. at 5.

461. Ibid.

462. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

463. BSCT, Counter-Resistance Strategies (October 2, 2002).

464. LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 5.

465. Ibid.

466. Memo from Marine Corps Service Planner to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques (November 4, 2002) see also Section IV D, infra.

467. Lt Col Kantwill et al., Improving the Fighting Position, A Practitioner's Guide to Operational Law Support to the Interrogation Process, 2005 Army Lawyer (July 2005) at 12, 14.

468. LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 7.

469. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

470. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

471. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

472. Ibid.

473. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

474. Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to USSOUTHCOM Commander GEN James Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies (October 11, 2002) (hereinafter "MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies.'')

475. MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies.

476. Memo from GEN James Hill to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Richard Myers, Counter-Resistance Techniques, (October 25, 2002) (hereinafter "GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques.")

477. GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques.

478. GEN James 1. Hill answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (August 20, 2008).

479. Ibid.

480. June 3, 2004 Media Availability with Commander U.S. Southern Command.

481. GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques.

482. GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques; In testimony to the Army IG, the SOUTHCOM Commander said that he thought the request "was important enough to where there ought to be a high level look at it... There ought to be a major policy discussion of this and everybody ought to be involved." Army IG, Interview of GEN James T. Hill (October 7, 2005), at 7.

483. Army IG, Interview of LTC Mark Gingras (October 11, 2005) at 20.

484. Ibid.

485. Joint Staff Action Processing Form (SJS 02-06697), Counter-Resistance Techniques (October 30, 2002).

486. Department of the Air Force Memo for UN and Multilateral Affair Division (1-5), Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques (November 1, 2002).

487. Ibid. at 1.

488. Ibid.

489. Ibid. at 2.

490. Ibid. at 1.

491. Department of the Navy Memo for the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (1-5) Joint Staff, Navy Planner's Memo WRT Counter-Resistance Techniques (SJS 02-06697) (November 4, 2002).

492. Memo from Marine Corps Service Planner to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques (November 4, 2002).

493. Ibid.

494. LTC Phifer to MG Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies.

495. Memo from Marine Corps Service Planner to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques (November 4, 2002).

496. Memo from the Army Deputy to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Joint Affairs) to the Joint Staff, J-5/UNMA [UN and Multilateral Affairs Division], SJS 02-06697 (November 7, 2002); Memo from Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate (International and Operational Law) to The Office of the Army General Counsel, Review-Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques (undated) (hereinafter "DAJA(IO) Memo for Army General Counsel. Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques.")

497. DAJA(IO) Memo for Army General Counsel, Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques.

498. Ibid.

499. Ibid.

500. Ibid.

501. Ibid.

502. Responses of Mr. Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006) at 7.

503. Memo from CITF Chief Legal Advisor MAK Sam McCahon to CITF Commander, Assessment of JTF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies and the Potential Impact on CITF Mission and Personnel (November 4, 2002) (hereinafter "McCahon to CDR CITF, Assessment of.JTF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies.")

504. McCahon to CDR CITF, Assessment of JTFF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies.

505. Ibid.

506. Ibid.

507. Committee staff interview of MAJ Sam McCahon (June 15, 2007).

508. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (May 23, 2008).

509. SASC Hearing (June I7, 2008).

510. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 33.

511. Ibid. at 45.

512. Ibid. at 41.

513. Ibid. at 33.

514. Ibid. at 34.

515. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

516. Responses of General Richard Myers to written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30, 2008).

517. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

518. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (February 21, 2008). Ms. Davidson said in a subsequent interview that she was not aware of the military services' comments before discussing the October 11, 2002 GTMO request with the DoD General Counsel. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (May 23, 2008).

519. SASC Hearing (Jooe 17, 2008).

520. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 163-65.

521. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 34.

522. Ibid. at 35.

523. SASC Hearing (June 17,2008).

524. Ibid.

525. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 37.

526. Draft memo from CJCS Richard Myers to Commander, United States Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques (undated).

527. Ibid.

528. Ibid.

529. Responses of GEN (Ret.) Richard Myers to April 16, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30, 2008).

530. Ibid.

531. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 168.

532. Memorandum From Joseph Witsch to JPRNCC, JPRNCD, JPRNCOS, JPRNOSO, Plan of Instruction (POI) for TF-170 Training Support (October 16, 2002).

533. See Section III D, supra; Plan of Instruction (POI) for JTF-170 Training Support (October 16, 2002).

534. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

535. Email from Chris Wirts to [delete] Richard Driggers, Joseph Witsch, [delete] [delete] and Gary Percival (October 29, 2002) (hereinafter "Email from Chris Wirts (October 29, 2002).")

536. Email from Chris Wirts (October 29,2(02).

537. JTF-170 and JTF-160 were combined to form JTF-GTMO in October 2002; Memo from [delete] to [Joint Staff], GTMO Detainee [delete] (November 15, 2002).

538. Committee staff interview of Chris Wirts (January 4, 2008).

539. See Section VII C, infra.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:21 am

PART 11 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

V. Command Change at Guantanamo as Dispute over Aggressive Techniques Continues (U)

A. Major General Geoffrey Miller Takes Command of JTF-GTMO (U)


(U) In November 2002 a new Commander, MG Geoffrey Miller, took command of JTF-GTMO. At the time, MG Miller had no first-hand experience with detainees or interrogations. [540]

(U) MG Miller told the Committee that prior to taking command, he met with SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill and his staff. [541] During those meetings, MG Miller got the impression that MG Dunlavey, the previous Commander, had bypassed the chain of command by raising issues directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense staff. MG Miller told the Committee that GEN Hill authorized him to speak directly with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but that he told SOUTHCOM he would keep SOUTHCOM informed of those communications. [542]

(U) MG Miller said that, while he was in Command at GTMO, he had direct discussions with the DoD General Counsel's office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). [543] MG Miller also testified to the Army IG that he and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz ''talked once a week when I was in Guantanamo." [544] Lt Col Ted Moss, the JTF-GTMO ICE Chief who began his tour of duty at GTMO in December 2002, said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was in phone contact with MG Miller "a lot." [545] However, MG Miller told the Committee that he misspoke when he testified to the Army IG and that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not speak to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz on the phone while he was at GTMO, but only briefed him quarterly, in person, on GTMO operations. [546]

(U) Shortly after MG Miller arrived at GTMO, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) LTC Phifer informed him of the October 11, 2002 request. [547] Although he later approved an interrogation plan that included reference to Category III techniques, MG Miller told the Army IG that he believed that the techniques in Category III and some techniques in Category II were "overly aggressive" and that he had not intended to use them. [548] MG Miller said he had concerns with stress positions, removal of clothing, and use of dogs, among other techniques. Nevertheless, there is evidence that those techniques were used at GTMO while he was in command. MG Miller told the Committee that he thought he discussed his concerns about the techniques with LTC Beaver in early November before the Secretary approved their use, but that he did not raise it with SOUTHCOM because he wanted to see which techniques would be approved. [549]

(U) MG Miller told the Army IG that when he arrived at GTMO, there was significant tension between JTF-GTMO, CITF, and FBI and that he sought to get all three organizations to work in concert. [550] Despite MG Miller's stated intent, his decision to approve an interrogation plan for Mohammed al Khatani that was opposed by the CITF and FBI, drove a deeper wedge between his organization and both CITF and FBI.

B. Khatani Interrogation Plan Fuels Dispute Over Aggressive Techniques (U)

(U) After their unsuccessful interrogation of Khatani in October 2002, JTF-GTMO staff spent several weeks drafting an extensive new interrogation plan. The plan was the first "Special Interrogation Plan" at GTMO and it would encounter strong resistance from both CITF and the FBI. One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that he thought Khatani's interrogation would define the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO and therefore they "had to get it right." [551]

[Delete] Several drafts of JTF-GTMO's interrogation plan for Khatani were circulated at GTMO in November 2002. The discussion below focuses primarily on two of those drafts, one circulated on November 12, 2002 and another which was drafted about a week later and appears to have been finalized on November 22, 2002. Both drafts are discussed here because each provides insight on the range of interrogation techniques considered by senior officials at GTMO. In addition, there is evidence that both draft plans were approved by MG Miller. Finally, there is evidence that techniques which were included in the "draft" circulated on November 12, 2002 but removed from the purported "final" plan, were nevertheless used during Khatani's interrogation.

1. JTF-GTMO Staff Circulate Khatani Interrogation Plan (U)

[Delete] According to the report completed by Vice Admiral (VADM) Church, "after discussing the matter in early November 2002 with the Secretary of Defense, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill gave verbal approval on November 12, 2002 for use of all Category I and II counter resistance techniques against Khatani." [552] GEN Hill told the Committee that he had no recollection of that. [553] That same day, November 12, 2002, LTC Phifer sent an email and a four page interrogation plan to MG Miller stating "[h]ere is the Interrogation Plan for [Khatani] as approved by you." [554]

[Delete] The next day, GTMO ICE Chief David Becker emailed the plan, which he referred to as the "[l]atest approved by MG Miller," to a GTMO interrogator. [555] According to the plan, the interrogation was scheduled to begin on November 15, 2002. [556] Mr. Becker told the Committee that the plan was developed by his interrogators with input from him and LTC Phifer. [557] In 2005, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that he thought the plan circulated on November 12, 2002 was part of the final version of the plan that he approved. [558] However, in a subsequent investigation, MG Miller identified a later version as the final plan. [559] He told the Committee that he never approved the version of the plan circulated on November 12, 2002. [560] However, contemporaneous documents indicate that others believed the plan circulated on November 12, 2002 had been approved by both MG Miller and SOUTHCOM and expected it to be implemented on November 15, 2002:

[Delete] [delete] The November 12, 2002 email from the Director for Intelligence LTC Phifer to MG Miller stated, "[h]ere is the Interrogation Plan for ISN: 063 as approved by you. Request you fwd to Gen Hill, info J2/J3/COS. We will begin at 0001 15 Nov per your guidance. [561]

[Delete] The November 13, 2002 email from the GTMO ICE Chief David Becker referred to the November 12, 2002 plan, which was attached to his email, as the "[l]atest approved by MG Miller." [562]

[Big delete]

[Delete] A November 14, 2002 email from the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver to CITF lawyer stated, "[c]oncerning 63 [Khatani] my understanding is that NSC has weighed in and stated that intel on this guy is utmost matter of national security... We are driving forward with support of SOUTHCOM. Not sure anything else needs to be said." [564]

[Delete] A November 15, 2002 staff memorandum for the J-2 of the Joint Staff stated that "interrogators were preparing to interrogate [Khatani] beginning at 15 0001 November 2002 ..." [565]

[Delete] According to the November 12, 2002 plan, the purpose of the interrogation was to "break the detainee and establish his role in the attacks of September 11, 2001." [566] The interrogation would be conducted for "20-hour sessions" and at the completion of each session, Khatani would be permitted four hours of rest, and then "another 20 hour interrogation session [would] begin." [567]

[Big delete]

Prior to the first interrogation, we would like to have the detainee's head and beard shaved. This is to be done for both psychological and hygiene purposes. [Big delete] During the interrogations the detainee will at times be placed in stress positions and blindfolded. If necessary the detainee may have his mouth taped shut in order to keep him from talking. Written approval for the tape and for the presence of dogs will be submitted and obtained prior to implementation. [569]


[Delete] The November 12, 2002 plan went on to describe four phases for the interrogation. [570] During Phase I, interrogators would increase the pressure on Khatani while not permitting him to speak, with the expectation that Khatani, when later presented with the opportunity to speak to an interrogator, would "provide his whole story." [571]

[Delete] Phase II of the plan was to place a cooperative detainee or a native linguist at Camp X-Ray in full view of Khatani. [572] [Big delete]

[Delete] Phase III of the plan, which was entitled "Level III techniques," was to utilize techniques based on those used at SERE school. The plan stated:

The third phase of the plan to exploit 063 requires OSD approval for the SERE interrogation technique training and approval of the level three counter interrogation resistance training submitted by JTF-GTMO. Once the approvals are in place, those interrogation techniques will be implemented to encourage 063 to cooperate. [Big delete]


[Delete] The plan's final phase, Phase IV, was entitled "Coalition Exploitation" and stated that:

The fourth phase of the plan to exploit 063 requires that he be sent off island either temporarily or permanently to either [two specified third countries], or another country to allow those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to obtain the requisite information. [574]


2. CITF and FBI Object to Proposed Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) On November 14, 2002, CITF Commander COL Britt Mallow sent an email to MG Miller raising concerns about both the Khatani interrogation and the October 11, 2002 request for authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques. [575] He stated:

I strongly disagree with the use of many of the proposed [Category] 3 and some [Category] 2 techniques. I feel they will be largely ineffective, and that they will have serious negative material and legal effects on our investigations. I also am extremely concerned that the use of many of these techniques will open any military members up for potential criminal charges, and that my agents, as well as other [military personnel] will face both legal and ethical problems if they become aware of their use. [576]


(U) COL Mallow told the Committee that in addition to his email, he raised concerns about the Khatani interrogation in conversations with MG Miller and in "several meetings with the DoD [General Counsel]." [577] COL Mallow said that MG Miller told him in a meeting that "if [CITF] did not want to participate in interrogations with the intelligence community because of our objections to methods, that [CITF] would not have the benefit of information resulting from any of those interrogations." [578]

(U) MG Miller told the Committee that, while he did not recall the CITF Commander's November 14, 2002 email specifically, he did recall communications from COL Mallow to that effect. [579] DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes stated that he did not recall seeing a copy of the Khatani interrogation plan at that time and did not "specifically" recall his staff advising him that CITF and FBI had concerns with interrogation techniques in the Khatani interrogation plan. [580]

[Delete] A CITF Legal Advisor, [delete], also raised objections to JTF-GTMO's interrogation plan for Khatani. In a November 15, 2002 memo for MG Miller, [delete] [delete] said that "the reliability of any information gained from aggressive techniques will be highly questionable" and objected to all "physical stresses intended for use" in Phase III of the interrogation plan. [581] [Delete] also objected to Phase IV of the plan, stating that it implied "that third country nationals with harsher interrogation standards could be used to convey threats to persons of family or inflict harm contrary to the Convention Against Torture." [582]

[Delete] [delete] The Khatani interrogation did not proceed on November 15, 2002 as planned. A November 15, 2002 staff memo to the Joint Staff J-2 indicated that the interrogation was delayed while MG Miller "consider[ed] COL Mallow's objections." [583] MG Miller denied that the Khatani interrogation was delayed because of COL Mallow's concerns, instead telling the Committee that the interrogation was delayed because he had not received SOUTHCOM's approval. [584] However, as noted above, GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver indicated in a November 14, 2002 email that JTF-GTMO planned to move forward "with support of SOUTHCOM." [585]

(U) In his November 14, 2002 email to MG Miller, COL Mallow proposed that JTF-GTMO and CITF develop a mutually acceptable interrogation plan for Khatani. [586] On November 20, 2002, FBI personnel, who were working closely with CITF, met with JTF-GTMO staff to discuss developing such a plan. [587]

[Big delete]

3. JTF-GTMO Briefs DoD General Counsel's Office on Interrogation Plan (U)

[Delete] On November 21, 2002, MG Miller, LTC Phifer, and representatives from the FBI, CITF, SOUTHCOM, and the DoD General Counsel's office all participated in a video teleconference (VTC) to discuss the Khatani interrogation. [591]

[Delete] LTC Phifer told the Committee that he and MG Miller briefed the group on the Khatani plan and that during the VTC, DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson stated that the Department was comfortable with what JTF-GTMO had planned. [592] MG Miller told the Committee that he did not recall the VTC. [593] Ms. Davidson said that she recalled participating in VTCs where the Khatani interrogation was discussed, but she did not recall if she had a copy of the interrogation plan itself and did not recall saying that the Department of Defense was comfortable with what JTF-GTMO proposed for the interrogation. [594] [Delete], the psychiatrist with the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team, said that in the context of the Khatani interrogation, ''we were routinely told that the interrogation strategy was approved up to [the Secretary of Defense] level." [595]

(U) Subsequent to the VTC, the FBI sent a memo to MG Miller alerting him to FBI "misgivings about the overall coercive nature and possible illegality" of the Khatani interrogation plan and informing him that the FBI had presented JTF-GTMO staff with "an alternative interrogation approach based on long-term rapport building." [596] A draft of that alternative approach, which was the product of both the FBI and CITF, stated that Khatani's negative interactions with interrogators "only reinforces Al-Qaeda stereotypes about evil Americans and validates their expectation of harsh treatment and potential torture." [597]

(U) On November 22, 2002, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Chief Psychologist Michael Gelles drafted a formal review of a JTF-GTMO draft plan. [598] Dr. Gelles concluded that the interrogation plan "lack[ed] substantive and thoughtful consideration." [599] Among other concerns, Dr. Gelles stated:

Strategies articulated in the later phases reflect techniques used to train US forces in resisting interrogation by foreign enemies... [These techniques] would prove not only to be ineffective but also border on techniques and strategies deemed unacceptable by law enforcement professionals... [600]


(U) Dr. Gelles noted that '"the choice to use force with this adversary in an interrogation may only reinforce his resistance" and stated that if the plan were implemented he would "have trouble not finding myself from a professional perspective, being forced into an adversary position through cross examination in a military tribunal as an expert in interrogation." [601]

(U) Notwithstanding the CITF and FBI concerns, MG Miller authorized interrogators to proceed with the Khatani interrogation beginning November 23, 2002.

4. "Final" Khatani Interrogation Plan (U)

[Delete] [delete] MG Miller identified a version of the Khatani plan that had been written on November 22, 2002 as the "final" plan that he authorized to be implemented on November 23, 2002. [602] While similar to the plan circulated on November 12, 2002, the November 22, 2002 plan contained notable differences from the earlier version that contemporaneous documents indicated had also been approved.

[Delete] [delete] Although there is evidence that both stress positions and dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation, the November 22, 2002 plan does not mention either of these two techniques. [603] MG Miller said the stress positions and use of dogs were removed from the plan at his direction. [604]

[Delete] [delete] With respect to dogs, MG Miller said that neither LTC Phifer, nor LTC Beaver objected to the use of dogs and that his ICE Chief, Mr. Becker, actually favored the use of dogs in interrogations. [605] MG Miller said, however, that he only approved the use of dogs for security around the perimeter of Camp X-Ray, where the interrogation was to take place, and that he made that view absolutely clear to Mr. Becker. CAPT Jane Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, however, that she met with MG Miller in early November and discussed the use of dogs for interrogation purposes. [606] She said that the "theory was that certain individuals are afraid of dogs" and that, while MG Miller talked about dogs being outside the interrogation room, they discussed the purpose of the dogs' presence during interrogations was that it "exploits [the detainee's] fear." [607]

[Delete] [delete] Mr. Becker told the Committee that MG Miller told him to remove dogs from the plan. [608] Nevertheless, a document describing interrogation techniques used in the Khatani interrogation and a witness account (both discussed below) suggest that dogs were used during the interrogation to shock and agitate Khatani. [609]

[Delete] [delete] With respect to stress positions, Mr. Becker told the Committee that, notwithstanding the fact that they were included in the earlier plan, there was never an intent to use stress positions with Khatani. [610] A document that appears to have been produced during the Khatani interrogation, however, stated that stress positions would "be employed." [611] In addition, a 2005 memo from the JTF-GTMO Chief of Staff referencing the 2002 interrogation stated that Khatani had "slight abrasions caused by stress positions and shackle restraints." [612]

[Delete] [delete] The November 22, 2002 plan identified by MG Miller as the final plan described five phases to the interrogation. [613] Phase I, which was added after November 12, called for the interrogators to "Induce and exploit Stockholm Syndrome" by establishing "an isolated, austere environment where the detainee becomes completely dependent on the interrogators and the interrogator presents himself as a 'caretaker' of the detainee." [614] Dr. Gelles said that the idea of inducing the Stockholm syndrome implied that "the subject feels that he is to be killed and the information provided may in fact be distorted." [615]

[Delete] [delete] Phase II of the November 22, 2002 plan (which is largely the same as Phase I of the earlier plan) stated that prior to the start of the first Phase II interrogation session, Khatani's head and beard would be shaved for "safety, hygiene and psychological purposes." [616] In addition, the plan stated that MG Miller had approved the use of hospital gauze to restrain the detainee's mouth to prevent him from becoming argumentative and verbally abusive.

[Delete] Phase III of the November 22, 2002 plan was largely the same as Phase II of the earlier plan and proposed having a native linguist translator play the role of a detainee to elicit information from Khatani. [617]

[Delete] Phase IV of the November 22, 2002 plan - which described the use of interrogation techniques based on those used in SERE school to increase U.S. personnel's resistance to illegal enemy interrogations - was virtually identical to the earlier plan and stated:

The fourth phase of the plan to exploit 063 [Khatani] requires [Office of the Secretary of Defense] approval for the SERE interrogation technique training and approval of the level three counter interrogation resistance training submitted by JTF-GTMO. Once the approvals are in place, those interrogation techniques will be implemented to encourage 063 to cooperate. The intent of raising the stakes to this level is to convince 063 that it is futile to resist. Success of Phase III is when his sense of futility is raised to a high enough level that source gives in and provides the necessary information. Phase III ends with success or a standstill, after the exhaustion of all tools JTF GTMO has to offer. [618]


[Delete] Despite having approved the plan, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that he knew "little about SERE" and "wasn't comfortable" with SERE techniques. [619] However, MG Miller acknowledged to the Committee that these techniques were included in the approved plan and that, if the first three phases of the Khatani plan were unsuccessful, that he was willing to consider the use of SERE techniques. [620]

[Delete] The plan's final phase, Phase V, maintained the same title "Coalition Exploitation" as Phase IV of the earlier plan but did not explicitly state an intention to render Khatani to a third country, as did the earlier plan. [621] Instead, under "Coalition Exploitation" the November 22, 2002 plan stated that:

The fifth phase of the plan to exploit 063 will be determined at the national, interagency level where the future disposition of 063 will be determined.[622]


[Big delete]

[Big delete] [624] Nevertheless, the idea of transferring Khatani to a third country was discussed. [625]

[Big delete]

5. FBI and CITF Continue to Object to Khatani Interrogation Plan (U)

(U) On November 22, 2002 the FBI sent MG Miller a memo that outlined FBI's continuing concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques. The FBI also requested a meeting with the Commander. [628] The memo stated:

Many of [JTF-GTMO's] methods are considered coercive by Federal Law Enforcement and UCMJ standards. Not only this, but reports from those knowledgeable about the use of these coercive techniques are highly skeptical as to their effectiveness and reliability. [629]


(U) The memo stated further that the "FBI/CITF strongly believes that the continued use of diametrically opposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will only weaken our efforts to obtain valuable information." [630]

(U) In late November, FBI agents at GTMO asked that their concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques be relayed to Marion "Spike" Bowman, a senior attorney in the FBI's Office of General Counsel. [631] Mr. Bowman said that "[a]s soon as I heard from the [the FBI agents] I talked with (now retired) Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro who immediately said we (the FBI) would not be a party to actions of any kind that were contrary to FBI policy and that individuals should distance themselves from any such actions." [632] Mr. Bowman also recommended to FBI General Counsel Kenneth Wainstein that FBI relay the concerns to the DoD General Counsel's office. Mr. Bowman subsequently called the acting DoD Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence and believes he also spoke with the DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel. DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes said that he did not recall being aware that the FBI had contacted his office with concerns. [633]

(U) On December 2, 2002, an FBI Special Agent, who was also an attorney, sent his own legal analysis of the October 11, 2002 GTMO request to another Special Agent for forwarding to Mr. Bowman. [634] The FBI Special Agent referred to several techniques - such as all the Category III techniques and several Category II techniques, including stress positions, hooding, removal of clothing, 20 hour interrogations, and use of individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress - as "coercive interrogation techniques which are not permitted by the U.S. Constitution." [635] The Special Agent's analysis also identified several techniques - including all Category III techniques and two Category II techniques, i.e. hooding and use of phobias - as "examples of coercive interrogation techniques which may violate 18 U.S.C. § 2340, (Torture Statute)" and warned that "it is possible that those who employ these techniques may be indicted, prosecuted, and possibly convicted if the trier of fact determines that the user had the requisite intent." [636]

(U) The following day, Mr. Bowman sent an email to another FBI Special Agent, stating "[i]t is irrelevant whether these detainees are considered prisoners of war, they are still entitled to minimal conditions of treatment - many of the techniques addressed appear to move well beyond the minimal requirements ... I concur that we can't control what the military is doing, but we need to stand well clear of it and get as much information as possible to D'Amuro, Gebhart, and Mueller as soon as possible." [637] Director Mueller said that he was not aware of the FBI's concerns with DoD interrogation techniques at GTMO until May 2004. [638]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]. [641] The DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, Eliana Davidson, said that the FBI's Unit Chief believed that efforts at GTMO were not being productive and that he advocated for Khatani's transfer during the VTC. [642] [Big delete]. [643]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete] DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes said he did not remember discussing the possible rendition of Khatani, but that "it may have been considered." [648]

(U) CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon said that FBI proposed to CITF the idea of rendering Khatani to a third country but that CITF "considered it possibly unlawful" and opposed the proposal. [649] He said CITF staff made Mr. Cobb aware of their concerns and that Mr. Cobb supported the CITF position.

(U) The same day the VTC took place, FBI's on-site supervisor and two Special Agents met with MG Miller where they again raised their concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques. [650] One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that MG Miller thanked the FBI personnel for their views, but told them that JTF-GTMO staff knew what they were doing. [651]

(U) On December 9, 2002, another FBI Special Agent who attended the meeting sent an email stating, "when I return to D.C., I will bring a copy of the military's interview plan [for Khatani] ... You won't believe it!" [652] Several months later he characterized the December 5, 2002 meeting with MG Miller:

Although [MG] Miller acknowledged positive aspects of [the FBI's approach to interrogations] it was apparent that he favored [JTF-GTMO's] interrogation methods, despite FBI assertions that such methods could easily result in the elicitation of unreliable and legally inadmissible information. [653]


[Delete] JTF-GTMO ICE Chief David Becker told the Committee that MG Miller asked him at one point why the JTF was not using the FBI's approach, to which Mr. Becker replied that the JTF had already tried the FBI approach, that it did not work, and that he wanted to be more aggressive. [654]

6. Khatani Interrogation Begins, CITF Directed To "Stand Clear" (U)

(U) On November 23, 2002, JTF-GTMO personnel took Khatani to Camp X-Ray to begin Phase I of the interrogation. [655] Two days later, CITF attorney [delete] sent the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate, LTC Diane Beaver, an email indicating that "CITF is not on board with aggressive techniques including 20 hour [plus] interrogations. Therefore, according to our policy, we will 'stand clear' and not offer participation, advisements, support or recommendations as to its implementation." [656] CITF later drafted formal guidance for its agents stating that "Detainees will be treated humanely. Physical torture, corporal punishment and mental torture are not acceptable interrogation tactics and are not allowed under any circumstances... CITF personnel will not participate in any interrogation that employs tactics inconsistent with or in direct violation of this policy." [657]

7. Techniques Used During Khatani Interrogation (U)

(U) According to [delete] the GTMO BSCT psychiatrist who participated in the interrogation, just before the Khatani interrogation began, Khatani was "made [to] believe he was sent to a hostile country which advocated torture." [658] [Delete] stated that Khatani was also "led to believe he himself might be killed if he did not cooperate with questioning." [659] The actual interrogation took place at GTMO's Camp X-Ray. LTC Phifer told the Committee that Khatani was taken to X-Ray [Big delete]. [660]

[Delete] However, an interrogator who participated in the interrogation told the Committee that part of the reason Khatani was taken to X-Ray was to scare him. [661]

(U) Khatani was interrogated from November 23, 2002 through January 16, 2003. [662] In June 2004, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill, described the origin of some of the interrogation techniques used in the interrogation:

The staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to our SERE school and developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided and looked at, said were OK. I sent that list of techniques up to the Secretary and said, in order for us to get at some of these very high-profile, high- value targets who are resistant to techniques, I may need greater flexibility. But I want a legal review of it and you to tell me that, policywise, it's the right way to do business. He did that. And he approved additional techniques, which I would not describe as harsh, but additional techniques and gave them to me the first part of December. And we began to use a few of those techniques, a few of those techniques on this individual... [663]


[Delete] [delete] A memo dated January 17, 2003 also described techniques '"used" against Khatani between November 23, 2002 and January 16, 2003, including stripping, forced grooming, invasion of space by a female interrogator, treating Khatani like an animal, using a military working dog, and forcing him to pray to an idol shrine. [664]

[Delete] [delete] These techniques are similar to techniques used in SERE school. In fact, JPRA training slides, identified by a JPRA instructor as those presented to interrogation personnel deploying for GTMO, identified "religious disgrace" and "invasion of personal space by a female" as methods to defeat resistance. [665] Likewise, JPRA materials identified "degradation" as a method to defeat resistance, which was understood to include such methods as stripping the individual, having the guards address the individual as if that person were an "animal" or of "very low status," and controlling use of the latrine. [666]

[Delete] [delete] The January 17, 2003 memo stated that "[s]earch/strip search" was used on Khatani "for security and to assert control." [667] A second document that appears to have been produced while the Khatani interrogation was ongoing stated that "removal of clothing" would "be employed" as part of Khatani's interrogation. [668] Despite the contemporaneous documents suggesting that removal of clothing was used during the interrogation, several senior JTF- JTMO personnel have said they were unaware of its use as an interrogation technique.

• [Delete] [delete] MG Miller told the Committee that he informed his Director for Intelligence, LTC Phifer, that he opposed the forced removal of clothing as an interrogation technique and in a 2004 sworn statement stated that "to the best of my knowledge JTF-GTMO never used [removal of clothing]" during the six week period in late 2002 early 2003 when it was authorized. [669]
• LTC Phifer and his replacement, COL Richard Sanders (who was given the title of Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) Commander) told the Committee that they were not aware that Khatani was strip searched. [670]
• Both Mr. Becker, the ICE Chief present for the development of the Khatani plan, and his successor Lt Col Ted Moss, who assumed the position when the interrogation was already underway, told the Committee that they were unaware of Khatani being stripped at the direction or suggestion of interrogation personnel. [671]

[Delete] [delete] The January 17, 2003 memo stated that Khatani's head and beard were shaved "for hygienic purposes and to assert control over the detainee," that Khatani's hands were shackled to a chair to prevent him from praying, and that prayer was denied in circumstances where prayer was ''used as a resistance technique." [672] The memo stated that up to eight ounces of water was poured over Khatani's head as a "method of asserting control" when Khatani exhibited ''undesired behavior." [673] And it said Khatani was forced to "sit, stand, lay down, walk or other non-stress position activities by guards to enforce the control of the interrogator." [674] MAJ Burney said that Khatani was "made to stand for several hours at a time or sit on a hard chair for several hours at a time. [675] The January 17, 2003 memo also stated that Khatani was ridiculed and berated ''to elicit an adversarial response." [676]

[Delete] The memorandum listed several techniques used to increase Khatani's stress level including using of a female interrogator who "touch[ed] [Khatani] in close proximity," instructing Khatani ''to pray to idol shrine to test religious temperance and incur," [Big delete]. [677]

[Delete] The memo stated that "K-9 units [were] present during interrogation but outside of booth to provide barking in order to agitate the detainee and provide shock value." [678]

[Delete] One interrogator who participated in the Khatani interrogation told the Committee that he understood that dogs could be used in a manner consistent with the description in the January 17, 2003 memo, i.e. they could be present during interrogation but outside the booth in order to agitate Khatani and provide shock value. [679] The interrogator told the Committee that during one of his shifts interrogating Khatani, an MP brought a dog to the outside of the room in which the interrogation was taking place and that the MP got the dog to bark. [680] The interrogator said that he did not ask the MP to do so and told the MP not to do it again.

(U) MAJ Burney, who was present for portions of the interrogation, testified to the Army IG that a dog was brought into the Khatani interrogation during late November or early December an estimated "half dozen times." [681] MAJ Burney testified:

[The] dog was never allowed to bite the detainee but would be ordered to bark loudly close to the detainee, to sort of sniff or muzzle the detainee, to put paws up on the detainee. [682]


(U) MAJ Burney said that interrogators stopped using the dog "not because anybody had necessarily objected to [the use of the dog]," but because ''the initial shock value had worn off" and "it just wasn't felt to be effective anymore." [683] None of the other witnesses interviewed by the Committee stated that they were aware of a dog being brought into the interrogation booth.

[Delete], who was present for portions of the interrogation, stated that at one point during an interrogation, either a guard or an interrogator suggested that a dog be used to scare Khatani. [684] [delete] said that he informed Mr. Becker, who intervened before the dogs were used. [685]

(U) As discussed above, MG Miller told the Committee that dogs were present at Camp X-Ray solely for securing the perimeter and that he was absolutely clear with ICE Chief David Becker that dogs were not to be used in interrogations. [686] He testified to the Army IG that he "rejected [using dogs in interrogations] as an acceptable technique" and that dogs "were not to be used during active interrogation." [687] In written answers to questions posed by Vice Admiral Church, however, the Director for Intelligence, LTC Phifer stated that dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation and that "We would bring the dog around to within 10 feet [of Khatani] and he would be somewhat unnerved by it. We did it to keep him off balance as well as to enhance security." [688] Despite the testimony of the BSCT psychiatrist and LTC Phifer, Mr. Becker stated that the Commander "refused to allow dogs" in interrogations while he was in command of JTF-GTMO and told the Committee that dogs were not at the Khatani interrogation. [689]

_______________

Notes:

540. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 5.

541. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

542. Ibid.

543. Ibid.

544. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 28, 2005).

545. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).

546. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

547. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 11.

548. Ibid.

549. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

550. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 7.

551. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

552. Church Report at 115.

553 General James Hill answers to July 28, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (August 20, 2008).

554. Email from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 12, 2002).

555. Email from David Becker to [Interrogation Control Element Staff Sergeant] (November 13, 2002). Both the plan attached to those emails and the subsequent plan identified by the JTF-GTMO Commander as the "final" plan contained the JTF-GTMO Commander's [Miller] signature block. However, the Committee has not seen any version of the plan that contained the JTF-GTMO Commander's signature.

556. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [Delete] [Khatani] (November 12, 2002).

557. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). One FBI agent who was a member of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit told the Committee that multiple versions of the plan were actually circulated at GTMO during this period. Committee Staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

558. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20,2005) at 7.

559. Inge Report.

560. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

561. Email from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 12, 2002) (emphasis added), attached as exhibit 7 to the Inge Report.

562. Email from David Becker to [Interrogation Control Element Staff Sergeant] (November 13, 2002).

563. Notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans/or Detainee #063, entry at "1111212002" (emphasis added).

564. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to [delete] (November 14, 2002) (emphasis added). Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she was neither briefed on, nor did she review, the Khatani interrogation plan. Similarly, then-NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that, to the best of his recollection, he too was neither briefed on, nor did he review the plan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

565. Memo from [delete] [delete] to [Joint Staff], GTMO Detainee [delete] (November 15, 2002) (emphasis added).

566. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 12, 2002).

567. Ibid.

568. Ibid.

569. Ibid. A third draft of the plan which appears to have been produced after November 12 stated that "written approval for use of gauze and for the presence of dogs have been approved by [MG Miller]" and was sent from an attorney in the DoD General Counsel's office to an attorney at the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in May 2003. January 31, 2008 SASC staff notes on Vaughn declaration documents.

570. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 12, 2002).

571. Ibid.

572. Ibid.

573. Ibid.

574. Ibid.

575. Email from COL Britt Mallow to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 14, 2002).

576. Ibid.

577. Responses of COL (Ret.) Britt Mallow to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006).

578. Ibid.

579. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

580. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 221, 228.

581. Memo from [delete] for Major General Geoffrey Miller, Objection to Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (November 15, 2002).

582. Ibid.

583. Memo from [delete] to J-2, Joint Staff, GTMO Detainee [delete] 063 [delete] (November 15, 2002).

584. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

585. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to [delete] (November 14, 2002) (emphasis added).

586. Email from COL Britt Mallow to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 14, 2002).

587. FBI memo to Major General Miller, VTC 21 November 2002 (undated).

588. Committee staff interview of FBI Special agent (November 8, 2007).

589. Internal FBI Email, Interview Plans (November 21, 2002).

590. Ibid.

591. Notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans for Detainee #063, entry at "11/21/2002."

592. [Delete] Committee staff interview of LTC Jerry Phifer (June 27, 2007). Notes taken by an FBI Special Agent who participated in the VIC indicate that, in briefing the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) plan, LTC Phifer "portray [ed] the DHS Interrogation Plan to SOUTHCOM and the General Counsel at the Pentagon as a unified FBI/DHS Interrogation Plan." The FBI Special Agent's notes state that the LTC Phifer characterization was "in direct contradiction" to what the Special Agent had told Phifer the previous day. See notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans for Detainee #063, entry at "11/21/2002."

593. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

594. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (February 21, 2008).

595. Written statement of [delete] (August 21, 2007) at 8.

596. FBI memo to Major General Miller, VTC 21 November 2002 (undated).

597. FBI and CITF Draft Interrogation Plan (November 22, 2002).

598. Memo from Michael G. Gelles, Psy.D. to Marie Fallon, Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063, (November 22, 2002) (hereinafter "Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002)").

599. Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002).

600. Ibid.

601. Ibid.

601. Inge Report at 9.

603. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 22, 2002) (hereinafter "Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).").

604. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

605. Ibid.

606. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 84.

607. Ibid.

608. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17,2007).

609. [Delete] Memorandum, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63(S) (January 17, 2003). Army IG, Interview of [delete] (April 28, 2006).

610. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

611. Memo, 063 Plan of Attack: Phase I Bravo (undated).

612. Memo from COL John A. Hadjis to Chief of Staff, USSOUTHCOM, Executive Summary on Information Concerning Detainee ISN: [delete] (U) (March 14, 2005).

613. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).

614. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002). The Stockholm Syndrome refers to a psychological event where hostages begin to identify with and grow sympathetic to their captors. The syndrome draws its name from a bank robbery and hostage situation in Stockholm, Sweden in 1973.

615 Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002).

616. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).

617. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 15, 2002) (hereinafter "Khatani interrogation plan (November 15, 2002)"); Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).

618. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).

619. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (March 26, 2006).

620. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

621. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).

622, Ibid.

623. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

624. Ibid.

625. See Section VB 5, infra.

626. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22,2002).

627. Ibid.; Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

628 FBI Memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Geoffrey Miller (November 22, 2002). Despite the heading on the memorandum, JTF-GTMO had replaced JTF-170 by the time this memo was written.

629. Ibid.

630. Ibid.

631. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

632. Responses of Marion Bowman to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (August 7, 2006).

633. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 236.

634. Email from FBI Special Agent (December 2, 2002).

635. FBI Memo, Legal Issues Re Interrogation Techniques, attached to Email from FBI Special Agent (December 2, 2002).

636. Ibid.

637. Email from Marion Bowman (December 3, 2002).

638. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (February 16, 2005).

639. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

640 Email from FBI Special Agent (May 10, 2004).

641. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

642. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (May 23, 2008).

643. Committee staff interview of FBI Unit Chief (May 17, 2008).

644. Ibid.

645. Ibid.

646. Ibid.

647. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

648. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 232.

649. Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006).

650. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agents (November 8,2007).

651. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

652. Email from FBI Special Agent (December 9,2002).

653. Electronic Communication from FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) (May 30, 2003).

654. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

655. Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation Into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse At Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility, prepared by Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt and Brig. Gen. John Furlow (hereinafter "Schmidt- Furlow Report'').

656. Email from to LTC Diane Beaver (November 25, 2002).

657. DoD CITF Memo for All Personnel Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigation Task Force, ALCITF Memorandum 004-02, Interrogation Procedures (December 16, 2002).

658 Written statement of [delete] August 21, 2007).

659. Ibid.

660. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).

661. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008).

662. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 17.

663. Transcript of Media Availability with Commander U.S. Southern Command General James Hill (June 3, 2004) (emphasis added). Despite General Hill's acknowledgement in 2004, in comments submitted to the DoD IG's August 25, 2006 report, the DoD General Counsel's office stated that "there is no evidence that SERE techniques were ever adopted at Guantanamo or anywhere else." See DoD Office of General Counsel, Legal Review of DRAFT SECRET/NOFORN DoD IG Report, "Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse (Project No. D2004- DINTOI-0174) (U)" (June 8, 2006) at 8.

664. Memo, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 063 (January 17, 2003). The author of the memo is unknown but a copy of the memo was sent by the JTF-GTMO BSCT psychiatrist, [delete] to LTC Morgan Banks, the Chief of the Psychological Applications Directorate (PAD) at the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC).

665 See Section I D, supra.

666. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 22; Level C Peacetime Governmental Detention Survival JPRA Instructor Guide, Exploitation: Threats and Pressures, Module 6.0, Lesson 6.1, para 5.3.3 (Version GO1.1).

667. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).

668. Memo, 063 Plan of Attack: Phase I Bravo (undated).

669. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007); Sworn Statement of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 19, 2004).

670. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of COL Richard Sanders (August 10, 2007).

671. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007); Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

672. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).

673. Ibid.

674. Ibid.

675. Written statement from MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

676. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).

677. Ibid.

678. Ibid.

679. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008); Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).

680. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008).

681. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006).

682. Ibid.

683. Ibid.

684. Committee staff interview of [delete] (August 13, 2007).

685. Ibid.

686. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

687. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (May 2, 2006).

688. LTC Jerry Phifer written answers to Church Report Questionnaire (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those written answers whether the Director for Intelligence [Phifer] was referring to the use of dogs in the interrogation of Khatani that began in November or the interrogation that took place in October 2003. See section B supra. 689 Army IG, Interview of David Becker (September 20, 2005) at 31.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:26 am

PART 12 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

VI. JPRA's Assistance to Another Government Agency (U)

[Delete] As the disagreement continued at GTMO about interrogation techniques being used by military interrogators in the Khatani interrogation, JPRA was developing another training session on the use of physical pressures and other interrogation techniques for [delete] interrogators. [690]

[Big delete]

[Delete] [delete] A Joint Staff Action Processing Form shows that [delete] request was endorsed by JPRA, JFCOM, Joint Staff, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy's office and approved on November 12, 2002. [693] The Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office (OSO) Christopher Wirts "received the approved requirement [for training] from JFCOM DSSO [Defense Sensitive Support Office] and [Joint Staff] DSSO" and subsequently informed three JPRA personnel that the requirement for training included a lesson in "physical pressures, techniques used in DoD [SERE] training" and "practical exercise[s] in interrogation and physical pressures." [694]

[Delete] The training took place at the [delete] facility in mid-to-late November 2002. [695] Three JPRA personnel conducted the multi-day training session and Mr. Wirts attended part of a one day session. [696] According to Joseph Witsch, the JPRA instructor who led the training, the instructors followed the JFCOM and Joint Staff-approved requirement and instructed [delete] interrogators on physical pressures used on students at SERE school. [697]

[Delete] The training session also included a demonstration of physical pressures. [698] This was in accordance with the requirement, approved by JFCOM and Joint Staff, for "practical exercise[s] in interrogation and physical pressures." [699] Mr. Witsch recalled that he "participated in a couple of those demonstrations," which included role play sessions, where JPRA personnel demonstrated the SERE physical pressures in "mock interrogation[s]." [700] Another JPRA instructor, Terrence Russell, recalled that [delete], rather than JPRA, led the demonstration of physical pressures. [701]

[Delete] According to Mr. Russell, in the demonstration of one of those physical pressures, a [delete] suggested that to "enhance ... the pain threshold" of a detainee being placed in a [big delete]" [702] According to Mr. Russell: "I thought that would be improper" because "[i]t would cause physical damage, permanent physical damage to an individual. And I think that that would be totally inappropriate to do to anybody, whether it's an American or a foreign detainee. We would not do something that would cause permanent physical damage." [703] The JPRA training team said they raised that concern with their superiors when they returned from the trip. [704] The senior SERE psychologist, Dr. Gary Percival, who also participated in the training session later described it as a "fiasco" and said that the [delete] [delete] and interrogators did not understand the concepts being taught. [705]

[Delete] JPRA personnel also instructed [delete] interrogators on how to perform waterboarding. [706] In his testimony to the Committee, Mr. Witsch said that the JPRA instructors "mentioned [waterboarding to [delete] and how it's done, [and described] basic steps in order to do it." [707]

[Delete] None of the JPRA personnel at [delete] training had performed waterboarding or were qualified to teach others how to perform the technique. [708] In fact, Mr. Witsch, who described the technique to [delete] at the training, testified that he did not recall all of the safety limitations associated with waterboarding. [709] For example, he testified that he was not aware that students at the U.S. Navy's SERE school could not be subjected to waterboarding for more than twenty seconds, if a cloth is placed over the student's face. [710] The twenty second time limit was emphasized in bold and in all capital letters in the Navy SERE school's instruction manual. [711]

[Delete] [delete] After Mr. Witsch described how to waterboard, [delete] interrogators proceeded to perform the technique on each other. [712] Another JPRA trainer, Terrence Russell, said that it was a requirement that [delete] interrogators experience the sensation of waterboarding and that [delete] staff ran "everybody through a small experience with the waterboard, in that they were [Big delete] " [713] According to Mr. Russell, nobody endured the waterboard for "very long." [714] The experience was "purely voluntary," and [delete] interrogators "stayed there five seconds, ten seconds, thirty seconds," but not longer than that. [715] Mr. Russell said that if the interrogators ''wanted to get off, they hopped off. But they had to experience the sensation. That was [delete] requirement." [716]

_______________

Notes:

690. Email from Christopher Wirts to Joe Witsch, Gary Percival, and Terry Russell (November 12, 2002).

691. [Big delete]

692. Ibid.

693. Joint Staff Action Processing Form (November 12, 2002).

694. Email from Christopher Wirts to Joe Witsch, Gary Percival, and Terry Russell (November 12, 2002).

695. Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008).

696. Ibid.

697. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 37.

698. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 85.

699. Ibid.

700. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 38.

701. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 85.

702. Ibid. at 128, 86.

703. Ibid. at 129.

704. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2007) at 41.

705. Committee staff interview of Dr. Gary Percival (July 25, 2001).

706. Testimony of Joseph Witseh (September 6, 2001) at 107.

707. Ibid. at 109.

708. Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008); Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6, 2001) at 113-14

709. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4,2001) at 112-113.

710. [Delete] FASO Detachment Brunswick Instruction 3305.C, p. E-5 (January 1, 1998) (emphasis in original) ("Water Board ***** The student is subjected to interrogation while strapped to a specially rigged, flat, wooded surface about four by seven feet with quick release bindings which will neither chafe nor cut when the student is strapped to the board. Two canteen cups (one pint each) of water may be slowly poured directly onto the student's face from a height of about twelve inches throughout the interrogation. No attempt will be made to direct the stream of water into the student's nostrils or mouth. NO CHEST OR STOMACH pressure may be used to compel the student to breath in any water. If a cloth is placed over the student's face, it will remain in place for a maximum time of TWENTY seconds, with a hospital corpsman instructor holding the face cloth in place. The cloth may be applied only twice in this manner to any given student. A student may be threatened at a later time with the water board and may even be strapped to the board again but under no circumstances may water actually be applied. The Watch Officer and a designated 9505 hospital corpsman shall be present whenever the water board is being used. The water board demonstrates omnipotence of the captor. Once the tactic is used on a student, it may be used as a credible threat.")
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:27 am

PART 13 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

VII. Secretary Rumsfeld Approves Interrogation Authorities, GTMO Plans to Implement SERE Techniques (U)

A. Secretary of Defense Authorizes Aggressive Techniques for use at GTMO


(U) On November 27, 2002, Mr. Haynes sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recommending that the Secretary authorize the Commander of SOUTHCOM to employ, at his discretion, all Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique (''use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing") in the JTF-GTMO October 11, 2002 request. [717]

(U) Mr. Haynes's memo stated that he had discussed the issue with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Richard Myers and that they concurred with his recommendation. [718] According to Mr. Haynes, his recommendation came after the Secretary of Defense expressed "some exasperation that he didn't have a recommendation" on the October 11, 2002 GTMO request and told his senior advisors "I need a recommendation." [719]

(U) Mr. Haynes's memo concluded that while "all Category III techniques may be legally available, we believe that a blanket approval of Category III techniques is not warranted at this time." [720] While the CJCS, General Myers, said that he "did not recall seeing the November 27, 2002 memo before it was presented to the Secretary," his Legal Counsel, CAPT Dalton, said that she and the Chairman were "satisfied with" the techniques that were recommended to the Secretary for approval. [721] CAPT Dalton also said, however, that she did not think the statement in the DoD General Counsel's memo that "all Category III techniques may be legally available" ''was an appropriate legal analysis." [722] She did not raise that concern with the Chairman. [723]

(U) Mr. Haynes stated that he "probably" read LTC Beaver's legal analysis of the request prior to making his recommendation but that he could not recall his opinion of it. [724] He could not recall whether he asked anyone on his staff to review or comment on the analysis or whether his office conducted its own legal review. [725]

(U) As discussed above, General Hill, the SOUTHCOM Commander, had requested in his October 25, 2002 memorandum that Department of Justice and Department of Defense lawyers review Category III techniques included in the October 11, 2002 GTMO request. [726] While the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had issued an opinion on August 1, 2002 evaluating standards of conduct for interrogations required under the anti-torture statute, Mr. Haynes testified in July 2006 that he "did not have a copy" of that opinion and that the OLC "had not expressed a view [to him] at that time. [727] In April 2008, however, Mr. Haynes stated that it was "very, very likely" that he had read the OLC opinion prior to making his recommendation to the Secretary and recalled it being "very permissive." [728] Two months later, in June 2008, Mr. Haynes testified that he did not "remember when he first read" the OLC memo. [729] The General Counsel said that he did not know whether anyone in his office consulted the Department of Justice about the October 11, 2002 GTMO request and he did not believe DOJ reviewed the techniques "in the context of [the GTMO] request." [730]

(U) Other than his November 27, 2002 memo to Secretary Rumsfeld recommending that the techniques be approved, Mr. Haynes said that he "did not write anything down" to support his legal analysis. [731] GTMO Staff Judge Advocate Diane Beaver stated that she "fully expected" that her legal review would be "carefully reviewed by legal and policy experts at the highest levels before a decision was reached" and was "shocked" that her opinion became the opinion upon which the Department of Defense relied. [732] LTC Beaver stated that she did not expect that her opinion "would become the final word on interrogation policies and practices within the Department of Defense" and that for her "such a result was simply not foreseeable." [733] She stated that she "did not expect to be the only lawyer issuing a written opinion on this monumentally important issue" and that in hindsight, could not "help but conclude that others chose not to write on this issue to avoid being linked to it." [734]

(U) Despite the fact that his memo recommended the Secretary of Defense authorize the use of aggressive interrogation techniques including stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, removal of clothing, the use of dogs to induce stress, and pushing and poking detainees, Mr. Haynes stated that he was not recommending blanket approval of other aggressive techniques in the GTMO request (like the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning) because "Our Armed Forces are trained to a standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint." [735]

(U) While several techniques included in the request were similar to techniques used in SERE training and provided by JPRA to the General Counsel's office in the July 26, 2002 memo, Mr. Haynes said that he did not "specifically recall" making a connection between the request and SERE. [736] In comments submitted to the DoD IG's August 25, 2006 report, the DoD General Counsel's office even stated that "There is no evidence that SERE techniques were ever adopted at Guantanamo or anywhere else." [737] Those comments were submitted two years after the SOUTHCOM Commander, General Hill, had said that ''the staff at Guantanamo" had traveled to "SERE school," where they "developed a list of techniques ..." and despite the fact that some of the techniques in the October 11, 2002 GTMO request were specifically identified as ''those used in U.S. military interrogation resistance training." [738]

(U) Mr. Haynes said that he raised legal concerns about the October 11, 2002 GTMO request with the Secretary prior to making his recommendation. [739] On December 2, 2002, however, Secretary Rumsfeld approved Mr. Haynes's recommendation that SOUTHCOM be given authority to use all Categories I and II techniques and one Category III technique in interrogations at GTMO. [740] In approving the techniques, the Secretary added a handwritten note at the bottom of the memo that questioned one of the limitations in the JTF-GTMO request, [741] In reference to ''the use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours," the Secretary wrote: "However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" [742]

[Delete] Despite having previously approved the Khatani plan, which included a phase to employ Category III techniques, MG Geoffrey Miller told the Committee that shortly after the authorization was issued, he told the SOUTHCOM Commander that he did not intend to use the Category III techniques at GTMO. [743]

(U) However, following the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization, JTF-GTMO senior staff began developing standard operating procedures to implement stress positions, stripping detainees, and non-injurious physical contact, such as pushing and poking detainees, all of which were authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The CITF Special Agent in Charge at GTMO, Timothy James, said that when he saw the Secretary's authorization, he was "in shock" and that it "told us we had lost the battle." [744]

B. JTF-GTMO Develops Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Use of SERE Techniques in Interrogations (U)

[Delete] [delete] On December 14, 2002, just prior to a staff meeting, GTMO's Director for Intelligence, LTC Phifer, gave Mr. James, the CITF Special Agent in Charge, a document entitled "JTF-GTMO 'SERE' Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure" and asked for his comments on the document. [745] The techniques described in the draft SOP, such as stress positions, non-injurious physical contact, removal of clothing, and hooding, had all been authorized by the Secretary of Defense on December 2, 2002. [746]

[Delete] [delete] The Department of Defense provided the Committee with two versions of the draft SERE SOP, one dated December 18, 2002 and another earlier undated draft. The draft SOPs were based on the Navy SERE school manual. [747]

(U) Under "purpose" both drafts of the SOP stated:

This SOP document promulgates procedures to be followed by JTF-GTMO personnel engaged in interrogation operations on detained persons. The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for use in real-world interrogations. These tactics and techniques are used at SERE school to 'break' detainees. The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation operations.

... Note that all tactics are strictly intended to be non-lethal. [748]


(D) The December 18, 2002 draft stated that "interrogators will undergo training by certified SERE instructors prior to being approved for use of any of the techniques described in this document" and stated that the draft SOP was "applicable to military and civilian interrogators assigned to Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." [749]

(U) In addition, the December 18, 2002 draft included a section describing "interrogation control and safety" that listed safeguards to "avoid injuries to the detainee, especially his head and/or neck" and stated that a "corpsman or medic should be onsite, and a doctor on-call should medical care be necessary." [750] The December 18, 2002 draft was unsigned but contained signature blocks for the JTF-GTMO's new ICE Chief, Lt Col Moss, the new JIG Commander, COL Sanders, and the JTF-GTMO Commander, MG Miller.

[Delete] [delete] Under "Degradation Tactics" the draft SOPs described the "shoulder slap," the "insult slap," the "stomach slap," and "stripping," all of which were included in the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization. [751]

[Delete] [delete] Regarding the shoulder slap, John Rankin, a Navy SERE Training Specialist who reviewed the draft SOPs at the time, noted that the SOPs' description of the shoulder slap differed from the technique as applied at the Navy SERE school. [752] The Navy instruction manual described the shoulder slap [Big delete]." [753] However, the draft GTMO SOPs described the shoulder slap as [Big delete]." [754]

[Delete] [delete] The draft SOPs described how to administer "insult slap[s]" and "stomach slap[s]" to "shock and intimidate the detainee." [755] The draft SOPs explained that the use of "stripping" involved the "forceful removal of detainees' c1othing." [756] The drafts also stated that "[i]n addition to degradation of the detainee, stripping can be used to demonstrate the omnipotence of the captor or to debilitate the detainee." [757]

[Delete] [delete] Under "Physical Debilitation Tactics" the draft SOPs described various stress positions and said the purpose of using them was to "punish detainees." [758] Among the stress positions listed was the "kneeling position," [Big delete]. Another stress position, the "standing position," [Big delete]." [760] The draft SOPs also listed "Worship- the-Gods" where a detainee would [Big delete] ." [761]

[Delete] [delete]

[Delete] [delete] The draft SERE SOPs described a number of other techniques including hooding; "manhandling," described as "pulling or pushing a detainee," and "walling," described as "placing a detainee forcibly against a specially constructed wall." [762] According to the draft SOPs, the purpose of walling was to "physically intimidate a detainee." [763]

(U) In an email sent shortly after the December 14, 2002 staff meeting where LTC Phifer provided him the draft SOP, CITF Special Agent in Charge Timothy James said that LTC Phifer briefed MG Miller and his staff on the draft SOP at the meeting. [764]

[Delete] Several senior GTMO staff reviewed drafts of the GTMO SERE SOP. On December 14, LTC Beaver sent an email to LTC Phifer, Lt Col Moss (the newly arrived ICE Chief) and members of the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) proposing changes to the draft SERE SOP. [765] LTC Beaver recommended:

[S]trictly prohibiting use of force to the head such as when detainee looks away. Pressure to head and neck must be avoided. Guiding chin up with two fingers for example or using other techniques to make detainee comply. This would avoid inadvertent injury... We can gain some control with use of pressure to shoulder and arms or upper body and less charge of injury to face, neck or head. [766]


(U) LTC Beaver later testified to the Committee that she might have recalled seeing a SERE SOP at the time but that she "had nothing to do" with drafting the December 18, 2002 version of the SOP and did not participate at all in drafting it. [767]

[Delete] On December 16, 2002, BSCT psychiatrist MAJ Paul Burney responded to LTC Beaver's email, stating that "if these techniques are employed at GTMO, our training/preparation must match that of the instructors who are allowed to use these same techniques at SERE school." [768] MAJ Burney described some of the requirements for SERE instructors, such as having them "go through SERE school themselves," ''undergo strict psychiatric screening," and be strictly supervised while doing their jobs at the SERE school. [769] MAJ Burney said that "there are still times when instructors go a bit too far and have to be redirected by other instructors. The SERE school takes this training VERY seriously. It clearly is not a see one, do one, teach one kind of situation" [770] The psychiatrist warned:

The environment down here is much different than at SERE school. There is not a cadre of experienced SERE instructors. The interrogators have not gone through SERE school or been subjected to this treatment themselves. There is not a psychiatric screening process in place. The interrogators are away from home, family, friends and are under a lot more stress than SERE instructors at the SERE school. The detainees being questioned are the enemy and are not U.S. personnel posing as the enemy... All these factors make using this kind of pressure much more dangerous in this environment compared to at the SERE school. [771]


[Delete[ As to the utility of the SERE resistance techniques, MAJ Burney also stated that "[i]t is quite possible that employing these techniques exactly as employed in SERE school may actually strengthen a detainee's ability to resist interrogation rather than overcome it." [772] MAJ Burney stated that he was "not suggesting that the use of physical pressures should be totally abandoned," but recommended that they should bring an experienced senior SERE trainer to GTMO to discuss the issue stating "the interrogation element feels these tools will greatly assist the interrogations process. It would be very interesting to me to know if senior SERE trainers... agree with this assessment or not." [773] MAJ Burney also recommended that, if JTF-GTMO determined the techniques might be effective, then they should institute the same screening processes that SERE schools use and that SERE school instructors be "sent to GTMO to help with the interrogation process." [774]

(U) Mr. Becker, the ICE Chief who left GTMO in December 2002, told the Committee that prior to his departure he had begun drafting the SOP and had discussed it with LTC Phifer. [775]

(U) As discussed above, contemporaneous documents suggest that LTC Phifer gave a copy of the draft SERE SOP to Timothy James, the CITF Special Agent in Charge, and briefed the draft to a JTF-GTMO staff meeting. [776] LTC Phifer was also a recipient of the December 14, 2002 email from LTC Beaver that proposed changes to the draft SERE SOP. [777] However, LTC Phifer testified to the Army IG that he had "never heard of [the SOP] or saw [the SOP]." [778] He later told the Committee that he did not recall the SOP or the December 14, 2002 staff meeting and said that he would not have been comfortable briefing the SOP. [779]

(U) LTC Phifer was replaced on or about December 17, 2002 by COL Richard Sanders, who was given the title of Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) Commander. [780] COL Sanders, whose signature block was included on the December 18, 2002 draft SERE SOP, did not recall seeing the SOP, but said he vaguely recalled discussions about it. [781] Lt Col Moss, the new ICE Chief whose signature block was also on the draft SERE SOP, told the Committee that he recalled the draft SOP but that he never signed it. [782]

(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she did not know who directed the development of the SOP and could not recall whether she discussed it with MG Miller. [783] MAJ Burney told the Committee that he recalled being provided a copy of the Navy SERE school's SOP but did not recall seeing a document drafted by GTMO personnel. [784]

[Delete] Despite having approved an interrogation plan that included SERE techniques and telling the Committee that, in the context of the Khatani interrogation, he was "willing to consider" SERE tactics, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that the techniques in the SOP ''were too aggressive and not appropriate for use [at GTMO]." [785]

(U) While a contemporaneous document suggests that LTC Phifer briefed MG Miller on the SOP, MG Miller told the Army IG that the SOP was never brought to his attention and that he had no knowledge of it. [786] MG Miller later told the Committee that he did not recall being briefed on the draft SOP. [787] As noted above, he also told the Committee that he opposed stress positions, removal of clothing, and the use of non-injurious physical contact - all techniques described in the draft SERE SOP - and that he had made his opposition clear to his staff prior to the time that the SOPs were drafted. [788]

(U) In response to LTC Phifer's request for comments on the draft SERE SOP, CITF raised concerns about the SOP verbally to LTC Phifer and drafted written comments about the SOP. [789] A draft of CITF's written comments (which they coordinated with FBI) was addressed to LTC Phifer and stated:

[There is a] fundamental difference between the military and [CITF and FBI] regarding which style of interrogation should be used... the military model is based on SERE tactics...This school teaches coercion and aggressive interrogation techniques as a way to "break" soldiers who are being trained in methods to resist interrogation by a foreign power... [CITF and FBI] believe these techniques discourage, rather than encourage, detainee cooperation. [790]


(U) CITF and FBI also argued that the use of the methods "only serves to reinforce" the negative perception of the detainees toward Americans and would create "real potential for mistreatment" of detainees. [791] CITF and FBI called the SERE techniques "unsuitable" and "ineffective" and said there were "serious concerns about the legal implications of the techniques." [792]

(U) On December 18, 2002, CITF Special Agent in Charge Timothy James sent an email to Mr. Fallon stating "at this moment the JTF-GTMO staff is working the SOP issue, and [MG Miller] will most likely make a decision in the next day or so." [793]

(U) Individuals interviewed by the Committee stated that the SOP was never signed or implemented at GTMO. [794] Less than two weeks after the December 18, 2002 draft SERE SOP was written, however, two instructors from the Navy SERE school traveled to GTMO to train interrogators on how to perform some of the physical pressures authorized by the Secretary of Defense and contained in the draft SERE SOPs.

C. SERE School Trainers Provide Instruction/or GTMO Interrogators (U)

(U) On December 30, 2002, a SERE Training Specialist, John Rankin, and a SERE Coordinator, Christopher Ross from the Navy SERE school in Brunswick, Maine arrived at GTMO to "provide [JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Element] personnel with the theory and application of the physical pressures utilized during [Navy SERE school] training evolutions." [795] Lt Col Moss told the Committee that his predecessor, Mr. Becker, had invited the SERE school trainers to GTMO. [796] MG Miller told the Committee that he was aware of the visit. [797]

(U) The trainers arrived on December 30, 2002 and met with Lt Col Moss and the ICE Operations Officer. [798] Lt Col Moss told them that "a high level directive had initiated [their] subsequent trip for the purpose of providing 'physical pressures' training." According to the SERE Training Specialist, John Rankin, that directive was a letter from the Secretary of Defense which was shown to him by Lt Col Moss. [799] Lt Col Moss also gave the two Navy SERE school personnel a copy of the December 18, 2002 draft SERE SOP. [800]

(U) The next day, the two Navy SERE school instructors led training for GTMO interrogators and other ICE personnel at Camp Delta. [801] The training included instruction on "Biderman's Principles," including lessons from a chart that was originally included in a 1957 article about how communists elicited false confessions. [802]

(U) The training also consisted of both lectures and instruction on the application of physical pressures. [803] The SERE Training Specialist John Rankin told the Committee that the instructors showed interrogators how to administer the insult slap, the shoulder slap, the stomach slap and demonstrated at least one stress position. [804] Mr. Rankin also said that they discussed the walling technique but did not demonstrate it because the facility lacked the specially constructed wall used at SERE school. [805] Two JTF-GTMO interrogators who attended the training stated that, following the demonstration, the interrogators broke off into pairs and practiced slapping each other. [806]

(U) Two interrogators who attended the training said that they understood that the techniques were available for interrogators to put in their ''toolbox." [807] One of those interrogators recalled being told that if interrogators wanted to use the techniques, they would need to notify their interrogation team chief. [808] A third interrogator who attended the training told the Committee that he believed Lt Col Moss said the techniques could not be used while they were pending approval. [809]

(U) The JIG Commander, COL Sanders, testified to the Army IG that he attended the initial portion of the training and "made it quite clear, at least I believe I made it quite clear [to the interrogators] ... the use of physical measures was not one of the things that we should consider was appropriate and would not be permitted." [810] COL Sanders also testified that he expressed the same concerns to MG Miller. [811] Those statements are inconsistent with the recollections of others.

(U) Of the three interrogators interviewed by the Committee who attended the training, none recalled COL Sanders making such a statement. [812] Lt Col Moss, the ICE Chief at the time, did not recall COL Sanders being present at the training. [813] MG Miller told the Committee that no one on his staff expressed concern to him about the training. [814]

(U) On the morning of January 2, 2003 the Navy SERE school personnel presented additional instruction on interrogation fundamentals and resistance to interrogation. [815] Later that day the instructors "presented an abbreviated theoretical physical pressures and peacetime guidance (government and hostage) to Marine JTF-GTMO personnel and two JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) officials." [816] LTC Beaver told the Committee that she was not aware the SERE instructors were coming to GTMO and did not attend any of the sessions. [817]

(U) In the weeks following the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization of the interrogation techniques, word had spread that serious concerns were emerging about the techniques. In mid-to-late December, prior to the SERE trainers' arrival at GTMO, General Hill, the SOUTHCOM Commander, alerted MG Miller that a debate had ensued regarding the Secretary's decision to authorize the techniques. [818]

(U) Prior to their departure on January 3, 2003, the two Navy SERE instructors met with MG Miller. [819] The GTMO Commander told the Committee that he informed the SERE instructors, in the presence of his staff, that he did not want the techniques they had demonstrated used in interrogations at GTMO. [820] Others who attended the meeting confirmed the Commander's account. [821] Mr. Rankin told the Committee that MG Miller said that he did not want interrogators using techniques that might "bite them" later on. [822]

[Delete] [delete] Before leaving, Mr. Rankin provided a memo for the ICE Operations Chief on the use of physical and psychological pressures during interrogations. The memo stated:

[The] use of physical and psychological pressures during interrogations, if deemed appropriate, are tools that can be applied in order to establish and reinforce [Biderman's] principles... these principles and associated pressures allow the interrogation system to establish and maintain control of the exploitation process... The application of physical pressures is only part of the overall captive management process. They are initially used to shock and intimidate by setting the stage and establishing control. There must be a statement made by demonstrating there are rewards and punishments for compliant and combative or resistive behavior. [823]


D. Navy General Counsel Raises Concerns About Interrogation Techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld Rescinds Authority (U)

(U) CITF had been established as a joint military organization composed of personnel from the Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID), the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and Air Force Office of Special Investigations. While CITF's Commander COL Britt Mallow was an Army Colonel assigned to CITF from CID, Deputy Commander Mark Fallon was an NCIS civilian employee on detail to the CITF. While COL Mallow reported concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques through his Army chain of command, Mr. Fallon also brought the concerns to NCIS leadership. [824]

(U) On December 17, 2002, two weeks after the Secretary authorized the interrogation techniques for use at GTMO and with the Khatani interrogation underway, David Brant, the NCIS Director informed Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora about recent objections raised by CITF. [825] The next day, Mr. Mora met with NCIS Chief Psychologist Dr. Michael Gelles, who had been to GTMO and was familiar with the interrogation techniques in use there. Dr. Gelles provided Mr. Mora excerpts of interrogation logs reflecting detainee mistreatment. Dismayed by what he read and heard, Mr. Mora met with Steven Morello, the Army General Counsel, and for the first time had the opportunity to review the October 11, 2002 GTMO request, LTC Beaver's legal analysis, and the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization of interrogation techniques for use in GTMO interrogations, which included stress positions, removal of clothing, dogs, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, 20 hour interrogations, forced grooming, and grabbing, pushing and poking detainees. [826] Mr. Mora testified to the Committee: "[W]hen I saw the December 2 Rumsfeld memo, and then reviewed Lieutenant Colonel Beaver's legal memorandum, when I saw that the memorandum was completely unbounded concerning the limit of abuse that could be applied to the detainees, I knew instantaneously ... that this was a flawed policy based upon inadequate legal analysis." [827]

(U) The following day, Mr. Mora briefed Navy Secretary Gordon England on the NCIS report of detainee mistreatment and received authorization to meet with DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes. [828] That afternoon, Mr. Mora met with Mr. Haynes and advised him that in his view "some of the authorized techniques could rise to the level of torture." [829] He recalled urging the DoD General Counsel to "think about the techniques more closely" questioning him "What did 'deprivation of light and auditory stimuli' mean? Could a detainee be locked in a completely dark cell? And for how long? A month? Longer? What precisely did the authority to exploit phobias permit? Could a detainee be held in a coffin? Could phobias be applied until madness set in?" [830]

(U) Mr. Mora also urged Mr. Haynes not to rely on LTC Beaver's legal analysis, characterizing it as "an incompetent product of legal analysis." [831] Mr. Mora left the meeting feeling confident that the Secretary's authorization for interrogation techniques would be suspended. [832]

(U) More than two weeks later, on January 6, 2003, the NCIS Director informed Mr. Mora that the Secretary's December 2, 2002 memo had not been suspended and that detainee mistreatment was continuing at GTMO. [833] Two days later, Mr. Mora met with a Special Assistant to both the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and informed him of the concerns. On January 9, 2003, Mr. Mora met again with DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, warning him that the "interrogation policies could threaten Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure and could even damage the presidency." [834] The Navy General Counsel also left Mr. Haynes with a draft copy of a memo written by a Navy JAG Corps Commander, Stephen Gallotta. [835]

[Delete] In that memo, CDR Gallotta summarized and attached comments that the military Services had submitted in November 2002 in response to the Joint Staff request. [836] CDR Gallotta's memo also assessed the legality of the techniques, concluding that several of the techniques "may violate the President's policy for the treatment of detainees," may violate international legal standards, and may violate the federal anti-torture statute (18 U.S.C. § 2340) and various articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). [837]

[Delete] In his January 9, 2003 memo, CDR Gallotta concluded:

Category III techniques that threaten death to the detainee or his family (#1) or which create the misapprehension of suffocation (#3) would likely be judged to constitute torture under the statute and customary international law. They reflect conduct specifically defined as torture in [18 U.S.C.] § 2340 and recognized as torture in international law. Category III, technique #4, mild, non-injurious grabbing and poking, is an assault under the UCMJ. Absent lawful purpose, these techniques may be per se unlawful.

Category II techniques could also, depending in their implementation, i.e., frequency of use, degree of pain inflicted, or combinations of techniques, rise to a level where they could be determined to be torture. Thus, additional analysis with specific guidance for implementation is recommended. [838]


(U) On January 15, 2003, "uncertain whether there would be any change to the interrogation policy," Mr. Mora delivered a draft memorandum to Mr. Haynes stating that "the majority of the proposed category II and all of the proposed category III techniques were violative of domestic and international legal norms in that they constituted, at a minimum, cruel and unusual treatment and, at worst, torture." [839] In a phone call that same day, Mr. Mora told the DoD General Counsel that he intended to sign the memo that afternoon if he had not heard that the Secretary's December 2, 2002 memo for interrogation techniques had been or was being suspended. [840] According to Mr. Mora, Mr. Haynes indicated during their conversations that "Secretary Rumsfeld was 'considering' rescinding the interrogation techniques he had previously authorized for use in Guantanamo." [841] In light of Mr. Mora's draft memo, Mr. Haynes also indicated that he would inquire further about the "Secretary's promise to 'consider' the withdrawal of the interrogation techniques." [842] Mr. Haynes called Mr. Mora later that day to tell him the Secretary had suspended his authorization for interrogation techniques. [843]

(U) On January 15, 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum for GEN Hill, the SOUTHCOM Commander, rescinding blanket authority for one Category III and all Category II techniques at GTMO. [844] GEN Hill said that Secretary Rumsfeld had called him days before formally rescinding authority for the techniques on January 15, 2003 and asked whether the interrogation should continue. GEN Hill said that he told the Secretary that he "would discuss the question with MG Miller, did so that day and reported back to [Secretary Rumsfeld] recommending we continue the interrogation." [845] According to GEN Hill, Secretary Rumsfeld agreed at that time that the interrogation should continue but subsequently called him back and directed that it be stopped. [846]

(U) Just days after the Secretary of Defense rescinded authority for JTF-GTMO to use the interrogation techniques he had authorized in December, CITF's Deputy Commander Mark Fallon and NCIS Chief Psychologist Michael Gelles met with MG Miller to discuss their concerns about interrogation approaches. Mr. Fallon said MG Miller was "dismissive" of their concerns and reported that the GTMO Commander said "'you have got to put on the same jersey if you want to be on the team."" [847]

[Delete] Following the Secretary's rescission, Khatani was moved out of Camp X-Ray. [848] Beginning on January 15, 2003 only Category I techniques were used in his interrogation. Category I techniques included yelling and techniques of deception. An April 19, 2003 memo from MG Miller the GTMO Commander said that on April 9, 2003, [Big delete]," interrogators and analysts attributed his cooperation to his failing a polygraph test, his being told that his information was becoming less important because other members of al Qaeda were cooperating, and interrogators informing Khatani that release or repatriation to Saudi Arabia depended on his truthfulness. [850]

E. National Security Council (NSC) Principals Discuss DoD Interrogations

(U) In a June 9, 2008 letter to the DoJ Inspector General, John Bellinger the former NSC Legal Advisor, stated that he "repeatedly asked the Defense Department about conditions and detention policies at Guantanamo Bay" and that he "specifically raised concerns about interrogations practices used at Guantanamo, including concerns raised by the Department of Justice." [851]

(U) Mr. Bellinger told the Committee that Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz raised concerns with him "about allegations of abuse of detainees at Guantanamo." [852] Mr. Bellinger said that Mr. Swartz called him on "several occasions" to express his concerns and that, in response, he "raised these concerns on several occasions with DoD officials and was told that the allegations were being investigated by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service." [853] He said that then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice "convened a series of meeting of NSC Principals in order to ensure that concerns about conditions and other issues relating to Guantanamo were fully discussed with the Department of Defense and other agencies." [854]

(U) Secretary Rice confirmed Mr. Bellinger's account, stating that he advised her "on a regular basis" regarding concerns and issues relating to Department of Defense detention policies and practices at Guantanamo. [855] She said that, as a result she "convened a series of meetings of NSC Principals in 2002 and 2003 to discuss various issues and concerns relating to detainees in the custody of the Department of Defense." [856]

_______________

Notes:

711. Ibid.

712. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3. 2007) at 87-88.

713. Ibid.

714. Ibid.

715. Ibid.

716. Ibid.

717. Action Memorandum from William J. Haynes II to Secretary of Defense, Counter-Resistance Techniques. (November 27, 2002), approved by the Secretary of Defense on December 2, 2002 (hereinafter "Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002)").

718. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

719. Committee interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 193; SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

720. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

721. Responses of General Richard Myers to April 16, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30, 2008); SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

722. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

723. Ibid

724. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 172.

725. Ibid.

726. GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques.

727. Confirmation Hearing of William James Haynes II to be Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, Senate Committee on Judiciary, 109th Cong. (July 11, 2006).

728. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 175-177, 190.

729. Ibid. at 193; SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

730. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 175-177, 186.

731. Ibid. at 177.

732. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

733. Ibid.

734. Ibid.

735. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

736. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 188.

737. Comment matrix, Legal Review of Draft SECRET/NOFORN DoD IG Report, Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse (Project No. D2004-DINT01-0174) (U). (June 8, 2006) at 8.

738. Media Availability with GEN Hill (June 3, 2004); MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies (October 11, 2002).

739. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 170.

740. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

741. Ibid.

742. Ibid.

743. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

744. Committee staff interview of Timothy James (May 18, 2007).

745. Email from Timothy James to Mark Fallon et al. (December 17, 2002).

746. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

747. JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure (undated) (hereinafter "JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated)"); JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure (December 18, 2002); (hereinafter "JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002)'').

748. JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated); JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).

749. JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).

750. JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).

751. Ibid. JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated).

752. Committee staff interview of John Rankin (September 25, 2007).

753. FASO Detachment Brunswick Instruction 3305.C (January 1, 1998) (emphasis added).

754. JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated); JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).

755. JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated); JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).

756. Ibid.

757. Ibid.

758. Ibid.

759. Ibid.

760. Ibid.

761. Ibid.

762. Ibid.

763. Ibid.

764. Email from Timothy James to Mark Fallon et al (December 17, 2002).

765. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to Lt Col Ted Moss and LTC Jerald Phifer (December 14, 2002).

766. Ibid.

767. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

768. Email from MAJ Paul Burney to LTC Diane Beaver (December 16, 2002).

769. Ibid.

770. Ibid.

771. Ibid.

772. Ibid.

773. Ibid.

774. Ibid.

775. Committee staff interview of David Becker (October 17, 2007).

776. Email from Timothy James to Mark Fallon et a!. (December 17, 2002).

777. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to Lt Col Ted Moss and LTC Jerald Phifer (December 14, 2002).

778. Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 9.

779. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).

780. Ibid.

781. Committee staff interview of COL Richard Sanders (August 10, 2007).

782. Committee staff interview of LTC Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).

783. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

784. Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).

785. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (March 28, 2006); Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller
(December 5, 2007).

786. Email from CITF Special Agent in Charge (December 18, 2002); Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (March 28, 2006).

787. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

788. Ibid.

789. Committee staff interview of Timothy James (May 18, 2007).

790. Draft Memo from Timothy James to JTF-GTMO/J2, JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation SOP DTD 10 Dec 02 (December 17, 2002). CITF Special Agent in Charge Timothy James told the Committee that he was sure he shared CITF's concerns with LTC Phifer verbally and thought he gave LTC Phifer a memo documenting those concerns. Committee staff interview of Timothy James (May 18, 2007).

791. Draft Memo from Timothy James to JTF-GTMO/J2, JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation SOP DTD 10 Dec 02 (December 17, 2002).

792. Ibid.

793. Email from Timothy James to Mark Fallon et al. (December 18, 2002).

794. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007); Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

795. Memorandum from John Rankin and Christopher Ross to Officer in Charge, FASOTRAGRULANT Det Brunswick, After Action Report Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) Training Evolution (January IS, 2003) (hereinafter "AAR JTF-GTMO Training Evolution (January 15, 2003)").

796. Committee staff interview of David Becker (October 17, 2007).

797. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

798. AAR JTF-GTMO Training Evolution (January 15, 2003).

799. Committee staff interview of John Rankin (September 24, 2007).

800. Ibid

801. AAR JTF-GTMO Training Evolution (January 15, 2003).

802. Ibid; Intelligence Science Board, Phase I Report: Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art (December 2006) at 316.

803. The Navy SERE instructors first provided a lecture on "Biderman's Chart of Coercion," which described the effects of various physical and psychological pressures on individuals in captivity. See AAR JTF-GTMO Training Evolution (January 15, 2003); Committee staff interviews of JTF-GTMO interrogators (July 12, 2007), (November 6, 2007), and (January 9, 2008).

804. Committee staff interview of John Rankin (September 24, 2007).

805. Ibid.

806. Committee staff interviews of JTF-GTMO interrogators (July 12, 2007) and (January 9, 2008).

807. Ibid.

808. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO interrogator (July 12, 2007).

809. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO interrogator (January 9, 2008).

810. Army IG, Interview of COL Richard Sanders (March 14, 2006).

811. Ibid. at 6.

812. Committee staff interviews of JTF-GTMO interrogators (July 12, 2007), (November 6, 2007), and (January 9, 2008).

813 Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).

814. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

815. AAR JTF-GTMO Training Evolution (January 15, 2003).

816. Ibid.

817. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

818. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

819. AAR JTF-GTMO Training Evolution (January 15, 2003).

820. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

821. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007); Committee staff interview of John Rankin (September 24, 2007); Committee staff interview of Christopher Ross (September 24, 2007).

822. Committee staff interview of John Rankin (September 24, 2007).

823. Memorandum from John Rankin to Captain Weis, Physical and Psychological Pressures During Interrogations (January 3, 2003).

824. Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2007).

825. Memo from Alberto J. Mora to the Inspector General, Department of the Navy, Statement for the Record: Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues (July 7, 2004) at 2-3 (hereinafter "Mora, Statement for the Record'').

826. The Army General Counsel also "demonstrated great concern with [the Secretary's] decision to authorize the interrogation techniques." Army lawyers explained to the Navy General Counsel that they had "tried to stop" the authorization "without success, and had been advised not to question the settled decision further." Mora, Statement for the Record at 5-6.

827. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

828. Mora, Statement for the Record at 7.

829. Ibid.

830. Ibid. at 7.

831. Ibid.

832. Ibid. at 8.

833. Ibid. at 9.

834. A series of meetings followed between Mr. Mora and senior officials, where Mr. Mora reiterated his concerns. Mr. Mora met with the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CAPT Jane Dalton, the Service General Counsels and senior Judge Advocates General, Army General Counsel Steven Morello, Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, and the DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell'Orto. Ibid. at 13- 14.

835. Ibid. at 10.

836. Memo by CDR Stephen Gallotta, Counter-Resistance Techniques (January 9, 2003). The Services raised legal concerns about many of the Categories II and ill techniques and called for further legal review of the proposal. See Section IV D, supra.

837. Gallotta, Counter-Resistance Techniques (January 9, 2003).

838. Ibid.

839. Mora, Statement for the Record at 14.

840. Ibid. at 15.

841. Mora responses to questions for the record from SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

842. Ibid.

843. Mora, Statement for the Record at 15; see also Mora responses to questions for the record from SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008) ("At no time did Mr. Haynes give me any indication that the techniques had been previous rescinded. Had this been the case, Mr. Haynes could have simply informed me of the fact upon our first conversation that day.").

844. Memo from the Secretary of Defense to Commander USSOUTHCOM, Counter-Resistance Techniques (January 15, 2003) (hereinafter "SECDEF memo to CDR SOUTHCOM (January 15, 2003)").

845. GEN James Hill answers to July 31, 2008 written questions (August 20, 2008).

846. Ibid.

847. Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006) at 16.

848. Memo from Major General Geoffrey Miller to Commander, U.S. Southern Command., Techniques Used on ISN 63 Since 15 January 2003 (S) (April 19, 2003).

849. Ibid.

850. Ibid.

851. Letter from John Bellinger, III to Glenn Fine (June 9, 2008).

852. John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

853. Ibid.

854. Ibid.

855. Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).

856. Ibid.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:35 am

PART 14 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

VIII. New Interrogation Policy Developed for GTMO (U)

(U) When he rescinded authority for GTMO to use aggressive interrogation techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the DoD General Counsel to set up a "Detainee Interrogation Working Group" within the Department "to assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees held by the United States Armed Forces in the war on terrorism." [857]

(U) Two days later, on January 17, 2003, Mr. Haynes directed Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker to convene the Working Group. [858] Per the Secretary's guidance, the Working Group was comprised of representatives from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the General Counsels of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Judge Advocates General of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, the Staff Judge Advocate for the Marine Corps, and the Joint Staff Legal Counsel and the Joint Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5). [859]

A. The Working Group Solicits Information on Interrogation Techniques

(U) As Working Group participants began considering issues relating to interrogations of detainees, they sought information on interrogation techniques to evaluate. Within the first two weeks, Working Group participants solicited information about interrogation techniques from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Combatant Commands. [860]

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency Provides Information on Specific Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) The Working Group's principals and their action officers met for the first time on January 23, 2003. [861] At that meeting, the Working Group received a briefing from the DIA about specific interrogation techniques. [862] A proposed agenda for the first Working Group meeting tasked David Becker with providing an overview of interrogation techniques to the Group. [863]

[Delete] Mr. Becker, the former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief, had recently returned from GTMO to a civilian job at DIA. Mr. Becker told the Committee that he discussed interrogation operations as well as particular interrogation techniques with the Working Group's senior JAG officers and their civilian counterparts. [864] He told the Committee that he was asked about aggressive techniques and was encouraged to talk about techniques that inflict pain. [865] He also said that he advised the Working Group to consider SERE resistance training techniques. [866]

[Delete] The Working Group tasked DIA with providing a list of interrogation techniques and their effectiveness so that the Group could assess their legality. [867] DIA relied on Mr. Becker to produce that list. [868]

[Delete] Mr. Becker compiled a list of 36 techniques for the Working Group. [869] The list included techniques from Army Field Manual 34-52; techniques from Category II of the October 11, 2002 GTMO request, including stress positions, isolation, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20 hour interrogations, forced grooming, and use of phobias, such as dogs; and all four techniques from Category III of the GTMO request, i.e., use of scenarios to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent, exposure to cold weather or water, use of a wet towel and dripping water, and the use of mild, non-injurious physical contact. [870] Mr. Becker also listed three "less common techniques" for the Working Group's consideration, i.e., use of drugs, use of female interrogators, and sleep deprivation." [871] Mr. Becker's memo identified each technique, assessed its effectiveness, and in some instances, also assessed legal and policy considerations. [872]

[Delete] [delete] Mr. Becker's memo stated that the Category III techniques from the October 11, 2002 GTMO request were '"the most aggressive and controversial" techniques. [873] Mr. Becker stated that the techniques were "currently used against U.S. soldiers in SERE schools, with their consent," but that they would "not comport with the Geneva Conventions" if applied to Prisoners of War (POWs). [874] His memo recommended that the Working Group conduct a policy review on the "reciprocity of treatment of captured U.S. personnel" before implementing any of the Category III techniques. [875] Mr. Becker said that attorneys who consulted with him on the memo added this recommendation. [876]

[Delete] [delete] Mr. Becker's memo stated [delete] may have already been using the Category III techniques and stated that [delete] had apparently obtained assistance from JPRA. [877] He wrote:

These [Category III] techniques may be employed by [delete] against the detainees they have in custody overseas. We understand [delete] office of the General Counsel did a legal review and established a finding similar to the legal review of the [GTMO SJA]. [Big delete]. The U.S. military uses standardized SOPs and training in their SERE schools. The SOPs establish the necessary checks and oversight that make SERE training both safe and effective. If adopted, those same standards should be applied when interrogating detainees in the GWOT. The SERE SOPs should resolve most of the policy issues regarding the use of the Category [III] counter-resistance techniques. [878]


[Delete] [delete] In describing one Category III technique - ''use of a wet towel and dripping water" - Mr. Becker's memo stated that the technique is "very effective," but that there are "wide ranging policy issues." [879] According to the memo, "[t]his particular method is no longer in use at SERE schools, but a similar method, called the waterboard, is very effective and it is understood that the waterboard is one of the techniques used with effect by [delete] interrogators." [880]

[Delete] [delete] As to the three "less common techniques" in his memo - use of drugs, use of female interrogators, and sleep deprivation - Mr. Becker stated that "interrogation approaches are limited only by the imagination of interrogators" and that it would be "impossible to list every possible interrogation approach." [881] His memo stated that "drugs such as sodium pentothal and demerol may be used with some effectiveness," that female interrogators could be used to make the detainee feel ''unclean,'' and that "sleep deprivation" can be effective. [882] Mr. Becker told the Committee that he based his statement about the effectiveness of the use of drugs on a rumor that [delete] had used drugs in their interrogation program. [883]

2. The Working Group Solicits Information About Interrogation Techniques From CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM (U)

[Delete] In addition to asking DIA for a list of interrogation techniques, the Working Group also requested that the Joint Staff provide a list of techniques "currently in effect or previously employed in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, techniques the combatant commanders have found to be effective, and techniques the combatant commanders desire to implement with accompanying rationale." [884]

[Delete] [delete] SOUTHCOM relied on the JTF-GTMO Commander to respond to the Joint Staff tasking. MG Miller sent SOUTHCOM Commander General Hill a memo on January 21, 2003 on the effectiveness of techniques that had been rescinded by the Secretary of Defense earlier that month. [885] In his memo, MG Miller stated that "[t]he command must have the ability to conduct interrogations using a wide variety of techniques" and listed nine techniques as "essential to mission success." Those nine included use of an isolation facility; interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation room at Camp Delta such as Camp X-Ray; varying levels of deprivation of light and auditory stimuli to include the use of a white room for up to three days; the use of up to 20-hour interrogations; the use of a hood during transportation and movement; removal of all comfort items (including religious items); serving of meals ready to eat (MREs) instead of hot rations; forced grooming, to include shaving of facial hair and head; and the use of false documents and reports. [886]

[Delete] MG Miller's January 21, 2003 memo stated that he believed that those nine techniques were lawful and stated:

These techniques are not intended to cause gratuitous, severe, physical pain or suffering or prolonged mental harm, but are instead intended to induce cooperation over a period of time by weakening the detainee's mental and physical ability to resist. [887]


[Delete] Miller attached another memo to his January 21, 2003 memo for General Hill. That attached memo, also dated January 21, 2003 and entitled "Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation of ISN 63," bore the same title as a memo dated January 17, 2003. (The earlier memo is described in detail above). Despite describing the same events and being written just days apart, the January 21, 2003 and the January 17, 2003 memos contain substantive differences.

[Delete] Several interrogation techniques that the January 17, 2003 memo identified as techniques used in the Khatani interrogation were omitted from the January 21, 2003 version. Among the techniques left out of the latter memo were "physical posturing," "search/strip search," and the presence of "K-9 military police" dogs. [888] In addition, the description of certain techniques differed in the two versions of the memo. For example, in the latter version, "denial of prayer" was removed and replaced with "postponement of prayer" and reference to the [Big delete] to deny him the ability to pray was omitted. [889]

[Delete] CENTCOM sent the Working Group's request for a list of techniques to CJTF-180, in Afghanistan. In response, LTC Robert Cotell, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) produced a memo on January 24, 2003 describing "current and past" interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180 interrogators. [890] LTC Cotell's memo was sent to the Working Group and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. [891]

[Delete] [delete] LTC Cotell's January 24, 2003 memo stated that "[p]rior to their rescission, CJTF-180 used selected techniques contained in SOUTHCOM's [Category] II and III techniques." [892] He identified interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180, including up to 96 hours of isolation; the use of female interrogators to create "discomfort" and gain more information; sleep adjustment, defined as "four hours of sleep every 24 hours, not necessarily consecutive;" use of individual fears; removal of comfort items; use of safety positions; isolation; deprivation of light and sound in living areas; the use of a hood during interrogation; and mild physical contact. [894] Several of these techniques were similar to those approved by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO in December 2002. CJTF-180 had obtained a list of those GTMO techniques prior to the time that LTC Cotell had drafted his January 24, 2003 memo. [894]

[Delete] [delete] The January 24, 2003 memo also recommended use of five additional techniques, including "deprivation of clothing" to put detainees in a "shameful, uncomfortable situation;" "food deprivation;" "sensory overload - loud music or temperature regulation;" "controlled fear through the use of muzzled, trained, military working dogs;" and ''use of light and noise deprivation." [895]

(U) LTG John Abizaid, the Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command, stated that the January 24, 2003 memorandum "was thoroughly reviewed" by the Working Group. [896]

3. The Working Group Requests Information from JPRA (U)


(U) The Working Group also sought information on interrogation techniques from the SERE community. On January 30, 2003, MAJ Nick Lovelace, an action officer at the Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence (J2), contacted JPRA on behalf of the Working Group. [897]

[Delete] MAJ Lovelace called Mr. Joseph Witsch, the JPRA instructor who had previously conducted training for [delete] and had served as Team Chief at the September 2002 training for GTMO interrogators and behavioral science personnel at Fort Bragg. [898]

[Delete] MAJ Lovelace requested material from JPRA "identifying interrogation techniques and methodologies used by the SERE community." [899] According to Mr. Witsch, MAJ Lovelace had already received information from the Army SERE school, but he described the information provided as "insufficient for his tasking." [900]

[Delete] Mr. Witsch advised MAJ Lovelace that information on interrogation techniques had already been provided to the Department of Defense General Counsel and to the DIA and he suggested that the Joint Staff action officer coordinate with them. [901] MAJ Lovelace indicated, however, that he was familiar with those materials but that he was looking for "more detail on exact procedures, techniques, and constraints" than had already been provided. [902]

[Delete] MAJ Lovelace's request on behalf of the Working Group prompted a discussion at JPRA about the advisability of providing "SERE school methodology in support of the GWOT" to the Working Group and other organizations. [903] In an email to JPRA Chief of Staff Daniel Baumgartner, Mr. Witsch expressed four "serious concerns" about sharing the requested information. [904]

[Delete] [delete] First among his concerns was the potential effect that sharing SERE school techniques could have on the training of American personnel. Mr. Witsch wrote:

Open source intel and media is flooded with what the USG/OGAs and DOD are currently doing with [Designated Unlawful Combatants (DUCs)]. How long will it take before we see some discussion on SERE school methods and techniques being used to interrogate DUCs. I'll take bets that it will occur in days and weeks versus months! It ain't healthy for our operators to expose how we prepare them to deal with interrogation and captivity in open source media. [905]


[Delete] Second, Mr. Witsch stated that the SERE techniques violated national and international laws. He wrote:

Our training is based on simulating our captors' passed [sic] performance while tapering the physical/psychological severity and harm to our students. The physical and psychological pressures we apply in training violate national and international laws. We are only allowed to do these things based on permission from DOD management and intense oversight by numerous organizations within DOD. I hope someone is explaining this to all these folks asking for our techniques and methodology! [906]


[Delete] [delete] His third concern was that a lack of proper oversight could give rise to significant drift, which, in turn, could pose a risk of investigation and exposure of the organization. Mr. Witsch asked:

What do you think is more than likely to happen when one of these organizations gets exposed and because of significant 'drift' and a lack of oversight they go beyond what we do in the SERE schools? The first question will be 'Where did you get your guidance?' Then we get investigated and exposed []. [907]


[Delete] [delete] Mr. Witsch's fourth concern was that JPRA would have no control over how the information would be used. He asked:

What's been handed out in hard copy and electronically from [] us and the SERE community to meet numerous requests from everybody? We use [sic] to have some general idea when we were dealing with primarily the SERE community. Now it's anybody's guess where the JTTP has gone and how it's being incorporated and used. [908]


[Delete] [delete] Mr. Witsch added:

I know this is cool stuff and may provide some utility when dealing with DUCs. I'm not saying that we should totally remove ourselves from this endeavor. We must get a handle on all these people seeking information on our stuff within the USG and DOD and control the amount [of] exposure our SERE community/programs are getting. This is getting out of control! [909]

[Delete] Lt Col Baumgartner recalled that he managed to delay providing information to the Working Group, but that JPRA later briefed The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, who was a member of the Working Group, on SERE techniques, including physical pressures. [910]

B. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel's Analysis Is Presented As Controlling Authority (U)

(U) At the initial meeting of the Working Group, in addition to a briefing from the DIA, participants also received a briefing from the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). [911] Despite the Secretary's guidance that the Working Group assess the legal issues relating to the interrogations of detainees, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, who knew that the OLC "had already done some work" on the issues, requested that the OLC produce a legal opinion to guide the Working Group's deliberations. [912]

(U) In the early stages of the Working Group's deliberations, Working Group members had set out to develop their own legal analysis and utilize that analysis in the evaluation of interrogation techniques. [913] A draft of that analysis, dated January 25, 2003, was shared with the DoD General Counsel's office and the OLC. [914]

[Delete] The draft reviewed U.S. obligations under international law and concluded that "obligations under the Torture Convention... apply to the interrogation of Operation Enduring Freedom detainees ..." [915] The draft analysis also included a review of articles of the UCMJ and other U.S. legal standards that were potentially applicable to U.S. interrogators. For example, the analysis found that unlawful force used against a detainee could constitute an offense under Article 128 (assault) of the UCMJ, and stated that assault:

May be interpreted to include unreasonably offensive poking, slapping, hitting, prodding, or pushing. Hooding not likely included if used for security reasons. Offensive touching would also include more severe techniques (e.g., wet towels, hand cuffing) if not inherent and necessary to custodial conduct. [916]


[Delete] The draft analysis also assessed the legality of the techniques that had been requested for approval by GTMO in October 2002, including some of those that the Secretary of Defense had approved for use at GTMO in December 2002. In its draft, the Working Group adopted the conclusion that Navy JAG Corps CDR Stephen Gallotta had reached in his January 9, 2003 memo, writing that:

Category III techniques that threaten death to the detainee or his family (#1) or which create the misapprehension of suffocation (#3) would likely be judged to constitute torture under the statute and customary international law. They reflect conduct specifically defined as torture in [18 U.S.C.] §2340 and recognized as torture in international law. Category III, technique #4, mild, non-injurious grabbing and poking, is an assault under the UCMJ. Absent lawful purpose, these techniques may be per se unlawful.

Category II techniques [] could also, depending in their implementation, i.e., frequency of use, degree of pain inflicted, or combinations of techniques, rise to a level where they could be determined to be torture. Thus, additional analysis with specific guidance for implementation is recommended. [917]


[Delete] The draft Working Group analysis recommended "[a]dditional factual information and legal analysis" to "establish both the legality of the proposed techniques and any limits to be applied to their use." [918] The draft also expressed "significant concerns with some of the substantive measures in the [October 11, 2002 GTMO] proposal as submitted, particularly in Category II and almost all of Category 111." [919] The Working Group's legal analysis was, however, soon superseded by that of the OLC. [920]

(U) Within the first two weeks of the Working Group's deliberations, the OLC delivered a draft legal memo to Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker. [921] The OLC's memo, which would be finalized on March 14, 2003, was presented to the Working Group as the "controlling authority for all questions of domestic and international law." [922] Among the Working Group members there was a "great deal of disagreement" with the OLC analysis and "serious concerns and objections over some of the legal conclusions reached by OLC." [923]

[Delete] Nevertheless, at Mr. Haynes's direction, Ms. Walker instructed the Working Group to consider the "OLC memorandum as authoritative" and directed that it "supplant the legal analysis being prepared by the Working Group action officers." [924]

(U) CAPT Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said she was ''very angry" when told that the Working Group would be governed by the OLC's legal analysis. [925] She told the Committee: "There was a point [during the Working Group process] where we were told that we could not argue against the OLC opinion ... that any other legal ideas that we had would not be accepted, particularly when we commented on the draft report." [926] Likewise, Alberto Mora, the Navy General Counsel and a participant in the Working Group, said that "[s]oon upon receipt of the OLC memo, the Working Group leadership began to apply its guidance to shape the content of its report." [927] Mr. Mora stated that "contributions from the members of the Working Group, including [contributions from his office], began to be rejected if they did not conform to the OLC guidance." [928]

(U) The final OLC memo, signed by John Yoo on March 14, 2003 (and known commonly as the "Yoo memo"), adopted many of the same conclusions as those of the First Bybee memo (dated August 1, 2002), in which the OLC had significantly narrowed the scope of what constituted torture under federal law. For example, Mr. Yoo's memo repeated OLC's previous analysis of the federal anti-torture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, finding that the statute prohibited "only extreme acts" and that in order to constitute torture, physical pain would have to be equivalent in intensity to that accompanying "serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions or even death." [929]

(U) The final March 14, 2003 OLC memo, however, added that general criminal statutes, such as the federal anti-torture statute, were inapplicable to the military during the conduct of a war. [930] The OLC concluded that the assault, maiming, interstate stalking, and anti-torture statutes do not apply to the "properly-authorized interrogation of enemy combatants by the United States Armed Forces during an armed conflict." [931]

(U) The OLC's conclusion was based, in part, on its analysis of the President's Commander in Chief authority. In the First Bybee memo, the OLC had asserted that "any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield detainees would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President." [932] In keeping with that finding, the March 14, 2003 final OLC memo held that the power to detain and interrogate enemy combatants arose out of the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. [933] "In wartime," according to the memo, "it is for the president alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy." [934]

(U) In the March 14, 2003 final opinion, the OLC used its broad reading of the Commander-in-Chief authority to conclude that "even if" federal criminal statutes "were misconstrued to apply" to interrogations, the "Department of Justice could not enforce this law or any of the other [applicable] criminal statutes." [935] According to the OLC, "[e] ven if an interrogation method arguably were to violate a criminal statute; the Justice Department could not bring a prosecution because the statute would be unconstitutional as applied in this context." [936]

(U) The First Bybee memo and the March 14, 2003 final OLC memo were withdrawn in June 2004 and December 2003, respectively. [937] According to Assistant Attorney General for OLC Jack Goldsmith, the memos were "legally flawed, tendentious in substance and tone, and overbroad ..." [938]

(U) The Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora called the OLC memo relied on by the Working Group in 2003 "profoundly in error" and a "travesty of the applicable law." [939] According to Mr. Mora, the "OLC memo proved a vastly more sophisticated version of the Beaver Legal Brief, but it was a much more dangerous document because of the statutory requirement that OLC opinions are binding provided much more weight to its virtually equivalent conclusions." [940] He stated that it became evident to those on the Working Group that the "report being assembled would contain profound mistakes in its legal analysis, in large measure because of its reliance on the flawed OLC Memo." [941] CAPT Dalton likewise said that "to the extent that [the Working Group report] relied on the OLC memo, it did not include what I considered to be a fair and complete legal analysis of the issues involved." [942] She added that being told what their legal opinion had to be "severely constrained [the Working Group's] ability to do an adequate job." [943] The report, she said, had been "geared toward a particular conclusion[]" and the legal analysis was written to support that conclusion. [944]

C. Working Group Drafts Report Recommending Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) When the Secretary of Defense directed the DoD General Counsel to set up the Working Group, the Secretary instructed him to complete the work within 15 days. [945] Although that goal was not met, the Working Group produced several drafts during that time frame and circulated a draft "Final Report" on February 4, 2003. [946]

[Delete] According to VADM Church's report, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Jim Haynes, "participated in several meetings" from the "initiation of the Working Group until the report was finalized" at which "the Working Group progress and recommendations were discussed." [947]

[Delete] Drafts of their report from this time period reflect the influence that SERE had on the Working Group's consideration of interrogation techniques. In a draft of the Working Group report, dated January 27, 2003, the report identified two categories of "interrogation techniques proven to be effective" - (1) those techniques that were "currently used by trained interrogators in accordance with U.S. Military Doctrine and policy" and (2) "additional techniques" deemed "acceptable for use in accordance with ancillary military training processes such as SERE schools." [948]

[Delete] The first category of techniques, which the January 27, 2003 draft report identified as those already in use and "proven to be effective," included techniques not listed in Army Field Manual 34-52, such as isolation, hooding, use of prolonged interrogations, mild physical contact, removal of clothing, forced grooming, dietary manipulation, use of phobias to increase levels of stress, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, prolonged standing, and deception. [949] In describing one of these techniques - deprivation of light and auditory stimuli - the draft report noted (in an apparent reference to SERE resistance training) that it was an "effective technique used in military training." [950]

[Delete] [delete] The second category of techniques in the January 27, 2003 draft Working Group report identified as "proven to be effective" were those in use "with ancillary military training processes such as SERE schools." [951] The draft report noted that this second category of techniques "should only be applied for detainees who are extremely resistant" to the first category of techniques and "who the interrogators strongly believe have vital information." [952] The techniques include use of stress positions, sleep deprivation, enforced physical training. face slap/stomach slap, water immersion, walling, use of wet towel on face or the "waterboard," use of smoke pipe, and use of drugs. [953] In describing these techniques, the Working Group draft made repeated reference to use of the techniques at SERE schools - e.g., "selected stress positions are used in U.S. Military Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) schools," the "face slap/stomach slap ... is used in SERE training," "water immersion . . . . is effectively used in SERE courses," ''use of a wet towel on face or the 'waterboard' ... is the most severe technique used at U.S. Military SERE schools," ''use of smoke pipe ... is also used at the SERE School." [954]

[Delete] According to JPRA's operating instructions, the purpose of subjecting students to physical pressures in SERE school is not to obtain information, but ''to project the student's focus into the resistance scenario and realistically simulate conditions associated with captivity and resistance efforts." [955] The JPRA operating instructions state that ''the application of physical pressure is necessary to produce the correct emotional and physiological projection a student requires for stress inoculation ..." [956]

[Delete] While the draft report described the two lists of techniques as "proven to be effective," it did not discuss the purpose for which the techniques were proven effective.

[Delete] As Working Group participants made revisions to the draft report, the list of interrogation techniques in the report remained largely unchanged. A February 2, 2003 draft report shows virtually the same list of interrogation techniques as the earlier draft. [957] However, unlike the earlier draft, the February 2, 2003 draft excluded almost all references to "SERE schools" or to techniques used in "military training." [958] For example, the entire category of techniques previously identified as techniques in use "with ancillary military training processes such as SERE schools" were instead described in the February 2, 2003 draft as techniques "considered effective by interrogators and for which USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM have requested approval." [959]

[Delete] By the time the Working Group issued its draft "Final Report" on February 4, 2003, the report made no reference to SERE schools or techniques used in "military training," [960] despite the fact that most of the SERE techniques remained in the report. [961]

[Delete] The February 4, 2003 draft "Final Report" recommended approval of 36 interrogation techniques for use with unlawful combatants outside the United States. [962]

(U) The report also listed, but did not recommend approval of, three additional techniques that the Working Group said it lacked sufficient information to evaluate fully - use of stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and water immersion/wetting down. [963] Two of the three techniques that the Working Group lacked enough information to make a judgment on, i.e., stress positions and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, were among those recommended for approval by Mr. Haynes and approved by the Secretary of Defense two months earlier, on December 2, 2002.

[Delete] Of the 36 recommended interrogation techniques in the February 4, 2003 draft, 26 techniques were recommended for general use and 10 techniques were recommended for use with certain limitations. [964] The 26 techniques recommended in the February 4, 2003 report for general use included 19 techniques from Army Field Manual 34-52 or its predecessor, and seven techniques that did not comport with the Field Manual, i.e., hooding, mild physical contact, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, false flag, and threat of transfer. [965] The report also recommended approval of 10 additional "exceptional" techniques for use with certain limitations. [966] The 10 "exceptional" techniques included isolation, prolonged interrogations, forced grooming, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, physical training, face slap/stomach slap, removal of clothing, increasing anxiety by use of aversions, and the waterboard. [967]

(U) Many of the 10 "exceptional" techniques in the report, were similar to techniques identified in earlier versions of the report as either having originated in SERE school or among those previously approved for use at GTMO and identified by Mr. Becker, the former GTMO ICE Chief, in his list for the Working Group.

(U) Each of the 36 recommended techniques was included in a color-coded matrix or a "stoplight" chart and designated as either "green," "yellow," or "red" to signify the Working Group's assessment of legal and policy considerations. [968]

[Delete] Waterboarding was the only technique evaluated as "red" in any area of consideration in the February 4, 2003 report, but the Working Group report continued to recommend at that time that it be approved for use. [969] That "red" designation meant that the Working Group determined that there was a major issue in law or policy with respect to waterboarding "that cannot be eliminated." [970] The Working Group rated the waterboard as red under U.S. domestic law and the prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in the Torture Convention. [971] The Working Group also indicated that the waterboard was not consistent with historical U.S. forces' interrogation role; prior U.S. public statements; or major partner nation reviews. In addition, the report indicated that the technique could have an effect on the treatment of captured U.S. forces, could potentially affect detainee prosecutions; was "inconsistent with modern U.S. military perceptions in decency in dealing with prisoners" and was "a significant departure from contemporary American military approach to the laws of war." [972] The February 4, 2003 Working Group Report gave the waterboard its only overall red rating and recommended that the approval authority for the technique be "no lower than the [Secretary of Defense]." [973]

(U) The Working Group's assessment of the techniques on the stoplight chart was governed by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo. The result, according to then-CAPT (now RADM) Dalton, was that drafts of the stoplight chart were "absolutely wrong legally." [974] According to RADM Dalton:

[T]here was a column originally . . . in the stoplight chart, that was labeled "Customary International Law." So one of the things we were supposed to assess was whether or not the techniques were consistent with customary international law. The stoplight chart had all 36 techniques green under customary international law because the OLC opinion and thus the Working Group report maintained that customary international law did not impose any constraints on the actions . . . That green column was absolutely wrong legally . . . it was embarrassing to have it in there, and one of my comments to the report was ... You need to delete that column entirely because it's embarrassing to have it in there and it's not reflective of the law. [975]


(D) In addition to concerns raised by then-CAPT Dalton, almost immediately, the February 4, 2003 draft final report and its recommended techniques generated objections from top military lawyers. Within days of receiving the report and continuing over the next month, the Deputy Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Air Force Jack Rives, the Navy JAG Michael Lohr, the Army JAG Thomas Romig, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps Kevin Sandkuhler submitted memoranda expressing serious concerns about the report and the techniques it recommended.

(U) The senior military lawyers raised the following concerns:

• (U) The OLC opinion, which was relied on almost exclusively by the Working Group, was "notably silent" on the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the military justice system applicable to U.S. personnel conducting interrogations. [976] Several of the recommended "exceptional" techniques, on their face, amounted to violations of the UCMJ (e.g., assault) and domestic criminal law. [977] As a result, "applying the more [exceptional] techniques during interrogation of detainees places the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal accusations domestically" and could result in criminal prosecution in domestic court. [978]
• (U) U.S. service members may be at risk for criminal prosecution or civil liability in foreign domestic courts and international fora. [979]
• (U) Employment of exceptional techniques may have a negative effect on the treatment of U.S. POWs by their captors and raises questions about the ability of the U.S. to call others to account for mistreatment of U.S. service members. [980]
• (U) Authorization of the exceptional interrogation techniques "may be seen as giving official approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. Armed Forces have heretofore been trained are unlawful" and use of the techniques will adversely impact "pride, discipline, and self-respect within the U.S. Armed Forces." [981]
• (U) Authorization of the exceptional techniques will negatively impact U.S. and international public support and respect of the U.S. Armed Forces and could have a negative impact on the public perception of the U.S. military. [982]
• (U) Authorization of the techniques will adversely impact "human intelligence exploitation and surrender of foreign enemy forces and cooperation and support of friendly nations." [983]

(U) According to DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, the Secretary of Defense met with participants of the Working Group and was aware of concerns reflected in the comments made by the senior military lawyers. [984]

(U) On March 6, 2003, the Working Group circulated another version of its report entitled "Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations."

[Delete] According to the Church Report, when circulated, the March 6, 2003 version was considered final, but at some point, it was later re-characterized as a draft. [985] Over the objections of the military lawyers, all 36 techniques from the February 4, 2003 draft report remained a part of the Working Group's recommendations and were included in the March 6, 2003 report. [986] The three techniques that the Working Group could not evaluate fully also remained in the March 6, 2003 report, but were not recommended for approval. [987] By March 6, 2003, the Working Group still "had not received adequate information" regarding these three techniques, including two that had been approved by the Secretary in December 2002, to conduct a "legal or policy analysis." [988]

(U) Upon receiving the March 6, 2003 version, senior military lawyers continued to raise concerns that the recommendations were based on a flawed OLC legal analysis. One JAG noted that the draft report's introduction, which said it was '''informed' by [the] OLC opinion ... create[d] an incorrect impression" since "[m]ost (if not all) working group members and TJAGs disagree[d] with significant portions of [the] OLC opinion, but were forced to accept it." [989] The military lawyers also continued to express the view that the recommended techniques would expose American soldiers to potential prosecution; would invite reciprocal treatment of captured U.S. personnel; could affect the admissibility of detainee statements in criminal prosecutions, including military commissions; and were not proven to result in obtaining reliable information from those being interrogated. [990]

D. SOUTHCOM Presses for Additional Techniques (U)

[Delete] As the various Working Group drafts were being discussed, JTF-GTMO and SOUTHCOM pressed for authority to use additional interrogation techniques at GTMO. On February 12, 2003, in advance of a planned briefing by MG Miller to Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, LTC Beaver sent an email to the Department of Defense's Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson stating that "we must have interrogation technique approval immediately and will speak to Mr. Wolfowitz about this. The hallmark is isolation and up to 20 hour interrogation. Without that we can't be successful in the community environment. We need commitment from the senior leadership to let us do this mission." [991]

[Delete] Three days later, LTC Beaver followed up with the General Counsel's office, stating that MG Miller "was informed by DEPSECDEF that we would have interrogation techniques (isolation and up to 20 hours) approved by Wednesday [February 19, 2003]. We hope this happens." [992]

[Delete] A month later, on March 12, 2003, a Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at SOUTHCOM sent LTC Beaver an email informing her about a March 11, 2003 meeting that was attended by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN James Hill, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Gen Richard Myers, where interrogation techniques were discussed. [993] According to the Deputy SJA at SOUTHCOM, during the meeting, Gen Myers, raised a concern that some of the techniques discussed for GTMO "could be illegal depending on how far they were used." [994] The Deputy SJA informed LTC Beaver that GEN Hill "promised the Chairman a paper discussing the techniques we want" and that SOUTHCOM wanted to get a draft memo to GEN Hill by close of business March 20, 2003. [995] LTC Beaver forwarded the email to DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel Eliana Davidson and told her "This email is not good news. It appears something went wrong." [996] Ms. Davidson replied that Mr. Haynes had been at the meeting where interrogation techniques were discussed and that she was trying to get some clarification on the meeting. [997]

[Delete] On March 21, 2003, GEN Hill sent a memorandum to Gen Myers regarding the interrogation techniques that had been rescinded in January. While MG Miller's January 21, 2003 letter to General Hill had listed only nine Category II techniques as "essential," General Hill's March 21, 2003 memo stated that both he and MG Miller felt that approval of all of the previously authorized techniques (in Categories I, II and III) was "essential." [998] General Hill stated that "both Geoff Miller and I believe that we need as many appropriate tools as possible" and called Category II and the one previously authorized Category III technique "critical to maximizing our ability to accomplish the mission, now and in the future." [999] The "critical" techniques referred to by General Hill included stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, removal of clothing, use of detainee phobias such as dogs, and the one Category III technique the Secretary had authorized, which included grabbing, poking, and light pushing.

E. JPRA Briefs Members of the Working Group on SERE Techniques (U)

[Delete] Prior to issuing a final report on April 4, 2003, members of the Working Group again sought information from JPRA on SERE techniques. The JAG of the Air Force, Maj Gen Thomas Fiscus, and two other military officers, visited JPRA and were briefed on SERE physical pressures. [1000] At the briefing, JPRA described its previous support to "high value target" interrogations, discussed the processes and procedures used in SERE training, and reviewed the "application of physical pressures in an operational environment." [1001] JPRA Chief of Staff Daniel Baumgartner told Maj Gen Fiscus that JPRA had previously provided information on techniques used in SERE schools to DoD Deputy General Counsel Richard Shiffrin. [1002]

F. The Working Group Finalizes Its Report and the Secretary of Defense Issues a New Interrogation Policy For GTMO (U)

[Delete] On March 28, 2003, the Secretary of Defense met with a number of senior advisors including Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Richard Myers, to discuss the interrogation techniques being considered by the Working Group. [1003] After that meeting, the Secretary decided to expressly authorize 24 interrogation techniques, including five that were not listed in the Army Field Manual (one of these five was classified as an "exceptional" technique). [1004]

[Delete] The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on March 31, 2003, and were briefed about Secretary Rumsfeld's decision. According to CAPT Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the "Chiefs recognized that the approved strategies would not hamper the combatant commander in the accomplishment of his mission, because the door was open to request additional strategies on a case-by-case basis if needed in compelling cases." [1005]

[Delete] The last and final version of the Working Group report was issued on April 4, 2003. The report was similar to the March 6, 2003 version, except that it did not recommend waterboarding or list the three other exceptional techniques that the Working Group could not evaluate fully - stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and water immersion/wetting down. [1006] At the direction of the DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell'Orto, the April 4, 2003 report was not circulated to the participants of the Working Group. [1007]

(U) In fact, when it came to finalizing the report, some participants of the Working Group who had raised objections to the report were excluded from the process and did not even know that the report had been completed. [1008] According to Alberto Mora, the Navy General Counsel, "Neither I, [the Navy Office of the General Counsel], nor - to my knowledge - anyone else in the [Department of Navy] ever received a completed version of the Working Group report. It was never circulated for clearance. Over time, I would come to assume that the report had never been finalized." [1009] Mr. Mora said that he only learned of the final report nearly a year later while watching a "televised congressional hearing on the Abu Ghraib scandal." [1010]

[Delete] On April 5, 2003, Gen Myers forwarded a memo proposing that the Secretary of Defense authorize 24 of the interrogation techniques reviewed during the Working Group process. [1011] In response, Marshall Billingslea, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict sent a memo to the Secretary of Defense raising concerns about the omission of certain techniques and recommending that the Secretary approve all 35 techniques "endorsed by the Working Group." [1012] Mr. Billingslea's memo stated:

The current memo omits some interrogation techniques that are not controversial from either a legal, or policy standpoint. For instance, blindfolding ('hooding'), lightly touching a detainee, and threatening transfer to a 3rd country all seem reasonable techniques to approve.

The draft memo also omits some techniques which the Working Group found to be legally-permissible, but which should be done only with appropriate oversight. While the Working Group felt that the Combatant Commander could approve these measures, we recommend requiring that you be notified prior to their use.

The measures in question include using prolonged interrogations, prolonged standing in non-stress positions, forced grooming, requiring physical exercise, face/stomach slaps to cause surprise but not pain or injury, etc.

Finally, we recommend delegating certain techniques to General Miller at GTMO. [1013]


(U) On April 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Commander of SOUTHCOM to use 24 interrogation techniques. [1014] Of the 24 techniques, four - Mutt and Jeff, incentive/removal of incentive, pride and ego down, and isolation - required that the SOUTHCOM Commander make a determination of "military necessity" and notify the Secretary in advance of using them. [1015] The Secretary authorized the use of the other 20 techniques with all detainees at GTMO so long as GTMO personnel adhered to certain safeguards. Those authorized techniques included dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, and false flag, none of which were listed in the Army Field Manual.

(U) In addition to expressly authorizing the 24 techniques listed in his April 16, 2003 memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote in his memo: "If, in your view, you require additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee." [1016]

(U) CAPT Dalton told the Committee that all of the techniques recommended by the Working Group were available for request. [1017] That understanding was shared by the Joint Chiefs, who she said believed that the door was open to request additional strategies on a case-by-case basis if needed in compelling cases." [1018] The GTMO Commander would soon seek and receive authority to use additional techniques that went beyond the 24 expressly approved in the Secretary's April 16, 2003 memo.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:36 am

PART 15 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

_______________

Notes:

857. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Detainee Interrogations (January 15, 2003). In this memo, the Secretary also directed the Working Group to address the "[l]egal considerations raised by interrogation of detainees held by US. Armed Forces;" "[p]olicy considerations with respect to the choice of interrogation techniques, including contribution to intelligence collection, effect on treatment of captured U.S. military personnel, effect on detainee prosecutions, [and] historical role of U.S. armed forces in conducting interrogations;" and "[r]ecommendations for employment of particular interrogation techniques by DoD interrogators."

858. Memorandum from Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes to Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, Working Group to Assess Legal, Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (January 17, 2003).

859. Department of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (April 4, 2003); Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Detainee Interrogations (January 15, 2003).

860. Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).

861. Church Report at 124.

862. Ibid.; Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).

863. Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, , 2003).

864. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

865. Ibid.

866. Ibid. The proposed agenda for the Working Group meeting (dated January 23, 2003) includes handwritten comments that reflect a discussion about "All [service] SEER [sic] guidelines" and "techniques." Since this document was produced to the Committee as a part of the source materials collected by VADM Church for his report, the Committee cannot determine whether these handwritten comments are those of a Working Group participant or VADM Church's team. Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).

867. [Delete] Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003); (U) Proposed Detainee Interrogation Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (Undated) [Delete] DIA's role was described in the memo as, "List, describe and assess the effectiveness of all interrogation techniques that may be effective in obtaining useful information from detainees in the war on terrorism. Suggest relevant policy considerations affecting each."

868. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

869. [Delete] Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). The 36 techniques included Direct, Incentive, Emotional Love, Emotional Hate, Fear Up Harsh, Fear Up Mild, Decreased Fear, Pride and Ego Up, Pride and Ego Down, Futility, We Know All, Establish Your Identity, Repetition Approach, File and Dossier, Mutt and Jeff, Rapid Fire, Silence, Change of Scenery, Use of Stress Positions, Use of Falsified Documents and Reports, Use of Isolation Facility, Interrogating Detainees in an Environment other than the Standard Interrogation Booth, Deprivation of Light and Auditory Stimuli, Hooding, Use of 20-Hour Interrogations, Switching the Detainee from Hot Rations to MREs, Removal of All Comfort Items, Forced Grooming, Use of Detainee Phobias, Use of Scenarios Designed to Convince the Detainees that Death or Severely Painful Consequences are Imminent, Exposure to Cold Weather or Water, Use of a Wet Towel and Dripping Water, Use of Mild, Non-Injurious Physical Contact, Use of Drugs, Use of Female Interrogators, and Sleep Deprivation. Defense Intelligence Agency memo, List, describe and assess the effectiveness of all interrogation techniques that may be effective in obtaining useful information from detainees in the war on terrorism. Suggest relevant policy considerations affecting each (undated) (hereinafter "List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA.")

870. [Delete] List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA. In describing one technique - use of mild, non injurious physical contact - the ICE Chief explained that "[i]ssues such as grabbing and poking have very minimal policy issues and play a part in the interrogator's efforts to be sincere. Other non-injurious contact such as a face slap or stomach slap are effective in gaining compliance and are used at SERE school. UCMJ policy issues should be resolved."

871. List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA.

872. Ibid.

873. Ibid. at 3.

874. Ibid.

875. Ibid.

876. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

877. List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA at 3.

878. Ibid.

879. Ibid.

880. Ibid.

881. Ibid at 4.

882. [Delete] [delete] "[1] Use of Drugs: Drugs such as sodium pentothal and demerol may be used with some effectiveness. Significant policy issues must be resolved. [2] Use of Female Interrogators: One al-Qaida resistance method is to pray during interrogations. Prayer is only allowed if the detainee is 'clean.' Having a woman rub scented oil on the detainee's arms and face makes the detainee perceive that he is unclean and he cannot pray until he cleans himself, which he is unable to do until he returns to his cell. The use of female interrogators to put oil on a detainee does not exceed limits already established by DoD policy or the Geneva Conventions. [3] Sleep Deprivation: This can be effective; however there are obvious policy considerations. Guidelines as to the use of sleep deprivation would have to be established." List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA at 4.

883. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

884. Proposed Detainee Interrogation Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (undated) at 1; Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).

885. Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller for Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Effectiveness of the Use of Certain Category n Counter-Resistance Strategies (January 21, 2003) (hereinafter "MG Miller memo, Effectiveness of Certain Category II Strategies (January 21, 2003)").

886. [Delete] MG Miller, Effectiveness of Certain Category II Strategies (January 21, 2003). Although MG Miller identified only nine "essential" techniques on January 21, 2003, a subsequent memo sent by the SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill called all the Category II and the one Category III technique (non-injurious physical contact such as poking and pushing) that the Secretary had authorized in December "critical to maximizing our ability to accomplish the mission, now and in the future." See Church Report at 135 and Section VIII D, infra.

887. MG Miller, Effectiveness of Certain Category II Strategies (January 21, 2003).

888. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63.(January 17, 2003); Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (S) (January 23, 2003), attached to MG Miller's memo, Effectiveness of Certain Category II Strategies (January 21, 2003).

889. Ibid.

890. Church Report at 197; Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1.

891. US Central Command Action Processing Form, Approval for the Use of Certain Interrogation Techniques in CJTF-180's AOR (April 4, 2003); Memorandum from GEN John P. Abizaid to VADM Church, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 6, 2004).

892. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1.

893. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 8. The Church Report called the distinction between stress positions and safety positions at the Bagram Collection Point "largely academic." Church Report at 200.

894. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002); Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1.

895. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1, 4-5, and 9.

896. Memorandum from GEN John Abizaid to VADM Church, Responses to Request for 1nformationfrom VADM Church (August 6, 2004).

897. Email from Joseph Witsch to Lt Col Dan Baumgartner (January 30, 2003).

898. Ibid.

899. The Joint Staff action officer stated that they needed the information immediately, since the "'blue ribbon panel' organized by the AF General Counsel" intended to "work through the weekend to meet this immediate requirement." Email from Joseph Witsch to Dan Baumgartner (January 30, 2003).

900. Ibid.

901. Ibid.

902. Ibid.

903. Ibid.

904. Email from Joseph Witsch to Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner (January 31, 2003).

905. Ibid.

906. Ibid.

907. Ibid.

908 Ibid.

909. Ibid.

910. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Dan Baumgartner (August 8, 2007); See Section VIII F, infra.

911. Church Report at 124; Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).

912. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Detainee Interrogations (January 15, 2003); Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 250; Hearing on the Nomination of William James Haynes II to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (July 11, 2006) at 14.

913. Church Report at 124.

914. [Delete] Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (February 21, 2008); Detainee Interrogations: Survey of Legal and Policy Considerations (draft) (undated). The Department of Defense allowed the Committee to review this document, but would not permit the Committee to keep a copy of the document.

915. [Delete] Detainee Interrogations: Survey of Legal and Policy Considerations at 1-8.

916. Ibid. at 10.

917. Ibid. at 20.

918. Ibid.

919. Ibid.

920. In comments to the Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker about a March 6, 2003 draft of the Working Group report, the Navy TJAG RADM Michael Lohr encouraged the Working Group to incorporate a reference to the OLC opinion into its report, noting that the draft report "contain[ed] large segments of DoJ work product, rather than being 'informed' by DOJ." Memo from RADM Michael Lohr to Mary Walker, Comments on the 6 March 2003 Detainee Interrogation Working Group Report (March 13, 2002) at 1.

921. Mora, Statement for the Record at 16; Hearing on the Nomination of William Haynes II to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 11, 2006) at 14.

922. Church Report at 124.

923. Ibid.

924. Church Report at 126 (citing February 2, 2003 Working Group draft)

925. Committee staff interview of Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 167.

926. Ibid. at 165.

927. Mora, Statement for the Record at 17. Other participants of the Working Group confirmed that "in drafting the subject report and recommendations, the legal opinions of the [OLC] were relied on almost exclusively." Memo from Air Force Deputy JAG Jack Rives to Air Force General Counsel, Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (February 5, 2003).

928. Mora, Statement for the Record at 17.

929. Memorandum from John Yoo to William J. Haynes II, Re: Military Interrogations of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (March 14, 2003) at 34-47 (hereinafter "Yoo Memo (March 14, 2003)").

930. Those canons included "the avoidance of constitutional difficulties, inapplicability of general criminal statutes to the conduct of the military during war, inapplicability of general statutes to the sovereign, and the specific governs the general." Yoo Memo (March 14, 2003) at 11-19.

931. Yoo Memo (March 14, 2003) at 11-19. Despite concluding that such statutes are inapplicable to the military during the conduct of a war, the OLC memo nonetheless considered whether use of certain specific techniques by an interrogator would constitute an offense under those laws. For example, the OLC memo considered whether slapping (or attempting to slap) a detainee would constitute assault or run afoul of U.S. constitutional standards. See Yoo Memo (March 14, , 2003) at 25, 28, 62, 68.

932. According to Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith, who withdrew both the First Bybee memo and the March 14, 2003 final OLC memo, "this extreme conclusion has no foundation in prior OLC opinions, or in judicial decisions, or in any other source of law." Goldsmith continued: "And the conclusion's significance sweeps far beyond the interrogation opinion or the torture statute. It implies that many other federal laws that limit interrogation -- anti-assault laws, the 1996 War Crimes Act, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice -- are also unconstitutional, a conclusion that would have surprised the many prior presidents who signed or ratified those laws, or complied with them during wartime." The conclusion was even more "inappropriate," according to Goldsmith because "it rested on cursory and one-sided legal arguments that failed to consider Congress's competing wartime constitutional authorities, or the many Supreme Court decisions potentially in tension with the conclusion." Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 148-149.

933. Yoo Memo (March 14, , 2003) at 2-6.

934. Ibid. at 5.

935. Ibid. at 18.

936. Ibid.

937. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 159; In December 2003, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith advised the Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes not to rely on the March 14, 2003 final OLC memo. Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008).

938. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 151.

939. Mora, Statement for the Record at 17; SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).

940. Mora, Statement for the Record at 17. Legal Counsel to the Joint Chiefs then-CAPT Jane Dalton also noted that the March 14, 2003 final OLC opinion was "similar to the Beaver analysis" in "approaches and methodology." Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 171.

941. Mora, Statement for the Record at 17.

942. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 173.

943. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 167.

944. Ibid. at 171.

945. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes II, Detainee Interrogations (January 15, 2003).

946. Church Report at 130.

947. Ibid.

948. DoD Working Group draft report (January 27, 2003) at 25-28.

949. Ibid. at 26-28.

950. Ibid. at 27.

951. Ibid. at 28.

952. Ibid.

953. Ibid.

954 Ibid.

955. JPRA, OL-FA JSSA Instructor Guide, Section 5.1 (September 21, 1994) (emphasis added)

956. Ibid.

957. The one exception was that the "deception" technique in the January 27, 2003 draft was replaced with the "false flag" technique in the February 2, 2003 draft. False flag is a type of deception technique used to try and "convince the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United Sates are interrogating him." DoD Working Group draft report (February 2, 2003).

958. Ibid.

959. In the February 2, 2003 draft, the technique known as "deprivation of light and auditory stimuli," which was identified in the earlier draft as an "effective technique used in military training" was moved into this category. DoD Working Group draft report (January 27, 2003) at 28; DoD Working Group draft report (February 2, 2003).

960. DoD Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003) at 60-64.

961. Ibid. at 60-64.

962. Ibid. at 70; Church Report at 130.

963. Church Report at 136.

964. Church Report at 130; Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003).

965. [Delete] According to the Church Report, "The first 19 of the techniques were identical to the 17 specifically enumerated in FM 34-52, except that the draft added one technique ('Mutt and Jeff,' which the draft described as 'a team consisting of a friendly and harsh interrogator') that was in the 1987 version of FM 34-52 but was not found in the [then] current version, and the draft also listed Change of Scenery Up and Change of Scenery Down as separate techniques, rather than using the more general Change of Scene technique listed in FM 34-52." Church Report at 127.

966. [Delete] The report stated that use of techniques listed in the report would be subject to conditions, i.e., "Limited to specified interrogation centers; There is a good basis to believe that the detainee possesses critical intelligence; The detainee is medically and operationally evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques in combination); Interrogators are specifically trained for the technique(s); Subject to a special interrogation plan (including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel); Appropriate supervision; and Appropriate specified senior level approval for use with any specific detainee (after considering the foregoing and receiving legal advice)." Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003) at 60-64, 70.

967. Church Report at 130; [Delete] Working Group Report at 60-64, 70 (February 4, 2003) "Increasing anxiety by use of aversions" replaced a technique referred to as "use of phobias to increase levels of stress" in previous versions of the report. Despite their differing names, the techniques were described similarly and included use of dogs as examples of the technique.

968. Green indicated "no significant constraint on use raised by the respective" law or policy under consideration, assuming adequate procedural safeguards; Yellow indicated that the law or policy under consideration did "not preclude use," but that there were "problematic aspects that cannot be eliminated by procedural safeguards; and "Red" indicated a "major issue" in the law or policy under consideration "that cannot be eliminated." Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003).

969. Ibid.

970. Church Report at 130; Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003). T

971. [delete] The Working Group also rated the waterboard as yellow under the prohibition against torture in the Torture Convention. Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003).

972. Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003).

973. Ibid.; Church Report at 130.

974. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 175.

975. Ibid. at 175-176.

976. Memo from Maj Gen Jack Rives to Mary Walker, Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (February 5, 2003) (hereinafter "Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003)"); Memo from Brig Gen Kevin Sandkuhler to Mary Walker, Working Group Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations (February 27, 2003) (hereinafter Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003)"); Memo from U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General RADM Michael Lohr to Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, Working Group Recommendations Relating to Interrogation of Detainees (February 6, 2003) (hereinafter "Lohr to Walker (February 6, 2003)'').

977. Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Memo from Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate General MG Jack Rives to Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, Comments on Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (February 6, 2003) (hereinafter "Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003)").

978. Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003); Memo from MG Thomas Romig to Mary Walker, Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access [sic] the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (March 3, 2003) (hereinafter "Romig to Walker (March 3, 2003)").

979. Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (Feb 27, 2003); Romig to Walker (March 3, 2003).

980. Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Lohr to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003).

981. Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003).

982. Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003).

983. Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003).

984. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 263.

985. Church Report at 5.

986. [Delete] "An additional caution was incorporated into the March 6, 2003 recommendations regarding technique 36, the waterboard: 'As a matter of policy, technique 36 should be used only in instances of extreme necessity. Some members of the working group believed that it should not be used by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.'" Church Report at 34; Working Group draft report (March 6, 2003) at 68-69.

987. Working Group draft report (March 6, 2003) at 68-69.

988. Ibid.

989. Email from Col James Walker to Daniel Ramos (March 10, 2003).

990. Church Report at 134-135.

991. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to Eliana Davidson (February 12, 2003).

992. Ibid.

993. Email from COL Terrence Farrell to LTC Diane Beaver (March 12, 2003).

994 Ibid.

995. Ibid.

996. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to Eliana Davidson (March 13, 2003).

997. Email from Eliana Davidson to LTC Diane Beaver (March 13, 2003).

998. Memo from GEN Hill to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information on Interrogation Techniques (March 21, 2003).

999. Ibid.

1000. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007).

1001. JPRA Power Point presentation, Project 22B (June 2003).

1002. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007).

1003. [Delete] "According to the Secretary's daily schedule, the advisors at the meeting included Mr. Haynes, Gen Myers, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Stephen Cambone, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Marshall Billingslea, and CAPT Dalton." Church Report at 136. By the time the Secretary met with his advisors, the Working Group had removed waterboarding from consideration. Ibid. at 135-6.

1004. Ibid. at 136.

1005. Memo from RADM Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Request for Information (August 10, 2004) at 5.

1006. Department of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (April 4, 2003).

1007. Church Report at 136.

1008. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008) (Testimony of Alberto Mora); Military Justice and Detention Policy in the Global War on Terrorism, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Personnel, 109th Cong. (July 14, 2005) (Testimony of MG Thomas Romig).

1009. Mora, Statement for the Record at 20.

1010. Ibid

1011. Church Report at 137.

1012. Memo from Marshall Billingslea to Secretary Rumsfeld, Interrogation Methods for GTMO (April 10, 2003).

1013. Ibid.

1014. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to GEN James T. Hill, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (April 16, 2003) (hereinafter "Secretary Rumsfeld to GEN Hill (April 16, 2003)").

1015. Secretary Rumsfeld to GEN Hill (April 16, 2003).

1016. Ibid

1017. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 225.

1018. Memo from RADM Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Request for Information (August 10, 2004) at 5.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:37 am

PART 16 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

IX. Aggressive Interrogations at GTMO (U)

A. Allegations of Detainee Mistreatment (U)


[Delete] As the final Working Group report was being generated, and on the heels of SOUTHCOM and GTMO's press for additional interrogation authorities, a Commander's inquiry was initiated at GTMO following allegations that, between March and April 2003, interrogation personnel and military police had forced detainees to engage in physical training. [1019]

[Delete] The resulting inquiry looked into only one of the alleged incidents of mistreatment -- an interrogation on [Big delete]. [1022] An An interrogator, two analysts, and a member of the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) who were interviewed for the inquiry "believed that the technique was appropriate, approved, applied properly, and was common practice ..." [1023] Notwithstanding the statement that the technique was "common practice," the GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief Lt Col Ted Moss, his deputy, and the ICE operations officer said they were not aware compulsive exercise was being used. [1024]

[Delete] On May 2, 2003, MG Miller directed the Director of the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), John Antonitis, to "cease of the use of the 'Fear-Up Harsh' interrogation technique," and said the inquiry had identified a need for re-training and corrective action to "ensure [interrogators1understand the approved interrogation techniques and practices and their limitations." [1025]

(U) A subsequent memorandum called "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO" criticized the Commander's inquiry. [1026]

[Delete] The memo said the inquiry was too limited and found that the disciplinary action "did not address the command failures that allowed such activity to take place, despite apparent command sanction in of the incidents." [1027] In fact, the Commander's inquiry failed to [Big delete] [1028] Nor did the inquiry review an allegation that, on April 17, 2003, a female GTMO interrogator sat on a detainee's lap "making sexual affiliated movements with her chest and pelvis while again speaking sexually oriented sentences." [1029]

[Big delete]

(U) The second incident involved a female military interrogator who wiped what she told the detainee was menstrual blood on a detainee's face and forehead. [1033]

[Delete] The "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO" memo found that there was "no clear information indicating disciplinary action for the 'lap dance' and simulated blood incidents." [1034]

[Delete] The same memo concluded that ''the incidents occurring during the Spring of 2003 signif[ied] a consistent problem at GTMO." [1035] It stated that it was "clear" that interrogators "may use several if not all of the techniques that require SECDEF notification." [1036] The memo also concluded that "interpretation of the SECDEF approved techniques has resulted in variations on how techniques are applied (i.e., is yelling, loud music and strobe lights environmental manipulation?)" and "[d]espite these revelations by interrogators, the supervisory chain of command reports that these techniques are not used." [1037] An FBI Special Agent serving at GTMO stated that ''there was a time period where the interrogations were obtrusive enough that the interview rooms for an entire trailer were not available if one of these techniques were been utilized." [1038]

[Delete] Other contemporaneous documents indicate that in addition to the use of strobe lights and loud music, techniques such as forced shaving, sensory deprivation and even implied threats of death were either used or planned for use in specific JTF-GMTO interrogations even after MG Miller's May 2, 2003 order to cease use of the "Fear-Up Harsh" interrogation technique. [Big delete]

B. Special Interrogation Plans Modeled on Khatani Interrogation (U)

(U) Despite their repeated objections, law enforcement had been unable to stop JTF-GTMO from proceeding with its aggressive interrogation of Mohammed al Khatani in November 2002. An FBI Special Agent told the Committee that law enforcement believed at the time that the Khatani interrogation would define the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO. [1039] Documents relating to JTF-GMTO's plans for interrogating other high value GTMO detainees substantiated the belief of the FBI Special Agent.

1. JTF-GTMO Plansfor Interrogation of Slahi (U)

[Delete] A memo dated on January 16, 2003 - the day after the Secretary of Defense rescinded interrogation techniques he had previously authorized for GTMO - described a plan for the interrogation of Mohamadou Walid Slahi. While Slahi's interrogation does not appear to have begun until July 2003, the January 16, 2003 memo described specific techniques JTF-GTMO intended to use in his interrogation, many of which mirrored those used in the Khatani interrogation. For example, the memo stated that interrogations would be conducted for up to 20 hours per day on Slahi, just as they had been for Khatani. [1040] The memo said that interrogators could pour water on Slahi's head to "enforce control" and "keep [him] awake." [1041] Interrogators had also poured water over Khatani's head as a "method of asserting control." [1042]

[Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo stated that "K-9 dogs can be present and made to bark to agitate [Slahi]." [1043] Similarly, military working dogs had been used in Khatani's interrogation ''to agitate the detainee and provide shock value." [1044] The presence of dogs in the Slahi memo is notable as MG Miller said that, months earlier, he had "rejected [using dogs in interrogations] as an acceptable technique" and that dogs "were not to be used during active interrogation" [1045]

[Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo also described techniques directed at breaking down Slahi's ego, including ridiculing him, making him wear a mask and signs labeling him a "liar," a "coward," or a "dog." [1046] The memo stated that interrogators would also instruct Slahi to bark and performm dog tricks "to reduce the detainee's ego and establish control." [1047] Khatani had also been forced to wear a dog collar and perform dog tricks, and interrogators had placed signs on him such as "liar," "coward," and "dog." [1048]

[Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo described shaving Slahi's head and beard, making him wear a burka, and subjecting him to strip search ''to reduce [his] ego by assaulting his modesty." [1049] Likewise, JTF-GMTO interrogators had shaved Khatani's head and beard and he had also been strip searched. [1050]

[Delete] The memo stated that Slahi would be denied the opportunity to pray and described techniques to exploit "religious taboos," such as using a female interrogator in "close physical contact." [1051] The memo also stated that interrogators would play music to "stress [Slahi] because he believes music is forbidden" and that light in Slahi's interrogation booth would be filtered "with red plastic to produce a stressful environment." [1052] Khatani had also been denied prayer and a female interrogator touched him during his interrogation to increase his stress level." [1053] Khatani too had been isolated, a red filter was placed over the light in his interrogation booth, and music was used in his interrogation to create stress. [1054]

[Delete] The January 16, 2003 memo indicated that JTF-GMTO interrogators planned to make use of a completely white room during Slahi's interrogation "to reduce outside stimuli and present an austere environment," that interrogators would use a strobe light in his interrogation booth to "disorient [Slahi] and add to [his] stress level," and that a hood would be placed on Slahi in the booth" ''to isolate him and increase feelings of futility." [1055]

2. JTF-GTMO FormaUy Submits Speciol Interrogation Plan/or Slahi (ISN 760) (U)

[Delete] In July 2003, six months after the above-described memo was produced and three months after the Secretary issued new interrogation authorities for GTMO, MG Miller submitted to SOUTHCOM a formal request for approval of a special interrogation plan for Slahi. [1056] In seeming contradiction to his May 2, 2003 order that the fear up harsh approach not be used in interrogations, the plan included many of the techniques described in the January 16, 2003 memo and stated that ''the single most important aspect of these techniques is the initial shock of the treatment ... [the] detainee will have the perception that his situation has changed drastically and that life can still become worse than what he is experiencing." [1057]

[Delete] The first three to five days of interrogation were planned for Camp Delta. [1058] If Slahi was not cooperative, the plan proposed that military police in full riot gear take him from his cell, place him on a watercraft, and drive him around to make him think he had been taken off of the island. In reality, Slahi would be taken to Camp Echo where the interrogation was to continue. A memo describing that part of the plan said that military police working dogs would be used during his movement to "assist developing the atmosphere that something major is happening and add to the tension level of the detainee." [1059]

[Delete] Interrogating Slahi at Camp Echo was intended to emotionally and psychologically weaken him through "drastic changes in his environment." [1060] Mirroring the Khatani interrogation plan, the Slahi plan included efforts to "replicate and exploit the 'Stockholm Syndrome' between detainee and his interrogators." [1061] In his evaluation of the Khatani plan more than seven months earlier, the NCIS psychologist assigned to the CITF, Dr. Michael Gelles, had said that the idea of inducing the Stockholm syndrome implied that "the subject feels that he is to be killed and the information provided may in fact be distorted." [1062]

[Delete] The GTMO plan stated that, while in the interrogation room at Camp Echo, Slahi would sit in a basic chair and "be shackled to the floor and left in the room for up to four hours while sound is playing continually." [1063] His time in the room was intended to "disorient him and establish fear of the unknown" and emphasize to Slahi that '''the rules have changed' and nobody knows he is there." [1064] The practice of shackling him to the floor and subjecting him to loud music was to be repeated over several days, interrupted by actual interrogations. Slahi was to be permitted four hours of sleep every sixteen hours. [1065]

[Delete] The plan stated that an interrogation room would be "modified in such a way as to reduce as much outside stimuli as possible. The doors will be sealed to a point that allows no light to enter the room. The walls may be covered with white paint or paper to further eliminate objects the detainee may concentrate on. The room will contain an eyebolt in the floor and speakers for sound." [1066] The plan said that the "interrogation team will make detainee feel psychologically uncomfortable, emotionally uncomfortable, assert superiority over detainee, escalate stress, play loud music, and continue to condition detainee to menial tasks." [1067]

[Delete] July 18, 2003, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN James Hill forwarded a copy of GTMO's interrogation plan for Slahi to the Secretary of Defense. GEN Hill's cover memorandum stated that the interrogation plan "employs techniques not previously approved in your [April 16, 2003] memorandum" and requested the Secretary's approval "to use sound modulation (at decibel levels not harmful to hearing) and sleep deprivation." [1068] The memorandum also notified the Secretary that GTMO intended to isolate Slahi and use "pride and ego down" with him. [1069]

[Delete] On July 24, 2003, Marshall Billingslea, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), forwarded a memo notifying the Secretary of Defense that JTF-GTMO intended to isolate Slahi and recommending that he approve the use of "sleep deprivation" and "sound modulation at decibel levels not harmful to hearing." [1070] A handwritten note on the memo stated that "OGC concurs that this is legal. We don't see any policy issues with these interrogation techniques. Recommend you authorize." [1071] Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the memo on July 28, 2003 and forwarded it to Secretary Rumsfeld, who added his approval on August 13, 2003. [1072]

[Delete] The Slahi plan stated that it would "not be implemented until approved by higher authority." [1073] Despite that statement, memoranda for the record suggest techniques for which JTF-GTMO sought authority were used at least a month before the Secretary's written approval.

3. Interrogation Begins Before Special Interrogation Plan Is Approved (U)

[Delete] Several memoranda for the record documenting Slahi's interrogation were written by JTF-GTMO personnel in July and August 2003. These memoranda indicate that at least one technique for which JTF-GTMO sought authority to use with Slahi, i.e., sound modulation, was used before written authority was actually granted by the Secretary of Defense. [1074] The memoranda also suggest the use of some techniques, such as forcing Slahi to stand for prolonged periods, for which no request for authority from SOUTHCOM or OSD appears to have been made by JTF-GTMO. [1075] In addition, while MG Miller had, more than two months earlier, said that interrogators were not to use the fear up harsh approach, the memoranda indicate that increasing Slahi's level of fear was an integral part of his interrogation and that one interrogator even implied to Slahi that he could be tortured or killed.

[Delete] The memoranda indicate that, on several occasions from July 8 through July 17, Slahi was interrogated by a masked interrogator called "Mr. X." On July 8, 2003 Slahi was interrogated by Mr. X and was "exposed to variable lighting patterns and rock music, to the tune of Drowning Pool's 'Let the Bodies Hit [the] Floor'." [1076] On July 10, 2003 Slahi was placed in an interrogation room handcuffed and standing while the air conditioning was turned off until the room became "quite warm." [1077] The next day, Slahi was brought into the interrogation booth and again remained standing and handcuffed while the air conditioning was again turned off. [1078] After allowing Slahi to sit, the interrogator later ''took [Slahi's] chair and left him standing for several hours." [1079] According to the memo, Slahi was ''visibly uncomfortable and showed signs of fatigue. This was 4th day of long duration interrogations." [1080]

(U) On July 17, 2003, the masked interrogator told Slahi about a dream he had had where he saw "four detainees that were chained together at the feet. They dug a hole that was six feet long, six feet deep, and four feet wide. Then he observed the detainees throw a plain, unpainted, pine casket with the number 760 [Slahi's internment serial number (lSN)] painted on it in orange on the ground." [1081]

[Delete] On August 2, 2003 an interrogator told Slahi ''to use his imagination and think up the worst possible thing that could happen to him" and asked him "what scares him more than anything else." [1082]

(U) That same day, the interrogator told Slahi that to ''use his imagination to think up the worst possible scenario he could end up in." [1083] The interrogator told Slahi that "beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the world. After all being beaten for a while, humans tend to disconnect the mind from the body and make it through. However, there are worse things than physical pain." [1084] The interrogator told Slahi that he would ''very soon disappear down a very dark hole. His very existence will become erased ... no one will know what happened to him and, eventually, no one will care." [1085]

(U) At one point in his interrogation, Slahi was also shown a fictitious letter that had been drafted by the Interrogation Team Chief stating that his mother had been detained, would be interrogated, and if she were uncooperative she might be transferred to GTMO. [1086] The letter pointed out that she would be the only female detained at '"this previously all-male prison environment." [1087]

[Delete] August 7, 2003, Slahi informed an interrogator that he had made a decision to cooperate. [1088] After questioning Slahi, his interrogator "congratulated [him] on his decision to tell the whole truth." [1089]

4. Special Interrogation Plan Approved and Implemented Despite Apparent Cooperation (U)

[Delete] Five days after interrogators congratulated Slahi for his decision to '"tell the whole truth," the Secretary of Defense approved JTF-GMTO's Special Interrogation Plan. Notwithstanding Slahi's apparent decision on August 7, 2003 to cooperate with interrogators, an August 21, 2003 email described preparations made to implement the Special Interrogation Plan. [1090] The email described sealing Slahi's cell at Camp Echo to "prevent light from shining" in and covering the entire exterior of his cell with tarp to "prevent him from making visual contact with guards." [1091]

[Delete] Weekly Reports from the JTF-GMTO Commander in September and October 2003 indicated that Slahi "continue[d] to be cooperative." [1092] Despite that apparent cooperation, those same weekly reports stated that that the interrogations were continuing in accordance with the approved interrogation plan. A contemporaneous document suggested that the interrogation may have begun affecting Slahi's mental state. [1093]

[Delete] An October 17, 2003 email from a JTF-GTMO interrogator to LTC Diane Zierhoffer, a JTF-GMTO Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) Psychologist, stated that '"Slahi told me he is "hearing voices now... He is worried as he knows this is not normal.... By the way ... is this something that happens to people who have little external stimulus such as daylight, human interaction etc???? Seems a little creepy." [1094] LTC Zierhoffer responded "sensory deprivation can cause hallucinations, usually visual rather than auditory, but you never know... In the dark you create things out of what little you have ..." [1095]

5. FBI Concerns with Special Interrogation (U)

[Big delete]

[Delete] The view that the use of the aggressive techniques could affect Slahi's potential prosecution turned out to be accurate. Lt Col Stuart Couch, a military prosecutor assigned to the Slahi case wrote in March 2004 that "prosecutors in our office are very concerned about the allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO and Afghanistan, and we have individually taken steps to address this issue. The techniques employed by the intelligence community in obtaining information is a policy decision that obviously affects our prosecution efforts, yet we are powerless to influence such activities." [1100] After becoming aware of interrogations techniques to which Slahi had been subject, Lt Col Couch refused to participate in the prosecution. [1101]

6. Special Project at GTMO Uses Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) JTF-GTMO produced written weekly updates on significant activities including certain detainee interrogations. The updates were sent to the SOUTHCOM Commander and, according to MG Miller, were forwarded to the Joint Staff and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. [1102] MG Miller said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was interested in the reports and his office would occasionally call GTMO to inquire about particular detainees.

[Delete] On July 13, 2003, the GTMO Commander sent an email, accompanied by his Weekly Update report, stating that GTMO had "finalized [delete] plans." [1103] According to the email, the objective [delete] was to "fracture [delete] detainee resistance to cooperation and to induce detainees to be forthcoming during interrogations." [1104] The email stated that the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Psychological Applications Directorate Chief LTC Morgan Banks, who had hosted the JPRA training for GTMO interrogation personnel at Fort Bragg in September 2002, "conducted a [delete] assessment visit" and had provided "very valuable insights." [1105] The email stated that LTC Banks planned to return for a "follow-up visit in 60 days." [1106]

[Big delete]

[Delete] [delete] In November 2003, several months after [delete] MG Miller submitted two requests for authority to use sound modulation in interrogations [delete] [big delete] suggesting that MG Miller felt he needed authorization to use that technique in interrogations. [1108] The Committee is not aware, however, of a similar request for authority to use strobe lights, loud music, and 15 hour interrogations in connection with [delete] [delete] According to the Church report, some interrogators considered strobe lights and loud music a form of environmental manipulation which had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense in April. [1109] MG Miller's written requests for authority to use sound modulation in the [delete] [delete] interrogations are at odds with that understanding.

7. CITF Reissues Order for Agents to "Stand Clear" of Aggressive Interrogations (U)

(D) In October 2003, with the Slahi Special Interrogation Plan underway, the Criminal Investigative Task Force again issued guidance to its agents to stand clear of interrogations using aggressive techniques. The guidance mirrored that issued by CITF in December 2002, stating that "detainees will be treated humanely" and that "physical torture, corporal punishment and mental torture are not acceptable interrogation tactics and are not allowed under any circumstances." [1110] The October 2003 guidance stated:

[CITF personnel will] not participate in any interrogation that violates this policy. When CITF personnel are conducting a joint interrogation with another U.S. government organization, and a member of that other organization employs tactics that are, or appear to the investigator to be, inhumane or cruel and unusual, the CITF personnel will immediately disengage from the interrogation, report the incident to their CITF chain of command, and document the incident in a memorandum for record. [1111]


8. GTMO Seeks Approvalfor Two Additional Special Interrogation Plans (U)

[Delete] On November 13, 2003, MG Miller sent two memoranda to GEN Hill at SOUTHCOM requesting approval of special interrogation plans for detainees [delete] [delete] [1112]. Consistent with the Secretary of Defense's April authorization, MG Miller notified GEN Hill of JTF-GMTO's intent to isolate the detainees. In addition, MG Miller requested approval to conduct interrogations up to 16 hours and use various types of sound. The plans also implied the use of other techniques, such as sensory deprivation, that were not authorized by the Secretary in April. Both memos indicated that the techniques in the plans had been previously used in the Slahi interrogation. In many ways, the techniques proposed in the two new special interrogation plans mirrored techniques used in both the Slahi and Khatani interrogations.

a. Special Interrogation Plan #3 (U)

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

b. Special Interrogation Plan #4 (U)

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

[Big delete]

c. SOUTHCOM and OSD Recommend Approval of Special Interrogation Plons #3 & #4 (U)

[Delete] On November 19, 2003, General Hill sent the [delete] interrogation plans to the Secretary of Defense. [1130] In memoranda accompanying the plans, General Hill requested approval [big delete].

[Delete] Tom O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), attached a cover memo to the SOUTHCOM Commander's request, recommending to the Secretary of Defense that he approve the plans. [1132] A coordination sheet attached to that memo indicated that Daniel Dell'Orto, the Principal Deputy DoD General Counsel, had approved the plan on December 31, 2003 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Myers had approved the plan on January 2, 2004. The date of the Chairman's approval (and possibly that of the Deputy DoD General Counsel) occurred after the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice withdrew its March 14, 2003 legal memo upon which DoD had been relying for interrogation techniques. [1133] The OLC's notification to DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes of that withdrawal occurred between December 25 and December 31, 2003. [1134] Mr. Haynes told the Committee that "the fact that the Department didn't have that opinion to rely on... didn't mean that Mr. Dell'Orto or somebody ... could not [have] concluded that something was legal in the absence of that memo." [1135]

_______________

Notes:

1019. Memo for Record from ACS Contractor, Possible Inappropriate Activities (undated).

1020. Memo from Diane Beaver to MG Geoffrey Miller, (U) Results of Commander's Inquiry, re: Allegation of Inhumane Treatment of [Big delete] (April 30, 2003).

1021. Ibid.

1023. Ibid.

1024. Ibid at 2.

1025. Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller for Commander USSOUTHCOM, Commander's Inquiry, Allegation of Inhumane Treatment of [Big delete] (May 3, 2003).

1026. Memo, Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO (undated) (hereinafter "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques").

1027. Ibid.

1028. An April 2003 Memorandum for Record drafted by a contractor at GTMO alleged the technique was used on several occasions, including in late March 2003 as well as on April 7, 2003, and April 17, 2003. Memo for Record from ACS Contractor, Possible Inappropriate Activities (undated).

1029. Ibid

1030. Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques at 2.

1031. Ibid

1032. Ibid.

1033. Ibid

1034. Ibid.

1035. Ibid

1036. Ibid

1037. Ibid. at 3.

1038. Email from FBI Special Agent (July 14, 2004).

1039. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).

1040. Memo, Methods and Approaches to Employ (U): Special Interrogation Operation of ISN 760 [delete] (January 16, 2003) (hereinafter "Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003)'').

1041. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1042. Memo, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003).

1043. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1044. Ibid.

1045. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (May 2, 2006).

1046. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1047. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1048. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003); Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1049. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1050. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003)

1051. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003),

1052. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1053. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 [delete] (January 17, 2003).

1054. Ibid

1055. Interrogation of ISN 760 (January 16, 2003).

1056. Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Joint Interrogation Group, ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July I, 2003) (hereinafter "ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003)").

1057. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003).

1058. Ibid

1059. Memo from LT Richard Zuley, Objective: Transport ISN 760 from Camp Delta to Camp Echo (undated).

1060. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003).

1061. Ibid

1062. Memo from Michael Gelles, Psy.D., Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 dtd November 21, 2002 (November 22, 2002).

1063. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003) at 7.

1064. Ibid

1065. On April 12, 2003 MG Miller sent GEN Hill an email requesting that SOUTHCOM provide a definition of sleep deprivation. On June 2, 2003, GEN Hill sent MG Miller a letter defining sleep deprivation as "keeping a detainee awake for more than 16 hours or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession." MG Geoffrey Miller email to GEN James Hill (April 12, 2003).

1066. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July I, 2003) at 8.

1067. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003).

1068. Memo from GEN James Hill to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Interrogation Plan (IP) for Detainee Mohamadou Walid Slahi, ISN [delete] (July 18, 2003).

1069. Ibid

1070. Memo from Marshall Billingslea to Secretary of Defense, Mohamadou Walid Slahi. (July 24, 2003).

1071. Ibid

1072. Ibid

1073. ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2003) at 3.

1074. Memo for Record, [delete] (MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI// (July 17, 2003).

1075. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 10, 2003).

1076. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 17, 2003).

1077. Memo for Record, G1MO-0598 GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 10, 2003).

1078. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI///(July 11, 2003).

1079. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (July 11, 2003).

1080. Ibid.

1081. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 24.

1082. Memo for Record, GTMO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (August 2, 2003).

1083. DoJ IG report at 123

1084. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 25.

1085. Ibid

1086. DoJ IG report.

1087. Ibid

1088. Memo for Record, G1MO-0598 [delete] MOUHAMADOO OULD SLAHI/// (September 8, 2003).

1089. Ibid.

1090. Email from JTF-G1MO IS2 to LT Richard Zuley and Capt Sean Wilson (August 21, 2003).

1091. Ibid

1092. JTF-GTMO Weekly Thematic Focus: September 29-October 5, 2003 and October 6-12, 2003.

1093. JTF-GTMO Weekly Thematic Focus: September 29-October 5, 2003; October 6-12 2003; October 20-26, 2003; and November 3-9. 2003.

1094. Email from JTF-GTMO Interrogator to LTC Diane Zierhoffer (October 17, 2003).

1095. Ibid

1096. Email from FBI Special Agent (December 5, 2003).

1097. Ibid

1098. Ibid

1099. FBI Electronic Communication from Counterterrorism MLDU to Counterterrorism (May 18, 2004).

1100. Memo from Lt Col Stuart Couch to Brigadier General Scott Black, Office of Military Commissions Prosecution Operational Assessment (March 18, 2004).

1101. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Stuart Couch (June 21, 2007).

1102. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).

1103. Email from MG Geoffrey Miller to GEN James Hill (July 13, 2003).

1104. Ibid

1105. Ibid

1106. Ibid

1107. Church Report at 172.

1108. Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Request for Approval of Interrogation Plan (IP) for [big delete] (November 13, 2003) at 2-3 (hereinafter "MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete]") Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Request for Approval of Interrogation Plan (IP) for ISN [big delete] (November 13, 2003) at 2-3 (hereinafter "MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete].

1109. Church Report at 172.

1110. DoD CITF, Memo for All Personnel Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigative Task Force, Interrogation Procedures Guidance (U) (October 3, 2003).

1111. Ibid.

1112. MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete]; MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for ISN [delete].

1113. MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for [delete] at 2.

1114. Ibid at 4.

1115. Ibid.

1116. Ibid at 2.

1117. Ibid at 5.

1118. Ibid at 6.

1119. Ibid. at 7.

1120. Ibid at 11.

1121. MG Miller, Request for Approval of IP for ISN [delete] at 2.

1122. Ibid at 8.

1123. Ibid. at 1.

1124. Ibid. at 7.

1125. Ibid.

1126. Ibid. at 9.

1127. Ibid. at 10.

1128. Ibid. at 9.

1129. Ibid. at 10.

1130. Memorandum from General James Hill to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Interrogation Plan (IP) for Detainee [delete] (November 19, 2003).

1131. Ibid.

1132. Action Memo from Thomas O'Connell for Secretary of Defense, Interrogation Plans for [big delete] (2003).

1133. Coordination, attached as Tab D to Action Memo from Thomas O'Connell for Secretary of Defense, Interrogation Plans for [big delete] (2003).

1134. Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith stated that he called the DoD General Counsel between Christmas and New Year 2003. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 153.

1135. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 295.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:40 am

PART 17 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

X. DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Withdraws March 14, 2003 Legal Opinion Governing DoD Interrogations (U)

(U) In the final week of 2003, the OLC notified the Department of Defense that the March 14, 2003 OLC legal opinion, upon which DoD had been relying for interrogations, was being withdrawn. [1136] According to the then- Assistant Attorney General for the OLC Jack Goldsmith, the March 2003 memo was one of a "short stack" of OLC opinions that his OLC colleague Patrick Philbin had identified, shortly after Mr. Goldsmith arrived at DoJ, as problematic and possibly containing "serious errors." [1137] Also included in that "short stack" were the two August 1, 2002 "Bybee" memos - the "First Bybee" memo, which presented OLC's narrow interpretation of what constituted torture under U.S. law and the "Second Bybee" memo, which included OLC's "advice to the CIA regarding potential interrogation methods." [1138]

(U) After reviewing the opinions, Mr. Goldsmith identified two that he ultimately rescinded, the March 14, 2003 "Yoo Memo" (withdrawn in December 2003) and the August 1, 2002 "First Bybee" memo (withdrawn in June 2004). [1139]

(U) Mr. Goldsmith told the Committee that he called Jim Haynes in December 2003 and told him the March 14, 2003 OLC opinion was under review and could not be relied on by the Department. [1140] That opinion had been presented to the Working Group as the controlling authority for all questions of domestic and international law and was the legal foundation for the Secretary's April 2003 authorization of techniques for GTMO. Mr. Goldsmith told the Committee that he informed Mr. Haynes in December 2003 that he had determined that only 20 of the 24 techniques authorized by Secretary Rumsfeld were lawful, and that the remaining four techniques were under review. [1141] Mr. Goldsmith also advised Mr. Haynes in December that the Department should come back to OLC for additional legal guidance before approving any technique not among those 24 specifically identified in the Secretary's April 2003 memo. [1142] Mr. Goldsmith told the Committee that Mr. Haynes did not inquire about the use of additional techniques during his tenure at OLC, which ended in June 2004. [1143]

[Delete] Notwithstanding the late December direction from the head of the OLC that DoD could not rely on the March 14 2003 OLC memo a March 26, 2004 memorandum for the record suggested that [big delete]." [1144] The frequent flyer program involved moving a detainee every few hours from one cell to another to disrupt their sleep. [Big delete].

[Delete] Continuous cell transfer was discussed at least as early as August 2003. An August 3, 2003 email from GTMO's ICE Operations Officer described interrogating a detainee for 15 hours, allowing him 5 hours of uninterrupted rest in his cell and then moving the detainee to a new cell every half hour until the 24 hour period expired whereby, according to the Operations Officer the cycle would restart and "the fun begins again." [1146]

(U) According to an FBI agent who was on assignment to GTMO in fall 2003, the agent received a briefing "that non cooperative detainees could be placed on a list for a specific interrogation technique involving interruption of sleep pattern, called the 'frequent flyer program." [1147] The agent stated that detainees were moved with all of their personal belongings and that the duration of the program for detainees "seemed to depend on the cooperativeness of the detainee." [1148] In fact, an investigation by the Department of Justice Inspector General found that "many FBI agents described a program of sleep disruption employed by the military as designed to disorient detainees and thereby obtain their cooperation, which was known as the 'frequent flyer program." [1149]

(U) Keeping detainees awake except for a period of four-hours of uninterrupted sleep using "Continuous cell transfer" or other means was not on the list of 24 techniques OLC advised the DoD General Counsel were permitted. The Committee is unaware of a request from DoD to OLC for legal guidance on whether that technique comported with techniques on that list of 24 approved by the Secretary.

_______________

Notes:

1136. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 153-54.

1137. Ibid. at 142; Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008).

1138. Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008); Sixth Decl. of Marilyn A. Dorn, ¶ 56, American Civil Liberties Union, et al. v. Department of Defense, et al., No. 04-Civ. 4151 (January 5, 2007).

1139. Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith said that his personal standard for rescinding prior OLC memos was to rescind opinions only after he determined they were legally flawed and he could affirmatively provide guidance on "precisely what interrogation practices were legally available under a proper analysis." Goldsmith reiterated the second part of this standard when asked if he considered withdrawing the third "problematic" opinion, known as the "Second Bybee" memo. He told the Committee that he had not completed his analysis of the Second Bybee memo by the time he submitted his resignation and left the Department. Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008); Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 152.

1140. In his book, Goldsmith stated that he placed the call between Christmas and New Years 2003. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 153.

1141. In his interview with Committee staff, Mr. Goldsmith said he eventually determined that all 24 were lawful. That account differs slightly from Goldsmith's account in his book, in which he said that he told Mr. Haynes in December that all 24 techniques were lawful. Ibid. at 154; Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008).

1142. Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008).

1143. Ibid.

1144. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 10.

1145. Memo for Record, Continuous Cell Transfer (Frequent Flyer Program) (March 26, 2004).

1146. Email from Maj. James Rogers to COL Jack Farr (August 3, 2003).

1147. FBI Electronic Communication from Administrative Services (SAAPU) to Inspection Division (July 15, 2004).

1148. Ibid.

1149. DoJ IG Report at 183.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:40 am

PART 18 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

XI. Development of Interrogation Policy in Afghanistan (U)

[Delete] After the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, [big delete] deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Afghanistan with a mission [big delete] [1150] While SMU TF operators conducted a limited amount of direct questioning, or, "screening" of detainees while on the battlefield, it appears that they did not conduct interrogations until at least October 2002.

(U) Prior to that point, SMU personnel had observed interrogations conducted by Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180), which had assumed control of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan at the end of May 2002. [1151] In addition to tactical questioning and screening on the battlefield, CJTF-180 personnel conducted more thorough interrogations at detention facilities at Kandahar and Bagram. Between October 2001 and January 2003, the only written guidance for interrogators operating in Afghanistan appears to have been Army Field Manual 34-52. There were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), however, to guide the implementation of the doctrine outlined in the Field Manual.

[Delete] In fall 2002 the SMU conducted assessments of interrogation operations at GTMO and [delete] at Bagram Airfield. Those assessments generated discussion about whether the SMU TF should conduct its own interrogations, separate and apart from CJTF-180, and which interrogation techniques should be permitted.

A. Assessment Team Visit to Guantanamo Bay (U)

[Delete] [delete] From October 8 through October 10, 2002, an SMU TF assessment team from Afghanistan visited JTF-170 at Guantanamo Bay. [1152] The visit occurred just as JTF-170 personnel at GTMO were finalizing a request, submitted to SOUTHCOM on October 11, 2002, to use interrogation techniques including stress positions, removal of clothing, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, use of detainee phobias such as dogs, exposure to cold weather or water, and non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking and pushing. [1153]

[Delete] [delete] A trip report prepared by the SMU TF assessment team, dated October 11, 2002, summarized the visit to GTMO. The report stated that the SMU TF team met with members of the JTF-170 Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT). [1154] Members of the BSCT had recently attended training conducted by SERE instructors from JPRA and in the week prior to the SMU TF team's visit, two of them had written the first draft of GTMO's request for new interrogation authorities. [1155]

[Delete] [delete] According to the SMU TF assessment team's trip report, GTMO "interrogation team psychologists" discussed interrogation approaches, including use of "religious oriented superstitions, varied schedules, shame, various disruptions of daily routines, and using ethnic interrogators." [1156] The SMU team's trip report also suggested that the team discussed with the JTF-170 Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker, the need for interrogators to have "SERE instructors' training for legal aspects of prisoner handling" and stated that a "JPRA [Mobile Training Team] appears to be the best option" for the training. [1157]

[Delete] [delete] On October 26, 2002, after the SMU TF assessment team returned to Afghanistan, a proposal was briefed to the SMU Commander. [1158] [Big delete]. [1159] The briefing stated that [big delete] with detainees, that "current interrogation methods are not producing actionable intelligence," and that "mainstream interrogation [tactics, techniques, and procedures] have limited success against [at Qa'ida] resistance techniques." [1160] The briefing proposed new interrogation techniques such as the use of strip searches for "degradation;" hoods for "sensory deprivation;" "sensory overload" through lights, darkness, noises, and dogs; and manipulation of the detainees' environment through "cold, heat, wet, discomfort, etc..." [1161] Stripping detainees, the use of hoods, the use of dogs, and environmental manipulation were among the interrogation techniques requested by GTMO. [1162]

[Delete] A memo entitled "Detainee Operations," dated October 27, 2002 (the day after the SMU TF proposal was briefed), described the SMU team's visit to GTMO as well as the team's assessment of interrogation operations at Bagram. [1163] With respect to operations at GTMO, the memo stated that "Due to a lack of effective national-level guidance, the GTMO staff is analogous to a weak set of parents unsure of their role and parental skills who get manipulated by clever and strong-willed children." [1164] The memo stated that the SMU TF team "assisted the [GTMO] staff in seeking advice and training from the JPRA staff regarding effective interrogation techniques." [1165]

[Delete] The October 27, 2002 memo described some interrogators at Bagram as "outmatched" and stated that the SMU TF team's observations of both GTMO and Bagram led to the conclusion that [big delete]. [1166]

[Delete] The October 27, 2002 memo also outlined a rationale for the SMU to conduct its own interrogations. [Big delete]. [1167] The memo recommended the "imaginative but legal use of non-lethal psychological techniques (i.e., battlefield noises/chaos, barking dogs, etc.)" as well as stress techniques such as "sensory deprivation (hoods, silence, flex cuffs), sensory overload (shouting, gun shots, white noise, machinery noise) and manipulation of the environment (hot, cold, wet. windy, hard surfaces)." [1168]

[Delete] A slide presentation dated the following week, described a concept of operations (CONOP) for SMU TF detainee exploitation. [1169] [Big delete]." [1170] The presentation argued that actionable intelligence might be produced ''via psychological/physical stress" and listed "sensory deprivation," "sensory overload - lights darkness, noises, and dogs," "environment - cold, heat, wet and discomfort" and "psychological deception leading to learned helplessness and increase compliance." [1171]

[Delete] The SMU TF also developed a "Decision Briefing" with the goal of gaining the CJTF-180 Commanding General LTG Dan McNeil's approval for the SMU TF to construct and operate its own interrogation facility for high value detainees co-located at the Bagram Collection Point. [1172] The briefing stated that CJTF-180 was focused on the detention mission rather than the interrogation mission, that "no advanced interrogation techniques" including "sensory deprivation/overload, sleep deprivation, psychological manipulation" were employed by CJTF-180, and that current procedures were having only "limited success[es]. [1173]

[Delete] While the SMU briefing noted that "advanced interrogation techniques" were not in use at Bagram prior to November 2002, Army investigations into the deaths of two detainees at Bagram in early December revealed that, by early December 2002, at least one of the techniques, sleep deprivation, was apparently in wide use there.

B. The Deaths of Dilawar and Habibullah (U)

(U/ [delete] In December 2002, two detainees were killed while detained by CJTF-180 at Bagram. Though the techniques do not appear to have been included in any written interrogation policy at Bagram, Army investigators concluded that the use of stress positions and sleep deprivation combined with other mistreatment at the hands of Bagram personnel, caused or were direct contributing factors in the two homicides. [1174] In the wake of the deaths of Habibullah and Dilawar, CJTF-180 and the SMU TF began developing written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for interrogations.

C. Questions Raised About Task Force Participation in OGA Interrogations (U)

[Delete] November 1, 2002, a month before the two detainee deaths at Bagram, the SMU TF Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) analyzed legal authorities and constraints relevant to SMU TF personnel's participation in interrogations [Big delete]. [1175] The SJA's analysis is reflected in a memo which was provided to the Committee in redacted form. Although the particular interrogation techniques in use [delete] were redacted from the version of the memo shared with the Committee, unredacted portions of that memo discuss the SMU TF's concerns about those techniques. [1176]

[Delete] Although the memo stated that while, in the author's opinion, "none of the interrogation techniques used or observed by [redacted] personnel constitutes 'torture,'" it also stated that "another observer might disagree." [1177] In addition, the memo stated that one of the [redacted] [delete] techniques "could rise to the level of torture if applied in such a way and for such a period of time that it rises to the level of severe physical pain or suffering." [1178] It also said that "although the interrogation techniques may not constitute 'torture' they may rise to the level of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment proscribed by international law." [1179]

[Delete] The November 1, 2002 memo assessed the risks that SMU personnel might face by participating in interrogations [big delete], particularly if there is media scrutiny." [1180] The memo referenced applicable DoD policies and Department of the Army (DA) regulations requiring the humane treatment of detainees and noted that although they might not apply to [delete] operating in a non-DoD facility, "U.S. military personnel remain subject to those authorities if [military personnel] participate in or run the interrogations." [1181] According to the memo, "these requirements arguably extend to military personnel even if 'detailed' to [delete]." [1182]

[Delete] The memo warned that "we are at risk as we get more 'creative' and stray from standard interrogation techniques and procedures taught at DoD and DA schools and detailed in official interrogation manuals." [1183]

[Delete] In a June 18, 2004 memorandum to the Naval Inspector General, [Big delete] said that after the SMU TF SJA wrote his opinion, the Commander of the SMU TF "restricted personnel from further involvement [delete] except for information sharing." [1184]

D. January 2003 Task Force Interrogation SOP (Afghanistan) (U)

[Delete] [delete] On January 10, 2003 the SMU Task Force Commander in Afghanistan approved the first interrogation standard operating procedure (SOP) for the SMU Task Force. [1185] In addition to identifying approaches from the Army Field Manual 34-52, the SOP approved four additional interrogation '"techniques" for use by SMU interrogators: isolation, multiple interrogators, stress positions, and sleep deprivation. [1186] Three of the four techniques approved by the SMU TF - isolation, stress positions, and multiple interrogators - were among those authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. [1187] The fourth technique - sleep deprivation (defined by the SMU TF as "no less than 4 hours sleep in a 24-hour period") - was, in effect, authorized by the Secretary on December 2, 2002, when he authorized the use of 20 hour interrogations. [1188]

[Delete] [delete] According to a summary of his statement to Church Report investigators, the SMU interrogator who drafted the SMU SOP reviewed GTMO's list of requested counter resistance techniques prior to drafting the SOP and discussed incorporating some of those techniques into the SMU's policy. [1189] While the interrogator told Church Report investigators that the interrogation techniques in use at GTMO "did not influence" the technique selection for the SMU SOP, an investigation completed by the Department of Defense Inspector General in 2006 concluded that the SMU SOP "was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002." [1190]

[Delete] [delete] In addition, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served in Afghanistan from late November 2002 until early January 2003 (just before the SMU TF SOP was issued) said that the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization generated discussion at the SMU TF and influenced his thinking about interrogation techniques. [1191] A legal review of the SMU TF's January 10, 2003 interrogation SOP, conducted by the SMU Legal Advisor who took over that job in early January, supports the DoD Inspector General's conclusion that the SOP was influenced by the Secretary's December 2, 2002 authorization. [1192] In his legal review, the SMU TF Legal Advisor referred to the techniques authorized by the Secretary of Defense for GTMO, including stress positions, isolation, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20 hour interrogations, removal of clothing, and the use of dogs to induce stress, and stated:

SECDEF's approval of these techniques provides us the most persuasive argument for use of 'advanced techniques' as we capture possible [high value targets] or those that are enablers and have intelligence value of [high value targets] ... the fact SECDEF approved use of the [CAT I/II/III] techniques at GTMO, subject to the same laws, provides an analogy and basis for use of these techniques [in accordance with] international and U.S. law. [1193]


[Delete] The SMU TF Legal Advisor concluded that the interrogation SOP proposed for use by the SMU was in accordance with their "guidance and constraints," and therefore, "legally sufficient." [1194] In addition, the Legal Advisor recommended that the SMU "continue to approach CENTCOM for clarifying guidance on whether the techniques apparently approved for use at GITMO by SECDEF ... are applicable or can become applicable for use in the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility]. If so incorporate those Category II techniques that are deemed necessary for [the SMU's] success." [1195]

E. CJTF-180 Produces Memorandum on Interrogation Techniques (U)

[Delete] Following his January 15, 2003 rescission of authority for GTMO to use the interrogation techniques he had previously authorized in December 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the establishment of the DoD Working Group on Interrogations. [1196] As discussed above, the Working Group requested that the Joint Staff provide a list of interrogation techniques "currently in effect or previously employed in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, techniques the combatant commanders have found to be effective, and techniques the combatant commanders desire to implement with accompanying rationale." [1197] CENTCOM sent the Working Group's request to CJTF-180 and, in response, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) LTC Robert Cotell produced a January 24, 2003 memo describing "current and past" interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180 interrogators. [1198] LTC Cotell's memo was sent to the Working Group and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. [1199]

[Delete] In his January 24, 2003 memo, LTC Cotell identified interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180, including up to 96 hours of isolation; the use of female interrogators to create "discomfort" and gain more information; sleep adjustment, defined as "four hours of sleep every 24 hours, not necessarily consecutive;" use of individual fears; removal of comfort items; use of safety positions; isolation; deprivation of light and sound in living areas; the use of a hood during interrogation; and mild physical contact. [1200]

[Delete] LTC Cotell's January 24, 2003 memo also recommended use of five additional techniques, including "deprivation of clothing" to put detainees in a "shameful, uncomfortable situation;" "food deprivation;" "sensory overload - loud music or temperature regulation;" "controlled fear through the use of muzzled, trained, military working dogs;" and ''use of light and noise deprivation." [1201]

(U) LTC Cotell's memo included techniques that were among those Secretary Rumsfeld had authorized for use at GTMO in December 2002. CJTF-180 had obtained a list of those techniques prior to LTC Cotell drafting his January 24, 2003 memo. [1202]

(U) JTF-GTMO's Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief Lt Col Ted Moss stated that sometime in January 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Intelligence Section at the Bagram Collection Point asked JTF-GTMO about their "parameters" for interrogation. [1203] According to Lt Col Moss, the GTMO Operations Officer faxed the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 memo authorizing interrogation techniques to CJTF-180. CPT Wood said that, in early January, she saw a "secret power point presentation" containing the techniques authorized for use at GTMO but did not recall where she had obtained the power point presentation. [1204] Lt Col Moss did not know if JTF-GTMO had also sent CJTF-180 the Secretary's letter that rescinded the use of those techniques. [1205]

[Delete] In his January 24, 2003 memorandum, LTC Cotell, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate acknowledged that the Secretary of Defense had rescinded authority to use similar interrogation techniques at GTMO, stating that "[p]rior to their rescission, CJTF-180 used selected techniques contained in SOUTHCOM's Cat II & III techniques ..." [1206] Notwithstanding that knowledge, however, the Church Report concluded that "in the absence of any contrary guidance from CENTCOM, JCS, or OSD," CJTF-180 "considered the techniques in their [January 24, 2003] memo as available for use." [1207] A summary of an interview with the Deputy SJA at CENTCOM stated that ''the methodologies approved for GTMO... would appear to me to be legal interrogation processes. [The Secretary of Defense] had approved them. The General Counsel had approved them... I believe it is fair to say the procedures approved for Guantanamo were legal for Afghanistan." [1208]

(U) In 2004, the Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command LTG (later GEN) John Abizaid stated that the January 24, 2003 memorandum had been '"thoroughly reviewed" by the Working Group. [1209]

[Delete] Within three weeks of the January 24, 2003 memo, the SMU TF in Afghanistan added the use of dogs to its interrogation policy. [1210] Just over two months after the Secretary had authorized dogs for use in interrogations at JTF-GTMO, the technique had become part of interrogation SOPs for both the conventional forces and the SMU TF in Afghanistan.

F. CENTCOM Raises Concerns About Interrogation Techniques (U)

[Delete] A week after the DoD Working Group on interrogations completed its report and just five days before the Secretary issued his April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM, Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command Lt Gen Michael DeLong sent a memorandum to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, requesting assistance in obtaining the Secretary of Defense's approval of interrogation techniques requested by CJTF-180 in their January 24, 2003 memo. [1211]

[Delete] The request came shortly after CAPT Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed Barry Hammill, CENTCOM's Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), that the Secretary of Defense's guidance on interrogation techniques would likely apply only to GTMO. [1212] CAPT Dalton had been informed by DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes that he would only concur in providing the techniques to SOUTHCOM, not to CENTCOM. [1213] CAPT Dalton recalled that CENTCOM had requested techniques in their January 24, 2003 memo and told CENTCOM's lawyers that she could ask the Chairman to engage with the Secretary of Defense on their behalf, if they were interested in using the techniques authorized for GTMO. [1214]

[Delete] In his memorandum to Gen Pace, dated April 11, 2003, LTG DeLong said that CENTCOM understood that "OSD may be close to making a decision that would be unfavorable to the use of the requested interrogation techniques at the [Bagram Collection Point]" and was concerned that disapproval of the techniques requested by CJTF-180 would "lead to mission degradation." [1215] The memo noted that the Commander of JTF-180, LTG McNeill, had "specifically endorsed" the CJTF-180 request to use aggressive techniques, including individual fears, black out goggles, deprivation of light and sound, sleep adjustment, threat of transfer to another agency or country, and safety positions. [1216] Lt Gen DeLong requested the assistance of VCJCS Gen Pace "in ensuring OSD approval" for the requested techniques. [1217]

_______________

Notes:

1150. [Delete] Department of Defense, Interrogation Special Focus Team Report on Special Mission Unit Interrogation Practices in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (October 28, 2004) at 3 (hereinafter "Church Special Focus Team Report"). As part of his investigation of detention operations and detainee interrogation techniques, Vice Admiral Albert Church examined interrogation techniques used by SMU in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. VADM Church's main report, released in March 2005, did not discuss the SMUs. Rather an Interrogation Special Focus Team, under the auspices of VADM Church's review, issued a separate, classified annex that discussed SMU interrogation practices in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though completed in October, 2004, the SMU annex was not provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee until July 26, 2006.

1151. [Delete] Church Special Focus Team Report at 6-7. [Big delete]

1152. Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002)

1153. Ibid at 3; LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request/or Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies.

1154. Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002).

1155. USASOC Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002); BSCT, Counter-resistance Strategies.

1156. Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002)

1157. Ibid. LTC Beaver, the GTMO SJA, specifically recommended in her review of the October 11, 2002 techniques memo submitted by JTF-170 (GTMO) to SOUTHCOM, that "the interrogators be properly trained in the use of the approved methods of interrogation," which included techniques similar to those used in SERE programs. LTC Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 5.

1158. Church Special Focus Team Report at 6.

1159. [Delete] Battlefield Exploitation Proposal (undated) at 2.

1160. Ibid at 4.

1161. Ibid at 5.

1162. LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies.

1163. Memo, Detainee Operations (October 27, 2002) at 1.

1164. Ibid.

1165. Ibid. at 1-2.

1166. Ibid. at 2.

1167. Ibid. at 3.

1168. Memo, Detainee Operations (October 27, 2002) at 3.

1169. [Delete] Battlefield Detainee Exploitation CONOP (November 3, 2002).

1170. Ibid. at 5. It is not clear from the slides whether any of the interrogation training was formal or informal training. There is no indication that any of the SMU personnel available for the mission had any formal DoD interrogation or debriefing training.

1171. [Delete] Battlefield Detainee Exploitation CONOP (November 3, 2002) at 7-8.

1172. [Delete] Interrogations Operations Decision Briefing (undated).

1173. Ibid.

1174. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Bagram Branch Office Memo, CID Report of Investigation - FINAL-0134-02-CID36923533 (October 8, 2004).

1175. Memorandum for [Redacted], Legal Analysis of [Redacted] Personnel Participating in Interrogation [delete] Detention Facility [Redacted] (November 1, 2002) at 1 (hereinafter "Personnel Participating in Interrogation at [delete] [delete] Detention Facility").

1176. Personnel Participating in Interrogation at [delete] Detention Facility.

1177. Ibid at 4.

1178. Ibid. at 5.

1179. Ibid. at 2.

1180. Ibid. at 1.

1181. Ibid. at 4.

1182. Ibid.

1183. Ibid at 6.

1184. Memo from USSOCOM Staff Judge Advocate for the Naval Inspector General, Response to Questions for the Record (U) (June 18, 2004).

1185. Department of Defense [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team Standing Operating Procedures (10 January 2003). Church Special Focus Team Report at 7.

1186. Two of those techniques - stress positions and sleep deprivation - were already in use by CJTF-180 interrogators prior to the approval of the SMU TF SOP. Church Special Focus Team Report and Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 8, 2008).

1187. Church Special Focus Team Report at 8.

1188. Church Special Focus Team Report, Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

1189. Summary of Statement of SMU Member with Church Special Focus Team Report Investigator (September 15, 2004).

1190. Ibid; DoD IG Report at 15-16.

1191. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 1 (May 29, 2008).

1192. Memo from [delete] Legal Advisor for COMJTF-5, Legal Review of [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003) at 11 (hereinafter "Legal Review of [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003)").

1193. Legal Review of [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003) at 11.

1194. Ibid

1195. Ibid. at 16. The SMU TF Legal Advisor also stated presciently that, "we are at risk as we get more 'creative' and stray from standard interrogation techniques and procedures taught at DoD and Service schools and detailed in official interrogation manuals."

1196. See section VIII.

1197. [Delete] Memo, Proposed Detainee Interrogation Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (undated) at I.

1198. Church Report at 197; Memorandum from CJTF-180-OPS LAW for CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1 (hereinafter "CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003)").

1199. U.S. Central Command Action Processing Form, Approval for the Use of Certain Interrogation Techniques in CJTF-180's AOR (April 4, 2003). Memo from Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 6, 2004).

1200. CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 8. The Church Report called the distinction between stress positions and safety positions at the Bagram Collection Point "largely academic." Church Report at 200.

1201. CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 4-5,9.

1202. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002); CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003).

1203. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).

1204. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006) at 15; Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2008).

1205. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).

1206. CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 10.

1207. Church Special Focus Team Report, see also Church Report at 6 for an unclassified accounting of the January 24, 2003 CJTF-180 memorandum for CENTCOM and the Joint Staff.

1208. Summary of Church Report interview of CENTCOM Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (July 15, 2004).

1209. Memorandum from Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 6, 2004).

1210. Church Special Focus Team Report at 11.

1211. Memo for the Vice Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (April 11, 2003).

1212. Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to William Hammill, CAPT Shelley Young, William Gade (April 2, 2003).

1213. Memo from CAPT Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Request for Information (August 10, 2004) at 5.

1214. Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to William Hammill, CAPT Shelley Young, William Gade (April 2, 2003).

1215. Ibid.

1216. Ibid.

1217. Ibid.
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 30242
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

PreviousNext

Return to Investigations of Government

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest