The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:43 am

PART 19 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

XII. Development of Interrogation Policy in Iraq (U)

[Delete] On March 20, 2003, a month before Lt Gen DeLong's request, the United States and its coalition partners had launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During the initial stages of OIF, conventional ground forces were directed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Combined Joint Task Force 7 CJTF-7 replaced CFLCC in the summer of 2003. As had been the case in Afghanistan, [big delete] deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Iraq to [big delete] [1218]

(U) As previously described, for more than a year after the onset of the war in Afghanistan, the only written guidance for interrogators appears to have been Army Field Manual 34-52 (FM 34-52). When written policies were finally established for interrogators in Afghanistan in January 2003, those policies included some interrogation techniques that were not listed in the Field Manual but had been previously authorized for use at Guantanamo Bay.

(U) By comparISGn, the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq had an interrogation policy in place before the beginning of OIF. This policy was identical to the February 2002 policy in use at the SMU Task Force in Afghanistan and reflected the influence of techniques authorized for use at GTMO. [1219] The first policy to guide interrogations conducted by conventional forces in Iraq, however, was not established until September 2003, more than five months after that war began. That September 2003 policy was also influenced by techniques authorized for use at GTMO.

A. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Policies (U)

1. SMU Task Force Uses Afghanistan Interrogation Policy (U)


[Delete] The SMU TF in Iraq [big delete] conducted screening and battlefield interrogations [delete] [1220] SMU TF interrogators questioned detainees for intelligence [big delete].

(U) According to a review completed by the DoD Inspector General in August 2006, the SMU TF based its first interrogation policy on the SOP used by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. The DoD Inspector General stated:

At the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the special mission unit forces used a January 2003 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which had been developed for operations in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan SOP was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002. . . and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as 'unlawful combatants.' [1223]


[Delete] Specifically, in February 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March, the SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy of the interrogation SOP in use by the SMU personnel in Afghanistan, changed the letterhead, and adopted the SOP verbatim. [1224] This SOP, which included stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs, governed SMU interrogations in Iraq from the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 until it was replaced later that year. [1225]

2. OGA Comments on SMU TF Interrogation Techniques (U)

[Delete] In May 2003, CAPT Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent an email to CENTCOM lawyers stating that CIA General Counsel Scott Muller had called Jim Haynes and told him that the techniques used by military interrogators at the SMU TF facility in Iraq were "more aggressive" than techniques used by CIA to interrogate the same detainees. [1226]

[Delete] The email requested that CENTCOM provide a list of interrogation techniques in use at Bagram in Afghanistan and at the SMU Task Force facility in Iraq. On June 8, 2003, the [delete] Legal Advisor provided CENTCOM with a list of interrogation techniques in use by the SMU TF in Iraq and Afghanistan. [1227] That list included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions (called comfort positions in the memo), sleep management, loud music and light control, and 20 hour interrogations. [1228] [Delete] Legal Advisor did not recall receiving any feedback about the list of interrogation techniques submitted to CENTCOM. [1229] Despite the presence of aggressive techniques in the JSOC Legal Advisor's June 8 memo, on June 10, 2003 CENTCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Delong, sent a message to the Director of the Joint Staff LTG George Casey stating that "I have confirmed that the military interrogations at both [the SMU TF facility in Iraq] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in accordance with [Army Field Manual] 34-52 and SECDEF direction." [1230]

3. July 2003 Interrogation SOP Drafted/or Iraq SMU TF (U)

[Delete] [delete] A July 15, 2003 SMU interrogation SOP appears to have been the first interrogation policy drafted specifically by the SMU TF in Iraq. [1231] The list of interrogation techniques in that SOP included "vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone); presence of military working dogs; 20-hour interrogations; isolation; and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1232]

(U) While the SOP described some techniques as having a "foundation" in Army Field Manual 34-52, Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay, who conducted an investigation into the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib, described techniques in the July 15, 2003 SMU SOP as "inconsistent with Army doctrine on detainee treatment or interrogation tactics." [1233]

[Delete] [delete] The July 15, 2003 policy contained the signature block of the SMU TF Commander [big delete] but was unsigned. [1234] [Delete] told the Committee that he did not think he ever approved or even saw an interrogation policy. [1235] He stated, however, that he was aware that the SMU TF used sleep deprivation, loud music, light control, isolation, "comfort positions," and military working dogs. [1236] The SMU Task Force Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003 stated that he was sure [delete] [delete] saw the policy, that he asked him to sign it, and that a copy of the policy sat in the Commander's inbox during the Legal Advisor's deployment to the Task Force. [1237]

[Delete] [delete] The SMU Task Force's Legal Advisor who arrived at the TF facility in late August 2003 likewise said that his predecessor had tried, without success, to get [delete] [delete] to sign the policy. [1238] That same Legal Advisor stated that he too tried numerous times, also unsuccessfully, to get the Commander to sign the policy. The Legal Advisor added that it got to the point where he would print out a fresh copy of the policy every night and give it to [delete] aide. The Legal Advisor said that he knew the Commander had received copies of the policy from his aide, but that he had a habit of repeatedly "losing" the draft policy. [1239] He said that the exercise became "laughable" and eventually, he was forced to raise the issue with the [delete] legal Advisor. [1240] In the absence of [delete] [delete] guidance, the Legal Advisor told the Committee that his direction to SMU personnel was that the unsigned SOP applied to SMU TF interrogations.

[Delete] [delete] The SMU Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer (J2X) who served at the SMU facility told the Committee that a list of authorized interrogations approaches was posted on a wall at the SMU TF facility. [1241] He specifically recalled stress positions, loud music, light control, isolation, allowing a minimum amount of time for sleep, and military working dogs as techniques authorized for use in interrogations. He stated that, although military working dogs were not typically present at the SMU TF facility, he recalled making a phone call to arrange for a military working dog to be present for an interrogation.

[Delete] [delete] While neither the January 10, 2003 nor the July 15, 2003 SMU policies included "removal of clothing" there is evidence that it was used as an interrogation technique at the SMU TF. [Big delete] who took command at the SMU TF in October 2003, stated that when he arrived on site he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique ''to gain control over the detainee." [1242] [Delete] stated that he did not know where the technique came from and that he was uncomfortable with stripping detainees even though "arguably, it was an effective technique." [1243] [Delete] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. [1244]

[Delete] However, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the SMU TF from December 2003 until February 2004 stated that he attended a meeting called by [delete] [delete] in December 2003 or January 2004 to discuss the use of stripping prisoners as part of interrogations. [1245] The Legal Advisor stated that stripping detainees gave him pause but said that the technique was 'widespread" at that time. [1246] He said that he advised the Commander that, if stripping were to be authorized, it should be limited to males only and that naked detainees should not be paraded through the Task Force facility. The Legal Advisor stated that two SMU TF behavioral scientists who also attended the meeting advised [delete] not to permit interrogators to strip detainees because of the implications of nudity in Arab culture. The Legal Advisor stated that the Commander nevertheless decided at the meeting that the SMU TF would continue to use nudity as an interrogation technique though the Legal Advisor stated that he thought [delete] may have said that he [delete] have to approve its use.

[Delete] Both LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), and COL Thomas Pappas, the Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205th MI BDE) in Iraq told the Committee that they were unaware of what interrogation techniques were authorized for use at the SMU TF facility. [1247] Interrogators from the 205th MI BDE, however, served at the SMU TF in support of interrogation operations there. In mid-June 2003, at the request of the SMU TF, CJTF-7 assigned two Arabic-speaking interrogators to the SMU. [1248] COL Pappas recalled sending a second set of approximately two to four interrogators from the 205th MI BDE to the SMU TF around November 2003 to replace the 205th MI BDE personnel already serving at the SMU. [1249]

(U) According to LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 would have retained UCMJ authority over the interrogators and the interrogators would have been required to conduct interrogations under the CJTF-7 authorities rather than those at the SMU TF. [1250] COL Pappas, however, believed that once his interrogators were sent to the SMU TF, that they were bound by the rules of the SMU TF and not CJTF-7 interrogation guidance. [1251]

4. Iraq Survey Group Concerns with SMU TF Detainee Treatment (U)

(U) The Iraq Survey Group was established in June 2003. According to its first Commander MG Keith Dayton, the ISG's mission was to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of WMD and to provide support to the CIA special Advisor on WMD. [1252] MG Dayton reported directly to the CENTCOM Commander, GEN John Abizaid. As part of its effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG debriefed and interrogated high value detainees, such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some of those detainees had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF and other operational units before being handed over to the ISG. From the onset, ISG personnel had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of detainees.

(U) MG Dayton told the DoD Inspector General that "as our interrogators started getting into the swing of things at Camp Cropper... some of the prisoners were alleging that they had been roughed up" by the SMU TF. [1253] MG Dayton stated that his Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) Chief [delete] had described the situation as "a disaster waiting to happen" and believed that ISG needed to "slam some rules on this place right away to basically keep ourselves from getting in trouble and make sure these people are treated properly." [1254]

(U) [Delete] said that he first became aware of allegations of detainee mistreatment while at the ISG facilities in the first week in June 2003. [1255] At that time, a Chief Warrant Officer told him that a detainee she was interrogating had alleged physical abuse during his capture and subsequent interrogation by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that "by mid-June 2003. a pattern of reports of abuse of prisoners (abuse primarily attributed to [the SMU TF] during their capture and interrogation of [high value targets] and other detainees, was coming to me..." [1256]

[Delete] MG Dayton described what he called a "notorious case" of alleged detainee abuse, in which a badly burned detainee was brought to the ISG facility. [1257] MG Dayton stated that according to the "special forces guys," the detainee had been captured on a very hot day, was thrown down on the metal floor on the Humvee, and during the long drive back from the operation, the detainee had "burned himself lying on the floor of the Humvee." [1258]

(U) Throughout the summer and autumn of 2003, ISG personnel continued to be concerned about the treatment of detainees by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that, during the last week in June 2003, a British interrogator reported to him that a detainee who had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF "was beaten so severely, that he had the MPs at Camp Cropper note the [detainee's] condition." [1259] [Delete] said he was told that the detainee's "back was almost broken, his nose was probably broken, and he had two black eyes, plus multiple contusions on his face." [1260]

[Delete] According to the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003, during one of the nightly briefings held at the SMU TF Joint Operations Center, [delete] the SMU TF Commander, said "continue to work him over" and "work him hard" in reference to a particular detainee being interrogated at the SMUTF. [1261] The Legal Advisor said that about 50 people were present when [delete] made that statement, that he (the Legal Advisor) was concerned about the message it conveyed, and that he subsequently spoke to the Commander about it. The Legal Advisor said that [delete] made a similar statement on a video teleconference,

[Delete] MG Dayton recalled that [delete] sought to address reports of SMU TF detainee mistreatment with him. According to MG Dayton, [delete] heard that "rumors" of detainee mistreatment were circulating and "he wanted to set [MG Dayton's] mind at rest." [1262] MG Dayton recalled that he spoke to [delete] a few times and that [delete] [delete] told him "You're going to hear rumors, but it's all -- it's all untrue." [1263]

(U) In addition to allegations of mistreatment by the SMU TF, [delete] the JIDC Chief said that he was informed in early June that the ICRC had visited a facility run by the 323 MI Battalion where high value detainees were undergoing interrogations. [1264] [Delete] said that the ICRC had subsequently prepared an inspection report [delete]. (He said that he understood the abuse had allegedly taken place while the detainees were under the control of the 115th MP Battalion.) [Delete] said he was told [delete]:

[Big delete]

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B. Interrogation Policies for Conventional Forces in Iraq (U)

1. CJTF-7 Stands Up (Summer 2003) (U) (U) In May 2003, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) began preparations to take over from CFLCC as the operational headquarters for all conventional ground units in the Iraqi theater. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, stated that during summer 2003, the general belief was that the number of forces in Iraq had to shrink as quickly as possible and that, accordingly, CENTCOM and CFLCC reduced troop levels "very, very rapidly." [1266] LTG Sanchez said that the drawdown left insufficient personnel behind for CJTF-7 to fulfill its mission as well as inadequate command structures, planning capacities, and intelligence capabilities. He said that during the handover "there were no intelligence structures that were transferred to [CJTF-7] from CFLCC" and, as a result, the remaining intelligence structure did not enable CJTF-7 to address the requirements of a Combined Joint Task Force operating at a "strategic, operational, and tactical level." [1267]

(U) LTG Sanchez stated that by July 2003, it was evident "that CJTF-7 was engaged in a counterinsurgency operation that would be difficult if not impossible to win without significant improvements in the intelligence capabilities of [CJTF-7]." [1268] LTG Sanchez said that he was particularly concerned about his HUMINT capabilities, including the level of interrogation expertise within CJTF-7, and that he "seriously questioned the training and experience of our interrogators." [1269]

(U) LTG Sanchez said he posed a challenge to his staff: "How do we ensure that we have the right mechanisms in place that allow our interrogators to push the limit of our authorities yet prevent a violation of the Geneva Convention and our duty to treat detainees humanely?" [1270] He said that "references to the [Field Manuals] and doctrine were common responses but the issues being faced were beyond the scope of the Army's limited doctrine." [1271] LTG Sanchez added that there was frustration about the ability to get a handle on the insurgency and that he put a tremendous amount of pressure on his intelligence officers. [1272]

(U) The Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, COL Pappas, said that soon after arriving in theater in July 2003, CJTF-7's Chief of Staff BG Daniel Hahn directed him to attend a meeting to brief LTG Sanchez on interrogation operations. [1273] COL Pappas told the Committee that he learned at that meeting that LTG Sanchez was concerned that interrogations had not generated the expected intelligence information. [1274] COL Pappas said that LTG Sanchez "believed that if the brigade improved its interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, that we would get the information necessary to stop the insurgency." [1275] COL Pappas agreed and told LTG Sanchez that his interrogators would need the authority to use additional interrogation techniques to accomplish that goal. [1276]

2. Interrogation Operations Begin at Abu Ghraib (U)

(U) In mid-Summer 2003, the 205th MI BDE began preparing for Operation Victory Bounty, an undertaking designed to track down remaining elements of the Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary organization loyal to Saddam Hussein. [1277] In late July 2003, ten to twelve members of the 519th MI Battalion went to Abu Ghraib to establish interrogation operations in anticipation of receiving individuals captured during Victory Bounty. [1278] On August 4, 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the 519th MI Battalion Assistant Operations Officer, assumed duties as the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at the facility. [1279] In late 2002, she had served as the Interrogation Operations Officer at the Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan.

(U) According to CPT Wood, no SOP was in place for interrogations when she took command, but interrogations were conducted "within the approved approaches within the Field Manual 34-52 only, with the possible addition of stress positions." [1280] CPT Wood stated that interrogators had used sleep deprivation and stress positions in Afghanistan and that she "perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan." [1281] She said that she used her "best judgment and concluded [the techniques] would be effective tools for interrogations at [Abu Ghraib]." [1282] She also said that she later put together a request for additional interrogation options because "the winds of war were changing" and there was "mounting pressure from higher for 'actionable intelligence' from interrogation operations." [1283] CPT Wood said that she did not want to repeat her experience in Afghanistan, where interrogators lacked written guidance. [1284]

3. 519th MI Battalion at Abu Ghraib Seeks Additional Guidance (U)

(U) CPT Wood said that guidance for interrogators about the rules for interrogations was important because the interrogators in the 519th Battalion had come to Abu Ghraib with a range of different experiences:

A lot of the interrogators and analysts also served in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan where some other techniques were approved for use ... I understood the Afghanistan rules were a little different because the detainees were not classified as EPWs. It was, ''use techniques in the spirit of the Geneva convention," not, ''you will apply the Geneva Convention." In order to use those similar techniques from GTMO and Afghanistan in Iraq, we sought approval from the higher command. [1285]


(U) COL Pappas, CPT Wood's superior officer, said he knew that CPT Wood believed she needed additional techniques and told her to submit a request. [1286]

4. 519th MI BN Proposes Interrogation Policy (U)

(U) On July 26, 2003, CPT Wood submitted a proposed interrogation policy to her chain of command. The proposed policy was based on the interrogation policy in use at the SMU TF facility in Iraq. [1287] CPT Wood said that she and her staff simply "cleaned up some of the grammar, changed the heading and signature block, and sent it up" to CJTF-7 as a proposed policy for the 519th MI BDE. [1288]

[Delete] Mirroring the SMU TF policies, CPT Wood's proposed policy included sleep management, ''vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone), presence of military working dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1289] The proposed policy stated that "EPWs that refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." [1290] The prohibition against threats, insults and exposure to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment, however, was limited to EPWs and CPT Wood stated that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. [1291]

(U) CPT Wood stated that submitting the proposed interrogation policy seemed a "natural progression" to her as she understood the techniques were already approved for use at the SMU TF in Iraq, and the policy was "similar to that of a document that was drafted in Afghanistan for the [Bagram Collection Point] as well as ... GTMO." [1292] CPT Wood did not hear back from CJTF-7 at that time. [1293] Just a few weeks later CJTF-7 itself solicited a "wish list" of interrogation techniques.

5. CJTF-7 Solicits "Wish List" of Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) On August 14, 2003, CPT William Ponce, the Battle Captain in the CJTF-7 HUMINT and Counterintelligence office (CJ2X), sent out an email to subordinate intelligence elements (including the 205th MI BDE and the 519th MI BN) requesting that they submit their "interrogation techniques wish list[s]." [1294] CPT Ponce wrote:

Immediately seek input from interrogation elements (Division / Corps) concerning what their special interrogation knowledge base is and more importantly, what techniques would they feel would be effective techniques that SJA could review (basically provide a list). [1295]


CPT Ponce added:

...The gloves are coming off gentleman regarding these detainees. Col. Boltz has made it clear that we want these individuals broken. Casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks. [1296]


(U) The Commander of the 205th MI BDE, COL Pappas, said he thought that CPT Ponce's email soliciting "interrogation techniques wish lists" was the result of the meeting he attended with LTG Sanchez shortly after arriving in theater. [1297] He called the Battle Captain's use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off" a "dumb" thing to say and a "poor choice of words." [1298] LTG Sanchez told the Committee that he expected his intelligence staff to send out the request for interrogation techniques, but stated that the use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off' was "not good." [1299] LTG Sanchez believed that the email reflected frustration on the part of intelligence personnel at not being able to meet his intelligence requirements.

(U) Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Lewis Welshofer, who was with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment responded to CPT Ponce's email with his own assessment of the interrogation situation:

Today's enemy, particularly those in [Southwest Asia], understand force, not psychological mind games or incentives. I would propose a baseline interrogation technique that at a minimum allows for physical contact resembling that used by SERE schools (This allows open handed facial slaps from a distance of no more than about two feet and back handed blows to the midsection from a distance of about 18 inches. Again, this is open handed.) ...Other techniques would include close confinement quarters, sleep deprivation, white noise, and a litany of harsher fear-up approaches. . . fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off. [1300]


(U) Maj. Nathan Hoepner, the Operations Officer (S-3) of the 501st MI Battalion took issue with the language in CPT Ponce email, stating in an email of his own:

As for "the gloves need to come off..." we need to take a deep breath and remember who we are. Those gloves are most definitely NOT based on Cold War or WWII enemies -- they are based on clearly established standards of international law to which we are signatories and in part the originators. Those in turn derive from practices commonly accepted as morally correct, the so-called "usages of war." It comes down to standards of right and wrong -- something we cannot just put aside when we find it inconvenient, any more than we can declare that we will "take no prisoners" and therefore shoot those who surrender to us simply because we find prisoners inconvenient.

"The casualties are mounting..." we have taken casualties in every war we have ever fought -- that is part of the very nature of war. We also inflict casualties, generally more than we take. That in no way justifies letting go of our standards. We have NEVER considered our enemies justified in doing such things to us. Casualties are part of war -- if you cannot take casualties then you cannot engage in war. Period. BOTTOM LINE: We are American soldiers, heirs of a long tradition of staying on the high ground. We need to stay there. [1301]


6. Interrogation OIC at Abu Ghraib Resubmits the Proposed Interrogation Policy for 519th MI BN (U)

(U) On August 27, 2003, CPT Wood re-submitted the proposed interrogation policy that she had previously sent in July. She said she thought the issue came up because CJTF-7 headquarters "want[ed] these guys broken" and said her August submission may have been a response to CPT Ponce's email. [1302]

[Delete] Though largely the same as the proposed policy submitted on July 26, 2003, the August 27, 2003 proposed policy included one additional interrogation technique - "sensory deprivation," which the proposed policy described as a "combination use of isolation and sleep management [big delete]." [1303] The proposed interrogation policy also inserted the term "stress positions" in place of "vary comfort positions" and limited use of sleep deprivation to 72 hours. [1304]

(U) CPT Wood said that two days after she submitted the proposed policy, two lawyers from CJTF-7 visited Abu Ghraib with a copy of her memo. [1305] According to CPT Wood, the two attorneys said that "they did not see anything wrong with it and that they would add their approval and forward it higher to CJTF-7 for consideration and review." [1306]

(U) Techniques in CPT Wood's proposed policy can be traced back though the SMU TF in Iraq to Afghanistan and, ultimately, to techniques authorized for use at GTMO by Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002. The GTMO techniques were, in turn, influenced by techniques used by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency and the military service SERE schools to train U.S. personnel to resist illegal enemy interrogations. In the summer of 2003, as CPT Wood was seeking approval for her proposed policy, the SMU TF in Iraq was soliciting JPRA's advice on interrogations.

C. JPRA Provides "Offensive" SERE Training in Iraq (U)

1. Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq Seeks Assistance from JPRA (U)


[Delete] In the summer of 2003 the Commander of the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq, [delete] called the Commander of JPRA, Col Randy Moulton, to request assistance with Task Force interrogations. [1307]

[Delete] On August 25, 2003, the SMU Task Force in Iraq formally requested a JPRA "interrogation team." [1308] The request asked that JPRA send two or more individuals to the TF for three weeks to "provide assistance to current interrogation efforts of key [high value targets]." [1309] On August 27, 2003, [big delete] request for support, forwarded it to JFCOM, and asked that JFCOM task JPRA to support the request. [1310] That same day, the JFCOM Operations Directorate (J-3) authorized JPRA to provide the requested support to the SMU TF.

[Delete] Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operations Support Office (OSO) subsequently selected three JPRA personnel for the mission. As Team Chief, Mr. Wirts chose Lt Col Steven Kleinman, a reserve officer who happened to be a trained interrogator. Mr. Wirts also chose Terrence Russell, JPRA's manager for research and development who was also a SERE specialist. Though Mr. Russell had no formal interrogation training or experience, he had previously conducted interrogation-related training for [delete] JTF-GTMO personnel. To complete the team, Mr. Wirts chose Lenny Miller, a contract SERE instructor who also lacked interrogation experience but who the SMU TF had specifically requested. The team's deployment date was set for September 1, 2003. [1311]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that, before being deployed, he thought he was being sent to Iraq to identify problems in the TF interrogation program. [1312] More than a year earlier, Lt Col Kleinman had drafted a paper identifying challenges faced by interrogators at GTMO. [1313] In the draft paper, Lt Col Kleinman identified "fundamental systemic problems" at GTMO that undermined operational effectiveness. [1314]

[Delete] Chief among the problems identified in the draft paper was the lack of trained personnel with experience in strategic interrogations. [1315] Lt Col Kleinman recommended a number of options in his draft paper to enhance DoD's ability to conduct strategic interrogation, including additional training. [1316] He recommended having experienced "survival, intelligence, and human factors specialists" conduct an "in-depth assessment" of operations at GTMO and provide a "comprehensive report that would set forth concrete steps to improve operational effectiveness and security." [1317] Lt Col Kleinman's paper did not recommend teaching interrogators at GTMO how to use SERE techniques in interrogations and he said that he did not believe that was the purpose of the Iraq trip. [1318]

2. Awareness of the JPRA Trip to Iraq at Headquarters, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) (U)

[Delete] JPRA received written approval from JFCOM to support the SMU TF request. [1319] JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton told the Committee that he was pretty sure he also conducted a briefing for the JFCOM Director for Operations (J-3) about JPRA's support to interrogation efforts at the SMU TF, although he could not recall when that briefing occurred. [1320] The JFCOM J-3, BG Thomas Moore, who was involved in coordinating at least one of JPRA's previous "offensive" training sessions completed his assignment as the J-3 at JFCOM in early to mid-August and was replaced by RADM John Bird. [1321]

(U) On September 4, 2003, just as the JPRA team was arriving in Iraq, Col Moulton emailed a JPRA "Weekly Report" to the JFCOM Command Group and others stating:

We deployed a Personnel Recovery Support Team to Baghdad in support of CENTCOM and [redacted] interrogation requirements. This is an issue that may merit Lessons Learned visibility, as there is currently no focal point within DoD for strategic debriefing / interrogation [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development (offensive). Currently, subject matter expertise on captivity environments, psychology, and maintenance resides almost solely within JPRA (defensive). [1322]


(U) In response, the JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Robert Wagner, questioned whether JPRA was operating within its charter. He wrote: "I'm not sure I see the connection between your assigned responsibilities and this task ... [W]hat charter places JPRA in the business of intelligence collection?" [1323] Col Moulton responded "There is nothing in our charter or elsewhere that points us towards the offensive side of captivity conduct nor are we requesting to take this on as a new responsibility." [1324] He added, however, that JPRA had a role to play in helping to educate and assist offensive operations, stating:

[Those conducting interrogations] have already demonstrated the need for our understanding and knowledge of captivity environment and psychology. We are also well aware of the problems associated with crossing the Rubicon into intel collection (or anything close). There may be a compromise position (my gut choice) whereby we could provide/assist in oversight, training, analysis, research, and [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development, while leaving the actual debriefing/interrogation to those already assigned the responsibility. [1325]


(U) In a subsequent email to RADM Bird, Col Moulton stated that while he was concerned about "mission creep" and departing too far from JPRA's traditional role, it was his view that "no DoD entity has a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation." [1326] Col Moulton wrote:

Our subject matter experts (and certain Service SERE psychologist[s]) currently have the most knowledge and depth within DoD on the captivity environment and exploitation. I think that JPRA/JFCOM needs to keep involved for reasons of TTP development and information sharing. We are NOT looking to expand our involvement to active participation. The current support was intended to be limited to advice, assistance, and observation. Our potential participation is predicated solely on the request of the Combatant Commander. [1327]


(U) Col Moulton testified to the Committee that before he sent the JPRA team to Iraq he talked to the SMU Task Force commander and was told that SMU TF detainees "were detained unlawful combatants and not covered under the Geneva Conventions." [1328] Col Moulton later said, referring to a subsequent call with the SMU TF Commander, that he did not know if the SMU TF Commander had "specifically" told him that. [1329]

3. JPRA Provides Interrogation Support to the Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq (U) [1330]

[Delete] On September 5, 2003, after their arrival in Iraq, the three-member JPRA team met with SMU TF personnel at the TF facility. [1331] According to U Col Kleinman, the JPRA Team Chief, the team was told that interrogators were having trouble gaining actionable intelligence information from detainees in TF custody. [1332] Lt Col Kleinman felt that the SMU TF's lack of success was a result of a poor screening process, which resulted in the TF holding some detainees with no information. [1333]

[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, the team also met that day with the SMU TF Commander [delete] and discussed [delete] expectations for the JPRA team. [1334] Mr. Russell said that [delete] "expected [the JPRA team] to become fully engaged in interrogation operations" and "encouraged [the team] to receive modified" rules of engagement (ROEs) from JPRA, since their ROEs at that time permitted the team to "advise and assist" but not to "engage in direct interrogations." [1335]

[Delete] Over the next week, Lt Col Kleinman spoke by phone with Col Moulton at least twice. While accounts by the three JPRA team members of those calls differed in some respects, all agree that the calls resulted in Col Moulton (1) authorizing the team to participate in SMU Task Force interrogations and (2) authorizing the team to use the full range of SERE school physical pressures in those interrogations. Col Moulton confirmed that the team's understanding of his guidance was correct. [1336]

4. JPRA Team Authorized to Participate in Interrogations (U)

[Delete] According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton on September 5, 2003 to discuss the team's ROEs and, the following day, Col Moulton gave the team permission to "become fully engaged in all BIF operations." [1337] That account is consistent with Col Moulton's recollection, which was that Lt Col Kleinman called him after arriving in Iraq to discuss a request from the SMU TF that team members actually participate in interrogations. [1338]

[Delete] Col Moulton said that, after getting the call from Lt Col Kleinman, he called [delete] [delete] "to confirm and inquire about the new request." [1339] In subsequent interviews and communications, Col Moulton has consistently stated that he relayed [delete] request to JFCOM and got JFCOM's authorization to permit the JPRA team to participate in interrogations. Col Moulton's recollection of who at JFCOM provided that authority, however, has varied.

(U) According to a memorandum of a September 2005 interview with the JPRA Commander, Col Moulton "relayed the request to the [JFCOM] J3 and got the verbal OK to allow active participation, but only for one or two demonstrations and then the team was to go back to its role as observers." [1340]

(U) In a 2006 email to the DoD IG, however, Col Moulton could not recall exactly whom at JFCOM he had spoken with, stating:

During the deployment I received a call from the Task Force commander requesting that our personnel participate in the debriefing. I notified JFCOM leadership of the request (either BG Moore or LTG Wagner I can't remember, but think it was [LTG] Wagner since this was late on a weekend night) and was told that they could support, but that any activities had to be approved through the task forces legal rep (we were chopped to them). [1341]


[Delete] In interviews with Committee staff in 2007, Col Moulton said that he had tried but had been unable to reach BGen Moore, so instead he called LTG Wagner whom he reached at home. [1342] According to that account, LTG Wagner told Col Moulton that he needed approval from his boss, JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, to approve the JPRA request. [1343] According to Col Moulton, LTG Wagner called him back and gave his approval. [1344]

[Delete] BGen Moore, whom Col Moulton referenced in his September 2005 interview, was no longer assigned to JFCOM in September 2003. [1345] RADM Bird, who replaced BGen Moore, stated that he did not recall receiving a call from the JPRA Commander. RADM Bird said that he thought it unlikely he would have received the call on the weekend as it would have had to have occurred over a secure line and he did not have that capability at home. LTG Wagner told the Committee that he could not recall if he received a call from Col Moulton. [1346]

[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, one of the JPRA team in Iraq, the JPRA team received permission from Col Moulton "to become fully engaged in all BIF operations." [1347] The next day, team members met with the SMU TF staff and "outlined the exploitation cycle and how [the staff] could incorporate [SERE Training, Tactics, and Procedures] to support their current interrogation operations." [1348]

[Delete] While it is not known when it occurred, the Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence (J-2X) for the SMU stated that members of the JPRA team demonstrated interrogation techniques, including the "attention slap," which he said was described as an openhanded slap to focus the detainee on the interrogation, and walling, which was described as a push up against the wall. [1349] The J-2X could not recall if all members of the JPRA team were present during that lesson. [1350] Lt Col Kleinman said that he was not aware of such a lesson. [1351]

[Delete] The J-2X stated that he was unsure if techniques taught to the staff were permitted under SMU TF policy and that, after the JPRA demonstration, he raised this matter with the SMU TF J2, which at the time was [delete]. [1352]

5. JPRA Present as Interrogator Uses Stress Positions and Slaps (U)

[Delete] On September 6, 2003, JPRA team members were present in the interrogation booth when a SMU TF interrogator used "selected physical pressures" on a detainee. [1353] According to Terrence Russell, the SMU TF interrogator "put the detainee on his knees and later began to use insult slaps every 3-4 seconds for an extended period of time." [1354]

(U) Lt Col (now Colonel) Kleinman described that same interrogation in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Lt Col Kleinman said:

I walked into the interrogation room, all painted in black with [a] spotlight on the detainee. Behind the detainee was a military guard... with a[n] iron bar... slapping it in his hand. The interrogator was sitting in a chair. The interpreter was - was to his left... and the detainee was on his knees... A question was asked by the interrogator, interpreted, the response came back and, upon interpretation, the detainee would be slapped across the face... And that continued with every question and every response. I asked my colleagues how long this had been going on, specifically the slapping, they said approximately 30 minutes. [1355]


(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that his two JPRA colleagues, who were present during the interrogation, "didn't seem to think there [was] a problem, because in SERE training... there's a facial slap, but it's conducted in very specific ways... This was not conducted in that fashion." [1356] In fact, Lt Col Kleinman described the environment at the Task Force facility as ''uncontrolled." [1357]

[Delete] Members of the JPRA team had differing views on the appropriate response to the interrogator's use of those techniques. Mr. Russell stated that he and Mr. Miller "saw nothing wrong with" the interrogator forcing the detainee to kneel or his slapping the detainee during the interrogation. [1358] Lt Col Kleinman had a different reaction.

[Delete] Lt Col Kleinman considered forcing the detainee to kneel and repeatedly slapping him to be "direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and [actions that] could constitute a war crime." [1359] Upon witnessing the abusive conduct, Lt Col Kleinman sought out the SMU TF J- 2X. [1360] Lt Col Kleinman told the J-2X what he had witnessed and recommended ''that the session be halted immediately." [1361] Lt Col Kleinman said the J-2X told him "[y]our judgment is my judgment. Do what you think. is right." [1362]

[Delete] Following his conversation with the J-2X, Lt Col Kleinman asked the two members of his team to step out of the interrogation booth. According to Mr. Russell:

In the hallway [Lt Col] Kleinman asked us our impression of the use of the kneeling and slaps. We both indicated that we saw nothing wrong with what was going on. He asked us our opinion of the slapping and we said they were only insult slaps and were not inflicting any pain to the detainee. [Lt Col] Kleinman indicated his disagreement and that both the slaps and kneeling were direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and could constitute a war crime. He further indicated that he wanted to intervene and stop the interrogation at that point. [1363]


[Delete] Over the objections of the other two members of JPRA team. Lt Col Kleinman then asked the SMU TF interrogator to step out of the booth. He explained to the interrogator "how and why [the interrogator's] methods were a violation of the Geneva Convention and TF [Policy]." [1364] According to Lt Col Kleinman, "[the interrogator] accepted my direction without reservation." [1365]

[Delete] With respect to Lt Col Kleinman's actions, Mr. Russell stated:

I think the clear violation of the TF policy was of a minor nature - that being a 10-minute extension of the kneeling policy. The use of insult slaps was, in the opinion of [Lt Col] Kleinman, serious enough to stop the interrogation - an action I did not then or now feel warranted his direct intervention. [1366]


[Delete] In subsequent testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell claimed that the use of the "insult slap" was consistent with the facility's operating instructions:

Under their operating instructions at that BIF, at that time and place, we did not see anything wrong with [the use of physical pressures]. It may not have been applied the way we would have done it, but we didn't see anything wrong with it. We advised [Lt Col] Kleinman of the same. He disagreed with us. [1367]

[Delete] SMU TF SOPs reviewed by the Committee do not include slapping as an authorized technique and the SMU TF J-2X told the Committee that he was unaware of any operating instructions that would have permitted an interrogator to repeatedly slap a detainee. [1368]

[Delete] Despite Mr. Russell's previous statement that he "saw nothing wrong with what was going on," he testified to the Committee that he found the SMU TF interrogator's repeated use of the insult slap to be "odd" and "in excess" of what would be used in resistance training at JPRA [1369] Mr. Russell also testified that the technique, as applied by the TF interrogator, was ineffective:

[The] insult slap is just that, it's an insult. After you do it two or three times it loses its effectiveness because the [sic], in our world, the student is anticipating the slap. It loses its effectiveness if you do it more than two or three or four times. [1370]


[Delete] While he did not raise any objection to their use in the interrogation, Mr. Russell stated that the techniques used at the SERE school, such as the insult slap, were not designed to elicit information from individuals but rather to "guide the student" to an appropriate resistance posture. [1371] According to his testimony, "history has shown us that physical pressures are not effective for compelling an individual to give information or to do something" and are not useful in gaining accurate, actionable intelligence. [1372] There is no indication in Mr. Russell's trip report, however, that he told anyone on the J-2X staff that the SMU TF's use of repeated slaps would be ineffective or that use of other SERE physical pressures, such as ''walling'', which were reportedly described for the J-2X staff, would be ineffective.

[Delete] Mr. Russell stated that when physical pressures are applied in the resistance phase of SERE training, medical and psychological personnel are present to observe interrogations and protect SERE school students, [1373] Mr. Russell testified that there were no medical or psychological personnel present during the interrogations he witnessed while at the SMU TF facility. [1374]

6. JPRA Team Authorized to Use SERE Techniques (U)

(U) At some point shortly after he intervened to stop the interrogation where the detainee was placed on his knees and slapped, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton. [1375] Lt Col Kleinman testified before the Committee that he told Col Moulton that the JPRA team was "being asked to use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation of detainees." [1376] Lt Col Kleinman testified that he also told Col Moulton that he had intervened to stop interrogations at the Task Force and that the use of SERE techniques "were violations of the Geneva Convention, they weren't authorized, and we should not do them." [1377]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he also told the SMU TF Commander that the use of SERE techniques in interrogations was ''unlawful'' and "a violation of the Geneva Convention." [1378] He said that the SMU TF Commander agreed with him but there were "no orders ever issued" by the Commander not to use the techniques. [1379]

[Delete] [delete] According to Lt Col Kleinman's trip report, after he spoke with Col Moulton, Col Moulton subsequently spoke to the SMU TF Commander, and then called him back to tell him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot" to use ''the full range of JPRA methods" on detainees, specifically including "walling, sleep deprivation, isolation, physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach slaps, and finger pokes to the chest), space/time disorientation, [and] white noise." [1380]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that Col Moulton told him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot to use SERE methods" in interrogations. [1381] Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Col Moulton that he considered this instruction to be an illegal order and that he would not carry it out. Col Moulton said that Lt Col Kleinman "was adamant about that he thought it was against the Geneva Convention." [1382]

7. JPRA Team Chief Seeks Legal Guidance (U)

[Delete] Following his conversation with the JPRA Commander, Lt Col Kleinman consulted with the SMU TF lawyer who advised him that the SERE tactics "fell outside the parameters of acceptability under the [Geneva Conventions] and [Task Force] policy." [1383] Lt Col Kleinman then met with the other two members of the JPRA team to inform them of the JPRA Commander's order that they could use ''the normal and usual range of physical pressures" during interrogations and to alert them of his concerns about the legality of that order. [1384] Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report:

[Lt Col] Kleinman indicated that he felt [it was] '... an illegal order' and we were exposing ourselves to possible future difficulties if we used any pressure inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. [1385]


(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that he relayed his conversation with Col Moulton to his two JPRA colleagues, informing them that he told Col Moulton that the authority to use SERE techniques "was an unlawful order" and that he "wasn't going to have any involvement with it, and [he] didn't think that they should either." [1386]

[Delete] Both Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller, the JPRA contractor, disagreed with Lt Col Kleinman's assessment. [1387] According to Mr. Russell, the two "indicated that the use of these moderate physical pressures, when used appropriately, were consistent with proper handling and interrogation." [1388] In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell added that he understood that the individuals held by the Task Force were considered "detained unlawful combatants" and "not automatically provided the protections of the Geneva Conventions," though he could not recall who told him this. [1389]

[Delete] [delete] Shortly after Col Moulton told Lt Col Kleinman that the team was "cleared hot" to employ the full range of JPRA methods, Lt Col Kleinman recommended that the TF Legal Advisor arrange a formal briefing with the SMU TF interrogation staff and the JPRA team [1390] In that meeting, Lt Col Kleinman reported that the TF Legal Advisor "set forth legal limitations that essentially excluded most of the [JPRA methods] (with the use of certain stress positions, such as kneeling on a hard floor for up to 30 minutes, cited as an acceptable method)." [1391]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that although the SMU TF lawyer agreed with him that it was unlawful to use SERE techniques in interrogations, when the lawyer later briefed interrogators on the techniques, there was no longer "any clarity" about whether or not they were illegal. [1392]

[Delete] Mr. Russell also described the TF Legal Advisor's briefing in his trip report:

The [TF Legal Advisor] discussed the [TF Commander's] expectations versus the methods of exploitation and physical pressures he had heard were being used in the BIF - including those prior to his recent arrival (2-3 weeks on site). He also discussed the status of the detainees and the fact that the BIF's detainees were not identified to the ICRC. He discussed the assumption of risk being taken by the [SMU]. command if BIF personnel engaged in 'beat down' tactics or while 'engaging in torture.' [1393]


[Delete] The TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that the SMU TF did not make status determinations for detainees, but that he advised in his briefing that the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to those detainees under the control of the SMU TF. [1394]
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:45 am

PART 20 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

8. JPRA Training Manager and Contractor Participate in an Interrogation (U)

(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that after he told his two JPRA colleagues that Col Moulton had "cleared hot" their use of SERE techniques in interrogations, his colleagues decided to "demonstrate the way you handle an interrogation." [1395]

[Delete] [delete] Around the time that Lt Col Kleinman met with the SMU TF Legal Advisor, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller met separately with the SMU TF Director of Intelligence (J-2), COL Brian Keller, and his J-2X and participated in interrogations with J-2X staff. [1396] In one instance, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller took the lead in the interrogation of a detainee. [1397] The interrogation began with the simulated release of the detainee - the detainee was permitted to clean up, leave the facility, and was escorted to a bus stop, when he was "captured" again. [1398] When the detainee was brought back to the SMU TF facility, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller took physical control of the detainee and led him into a holding cell. [1399] Once in the holding cell, one or both of the men forcibly stripped the detainee naked. [1400] [Big delete]." [1401] He told the Committee: "we [had] done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students." [1402]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman also described that interrogation in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He said the detainee was driven away from the Task Force's interrogation facility to make him think he was being released and then brought back to a "bunker that was about a story ... into the ground - cement, cold, dark." [1403] He said:

[The detainee] was literally carried by two of the guards into the bunker struggling against them. He was taken down there. My two JPRA colleagues took over from that point. .. [T]hey ripped his Abaya off - not cut - they ripped it off... ripped off his underwear, took his shoes, they'd hooded him already, then they - they had shackled him by the wrist and ankles - being screamed at the entire time in his ear in English about essentially... what a poor specimen of human that he was... And then the orders were given that he was to stand in that position for 12 hours no matter how much he asked for help, no matter how much he pleaded, unless he passed out, the guards were not to respond to any requests for help. [1404]


(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he told his colleagues that what they did was ''unlawful'' and he stopped the interrogation. [1405]

[Delete] Mr. Russell testified to the Committee that the detainee was naked only for "however long it took to have his clothes taken off and put the new dish-dash on again." [1406]

[Delete] In his trip report, Lt Col Kleinman reported that he told the two other JPRA team members that he disagreed with their approach. [1407] Mr. Russell stated that the exploitation scenario was conducted after coordination with the J- 2X staff and that the techniques, including isolation and sleep deprivation, were "employed in accordance with existing TF guidance and policy." [1408] While Col Kleinman testified that he intervened to stop the interrogation, Mr. Russell said that Lt Col Kleinman never raised an objection to the interrogation. [1409]

[b]9. JPRA Team Chief Objects to SMU TF Interrogation (U)[/b]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that he intervened to stop another interrogation being conducted by SMU TF personnel. [1410] Lt Col Kleinman said that "a plan was laid out on butcher paper for another detainee that involved extensive stress positions, followed by interrogation, followed by short periods of sleep." [1411] Lt Col Kleinman photographed the plan which had been posted in plain view and described a schedule for keeping the detainee awake and placing him in stress positions. [1412] The plan listed the following schedule:

*1830 -2130 Awake
*2130-2230 Sleep
*2230-2300 On Knees
*2300-2330 Sitting Down
*2330-0030 Sit Up
*0030-0100 Sit Down
*0100-0130/0200 On Knees
*0200-0300 Sleep [1413]


(U) Another photograph showed the same detainee in his cell and hooded. His hands appear handcuffed behind his back. [1414] Lt Col Kleinman said that his photograph did not reflect the fact that the detainee also had his ankles shackled. [1415]

[Delete] [delete] Mr. Russell's trip report appears to confirm Lt Col Kleinman's account. It stated that Lt Col Kleinman intervened in an SMU TF "interrogator's plan for imposing a regime of sleep deprivation and physical pressures." [1416] According to Mr. Russell, the proposed interrogation regimen "included an 18-hour plan to impose sleep deprivation and physical activities [big delete]" as well as "the use of two separate 30-minute kneeling sessions separated by 3 hours of standing or resting." [1417] According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman reportedly objected to the use of "kneeling." [1418] Mr. Russell said that he and Mr. Miller felt that "the regime proposal was appropriate and well within [the SMU TF] current [Rules of Engagement] for detainee handling." [1419]

10. JPRA Develops a Concept of Operations (CONOP) (U)

[Delete] While the team was in Iraq, [delete] requested that JPRA develop a formal Concept of Operations (CONOP) for detainee exploitation. [1420] Col Moulton tasked members of the team with developing the CONOP. [1421] Mr. Russell's trip report stated that he drafted the CONOP in Iraq and that Mr. Miller and Lt Col Kleinman reviewed it and offered suggestions. [1422] He later testified to the Committee that he drafted a "skeleton of a CONOP" with Mr. Miller and that Lt Col Kleinman was aware that they were working on it. [1423] Lt Col Kleinman said that he knew that his team members were working on a CONOP, but that he did not see sections of it. [1424]

(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Mr. Russell that he would not participate in drafting the CONOP because he "absolutely disagreed with that type of expansion of the use of SERE methods," and that his "contribution would be nothing but contrary." [1425]

[Delete] While the JPRA team was still in Iraq, the draft was shared with and edited by JPRA personnel in the U.S., including Christopher Wirts, JPRA's Operations Support Office Chief. [1426] The CONOP, called "Concept of Operations for HVT exploitation," provided JPRA's "recommendations and guidance to USG forces conducting exploitation operations. [1427]

[Delete] The September 2003 CONOP was similar to the April 2002 "Exploitation Draft Plan" that Dr. Bruce Jessen, JPRA's former senior SERE psychologist, had drafted shortly before JPRA's support to [delete] the DoD General Counsel. [1428] As had the April 2002 exploitation draft plan, the CONOP described a JPRA-directed exploitation process and included recommendations for exploitation and captivity operations, such as "tailoring detainee punishment consequences to maximize cultural undesirability." [1429]

[Delete] The September 2003 CONOP also identified "critical operational exploitation principles," including:

[Big delete] [10] Controlling authority sets [Rules of Engagement] prior to initiating process within the Torture Convention [11.] Established the latitude and process for the HVT team to offer concessions for validated information or cooperation of the HVT, [big delete].

[Delete] Those exploitation principles were similar to those that had been included in the exploitation draft plan nearly a year and a half earlier. In addition, the September 2003 JPRA CONOP listed specific interrogation techniques and incorporated portions of the March 6, 2003 DoD Interrogation Working Group draft report. JPRA personnel considered the Working Group report authoritative guidance on U.S. policy and law. [1431]

[Big delete]. [1433] Mr. Wirts said that the DoD Working Group draft reflected material that the Working Group had gleaned from JPRA on SERE training and that it was, in turn, used to formulate the HVT exploitation CONOP. [1434] A copy of a CONOP that incorporated interrogation techniques from the Working Group draft was circulated while the team was still in Iraq, and was sent to CAPT Daniel Donovan, the JFCOM Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), on September 23, 2003. [1435]

11. JPRA Team Leaves Iraq (U)

(U) According to the DoD Inspector General's August 2006 report, when it "became apparent that friction was developing" between the SMU TF and the JPRA team, ''the decision was made to pull the team out [of Iraq] before more damage was done to the relationship between the two organizations." [1436] Lt Col Kleinman referred to the DoD IG report's statement that "friction was developing" as an understatement and said that he felt his life was being threatened at the SMU TF. [1437] He recalled one instance (after he stopped what he believed to be in violation of the Geneva Conventions) in which an SMU TF member told him, while sharpening a knife, to "sleep lightly," noting that they did not "coddl[e] terrorists" at the SMU TF. [1438]

[Delete] The SMU TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that JPRA had no business at the SMU TF facility either assisting in or conducing interrogations and that he sought to have the team removed [1439] The Legal Advisor said that he met with [delete] the SMU TF Commander, and told him that SERE training was not meant for detainees and that JPRA's presence had the potential to lead to abuse. He also recalled telling the Commander that JPRA was not qualified or trained to perform interrogations. The Legal Advisor said that [delete] [delete] did not act on his concerns.

[Delete] Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report that the SMU TF Operations Officer (J-3) also recommended to [delete] that the JPRA team should leave the facility, noting that the J-3 ''was particularly concerned over the [JPRA] CONOP having been sent [to JPRA headquarters] without his staff's security review." [1440] On September 22, 2003, the JPRA Commander directed Lt Col Kleinman and Mr. Miller to return to the U.S., but told Mr. Russell to remain in place for ''the possible arrival of a follow-up team." [1441] On September 23, 2003, the team's original scheduled departure date, JPRA informed the team that all three team members should leave Iraq. [1442]

12. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Reviews JPRA Concept Of Operations (CONOP) (U)

(U) The same day the JPRA team returned home from Iraq, a copy of the JPRA HVT exploitation CONOP was sent to CAPT Donovan, the JFCOM SJA. [1443] CAPT Donovan commented on the CONOP in a September 26, 2003 email to Col Moulton, JPRA Deputy Commander John Atkins, OSO Chief Christopher Wirts and others, and circulated a version of the CONOP with his edits and comments.

(U) In his email, CAPT Donovan stated that JPRA should not rely on the March 6, 2003 Working Group report as "authoritative DoD guidance." He wrote that, although the Secretary had approved certain counter-resistance techniques during interrogations of unlawful combatants at GTMO, not all of the techniques listed in the Working Group report had been approved for use. [1444] CAPT Donovan also raised serious concerns about the legality of the interrogation techniques in the CONOP emphasizing that, unlike in Afghanistan and at GTMO, the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq. He wrote:

Unlike OEF-Afghanistan, in which the Taliban and Al-Qaida enemy 'forces' were all deemed to be UNLAWFUL combatants NOT legally entitled to the full protections of the Geneva conventions, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was executed as a CONVENTIONAL armed conflict in which the vast majority of enemy forces were LAWFUL combatants. Therefore, almost all captured personnel within Iraq are legally entitled to either prisoner of war (POW) or civilian internee (CI) status which means they get the full protections of the Geneva Conventions. Many of the counter-resistance techniques approved by SECDEF for use on UNLAWFUL combatants detained at GTMO would not/not be legal under the Geneva Conventions if applied to POWs or CIs in Iraq. [1445]


[Delete] In editing the CONOP, CAPT Donovan not only struck references to several interrogation techniques that had been included in the March 6, 2003 draft Working Group report, but also noted that even those techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO might not be lawful for use on detainees in Iraq. [1446]

[Delete] CAPT Donovan also substantially revised JPRA's "critical operational exploitation principles" by, for example, adding that detainee treatment must be "in accordance with the approved [Rules of Engagement]" and clarifying that Rules of Engagement must be within U.S. law and policy including - but not simply limited to - the Torture Convention. [1447] CAPT Donovan struck JPRA's reference to "constant sensory deprivation" completely, noting that the technique was neither approved by the March 6, 2003 Working Group report nor by the Secretary of Defense in his April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM. [1448]

[Delete] Days later, CAPT Donovan raised his concerns about the CONOP to LTG Wagner, JFCOM's Deputy Commander, and Maj Gen James Soligan, JFCOM's Chief of Staff, in anticipation of a scheduled visit by the two to JPRA [1449] CAPT Donovan stated that while it made "a certain amount of sense to seek JPRA's advice regarding interrogation techniques that [had] been successfully used against us by our enemies," he was concerned that the SMU TF "may have gone a bit further by asking JPRA to develop a CONOP for "more effective" interrogations [by the SMU] of HVTs captured in Iraq." [1450] He expressed particular concerns with the "interrogation techniques" included in the CONOP:

A number of the 'interrogation techniques' suggested by JPRA in their draft CONOP are highly aggressive (such as the 'water board') and it probably goes without saying that if JPRA is to include such techniques in a CONOP they prepare for an operational unit in another [Area of Responsibility], they need to be damn sure they're appropriate in both a legal and a policy sense. [1451]


13. JFCOM Verifies Team Chiefs Account of Events in Iraq (U)

(U) In May 2004, the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) initiated a review of DoD directed reports of detainee abuse. [1452] As part of that review, the DoD IG looked into JPRA's "offensive" interrogation support. In response to questions from the DoD IG, CAPT Alan Kaufman, the JFCOM SJA, initiated an inquiry into JPRA's September 2003 support to the SMU TF in Iraq. According to CAPT Kaufman, the scope of the JFCOM inquiry was narrow, focusing only on whether or not the incidents described in Lt Col Kleinman's trip report had been reported up the chain of command to JFCOM. [1453] On September 23, 2005, after JFCOM concluded its inquiry, JFCOM's Deputy Commander LTG Wagner sent a memo to the DoD IG stating:

This command looked into the information flow between the requesting unit, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, (JPRA) and the chain of command at USJFCOM with regard to JPRA's participation in the two subject missions to assist in the global war on terror. While most requests and decisions were verbal, I concluded that information did flow up the chain of command to the appropriate authority.

Action was taken based on JPRA Commanding Officer's (CO) judgment and input from the chain of command ... [1454]


(U) The memo continued:

The actions Lt Col Kleinman witnessed did occur. However, all others involved, including the JPRA [Commanding Officer] and the [Commanding Officer] of the task force believed them to be authorized actions under the existing decisions by DoD General Counsel. The [Commanding Officer] conveyed this to Lt Col Kleinman both during and after the deployment. Lt Col Kleinman did not seek any other response or relief, nor take any issue up his chain of command. [1455]


D. Major General Geoffrey Miller Leads GTMO Assessment Team to Iraq (U)

1. CJTF-7 Commander Identifies Deficiencies (U)


(U) During the summer of 2003 Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) assumed control of coalition forces in Iraq from its predecessor, the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). The Commander of CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez, said that when he took over from CFLCC he identified deficiencies with existing intelligence operations. [1456] LTG Sanchez said that he participated in regular video teleconferences and phone calls with CENTCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) during which he shared his concerns about his command's intelligence capabilities and asked for assistance. LTG Sanchez stated:

I was very concerned about our ability to really push the envelope to the limits of our authority in interrogations. I went back to Washington and said "You've got to send us some help because this is a problem that is way beyond anything we could imagine and it's a problem that hasn't been faced by our Army." [1457]


(U) Even before the CJTF-7 Commander sought assistance, however, discussions had apparently taken place about whether to send MG Geoffrey Miller, the GTMO Commander, to Iraq to assess operations there. In May 2003, before CJTF-7 took command in Iraq from CFLCC, LTG Ronald Burgess, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) at the Joint Staff told MG Miller that a request would be forthcoming for him to lead an assessment trip to Iraq. [1458] According to an investigation conducted by MG George Fay and LTG Anthony Jones, the Joint Staff later requested that SOUTHCOM send a team to assist CENTCOM and the Iraq Survey Group "with advice on facilities and operations specific to screening, interrogations, HUMINT collection, and interagency integration in the short and long term." [1459]

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) Stephen Cambone said that MG Miller was asked to go to Iraq "at my encouragement, to take a look at the situation as it existed there." [1460] LTG William Boykin, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighter Support said that the decision to send MG Miller to Iraq was made in a meeting that included USDI Cambone and the Secretary of Defense. [1461]

2. GTMO Assessment Team Travels to Iraq (U)

[Delete] From August 31 to September 10, 2003, MG Miller led a team to assess intelligence operations in Iraq. [1462] The JTF-GTMO Commander was accompanied by several JTF-GTMO and former JTF-GTMO staff, including LTC Diane Beaver, the former SJA, and David Becker, the former Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief. Additionally, MG Miller brought representatives from the CIA and the DoD Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF). MG Miller said that the purpose of his trip was to "make an assessment for the chain of command," about the ability of U.S. forces in Iraq to conduct "strategic interrogation and intelligence development and detention operations in theater." [1463]

(U) The day after arriving in Iraq, MG Miller met with LTG Sanchez and described the purpose of the assistance visit, [1464] MG Miller said that his team was aware that the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq and told LTG Sanchez that he would have to decide what recommendations were applicable to his command. MG Miller also met with MG Barbara Fast, the CJTF-7 Director of Intelligence, and gave her the same briefing.

3. GTMO Team Visits Iraq Survey Group (lSG) (U)

(U) Following an initial visit to the Corps Holding Area at Camp Cropper, MG Miller's assessment team visited the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) facilities. [1465] The ISG was established in June 2003 with the mission to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of weapons of mass destruction and to provide support to the CIA special Advisor. [1466] As part of its effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG interrogated and debriefed high value detainees, such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. [1467] When MG Miller's team arrived at the facility, they received a briefing from ISG personnel, toured the facilities, and observed ongoing operations. [1468]

(U) Chief Warrant Officer Brian Searcy, who was Chief of Interrogation at the ISG accompanied MG Miller and his team on the tour. CWO Searcy told the Committee that during the tour, MG Miller remarked that the ISG was "running a country club" and suggested that they were too lenient with detainees. [1469] He said that MG Miller recommended the ISG shackle detainees and make them walk on gravel rather than on concrete pathways to show the detainees who was in control. CWO Searcy also recalled that the JTF-GTMO Commander suggested that the ISG "GTMO-ize" their facility. [1470]

(U) MG Miller did not recall referring to the ISG as a "country club" and said that, as far as he knew, he "never used the word GTMO-ize." [1471] However, he did recall telling ISG personnel that he was troubled that the ISG were treating detainees with too much respect, which was not, in his opinion, how prisoners ought to be treated. [1472]

(U) Mike Kamin, the ISG's Collection Manager said that Lt Col Ken Rapuano, the ISG's Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIOC) Chief, was "energized" after meeting with MG Miller and said that the GTMO Commander had told him about techniques like temperature manipulation and sleep deprivation. [1473] According to Mr. Kamin, ISG JIDC personnel balked at the idea of implementing such techniques. [Delete] an ISG strategic debriefer said that he wrote a letter to his chain of command stating that he would resign if the techniques were implemented. [1474]

(U) Lt Col Rapuano said that he met with MG Miller and members of his team in a meeting with MG Keith Dayton, the ISG Commander, and other members of ISG's leadership. Lt Col Rapuano said that he did not recall a discussion of specific interrogation techniques but did recall "some discussion of procedures for air conditioning cells." [1475] Lt Col Rapuano said did not recall any discussions of sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique.

(U) At the end of the visit, MG Miller met with MG Dayton and members of his staff. MG Dayton said that MG Miller told him that the ISG was "not getting much out of these people" and was "not getting the maximum." [1476] MG Dayton said he asked what was meant by that and was told "you haven't broken [the detainees]" psychologically. [1477] MG Dayton said that MG Miller told him that he would "get back to you with some ideas of how you can perhaps deal with these people where you can actually break them, some techniques you can use." [1478] The ISG Commander stated:

I remember very clearly saying, "Geoff, slow down. We're not changing anything right now. You know, we think we're within the rules. If you want me to change something, you give me something in writing that you think needs to be changed. I'll have my lawyers look at it. [1479]


(U) Although MG Miller recalled saying that he was troubled that detainees at the ISG were being treated with too much respect, he did not recall using the term "break." [1480] As to techniques to get more information from detainees, MG Miller said he only recalled discussing the possibility of ISG interrogating detainees more frequently. According to MG Dayton, MG Miller never followed up with him after the trip. [1481]

4. GTMO Team Visits Special Mission Unit Task Force (U)

[Delete] Following the visit to the ISG, MG Miller, John Antonitis, the former Director of the Joint Interrogation Group at JTF-GTMO, and the Superintendent of Camp Delta at JTF-GTMO, visited the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) facility. [Delete] the SMU TF Commander, said he had contacted MG Miller at JTF-GTMO to request assistance with his detention and interrogation operations. [1482] MG Miller, however, said that [delete] did not request the visit and that visiting the SMU TF was not even on his initial itinerary. [1483] In fact, MG Miller described [delete] as not "open" to a visit and said that when his staff called the SMU TF to schedule the visit, they initially said "no" to the visit.

[Delete] MG Miller said that he and two other members of his team met with [delete] and a few of his operators for about 45 minutes to an hour at the SMU TF facility. [1484] The JTF-GTMO Commander did not see an SOP for SMU TF interrogations and recalled that the SMU TF Commander told him the SMU TF was using operators as interrogators. MG Miller said that he told [delete] that he needed to establish interrogation authorities and obtain qualified interrogators. For several months prior to his meeting with MG Miller, SMU TF Legal Advisors had tried, without success, to get [delete] to sign an interrogation policy for the facility under his command. [1485]

[Delete] While she did not accompany the JTF-GTMO Commander on his visit to the SMU TF, LTC Beaver, the former JTF-GTMO SJA, said that a Legal Advisor for the SMU TF contacted her and arranged to meet with her at Camp Victory. [1486] According to LTC Beaver, the SMU TF Legal Advisor raised concerns with her about physical violence being used by SMU TF personnel during interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees. [1487] He told her that he was "risking his life" by talking to her about these issues. [1488] LTC Beaver told the Committee that the SMU Legal Advisor said he had also raised these issues with the Commander of the SMU TF, but that was not receptive to his concerns.

[Delete] LTC Beaver told the Committee that she informed both COL Marc Warren (the CJTF-7 SJA) and MG Miller about her conversation with the SMU TF Legal Advisor. [1489] When he met with the Committee, MG Miller did not recall LTC Beaver bringing those concerns to his attention. [1490] A slide presentation summarizing the GTMO assessment team's visit to Iraq, however, stated that there were "concerns about [SMU TF] interrogation practices such as physical contact and choking." [1491] The same presentation noted that other governmental agencies "won't interrogate at [the SMU TF] facility because of current treatment concerns." [1492]

5. GTMO Team Discusses Interrogations with CJTF-7 (U)

(U) During their assessment visit, the JTF-GTMO Commander's team held several meetings with CJTF-7 interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib and Camp Victory. According to COL Thomas Pappas, the 205th MI BDE Commander, conversations with MG Miller focused on the range of intelligence capabilities that would enable effective interrogations. [1493] COL Pappas stated that the "tenor of the discussions was that we had to get tougher with the detainees." [1494]

(U) CPT Wood, the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at Abu Ghraib said her conversations with the JTF-GTMO Commander "centered on renovations and improvements of facilities, challenges of interrogation operations, and the need for increased [Military Police/Military Intelligence] cooperation." [1495] CPT Wood believed that MG Miller and his team wanted to build a "miniature Guantanamo Bay." [1496] In her view, however, the GTMO concept was not applicable to Abu Ghraib. She stated:

... Abu Ghraib wasn't GTMO. The prison was an austere environment; it was not conducive to interrogation operations like GMTO. That was actually built and designed to facilitate interrogation operations. We didn't have the MP force that was necessary for such a high population and we were frequent targets of small arms and mortar attacks. We worked in a hundred and thirty degree weather without air conditioning and we went through the winter without heat. Most of the detainees were not of intelligence value. [1497]


(U) MG Miller said that he spent parts of three days at Abu Ghraib with COL Pappas and CPT Wood discussing how to improve operations. [1498] LTG Sanchez recalled that the team "recommended the creation of a command policy" on interrogations and the team provided CJTF-7 with electronic copies of SOPs and a copy of a Joint Staff policy memorandum entitled "Interrogation Techniques in the War on Terrorism." [1499] According to MG Miller, members of his assessment team also discussed interrogation authorities and techniques during their meetings with CJTF-7 personnel. [1500]

(U) CPT Wood said that members of the GTMO assessment team had, in their possession, copies of the proposed interrogation policy she had copied from the SMU Task Force's interrogation policy and submitted to her chain of command prior to the assessment team's visit. [1501] That proposed policy included presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1502] CPT Wood said that a member of the GTMO assessment team referred to her proposal as a "good start," but told her that CJTF-7 "should consider something along the lines of what's approved for use in [GTMO]." [1503] LTC Beaver recalled reviewing CPT Wood's proposed SOP. LTC Beaver said that she was concerned about the SOP because she knew that, "in a Geneva setting, it was potentially a problem," that she brought it to the attention of COL Marc Warren, the CJTF-7 SJA and recommended that he review it. [1504]

(U) David Becker, the former JTF-GTMO ICE Chief, recalled discussing stress positions, dogs, and nudity with COL Pappas during the visit. Mr. Becker said:

[W]hat I told Pappas was, look I understand they're doing all kinds of different approaches out there. And I talked about the memo that was approved for Guantanamo at one point. I said look, when you use stress positions; when you use dogs; when you use - I mean when you use stress positions, dogs, nakedness . . . the concept of the conversation was as you develop these techniques, talk to the interrogators. Figure out what they want to use and put it in writing. And you have to establish left and right lanes in the road for the conduct of interrogations. And you've got to do it in writing. And then you've got to build the interrogation plan and you've got the interrogators to stick to it. And that's what I said. And the "use of dogs" came up in that conversation. [1505]


(U) COL Pappas recalled discussions with the GTMO assessment team about dogs being "effective in doing interrogations with Arabs" and talk of "Arabs being fearful of dogs." [1506] COL Pappas said that while no one from MG Miller's team said "okay, use the dogs while you're doing an interrogation" there was discussion "about 'setting conditions for interrogations.'" [1507] COL Pappas later authorized the use of dogs in interrogations at Abu Ghraib. [1508]

(U) COL Pappas also recalled discussing dogs with MG Miller during the visit. In a February 2004 interview, COL Pappas said that the use of dogs had been "a technique that [he] had discussed with Miller" during the JTF-GTMO assistance visit to Iraq. [1509] COL Pappas stated that MG Miller "said that they used military working dogs, and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which ... you could get information." [1510] In a later interview, COL Pappas again described his discussions with MG Miller:

There was never any discussion [with the JTF-GTMO Commander] of the execution of how the dogs would be used. Now he did say that dogs were an effective technique to use with the detainees. He did say we want to make sure we control the detainee at all times. The I-bolts in the floor came from MG Miller's team ... He did meet with some of the interrogators and told them to be more aggressive, but he never told them how. His overtone was to be more aggressive, but I never heard him say take dogs into the booths or anything like that. [1511]


(U) MAT David DiNenna, the Operations Officer (8-3) of the 320th MP BN also recalled a discussion with MG Miller about dogs. According to MAT DiNenna, during a meeting at Abu Ghraib, MG Miller asked him whether or not they had military working dogs. [1512] MAT DiNenna told MG Miller that they did not, but that he had "requested them when [he] first arrived at Abu [Ghraib], and since that time, had made numerous requests." [1513] MAJ DiNenna said:

MG Miller then looked at COL Pappas and stated that dogs have been extremely useful at GITMO. He stated, "These people are scared to death of dogs, and the dogs have a tremendous affect." [1514]


(U) MAJ DiNenna said that he was "concerned that [MG Miller] was implying MI would receive the dogs at Abu [Ghraib], yet I desperately needed them as a force multiplier for the facilities." [1515]

(U) MGMiller maintained that he and COL Pappas "never discussed using dogs in interrogations." [1516] He stated that his discussions about dogs with COL Pappas were "in the context of security operations and force protection." [1517] MG Miller said, however, that he did not discuss the use of dogs at all with BG Janis Karpinski, the Commander of the 800th MP BDE or anyone else in her unit, which was responsible for security operations and force protection at the prison. [1518]

6. GTMO Commander Recommends CJTF-7 Develop an Interrogation Policy (U)

(U) During his assessment visit, the JTF-GTMO Commander provided an "interim update" to LTG Sanchez and recommended that CJTF-7 "establish interrogation authorities so the interrogators understand what their limits are." [1519] MG Miller stated that he also directed LTC Beaver to "let [CJTF-7] see what we use at Guantanamo as a template," referring to the Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM. [1520] MG Miller stated that, with respect to GTMO's guidance from the Secretary, he told LTG Sanchez:

[T]he first caveat was that the Geneva Convention applied here. You must use only Geneva Convention authorities. You may not use anything other unless you get approval from SecDef to go about doing that. And so if you're going to ask for any of those, you got to go through the CENTCOM Commander and up to JCS and OSD to get approval from there. [1521]


(U) LTG Sanchez said that he instructed his SJA to develop an interrogation policy, the "key purpose" of which was to "unequivocally establish as policy adherence to the Geneva Convention and to regulate approach techniques that we believed were derived from multiple sources" including the Army Field Manual, and techniques used in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan. [1522]

(U) LTC Beaver said that she left the April 16, 2003 memo from Secretary Rumsfeld with the CJTF-7 legal staff. She also said that she told COL Marc Warren, the CJTF-7 SJA, and other lawyers on the CJTF-7 staff that while the policy had worked at Guantanamo, that CJTF-7 "would need to evaluate what was permissible in Iraq and what the command thought would work in this environment." [1523]

(U) According to COL Pappas, CJTF-7 began drafting an interrogation policy while MG Miller and his assessment team were still in Iraq. [1524] He said that LTC Beaver, and several CJTF-7 lawyers worked on a memo at Camp Victory. MG Miller said that, while he did not know who actually drafted the memo, LTC Beaver told him that she worked on the issue with COL Warren and his staff. [1525] LTC Beaver did not recall working on an interrogation policy during the assessment visit. [1526]

7. JTF-GTMO Assessment Team Produces Trip Report (U)

[Delete] At the conclusion of the assessment trip, MG Miller produced a trip report that described the team's findings. [1527] The trip report echoed what the JTF-GTMO Commander had told LTG Sanchez and MG Fast with regard to interrogation guidelines. The report stated "the team observed that the Task Force [CJTF-7] did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq." [1528] While the report did not discuss specific interrogation approaches or techniques, it did recommend ways in which the CJTF could improve the interrogation process:

Interrogations are [being] conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate detention operations, interrogation operations, and collection management under one command authority. [1529]


(U) Subsequent to the assessment trip, six GTMO personnel - three interrogators and three analysts - were sent to Abu Ghraib to assist in implementing the GTMO recommendations and in establishing a Joint Intelligence and Debriefing Center. [1530]

8. MG Miller Briefs Senior DoD Officials on Assessment Visit (U)

(U) MG Miller presented his trip report to SOUTHCOM and was subsequently told that it was forwarded to the Joint Staff and OSD. [1531] He was subsequently directed to brief senior Department of Defense officials on his assessment visit and the report. MG Miller told the Army Inspector General (IG) that the briefing took place in October and was attended by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steven Cambone, as well as senior military officers including LTG Ronald Burgess, the Director for Intelligence at the Joint Staff. According to MG Miller, his briefing covered "the ability of the CJTF-7 to be able to execute the strategic interrogation mission to develop intelligence, actual intelligence and an assessment of CJTF-7's ability to detain civilian detainees in accordance with the Geneva Convention and ARI90-8." [1532] Following the briefing, the GTMO Commander met privately with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone. [1533]

(U) While MG Miller said that Under Secretary Cambone attended the briefing, Under Secretary Cambone testified on May 11, 2004 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was, in fact "not briefed" by the GTMO Commander on the trip report. [1534] In his written answer to a question for the record following his testimony, Under Secretary Cambone stated that, in fact, he "was never officially briefed on MG Miller's report." [1535] Just over a week after Under Secretary Cambone's testimony, MG Miller testified before the Committee that he had "no direct discussions" with Under Secretary Cambone following his visit to Iraq. [1536]

(U) In August 2004, however, MG Miller told Army Investigators that, following his return from Iraq he "gave an outbrief to both Dr. Wolfowitz and Secretary Cambone." [1537] The GTMO Commander went on to state ''the meeting that I had with Secretary Cambone had occurred after I returned... The discussion generally was about how we could improve the flow of intelligence from Iraq through and in interrogations." [1538]

(U) More than a year later, in October 2005, the Army IG asked MG Miller about his testimony to the Committee that he had not had "direct discussions" with Under Secretary Cambone. Despite previously describing a "discussion" with Under Secretary Cambone, MG Miller told the IG that when asked at [the Senate Armed Services Committee] about discussions with Under Secretary Cambone after his trip, "I said no because I didn't have discussions with Cambone." [1539] MG Miller also told the Army IG that he didn't even know that the person attending the meeting was Dr. Cambone until Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz used his name." [1540] The Army IG also asked MG Miller about the smaller meeting that he attended with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone immediately following his briefing. MG Miller said that the reason for the smaller meeting was so that he could give the ''unvarnished truth" about his visit and said that he told Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone during that smaller meeting that CJTF-7 was at risk for "mission failure." [1541]

(U) Under Secretary Cambone stated in December 2006 that his records indicated that he "did attend MG Miller's briefing to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz," but that he did "not remember participating in any substantive discussions." Under Secretary Cambone said that he had "no personal recollection" of the smaller meeting that took place subsequent to MG Miller's briefing. [1542]

(U) During his December 20, 2007 interview with Committee staff, MG Miller said that he did not learn that Under Secretary Cambone was in attendance at the briefing until someone referred to him by name either during or after his briefing. [1543] He stated that, when he was asked at the May 2004 Committee hearing about discussions with Under Secretary Cambone, he had forgotten that Under Secretary Cambone had actually attended the briefing. MG Miller said his use of the word "discussion" in his August 2004 testimony to describe his interaction with Undersecretary Cambone was an imprecise use of words. MG Miller stated that, in the smaller meeting he attended following his briefing with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Undersecretary Cambone, that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz simply thanked him for his work.

E. Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy Established (U)

1. CJTF-7 Commander Issues Policy Including Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (U)


(U) On September 14, 2003, less than a week after MG Miller's team left Iraq, LTG Sanchez issued the first CJTF-7 "Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy." The September 14, 2003 policy stated that the Geneva Conventions were applicable in Iraq and that Coalition Forces "will continue to treat all persons under their control humanely." [1544] LTG Sanchez stated that he issued the policy because FM 34-52 left the "universe of approaches to the imagination of the interrogator" and demanded additional structure. [1545]

(U) According to LTG Sanchez, the September 14, 2003 policy "drew heavily" on the Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 guidance for GTMO. [1546] Indeed, the September 14, 2003 policy included all 24 interrogation techniques that were in that guidance, as well as techniques that CPT Wood had copied from the SMU TF in Iraq's interrogation policy and submitted for approval. The latter included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, loud music, and light control. [1547] The techniques CPT Wood had copied from the SMU TF policy had, in turn, been based on techniques included in the interrogation policy used by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. That policy was influenced, in turn, by the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 approval of aggressive interrogation techniques for use at GTMO. [1548]

(U) Although some of the techniques authorized by the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy required the CJTF-7 Commander's approval before they could be used on Enemy prisoners of War (EPWs), LTG Sanchez stated that "with few exceptions, persons captured after May 1, 2003 were not entitled to EPW status as a matter of law." [1549] CPT Wood said that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. [1550]

(U) LTG Sanchez stated that CJTF-7 forwarded the September 14, 2003 policy to CENTCOM with a cover memorandum stating that the policy was based on that used at Guantanamo Bay, but "modified for applicability to a theater of war in which the Geneva Conventions apply." [1551] LTG Sanchez stated that his intent, unless otherwise directed, was to "immediately implement the policy outlined in the memo." [1552]

2. Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy Implemented at Abu Ghraib (U)

(U) The September 14, 2003 policy went into effect for interrogators at Abu Ghraib as soon as it was issued. CPT Wood stated that she briefed the new policy for all of the [number of] interrogators and analysts working for her. She stated that during the briefing, "the interrogators took turns reading [the September 14 policy] line by line aloud." [1553] She stated that each interrogator present signed a document noting that he or she had received training on the policy. CPT Wood said that personnel who arrived at Abu Ghraib after CJTF-7 issued the policy were briefed on it during in- processing.

(U) CPT Wood also developed a Memorandum for Record on CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) to be signed by all personnel at Abu Ghraib in contact with detainees. [1554] The IROE stated that the interrogation approaches specified in Army FM 34-52, as well as yelling, light control, loud music, deception, and false flag were "approved for all detainees, regardless of status (security detainees, civilian internees, or EPWs)." [1555] Use of other approaches authorized by the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 memorandum, including stress positions, presence of dogs, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, and sleep management, were to be approved by the interrogation officer in charge or the noncommissioned officer in charge.

(U) At least one version of the IROE used a September 10, 2003 CJTF-7 draft policy as its basis, rather than the September 14 approved policy. [1556] That IROE also listed sensory deprivation as "approved in accordance with the CJTF-7 policy." [1557] While CPT Wood had requested sensory deprivation and the technique had been included in a September 10, 2003 draft policy, it was not among those listed in the September 14, 2003 policy approved by CJTF-7. CPT Wood acknowledged that she may have used the wrong policy as a basis for her IROE. [1558]

3. CENTCOM Raises Concerns About CJTF-7 Policy (U)

(U) LTG Sanchez said that when he issued the September 14, 2003 policy, there was agreement in the CJTF-7 legal community that the techniques in the policy were lawful. He said that that consensus was developed in the absence of guidance from CENTCOM, who he said believed the issue was too contentious and would not give CJTF-7 legal guidance. [1559] LTG Sanchez said that ''time was of the essence" so he "decided to publish the September memorandum knowing that discussions were ongoing as to the legality of some of the approaches included in the memorandum." [1560]

[Delete] LTG Sanchez stated that when the September 14, 2003 policy reached CENTCOM, it "energized the legal community there and that COL Fred Pribble [the CENTCOM SJA] had concerns." [1561] LTG Sanchez said that CENTCOM lawyers thought some techniques in the September 14 policy came too close to the boundary. [1562] COL Marc Warren, the CJTF-7 SJA, stated that the CENTCOM SJA "raised concerns to us that the policy was objectionable in that aspects of the approved approaches were impermissibly coercive." [1563]

[Delete] On September 15, 2003, the day after the policy was issued, COL Warren sent a copy to COL Pribble and William "Barry" Hammill, CENTCOM's Deputy SJA, stating "this is pretty tame stuff, largely a direct lift from the Army Interrogation FM. The genesis of this product was the visit by MG Miller's GITMO team." [1564] The next day, Mr. Hammill asked Major Carrie Ricci, the Chief of International Law at CENTCOM to review the policy. [1565] That same day, MAJ Ricci responded in an email stating that "Many of the techniques appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III and IV and should not be used on [enemy prisoners of war] or [civilian internees]. The [Geneva Conventions] prohibits all coercive interrogation techniques." [1566]

[Delete] On September 17, 2003, COL Pribble sent a copy of MAJ Ricci's email to COL Warren who responded that "almost all of these techniques are right out of the Field Manual and are in use now." [1567] That same day, MAJ Ricci responded:

Gentlemen, it's the techniques that are not in the field manual that concern me. Techniques such as dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, sleep management, yelling, loud music, light control, stress positions, etc. many of these techniques appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III, Article 17: ''No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."

... My recommendation is that the interrogation policy be kept in conformity with the [Field Manual] ... I would hesitate to put in writing how we are directing interrogations beyond what is in the [Field Manual]. If CJTF-7 wants to take advantage of the additional measures used at Guantanamo, this should be limited to detainees who are not entitled to [Geneva Convention] protections or else I believe we should still seek SECDEF approval- and I am doubtful some of these techniques will be approved. The policy as written is troublesome. [1568]


[Delete] Later that day, MAJ Ricci spoke with COL Warren by phone. [1569] In a subsequent email to Mr. Hammill she said that COL Warren was "going to try and re-work the policy. He is understandably unhappy that the policy was already signed by the [Commanding General] and now the SJA has the regrettable task of telling the [Commanding General] the policy has problems - but that's what we get paid for." [1570]

[Delete] In a September 22, 2003 email to MAJ Ricci, CENTCOM SJA COL Fred Pribble said "During my sit-down with COL Warren in Baghdad, he was pretty quick to admit that we (read you) had made the right call and that they would scrub the policy." [1571]

[Delete] LTG Sanchez said that after CJTF-7 and CENTCOM lawyers began to debate the policy that he and COL Warren again reviewed the memo. LTG Sanchez stated that COL Warren told him:

"Yes, they are legal. There is some dissent and different opinions within the legal community. Some of these may be harsher than others, and in order for us to eliminate debate and get consensus, we probably ought to put some of these aside, and oh, by the way, they probably wouldn't get us too much anyway if we implemented them." I said "Okay, fine let's get consensus. Go ahead and constrain it (the September policy)." [1572]


4. CJTF-7 Issues New Interrogation Policy (U)

(U) On October 12, 2003, nearly a month after MAJ Ricci's concerns were brought to COL Warren's attention, LTG Sanchez issued a revised interrogation policy, eliminating all techniques not listed in either the 1987 or 1992 versions of the Army Field manual. Techniques removed from the list of authorized techniques included dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, false flag, presence of military working dogs, sleep management, stress positions, and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1573] CJTF-7 also removed isolation and added "segregation" to the new policy. The October 12, 2003 policy stated that the CJTF-7 Commanding General had to approve segregation in all cases exceeding "30 days in duration, whether consecutive or nonconsecutive." [1574]

(U) CJTF-7 removed ''the presence of military dogs" from the list of interrogation techniques in the October 12, 2003 policy, but added a line in the "General Safeguards" section of the policy stating that "Should working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under the control of a handler at all times to ensure safety." [1575] Despite references to dogs in both the September 14, 2003 interrogation policy and the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy, LTG Sanchez said that the "intent for the use of dogs was always focused on the security contributions they make in a detention facility" and that there was "no explicit direction, guidance, or condoning of the use of unmuzzled dogs in the conduct of interrogations." [1576] LTG Sanchez acknowledged that placement of "presence of military working dogs" in the interrogation techniques section of the September 14 policy was "confusing." [1577] He said that he removed the "presence of military working dogs" from the list of interrogation techniques in the October policy and put it in the general safeguards section to make it "clear that using dogs for the deliberate purpose of frightening a detainee was not permitted." [1578]

(U) LTG Sanchez stated that "It is certainly clear under the October 2003 policy that the use of military working dogs in interrogations would require an exception to policy granted by me." [1579] COL Pappas stated, however, that he believed that the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy "delegated to me the authority to approve the use of muzzled dogs." [1580]

(U) The October 12, 2003 policy also stated that requests to use interrogation approaches not listed in the policy "will be submitted to [the CJTF-7 Commander] through CJTF-7 [Director for Intelligence] and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards." [1581]

(U) CPT Wood at Abu Ghraib said that when the October 12, 2003 policy was issued, her interrogators signed a new Interrogation Rules of Engagement Memorandum (IROE). [1582] The new IROE listed all of the techniques identified in the October 12, 2003 policy and stated that they were "approved for all detainees, regardless of status." [1583] The IROE also listed approaches not explicitly approved in the October 12, 2003 policy, but which had to be requested through the Interrogation Officer in Charge to the CJTF-7 Commanding General. The IROE listed nine examples of such techniques, presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sensory deprivation, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, isolation, sleep management, and change of scenery down. [1584]

F. SMU Task Force Issues a New Interrogation SOP (U)

[Big delete]. On October 16 2003 a new Commander, [delete] took command of the SMU TF. [Delete] stated that he "used his subject matter experts to build the [interrogation] SOP consistent with existing rules and regulations." [1585] This SOP went into effect on October 25, 2003. The Department of Defense has not provided the Committee with a copy of the October 25, 2003 SMU TF SOP. [1586]

[Delete] According to the Church Special Focus Team Report, however, the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy included ten interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual. [1587] Those techniques included controlled fear (muzzled dogs), stress positions, sleep deprivation/adjustment, environmental manipulation, yelling, loud music, and light control, removal of comfort items, isolation, false documents/report, multiple interrogator, and repeat and control. [1588] Less than two weeks before the policy was finalized, several of these techniques, including environmental manipulation, stress positions, muzzled dogs, and sleep adjustment had been removed from CJTF-7's interrogation SOP after CENTCOM raised legal concerns about them. [1589]

[Delete. Despite having been included in the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy, which he approved, [delete] indicated to DoD investigators in June 2004 that he had not approved "environmental manipulation" or "presence of military working dogs." [1590]

[Delete] There is evidence that at least one technique that was not in the SOP - removal of clothing - was in use at the SMU TF in late 2003. [Delete] stated that when he took command in October 2003, he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique [big delete]." [1591] He said that he did not know where the technique came from. [1592] Weeks prior to his October 2003 arrival, however, JPRA instructors had stripped a detainee during their assistance visit to the SMU TF facility as part of an interrogation. [1593] Terrence Russell, the JPRA training manager who was part of the JPRA team of instructors at the SMU TF, said that the detainee was stripped [big delete]." [1594] Mr. Russell stated that ''we've done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students." [1595]

[Big delete] stated that he was ''uncomfortable'' with stripping detainees and that "stripping a detainee just didn't seem right to [him] even though arguably, it was an effective technique." [1596] He said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:54 am

PART 21 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

Notes:

1218. [Delete] Memorandum for All [Delete] Personnel, Policy No. 1 -- Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility (BIT/F) Policy (July 15, 2003) hereinafter "BIT/F Policy (July 15, 2003")

1219. Notwithstanding differences between the legal status of detainees held in Iraq and those in Afghanistan, the SMU TF used the same interrogation approaches in both theaters. In addition, the JTF-7 interrogation policies included techniques that had been authorized for use at GTMO. By September 2003, interrogation approaches initially authorized for a war in which the President had determined that the protections of the Geneva Conventions did not apply, would be authorized for all U.S. forces in Iraq.

1220. Church Special Focus Team Report at 3.

1221. [Delete] BIT/F Policy (July 15, 2003).

1222. DoD IG, Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 21; Flag and General Officer Questionnaire for [Big delete] (June 29, 2004) at 2 (hereinafter Questionnaire [delete] (June 29, 2004)").

1223. DoD IG Report at 16.

1224. [Delete] Church Special Focus Team Report at 12. [Big delete].

1225. [Delete] Although the Church Special Focus Team Report concluded that the SOP the SMU TF had acquired from its sister unit in Afghanistan before the invasion of Iraq remained in effect for the SMU TF in Iraq until it was replaced on October 25, 2003, the Committee was advised that an unsigned July 15, 2003 SOP was in effect for the SMU TF in Iraq. Church Special Focus Team Report at 12. Committee staff interview of SMU Legal Advisor 1 (May 29, 2008).

1226. Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to CAPT Shelley Young and Mr. William Hammill (April 2, 2003).

1227. [Delete] Memo from the [delete] Legal Advisor to Staff Judge Advocate, USCENTCOM, Joint Task Forces [delete] [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Techniques (June 8, 2003); Church Special Focus Team Report at 12.

1228. [Delete] Memo from the [delete] Legal Advisor to Staff Judge Advocate, USCENTCOM, Joint Task Forces [delete] [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Techniques (June 8, 2003).

1229. Ibid.; Church Special Focus Team Report at 12.

1230. Message from CENTCOM Deputy Commander (June 10, 2003).

1231. BIT/F Policy (July 15, 2003) at 1.

1232. Ibid. at 5.

1233. BIT/F Policy (July 15, 2003) at 5; Review of Department of Defense Detention and Interrogation Operations, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Cong., S. Hrg. 108-868 (May 7, 11, 19; July 22; September 9, 2004) at 1294.

1234. BIT/F Policy (July 15, 2003) at 3.

1235. Committee staff interview of [delete] (October 11, 2007).

1236 Ibid.

1237. Committee staff interview of SMU Legal Advisor 1 (May 29, 2008).

1238. The SMU TF Legal Advisor added that he would be surprised if the Committee found anything with [delete] [delete] signature on it. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 2 (March 12, 2008).

1239. Ibid.

1240. Ibid.

1241. Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).

1242. [Delete] Questionnaire (June 29, 2004) at 3.

1243. Ibid.

1244. Ibid.

1245. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 1 (May 29, 2008).

1246. Ibid.

1247. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).

1248. USCENTCOM to CDR CJTF7, CFC FRAGO 09-278 Arabic Linguist Interrogator Support [delete] DTG 141543Z JUN 03 (June 14, 2003).

1249. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007). An interrogator with the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) who visited the Task Force facilities regularly recalled that at some point after June 2003 he saw interrogators from the 323rd MI BN (which was also providing interrogators to Abu Ghraib) whom he knew as he had trained some of them in Kuwait prior to the war. Committee staff interview of CWO Brian Searcy (June 4, 2007).

1250. Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).

1251. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007).

1251. DoD IG. Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 10, 12, 19, 30, 52.

1253. DoD IG, Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 18.

1254. Ibid. at 19.

1255. Statement of (August 9, 2004).

1256. Ibid. at 9.

1257. DoD 10, Interview or MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 20.

1258. Ibid. at 2I.

1259. Statement of [delete] (August 9, 2004) at 9.

1260. Ibid.

1261. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 1 (May 29, 2008).

1262. DoD IG, Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 50.

1263. Ibid. at 29.

1264. Email from to ISG Personnel (June 17, 2003).

1265. Email from to ISG Personnel (June 17, 2003).

1266. Army IG, Interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 26, 2004) at 2-3.

1267. Ibid. at 10.

1268. Ibid. at 5.

1269. Ibid. at 6.

1270. Ibid. at 7.

1271. Ibid.

1272. Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2001).

1273. The CJTF-7 Commander, his senior staff, and division Commanders attended the meeting. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2001).

1274. Ibid.

1275. Army IG, Interview of Col Thomas Pappas (August 24, 2006) at 6.

1276. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2001).

1277. DoD News Briefing (August 7, 2003).

1278. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 4.

1279. Ibid. at 3.

1280. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004); Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2008).

1281. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 21, 2004).

1282. Ibid.

1283. Ibid.

1284. Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2008).

1285. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 3. Additionally, CJTF-7 Commander LTG Sanchez said a key purpose of his eventually issuing an interrogation policy was to regulate approach techniques believed derived, in part, from techniques used in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan. Statement by LTG Ricardo Sanchez to the Department of the Army Inspector General (October 2004) at 7.

1286. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007).

1287. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 10. The Interrogation OIC had received the policy from one of her Chief Warrant Officers who had, in turn, received the policy from the LTC Robert Whelan, Commander of the 519tb Ml BN.

1288. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 4; Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2008). CPT Wood explained that even though the memorandum was dated July 26, 2003, which was before she took over the position at Abu Ghraib, she thought that one of her Chief Warrant Officers might have sent it up the chain knowing that she would be on board shortly.

1289. Memo from CPT Carolyn Wood to C2X, cm-7 (IRAQ) ABU GHURA. YB, Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SFIF) Detainee Interrogation Policy (July 26, 2003) (hereinafter "SFIF Interrogation Policy (July 26, 2003)"); see also BIT/F Policy (July 15, 2003) at 3.

1290. SFIF Interrogation Policy (July 26, 2003) at 2.

1291. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 4.

1292. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006).

1293. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 10.

1294. Email from CPT (P) William Ponce Jr. to CS165MI, HECC (August 14, 2003).

1295. Ibid.

1296. Ibid.

1297. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007).

1298. Ibid.; Sworn Statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 15.

1299. Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).

1300. Email from CPT (P) William Ponce Jr. to CSI65MI, HECC (August 14, 2003). CWO Lewis Welshofer was later tried and convicted of negligent homicide and negligent dereliction of duty in connection with the November 26, 2003 killing of an Iraq detainee.

1301. Email from 4ID 104 MI ICE to various recipients (August 14, 2003) (emphasis in original).

1302. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 2.

1303. Memo from CPT Carolyn Wood to C2X, CJTF-7 (IRAQ), ABU GHURAYB, Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SF/F) Detainee Interrogation Policy (August 27, 2003) at 4.

1304. Ibid.

1305. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 4; Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2007).

1306. Ibid.

1307. Memo from Lt Col Arlene McCue for the Force Judge Advocate, Results of Telephonic Interview With Colonel Randy Moulton, (USA Ret), former Commanding Officer, JPRA (September 23, 2005) at 1 (hereinafter "McCue, Results of Interview with Colonel Moulton'''); Committee staff interview of [delete] (October 10, 2007). [Delete] The Chief of the Operational Support Office (OSO) at JPRA told the Committee that in the process of providing defensive SERE training to Special Mission Units, JPRA personnel who had conducted offensive training [big delete] also consulted with the Special Mission Units to determine how they could be helpful in training. Committee staff interview of Chris Wirts (January 4, 2007).

1308. [Delete] Priority Message, Request JPRA Assistance in Interrogation Support, Date Time Group (DTG) 252059Z AUG 03 (August 25, 2003).

1309. Ibid.

1310. [Delete] to HQ JPRA, Interrogator Support, DTG 272054Z AUG 03 (August 27, 2003); HQ [delete] to CDR USJFCOM, Request for Interrogator Support, DTG 271004Z AUG 03 (August 27, 2003).

1311. Details of the three-week JPRA trip to Iraq are reflected in trip reports that Lt Col Kleinman and Mr. Russell submitted "upon their return from Iraq in late September 2003." Lt Col Kleinman's trip report is annotated with the comments of Mr. Russell. See DoD IG Memorandum for the Record, 4 January 2005 Meeting with Mr. Lt Col Steve Kleinman (January 11, 2005) at 4; Memorandum from Mr. Terry Russell for Lt. Col. Reichert, Mr. Wirts, JPRA Support to [delete] (undated) (hereinafter "Russell Trip Report"); Memorandum from Lt Col Steven Kleinman, Trip Report - TDY to CENTCOM AOR. 1-24 Sep 03 (undated) (hereinafter "Kleinman Trip Report").

1312. Jane Mayer, The Dark Side (New York: Doubleday) at 246.

1313. Maj Steven Kleinman, Support to DoD Interrogation Operations (May 17, 2002).

1314. Ibid.

1315. Ibid. at 1-2.

1316. Ibid. at 4-6.

1317. Ibid. at 5.

1318. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008).

1319. (SIFP) CDR USJFCOM to HQ JPRA, Interrogator Support, DIG 272054Z AUG 03 (August 27, 2003).

1320 Committee staff interview of Col Randy Moulton (November 26, 2007).

1321. Committee staff interview of RADM John Bird (March 17, 2008)

1322. Email from JPRA J2 to weekly report distribution list., JPRA Weekly Report (September 4, 2003). The JPRA Commander also updated JFCOM in JPRA's subsequent weekly reports. See September 11, 2003 Weekly Report (the JPRA team "deployed to Baghdad continues to support [redacted] with strategic debriefing.") September 25, 2003 Weekly Report (the JPRA team "deployed to Baghdad to support [redacted] with strategic debriefing" returned on September 24, 2003.)

1323. Email from LTG Wagner to Col Moulton (September 6, 2003).

1324. Email from Col Moulton to LTG Wagner (September 8, 2003).

1325. Ibid.

1326. Email from Col Moulton to RADM Bird (September 9, 2003).

1327. Ibid. (emphasis in original).

1328. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1329 Ibid.

1330. To the extent possible, the Committee relied on contemporaneous documents, including Lt Col Kleinman's and Mr. Russell's written trip reports, to establish the timeline of events during the JPRA team's visit to the SMU Task Force.

1331. Russell Trip Report.

1332. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (February 14, 2007).

1333. Ibid. During his interview with Committee staff, Lt Col Kleinman described the interrogation of an Iraqi man who had been detained by U.S. forces because interrogators believed he had useful intelligence because he knew about "bridges." Lt Col Kleinman said that it later became clear that the man was a dental technician.

1334. Russell Trip Report at 2.

1335. Ibid. at 1.

1336 SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1337. Russell trip report at 2.

1338 Committee staff interview of Randy Moulton (June 19, 2007); Committee staff interview of Randy Moulton (November 26, 2007)

1339. McCue, Results of Interview with Colonel Moulton at 1.

1340. McCue, Results of Interview with Colonel Moulton at 1. According to the DoD IG report, the JPRA Commander confirmed that the U.S. Joint Forces Command J-3 and the SMU TF Commander "gave a verbal approval for the SERE team to actively participate in 'one or two demonstration' interrogations." DoD IG Report at 28.

1341. Email from Randy Moulton to DoD IG (June 30, 2006) at 3.

1342. Committee staff interview of Col Randy Moulton (June 19, 2007); Committee staff interview of Col Randy Moulton (November 26, 2007). LTG Wagner, however, to which the JPRA Commander referred had already left JFCOM in August 2003, well before the JPRA team deployed to Iraq. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Col Moulton said that he was unable to reach RADM Bird or Maj Gen Soligan so he "went up the chain and spoke with General Wagner." SASC hearing (September 25, 2008).

1343. Committee staff interview of Col Randy Moulton (June 19, 2007).

1344. Ibid.

1345. Committee staff interview of RADM John Bird (March 17, 2008).

1346. Committee staff interview of Robert Wagner (June 28, 2007).

1347. Russell Trip Report.

1348. Russell Trip Report.

1349. With the walling technique, the J-2X stated that instructions were given to use a wood wall and to pick a spot on the wall in between any metal braces. Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).

1350. Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).

1351. Committee staff interview of Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008).

1352. Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).

1353. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 102-103, 106.

1354. Russell Trip Report.

1355. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1356. Ibid.

1357. Ibid.

1358. Russell Trip Report.

1359 Ibid. at 5; Kleinman Trip Report at 2-3.

1360. Kleinman Trip Report at 2-3.

1361. Ibid.

1362 Ibid.

1363 Russell Trip Report at 5. Mr. Russell also felt that Lt Col Kleinman should have used the interrogator's chain of command at the Task Force to stop the interrogation. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 105.

1364. Kleinman Trip Report at 3.

1365 Ibid.

1366. [Delete] Kleinman Trip Report at 3. In his own trip report, Mr. Russell also noted that the use of kneeling was an authorized SMU TF technique. See Russell Trip Report at 3-4.

1367. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 104-105.

1368. Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).

1369. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 103.

1370. Ibid. at 104.

1371. Ibid. at 111-12.

1372. Ibid. at 126-27.

1373. Ibid. at 123.

1374. Ibid.

1375. The record is unclear as to exactly what date the call occurred.

1376. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1377. Ibid.

1378. Ibid.

1379. Ibid.

1380. [Delete] Kleinman Trip Report at 3; Russell Trip Report at 2 ("The JPRA Commander had cleared Lenny Miller and me to use our normal and usual range of physical pressures while interrogating detainees''); Committee staff interview of Steven Kleinman (February 14, 2007); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 99.

1381. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1382. Ibid.

1383. Kleinman Trip Report at 4; Russell Trip Report at 6.

1384. Russell Trip Report at 2.

1385. Ibid.

1386. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008)

1387. Russell Trip report at 6..

1388 Ibid.

1389. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 106-07.

1390. Russell Trip Report at 3; Kleinman Trip Report at 4.

1391. Kleinman Trip Report at 4.

1392. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1393. Russell Trip Report at 3.

1394. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 2 (March 12, 2008).

1395. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1396. Russell Trip Report at 2-3.

1397. Kleinman Trip Report at 3.

1398. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 114-15.

1399. Ibid. at 115.

1400. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008). Mr. Russell testified that both he and Mr. Miller removed the detainee's clothing, but Mr. Miller told the Committee that only Mr. Russell removed the detainee's clothing. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 116; Committee staff interview of Lenny Miller (July 24, 2007).

1401. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 117.

1402. Ibid.

1403. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1404. Ibid.

1405. Ibid.

1406 Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 116-19.

1407. Kleinman Trip Report at 3.

1408. Ibid. at 3-4.

1409. SASC hearing (September 25, 2008); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 119.

1410. SASC hearing (September 25, 2008).

1411. Ibid.

1412. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (February 14, 2007); Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008). Lt Col Kleinman told the Committee that the IF Commander gave him permission to take photographs.

1413. Untitled Photograph taken by Lt Col Steven Kleinman, (September 2003).

1414. Ibid.

1415. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008).

1416. In his trip report, Terrence Russell wrote that he had learned about Lt Col Kleinman's intervention from the J2- X. Russell Trip Report at 3.

1417. Ibid.

1418. Ibid. at 4.

1419. Ibid.

1420. [Delete] JPRA, Executive Summary of JPRA Support [delete] (undated)

1421. [Delete] Ibid.; Russell Trip Report at 4.

1422. Russell Trip Report at 4.

1423. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 120-121.

1424. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008).

1425. SASC Hearing (September 25, 2008).

1426. Russell Trip Report at 4.

1427. Concept of Operations For HVT Exploitation (Undated), attachment to JPRA, Executive Summary of JPRA Support [delete] (undated) (hereinafter "Concept of Operations for HVT Exploitation - Version 1")

1428. [Delete] Exploitation Draft Plan (Undated); Concept of Operations For HVF Exploitation - Version 1

1429. Similar recommendations had also been listed in the February 28, 2003 JPRA memorandum on "prisoner handling recommendations" that JPRA had provided to SOUTHCOM in February 2002.

1430. [Delete] Concept of Operations For HVT Exploitation - Version 1.

1431. Ibid. (noting that "HVT exploitation operations will be conducted within the intent of U.S. policy and law, [in accordance with] U.S. interpretation as identified" in the March 6, 2003 Working Group report.)

1432. [Delete] Concept of Operations For HVT Exploitation - Version 1.

1433. Ibid.

1434. Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008).

1435. [Delete] Following their trip, JPRA personnel also completed an "Executive Summary" of their support to the SMU TF that described the visit and summarized observations and recommendations provided to the SMU TF Commander. [Delete] Executive Summary of JPRA Support [delete] (undated).

1436. DoD IG Report at 28.

1437. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008).

1438. Ibid.

1439. Committee staff interview of SMU TF Legal Advisor 2 (March 12, 2008).

1440. Russell Trip Report at 4.

1441. Ibid. [Delete] The initial decision to keep Mr. Russell in theater may be relevant to discussions Col Moulton was having with CENTCOM about the possibility of sending another three-man team to Iraq. Shortly after the original team left for Iraq, Col Moulton began discussions about sending a JPRA team to assist CENTCOM. On September 3, 2003, Col Moulton contacted the JPRA representative at CENTCOM and explained the genesis of their SMU TF mission and how he thought such support might be expanded to other missions and organizations throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Col Moulton wrote:

I've been in contact with [delete] in Baghdad. He was the one who requested the [JPRA team] to assist in interrogation training. He also mentioned that there are several entities doing interrogations, and there is no standardization/methodology on how to conduct/coordinate the process. He asked me to bring a team over to observe what they are doing and what others are doing. I think it would be a good idea to bring a team over to observe what they are doing and what others are doing. I think it would be a good idea to bring a team forward (3 person - myself, Chris Wirts, Terry Russell) to visit the various interrogation facilities and report back to JCS (through CENTCOM and the JFCOM/LL folks) with observations and potential recommendations.

[Delete] Col Moulton also stated that he had pitched the idea to JFCOM:

Having said that, I think the request needs to come from CENTCOM, not just [delete] I can support, and have already presented the concept to JFCOM. We just need the invite. Long-term is to identify the need for an OSD OPR [Office of Primary Responsibility] for strategic debriefing/interrogation. To put it into football terms, we (JPRA) are the quarterback for defensive resistance operations - there is no quarterback for offensive resistance operations. Where that responsibility would ultimately fall (JPRA [delete] is not the issue, but rather that someone has to take the lead.


Email from Col Moulton to JPRA CENTCOM LNO (September 3, 2003).

1442. Russell Trip Report at 6; see also email from Mike Lampe to David Ayres (August 28, 2003).

1443. Email from CAPT Donovan to Col Moulton, Col Atkins, Mr. Wirts, and Mr. Jagielski (September 26, 2003).

1444. Ibid.

1445. Ibid.

1446. The techniques that CAPT Donovan struck included [big delete]. Concept of Operations For HVT Exploitation at 6 (hereinafter "Concept of Operations For HVT Exploitation - Version 2").

1447. Concept of Operations For HVT Exploitation - Version 2 at 2.

1448. Ibid.

1449. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to LTG Wagner, Maj Gen Soligan (September 29, 2003).

1450. Ibid.

1451. Ibid.

1452. DoD IG Report.

1453. Committee staff interview of CAPT Alan Kaufman (September 17, 2007).

1454. The ''two'' missions refer to the September 2003 trip to Iraq and the September 2002 JPRA training at Fort Bragg. Memo from LTG Robert Wagner, Follow up response to June 2003 USJFCOM IG Meeting on DoD IG Inquiry to USJFCOM of 27 May 2005 (September 23, 2005)

1455. Ibid.

1456. Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).

1457. Army IG, Interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 3.

1458 .Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 65; AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (August 24, 2004) at 57 (hereinafter "Fay Report").

1459. Fay Report at 57.

1460. Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Congress, S. Hrg. 108-868 (May 7, 2004, May 11, 2004) at 41, 98.

1461. Army IG, Interview of LTG William Boykin (November 17, 2005) at 3.

1462. MG Geoffrey Miller, Assessment of DoD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq (U) (undated) at 2 (hereinafter "Miller Report.")

1463. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 65.

1464. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1465. Several members of the assessment team recalled the conditions at the Corps Holding Area. LTC Beaver described the facility as "grotesque" and recalled telling lawyers at CJTF-7 about "stagnant water, maggots, feces approximately 6 inches tall on the toilets and running down the sides of the toilets." She told the Committee that she saw senior non-commissioned officers who were oblivious to their surroundings and that she recalled one guard tell the visiting team "I don't give an [expletive] if [the Iraqi prisoners] die."

MG Miller said he was "dismayed and shocked at the operations" at Camp Cropper, referring to them as "inappropriate, unprofessional, and not humane." MG Miller also called it "shocking'" that "the guards didn't even know the rules of engagement for use of deadly force." MG Miller said that he told LTG Sanchez: "you have a major problem at Camp Cropper and you need to take action now." According to MG Miller, LTG Sanchez asked him to share his assessment with the 800th MP BDE Commander BG Janis Karpinski and direct that "corrections be made in the next 48 hours." MG Miller said that, in a subsequent meeting with BG Karpinski, he met with "significant pushback." He recalled his reaction in that meeting. "[I] kind of cleared the room and told General Karpinski, I said these are the findings, if you don't agree with them, let's you and I go see General Sanchez because he has directed that you take action to have corrective action be taken and in place within 48-hours. And so she called the staff back in and started to go forward with it."

MG Miller told the Committee that BG Karpinski accepted the guidance, but not willingly. According to LTC Beaver, the Corps Holding Area at Camp Cropper was closed shortly after the team left Iraq. Sworn Statement of LTC Diane Beaver (December 10, 2004) at 1; Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007); Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 28, 2005) at 68.

1466. DoD IG, Interview of LTG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 10.

1467. Ibid. at 52.

1468. Committee staff interview of Brian Searcy (June 4, 2007).

1469. Ibid.

1470 Ibid.

1471. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007); Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller for Javal Davis trial (August 21, 2004). The former JTF-GTMO ICE Chief David Becker, who was present during the ISG visit did not recall the MG Miller using the term "GTMO-ize." Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).

1472. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1473. Committee staff interview of Mike Kamin (May 30, 2007).

1474. Committee staff interview of [delete] (May 23, 2007).

1475. Lt Col Rapuano said that "the issue discussed, without decision, was if it was appropriate that detainees were being provided cooler living conditions than most Coalition personnel had in their living quarters and work areas, and whether only the cooperative detainees should be rewarded with cooler cells." Kenneth Rapuano answers to September 3, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 16, 2008).

1476. DoD IG, Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 33.

1477. Ibid.

1478. Ibid.

1479. Ibid. at 34.

1480. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1481. DoD IG, Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 34; Committee staff interview of LTG Keith Dayton (June 1, 2007).

1482. Committee staff interview of [delete] (October 10, 2007).

1483. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1484. Ibid.

1485. See Section XII A, supra.

1486. Sworn Statement of LTC Diane Beaver (December 10, 2004) at 1.

1487. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

1488. Ibid.

1489. Ibid.

1490 Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1491. Slide presentation, The GTMO Commander-Team Visit to Iraq (undated).

1492. Ibid.

1493. COL Pappas stated that the discussions were broad but focused on the understanding that "interrogation is what drives the train," as well as developing a "singular unified purpose that was to extract information" from detainees. Army IG, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 10, 12, 15.

1494. Ibid. at 10.

1495. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 21, 2004) at 2.

1496. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 12.

1497. Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006) at 45.

1498. Army IG, Statement of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 19, 2004) at 2.

1499. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 7.

1500. Army IG, Statement of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 19, 2004) at 2.

1501 Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 21, 2004) at 6; see Section XII B, supra.

1502 Alpha Company, 519th MI BN SFIF Interrogation TIPS (August 27, 2003).

1503. Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 21, 2004) at 6.

1504. SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); Committee staff interview of LTC Beaver (October 11, 2007).

1505. Army IG, Interview of David Becker (September 22, 2005) at 25.

1506. Army IG, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 10. In a 2007 interview with Committee staff, COL Pappas recalled having discussions with former JTF-GTMO ICE Chief David Becker, but did not recall if the use of dogs came up in those discussions. Committee staff interview of Col Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007).

1507. Army IG, Interview of Col Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 10.

1508. Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas to LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003).

1509. Army 15-6 Investigation, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (February 12, 2004) at 28.

1510. Ibid. at 29.

1511. Sworn Statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 14.

1512. MAJ David DiNenna, answers to February 13, 2006 written questions (undated). MAJ DiNenna wrote that he had "requested dogs in June 2003 when I first arrived at Abu Ghraib. We had 2 MWD [Military Working Dog] teams at Camp Bucca prior to that and they proved to be a tremendous force multiplier. I requested MWD from that point until they arrived in November 2003."

1513. Ibid.

1514. Ibid.

1515. Ibid. at 21.

1516. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 71.

1517. Ibid.

1518. Ibid. at 73.

1519. Ibid. at 69.

1520. Ibid.

1521. Ibid.

1522. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 7.

1523. Sworn Statement of LTC Diane Beaver (December 10, 2004) at 5.

1524. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007).

1525. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1526. Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2007).

1527. Miller Report

1528. Ibid. at 2.

1529. Ibid. at 4.

1530. Fay Report at 59.

1531. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 28, 2005) at 5, 8.

1532. Ibid. at 4.

1533 Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 82.

1534. Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Congress, S. Hrg. 108-868 (May 11, 2004) at 339.

1535. Ibid. at 371.

1536. Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Congress, S. Hrg. 108-868 (May 19, 2004) at 594.

1537. Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller for Javal Davis trial (August 21, 2004) at 3.

1538. Ibid.

1539. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20.2005) at 79.

1540. Ibid.

1541. Ibid. at 82.

1542. Letter from Under Secretary Stephen Cambone to Senator John Warner (December 19, 2006).

1543. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).

1544. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003).

1545. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 9, 12.

1546. Ibid. at 8.

1547. The September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy did not include sensory deprivation, which was also included in CPT Wood's August 27, 2003 policy proposal. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Alpha Company, 519th MI BN SFIF Interrogation TTPS (August 27, 2003).

1548. The September 14, 2003 policy also included "Mutt and leff," which was part of the 1987 version of Army FM 34-52, but not the 1992 version of the Army Field Manual 34-52. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003).

1549. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 8.

1550. Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 4.

1551. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 8, 12.

1552. Ibid.

1553. Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 4.

1554. Memorandum for Record, CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003) (hereinafter "CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003)").

1555. Ibid.

1556. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 10, 2003).

1557. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003).

1558. Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11, 2008); CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter- Resistance Policy (September 10, 2003).

1559. Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).

1560 Ibid.; Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 8, 12.

1561. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 4.

1562. Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).

1563. COL Mark Warren, Judge Advocate Interview Questions (June 25, 2004).

1564. Email from COL Marc Warren to COL Fred Pribble and William Hammill (September 15, 2003).

1565. Email from William Hammill to MAl Carrie Ricci (September 16, 2003).

1566. Email from MAJ Carrie Ricci to William Hammill (September 16, 2003).

1567. Email from COL Marc Warren to COL Fred Pribble, MAJ Carrie Ricci, and William Hammill (September 17, 2003).

1568. Email from MN Carrie Ricci to COL Marc Warren, COL Fred Pribble, and William Hammill (September 16, 2003).

1569. Email from MN Carrie Ricci to William Hammill (September 17, 2003).

1570. Ibid.

1571. Email from COL Fred Pribble to MAJ Carrie Ricci and William Hammill (September 22, 2003).

1572. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 4.

1573. The October 12, 2003 policy also eliminated two Army FM techniques - change of scenery up and change of scenery down. CJTF-7 Memorandum for C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003) (hereinafter "c.rrF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003)").

1574. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003).

1575. Ibid.

1576. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 21; Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 3 (emphasis added).

1577. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 4, 5.

1578. Ibid.

1579. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 21.

1580. Army IG, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 27.

1581. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003).

1582. Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 4.

1583. Memorandum for Record CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003).

1584. Ibid.

1585. [Delete] Questionnaire (June 29, 2004) at 2.

1586. [Delete] The Department of Defense produced two documents to the Committee in response to the request for the October SOP. Neither of those two documents is dated and one appears to be a draft written sometime after December 18 2003. See Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force [delete] Baghdad Airbase, Iraq, [delete] Battlefield Interrogation Facility/Team Standing Operating Procedures, Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force [delete] Baghdad Airbase, Iraq, [delete] Battiefield Interrogation Team and temporary Facility Standing Operating Procedures. The Department stated in a March 10, 2008 letter that the documents provided in response to the Committee's request for the October 25, 2003 SOP were "reasonably close to the time frame and location requested." Letter from ASD Robert Wilkie to Chairman Carl Levin (March 10, 2008). The Department has also informed the Committee that after "multiple searches we were unable to locate an SOP with the exact October 25, 2003 date." Email from Thomas Alexander to Committee staff (April 9, 2008).

1587. Church Special Focus Team Report at 12-13.

1588. [Delete] Although the Church Special Focus Team Report identified "repeat and control" as a technique that went beyond the Army FM, it could also arguably be classified as a Field Manual technique.

1589. CJTF-7's September 14, 2003 SOP included "sleep management" and "sleep adjustment." See Section XII E, supra.

1590. [Delete] Questionnaire (June 29, 2004) at 4.

1591. Church Special Focus Team Report at 13; [Big delete] Questionnaire (June 29, 2004) at 3.

1592. [Big delete] Questionnaire (June 29, 2004) at 3.

1593. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 117.

1594. Ibid.

1595. Ibid.

1596 [Delete] Questionnaire (June 29, 2004) at 3.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:56 am

PART 22 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

XIII. Interrogation Techniques and Detainee Mistreatment at Abu Ghraib (U)

(U) Between September and December 2003, military personnel at Abu Ghraib engaged in what Major General Antonio Taguba would later call "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" of detainees. [1597] Several instances of abuse were captured in photographs taken by the soldiers themselves and, in April 2004, some of those photographs appeared in the media.

(U) Two Army investigations, one conducted by MG Taguba and the other conducted by Major General George Fay would later find that abuses at Abu Ghraib were perpetrated directly by both military police (MP) and military intelligence (MI) personnel. [1598] In addition to the direct participation of MI personnel in incidents of detainee abuse, MG Fay's investigation also identified situations where MI personnel solicited MPs to engage in detainee abuse, using such methods as "isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, [and] the use of dogs as an interrogation tool to induce fear, and physical abuse." [1599]

(U) MG Fay cited the inadequacy of interrogation doctrine as a "contributing factor" to Abu Ghraib and stated that interrogation techniques developed and approved for use at GTMO and in Afghanistan became "confused" at Abu Ghraib and "were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards." [1600] As discussed above, some of the techniques MG Fay found to be abusive were also authorized for use by military interrogators conducting interrogations at the SMU TF facility in Iraq.

(U) Interviews conducted by investigators for both MG Fay and MG Taguba contain evidence that the use of aggressive interrogation techniques like use of military working dogs, stress positions, and removal of clothing, was not limited to the specific incidents described in those reports. In fact, those interviews appear to indicate that the use of some of these techniques was widespread at Abu Ghraib.

A. Use of Military Working Dogs (U)

(U) The use of military working dogs to exploit detainee fears was authorized on December 2, 2002 by the Secretary of Defense for use at Guantanamo Bay. [1601] Weeks later, the technique appeared in a January 24, 2003 memorandum from CJTF-180's Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and was subsequently considered available for use in Afghanistan. [1602] The use of dogs was also among those techniques authorized for use at the SMU TF in Iraq. [1603]

[Delete] Following MG Miller's assistance visit to Iraq in August and September 2003, CJTF-7 had submitted a request for three military police dog teams "to provide an increased security posture" to support detention and interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. [1604]

(U) The dog teams arrived at Abu Ghraib on November 20, 2003. [1605] According to MG Fay's report, "abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived" with the first incident occurring on November 24, 2003. [1606] Major General Fay's report documented seven other times over the next six weeks when dogs were used, including three occasions in which they were used in interrogations, one occasion the report referred to as "an apparent [Military Intelligence] directed use of dogs in detainee abuse," and one incident described as dogs being used likely as a ''softening up" technique for future interrogations." [1607]

[Delete] COL Pappas, the Commander of the 205th MI BDE, said that on December 12, 2003 he "specifically approved the dogs to be used." [1608] A December 14, 2003 memo for LTG Sanchez, the CJTF-7 Commander, signed by COL Pappas indicated that COL Pappas approved the "presence of military working dogs" for three detainees captured in conjunction with Saddam Hussein. [1609] COL Pappas stated that he "couldn't say for sure" whether he actually sent the memo to LTG Sanchez, but that he "signed it with the intent of it going to him." [1610] LTG Sanchez said that no request for the use of dogs in interrogations "was ever received or approved by me." [1611]

(U) One intelligence analyst stated that it was "common knowledge" that one soldier used "dogs while he was on his special projects" working directly for COL Pappas after the capture of Saddam Hussein." [1612] And an MP said that dogs could be used in interrogations "with the proper authorization," and that "dogs were used to scare the detainee into confessing or producing intelligence." [1613]

(U) An Army dog handler said that "MI would ask me to use my dog as a psychological and physical deterrent. It would consist of a dog walking up to a prisoner and the dog barking at a prisoner." [1614] The same dog handler said that "Someone from MI gave me a list of cells, for me to go see, and pretty much have my dog bark at them... Having the dogs bark at detainees was psychologically breaking them down for interrogation purposes." [1615]

(U) On February 19, 2004, after MG Taguba had begun his investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, the Commander of the 504th MI Brigade issued a memorandum stating that "military working dogs will not be present during the interrogation or debriefing of any detainees at the Abu Ghraib facility." [1616]

B. Stress Positions and Physical Training (U)

(U) Stress positions were authorized for use in interrogations at GTMO by the Secretary of Defense on December 2, 2002. [1617] The technique was used in interrogations in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003. [1618] Stress positions were also authorized for use at the SMU TF in Iraq. [1619]

(U) CPT Wood at Abu Ghraib said that stress positions and forced exercise regimens (also called compulsory physical training) were used in interrogations and the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy explicitly authorized the use of stress positions. [1620] CPT Wood's October 9, 2003 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) for interrogators listed stress positions as an approved technique. [1621] While the October 12, 2003 CJTF-7 policy removed stress positions from the list of authorized interrogation techniques, a subsequent IROE for interrogators continued to list the technique, with the caveat that its use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CJTF-7 prior to employment." [1622]

(U) MG Fay's report stated that "What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise) carried over into sexual and physical assaults..." [1623] The report described one incident where a detainee was ''forced to stand while handcuffed in such a way to dislocate his shoulder" and described a photograph of an interrogation being conducted while another detainee was squatting on a chair which MG Fay called "an unauthorized stress position." [1624]

(U) One MP said he "saw MI use stress positions" at Abu Ghraib. [1625] Similarly, the warden of the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib stated that military intelligence made detainees engage in physical training and he saw "detainees holding buckets, arms out, and other drills." [1626] An MP Platoon leader stated that he also "observed [military intelligence personnel] making detainees do physical training." [1627]

(U) When asked whether he had ever been directed by MI or another government agency (OGA) to "soften up" a prisoner, one MP said "Yes, I would have them do physical training to tire them out." [1628] Another MP stated that military intelligence personnel insinuated that MP soldiers should abuse detainees telling them to "'Loosen this guy up for us.' 'Make sure he has a bad night.' 'Make sure he gets the treatment.'" [1629]

(U) One interrogator confirmed the practice of having MPs "soften up" detainees, stating that the "MPs did prepare prisoners prior to interrogations by having them do physical exercises and yelling at them. The interrogators would verbally discuss, with an MP, a detainee and his cooperativeness and various methods to deal with a detainee such as physical exercise at random hours of the night and yelling." [1630] Other MI soldiers confirmed the use of stress positions by interrogators at Abu Ghraib. One interrogation analyst stated that he witnessed the use of a stress position where a detainee was "handcuffed to the floor." [1631] The same soldier referred to that use of the stress position as "in following with the interrogation plan." [1632] An interrogator likewise stated that she "did use a stress position" in interrogations. [1633] Another interrogator who was deployed from GTMO to Abu Ghraib following the MG Miller assistance visit said that "stress positions were authorized" when he first got to Abu Ghraib in October 2003 and that he witnessed use of the technique. [1634]

C Removal of Clothing (U)

(U) Removal of clothing was authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. [1635] The technique was also recommended as an effective technique in a January 24, 2003 memo written by the CJTF-180 Deputy SJA and was subsequently considered approved policy in Afghanistan. [1636]

[Delete] The Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq also used "removal of clothing" as an interrogation technique in the fall of 2003, just as the Abu Ghraib abuses were taking place. While not included in the SMU TF interrogation SOP, the SMU TF Commander [big delete] stated that when he took command in October 2003 he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique [delete] [big delete] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. [1638]

(U) Though it never appeared in CJTF-7's interrogation policy, MG Fay stated in his report that removal of clothing was "imported" to Abu Ghraib and could be "traced through Afghanistan and GTMO." [1639] MG Fay's report stated that removal of clothing was "used to humiliate detainees" and said the practice "contributed to an environment that would appear to condone depravity and degradation rather than the humane treatment of detainees." [1640] His report identified several specific incidents of detainees being stripped or partially stripped at the direction of interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib.

(U) Statements by military police and military intelligence personnel who served at Abu Ghraib indicated that removal of clothing was widely used for interrogations. COL Jerry Philabaum, the Commander of the 320th MP BN at the facility, recalled seeing "between 12-15 detainees naked in their own individual cells." [1641] He said that when he raised the issue with the JIDC Commander, LTC Steven Jordan, he was told it "was normal practice for detainees to be naked in their cells, but that usually they didn't have that many naked and that it was a technique [military intelligence] used." [1642] CPT Donald Reese, the Commander of the 37200 MP Company, stated that LTC Jordan also told him that stripping detainees was "an interrogation method that we use." [1643] CPT Reese said the fact that detainees were naked as an interrogation method was "known by everybody" and stated that it was "common practice to walk the tier and see detainees without clothing and bedding." [1644]

(U) Similarly, an intelligence analyst at Abu Ghraib stated that it was "common that the detainees on [military intelligence] hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given clothing as an incentive to cooperate with US." [1645] One interrogator stated that "it was practice, especially for [military intelligence] holds to take their clothes in a possible attempt to renew the 'capture shock' of detainees who had been in custody for an extended period of time or were transferred from other facilities." [1646] Another interrogator said that "it was common to see detainees in cells without clothes or naked" and said that it was "one of our approaches." [1647] The interrogator said that "any officer who would walk the area at night should have seen the detainees naked." [1648]

(U) One military police (MP) soldier stated that MI "would tell us to take away [the detainees'] mattresses, sheets, and clothes" and that ''the detainees would sleep in their cells naked." [1649] Another MP stated that MI used "clothing removal as an interrogation technique in Tier 1A." [1650] Major Michael Sheridan, who was Executive Officer of the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib, said that he stopped permitting MPs to escort detainees to interrogations after an incident where a male detainee "was being interrogated naked and then my MPs had to escort him back to his cell in 45 degree temps with nothing but a bag over his head, and one of the MPs was female." [1651]

(U) One Abu Ghraib interrogator stated that another interrogator who was deployed from GTMO to Abu Ghraib, told him that he "was permitted as the interrogator to strip a detainee completely naked in the interrogation booth." [1652] Another GTMO interrogator deployed to Abu Ghraib said that he oversaw the interrogation of a detainee who had been stripped. [1653] The interrogator said that the technique was approved by a superior officer. [1654] A third interrogator who had previously served at GTMO recalled asking an MP at Abu Ghraib ''to strip [a detainee] naked for us for the interrogation." [1655]

D. Sleep Adjustment/Sleep Management (U)

(U) On December 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of 20 hour interrogations at GTMO. [1656]

[Delete] A January 24, 2003 memo from the CJTF-180 Deputy SJA stated that "sleep adjustment," which the memo described as "generally 4 hours of sleep per every 24 hours," was used as an interrogation technique in Afghanistan. [1657] The SMU TF interrogation policy for Iraq listed "sleep management" as an authorized technique and described the technique as "four hours of sleep during [a] 24 hour period" - the same way that CJTF-180 had described "sleep adjustment" in Afghanistan. [1658]

(U) The September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy authorized both sleep management and sleep adjustment for interrogations, defining the former as "adjusting the sleep times of a detainee" and the latter as "4 hours of sleep per 24 hour period." [1659] CPT Wood's October 9, 2003 IROE also listed both "sleep adjustment" and "sleep management" as approved techniques. [1660] CJTF-7's October 12, 2003 policy did not include either sleep adjustment or sleep management as authorized interrogation techniques. [1661] However, an October 16, 2003 IROE written by CPT Wood continued to list both techniques, saying that their use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CJTF-7 prior to employment." [1662]

(U) MG Fay's report stated that the "'sleep adjustment' technique was used by [military intelligence] as soon as the Tier 1A block opened" at Abu Ghraib. [1663] Interviews of MI and MP soldiers, however, indicated a lack of clarity among MI and MP as to what "sleep adjustment," "sleep management," and "sleep deprivation" actually meant. In any case, MPs were integral to carrying out each of those techniques for MI personnel.

(U) One contract interrogator stated that "During a typical SMMP [sleep and meal management program], the MPs are responsible for administering the written program provided by the interrogator... In addition, the MPs are advised that during the awake time period of an approved SMMS program, the MPs are allowed to do what is necessary to keep the detainee awake in the allotted period of time as long as it adheres to approved rules of engagement and proper treatment of detainee." [1664] An MI non-commissioned officer stated that he provided sleep adjustment schedules included in interrogation plans written by interrogators he was supervising to the MP Sergeant of the Guard. [1665] Similarly, an intelligence analyst said that the process for using sleep management was "for the interrogator to request it in writing and submit the request with the interrogation plan... Once it was approved, a memo was given to the MPs showing the schedule." [1666]

(U) COL Jerry Philabaum, the Commander of the 320th MP BN, said that "When [military intelligence] wanted a detainee on sleep deprivation, they would tell the MP guard that prisoner 'X' was on sleep deprivation. They would give instructions that the detainee was to sleep four hours within a 24 hour period... I don't believe MPs were given specific instructions on how to keep the detainees awake. It was left to the MPS." [1667] Another MP Officer stated that:

When MI needed our assistance with detainees, they did their request through memorandums. The memorandums would dictate what MI wanted. The memorandums were signed by COL Pappas and given to the NCOIC [Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge] of the wing. The memorandums would give instructions on diet patterns, sleep patterns, music playing, and various other techniques that MI requested the MPs to carry out. [1668]


An MP non-commissioned officer stated that "there was no SOP for sleep management." [1669] MG Fay stated that techniques used by MPs to keep detainees awake included stripping them and giving them cold showers." [1670]

(U) CPT Wood said that "sleep management was approved by the [Commanding General] about a dozen times" during her time at Abu Ghraib. [1671] She stated that she "personally remember[ed] seeing LTG Sanchez's signature on some approvals for sleep management." [1672] COL Pappas said that he believed the October 12, 2003 CJTF-7 policy gave him the authority to authorize sleep management. [1673]

[Delete] A December 14, 2003 memo for LTG Sanchez signed by COL Pappas approved "sleep management" for three detainees captured in conjunction with Saddam Hussein. [1674] COL Pappas stated that he "couldn't say for sure" whether he actually sent the memo to LTG Sanchez but that he "signed it with the intent of it going to him." [1675] LTG Sanchez said that, other than requests to approve segregation in excess of 30 days, he did "not recall signing any other memos" approving other interrogation techniques. [1676]

E. Sensory Deprivation and Isolation (U)

(U) "Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli" was authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. [1677]

[Delete] A January 24, 2003 memo from the CJTF-180 Deputy SJA stated that "deprivation of light and sound in the living areas" had been utilized and recommended that ''use of light and noise deprivation" (not limited to living areas) be approved for implementation. [1678] The technique was subsequently considered available for use in Afghanistan. [1679]

(U) Sensory deprivation was never listed in CJTF-7 policy as an approved technique. It was listed, however, as an approved technique in an October 9, 2003 interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) document for interrogators at Abu Ghraib. [1680] A subsequent IROE also listed the technique but said its use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CJTF-7 prior to employment." [1681]

(U) Major General Fay's report identified several specific instances where detainees at Abu Ghraib were placed in a small room in Tier 1A of Abu Ghraib that was referred to as "the hole" and where they were subject to total isolation and light deprivation. [1682] The report said that conditions for isolating detainees "sometimes included being kept naked in very hot or very cold, small rooms, and/or completely darkened rooms, clearly in violation of the Geneva Conventions." [1683]

(U) MG Fay stated that the "environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of detainee abuse there. [1684] But MG Fay was not the first to note the environment at Abu Ghraib as problematic. An assessment of Abu Ghraib by a retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington in late 2003 had referred to Abu Ghraib as a "pressure cooker" and cited an urgent need to improve conditions at the facility. [1685]

F. "Lost Opportunity" to Fix Problems at Abu Ghraib

1. Retired Army Intelligence Officer Leads Assessment Team (U)


(U/ [delete] In November 2003, Terry Ford, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) and BG Barbara Fast, the CJTF-7 Director for Intelligence, commissioned retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington to assess U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq. [1686] COL Herrington had also assessed intelligence operations at Guantanamo Bay in March 2002. [1687]

Shortly before leaving for Iraq, COL Herrington received a call from [delete] [delete] the former Chief of the Iraq Survey Group's Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). [Delete] told COL Herrington of his concern that detainees had been ''tortured and beaten by "agency guys" and SMU TF personnel in Iraq. [1688] COL Herrington decided to look into [delete] claims during his assessment visit.

2. Assessment Team Visits Abu Ghraib and CJTF-7 Headquarters (U)

(U) After arriving in Iraq, COL Herrington and his team visited the interrogation facility at Abu Ghraib. While the team did not see evidence that detainees were being "illegally or improperly treated" at the facility, they did note several serious deficiencies. [1689]

(U) In his written report of the visit, COL Herrington cited an urgent need to improve conditions at Abu Ghraib. [1690] He cited overpopulation of the facility as a problem that could lead to further rioting and danger to U.S. personnel. He commented that the leadership at Abu Ghraib felt the facility was a "pressure cooker" and that it was "only a matter of time before prisoners staged an uprising" and that "bad things" such as "death, injury, or hostage situations" were likely to occur. [1691] COL Herrington also assessed that shortages of interrogators and equipment had resulted in a failure to interrogate detainees of intelligence value. [1692] He concluded that Abu Ghraib was simply ''unsuitable for the exploitation of high value detainees." [1693]

(U) COL Herrington also expressed concern with the practice of not assigning Internment Serial Numbers (ISNs) to certain detainees. He wrote in his assessment report that the creation of "ghost" detainees who were not in the accounting system carried certain risks "not the least of which is that it may be technically illegal." [1694]

(U) On December 9, 2003, COL Herrington met with MG Barbara Fast, CJTF-7's Director for Intelligence (CJ-2). [1695] He later described her as "astonished" by his observations of Abu Ghraib. [1696] He said that "in a couple of cases she said, 'I was unaware of that. I didn't know that' or 'I thought we fixed that.'" [1697] COL Herrington added that, "It was very evident to me that she was not being well informed" by her staff. [1698]

3. Team Hears Reports of Detainee Mistreatment (U)

(U) While visiting the Iraq Survey Group facility, COL Herrington learned from ISG medical personnel that prisoners arriving at the ISG who had been captured by the SMU TF showed signs of "having been beaten" by their captors. [1699] The report was consistent with what the retired Army Colonel had been told by [delete] the former ISG JIDC Chief, prior to his visit. When, during his visit, COL Herrington asked the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the JIDC whether these problems had been reported to higher authority, the OIC advised him that "everyone knows about it." [1700]

(U) COL Herrington wrote in his report that an OGA representative told him that OGA personnel had been instructed not to have any involvement with interrogation operations at the SMU TF as the "practices there were in contravention to his Agency's guidance on what was and what was not permissible in interrogating detainees." [1701] He added that he had been told by his CJTF-7 escort that it would be "difficult, if not impossible" to visit the SMU TF facilities. His written report stated that:

Based on 1) What my source [delete] told me before I deployed about what he observed concerning mistreatment; 2) The statement of the ISG-JIDC OIC on the same subject; and 3) the OGA representative's statement, it seems clear that [the SMU TF] needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees. [1702]


4. COL Herrington Reports Findings (U)

(U) When COL Herrington returned to the U.S. and briefed LTG Keith Alexander, the Army G2, and his deputy Terry Ford, he reiterated the concerns about what he had seen in Iraq and stated, "when it becomes known, everybody who touched it will be in trouble." [1703] COL Herrington later told the DoD IG that the two were "very supportive and expressed confidence in his assessment, but no official follow-ups were discussed or scheduled at that time." [1704]

(U) COL Herrington told the DoD IG that he expected that CJTF-7 and the Army G2 would investigate the issues he raised. [1705] However, he said they never contacted him and he was notified by CJTF-7 in April of 2004 that there had been "insufficient evidence to substantiate" what he had heard from the former ISG JIDC Chief about detainee mistreatment in Iraq.[1706] The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at CJTF-7 stated in an April 7, 2004 letter to COL Herrington that the investigating officer had not been able to "recreate those conversations upon which [COL Herrington's] report was based" and that it had been difficult to "pin down timelines and events in time." [1707]

(U) The allegations raised by COL Herrington were the subject of an investigation conducted by CJTF-7 in early 2004. In what VADM Church described as an "extremely brief, three-page report," the CJTF-7 investigating officer found no proof to substantiate the allegations against the SMU TF. [1708] VADM Church criticized the CJTF-7 report as "extremely brief and cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology." [1709] VADM Church called the failure to more thoroughly investigate the allegations a "lost opportunity to address potential detainee abuse in Iraq early on." [1710]

_______________

Notes:

1597. MG Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (hereinafter "Taguba Report'') at 16.

1598. Taguba Report at 16-17; Fay Report at 7.

1599. Fay Report at 7.

1600. Ibid at 8.

1601. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

1602. Fay Report at 83; Church Report at 7.

1603. DoD IG Report at 16.

1604. See Deployment Order 231, referencing U.S. CENTCOM October 9, 2003 request for forces.

1605. Fay Report at 83.

1606. Ibid.

1607. Ibid at 85-87.

1608. Sworn statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 7.

1609. Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas for LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003).

1610. Sworn statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 9.

1611. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 21.

1612. Statement of Intelligence Analyst (May 25, 2004).

1613. Statement of 504th MI BN soldier (June 4, 2004).

1614. Statement of Army dog handler (undated).

1615. Interview of Army dog handler (February 13, 2004).

1616. Memo from COL Foster P. Payne II for Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, Suspension of Use of Military Working Dogs (February 19, 2004).

1617. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

1618. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Bagram Branch Office Memo, CID Report of Investigation-FINAL -0134-02-CID36923533 (October 8, 2004).

1619. DoD IG Report at 16.

1620. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006) at 30.

1621. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003).

1622. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003); CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003).

1623. Fay Report at 10.

1624. Ibid at 68, 82.

1625. Statement of MP soldier (June 6, 2004).

1626. Interview of MP Company Commander (February 21, 2004).

1627. Interview of MP Platoon leader (June 6, 2004).

1628. Statement of MP soldier (January 17, 2004).

1629. Statement of MP soldier (January 14, 2004).

1630. Statement of MP soldier (January 21, 2004).

1631. Statement of 302nd MI BN soldier (May 11, 2004).

1632. Ibid.

1633. Statement of MI soldier (June 4, 2004).

1634. Statement of interrogator (June 4, 2004).

1635. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

1636. Fay Report at 88; Church Report at 7.

1637. [Big delete] Questionnaire (June 29 2004) at 3.

1638. Ibid.

1639. Fay Report at 87.

1640. Ibid at 70.

1641. Statement of Commander 320th MP BN (May 26, 2004).

1642. Ibid.

1643. Statement of 372nd MP Company Commander (May 3, 2004); Interview of 372nd MP Company Commander (February 10, 2004) at 48.

1644. Interview of 372nd MP Company Commander (February 10, 2004) at 48-49; Statement of 372nd MP Company Commander (February 21, 2004); Statement of 372nd MP Company Commander (January 18, 2004) at 1-2.

1645. Statement of Intelligence Analyst (May 25, 2004).

1646. Statement of MI soldier (June 15, 2004).

1647. Unsigned interrogator statement (May 13. 2004). The statement was contained in a memorandum for the record which the interrogator declined to sign based on advice from counsel.

1648. Ibid.

1649. Taguba Report at 19; Article 32 Transcript U.S. v Davis (April 7. 2004) at 11.

1650. Statement of MP soldier (June 6, 2004).

1651. Interview of Major Michael Sheridan (February 14. 2004) at 8.

1652. Statement of MI soldier (May 25. 2004).

1653. Statement of MI soldier (June 4, 2004).

1654. Ibid.

1655. Statement of MI soldier (July 20. 2004).

1656. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

1657. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at
4.9.

1658. [Delete] Memorandum for all [delete] Personnel, SUBJECT: Policy No. 1 - Battlefield Interrogation Team and facility (BIT/F) Policy (July 15, 2003).

1659. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003).

1660. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003).

1661. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003).

1662. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003).

1663. Fay Report at 70.

1664. Interview of contract interrogator (June 22, 2004).

1665. Statement of non-commissioned officer (June 4, 2004).

1666. Statement of Intelligence Analyst (May 25, 2004).

1667. Statement of COL Jerry Philabaum (May 26, 2004).

1668. Interview of MP officer (February 10, 2004).

1669. Article 32 Transcript U.S. v Davis (April 7, 2004) at 14.

1670. Fay Report at 70.

1671. Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 6.

1672. Ibid.

1673. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007).

1674. Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas for LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003).

1675. Statement of COL Thomas Pappas (January 25, 2006) at 9.

1676. Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23, 2004) at 6.

1677. Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002).

1678. Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF-180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 4, 9.

1679. Church Report at 7.

1680. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 9, 2003).

1681. CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (October 16, 2003).

1682. Fay Report at 94.

1683. Ibid at 28.

1684. Ibid at 9.

1685. Herrington to Fast, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 2.

1686. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Detainee Abuse Evaluation Memorandum for the Record, October 20, 2004 meeting with Col (Ret) Stuart A. Herrington (undated) at 1 (hereinafter DoD IG, Herrington Interview).

1687. See Section I F, supra.

1688. DoD IG, Herrington Interview at 1.

1689. Herrington to Fast. Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 3.

1690. Ibid.

1691. Ibid.

1692. Ibid at 8.

1693. Ibid at 2-3.

1694. Ibid at 4.

1695. Army IG, Interview of COL (Ret) Stuart Herrington (November 3, 2004) at 17; DoD IG, Herrington Interview.

1696. Army IG, Interview of COL (Ret) Stuart Herrington (November 3, 2004) at 17.

1697. Ibid.

1698. Ibid at 16.

1699. Herrington to Fast, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 7.

1700. Herrington to Fast, Report of CI/HUMINT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 7.

1701. Ibid.

1702. Ibid.

1703. DoD IG, Herrington Interview at 3.

1704. Ibid. at 4.

1705. Ibid.

1706. Ibid.

1707. Letter from Office of the Staff Judge Advocate to COL Stuart Herrington (April 7, 2004).

1708. Church Report at 61.

1709. Ibid.

1710. Ibid.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:59 am

PART 23 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

XIV. Interrogation Policies Following Abu Ghraib (U)

[Delete] While CENTCOM legal concerns had led to CJTF-7s removal of most of the aggressive interrogation techniques from its interrogation policy in October 2003, interrogation policies issued by Task Forces under CENTCOM Command, including the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) CJTF-180 (the conventional forces in Afghanistan), and the Special Mission Units in Iraq and Afghanistan continued to include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004.

A. February 2004 CJSOTF Interrogation SOP(U)

[Delete] The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) operated under the tactical command of CJTF-7. CJSOTF-AP contained units from the 5th Special Forces Group, [big delete].

[Big delete]

[Big delete] That policy had been superseded by an October 12, 2003 policy that was issued after CENTCOM raised legal concerns with techniques in the earlier policy. [1714]

[Delete] On February 27, 2004, [delete] Commander, [delete] issued an interrogation policy for [delete] using the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy as its basis and authorizing the use of aggressive interrogation techniques, including the presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, loud music, and light control, and environmental manipulation. [1715] The policy stated that certain techniques, such as presence of military working dogs, stress positions, and loud music and light control, required approval by the CJTF-7 Commander if they were to be used against enemy prisoners of war. The use of those techniques against all other detainees, however, was permitted with the written approval of a [delete] Deputy Commander or Commander.

[Big delete]

[Big delete]." [1717] A report completed by Brigadier General Richard Formica stated that [big delete] "some detainees were wet down and laced in air conditioned room or outside in cold weather." [1718] [Big delete] . [1719]

[Delete] The March 23, 2004 policy stated that "you should consider the fact that some interrogation techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise inconsistent with international law before applying each technique. These techniques are labeled with a [CAUTION]." [1720] Environmental manipulation, the use of power tools, stress positions, and the presence of working dogs were all marked with the word "CAUTION." [1721]

[Big delete] BG Formica also found that some detainees held by a tactical unit were "kept naked for the initial interrogation" and fed only bread or crackers and water "if they did not cooperate with ... interrogators." [1723] He said that a detainee held by another tactical unit under CJSOTF-AP command "may have been fed just bread and water for 17 days." [1724]

B. Interrogation Plan in Iraq Derived from SERE (U)

[Delete] [delete] The Department of Defense provided the Committee an undated document drafted by a Chief Warrant Officer from the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division was deployed to Iraq and stationed outside Kirkuk from January 2004 through February 2005. The document, called "Camp Honesty Interrogation Plan" stated that it was "based off of U.S. SERE Training Doctrine." [1725] It described subjecting detainees to "sensory over-stimulation" where they would be placed, handcuffed behind their backs in so-called "black room[s]." [1726] The plan stated that two soldiers with night vision goggles would be present in the room and would ''touch [the] detainee on [the] head, hands and feet with string simulating sensors." [1727] In addition, sound would be used to "activate and confuse auditory sensors" resulting in "heart-rate increase and increased stress levels." [1728]

C. March 2004 Interrogation SOP for Conventional Forces in Afghanistan (U)

[Delete] The interrogation policy in place for CJTF-180, the conventional forces in Afghanistan, also continued to include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004. A March 27, 2004 CJTF-180 Standard Operating Procedure, signed by LTC Charles Pede, the Staff Judge Advocate, LTC Scott Berrier, the Director of Intelligence, and LTC Clayton Cobb, the MP Commander for CJTF-180 included a list of "standard [tactics, techniques, and procedures for use" at Bagram. [1729] That list included the use of "safety positions," "sleep adjustment," "sensory overload," invading a detainee's personal space to "increase psychological discomfort," "dietary manipulation," adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell to "create moderate discomfort," and using blacked out goggles as an interrogation technique. [1730]

D. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Polices (U)

[Big delete] Prior to March 2004, however, each operated under a distinct interrogation SOP. On March 26, 2004 the SMU TF implemented a single interrogation policy that covered SMU TF operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. [1731]

[Delete] The March 26, 2004 SMU SOP authorized 14 "interrogation techniques" not explicitly listed in FM 34-52, including use of muzzled dogs, "safety positions (during interrogations)," sleep adjustment/management, mild physical contact, isolation, sensory overload, sensory deprivation, and dietary manipulation. [1732]

[Delete] According to the Church Special Focus Team Report, the March 26, 2004 SMU TF SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time. [1733] In fact, many of the techniques in that SOP had been abandoned by conventional forces in Afghanistan months earlier, after CENTCOM identified legal concerns with the techniques. [1734] Although the authority in the March SOP to use "muzzled dogs" was rescinded on April 22, 2004, the remainder of the techniques remained authorized until May 6, 2004, when GEN John Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, suspended use of all non-FM 34-52 techniques. [1735] The Church Special Focus Team report said the techniques were suspended as a result of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. [1736] GEN Abizaid stated that neither he nor his staff "reviewed or approved" the March 2004 SMU TF SOP "prior to its issuance." [1737]

[Delete] Several interrogation techniques authorized for use by the SMU Task Force prior to GEN Abizaid's suspension, including stress positions, sleep adjustment/management, sensory overload, and sensory deprivation were similar to techniques used in the resistance phase of SERE training. In fact, undated SMU TF SOPs from this period suggest a connection between SMU TF interrogation techniques and SERE. The SOPs state, under interrogation "Standards," that "[i]nterrogations will be done [in accordance with] all applicable rules and regulations to include... Survival/Evasion/Resistance/and Escape regulations." [1738]

[Delete] [delete] ) On May 23, 2004 [big delete] the SMU TF Commander, sent a message to [delete] stating that the May 6, 2004 [big delete] wrote that detainees held by his TF were "hardened" and "trained to resist interrogation" and added:

FOR THIS LIMITED GROUP OF DETAINEES, [BIG DELETE] SLEEP MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANIPULATION (LIGHT AND NOISE), EXTENDED INTERROGATIONS, VARYING COMFORT POSITIONS AND THE USE OF HOODS TO INDUCE A PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF ISOLATION AND DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERROGATORS ARE PARTICULARLY USEFUL. [1740]


[Delete] told [delete] that he planned to request "authority to employ" additional techniques. [1741]

[Delete] [delete] On May 27, 2004, [delete] formally requested that CENTCOM grant authority to the SMU TF to use five interrogation techniques: sleep management, control positions, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery. [1742] The request stated that control positions - defined as "requiring the detainee to stand, sit, kneel, squat, maintain sitting position with back against the wall, bend over chair, lean with head against wall, lie prone across chairs, stand with arms above head or raised to shoulders, or other normal physical training positions" - could also "be used in order to implement sleep management" and that "in the most exceptional circumstances, and on approval from [the SMU TF Commander]," interrogators could ''use handcuffs to enforce the detainee's position." [1743] An interrogator could require a detainee to remain in a control position for "no more than 45 minutes in one hour and for no more than six hours in a 24 hour period." [1744]

(U) Notwithstanding the May 6, 2004 suspension of all non-FM 34-52 techniques, on June 4, 2004, GEN Abizaid approved the use of sleep management, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery for the SMU TF. [1745] He delegated the approval authority for the use of those techniques to the "first general officer in the chain of command," and specified that none of the techniques could be used beyond a 72 hour period "without a review by [the SMU TF Commander] or the first general officer in the chain of command." [1746]

_______________

Notes:

1711. AR-15-6 Investigation of CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations (November 8, 2004) at 13, 15, 71 (hereinafter "Formica Report').

1712. Statement of COL Hector Pagan (August 2, 2004).

1713. Statement of LTC Michael Black (November 3, 2004).

1714. See Section XU E, supra.

1715. [Delete] Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (February 27, 2004) at 2-3.

1716. [Delete] Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (March 23, 2004) at 3.

1717. Ibid.

1718. Formica Report at 71.

1719. [Delete] Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (March 23, 2004) at 4.

1720. Ibid at 6.

1721. Ibid at 4.

1721. Formica Report at 8.

1723. Ibid. at 74.

1724. Ibid at 8.

1725. THT 160 ([Delete]), Camp Honesty Interrogation Plan (undated).

1726. Ibid.

1727. Ibid.

1728. Ibid.

1729. CJTF-180 SJA Memorandum for Record, CTJ'F-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures (March 27, 2004).

1730. Ibid.

1731. Church Special Focus Team Report at 15.

1732. [Delete] The 14 techniques were the use of military working dogs, safety positions (during interrogations), use of blackened goggles/ear muffs during interrogation, sleep adjustment/sleep management, use of female interrogators, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, change of environment/ environmental manipulation, diet manipulation, use of falsified documents or reports and deception, use of individual fears, use of isolation, fear of long-term incarceration, and mild physical contact. Battlefield Interrogation Team and Temporary Screening Facility Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), Change 2 Dated May 18, 2004.

1733. Church Special Focus Team Report at 15.

1734. Ibid.

1735. Ibid at 16; Memorandum from SMU TF Commanding General to USCENTCOM, Request for Use of Interrogation Techniques (May 27, 2004); CENTCOM/SOCOM Briefing to Committee Staff (December 21, 2007).

1736. Church Special Focus Team Report at 16.

1737. Memorandum from General John Abizaid, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August 16, 2004).

1738. [Delete] See Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force 121 (ITF-121), Baghdad Air Base, Iraq CITF-121 Battlefield Interrogation facility/Team Standard Operating Procedures.

1739. Message from Commander [delete] to Commander [delete] DTG 231006Z MAY 04 (May 23, 2004) at 1.

1740. Ibid (emphasis in original).

1741. Ibid. at 1.

1742. [Big delete] Request for Use of Interrogation Techniques (May 27, 2004).

1743. Ibid.

1744. Ibid.

1745. [Delete] Church Special Focus Team Report at 16. Although the request defined "separation" to include the use of goggles, earmuffs, and hooding, the CENTCOM Commander approved "separation," but not the "use of hooding." Memorandum from General John Abizaid to Commander [big delete] Request for Use of Interrogation Techniques, Dated 27 May 2004 (June 4 ,2004).

1746. Ibid.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 10:00 am

PART 24 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

XV. CENTCOM Seeks JPRA Interrogation Assistance in Afghanistan (U)

A. May 2004 CENTCOM Request (U)


(U) In the wake of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) personnel traveled to CENTCOM headquarters to coordinate a plan to send a training team to assist CENTCOM with interrogations in Afghanistan.

[Delete] According to Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office (OSO) the meeting at CENTCOM took place after the mission to Afghanistan had been "tentatively approved." [1747] On May 12, 2004 CENTCOM made a formal request through the Joint Staff for JPRA "interrogation/exploitation" assistance.

[Delete] In the May 12, 2004 request, CENTCOM asked that JFCOM provide a Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) team to "conduct an on-site assessment of [Bagram Collection Point] operations in Bagram and Kandahar to assist in the development and implementation of an indoctrination program and other interrogation/exploitation options." [1748] The CENTCOM request stated that the JPRA team would "... observe exploitation procedures at the site to assist in identifying improvements or development of alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1749]

[Delete] That same day, JPRA personnel briefed JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Wagner, JFCOM Chief of Staff Maj Gen James Soligan, and JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, about the planned support. [1750]

(U) Materials prepared for those briefings stated that after September 11, 2001, JPRA was "requested to support [big delete] [Defense Intelligence Agency], [delete] GTMO, Fort Huachuca, and [delete]." [1751]

[Delete] [delete] The briefing materials specifically highlighted JPRA's September 2003 trip to Iraq in support of the Special Mission Unit Task Force there and described JPRA's intended support for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. [1752] Among JPRA's "key tasks" for the planned Afghanistan trip was to observe "exploitation procedures" used by CENTCOM personnel and to "identify areas for improvement" and "assist and advise on alternate approaches." [1753] The briefing materials stated that JPRA intended to provide "on the spot recommendations to the [CENTCOM] staff if appropriate" on these alternate approaches. [1754]

Delete] [delete] The briefing materials also included a proposed Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the Afghanistan trip. [1755] The proposed CONOP was similar in scope and structure to the CONOP JPRA had circulated in September 2003, near the end of the Iraq trip. Unlike the Iraq CONOP, however, the Afghanistan CONOP included many of the edits that had been suggested by CAPT Daniel Donovan, the JFCOM SJA (e.g., clarifying that Rules of Engagement must be within U.S. law and policy including - but not simply limited to - the Torture Convention, removing reference to "constant sensory deprivation," etc.). The Afghanistan CONOP did not, however, reflect all of the SJA's edits. For example, [big delete] CAPT Donovan had recommended removing these techniques from the Iraq CONOP. [1757]

[Delete] The reference to JPRA's prior interrogation support in the briefing materials prompted a discussion among ADM Giambastiani, LTG Wagner, Maj Gen Soligan and CAPT Donovan about the September 2003 trip to Iraq and the CONOP that was created during that trip.

[Delete] [delete] Col Moulton, the JPRA Commander, had earlier defended the inclusion of the full range of SERE techniques in the Iraq CONOP by saying that "all the techniques discussed [in the CONOP] are ones that [JPRA] (or other services) employ in our training (with considerable oversight - only the Navy uses the waterboard)." He continued: "In discussions with [the Office of Secretary of Defense General Counsel] last year, they specifically requested what type of techniques we found most effective against our personnel. Our intent is to provide a prioritized list of what works on our folks, and let the lawyers and Combatant Commanders decide to what degree and which target audience they apply these, if any, techniques." [1758]

[Delete] [delete] During consideration of the Afghanistan trip, CAPT Donovan forwarded Col Moulton's email to ADM Giambastiani, LTG Wagner, and Maj Gen Soligan and wrote:

When [Col Mouhon] says that the Navy uses [waterboarding], he means that they use it against our own people during survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training. In other words, qualified Navy SERE instructors use this to demonstrate to our own people what the ENEMY is likely to do to them in the event they are captured, and (hopefully) to train our people how to resist or cope with such techniques.

JPRA and SERE folks will swear that the "water board" does not actually physically harm subjects if it is administered by properly trained SERE instructors, under close supervision, etc. For that reason, some argue that the "water board" does not technically constitute torture under domestic or international law. I can only say that in my opinion, that argument does not pass the "Washington Post test." I fail to see how anyone can reasonably say that employing such techniques against those in our custody is worthy of the United States, no matter how much we may need the information. In my view, for the U.S. to do this "lowers the bar" and ensures, if there is any doubt, that similar techniques will be employed against any U.S. personnel captured by our enemies. For this reason, there is risk involved in having JPRA "advise" interrogators in CENTCOM - JPRA's expertise concerns the effective techniques used by the BAD GUYS against us, and I frankly don't believe that's the kind of advice we should be giving to the U.S. side. I see great potential for theater personnel to do it wrong, and to then say, "well JPRA said this was what we should do." [1759]


[Delete] [delete] On May 13, 2004, the day after Col Moulton briefed the JFCOM leadership, he circulated a revised CONOP for the Afghanistan trip. The revised CONOP stated that JPRA would "not recommend or train physical pressures," however, it also stated that a "key task" of the mission was to observe "exploitation procedures at the site to assist in identifying improvements" and develop "alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1760] CAPT Donovan immediately expressed his concern with that "key task" in an email to ADM Giambastiani and LTG Wagner, stating:

I [am] concerned about JPRA "identifying alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives" (read: more effective interrogation methods). Since JPRA's expertise is all the unlawful interrogation techniques the enemy uses against captured U.S. forces, I recommend you consider NOT having JPRA get involved in this aspect of CENTCOM's request. [1761]


[Delete] CAPT Donovan also expressed his concerns about the intended mission to Col Moulton, writing in a May 13, 2004 email:

[I]t is not advisable to have JPRA assist in "improving exploitation" (i.e., suggesting more effective interrogation techniques). JPRA's core expertise is in training DoD personnel to resist/cope with techniques - many of them illegal - that may be employed by our enemies if DoD personnel are captured. It just doesn't make sense to me to have experts in what the "bad guys" do to us advising our U.S. interrogators - there is a real risk, if theater interrogators then "do it wrong," for them to claim "JPRA's experts recommended this." Accordingly, my recommendation is that JPRA not get involved in this aspect of the requested support. [1762]


[Delete] The next day, CAPT Donovan sent another email to ADM Giambastiani, LTG Wagner, and Maj Gen Soligan pointing out the "potential risk to the entire JPRA mission if they are in any way implicated in the current mess in Iraq." [1763] JPRA's planned May 2004 mission to Afghanistan was subsequently called off. [1764]

B. CENTCOM Makes Another Request for JPRA Interrogation Assistance in Afghanistan (U)

[Delete] On June 20, 2004, about a month after their initial request, CENTCOM made another request to the Joint Staff for JPRA assistance at interrogation facilities in Bagram and Kandahar in Afghanistan. [1765] The request sought a team from JPRA to "conduct on-site assessments" in July and to "assist the commands in ... developing and implementing an indoctrination program and other interrogation/exploitation options, required as a result of the assessments." [1766] Specifically, CENTCOM requested that the JPRA team "observe exploitation procedures at the site and identify improvements or develop alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1767]

[Delete] When the request arrived at JFCOM, CAPT Donovan again raised concerns with Maj Gen Soligan about the scope of the request. In a June 21, 2004 email, he asked "whether JPRA is really the appropriate choice" for the mission described in the CENTCOM request, i.e., to "observe exploitation procedures at the site and identify improvements or develop alternate approaches to meet exploitation objectives." [1768] Maj Gen Soligan subsequently raised the issue with Maj Gen John Sattler, the CENTCOM Director of Operations (13), who Maj Gen Soligan said told him that CENTCOM had made a "conscious decision on what capability they want." [1769]

[Delete] CAPT Donovan also raised his concerns directly with lawyers at CENTCOM and the Joint Staff. In an email to the lawyers, he wrote:

I'm concerned that the folks from our Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) - who oversee training U.S. military personnel how to resist interrogations by our enemies (e.g., SERE training) - are the wrong guys to be advising U.S. interrogators how to more effectively exploit PUCs. JPRA considers themselves to be the exploitation experts, but in many ways my view is that their expertise is in training U.S. personnel how to best resist ILLEGAL techniques. This kind of advice may be the last thing you all want/need in Afghanistan right now. [1770]


[Delete] Over the next month, JFCOM senior leadership discussed the proposed trip with JPRA and the Joint Staff. At JFCOM's request, JPRA developed and provided JFCOM with a training plan for the mission. [1771] On June 30, 2004, Maj Gen Soligan told JPRA in an email to prepare for the trip, but directed them not to deploy until the trip was approved by JFCOM's Commander ADM Edmund Giambastiani. [1772] JFCOM also discussed working with Joint Staff to find a capability outside JPRA to send to CENTCOM to assist with their detainee operations, but expected a "nonconcur" with any "recommendation to use other resources." [1773]

[Delete] As discussions about the CENTCOM request continued within JFCOM, Col Kenneth Rollins, a SERE psychologist added his perspective on the advisability of sending JPRA personnel to assist with interrogations. The psychologist said:

[W]e need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at SERE school (done to INCREASE RESISTANCE capability in students) versus what is taught at interrogator[] school (done to gather information). What is done by SERE instructors is by definition ineffective interrogator conduct, and interrogator school, not SERE school is the appropriate focus and model for investigating interrogators. Simply stated, SERE school does not train you on how to interrogate, and things you "learn" there by osmosis about interrogation are probably wrong if copied by interrogators. [1774]


[Delete] As Col Rollins's comments were circulated at JFCOM, Lt Col Richard Posey, one of the JFCOM JAGs added that "[i]t would be difficult to come up with a stronger argument against concurring in this request." [1775] Lt Col Posey added: "CENTCOM needs interrogation experts. JPRA is telling us ... that their instructors are ineffective interrogators and probably do it wrong because their focus is on increasing resistance not decreasing it. For the same reasons, this does not pass the Washington Post test. DoD already has enough egg on its face concerning detainee operations." [1776]

(U) The trip to Afghanistan was subsequently cancelled. Christopher Wirts, JPRA Operations Support Office (OSO) Chief, told the Committee that although he did not know why JFCOM cancelled the trip, he recalled discussing the negative media attention from Abu Ghraib with LTG Wagner and Maj Gen Soligan. [1777]

C. U.S. Joint Forces Command Issues Policy Guidance For JPRA "Offensive" Support (U)

[Delete] In July 2004, following JFCOM's cancellation of the proposed trip by JPRA personnel to Afghanistan, ADM Giambastiani issued guidance to JPRA about "offensive" interrogation support. In a July 21, 2004 email to Col Moulton and RADM John Bird, the JFCOM J-3, Maj Gen Soligan wrote:

ADM Giambastiani has given specific guidance that JPRA will not conduct any activities on or make any recommendations on offensive interrogation techniques or activities without specific approval from the JF COM Commander, [Deputy Commander, or Chief of Staff] All JPRA actions and recommendations related to interrogations of enemy detainees will be conducted in accordance with JPRA's current mission statement and limited to defensive actions and recommendations. [1778]


[Delete] A few days after that email, a draft memo containing the guidance was sent to Col Moulton. In a July 26, 2004 email to Maj Gen Soligan and RADM Bird, Col Moulton questioned why the policy was necessary and offered his view on JPRA's prior support to interrogation operations:

Immediately following 9/11 JPRA was approached by various organizations, starting with General Council [sic] (and later [big delete] USA strategic debriefing school in Ft Huachuca, and JTF 170) regarding U.S. training on resistance to interrogation techniques. All requests for information or support were coordinated through JFCOM, and all interested agencies were directed to make formal requests through JFCOM. All external requests for support have been unsolicited. From the very beginning I expressed concern that supporting these requests would go outside the JPRA charter and provided an honest assessment of the potential risk associated with the support. All CONOPS and actions have been fully vetted through JFCOM. If the message is to relay that we won't play in "offensive" ops - that has been received loud and clear. If the purpose is to prevent OSD/GC,. and other DoD Interrogation organizations from making requests I'm not sure this memo is going to help. [1779]


(U) A formal JFCOM policy memo relating to JPRA's "offensive" support to interrogation operations was not finalized until September 29, 2004, after the Inspector General of the Department of Defense began looking into the issue. In the September 2004 memo, Maj Gen Soligan wrote:

Recent requests from OSD and the Combatant Commands have solicited JPRA support based on knowledge and their application to U.S. strategic debriefing and interrogation techniques. These requests, which can be characterized as "offensive" techniques include, but are not limited to, activities designed not to increase one's resistance capabilities to interrogation techniques but rather intended to instruct personnel, for the purpose of gathering of information, on how to break down another's ability to withstand interrogation ... The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for "offensive" purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA. [1780]


(U) The policy did not, however, explicitly prohibit JPRA from conducting such activities in all instances. Instead, it stated that all requests for "offensive" support should "continue to" be directed through JFCOM but instructed that:

[A]ny deviation in roles and responsibilities must be carefully scrutinized and vetted through proper legal and policy channels. JPRA personnel will not conduct any activities without specific approval from the USJFCOM Commander, Deputy Commander, or the Chief of Staff. Deviations from the JPRA chartered mission of this nature are policy decisions that will be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for action. JPRA will continue to direct all requests for external support through USJFCOM and refrain from providing any support or information unless specifically directed by USJFCOM as outlined above. [1781]


(U) As the Department of Defense Inspector General continued its inquiry into JPRA's prior "offensive" interrogation support, the DoD Inspector General asked JFCOM about the September 2004 policy memo. [1782] In a February 2005 memo to the DoD Inspector General, LTG Wagner stated that the purpose of the September 2004 policy was to provide "clear guidance" and to "prevent use of JPRA outside the command's mission scope." [1783] Knowing that CENTCOM and Joint Staff had expressed interest in JPRA to assist or support "in-theater interrogations," LTG Wagner said that JFCOM sought to clarify that "JPRA is primarily a school house, not an intelligence gathering activity." [1784] He added that "JPRA does not have not have personnel assigned to be interrogators," and that ''the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations - not in how to conduct interrogations." [1785]

(U) According to LTG Wagner, JFCOM issued the September 2004 policy statement ''to ensure that JPRA activities remained within the scope of that Agency's mission charter." [1786] He stated that JFCOM considered requests for JPRA "interrogator support" to be "inconsistent" with JPRA's charter. [1787] He stated, however, that the memorandum was not "issued in response to suspected or known inappropriate JPRA activities, as no such activities were known by this headquarters to have been conducted." [1788] Notwithstanding that statement, however, by September 2004, when JFCOM issued the policy, JFCOM had already approved a trip by JPRA personnel to Iraq as well as other "offensive" interrogation support - activities that fell outside JPRA's roles and responsibilities.

_______________

Notes:

1747. [Delete] Email from Christopher Wirts to Thomas Markland, John Huffstutter, David Ellis (January 19, 2005). Mr. Wirts's email stated "Initially when the mission was tentatively approved we went to HQ CENTCOM and reviewed/briefed the J2X on how we intended to support. They were satisfied with our methods and intent. After the CENTCOM visit, we were called to JFCOM and met with ADM [Giambastiani], Gen Soligan, Gen Wagner, JFCOM Legal and a host of other personnel. In the days following the meeting, the mission was turned off."

1748. Message from CENTCOM, Request for USJFCOM Support, DTG: 121729Z May 04 (May 12, 2004).

1749. Ibid.

1750. Email from Randy Moulton to Steven Johns and Fred Milburn (May 10, 2004); Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2007)

1751. Email from Randy Moulton to [delete], James Soligan. Robert Wagner, Fred Milburn, et al., attaching Briefing Slides and Executive Summary with Iraq CONOP; Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2007).

1752. As part of the briefing materials, an executive summary of the September 2003 trip identified the JPRA-identified deficiencies as the SMU TF's "lack of clear legal guidance on status of captured personnel," "lack of established [Rules of Engagement or Standard Operating Procedure]," "lack of training and preparation," and "lack of information sharing." [delete] See Executive Summary; see also Briefing Slides at 5-8.

1753. Briefing slides at 6-8.

1754. Ibid.

1755. Several drafts of a Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the planned trip by JPRA personnel to Afghanistan were provided to the Committee. While those drafts are not dated, communications between and/or among JPRA and JFCOM personnel discussing revisions to the drafts suggest when those drafts were produced and how the CONOP evolved.

1756. Ibid.

1757. [Delete] Shortly after the briefing, a JFCOM action officer sent JPRA leadership a list of action items for LTG Wagner and MG Soligan. Among those were JPRA (1) locating the after action report from JPRA's support to [delete] [delete] and (2) preparing a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to provide policy/guidance on possibility of extending JPRA roles/responsibilities to the offensive vice defensive preparations/practices." In response, Col. Moulton told the JFCOM action officer that "[t]here was no [after action report] for the" support" and instead directed him to the "executive summary" of the trip provided in the briefing materials. Col. Moulton also stated that it was JPRA's understanding that "[Admiral Giambastiani] would approve our participation [in the Afghanistan trip] with a [Voice Command] from the Joint Staff regardless of the status of the policy guidance (he has previously approved and we are currently supporting other 'offensive' efforts)." Email from Randy Moulton to Steven Johns, Fred Milburn, Christopher Wirts, and Dan Donovan (May 13, 2004).

1758. Email from Col. Randy Moulton to Maj Gen James Soligan, CAPT Dan Donovan, RADM John Bird, LTG Robert Wagner et al. (September 30, 2003).

1759. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, LTG Robert Wagner and Maj Gen James Soligan (May 13, 2004) (emphasis in original).

1760. [Delete] Draft Concept of Operations in Support of Pending CENTCOM Joint Interrogation Facility Observation and Assessment Requirement.

1761. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, LTG Robert Wagner, Maj Gen James Soligan. (May 13, 2004) (emphasis in original).

1762. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Col. Randy Moulton and Col Fred Milburn (May 13, 2004).

1763. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Maj Gen James Soligan. copying ADM Edmund Giambastiani and LTG Robert Wagner (May 14, 2004).

1764. [Delete] According to Mr. Wirts, JPRA's OSO Chief, "[W]e went to HQ CENTCOM and reviewed/briefed the J2X on how we intended to support. They were satisfied with our methods and intent. After the CENTCOM visit, we were called to JFCOM and met with [Admiral Giambastiani, Maj Gen Soligan. LTG Wagner], JFCOM Legal and a host of other personnel. In the days following the meeting, the mission was turned off." Email from Christopher Wirts to Lt Col Thomas Markland, copying Lt Col John Huffstutter, Col David Ellis (January 19, 2005).

1765. CENTCOM Request for USJFCOM Operational Support, DTG: 200800Z JUN 04 (June 20, 2004).

1766. Ibid.

1767. Ibid.

1768. Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Maj Gen James Soligan and LTG Robert Wagner (June 21, 2004).

1769. Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to CAPT Dan Donovan (June 21, 2004).

1770. Email from Dan Donovan to Joint Staff and CENTCOM lawyers (June 21, 2004) (emphasis in original).

1771. [Delete] The training plan was intended to provide the JFCOM Commander an idea of how JPRA would satisfy the request to "conduct on-site assessments" at Bagram and Kandahar and "assist the commands in . . . developing and implementing an indoctrination program and other interrogation/exploitation options ..." Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton, RADM John Bird, LTG Robert Wagner (June 23, 2004).

1772. Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to RADM John Bird, Col. Randy Moulton, et al. (June 30, 2004).

1773. Email from Lt Col Richard Posey to CAPT Alan Kaufman, copying LTC John Jones, CAPT Daniel Donovan (June 30, 2004); Email from Lt Col Richard Posey to Maj Paul Voss, copying Col Fred Milburn, Lt Col Steven Johns, CAPT Alan Kaufman, LTC John Jones (July 12, 2004).

1774. Email from Lt Col Richard Posey to Maj Paul Voss, copying Col Fred Milburn, Lt Col Steven Johns, CAPT Alan Kaufman, LTC John Jones (July 12, 2004) (emphasis in original).

1775. Ibid.

1776. Ibid.

1777. Committee staff interview Christopher Wirts (January 4. 2008).

1778. Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton. RADM John Bird, Maj Gen Jack Holbein, Col Fred Milburn (July 21, 2004).

1779. Email from Col Randy Moulton to Maj Gen James Soligan, RADM John Bird, Maj Gen Jack Holbein (July 26, 2004).

1780. Memo from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Mission Guidance (September 29, 2004).

1781. Ibid.

1782. Memorandum for the Department of Defense Inspector General, signed by LTG Robert Wagner (February 10, 2005).

1783. Ibid.

1784. Ibid.

1785. Ibid.

1786. Ibid.

1787. Ibid.

1788. Ibid.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 10:04 am

PART 25 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

The origins of aggressive interrogation techniques: Part I of the Committee's inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody

Index of Documents


(Note: web links noted for documents not included in the packet)

(Tab 1 - EXTRACTS) July 25, 2002 Memorandum from JPRA Chief of Staff for Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Subject: Exploitation.

I. (U) BACKGROUND: JPRA is the principal DoD Agency for Joint Personnel Recovery (PR) support. JPRA provides Joint PR functional expertise and assistance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Combatant Commands (CINCs), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Services, Defense Agencies, DoD Field activities and other Governmental Agencies (OGAs). JPRA is under combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the DoD Executive Agent for Personnel Recovery. JPRA is designated as the DoD Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for DoD-wide Joint PR support matters responsible for executing SecDef directed USJFCOM Executive Agent (EA) functions. The JPRA staff works five core mission areas: Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR), Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), Code of Conduct Training (includes Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape [SERE]), Operational POW/MIA Matters (includes repatriation and debriefing), and PR Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) as the DoD OPR for PR in accordance with USJFCOMINST 3100.4, Charter for the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 22 Nov 00.

(U) Under the Code of Conduct Training mission area JPRA oversees Service SERE training programs and at an advanced level, provides selected SERE training to special mission units, sensitive reconnaissance operations personnel, military attaches and other designated high-risk-of-capture personnel. JPRA also is responsible for training Service SERE instructors and certifying SERE courses of instruction. Resistance training to teach DoD personnel how to maintain dignity and honor in the face of the enemy through effective use of the Code of Conduct is core to SERE training. Within that training piece JPRA has arguably developed into the DoD's experts on exploitation as predecessor organizations have been teaching advanced resistance techniques with regard to exploitation since 1961. JPRA's collateral mission as the DoD lead for repatriation and debriefing activities (having facilitated all repatriations from Operation HOMECOMING to present) under the Operational POW/MIA Affairs mission area also provides the real time lessons learned products on detention situations to ensure techniques and strategies incorporated into training courses are accurate and in step with the world geopolitical scene.

2. (U) With regard to your request for assistance on exploitation/interrogation techniques that have been effective against Americans JPRA offers the following documents:

a. (U) Attachment 1: (U) Exploitation Processes Used Against American Prisoners And Detainees, A Historical Overview, 25 Jul 02. This paper explains the exploitation process as an overall systematic approach on how to get detainees to cooperate.

b. (U) Attachment 2: (S INF) Interrogation Methods Used Against American Prisoners And Detainees, A Historical Overview of Effective Methods, 25 Jul 02. This paper explains the interrogation techniques used within the exploitation process. Each technique is explained and has lessons learned examples that highlight the effectiveness of these techniques used against Americans. Only a few representative examples were used per technique to keep the length of the paper reasonable.

c. (U) Attachment 3: (U) Psychological Aspects of Detention. The goal of this lesson plan (used in JPRA courses of instruction) is to highlight for students the fact that psychological stresses are inherent in detention situations, but that they can be successfully overcome. From an exploitation perspective the goal would be to induce these in detainees. Obviously with this lesson plan and the next three provided, classification increases to SECRET NOFORN and above when using certain operational lessons learned as examples.

d. (U) Attachment 4: (U) Exploitation - Threats and Pressures. The goal of this lesson plan is to focus students' attention on a peacetime governmental detainer's most likely exploitation goals and the historically effective tools used to achieve them. Reversing this, an exploiter/interrogator has a plan for exploitation of enemy detainee.

e. (U) Attachment 5: (U) Methods of Interrogation. The goal of this lesson plan is to ensure that students have a clear understanding of the processes and tools a professional exploiter employs in order to obtain his desired results. Stress that such an understanding is critical to successfully resisting. The applicability to the interrogator is to thoroughly understand the techniques and how to use them with the greatest effect.

f. (U) Attachment 6: (C) Resistance to Interrogation. The goal of this lesson plan is to emphasize to the students that time tested resistance techniques, logically combined with a planned personal resistance posture can defeat the most professional exploiter. The utility to the interrogator is what to look for and use strategies designed to defeat resistance in enemy detainees.

3. (U) The enclosed documents provide a thorough academic grounding in exploitation and were built on what has been effective against Americans in the past. The ability to exploit however, is a highly specialized skill set built on training and experience. JPRA will continue to offer exploitation assistance to those governmental organizations charged with the mission of gleaning intelligence from enemy detainees. We trust this has answered your question. If you need further information please call me at [phone number redacted].

//signed//

DANIEL J. BAUMGARTNER JR., Lt Col, USAF
Chief of Staff

(Tab 2 - EXTRACTS) July 26, 2002 Memorandum from JPRA Chief of Staff for Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Subject: Exploitation and Physical Pressures.

I. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to answer follow-on questions resulted from the meeting between JPRA and OSD GC on 25 Jul 02.

2. (U) BACKGROUND: Under the Code of Conduct Training mission area JPRA oversees Service SERE training programs and at an advanced level, provides selected SERE training to "special" designated high-risk-of-capture personnel. Resistance training to teach DoD personnel how to maintain dignity and honor in the face of the enemy through effective use of the Code of Conduct is core to SERE training. Within that training piece JPRA has arguably developed into the DoD's experts on exploitation and as such, has developed a number of physical pressures to increase the psychological and physical stress on students to highlight inappropriate coping strategies and provide realism in a contrived captivity environment.

4. JPRA will continue to offer exploitation assistance to those governmental organizations charged with the mission of gleaning intelligence from enemy detainees. We trust this has answered your additional questions. If you need further information please call me at [phone number redacted].

//signedl/
DANIEL J. BAUMGARTNER JR., Lt Col, USAF
Chief of Staff

(Tab 3 - EXTRACTS) July 25, 2002 document entitled "Physical Pressures used in Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees." Attached to JPRA Memorandum of July 26, 2002.

INTRODUCTION

(FOUO) Physical pressures used in resistance training are not designed to elicit compliance, to produce enduring or damaging consequences, or to render the student so incapacitated by physical or emotional duress that learning does not take place. The purpose of applying physical pressures is to project the students' focus into the resistance scenario and realistically simulate conditions associated with captivity and resistance efforts. The pressures used in training are minor in comparison to that which American prisoners have experienced in the past. The tactics are used in lieu of pressures used historically.

(FOUO) The application of physical pressures in training is necessary to produce the correct emotion and physiological projection a student requires for stress inoculation and stress resolution to be accomplished. This "Controlled Realism" must exist for the correct learning to take place. If too little physical pressure is applied, the student will fail to acquire the necessary inoculation effect and run the risk of underestimating the demands real captivity can produce. If too much physical pressure is applied, the student is made vulnerable to the effects of learned helplessness, which will render him/her less prepared for captivity than s/he was prior to training.

(FOUO) Applying physical pressures in an intense, simulated captivity role-play requires considerable skill and composure on the part of the resistance-training instructor. This is an acquired skill which demands considerable knowledge, experience, and grounding in human behavior and resistance theory. Not all resistance-training role-players are necessarily suited to perform this particular element of instruction. Careful training and monitoring of the instructor of qualified individuals are necessary to maintain the desired application of this critical education tool. The instructor who uses these physical pressures in training must:

• Remember physical pressure must be uniquely applied to each individual student depending on his/her physical size and resilience.
• Constantly monitor the student's resistance behavior and appropriately applied physical pressure in a manner that is consistent with controlled realism, but also facilitates the desired learning outcome.

(FOUO) APPROVED PHYSICAL PRESSURES USED IN JPRA RESISTANCE TRAINING INCLUDE:

1. (FOUO) FACIAL SLAP: Slap the subject's face midway between the chin and the bottom of the corresponding ear lobe. The arm swing follows an ark no greater than approximately 18 inches. "Pull" the force of the slap to generate the appropriate effect. Use no more than 2 slaps with any singular application -- typically, the training effectiveness of slapping has become negligible after 3 to 4 applications. (Typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

2. (FOUO) WALLING: With a hood, towel or similar aide, roll or fold the hood the long way, place it around the subject's neck. Grasp each side firmly and roll your fist inwardly till a relatively flat surface is created by the first joint of your fingers or the back of your hand. Quickly and firmly push, numerous times, the student into the wall in a manner, which eliminates a 'whip lash' effect of the head -- push with your arms only. Do not use 'leg force' to push the student -- ensure the wall you are using will accommodate the student without injury and adjust your 'push' accordingly. (Typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

3. (FOUO) SILENCING FACIAL HOLD: This tactic is used when the subject is talking too much or about inappropriate subjects. The interrogator attempts to physically intimidate the subject into silence by placing their hand over the subject's mount [mouth] and violating their personal space. (Typical conditions for application: to threaten or intimidate via invasion of personal space, to instill fear and apprehension without using direct physical force, to punish illogical, defiant, or repetitive responses).

4. (FOUO) FACIAL HOLD: This tactic is used when the subject fails to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. The interrogator grasps the subject's head with both hands holding the head immobile. Again, the interrogator moves into and violates the subject's personal space (Typical conditions for application: to threaten or intimidate via invasion of personal space, to instill fear and apprehension without using direct physical force, to punish illogical, defiant, or repetitive responses).

5. (FOUO) ABDOMEN SLAP: This tactic is used when the subject is illogical, defiant, arrogant and generally uncooperative. It is designed to gain the subject's attention (Typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

6. (FOUO) FINGER PRESS: This tactic is using the forefinger to forcefully, repeatedly jab the chest of the subject. The motion should be firm but not forceful enough to cause injury. (Typical conditions for application: to instill apprehension and insult).

7. (FOUO) WATER: When using this tactic, water is poured, flicked, or tossed on the subject. The water is used as a distracter, to disturb the subject's focus on the line of interrogation. When pouring, the subject is usually on their knees and the water is poured slowly over their head. Flicking water is generally directed to the face and again used to distract the subject's attention and focus. Tossing water is more forceful and should come as a surprise. The water is usually directed to the mouth and chin area of the face and care is used to avoid the subject's eyes. (Typical conditions for application: to create a distracting pressure, to startle, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

8. (FOUO) BLOCK HOLD: The subject can be sitting, kneeling or standing with their arms extended out straight with the palms up. The interrogator puts a weighted block, 10-15 lbs., on their hands. The subject is required to keep their arms straight, told not to drop the block at risk of additional punishment (typical conditions for application: to create a distracting pressure, to demonstrate self-imposed pressure, to instill apprehension, humiliation or cause insult).

9. (FOUO) BLOCK SIT: Using a block with a pointed end that is pointed to the floor, the subject is told sit on the flat top with feet and knees together. The knees are bent 90 degrees, and the subject is not allowed to spread their legs to form a tripod. The process of trying to balance on this very unstable seat and concentrate on the interrogator's questions at the same time is very difficult (typical conditions for application: to create a distracting pressure, to demonstrate self-imposed pressure, to instill apprehension, humiliation or cause insult).

10. (FOUO) ATTENTION GRASP: In a controlled, quick motion the subject is grabbed with two hands, one on each side of the collar. In the same motion, the interrogator draws the subject into his or her own space. (Typical conditions for application: to startle, to instill fear, apprehension, and humiliation or cause insult).

11. (FOUO) STRESS POSITION: The subject is placed on their knees, told to extend their arms either straight up or straight to the front. The subject is not allowed to lean back on their heels, arch their back or relieve the pressure off the point of the knee. Note: there are any number of uncomfortable physical positions that can be used and considered in this category (typical conditions for application: to create a distracting pressure, to demonstrate self-imposed pressure, to instill apprehension, humiliation or cause insult).

(FOUO) APPROVED PHYSICAL PRESSURES USED IN OTHER SERVICE SCHOOL RESISTANCE TRAINING PROGRAMS INCLUDE:

NOTE: In addition to the tactics listed below, the individual service school programs include many of the same pressures used in JPRA training. It is important to remember that as with any physical pressure, these tactics are closely monitored, strict time limits are applied and training safety is always paramount.

I. (FOUO) SMOKE: Pipe tobacco smoke is blown into the subject's face while in a standing, sitting or kneeling position. This is used during interrogation to produce discomfort. A smoking pipe is filled with dry tobacco, the pipe is lit and the bit of the pipe has a hose attached. The interrogator blows back through the pipe bowl creating an extraordinary amount of thick, sickening smoke. Maximum duration is five minutes (typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

2. (FOUO) WATERBOARD: Subject is interrogated while strapped to a wooden board, approximately 4'x7'. Often the subject's feet are elevated after being strapped down and having their torso stripped. Up to 1.5 gallons of water is slowly poured directly onto the subject's face from a height of 12-24 inches. In some cases, a wet cloth is placed over the subject's face. It will remain in place for a short period of time. Trained supervisory and medial staff monitors the subject's physical condition. Student may be threatened or strapped back onto the board at a later time. However, no student will have water applied a second time. This tactic instills a feeling of drowning and quickly compels cooperation (typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior).

3. (FODO) SHAKING AND MANHANDLING: Subject is grasped with a rolled cloth hood or towel around their neck (provides stability to the head and neck). The subject's clothing is grasped firmly and then a side-to-side motion is used to shake the subject. Care is used to not create a whipping effect to the neck. (Typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

4. (FOUO) GROUNDING: This tactic is using the manhandling pressure and forcefully guiding the subject to the ground, never letting go (typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior).

5. (FOUO) CRAMPED CONFINEMENT ("the little box"): This is administered by placing a subject into a small box in a kneeling position with legs crossed at the ankle and having him learn [sic] forward to allow the door to be closed without exerting pressure on the back. Time and temperature is closely monitored (typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, to instill humiliation or cause insult).

6. (FOUO) IMMERSION IN WATER/WETTING DOWN: Wetting the subject consists of spraying with a hose, hand pressure water cans, or immersing in a shallow pool of water. Depending on wind and temperature, the subject may be either fully clothed or stripped. Immersion of the head or back of head is prohibited for safety reasons (typical conditions for application: to instill fear and despair, to punish selective behavior, instill humiliation or cause insult).

OTHER TACTICS TO INDUCE CONTROL, DEPENDENCY, COMPLIANCE, AND COOPERATION

I. (FOUO) Isolation / Solitary confinement: See JPRA Instructor Guide Module 6.0 I Lesson 6.1; para. 5.3.1

2. (FOUO) Induced Physical Weakness and Exhaustion: See JPRA Instructor Guide Module 6.0/Lesson 6.1; para. 5.3.2

3. (FOUO) Degradation: See JPRA Instructor Guide Module 6.0 /Lesson 6.1; para. 5.3.3

4. (FOUO) Conditioning: See JPRA Instructor Guide Module 6.0 /Lesson 6.1; para. 5.3.4

5. (FOUO) Sensory Deprivation: When a subject is deprived of sensory input for an interrupted period, for approximately 6-8 hours, it is not uncommon for them to experience visual, auditory and/or tactile hallucinations. If deprived of input, the brain will make it up. This tactic is used in conjunction with other methods to promote dislocation of expectations and induce emotions.

6. (FOUO) Sensory overload: This includes being continually exposed to bright, flashing lights, loud music, annoying/irritating sounds, etc. This tactic elevates the agitation level of a person and increases their emotionality, as well as enhances the effects of isolation.

7. (FOUO) Disruption of sleep and biorhythms: Sleep patterns are purposefully disrupted to make it more difficult for the subject to think clearly, concentrate, and make rational decisions.

8. (FOUO) Manipulation of diet: Purposeful manipulation of diet, nutrients, and vitamins can have a negative impact on the subject's general health and emotional state. Medical personnel in the POW camps in North Korea believe that a B vitamin compound was responsible, in large part, to the phenomena called "give-up-itis." Recent studies suggest the removal of certain amino acids from a diet can induce heightened levels of emotional agitation.

(Tab 4 - July 24, 2002 Memorandum from Chief of Psychology Services at the 336th Training Support Squadron, Surgeon General Flight to JPRA Chief of Staff. Attached to JPRA Memorandum of July 26, 2002.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND

24 Jul 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR JPRA
ATTENTION: LTCOL BAUMGARTNER

FROM: 336 TRSS/SGF

SUBJECT: Psychological Effects of Resistance Training

1. Psychology Services at the Air Force Survival School at Fairchild AFB, WA maintains a log of psychological interventions conducted with students during training and prepares a yearly report of these interventions for risk monitoring purposes. Additionally, periodically Psychology Services conducts research to assess student confidence in ability to adhere to the Code of Conduct. We do not, however, routinely survey students in the years after training completion to conduct any psychological assessments of students.

2. Historically, a small minority of students in USAF Resistance Training (RT) have had temporary adverse psychological reactions during training. From 1992 through 2001, 26,829 students participated in RT, with 1,156 (4.3%) of them having contact with Psychology Services during training. Out of the students Psychology Services intervened with, 1,119 (96.8%) were successfully remotivated to complete training with only 37 (3.2 %) psychological pulls. Out of the entire student population, only 0.14% were psychologically pulled from training.

3. Data from the Code of Conduct confidence studies are more complex to report in this format. In general, however, student confidence in their ability to adhere to the Code of Conduct is high prior to training, is reduced as expected after the Pre-Academic RT Laboratory, recovers during RT Academics, and is sustained or improves in the Post-Academic Laboratory. This suggests that RT is building realistic confidence to adhere to the Code of Conduct, and certainly is not crushing the spirit of the students.

4. While we have not surveyed students after completion of training for long-term psychological effects of RT during my tenure as Chief of Psychology Services at the Air Force Survival School, I feel reasonably certain that USAF RT training does not cause long-term psychological harm for a couple of reasons.

a. First, we minimize carryover of temporary psychological effects by performing three extensive debriefings during training. Two of the debriefings are performed by Psychology Services staff trained in advanced Critical Incident Stress Management, and the other debriefing is a thorough operational debriefing. Affording students these opportunities to discuss their training experiences in open group environments mitigates the risk of turning a "dramatic" experience into a "traumatic" experience.

b. Second, in spite of the training needing to be extremely stressful in order to be effective, we have encountered very few complaints about the training we provide. In my tenure in which nearly 10,000 students have completed training, we have had no congressional complaints about RT and only one Inspector General complaint which was not due to psychological concerns. I am aware of only letter of inquiry sent to the schoolhouse inquiring about long-term effects of training after completing training over twenty years ago. Even in this one inquiry out of 50,000 or so students completing RT since then, it was impossible to attribute this person's reported symptoms to his training.

c. Thus, I have to conclude that if there are any long-term negative psychological effects of USAF RT, they are certainly minimal.

5. I was also asked to comment from a psychological perspective on the effects of using the watering board.

a. The watering board is an intense physical and psychological stressor utilized by the Navy RT programs. We do not use this pressure in USAF RT.

b. I observed the watering board being utilized approximately 10-12 times when I was conducting a Staff Assistance Visit to the Navy North Island SERE School in September of 2001. The effects of the pressure were highly predictable. Use of the watering board resulted in student capitulation and compliance 100% of the time. I do not believe the watering board posed a real and serious physical danger to the students when I observed. The Navy had highly qualified medical personnel immediately available to intervene, and their students had all been medically screened prior to training. Psychologically, however, the watering board broke the students' will to resist providing information and induced helplessness.

///signed///
JERALD F. OGRISSEG, Maj, USAF, BSC
Chief, Psychology Services

(Tab 5) August 1, 2002 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.

(Tab 5) August 1, 2002 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.

(Tab 6 - EXTRACTS) September 27, 2002 USSOUTHCOM (Office of the Staff Judge Advocate) document entitled "Trip Report, DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO."

(U) Purpose: Provide summary of visit by DoD General Counsel (GC) and others to GTMO on 25 Sep 02.

(U) Background:

(U) On 25 Sep 02, Mr. Haynes, DOD GC; Mr. Addington, Counsel to the VP; Mr. Rizzo, CIA Acting GC; the Honorable Mr. Chertoff, DOJ, Criminal Division; and others (complete list of visitors at Tab B) visited GTMO.

(U) Stated purpose of their visit was:

• Tour facilities
• Receive briefings on Intel successes, Intel challenges, Intel techniques, Intel problems and future plans for facilities.

(U) Hurricane evacuation plan was briefed in detail.

(FOUO) Overall

• Visitors asked very few questions and made very few comments
• MG D did take Mr. Haynes and a few others aside for private conversations.
• It appeared that MG D was doing most, if not all, of the speaking at these side meetings.

(U) Recommendation: None. FYI only.

(Tab 7) October 24, 2002 email between DoD CITF Personnel, Subject: FW: Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes [Minutes of an October 2, 2002 meeting at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba].

Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes

Rhodes, Barry A

From: Zolper, Peter C.
sent: Wednesday, August 27, 20034:02 PM
To: Fallon, Mark
Cc: Rhodes, Barry A.
Subject: (U) RE: Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Barry

--Original Message--
From: Fallon, Mark
Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2003 12:46 PM
To: Zolper, Peter C.
Subject: FW: Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes

R/Mark Fallon
Deputy Commander/SAC
[Big delete]

--Original Message--
From: Fallon Mark
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 4:52 PM
To: McCahon, Sam
Cc: Mallow Brittain; Thomas Blaine; Johnson Scott; Smith David
Subject: RE: Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes

Sam:

We need to ensure seniors at OGC are aware of the 170 strategies and how it might impact CITF and Commissions. This looks like the kinds of stuff Congressional hearings are made of. Quotes from LTC Beaver regarding things that are not being reported give the appearance of impropriety. Other comments like "It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong" and "Any of the techniques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any possible accidents." seem to stretch beyond the bounds of legal propriety. Talk of "wet towel treatment" which results in the lymphatic gland reacting as if you are suffocating, would in my opinion; shock the conscience of any legal body looking at using the results of the interrogations or possibly even the interrogators. Someone needs to be considering how history will look back at this.

R/Mark Fallon
Deputy Commander
Criminal Investigation Task Force
[Delete]

--Original Message--
From: Thomas Blaine
Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 7:57 PM
To: McCahon Sam; Johnson Scott; Fallon Mark
Subject: FW: Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes

Sam,

Very Interesting reading on how detainees are being treated for Info.

Scott, Mark,

FYI

Blaine

Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes

Persons in Attendance:

COL Cummings, LTC Phifer, CDR Bridges, LTC Beaver, MAJ Burney, MAJ Leso, Dave Becker, John Fredman, ILT Seek, SPC Pimentel

The following notes were taken during the aforementioned meeting at 1340 on October 2, 2002. All questions and comments have been paraphrased:

BSCT Description of SERE Psych Training (MAJ Burney and MAJ Leso)

• Identify trained resisters
o Al Qaeda Training
• Methods to overcome resistance
o Rapport building (approach proven to yield positive results)
o Friendly approach (approach proven to yield positive results)
o Fear Based Approaches are unreliable, ineffective in almost all cases
• What's more effective than fear based strategies are camp-wide, environmental strategies designed to disrupt cohesion and communication among detainees.
o Environment should foster dependence and compliance

LTC Phifer: Harsh techniques used on our service members have worked and will work on some, what about those?

MAJLeso: Force is risky, and may be ineffective due to the detainees' frame of reference. They are used to seeing much more barbaric treatment.

Becker: Agreed

→ At this point a discussion about ISN 63 ensued, recalling how he has responded to certain types of deprivation and psychological stressors. After short discussion the BSCT continued to address the overall manipulation of the detainees' environment.

BSCT continued:

• Psychological stressors are extremely effective (ie, sleep deprivation, withholding food. isolation, loss of time)

COL Cummings: We can't do sleep deprivation
LTC Beaver: Yes, we can - with approval.

• Disrupting the normal camp operations is vital. We need to create an environment of "controlled chaos"

LTC Beaver: We may need to curb the harsher operations while ICRC is around. It is better not to expose them to any controversial techniques. We must have the support of the DOD.

Becker: We have had many reports from Bagram about sleep deprivation being used.

LTC Beaver: True, but officially it is not happening. It is not being reported officially. The ICRC is a serious concern. They will be in and out, scrutinizing our operations, unless they are displeased and decide to protest and leave. This would draw a lot of negative attention.

COL Cummings: The new PSYOP plan has been passed up the chain.

LTC Beaver: It's at J3 at SOUTHCOM.

Fredman: The DOJ has provided much guidance on this issue. The CIA is not held to the same rules as the military. In the past when the ICRC has made a big deal about certain detainees, the DOD has "moved" them away from the attention of ICRC. Upon questioning from the ICRC about their whereabouts, the DOD's response has repeatedly been that the detainee merited no status under the Geneva Convention. The CIA bas employed aggressive techniques on less than a handful of suspects since 9/11.

Under the Torture Convention, torture has been prohibited by international law, but the language of the statutes is written vaguely. Severe mental and physical pain is prohibited. The mental part is explained as poorly as the physical. Severe physical pain described as anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body parts. Mental torture described as anything leading to permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality. It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong. So far, the techniques we have addressed have not proven to produce these types of results, which in a way challenges what the BSCT paper says about not being able to prove whether these techniques will lead to permanent damage. Everything on the BSCT white paper is legal from a civilian standpoint [Any questions of severe weather or temperature conditions should be deferred to medical staff.] Any of the techniques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any possible accidents. The CIA operates without military intervention. When the CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in the past. the FBI has pulled their personnel from theatre. In those rare instances, aggressive techniques have proven very helpful.

LTC Beaver: We will need documentation to protect us.

Fredman: Yes, if someone dies while aggressive techniques are being used, regardless of cause of death, the backlash of attention would be severely detrimental. Everything must be approved and documented.

Becker: LEA personnel will not participate in harsh techniques.

LTC Beaver: There is no legal reason why LEA personnel cannot participate in these operations

→ At this point a discussion about whether or not to video tape the aggressive sessions, or interrogations at all ensued.

Becker: Videotapes are subject to too much scrutiny in court. We don't want the LEA people in aggressive sessions anyway.

LTC Beaver: LEA choice not to participate in these types of interrogations is more ethical and moral as opposed to legal

Fredman: The videotaping of even totally legal techniques will look "ugly".

Becker: (Agreed)

Fredman: The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. The US did not sign up on the second part, because of the 8th amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), but we did sign the part about torture. This gives us more license to use more controversial techniques.

LTC Beaver: Does SERE employ the "wet towel" technique?

Fredman: If a well-trained individual is used to perform this technique it can feel like you're drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you're suffocating, but your body will not cease to function. It is very effective to identify phobias and use them (ie, insects, snakes, claustrophobia). The level of resistance is directly related to person's experience.

MAJ Burney: Whether or not significant stress occurs lies in the eye of the beholder. The burden of proof is the big issue. It is very difficult to disprove someone else's PTSD.

Fredman: These techniques need involvement from interrogators, psych, medical, legal, etc.

Becker: Would we get blanket approval or would it be case by case?

Fredman: The CIA makes the call internally on most of the types of techniques found in the BSCT paper, and this discussion. Significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ.

LTC Phifer: Who approves ours? The CG? SOUTHCOM CG?

Fredman: Does the Geneva Convention apply? The CIA rallied for it not to.

LTC Phifer: Can we get DOJ opinion about these topics on paper?

LTC Beaver: Will it go from DOJ to DOD?

LTC Phifer: Can we get to see a CIA request to use advanced aggressive techniques?

Fredman: Yes, but we can't provide you with a copy. You will probably be able to look at it

An example of a different perspective on torture is Turkey. In Turkey they say that interrogation at all, or anything you do to that results in the subject betraying his comrades is torture.

LTC Beaver: In the BSCT paper it says something about "imminent threat of death", ...

Fredman: The threat of death is also subject to scrutiny, and should be handled on a case by case basis. Mock executions don't work as well as friendly approaches, like letting someone write a letter home, or providing them with an extra book.

Becker: I like the part about ambient noise.

→ At this point a discussion about ways to manipulate the environment ensued, and the following ideas were offered:

• Medical visits should be scheduled randomly. rather than on a set system
• Let detainee rest just long enough to fall asleep and wake him up about every thirty minutes and tell him it's time to pray again
• More meals per day induce loss of time
• Truth serum; even though it may not actually work, it does have a placebo effect.

Meeting ended at 1450.

(Tab 8) October, 11 2002 Memorandum from MG Michael Dunlavey to Commander USSOUTHCOM, Subject: Counter-Resistance Strategies. Two Attachments: JTF-170 J2 Memo, Subject: Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies and JTF-170 SJA Memo, Subject: Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE 170
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09880

JTF 170-C3

11 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, Florida 33172-1217

SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Strategies

1. Request that you approve the interrogation techniques delineated in the enclosed Counter-Resistance Strategies memorandum. I have reviewed this memorandum and the legal review provided to me by the JTF-170 Staff Judge Advocate and concur with the legal analysis provided.

2. I am fully aware of the techniques currently employed to gain valuable intelligence in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Although these techniques have resulted in significant exploitable intelligence, the same methods have become less effective over time. I believe the methods and techniques delineated in the accompanying J-2 memorandum will enhance our efforts to extract additional information. Based on the analysis provided by the JTF-170 SJA, I have concluded that these techniques do not violate U.S. or international laws.

3. My point of contact for this issue is LTC Jerald Phifer at DSN 660-3476.

MICHAEL E. DUNLAVEY
Major General, USA
Commanding

2 Encls
1. JTF 170-J2 Memo, 11 Oct 02
2. JTF 170-SJA Memo, 11 Oct 02

***
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 26 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE 170
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09880

JTF 170-SJA

11 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Joint Task Force 170

SUBJ: Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques

1. I have reviewed the memorandum on Counter-Resistance Strategies, dated 11 Oct 02, and agree that the proposed strategies do not violate applicable federal law. Attached is a more detailed legal analysis that addresses the proposal.

2. I recommend that interrogators be properly trained in the use of the approved methods of interrogation and that interrogations involving category II and III methods undergo a legal review prior to their commencement.

3. This matter is forwarded to you for your recommendation and action.

DIANE E. BEAVER
LTC, USA
Staff Judge Advocate

2 Encls
1. JTF 170-J2 Memo, 11 Oct 02
2. JTF 170-SJA Memo, 11 Oct 02

***

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE 170
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09880

JTF-J2

11 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Joint Task Force 170

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies

1. PROBLEM: The current guidelines for interrogation procedures at GTMO limit the ability of interrogators to counter advanced resistance.

2. Request approval for use of the following interrogation plan.

a. Category I techniques. During the initial category of interrogation the detainee should be provided a chair and the environment should be generally comfortable. The format of the interrogation is the direct approach. The use of rewards like cookies or cigarettes may be helpful. If the detainee is determined by the interrogator to be uncooperative, the interrogator may use the following techniques.

(1) Yelling at the detainee (not directly in his ear or to the level that it would cause physical pain or hearing problems)

(2) Techniques of deception.

(a) Multiple interrogator techniques.

(b) Interrogator identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.

b. Category II techniques. With the permission of the OIC, Interrogation Section, the interrogator may use the following techniques.

(1) The use of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours.

(2) The use of falsified documents or reports.

(3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made to through the OIC, Interrogation Section to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by the Commanding General. For selected detainees, the OIC Interrogation Section will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.

(4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth.

(5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.

(6) The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during transportation and questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.

(7) The use of 20-hour interrogations.

(8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).

(9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.

(10) Removal of clothing.

(11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.)

(12) Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress.

c. Category III techniques. Techniques in this category may be used only by submitting a request through the Director, JIG, for approval by the Commanding General with appropriate legal review and information to Commander, USSOUTHCOM. These techniques are required for a very small percentage of the most uncooperative detainees (less than 3%). The following techniques and other aversive techniques, such as those used in U.S. military interrogation resistance training or by other U.S. government agencies, may be utilized in a carefully coordinated manner to help interrogate exceptionally resistant detainees. Any of these techniques that require more than light grabbing, poking, or pushing, will be administered only by individuals specifically trained in their safe application.

(1) The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family.

(2) Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring).

(3) Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.

(4) Use of mild, non injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.

3. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at _3476.

JERALD PHIFER
LTC, USA
Director, J2

***

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE 170
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09880

JTF 170-SJA

11 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Joint Task Force 170

SUBJECT: Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies

1. (U) ISSUE: To ensure the security of the United States and its Allies, more aggressive interrogation techniques that the ones presently used, such as methods proposed in the attached recommendation, may be required in order to obtain information from detainees that are resisting interrogation efforts and are suspected of having significant information essential to national security. This legal brief references the recommendations outlined in the JTF-170-J2 memorandum, dated 11 October 2002.

2. (U) FACTS: The detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), are not protected by the Geneva Conventions (GC). Nonetheless, DoD interrogators trained to apply the Geneva Conventions have been using commonly approved methods of interrogation such as rapport building through the direct approach, rewards, the multiple interrogator approach, and the use of deception. However, because detainees have been able to communicate among themselves and debrief each other about their respective interrogations, their interrogation resistance strategies have become more sophisticated. Compounding this problem is the fact that there is no established clear policy for interrogation limits and operations at GTMO, and may interrogators have felt in the past that they could not do anything that could be considered "controversial." In accordance with President Bush's 7 February 2002 directive, the detainees are not Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). They must be treated humanely and, subject to military necessity, in accordance with the principles of GC.

3. (U) DISCUSSION: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not adopted specific guidelines regarding interrogation techniques for detainee operations at GTMO. While the procedures outlined in Army FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation (28 September 1992), are utilized, they are constrained by, and conform to the GC and applicable international law, and therefore are not binding. Since the detainees are not EPWs, the Geneva Conventions limitations that ordinarily would govern captured enemy personnel interrogations are not binding on U.S. personnel conducting detainee interrogations at GTMO. Consequently, in the absence of specific binding guidance, and in accordance with the President's directive to treat the detainees humanely, we must look to applicable international and domestic law in order to determine the legality of the more aggressive interrogation techniques recommended in the J2 proposal.

a. (U) International Law: Although no international body of law directly applies, the more notable international treaties and relevant law are listed below.

(1) (U) In November of 1994, the United States ratified The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, the United State took a reservation to Article 16, which defined cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment, by instead deferring to the current standard articulated in the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, the United States is only prohibited from committing these acts that would otherwise be prohibited under the United States Constitutional Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment. The United States ratified the treaty with the understanding that the convention would not be self-executing, that is, that it would not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts. This convention is the principal U.N. treaty regarding torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.

(2) (U) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by the United States in 1992, prohibits inhumane treatment in Article 7, and arbitrary arrest and detention in Article 9. The United States ratified it on the condition that it would not be self-executing, and it took a reservation to Article 7 that we would only be bound to the extent that the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.

(3) (U) The American Convention on Human Rights forbids inhumane treatment, arbitrary imprisonment, and requires the state to promptly inform detainees of the charges against them, to review their pretrial confinement, and to conduct a trial within a reasonable time. The United States signed the convention on 1 June 1977, but never ratified it.

(4) (U) The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court and criminalized inhumane treatment, unlawful deportation, and imprisonment. The United States not only failed to ratify the Rome Statute, but also later withdrew from it.

(5) (U) The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, prohibits inhumane or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. Although international declarations may provide evidence of customary international law (which is considered binding on all nations even without a treat), they are not enforceable by themselves.

(6) (U) There is some European case law stemming from the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of torture. The Court ruled on allegations of torture and other forms of inhumane treatment by the British in the Northern Ireland conflict. The British authorities developed practices of interrogation such as forcing detainees to stand for long hours, placing black hoods over their heads, holding the detainees prior to interrogation in a room with continuing loud noise, and depriving them of sleep, food, and water. The European Court concluded that these acts did not rise to the level of torture as defined in the Convention Against Torture, because torture was defined as an aggravated form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. However, the Court did find that these techniques constituted cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. Nonetheless, and as previously mentioned, not only is the United States not a part of the European Human Rights Court, but as previously stated, it only ratified the definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment consistent with the U.S. Constitution. See also Mehjnovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Geor. 2002); Committee Against Torture v. Israel, Supreme Court of Israel, 6 Sep 99, 7 BHRC 31; Ireland v UK (1978), 2 EHRR 25.

b. (U) Domestic Law; Although the detainee interrogations are not occurring in the continental United States, U.S. personnel conducting said interrogations are still bound by applicable Federal Law, specifically, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 18 U.S.C. 2340, and for military interrogators, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

(1) (U) The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. There is a lack of Eighth Amendment case law relating in the context of interrogations, as most of the Eighth Amendment litigation in federal court involves either the death penalty, or 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions from inmates based on prison conditions. The Eighth Amendment applies as to whether or not torture or inhumane treatment has occurred under the federal torture statute. (footnote marker) [1]

(a) (U) A principal case in the confinement context that is instructive regarding Eighth Amendment analysis (which is relevant because the United States adopted the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment, it do so deferring to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution) and conditions of confinement if a U.S. court were to examine the issue is Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). The issue in Hudson stemmed from a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a prison inmate suffered minor bruises, facial swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate resulting from a beating by prison guards while he was cuffed and shackled. In this case the Court held that there was no governmental interest in beating an inmate in such a manner. The Court further ruled that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner might constitute cruel and unusual punishment, even though the inmate does not suffer serious injury.

(b) (U) In Hudson, the Court relied on Whitley v. Alberts, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), as the seminal case that establishes whether a constitutional violation has occurred. The Court stated that the extent of the injury suffered by an inmate is only one of the factors to be considered, but that there is no significant injury requirement in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, and that the absence of serious injury is relevant to, but does not end, the Eighth Amendment inquiry. The Court based its decision on the "...settled rule that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eight Amendment. " Whitley at 319, quoting Ingraham v Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977). The Hudson Court then held that in the excessive force or conditions of confinement context, the Right Amendment violation test delineated by the Supreme Court in Hudson is that when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated, whether or not significant injury is evident. The extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation, but the question of whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering, ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very (emphasis added) purpose of causing harm If so, the Eighth Amendment claim will prevail.

(c) (U) At the District Court level, the typical conditions of confinement claims involve a disturbance of the inmate's physical comfort, such as sleep deprivation or loud noise. The Eighth Circuit ruled in Singh v Holcomb, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24790, that an allegation by an inmate that he was constantly deprived of sleep which resulted in emotional distress, loss of memory, headaches, and poor concentration, did not show either the extreme deprivation level, or the officials' culpable state of mind required to fulfill the objective component of an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.

(d) (U) In another sleep deprivation case alleging an Eighth Amendment violation, the Eighth Circuit established a totality of the circumstance test, and stated that if a particular condition of detention is reasonable related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment. In Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F. 3d 647 (8th Cir. 1996), the complainant was confined to a 5-1/2 by 5-1/2 foot cell without a toilet or sink, and was forced to sleep on a mat on the floor under bright lights that were on twenty-four hours a day. His Eighth Amendment claim was not successful because he was able to sleep at some point, and because he was kept under those conditions due to a concern for his health, as well as the perceived danger that he presented. This totality of the circumstances test has also been adopted by the Ninth Circuit. In Green v CSO Strack, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 14451, the Court held that threats of bodily injury are insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, and that sleep deprivation did not rise to a constitutional violation where the prisoner failed to present evidence that he either lost sleep or was otherwise harmed.

(e) (U) Ultimately, an Eighth Amendment analysis is based primarily on whether the government had a good faith legitimate governmental interest, and did not act maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

(2) (U) The torture statute (18 U.S.C. 2340) is the United States' codification of the signed and ratified provisions of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and pursuant to subsection 2340B, does not create any substantive or procedural rights enforceable by law by any party to any civil proceeding.

(a) (U) The statute provides that "whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life."

(b) (U) Torture is defined as "an act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended (emphasis added) to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incident to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control." The statute defines "sever mental pain or suffering" as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting (emphasis added) from the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of sever physical pain or suffering; or the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses of the personality; or the threat of imminent death; or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality."

(c) (U) Case law in the context of the federal torture statute and interrogations is also lacking, as the majority of the case law involving torture relates to either the illegality of brutal tactics used by the police to obtain confessions (in which the Court simply states that these confessions will be deemed as involuntary for the purposes of admissibility and due process, but does not actually address torture or the Eighth Amendment), or the Alien Torts Claim Act, in which federal courts have defined that certain uses of force (such as kidnapping, beating and raping of a nun with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, See Ortiz v Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162 (D. Mass. 1995)) constituted torture. However, no case law on point within the context of 18 USC 2340.

(3) (U) Finally, U.S. military personnel are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The punitive articles that could potentially be violated depending on the circumstances and results of an interrogation are: Article 93 (cruelty and maltreatment), Article 118 (murder), Article 119 (manslaughter), Article 124 (maiming), Article 128 (assault), Article 134 (communicating a threat, and negligent homicide), and the inchoate offenses of attempt (Article 80), conspiracy (Article 81), accessory after the fact (Article 78), and solicitation (Article 82). Article 128 is the article most likely to be violated because a simple assault can be consummated by an unlawful demonstration of violence which creates in the mind of another a reasonable apprehension of receiving immediate bodily harm, and a specific intent to actually inflict bodily harm is not required.

4. (S/NF) ANALYSIS: The counter-resistance techniques proposed in the JTF-170-J2 memorandum are lawful because they do not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the federal torture state as explained below. An international law analysis is not required for the current proposal because the Geneva Conventions do not apply to these detainees since they are not EPWs.

(a) (S/NF) Based on the Supreme Court framework utilized to assess whether a public official has violated the Eighth Amendment, so long as the force used could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation to achieve a legitimate governmental objective, and it was applied in a good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose causing harm, the proposed techniques are likely to pass constitutional muster. The federal torture statute will not be violated so long as any of the proposed strategies are not specifically intended to cause severe physical pain or suffering or prolonged mental harm. Assuming that severe physical pain is not inflicted, absent any evidence that any of these strategies will in fact cause prolonged and long lasting mental harm, the proposed methods will not violate the statute.

(b) (S/NF) Regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice; the proposal to grab, poke in the chest, push lightly, and place a wet towel or hood over the detainee's head would constitute a per se violation of Article 128 (Assault). Threatening a detainee with death may also constitute a violation of Article 128, or also Article 134 (communicating a threat). It would be advisable to have permission or immunity in advance from the convening authority, for military members utilizing these methods.

(c) (S/NF) Specifically, with regard to Category I techniques, the use of mild and fear related approaches such as yelling at the detainee is not illegal because in order to communicate a threat, there must also exist an intent to injure. Yelling at the detainee is legal so long as the yelling is not done with the intent to cause severe physical damage or prolonged mental harm. Techniques of deception such as multiple interrogator techniques, and deception regarding interrogator identity are all permissible methods of interrogation, since there is no legal requirement to be truthful while conducting an interrogation.

(d) (S/NF) With regard to Category II methods, the use of stress positions such as the proposed standing for four hours, the use of isolation for up to thirty days, and interrogating the detainees in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth are all legally permissible so long as no severe physical pain is inflicted and prolonged mental harm intended, and because there is a legitimate governmental objective in obtaining the information necessary that the high value detainees on which these methods would be utilized possess, for the protection of the national security of the United States, its citizens, and allies. Furthermore, these methods would not be utilized for the "very malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm." and absent medical evidence to the contrary, there is no evidence that prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these strategies. The use of falsified documents is legally permissible because interrogators may use deception to achieve their purpose.

(e) (S/NF) The deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, the placement of a hood over the detainee's head during transportation and questioning, and the use of 20 hour interrogations are all legally permissible so long as there is an important governmental objective, and it is not done for the purpose of causing harm or with the intent to cause prolonged mental suffering. There is no legal requirement that detainees must receive four hours of sleep per night, but if a U.S. Court ever had to rule on this procedure, in order to pass Eighth Amendment scrutiny, and as a cautionary measure, they should receive som amount of sleep so that no sever physical or mental harm will result. Removal of comfort items is permissible because there is no legal requirement to provide comfort items. The requirement is to provide adequate food, water, shelter, and medical care. The issue of removing published religious items or materials would be relevant if these were United States citizens with a First Amendment right. Such is not the case with the detainees. Forced grooming and removal of clothing are not illegal, so long as it is not done to punish or cause harm, as there is a legitimate governmental objective to obtain information, maintain health standards in the camp and protect both the detainees and the guards. There is no illegality in removing hot meals because there is no specific requirement to provide hot meals, only adequate food. The use of the detainee's phobias is equally permissible.

(f) (S/NF) With respect to the Category III advanced counter-resistance strategies, the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent is not illegal for the same aforementioned reasons that there is a compelling governmental interest and it is not done intentionally to cause prolonged harm. However, caution should be utilized with this technique because the torture statute specifically mentions making death threats as an example of inflicting mental pain and suffering. Exposure to cold weather or water is permissible with appropriate medical monitoring. The use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation would also be permissible if not done with the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm, and absent medical evidence that it would. Caution should be exercised with this method, as foreign courts have already advised about the potential mental harm that this method may cause. The use of physical contact with the detainee, such as pushing and poking will technically constitute an assault under Article 128, UCMJ.

5. (S/NF) RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that the propose methods of interrogation be approved, and that the interrogators be properly trained in the use of the approved methods of interrogation. Since the law requires examination of all facts under a totality of circumstances test, I further recommend that all proposed interrogations involving category II and III methods must undergo a legal, medical, behavioral science, and intelligence review prior to their commencement.

6. (U) POC: Captain Michael Bordera, x3536.

DIANE E BEAVER
LTC, USA
Staff Judge Advocate

______________

[1] Notwithstanding the argument that U.S. personnel are bound by the Constitution, the detainees confined at GTMO have no jurisdictional standing to bring section 1983 action alleging an Eighth Amendment violation in U.S. Federal Court

(Tab 9) October 25, 2002 Transmittal Memorandum from USSOUTHCOM (General Hill) to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL. 33172-1217

SCCDR

25 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 20318-9999

SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques

1. The activities of Joint Task Force 170 have yielded critical intelligence support for forces in combat, combatant commanders, and other intelligence/law enforcement entities prosecuting the War on Terrorism. However, despite our best efforts, some detainees have tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods. Our respective staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Task Force 170 have been trying to identify counter-resistant techniques that we can lawfully employ.

2. I am forwarding Joint Task Force 170's proposed counter-resistance techniques. I believe the first two categories of techniques are legal and humane. I am uncertain whether all the techniques in the third category are legal under U.S. law, given the absence of judicial interpretation of the U.S. torture statute. I am particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death of the detainee or his family. However, I desire to have as many options as possible at my disposal and therefore request that Department of Defense and Department of Justice lawyers review the third category of techniques.

3. As part of any review of Joint Task Force 170's proposed strategy, I welcome any suggested interrogation methods that others may propose. I believe we should provide our interrogators with as many legally permissible tools as possible.

4. Although I am cognizant of the important policy ramifications of some of these proposed techniques, I firmly believe that we must quickly provide Joint Task Force 170 counter-resistance techniques to maximize the value of our intelligence collection mission.

James T. Hill
General, US Army
Commander

Encls
1. JTF 170 CDR Memo dtd 11 October, 2002
2. JTF 170 SJA Memo dtd 11 October, 2002
3. JTF 170 J-2 Memo dtd 11 October, 2002

(Tab 10) November 4, 2002 Memorandum from Headquarters U.S. Air Force to Joint Staff: Review of SOUTHCOM/GTMO Request for Techniques.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

AFPM #523-02

4 Nov 02

MEMORANDUM FOR UN AND MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS DIVISION (J-5), JOINT STAFF (Ann: CDR Lippold)

SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques

I. The Air Force concurs with the need to conduct an in-depth legal and policy assessment, as recommended by CDRUSSOUTHCOM, prior to implementation of the proposed counter-resistance interrogation techniques. As such, we offer the following critical comments on the proposed techniques:

AF-1, CRITICAL. General Comment. The Air Force has serious concerns regarding the legality of many of the proposed techniques, particularly those under Category III. Some of these techniques could be construed as "torture," as that crime is defined by 18 U.S.C. 2340. That statute, for example, defines "torture" to include "the threat of imminent death," or ''the threat that another person win imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering ..." One of the proposed techniques, under Category III, is "the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family." The torture statute also prohibits the intentional infliction, or threatened infliction, of severe physical pain or suffering, as well the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of "procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality." The extent to which the proposed techniques may violate this statute requires thorough and careful analysis.

AF-2. CRITICAL. GeneraI Comment. Implementation of these techniques could preclude the ability to prosecute the individuals interrogated. Successful prosecutions in military commissions or subsequent use of detainee statements in Federal prosecutions will require that the evidence obtained be admissible. Although the President's military order establishes a fairly low evidentiary threshold of probative value to a reasonable person, many of the techniques described in the memo will place a burden on the prosecution's ability to convince commission members that the evidence meets even that low standard. The Level III techniques will almost certainly result in any statements obtained being declared as coerced and involuntary, and therefore inadmissible. Such a finding may also potentially exclude any evidence derived from the coerced statement. Admissibility of evidence obtained using the Level I and II techniques will be fact specific, but the same concerns remain. Additionally, the techniques described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely and to provide them with adequate food, water, shelter and medical treatment. [1] Defense counsel will undoubtedly argue that any evidence derived by the prosecution must be excluded because the Government did not abide by its own rules. Application of the interrogation methods may also have an adverse impact on the DoJ's ability to use the detainees in support of on-going and future prosecutions, a stated objective of the SECDEF. Any statements obtained under these circumstances will be inherently suspect and of questionable value in a prosecution using established rules of criminal procedure that prohibit such conduct on the part of law enforcement agents.

AF-3. CRITICAL. General Comment. Implementation of the proposed techniques would require a change in Presidential policy. On 7 Feb 02 President Bush determined that the detainees "will be provided many POW privileges as a matter of policy." [2] Included among those privileges are "clothing and shoes," "three meals a day that meet Muslim dietary laws," "soap and toilet articles," and "the opportunity to worship." A number of the Category II techniques would appear to deprive detainees of these privileges. In addition. the President declared that "[t]he detainees will not be subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment," and that the detainees would be able to "raise concerns about their conditions" during private visits with representatives of the ICRC. Obviously implementation of the techniques under consideration by SOUTHCOM would require a modification of or exception to, the President's policy regarding treatment of detainees. Consequently, NSC-level review and Presidential-level approval will be required prior to implementing the proposed techniques.

2. (U) Air Force POC is [big delete]

DONALD E. RICHBURG, Colonel, USAF
USAF Planner, Joint/NSC Matters

cc:
cc:
USA
USN
USMC

_______________

Notes:

1. Presidential Order of 13 November 2001

2. White House Fact Sheet, 7 February 2002.

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PART 27 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)

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Tab 11) November 4, 2002 Memorandum from Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) to Joint Staff: Review of SOUTHCOM/GTMO Request for Techniques.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE
6010 6th Street
FORT BELVOIR, VA 22060-5506

MEMORANDUM THRU

Division Chief. Plans. Policy and Integration. DoD CITF. Bldg. 714, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5506

FOR COMMANDER, CITF

SUBJECT: Assessment of JTF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies and the Potential Impact on CITF Mission and Personnel.

1. Pursuant to your directive I have reviewed the following documents in order to provide an assessment of potential impacts on the CITF mission:

DOD JTF 170 Memorandum from LTC Beaver, dated 11 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques, with attached Legal Brief of the same date.

DOD JTF 170 Memorandum from LTC Jerald Phifer, dated 11 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies

DOD JTF 170 Memorandum from MG Michael E. Dunlavey dated 11 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Strategies

USSOCOM Memorandum from General James T. Hill, dated 25 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques

2. The following represents my assessment of the adverse impacts on the CITF mission if certain counter-resistant techniques are used at GTMO:

a. Liability. CITF personnel who are aware of the use or abuse of certain techniques may be exposed to liability under the UCMJ for failing to intercede or report incidents, if an inquiry later determines the conduct to be in violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice or 18 U.S.C. § 2340.

(1) The legal memorandum cited above opines that certain treatment, although not amounting to torture, has been determined to constitute cruel and unusual, or inhumane treatment or punishment insofar as it is defined in the Convention Against Torture. ("CAT"). Although the United States has not ratified the entire CAT, it has ratified the definition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment insofar as the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution defines it. Therefore, any conduct that would constitute cruel and unusual punishment would be prohibited by the Constitution and would be illegal.

(2) The suggested Tier III and certain Tier II techniques may subject service members to punitive articles of the UCMJ. The following are the most likely provisions to be violated if service members participated in the prescribed techniques: Article 93 (Cruelty and Maltreatment), Article 124 (Maiming), Article 128 (assault) and Article 134 (Communicating a Threat). Should the detainee die in the process or as a result of the techniques, then Article 118 (Murder) and Article 134 (Negligent Homicide) could apply. CITF members who are aware of or participate in the conduct could be held responsible under the inchoaic offenses of Article 80 (Attempt), (Article 81 (Conspiracy) or Article 82 (Accessory After the Fact).

b. Evidentiary Issues. Under Military Commission Order Number 1, if the Presiding Officer determines that the information is probative to a reasonable person, then it will be admitted. This would apply to confessions as well as statements about other defendants. The voluntary nature of any statement, however, will affect the weight accorded that evidence. Consequently, any information derived from the aggressive techniques, although admissible, will be of diminished value during any subsequent proceedings. The taint concerning the diminished weight accorded the statements would apply not only to the detainee making the statements, but also against those individuals about whom the detainee has provided incriminating information.

Additionally, the adverse impact may have consequences on all Commission actions. The al Qaeda training manual instructs members to assert that they have been tortured. The assertion is designed to mitigate the value of any incriminating statements the al Qaeda member may have made during the course of the interrogation. One detainee subjected to these techniques could taint the voluntary nature of all other confessions and information derived from detainees not subjected to the aggressive techniques.

3. Recommendations: Both the utility and legality of applying certain techniques identified in the memorandum listed above are, in my opinion, questionable. Any policy decision to use the Tier III techniques, or any technique inconsistent with the analysis herein, will be contrary to my recommendation. Nonetheless, if the application of the requested measures is approved, I recommend the following actions to mitigate the adverse impact on the CITF:

a. The aggressive techniques should not occur at GTMO where both CITF and the intelligence community are conducting interviews and interrogations. By not using these techniques in a co-located setting, other detainees not subjected to these techniques are less likely to be under the impression that they will be subjected to similar treatment if they do not provide the answers the government is seeking. It is unlikely that a detainee who has been exposed to Tier III techniques will distinguish between CITF and Intelligence Interrogators. His impression will be that he will be punished for any responses that differ from what the interrogator determines to be acceptable.

b. A decision should be made prior to applying the aggressive procedures that the detainee subject to the treatment would not be a considered for referral to the Military Commission. This will reduce the risk that the more aggressive techniques used against a few detainees would be revealed resulting in assumption that these techniques had been used on all the detainees.

c. CITF personnel should not participate in the aggressive techniques, either in their administration, observation or designation of who will be subjected to the strategies. A firm nonporous wall should be erected between CITF personnel and those planning and engaging in the aggressive techniques. This measure will help preserve the integrity of our investigations, any Commission case and will insulate CITF personnel from potential administrative or criminal liability.

4. Conclusion. While some of the techniques identified in Tier I and II pose no threat to either the integrity of the investigation or to subsequent liability of the CITF personnel, i.e., using a ruse, raising one's voice, for the most part they are inconsistent with well-established law enforcement techniques. Any of the Tier III techniques could expose persons involved to administrative and criminal liability as well as negatively impact4 on subsequent Military Commission proceedings.

In legal analysis conducted by the SJA for JTF-170, there are two common themes running throughout the document justifying the use of the procedures. 1) There is no civil liability that will flow to the U.S. Government by using the asserted techniques, and 2) because the purpose of inflicting pain and treating detainees in a degrading manner is not in and of itself to cause pain or harm but to elicit information, it does not conflict with the well established authority under the U.S. Constitution.

There is no Constitution case law related to the infliction of pain on prisoners, other than that related to causing pain for pain's sake, because it is not the prison official's objective to elicit information from those in their custody. Conversely, our objectively is specifically to elicit information from the detainees. The intended use of Tier III techniques, if detected, will establish a new case law in this area, much to the detriment of the U.S. foreign and domestic interests. I cannot advocate any action, interrogation or otherwise, that is predicated upon the principal that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are not aware of how we conduct our business.

SAM W. MCCAHON
MAJ, JA
Chief Legal Advisor

4 Encls

(Tab 12) November 7, 2002 Memorandum from Headquarters, Department of the Army to Joint Staff: Review of SOUTHCOM/GTMO Request for Techniques.

HEADQUARTER, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
(Joint Affairs)

ARMY PLANNER DAMO-ZC
Memorandum No.

MEMORANDUM FOR LEGAL COUNSEL TO CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: SJS 02--6697

1. Army has reviewed the request of the Commander, United States Southern Command, for further legal review by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice of the proposal to employ Counter-Resistance Techniques in the intelligence interrogation of enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

2. As set forth in the enclosed memoranda, Army interposes significant legal, policy and practical concerns regarding most of the Category II and all of the Category III techniques proposed.

3. Army concurs in the recommendation for a comprehensive legal review of this proposal in its entirely by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice.

Encls
1. CITF Legal Opinion
2. OTJAG e-mail

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DAJA-IO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE ARMY GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Review -- Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques

1. I have reviewed the proposed request for approval of counter resistance strategies. I concur in the proposed Category I techniques, but have significant concerns (legal, policy, and practical) regarding most of the Category II and all of the Category III techniques.

2. My legal concerns are summarized as follows:

a. The President directed in Military Order 1 (13 Nov 01) that detainees would be treated "humanely." In a White House Memo, dated 7 Feb 02, he reaffirmed this order and stated further that they will be treated "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

b. In addition to comporting with the President's order, an techniques employed must be consistent with Federal law, to include the UCMJ. As noted in LTC Beaver's legal review, the U.S. has enacted a Federal torture statute (18 U.S.C. 2340, et seq). This statute defines torture as an act "intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering ... upon another person within his custody or physical control." Severe physical pain or suffering is further defined as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from ... the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; ... threat of imminent death; or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering."

c. In my opinion, the listed Category III techniques violate the President's order, and various UCMJ articles. In addition, techniques 1 (use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee of death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family), and 3 (use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation) appear to be clear violations of the Federal torture statute.

d. Regarding the Category II techniques, numbers 2 (prolonged use of stress positions), 5 (deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and 12 (using individual phobias to induce stress), in my opinion, crosses the line of "humane" treatment, would likely be considered maltreatment under Article 93 of the UCMJ, and may violate the Federal torture statute if it results in severe physical pain or suffering. Techniques 10 (removal of clothing) and 11 (forced grooming) are certainly permissible for health reasons, but are problematic (may be considered inhumane) if done only for interrogation purposes. To properly assess these and the other techniques listed Category II, we would need a more detailed plan of exactly how these techniques are going to be used.

3. From a policy standpoint, employing many of the suggested techniques would create a PA nightmare. The War on Terror is expected to last many years and ultimate success requires strong domestic and international support. Whatever interrogation techniques we adopt will eventually become public knowledge. If we mistreat detainees, we will quickly lose the morale high ground and public support will erode. The techniques noted above will not read well in either the New York Times or the Cairo Times. Additionally, many of the techniques arguably violate the torture and inhumane treatment provisions of the ICC. While we may not be subject to the ICC, failure to adhere to these provisions severely undercuts our stated position that we follow international law and principles and will police our own.

4. Finally, the plan does not adequately lay out how these techniques will result in our forces gaining any useful information.

5. In view of the foregoing, I believe the proposed plan is legally insufficient, and that a more thorough legal, policy and practical analysis should be conducted before any of the Category II and III techniques are adopted.

John Ley

(Tab 13) November 4, 2002 Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations to Joint Staff: Review of SOUTHCOM I GTMO Request for Techniques.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO: N3/N5L
NPM 466-02
4 Nov 02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE (J-5), JOINT STAFF

Subj: NAVY PLANNER'S MEMO WRT COUNTER-RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES
(SJS 02-06697) (S/NF)

1. (u) The Navy staff has review subject tasker and concurs with the following substantive comment:

SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT:

(SINF) Navy staff concurs with developing a range of advance counter-resistance techniques to apply to foreign detainees. Navy staff recommends, however that more detailed interagency legal and policy review be conducted on proposed techniques. Such policy review should address the possibility, if not the likelihood, that techniques will be inadvertently disclosed though the visits to the detainees in Cuba by the International Committee of the Red Cross or foreign government delegations, which could lead to international scrutiny. Navy staff also recommends that the classification level of counter-resistance techniques be increased to the Top Secret level.

2. (U) OPNAV point of contact is [big delete]

D. D. THOMPSON
Captain. U.S. Navy
Special Assistant to the CNO
for JCS Matters

(Tab 14) November 4, 2002 Memorandum from Headquarters United States Marine Corps to Joint Staff: Review of SOUTHCOM/GTMO Request for Techniques.

4 Nov 02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, J-5, THE JOINT STAFF

Subj: COUNTER-RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES

1. (U) We have reviewed the subject documents, and have the following comments.

CRITICAL:

We concur with general proposition of developing a more robust interrogation plan. We are concerned, however, with the techniques proposed in the subject documents, especially the Category III techniques. We disagree with the position that the proposed plan is legally sufficient. [Illegible] [illegible] techniques proposed should not be implemented without a more thorough legal and policy review.

It is the policy of the U.S. Government to treat al Qaeda and Taliban detainees humanely. This policy was addressed in the President's Military Order No. 1, dated 13 Nov 01. Under Section III (Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense), the President directed that the detainees "shall be ... treated humanely." Moreover, in a White House memorandum dated 7 Feb 02, the President 'reaffirm[ed] the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." A White House Fact Sheet, issued in conjunction with the 7 Feb 02 Memorandum, amplifies the meaning of humane treatment by stating that the detainees will not be subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment. While the principles of Geneva may be "waived" because of military necessity, humane treatment is not subject to waiver.

In addition, several of the Category II and III techniques arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to possible prosecution. (See 18 U.S.C. 2340 et seq). This federal statute states that "[w]hoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life." The statute defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control." The statute defines "severe physical or mental pain or suffering," as the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering ... threat of imminent death; or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering." Clearly, the "use of [illegible] designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family," would be a violation of the federal torture statute. To argue otherwise is disingenuous. There also would be exposure to criminal prosecution under the UCMJ. We are unaware of any authority that would allow a [illegible] authority to give "permission or immunity in advance" to commit a criminal violation.

Moreover, the International Criminal Court (ICC) purports to have jurisdiction over "War Crimes." (See Article 5, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court]. The Rome Statutes define "war crimes" as, "Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons ... protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention; ... Torture or inhuman treatment; ..." The Rome Statute defines "torture" to mean "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions." While President Bush has stated that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda, he did state, "that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban." (See President's Memorandum, dated 7 Feb 02). Regardless, there are many in the international community, and nationally, that dispute the President's determination of the inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda. The ICC could very well determine that it does in fact apply to both al Qaeda and the Taliban, and therefore seek jurisdiction to try our service members involved in "torture" of the detainees. Notwithstanding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, customary international law prohibits the mistreatment of prisoners.

It also is clear that any statements, and evidence derived from these statements, will be inadmissible in federal court. While the procedures for the military tribunals have not been finalized, it is doubtful that statements obtained through aggressive methods will be admissible, not to mention the reliability of such statements will be called into question.

We also are concerned over the self-imposed approval process for escalating to the employment of Category II or III techniques.

Prolonged pauses in an interrogation, that are not parts of the interrogation strategy, will certainly diminish the interrogator's effectiveness in eliciting information. Undue delay in gaining approval for employment of a particular interrogation technique during the course of an interrogation, could significantly undermine any momentum already achieved by the interrogator. Rather, any approval process adopted must be sufficiently responsive to operate effectively during the course of the interrogation process, and not [illegible] interrogation. Clear guidance in the form of well-defined limits, afford the interrogator a range of maneuverability that obviates the need to pause for "policy clarification."

Regarding the use of the isolation facility (described as a Category II technique), segregating the detainees, individually [illegible] [illegible] resistance levels, maintains the shock of capture (SOC) and enhances the ability to gather intelligence. Once detainees have been allowed to communicate with one another, SOC is diminished. Isolation is an effective means to SOC almost indefinitely (if conducted properly). In fact, depending on the level of isolation, SOC can be maintained without the need for other questionable techniques.

[Illegible] point of contact is [big delete].

[Illegible]
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Marine Corps Service Planner

(Tab 15) November 27, 2002 Memorandum from William J. Haynes (DoD GC) to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques.

(Tab 15) November 27, 2002 Memorandum from William J. Haynes (DoD GC) to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques.

(Tab 16) (First Page and EXTRACTS) December 18, 2002 "JTF GTMO 'SERE' Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure."

JTF GTMO SERE SOP
18 DECEMBER 2002

[All reference to SERE will be removed]

OTF GTMO "SERE" INTERROGATION STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

Subj: GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYING "SERE" [Management] TECHNIQUES DURING DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS

Ref: (a) FASO DETACHMENT BRUNSWICK INSTRUCTION 3305, 3D

1. Purpose. This SOP document promulgates procedures to be followed by JTF-GTMO personnel engaged in interrogation operations on detained persons. The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for use in real-world interrogations. These tactics and techniques are used at SERE school to “break” SERE detainees. The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation operations.

The basis for this document is the SOP used at the U.S. Navy SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) school in Brunswick, Maine and is defined by reference (a).

Note that all tactics are strictly non-lethal.

STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES LAID OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT IS MANDATORY!

2. Training. All interrogators will undergo training by certified SERE instructors prior to being approved for use of any of the techniques described in this document. Training will be [illegible] and maintained [illegible] by the International Control Element (ICE) [illegible]

3. Scope. Applicable to designated military and civilian interrogators assigned to Joint Task Force -- Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Approved: ________________
LT COL TED K. MOSS
ICE CHIEF

Approved: ________________
COL [illegible]
[illegible]

Approved: ________________
MG GEOFFREY MILLER
COMMANDING GENERAL JTF GTMO

3. Degradation Tactics

a. Shoulder Slap
b. Insult Slap
c. Stomach Slap
d. Stripping

4. Physical Debilitation Tactics

a. Stress Positions

1. Head Rest Index Finger Position
2. Kneeling Position
3. Worship-the-Gods
4. Sitting Position
5. Standing position

3. Demonstrate Omnipotence Tactics

a. Manhandling
b. Walling

(Tab 17) December 17, 2002 Memorandum from CJTF Memorandum to the JTF-GTMO J-2, Subject: "JTF GTMO 'SERE' Interrogation SOP."

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE (DEPLOYED)
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

CITF-G/SAC

17 Dec 02

MEMORANDUM FOR JTF-GTMO/J2

SUBJECT: JTF GTMO "SERE" INTERROGATION SOP DTD 10 DEC 02

1. On 14 December 02, prior the "Decision Making" brief with the CG, you provided me a copy of JTF GTMO SERE INTERROGATION SOP dated 10 Dec 02 and asked me to review it and provide you with my opinion. Consistent with our "stand clear" policy, I cannot offer you any specific input or advise as you inquired. However, I do want to reiterate CITF-G's general position on this matter. As outlined in our memorandum for JTF GTMO dated 15 Nov 02, CITF-G objects to these aggressive interrogation techniques. While the subject SOP clearly does not apply to LEA (CITF and FBI) interrogators (applicably only to military and civilian interrogators assigned to JTF-GTMO), LEA in conjunction with the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit want to provide you the following general observations on why employing "SERE" tactics and techniques are not effective methods, with very limited potential benefit.

2. General Observations: Both the military and LEA share the identical mission of obtaining intelligence in order to prevent future attacks on Americans. However, LEA has the additional responsibility of seeking reliable information/evidence from detainees to be used in subsequent legal proceedings.

[Big Delete]

4. The SERE methods were designed for use in a battlefield environment as a means of collecting tactical intelligence (e.g. to uncover enemy plans, determine enemy strength, movement, weapon capabilities and logistical support, etc.) However, there is no evidence to support that captured combatant techniques work effectively in the interrogation of detainees in a non-combat environment such as GTMO. LEA believes that these techniques discourage, rather than encourage, detainee cooperation.

5. LEA agents are responsible for investigating a wide variety of criminal and counterintelligence matters around the world. Accordingly, they are highly trained and experienced in eliciting information from reluctant subjects of diverse cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. LEA agents only use rapport-based methods that not only yield results, but also are legally sound. LEA agents are neither trained nor authorized to use coercive interrogation techniques under any circumstances.

7. Utilizing rapport-based methods, LEA have realized numerous successes during several major terrorism investigations including the bombings of embassies in East Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Like most of the GTMO detainees, the perpetrators of those terrorist acts were motivated by a distorted religious doctrine and reinforced by a group/cultural dynamic.

8. LEA does not believe that coercive interrogation techniques are effective. However, on those rare occasions when those techniques have yielded results, the reliability of the information gathered has proven to be highly questionable. Detainees who are coerced into making admissions often develop strong feelings of anger and resentment toward their interrogators. Instead of creating an environment conducive to fostering continued cooperation, the interrogation process ends up fueling hostility and strengthening a detainee's will to resist.

9. A recovered Al Qaeda training manual instructs its members to expect Americans to use coercive interrogation tactics, even torture, to elicit information. The manual draws attention to these techniques and characterizes them as further proof of the evil and unjust acts which Americans commit against Muslims. Thus, the use of coercive techniques only serves to reinforce those erroneous perceptions. In essence, we end up proving ourselves worthy of the detainees' righteous resolve and inspiring continued resistance. By contrast, the use of a rapport-based approach represents the first step in disrupting a detainee's belief system. Intelligence officers, law enforcement personnel and diplomats have long recognized the value of this [illegible].

10. An advantage of a rapport-based model is that it allows interrogators to capitalize on a collective knowledge acquired about the unique mindset of those drawn to radical fundamentalism. It allows interviewers the opportunity to tailor specific approaches based on a careful review of a detainee's particular circumstances, rather than relying on haphazard, proscriptive approaches.

11. Rapport-based approaches work best after a detainee's motivations are understood and incorporated into a specific plan designed to exploit his psychological needs and vulnerabilities.

12. A rapport-based model avoids the potential for detainee abuse by practitioners. This point cannot be overstated. Both research and experience demonstrate that when coercive techniques are used in closed environments, there is a real potential for mistreatment to occur. This holds true even for highly trained and disciplined interrogators for whom the line between permissive behavior and abuse can easily become blurred. This phenomenon is often so subtle that it can escape the attention of interrogators as well as their leaders tasked with oversight responsibilities.

13, LEA have previously addressed these issues in both private discussions and in written communications with command personnel on many occasions. LEA has formally voiced its collective view that coercive SERE tactics are not only unsuitable in GTMO (where both LEA and the intelligence community are conducting interrogations), but more importantly they are ineffective. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the legal implications of these techniques.

14. Despite the advice of LEA behavioral experts who have consistently advocated the use of a rapport-based approach, there appears to be a tendency to revert to a shortsighted coercive model of interrogation. LEA recognizes that everyone involved in interrogation efforts at GTMO is under intense pressure to succeed in eliciting information from the detainees. However, LEA believes that an expectation to produce immediate results should not distract us from employing sound methodological tools to accomplish our ultimate objective -- preventing and disrupting future acts of terrorism.

TIMOTHY C. JAMES
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE
GUANTANAMO

Copy:
JTF-GTMO/SJA
FBI SSA

(Tab 18) July 7, 2004 Memorandum from Alberto Mora for Inspector General, Department of the Navy, Subject: Statement for the Record of Alberto Mora for the Department of the Navy Inspector General.

(Tab 18) July 7, 2004 Memorandum from Alberto Mora for Inspector General, Department of the Navy, Subject: Statement for the Record of Alberto Mora for the Department of the Navy Inspector General.

(Tab 19) January 15, 2003 Memorandum from Navy SERE School Training Specialist and SERE Coordinator to Officer in Charge, Subject: After Action Report, Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF GTMO) Training Evolution.

15 Jan 2003

From: John F. Rankin, SERE Training Specialist
Christopher Ross, SERE Coordinator

To: Officer in Charge, FASOTRAGRULANT Det Brunswick

Via: SERE Department Head

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO BAY (JTF-GTMO) TRAINING EVOLUTION

Encl: (1) Draft ICE SOP
(2) Coercive Management Worksheet
(3) Physical and Psychological Pressures paper
(4) Al Qaeda Training Manual

1. Background: Dates of report are 29 Dec 02-4 Jan 03. Mr. Ross and I were directed to proceed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba at the request of Lt Col Moss, Commander of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE), JTF-GTMO. Our initial impression concerning the reason for the trip was to provide ICE personnel with the theory and application of the physical pressures utilized during our training evolutions.

2. We arrived 30 Dec 02 and were met by SFC Sessions, ICE Operations Chief, at the Ferry Landing, Windward Side -- GTMO. He transported us to the security building wherein we received our access badges. Immediately following we proceeded to the ICE command center located in Camp Delta, the primary detention facility. Here we met with Lt Col Moss (USA) and Capt Weis (USMC), the ICE Operations Officer. After a thorough in-brief, it was confirmed that a high-level directive had initiated our subsequent trip for the purpose of providing "physical pressures" training. Lt Col Moss also provided us with a draft ICE SOP for utilization of physical pressures, enclosure (1). A tentative training plan was drafted.

3. On the morning of 31 Dec 02, Mr. Ross and I initiated training with an in-depth class on Biderman's Principles, enclosure (2) and the theory and practical application of selected physical pressures, IAW our "Blue Book," to approximately 24 ICE personnel. This training was conducted in one of the newly constructed interrogation facilities located at Camp Delta. During this training it was stressed that the physical pressures are only part of the overally conditioning process designed to establish and maintain an effective captive management program, as described in enclosure (3). Later in the day Mr. Ross and I were taken on a tour of one of the inactive "blocks" and the Maximum Security Unit (MSU) located in Camp Delta.

4. On morning of 2 Jan 03, Mr. Ross and I presented classes to ICE personnel covering interrogation fundamentals and resistance to interrogation. Resistance was specifically requested since it was evident that some of the higher priority detainees had received some kind of resistance training, as evidenced by the Al Qaeda Training Manual, enclosure (4). Theory is that ICE personnel would be able to more readily recognize if the detainee was applying resistance techniques and then counter or report their efforts. During the afternoon, we presented an abbreviated theoretical physical pressures and peacetime guidance (governmental and hostage) to Marine JTF-GTMO personnel and two JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) officials.

5. During the evening Mr. Ross and I were taken to another detention site and allowed to observe operations being conducted. (Recommendations included in enclosure (3)).

6. On 3 Jan 03, Mr. Ross and I met with Major General Miller, JTF-GTMO Commander, at the ICE command center. During the meeting the high-level directive was sighted which outlined specific guidance regarding current and proposed ICE operations in dealing with detainees. Major General Miller clearly expressed his guidance as to the application of physical pressures. He gratefully accepted our advice as to how operations and management of detainees could be improved and thanked us for our efforts. Later that afternoon we were taken into the active blocks and observed some interviews of detainees. We later received an out-brief by Lt Col Moss and Capt Weis wherein Capt Weis was provided enclosure (3).

7. Issues and Recommendations:

Issue: Security clearance information

Discussion: Due to short notice of trip, no POC was provided or obtained to pass security clearance information to facilitate issuance of badges. I was in one of the clearance systems and my information was available. Mr. Ross' was not. Mr. Hill was called and immediately responded by faxing information to the Special Security Office (SSO), GTMO.

Recommendation: Participants and sponsors send clearance information or POCs expeditiously to avoid delays. SSO, GTMO POC is [big delete]. Mr. Hill investigate reason why my clearance information was available through one of the systems/database and Mr. Ross' was not.

Issue: Rental car availability

Discussion: We were authorized a rental car, however, orders did not specify which agency. Most rental agencies located in Jacksonville, FL airport do not afford the convenience of drop off sites. Since we were only transiting from the airport to NAS Jacksonville, a drop off capability was needed to avoid the $50.00 cab fare.

Recommendation: Future trips of this nature should utilize Enterprise Rental since they have a satellite office located in the military terminal. Enterprise has also waived the drop fee for personnel on orders. A reservation request form and business card has been provided to the Resource Department.

8. A debrief of the trip was provided to available SERE personnel. A make-up brief is available upon request for those that missed it.

9. Conclusion: It is unknown at this time whether another request for support will made. Recommend that future trainers, if requested, be thoroughly prepared to discuss and explain Biderman's Principles and captive management techniques.

John F. Rankin

[Note: Maybe a good idea to plan/coord a return trip to see how things are progressing.]

Coercive Management Techniques

Image

MEMORANDUM

01/03/03

From: John F. Rankin, SERE Training Specialist, FASOTRAGRULANT Det. Brunswick ME.

To: Captain Weis, ICE, JTF-GTMO

Subj: PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES DURING INTERROGATIONS

Ref: (a) Coercive Management Techniques Chart

1. The use of physical and psychological pressures during interrogations, if deemed appropriate, are tools that can be applied in order to establish and reinforce the principles contained in reference (a). These principles must be supported by an interrogation or collection system that facilitates complete control of actions prior to, during and after interrogations.

2. These principles and associated pressures allow the interrogation system to establish and maintain control of the exploitation process of HUMINT sources under the authority of the ICE.

3. The management techniques are most effective if used in concert with each other since they are all mutually supporting and build upon the effects of others. They are all designed to elicit compliance from HUMINT sources by setting up the "captive environment." This is ideally accomplished by establishing control, instilling dependencies for basic existence, rewards and punishments, gaining compliance and in the end cooperation. A distinction must be drawn in that compliance is not always a willful or voluntary act. Conversely, if someone freely cooperates without inducement or the aforementioned pressures, the cycle has for the most part been completed.

4. The application of physical pressures is only a part of the overall captive management process. They are initially used to shock and intimidate by setting the stage and establishing control. There must be a statement made by demonstrating there are rewards and punishments for compliant and combative or resistive behavior.

5. Implementation of an effective program that supports these principles is dependent on a comprehensive training plan and supervisory controls that prevent abuse and stresses safety and oversight.

John F. Rankin

Enclosure (3)

(Tab 20) January 15, 2003 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the USSOUTHCOM Commander; January 15, 2003 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to USSOUTHCOM Commander to DoD General Cousel William J. Haynes.

January 15, 2003 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the USSOUTHCOM Commander; January 15, 2003 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to USSOUTHCOM Commander to DoD General Cousel William J. Haynes.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET/NOFORN

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
JAN 15 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER USSOUTHCOM

SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques (U)

(U) My December 2, 2002, approval of the use of all Category II techniques and one Category III technique during interrogations at Guantanamo is hereby rescinded. Should you determine that particular techniques in either of these categories are warranted in an individual case, you should forward that request to me. Such a request should include a thorough justification for the employment of those techniques and a detailed plan for the use of such techniques.

(U) In all interrogations, you should continue the humane treatment of detainees, regardless of the type of interrogation technique employed.

(U) Attached is a memo to the General Counsel setting in motion a study to be completed within 15 days. After my review, I will provide further guidance.

Classified by: Secretary Rumsfeld
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify on: 10 years

Declassify Under the Authority of Executive Order 12958
By Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense
By William P. Marriott, CAPT, USN
June 21, 2004

[Signed Donald Rumsfeld]

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET/NOFORN

(Tab 21) March 14, 2003 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum from John Yoo to William J. Haynes, Re: Military Interrogations of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside of the United States.

March 14, 2003 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum from John Yoo to William J. Haynes, Re: Military Interrogations of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside of the United States.

(Tab 22) April 4, 2003 Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations.

April 4, 2003 Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations.

(Tab 23) April 16, 2003 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to USSOUTHCOM Commander, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism.

April 16, 2003 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to USSOUTHCOM Commander, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism.

(Tab 24) September 29, 2004 Memorandum from MG Soligan, Chief of Staff, JFCOM for Commander, JPRA, Subject: JPRA Mission Guidance.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO:
J02
29 Sep 04

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY

Subject: Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Mission Guidance

1. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is the DoD Office of Primary Responsibility for DoD-wide personnel recovery matters. JPRA provides Joint Personnel Recovery functional expertise and assistance through DoD and other government agencies on issues related to Combat Search and Rescue; Evasion and Recovery; Operational POW/MIA Matters and Code of Conduct Training. JPRA will conduct operations in accordance with its mission as stated in USJFCOMINST 3100.4.

2. JPRA's training mission is focused on ensuring the survivability of U.S. personnel in hostile environments or captivity. The Code of Conduct training, designed to develop uniform training programs in the areas of combat survival, evasion, resistance, and escape within the Services, is of particular importance given the current operational climate. Focus must remain on training personnel in these "defensive" techniques. Recent requests from OSD and the Combatant Commands have solicited JPRA support based on knowledge and information gained through the debriefing of former U.S. POWs and detainees and their application to U.S. strategic debriefing and interrogation techniques. These requests, which can be characterized as "offensive" support, go beyond the chartered responsibilities of JPRA. These "offensive" techniques include, but are not limited to, activities designed not to increase one's resistance capabilities to interrogation techniques but rather intended to instruct personnel, for the purpose of gathering of information, on how to break down another's ability to withstand interrogation.

3. The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for "offensive" purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA. Accordingly, any deviation in roles and responsibilities must be carefully scrutinized and vetted through proper legal and policy channels. JPRA personnel will not conduct any activities or make any recommendations on offensive interrogation techniques or activities without specific approval from the USJFCOM Commander, Deputy Commander, or the Chief of Staff. Deviations from the JPRA chartered mission of this nature are policy decisions that will be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for action. JPRA will continue to direct all requests for external support through USJFCOM and refrain from providing any support or information unless specifically directed by USJFCOM as outlined above.

JAMES N. SOLIGAN
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff

(Tab 25) February 10, 2005, Memorandum from LTG Wagner, Deputy Commander, JFCOM for the Department of Defense Inspector General.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Subject: Investigation into Training Activities of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

1. The attached records show email discussions and other records relevant to activities of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), including a memorandum dated 29 September 2004, signed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), to the Commander, JPRA. The question has been asked, "Why was this memo issued?" The attached email traffic provides useful information but is insufficient to answer the question, as it does not reflect verbal Command Group discussions leading to drafting the memorandum;

2. Quite simply, the memorandum was written as a protective measure to provide clear guidance and to prevent use of JPRA outside the command's mission scope. The USJFCOM Command Group had learned that various personnel in the CENTCOM AOR and at the Joint Staff level, with incomplete understanding of JPRA's mission, were interested in JPRA's availability to assist/support in-theater interrogation. Relative to the expressed interest, the Command Group focused on the following points:

a. JPRA is primarily a school house, not an intelligence gathering activity. It focuses on training our own forces in evasion, survival, resistance and escape. Resistance training includes exposure to conditions our forces might expect to encounter.

b. JPRA does not have personnel assigned to be interrogators, and does not advocate interrogation measures to be executed by our force. Relative to interrogation capability, the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations -- not in how to conduct interrogations.

c. JPRA does assist in personnel repatriation.

3. The Command Group summarized the limits of JPRA's mission as training and defensive response to interrogation -- not offensive interrogation techniques or operations. Thus, the 29 September 2004 memorandum was not issued in response to suspected or known inappropriate JPRA activities, as no such activities were known by this headquarters to have been conducted -- but rather, simply to ensure that JPRA activities remained within the scope of that Agency's mission charter. This was accomplished by specifically directing Commander, JPRA not to engage in any activities that could be considered as in support of interrogations of people captured and detained by U.S. or coalition forces during the conduct of operations. The memorandum was not viewed as a "change of mission," but rather it was intended to ensure continued operation within the assigned charter.

4. To summarize, the view of this Headquarters now, at the time, and during the preceding year, has and had been that requests from various sources for JPRA "interrogation support" were both inconsistent with the unit's charter and might create conditions which tasked JPRA to engage in offensive operational activities outside of JPRA's defensive mission. Therefore, to the extent that requests for JPRA support might pull that Agency outside the scope of its training mission and into the actual conduct of offensive operations, such requests were viewed as inappropriate. While there was no harm in a request, the appropriate answer was "No." To ensure and maintain the credibility of the JPRA training expertise within the scope of its mission, the Command Group wanted to make it clear that JPRA personnel should not attempt to apply any perceived individual or unit interrogation expertise -- notwithstanding a certain level of external demand for that kind of "outside the scope activity."

5. I hope that this memorandum and the attached records provide you with information adequate to answer your questions. If you require further information, please contact my point of contact for this matter, [delete] the USJFCOM Inspector General.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2013 7:59 pm

PART 1 OF 3 (Afterword)

Afterword

As this volume goes to press, additional materials on Abu Ghraib and new materials on Guantanamo are daily finding their way into the public arena via the media, human rights groups and indefatigable researchers. Included are a select few of those documents, brought to light by the American Civil Liberties Union. They include reports on detainee mistreatment and abuse and discussions among the FBI, the Department of Defense, and the White House.

Following the newly released ACLU documents is a statement from David Hicks, a detainee at Guantanamo. Hicks is an Australian citizen.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECRET//NOFORN//20290625

INFO MEMO

S 0517/DR

June 25, 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Subject: (S//NF) Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 62-6 Personnel

(S//NF) During the afternoon of 24 June 2004, we were notified that DIA personnel serving with TF 6-26 in Baghdad had informed their ISG seniors of the following

:• (S//NF) Two DIA, Directorate for Human Intelligence (DIA/DH) interrogators/debriefers assigned to support TF 6- 26 (SOF) have observed:
o Prisoners arriving at the Temporary Detention Facility in Baghdad with burn marks on their backs. Some have bruises, and some have complained of kidney pain.
o One of the two DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers witnessed TF 6-26 officers punch a prisoner in the face to the point the individual needed medical attention. This record of treatment was not recorded by TF 6-26 personnel. In this instance, the debriefer was ordered to leave the room.
o One DIA/DH interrogator/debriefer took pictures of the injuries and showed them to his TF 62-6 supervisor, who immediately confiscated them.
• (S//NF) TF 6-26 personnel have taken the following actions with regards to DIA/DH interrogators/debriefers:
o Confiscated vehicle keys
o Instructed them not to leave the compound without specific permission, even to get a haircut at the PX
o Threatened them
o Informed them that their e-mails were being screened
o Ordered them not to talk to anyone in the US
• (S//NF) The two DH strategic debriefers assigned to TF 62-6 reported the above information to the Operations Officer. He immediately contacted DIA IG Forward and asked that both individuals be interviewed. The IG representative made the recommendation that VADM Church's group be immediately apprised in order to get this into official IG channels as the issue fell directly under its charter. The Church IG Team senior investigating officer is conducting interviews of the interrogators/debriefers today. The DIA IG was informed and concurred with this course of action.
• (S//NF) The ISG Operations Officer contacted and briefed the Director of the ISG, who was in Qatar attending a Commander's Conference. The ISG Director informed the Deputy Commander for Detainee Affairs, MNF-1. He subsequently contacted the Commander of TF 6-26 and directed him to investigate this situation. In turn the TF 6-26 Commander informed his superior, the Commander ISOC. The Commander, CENTCOM has also been informed of this situation.
• (S//NF) The two interrogators/debriefers were directed to return to the ISG compound at Camp Slayer due to these events.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECRET//NOFORN/X1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 10 June, 2004

REPLY TO ATTN OF: [delete]

SUBJECT: Memorandum for Record -- Report of Violations of The Geneva Conventions and the International Laws of Land Warfare (U)

1. (S) From [delete] I was employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency as an Intelligence Officer assigned and under the operational control to [delete]. I have been in the civilian employment of the Department of Defense in the capacity of intelligence officer for approximately 14 years. I have received specialized on-the-job-training in HUMINT operations, to include interrogation. I spoke about the incidents reported in the document during a meeting with [delete] at approximately 12:15 pm. Present at the meeting were [delete].

(U) This statement is in support of the following:

a. (U) Two counts of violations of The Geneva Convention as it pertains to detainee abuse.

b. (U) One count of violations of The Geneva Convention as it pertains to the illegal detainment of non-combatants.

3. (U) Details:

a. (S//NF) (1st count, ref para 2.a.) On or about 11 May 2004, in Baghdad, Iraq, I witnessed the mistreatment of a TF 6-26 detainee during the initial interrogation after his capture. During the interrogation, conducted by a US Army interrogator, four or five non-interrogator personnel from the Task Force entered the room and began slapping the detainee white he was attempting to respond to the questioning. After approximately 15 minutes, a senior NCO, going by call sign "X03" entered the room and asked most of the personnel to leave, to include ALL of the interrogators. I am not aware of what specifically occurred during my absence. [Delete] officer assigned to the Task Force, was present as well and witness the incident. [Delete] was observing the interrogation and I was assisting the lead interrogator, A 1st SF Group interrogator also augmenting the unit. I am not aware if this matter has been previously reported.

b. (S//NF) (2nd count, ref para 2.a.) During another TF 6-26 operation in Baghdad, a [delete] of the Coalition Provisional Authority's Counterintelligence office PA-C1) was arrested during a raid targeting an al-Qaida facilitator. [Delete] and two male family members were detained and moved to the TF 6-26 screening facility. [Delete] and his family members were released and during the initial debriefing of [delete] he reported to TF 6-26 and CPA-CI handlers that he had been "slapped around" during initial interrogation at the place of his capture. The matter was reported in an internal TF contract report to the B Squadron commander by the DIA handling officer. [Delete]

c. (S//NF) (Ref para 2.b.) On 9 May 2004, TF 6-26 personnel detained the wife of a suspected Iraqi terrorist, in Tarmiya, Iraq. The 28-year-old woman had three young children at the house, one being as young as six months and still nursing. Her husband was the primary target of the raid, with other suspect personnel subject to detainment as well. The house belonged to the primary target's in-laws, and it was believed his wife and children would be there as well. During the pre-operation brief it was recommended by TF personnel that if the wife were present, she be detained and held in order to leverage the primary target's surrender. I objected to the detainment of the young mother to the raid team leader, "X03." I believed it was a dead issue, since I would be on-target and responsible for screening the occupants of the house for suspects to detain. During my initial screening of the occupants at the target house, I determined that the wife could provide no actionable intelligence leading to the arrest her husband. Despite my protest, the raid team leader detained her anyway. I concurred with the arrest of one of her brothers, who had been identified as likely having knowledge of the primary target's location. I reported the incident to the HUMINT support element operations officer. [Delete] as I understand it, the matter was in turn reported to the Task Force HQ. Approximately two day later, the wife and her brother were released into the custody of their tribal sheikh.

4. (U) Concluding statement: The tactical interrogation report is a record of the interrogation and is more often then not the only written record forwarded with the detainees as they are moved through the detention system from screening facilities to final detention centers. Since those interrogation reports, as a matter of record, contain the names of the interrogators, any mistreatment of detainees, whether in the presence of the interrogator or not, reflects adversely and directly on the interrogator named in the report. This is a liability to the DHS collector and the DIA. It is my recommendation that any direct interrogation support to a DoD element by DHS be supported with an MOU clearly defining DoD interrogation and detainee treatment policies.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FROM: DH HUMINT SCG, SEP 03
DECL ON: X1

UNCLASSIFIED

Thu Jan 17 01:55:06 2002 (Islamabad 295) TFI COPY 14 OF 14 Page 1 OF 3

PTP0943

SECRET

RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.4(D)

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000295

NODIS

FROM USLO KABUL #0050

FROM SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ZAL KHALILZAD

SECSTATE FOR SECRETARY POWELL AND A/S ROCCA

NSC FOR NSA RICE AND HADLEY

SECDEF FOR RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/22
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PROP, PTER, PINS, AF
SUBJECT: VISIT TO QANDAHAR: FOCUS ON DETAINEES

SECTION 01 OF 02 Islamabad 295

SUBJECT: USLO-KABUL #0050 QANDAHAR DETAINEES

Classified by Special Presidential Envoy Zal Khalilzad.
Reason 1.5 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY:

1. (S) Accompanied by my delegation members, I called on [Delete] with a report on detainees as well as an assessment of the ground situation. As a part of the briefing, I visited the airport holding facility for the Cuba-bound al Qaida and Taliban detainees. End Summary.

OBJECTIVES

2. (s) [Delete] has three principal objectives -- to process and transport the detainees, to clean up weapons and munitions caches and to support Special Forces operations -- tasks made all the more difficult because of the estimated 19,000 Taliban and al Qaida soldiers in the hills surrounding Qandahar as well as in the city itself. While the Taliban Pose a concern to the base - both because of the possibility of an attack on the U.S. military camp, either with a terrorist motive or in an attempt to free the captives - General Mattis told me that his primary concern relates to landmines and unexploded ordinance. He explained that the Taliban have re-mined areas that were marked as mine free. The General told me that several Marines and a number of local fighters had been seriously injured in land-mine incidents.

3. (C) [Delete] regard to access to detainees for interrogation purposes, cooperation is also excellent between USG and foreign agencies seeking information.

DETAINEES

[Delete]

5. (S) There are currently 380 prisoners from a number of countries, [delete]. Some European detainees have told their interrogators that they joined the Taliban/al Qaida for the adventure. Others say hate for the U.S. led them to the Taliban. Most of the prisoners are between 20- 30 years of age, but several appear to be in their sixties. The detainees are held in groups of twenty in razor wired pens. There is no privacy and even calls of nature are performed in public a practice aimed at preventing suicide or escapes during the unsupervised periods. The only prisoners not held in open pens are those who are located in a small hangar, either for interrogation or because they are high-ranking and need to be separated from others for interrogation purposes. [Delete]

6. (S) Walking through the detention center, I observed the detainees, uniformly attired in blue coveralls, seated in pens and sleeping or reading the Koran, the only book they are allowed. Several detainees ware carrying the honey buckets for disposal across the compound. Each prisoner had two blankets (purchased locally to boost the economy the General said).

7. (S) We also visited the field hospital where detainees are treated by the same military doctors who treat the American soldiers. The doctors explained that the detainees generally arrive with severe gastroenteritis complicated by malnutrition. A few have serious battle injuries, including some which require below the knee amputations. Respecting a policy of informed consent, the doctors said that no detainee has agreed to an amputation, preferring to rely on various temporary measures that will not save the limb but will prolong the situation. The doctors told me these detainees believe that their limbs will be repaired once they reach their next destination, perhaps the U.S. As a part of a delousing program, the military has had to shave off the beards of some of the Cuba-bound detainees, a practice the Red Cross has approved.

8. (S) Detainees eat MREs (Meals Ready to Eat) just like their captors although all pork products have been removed. The plastic spoons also are removed from the packets since the detainees might sharpen them and use the implements as weapons or a tool for suicide.

9. (S) Detainees are allowed to talk to residents in their own pen, but large groups are not allowed. They are not allowed to talk to prisoners in other pens. The General's assessment of the detainees is based on interaction with them over an extended period. He considers them hostile and dangerous. They shout epithets at their captors, including threats against the female relatives of the soldiers guarding them, knee Marines in the groin, and say that they will escape and kill "more Americans and Jews." The General is all business. There is a risk that the detainees may try to throw their blankets over the razor wire and make a run for it. [Delete]

10. (S) The General does not consider the Taliban and al Qaida to be particularly devout and cites as an example the defiled mosque at the airport. Littered with garbage and piles of human excrement, the General said people who would desecrate their own religious sites in this way were hardly religious. [Delete]

11. (C) Another part of the General's job is to clean up weapons and ammunition caches. The triage process involves sorting by category, removing those items which are of interest to the USG and shipping them back to the U.S., and destroying the rest. When I asked if we had considered turning these over to the Interim Authority, the General said that the items thus far were degraded to a point where they were no longer useful.

12. (C) Due to scheduling problems, I was unable to meet local officials but hope to return on January 18.
CHAMBERLIN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 19 OCT 2004 200303827
NODIS UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

200201625

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Jan 24 2002

Dep Sec Has Seen

RELEASED IN PART B6

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/ES

SECRET/NOFORN
DECL: 1/24/12

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: PM - Gregory M. Suchan, Acting

SUBJECT: Nationalities at Bagram

You asked for information regarding the nationalities of the prisoners held at the Bagram facility. The CWG has collected the following information:

Bagram is a temporary "collection center" where some detainees stop over enroute to their permanent location. The conditions at Bagram are stable. Plans are to construct accommodations for 75 detainees. Currently there are 27 detainees at this location.

Image

Detainees at the Bagram Facility

Country No. of Detainees
Yemeni 10
Afghani 4
Pakistani 1
Kuwaiti 2
Saudi 5
Tunisian 2
Egyptian 1
Palestinian 1
Morrocan 2

Attachment:
Tab 1- List of Detainees (in detail)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 04 OCT 1004 200303827

Classified by PM A/S Gregory M. Suchan, Acting
Reasons: E.O. 12958, 1.5 (b) and (d)
UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

NotesTele. TXT

UNCLASSIFIED
TELEGRAM

March 24, 2004

RELEASED IN PART
B6

To: SECSTATE WASH DC - PRIORITY

Action: IO

From: USMISSION GENEVA (GENEVA 824 - PRIORITY)

TAGS: PHUM

Captions: None

Subject: LETTER FROM SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE TO AMBASSADOR BREMMER REGARDING FOUR MEN BEING HELD IN BASRA, IRAQ

Ref: None

1. Mission has received a letter dated March 12, 2004 from Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur on Torture regarding the detention of four individuals in Basra, Iraq.

2. Begin text of letter:

Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Special Rapporteur on torture pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/62.

In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of your Excellency's Government to information I have received regarding [Delete]

[Delete] The four men are reportedly held incommunicado detention at the "Intelligence Directorate" in Basra; Basra being currently under control of the United Kingdom military.

The "Intelligence Directorate" was reportedly formed a few months ago by the Badr organization, the alleged armed wing of the political group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Several people are said to have been held incommunicado and tortured at the directorate's headquarters in Basra. The methods of torture reportedly include lashing on various parts of the body, specifically on the back with an iron stick inserted inside a plastic pipe.

In view of their alleged incommunicado detention, it is feared that they may be at risk of torture or ill-treatment.

Without in any way implying any determination of the facts of the case, I should like to appeal to your Excellency to seek clarification of the circumstances with a view to ensuring that the right to physical and mental integrity of the above-named persons is protected. Under Articles 3 and 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Coalition Provisional Authority, as the occupying power is obliged to respect the rights of civilians in occupied territories, including the prohibition of cruel treatment, torture, and humiliating and degrading treatment. Moreover, this is set forth, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. I would also like to draw your Excellency's attention to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/62 and 2003/32 which remind all States that "prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and urges all States to respect the safeguards concerning the liberty, security and dignity of the person." (paras 10 and 14 respectively).

I would greatly appreciate receiving information from your Excellency's Government concerning the steps taken by the competent authorities in compliance with the provisions contained in the international legal instruments referred to above, as they apply to the aforementioned persons.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Theo van Boven


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.4(D), B6

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL KABUL 001012

NSC FOR. ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY
PACOM FOR POLAD
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013
TAGS: PREL. PHUM, PTER, KAWC, AF, PK

SUBJECT: IMPROVED CONDITIONS AT SHIBERGHAN PRISON

REF: STATE 95030 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS 1.5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 30 SEP 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

(B) AND (D)

1. (C) Summary. The prison in the provincial (Jowzjan) capital of Shiberghan has the largest population of Taliban prisoners in Afghanistan. Shortly after the fall of the Taliban the prison suffered from over-crowding as well as shortages of food and medicine. A site visit on April 17 revealed a significantly better life for the prisoners with one-third the population of a year ago and sufficient nutrition and medical care. End summary.

2. (C) Mazar-e Sharif-based Poloff conducted a site visit accompanied by a military civil affairs team with expertise in preventative medicine and prison assessment. A citizen soldier provided prison assessment expertise from the U.S. Army civil Affairs Unit. Prior to being called to active duty in Afghanistan, [delete]

3. (C) The delegation interviewed the prison warden, Akhtar Khan and [delete] prior to inspecting the grounds, medical facility, and interviewing 13 prisoners.

4. (C) The warden reported this is a 43 year-old prison built to support 1000 inmates. In January 2002, the population swelled to 3478 as Taliban forces surrendered or were captured. Local forces were taxed to their capacity to care for the prisoners and requested assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for supplemental feeding assistance, prisoner registration, as well as, humanitarian medical and sanitation assistance.

5. (C) The picture is now better in April 2003 with a prison population of 1088, comprised of 564 Pakistani and 524 Afghan prisoners. Most of the prisoners have been in confinement for one and a half years. [Delete] there are 75 known Taliban commanders and 35 inmates convicted of civil crimes such as murder, robbery, gambling, and sexual abuse. The population was reduced by over 1000 through a series of amnesty decrees from President Karzai during Eid celebrations; others were released after investigation by the intelligence agencies. A small number of prisoners were transferred to U.S. control for detention elsewhere.

6. (C) The health of the prisoners has improved dramatically in the past year. There were three patients in the 14-bed sick ward with mild respiratory difficulties compared to an overflowing combat casualty ward in 2002. The humanitarian NGO Emergencies provides all the medicine and a medical staff of three. The physicians interviewed confirmed additional assistance is provided by the Shiberghan city public health hospital primarily to treat the 108 cases of tuberculosis (TB). There are 25 contagious TB patients housed in a stark but uncrowded TB isolation cellblock close to the infirmary and away from the prison population. The balance of the TB patients have been treated, do not have active TB and have been returned to the prison population. The medical facility is clean and provides a higher standard of care than the Balkh and Mazar regional clinics for Afghan citizens. The warden and medical staff reported one death in 2003 compared to 36 in 2002. There no longer is concern with dysentery or jaundice in the prison population. The ICRC has assisted in upgrading the sanitation system of the prison and the medical staff provides health education. Periodic outbreaks of lice and scabies are treated with appropriate medication and are not prevalent. The prisoner's clothes and bodies appeared as clean as the Afghan population we observe daily in Mazar and the Afghan countryside.

7. (C) The diet of the prisoners has steadily improved as the population decreased to a more manageable level. The ICRC provided a supplemental feeding program during the winter of 2002-2003 to ensure adequate nutrition. This was discontinued as the three meals currently provide sufficient calories. The diet includes bread and sugar for breakfast, rice for lunch and beans for dinner. Drinking water is from a tap in the cellblock.

8. (C) Poloff did not observe outward signs of physical mistreatment of the prisoners. Except for a walk through of the central courtyard where prisoners could be seen from behind locked gates and 13 randomly selected interiews with inmates, the delegation members did not go into the cellblocks for their own protection. Prison officials wanted to offer access but were correctly concerned about a spontaneous uprising of passionate Taliban and suspected al-Qaida prisoners against an American official. The ICRC [delete] conduct bi-weekly visits to this prison with unfettered access to all prisoners. All the prisoners interviewed by the delegation said they had spoken with an ICRC representative and some have received and sent letters and had visits from relatives as a result of registration.

9. (C) The prisoners rotate for exercise by cellblock. The cells are emptied, scrubbed down, and bedding is aired out during their exercise rotation. Prisoners may flow between the interior and exterior courtyards during this time. Non-compliant prisoners are isolated or have their movement restricted. Prisoners may have visitors for five minutes on Mondays and Thursdays and may receive packages from family and friends.

10. (C) Comment: Following a January 2002 visit by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to Shiberghan prison. PHR released a report documenting the poor conditions there. Shiberghan became a synonym for misery. Human rights and press reporting since then have continued to feed off the PHR report that is now over a year old and out of date. Lodging and food at Shiberghan are on par with those of most Afghans who are not in prison. The medical facility and treatment is superior to what is available to citizens in the region. We saw no overt signs of animosity directed by the prison staff toward the prisoners, and the prisoners did not appear to be afraid of the guard staff. While conditions at Shiberghan are not ideal, prison officials working with IOs and NGOs have clearly improved prison standards and reduced the misery that was so evident in January 2002. End comment.

FINN


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

200330899

United States Department of State

Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 12, 2003

RELEASED IN PART B6

Yvan Peeters

Dear Ms. Peeters:

Thank you for your letter of October 12 to Secretary Powell expressing concern related to juveniles detainees held under U.S. control at a U.S. Naval Base located in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Secretary Powell has asked me to respond to your letter on his behalf.

The detention of juveniles in accordance with the laws and customs of war is consistent with U.S. obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As with all detainees, these individuals are being held because they are enemy combatants who pose a threat to United States forces. The United States recognizes the special needs of younger detainees and the difficult circumstances surrounding their situation, and is treating young enemy combatants in a manner appropriate to their status and age.

Sincerely,

Pierre Prosper

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2004 200303827

UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

S/S 200332515

S35

United States Department of State

Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASED IN PART B6

ORIG LTR TO ADDRESSEE BY BUREAU
COPY TO:
IPS
(HEW)

February 23, 2004

Tausif Paracha

Dear Mr. Paracha:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Powell expressing concern related to a detainee held under U.S. control at an airbase in Afghanistan.

The United States and its Coalition partners are at war with the al Qaida network and remnants of the Taliban who continue to support them. The al Qaida network today is a multinational enterprise with operations in more than 60 countries. Active hostilities are ongoing daily in Afghanistan and around the world. We continue to fight against enemy combatants who are planning and conducting attacks against the international community. In this context, operational and security concerns compel me to refrain from confirming or commenting on the circumstances of capture, transfer or detention of specific individuals believed to be held as enemy combatants in the course of that conflict.

Let me assure you, however, that President Bush has affirmed on any number of occasions that at Qaida and Taliban detainees are treated humanely, and, to the extent consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. As a result. representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) routinely visit detainees individually and privately. United States Government personnel are not permitted to torture detainees or participate in torture by others. Torture is a violation of the laws of the United States. Allegations of torture will be thoroughly investigated. In cases where the United States Government transfers detainees to other countries for detention or questioning on our behalf, we seek and receive assurances that the detainees will not be tortured and will be treated humanely.

The authority to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities exists in law independent of the civil or criminal justice system. In this war, as in every war, enemy combatants are not provided counsel or access to courts for the purpose of challenging their detention while hostilities are ongoing. While some enemy combatants may face criminal prosecution before the end of hostilities, nations at war traditionally have waited until hostilities cease to bring such charges. If and when an enemy is charged with a crime, he would then be entitled to access to counsel and be afforded other privileges necessary to receive a fair trial.

Sincerely,

Pierre-Richard Prosper

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

Tausif Paracha

RELEASED IN PART B6

November 3, 2003

RE: Illegal Detainment of Saifullah Paracha

Dear Mr. Powell

I hope you recover well from your surgery and wish you a Merry Christmas. This letter is in regards to my uncle.

Kidnapping, torture, use of chemicals, would you ever think the United States of America would be involved in this. My uncle is living proof of this. The US government on July 5th kidnapped him. My family was literally begging the US government to let us know if he was just alive, and they refused to comment. We found out about two months after he was kidnapped. We received a letter from the International Red Cross that he is in US custody in Afghanistan.

As newspapers and well-known magazines like Time, Guardian, Newsweek state, torture and use of chemicals takes place at the US base on detainees in Afghanistan. How can the US be involved in such atrocious behavior. Nothing justifies kidnapping and torturing people. How can a country such as the US who has always supported Human Rights be involved in such uncivilized actions.

I myself am a 9/11 survivor, I was in front of the WTC on Sept 11th. I am pleading for you to help us in our cause. We just want the US government to act civilized. If the US government has proof of my uncle being involved in something unjust, bring him into the legal process. Bring him to a court and provide him an attorney as amendment VI of the Bill of Rights state.

Everything the government is doing to my uncle is against the US constitution, International law, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is a legal system the US follows; all we want is to have America follow that.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy, and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(I) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Everyone of these laws are being violated, on a national and international level.

I am a US citizen and have lived in New York my entire life. [Delete] I am again pleading for your assistance, if you can help in anyway it will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully yours,
Tausif Paracha
President
Verticity

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2004 200303827

UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

H009 06/02/2004 14:07.

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Jun 1, 2004

Dear Mr. Skelton:

In your letter to Dr. Rice dated May 20, you asked ''when was Secretary Powell or his staff at the State Department given a copy of the ICRC report?" Similar questions were asked about when the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others were given the report. Dr. Rice has replied on behalf of the President. As she noted in her May 20 response to you, the U.S. Mission in Geneva obtained a copy, and transmitted it to the Department on March 5. The NSC was provided a copy of the ICRC report the same day. The Secretary of State received an internal memorandum describing the allegations of the report on March 11.

We hope this information is helpful to you. If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us again.

Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable
Ike Skelton,
House of Representatives.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

H2004 0525-009


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UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Skelton regarding February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Representative Skelton wrote the president on May 10, 2004, to ask, among other things, when the Departments of State and Defense became aware of the February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Tab B). I have provided a response to Representative Skelton on behalf of the President (Tab A). I request that each of you provide a response to Representative Skelton on behalf of your departments.

Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachments
Tab A: Copy of Rice Letter to Representative Skelton
Tab B: Copy of Incoming Correspondence from Representative Skelton

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 20, 2004

Dear Representative Skelton:

I am responding to your letter to the President dated May 10, 2004.

Before the date of your letter, neither the President nor I were given a copy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) February 2004 report on Iraq. The ICRC did not provide a copy of the report to the White House. When ICRC President Kellenberger met with me on January 15, he did not raise the issue of mistreatment of detainees in Iraq nor did he mention that ICRC was preparing a report.

National security Council staff learned in mid-February that ICRC officials had provided a report about ill-treatment of Iraqi detainees to CPA officials in Baghdad. Our staff inquired with DOD officials in Washington about the ICRC report and were told that DOD officials were generally aware of the allegations, were seeking more information about them, and that military authorities were investigating them. The Secretary of Defense had already informed the President that the Department of Defense was investigating allegations of mistreatment of detainees in Iraq.

National Security Council staff sought and eventually received a copy of the ICRC report from the State Department in early March. Our staff was told that the State Department's Mission in Geneva had obtained a copy of the report from ICRC officials in Geneva. Our staff was also told by State Department officials that the ICRC was reluctant to share the report with Washington because the issues were being handled between local ICRC officials and United States Government authorities in Baghdad with whom the ICRC had a positive working relationship that the ICRC did not wish to jeopardize. Finally, NSC staff were told that the ICRC had told the State Department that ICRC officials in Baghdad were pleased with the initial response by United States Government officials in Baghdad and with steps already taken by United States Government authorities to respond positively to the report. National Security council staff were informed that the ICRC had told the State Department that ICRC planned to conduct another round of inspections soon and expected to be able to report substantial improvements. Upon receiving the report, NSC staff asked appropriate DOD officials to review the issues raised in the report.

You also asked when Secretaries Powell, and Rumsfeld or their staffs were given copies of the ICRC report. In order to provide a rapid response to your letter, I have provided you information about when the NSC was informed about the ICRC report. Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld have asked their departments to collect information'about the handling of the ICRC report in their departments, and I have asked them to reply to you directly as soon as that information is available.

Finally, you have asked why the ICRC report was not shared with the Congress. ICRC reports are generally provided to the Departments of State and Defense and are not routinely shared with the White House. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense are in the best position to provide you information about their practices for handling ICRC reports. It is my understanding, however, that ICRC practice is to limit dissemination of their reports and often to provide copies only to local military commanders in order to maintain a confidential working relationship with the military units responsible, for detention of prisoners of war and other detainees.

Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
tor National security Affairs

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington; D.C. 20515-2504

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE 10: 26 OCT 2004 100303827
UNCLASSIFIED


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
TIME OF TRANSMISSION
2004 MAY 20 AM 10:00

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: NSC PH: 456-9425 ROOM: WWD

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM REP SKELTON RE FEB 04 REPORT OF THE INTL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

STATE: COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE

DEFENSE: DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN PART B5

IKE SKELTON
4th District, Missouri

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-25-4
May 10, 2004

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have a copy of the February 2004 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment By the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment, and Interrogation.

As this report was dated February 2004 and Members of Congress did not find out about the issue of prisoner mistreatment until early May by way of the media, my question is three-fold:

1) When was the President or his Administration given a copy of the ICRC report?

2) When was Secretary Powell or his staff at the State Department given a copy of the ICRC report?

3) When was Secretary Rumsfeld or his staff at the Department of Defense given a copy of the ICRC report?

According to an article by David S. Cloud in today's Wall Street Journal entitled, "Red Cross Cited Detainee Abuse Over a Year Ago,"

"It could not be learned last night how widely read the ICRC report was among senior Bush administration officials. U.S. officials said yesterday that Secretary of State Colin Powell, for instance, had raised the problems with detention procedures at several high-level administration meetings this year. A State Department official said last night that he couldn't say when Mr. Powell first saw the report. But he noted that the ICRC had been making recommendations and raising concerns for a long time, and that Mr. Powell and other administration officials had been aware of that."


Please explain why this issue was not brought to the attention of Members of Congress whose committee responsibilities include oversight of the U.S. military and U.S. foreign affairs.

Sincerely,

IKE SKELTON
Member of Congress

IS:lb

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 29 OCT 2004 200303827
UNCLASSIFIED


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[Delete] Fwd. GTMO matters

From: [Delete]
To: [Delete]
Date: Mon, Dec 16, 2002 3:23 PM
Subject: Fwd: GTMO matters

b6 -1
b7C -1

[Delete]

Looks like we are stuck in the mud with the interview approach of the military vrs. law enforcement. We need to establish a Bureau policy laying out the boundaries for the interview process. Apparently, CITF is formulating a policy for their agents.

The attached is a draft that is being worked on down at GTMO [delete]

Let me know what you think.

[Delete]

[Delete]


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription: 11/25/2002

Investigation on 11/25/2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

File # 265A-MM-C99102

by Det. [Delete]

DETAINEES-3117

On 11/25/2002 [delete] was interviewed at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The interview was conducted by FBI Task Force Officer Det. [delete] was [delete]. The results of the interview are as follows:

[Delete] was asked if any changes had occurred in the detainee camp over the weekend. He said that he was given a paper by the guards indicating that there would be four basic classes of detainees with regard to privilege/discipline issues. An isolation unit would be utilized for serious violators of camp regulations. All rewards and punishment are to be based on camp behavior and cooperation with investigators. Rewards that may be given to detainees include cold water and the ability to store food in their cells. [Delete] sees these new rules as a positive step in soliciting the cooperation of the detainees.

[Delete] said he experienced punishment at the camp on one prior occasion about [delete] months ago. He, along [delete]. He was placed in the isolation unit [delete]. He now regrets his actions in the [delete] incident and says that participating with the other detainees in the water [delete] was a mistake.

[Delete]

Page 2

[Delete]

The interviewer probed [Delete] on his guilt or innocence based on the facts of his detainment. It was mentioned that if [delete] was truly innocent, he should have no hesitation answering any questions posed by interviewers. If, on the other hand, [delete] was guilty of some crime, [delete] should admit his mistake(s) and move ahead with his life in the hopes of one day being released from custody. [Delete] volunteered that he has not been overly enthusiastic about being interviewed during Ramadan. With 10 days of Ramadan left, [delete] promised that he would be willing to answer any questions that this interviewer poses to him, without an "R.T.N." response, after Ramadan ends. [Delete] was told that no promises could be made to him at this time with regard to when he is called for his next interview.

Page 3

[Delete]

[Delete]

[Delete]

[Delete] was asked if he ever thought he would be going home. He asked the interviewer if he wanted the truth and then said that the other detainees [delete] [delete] and this helps to keep him strong. He was never as religious as he is now. He has been heavily influenced by the other detainees around him.

[Delete] was reminded of his answer to a question posed during his previous interview relating to if he had ever met USAMA BIN LADEN. When the interview told him that he (the interviewer) would like to meet and interview UBL, [delete] smiled broadly and seemed genuinely pleased and intrigued. He then asked the interviewer if he would also like to meet [delete] [delete] was asked again if he had ever met UBL. While not directly answering it, [delete] replied that it would not be unusual for someone to have met UBL [delete. He denied that anyone from the Middle East having met UBL [delete] would achieve celebrity status considering the vast amounts of sympathizers and followers they both have.

The interview was then concluded.
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