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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 1 OF 2

MEMO __

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20530

Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

May 10, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. RIZZO
SENIOR DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Re: Application of 18 U.S,C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees

In our Memorandum for John A, Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G, Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005) ("Techniques"), we addressed the application of the anti-torture statute, 18 U.S.C, §§ 2340-2340A, to certain interrogation techniques that the CIA might use in the questioning of a specific al Qaeda operative. There, we considered each technique individually. We now consider the application of the statute to the use of these same techniques in combination. Subject to the conditions and limitations set out here and in Techniques, we conclude that the authorized combined use of these specific techniques by adequately trained interrogators would not violate sections 2340-2340A.

Techniques, which set out our general interpretation of the statutory elements, guides us here. [1] White referring to the analysis provided in that opinion, we do not repeat it, but instead presume a familiarity with it. Furthermore, in referring to the individual interrogation techniques whose combined use is our present subject, we mean those techniques as we described them in Techniques, including all of the limitations, presumptions, and safeguards described there.

One overarching point from Techniques bears repeating: Torture is abhorrent and universally repudiated, see Techniques at 1, and the President has stated that the United States will not tolerate it. Id. at 1-2 & n.2 (citing Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1167-68 (July 5, 2004)). In Techniques, we accordingly exercised great care in applying sections 2340-2340A to the individual techniques at issue; we apply the same degree of care in considering the combined use of these techniques.

1.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, it is a crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit torture outside the United States. "Torture" is defined as "an act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). "Severe mental pain or suffering" is defined as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" any of four predicate acts. Id. § 2340(2). These acts are (1) "the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering"; (2) "the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality"; (3) "the threat of imminent death"; and (4) "the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality."

In Techniques, we concluded that the individual authorized use of several specific interrogation techniques, subject to a variety of limitations and safeguards, would not violate the statute when employed in the interrogation of a specific member of al Qaeda, though we concluded that at least in certain respects two of the techniques presented substantial questions under sections 2340-2340A. The techniques that we analyzed were dietary manipulation, nudity, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold., the facial slap or insult slap, the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, water dousing, extended sleep deprivation, and the "waterboard." Techniques at 7-15.

Techniques analyzed only the use of these techniques individually. As we have previously advised, however, '''courts tend to take a totality-of-the-circumstances approach and consider an entire course of conduct to determine whether torture has occurred." Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative at 9 (Aug. 1, 2002) ("Interrogation Memorandum") (TS). A complete analysis under sections 2340-2340A thus entails an examination of the combined effects of any techniques that might be used.

In conducting this analysis, there are two additional areas of general concern. First, it is possible that the application of certain techniques might render the detainee unusually susceptible to physical or mental pain or suffering. If that were the case, use of a second technique that would not ordinarily be expected to -- and could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to -- cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering by itself might in fact cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering because of the enhanced susceptibility created by the first technique. Depending on the circumstances, and the knowledge and mental state of the interrogator, one might conclude that severe pain or suffering was specifically intended by the application of the second technique to a detainee who was particularly vulnerable because of the application of the first technique. Because the use of these techniques in combination is intended to, and in fact can be expected to, physically wear down a detainee, because it is difficult to assess as to a particular individual whether the application of multiple techniques renders that individual more susceptible to physical pain or suffering, and because sleep deprivation, in particular, has a number of documented physiological effects that, in some circumstances, could be problematic it is important that all participating CIA personnel, particularly interrogators and personnel of the CIA Office of Medical Services ("OMS"), be aware of the potential for enhanced susceptibility to pain and suffering from each interrogation technique. We also assume that there will be active and ongoing monitoring by medical and psychological personnel of each detainee who is undergoing a regimen of interrogation, and active intervention by a member of the team or medical staff as necessary, so as to avoid the possibility of severe physical or mental pain or suffering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A as a result of such combined effects.

Second, it is possible that certain techniques that do not themselves cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering might do so in combination, particularly when used over the 30-day interrogation period with which we deal here. Again, depending on the circumstances, and the mental state of the interrogator, their use might be considered to be specifically intended to cause such severe pain or suffering. This concern calls for an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances, looking at which techniques are combined and how they are combined.

Your office has outlined the manner in which many of the individual techniques we previously considered could be combined in Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques (undated, but transmitted Dec. 30, 2004) ("Background Paper"). The Background Paper, which provides the principal basis for our analysis, first divides the process of interrogation into three phases: "Initial Conditions," "Transition to Interrogation," and "Interrogation." Id. at 1. After describing these three phases, see id. at 1-9, the Background Paper "provides a look at a prototypical interrogation with an emphasis on the application of interrogation techniques, in combination and separately," id. at 9-18, The Background Paper does not include any discussion of the waterboard; however, you have separately provided to us a description of how the waterboard may be used in combination with other techniques, particularly dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation, See Fax for Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [delete] Assistant General Counsel, CIA, at 3-4 (Apr. 22, 2005) ("April 22 [delete] Fax).

Phases of the Interrogation Process

The first phase of the interrogation process, "Initial Conditions," does not involve interrogation techniques, and you have not asked us to consider any legal question regarding the CIA's practices during this phase. The "Initial Conditions" nonetheless set the stage for use of the interrogation techniques, which come later. [2]

According to the Background Paper, before being flown to the site of interrogation, a detainee is given a medical examination. He then is "securely shackled and is deprived of sight and sound through the use of blindfolds, earmuffs, and hoods" during the flight. Id. at 2, An on-board medical officer monitors his condition. Security personnel also monitor the detainee for signs of distress. Upon arrival at the site, the detainee "finds himself in complete control of Americans" and is subjected to "precise, quiet, and almost clinical" procedures designed to underscore "the enormity and suddenness of the change in environment, the uncertainty about what will happen next, and the potential dread [a detainee] may have of U.S. custody." Id. His head and face are shaved; his physical condition is documented through photographs taken while he is nude; and he is given medical and psychological interviews to assess his condition and to make sure there are no contraindications to the use of any particular interrogation techniques. See Id. at 2-3.

The detainee then enters the next phase, the "Transition to Interrogation." The interrogators conduct an initial interview, "in a relatively benign environment," to ascertain whether the detainee is willing to cooperate. The detainee is "normally clothed but seated and shackled for security purposes." Id. at 3. The interrogators take "an open, non-threatening approach," but the detainee "would have to provide information on actionable threats and location information on High-Value Targets at large -- not lower-level information -- for interrogators to continue with [this] neutral approach." Id.. If the detainee does not meet this "very high" standard, the interrogators submit a detailed interrogation plan to CIA headquarters for approval. If the medical and psychological assessments find no contraindications to the proposed plan, and if senior CIA officers at headquarters approve some or all of the plan through a cable transmitted to the site of the interrogation, the interrogation moves to the next phase. Id. [3]

Three interrogation techniques are typically used to bring the detainee to "a baseline, dependent state," "demonstrat[ing] to the [detainee] that he has no control over basic human needs" and helping to make him "perceive and value his personal welfare, comfort, and immediate needs more than the information he is protecting." Id. at 4. The three techniques used to establish this "baseline" are nudity, sleep deprivation (with shackling and, at least at times, with use of a diaper), and dietary manipulation. These techniques, which Techniques described in some detail, "require little to no physical interaction between the detainee and interrogator." Background Paper at 5.

Other techniques, which "require physical interaction between the interrogator and detainee," are characterized as "corrective" and "are used principally to correct, startle, or achieve another enabling objective with the detainee." Id. These techniques "are not used simultaneously but are often used interchangeably during an individual interrogation session." Id. The insult slap is used "periodically throughout the interrogation process when the interrogator needs to immediately correct the detainee or provide a consequence to a detainee's response or non-response." Id. at 5-6. The insult slap "can be used in combination with water dousing or kneeling stress positions" -- techniques that are not characterized as "corrective." Id. at 6. Another corrective technique, the abdominal slap, "is similar to the insult slap in application and desired result" and "provides the variation necessary to keep a high level of unpredictability in the interrogation process." Id. The abdominal.slap may be simultaneously combined with water dousing, stress positions, and wall standing. A third corrective technique, the facial hold, "is used sparingly throughout interrogation." Id. It is not painful, but "demonstrates the interrogator's control over the [detainee]." Id. It too may be simultaneously combined with water dousing, stress positions, and wall standing. Id. Finally, the attention grasp "may be used several times in the same interrogation" and may be simultaneously combined with water dousing or kneeling stress positions. Id.

Some techniques are characterized as "coercive." These techniques "place the detainee in more physical and psychological stress." Id. at 7. Coercive techniques "are typically not used in combination, although some combined use is possible." Id. Walling "is one of the most effective interrogation techniques because it wears down the [detainee] physically, heightens uncertainty in the detainee about what the interrogator may do to him, and creates a sense of dread when the [detainee] knows he is about to be walled again." Id. [4] A detainee "may be walled one time (one impact with the wall) to make a point or twenty to thirty times consecutively when the interrogator requires a more significant response to a question," and "will be walled multiple times" during a session designed to be intense. Id. Walling cannot practically be used at the same time as other interrogation techniques.

Water temperature and other considerations of safety established by OMS limit the use of another coercive technique, water dousing. See id. at 7-8. The technique "may be used frequently within those guidelines." Id. at 8. As suggested above, interrogators may combine water dousing with other techniques, such as stress positions, wall standing, the insult slap, or the abdominal slap. See id. at 8.

The use of stress positions is "usually self-limiting in that temporary muscle fatigue usually leads to the [detainee's] being unable to maintain the stress position after a period of time." Id. Depending on the particular position, stress positions may be combined with water dousing, the insult slap, the facial hold., and the attention grasp. See id. Another coercive technique, wall standing, is "usually self-limiting" in the same way as stress positions. Id. It may be combined with water dousing and the abdominal slap. See id. OMS guidelines limit the technique of cramped confinement to no more than eight hours at a time and 18 hours a day, and confinement in the "small box" is limited to two hours. Id. Cramped confinement cannot be used in simultaneous combination with corrective or other coercive techniques.

We understand that the CIA's use of all these interrogation techniques is subject to ongoing monitoring by interrogation team members who will direct that techniques be discontinued if there is a deviation from prescribed procedures and by medical and psychological personnel from OMS who will direct that any or all techniques be discontinued if in their professional judgment the detainee may otherwise suffer severe physical or mental pain or suffering. See Techniques at 6-7.

A Prototypical Interrogation

In a "prototypical interrogation," the detainee begins his first interrogation session stripped of his clothes, shackled, and hooded, with the walling collar over his head and around his neck. Background Paper at 9-10. The interrogators remove the hood and explain that the detainee can improve his situation by cooperating and may say that the interrogators "will do what it takes to get important information." Id. [5] As soon as the detainee does anything, inconsistent with the interrogators' instructions, the interrogators use an insult slap or abdominal slap. They employ walling if it becomes clear that the detainee is not cooperating in the interrogation. This sequence "may continue for several more iterations as the interrogators continue to measure the [detainee's] resistance posture and apply a negative consequence to [his] resistance efforts." Id. The interrogators and security officers then put the detainee into position for standing sleep deprivation, begin dietary manipulation through a liquid diet, and keep the detainee nude (except for a diaper). See id. at 10-11. The first interrogation session, which could have lasted from 30 minutes to several hours, would then be at an end. See id. at 11.

If the interrogation team determines there is a need to continue, and if the medical and psychological personnel advise that there are no contraindications, a second session may begin. See id at 12. The interval between sessions could be as short as an hour or as long as 24 hours. See id at 11. At the start of the second session, the detainee is released from the position for standing sleep deprivation, is hooded, and is positioned against the walling wall, with the walling collar over his head and around his neck. See id. Even before removing the hood, the interrogators use the attention grasp to startle the detainee. The interrogators take off the hood and begin questioning. If the detainee does not give appropriate answers to the first questions, the interrogators use an insult slap or abdominal slap. See id. They employ walling if they determine that the detainee "is intent on maintaining his resistance posture." Id. at 13. This sequence "may continue for multiple iterations as the interrogators continue to measure the [detainee's] resistance posture." Id. The interrogators then increase the pressure on the detainee by using a hose to douse the detainee with water for several minutes. They stop and start the dousing as they continue the interrogation. See id. They then end the session by placing the detainee into the same circumstances as at the end of the first session: the detainee is in the standing position for sleep deprivation, is nude (except for a diaper), and is subjected to dietary manipulation. Once again, the session could have lasted from 30 minutes to several hours. See id.

Again, if the interrogation team determines there is a need to continue, and if the medical and psychological personnel find no contraindications, a third session may follow. The session begins with the detainee positioned as at the beginning of the second. See id. at 14. If the detainee continues to resist, the interrogators continue to use walling and water dousing. The corrective techniques -- the insult slap, the abdominal slap, the facial hold, the attention grasp -- "may be used several times during this session based on the responses and actions of the [detainee] " The interrogators integrate stress positions and wall standing into the session. Furthermore, "[i]ntense questioning and walling would be repeated multiple times." Id. Interrogators "use one technique to support another." Id. For example, they threaten the use of walling unless the detainee holds a stress position, thus inducing the detainee to remain in the position longer than he otherwise would. At the end of the session, the interrogators and security personnel place the detainee into the same circumstances as at the end of the first two sessions, with the detainee subject to sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation. Id.

In later sessions, the interrogators use those techniques that are proving most effective and drop the others. Sleep deprivation "may continue to the 70 to 120 hour range, or possibly beyond for the hardest resisters, but in no case exceed the 180-hour time limit." Id at 15. [6] If the medical or psychological personnel find contraindications, sleep deprivation will end earlier. See id at 15-16. While continuing the use of sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation, the interrogators may add cramped confinement. As the detainee begins to cooperate, the interrogators "begin gradually to decrease the use of interrogation techniques." Id. at 16. They may permit the detainee to sit, supply clothes, and provide more appetizing food. See id.

The entire process in this "prototypical interrogation" may last 30 days. If additional time is required and a new approval is obtained from headquarters, interrogation may go longer than 30 days. Nevertheless, "[o]n average," the actual use of interrogation techniques covers a period of three to seven days, but can vary upwards to fifteen days based on the resilience of the [detainee]." Id. As in Techniques, our advice here is limited to an interrogation process lasting no more than 30 days. See Techniques at 5.

Use of the Waterboard in Combination with Other Techniques

We understand that for a small number of detainees in very limited circumstances, the CIA may wish to use the waterboard technique. You have previously explained that the waterboard technique would be used only if: (1) the CIA has credible intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent; (2) there are "substantial and credible indicators the subject has actionable intelligence that can prevent, disrupt or delay this attack"; and (3) other interrogation methods have failed or are unlikely to yield actionable intelligence in time to prevent the attack. See Attachment to Letter from John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA, to Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Aug. 2, 2004). You have also informed us that the waterboard may be approved for use with a given detainee only during, at most, one single 30-day period, and that during that period, the waterboard technique may be used on no more than five days. We further understand that in any 24-hour period, interrogators may use no more than two "sessions" of the waterboard on a subject -- with a "session" defined to mean the time that the detainee is strapped to the waterboard -- and that no session may last more than two hours. Moreover, during any session, the number of individual applications of water lasting 10 seconds or longer may not exceed six. The maximum length of any application of water is 40 seconds (you have informed us that this maximum has rarely been reached). Finally, the total cumulative time of all applications of whatever length in a 24-hour period may not exceed 12 minutes. See Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, at 1-2 (Aug. 19, 2004).

You have advised us that in those limited cases where the waterboard would be used, it would be used only in direct combination with two other techniques, dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation. See April 22 [delete] Fax at 3-4. While an individual is physically on the waterboard, the CIA does not use the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial or insult slap, the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, or water dousing, though some or all of these techniques may be used with the individual before the CIA needs to resort to the waterboard, and we understand it is possible that one or more of these techniques, might be used on the same day as a waterboard session, but separately from that session and not in conjunction with the waterboard. See id at 3.

As we discussed in Techniques, you have informed us that an individual undergoing the waterboard is always placed on a fluid diet before he may be subjected to the waterboard in order to avoid aspiration of food matter. The individual is kept on the fluid diet throughout the period the waterboard is used. For this reason, and in this way, the waterboard is used in combination with dietary manipulation. See April 22 [delete] Fax at 3.

You have also described how sleep deprivation may be used prior to and during the waterboard session. Id. at 4. We understand that the time limitation on use of sleep deprivation, as set forth in Techniques, continues to be strictly monitored and enforced when sleep deprivation is used in combination with the waterboard (as it is when used in combination with other techniques). See April 22 [delete] Fax at 4. You have also informed us that there is no evidence in literature or experience that sleep deprivation exacerbates any harmful effects of the waterboard, though it does reduce the detainee's will to resist and thereby contributes to the effectiveness of the waterboard as an interrogation technique. Id. As in Techniques, we understand that in the event the detainee were perceived to be unable to withstand the effects of the waterboard for any reason, any member of the interrogation team has the obligation to intervene and, if necessary, to halt the use of the waterboard. See April 22 [delete] Fax at 4.

The issue of the combined effects of interrogation techniques raises complex and difficult questions and comes to us in a less precisely defined form than the questions treated in our earlier opinions about individual techniques. In evaluating individual techniques, we turned to a body of experience developed in the use of analogous techniques in military training by the United States, to medical literature, and to the judgment of medical personnel. Because there is less certainty and definition about the use of techniques in combination, it is necessary to draw more inferences in assessing what may be expected. You have informed us that, although "the exemplar [that is, the prototypical interrogation] is a fair representation of how these techniques are actually employed," "there is no template or script that states with certainty when and how these techniques will be used in combination during interrogation." Background Paper at 17. Whether any other combination of techniques would, in the relevant senses, be like the ones presented -- whether the combination would be no more likely to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A -- would be a question that cannot be assessed in the context of the present legal opinion. For that reason, our advice does not extend to combinations of techniques unlike the ones discussed here. For the same reason, it is especially important that the CIA use great care in applying these various techniques in combination in a real-world scenario, and that the members of the interrogation team, and the attendant medical staff, remain watchful for indications that the use of techniques in combination may be having unintended effects, so that the interrogation regimen may be altered or halted, if necessary, to ensure that it will not result in severe physical or mental pain or suffering to any detainee in violation of 18 U.S. C. §§ 2340-2340A.

Finally, in both of our previous opinions about specific techniques, we evaluated the use of those techniques on particular identified individuals. Here, we are asked to address the combinations without reference to any particular detainee. As is relevant here, we know only that an enhanced interrogation technique, such as most of the techniques at issue in Techniques, may be used on a detainee only if medical and psychological personnel have determined that he is not likely, as a result, to experience severe physical or mental pain or suffering. Techniques at 5. Once again, whether other detainees would, in the relevant ways, be like the ones previously at issue would be a factual question we cannot now decide. Our advice, therefore, does not extend to the use of techniques on detainees unlike those we have previously considered. Moreover, in this regard, it is also especially important, as we pointed out in Techniques with respect to certain techniques, see, e.g., id at 37 (discussing sleep deprivation), that the CIA will carefully assess the condition of each individual detainee and that the CIA's use of these techniques in combination will be sensitive to the individualized physical condition and reactions of each detainee, so that the regimen of interrogation would be altered or halted, if necessary, in the event of unanticipated effects on a particular detainee.

Subject to these cautions and to the conditions, limitations, and safeguards set out below and in Techniques, we nonetheless can reach some conclusions about the combined use of these techniques. Although this is a difficult question that will depend on the particular detainee, we do not believe that the use of the techniques in combination as you have described them would be expected to inflict "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" within the meaning of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). Although the combination of interrogation techniques will wear a detainee down physically, we understand that the principal effect, as well as the primary goal, of interrogation using these techniques is psychological -- "to create a state of learned helplessness and dependence conducive to the collection of intelligence in a predictable, reliable, and sustainable manner." Background Paper at 1 -- and numerous precautions are designed to avoid inflicting "severe physical or mental pain or suffering."

For present purposes, we may divide "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" into three categories: "severe physical ... pain," "severe physical ... suffering," and "severe ... mental pain or suffering" (the last being a defined term under the statute). See Techniques at 22-26; Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004).

As explained below, any physical pain resulting from the use of these techniques, even in combination, cannot reasonably be expected to meet the level of "severe physical pain" contemplated by the statute. We conclude, therefore, that the authorized use in combination of these techniques by adequately trained interrogators, as described in the Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax, could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so. Moreover, although it presents a closer question under sections 2340-2340A, we conclude that the combined use of these techniques also cannot reasonably be expected to -- and their combined use in the authorized manner by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to -- cause severe physical suffering. Although two techniques, extended sleep deprivation and the waterboard, may involve a more substantial risk of physical distress, nothing in the other specific techniques discussed in the Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax, or, as we understand it, in the CIA's experience to date with the interrogations of more than two dozen detainees (three of whose interrogations involved the use of the waterboard), would lead to the expectation that any physical discomfort from the combination of sleep deprivation or the waterboard and other techniques would involve the degree of intensity and duration of physical distress sufficient to constitute severe physical suffering under the statute. Therefore, the use of the technique could not reasonably be viewed as specifically intended to cause severe physical suffering. We stress again, however, that these questions concerning whether the combined effects of different techniques may rise to the level of physical suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A are difficult ones, and they reinforce the need for close and ongoing monitoring by medical and psychological personnel and by all members of the interrogation team and active intervention if necessary.

Analyzing the combined techniques in terms of severe mental pain or suffering raises two questions under the statute. The first is whether the risk of hallucinations from sleep deprivation may become exacerbated when combined with other techniques, such that a detainee might be expected to experience "prolonged mental harm" from the combination of techniques. Second, the description in the Background Paper that detainees may be specifically told that interrogators will "do what it takes" to elicit information, id. at 10, raises the question whether this statement might qualify as a threat of infliction of severe physical pain or suffering or another of the predicate acts required for "severe mental pain or suffering" under the statute. After discussing both of those possibilities below, however, we conclude that the authorized use by adequately trained interrogators of the techniques in combination, as you have described them, would not reasonably be expected to cause prolonged mental harm and could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe mental pain or suffering. We stress that these possible questions about the combined use of the techniques under the statutory category of severe mental pain or suffering are difficult ones and they serve to reinforce the need for close and ongoing monitoring and active intervention if necessary.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

PostPosted: Sat Oct 12, 2013 12:15 am
by admin
PART 2 OF 2

Severe Physical Pain

Our two previous opinions have not identified any techniques that would inflict pain that approaches the "sever[ity] required to violate the statute. A number of the techniques -- dietary, manipulation, nudity, sleep deprivation, the facial hold, and the attention grasp -- are not expected to cause physical pain at all. See Techniques at 30-36. Others might cause some pain, but the level of pain would not approach that which would be considered "severe." These techniques are the abdominal slap, water dousing, various stress positions, wall standing, cramped confinement, walling, and the facial slap. See id. We also understand that the waterboard is not physically painful. Id. at 41. In part because none of these techniques would individually cause pain that even approaches the "severe" level required to violate the statute, the combined use of the techniques under the conditions outlined here would not be expected to -- and we conclude that their authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to -- reach that level. [7]

We recognize the theoretical possibility that the use of one or more techniques would make a detainee more susceptible to severe pain or that the techniques, in combination, would operate differently from the way they would individually and thus cause severe pain, But as we understand the experience involving the combination of various techniques, the OMS medical and psychological personnel have not observed any such increase in susceptibility. Other than the waterboard, the specific techniques under consideration in this memorandum -- including sleep deprivation -- have been applied to more than 25 detainees. See [delete] Fax at 1-3. No apparent increase in susceptibility to severe pain has been observed either when techniques are used sequentially or when they are used simultaneously -- for example, when an insult slap is simultaneously combined with water dousing or a kneeling stress position, or when wall standing is simultaneously combined with an abdominal slap and water dousing. Nor does experience show that, even apart from changes in susceptibility to pain, combinations of these techniques cause the techniques to operate differently so as to cause severe pain. OMS doctors and psychologists, moreover, confirm that they expect that the techniques, when combined as described in the Background Paper and in the April 22 [delete] Fax, would not operate in a different manner from the way they do individually, so as to cause severe pain.

We understand that experience supports these conclusions even though the Background Paper does give examples where the distress caused by one technique would. be increased by use of another. The "conditioning techniques" -- nudity, sleep deprivation, and dietary manipulation -- appear designed to wear down the detainee, physically and psychologically, and to allow other techniques to be more effective, see Background Paper at 5, 12; April 22 [delete] Fax at 4; and "these [conditioning[ techniques are used in combination in almost all cases," Background Paper at 17. And, in another example, the threat of walling is used to cause a detainee to hold a stress position longer than he otherwise would. See id at 14. The issue raised by the statute, however, is whether the techniques would be specifically intended to cause the detainee to experience "severe ... pain." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). In the case of the conditioning techniques, the principal effect, as you have described it, is on the detainee's will to resist other techniques, rather than on the pain that the other techniques cause. See Background Paper at 5, 12; April 22 [delete] Fax at 4. Moreover, the stress positions and wall standing, while inducing muscle fatigue, do not cause "severe physical ... pain," and there is no reason to believe that a position, held somewhat longer than otherwise, would create such pain. See Techniques at 33-34. [8]

In any particular case, a combination of techniques might have unexpected results, just as an individual technique could produce surprising effects. But the Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax, as well as Techniques, describe a system of medical and psychological monitoring of the detainee that would very likely identify any such unexpected results as they begin to occur and would require an interrogation to be modified or stopped if a detainee is in danger of severe physical pain. Medical and psychological personnel assess the detainee before any interrogation starts. See, e.g., Techniques at 5. Physical and psychological evaluations are completed daily during any period in which the interrogators use enhanced techniques, including those at issue in Techniques (leaving aside dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation of less than 48 hours). See id at 5-7. Medical and psychological personnel are on scene throughout the interrogation, and are physically present or are otherwise observing during many of the techniques. See id. at 6-7. These safeguards, which were critically important to our conclusions about individual techniques, are even more significant when techniques are combined.

In one specific context, monitoring the effects on detainees appears particularly important. The Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax illustrate that sleep deprivation is a central part of the "prototypical interrogation." We noted in Techniques that extended sleep deprivation may cause a small decline in body temperature and increased food consumption. See Techniques at 33-34. Water dousing and dietary manipulation and perhaps even nudity may thus raise dangers of enhanced susceptibility to hypothermia or other medical conditions for a detainee undergoing sleep deprivation. As in Techniques, we assume that medical personnel will be aware of these possible interactions and will monitor detainees closely for any signs that such interactions are developing. See id. at 33-35. This monitoring, along with quick intervention if any signs of problematic symptoms develop, can be expected to prevent a detainee from experiencing severe physical pain.

We also understand that some studies suggest that extended sleep deprivation may be associated with a reduced tolerance for some forms of pain. [9] Several of the techniques used by the CIA may involve a degree of physical pain, as we have previously noted, including facial and abdominal slaps, walling, stress positions, and water dousing. Nevertheless, none of these techniques would cause anything approaching severe physical pain. Because sleep deprivation appears to cause at most only relatively moderate decreases in pain tolerance, the use of these techniques in combination with extended sleep deprivation would not be expected to cause severe physical pain.

Therefore, the combined use of techniques, as set out in the Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax, would not reasonably be expected by the interrogators to result in severe physical pam. We conclude that the authorized use of these techniques in combination by adequately trained interrogators, as you have described it, could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause such pain for purposes of sections 2340-2340A. The close monitoring of each detainee for any signs that he is at risk of experiencing severe physical pain reinforces the conclusion that the combined use of interrogation techniques is not intended to inflict such pain. OMS has directed that "[m]edical officers must remain cognizant at all times of their obligation to prevent severe physical or mental pain or suffering." OMS Guidelines at 10. The obligation of interrogation team members and medical staff to intercede if their observations indicate a detainee is at risk of experiencing severe physical pain, and the expectation that all interrogators understand the important role played by OMS and will cooperate with them in the exercise of this duty, are here, as in Techniques, essential to our advice. See Techniques at 14.

Severe Physical Suffering

We noted in Techniques that, although the statute covers a category of "severe physical ... suffering" distinct from "severe physical pain," this category encompasses only "physical distress that is 'severe' considering its intensity and duration or persistence, rather than merely mild or transitory." Id.. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). Severe physical suffering for purposes of sections 2340-2340A, we have concluded, means a state or condition of physical distress, misery, affliction, or torment, usually involving physical pain, that is both extreme in intensity and significantly protracted in duration or persistent over time. Id. Severe physical suffering is distinguished from suffering that is purely mental or psychological in nature, since mental suffering is encompassed by the separately defined statutory category of "severe mental pain or suffering," discussed below. To amount to torture, conduct must be "sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant the universal condemnation that the term 'torture' both connotes and invokes." See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (interpreting the TVPA); cf. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp; 2d 1322, 1332-40, 1345-46 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (standard met under the TVPA by a course of conduct that included severe beatings to the genitals, head, and other parts of the body with metal pipes and various other items; removal of teeth with pliers; kicking in the face and ribs; breaking of bones and ribs and dislocation of fingers; cutting a figure into the victim's forehead; hanging the victim and beating him; extreme limitations of food and water; and subjection to games of "Russian roulette").

In Techniques, we recognized that, depending on the physical condition and reactions of a given individual, extended sleep deprivation might cause physical distress in some cases. Id. at 34. Accordingly, we advised that the strict limitations and safeguards adopted by the CIA are important to ensure that the use of extended sleep deprivation would not cause severe physical suffering. Id. at 34-35. We pointed to the close medical monitoring by OMS of each detainee subjected to sleep deprivation, as well as to the power of any member of the interrogation team or detention facility staff to intervene and, in particular, to intervention by OMS if OMS concludes in its medical judgment that the detainee may be experiencing extreme physical distress. With those safeguards in place, and based on the assumption that they would. be strictly followed, we concluded that the authorized use of sleep deprivation by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause such severe physical suffering. Id. at 34. We pointed out that "[d]ifferent individual detainees may react physically to sleep deprivation in different ways," id., and we assumed that the interrogation team and medical staff "will separately monitor each individual detainee who is undergoing sleep deprivation, and that the application of this technique will be sensitive to the individualized physical condition and reactions of each detainee." Id.

Although it is difficult to calculate the additional effect of combining other techniques with sleep deprivation, we do not believe that the addition of the other techniques as described in the Background Paper would result in "severe physical ... suffering." The other techniques do not themselves inflict severe physical pain. They are not of the intensity and duration that are necessary for "severe physical suffering"; instead, they only increase, over a short time, the discomfort that a detainee subjected to sleep deprivation experiences. They do not extend the time at which sleep deprivation would end, and although it is possible that the other techniques increase the physical discomfort associated with sleep deprivation itself, we cannot say that the effect would be so significant as to cause "physical distress that is 'severe' considering its intensity and duration or persistence." Techniques at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). We emphasize that the question of "severe physical suffering" in the context of a combination of techniques is a substantial and difficult one, particularly in light of the imprecision in the statutory standard and the relative lack of guidance in the case law. Nevertheless, we believe that the combination of techniques in question here would not be "extreme and outrageous," and thus would not reach the high bar established by Congress in sections 2340-2340A, which is reserved for actions that "warrant the universal condemnation that the term 'torture' both connotes and invokes." See Price v. Socialist People 's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 294 F.3d at 92 (interpreting the TVPA)

As we explained in Techniques experience with intended sleep deprivation shows that "'[s]urprisingly, little seemed to go wrong with the subjects physically. The main effects lay with sleepiness and impaired brain functioning, but even these were no great cause for concern.'" Id. at 36 quoting James Horne Why We Sleep: The Functions of Sleep in Humans and Other Mammals 23-24 (1988)). The aspects of sleep deprivation that might result in substantial physical discomfort, therefore, are limited in scope; and although the degree of distress associated with sleepiness, as noted above, may differ from person to person, the CIA has found that many of the at least 25 detainees subjected to sleep deprivation have tolerated it well. The general conditions in which sleep deprivation takes place would not change this conclusion. Shackling is employed as a passive means of keeping a detainee awake and is used in a way designed to prevent causing significant pain. A detainee is not allowed to hang by his wrists. When the detainee is shackled in a sitting position, he is on a stool adequate to bear his weight; and if a horizontal position is used, there is no additional stress on the detainee's arm or leg joints that might force his limbs beyond their natural extension or create tension on any joint. Furthermore, team members, as well as medical staff, watch for the development of edema and will act to relieve that condition, should significant edema develop. If a detainee subject to sleep deprivation is using an adult diaper, the diaper is checked regularly and changed as needed to prevent skin irritation.

Nevertheless, we recognize, as noted above, the possibility that sleep deprivation might lower a detainee's tolerance for pain. See supra p. 13 & n.9. This possibility suggests that use of extended sleep deprivation in combination with other techniques might be more likely than the separate use of the techniques to place the detainee in a state of severe physical distress and, therefore, that the detainee might be more likely to experience severe physical suffering. However, you have informed us that the interrogation techniques at issue would not be used during a course of extended sleep deprivation with such frequency and intensity as to induce in the detainee a persistent condition of extreme physical distress such as may constitute "severe physical suffering" within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A. We understand that the combined use of these techniques with extended sleep deprivation is not designed or expected to cause that result. Even assuming there could be such an effect, members of the interrogation team and medical staff from OMS monitor detainees and would intercede if there were indications that the combined use of the techniques may be having that result, and the use of the techniques would be reduced in frequency or intensity or halted altogether, as necessary. In this regard, we assume that if a detainee started to show an atypical, adverse reaction during sleep deprivation, the system for monitoring would identify this development.

These considerations underscore that the combination of other techniques with sleep deprivation magnifies the importance of adhering strictly to the limits and safeguards applicable to sleep deprivation as an individual technique, as well as the understanding that team personnel, as well as OMS medical personnel, would intervene to alter or stop the use of an interrogation technique if they conclude that a detainee is or may be experiencing extreme physical distress.

The waterboard may be used simultaneously with two other techniques: it maybe used during a course of sleep deprivation, and as explained above, a detainee subjected to the waterboard must be under dietary manipulation, because a fluid diet reduces the risks of the technique. Furthermore, although the insult slap, abdominal slap, attention grasp, facial hold, walling, water dousing, stress positions, and cramped confinement cannot be employed during the actual session when the waterboard is being employed, they may be used at a point in time close to the waterboard, including on the same day. See April 22 [delete] Fax at 3.

In Techniques, we explained why neither sleep deprivation nor the waterboard would impose distress of such intensity and duration as to amount to "severe physical suffering," and, depending on the circumstances and the individual detainee, we do not believe the combination of the techniques, even if close in time with other techniques, would change that conclusion. The physical distress of the waterboard, as explained in Techniques, lasts only during the relatively short periods during a session when the technique is actually being used. Sleep deprivation would not extend that period. Moreover, we understand that there is nothing in the literature or experience to suggest that sleep deprivation would exacerbate any harmful effects of the waterboard. See supra p. 9. Similarly, the use of the waterboard would not extend the time of sleep deprivation or increase its distress, except during the relatively brief times that the technique is actually being used. And the use of other techniques that do not involve the intensity and duration required for "severe physical suffering" would not lengthen the time during which the waterboard would be used or increase, in any apparent way, the intensity of the distress it would cause. Nevertheless, because both the waterboard and sleep deprivation raise substantial questions, the combination of the techniques only heightens the difficulty of the issues. Furthermore, particularly because the waterboard is so different from other techniques in its effects, its use in combination with other techniques is particularly difficult to judge in the abstract and calls for the utmost vigilance and care.

Based on these assumptions, and those described at length in Techniques, we conclude that the combination of techniques, as described in the Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax, would not be expected by the interrogators to cause "severe physical ... suffering," and that the authorized use of these techniques in combination by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A.

Severe Mental Pain or Suffering

As we explained in Techniques, the statutory definition of "severe mental pain or suffering" requires that one of four specified predicate acts cause "prolonged mental harm." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2); see Techniques at 24-25. In Techniques, we concluded that only two of the techniques at issue here -- sleep deprivation and the waterboard -- would even arguably involve a predicate act. The statute provides that "the administration or application ... of ... procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality" can be a predicate act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2)(B). Although sleep deprivation may cause hallucinations, OMS, supported by the scientific literature of which we are aware, would not expect a profound disruption of the senses and would order sleep deprivation discontinued if hallucinations occurred. We nonetheless assumed in Techniques that any hallucinations resulting from sleep deprivation would amount to a profound disruption of the senses. Even on this assumption, we concluded that sleep deprivation should not be deemed "calculated" to have that effect. Techniques at 35-36. Furthermore, even if sleep deprivation could be said to be "calculated" to disrupt the senses profoundly and thus to qualify as a predicate act, we expressed the understanding in Techniques that, as demonstrated by the scientific literature about which we knew and by relevant experience in CIA interrogations, the effects of sleep deprivation, including the effects of any associated hallucinations, would rapidly dissipate. Based on that understanding, sleep deprivation therefore would not cause "prolonged mental harm" and would not meet the statutory definition for "severe mental pain or suffering." Id. at 36.

We noted in Techniques that the use of the waterboard might involve a predicate act. A detainee subjected to the waterboard experiences a sensation of drowning, which arguably qualifies as a "threat of imminent death." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C). We noted, however, that there is no medical basis for believing that the technique would produce any prolonged mental harm. As explained in Techniques, there is no evidence for such prolonged mental harm in the CIA's experience with the technique, and we understand that it has been used thousands of times (albeit in a somewhat different way) during the military training of United States personnel, without producing any evidence of such harm.

There is no evidence that combining other techniques with sleep deprivation or the waterboard would change these conclusions. We understand that none of the detainees subjected to sleep deprivation has exhibited any lasting mental harm, and that, in all but one case, these detainees have been subjected to at least some other interrogation technique besides the sleep deprivation itself. Nor does this experience give any reason to believe that, should sleep deprivation cause hallucinations, the use of these other techniques in combination with sleep deprivation would change the expected result that, once a person subjected to sleep deprivation is allowed to sleep, the effects of the sleep deprivation, and of any associated hallucinations, would rapidly dissipate.

Once again, our advice assumes continuous, diligent monitoring of the detainee during sleep deprivation and prompt intervention at the first signs of hallucinatory experiences. The absence of any atypical, adverse reaction during sleep deprivation would buttress the inference that, like others deprived of sleep for long periods, the detainee would fit within the norm established by experience with sleep deprivation, both the general experience reflected in the medical literature and the CIA's specific experience with other detainees. We understand that, based on these experiences, the detainee would be expected to return quickly to his normal mental state once he has been allowed to sleep and would suffer no "prolonged mental harm."

Similarly, the CIA's experience has produced no evidence that combining the waterboard and other techniques causes prolonged mental harm, and the same is true of the military training in which the technique was used. We assume, again, continuous and diligent monitoring during the use of the technique, with a view toward quickly identifying any atypical, adverse reactions. and intervening as necessary.

The Background Paper raises one other issue about "severe mental pain or suffering." According to the Background Paper, the interrogators may tell detainees that they "will" do what it takes to get important information." Background Paper at 10. (We understand that interrogators may instead use other statements that might be taken to have a similar import.) Conceivably, a detainee might understand such a statement as a threat that, if necessary, the interrogators will imminently subject him to "severe physical pain or suffering" or to "the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality," or he perhaps even could interpret the statement as a threat of imminent death (although, as the detainee himself would probably realize, killing a detainee would end the flow of information). 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2)(A)-(C).

We doubt that this statement is sufficiently specific to qualify as a predicate act under section 2340(2). Nevertheless, we do not have sufficient information to judge whether, in context, detainees understand the statement in any of these ways. If they do, this statement at the beginning of the interrogation arguably requires considering whether it alters the detainee's perception of the interrogation techniques and whether, in light of this perception, prolonged mental harm would be expected to result from the combination throughout the interrogation process of all of the techniques used. We do not have any body of experience, beyond the CIA's own experience with detainees, on which to base an answer to this question. SERE training, for example, or other experience with sleep deprivation, does not involve its use with the standing position used here, extended nudity, extended dietary manipulation, and the other techniques which are intended "to create a slate of learned helplessness." Background Paper at 1, and SERE training does not involve repeated applications of the waterboard. A statement that the interrogators "will do what it takes to get important information" moves the interrogations at issue here even further from this body of experience.

Although it may raise a question, we do not believe that, under the careful limitations and monitoring in place, the combined use outlined in the Background Paper, together with a statement of this kind, would violate the statute. We are informed that, in the opinion of OMS, none of the detainees who have heard such a statement in their interrogations has experienced "prolonged mental harm," such as post-traumatic stress disorder, see Techniques at 26 n.31, as a result of it or the various techniques utilized on them. This body of experience supports the conclusion that the use of the statement does not alter the effects that would be expected to follow from the combined use of the techniques. Nevertheless, in light of these uncertainties, you may wish to evaluate whether such a statement is a necessary part of the interrogation regimen or whether a different statement might be adequate to convey to the detainee the seriousness of his situation.

***

In view of the experience from past interrogations, the judgment of medical and psychological personnel, and the interrogation team's diligent monitoring of the effects of combining interrogation techniques, interrogators would not reasonably expect that the combined use of the interrogation methods under consideration, subject to the conditions and safeguards set forth here and in Techniques, would result in severe physical or mental pain or suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A. Accordingly, we conclude that the authorized use, as described in the Background Paper and the April 22 [delete] Fax, of these techniques in combination by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and thus would not violate sections 2340-2340A. We nonetheless underscore that when these techniques are combined in a real world scenario, the members of the interrogation team and the attendant medical staff must be vigilant in watching for unintended effects, so that the individual characteristics of each detainee are constantly taken into account and the interrogation may be modified or halted, if necessary, to avoid causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering to any detainee. Furthermore, as noted above, our advice does not extend to combinations of techniques unlike the ones discussed here, and whether any other combination of techniques would be more likely to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A would be a question that we cannot assess here. Similarly, our advice does not extend to the use of techniques on detainees unlike those we have previously considered, and whether other detainees would, in the relevant ways, be like the ones at issue in our previous advice would be a factual question we cannot now decide. Finally, we emphasize that these are issues about which reasonable persons may disagree. Our task has been made more difficult by the imprecision of the statute and the relative absence of judicial guidance, but we have applied our best reading of the law to the specific facts that you have provided.

Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.

Steven G. Bradbury
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

_______________

Notes:

1. As noted in Techniques, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice is satisfied that our general interpretation of the legal standards under sections 2340-2340A, found in Techniques, is consistent with its concurrence in our Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340- 2340A (Dec. 30, 2004). In the present memorandum, we address only the application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to combinations of interrogation techniques. Nothing in this memorandum or in our prior advice to the CIA should be read to suggest that the use of these techniques would conform to the requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that governs members of the Armed Forces or to United States obligations under the Geneva Conventions in circumstances where those Conventions would apply. We do not address the possible application of article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10; 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force for U.S. Nov. 20, 1994), nor do we address any question relating to conditions of confinement or detention, as distinct from the interrogation of detainees. We stress that our advice on the application of sections 2340-2340A does not represent the policy views of the Department of Justice concerning interrogation practices. Finally, we note that section 6057 (a) of H.R. 1268 (109th Cong. 1st Sess.), if it becomes law, would forbid expending or obligating funds made available by that bill "to subject any person in the custody or under the physical control of the United Stales to torture," but because the bill would define "torture" to have "the meaning given that term in section 2340(1) of title 18, United Stales Code," § 6057(b)(1), the provision (to the extent it might apply here at all) would merely reaffirm the preexisting prohibitions on torture in sections 2340-2340A.

2. Although the OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation and Detention (Dec. 2004) ("OMS Guidelines") refer to the administration of sedatives during transport if necessary to protect the detainee or the rendition team, id. at 4-5, the OMS Guidelines do not provide for the use of sedatives for interrogation. The Background Paper does not mention the administration of any drugs during the detainee's transportation to the site of the interrogation or at any other time, and we do not address any such administration. OMS, we understand, is unaware of any use of sedation during the transport of a detainee in the last two years and states that the interrogation program does not use sedation or medication for the purpose of interrogation. We caution that any use of sedatives should be carefully evaluated, including under 18 U.S.C, § 2340(2)(B). For purposes of our analysis, we assume that no drugs are administered during the relevant period or that there are no ongoing effects from any administration of any drugs; if that assumption does not hold, our analysis and conclusions could change.

3. The CIA maintains certain "detention conditions" at all of its detention facilities. (These conditions "are not interrogation techniques," id. at 4, and you have not asked us to assess their lawfulness under the statute.) The detainee is "exposed to white noise/loud sounds (not to exceed 79 decibels) and constant light during portions of the interrogation process." Id. These conditions enhance security. The noise prevents the detainee from overhearing conversations of staff members, precludes him from picking up "auditory clues" about his surroundings, and disrupts any efforts to communicate with other detainees. Id. The light provides better conditions for security and for monitoring by the medical and psychological staff and the interrogators. Although we do not address the lawfulness of using white noise (noise not to exceed 79 decibels) and constant light, we note that according to materials you have furnished to us, (1) the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has determined that there is no risk of permanent hearing loss from continuous, 24-hour per day exposure to noise of up to 82 decibels, and (2) detainees typically adapt fairly quickly to the constant light and it does not interfere unduly with their ability to sleep. See Fax for Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [delete] Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency at 3 (Jan. 4, 2005) ("[delete] Fax").

4. Although walling "wears down the [detainee] physically," Background Paper at 7, and undoubtedly may startle him, we understand that it is not significantly painful. The detainee hits "a flexible false wall," designed "to create a loud sound when the individual hits it" and thus to cause '''shock and surprise." Interrogation Memorandum at 2. But the detainee's "head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a collar effect to help prevent whiplash"; it is the detainee's shoulder blades that hit the wall, and the detainee is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall in order to reduce the chances of any injury. See id. You have informed us that a detainee is expected to feel "dread" at the prospect of walling because of the shock and surprise caused by the technique and because of the sense of powerlessness that comes from being roughly handled by the interrogators, not because the technique causes significant pain.

5. We address the effects of this statement below at pp. 18-19.

6. As in Techniques, our advice here is restricted to one application of no more than 180 hours of sleep deprivation.

7. We are not suggesting that combinations or repetitions of acts that do not individually cause severe physical pain could not result in severe physical pain. Other than the repeated use of the "walling" technique, however, nothing in the Background Paper suggests the kind of repetition that might raise an issue about severe physical pain; and, in the case of walling, we understand that this technique involves a false, flexible wall and is not significantly painful, even with repetition. Our advice with respect to walling in the present memorandum is based on the understanding that the repetitive use of walling is intended only to increase the shock and drama of the technique, to wear down the detainee's resistance, and to disrupt expectations that he will not be treated with force, and that such use is not intended to, and does not in fact, cause severe physical pain to the detainee. Along these lines, we understand that the repeated use of the insult slap and the abdominal slap gradually reduces their effectiveness and that their use is therefore limited to times when the detainee's overt disrespect for the question or questioner requires immediate correction, when the detainee displays obvious efforts to misdirect or ignore the question or questioner, or when the detainee attempts to provide an obvious lie in response to a specific question. Our advice assumes that the interrogators will apply those techniques as designed and will not strike the detainee with excessive force or repetition in a manner that might result in severe physical pain. As to all techniques, our advice assumes that the use of the technique will be stopped if there is any indication that it is or may be causing severe physical pain to the detainee.

8. Out advice about wall standing and stress positions assumes that the positions used in each technique are not designed to produce severe pain that might result from contortions or twisting of the body, but only temporary muscle fatigue.

9. For example, one study found a statistically significant drop of 8-9% in subjects' tolerance thresholds for mechanical or pressure pain after 40 hours of total sleep deprivation. See S. Hakki Onen, et al., The Effects of Total Sleep Deprivation, Selective Sleep Interruption and Sleep Recovery on Pain Tolerance Thresholds in Healthy Subjects, 10 J. Sleep Research 35, 41 (2001); see also id. at 35-36 (discussing other studies). Another study of extended total sleep deprivation found a significant decease in the threshold for heat pain and some decrease in the cold pain threshold.. See B. Kundermann, et al., Sleep Deprivation Affects Thermal Pain Thresholds but not Somatosensory Thresholds in Healthy Volunteers, 66 Psychosomatic Med. 932 (2004).

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

PostPosted: Sat Oct 12, 2013 12:18 am
by admin
PART 1 OF 3

MEMO __

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20530

Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

May 10, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. RIZZO
SENIOR DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Re: Application of 18 U.S,C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainees

You have asked us to address whether certain specified interrogation techniques designed to be used on the high-value Al Qaeda detainee war on terror comply with the federal prohibition on torture, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Our analysis of this question is controlled by this office's recently published opinion interpreting the anti-statute. See memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, acting assistant attorney general, office of legal counsel, Re: legal standards applicable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) ("2004 Legal Standards Opinion"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov. (We provided a copy of that opinion to you at the time it was issued.) Much of analysis from our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion is reproduced below; all of it is incorporated by reference herein. Because you have asked us to address the application of sections 2340-2340A to specific interrogation techniques, the present memorandum, necessarily includes additional discussion of the applicable legal standards and their application to particular facts. We stress, however, that the legal standards we apply in this memorandum are fully consistent with the interpretation of a statute set forth in our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion and constitute our authoritative view of legal standards applicable under sections 2340-2340A. Our task is to explicate for standards in order to assist you in complying with the law.

A paramount recognition emphasized in our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion merits re-emphasis at the outset and guides our analysis. Torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms. The universal reputation of torture is reflected not only in our criminal law, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, but also in international agreements, [1] in centuries of Anglo-American law, see, e.g., John H., Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien Regime (1977) ("Torture and the Law of Proof"), ending the long-standing policy of the United States, repeatedly and recently reaffirmed by the president. [2] Consistent with these norms, the president has directed unequivocally that the United States is not to engage in torture. [3]

The task of interpreting and applying sections 2340-2340A is complicated by the lack of precision in the statutory terms and the lack of relevant case law. In defining the federal crime of torture, Congress required that a defendant "specifically intend[] to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering," and Congress narrowly defined "severe mental pain or suffering" to mean "prolonged mental harm caused by" enumerated predicate acts, including "the threat of imminent death" and "procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality." 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (emphases added). These statutory requirements are consistent with U.S. obligations under United Nations Convention Against Torture, the treaty that obligates the United States to ensure that torture is a crime under U.S. law. However, many of the key terms used in the statute (for example, "severe," "for long," "suffering") are imprecise and necessarily bring a degree of uncertainty to addressing the reach of sections 2040-2340A. Moreover, relevant judicial decisions in this area provide only limited guidance. [4] This imprecision and lack of judicial guidance, coupled with the president's clear directive that the United States does not condone or engage in torture, counsel great care in applying the statute to specific conduct. We have attempted to exercise such care throughout this memorandum.

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the particular question before us: whether certain specified interrogation techniques may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") on a high-value Al Qaeda detainee, consistent with the federal statutory prohibition on torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. [5] For the reasons discussed below, and based on the representations we have received from you (or officials of your Agency) about the particular techniques in question, the circumstances in which they are authorized for use, and the physical and psychological assessments made of the detainee to be interrogated, we conclude that the separate authorized use of each of the specified techniques at issue, subject to the limitations and safeguards described herein, would not violate section 2340-2340A. [6] Our conclusion is straightforward with respect to all but two of the techniques discussed herein. I've discussed the use of sleep deprivation as an enhanced technique and use of the waterboard involve more substantial questions, with the waterboard presenting the most substantial question.

We base our conclusions on the statutory language enacted by Congress in sections 2340-2340A. We do not rely on any consideration of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief under the Constitution, any application of the principle of constitutional avoidance (or any conclusion about constitutional issues), or any arguments based on possible defenses of "necessity" or self-defense. [7]

I.

A.


In asking us to consider certain specific techniques to be used in the interrogation of a particular Al Qaeda operative, you have provided background information common to the use of all of the techniques. You have advised that these techniques would be used only on an individual who is determined to be a "high value detainee," defined as:

A detainee, who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: (1) is a senior member of Al Qaeda or an Al Qaeda associated terrorist group (Jemahh Islamiyyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zarqawi group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the USA, its military forces, citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had direct involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or assisting the Al Qaeda leadership in planning and preparing such terrorist actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies.


Fax for Daniel Levin, acting assistant attorney general, office of legal counsel, from [delete] Assistant General Counsel, CIA, at 3 (Jan. 4, 2005) ("January 4 [delete] Fax"). For convenience, below we will generally refer to such individuals simply as detainees.

You have also explained that, prior to interrogation, each detainee is evaluated by medical and psychological professionals from the CIA's office of medical services ("OMS") to ensure that he is not likely to suffer any severe physical or mental pain or suffering as a result of interrogation.

[T]echnique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced" measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel confirming from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to produce "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." As a practical matter, the detainee's physical condition must be such that these interventions will not have a lasting effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will result.


OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation and Detention at 9 (Dec. 2004) ("OMS Guidelines") (footnote omitted). New detainees are also subject to general intake examination, which includes "a thorough initial medical assessment ... with a complete, documented history and physical addressing in depth any chronic or previous medical problems. Assessment should especially attend to cardio-vascular, pulmonary, neurological, and musculoskeletal findings. ... Vital signs and weight should be recorded, and blood work drawn...." Id. at 6. In addition, "subsequent medical rechecks during the interrogation should be performed on a regular basis." Id. As an additional caution, and to ensure the objectivity of their medical and psychological assessments, OMS personnel do not participate in administering interrogation techniques; their function is to monitor interrogations and the health of the detainee.

The detainee is then interviewed by trained and certified interrogators to determine whether he is actively attempting to withhold or distort information. If so, the on-scene interrogation team develops an interrogation plan, which may include only those techniques for which there is no medical or psychological contraindication. You have informed us that the initial OMS assessments have ruled out the use of some -- or all -- of the interrogation techniques as to certain detainees. If the plan calls for the use of any of the interrogation techniques discussed herein, it is submitted to CIA headquarters, which must review the plan and approve the use of any of these interrogation techniques before they may be applied. See George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the [big delete] (Jan. 28, 2003) ("Interrogation Guidelines"). Prior written approval "From the director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the chief, CTC Legal Group," is required for the use of any enhanced interrogation techniques. Id. We understand that, as to the detainee here, this written approval has been given for each of the techniques we discuss, except for waterboard.

We understand that, when approved, interrogation techniques are generally used in an escalating fashion, with milder techniques used first. Use of the techniques is not continuous. Rather, one or more techniques may may be applied -- during or between interrogation sessions -- based on the judgment of the interrogators and other team members and subject always to the monitoring of the on-scene medical and psychological personnel. Use of the techniques may be continued if the detainee is still believed to have and to be withholding actionable intelligence. The use of these techniques may not be continued for more than 30 days without additional approval from CIA headquarters. See generally Interrogation Guidelines at 1-2 (describing approval procedures required for use of enhanced interrogation techniques). Moreover, even within that 30 day period, any further use of these interrogation techniques is discontinued if the detainee is judged to be consistently providing accurate intelligence or if he is no longer believed to have actionable intelligence. This memorandum addresses the use of these techniques during no more than one 30-day period. We do not address whether the use of these techniques beyond the initial 30 day period would violate the statute.

Medical and psychological personnel are on-scene throughout (and, as detailed below, physically present or otherwise observing during the application of many techniques, including all techniques involving physical contact with detainees), and "[d]aily physical and psychological evaluations are continued throughout the period of [enhanced interrogation technique] use." IG Report, at 30 n. 35; see also George J. Tenet, Director of Central intelligence, Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, at 1 (Jan. 28, 2003) ("Confinement Guidelines") ("Medical and, as appropriate, psychological personnel shall be physically present at, or reasonably available to, each detention facility. Medical personnel shall check the physical condition of each detainee at intervals appropriate to the circumstances and shall keep appropriate records."); IG Report at 28-29. [8] In addition, "[i]n each interrogation session in which an Enhanced Technique is employed, a contemporaneous record shall be created setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed." Interrogation Guidelines at 3. At any time, any on-scene personnel (including the medical or psychological personnel, the chief of base, substantive experts, security officers, and other interrogators) can intervene to stop the use of any technique. If it appears that the technique is being used improperly, and on-scene medical personnel can intervene if the detainee has developed a condition making the use of the technique unsafe. More generally, medical personnel watch for signs of physical distress or mental harm so significant as possibly to amount to the "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" that is prohibited by sections 2340-2340A. As the OMS Guidelines explain, "[m]edical officers must remain cognizant at all times of their obligation to prevent 'severe physical or mental pain or suffering.'" OMS Guidelines at 10. Additional restrictions on certain techniques are described below.

These techniques have all been imported from military survival, evasion, resistance, escape ("SERE") training, where they have been used for years on U.S. military personnel, although with some significant differences described below. See IG Report at 13-14. Although we refer to the SERE experience below, we note at the outset an important limitation on reliance on that experience. Individuals undergoing SERE training are obviously in a very different situation from detainees undergoing interrogation; SERE trainees know it is part of a training program, not a real-life interrogation regime, they presumably know it will last only a short time, and they presumably have assurances that they will not be significantly harmed by the training.

B.

You have described the specific techniques at issue as follows. [9]

1. Dietary manipulation. This technique involves the substitution of commercial liquid meal replacements for normal food, presenting detainees with a bland, unappetizing, but nutritionally complete diet. You have informed us that the CIA believes dietary manipulation makes other techniques, such as sleep deprivation, more effective. See August 25 [delete] Letter at 4. Detainees on dietary manipulation are permitted as much water as they want. In general, minimum daily fluid and nutritional requirements are estimated using the following formula:

Fluid requirement: 35ml/kg/day. This may be increased depending on ambient temperature, body temperature, and level of activity. Medical officers must monitor fluid intake, and although detainees are allowed as much water as they want, monitoring of urine output may be necessary in the unlikely event that the officers suspect that the detainee is becoming dehydrated.

Calorie requirement: The CIA generally follows as a guideline a calorie requirement of 900 kcal/day + 10 kcal/kg/day. This quantity is multiplied by 1.2 for a sedentary activity level, or 1.4 for a moderate activity level. Regardless of this formula, the recommended minimum calorie intake is 1500 kcal/day, and in no event is the detainee allowed to receive less than 1000 kcal/day. [10] Calories are provided using commercial liquid diets (such as Ensure Plus), which also supply other essential nutrients and make for nutritionally complete meals. [11]


Medical officers are required to ensure adequate fluid and nutritional intake, and frequent medical monitoring takes place while any detainee is undergoing dietary manipulation. All detainees are weighed weekly, and in the unlikely event that a detainee were to lose more than 10 percent of his body weight, the restricted diet would be discontinued.

2. Nudity. This technique is used to cause psychological discomfort, particularly if the detainee, for cultural or other reasons, is especially modest. When the technique is employed, clothing can be provided as an instant reward for cooperation. During and between interrogation sessions, a detainee may be kept nude, provided that ambient temperatures and the health of the detainee permit. For this technique to be employed, ambient temperature must be at least 68°F. [12] No sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted. Although each detention cell has full-time closed-circuit video monitoring, the detainee is not intentionally exposed to other detainees or unduly exposed to the detention facility staff. We understand that interrogators "are trained to avoid sexual innuendo or any acts of implicit or explicit sexual degradation." October 12 [delete] Letter at 2. Nevertheless, interrogators can exploit the detainee's fear of being seen naked. In addition, female officers involved in the interrogation process may see the detainees naked; and for purposes of our analysis, we will assume that detainees subjected to nudity as an interrogation technique are aware that they may be seen naked by females.

3. Attention grasp. This technique consists of grasping the individual with both hands, one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the individual is drawn toward the interrogator.

4. Walling. This technique involves the use of a flexible, false wall. The individual is placed with his heels touching the flexible wall. The interrogator pulls the individual forward and then quickly and firmly pushes the individual into the wall. It is the individual's shoulder blades that hit the wall. During this motion, the head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a C-collar effect to help prevent whiplash. To reduce further the risk of injury, the individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have informed us that the false wall is also constructed to create a loud noise when the individual hits it in order to increase the shock or surprise of the technique. We understand that walling may be used when the detainee is uncooperative or unresponsive to questions from interrogators. Depending on the extent of the detainee's lack of cooperation, he may be walled one time during an interrogation session (one impact with the wall) or many times (perhaps 20 or 30 times) consecutively. We understand that this technique is not designed to, and does not, cause severe pain, even when used repeatedly as you have described. Rather, it is designed to wear down the detainee and to shock or surprise the detainee and alter his expectations about the treatment he believes he will receive. In particular, we specifically understand that the repetitive use of the walling technique is intended to contribute to the shock and trauma of the experience, dispel a detainee's expectations that interrogators will not use increasing levels of force, and to wear down his resistance. It is not intended to -- and based on experience you have informed us that it does not -- inflict any injury or cause severe pain. Medical and psychological personnel are physically present or otherwise observing whenever the need is applied (as they are with any interrogation technique involving physical contact with the detainee).

5. Facial hold. This week is used to hold the head immobile during interrogation. One open palm is placed on either side of the individual's face. The fingertips are kept well away from the individual's eyes.

6. Facial slap or insult slap. With this technique, the interrogator slaps the individual's face with fingers slightly spread. The hand makes contact with the area directly between the tip of the individuals chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. The interrogator thus "invades" the individual's "personal space." We understand that the goal of the facial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting. Instead, the purpose of the facial slap is to induce shock, surprise, or humiliation. Medical and psychological personnel are physically present or otherwise observing whenever this technique is applied.

7. Abdominal slap. In this technique, the interrogators strikes the abdomen of the detainee with the back of his open hand. The interrogator must have no rings or other jewelry on his hand. The interrogator is positioned directly in front of the detainee, generally no more than 18 inches from the detainee. With his fingers held tightly together and fully extended, and with his palm toward the interrogator's own body, using his elbow as a fixed pivot point, the interrogator slaps the detainee in the detainee's abdomen. The interrogator may not use a fist, and the slap must be delivered above the navel below the sternum. This technique is used to condition a detainee to pay attention to the interrogator's question and to dislodge expectation that the detainee will not be touched. It is not intended to -- and based on experience you have informed us that it does not -- inflict any injury or cause any significant pain. Medical and psychological personnel are physically present or otherwise observing whenever this technique is applied.

8. Cramped confinement. This technique involves placing the individual in a confined space, the dimensions of which restrict the individual's movement. The confined space is usually dark. The duration of confinement varies based upon the size of the container. For the larger confined space, the individual can stand up or sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the subject to sit down. Confinement in the larger space may last no more than 8 hours at a time for no more than 18 hours a day; for the smaller space, confinement may last no more than two hours. Limits on the duration of cramped confinement are based on considerations of the detainee's size and weight, how he responds to the technique, and continuing consultation between the interrogators and OMS officers. [13]

9. Wall standing. This technique is used only to induce temporary muscle fatigue. The individual stands about four to five feet from a wall, with his feet spread approximately to shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in front of him, with his fingers resting on the wall and supporting his body weight. The individual is not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet.

10. Stress positions. There are three stress positions that may be used. You have informed us that these positions are not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather, like wall standing, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with temporary muscle fatigue. The three stress positions are (1), sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front and arms raised above the head, (2) kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle, and (3) leaning against the wall generally about three feet away from the detainee's feet, with only the detainee's head touching the wall, while his wrists are handcuffed in front of him or behind his back, and while an interrogator stands next to him to prevent injury if he loses his balance. As with wall standing, we understand that these positions are used only to induce temporary muscle fatigue.

11. Water dousing. Cold water is poured on the detainee either from a container or from a hose without a nozzle. This technique is intended to weaken the detainee's assistance and persuade him to cooperate with interrogators. The water poured on the detainee must be potable, and the interrogators must ensure that water does not enter the detainee's nose, mouth, or eyes. A medical officer must observe and monitor the detainee throughout the application of this technique, including for signs of hypothermia. Ambient temperatures must remain above 64°F. If the detainee is lying on the floor, his head is to remain vertical, and a poncho, mat, or other material must be placed between him and the floor to minimize the loss of body heat. At the conclusion of the water dousing session, the detainee must be moved to a heated room if necessary to permit his body temperature to return to normal in a safe manner. To ensure an adequate margin of safety, the maximum period of time that a detainee may be permitted to remain wet has been set at two-thirds the time at which, based on the extensive medical literature and experience, hypothermia could be expected to develop in healthy individuals who are submerged in water of the same temperature. For example, in employing this technique:

For water temperature of 41°F, total duration of exposure may not exceed 20 minutes without drying and rewarming.

For water temperature of 50°F, total duration of exposure may not exceed 40 minutes without drying and rewarming.

For water temperature of 59° F, total duration of exposure may not exceed 60 minutes without drying and rewarming.


The minimum permissible temperature of the water used in water dousing is 41°F, though you have informed us that in practice the water temperature is generally not below 50°F, since tap water rather than refrigerated water is generally used. We understand that a version of water dousing routinely used in SERE training is much more extreme in that it involves complete immersion of the individual in cold water (where water temperatures may be below 40°F) and is usually performed outdoors where ambient air temperatures may be as low as 10°F. Thus, the SERE training version involves a far greater impact on body temperature; SERE training also involves a situation where the water may enter the trainee's nose and mouth. [14]

You have also described a variation of water dousing involving much smaller quantities of water; this variation is known as "flicking." Flicking of water is achieved by the interrogator wetting his fingers and then flicking them at the detainee, propelling droplets at the detainee. Flicking of water is done "in an effort to create a distracting effect, to awaken, to startle, irritate, to instill humiliation, or to cause a temporary insult." October 22 [delete] Letter at 2. The water used in the "flicking" variation of water dousing also must be potable and within the water and ambient air temperature ranges for water described above. Although water may be flicked into the detainee's face with this variation, the flicking of water at all times is done in such a manner as to avoid the inhalation or ingestion of water by the detainee. See Id.

12. Sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours). This technique subjects a detainee to an extended period without sleep. You have informed us that the primary purpose of this technique is to weaken the subject and wear down his resistance.

The primary method of sleep deprivation involves the use of shackling to keep the detainee awake. In this method, the detainee is standing and is handcuffed, and the handcuffs are attached by length of chain to the ceiling. The detainee's hands are shackled in front of his body, so that the detainee has approximately a two- to three-foot diameter of movement. The detainee's feet are shackled to a bolt in the floor. Due care is taken to ensure that the shackles are neither too loose nor too tight for physical safety. We understand from discussions with OMS that the shackling does not result in any significant physical pain for the subject. The detainee's hands are generally between the level of his heart and his chin. In some cases, the detainee's hands may be raised above the level of his head, but only for a period of up to two hours. All of the detainee's weight is borne by his legs and feet during standing sleep deprivation. You have informed us that the detainee is not allowed to hang from or support his body weight with the shackles. Rather, we understand that the shackles are only used as a passive means to keep the detainee standing and thus to prevent him from falling asleep; should the detainee begin to fall asleep, he will lose his balance and awaken, either because of the sensation of losing his balance or of the restraining tension of the shackles. The use of this passive means for keeping the detainee awake avoids the need for using means that would require interaction with the detainee and might pose a danger of physical harm.

We understand from you that no detainee subjected to this technique by the CIA has suffered any harm or injury, either by falling down and forcing the handcuffs to bear his weight or in any other way. You have assured us that detainees are continuously monitored by closed-circuit television, so that if the detainee were unable to stand, he would immediately be removed from the standing position and would not be permitted to dangle by his wrists. We understand that standing sleep deprivation may cause edema, or swelling, in the lower extremities, because it forces detainees to stand for an extended period of time. OMS has advised us that this condition is not painful, and that the condition disappears quickly once the detainee is permitted to lie down. Medical personnel carefully monitor any detainee being subjected to standing sleep deprivation for indications of edema or other physical or psychological conditions. The OMS Guidelines include extensive discussion on medical monitoring of detainees being subjected to shackling and sleep deprivation, and they include specific instructions for medical personnel to require alternative, non-standing positions or to take other actions, including ordering the cessation of sleep deprivation, in order to relieve or avoid serious edema or other significant medical conditions. See OMS Guidelines at 14-16.

In lieu of standing sleep deprivation, a detainee may instead be seated on and shackled to a small stool. This stool supports the detainee's weight, but is too small to permit the subject to balance himself sufficiently to be able to go to sleep. On rare occasions, a detainee may also be restrained in a horizontal position when necessary to enable recovery from edema without interrupting the course of sleep deprivation. [15] We understand that those alternative restraints, although uncomfortable, are not significantly painful, according to the experience and professional judgment of OMS and over personnel.

We understand that a detainee undergoing sleep deprivation is generally fed by hand by CIA personnel so that he need not be unshackled; however, "[i]f progress is made during interrogation, the interrogators may unshackle the detainee and let him feed himself as a positive incentive." October 12 [delete] Letter at 4. If the detainee is clothed, he wears an adult diaper under his pants. Detainees subject to sleep deprivation who are also subject to nudity as a separate interrogation technique will at times be nude and wearing a diaper. If the detainee is wearing a diaper, it is checked regularly and changed as necessary. The use of the diaper is for sanitary and health purposes of the detainee; it is not used for the purpose of humiliating the detainee, and it is not considered to be an interrogation technique. The detainee's skin condition is monitored, and diapers are changed as needed so that the detainee does not remain in a soiled diaper. You have informed us that to date no detainee has experienced any skin problems resulting from use of diapers.

The maximum allowable duration for sleep deprivation authorized by the CIA is 180 hours, after which the detainee must be permitted to sleep without interruption for at least eight hours. You have informed us that to date, more than a dozen detainees have been subjected to sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours, and three detainees have been subjected to sleep deprivation of more than 96 hours; the longest period of time for which any detainee has been deprived of sleep by the CIA is 180 hours. Under the CIA's guidelines, sleep deprivation could be resumed after a period of eight hours of uninterrupted sleep, but only if OMS personnel specifically determined that there are no medical or psychological contraindications based on the detainee's condition at that time. As discussed below, however, in this memorandum we will evaluate only one application of up to 180 hours of sleep deprivation. [16]

You have informed us that detainees are closely monitored by the interrogation team at all times (either directly or by closed-circuit video camera) while being subjected to sleep deprivation, and that these personnel will intervene and the technique will be discontinued if there are medical or psychological contraindications. Furthermore, as with all interrogation techniques used by the CIA, sleep deprivation will not be used on any detainee if the prior medical and psychological assessment reveals any contraindications.

13. The "waterboard". In this technique, the detainee is lying on a gurney that is inclined at an angle of 10 to 15 degrees to the horizontal, with the detainee on his back and his head toward the lower end of the gurney: A cloth is placed over the detainee's face, and cold water is poured on the cloth from a height of approximately 6 to 18 inches. The wet cloth creates a barrier through which it is difficult -- or in some cases not possible -- to breathe. A single "application" of water may not last for more than 40 seconds, with the duration of an "application" measured from the moment when water -- of whatever quantity -- is first poured onto the cloth until the moment the cloth is removed from the subject's face. See August 19 [delete] Letter at 1. When the time limit is reached, the pouring of water is immediately discontinued and the cloth is removed. We understand that if the detainee makes an effort to defeat the technique (e.g., by twisting his head to the side and breathing out of the corner of his mouth); the interrogator may cup his hands around the detainee's nose and mouth to dam the runoff, in which case it would not be possible for the detainee to breathe during the application of the water. In addition, you have informed us that the technique may be applied in a manner to defeat efforts by the detainee to hold his breath by, for example, beginning an application of water as the detainee is exhaling. Either in the normal application, or where countermeasures are used, we understand that water may enter -- and may accumulate in -- the detainee's mouth and nasal cavity, preventing him from breathing. [17] In addition, you have indicated that the detainee as a countermeasure may swallow water, possibly in significant quantities. For that reason, based on advice of medical personnel, the CIA requires that saline solution be used instead of plain water to reduce the possibility of hyponatremia (i.e., reduced concentration of sodium in the blood) if the detainee drinks the water.

We understand that the effect of the waterboard is to induce a sensation of drowning. This sensation is based on a deeply rooted physiological response. Thus, the detainee experiences this sensation even if he is aware that he is not actually drowning. We are informed that based on extensive experience, the process is not physically painful, but that it usually does cause fear and panic. The waterboard has been used many thousands of times in SERE training provided to American military, personnel, though in that context it is usually limited to one or two applications of no more than 40 seconds each. [18]

You have explained that the waterboard technique is used only if: (1) the CIA has credible intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent; (2) there are "substantial and credible indicators the subject has actionable intelligence that can prevent, disrupt or delay this attack"; and (3) other interrogation methods have failed or are unlikely to yield actionable intelligence in time to prevent the attack. See Attachment to August 2 Rizzo Letter. You have also informed us that the waterboard may be approved for use with a given detainee only during, at most, one single 30-day period, and that during that period, the waterboard technique may be used on no more than five days. We further understand that in any 24-hour period, interrogators may use no more than two "sessions" of the waterboard on a subject -- with a "session" defined to mean the time that the detainee is strapped to the waterboard -- and that no session may last more than two hours. Moreover, during any session, the number of individual applications of water lasting 10 seconds or longer may not exceed six. As noted above, the maximum length of any application of water is 40 seconds (you have informed us that this maximum has rarely been reached). Finally, the total cumulative time of all applications of whatever length in a 24-hour period may not exceed 12 minutes. See August 19 [delete] Letter at 1-2. We understand that these limitations have been established with extensive input from OMS, based on experience to date with this technique and OMS's professional judgment that use of the waterboard on a healthy individual subject to these limitations would be "medically acceptable." See OMS Guidelines at 18-19.

During the use of the waterboard, a physician and a psychologist are present at all times. The detainee is monitored to ensure that he does not develop respiratory distress. If the detainee is not breathing freely after the cloth is removed from his face, he is immediately moved to a vertical position in order to clear the water from his mouth, nose, and nasopharynx. The gurney used for administering this technique is specially designed so that this can be accomplished very quickly if necessary. Your medical personnel have explained that the use of the waterboard does pose a small risk of certain potentially significant medical problems and that certain measures are taken to avoid or address such problems. First, a detainee might vomit and then aspirate the emesis. To reduce this risk, any detainee on whom this technique will be used is first placed on a liquid diet. Second, the detainee might aspirate some of the water, and the resulting water in the lungs might lead to pneumonia. To mitigate this risk, a potable saline solution is used in the procedure. Third, it is conceivable (though, we understand from OMS, highly unlikely) that a detainee could suffer spasms of the larynx that would prevent him from breathing even when the application of water is stopped and the detainee is returned to an upright position. In the event of such spasms, a qualified physician would immediately intervene to address the problem, and, if necessary, the intervening physician would perform a tracheotomy. Although the risk of such spasms is considered remote (it apparently has never occurred in thousands of instances of SERE training), we are informed that the necessary emergency medical equipment is always present -- although not visible to the detainee -- during any application of the waterboard. See generally id. at 17-20. [19]

We understand that in many years of use on thousands of participants in SERE training, the waterboard technique (although used in a substantially more limited way) has not resulted in any cases of serious physical pain or prolonged mental harm. In addition, we understand that the waterboard has been used by the CIA on three high level al Qaeda detainees, two of whom were subjected to the technique numerous times, and according to OMS, none of these three individuals has shown any evidence of physical pain or suffering or mental harm in the more than 25 months since the technique was used on them. As noted, we understand that OMS has been involved in imposing strict limits on the use of the waterboard, limits that, when combined with careful monitoring, in their professional judgment should prevent physical pain or suffering or mental harm to a detainee. In addition, we understand that any detainee is closely monitored by medical and psychological personnel whenever the waterboard is applied, and that there are additional reporting requirements beyond the normal reporting requirements in place when other interrogation techniques are used. See OMS Guidelines at 20.

* * *

As noted, all of the interrogation techniques described above are subject to numerous restrictions, many based on input from OMS. Our advice in this memorandum is based on our understanding that there will be careful adherence to all of these guidelines, restrictions, and safeguards, and that there will be ongoing monitoring and reporting by the team, including OMS medical and psychological personnel, as well as prompt intervention by a team member, as necessary, to prevent physical distress or mental harm so significant as possibly to amount to the "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" that is prohibited by sections 2340-2340A. Our advice is also based on our understanding that interrogators who will use these techniques are adequately trained to understand that the authorized use of the techniques is not designed or intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and also to understand and respect the medical judgment of OMS and the important role that OMS personnel play in the program.

C.

You asked for our advice concerning these interrogation techniques in connection with their use on a specific high value al Qaeda detainee named [delete]. You informed us that the [delete] had information about al Qaeda's plans to launch an attack within the United States. According to [delete] had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and had arranged meetings between an associate and [delete] to discuss such an attack. August 25 [delete] Letter at 2-3. You advised us that medical and psychological assessments [delete] were completed by a CIA physician and psychologist, and that based on this examination, the physician concluded [delete] medically stable and has no medical contraindications to interrogation, including the use of interrogation techniques addressed in this memorandum. [20] Medical and Psychological Assessment of [delete] attached to August 2 Rizzo Letter at 1. [21] The psychological assessment found [delete] was alert and oriented and his concentration and attention were appropriate." Id. at 2. The psychologist further found [delete] "thought processes were clear and logical; there was no evidence of a thought disorder, delusions, or hallucinations[, and t]here were not significant signs of depression, anxiety or other mental disturbance." Id. The psychologist evaluated [delete] `psychologically, stable, reserved and defensive," and "opined that there was no evidence that the use of the approved interrogation methods would cause any severe or prolonged psychological disturbance [delete] Id. at 2. Our conclusions depend on these assessments. Before using the techniques on other detainees, the CIA would need to ensure, in each case, that all medical and psychological assessments indicate that the detainee is fit to undergo the use of the interrogation techniques.

II.

A.


Section 2340A provides that "[w]hoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life." [22] Section 2340(1) defines "torture" as "an act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control." [23]

Congress enacted sections 2344-2340A to carry out the obligations of the United States under the CAT. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-482, at 229 (1994). The CAT, among other things, requires the United States, as a state party, to ensure that acts of torture, along with attempts and complicity to commit such acts, are crimes under U.S. law. See CAT arts. 2, 4-5. Sections 2340-2340A satisfy that requirement with respect to acts committed outside the United States. [24] Conduct constituting "torture" within the United States already was -- and remains -- prohibited by various other federal and state criminal statutes.

The CAT defines "torture" so as to require the intentional infliction of "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental." Article 1(1) of the CAT provides:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.


The Senate included the following understanding in its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the CAT:

The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.


S. Exec. Rep. No, 101-30, at 36 (1990). This understanding was deposited with the U.S. instrument of ratification, see 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Oct. 21, 1994), and thus defines the scope of United States obligations under the treaty. See Relevance of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, 11 Op. O.L.C. 28, 32-33 (1987). The criminal prohibition against torture that Congress codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A generally tracks the CAT's definition of torture, subject to the U.S. understanding.

B.

Under the language adopted by Congress in sections 2340-2340A, to constitute "torture," conduct must be "specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering." In the discussion that follows, we will separately consider each of the principal components of this key phrase: (1) the meaning of "severe"; (2) the meaning of "severe physical pain or suffering"; (3) the meaning of "severe mental pain or suffering"; and (4) the meaning of "specifically intended."

(1) The meaning of "severe."

Because the statute does not define "severe," "we construe [the] term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). The common understanding of the term "torture" and the context in which the statute was enacted also inform our analysis. Dictionaries define "severe" (often conjoined with "pain") to mean "extremely violent or intense: severe pain" American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1653 (3d ed. 1992); see also XV Oxford English Dictionary 101. (2d ed. 199) ("Of pain, suffering, loss, or the like: Grievous, extreme and "Of circumstances ... Hard to sustain or endure."). The common understanding of "torture" further supports the statutory concept that the pain or suffering must be severe. See Black's Law Dictionary 1528 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "torture" as "[t]he infliction of intense pain to the body or mind to punish, to extract a confession or information, or to obtain sadistic pleasure") (emphasis added), Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 2414 (2002) (defining "torture" as "the infliction of intense pain (as from burning, crushing, wounding) to punish or coerce someone") (emphasis added); Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide 1064 (1999) (defining "torture" as "the infliction of severe bodily pain, esp. as a punishment or a means of persuasion") (emphasis added). Thus, the use of the word "severe" in the statutory prohibition on torture clearly denotes a sensation or condition that is extreme in intensity and difficult to endure.

This interpretation is also consistent with the historical understanding of torture, which has generally involved the use of procedures and devices designed to inflict intense or extreme pain. The devices and procedures historically used were generally intended to cause extreme pain while not killing the person being questioned (or at least, not doing so quickly) so that questioning could continue. Descriptions in Lord Hope's lecture, "Torture," University of Essex/Clifford Chance Lecture at 7-8 (Jan. 28, 2004) (describing the "boot," which involved crushing of the victim's legs and feet, repeated pricking with long needles, and thumbscrews), and in Professor Langbein's book; Torture and the Law of Proof, cited supra p. 2, make this clear. As Professor Langbein summarized:

The commonest torture devices -- strappado, rack, thumbscrews, legscrews -- worked upon the extremities of the body, either by distending or compressing them. We may suppose that these modes of torture were preferred because were somewhat less likely to maim or kill than coercion directed to the trunk of the body, and because they would be quickly adjusted to take account of the victim's responses during the examination.


Torture and the Law of Proof at 15 (footnote omitted).25

The statute, moreover, was intended to implement United States obligations under the CAT, which, as quoted above, defines "torture" as acts that intentionally inflict "severe pain or suffering." CAT art. 1(1). As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained in its report recommending that the Senate consent to ratification of the CAT:

The [CAT) seeks to define "torture" in a relatively limited fashion, corresponding to the common understanding of torture as an extreme practice which is universally condemned...

...

...The term "torture," in United States and international usage, is usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of electric currents to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme pain.


S. Exec. Rep: No. 101-30 at 13.14. See also David P, Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within the United States, 15.Nova L. Rev, 449, 455 (1991) ("By stressing the extreme nature of torture, ... [the] definition [of torture in the CAT] describes a relatively limited set of circumstances likely to be illegal under most, if not all, domestic legal systems").

Drawing distinctions among gradations of pain is obviously not an easy task, especially given the lack of any precise, objective scientific criteria for measuring pain. [26] We are given some aid in this task by judicial interpretations of the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). The TVPA, also enacted to implement the CAT, provides a civil remedy to victims of torture. The TVPA defines "torture" to include:

any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions}, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person. has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind ...


28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 3(b)(1) (emphases added). The emphasized language, is similar to section 2340's phrase "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." [27] As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained:

The severity requirement is crucial to ensuring that the conduct proscribed by the [CAT] and the TVPA is sufficiently extreme, and outrageous to warrant the universal condemnation that the term "torture" both connotes and invokes. The drafters of the [CAT], as well as the Reagan Administration that signed it, the Bush Administration that submitted it to Congress, and the Senate that ultimately ratified it, therefore all sought to ensure that "only acts of a certain gravity shall be considered to constitute torture."

The critical issue is the degree of pain and suffering that the alleged torturer intended to, and actually did, inflict upon the victim. The more intense, lasting, or heinous the agony, the more likely it is to be torture.


Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92-93 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The D.C. Circuit in Price concluded that a complaint that alleged beatings at the hands of police but that did not provide details concerning "the severity of plaintiff's alleged beatings, including their frequency, duration, the parts of the body at which they were aimed, and the weapons used to carry them out," did not suffice "to ensure that [it] satisf[ied] the TVPA's rigorous definition of torture." Id. at 93.

In Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 326 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit again considered the types of acts that constitute torture under the TVPA definition. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Libyan authorities had held her incommunicado and threatened to kill her if she tried to leave. See id. at 232, 234. The court acknowledged that "these alleged acts certainly reflect a bent toward cruelty on the part of their perpetrators," but, reversing the district court, went on to hold that "they are not in themselves so sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to constitute torture within the meaning of the [TVPA]." Id. at 234. Cases in which courts have found torture illustrate the extreme nature of conduct that falls within the statutory definition. See, e.g., Hilao. v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790-91, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a course of conduct that included, among other things, severe beatings of plaintiff, repeated threats of death and electric shock, sleep deprivation, extended shackling to a cot (at times with a towel over his nose and mouth and water poured down his nostrils), seven months of confinement in a "suffocatingly hot" and cramped cell, and eight years of solitary or near-solitary confinement, constituted torture); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332-40, 1345-46 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (concluding that a course of conduct that included, among other things, severe beatings to the genitals, head, and other parts of the body with metal pipes, brass knuckles, batons, a baseball bat, and various other items; removal of teeth with pliers; kicking in the face and ribs; breaking of bones and ribs and dislocation of fingers; cutting a figure into the victim's forehead; hanging the victim and beating him; extreme limitations of food and water; and subjection to games of "Russian roulette," constituted torture); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22-23 (D.D.C. 2001) (entering default judgment against Iraq where plaintiffs alleged, among other things, threats of "physical torture, such as cutting off ... fingers, pulling out ... fingernails," and electric shocks to the testicles); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64-66 (D.D.C. 1998) (concluding that a course of conduct that included frequent beatings, pistol whipping, threats of imminent death, electric shocks, and attempts to force confessions by playing Russian roulette and pulling the trigger at each denial, constituted torture).

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 2 OF 3

(2) The meaning of "severe physical pain or suffering,"

The statute provides a specific definition of "severe mental pain or suffering," see 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2), but does not define the term "severe physical pain or suffering." The meaning of "severe physical pain" is relatively straightforward; it denotes physical pain that is extreme in intensity and difficult to endure. In our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, we concluded that under some circumstances, conduct intended to inflict "severe physical suffering" may constitute torture even if it is not intended to inflict "severe physical pain." Id. at 10. That conclusion follows from the plain language of sections 2340-2340A. The inclusion of the words "or suffering" in the phrase "severe physical pain or suffering" suggests that the statutory category of physical torture is not limited to "severe physical pain." See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174(2001) (explaining presumption against surplusage).

"Severe physical suffering," however, is difficult to define with precision. As we have previously noted, the text of the statute and the CAT, and their history, provide little concrete guidance as to what Congress intended by the concept of "severe physical suffering." See 2004 Legal Standards Opinion at 11. We interpret the phrase in a statutory context where Congress expressly distinguished "severe physical pain or suffering" from "severe mental pain or suffering." Consequently, we believe it a reasonable inference that "physical suffering" was intended by Congress to mean something distinct from "mental pain or suffering." [28] We presume that where Congress uses different words in a statute, those words are intended to have different meanings. See, e.g., Barnes v. United Slates, 199 F.3d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Different language in separate clauses in a statute indicates Congress intended distinct meanings.") Moreover, given that Congress precisely defined "mental pain or suffering" in sections 2340-2340A, it is unlikely to have intended to undermine that careful definition by including essentially mental distress within the separate category of "physical suffering." [29]

In our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, we concluded, based on the understanding that "suffering" denotes a "state" or "condition" that must be "endured" over time, that there is "an extended temporal element, or at least an element of persistence" to the concept of physical suffering in sections 2340-2340A. Id. at 12 & n.22. Consistent with this analysis in our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, and in light of standard dictionary definitions, we read the word "suffering," when used in reference to physical or bodily sensations, to mean a state or condition of physical distress, misery, affliction, or torment (usually associated with physical pain) that persists for a significant period of time. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2284 (defining "suffering" as "the state or experience of one who suffers: the endurance of or submission to affliction, pain, loss"; "a pain endured or a distress, loss, or injury incurred"); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 572, 1229, 1998 (2d.ed, unabridged 1987) (giving "distress," "misery," and "torment" as synonyms of "suffering"). Physical distress or discomfort that is merely transitory and that does not persist over time does not constitute "physical suffering" within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, in our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, we concluded that "severe physical suffering" for purposes of sections 2340-2340A requires "a condition of some extended duration or persistence as well as intensity" and "is reserved for physical distress that is 'severe' considering its intensity and duration or persistence, rather than merely mild or transitory." Id. at 12.

We therefore believe that "severe physical suffering" under the statute means a state or condition of physical distress, misery, affliction, or torment, usually involving physical pain, that is both extreme in intensity and significantly protracted in duration or persistent over time. Accordingly, judging whether a particular state or condition may amount to "severe physical suffering" requires a weighing of both its intensity and its duration. The more painful or intense is the physical distress involved -- i.e., the closer it approaches the level of severe physical pain separately proscribed by the statute -- the less significant would be the element of duration or persistence over time. On the other hand, depending on the circumstances, a level of physical distress or discomfort that is lacking in extreme intensity may not constitute "severe physical suffering" regardless of its duration -- i.e., even if it lasts for a very long period of time. In defining conduct proscribed by sections 2340-2340A, Congress established a high bar. The ultimate question is whether the conduct "is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant the universal condemnation that the term 'torture' both connotes and invokes." See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d at 92 (interpreting the TVPA); cf. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-40, 1345-46 (standard met under the TVPA by a course of conduct that included severe beatings to the genitals, head, and other parts of the body with metal pipes and various other items; removal of teeth with pliers; kicking in the face and ribs; breaking of bones and ribs and dislocation of fingers; cutting a figure into the victim's forehead; hanging the victim and beating him; extreme limitations of food and water; and subjection to games of "Russian roulette").

(3) The meaning of "severe mental pain or suffering."

Section. 2340 defines "severe mental pain or suffering" to mean:

the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from --

(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;

(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;

(C) the threat of imminent death; or

(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality[.]


18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). Torture is defined under the statute to include an act specifically intended to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. See Id. § 2340(1),

An important preliminary question with respect to this definition is whether the statutory list of the four "predicate acts" in section 2340(2)(A)-(D) is exclusive. We have concluded that Congress intended the list of predicate acts to be exclusive -- that is, to satisfy the definition of "severe mental pain or suffering" under the statute, the prolonged mental harm must be caused by acts falling within one of the four "statutory categories of predicate acts. 2004 Legal Standards Opinion at 13. We reached this conclusion based on the clear language of the statute, which provides a detailed definition that includes four categories of predicate acts joined by the disjunctive and does not contain a catchall provision or any other language suggesting that additional acts might qualify (for example, language such as "including" or "such acts as"). Id.30

Congress plainly considered very specific predicate acts, and this definition tracks the Senate's understanding concerning mental pain or suffering on which its advice and consent to ratification of the CAT was conditioned. The conclusion that the list of predicate acts is exclusive is consistent with both the text of the Senate's understanding, and with the fact that the understanding was required out of concern that the CAT's definition of torture would not otherwise meet the constitutional requirement for clarity in defining crimes. See 2004 Legal Standards Opinion at 13. Adopting an interpretation of the statute that expands the list of predicate acts for "severe mental pain or suffering" would constitute an impermissible rewriting of the statute and would introduce the very imprecision that prompted the Senate to require this understanding as a condition of its advice and consent to ratification of the CAT.

Another question is whether the requirement of "prolonged mental harm" caused by or resulting from one of the enumerated predicate acts is a separate requirement, or whether such "prolonged mental harm" is to be presumed any time one of the predicate acts occurs. Although it is possible to read the statute's reference to "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" the predicate acts as creating a statutory presumption that each of the predicate acts will always cause prolonged mental harm, we concluded in our 2004 Legal Standards Opinion that that was not Congress's intent, since the statutory definition of "severe mental pain or suffering" was meant to track the understanding that the Senate required as a condition to its advice and consent to ratification of the CAT:

in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.


S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30 at 36. As we previously stated, "[w]e do not believe that simply by adding the word 'the' before 'prolonged harm,' Congress intended a material change in the definition of mental pain or suffering as articulated in the Senate's understanding to the CAT." 2004 Legal Standards Opinion at 13-14. "The definition of torture emanates directly from article 1 of the [CAT]. The definition for 'severe mental pain and suffering' incorporates the [above mentioned] understanding." S. Rep. No. 103-107, at 58-59 (1993) (emphasis added). This understanding, embodied in the statute, defines the obligation undertaken by the United States. Given this understanding, the legislative history, and the fact that section 2340(2) defines "severe mental pain or suffering" carefully in language very similar to the understanding, we believe that Congress did not intend to create a presumption that any time one of the predicate acts occurs, prolonged mental harm is automatically deemed to result. See 2004 Legal Standards Opinion at 13-14. At the same time, it is conceivable that the occurrence of one of the predicate acts alone could, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, give rise to an inference of intent to cause prolonged, mental harm, as required by the statute.

Turning to the question of what constitutes "prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" a predicate act, we have concluded that Congress intended this phrase to require mental "harm" that has some lasting duration. Id. at 14. There is little guidance to draw upon in interpreting the phrase "prolonged mental harm," which does not appear in the relevant medical literature. Nevertheless, our interpretation is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms. First, the use of the word "harm" -- as opposed to simply repeating "pain or suffering" -- suggests some mental damage or injury. Ordinary dictionary definitions of "harm," such as "physical or mental damage: injury," Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1034 (emphasis added), or "[p]hysical or psychological injury or damage," American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language at 825 (emphasis added), support this interpretation. Second, to "prolong" means to "lengthen in time," "extend in duration," or "draw out," Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1815, further suggesting that to be "prolonged," the mental damage must extend for some period of time. This damage need not be permanent, but it must be intended to continue for a "prolonged" period of time. [31] Moreover, under section 2340(2), the "prolonged mental harm" must be cause by or "resulting from" one of the enumerated predicate acts. As we pointed out in 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, this conclusion is not meant to suggest that, if the predicate act or acts continue for an extended period, "prolonged mental harm" cannot occur until after they are completed. Id. at 14-15 n.26. Early occurrences of the predicate act could cause mental harm that could continue -- and become prolonged -- during the extended period the predicate acts continued to occur. See, e.g., Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that predicate acts had continued over a three-to-four-year period and concluding that "prolonged mental harm" had occurred during that time).

Although there are few judicial opinions discussing the question of "prolonged mental harm," those cases that have addressed the issue are consistent with our view. For example, in the TVPA case of Mehinovic v. Vuckovic; the district court explained that:

[The defendant] also caused or participated in the plaintiff’s mental torture. Mental torture consists of "prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; ... The threat of imminent death ...." As set out above, plaintiffs noted in their testimony that they feared that they would be killed by [the defendant] during the beatings he inflicted or during games of "Russian roulette." Each plaintiff continues to suffer long-term psychological harm as a result of the ordeals they suffered at the hands of defendant and others.


198 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 (emphasis added, first ellipsis in original). In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that each of the plaintiffs were continuing to suffer serious mental harm even ten years after the events in question. See id. at 1334-40. In each case, these mental effects were continuing years after the infliction of the predicate acts. See also Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98, 601-02 (victim was kidnapped and "forcibly recruited" as a child soldier at the age of 14, and, over a period of three to four years, was repeatedly forced to take narcotics and threatened with imminent death, all of which produced "prolonged mental harm" during that time). Conversely, in Willeda Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 D. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2003), the court rejected a claim under the TVPA brought by individuals who had been held at gunpoint overnight and repeatedly threatened with death. While recognizing that their experience caused lasting damage, noting that "there is simply no allegation that Plaintiffs have suffered any prolonged mental harm or physical injury as a result of their alleged intimidation." Id. at 1294-95.

(4) The meaning of "specifically intended."

It is well recognized that the term "specific intent" has no clear, settled definition, and that the courts do not use it consistently. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e), at 355 & n.79 (2d. 2003). "Specific intent" is most commonly understood, however, "to designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." Id. at 354; see also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 265 (2000) (explaining that general intent, as opposed to specific intent, requires "that the defendant possessed knowledge [only] with respect to the actus reus of the crime"). Some cases suggest that only a conscious desire to produce the proscribed result constitutes specific intent; other suggest that even reasonable foreseeability may suffice. In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), for example, the Court suggested that, at least "[i]n a general sense," id. at 405, "specific intent" requires that one consciously desire the result. Id. at 403-05. The Court compared the common law's mens rea concepts of specific intent and general intent to the Model Penal Code's mens rea concepts of acting purposefully and acting knowingly. See id. at 404-05. "[A] person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully," wrote the Court, "if 'he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct.'" Id. at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). A person "is said to act knowingly," in contrast, "if he is aware 'that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then stated: "In a general sense, 'purpose' corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent." Id. at 405. In contrast, cases such as United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1979), suggest that to prove specific intent it is enough that the defendant simply have "knowledge or notice" that his act "would have likely resulted in" the proscribed outcome. Id. at 1273. "Notice," the court held, "is provided by the reasonable foreseeabitity of the natural and probable consequences of one's acts." Id.

As in 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, we will not attempt to ascertain the precise meaning of "specific intent" in sections 2340-2340A. See id. at 16-17. It is clear, however, that the necessary specific intent would be present if an individual performed an act and "consciously desire[d]" that act to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. I. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(a), at 341. Conversely, if an individual acted in good faith, and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct would not be expected to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, he would not have the specific intent necessary to violate sections 2340-2340A. Such an individual could be said neither consciously to desire the proscribed result, see, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405, nor to have "knowledge or notice" that his act "would likely have resulted in" the proscribed outcome, Neiswender, 590 F.2d at 1273.

As we did in 2004 Legal Standards Opinion, we stress two additional points regarding specific intent: First, specific intent is distinguished from motive. A good motive, such as to protect national security, does not excuse conduct that is specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, as proscribed by the statute. Second, specific intent to take a given action can be found even if the actor would take the action only upon certain conditions. Cf., e.g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11 (1999) ("[A] defendant may not negate a proscribed intent, by requiring the victim to comply with a condition the defendant has no right to impose."). See also id., at 10-11 & nn. 9-12; Model Penal Code § 2.02(6). Thus, for example, the fact that a victim might have avoided being tortured by cooperating with the perpetrator would not render permissible the resort to conduct that would otherwise constitute torture under the statute. 2004 Legal Standards Opinion at 17.32

III.

In the discussion that follows, we will address each of the specific interrogation techniques you have described. Subject to the understandings, limitations, and safeguards discussed herein, including ongoing medical and psychological monitoring and team intervention as necessary, we conclude that the authorized use of each of these techniques, considered individually, would not violate the prohibition that Congress has adopted in sections 2340-2340A. This conclusion is straightforward with respect to all but two of the techniques. Use of sleep deprivation as an enhanced technique and use of the waterboard, however, involve more substantial questions, with the waterboard presenting the most substantial question. Although we conclude that the use of these techniques -- as we understand them and subject to the limitations you have described -- would not violate the statute, the issues raised by these two techniques counsel great caution in their use, including both careful adherence to the limitations and restrictions you have described and also close and continuing medical and psychological monitoring.

Before addressing the application of section 2340-2340A to the specific techniques in question, we note certain overall features of the CIA's approach that are significant to our conclusions. Interrogators are trained and certified in a course that you have informed us currently lasts approximately four weeks. Interrogators (and other personnel deployed as part of this program) are required to review and acknowledge the applicable interrogation guidelines. See Confinement Guidelines at 2; Interrogation Guidelines at 2 ("The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall ensure that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained pursuant to the authorities set forth in [delete] have been appropriately screened (from the medical, psychological and security standpoints), have reviewed these Guidelines, have received appropriate training in their implementation, and have completed the attached Acknowledgement"). We assume that all interrogators are adequately trained, that they understand the design and purpose of the interrogation techniques, and that they will apply the techniques in accordance with their authorized and intended use.

In addition, the involvement of medical and psychological personnel in the adaptation and application of the established SERE techniques is particularly noteworthy for purposes of our analysis. [33] Medical personnel have been involved in imposing limitations on -- and requiring changes to -- certain procedures, particularly the use of the waterboard. [34] We have had extensive meetings with the medical personnel involved in monitoring the use of these techniques. It is clear that they "have carefully worked to ensure that the techniques do not result in severe physical or mental pain or suffering to the detainees. [35] Medical and psychological personnel evaluate each detainee before the use of these techniques on the detainee is approved, and they continue to monitor each detainee throughout his interrogation and detention. Moreover, medical personnel are physically present throughout application of the waterboard (and present or otherwise observing the use of all techniques that involve physical contact, as discussed more fully above), and they carefully monitor detainees who are undergoing sleep deprivation or dietary manipulation. In addition, they regularly assess both the medical literature and the experience with detainees. [36] OMS has specifically declared that "[m]edical officers must remain cognizant at all times of their obligation to prevent 'severe physical' or mental pain or suffering.'" OMS Guidelines at 10. In fact, we understand that medical and psychological personnel have discontinued the use of techniques as to a particular detainee when they believed he might suffer such pain or suffering, and in certain instances, OMS medical personnel have not cleared certain detainees for some -- or any -- techniques based on the initial medical and psychological assessments. They have also imposed additional restrictions on the use of techniques (such as the waterboard) in order to protect the safety of detainees, thus reducing further the risk of severe pain or suffering. You have informed us that they will continue to have this role and authority. We assume that all interrogators understand the important role and authority of OMS personnel and will cooperate with OMS in the exercise of these duties.

Finally, in sharp contrast to those practices universally condemned as torture over the centuries, the techniques we consider here have been carefully evaluated to avoid causing severe pain or suffering to the detainees. As OMS has described these techniques as a group:

In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact; and not some physical effect, with a specific goal of "dislocat[ing] [the detainees] expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive...." The more physical techniques are delivered in a manner carefully limited to avoid serious pain. The slaps, for example, are designed "to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation" and "not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting."


Id. at 8-9.

With this background, we turn to the application of sections 2344-2340A to each of the specific interrogation techniques.

1. Dietary manipulation. Based on experience, it is evident that this technique is not expected to cause any physical pain, let alone pain that is extreme in intensity. The detainee is carefully monitored to ensure that he does not suffer acute weight loss or any dehydration. Further, there is nothing in the experience of caloric intake at this level that could be expected to cause physical pain. Although we do not equate a person who voluntarily enters a weight-loss program with a detainee subjected to dietary manipulation as an interrogation technique, we believe that it is relevant that several commercial weight-loss programs available in the United States involve similar or even greater reductions in caloric intake. Nor could this technique reasonably be thought to induce "severe physical suffering." Although dietary manipulation may cause some degree of hunger, such an experience is far from extreme hunger (let alone starvation) and cannot be expected to amount to "severe physical suffering" under the statute. The caloric levels are set based on the detainee's weight, so as to ensure that the detainee does not experience extreme hunger. As noted, many people participate in weight-loss programs that involve similar or more stringent caloric limitations, and, while such participation cannot be equated with the use of dietary manipulation as an interrogation technique, we believe that the existence of such programs is relevant to whether dietary manipulation could cause "severe physical suffering" within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A. Because there is no prospect that the technique would cause severe physical pain or suffering, we conclude that the authorized use of this technique by an adequately trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so.

This technique presents no issue of "severe mental pain or suffering" within the meaning of section 2340-2340A, because the use of this technique would involve no qualifying predicate act. The technique does not, for example, involve "the intentional infliction of threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering," 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2)(A), or the "application ... of ... procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or the personality," id. § 2340 (2)(B). Moreover, there is no basis to believe that dietary manipulation could cause "prolonged mental harm." Therefore, we conclude that the authorized use of this technique by an adequately trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause such harm. [37]

2. Nudity. We understand that nudity is used as a technique to create psychological discomfort, not to inflict any physical pain or suffering. You have informed us that during the use of this technique, detainees are kept in locations with ambient temperatures that ensure there is no threat to their health. Specifically, this technique would not be employed at temperatures below 68°F (and is unlikely to be employed below 75°F). Even if this technique involves some physical discomfort, it cannot be said to cause "suffering" (as we have explained the term above), let alone "severe physical pain or suffering," and we therefore conclude that its authorized use by an adequately 'trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so. Although some detainees might be humiliated by this technique, especially given possible cultural sensitivities, and the possibility of being seen by female officers, it cannot constitute "severe mental pain or suffering" under the statute because it does not involve any of the predicate acts specified by Congress.

3. Attention grasp. The attention grasp involves no physical pain or suffering, for the detainee and does not involve any predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering under the statute. Accordingly, because this technique cannot be expected to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering, we conclude that its authorized use by, an adequately trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so.

4. Walling. Although the walling technique involves the use of considerable force to push the detainee against the wall and may involve a large number of repetitions in certain cases, we understand that the false wall that is used is flexible and that this technique is not designed to, and does not, cause severe physical pain to the detainee. We understand that there may be some pain or irritation associated with the collar, which, is used to help avoid injury such as whiplash to the detainee, but that any physical pain associated with the use of the collar would not approach the level of intensity needed to constitute severe physical pain. Similarly, we do not believe that the physical distress caused by this technique or the duration of its use, even with multiple repetitions, could amount to severe physical suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A. We understand that medical and psychological personnel are present or observing during the use of this technique (as with all techniques involving physical contact with a detainee), and that any member of the team or the medical staff may intercede to stop the use of the technique if it is being used improperly or if it appears that it may cause injury to the detainee. We also do not believe that the use of this technique would involve a threat of infliction of severe physical pain or suffering or other predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering under the statute. Rather, this technique is designed to shock the detainee and disrupt his expectations that he will not be treated forcefully and to wear down his resistance to interrogation. Based on these understandings, we conclude that the authorized use of this technique by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 2340-2340A. [38]

5. Facial hold. Like the attention grasp, this technique involves no physical pain or suffering and does not involve any predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering.

6. Facial slap or insult slap. Although this technique involves a degree of physical pain, the pain associated with a slap to the face, as you have described it to us, could not be expected to constitute severe physical pain. We understand that the purpose of this technique is to cause shock, surprise, or humiliation, not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting; we assume it will be used accordingly. Similarly, the physical distress that may be caused by an abrupt slap to the face, even if repeated several times, would not constitute an extended state or condition of physical suffering and also would not likely involve the level of intensity required for severe physical suffering under the statute. Finally, a facial slap would. not involve a predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering. Therefore, the authorized use of this technique by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 2340-2340A. [39]

7. Abdominal slap. Although the abdominal slap technique might involve some minor physical pain, it cannot, as you have described it to us, be said to involve even moderate, let alone severe, physical pain or suffering. Again, because the technique cannot be expected to cause severe physical pain or suffering, we conclude that its authorized use by an adequately trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so. Nor could it be considered specifically intended to cause severe mental pain or suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A, as none of the statutory predicate acts would be present.

8. Cramped confinement. This technique does not involve any significant physical pain or suffering. It also does not involve a predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering. Specifically, we do not believe that placing a detainee in a dark, cramped space for the limited period of time involved here could reasonably be considered a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses so as to cause prolonged mental harm. Accordingly, we conclude that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 2340-2340A.

9. Wall standing. The wall standing technique, as you have described it, would not involve severe physical pain within the meaning of the statute. It also cannot be expected to cause severe physical suffering. Even if the physical discomfort of muscle fatigue associated with wall standing might be substantial, we understand that the duration of the technique is self-limited by the individual detainee's ability to sustain the position; thus, the short duration of the discomfort means that this technique would not be expected to cause, and could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause, severe physical suffering. Our advice also assumes that the detainee's position is not designed to produce severe pain that might result from contortions or twisting of the body, but only temporary muscle fatigue. Nor does wall standing involve any predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that the authorized use of this technique by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of the statute.

10. Stress positions. For the same reasons that the use of wall standing would not violate the statute, we conclude that the authorized use of stress positions such as those described in Interrogation Memorandum, if employed by adequately trained interrogators, could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 2340-2340A. As with wall standing, we understand that the duration of the technique is self-limited by the individual detainee's ability to sustain the position; thus, the short duration of the discomfort means that this technique would not be expected to cause, and could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause, severe physical suffering. Our advice also assumes that stress positions are not designed to produce severe pain that might result from contortions or twisting of the body, but only temporary muscle fatigue. [40]

11. Water dousing. As you have described it to us, water dousing involves dousing the detainee with water from a container or a hose without a nozzle, and is intended to wear him down both physically and psychologically. You have informed us that the water might be as cold as 41°F, though you have further advised us that the water generally is not refrigerated and therefore is unlikely to be less than 50°F. (Nevertheless, for purposes of our analysis, we will assume that water as cold as 41°F might be used.) OMS has advised that, based on the extensive experience in SERE training, the medical literature, and the experience with detainees to date, water dousing as authorized is not designed or expected to cause significant physical pain, and certainly not severe physical pain. Although we understand that prolonged immersion in very cold water may be physically painful, as noted above, this interrogation technique does not involve immersion and a substantial margin of safety is built into the time limitation on the use of the CIA's water dousing technique -- use of the technique with water of a given temperature must be limited to no more than two-thirds of the time in which hypothermia could be expected to occur from total immersion in water of the same temperature. [41] While being cold can involve physical discomfort, OMS also advises that in their professional judgment any resulting discomfort is not expected to be intense, and the duration is limited by specific times tied to water temperature. Any discomfort caused by this technique, therefore, would not qualify as "severe physical suffering" within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A. Consequently, given that there is no expectation that the technique will cause severe physical pain or suffering when properly used, we conclude that the authorized use of this technique by an adequately trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause these results.

With respect to mental pain or suffering, as you have described the procedure, we do not believe that any of the four statutory predicate acts necessary for a possible finding of severe mental pain or suffering under the statute would be present. Nothing, for example, leads us to believe that the detainee would understand the procedure to constitute a threat of imminent death, especially given that care is taken to ensure that no water will get into the detainee's mouth or nose. Nor would a detainee reasonably understand the prospect of being doused with cold water as the threatened infliction of severe pain. Furthermore, even were we to conclude that there could be a qualifying predicate act, nothing suggests that the detainee would be expected to suffer any prolonged mental harm as a result of the procedure. OMS advises that there has been no evidence of such harm in the SERE training, which utilizes a much more extreme technique involving total immersion. The presence of psychologists who monitor the detainee's mental condition makes such harm even more unlikely. Consequently, we conclude that the authorized use of the technique by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe mental pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute.

The flicking technique, which is subject to the same temperature limitations as water dousing but would involve substantially less water, a fortiori would not violate the statute.

12. Sleep deprivation. In the Interrogation Memorandum, we concluded that sleep deprivation did not violate sections 2340-2340A. See id. at. 10, 14-15. This question warrants further analysis for two reasons. First, we did not consider the potential for physical pain or suffering resulting from the shackling used to keep detainees awake or any impact from the diapering of the detainee. Second, we did not address the possibility of severe physical suffering that does not involve severe physical pain.

Under the limitations adopted by the CIA, sleep deprivation may not exceed 180 hours, which we understand is approximately two-thirds of the maximum recorded time that humans have gone without sleep for purposes of medical study, as discussed below. [42] Furthermore, any detainee who has undergone 180 hours of sleep deprivation must then be allowed to sleep without interruption for at least eight straight hours. Although we understand that the CIA's guidelines would allow another session of sleep deprivation to begin after the detainee has gotten at least eight hours of uninterrupted sleep following 180 hours of sleep deprivation, we will evaluate only one application of up to 180 hours of sleep deprivation. [43]

We understand from OMS, and from our review of the literature on the physiology of sleep, that even very extended sleep deprivation does not cause physical pain, let alone severe physical pain. [44] "The longest studies of sleep deprivation in humans ... [involved] volunteers [who] were deprived of sleep for 8 to 11 days.... Surprisingly, little seemed to go wrong with the subjects physically. The main effects lay with sleepiness and impaired brain functioning, but even these were no great cause for concern," James Horne, Why We Sleep: The Functions of Sleep in Humans and Other Mammals 23-24 (1988) ("Why We Sleep") (footnote omitted). We note that there are important differences between sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique used by the CIA and the controlled experiments documented in the literature. The subjects of the experiments were free to move about and engage in normal activities and often led a "tranquil existence" with "plenty of time for relaxation," see id. at 24, whereas a detainee in CIA custody would be shackled and prevented from moving freely. Moreover, the subjects in the experiments often increased their food consumption during periods of extended sleep loss, see id. at 38, whereas the detainee undergoing interrogation may be placed on a reduced-calorie diet, as discussed above. Nevertheless, we understand that experts who have studied sleep deprivation have concluded that "[t]he most plausible reason for the uneventful physical findings with these human beings is that ... sleep loss is not particularly harmful." Id. at 24, We understand that this conclusion does not depend on the extent of physical movement or exercise by the subject or whether the subject increases his food consumption. OMS medical staff members have also informed us, based on their experience with detainees who have undergone extended sleep deprivation and their review of the relevant medical literature, that extended sleep deprivation does not cause physical pain. Although edema, or swelling, of the lower legs may sometimes develop as a result of the long periods of standing associated with sleep deprivation, we understand from OMS that such edema is not painful and will quickly dissipate once the subject is removed from the standing position. We also understand that if any case of significant edema develops, the team will intercede to ensure that the detainee is moved from the standing position and that he receives any medical attention. necessary to relieve the swelling and allow the edema to dissipate. For these reasons, we conclude that the authorized use of extended sleep deprivation by adequately trained interrogators would not be expected to cause and could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical pain.

In addition, OMS personnel have informed us that the shackling of detainees is not designed to and does not result in significant physical pain. A detainee subject to sleep deprivation would not be allowed to hang by his wrists, and we understand that no detainee subjected to sleep deprivation to date has been allowed to hang by his wrists or has otherwise suffered injury. [45] If necessary, we understand that medical personnel will intercede to prevent any such injury and would require either that interrogators use a different method to keep the detainee awake (such as through the use of sitting or horizontal positions), or that the use of the technique be stopped altogether. When the sitting position is used, the detainee is seated on a small stool to which he is shackled; the stool supports his weight but is too small to let the detainee balance himself and fall asleep. We also specifically understand that the use of shackling with horizontal sleep deprivation, which has only been used rarely, is done in such a way as to ensure that there is no additional stress on the detainees arm or leg joints that might force the limbs beyond natural extension or create tension on any joint. Thus, shackling cannot be expected to result in severe physical pain, and we conclude that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so. Finally, we believe that the use of a diaper cannot be expected to -- and could not reasonably be considered intended to -- result in any physical pain, let alone severe physical pain.

Although it is a more substantial question, particularly given the imprecision in the statutory standard and the lack of guidance from the courts, we also conclude that extended sleep deprivation, subject to the limitations and conditions described herein, would not be expected to cause "severe physical suffering." We understand that some individuals who undergo extended sleep deprivation would likely at some point experience physical discomfort and distress. We assume that some individuals would eventually feel weak physically and may experience other unpleasant physical sensations from prolonged fatigue, including such symptoms as impairment to coordinated body movement, difficulty with speech, nausea, and blurred vision. See Why We Sleep at 30, In addition, we understand that extended sleep deprivation will often cause a small drop in body temperature, see id. at 31, and we assume that such a drop in body temperature may also be associated with unpleasant physical sensations. We also assume that any physical discomfort that might be associated with sleep deprivation would likely increase, at least to a point, the longer the subject goes without sleep. Thus, on these assumptions, it may be the case that at some point, for some individuals, the degree of physical distress experienced in sleep deprivation might be substantial. [46]

On the other hand we understand from OMS, and from the literature we have reviewed on the physiology of sleep, that many individuals may tolerate extended sleep deprivation well and with little apparent distress, and that this has been the CIA's experience. [47] Furthermore, the principal physical problem associated with standing is edema, and in any instance of significant edema, the interrogation team will remove the detainee from the standing position and will seek medical assistance. The shackling is used only as a passive means of keeping the detainee awake and, in both the tightness of the shackles and the positioning of the hands, is not intended to cause pain. A detainee, for example, will not be allowed to hang by his wrists. Shackling in the sitting position involves a stool that is adequate to support the detainee's weight. In the rare instances when horizontal sleep deprivation may be used, a thick towel or blanket is placed under the detainee to protect against reduction of body temperature from contact with the floor, and the manacles and shackles are anchored so as not to cause pain or create tension on any joint. If the detainee is nude and is using an adult diaper, the diaper is checked regularly to prevent skin irritation. The conditions of sleep deprivation are thus aimed at preventing severe physical suffering. Because sleep deprivation does not involve physical pain and would not be expected to cause extreme physical distress to the detainee, the extended duration of sleep deprivation, within the 180-hour limit imposed by the CIA, is not a sufficient factor alone to constitute severe physical suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A. We therefore believe that the use of this technique, under the specified limits and conditions, is not "extreme and outrageous" and does not reach the high bar set by Congress for a violation of sections 2340-2340A. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d at 92 (to be torture under the TVPA, conduct must be "extreme and outrageous"); cf. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-40, 1345-46 (standard met under the TVPA by a course of conduct that included severe beatings to the genitals, head, and other parts of the body with metal pipes and various other items; removal of teeth with pliers; kicking in the face and ribs; breaking of bones and ribs and dislocation of fingers; cutting a figure into the victim's forehead; hanging the victim and beating him; extreme limitations of food and water; and subjection to games of "Russian roulette").

Nevertheless, because extended sleep deprivation could in some cases result in substantial physical distress, the safeguards adopted by the CIA, including ongoing medical monitoring and intervention by the team if needed, are important to ensure that the CIA's use of extended sleep deprivation will not run afoul of the statute. Different individual detainees may react physically to sleep deprivation in different ways. We assume, therefore, that the team will separately monitor each individual detainee who is undergoing sleep deprivation, and that the application of this technique will be sensitive to the individualized physical condition and reactions of each detainee. Moreover, we emphasize our understanding that OMS will intervene to alter or stop the course of sleep deprivation for a detainee if OMS concludes in its medical judgment that the detainee is or may be experiencing extreme physical distress. [48] The team, we understand, will intervene not only if the sleep deprivation itself may be having such effects, but also if the shackling or other conditions attendant to the technique appear to be causing severe physical suffering. With these precautions in place, and based on the assumption that they will be followed, we conclude that the authorized use of extended sleep deprivation by adequately trained interrogators would not be expected to and could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical suffering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.

Finally, we also conclude that extended steep deprivation cannot be expected to cause "severe mental pain or suffering" as defined in sections 2340-2340A, and that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do so. First, we do not believe that use of the sleep deprivation technique, subject to the conditions in place, would involve one of the predicate acts necessary for "severe mental pain or suffering" under the statute. There would be no infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering, within the meaning of the statute, and there would be no threat of imminent death. It may be questioned whether steep deprivation could be characterized as a "procedure[] calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality" within the meaning of section 2340(2)(B), since we understand from OMS and from the scientific literature that extended sleep deprivation might induce hallucinations in some cases. Physicians from OMS have informed us, however, that they are of the view that, in general, no "profound" disruption would result from the length of sleep deprivation contemplated by the CIA, and again the scientific literature we have reviewed appears to support this conclusion. Moreover, we understand that any team member would direct that the technique be immediately discontinued if there were any sign that the detainee is experiencing hallucinations. Thus, it appears that the authorized use of sleep deprivation by the CIA would not be expected to result in a profound disruption of the senses, and if it did, it would be discontinued. Even assuming, however, that the extended use of sleep deprivation may result in hallucinations that could fairly be characterized as a "profound" disruption of the subject's senses, we do not believe it tenable to conclude that in such circumstances the use of sleep deprivation could be said to be "calculated" to cause such profound disruption to the senses, as required by the statute. The term "calculated" denotes something that is planned or thought out beforehand: "Calculate," as used in the statute, is defined to mean "to plan the nature of beforehand: think out"; "to design, prepare, or adapt by forethought or careful plan: fit or prepare by appropriate means." Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 315; (defining "calculate" -- "used chiefly [as it is in section 2340(2)(B)] as [a] past part[iciple] with complementary, infinitive <calculated to succeed>"). Here, it is evident that the potential for any hallucinations on the part of a detainee undergoing sleep deprivation is not something that would be a "calculated" result of the use of this technique, particularly given that the team would intervene immediately to stop the technique if there were signs the subject was experiencing hallucinations.

Second, even if we were to assume, out of an abundance of caution, that extended sleep deprivation could be said to be a "procedure[] calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality of the subject within the meaning of section 2340(2)(B), we do not believe that this technique would be expected to -- or that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could reasonably be considered specifically intended to -- cause "prolonged mental harm" as required by the statute, because, as we understand it, any hallucinatory effects of sleep deprivation would dissipate rapidly, OMS has informed us, based on the scientific literature and on its own experience with detainees who have been sleep deprived, that any such hallucinatory effects would not be prolonged. We understand from OMS that Why We Sleep provides an accurate summary of the scientific literature on this point. As discussed there, the longest documented period of time for which any human has gone without sleep is 264 hours. See id. at 29-34. The longest study with more than one subject involved 205 hours of sleep deprivation. See id. at 37-42. We understand that these and other studies constituting a significant body of scientific literature indicate that sleep deprivation temporarily affects the functioning of the brain but does not otherwise have significant physiological effects. See id. at 100. Sleep deprivation's effects on the brain are generally not severe but can include impaired cognitive performance and visual hallucinations; however, these effects dissipate rapidly, often with as little as one night's sleep. See id. at 31-32, 34-37, 40, 47-53. Thus, we conclude, any temporary hallucinations that might result from extended sleep deprivation could not reasonably be considered "prolonged mental harm" for purposes of sections 2340-2340A. [49]

In light of these observations, although in its extended uses it may present a substantial question under sections 2340-2340A, we conclude that the authorized use of sleep deprivation by adequately trained interrogators, subject to the limitations and monitoring in place, could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe mental pain or suffering. Finally, the use of a diaper for sanitary purposes on an individual subjected to sleep deprivation, while potentially humiliating, could not be considered specifically intended to inflict severe mental pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute, because there would be no statutory predicate act and no reason to expect "prolonged mental harm" to result. [50]

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 3 OF 3

13. Waterboard. We previously concluded that the use of the waterboard did not constitute torture under sections 2340-2340A. See Interrogation Memorandum at 11, 15. We must reexamine the issue, however, because the technique, as it would be used, could involve more applications in longer sessions (and possibly using different methods) than we earlier considered. [51]

We understand that in the escalating regimen of interrogation techniques, the waterboard is considered to be the most serious, requires a separate approval that may be sought only after other techniques have not worked (or are considered unlikely to work in the time available), and in fact has been -- and is expected to be -- used on very few detainees. We accept the assessment of OMS that the waterboard "is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques." OMS Guidelines at 15. This technique could subject a detainee to a high degree of distress. A detainee to whom the technique is applied will experience the physiological sensation of drowning, which likely will lead to panic. We understand that even a detainee who knows he is not going to drown is likely to have this response. Indeed, we are informed that even individuals very familiar with the technique experience this sensation when subjected to the waterboard.

Nevertheless, although this technique presents the most substantial question under the statute, we conclude for the reasons discussed below that the authorized use of the waterboard by adequately trained interrogators, subject to the limitations and conditions adopted by the CIA and in the absence of any medical contraindications, would not violate sections 2340-2340A. (We understand that a medical contraindication may have precluded the use of this particular technique on [delete]. In reaching this conclusion, we do not in any way minimize the experience. The panic associated with the feeling of drowning could undoubtedly be significant. There may be few more frightening experiences than feeling that one is unable to breathe. [52]

However frightening the experience may be, OMS personnel have informed us that the waterboard technique is not physically painful. This conclusion, as we understand the facts, accords with the experience in SERE training, where the waterboard has been administered to several thousand members of the United States Armed Forces. [53] To be sure, in SERE training, the technique is confined to at most two applications (and usually only one) of no more than 40 seconds each. Here, there may be two sessions, of up to two hours each, during a 24-hour period, and each session may include multiple applications, of which six may last 10 seconds or longer (but none more than 40 seconds), for a total time of application of as much as 12 minutes in a 24-hour period. Furthermore, the waterboard may be used on up to five days during the 30-day period for which it is approved. See August 19 [delete] Letter at 1-2. As you have informed us, the CIA has previously used the waterboard repeatedly on two detainees, and, as far as can be determined, these detainees did not experience physical pain or, in the professional judgment of doctors, is there any medical reason to believe they would have done so. Therefore, we conclude that the authorized use of the waterboard by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause "severe physical pain."

We also conclude that the use of the waterboard, under the strict limits and conditions imposed, would not be expected to cause "severe physical suffering" under the statute. As noted above, the difficulty of specifying a category of physical suffering apart from both physical pain and mental pain or suffering, along with the requirement that any such suffering be "severe," calls for an interpretation under which "severe physical suffering" is reserved for physical distress that is severe considering both its intensity and duration. To the extent that in some applications the use of the waterboard could cause choking or similar physical -- as opposed to mental -- sensations, those physical sensations might well have an intensity approaching the degree contemplated by the statute. However, we understand that any such physical -- as opposed to mental -- sensations caused by the use of the waterboard end when the application ends. Given the time limits imposed, and the fact that any physical distress (as opposed to possible mental suffering, which is discussed below) would occur only during the actual application of water, the physical distress caused by the waterboard would not be expected to have the duration required to amount to severe physical suffering. [54] Applications are strictly limited to at most 40 seconds, and a total of at most 12 minutes in any 24-hour period, and use of the technique is limited to at most five days during the 30-day period we consider. Consequently, under these conditions, use of the waterboard cannot be expected to cause "severe physical suffering" within the meaning of the statute, and we conclude that its authorized use by adequately, trained interrogators could not reasonably be, considered specifically intended to cause "severe physical suffering." [55] Again, however, we caution that great care should be used in adhering to the limitations imposed and in monitoring any detainee subjected to it to prevent the detainee from experiencing severe physical suffering.

The most substantial question raised by the waterboard relates to the statutory definition of "severe mental pain or suffering." The sensation of drowning that we understand accompanies the use of the waterboard arguably could qualify as a "threat of imminent death" within the meaning of section 2340(2)(C) and thus might constitute a predicate act for "severe mental pain or suffering" under the statute. [56] Although the waterboard is used with safeguards that make actual harm quite unlikely, the detainee may not know about these safeguards, and even if he does learn of them, the technique is still likely to create panic in the form of an acute instinctual fear arising from the physiological sensation of drowning.

Nevertheless, the statutory definition of "severe mental pain or suffering" also requires that the predicate act produce "prolonged mental harm." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). As we understand from OMS personnel familiar with the history of the waterboard technique, as used both in SERE training (though in a substantially different manner) and in the previous CIA interrogations, there is no medical basis to believe that the technique would produce any mental effect beyond the distress that directly accompanies its use and the prospect that it will be used again. We understand from the CIA that to date none of the thousands of persons who have undergone the more limited use of the technique in SERE training has suffered prolonged mental harm as a result. The CIA's use of the technique could far exceed the one or two applications to which SERE training is limited, and the participant in SERE training presumably understands that the technique is part of a training program that is not intended to hurt him and will end at some foreseeable time. But the physicians and psychologists at the CIA familiar with the facts have informed us that in the case of the two detainees who have been subjected to more extensive use of the waterboard technique, no evidence of prolonged mental harm has appeared in the period since the use of the waterboard on those detainees, a period which now spans at least 25 months for each of these detainees. Moreover, in their professional judgment, based on this experience and the admittedly different SERE experience, OMS officials inform us that they would not expect the waterboard to cause such harm. Nor do we believe that the distress accompanying use of the technique on five days in a 30-day period in itself could be the "prolonged mental harm" to which the statute refers. The technique may be designed to create fear at the time it is used on the detainee, so that the detainee will cooperate to avoid future sessions. Furthermore, we acknowledge that the term "prolonged" is imprecise. Nonetheless, without in any way minimizing the distress caused by this technique, we believe that the panic brought on by the waterboard during the very limited time it is actually administered, combined with any residual fear that may be experienced over a somewhat longer period, could not be said to amount to the "prolonged mental harm" that the statute covers. [57] For these reasons, we conclude that the authorized use of the waterboard by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause "prolonged mental harm." Again, however, we caution that the use of this technique calls for the most careful adherence to the limitations and safeguards imposed, including constant monitoring by both medical and psychological personnel of any detainee who is subjected to the waterboard.

Even if the occurrence of one of the predicate acts could, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, give rise to an inference of intent to cause "prolonged mental harm," no such circumstances exist here. On the contrary, experience with the use of the waterboard indicates that prolonged mental harm would not be expected to occur, and CIA's use of the technique is subject to a variety of safeguards, discussed above, designed to ensure that prolonged mental harm does not result. Therefore, the circumstances here would negate any potential inference of specific intent to cause such harm.

Assuming adherence to the strict limitations discussed herein, including the careful medical monitoring and available intervention by the team as necessary, we conclude that although the question is substantial and difficult, the authorized use of the waterboard by adequately trained interrogators and other team members could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering and thus would not violate sections 2340-2340A. [58]

* * *

In sum, based on the information you have provided and the limitations, procedures, and safeguards that would be in place, we conclude that -- although extended sleep deprivation and use of the waterboard present more substantial questions in certain respects under the statute and the use of the waterboard raises the most substantial issue -- none of these specific techniques, considered individually, would violate the prohibition in sections 2340-2340A. The universal rejection of torture and the President's unequivocal directive that the United States not engage in torture warrant great care in analyzing whether particular interrogation techniques are consistent with the requirements of sections 2340-2340A, and we have attempted to employ such care throughout our analysis. We emphasize that these are issues about which reasonable persons may disagree. Our task has been made more difficult by the imprecision of the statute and the relative absence of judicial guidance, but we have applied our best reading of the law to the specific facts that you have provided. As is apparent, our conclusion is based on the assumption that close observation, including medical and psychological monitoring of the detainees, will continue during the period when these techniques are used; that the personnel present are authorized to, and will, stop the use of a technique at any time if they believe it is being used improperly or threatens a detainee's safety or that a detainee may be at risk of suffering severe physical or mental pain or suffering; that the medical and psychological personnel are continually assessing the available literature and ongoing experience with detainees, and that, as they have done to date, they will make adjustments to techniques to ensure that they do not cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering to the detainees; and that all interrogators and other team members understand the proper use of the techniques, that the techniques are not designed or intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and that they must cooperate with OMS personnel in the exercise of their important duties.

Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.

Steven G. Bradbury
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

_______________

Notes:

1. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force for U.S. Nov. 20, 1994) ("Convention Against Torture" or "CAT"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

2 .See, e.g., Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 40 Weekly Comp Pres. Doc. 1167 (July 5, 2004) ("Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right...."); Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 824 (June 30, 2003) ("Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere."); see also Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan to the Senate (May 20, 1988), in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at ii (1988) ("Ratification of the Convention by the United States will clearly express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice still prevalent in the world today.").

3. See, e.g., Weekly Com. Pres. Doc. at 1167-68 ("American stands against and will not tolerate torture.... Torture is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it everywhere.").

4. What judicial guidance there is comes from decisions that apply a related by separate statute (the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)). These judicial opinions generally contain little if any analysis of specific conduct or of the relevant statutory standards.

5. We have previously advised you that the use by the CIA of the techniques of interrogation discussed herein is consistent with the Constitution and applicable statutes and treaties. In the prevent memorandum, you have asked us to address only the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Nothing in this memorandum or in our prior advice to the CIA should be read to suggest that the use of these techniques would conform to the requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that governs members of the Armed Forces or to United States obligations under the Geneva Conventions in circumstances where those Conventions would apply. We do not address the possible application of article 16 of the CAT, nor do we address any question relating to conditions of confinement or detention, as distinct from the interrogation of detainees. We stress that our advice on the application of sections 2340-2340A does not represent the policy views of the Department of Justice concerning interrogation practices. Finally, we note that section 6057(a) of H.R. 1268 (109th Cong. 1st Sess.), if it becomes law, would forbid expending or obligating funds made available by that bill "to subject any person in the custody or under the physical control of the United States to torture," but because the bill would define "torture" to have "the meaning given that term in section 2340(1) of title 18, United States Code," § 6057(b)(1), the provision (to the extent it might apply here at all) would merely reaffirm the preexisting prohibitions on torture in sections 2340-2340A.

6. The present memorandum addresses only the separate use of each individual technique, not the combined use of techniques as part of an integrated regimen of interrogation. you have informed us that most of the CIA's authorized techniques are designed to be used with particular detainees in an interrelated or combine manner as part of an overall interrogation program, and you have provided us with a description of a typical scenario for the CIA's combined use of techniques. See Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques (Dec. 30, 2004) ("Background Paper"). A full assessment of whether the use of interrogation techniques is consistent with sections 2340-2340A should take into account the potential combined effects of using multiple techniques on a given detainee, either simultaneously or sequentially within a short time. We will address in a separate memorandum whether the combined use of certain techniques, as reflected in the Background Paper, is consistent with the legal requirements of sections 2340-2340A.

7. In preparing the present memorandum, we have reviewed and carefully considered the report prepared by the CIA Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 20001-October 2003), No. 2003-7123-IG (May 7, 2004) ("IG Report") [delete][delete] Various aspects of the IG Report are addressed below.

8. In addition to monitoring the application and effects of enhanced interrogation techniques, OMS personnel are instructed more generally to ensure that "[a]dequate medical care shall be provided to detainees, even those undergoing enhanced interrogation." OMS Guidelines at 10.

9. The descriptions of these techniques are set out in a number of documents including: the OMS Guidelines; Interrogations Guidelines; Confinement Guidelines; Background Paper; Letter from [delete] Associated General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") (July 30, 2004) ("July 30 [delete]; Letter from John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA, to Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC (Aug. 2, 2004) ("August 2 Rizzo Letter"); Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC (Aug. 19, 2004) ("August 19 [delete] Letter"); Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC (Aug. 25, 2004) ("August 25 [delete] Letter"); Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC (Oct. 12, 2004) ("October 12 [delete] Letter"); Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC (Oct. 22, 2004) ("October 22 [delete] Letter"). Several of the techniques are described and discussed in an earlier memorandum to you. See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002) ("Interrogation Memorandum") (TS). We have separately reanalyzed all techniques in the present memorandum, and we will note below where aspects of particular techniques differ from those addressed in the Interrogation Memorandum. In order to avoid any confusion in this extremely sensitive and important area, the discussions of the statute in the 2004 Legal Standards Opinion and this memorandum supersede that in the Interrogation Memorandum; however, this memorandum confirms the conclusion of Interrogation Memorandum that the use of these techniques on a particular high value al Qaeda detainee, subject to the limitations imposed herein, would not violate sections 2340-2340A. In some cases additional facts set forth below have been provided to us in communications with CIA personnel. The CIA has reviewed this memorandum and confirmed the accuracy of the descriptions and limitations. Our analysis assumes adherence to these descriptions and limitations.

10. This is the caloric requirements for males, the CIA presently has no female detainees.

11. While detainees subject to dietary manipulation are obviously situated differently from individuals who voluntarily engage in commercial weight-loss programs, we note that widely available commercial weight-loss programs in the United States employ diets of 1000 kcal/day for sustained periods of weeks or longer without requiring medical supervision. While we do not equate commercial weight-loss programs and this interrogation technique, the fact that these calorie levels arc used in the weight-loss programs, in our view, is instructive in evaluating the medical safety of the interrogation technique.

12. You have informed us that it is very unlikely that nudity would be employed at ambient temperatures below 75°F. See October 12 [delete] Letter at 1. For purposes of our analysis, however, we will assume that ambient temperatures may be as low as 68°F.

13. In Interrogation Memorandum, we also addressed the use of harmless insects placed in a confinement box and concluded that it did not violate the statute. We understand that -- for reasons unrelated to any concern that it might violate the statute -- the CIA never used that technique and has removed it from the list of authorized interrogation techniques, accordingly, we do not address it again here.

14. See October 12 [delete] Letter at 2-3. Comparison of the time limits for water dousing with those used in SERE training is somewhat difficult as we understand that the SERE training time limits are based on the ambient air temperature rather than water temperature.

15. Specifically, you have informed us that on three occasions early in the program, the interrogation team and the attendant medical officers identified the potential for unacceptable edema in the lower limbs of detainees undergoing standing sleep deprivation, and in order to permit the limbs to recover without impairing interrogation requirements, the subjects underwent horizontal sleep deprivation. Fax for Steven C. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, from [delete] Assistant General Counsel, CIA, at 2 (Apr. 22, 2005) ("April 22 [delete] Fax"). In horizontal sleep deprivation, the detainee is placed prone on the floor on top of a thick towel or blanket (a precaution designed to prevent reduction of body temperature through direct contact with the cell floor). The detainee's hands are manacled together and the arms placed in an outstretched position-either extended beyond the head or extended to either side of the body-and anchored to a far point on the floor in such a manner that the arms cannot be bent or used for balance or comfort. At the same time, the ankles are shackled together and the legs are extended in a straight line with the body and also anchored to a far point on the floor in such a manner that the legs cannot be bent or used for balance or comfort. Id. You have specifically informed us that the manacles and shackles are anchored without additional stress on any of the arm or leg joints that might force the limbs beyond natural extension or create tension on any joint. Id. The position is sufficiently uncomfortable to detainees to deprive them of unbroken sleep, while allowing their lower limbs to recover from the effects of stranding sleep deprivation. We understand that all standard precautions and procedures for shackling are observed for both hands and feet while in this position. Id. You have informed us that horizontal sleep deprivation has been used until the detainee's affected limbs have demonstrated sufficient recovery to return to sitting or standing steep deprivation mode; as warranted by the requirements of the interrogation team, and subject to a determination by the medical officer that there is no contraindication to resuming other sleep deprivation modes. Id.

16. We express no view on whether any further use of sleep deprivation following a 180-our application of the technique and 8 hours of sleep would violate sections 2340-2340A.

17. In most applications of this technique, including as it is used in SERE training, it appears that the individual undergoing the technique is not in fact completely prevented from breathing, but his airflow is restricted by the wet cloth, creating a sensation of drowning. See IG Report at 15 ("Airflow is restricted ... and the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation."). For purposes of our analysis, however, we will assume that the individual is unable to breathe during the entire period of any application of water during the waterboard technique.

18. The Inspector General was critical of the reliance on the SERE experience with the waterboard in light of these and other differences in the application of the technique. We discuss the Inspector General's criticisms further below. Moreover, as noted above, the very different situations of detainees undergoing interrogation and military personnel undergoing training counsels against undue reliance on the experience in SERE training. That experience is nevertheless of some value in evaluating the technique.

19. OMS identified other potential risks:

In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation, the subject may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of the airways and loss of consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. Any subject who has reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the waterboard, and the physician on the scene can not concur in the further use of the waterboard without specific [Chief; OMS] consultation and approval.


OMS Guidelines at 18. OMS has also stated that "[b]y days 3-5 of an aggressive program, cumulative effects become a potential concern. Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages of this technique, we believe that beyond this point continued intense waterboard applications may not be medically appropriate." Id. at 19. As noted above, based on OMS input, the CIA has adopted and imposed a number of strict limitations on the frequency and duration of use of the waterboard.

20. You have advised us that the waterboard has not been used [delete]. We understand that there may have been medical reasons against using that technique in his case. Of course, our advice assumes that the waterboard could be used only in the absence of medical contraindications.

21. The medical examination reported [delete] was obese, and that he reported a "5-6 history of non-exertial chest pressures, which are intermittent, at times accompanied by nausea and depression and shortness of breath." Medical and Psychological Assessment of [delete] at 1, attached to August 2 Rizzo Letter. [delete] he has never consulted a physician for this problem," and was "unable or unwilling to be more specific on the frequency or intensity of the aforementioned symptoms." Id. He also reported suffering "long-term medical and mental problems" from a motor vehicle accident "many years ago," and stated that he took medication as a result of that accident until ten years ago. Id. He stated that he was not currently taking any medication. He also reported seeing a physician for kidney problems that caused him to urinate frequently and complained of a toothache. Id. The medical examination [delete] showed a rash on his chest and shoulders and that "his nose and chest were clear, [and] his heart sounds were normal with no murmurs or gallops." Id. The physician opined [delete] "likely has some reflux esophagitis and mild check folliculitis, but doubt[ed] that he has any coronary pathology." Id.

22. Section 2340A provides in full:

(a) Offenses. -- Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

(b) Jurisdiction. -- There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if --

(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States, or

(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.

(c) Conspiracy. -- A person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.


18 U.S.C. § 2340A.

23. Section 2340 provides in full:

As used in this chapter --

(1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanction) upon another person within his custody or physical control;

(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from --

(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe pain or suffering;

(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;

(C) the threat of imminent death; or

(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration of application of min-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality; and

(3) "United States" means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.


18 U.S.C. § 2340 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004)).

24. Congress limited the territorial reach of the federal torture statute by providing that the prohibition applies only to conduct occurring "outside the United States," 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), which is currently defined in the statute to mean outside "the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States." Id. § 2340(3) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004)). You have advised us that the CIA's use of the techniques addressed in this memorandum would occur "outside the United States" as defined in section 2340-2340A.

25. We emphatically are not saying that only such historical techniques -- or similar ones -- can constitute "torture" under sections 2340-2340A. But the historical understanding of torture is relevant in interpreting Congress's intent in prohibiting the crime of "torture." Cf. Morissette v United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).

26. Despite extensive efforts to develop objective criteria for measuring pain, there is no clear, objective, consistent measurement. As one publication explains:

Pain is a complex, subjective, perceptual phenomenon with a number of dimensions -- intensity, quality, time course, impact, and personal meaning -- that are uniquely experienced by each individual and, thus, can only be assessed indirectly. Pain is a subjective experience and there is no way to objectively quantify it. Consequently, assessment of patient's pain depends on the patient's overt communications, both verbal and behavioral. Given pain's complexity, one must assess not only its somatic (sensory) component but also patients' moods, attitudes, coping efforts, resources, responses of family members, and the impact of pain on their lives.


Dennis C. Turk, Assess the Person, Not Just the Pain, Pain: Clinical Updates, Sept. 1993 (emphasis added). This lack of clarity further complicates the effort to define "severe" pain or suffering.

27. Section 3(b)(2) of the TVPA defines "mental pain or suffering" using substantially identical language to section 2340(2)'s definition of "severe pain or suffering."

28. Common dictionary definitions of "physical" support reading "physical suffering" to mean something different from mental pain or suffering. See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language at 1366 ("Of or relating to the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit"); Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide at 748 ("of or concerning the body (physical exercise; physical education)").

29. This conclusion is reinforced by the expressions of concern at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to the CAT about the potential for vagueness in including the concept of mental pain of suffering as a definitional element in any criminal prohibition on torture. See, e.g., Convention against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 8, 10 (1990) (prepared statement of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State: "The Convention's wording ... is not in all respects as precise as we believe necessary.... [B]ecause [the Convention] requires establishment of criminal penalties under our domestic law, we must pay particular attention to "the meaning and interpretation of its provisions, especially concerning the standards by which the Convention will be applied as a matter of U.S. law... [W]e prepared a codified proposal which ... clarifies the definition of mental pain and suffering." id. at 15-16 (prepared statement of Mark Richard. "The basic problem with the Torture Convention-one that permeates all our concerns-is its imprecise definition of torture, especially as that term is applied to actions which result solely in mental anguish. This definitional vagueness makes it very doubtful that the United States can, consistent with Constitutional due process constraints, fulfill its obligation under the Convention to adequately engraft the definition of torture into the domestic criminal law of the United States."); id. at 17 (prepared statement of Mark Richard: "Accordingly, the Torture Convention's Vague definition concerning the mental suffering aspect of torture cannot be resolved by reference to established principles of international law. In an effort to overcome this unacceptable element of vagueness in Article I of the Convention, we have proposed an understanding which defines severe mental pain constituting torture with sufficient specificity to... meet Constitutional due process requirements.").

30. These four categories of predicate acts "are members of an 'associated group or series, justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence." Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). See also, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.23 (6th ed. 2000). Nor do we see any "contrary indication" that would rebut this inference. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65.

31. Although we do not suggest that the statute is limited to such cases, development of a mental disorder-such as post-traumatic stress disorder or perhaps chronic depression-could constitute "prolonged mental harm." See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 369-76,463-69 (4th ed. 2000) ("DSM-IV-TR"). See also, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc, A/59/324, at 14 (2004) ("The most common diagnosis of psychiatric symptoms among torture survivors is said to be post-traumatic stress disorder."); see also Melin Basoglu et al., Torture and Mental Health: A Research Overview; in Ellen Gerrity et al. eds., The Mental Health Consequences of Torture 48-49 (2001) (referring to findings of higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder in studies involving torture survivors), Murat Parket et al., Psychological Effects of Torture: An Empirical Study of Tortured and Non-Tortured Non-Political Prisoners, in Metin Basoglu ed., Torture and Its Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches 77 (1992) (referring to findings of post-traumatic stress disorder in torture survivors). OMS has advised that -- although the ability to predict is imperfect -- they would object to the initial or continued use or any technique if their psychological assessment of the detainee suggested that the use of the technique might result in PTSD, chronic depression, or other condition that could constitute prolonged mental harm.

32. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has reviewed this memorandum and is satisfied that our general interpretation of the legal standards under sections 2340-2340A is consistent with its concurrence in the 2004 Legal Standards Opinion.

33. As noted above, each of these techniques has been adapted (although in some cases with significant modifications) from SERE training. Through your consultation with various individuals responsible for such training, you have learned facts relating to experience with them, which you have reported to us. Again, fully recognizing the limitations of reliance on this experience, you have advised us that these techniques have been used as elements of a course of training without any reported incidents of prolonged mental harm or of any severe physical pain, injury, or suffering. With respect to the psychological impact, [delete]of the SERE school advised that during his three and a half years in that position, he trained 10,000 students, only two of whom dropped out following use of the techniques. Although on rare occasions students temporarily postponed the remainder of the training and received psychological counseling, we understand that those students were able to finish the program without any indication of subsequent mental health effects. [delete] who has had over ten years experience with SERE training, told you that he was not aware of any individuals who completed the program suffering any adverse mental health effects (though he advised of one person who did not complete the training who had an adverse mental health reaction that lasted two hours and spontaneously dissipated without requiring treatment and with no further symptoms reported). In addition, the [delete] who has had experience with all of the techniques discussed herein, has advised that the use of these procedures has not resulted in any reported instances of prolonged mental harm and very few instances of immediate and temporary adverse psychological responses to the training. Of 26,829 students in Air Force SERE training from 1992 through 2001, only 0.14% were pulled from the program for psychological reasons (specifically, although 4.35 had some contact with psychology services, only 3% of those individuals with such contact in fact withdrew from the program). We understand that [delete] expressed confidence-based on debriefing of students and other information-that the training did not cause any long-term psychological harm and that if there are any long-term psychological effects of the training at all, they "are certainly minimal."

34. We note that this involvement of medical personnel in designing safeguards for, and in monitoring implementation of the procedures is a significant difference from earlier uses of the techniques catalogued in the Inspector General's Report. See IG Report at 21 n.26 ("OMS was neither consulted nor involved in the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of [enhanced interrogation techniques], nor provided with the OTS report cited in the OLC opinion [the Interrogation Memorandum]."). Since that time, based on comments from OMS, additional constraints have been imposed on use of the techniques.

35. We are mindful that, historically, medical personnel have sometimes been used to enhance, not prevent, torture-for example, by keeping a torture victim alive and conscious so as to extend his suffering. It is absolutely clear, as you have informed us and as our own dealings with OMS personnel have confirmed, that the involvement of OMS is intended to prevent harm to the detainees and not to extend or increase pain or suffering. As the OMS Guidelines explain, "ORM is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency detainees subject to 'enhanced' interrogation techniques, and for determining that the authorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or permanent harm." OMS Guidelines at 9 (footnote omitted).

36. To assist in monitoring experience with the detainees, we understand that there is regular reporting on medical and psychological experience with the use of these techniques on detainees and that there are special instructions on documenting experience with sleep deprivation and the waterboard. See OMS Guidelines at 6-7, 16, 20.

37. In Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1987), the European Court of Human Rights concluded by a vote of 13-4 that a reduced diet, even in conjunction with a number of other techniques, did not amount to "torture," as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights. The reduced diet there consisted of one "round" of bread and a pint of water every six hours, see id., separate opinion of Judge Zekia, Part A. The duration of the reduced diet in that case is not clear.

38. In Interrogation Memorandum, we did not described the walling technique as involving the number of repetitions that we understand may be applied. Our advice with respect to walling in the present memorandum is specifically based on the understanding that the repetitive use of walling is intended only to increase the drama and shock of the technique, to wear down the detainee's resistance, and to disrupt expectations that he will not be treated with force, and that such use is not intended to, and does not in fact, cause severe physical pain to the detainee. Moreover, our advice specifically assumes that the use of walling will be stopped if there is any indication that the use of the technique is or may be causing severe physical pain to a detainee.

39. Our advice about both the facial slap and the abdominal slap assumes that the interrogators will apply those techniques as designed and will not strike the detainee with excessive force or repetition in a manner that might result in severe physical pain.

40. A stress position that involves such contortion or twisting, as well as on held for so long that it could not be aimed only at producing temporary muscle fatigue, might raise more substantial questions under the statute. Cf. Army Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation at I-8 (1992)(indicating that "[f]orcing an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged periods of time" may constitute "torture" within the meaning of the Third Geneva Convention's requirement that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war," but not addressing 18 U.S.C §§ 2340-2340A); United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/59/150 at 6 (Sept. 1, 2004) (suggesting that "holding detainees in painful and/or stressful position" might in certain circumstances be characterized as torture).

41. Moreover, even in the extremely unlikely event that hypothermia set in, under the circumstances in which this technique is used-including close medical supervision and, if necessary, medical attention-we understand that the detainee would be expected to recover fully and rapidly.

42. The IG Report described the maximum allowable period of sleep deprivation at the time as 264 hours or 11 days. See IG Report at 15. You have informed us that you have since established a limit of 180 hours, that in fact no detainee has been subjected to more than 180 hours of sleep deprivation, and that sleep deprivation will rarely exceed 120 hours. To date, only three detainees have been subjected to sleep deprivation for more than 96 hours.

43. As noted above, we are not concluding that additional use of sleep deprivation, subject to close and careful medical supervision, would violate the statute, but at the present time we express no opinion on whether additional sleep deprivation would be consistent with sections 2340-2340A.

44. Although sleep deprivation is not itself physical painful, we understand that some studies have noted that extended total sleep deprivation may have the effect of reducing tolerance to some forms of pain in some subjects. See, e.g., B. Kundermann, et al., Sleep Deprivation Affects Thermal Pain Thresholds but not Somatosensory Thresholds in Healthy Volunteers, 66 Psychosomatic Med. 932 (2004) (finding a significant decrease in heat pain thresholds and some decrease in cold pain thresholds after one night without sleep); S. Hakki Onen, et al., The Effects of Total Sleep Deprivation, Selective Sleep Interruption and Sleep Recovery on Pain Tolerance Thresholds in Healthy Subjects, 10 J. Sleep Research 35, 41 (2001) (finding a statistically significant drop of 8-9% in tolerance thresholds for mechanical or pressure pain after 40 hours), id. at 35-36 (discussing other studies). We will discuss the potential interactions between sleep deprivation and other interrogation techniques in the separate memorandum, to which we referred in footnote 6, addressing whether the combine use of certain techniques is consistent with the legal requirements of section 2340-2340A.

45. This includes a total of more than 25 detainees subjected to at least some period of sleep deprivation. See January 4 [delete] Fax at 1-3.

46. The possibility noted above that sleep deprivation might heighten susceptibility to pain, see supra note 44, magnifies this concern.

47. Indeed, although it may seem surprising to those not familiar with the extensive medical literature relating to sleep deprivation, based on that literature and its experience with the technique, in its guidelines, OMS lists sleep deprivation as less intense than water dousing, stress positions, walling, cramped confinement, and the waterboard. See OMS Guidelines at 8.

48. For Example, any physical pain or suffering associated with standing or with shackles might become more intense with an extended use of the technique on a particular detainee whose condition and strength do not permit him to tolerate it, and we understand that personnel monitoring the detainee will take this possibility into account and, if necessary, will ensure that the detainee is placed into a sitting or horizontal position or will direct that the sleep deprivation be discontinued altogether. See OMS Guidelines at 14-16.

49. Without determining the minimum time-for mental harm to be considered "prolonged," we do not believe that "prolonged mental harm" would occur during the sleep deprivation itself. As noted, OMS would order that the technique be discontinued if hallucinations occurred. Moreover, even if OMS personnel were not aware of any such hallucinations, whatever time would remain between the onset of such hallucinations, which presumably would be well into the period of sleep deprivation, and the 180-hour maximum for sleep deprivation would not constitute "prolonged" mental harm within the meaning of the statute. Nevertheless, we note that this aspect of the technique calls for great care in monitoring by OMS personnel, including psychologists, especially as the length of the period of sleep deprivation increases.

50. We note that the court of appeals in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789(9th Cir. 1996), stated that a variety of techniques taken together; one of which was sleep deprivation, amounted to torture. The court, however, did not specifically discuss sleep deprivation apart from the other conduct at issue, and it did not conclude that sleep deprivation alone amounted to torture. In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights concluded by a vote of 13-4 that sleep deprivation even in conjunction with a number of other techniques, did not amount to torture under the European Charter. The duration of the sleep deprivation at issue was not clear, see separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice at P 19, but may have been 96-120 hours, see majority opinion at P 104. Finally, we note that the Committee Against Torture of the Office of the High Commissioner for-Human Rights, in Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Israel, U.N. Doc., A/52/44, at P 257 (May 9, 1997), concluded that a variety of practices taken together, including "sleep deprivation for prolonged periods," "constitute torture as defined in article 1 of the [CAT]." See also United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 at P 56 (Sept. 10, 1997) ("sleep deprivation practiced on suspects... may in some cases constitute torture"). The Committee provided no details on the length of the sleep deprivation or how it Was implemented and no analysis to support its conclusion. These precedents provide little or no helpful guidance in our review of the CIA's use of sleep deprivation under sections 2340-2340A. While we do not rely on this fact in interpreting sections 2340-2340A, we note that we are aware of no decision of any foreign court or international tribunal finding that the techniques analyzed here, if subject to the limitations and conditions set out, would amount to torture.

51. The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard was used with far greater frequency than initially indicated, see IG Report at 5, 44, 46, 103-04, and also that it was used in a different manner. See id. at 37 ("[T]he waterboard technique ... was different from the technique described in the DOJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE school and in the DOJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages, the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator ... applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique is different from that used in SERE training because it is 'for real' and is more poignant and convincing."), see also id. at 14 n.14. The Inspector General further reported that "OMS contends that the expertise of the SER psychologist/interrogators on the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either efficacious or medically safe." Id. at 21 n.26. We have carefully considered the IG Report and discussed it with OMS personnel. As noted, OMS input has resulted in a number of changes in the application of the waterboard, including limits on the frequency and cumulative use of the technique. Moreover, OMS personnel are carefully instructed in monitoring this technique and are personally present whenever it is used. See OMS Guidelines at 17-20. Indeed, although physician assistants can be present when other enhanced techniques are applied, "use of the waterboard requires the presence of a physician." Id. at 9 n.2.

52. As noted above, in most uses of the technique, the individual is in fact able to breathe, though his breathing is restricted. Because in some uses breathing would not be possible, for purposes of our analysis we assume that the detainee is unable to breathe during applications of water.

53. We understand that the waterboard is currently used only in Navy SERE training. As noted in the IG Report, "[a]ccording to individuals with authoritative knowledge of the SERE program, ... [e]xcept for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued because of its dramatic effect on the students who were subjects." IG Report at 14 n.14. We understand that use of the waterboard was discontinued by the other services not because of any concerns about possible physical or mental harm, but because students were not successful at resisting the technique and, as such, it was not considered to be a useful training technique. we note that OMS has concluded that "[w]hile SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain psychological resistance to the waterboard, our experience was otherwise. Some subject unquestionably can withstand a large number of applications, with no immediately discernible cumulative impact beyond their strong aversion to the experience." OMS Guidelines at 17. We are aware that at a recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Douglas Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for Victims of Torture, testified that some U.S. military personnel who have undergone waterboard training have apparently state "that it's taken them 15 years of therapy to get over it." You have informed us that, in 2002, the CIA made inquiries to Department of Defense personnel involved in SERE training and that the Department of Defense was not aware of any information that would substantiate such statements, nor is the CIA aware of any such information.

54. We emphasize that physical suffering differs from physical pain in this respect. Physical pain may be "severe" even if lasting only seconds, whereas, by contrast, physical distress may amount to "severe physical suffering" only if it is severe both in intensity and duration.

55. As with sleep deprivation, the particular condition of the individual detainee must be monitored so that, with extended or repeated use of the technique, the detainee's experience does not depart from these expectations.

56. It is unclear whether a detainee being subjected to the waterboard in fact experiences it as a "threat of imminent death." We understand that the CIA may inform a detainee on whom this technique is used that he would not be allowed to drown. Moreover, after multiple applications of the waterboard, it may become apparent to the detainee that, however, frightening the experience may be, it will not result in death, nevertheless, for purposes of our analysis, we will assume that the physiological sensation of drowning associated with the use of the waterboard may constitute a "threat of imminent death" within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A.

57. In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the Ninth Circuit stated that a course of conduct involving a number of techniques, one of which has similarities to the waterboard, constituted torture. The court described the course of conduct as follows:

He was then interrogated by members of the military, who blindfolded and severely beat him while he was handcuffed and fettered; they also threatened him with death. When this round of interrogation ended, he was denied sleep and repeatedly threatened with death. In the next round of interrogation, all of his limbs were shackled to a cot and a towel was placed over his nose and mouth; his interrogators then poured water down his nostrils so that he felt as though he were drowning. This lasted for approximately six hours, during which time interrogators threatened [him] with electric shock and death. At the end of this water torture, [he] was left shackled to the cot for the following three days, during which time he was repeatedly interrogated. He was then imprisoned for seven months in a suffocatingly hot and unlit cell, measuring 2.5 meters square; during this time he was shackled to his cot, at fist by all his limbs and later by one hand and one foot, for all but the briefest periods (in which he was allowed to eat or use the toilet). The handcuffs were often so tight that the slightest movement... made them cut into his flesh. During this period, he felt 'extreme pain, almost indescribable, the boredom' and 'the feeling that tons of lead ... were falling on [his] brain. [He] was never told how long the treatment inflicted upon him would last. After seven months shackled to his cot, [he] spent more than eight years in detention, approximately five of them in solitary confinement and the rest in near-solitary confinement.


103 F.3d at 790-91. The court then concluded, "it seems clear that all of the abuses to which [a plaintiff] testified-including the eight years during which be was held in solitary or near-solitary confinement-constituted a single course of conduct of torture." Id. at 795, In addition to the obvious differences between the technique in Hilao and the CIA's use of the waterboard subject to the careful omits described above (among other things, in Hilao the session lasted six hours and followed explicit threats of death and severe physical beatings), the court reached no conclusion that the technique by itself constituted torture. However, the fact that a federal appellate court would even colloquially describe a technique that may share some of the characteristics of the waterboard as "water torture" counsels continued care and careful monitoring in the use of this technique.

58. As noted, medical personnel are instructed to exercise special care in monitoring and reporting on use of the waterboard. See OMS Guidelines at 20 ("NOTE: In order to best inform future medical judgments and recommendations, it is important that every application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented: how long each application (and the entire procedure) lasted, how much water was used in the process (realizing that much splashes off), how exactly the water was applied, if a seal was achieved, if the naso- or oropharynx was filled, what sort of volume was expelled, how long was the break between applications, and how the subject looked between each treatment.") (emphasis omitted).

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

PostPosted: Sat Oct 12, 2013 12:38 am
by admin
PART 1 OF 3

MEMO __

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20530

Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

May 30, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. RIZZO
SENIOR DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees

You have asked us to address whether certain "enhanced interrogation techniques" employed by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") in the interrogation of high value al Qaeda detainees are consistent with United States obligations under Article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force for U.S. Nov. 20, 1994) ("CAT"). We concluded that use of these techniques, subject to the CIA's careful screening criteria and limitations and its medical safeguards, is consistent with United States obligations under Article 16. [1]

By its terms, Article 16 is limited to conduct within "territory under [United States] jurisdiction." We conclude that territory under United States jurisdiction includes, at most, areas over which the United States exercises at least de facto authority as the government. Based on CIA assurances, we understand that the interrogations do not take place in any such areas. We therefore conclude that Article 16 in inapplicable to the CIA's interrogation practices and that those practices thus cannot violate Article 16. Further. the United States undertook its obligations under Article 16 subject to a Senate reservation, which, as relevant here, explicitly limits those obligations to the "cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment ... prohibited by the Fifth Amendment ... to the Constitution of the United States." [2] There is a strong argument that through this reservation the Senate intended to limit the scope of United States obligations under Article 16 to those imposed by the relevant provision of the Constitution. As construed by the courts, the Fifth Amendment does not apply to aliens outside the United States. The CIA has assured us that the interrogation techniques are not used within the United States or against United States persons, including both United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. Because the geographic limitation on the face of Article 16 renders it inapplicable to the CIA interrogation program in any event, we need not decide in the memorandum the precise effect, if any, of the Senate reservation on the geographic reach of United States obligations under Article 16. For these reasons, we conclude in Part II that the interrogation techniques where and as used by the CIA are not subject to, and therefore do not violate, Article 16.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, you have also asked whether the interrogation techniques at issue would violate the substantive standards applicable to the United States under Article 16 if, contrary to our conclusion in Part II, those standards did extend to the CIA interrogation program. As detailed below in Part III, the relevant constraint here, assuming Article 16 did apply, would be the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of executive conduct that "shocks the conscience." The Supreme Court has emphasized that whether conduct "shocks the conscience" is a highly context-specific and fact-dependent question. The Court, however, has not set forth with precision a specific test for ascertaining whether conduct can be said to "shock the conscience" and has disclaimed the ability to do so. Moreover, there are few Supreme Court cases addressing whether conduct "shocks the conscience," and the few cases there are have all arisen in very different contexts from that which we consider here.

For these reasons, we cannot set forth or apply a precise test for ascertaining whether conduct can be said to "shock the conscience." Nevertheless, the Court's "shocks the conscience" cases do provide some signposts that can guide our inquiry. In particular, on balance the cases are best read to require a determination whether the conduct is "'arbitrary in the constitutional sense,'" County of Sacrament to v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citation omitted); that is, whether it involves the "exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective," id. "[C]conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id. at 849. Far from being constitutionally arbitrary, the interrogation techniques at issue here are employed by the CIA only as reasonably deemed necessary to protect against grave threats to United States interests, a determination that is made at CIA Headquarters, with input from the on-scene interrogation team, pursuant to careful screening procedures that ensure that the techniques will be used as little as possible on as few detainees as possible. Moreover, the techniques have been carefully designed to minimize the risk of suffering or injury and to avoid inflicting any serious or lasting physical or psychological harm. Medical screening, monitoring, and ongoing evaluations further lower such risk. Significantly, you have informed us that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States. Because the CIA interrogation program is carefully limited to further a vital government interest and designed to avoid unnecessary or serious harm, we conclude that it cannot be said to be constitutionally arbitrary.

The Supreme Court's decisions also suggest that it is appropriate to consider whether, in light of "traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and the standards of blame generally applied to them," use of the techniques in the CIA interrogation program "is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Id. at 847 n.8. We have not found evidence of traditional executive behavior or contemporary practice either condemning or condoning an interrogation program carefully limited to further a vital government interest and designed to avoid unnecessary or serious harm. We recognize, however, that use of coercive interrogation techniques in other contexts -- in different settings, for other purposes, or absent the CIA's safeguards -- might be thought to "shock the conscience." Cf., e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (finding that pumping the stomach of a criminal defendant to obtain evidence "shocks the conscience"); U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation (1992) ("Field Manual 34-52") (detailing guidelines for interrogations in the context of traditional warfare); Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (describing human-rights abuses condemned by the United States). We believe, however, that each of these other contexts, which we describe more fully below, differs critically from the CIA interrogation program in ways that would be unreasonable to ignore in examining whether the conduct involved in the CIA program "shock[s] the contemporary conscience." Ordinary criminal investigations within the United States, for example, involve fundamentally different government interests and implicate specific constitutional guarantees, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, that are not at issue here. Furthermore, the CIA interrogation techniques have all been adapted from military Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape ("SERE") training. Although there are obvious differences between training exercises and actual interrogation, the fact that the United States uses similar techniques on its own troops for training purposes strongly suggests that these techniques are not categorically beyond the pale.

Given that the CIA interrogation program is carefully limited to further the Government's paramount interest in protecting the Nation while avoiding unnecessary or serious harm, we conclude that the interrogation program cannot "be said to shock the contemporary conscience" when considered in light of "traditional executive behavior" and "contemporary practice." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8.

I.

[Big delete]

Elsewhere, we have described the CIA interrogation program in great detail. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a high Value al Qaeda Detainee at 4-15, 28-45 (May 10, 2005) ("Techniques"); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees at 3-9 (May 10, 2005) ("Combined Use"). The descriptions of the techniques, including all limitations and safeguards applicable to their use, set forth in Techniques and Combined Use are incorporated by reference herein, and we assume familiarity with those descriptions. Here, we highlight those aspects of the program that are most important to the question under consideration. Where appropriate, throughout this opinion we also provide more detailed background information regarding specific high value detainees who are representative of the individuals on whom the techniques might be used. [3]

A.

Under the CIA's guidelines, several conditions must be satisfied before the CIA considers employing enhanced techniques in the interrogation of any detainees. The CIA must, based on available intelligence, conclude that the detainee is an important and dangerous member of an al Qaeda-affiliated group. The CIA must then determine, at the Headquarters level and on a case-by-case basis with input from the on-scene interrogation team, that enhanced interrogation methods are needed in a particular interrogation. Finally, the enhanced techniques, which have been designed and implemented to minimize the potential for serious or unnecessary harm to the detainees, may be used only if there are no medical or psychological contraindications.

1.

[Big delete] the CIA uses enhanced interrogation techniques only if the CIA's Counterterrorist Center ("CTC") determines an individual to be a "High Value Detainee," which the CIA defines as:

a detainee who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: (1) is a senior member al-Qai'da or an al-Qai'da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the USA, its military forces, its citizens and organization, or its allies; or that has/had direct involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or assisting the al-Qai'da leadership in planning and preparing such actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies.


Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [delete], Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, at 4 (Jan. 4, 2005) (January 4 [delete] Fax"). The CIA, therefore, must have reason to believe that the detainee is a senior member (rather than a mere "foot soldier") of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization, who likely has actionable intelligence concerning terrorist threats, and who poses a significant threat to United States interests.

The "waterboard," which is the most intense of the CIA interrogation techniques, is subject to additional limits. It may be used on a High Value Detainee only if the CIA has "credible intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent"; "substantial and credible indicators that the subject has actionable intelligence that can prevent, disrupt or delay this attack"; and "[o]ther interrogation methods have failed to elicit the information [or] CIA has clear indications that other ... methods are unlikely to elicit this information within the perceived time limit for preventing the attack." Letter from John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, to Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 5 (Aug. 2, 2004) ("August 2 Rizzo Letter") (attachment).

To date, the CIA has taken custody of 94 detainees [big delete] and has employed enhanced techniques to varying degrees in the interrogations of 28 of these detainees. We understand that two individuals, [delete] [delete] are representative of the high value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or might be, used. On [delete] the CIA took custody of [delete] whom the CIA believed had actionable intelligence concerning the pre-election threat to the United States. See Letter from [delete], Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, to Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 2 (Aug. 25, 1004) ("August 25 [delete] Letter"). [Delete] extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and intelligence indicated [delete] arranged a ... meeting between [delete] and [big delete] at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed." Id. at 2-3; see also Undated CIA Memo, [big delete].

Intelligence indicated that prior to his capture, [delete] "perform[ed] critical facilitation and finance activities for al-Qa'ida," including "transporting people, funds, and documents." Fax for Jack L. Goldsmith, III, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [delete], Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (March 12, 2004). The CIA also suspected [delete] played and active part in planning attacks against United States forces [big delete] had extensive contacts with key members of al Qaeda, including, prior to their captures, Khalid Shayk Muhammad ("KSM") and Abu Zubaydah. See id. [Delete] was captured while on a mission from [delete] to establish contact with al-Zarqawi. See CIA Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Efforts Grinding Down al-Qa'ida 2 (Feb. 21, 2004).

Consistent with its heightened standard for use of the waterboard, the CIA has used this technique in the interrogations of only three detainees to date (KSM, Zubaydah, and Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri) and has not used it since the March 2003 interrogation of KSM. See Letter from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, to Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 1 (June 14, 2004).

We understand that Abu Zubaydah and KSM are representative of the types of detainees on whom the waterboard has been used, or might be, used. Prior to his capture, Zubaydah was "one of Usama Bin Laden's key lieutenants." CIA, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn ABU ZUBAYDAH at 1 (Jan. 7 2002) ("Zubaydah Biography"). Indeed, Zubaydah was al Qaeda's third or fourth highest ranking member and had been involved "in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda." Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative at 7 (Aug. 1 2003) ("Interrogation Memorandum"); Zubaydah Biography (noting Zubaydah's involvement in the September 11 attacks). Upon his capture on March 27, 2002, Zubaydah became the most senior member of al Qaeda in United States custody. See IG Report at 12.

KSM, "a mastermind" of the September 11, 2001, attacks, was regarded as "one of al-Qa'ida's most dangerous and resourceful operatives" (CIA "Khalid Shayk Muhammad (Nov. 1, 2002) ("CIA KSM Biography"). [Big delete] Prior to his capture, the CIA considered KSM to be one of al Qaeda's "most important operational leaders ... based on his close relationship with Usama Bin Laden and his reputation among the al-Qa'ida rank and file." Id. After the September 11 attacks, KSM assumed "the role of operations chief for al-Qa'ida around the world." CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Khalid Shayk Muhammad, Preeminent Source on A-Qa'ida 7 (July 13, 2004) ("Preeminent Source"). KSM also planned additional attacks within the United States both before and after September 11. See id. at 7-8; see also The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 150 (official gov't ed. 2004) ("9/11 Commission Report"). [4]

2.

Even with regard to detainees who satisfy these threshold requirements, enhanced techniques are considered only if the on-scene interrogation team determines that the detainee is withholding or manipulating information. In order to make this assessment, interrogators conduct an initial interview "in a relatively benign environment." Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [delete] Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques at 3 (Dec. 30, 2004) ("Background Paper"). At this stage, the detainee is "normally clothed but seated and shackled for security purposed," and the interrogators take "an open, non-threatening approach." Id. In order to be judged participatory, however, a high value detainee "would have to willingly provide information on actionable threats and location information on High-Value Targets at large -- not lower level information." Id. If the detainee fails to meet this "very high" standard, the interrogation team develops an interrogation plan, which generally calls for the use of enhanced techniques only as necessary and in escalating fashion. See id. at 3-4; Techniques at 5.

Any interrogation plan that involves techniques must be reviewed and approved by "the Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the Chief, CTC Legal Group." George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the [big delete] at 3 (Jan. 28, 2003) ("Interrogation Guidelines"). [5] Each approval lasts for a period of at most 30 days, see id. at 1-2, although enhanced interrogation techniques are generally not used for more than seven days, see Background Paper at 17.

For example, after medical and psychological examinations found no contraindications, [delete]'s interrogation team sought and obtained approval to use the following techniques: attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, wall standing, stress positions, and sleep deprivation. See August 25 [delete] Letter at 2. The interrogation team "carefully analyzed Gul's responsiveness to different areas of inquiry" during this time and noted that his resistance increased as questioning moved to his "knowledge of operational terrorist activities." Id. at 3. [Delete] feigned memory problems (which CIA psychologists rules out through intelligence and memory tests) in order to avoid answering questions. Id.

At that point, the interrogation team believed [delete] "maintains a tough, Mujahidin fighter mentality and has conditioned himself for a physical interrogation." Id. The team therefore concluded that "more subtle interrogation measures designed more to weaken [delete] physical ability and mental desire to resist interrogation over the long run are likely to be more effective." Id. For these reasons, the team sought authorization to use dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and abdominal slap. Id. at 4-5. In the team's view, adding these techniques would be especially helpful [delete] because he appeared to have a particular weakness for food and also seemed especially modest. See id. at 4.

The CIA used the waterboard extensively in the interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah but did so only after it became clear that standard interrogation techniques were not working. Interrogators used enhanced techniques in the interrogation of al-Nashiri with notable results as early as the first day. See IG Report at 35-36. Twelve days into the interrogation, the CIA subjected al-Nashiri to one session of the waterboard during which water was applied two times. See id. at 36.

3.

Medical and psychological professionals from the CIA's Office of Medical Services ("OMS") carefully evaluate detainees before any enhanced technique is authorized in order to ensure that the detainee "is not likely to suffer any severe physical or mental pain or suffering as a result of interrogation." Techniques at 4; see OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation and Detention at 9 (Dec. 2004) ("OMS Guidelines"). In addition, OMS officials continuously monitor the detainee's condition throughout any interrogation using enhanced techniques, and the interrogation team will stop the use of particular techniques or the interrogation altogether if the detainee's medical or psychological condition indicates that the detainee might suffer significant physical or mental harm. See Techniques at 5-6. OMS has, in fact, prohibited the use of certain techniques in the interrogations of certain detainees. See id. at 5. Thus, no technique is used in the interrogation of any detainee -- no matter now valuable the information the CIA believes the detainee has -- if the medical and psychological evaluations or ongoing monitoring suggest that the detainee is likely to suffer serious harm. Careful records are kept of each interrogation, which ensures accountability and allows for ongoing evaluation of the efficacy of each technique and its potential for any unintended or inappropriate results. See id.

B.

Your office has informed us that the CIA believes that "the intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launched a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001." Memorandum for Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [big delete] OCI Counterterrorist Center, Re: effectiveness of the CIA Counterintelligence Interrogation Techniques at 2 (Mar. 2, 2005) ("Effectiveness Memo"). In particular, the CIA believes that it would have been unable to obtain critical information from numerous detainees, including KSM and Abu Zubaydah without these enhanced techniques. Both KSM and Zubaydah had "expressed their belief that the general U.S. population was 'weak," lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals." Id. at 1. Indeed, before the CIA used enhanced techniques in its interrogation of KSM, KSM resisted giving any answers to questions about future attacks, simply noting, "Soon, you will know." Id. We understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, Zubaydah, and others, by contrast, has yielded critical information. See IG Report at 86, 90-91 (describing increase in intelligence reports attributable to use of enhanced techniques). As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, "brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have reached the limit of their ability to withhold it in the face of psychological and physical hardships." Effectiveness Memo at 2. And, indeed, we understand that since the use of enhanced techniques, "KSM and Abu Zubaydah have been pivotal sources because of their ability and willingness to provide their analysis and speculation about the capabilities, methodologies, and mindsets of terrorists." Preeminent Source at 4.

Nevertheless, current CIA threat reporting indicates that, despite substantial setbacks over the last year, al Qaeda continues to pose a grave threat to the United States and interests. See CIA [big delete]. You have informed us that the CIA believes that enhanced interrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt such emerging threats.

In understanding the effectiveness of the interrogation program, it is important to keep two related points in mind. First the total value of the program cannot be appreciated solely by focusing on individual pieces of information. According to the CIA Inspector General:

CTC frequently uses the information from one detainee, as well as other sources, to vet the information of another detainee. Although lower-level detainees provide less information than the high value detainees, information from these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the information needed to probe the high value detainees further... [T]he triangulation of intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities than would be possible from a single detainee.


IG Report at 86. As illustrated below, we understand that even interrogations of comparatively lower-tier high value detainees supply information that the CIA uses to validate and assess information elicited in other interrogations and through other methods. Intelligence acquired from the interrogation program also enhances other intelligence methods and has helped to build the CIA's overall understanding al Qaeda and its affiliates. Second, it is difficult to quantify with confidence and precision the effectiveness of the program. As the IG Report notes, it is difficult to determine conclusively whether interrogations have provided information critical to interdicting specific imminent attacks. See id. at 88. And, because the CIA has used enhanced techniques sparingly, "there is limited data on which to assess their individual effectiveness." Id. at 89. As discussed below, however, we understand that interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence as well as a general increase in the amount of intelligence regarding al Qaeda and its affiliates. See id. at 85-91.

With these caveats, we turn to specific examples that you have provided to us. You have informed us that the interrogation of KSM -- once enhanced techniques were employed -- led to the discovery of a KSM plot, the "Second Wave," "to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into" a building in Los Angeles. Effectiveness Memo at 3. You have informed us that information obtained from KSM also led to the capture of Riduan bin Isomuddin, better known as Hambali, and the discovery of the Guraba Cell, a 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell tasked with executing the "Second Wave." See id. at 3-4; CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Al-Qa'ida's Ties to Other key Terror Groups: Terrorists Links in a Chain 2 (Aug. 28, 2003). More specifically, we understand that KSM admitted that he had tasked Majid Khan with delivering a large sum of money to an al Qaeda associate. See Fax from [big delete] DCI Counterterrorist Center, Briefing Note on the Value of Detainee Reporting at 1 (Apr. 15, 2005) ("Briefing Notes"). Khan subsequently identified the associate (Zubair), who was then captured. Zubair, in turn, provided information that led to the arrest of Hambali. See id. The information acquired from theses captures allowed CIA interrogators to pose more specific questions to KSM, which led the CIA to Hambali's brother, al-Hadi. Using information obtained from multiple sources, al-Hadi was captured, and he subsequently identified the Guraba cell. See id. at 1-2. With the aid of this additional information, interrogations of Hambali confirmed much of what was learned from KSM. [6]

Interrogations of Zubaydah -- again, once enhanced techniques were employed -- furnished detailed information regarding al Qaeda's "organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi" and identified KSM as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks. See Briefing Notes at 4. You have informed us that Zubaydah also "provided significant information on two operatives, [including] Jose Padilla[,] who planned to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area." Effectiveness Memo at 4. Zubaydah and KSM have also supplied important information about al-Zarqawi and his network. See Fax for Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from [delete] Office of General Counsel, CIA, [very big delete].

More generally, the CIA has informed us that, since March 2002, the intelligence derived from CIA detainees has resulted in more than 6,000 intelligence reports and, in 2004, accounted for approximately half of CTC's reporting on al Qaeda. See Briefing Notes at 1; see also IG Report at 86 (noting that from September 11, 2001, through April 2003, the CIA "produced over 3,000 intelligence reports from" a few high value detainees). You have informed us that the substantial majority of this intelligence has come from detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. In addition, the CIA advises us that the program has been virtually indispensable to the task of deriving actionable intelligence from other forms of collection. [Big delete]

C.

There are three categories of enhanced interrogation techniques: conditioning techniques, corrective techniques, and coercive techniques. See Background Paper at 4. As noted above, each of the specific enhanced techniques has been adapted from SERE-training, where similar techniques have been used, in some form, for years on United States military personnel. See Techniques at 6; IG Report at 13-14.

1. Conditioning techniques

Conditioning techniques are used to put the detainee in a "baseline" state, and to "demonstrate to the (detainee] that he has no control over basic human needs." Background Paper at 4. This "creates ... a mindset in which [the detainee] learns to perceive and value his personal welfare, comfort, and immediate needs more than the information he is protecting." Id. Conditioning techniques are not designed to bring about immediate results. Rather, these techniques are useful in view of their "cumulative effect..., used over time and in combination with other interrogation techniques and intelligence exploitation methods" Id. at 5. The specific conditioning techniques are nudity, dietary manipulation, and sleep deprivation.

Nudity is used to induce psychological discomfort and because it allows interrogators to reward detainees instantly with clothing for cooperation. See Techniques at 7. Although this technique might cause embarrassment, it does not involve any sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse. See id. at 7-8. Because ambient air temperature are kept above 68°F, the techniques is at most mildly physically uncomfortable and poses no threat to the detainee's health. Id. at 7.

Dietary manipulation involved substituting a bland, commercial liquid meal for a detainee's normal diet. We understand that its use can increase the effectiveness of other techniques, such as sleep deprivation. As a guideline, the CIA uses a formula for caloric intake that depends on a detainee's body weight and expected level of activity and that ensures that caloric intake will always be set at or above 1,000 kcal/day. See id. at 7 & n.10. [8] By comparison, commercial weight-loss programs used within the United States not uncommonly limit intake to 1000 Kcal/day regardless of body weight. Detainees are monitored at all times to ensure that they do not lose more than 10% of their starting body weight. See id. at 7. The CIA also sets a minimum fluid intake, but a detainee undergoing dietary manipulation may drink as much water as he pleases. See id.

Sleep deprivation involves subjecting a detainee to an extended period of sleeplessness. Interrogators employ sleep deprivation in order to weaken a detainee's resistance. Although up to 180 hours may be authorized, the CIA has in fact subjected only three detainees to more than 96 hours of sleep deprivation. Generally, a detainee undergoing this technique is shackled in a standing position with his hands in front of his body, which prevents him from failing asleep but also allows him to move around within a two- to three-foot diameter. The detainee's hands are generally positioned below his chin, although they may not be raised above the head for a period not to exceed two hours. See id. at 11-13 (explaining the procedures at length). As we have previously noted, sleep deprivation itself generally has few negative effects (beyond temporary cognitive impairment and transient hallucinations), though some detainees might experience transient "unpleasant physical sensations from prolonged fatigue, including such symptoms as impairment to coordinated body movement, difficulty with speech, nausea, and blurred vision." Id. at 37; see also Id. 37-38. Subjects deprived of sleep in scientific studies for longer than the 180-hour limit imposed by the CIA generally return to normal neurological functioning with as little as one night of normal sleep. See id. at 40. In light of the ongoing and careful medical monitoring undertaken by OMS and the authority and obligation of all members of the interrogation team, and of OMS personnel and other facility staff, to stop the procedure if necessary, this technique is not to be expected to result in any detainee experiencing extreme physical distress. See id. at 38-39. [9]

With respect to the shackling, the procedures in place (which include constant monitoring by detention personnel, via closed-circuit television, and intervention if necessary) minimize the risk that a detainee will hang by his wrists or otherwise suffer injury from the shackling. See id. at 11. Indeed, these procedures appear to have been effective, as no detainee has suffered any lasting harm from the shackling. See id.

Because releasing a detainee from the shackles would present a security problem and would interfere with the effectiveness of the technique, a detainee undergoing sleep deprivation frequently wears and adult diaper. See Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 4 (Oct, 12, 2004) ("October 12 [delete] Letter"). Diapers are checked and changed as needed so that no detainee would be allowed to remain in a soiled diaper, and the detainee's skin condition is monitored. See Techniques at 12. You have informed us that diapers are used solely for sanitary and health reasons and not in order to humiliate the detainee.

2. Corrective techniques

Corrective techniques entail some degree of physical interaction with the detainee and are used "to correct, startle, or to achieve another enabling objective with the detainee." Background Paper at 5. These techniques "condition a detainee to pay attention to the interrogator's questions and ... dislodge expectations that the detainee will not be touched. Techniques at 9. This category comprises the following techniques: insult (facial) slap, abdominal slap, facial hold, and attention grasp. See Background Paper at 5; see also Techniques at 8-9 (describing these techniques). [10] In the facial hold technique, for example, the interrogator uses his hands to immobilize the detainee's head. The interrogator's fingers are kept closely together and away from the detainee's eyes. See Pre-Academic Laboratory (PREAL) Operating Instructions at 19 ("PREAL Manual"). The Technique instills fear and apprehension with minimal physical force. Indeed, each of these techniques entails only mild uses of force and does not cause any significant pain or any lasting harm. See Background Paper at 5-7.

3. Coercive techniques

Coercive techniques "place the detainee in more physical and psychological stress" than the other techniques and are generally "considered to be more effective tools in persuading a resistant [detainee] to participate with CIA interrogators." Background Paper at 7. These techniques are typically not used simultaneously. The Background Paper lists walling, water dousing, stress positions, wall standing, and cramped confinement in this category. We will also treat the waterboard as a coercive technique.

Walling is performed by placing the detainee against what seems to be a normal wall but is in fact a flexible false wall. See Techniques at 8. The interrogator pulls the detainee towards him and then quickly slams the detainee against the false wall. The false wall is designed, and a c-collar or similar device is used, to help avoid whiplash or similar injury. See id. The technique is designed to create a loud sound and shock the detainee without causing significant pain. The CIA regards walling as "one of the most effective interrogation techniques because it wears down the [detainee] physically, heightens uncertainty in the detainee about what the interrogator may do to him, and creates a sense of dread when the [detainee] know he is about to be walled again." Background Paper at 7. A detainee "may be walled one time (one impact with the wall) to make a point or twenty to thirty times consecutively when the interrogator requires a more significant response to a question," and "will be walled multiple times" during a session designed to be intense. Id. At no time, however, is the technique employed in such a way that could cause severe physical pain. See Techniques at 32 n.38. [11]

In the water dousing technique, potable cold water is poured on the detainee either from a container or a hose without a nozzle. Ambient air temperatures are kept above 64°F. The maximum permissible duration of water exposure depends on the water temperature, which may be no lower than 41°F and is usually no lower than 50°F. See id. at 10. Maximum exposure durations have been "set at two-thirds the time at which, based on extensive medical literature and experience, hypothermia could be expected to develop in healthy individuals who are submerged in water of the same temperature" in order to provide adequate safety margins against hypothermia. Id. This technique can easily be used in combination with other techniques and "is intended to weaken the detainee's resistance and persuade him to cooperate with interrogators." Id. at 9.

Stress positions and wall standing are used to induce muscle fatigue and the attendant discomfort. See Techniques at 9 (describing techniques); see also PREAL Manual at 20 (explaining that stress positions are used "to create a distracting pressure" and "to humiliate or insult"). The use of these techniques is "usually self-limiting in that temporary muscle fatigue usually leads to the [detainee's] being unable to maintain the stress position after a period of time." Background Paper at 8. We understand that these techniques are used only to induce temporary muscle fatigue; neither of these techniques is designed or expected to cause severe physical pain. See Techniques at 33-34.

Cramped confinement involves placing the detainee in an uncomfortably small container. Such confinement may last up to eight hours in a relatively large container or up to two hours in a smaller container. See Background Paper at 8; Techniques at 9. The technique "accelerate[s] the physical and psychological stresses of captivity." PREAL Manual at 22. In OMS's view, however, cramped confinement "ha[s] not proved particularly effective" because is provides "a safehaven offering respite from interrogation." OMS Guidelines at 16.

The waterboard is generally considered to be "the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques," id. at 17, a conclusion with which we have readily agreed, see Techniques at 41. In this technique, the detainee is placed face-up on a gurney with his head inclined downward. A cloth is placed over his face on which cold water is then poured for periods of at most 40 seconds. This creates a barrier through which it is either difficult of impossible to breathe. The technique thereby induce[s] a sensation of drowning." Id. at 13. The waterboard may be authorized for, at most, one 30-day period, during which the technique can actually be applied on no more than five days. See id. at 14 (describing, in detail, these and additional limitations); see also Letter from [delete] Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 1 (Aug. 19, 2004) ("August 19 [delete] Letter"). Further, there can be no more than two sessions in any 24-hour period. Each session -- the time during which the detainee is strapped to the waterboard -- lasts no more than two hours. There may be at most six applications of water lasting 10 seconds or longer during any session, and water may be applied for a total of no more than 12 minutes during any 24-hour period. See Techniques at 14.

As we have explained, "these limitations have been established with extensive input from OMS, based on experience to date with this technique and OMS's professional judgment that the health risks associated with the use of the waterboard on a healthy individual subject to these limitations would be 'medically acceptable.'" Id. at 14 (citing OMS Guidelines at 18-19). In addition, although the waterboard induces fear and panic, it is not painful. See id. at 13.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

PostPosted: Sat Oct 12, 2013 12:39 am
by admin
PART 2 OF 3

II.

We conclude, first, that the CIA interrogation program does not implicate United States obligations under Article 16 of the CAT because Article 16 has limited geographic scope. By its terms, Article 16 places no obligations on a State Party outside "territory under its jurisdiction." The ordinary meaning of the phrase, the use of the phrase elsewhere in the CAT, and the negotiating history of the CAT, and the negotiating history of the CAT demonstrate that the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" is best understood as including, at most, areas where a State exercises territory-based jurisdiction; that is areas over which the State exercises at least de facto authority as the government. As we explain below, based on CIA assurances, we understand that the interrogations conducted by the CIA do not take place in any "territory under [United States] jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 16. We therefore conclude that the CIA interrogation program does not violate the obligations set forth in Article 16.

Apart from the terms of Article 16 as stated in the CAT, the United States undertook its obligations under the CAT subject to a Senate reservation that provides: "[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 ... only insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." There is a strong argument that in requiring this reservation, the Senate intended to limit United States obligations under Article 16 to the existing obligations already imposed by these Amendments. These Amendments have been construed by the courts no to extend protections to aliens outside the United States. The CIA has also assured us that the interrogation techniques are not used within the United States or against United States persons, including both U.S. citizens and lawful permanent resident aliens.

A.

"[W]e begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used." Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (1980) ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.") [12] Article 16 states that "[e]ach State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture." CAT Art. 16(1) (emphasis added). [13] This territorial limitation is confirmed by Article 16's explication of this basic obligation: "In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. Articles 11 through 13 impose on each State Party certain specific obligations, each of which is expressly limited to "territory under its jurisdiction." See infra pp. 18-19 (describing requirements). Although Article 10, which as incorporated in Article 16 requires each State Party to "ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition" against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is given to specified government personnel, does not expressly limit its obligation to "territory under [each State's] jurisdiction," Article 10's reference to the "prohibition" against such treatment or punishment can only be understood to refer to the territorially limited obligation set forth in Article 16.

The obligations imposed by the CAT are thus more limited with respect to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment than with respect to torture. To be sure, Article 2, like Article 16, imposes an obligation on each State Party to prevent torture "in any territory under its jurisdiction." Article 4(1), however, separately requires each State Party to "ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law." (emphasis added.) The CAT imposes no analogous requirement with respect to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [14]

Because the CAT does not define the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction," we turn to the dictionary definitions of the relevant terms. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 654-55 (2004) (drawing on dictionary definitions in interpreting a treaty); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 509 U.S. 155, 180-1 (1993) (same). Common dictionary definitions of "jurisdiction" include "[t]he right and power to interpret and apply the law[; a]uthority or control[; and t]he territorial range of authority or control." American Heritage Dictionary 711 (1973); American Heritage Dictionary 978 (3d ed. 1992) (same definitions); see also Black's Law Dictionary 766 (5th ed. 1979) ("[a]reas of authority"). Common dictionary definitions of "territory" include "[a]n area of land[; or t]he land and waters under the jurisdiction of a state, nation, or sovereign." American Heritage Dictionary at 1329 (1973); American Heritage Dictionary at 1854 (3d ed. 1992) (same); see also Black's Law Dictionary at 1321 ("A part of a country separated from the rest, and subject to a particular jurisdiction. geographical area under the jurisdiction of another country or sovereign power."); Black's Law Dictionary at 1512 (8th ed. 2004) ("[a] geographical area included within a particular government's jurisdiction; the portion of the earth's surface that is in a state's exclusive possession and control"). Taking these definitions together, we conclude that the most plausible meaning of the term "territory under its jurisdiction" is the land over which a State exercises authority and control as the government. Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004) (concluding that "the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" subsumes areas over which "the United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control") (internal quotation marks omitted); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262, U.S. 100, 123 (1923) ("It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control[.]").

This understanding of the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" is confirmed by the way the phrase is used in various provisions throughout the CAT. See Air France v. Sakes, 470 U.S. 392, 398 (1985) (treaty drafters "logically would ... use[] the same word in each article" when they intend to convey the same meaning throughout); J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 53 (1988) ("CAT Handbook") (noting that "it was agreed that the phrase 'territory under its jurisdiction' has the same meaning" in different articles of the CAT).

For example, Article 5 provides:

Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 [requiring each State Party to criminalize all acts of torture[ in the following cases:

(a) When the offenses are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;

(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;

(c) When the victim is a national of that State if the State considers it appropriate.


CAT art. 5(1) (emphasis added). The CAT thereby distinguishes jurisdiction based on territory from jurisdiction based the nationality of either the victim or the perpetrator. Paragraph (a) also distinguishes jurisdiction based on territory based on registry of ships and aircraft. To read the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" to subsume these other types of jurisdiction would eliminate these distinctions and render most of Article 5 surplusage. Each of Article 5's provisions, however, "like all the other words of the treaty, is to be given a meaning, if reasonably possible, and rules of construction may not be resorted to render it meaningless or inoperative." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 303-04 (1933).

Articles 11 through 13, moreover, use the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" in ways that presuppose that the relevant State exercises the traditional authorities of the government in such areas. Article 11 requires each States to "keep under systematic review ... arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction." Article 12 mandates that "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction." Similarly, Article 13 requires "[e]ach State Party [to] ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities." These provisions assume that the relevant State exercises traditional governmental authority -- including the authority to arrest, detain, imprison, and investigate crime -- within any "territory under its jurisdiction."

Three other provisions underscore this point. Article 2(1) requires each State Party to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent such acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction." "Territory under its jurisdiction," therefore, is most reasonably read to refer to areas over which States exercises broad governmental authority -- the areas over which States could take legislative, administrative, or judicial action. Article 5(2), moreover, enjoins "[e]ach State Party ... to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him." Article 7(1) similarly requires State Parties to extradite suspects or refer them to "competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." These provisions evidently contemplate that each State Party has authority to extradite and prosecute those suspected of torture in any "territory under its jurisdiction." That is, each State Party is expected to operate as the government in "territory under its jurisdiction." [15]

This understanding is supported by the negotiating record. See Zicherman V. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) ("Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, see U.S. Const., Art. II, §2, but also an agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history ..."); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32 (permitting recourse to "the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" inter alia "to confirm" the ordinary meaning of the text). The original Swedish proposal, which was the basis for the first draft of the CAT, contained a predecessor to Article 16 that would have required that "[e]ach State Party undertake[] to ensure that [a proscribed act] does not take place within its jurisdiction." Draft International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, submitted by Sweden on January 18, 1978, arts. 2-3, E/CN.4/1285, in CAT Handbook app. 6, at 203 (emphasis added); CAT Handbook at 47. France objected that the phrase "within its jurisdiction" was too broad. For example, it was concerned that the phrase might extend to signatories' citizens located in territory belonging to other nations. See Report of the Pre-Sessional Working Group, E/CN.4/L 1470 (1979), reprinted in Report of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1347 35, 40 (1979); CAT Handbook at 48. Although France suggested replacing "within its jurisdiction" with "in its territory," the phrase "any territory under its jurisdiction" was chosen instead. See CAT Handbook at 48.

There is some evidence that the United States understood these phrases to mean essentially the same thing. See, e.g., Exec. Report 101-30, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 (Aug. 31), 1994) (senate Foreign Relations Committee Report) (suggesting that the phrase "in any territory under jurisdiction" would impose obligations on a State Party with respect to conduct committed "in its territory" but not with respect to conduct "occurring abroad"); Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, S. Heg. 101-718 at 7 (Jan. 30, 1990) (prepared statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State) (stating that under Article 2, State Parties would be obligated "to take administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent torture within their territory") emphasis added). Other evidence, however, suggests that the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" has a somewhat broader meaning that "in its territory." According to the record of the negotiation relating to Article 12 and 13 of the CAT, "[i]n response to the question on the scope of the phrase 'territory under its jurisdiction' as contained in these articles, it was said that it was intended to cover, inter alia, territories still under colonial rule and occupied territory." U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/1367, Mar. 5, 1980, at 13. And one commentator has stated that the negotiating record suggests that the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" "is not limited to a State's land territory, its territorial sea and the airspace over its land and sea territory, but it also applied to territories under military occupation, to colonial territories and to any other territories over which a State has factual control." Id. at 131. Others have suggested that the phrase would also reach conduct occurring on ships and aircraft registered in a State. See CAT Handbook at 48; Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 5 (1988) (Secretary of State Schultz) (asserting that the "territory under its jurisdiction" "refers to all places that the State Party controls as a governmental authority, including ships and aircraft registered in that State"). [16]

Thus, although portions of the negotiating record of the CAT may support reading the phrase "any territory under its jurisdiction" to included not only sovereign territory but also areas subject to de facto government authority (and perhaps registered ships and aircraft), the negotiating record as a whole tends to confirm that the phrase does not extend to place where a State Party does not exercise authority as the government.

The CIA has assured us that the interrogations at issue here do not take place within the sovereign territory of special maritime and territorial jurisdiction ("SMTJ") of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 5 (defining "United States"); id. § 7 (defining SMTJ). As relevant here, we believe that the phrase "any territory under its jurisdiction " certainly reaches no further than the sovereign territory and the SMTJ of the United States. [17] Indeed, in many respects, it probably does not reach this far. Although many provisions of the SMTJ invoke territorial bases of jurisdiction, other provisions assert jurisdiction on other grounds, including, for example, sections 7(9), which assert jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by or against United States citizens. Accordingly, we conclude that the interrogation program does not take place within "territory under United States[ jurisdiction" and therefore does not violate Article 16 -- even absent the Senate's reservation limiting United States obligations under Article 16, which we discuss in the next section.

B.

As a condition to its advice to the ratification of the CAT, the Senate required a reservation that provides that the United States is

bound by the obligation under Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.


Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990). This reservation, which the United States deposited with its instrument of ratification, is legally binding and defines the scope of United States obligations under Article 16 of the CAT. See Relevance of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, 11 Op. O.L.C. 28, 33 (1987) (Reservations deposited with the instrument of ratification "are generally binding ... both internationally and domestically ... in subsequent interpretation of the treaty.") [18]

Under the terms of the reservation, the United States is obligated to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" only to the extent that such treatment amounts to the "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments." Giving force to the terms of this reservation, treatment that is not "prohibited by" these amendments would not violate United States obligations as limited by the reservation.

Conceivably, one might read the text of the reservation as limiting only the substantive (as opposed to the territorial) reach of United States obligations under Article 16. That would not be an unreasonable reading of the text. Under this view, the reservation replaced only the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and left untouched the phrase "in any territory under its jurisdiction," which defines the geographic scope of the Article. The text of the reservation, however, is susceptible to another reasonable reading -- one suggesting that the Senate intended to ensure that the United States would, with respect to Article 16, undertake no obligations not already imposed by the Constitution itself. Under this reading, the reference to the treatment or punishment prohibited by the constitutional provisions does not distinguish between the substantive scope of the constitutional prohibitions and their geographic scope. As we discuss below, this second reading is strongly supported by the Senate's ratification history of the CAT.

The Summary and Analysis of the CAT submitted by the President to the Senate in 1988 expressed concern that "Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law." Summary and Analysis of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15. "In view of the ambiguity of the terms," the Executive Branch suggested "that U.S. obligations under this article [Article 16] should be limited to conduct prohibited by the U.S. Constitution." S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 8 (1990) (emphasis added); see also id. at 25-26. Accordingly, it proposed what became the Senate's reservation in order "[t]o make clear that the United States construes the phrase ["cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"] to be coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment." Id. at 25-26; S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15 (same). As State Department Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sogaer explained, "because the Constitution of the United States directly addresses this area of the law ... [the reservation] would limit our obligations under this Convention to the proscriptions already covered in our Constitution.." Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 11 (1990) (prepared statement). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed the same concern about the potential scope of Article 16 and recommended the same reservation to the Senate. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 8, 25-26.

Furthermore, the Senate declared that Articles 1 through 16 of the CAT are not self-executing, see Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990), and the discussions surrounding this declaration in the ratification history also indicate that the United States did not intend to undertake any obligations under Article 16 that extended beyond those already imposed by the Constitution. The Administration expressed the view that "as indicated in the original Presidential transmittal, existing Federal legislation would be required only to establish criminal jurisdiction under Article 5." Letter for Senator Pressler, from Janet Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State (April 4, 11190), in S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 41 (emphasis added). It was understood that "the majority of the obligations to be undertaken by the United States pursuant to the Convention [were] already covered by existing law" and that "additional implementing legislation [would] be needed only with respect to article 5." S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 10 (emphasis added). Congress then enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2349A, the only "necessary legislation to implement" United States obligations under the CAT, noting that the United States would "not become a party to the Convention until the necessary implementing legislation is enacted." S. Rep. No. 103-107, at 366 (1993). Reading Article 16 to extend the substantive standards of the Constitution in contexts where they did not already apply would be difficult to square with the evident understanding of the United States that existing law would satisfy its obligations under the CAT except with respect to Article 5. The ratification history thus strongly support the view that United States obligations under Article 16 were intended to reach no further -- substantively, territorially, or in any other respect -- than its obligations under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested in various contexts that the Constitution does not apply to aliens outside the United States. See, e.g. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) ("[O]ur Constitution, laws, and policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizen ..."); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (noting that cases relied upon by an alien asserting constitutional rights "establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with his country"). Federal courts of appeals, in turn, have held that "[t]he Constitution does not extend its guarantees to nonresident aliens living outside the United States," Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robing Co., 820 F.2f 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1987); that "non-resident aliens ... plainly cannot appeal to the protection of the Constitution or laws of the United States," Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam); and that a "foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise," 32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep't of State, 292 F. 3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F. 3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). [19]

As we explain below, it is the Fifth Amendment that is potentially relevant in the present context. With respect to that Amendment, the Supreme Court has "rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendments rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States." Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. In Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269, the Court noted its "emphatic" "rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment" in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), which rejected "[t]he doctrine that the term 'any person' in the Fifth Amendment spreads its protection over alien enemies anywhere in the word engaged in hostilities against us," id. at 782. Accord Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager and noting that "[i]t is well established that" Fifth Amendment protections "are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders"). Federal courts of appeals have similarly held that "non-resident aliens who have insufficient contacts with the United States are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protections." Jifry v. F.A.A., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir 2004); see also Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (relying on Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez to conclude that an alien could not state a due process claim for torture allegedly inflicted by United States agents abroad), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002); Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1428-29 (11th Cir. 1995) (relying on Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez to conclude that aliens held at Guantanamo Bay lack Fifth Amendment rights). [20]

The reservation required by the Senate as a condition of its advice and consent to the ratification of the CAT thus tends to confirm the territorially limited reach of U.S. obligations under Article 16. Indeed, there is a strong argument that, by limiting United States obligations under Article 16 to those that certain provisions of the Constitution already impose, the Senate's reservation limits the territorial reach of Article 16 even more sharply than does the text of Article 16 standing alone. Under this view, Article 16 would impose no obligations with respect to aliens outside the United States. [21] And because the CIA has informed us that these techniques are not authorized for use against United States persons, or within the United States, they would not, under this view, violate Article 16, however, or even if it is read not to bear on this question at all, the program would still not violate Article 16 for the reasons discussed in Part II.A. Accordingly, we need not decide here the precise effect, if any, of the Senate reservation on the geographic scope of U.S. obligations under Article 16. [22]

III.

You have also asked us to consider whether the CIA interrogation program would violate the substantive standards applicable to the United States under Article 16 if, contrary to the conclusions reached in Part II above, those standards did extend to the CIA interrogation program. Pursuant to the Senate's reservation, the United States is bound by Article 16 to prevent the "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." As we explain, the relevant test is whether use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques constitutes government conduct that "shocks the conscience." Based on our understanding of the relevant case law and the CIA's descriptions of the interrogation program, we concluded that use of the enhanced interrogation techniques, subject to all applicable conditions, limitations and safeguards, does not "shock the conscience." We emphasize, however, that this analysis calls for the application of a somewhat subjective test with only limited guidance from the Court. We therefore cannot predict with confidence whether a court would agree with our conclusions, though, as discussed more fully below, we believe the interpretation of Article 16's substantive standard is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry.

A.

Although, pursuant to the Senate's reservation, United States obligations under Article 16 extend to "the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States," only the Fifth Amendment is potentially relevant here. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." (Emphasis added.) This Amendment does not apply to actions taken by the federal Government. See; e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 m.21 (1987) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not apply" to the federal Government); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954) (noting that the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions taken by the District of Columbia). The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." (Emphasis added.) As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the Eighth Amendment does not apply until there has been a formal adjudication of guilt. E.g.; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). See also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing detainees' claims based on Eighth Amendment because "the Eighth Amendment applies only after an individual is convicted of a crime") (stayed pending appeal). The same conclusion concerning the limited applicability of the Eighth Amendment under Article 16 was expressly recognized by thee Senate and the Executive Branch during the CAT ratification deliberations:

The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is, of the three [constitutional provisions cited in the Senate reservation], the most limited in scope, as this amendment has consistently been interpreted as protecting only "those convicted of crime." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). The Eighth Amendment does, however, afford protection against torture and ill-treatment of persons in prison and similar situations of criminal punishment.


Summary and Analysis of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 9 (emphasis added). Because the high value detainees on whom the CIA might use enhanced interrogation techniques have not been convicted of any crime, the substantive requirements of the Eighth Amendment would not be relevant here, even if we assume that Article 16 has application to the CIA's interrogation program. [23]

The Fifth Amendment, however, is not subject to these same limitations. As potentially relevant here, the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment protects against executive action that "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) ("To this end, for half century now we have spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience."). [24]

B.

We must therefore determine whether the CIA interrogation program involves conduct that "shocks the conscience". The Court has indicated that whether government conduct can be said to "shock the conscience" depends primarily on whether the conduct is "arbitrary in the constitutional sense," Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted); that is, whether it amounts to the "exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective," id. "[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level," id. at 849, although, in some cases, deliberate indifference to the risk of inflicting such unjustifiable injury might also "shock the conscience," id. at 850-51. The Court has also suggested that it is appropriate to consider whether, in light of "traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to them," conduct "is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Id. at 847 n.8. [25]

Several considerations complicate our analysis. First, there are relatively few cases in which the Court has analyzed whether conduct "shocks the conscience," and these cases involve context that differ dramatically from the CIA interrogation program. Further, the Court has emphasized that there is "no calibrated yard stick" with which to determine whether conduct "shocks the conscience." Id. at 847. To the contrary: "Rules of due process are not ... subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory." Id. at 850. A claim that government conduct "shocks the conscience," therefore, requires "an exact analysis of circumstances." Id. The Court has explained:

The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in light of other considerations, fall short of such a denial.


Id. at 850 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 4555, 462 (1942)) (alteration in Lewis). Our task, therefore, is to apply in a novel context a highly fact-dependent test with little guidance from the Supreme Court.

1.

We first consider whether the CIA interrogation program involves conduct that is "constitutionally arbitrary." We conclude that it does not. Indeed, we find no evidence of "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest," id. at 849, or of deliberate indifference to the possibility of such unjustifiable injury, see id. at 853.

As an initial matter, the Court has made clear that whether conduct can be considered to be constitutionally arbitrary depends vitally on whether it furthers a government interest, and, if it does, the nature and importance of that interest. The test is not merely whether the conduct is "intended to injure," but rather whether it is "intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest." Id. at 849 (emphasis added). It is the "exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective" that can be said to "shock the conscience." Id. at 846 (emphasis added). In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987), for example, the Court explained that the Due Process Clause "lays down [no] ... categorical imperative," and emphasized that the Court has "repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest." See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2004) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the individual's interests must be weighed against the government's). The government's interest is thus an important part of the context that must be carefully considered in evaluating an asserted violation of due process. [26]

Al Qaeda's demonstrated ability to launch sophisticated attacks causing mass casualties within the United States and against United States interests worldwide, as well as its continuing efforts to plan and to execute such attacks, see supra p. 9, indisputably pose a grave and continuing threat. "It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation." Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748 (noting that "society's interest is at its peak" "in times of war or insurrection"). It is this paramount interest that the Government seeks to vindicate through the interrogation program. Indeed, the program, which the CIA believes "has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001," Effectiveness Memo at 2, directly furthers that interest, producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence. As detailed above, ordinary interrogation techniques had little effect on either KSM or Zubaydah. Use of enhanced techniques, however, led to critical, actionable intelligence such as the discovery of the Guraba Cell, which was tasked with executing KSM's planned Second Wave attacks against Los Angeles. Interrogations of these most valuable detainees and comparatively lower-tier high value detainees [big delete] have also greatly increased the CIA's understanding of our enemy and its plans.

As evidenced by our discussion in Part I, the CIA goes to great lengths to ensure that the techniques are applied only as reasonably necessary to protect this paramount interest in "the security of the Nation." Various aspects of the program ensure that enhanced techniques will be used only in the interrogations of the detainees who are most likely to have critical, actionable intelligence. The CIA screening procedures, which the CIA imposes in addition to the standards applicable to activities conducted pursuant to paragraph four of the Memorandum of Notification, ensure that the techniques are not used unless the CIA reasonably believes that the detainee is a "senior member of al-Qai'da or [its affiliates]," and the detainee has "knowledge of imminent terrorist threat against the USA" or has been directly involved in the planning of attacks. January 4 [delete] Fax, at 5, supra p. 5. The fact that enhanced techniques have been used to date in the interrogations of only 28 high value detainees out of the 94 detainees in CIA custody demonstrates this selectivity.

Use of the waterboard is limited still further, requiring "credible intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent; ... substantial and credible indicators that the subject has actionable intelligence that can prevent, disrupt or delay this attack; and [a determination that o]ther interrogation methods have failed to elicit the information [and that] ... other ... methods are unlikely to elicit this information within the perceived time limit for preventing the attack." August 2 Rizzo Letter (attachment). Once again, the CIA's practice confirms the program's selectivity. CIA interrogators have used the waterboard on only three detainees to date -- KSM, Zubaydah, and Al-Nashiri -- and have not used it at all since March 2003.

Moreover, enhanced techniques are considered only when the on-scene interrogation team considers them necessary because a detainee is withholding or manipulating important, actionable intelligence or there is insufficient time to try other techniques. For example, as recounted above, the CIA used enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah only after ordinary interrogation tactics had failed. Even then, CIA Headquarters must make the decision whether to use enhanced techniques in any interrogation. Officials at CIA Headquarters can assess the situation based on the interrogation team's reports and intelligence from a variety of other sources and are therefore well positioned to assess the importance of the information sought.

Once approved, techniques are used only in escalating fashion so that it is unlikely that a detainee would be subjected to more duress than is reasonably necessary to elicit the information sought. Thus, no technique is used on a detainee unless use of that technique at that time appears necessary to obtaining the intelligence. And use of enhanced techniques ceases "if the detainee is judged to be consistently providing accurate intelligence or if he is no longer believed to have actionable intelligence." Techniques at 5. Indeed, use of the techniques usually ends after just a few days when the detainee begins participating. Enhanced techniques, therefore, would not be used on a detainee not reasonably thought to possess important, actionable intelligence that could not be obtained otherwise.

Not only is the interrogation program closely tied to a government interest of the highest order, it is also designed, through its careful limitations and screening criteria, to avoid causing any severe pain or suffering or inflicting significant or lasting harm. As the OMS Guidelines explain, "[i]n all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact, and not some physical effect, with a specific goal of 'dislocate[ing] [the detainee's] expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive.'" OMS Guidelines at 8-9 (second alteration in original). Thus, no technique is ever used if there is reason to believe it will cause the detainee significant mental or physical harm. When enhanced techniques are used, OMS closely monitors the detainees' condition to ensure that he does not, in fact, experience severe pain or suffering or sustain any significant or lasting harm.

This facet of our analysis bears emphasis. We do not conclude that any conduct, no matter how extreme, could be justified by a sufficiently weighty government interest coupled with appropriate tailoring. Rather, our inquiry is limited to the program under consideration, in which the techniques do not amount to torture considered independently or in combination. See Techniques at 28-45; Combined Use at 9-19. Torture is categorically prohibited both by the CAT, see art. 2(2) ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever ... may be invoked as a justification of torture."), and by implementing legislation, see 18 U.S.C §§2340-2340A.

The program, moreover, is designed to minimize the risk on injury or any suffering that is unintended or does not advance the purpose of the program. For example, in dietary manipulation, the minimum caloric intake is set at or above levels used in commercial weight-loss programs, thereby avoiding the possibility of significant weight loss. In nudity and water dousing, interrogators set ambient air temperatures high enough to guard against hypothermia. The walling technique employs a false wall and a C-collar (or similar decide) to help avoid whiplash. See Techniques at 8. With respect to sleep deprivation, constant monitoring protects against the possibility that detainees might injure themselves by hanging from their wrists, suffer from acute edema, or even experience non-transient hallucinations. See Techniques at 11-13. With the waterboard, interrogators use potable saline rather than plain water so that detainees will not suffer from hyponatremia and to minimize the risk of pneumonia. See id. at 13-14. The board is also designed to allow interrogators to place the detainee in a head-up position so that water may be cleared very quickly, and medical personnel and equipment are on hand should any unlikely problems actually develop. See id. 14. All enhanced techniques are conducted only as authorized and pursuant to medical guidelines and supervision. [27]

As is clear from these descriptions and the discussion above, the CIA uses enhanced techniques only as necessary to obtain information that it reasonably views as vital to protecting the United States and its interests from further terrorist attacks. The techniques are used only in the interrogation of those who are reasonably believed to be closely associated with al Qaeda and senior enough to have actionable intelligence concerning terrorist threats. Even then, the techniques are used only to the extent reasonably believed to be necessary to obtain otherwise unavailable intelligence. In addition, the techniques are designed to avoid inflicting severe pain or suffering, and no technique will be used if there is reason to believe it will cause significant harm. Indeed, the techniques have been designed to minimize the risk of injury or any suffering that does not further the Government's interest in obtaining actionable intelligence. The program is clearly not intended "to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest." Lewis 523 U.S. at 849. Nor can it be said to reflect "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of such unjustifiable injury. Id. at 851. [28]

2.

We next address whether, considered in light of "an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to them," use of the enhanced interrogation techniques constitutes government behavior that "is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Id, at 847 n.8. We have not found evidence of traditional executive behavior or contemporary practice either condemning or condoning an interrogation program carefully limited to further a vital government interest and designed to avoid unnecessary or serious harm. [29] However, in many contexts, there is a strong tradition against the use of coercive interrogation techniques. Accordingly, this aspect of the analysis poses a more difficult question. We examine the traditions surrounding ordinary criminal investigations within the United States, the military's tradition of not employing coercive techniques in intelligence interrogations and the fact that that United States regularly condemns conduct undertaken by other countries that bears at least some resemblance to the techniques at issue.

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These traditions provide significant evidence that the use of enhanced interrogation techniques might "shock the contemporary conscience" in at least some contexts. Id. As we have explained, however, the due process inquiry depends critically on setting and circumstance, see, e.g., id. at 847, 850, and each of these contexts differs in important ways from the one we considerer here. Careful consideration of the underpinnings of the standards of conduct expected in these other contexts, moreover, demonstrates that those standards are not controlling here. Further, as explained below, the enhanced techniques are all adapted from techniques used by the United States on its own troops, albeit under significantly different conditions. At a minimum, this confirms that use of these techniques cannot be considered to be categorically impermissible, that is, in some circumstances, use of these techniques is consistent with "traditional executive behavior" and "contemporary practice." Id. at 847 n.8. As explained below, we believe such circumstances are present here.

Domestic Criminal Investigations. Use of interrogation practices like those we consider here in ordinary criminal investigation might well "shock the conscience." In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction where the prosecution introduced evidence against the defendant that had been obtained by the forcible pumping of the defendant's stomach. The Court concluded that the conduct at issue "shocks the conscience" and was "too close to the rack and the screw." Id. at 172. Likewise, in Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), the Court then considered a conviction under a statute that criminalized depriving an individual of a constitutional right under color of law. The defendant suspected several persons of committing a particular crime. He then

over a period of three days took four men to a paint shack ... and used brutal methods to obtain a confession from each of them. A rubber hose, a pistol, a blunt instrument, a sash cord and other implement were used in the project. ... Each was beaten, threatened, and unmercifully punished for several hours until he confessed.


Id. at 98-99. The Court characterized this as "the classic use of force to make a man testify against himself," which would render the confessions inadmissible. Id. at 101. The Court concluded:

But where police take matters in their own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution. It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.


Id. at 101.

More recently, in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), the police had questioned the plaintiff, a gunshot wound victim who was in severe pain and believed he was dying. At issue was whether a section 1983 suit could be maintained by the plaintiff. The Court rejected the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause claim, see id. at 773 (opinion of Thomas, J.); id. at 778-79 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment), but remanded for consideration of whether the questioning validated the plaintiff's substantive due process rights, see id. at 779-80. Some of the justices expressed the view that the Constitution categorically prohibits such coercive interrogations. See id. at 783, 788 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the interrogation at issue as "torturous" and asserting that such interrogation "is a classic example of a violation of a constitutional right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Constitution does not countenance the official imposition of severe pain or pressure for purposes of interrogation. This is true whether the protection is found in the Self-Incrimination Clause, the broader guarantees of the Due Process Clause, or both.").

The CIA program is considerably less invasive or extreme than much of the conduct at issue in these cases. In addition, the government interest at issue in each of these cases was the general interest in ordinary law enforcement (and, in Williams, even that was doubtful). That government interest is strikingly different from what is at stake here: the national security -- in particular, the protection of the United States and its interests against attacks that may result in massive civilian casualties. Specific constitutional constraints, such as the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, which provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," (emphasis added), apply when the government acts to further its general interest in law enforcement and reflect explicit fundamental limitations on how the government may further that interest. Indeed, most of the Court's police interrogation cases appear to be rooted in the policies behind the Self-Incrimination Clause and concern for the fairness and integrity of the trial process. In Rochin, for example, the Court was concerned with the use of evidence obtained by coercion to bring about a criminal conviction. See, e.g., 342 U.S. at 173 ("Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.'") (citation omitted); id. (refusing to hold that "in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach"). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964) (characterizing the interest at stake in police interrogation cases as the "right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession"); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) explaining that "[a] coerced confession is offensive to basic standards of procured by torture are not premises from which a civilized forum will infer guilt"). Even Chavez, which might indicate the Court's receptiveness to a substantive due process claim based on coercive police interrogation practices irrespective of whether the evidence obtained was ever used against the individual interrogated, involved an interrogation implicating ordinary law enforcement interests.

Courts have long distinguished the government's interest in ordinary law enforcement from other government interests such as national security. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review recently explained that, with respect to the Fourth Amendment, "the [Supreme] Court distinguishes[s] general crime control programs and those that have another particular purpose, such as protection of citizens against special hazards or protection of our borders." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745-46 (For. Intel Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (discussing the Court's "special needs" cases and distinguishing "FISA's general programmatic purpose" of "protect[ing] the nation against terrorists and espionage threats directed by foreign powers" from general crime control). Under the "special needs" doctrine, the Supreme Court has approved of warantless and even suspicionless searches that serve "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Vermonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, although the Court has explained that it "cannot sanction [automobile] stops justified only by the" "general interest in crime control," Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted), it suggested that it might approve of a "roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack," id. See also Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Noel J. Francisco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Whether OFAC May Without Obtaining a Judicial Warrant Enter the Commercial Premises of a Designated Entity to Security Property That Has Been Blocked Pursuant to IEEPA (April 11, 2005). Notably, in the due process context, the Court has distinguished the Government’s interest in detaining illegal aliens generally from its interest in detaining suspected terrorists. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691. Although the Court concluded that a statute permitting the indefinite detention of aliens subject to a final order or removal but who could not be removed to other countries would raise substantial constitutional questions, it suggested that its reasoning might not apply to a statute that "appl[ied] narrowly to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals, say, suspected terrorists." Id. at 691 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Accordingly, for these reasons, we do not believe that the tradition that emerges from the police interrogation context provides controlling evidence of a relevant executive tradition prohibiting use of these techniques in the quite different context of interrogations undertaken solely to prevent foreign terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests.

United States Military Doctrine. Army Field Manual 34-52 sets forth the military's basic approach to intelligence interrogations. It lists a variety of interrogation techniques that generally involve only verbal and emotional tactics. In the "emotional love approach," for example, the interrogator might exploit the love a detainee feels for his fellow soldiers, and use this to motivate the detainee to cooperate. Id. at 3-15. In the "fear-up (harsh) approach," "the interrogator behaves in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice [and] may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the [detainee's] implanted feelings of fear." Id. at 3-16. The Field Manual counsels that "[g]reat care must be taken when [using this technique] so any actions would not violate the prohibition on coercion and threats contained in the GPW, Article 17." Id. Indeed, from the outset, the Field Manual explains that the Geneva Conventions "and US policy expressly prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation." Id. at I-8. As prohibited acts of physical and mental torture, the Field Manual lists "[f]ood deprivation" and "[a]bnormal sleep deprivation" respectively. Id.

The Field Manual provides evidence "of a traditional executive behavior[ and] of contemporary practice," Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8, but we do not find it dispositive for several reasons. Most obviously, as the Field Manual makes clear, the approach it embodies is designed for traditional armed conflicts, in particular, conflicts governed by the Geneva Conventions. See Field Manual 34-52 at 1-7 to 1-8; see also id. at iv-v (noting that interrogations must comply with the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice). The United States, however, has long resisted efforts to extend the protections of the Geneva Conventions to terrorists and other unlawful combatants. As President Reagan stated when the United States rejected Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the position of the United States is that it "must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law." President Ronal Reagan, Letter of Transmittal to the Senate of Protocol II (Jan. 29, 1987). President Bush, moreover, has expressly determined that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War ("GPW") does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. See Memorandum from the President, Re: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees at 1 (Feb. 7, 2002); see also Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees at 9-10 (Jan. 22, 2002) (explaining that GPW does not apply to non-state actors such as al Qaeda).

We think that a policy premised on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and not purporting to bind the CIA does not constitute controlling evidence of executive tradition and contemporary practice with respect to untraditional armed conflict where those treaties do not apply, where the enemy flagrantly violates the laws of war by secretly attacking civilians, and where the United States cannot identity the enemy or prevent its attacks absent accurate intelligence.

State Department Reports. Each year, in the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the United States condemns coercive interrogation techniques and other practices employed by other countries. Certain of the techniques the United States has condemned appear to bear some resemblance to some of the CIA interrogation techniques. In their discussion of Indonesia, for example, the reports list as "[p]sychological torture" conduct that involves "food and sleep deprivation," but give no specific information as to what these techniques involve. In their discussion of Egypt, the reports list as "methods of torture" "stripping and blindfolding victims; suspending victims from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor, beating victims [with various objects]; ... and dousing victims with cold water." See also, e.g. Algeria (describing the "chiffon" method, which involves "placing a rag drenched in dirty water in someone's mouth"); Iran (counting sleep deprivation as either torture or severe prisoner abuse); Syria (discussing sleep deprivation and "having cold water thrown on" detainees as either torture or "ill-treatment"). The State Department's inclusion of nudity, water dousing, sleep deprivation, and food deprivation among the conduct it condemns is significant and provides some indication of an executive foreign relations tradition condemning the use of these techniques. [30]

To the extent they may be relevant, however, we do not believe that the reports provide evidence that the CIA interrogation program "shocks the contemporary conscience." The reports do not generally focus on or provide precise description of individual interrogation techniques. Nor do the reports discuss in any detail the contexts in which the techniques are used. From what we glean from the reports, however, it appears that the condemned techniques are often part of a course of conduct that involves techniques and is undertaken in ways that bear no resemblance to the CIA interrogation program. Much of the condemned techniques goes far beyond the CIA techniques and would almost certainly constitute torture under United States law. See, e.g., Egypt (discussing "suspending victims from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor" and "beating victims [with various objects]"); Syria (discussing finger crushing and severe beatings); Pakistan (beatings, burning with cigarettes, electric shock); Uzbekistan (electric shock, rape, sexual abuse, beating). The condemned conduct, moreover, is often undertaken for reasons totally unlike the CIA's. For example, Indonesia security forces apparently use their techniques in order to obtain confessions, to punish, and to extort money. Egypt "employ[s] torture to extract information, coerce opposition figures to cease their political activities, and to deter others from similar activities." There is no indication that techniques are used only as necessary to protect against grave terrorist threats of for any similarly vital government interests (or indeed for any legitimate government interest). On the contrary, much of the alleged abuses discussed in the reports appears to involve either the indiscriminate use of force, see, e.g., Kenya, or the targeting of critics of the government, see, e.g., Liberia, Rwanda. And there is certainly no indication that these countries apply careful screening procedures, medical monitoring, or any of the other safeguards required by the CIA interrogation program.

A United States foreign relations tradition of condemning torture, the indiscriminate use of force, the use of force against the government's political opponents, or the use of force to obtain confessions in ordinary criminal cases says little about the propriety of the CIA interrogation practices. The CIA's careful screening procedures are designed to ensure that enhanced techniques are used in the relatively few interrogations of terrorists who are believed to possess vital, actionable intelligence that might avert an attack against the United States or its interests. The CIA uses enhanced techniques only to the extent reasonably believed necessary to obtain the information and takes great care to avoid inflicting severe pain or suffering or any lasting or unnecessary harm. In short, the CIA program is designed to subject detainees to no more duress than is justified by the Government's interest in protecting the United States from further terrorist attacks. In these essential respects, it differs from the conduct condemned in the State Department reports.

SERE Training. There is also evidence that use of these techniques is in some circumstances consistent with executive tradition and practice. Each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques has been adapted from military SERE training, where the techniques have long been used on our own troops. See Techniques at 6; IG Report at 13-14. In some instances, the CIA uses a milder form of the technique than SERE. Water dousing, as done in SERE training, involved complete immersion in water that may be below 40°F. See Techniques at 10. This aspect of SERE training is done outside with ambient air temperatures as low as 10°F. See id. In the CIA technique, by contrast, the detainee is splashed with water that is never below 41°F and is usually warmer. See id. Further, ambient air temperatures are never below 64°F. See id. Other techniques, however, are undeniably more extreme as applied in the CIA interrogation program. Most notably, the waterboard is used quite sparingly in SERE training -- at most two times on a trainee for at most 40 seconds each time. See id. at 13, 42. Although the CIA program authorizes waterboard use only in narrow circumstances (to date, the CIA has used the waterboard on only three detainees), where authorized, it may be used for two "sessions" per day of up to two hours. During a session, water may be applied up to six times for ten seconds or longer (but never more than 40 seconds). In a 24-hour period, a detainee may be subjected to up to twelve minutes of water application. See id. at 42. Additionally, the waterboard may be used on as many as five days during a 30-day approval period. See August 19 [delete] Letter at 1-2. The CIA used the waterboard "at least 83 times during August 2002" in the interrogation of Zubaydah, IG Report at 90, and 183 times during March 2003 in the interrogation of KSM, see id. at 91.

In addition, as we have explained before:

Individuals undergoing SERE training are obviously in a very different situation from detainees undergoing interrogation; SERE trainees know it is part of a training program, not a real-life interrogation regime, they presumably know it will last only a short time, and they presumably have assurances that they will not be significantly harmed by the training.


Techniques at 6. On the other hand, the interrogation program we consider here furthers the paramount interest of the United States in the security of the Nation more immediately and directly than SERE training, which seeks to reduce the possibility that United States military personnel might reveal information that could harm the national security in the event they are captured. Again, analysis of the due process question must pay careful attention to these differences. But we can draw at least one conclusion from the existence of the SERE training. Use of the techniques involved in the CIA's interrogation program (or at least the similar techniques from which these have been adapted) cannot be considered to be categorically inconsistent with "traditional executive behavior" and "contemporary practice" regardless of context. [31] It follows that use of these techniques will not shock the conscience in at least some circumstances. We believe that such circumstances exist here, where the techniques are used against unlawful combatants who deliberately attack civilians in an untraditional armed conflict in which intelligence is difficult or impossible to collect by other means and is essential to the protection of the United States and its interests, where the techniques are used only when necessary and only in the interrogation of key terrorist leaders reasonably thought to have actionable intelligence, and where every effort is made to minimize unnecessary suffering and to avoid inflicting significant or lasting harm.

Accordingly, we conclude that, in light of "an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to them," the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA interrogation program as we understand it, does not constitute government behavior that "is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8.

C.

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the CIA interrogation techniques, with their careful screening procedures and medical monitoring, do not "shock the conscience." Given the relative paucity of Supreme Court precedent applying this test at all, let alone in anything resembling this setting, as well as the context-specific, fact independent, and somewhat subjective nature of the inquiry, however, we cannot predict with confidence that a court would agree with our conclusion. We believe, however, that the question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques violate the substantive standard of United States obligations under Article 16 is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry.

As discussed above, Article 16 imposes no legal obligation on the United States that implicate the CIA interrogation program in view of the language of Article 16 itself and, independently, the Senate's reservation. But even if this were less clear (indeed, even if it were false), Article 16 itself has no domestic legal effect because the Senate attached a non-self execution declaration to its resolution of ratification. See Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990) ("the United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing") It is well settled that non-self executing treaty provisions "can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect." Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, ... but is carried in to execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument."). One implication of the fact that article 16 is non-self-executing is that, with respect to Article 16, "the courts have nothing to do and can give no redress." Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580. 598 (1884). As one court recently explained in the context of the CAT itself, "Treaties that are not self-executing do not create judicially-enforceable rights unless they are first given effect by implementing legislation." August v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 2 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Because (with perhaps one narrow exception [32]) Article 16 has not been legislatively implemented, the interpretation of its substantive standard is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry. [33]

* * *

Based on CIA assurances, we understand that the CIA interrogation program is not conducted in the United States or "territory under [United States] jurisdiction," and that it is not authorized for use against United States persons. Accordingly, we conclude that the program does not implicate Article 16. We also conclude that the CIA interrogation program, subject to its careful screening, limits, and medical monitoring, would not violate the substantive standards applicable to the United States under Article 15 even if those standards extended to the CIA interrogation program. Given the paucity of relevant precedent and the subjective nature of the inquiry, however, we cannot predict with confidence whether a court would agree with this conclusion, though for the reasons explained, the question is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry.

Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.

Steven G. Bradbury
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

_______________

Notes:

1. Our analysis and conclusions are limited to the specific legal issues we address in this memorandum. We note that we have previously concluded that use of these techniques, subject to the limits and safeguards required by the interrogation program, does not violate the federal prohibition on torture, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005); see also Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A to the Combine Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 10, 2005) (concluding that the anticipated combined use of these techniques would not violate the federal prohibition on torture). The legal advice provided in this memorandum does not represent the policy view of the Department of Justice concerning the use of any interrogation methods.

2. The reservation provides in full:

That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, eighth, and/or Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.


136 Cong. Rec. 36198 (1990). As we explain below, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are not applicable in this context.

3. The CIA has reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of our description of the interrogation program, including its purposes, methods, limitations, and results.

4. Al-Nashiri, the only other detainee to be subjected to the waterboard, planned the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and was subsequently "recognized as the chief of al Qaeda operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula." 9/11 Commission Report at 153.

5. You have informed us that the current practice is for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to make this determination personally.

6. We discuss only a small fraction of the important intelligence the CIA interrogators have obtained from KSM. [Big delete].

7. As with KSM, we discuss only a portion of the intelligence obtained through interrogations of Zubaydah.

8. As we explained in Techniques: "The CIA generally follows as a guideline a calorie requirement of 900 kcal/day + 10 kcal/kg/day. This quantity is multiplied by 1.2 for a sedentary activity level or 1.4 for a moderate activity level. Regardless of this formula, the recommended minimum calorie intake is 1500 kcal/day, and in no event is the detainee allowed to receive less than 1000 kcal/day." Id. at 7 (footnote omitted). The guideline caloric intake for a detainee who weighs 150 pounds (approximately 68 kilograms) would therefore be nearly 1,900 kcal/day for sedentary activity and would be more than 2,200 kcal/day for moderate activity.

9. In addition, as we observed in Techniques, certain studies indicate that sleep deprivation might lower pain thresholds in some detainees. See Techniques at 36 n.44. The ongoing medical monitoring is therefore especially important when interrogators employ this technique in conjunction with other techniques. See Combined Use at 13-14 & m.9, 16. In this regard, we note once again that the CIA has "informed us that the interrogation techniques at issue would not be used during a course of extended sleep deprivations with such frequency and intensity as to induce in the detainee a persistent condition of extreme physical distress such as may constitute 'severe physical suffering.'" Id. at 16.

10. As noted in our previous opinions, the slap techniques are not used in a way that could cause severe pain. See, e.g., Techniques at 8-9, 33 & n. 39; Combined Use at 11.

11. Although walling "wears down the [detainee] physically," Background Paper at 7, and undoubtedly may startle him, we understand that it is not significantly painful. The detainee hits a flexible false wall designed to create a loud sound when the individual bits it and thus to cause shock and surprise. See Combined Use at 6 n.4. But the detainee's head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a C-collar effect to help prevent whiplash; it is the detainee's shoulder blades that hit the wall; and the detainee is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall in order to reduce the chances of any injury. See id. You have informed us that a detainee is expected to feel "dread" at the prospect of walling because of the shock and surprise caused by the technique and because of the sense of powerlessness that comes from being roughly handled by the interrogators, not because the technique causes significant pain. See id.

12. The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention and is therefore not bound by it. Nevertheless, Article 31(1)'s emphasis on textual analysis reflects international interpretive practice. See e.g., Rudolf Bernhardt, "Interpretation in International Law," in 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1416, 1420 (1995) ("According to the prevailing opinion, the starting point in any treaty interpretation is the treaty text and the normal or ordinary meaning of its terms.").

13. Article 16(1) provides in full:

Each State Party undertakes to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent of acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.


14. In addition, although Article 2(2) emphasized that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture," the CAT has no analogous provision with respect to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Because we conclude that CIA interrogation program does not implicate United States obligations under Article 16 and that the program would conform to United States obligations under Article 16 even if that provision did apply, we need not consider whether the absence of a provision analogous to Article 2(2) implies that States Parties could derogate from their obligations under Article 16 in extraordinary circumstances.

15. Article 6 may suggest an interpretation of the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" that is potentially broader than the traditional notion of "territory." Article 6(1) directs a State Party "in whose territory a person alleged to have committed [certain offenses] is present" to take the suspected offender into custody. (Emphases added.) The use of the word "territory" in Article 6 rather than the phrase "territory under its jurisdiction" suggests that the terms have distinct meanings. See Factor, 290 U.S. at 303-04 (stating that treaty language should not be construed to render certain phrases "meaningless or inoperative"). Article 6 may thus support the position, discussed below, that "territory under its jurisdiction" may extend beyond sovereign territory to encompass areas where a State exercises de facto authority as the government, such as occupied territory. See infra p. 20. Article 20, which refers to "the territory of a State Party" may support the same inference.

16. This suggestion is in tension with the text of Article 5(10(a), which seems to distinguish "territory under [a State's] jurisdiction" from "ship[s] or aircraft registered in that State." See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 n.5 (1989) (noting that where treaty text is not perfectly clear, the "natural meaning" of the text "could properly be contradicted only by clear drafting history"). Because the CIA has assured us that its interrogations do not take place on ships or aircraft registered in the United States, we need not resolve this issue here.

17. As we have explained, there is an argument that "territory under [a State's] jurisdiction" might also include occupied territory. Accordingly, at least absent the Senate's reservation, Article 16's obligations might extend to occupied territory. Because the United States is not currently an occupying power within the meaning of the laws of war anywhere in the world, we need not decide whether occupied territory is "territory under [United States] jurisdiction."

18. "The Senate's right to qualify its consent to ratification by reservations, amendments and interpretations was established through a reservation to the lay treaty of 1794." Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 253 (1992), and has been frequently exercises since then. The Supreme Court has indicated its acceptance of this practice. See Haver v. Yoker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 107 (1801). See also Constitutionality of Proposed Conditions to Senate Consent to the Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 10 Op. O.L.C. 12, 16 (1986) ("[T]he Senate's practice of conditioning its consent to particular treaties is well-established.").

19. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law asserts that "[a]lthough the matter has not been authoritatively adjudicated, at least some actions by the United State in respect to foreign nationals outside the country are also subject to constitutional limitations." Id. § 722, cmt. m. This statement is contrary to the authorities cited in the text.

20. The Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), is not to the contrary. To be sure, the Court state in a footnote that:

Petitioner's allegations -- that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing -- unquestionably describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."


Id. at 2698 n.15. We also believe this footnote is best understood to leave intact the Court's settled understanding of the Fifth Amendment. First, the Court limited its holding to the issue before it: whether the federal courts have statutory jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by such aliens held at Guantanamo as enemy combatants. See id. at 2699 ("Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary ... are matters that we need not address now. What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing."). Indeed, the Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari "limited to the following Question: Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba." Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003).

Second, the footnote relies on a portion of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez "and the cases cited therein," Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15. In this portion of Justice Kenney's Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, Justice Kennedy discusses the Insular Cases. These cases stand for the proposition that although not every provision of the Constitution applies in United States territory overseas, certain core constitutional protections may apply in certain insular territories of the United States. See also, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing Insular Cases); Baltac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Given that the Court in Rasul stressed GTMO's unique status as "territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States," Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15, in the very sentence that cite Justice Kennedy's concurrence, it is conceivable that foot note 15 might reflect, at most a willingness to consider whether GTMO is similar in significant respects to the territories at issue in the Insular Cases. See also id. at 2696 (noting that under the agreement with Cuba "the United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that "Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory" and explaining that "[w]hat matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that the United States has long exercised over Guantanamo Bay").

21. Additional analysis may be required in the case of aliens entitled to lawful permanent resident status. Compare Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), with Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). You have informed us that the CIA does not used these techniques on any United States persons, including lawful permanent residents, and we do not here address United States obligations under Article 16 with respect to such aliens.

22. Our analysis is not affected by the recent enactment of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). Section 1031(a)(1) of that law provides that:

[n]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act shall be obligated or expended to subject any person in the custody or under the physical control of the United States to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.


119 Stat. at 256. Because the Senate reservation, as deposited with the United States instrument of ratification, defines United States obligations under Article 16 of the CAT, this statute does not prohibit the expenditure of funds for conduct that does not violate United States obligations under Article 16, as limited by the Senate reservation. Furthermore, this statute itself defines "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" as "the cruel, unusual, and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the fifth amendment, eighth amendment, or fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id. § 1031(b)(2).

23. To be sure, treatment amounting to punishment (let alone, cruel and unusual punishment) generally cannot be imposed on individuals who have not been convicted of crimes. But this prohibition flows from the Fifth Amendment rather than the Eighth. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987). See also infra note 26.

24. Because what is at issue under the text of the Senate reservation is the subset of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" that is "the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment ... prohibited by the Fifth ... Amendment[]," we do not believe that the procedural aspects of the Fifth Amendment are relevant, at least in the context of interrogation techniques unrelated to the criminal justice system. Nor, given the language of Article 16 and the reservation, do we believe that United States obligations under this Article include other aspects of the Fifth Amendment, such as the Takings Clause or the various privacy rights that the Supreme Court has found to be protected by the Due Process Clause.

25. It appears that conscience-shocking conduct is a necessary but perhaps not sufficient condition to establishing that executive conduct violates substantive due process. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 ("Only if the necessary condition of egregious behavior were satisfied would there be a possibility of recognizing a substantive due process right to be free of such executive action, and only then might there be a debate about the sufficiency of historical examples of enforcement of the right claimed, or its recognition in other ways.") (emphases added); see also, e.g., Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 978 n.1 (8th Cit. 2005) ("To violate substantive due process, the conduct of and executive official must be conscience shocking and must violate" a fundamental right); Slusarchuck v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir. 2003). It is therefore arguable that conscience-shocking behavior would not violate the Constitution if it did not violate a fundamental right or if it were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). Because we conclude that the CIA interrogation program does not "shock the conscience," we need not address these issues here.

26. The pretrial detention context is informative. Analysis of the government's interest and purpose in imposing a condition of confinement is essential to determining whether there is a violation of due process in this context. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-50.0The government has a legitimate interest in "effectuat[ing] th[e] detention, Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on such detainees would violate due process because the government has no legitimate interest in inflicting punishment prior to conviction. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 & n.16.

In addition, Lewis suggests that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence sheds at least some light on the due process inquiry. See 523 U.S. at 825-53 (analogizing the due process inquiry to the Eighth Amendment context and noting that in both cases "liability should turn on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm'") (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). The interrogation program we consider does not involve or allow the malicious or sadistic infliction of harm. Rather, as discussed in the text, interrogation techniques are used only as reasonably deemed necessary to further a government interest of the highest order, and have been carefully designed to avoid inflicting severe pain or suffering or any other lasting or significant harm and to minimize the risk of any harm that does not further this government interest. See infra pp. 29-31.

27. The CIA’s CTC generally consults with the CIA's Office of General Counsel (which in turn may consult with this Office) when presented with novel circumstances. This consultation further reduces any possibility that CIA interrogators could be thought to be "abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression," Lewis, 523 U.S. at 840 (citation and quotation marks omitted; alteration in Lewis); see also Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774 (opinion of Thomas, J.), so as to render their conduct constitutionally arbitrary.

28. This is not to say that the interrogation program has worked perfectly. According to the IG Report, the CIA, at least initially, could not always distinguish detainees who had information but were successfully resisting interrogation from those who did not actually have the information. See IG Report at 83-85. On at least one occasion, this may have resulted in what might be deemed in retrospect to have been the unnecessary use of enhanced techniques. On that occasion, although the on-scene interrogation team judged Zubaydah to be compliant elements within CIA Headquarters still believed he was withholding information. [Big delete] See id. 84. At the direction of CIA Headquarters, interrogators therefore used the waterboard one more time on Zubaydah. [Big delete] See id. at 84-85.

This example, however, does not show CIA "conduct [that is] intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest," or "deliberate indifference" to the possibility of such unjustifiable injury. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. As long as the CIA reasonably believed that Zubaydah continued to withhold sufficiently important information, use of the waterboard was supported by the Government's interest in protecting the Nation from subsequent terrorist attacks. The existence of a reasonable, good faith belief is not negated because the factual predicates for that belief are subsequently determined to be false. Moreover, in the Zubaydah example, CIA techniques were no longer needed. See IG Report at 85. Thus, the CIA did not simply rely on what appeared to be credible intelligence but rather ceased using enhanced techniques despite this intelligence.

29. CIA interrogation practice appears to have varied over time. The IG Report explains that the CIA "has had intermittent involvement in the interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of the United States." IG Report at 9. In the early 1980, for example, the CIA initiated the Human Resource Exploitation ("HRE") training program, "designed to train foreign liaison services on interrogation techniques." Id. The CIA terminated the HRE program in 1986 because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America. See id. at 10. [Big delete]

30. We recognize that as a matter of diplomacy, the United States may for various reasons in various circumstances call another nation to account for practices that may in some respects resemble conduct in which the United States might in some circumstances engage, covertly or otherwise. Diplomatic relations with regard to foreign countries are not reliable evidence of United States executive practice and thus may be of only limited relevance here.

31. In addition, the fact that individuals voluntarily undergo the techniques in SERE training is probative. See Breithoupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957) noting that people regularly voluntarily allow their blood to be drawn and concluding that involuntary blood testing does not "shock the conscience").

32. As noted above, Section 1031 of Public Law 109-13 provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act shall be obligated or expended to subject any person in the custody of under the physical control of the United States to ... cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." To the extent this appropriations rider implements Article 16 ,it creates a narrow domestic law obligation not to expend funds appropriated under Public Law 109-13 for conduct that violates Article 16. This appropriations rider, however, is unlikely to result in judicial interpretation of Article 16's substantive standards since it does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandobal, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress."); Resident Council of Allen Parkway VIII. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 980 F2d 1043, 1052 (5th Cir. 1993) ("courts have been reluctant to infer congressional intent to create private rights under appropriations measure") (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981)).

It is possible that a court could address the scope of Article 16 if a prosecution were brought under the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000), for a violation of section 1031's spending restriction. Section 1341 (a)(1)(A) of title 31 provides that officers or employees of the United States may not "make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation of fund for the expenditure or obligation." "[K]nowing[] and willful[] violati[ons]" of section 1341(a) are subject to criminal penalties. Id. §1350.

33. Although the interpretation of Article 16 is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry, it is conceivable that a court might attempt to address substantive questions under the Fifth Amendment if, for example, the United States sought a criminal conviction of a high value detainee in an Article III court in the United States using evidence that had been obtained from the detainee through the use of enhance interrogation techniques.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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MEMO __

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20530

Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

October 6, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Re: October 23, 2001 OLC Opinion Addressing the Domestic Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that caution should be exercised before relying in any respect on the Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001) ("10/23/01 Memorandum") as a precedent of the Office of Legal Counsel, and that certain propositions stated in the 10/23/01 Memorandum, as described below, should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose.

It is important to understand the context of the 10/23/01 Memorandum. It was the product of an extraordinary -- indeed, we hope, a unique -- period in the history of the Nation: the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Perhaps reflective of this context, the 10/23/01 Memorandum did not address specific and concrete policy proposals; rather it addressed in general terms the broad contours of hypothetical scenarios involving possible domestic military contingencies that senior policymakers feared might become a reality in the uncertain wake of the catastrophic terrorist attacks of 9/11. Thus, the 10/23/01 Memorandum represents a departure, although perhaps for understandable reasons, from the preferred practice of OLC to render formal opinions only with respect to specific and concrete policy proposals and not to undertake a general survey of a broad area of the law or to address general or amorphous hypothetical scenarios that implicate difficult questions of law.

We also judge it necessary to point out that the 10/23/01 Memorandum states several specific propositions that are either incorrect or highly questionable. The memorandum's treatment of the following propositions is not satisfactory and should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose:

The memorandum concludes in part V, pages 25-34, that the Fourth Amendment would not apply to domestic military operations designed to deter and prevent further terrorist attacks. This conclusion does not reflect the current views of this Office. The Fourth Amendment is fully applicable to domestic military operations, though the application of the Fourth Amendment's essential "reasonableness" requirement to particular circumstances will be sensitive to the exigencies of military actions. The 10/23/01 Memorandum itself concludes in part VI, pages 34-37, that domestic military operations necessary to prevent or address further catastrophic terrorist attacks within the United States likely would satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, if the Fourth Amendment were held to apply; thus, the erroneous conclusion in part V was not necessary to the opinion.

Part V of the memorandum also contains certain broad statements on page 24 suggesting that First Amendment speech and press rights and other guarantees of individual liberty under the Constitution would potentially be subordinated to overriding military necessities. These statements, too, were unnecessary to the opinion, are overbroad and general, and are not sufficiently grounded in the particular circumstances of a concrete scenario, and therefore cannot be viewed as authoritative.

The memorandum concludes in part IV(A), pages 16-20, that the domestic deployment of the Armed Forces by the President to prevent and deter terrorism would fundamentally serve a military purpose, rather than a law enforcement purpose, and therefore the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000), would not apply to such operations. Although the "military purpose" doctrine is a well-established limitation on the applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act, the broad conclusion reached in part IV(A) of the 10/23/01 Memorandum is far too general and divorced from specific facts and circumstances to be useful as an authoritative precedent of OLC.

The memorandum, on pages 20-21, treats the Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), enacted by Congress in the immediate wake of 9/11, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001), as a statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act's restriction on the use of the military for domestic law enforcement. The better view, however, is that a reasonable and necessary use of military force taken under the authority of the AUMF would be a military action, potentially subject to the established "military purpose" doctrine, rather than a law enforcement action.

The memorandum reasons, on pages 21-22, that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000), would provide general authority for the President to deploy the military domestically to prevent and deter future terrorist attacks; whereas, consistent with the longstanding interpretation of the Executive Branch, any particular application of the Insurrection Act to authorize the use of the military for law enforcement purposes would require the presence of an actual obstruction of the execution of federal law or a breakdown in the ability of state authorities to protect federal rights.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we have concluded that appropriate caution should be exercised before relying in any respect on the 10/23/01 Memorandum as a precedent of OLC, and that the particular propositions identified above should not be treated as authoritative. We have advised the Counsel to the President, the Acting General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and appropriate offices within the Department of Justice of these conclusions.

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PART 1 OF 2

The ICRC Report

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION

FEBRUARY 2004

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary
• Introduction
• 1. Treatment during arrest
o 1.1 Notification to families and information for arrestees
• 2. Treatment during transfer and initial custody
• 3. Treatment during interrogation
o 3.1 Methods of ill-treatment
o 3.2 Military intelligence section, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility
o 3.3 Umm Qasr (JFIT) and Camp Bucca (JIF/ICE)
o 3.4 Previous action taken by the ICRC in 2003 on the issue of treatment
o 3.5 Allegations of ill-treatment by the Iraqi police
• 4. Treatment in regular internment facilities
o 4.1 General conditions of treatment
o 4.2. "High Value Detainees" section, Baghdad International Airport
• 5. Disproportionate and excessive use of force against persons deprived of their liberty
• 6. Seizure and confiscation of personal belongings of persons deprived of their liberty
• 7. Exposure of persons deprived of their liberty to danger tasks
• 8. Protection of persons deprived of their liberty against shelling
• Conclusion

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In its "Report on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and other protected persons in Iraq", the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) draws the attention of the Coalition Forces (hereafter called "the CF") to a number of serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. These violations have been documented and sometimes observed while visiting prisoners of war, civilian internees and other protected persons by the Geneva Conventions (hereafter called persons persons deprived of their liberty when their status is not specifically mentioned) in Iraq between March and November 2003. During its visits to places of internment of the CF, the ICRC collected allegations during private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty relating to the treatment by the CF of protected persons during their capture, arrest, transfer, internment and interrogation.

The main violations, which are described in the ICRC report and presented confidentially to the CF, include:

• Brutality against protected persons upon capture and initial custody, sometimes causing death or serious injury
• Absence of notification of arrest of persons deprived of their liberty to their families causing distress among persons deprived of their liberty and their families
• Physical or psychological coercion during interrogation to secure information
• Prolonged solitary confinement in cells devoid of daylight
• Excessive and disproportionate use of force against persons deprived of their liberty resulting in death or injury during their period of internment

Serious problems of conduct by the CF affecting persons deprived of their liberty are also presented in the report:

• Seizure and confiscation of private belongings of persons deprived of their liberty
• Exposure of persons deprived of their liberty to dangerous tasks
• Holding persons deprived of their liberty in dangerous places where they are not protected from shelling

According to allegations collected by ICRC delegates during private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty, ill-treatment during capture was frequent. While certain circumstances might require defensive precautions and the use of force on the part of battle group units, the ICRC collected allegations of ill-treatment following capture which took place in Baghdad, Basrah, Ramadi and Tikrit, indicating a consistent pattern with respect to times and places of brutal behavior during arrest. The repetition of such behavior by CF appeared to go beyond reasonable, legitimate and proportional use of force required to apprehend suspects or restrain persons resisting arrest or capture, and seemed to reflect a usual modus operandi by certain CF battle group units.

According to the allegations collected by the ICRC, ill-treatment during interrogation was not systematic, except with regard to persons arrested in connected with suspected security offences or deemed to have an "intelligence" value. In these cases, persons deprived of their liberty under supervision of Military Intelligence were at high risk of being subjected to a variety of harsh treatments ranging from insults, threats and humiliations to both physical and psychological coercion, which in some cases was tantamount to torture, in order to force cooperation with their interrogators.

The ICRC also started to document what appeared to be widespread abuse of power and ill-treatment by the Iraqi police which is under the responsibility of the Occupying Powers, including threats to hand over persons in their custody to the CF so as to extort money from them, effective hand over of such persons to the custody of the CF on allegedly fake accusations, or invoking CF orders or instructions to mistreat persons deprived of their liberty during interrogation.

In the case of the "High Value Detainees" held in Baghdad International Airport, their continued internment, several months after their arrest, in strict solitary confinement in cells devoid of sunlight for nearly 23 hours a day constituted a serious violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC was also concerned about the excessive and disproportionate use of force by some detaining authorities against persons deprived of their liberty involved during their internment during periods of unrest or escape attempts that cause death and serious injuries. The use of firearms against persons deprived of their liberty in circumstances where methods without using firearms could have yielded the same result could amount to a serious violation of International Humanitarian Law. The ICRC reviewed a number of incidents of shootings of persons deprived of their liberty with live bullets, which have resulted in deaths or injuries during periods of unrest related to conditions of internment or escape attempts. Investigations initiated by the CF into these incidents concluded that the use of firearms against persons deprived of their liberty was legitimate. However, non-lethal measures could have been used to obtain the same results and quell the demonstrations or neutralize persons deprived of their liberty trying to escape.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the ICRC has regularly brought its concern to the attention of the CF. The observations in the present report are consistent with those made earlier on several occasions orally and in writing to the CF throughout 2003. In spite of some improvements in the material conditions of internment, allegations of ill-treatment perpetrated by members of the CF against persons deprived of their liberty continued to be collected by the ICRC and thus suggested that the use of ill-treatment against persons deprived of their liberty went beyond exceptional cases and might be considered as a practice tolerated by the CF.

The ICRC report does not aim to be exhaustive with regard to breaches of International Humanitarian Law by the CF in Iraq. Rather, it illustrates priority areas that warrant attention and corrective action on the part of CF, in compliance with their International Humanitarian Law obligations.

Consequently the ICRC asks the authorities of the CF in Iraq:

- to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensitivity of the persons deprived of their liberty held under their control

- to set up a system of notifications of arrest to ensure quick and accurate transmission of information to the families of persons deprived of their liberty

- to prevent all forms of ill-treatment, moral or physical coercion of persons deprived of their liberty in relation to interrogation

- to set up an internment regime which ensures the respect of the psychological integrity and human dignity of the persons deprived of their liberty

- to ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are allowed sufficient time every day outside in the sunlight, and that are allowed to moved and exercise in the outside yard

- to define and apply regulations and sanctions compatible with International Humanitarian Law and to to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are fully informed upon arrival of such regulations and sanctions

- to thoroughly investigate violations of International Humanitarian Law in order to determine responsibilities and prosecute those found responsible for violations of International Humanitarian Law

- to ensure that battle group units arresting individuals and staff in charge of internment facilities receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and fulfill their responsibilities as arresting authority without resorting to ill-treatment or making excessive use of force.

INTRODUCTION

1. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is mandated by the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions to monitor the full application of and respect for the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. The ICRC reminds the High Contracting Parties concerned, usually in a confidential way, of their humanitarian obligations under all four Geneva Conventions, in particular the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions as far as treatment of persons deprived of their liberty is concerned and under Protocol 1 of 1977 additional to the Geneva Conventions, confirmed and reaffirmed rules of customary law and universally acknowledged principles of humanity.

The information contained in this report is based on allegations collected by the ICRC in private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty during its visits to places of internment of the Coalition forces (CF) between March and November 2003. The allegations have been thoroughly revised in order to present this report as factually as possible. The report is also based on other accounts given either by fellow persons deprived of their liberty inside internment facilities by family members. During this period, the ICRC conducted some 29 visits in 14 internment facilities in the central and southern parts of the country. The testimonies were collected in Camp Cropper (Core Holding Area, Military Intelligence section, "High Value Detainees" section); Al-Salihiyye, Tasferat and Al-Russafa prisons; Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility (including Camp Vigilant and the "Military Intelligence" section); Umm Qasr and Camp Bucca, as well as several temporary internment places such as Tallil Trans-Shipment Place, Camp Condor, Amarah Camp and the Field Hospital in Shaibah.

The ICRC conditions for such visits to persons deprived of their liberty in internment facilities are common for all countries where the organization operates. The can be expressed as follows:

• The ICRC must have access to all persons deprived of their liberty who come within its mandate in their place of internment
• The ICRC must be able to talk freely and in private with the persons deprived of their liberty of its choice and to register their identity
• The ICRC must be authorized to repeat its visits to the persons deprived of their liberty
• The ICRC must be notified of arrests, transfers and releases by the detaining authorities

Each visit to persons deprived of their liberty is carried out in accordance with ICRC's working procedures expressed as follows:

• At the beginning of each visit, the ICRC delegates speak with the detaining authorities to present the ICRC's mandate and the purpose of the visit as well as to obtain general information on internment conditions, total of interned population and movements of persons deprived of their liberty (release, arrest, transfer, death, hospitalization).
• The ICRC delegates, accompanied b the detaining authorities tour the internment facilities.
• The ICRC delegates hold private interviews with persons of their choice who are deprived of their liberty, with no time limit in a place freely chosen and if necessary register them.
• At the end of each visit, the delegates hold a final talk with the detaining authorities to inform them about the ICRC's findings and recommendations.

2. The aim of the report is to present information collected by the ICRC concerning the treatment of prisoners of war by the CF, civilian internees and other protected persons deprived of their liberty during the process of arrest, transfer, internment and interrogation.

3. The main places of internment where mistreatment allegedly took place included battle group unit stations; the military intelligence sections of Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility; Al-Baghadadi, Heat Base and Habbania Camp in Ramadi governorate; Tikrit holding area (former Saddam Hussein Islamic School); a former train station in Al-Khaïm, near the Syrian border, turned into a military base; the Ministry of Defense and Presidential Palace in Baghdad, the former mukhabarat office in Basrah, as well as several Iraqi police stations in Baghdad.

4. In most cases, the allegations of ill-treatment referred to acts that occurred prior to the internment of persons deprived of their liberty in regular internment facilities, while they were in the custody of arresting authorities or military and civilian intelligence personnel. When persons deprived of their liberty were transferred to regular internment facilities, such as those administered by the military police, where the behavior of guards was strictly supervised, ill-treatment of the type described in this report usually ceased. In these places, violations of the provisions of International Humanitarian Law relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty were a result of the generally poor standard of internment conditions (long term internment in unsuitable temporary facilities) or of the use of what appeared to be excessive force to quell unrest or to prevent attempted escapes.

1. TREATMENT DURING ARREST

5. Protected persons interviewed by ICRC delegates have described a fairly consistent pattern with respect for times and places of brutality by members of the CF arresting them.

6. Arrests as described in these allegations tended to follow a pattern. Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors, waking up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one room under military guard while searching the rest of the house and further breaking doors, cabinets and other property. They arrested suspects, tying their hands in the back with flexi-cuffs, hooding them, and taking them away. Sometimes they arrested all adult males present in a house, including elderly, handicapped and sick people. Treatment often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles, punching and kicking and striking with rifles. Individuals were often led away in whatever they happened to be wearing at the time of arrest -- sometimes in pyjamas or underwear -- and were denied the opportunity to gather a few essential belongings, such as clothing, hygiene items, medicine or eyeglasses. Those who surrendered with a suitcase often had their belongings confiscated. In many cases personal belongings were seized during the arrest, with no receipt being issued (see section 6, below).

7. Certain CF military intelligence officers told the ICRC that in their estimate between 70% and 90% of persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake. They also attributed the brutality of some arrests to the lack of proper supervision of battle group units.

8. In accordance with provisions of International Humanitarian Law which oblige the CF to treat prisoners of war and other protected persons humanely and to protect them against acts of violence, threats thereof, intimidation and insults (Art. 13, 14, 17, 87, Third Geneva Convention; Art. 5, 27, 31, 32, 33 Fourth Geneva Convention), the ICRC asks the authorities of CF to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensitivity of the persons deprived of their liberty held under their control. The ICRC also asks the authorities of CF to ensure that battle group units arresting individuals receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and fulfill their responsibilities without resorting to brutality or using excessive force.

1.1 Notification to families and information for arrestees

9. In almost all instances documented by the ICRC, arresting authorities provided no information about who they were, where their base was located, nor did they explain the cause of arrest. Similarly, they rarely informed the arrestee or his family where he was being taken and for how long, resulting in the de facto "disappearance" of the arrestee for weeks or even months until contact was finally made.

10. When arrests were made in the streets, along the roads, or at checkpoints, families were not informed about what had happened to the arrestees until they managed to trace them or received news about them through persons who had been deprived of their liberty, or ICRC Red Cross messages. In the absence of a system to notify the families of the whereabouts of their arrested relatives, many were left without news for months, often fearing that their relatives unaccounted for were dead.

11. Nine months into the present conflict, there is still no satisfactory functioning system of notification to the families of captured or arrested persons, even though hundreds of arrests continue to be carried out every week. While the main places of internment (Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib) are part of a centralized notification system through the National Information Bureau (and their data are forwarded electronically to ICRC on a regular basis), other places of internment such as Mossul or Tikrit are not. Notifications from those places therefore depend solely on capture or internment cards as stipulated by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

Since March 2003 capture cards have often been filled out carelessly, resulting in unnecessary delays of several weeks or months before families were notified, and sometimes resulting in no notification at all. It is the responsibility of the detaining authority to see to it that each capture or internment card is carefully filled out so that the ICRC is in a position to effectively deliver them to families. The current system of General Information Centers (GIC), set up under the responsibility of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACC), while an improvement, remains inadequate, as families outside the main towns do not have access to them, lists made available are not complete and often outdated and do not reflect the frequent transfers from one place of internment to another. In the absence of a better alternative, the ICRC's delivery of accurate capture cards remains the most reliable, prompt and effective system to notify the families, provided cards are properly filled out.

The ICRC has raised this issue repeatedly with the detaining authorities since March 2003, including at the highest level of the CF in August 2003. Despite some improvement, hundreds of families had had to wait anxiously for weeks and sometimes months before learning of the whereabouts of their arrested family members. Many families travel for weeks throughout the country from one place of internment to another in search of their relatives and often come to learn about their whereabouts informally (through released detainees) or when the person deprived of his liberty is released and returns home.

12. Similarly, transfers, cases of sickness at the time of arrest, deaths, escapes or repatriations, continue to be notified only insufficiently or are not notified at all by the CF to families in spite of their obligation to do so under International Humanitarian Law.

13. In accordance with provisions of both the Third Geneva Convention (Art. 70, 122, 123) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (Art. 106, 136, 137, 138, 140), the ICRC reminds the CF of their treaty-based obligation to notify promptly the families of all prisoners of war and other protected persons captured or arrested by them. Within one week, prisoners of war and civilian detainees must be allowed to fill out capture cards or internment cards mentioning at the very least their capture/arrest, address (current place of detention/internment) and state of health. These cards must be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner. As long as there is no centralized system of notifications of arrest set up by CF, it is of paramount importance that these capture cards be filled out properly, so as to allow the ICRC to transmit them rapidly to the concerned families.

14. The same obligation of notification to families of captured or arrested persons applies to transfers, cases of sickness, deaths, escapes and repatriation and identification of the dead of the adverse party. All these events must be notified to the ICRC with the full details of the persons concerned, so as to allow the ICRC to inform the concerned families (Art. 120, 121, 122, 123 Third Geneva Convention; Art. 129, 130, 136, 137, 140 Fourth Geneva Convention).

2. TREATMENT DURING TRANSFER AND INITIAL CUSTODY

15. The ICRC collected several allegations indicating that following arrest persons deprived of their liberty were ill-treated, sometimes during transfer from their place of arrest to their initial internment facility. This ill-treatment would normally stop by the time the persons reached a regular internment facility, such as Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca or Abu Ghraib. The ICRC also collected one allegation of death resulting from harsh conditions of internment and ill-treatment during initial custody.

16. One allegation collected by the ICRC concerned the arrest of nine men by the CF in a hotel in Basrah on 13 September 2003. Following their arrest, the nine men were made to kneel, face and hands against the ground, as if in a prayer position. The soldiers stamped on the back of the neck of those raising their head. They confiscated their money without issuing a receipt. The suspects were taken to Al-Hakimiya, a former office previously used by the mukhabarat in Basrah and then beaten severely by CF personnel. One of the arrestees died following the ill-treatment [Name redacted], aged 28, married, father of two children). Prior to his death, his co-arrestees heard him screaming and asking for assistance.

The issued "International Death Certificate" mentioned "Cardio-respiratory arrest -- asphyxia" as the condition directly leading to the death. As to the cause of that condition, it mentioned "Unknown" and "Refer to the coroner". The certificate did not bear any other mention. An eyewitness description of the body given to the ICRC mentioned a broken nose, several broken ribs and skin lesions on the face consistent with beatings. The father of the victim was informed of his death on 18 September, and was invited to identify the body of his son. On 3 October, the commander of the CF in Basrah presented to him his condolences and informed him that an investigation had been launched and that those responsible would be punished. Two other persons similarly deprived of their liberty were hospitalized with severe injuries. Similarly, a week later, an ICRC medical doctor examined them in the hospital and observed large haematomas with dried scabs on the abdomen, buttocks, sides, thigh, wrists, nose and forehead consistent with their accounts of beatings received.

17. During a visit of the ICRC in Camp Bucca on 22 September 2003, a 61-year-old person deprived of his liberty alleged that he had been tied, hooded, and forced to sit on the hot surface of what he surmised to be the engine of a vehicle, which had caused severe burns to his buttocks. The victim had lost consciousness. The ICRC observed large crusted lesions consistent with his allegation.

18. The ICRC examined another person deprived of his liberty in the "High Value Detainees" section in October 2003 who had been subjected to a similar treatment. He had been hooded, handcuffed in the back, and made to lie face down, on a hot surface during transportation. This had caused severe skin burns that required three months hospitalization. At the time of the interview he had been recently discharged from hospital. He had to undergo several skin grafts, the amputation of his right index finger, and suffered permanent loss of the use of his left fifth finger secondary to burn-induced skin retraction. He also suffered extensive burns over the abdomen, anterior aspects of lower extremities, the palm of his right hand and the sole of his left foot. The ICRC recommended to the CF that the case be investigated to determine the cause and circumstances of the injuries and the authority responsible for the ill-treatment. At the time of writing the results of the report were still pending.

19. During transportation following arrest, persons deprived of their liberty were almost always hooded and tightly restrained with flexi-cuffs. They were occasionally

[Balance of text and paragraphs 20 and 21 missing, perhaps a full page.]

haematoma and linear marks compatible with repeated whipping or beating. He had wrist marks compatible with tight flexi-cuffs.

The ICRC also collected allegations of deaths as a result of harsh internment conditions, ill-treatment, lack of medical attention, or the combination thereof, notably in Tikrit holding area formerly known as the Saddam Hussein Islamic School.

22. Some CF military intelligence officers told the ICRC that the widespread ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty during arrest, initial internment and "tactical questioning" was due to a lack of military police on the ground to supervise and control the behavior and activities of the battle group units, and the lack of experience of intelligence officers in charge of the "tactical questioning".

23. In accordance with provisions of International Humanitarian Law which oblige the CF to treat prisoners of war and other protected persons humanely and to protect them against acts of violence, threats thereof, intimidation and insults (Art. 13, 14, 17, 87, Third Geneva Convention; Art. 5, 27, 31, 32, 33 Fourth Geneva Convention), the ICRC asks the authorities of CF to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensitivity of the persons deprived of their liberty held under their control.

The ICRC also asks the authorities of CF to ensure that battle group units transferring and/or holding individuals receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and fulfill their responsibilities without resorting to brutality or using excessive force.

3. TREATMENT DURING INTERROGATION

24. Arrests were usually followed by temporary internment at battle group level or at initial interrogation facilities managed by military intelligence personnel, but accessible to other intelligence personnel (especially in the case of security detainees). The ill-treatment by the CF personnel during interrogation was not systematic, except with regard to persons arrested in connection with suspected security offenses or deemed to have an "intelligence" value. In these cases, persons deprived of their liberty supervised by the military intelligence were subjected to a variety of ill-treatments ranging from insults and humiliation to both physical and psychological coercion that in some cases might amount to torture in order to force them to cooperate with their interrogators. In certain cases, such as in Abu Ghraib military intelligence section, methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information. Several military intelligence officers confirmed to the ICRC that it was part of the military intelligence process to hold a person deprived of his liberty naked in a completely dark and empty cell for a prolonged period to use inhumane and degrading treatment, including physical and psychological coercion, against persons deprived of their liberty to secure their cooperation.

3.1 Methods of Ill-Treatment

25. The methods of ill-treatment most frequently alleged during interrogation included

• Hooding, used to prevent people from seeing and to disorient them, and also to prevent them from breathing freely. One or sometimes two bags, sometimes with an elastic blindfold over the eyes which, when slipped down, further impeded proper breathing. Hooding was sometimes used in conjunction with beatings thus increasing anxiety as to when blows would come. The practice of hooding also allowed the interrogators to remain anonymous and thus to act with impunity. Hooding could last for periods from a few hours to up to two to four consecutive days, during which hoods were lifted only for drinking, eating or going to the toilets;
• Handcuffing with flexi-cuffs, which were sometimes made so tight and used for such extended periods that they caused skin lesions and long-term aftereffects on the hands (nerve damage), as observed by the ICRC;
• Beating with hard objects (including pistols and rifles), slapping, punching, kicking with knees or feet on various parts of the body (legs, sides, lower back, groin);
• Pressing the face into the ground with boots;
• Threats (of ill-treatment, reprisals against family members, imminent executive or transfer to Guantanamo);
• Being stripped naked for several days while held in solitary confinement in an empty and completely dark cell that included a latrine;
• Being held in solitary confinement combined with threats (to intern the individual indefinitely, to arrest other family members, to transfer the individual to Guantanamo), insufficient sleep, food or water deprivation, minimal access to showers (twice a week), denial of access to open air and prohibition of contacts with other persons deprived of their liberty;
• Being paraded naked outside cells in front of other persons deprived of their liberty and guards, sometimes hooded or with women's underwear over the head;
• Acts of humiliation such as being made to stand naked against the wall of the cell with arms raised or with women's underwear over the head for prolonged periods -- while being laughed at by guards, including female guards, and sometimes photographed in this position;
• Being attached repeatedly over several days, for several hours each time, with handcuffs to the bars of their cell door in humiliating (i.e. naked or in underwear) and/or uncomfortable position causing physical pain;
• Exposure while hooded to loud noise or music, prolonged exposure while hooded to the sun over several hours, including during the hottest time of the day when temperatures could reach 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) or higher;
• Being forced to remain for prolonged periods in stress positions such as squatting or standing with or without the arms lifted.

26. These methods of physical and psychological coercion were used by the military intelligence in a systematic way to gain confessions and extract information or other forms of cooperation from persons who had been arrested in connection with suspected security offences or deemed to have an "intelligence value."