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PART 1 OF 3

ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CUSTODY

February 2007

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• 1. Main Elements of the CIA Detention Program
o 1.1. Arrest and Transfer
o 1.2. Continuous Solitary Confinement and Incommunicado Detention
o 1.3. Other Methods of Ill-treatment
 1.3.1. Suffocation by water
 1.3.2. Prolonged stress standing
 1.3.3. Beatings by use of a collar
 1.3.4. Beating and kicking
 1.3.5. Confinement in a box
 1.3.6. Prolonged nudity
 1.3.7. Sleep deprivation and use of loud music
 1.3.8. Exposure to cold temperature/cold water
 1.3.9. Prolonged use of handcuffs and shackles
 1.3.10. Threats
 1.3.11. Forced shaving
 1.3.12. Deprivation/restricted provision of solid food
o 1.4. Further Elements of the Detention Regime
• 2. Conditions of Detention In Later Stages
• 3. Health Provision and Role of Medical Staff
• 4. Legal Aspects Related to Undisclosed Detention
• 5. Fate of Other Persons who Passed Through the CIA Detention Program
• 6. Future use of the CIA Detention Program
• Conclusion
• Annex 1.
• Annex 2.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
REGIONAL DELEGATION FOR UNITED STATES AND CANADA
1100 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 587-4600 • Fax: (202) 587-4696

Washington, 14 February 2007
WAS 07/76

John Rizzo
Acting General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed a report on the findings and recommendations of the International Committee of the Red Cross following its visits to fourteen “high value detainees” transferred to Guantanamo in September 2006. The report covers the period during which these persons were held in the detention program run by the Central Intelligence Agency.

We hope that you will find the report useful and thank you in advance for the action you will take on the matters raised.

Yours sincerely,
Geoff Loane
Head of Regional Delegation

Strictly Confidential

ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN “HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY

February 2007

This report is strictly confidential and intended only for the Authorities to whom it is presented. It may not
be published, in full or in part, without the consent of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

[Editors’ Note: These lines appear at the bottom of every page of the original version of the report]

INTRODUCTION

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has consistently expressed its grave concern over the humanitarian consequences and legal implications of the practice by the United States (US) authorities of holding persons in undisclosed detention in the context of the fight against terrorism [1]. In particular, the ICRC has underscored the risk of ill-treatment, the lack of contact with the outside world as a result of being held incommunicado, the lack of a legal framework, and the direct effects of such treatment and conditions on the persons held in undisclosed detention and on their families.

The ICRC made its first written interventions to the US authorities in 2002, requesting information on the whereabouts of persons allegedly held under US authority in the context of the fight against terrorism. Since then, it has made regular written and oral interventions to the US authorities on the issue of undisclosed detention (see Annex 2). In particular, the ICRC transmitted two reports on undisclosed detention on 18 November 2004 and 18 April 2006 respectively which consolidated the information previously transmitted [2] and included more recent allegations of undisclosed locations, hidden detainees and third country detention. Both reports annexed a non-exhaustive nominal list of persons allegedly held in undisclosed detention by the US authorities [3]. Despite repeated requests at various levels of the US Government (USG), the ICRC has not received a response to most of these written interventions. The main written response by the US authorities is the Note Verbale of 8 June 2005 which responds to three earlier written interventions [4]. The US authorities have never responded to the two ICRC consolidated reports.

On 6 September 2006, President Bush publicly announced that fourteen “high value” detainees had been transferred from the High Value Detainee Program run by the Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA detention program) to the custody of the Department of Defense in Guantanamo Bay Internment Facility (hereafter Guantanamo). The fourteen detainees (hereafter the fourteen) were reportedly held in the CIA detention program from the time of their arrest, or shortly thereafter, until their arrival in Guantanamo [5]. Throughout their time in CIA custody—which ranges from 16 months to almost four and a half years—these persons were held in undisclosed detention.

Prior to this public announcement, the ICRC had never been informed by the US authorities of the existence of the CIA detention program, nor of the presence in US custody of the fourteen. This is despite the fact that thirteen of the fourteen had been included in the above-mentioned ICRC written requests to the US authorities concerning undisclosed detention, the first of which were made in January 2003 [6]. The remaining detainee was not known to the ICRC.

The ICRC was granted access to the fourteen in Guantanamo, and met with each of them in private for the first time from 6 to 11 October 2006.

The ICRC regards the confirmation of the present whereabouts of the fourteen by the US authorities, and the subsequent access granted to the ICRC, as positive steps. However, it deplores the fact that these persons were held in undisclosed detention during a prolonged period by the US authorities and the conditions of detention and treatment to which they were subjected during that time. It is also gravely concerned by the lack of information provided to the ICRC regarding their fate despite regular and repeated requests.

The ICRC recognizes the right of the US authorities to take measures to address legitimate security concerns, including the detention and interrogation of individuals suspected of posing a threat to national security. However, the ICRC believes that the US can achieve these objectives while respecting its obligations and historical commitment to respect international law.

The aim of the present report is to provide a description of the treatment and material conditions of detention of the fourteen during the period they were held in the CIA detention program, as reported to the ICRC during its private interviews with these persons. Section One reports in detail the main elements of the CIA detention program, including arrest and transfers, incommunicado detention and other conditions and treatment, in particular during the initial stages of interrogation; Section Two outlines the conditions of detention and treatment in the later stages; Section Three considers the provision of health care and the role of medical staff during the entire period of undisclosed detention; Section Four details the legal aspects related to undisclosed detention; Section Five discusses the issue of the persons other than the fourteen who passed through the CIA detention program; and, finally, Section Six addresses the issue of future use of the CIA detention program.

A separate ICRC report has been transmitted to the Department of Defense regarding the material conditions and treatment of the fourteen since their arrival in Guantanamo [7].

1. MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE CIA DETENTION PROGRAM

Following the transfer of the fourteen from CIA custody to the custody of the Department of Defense in Guantanamo in September 2006, the ICRC met with each of these persons in private from 6 to 11 October, and from 4 to 14 December, 2006. The information provided in this report is based on the information gathered during those interviews, to the extent that each detainee agreed for it to be transmitted to the authorities.

The fourteen, who are identified individually below, described being subjected, in particular during the early stages of their detention, lasting from some days up to several months, to a harsh regime employing a combination of physical and psychological ill-treatment with the aim of obtaining compliance and extracting information. This regime began soon after arrest, and included transfers of detainees to multiple locations, maintenance of the detainees in continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention throughout the entire period of their undisclosed detention, and the infliction of further ill-treatment through the use of various methods either individually or in combination, in addition to the deprivation of other basic material requirements.

It is essential to a proper understanding of this report that all of the elements of treatment and material conditions of detention individually outlined below be considered as forming a whole, as each constitutes an integral part of the situation of the detainees in the CIA detention program. In addition to the information contained in the following section, it is also necessary to consider the prolonged duration of the detention, the conditions of detention and treatment in the later stages of detention. and the role of health personnel and, in particular, the lack of legal framework governing the undisclosed detention of the fourteen. When understood in their totality, the undisclosed detention regime to which these persons were subjected becomes all the more disturbing.

The ICRC wishes to underscore that the consistency of the detailed allegations provided separately by each of the fourteen adds particular weight to the information provided below.

The general term “ill-treatment” has been used throughout the following section, however, it should in no way be understood as minimising the severity of the conditions and treatment to which the detainees were subjected. Indeed, as outlined in Section 4 below, and as concluded by this report, the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques—singly or in combination— that amounted to torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

1.1. ARREST AND TRANSFER

The following fourteen persons are referred to in this report, in chronological order according to date of arrest:



The fourteen were arrested in four different countries. In each case, they were reportedly arrested by the national police or security forces of the country in which they were arrested. In some cases US agents were present at the time of arrest. All fourteen were detained in the country of arrest for periods ranging from a few days up to one month before their first transfer to a third country (reportedly Afghanistan, see below) and from there on to other countries. Interrogation in the country of arrest was conducted by US agents in nearly all cases. In two cases, however, detainees reported having been interrogated by the national authorities, either alone or jointly with US agents: Mr Abdelrahim Hussein Abdul Nashiri was allegedly interrogated for the first month after arrest by Dubai agents, and one detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities was allegedly interrogated by both Pakistani and US agents. During their subsequent detention, outlined below, detainees sometimes reported the presence of non-US personnel (believed to be personnel of the country in which they were held), even though the overall control of the facility appeared to remain under the control of the US authorities.

Throughout their detention, the fourteen were moved from one place to another and were allegedly kept in several different places of detention, probably in several different countries. The number of locations reported by the detainees varied, however ranged from three to ten locations prior to their arrival in Guantanamo in September 2006.

The transfer procedure was fairly standardised in most cases. The detainee would be photographed, both clothed and naked prior to and again after transfer. A body cavity check (rectal examination) would be carried out and some detainees alleged that a suppository (the type and the effect of such suppositories was unknown by the detainees), was also administered at that moment.

The detainee would be made to wear a diaper and dressed in a tracksuit. Earphones would be placed over his ears, through which music would sometimes be played. He would be blindfolded with at least a cloth tied around the head and black goggles. In addition, some detainees alleged that cotton wool was also taped over their eyes prior to the blindfold and goggles being applied. Mr Abu Zubaydah alleged that during one transfer operation the blindfold was tied very tightly resulting in wounds to his nose and ears. He does not know how long the transfer took but, prior to the transfer, he reported being told by his detaining authorities that he would be going on a journey that would last twenty-four to thirty hours.

The detainee would be shackled by hands and feet and transported to the airport by road and loaded onto a plane. He would usually be transported in a reclined sitting position with his hands shackled in front. The journey times obviously varied considerably and ranged from one hour to over twenty-four to thirty hours. The detainee was not allowed to go to the toilet and if necessary was obliged to urinate or defecate into the diaper.

On some occasions the detainees were transported lying flat on the floor of the plane and/or with their hands cuffed behind their backs. When transported in this position the detainees complained of severe pain and discomfort.

In addition to causing severe physical pain, these transfers to unknown locations and unpredictable conditions of detention and treatment placed mental strain on the fourteen, increasing their sense of disorientation and isolation. The ability of the detaining authority to transfer persons over apparently significant distances to secret locations in foreign countries acutely increased the detainees’ feeling of futility and helplessness, making them more vulnerable to the methods of ill-treatment described below.

The ICRC was informed by the US authorities that the practice of transfers was linked specifically to issues that included national security and logistics, as opposed to being an integral part of the program, for example to maintain compliance. However, in practice, these transfers increased the vulnerability of the fourteen to their interrogation, and was performed in a manner (goggles, earmuffs, use of diapers, strapped to stretchers, sometimes rough handling) that was intrusive and humiliating and that challenged the dignity of the persons concerned.

As their detention was specifically designed to cut off contact with the outside world and emphasise a feeling of disorientation and isolation, some of the time periods referred to in the report are approximate estimates made by the detainees concerned. For the same reasons, the detainees were usually unaware of their exact location beyond the first place of detention in the country of arrest and the second country of detention, which was identified by all fourteen as being Afghanistan. This report will not enter into conjecture by referring to possible countries or locations of places of detention beyond the first and second countries of detention, which are named, and will refer, where necessary, to subsequent places of detention by their position in the sequence for the detainee concerned (eg. third place of detention, fourth place of detention). The ICRC is confident that the concerned authorities will be able to identify from their records which place of detention is being referred to and the relevant period of detention.

Moreover, the ICRC notes that four detainees believed that they had previously been held in Guantanamo, for periods ranging from one week to one year during 2003/4. They reported recognising this location upon return there in September 2006, as each had been allowed outdoors on a daily basis during their earlier time there. The ICRC has been assured by DoD that it was given full notification of and access to all persons held in Guantanamo during its regular detention visits. The ICRC is concerned, if the allegations are confirmed, it had in fact been denied access to these persons during the period in which they were detained there.

1.2. CONTINUOUS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION

Throughout the entire period during which they were held in the CIA detention program— which ranged from sixteen months up to almost four and a half years and which, for eleven of the fourteen was over three years—the detainees were kept in continuous solitary confinement [8] and incommunicado detention. They had no knowledge of where they were being held, no contact with persons other than their interrogators or guards. Even their guards were usually masked and, other than the absolute minimum, did not communicate in any way with the detainees. None had any real—let alone regular—contact with other persons detained, other than occasionally for the purposes of inquiry when they were confronted with another detainee. None had any contact with legal representation. The fourteen had no access to news from the outside world, apart from in the later stages of their detention when some of them occasionally received printouts of sports news from the internet and one reported receiving newspapers.

None of the fourteen had any contact with their families, either in written form or through family visits or telephone calls. They were therefore unable to inform their families of their fate. As such, the fourteen had become missing persons. In any context, such a situation, given its prolonged duration, is clearly a cause of extreme distress for both the detainees and families concerned and itself constitutes a form of ill-treatment.

In addition, the detainees were denied access to an independent third party. In order to ensure accountability, there is a need for a procedure of notification to families, and of notification and access to detained persons, under defined modalities, for a third party, such as the ICRC. That this was not practiced, to the knowledge of the ICRC, neither for the fourteen nor for any other detainee who passed through the CIA detention program, is a matter of serious concern.

1.3. OTHER METHODS OF ILL-TREATMENT

As noted above, the fourteen were subjected to an extremely harsh detention regime, characterised by ill-treatment. The initial period of interrogation, lasting from a few days up to several months was the harshest, where compliance was secured by the infliction of various forms of physical and psychological ill-treatment. This appeared to be followed by a reward based interrogation approach with gradually improving conditions of detention, albeit reinforced by the threat of returning to former methods.

The methods of ill-treatment alleged to have been used include the following:

• Suffocation by water poured over a cloth placed over the nose and mouth, alleged by three of the fourteen.
• Prolonged stress standing position, naked, held with the arms extended and chained above the head, as alleged by ten of the fourteen, for periods from two or three days continuously, and for up to two or three months intermittently, during which period toilet access was sometimes denied resulting in allegations from four detainees that they had to defecate and urinate over themselves.
• Beatings by use of a collar held around the detainees neck and used to forcefully bang the head and body against the wall, alleged by six of the fourteen.
• Beating and kicking, including slapping, punching, kicking to the body and face, alleged by nine of the fourteen.
• Confinement in a box to severely restrict movement alleged in the case of one detainee.
• Prolonged nudity alleged by eleven of the fourteen during detention, interrogation and ill-treatment; this enforced nudity lasted for periods ranging from several weeks to several months.
• Sleep deprivation was alleged by eleven of the fourteen through days of interrogation, through use of forced stress positions (standing or sitting), cold water and use of repetitive loud noise or music. One detainee was kept sitting on a chair for prolonged periods of time.
• Exposure to cold temperature was alleged by most of the fourteen, especially via cold cells and interrogation rooms, and for seven of them, by the use of cold water poured over the body or, as alleged by three of the detainees, held around the body by means of a plastic sheet to create an immersion bath with just the head out of the water.
• Prolonged shackling of hands and/or feet was alleged by many of the fourteen.
• Threats of ill-treatment to the detainee and/or his family, alleged by nine of the fourteen.
• Forced shaving of the head and beard, alleged by two of the fourteen.
• Deprivation/restricted provision of solid food from 3 days to 1 month after arrest, alleged by eight of the fourteen.

In addition, the fourteen were subjected for longer periods to a deprivation of access to open air, exercise, appropriate hygiene facilities and basic items in relation to interrogation, and restricted access to the Koran linked with interrogation (see Section 1.4 Other Aspects of the Detention Regime).

The following section provides various examples of each of the methods of ill-treatment alleged to have been used on the fourteen during their time in CIA detention. The examples provided are only samples to illustrate each particular method and are not in any way meant to be a representation of all of the allegations recorded.

For the purposes of clarity in this report, each method of ill-treatment mentioned below has been detailed separately. However, each specific method was in fact applied in combination with other methods, either simultaneously, or in succession. Not all of these methods were used on all detainees [9], except in one case, namely that of Mr Abu Zubaydah, against whom all of the methods outlined below were allegedly used.

In order to provide as complete and accurate a picture as possible, some excerpts from the interviews conducted with some of the fourteen, as recorded by the ICRC, are attached in Annex 1.

The information contained in the following section was reported to the ICRC by twelve of the fourteen. Two detainees did not report allegations of the other methods of ill-treatment outlined in Section 1.3. These two detainees were, nevertheless, subjected to ill-treatment in the form of continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention.

1.3.1. SUFFOCATION BY WATER

Three of the fourteen alleged that they were repeatedly subjected to suffocation by water. They were: Mr Abu Zubaydah, Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed and Mr Al Nashiri.

In each case, the person to be suffocated was strapped to a tilting bed and a cloth was placed over the face, covering the nose and mouth. Water was then poured continuously onto the cloth, saturating it and blocking off any air so that the person could not breathe. This form of suffocation induced a feeling of panic and the acute impression that the person was about to die. In at least one case, this was accompanied by incontinence of the urine. At a point chosen by the interrogator the cloth was removed and the bed was rotated into a head-up and vertical position so that the person was left hanging by the straps used to secure him to the bed. The procedure was repeated at least twice, if not more often, during a single interrogation session. Moreover, this repetitive suffocation was inflicted on the detainees during subsequent sessions. The above procedure is the so-called ‘water boarding’ technique.

In all three cases this caused considerable pain, particularly for Mr Abu Zubaydah who had undergone surgery just three months earlier. He stated that he vomited on several occasions during this procedure.

Mr Abu Zubaydah described the suffocation method of ill-treatment, used in his third place of detention, as follows: “I was put on what looked like a hospital bed, and strapped down very tightly with belts. A black cloth was then placed over my face and the interrogators used a mineral water bottle to pour water on the cloth so that I could not breathe. After a few minutes the cloth was removed and the bed was rotated into an upright position. The pressure of the straps on my wounds caused severe pain. I vomited. The bed was then again lowered to a horizontal position and the same torture carried out with the black cloth over my face and water poured on from a bottle. On this occasion my head was in a more backward, downwards position and the water was poured on for a longer time. I struggled without success to breathe. I thought I was going to die. I lost control of my urine. Since then I still lose control of my urine when under stress.” The suffocation procedure was applied during five sessions of ill-treatment that took place during an approximately one-week intense period of interrogation allegedly in Afghanistan in 2002. During each session, apart from one, the suffocation technique was applied once or twice; on one occasion, it was applied three times.

Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed gave the following description of this method of ill-treatment, used in his third place of detention: “I would be strapped to a special bed, which can be rotated into a vertical position. A cloth would be placed over my face. Water was then poured onto the cloth by one of the guards so that I could not breathe. This obviously could only be done for one or two minutes at a time. The cloth was then removed and the bed was put into a vertical position. The whole process was then repeated during about 1 hour”. The procedure was applied during five different sessions during the first month of interrogation in his third place of detention. He also said that injuries to his ankles and wrists occurred during the suffocation as he struggled in the panic of not being able to breathe. As during other forms of ill-treatment he was always kept naked during the suffocation. Female interrogators were also present during this form of ill-treatment, again increasing the humiliation aspect. Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed described a device attached to one of his fingers, the reading of which was checked regularly by a person he assumed to be a doctor. From the description, this appears to have been a pulse oxymeter, a medical device for measuring the saturation of oxygen in the blood (also see Sect. 3 Health Provision and the Role of Medical Staff).

1.3.2. PROLONGED STRESS STANDING

Ten of the fourteen alleged that they were subjected to prolonged stress standing positions, during which their wrists were shackled to a bar or hook in the ceiling above the head for periods ranging from two or three days continuously, and for up to two or three months intermittently. All those detainees who reported being held in this position were allegedly kept naked throughout the use of this form of ill-treatment.

For example, Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that, apart from the time when he was taken for interrogation, he was shackled in the prolonged stress standing position for one month in his third place of detention (he estimates he was interrogated for approximately eight hours each day at the start of the month gradually declining to four hours each day at the end of the month).

Mr Ramzi Binalshib alleged that he was shackled in this position for two to three days in Afghanistan his second place of detention and for seven days in his fourth; Mr Al Nashiri for at least two days in Afghanistan and again for several days in his third place of detention; Mr Majid Khan for three days in Afghanistan and seven days in his third place of detention, Mr Bin Attash for two weeks with two or three short breaks where he could lie down in Afghanistan and for several days in his fourth place of detention; Mr Bin Lep for seven days in Afghanistan and Mr Hambali for four to five days, blindfolded with a type of sack over his head, while still detained in Thailand.

Mr Bin Attash commented that during the two weeks he was shackled in the prolonged stress standing position with his hands chained above his head, his artificial leg was sometimes removed by the interrogators to increase the stress and fatigue of the position.

One detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that he was shackled in this position for two to three months, seven days of prolonged stress standing followed by two days able to sit or lie down.

While being held in this position some of the detainees were allowed to defecate in a bucket. A guard would come to release their hands from the bar or hook in the ceiling so that they could sit on the bucket. None of them, however, were allowed to clean themselves afterwards. Others were made to wear a garment that resembled a diaper. This was the case for Mr Bin Attash in his fourth place of detention. However, he commented that on several occasions the diaper was not replaced so he had to urinate and defecate on himself while shackled in the prolonged stress standing position. Indeed, in addition to Mr Bin Attash, three other detainees specified that they had to defecate and urinate on themselves and remain standing in their own bodily fluids. Of these, only Mr Bin Lep agreed that his name be transmitted to the authorities.

Many of the detainees who alleged that they had undergone this form of ill-treatment commented that their legs and ankles swelled as a result of the continual forced standing with their hands shackled above their head. They also noted that while being held in this position they were checked frequently by US health personnel.

Although this position prevented most detainees from sleeping, three of the detainees stated that they did fall asleep once or more while shackled in this position. These include Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed and Mr Bin Attash; the third did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities. When they did fall asleep held in this position, the whole weight of their bodies was effectively suspended from the shackled wrists, transmitting the strain through the arms to the shoulders.

1.3.3. BEATING BY USE OF A COLLAR

Six of the fourteen alleged that an improvised thick collar or neck roll was placed around their necks and used by their interrogators to slam them against the walls. For example, Mr Abu Zubaydah commented that when the collar was first used on him in his third place of detention, he was slammed directly against a hard concrete wall. He was then placed in a tall box for several hours (see Section 1.3.5., Confinement in boxes). After he was taken out of the box he noticed that a sheet of plywood had been placed against the wall. The collar was then used to slam him against the plywood sheet. He thought that the plywood was in order to absorb some of the impact so as to avoid the risk of physical injury. Mr Abu Zubaydah also believed that his interrogation was a form of experimentation with various interrogation techniques. Indeed some forms of ill-treatment were allegedly used against him that were not reported to have been used on other detainees. He claimed that he was told by one of the interrogators that he was one of the first to receive these interrogation techniques.

Mr Bin Attash alleged that during interrogation in Afghanistan: “on a daily basis during the first two weeks a collar was looped around my neck and then used to slam me against the walls of the interrogation room. It was also placed around my neck when being taken out of my cell for interrogation and was used to lead me along the corridor. It was also used to slam me against the walls of the corridor during such movements”.

Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that, in his third place of detention: “a thick plastic collar would be placed around my neck so that it could then be held at the two ends by a guard who would use it to slam me repeatedly against the wall”.

1.3.4. BEATING AND KICKING

Nine of the fourteen alleged that they had been subjected to daily beatings during the initial period, involving repeated slapping, punching and, less often, kicking, to the body and face, as well as a detainee having his head banged against a solid object. These beatings lasted up to half an hour and were repeated throughout the day and again on subsequent days. They took place during periods ranging from one week up to two to three months.

For example, one detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that: “In Kabul the treatment got worse. I was punched and slapped in the face and on the back to the extent that I was bleeding. While having a rope round my neck and being tied to a pillar my head was banged against the pillar repeatedly.” The interrogators then allegedly took a picture of the detainee to show to another suspect, in order to threaten the same treatment to that person (see Section 1.3.10. Threats).

Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that on a daily basis during the first month of interrogation in his third place of detention: “if I was perceived not to be cooperating I would be placed against a wall and subjected to punches and slaps in the body, head and face”.

Mr Bin Attash alleged that: “every day for the first two weeks [in Afghanistan] I was subjected to slaps to the face and punches to the body during interrogation. This was done by one interrogator wearing gloves. He was then replaced by a second interrogator who was more friendly and pretended that he could save me from the first interrogator”.

One detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities said that: “during the early days of the interrogation [in Kabul] I was often subjected to punches and slaps to the face by the interrogator. Two Afghan guards held me by the shoulders during the beatings.”

1.3.5. CONFINEMENT IN A BOX

One of the fourteen reported that confinement inside boxes was used as a form of ill-treatment. Mr Abu Zubaydah, alleged that during an intense period of his interrogation in Afghanistan in 2002 he was held in boxes that had been specially designed to constrain his movement. One of the boxes was tall and narrow and the other was shorter, forcing him to crouch down. Mr Abu Zubaydah stated that: “As it was not high enough even to sit upright, I had to crouch down. It was very difficult because of my wounds. The stress on my legs held in this position meant that my wounds both in the leg and stomach became very painful. I think this occurred about three months after my last operation”. He went on to say that a cover was placed over the boxes while he was inside making it hot and difficult to breathe. The combination of sweat, pressure and friction from the slight movement possible to try to find a comfortable position, meant that the wound on his leg began to reopen and started to bleed. He does not know how long he remained in the small box; he says that he thinks he may have slept or fainted. The boxes were used repeatedly during a period of approximately one week in conjunction with other forms of ill-treatment, such as suffocation by water, beatings and use of the collar to slam him against the wall, sleep deprivation, loud music and deprivation of solid food. During this period, between sessions of ill-treatment he was made to sit on the floor with a black hood over his head until the next session began.

1.3.6. PROLONGED NUDITY

The most common method of ill-treatment noted during the interviews with the fourteen was the use of nudity. Eleven of the fourteen alleged that they were subjected to extended periods of nudity during detention and interrogation, ranging from several weeks continuously up to several months intermittently.

For example, Mr Bin Attash alleged that he was kept naked for two weeks in Afghanistan, followed by one month of being clothed. However, after being transferred to his next place of detention, he was allegedly again kept naked for another one month.

Mr Hambali alleged that he was kept naked for four to five days while still detained in Thailand and was then held for one week naked in Afghanistan. He was then provided with clothes, which were again removed after one week after which he remained naked for another month before clothes were finally provided.

Mr Abu Zubaydah alleged that after spending several weeks in hospital following arrest he was transferred to Afghanistan where he remained naked, during interrogation, for between one and a half to two months. He was then examined by a woman he assumed to be a doctor who allegedly asked why he was still being kept naked. Clothes were given to him the next day. However, the following day, these clothes were then cut off his body and he was again kept naked. Clothes were subsequently provided or removed according to how cooperative he was perceived by his interrogators.

Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that he was kept naked for one month in Afghanistan. Mr Majid Khan alleged that he was kept naked for three days in Afghanistan and for seven days in his third place of detention. Mr Bin Lep alleged that he was kept naked for three to four days while still detained in Thailand followed by nine days naked in Afghanistan.

One of the detainees who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that while detained in Afghanistan he was kept naked for two to three months with clothes being provided approximately every seven days for a two day period and then being again removed.

Most of the detainees commented that the provision of clothes was determined by how cooperative they were perceived by the interrogators.

1.3.7. SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND USE OF LOUD MUSIC

Eleven of the fourteen alleged that they were deprived of sleep during the initial interrogation phase from seven days continuously to intermittent sleep deprivation that continued up to two or three months after arrest. Sleep was deprived in various ways, and therefore overlaps with some of the other forms of ill-treatment described in this section, from the use of loud repetitive noise or music to long interrogation sessions to prolonged stress standing to spraying with cold water.

For example, Mr Abu Zubaydah alleged that, while detained in Afghanistan, “I was kept sitting on a chair, shackled by hands and feet for two to three weeks. During this time I developed blisters on the underside of my legs due to the constant sitting. I was only allowed to get up from the chair to go to the toilet, which consisted of a bucket”. He alleged that he was constantly deprived of sleep during this period, “if I started to fall asleep a guard would come and spray water in my face”, he said. The cell was kept very cold by the use of air-conditioning and very loud “shouting” music was constantly playing on an approximately fifteen minute repeat loop twenty-four hours a day. Sometimes the music stopped and was replaced by a loud hissing or crackling noise.

One detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that loud music played for twenty-four hours a day throughout the one year period he believed he was held in Afghanistan. He reported that during the last month it changed to sounds of wind, waves and birds.

1.3.8. EXPOSURE TO COLD TEMPERATURE/COLD WATER

Detainees frequently reported that they were held for their initial months of detention in cells which were kept extremely cold, usually at the same time as being kept forcibly naked. The actual interrogation room was also often reported to be kept cold. Requests for clothing or for blankets went unanswered. For example, Mr Abu Zubaydah alleged that his cell was excessively cold throughout the nine months he spent in Afghanistan.

Seven of the fourteen reported that they were also subjected to dousing with cold water during interrogation sessions. In four cases the water was allegedly thrown or poured onto the detainee with buckets or a hose-pipe while held in a stress standing position with their arms shackled above their head for prolonged periods. Several thought that this was in order to clean away the feces which had run down their legs when they defecated while held in the prolonged stress standing position (see Section 1.3.2. Prolonged Stress Standing). In three cases cold water was also poured over the detainee while he was lying on a plastic sheet raised at the edges by guards to contain the water around his body creating an immersion bath with just the head exposed. In one case a detainee was strapped to a tilting bed and cold water was poured over his body while he was threatened with “water boarding” (although that procedure was not actually carried out on that individual).

For example, one detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that, during his detention in Afghanistan, his interrogators “threw cold water on me with buckets” during the early days of the interrogation; Mr Ramzi Binalshib alleged that he was: “splashed with cold water from a hose” during interrogation in his fourth place of detention and that in his eighth place of detention he was: “restrained on a bed, unable to move, for one month, February 2005 and subjected to cold air-conditioning during that period.”

Another detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that: “when I was taken for interrogation I would first be splashed with cold water by the guards while still in the [cell in the prolonged stress standing] position. I'm not sure if this was to clean me or as part of the interrogation process—or both. I was then blindfolded and walked the fifteen minutes to another room, separate from the interrogation room, where I was made to lie on a plastic sheet, which was then raised at the edges. Cold water was then poured onto me using a kettle or hose for between fifteen and thirty minutes. I was still blindfolded. My interrogator told me that a woman was also present during the cold water treatment. I think I heard a female voice on at least one occasion”. He alleged that this was repeated on an almost daily basis, with breaks of two days approximately once a week, during two to three months while he was detained in Afghanistan.

Mr Bin Attash described the following from his detention in Afghanistan: “on a daily basis during the first two weeks I was made to lie on a plastic sheet placed on the floor which would then be lifted at the edges. Cold water was then poured onto my body with buckets. They did not have a hosepipe to fill the sheet more easily. This jail was not so well equipped for torture”. He was kept enveloped within the sheet with the cold water for several minutes. In his next place of detention, he was allegedly doused every day during the month of July 2003 with cold water from a hosepipe. He commented that: “in this place of detention they were rather more sophisticated than in Afghanistan because they had a hosepipe with which to pour water over me”.

1.3.9. PROLONGED USE OF HANDCUFFS AND SHACKLES

Many of the detainees alleged that they were kept for long periods continuously shackled and/or handcuffed. For example, Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed was allegedly kept continuously shackled, even when inside his cell for nineteen months.

One detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that he was kept for four and a half months continuously handcuffed and seven months with the ankles continuously shackled while detained in Kabul in 2003/4. On two occasions, his shackles had to be cut off his ankles as the locking mechanism and ceased to function, allegedly due to rust.

Mr Bin Attash alleged that he was kept permanently handcuffed and shackled throughout his first six months of detention. During the four months he was held in his third place of detention, when not kept in the prolonged stress standing position, his ankle shackles were allegedly kept attached by a one meter long chain to a pin fixed in the corner of the room where he was held.

1.3.10. THREATS

Nine of the fourteen alleged that they had been subjected to threats of ill-treatment. Seven of these cases took the form of a verbal threat, including of ill-treatment in the form of “water boarding”, electric shocks, infection with HIV, sodomy of the detainee and the arrest and rape of his family, torture, being brought close to death, and of an interrogation process to which “no rules applied”. The other two threats were made by visual means, namely of ill-treatment which would make the detainee resemble a co-detainee (through use of a photo of a co-detainee showing physical signs of ill-treatment), and of a return to past methods of ill-treatment (through displaying during interrogation a neck collar previously used for ill-treatment). In all cases, the threats were made to induce cooperation with the interrogation.

For example, Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that, in his third place of detention, one of his interrogators stated that the green light had been received from Washington to give him a “hard time” and that, although they would not let him die, he would be brought to the “verge of death and back again”.

Mr Abu Zubaydeh alleged that, in his third place of detention, he was told by one of the interrogators that he was one of the first to receive these interrogation techniques, “so no rules applied”.

Mr Hambali alleged that, in his third place of detention, he was threatened with a return to previous methods of ill-treatment (namely, having his head slammed against the wall by use of a collar, see Section 1.3.3 Beatings by use of a collar), by his interrogators showing him the collar during interrogation sessions. Similarly, Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed stated that the collar previously used had been placed on the table in front of him during interrogation sessions in his third place of detention.

Mr Al Nashiri alleged that, in his third place of detention, he was threatened with sodomy, and with the arrest and rape of his family.

1.3.11. FORCED SHAVING

Two of the fourteen alleged that their heads and beards were forcibly shaved. Mr Abu Zubaydah alleged that his head and beard were shaved during the transfer to Afghanistan.

Mr Ramzi Binalshib alleged that, in his eighth place of detention, first his head was shaved and then some days later his beard was also shaved off. He was particularly distressed by the fact that the people who shaved him allegedly deliberately left some spots and spaces in order to make him look and feel particularly undignified and abused.

1.3.12. DEPRIVATION/RESTRICTED PROVISION OF SOLID FOOD

Eight of the fourteen alleged that they were deprived of solid food for periods ranging from three days to one month. This was often followed by a period when the provision of food was restricted and allegedly used as an incentive for cooperation. Two other detainees alleged that, whilst they were not totally deprived of solid food, food was provided intermittently or provided in restricted amounts.

For example, Mr Abu Zubaydah alleged that in Afghanistan, during the initial period of two to three weeks while kept constantly sitting on a chair, he was not provided with any solid food, but was provided with Ensure (a nutrient drink) and water. After about two to three weeks he began to receive solid food (rice) to eat on a daily, once a day, basis. Approximately one month later, during a resumption of intense questioning he was again deprived of food for approximately one week and only given Ensure and water.

Mr Binalshib alleged that during a period of three weeks in his fourth place of detention he was deprived of solid food for three to four weeks and only provided with Ensure and water.

One detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that during the initial two to three months of his detention in Afghanistan, although not totally deprived of solid food, he was given just one meal every two to three days. Later this increased to one meal a day, until the last month in that place of detention, when he finally received three meals a day. He believes he was detained in Afghanistan for approximately one year.

Mr Bin Attash alleged that he was not provided with any solid food during the first two weeks of his detention in Afghanistan; only Ensure and water being provided during that period. During the third week the Ensure continued, but he was also given one solid meal a day. This consisted of either bread and gravy or rice and potatoes. He was held in Afghanistan for three weeks. In his next place of detention food was adequately provided.

Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that during the first month in his third place of detention, he was not provided with any solid food apart from on two occasions as a reward for perceived cooperation. A drink of Ensure was provided once every four hours. If he refused to drink then his mouth was forced open by a guard and the Ensure was poured down his throat. After about one month solid food began to be provided twice a day.

Mr Majid Khan alleged that he did not receive any solid food for seven days in Afghanistan.

One detainee who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities alleged that during the one week he was held in his first place of detention he was not provided with any food and was only given Ensure and water to drink. After arriving in where he believes was Kabul, he was kept another two days without food, after which he was provided with meals irregularly for the next two months, after which meals were provided on a regular basis.

Mr Bin Lep alleged that he was not provided with any solid food until twelve days after his arrest.

Mr Hambali alleged that throughout his four to five days of detention in Thailand, where he was allegedly held in US custody, he was not provided with any solid food. During the two months he was detained in Afghanistan he received solid food irregularly, sometimes twice a day and sometimes only once in two to three days. Ensure was provided throughout to supplement the lack of solid food.

PART 2 OF 3 (ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CUSTODY cont'd.)

1.4. FURTHER ELEMENTS OF THE DETENTION REGIME

The conditions of detention under which the fourteen were held, particularly during the earlier period of their detention, formed an integral part of the interrogation process as well as an integral part of the overall treatment to which they were subjected as part of the CIA detention program. This report has already drawn attention to certain aspects associated with basic conditions of detention, which were clearly manipulated in order to exert pressure on the detainees concerned.

In particular, the use of continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention, lack of contact with family members and third parties, prolonged nudity, deprivation/restricted provision of solid food and prolonged shackling have already been described above.

The situation was further exacerbated by the following aspects of the detention regime:

• Deprivation of access to the open air
• Deprivation of exercise
• Deprivation of appropriate hygiene facilities and basic items in pursuance of interrogation
• Restricted access to the Koran linked with interrogation

These aspects cannot be considered individually, but must be understood as forming part of the whole picture. As such, they also form part of the ill-treatment to which the fourteen were subjected.

Little or no access to open air was granted to the fourteen throughout their detention period. For most, their arrival in Guantanamo was the first time they had been allowed outdoors at all since their arrest (apart from during transfer from one place of detention to another). Two detainees said they were taken outdoors twice during their periods of detention in Afghanistan and only four detainees claimed that they received a regular outdoor period during any part of their detention. These four believed that they were previously detained in Guantanamo for periods ranging from one week to one year during 2003/4. During this time they were allowed to go outdoors on a daily basis. Apart from these few exceptions, none of the fourteen received any access to open air throughout their period in the CIA detention program.

Access to exercise was also severely limited, particularly during the early months and years of detention for the detainees arrested during 2002 and 2003. According to many of the detainees it was after several months or years of detention that the authorities constructed or provided such facilities. For example, Mr Bin Attash was kept for approximately two and a half years without any possibility to exercise outside his cell apart from a one month period in his fifth place of detention which was equipped with a gym/exercise area. Mr Hambali was allegedly detained for nine months before he was provided with any possibility to exercise outside of his cell. Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed was allegedly held for nineteen months before he was provided with access to a small gym located outside his cell in his fifth place of detention.

Basic materials such as toothbrushes, toothpaste, soap, towels, toilet paper, clothes, underwear, blankets and mattress were not provided at all during the initial detention period, in some instances lasting several months. The timing of initial provision and continued supply of all these items was allegedly linked with compliance and cooperation on the part of the detainee. Even after being provided, these basic items allegedly were sometimes removed in order to apply pressure for purposes of interrogation.

In the early phase of interrogation, from a few days to several weeks, access to shower was totally denied and toilet, as mentioned above, was either provided in the form of a bucket or not provided at all—in which case those detainees shackled in the prolonged stress standing position had to urinate and defecate on themselves and remain standing in their own bodily fluids for periods of several days (see Section 1.3.2. Prolonged Stress Standing).

During the initial stages of detention, particularly during the most intense interrogation phase, the fourteen were not provided with access to the Koran. The cultural and religious significance of this lack of access added significant psychological pressure to the detainees. Later, usually about two months after arrest, Korans were provided and the direction of Mecca was indicated. Detainees alleged, however, that throughout their detention period the timing of the prayer schedule was inaccurate. Several detainees alleged that on occasion their Korans, along with other items, were removed according to the needs of the interrogation. For example, Mr Bin Attash was provided with a Koran in his third place of detention, approximately two months after arrest. He was able to keep the Koran for one month. It was then removed as the interrogation again became harsher and was finally returned to him one month later. Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that he was not allowed to pray until approximately one month after his arrest. He was provided with a Koran in April 2003, approximately six weeks after arrest. It was confiscated on four occasions during his stay in his third place detention. Mr Hambali was provided with a Koran about four days after his arrival in his third place of detention, approximately two months after arrest. He stated that: “A few days later the air conditioning was made very cold and everything was removed from my cell, including the Koran. I was only left with a T-shirt and shorts”.

2. CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN LATER STAGES

The ICRC notes that conditions of detention and treatment, following the initial period during which the methods described above were used, gradually improved. The timing for the implementation of these improvements varied for each detainee and appears linked to the needs of the interrogation. The introduction of improvements appears to mark the transition from the phase where compliance was obtained by force to what resembled a more incentive-based approach (see Section 1.3 for examples of approximate timeframes).

Following the initial stages of interrogation described above, all detainees were provided with clean clothes on a weekly basis, were gradually provided with solid food three times per day (although some complaints of quality and quantity lasted throughout), and were provided with books in English or their mother tongue and magazines.

In the latter stages of detention, usually six to eight months after arrest, all fourteen were provided with toilet facilities in their cells, to which they had unlimited access, some also had unlimited access to washbasins, and all were able to shower either on a weekly basis or more often. After a period which varied between several months to two and a half years following the arrest, all detainees were allowed to move from their cells to a closed indoor area in which they were able to use exercise machines. Also in the latter stages of detention, the cell temperature was usually maintained at a proper level. In the final place of detention prior to their arrival in Guantanamo, some detainees were able to watch a film on a weekly basis and/or use a portable DVD player.

Although each of these aspects represents an improvement in the situation in which the fourteen were held, such improvements must be understood against the earlier background of severe ill-treatment and ongoing threats of such treatment, continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention, ongoing transfers, and the lack of legal framework governing their detention.

3. HEALTH PROVISION AND THE ROLE OF MEDICAL STAFF

During the course of their detention, detainees described three principal roles for health personnel whom they encountered. Firstly, there was a direct role in monitoring the ongoing ill-treatment which, in some instances, involved the health personnel directly participating while certain methods were used. Secondly, there was a role in performing a medical check just prior to, and just after, each transfer. Finally, there was the provision of healthcare, to treat both the direct consequences of ill-treatment detailed in previous sections, and to treat any natural ailments that arose during the prolonged periods of detention.

Throughout the course of the initial phase of the detention, the ICRC received allegations that health personnel were directly involved in monitoring the health effects of ill-treatment. In some cases it was alleged that, based on their assessments, health personnel gave instructions to interrogators to continue, to adjust, or to stop particular methods. As with other personnel within the detention facilities, the health personnel did not identify themselves, but the detainees presumed from their presence and function that they were either physicians or psychologists. [10]

For certain methods, notably suffocation by water, the health personnel were allegedly directly participating in the infliction of the ill-treatment. In one case, it was alleged that health personnel actively monitored a detainee’s oxygen saturation using what, from the description of the detainee of a device placed over the finger, appeared to be a pulse oxymeter. For example, Mr Khaled Shaik Mohammed alleged that on several occasions the suffocation method was stopped on the intervention of a health person who was present in the room each time this procedure was used.

Other detainees who were shackled in a stress standing position for prolonged periods in their cells were monitored by health personnel who in some instances recommended stopping the method of ill-treatment, or recommended its continuation, but with adjustments. For example, Mr Bin Attash (the detainee has had a right-sided below knee amputation) alleged that while being held in a form of stress standing position with his arms shackled above his head, and his feet touching the floor, had his lower leg measured on a daily basis with a tape measure by a person he assumed to be a doctor for signs of swelling; the health person finally ordered that he be allowed to sit on the floor, albeit with his arms still shackled above his head. Mr Hambali alleged that, after a period of the same form of prolonged stress standing, a health person intervened to prevent further use of the method, but told him that “I look after your body only because we need you for information”.

As well as the monitoring of specific methods of ill-treatment, other health personnel were alleged to have directly participated in the interrogation process. One detainee, who did not wish his name to be transmitted to the authorities, alleged that a health person threatened that medical care would be conditional upon cooperation with the interrogators.

The second alleged role of the health personnel was to perform a medical check prior to and after each transfer from one detention location to another. The purpose and results of this medical examination appear not to have been divulged to the detainees.

The third alleged role was to provide medical care to detainees, either for injuries resulting directly from the various forms of ill- treatment employed, or treatment for common ailments that arose throughout the course of the detention.

With regard to this third role, when such medical treatment was necessary it appears from the descriptions given that the care was appropriate and satisfactory. In two specific cases, detainees indicated that exceptional lengths were taken to provide very high standards of medical intervention.

Medical ethics are based on a number of principles [11] which include the principle of beneficence (a medical practitioner should act in the best interest of the patient—salus aegroti suprema lex), non-malefiance (first do no harm—primum non nocere) and dignity (the patient and the person treating the patient have the right to dignity). These principles guide any relationship between a medical doctor and a person whom he or she is relating to as a medical doctor.

There are accepted roles for health professionals working in recognised, official, places of detention such as police stations and prisons wherein the health professionals have the health care and best interests of the detainee as their primary consideration. [12] To this end, when a person enters an official detention facility or system, a medical assessment of their medical status is required in order to meet their current and ongoing health needs. In the case of a normal, lawful interrogation, a physician may be asked to provide a medical opinion, within the usual bounds of medical confidentiality, as to whether existing mental or physical health problems would preclude the individual from being questioned. Secondly, a physician may rightly be requested to provide medical treatment to a person suffering a medical emergency during questioning. This accepted role of the physician, or any other health professional, clearly does not extend to ruling on the permissibility, or not, of any form of physical or psychological ill-treatment. The physician, and any other health professionals, are expressly prohibited from using their scientific knowledge and skills to facilitate such practices in any way. On the contrary, the role of the physician and any other health professional involved in the care of detainees is explicitly to protect them from such ill-treatment and there can be no exceptional circumstances invoked to excuse this obligation. [13]

With the exceptions detailed in the above paragraph, any interrogation process that requires a health professional to either pronounce on the subject’s fitness to withstand such a procedure, or which requires a health professional to monitor the actual procedure, must have inherent health risks. As such, the interrogation process is contrary to international law and the participation of health personnel in such a process is contrary to international standards of medical ethics. In the case of the alleged participation of health personnel in the detention and interrogation of the fourteen detainees, their primary purpose appears to have been to serve the interrogation process, and not the patient. In so doing the health personnel have condoned, and participated in ill-treatment.

4. LEGAL ASPECTS IN RELATION TO UNDISCLOSED DETENTION

As described in the following paragraphs, it is a basic tenet of international law that any person deprived of liberty must be registered and held in an officially recognized place of detention.

International humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to international armed conflicts contains numerous provisions and provides extensive requirements concerning the registration of persons deprived of their liberty, ICRC visits to places of detention and the transmission of information related to such persons to, inter alia, their next of kin [14]. The entire system of detention provided for by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in which the ICRC plays a supervisory role, is based on the idea that detainees must be registered and held in officially recognised places of detention. While under the Geneva Conventions ICRC access to certain detainees may be restricted for reasons of imperative military necessity, such restriction should be of a temporary and exceptional nature only [15].

Customary rules of IHL and human rights soft law instruments contain similar explicit provisions on the obligation of registration of detainees and the prohibition of unacknowledged detention, as well as provisions on contacts with family, applicable in situations of non-international armed conflicts and other situations of violence [16]. All of the above-mentioned rules aim at preventing, inter alia, enforced disappearance, which is prohibited under international law, including customary IHL. As far as IHL is concerned, the phenomenon of enforced disappearance violates, or risks violating, a range of customary rules, most notably the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the prohibition of torture and/or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CID) [17].

In the ICRC’s view, the fourteen were placed outside the protection of the law during the time they spent in CIA custody. Indeed, one of the main effects of the transfers was to place the fourteen in secret detention facilities in unspecified locations in a number of different countries, outside the reach of any judicial or administrative system. As such, they were, for instance, apparently both precluded from knowing the reasons for their detention and denied access to any mechanism capable of independently reviewing the lawfulness of their detention. They were also denied contact with their families, including any information to the families of their detention. The totality of the circumstances in which the fourteen were held effectively amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance, in contravention of international law. [18]

As regards conditions of detention and treatment of the fourteen, the effects of their being in undisclosed detention were severe and multifaceted, as the present report shows. The absence of scrutiny by any independent entity—including the ICRC— inevitably creates conditions conducive to excesses that would not otherwise be permitted. Persons held in undisclosed detention are especially vulnerable to being subjected to ill-treatment. Indeed, the allegations of the fourteen include descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques—singly or in combination—that amounted to torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

In that regard, the ICRC wishes to remind the US authorities that international law absolutely prohibits CID and torture. Torture is defined by the 1984 UN Convention against Torture as: “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” [19]. In particular, the provisions of common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which reflects elementary considerations of humanity, stipulate that persons taking no active part in the hostilities “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”, and that “cruel treatment and torture”, “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” are prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever.

5. FATE OF OTHER PERSONS WHO PASSED THROUGH THE CIA DETENTION PROGRAM

During his speech of 6 September 2006, President Bush also stated that the CIA detention program held a limited number of persons at a given time, and that a number of other persons had also been detained by the CIA in the context of the fight against terrorism. President Bush added that: “many of them have been returned to their home countries for prosecution or detention by their governments” once the US authorities had determined that they had “little or no intelligence value”.

In subsequent discussions with various US Government departments, it was again stated to the ICRC that the majority, if not all, other detainees who went through this program have been transferred to their countries of origin.

It is the ICRC’s understanding that these transfers are all subject to formal agreements between the USG and the respective countries which include, inter alia, assurances of humane treatment on the part of the countries of origin. The ICRC has a number of legal and operational concerns about this practice. In particular, the ICRC regrets that the USG has not informed the ICRC of the countries of destination so that the ICRC can seek access from the relevant authorities in order to monitor human treatment and to ensure communication with their families.

In light of the conditions of detention and treatment of the fourteen during the period they were held in the CIA detention program, as reported above, the ICRC remains gravely concerned by the fact that a significant number of other persons have passed through this detention program and may have been subjected to similar, if not the same, conditions and treatment. The ICRC has not received any clarification of the fate of these persons, and has therefore not been able to seek access to them following their reported transfer to their home countries. Consequently, it has not been able to assess the detention regime experienced by these persons whilst in CIA custody, nor to assess whether they are currently assured humane treatment by the detaining authorities in their respective countries of origin, nor whether they have been given the possibility of re-establishing contact with their families.

The ICRC welcomes the fact that it has been able to begin discussions with the CIA on this question. It considers the issue to be a humanitarian priority and anticipates a continuation of the discussions aimed at resolving this question.

6. FUTURE USE OF THE CIA DETENTION PROGRAM

According to information provided to the ICRC by the US authorities, no persons were held in the CIA detention program as of October 2006. Nevertheless, in his speech of 6 September 2006, President Bush made clear that the CIA detention program had not been discontinued and could again be used in the future.

The ICRC is concerned by the maintenance or resumption of any type of undisclosed detention, particularly in view of the information described in the body of this report, including the legal aspects. It urges the US authorities to end the practice of undisclosed detention.

Without prejudice to this position, the ICRC requests that, should persons nevertheless be held in the CIA detention program in the future, it be notified of their detention and be granted access to conduct its traditional visits to the persons detained. In addition, it urges the authorities to ensure that conditions of detention and treatment are humane. [20] Finally, the ICRC wishes to remind the CIA that persons whose continued detention is deemed necessary for imperative reasons of security should be afforded an independent and impartial review of deprivation of liberty that appropriately addresses their status. Review processes should enable the internees to challenge the reasons for their continued internment by application of appropriate procedural safeguards [21]

CONCLUSION

All of the fourteen were subjected to a process of ongoing transfers to places of detention in unknown locations and continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention throughout the entire period of their detention. The fourteen were placed outside the protection of the law during the time they spent in the CIA detention program. The totality of the circumstances in which they were held effectively amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance, in contravention of international law.

Moreover, and in addition to the continuous solitary confinement and incommunicado detention which itself was a form of ill- treatment, twelve of the fourteen alleged that they were subjected to systematic physical and/or psychological ill-treatment. This was a consequence of both the treatment and the material conditions which formed part of the interrogation regime, as well as the overall detention regime. This regime was clearly designed to undermine human dignity and to create a sense of futility by inducing, in many cases, severe physical and mental pain and suffering, with the aim of obtaining compliance and extracting information, resulting in exhaustion, depersonalisation and dehumanisation.

The allegations of ill-treatment of the detainees indicate that, in many cases, the ill-treatment to which they were subjected while held in the CIA program, either singly or in combination, constituted torture. In addition, many other elements of the ill-treatment, either singly or in combination, constituted cruel inhuman or degrading treatment.

The alleged participation of health personnel in the interrogation process and, either directly or indirectly, in the infliction of ill- treatment constituted a gross breach of medical ethics and, in some cases, amounted to participation in torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

In light of the above, the ICRC remains gravely concerned by the fate of the other persons previously held in the CIA detention program, who remain unaccounted for. It continues to request that the relevant US authorities provide clarification concerning the fate of all persons for whom it has information.

The ICRC also remains gravely concerned about the announcement by President Bush that the US authorities intend to continue the practice of undisclosed detention by holding persons arrested in the context of the fight against terrorism in the CIA detention program in the future.

The ICRC urges the US authorities to end the practice of undisclosed detention and to ensure that all persons detained in the context of the fight against terrorism are held in conformity with the rules and principles of international law.

Without prejudice to its position on undisclosed detention, the ICRC requests that, should persons nevertheless be held in the CIA detention program in the future, it be notified of their detention and granted access to these detainees. Moreover, it urges the US authorities to provide the ICRC with notification and access to all detainees held under US authority in the context of the fight against terrorism. Such access, of a purely humanitarian nature, should not be seen as inconsistent with any legitimate security concerns of the US authorities in relation to the concerned detainees.

To this end, the ICRC recommends the following:

• that the US authorities take all measures to eliminate abusive conditions of detention and treatment in all places of detention under their authority;
• that all persons detained in the context of the fight against terrorism be treated humanely at all times;
• that all persons detained in the context of the fight against terrorism be permitted to communicate with family members within a reasonable time;
• that all persons detained in the context of the fight against terrorism be held in a legal framework affording all fundamental guarantees;
• that the ICRC be notified of all arrests carried out by the US authorities or by third country authorities acting on behalf of or in cooperation with the US authorities in the context of the fight against terrorism;
• that the ICRC be granted access to all persons held under US authority in the context of the fight against terrorism;
• that the US authorities investigate all allegations of ill-treatment and take steps to punish the perpetrators, where appropriate, and to prevent such abuses from happening again.
• that the US authorities inform the ICRC of the identities of the other persons who have passed through the CIA detention program, the country to which they have been returned and any other relevant details to allow the ICRC to seek access to these persons.

The ICRC trusts that the information in the present report will provide a useful tool for the relevant US authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure that all persons deprived of liberty in the context of the fight against terrorism are treated in accordance with the provisions of international law and internationally recognised standards. The ICRC looks forward to continue its dialogue with the US authorities on this issue.

ANNEX 1

The following examples of excerpts from some of the interviews conducted with the fourteen are in no way meant to represent the entirety of any one those interviews or to be representative of all of the interviews carried out. These excerpts are reproduced verbatim. They are presented only to illustrate how the various alleged methods of ill-treatment described in Section 1. of the report were reportedly used in combination with each other.

i) Abu Zubaydeh reported the following regarding his detention in Afghanistan were he was held for approximately nine months from May 2002 to February 2003. He had previously been held in hospital for what he believes were several weeks and had several operations to severe gunshot injuries sustained at the time of arrest:

“I woke up, naked, strapped to a bed, in a very white room. The room measured approximately 4m x 4m. The room had three solid walls, with the fourth wall consisting of metal bars separating it from a larger room. I am not sure how long I remained in the bed. After some time, I think it was several days, but can’t remember exactly, I was transferred to a chair where I was kept, shackled by hands and feet for what I think was the next 2 to 3 weeks. During this time I developed blisters on the underside of my legs due to the constant sitting. I was only allowed to get up from the chair to go the toilet, which consisted of a bucket. Water for cleaning myself was provided in a plastic bottle.

I was given no solid food during the first two or three weeks, while sitting on the chair. I was only given Ensure and water to drink. At first the Ensure made me vomit, but this became less with time.

The cell and room were air-conditioned and were very cold. Very loud, shouting type music was constantly playing. It kept repeating about every fifteen minutes twenty-four hours a day. Sometimes the music stopped and was replaced by a loud hissing or crackling noise.

The guards were American, but wore masks to conceal their faces. My interrogators did not wear masks.

During this first two to three week period I was questioned for about one to two hours each day. American interrogators would come to the room and speak to me through the bars of the cell. During the questioning the music was switched off, but was then put back on again afterwards. I could not sleep at all for the first two to three weeks. If I started to fall asleep one of the guards would come and spray water in my face.

After about two or three weeks I began to receive food, rice, to eat on a daily basis. They gave it once a day. I could eat with my hand, but I was not allowed to wash. It was also around this time that I was allowed to lie on the floor. I remained naked and in shackles, but I could sleep a little. It went on like this for about another one and a half months.

During the first few days a doctor came and gave me an injection. I was told it was an anti-biotic. After about one and a half to two months I was examined by a female doctor who asked why I was still naked. My measurements were taken and the next day, I was provided with orange clothes to wear. This was followed however, by more threats that worse was to follow.

Indeed, the next day guards came into my cell. They told me to stand up and raise my arms above my head. They then cut the clothes off of me so that I was again naked and put me back on the chair for several days. I tried to sleep on the chair, but was again kept awake by the guards spraying water in my face.

When my interrogators had the impression that I was cooperating and providing the information they required, the clothes were given back to me. When they felt I was being less cooperative the clothes were again removed and I was again put back on the chair. This was repeated several times.

Eventually, (I don't remember after how long), I was allowed to have a mattress and was given a towel to use as a sheet to cover myself with while sleeping. I was allowed some tissue paper to use when going to toilet on the bucket.

There then followed a period of about one month with no questioning. During this period I was given food, rice and beans, on a daily basis, varying between once or twice a day. They also continued to give me Ensure to drink. My cell was still very cold and the loud music no longer played, but there was a constant loud hissing or crackling noise, which played twenty-four hours a day. I tried to block out the noise by putting tissue in my ears.

There then followed a period of about one month with no questioning. Then, about two and a half or three months after I arrived in this place, the interrogation began again, but with more intensity than before. Then the real torturing started. Two black wooden boxes were brought into the room outside my cell. One was tall, slightly higher than me and narrow. Measuring perhaps in area 1m x 0.75m and 2m in height. The other was shorter, perhaps only 1m in height. I was taken out of my cell and one of the interrogators wrapped a towel around my neck, they then used it to swing me around and smash me repeatedly against the hard walls of the room. I was also repeatedly slapped in the face. As I was still shackled, the pushing and pulling around meant that the shackles pulled painfully on my ankles.

I was then put into the tall back box for what I think was about one and a half to two hours. The box was totally black on the inside as well as the outside. It had a bucket inside to use as a toilet and had water to drink provided in a bottle. They put a cloth or cover over the outside of the box to cut out the light and restrict my air supply. It was difficult to breathe. When I was let out of the box I saw that one of the walls of the room had been covered with plywood sheeting. From now on it was against this wall that I was then smashed with the towel around my neck. I think that the plywood was put there to provide some absorption of the impact of my body. The interrogators realized that smashing me against the hard wall would probably quickly result in physical injury.

During these torture sessions many guards were present, plus two interrogators who did the actual beating, still asking questions, while the main interrogator left to return after the beating was over. After the beating I was then placed in the small box. They placed a cloth or cover over the box to cut out all light and restrict my air supply. As it was not high enough even to sit upright, I had to crouch down. It was very difficult because of my wounds. The stress on my legs held in this position meant my wounds both in the leg and stomach became very painful. I think this occurred about 3 months after my last operation. It was always cold in the room, but when the cover was placed over the box it made it hot and sweaty inside. The wound on my leg began to open and started to bleed. I don’t know how long I remained in the small box, I think I may have slept or maybe fainted.

I was then dragged from the small box, unable to walk properly and put on what looked like a hospital bed, and strapped down very tightly with belts. A black cloth was then placed over my face and the interrogators used a mineral water bottle to pour water on the cloth so that I could not breathe. After a few minutes the cloth was removed and the bed was rotated into an upright position. The pressure of the straps on my wounds was very painful. I vomited. The bed was then again lowered to a horizontal position and the same torture carried out again with the black cloth over my face and water poured on from a bottle. On this occasion my head was in a more backward, downwards position and the water was poured on for a longer time. I struggled against the straps, trying to breathe, but it was hopeless. I thought I was going to die. I lost control of my urine. Since then I still lose control of my urine when under stress.

I was then placed again in the tall box. While I was inside the box loud music was played again and somebody kept banging repeatedly on the box from the outside. I tried to sit down on the floor, but because of the small space the bucket with urine tipped over and spilt over me. I remained in the box for several hours, maybe overnight. I was then taken out and again a towel was wrapped around my neck and I was smashed into the wall with the plywood covering and repeatedly slapped in the face by the same two interrogators as before.

I was then made to sit on the floor with a black hood over my head until the next session of torture began. The room was always kept very cold.

This went on for approximately one week. During this time the whole procedure was repeated five times. On each occasion, apart from one, I was suffocated once or twice and was put in the vertical position on the bed in between. On one occasion the suffocation was repeated three times. I vomited each time I was put in the vertical position between the suffocation.

During that week I was not given any solid food. I was only given Ensure to drink. My head and beard were shaved everyday.

I collapsed and lost consciousness on several occasions. Eventually the torture was stopped by the intervention of the doctor.

I was told during this period that I was one of the first to receive these interrogation techniques, so no rules applied. It felt like they were experimenting and trying out techniques to be used later on other people.

At the end of this period two women and a man came to interrogate me. I was still naked and, because of this, I refused to answer any questions. So they again repeatedly slapped me in the face and smashed me against the wall using the towel around my neck. The following day I was given a towel to wear around my waist, but I was still very cold.

Then, little by little, things started to get better. I was again given rice to eat. Then my mattress was returned. I was allowed to clean my cell. The tall box was removed, but the short one remained in the room outside my cell, I think as a deliberate reminder as to what my interrogators were capable of. One week after the end of torture I was given a pair of green shorts and a top to wear. The food also improved with the addition of beans and fruit.

I was provided with water and allowed to wash inside the cell. However, the loud noise continued throughout the nine months I spent in that place. I was never given any outdoor time.”

ii) Walid Bin Attash reported the following regarding his detention in Afghanistan, where he was held for approximately three weeks from mid-May to the start of June 2003 and in his subsequent place of detention, where he was held from June to October 2003:

“On arrival at the place of detention in Afghanistan I was stripped naked. I remained naked for the next two weeks. I was put in a cell measuring approximately 1m x 2m. I was kept in a standing position, feet flat on the floor, but with my arms above my head and fixed with handcuffs and a chain to a metal bar running across the width of the cell. The cell was dark with no light, artificial or natural.

During the first two weeks I did not receive any food. I was only given Ensure and water to drink. A guard would come and hold the bottle for me while I drank. During the third week the Ensure continued, but I was also provided with one meal each day. This consisted of either gravy and bread or rice and potatoes. The toilet consisted of a bucket in the cell, which was removed once a day. I was not allowed to clean myself after using the bucket. Loud music was playing twenty-four hours each day throughout the three weeks I was held there.

After some time of being held in this position my stump began to hurt so I removed my artificial leg to relieve the pain. Of course my one good leg then began to ache and soon started to give way so that I was left hanging with all my weight on my wrists. I shouted for help but at first nobody came. Finally, after about one hour a guard came and my artificial leg was given back to me and I was again placed in the standing position with my hands above my head. After that the interrogators sometimes deliberately removed my artificial leg in order to add extra stress to the position. For the first two weeks I was held in this position apart for two or three times when I was allowed to lie down, but I cannot remember for how long.

Usually, throughout the interrogation, the methods they used were specifically designed not to leave marks. However, when I was in this position the cuffs cut into my wrists and made wounds. When this happened the doctor would be called.

For interrogation I was blindfolded and removed from the cell and taken to another room. Every day for the first two weeks I was subjected to slaps to my face and punches to my body during the interrogation. This was done by one interrogator wearing gloves. He was then replaced by a second interrogator who was more friendly and pretended that he could save me from the first interrogator.

Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks a collar was looped around my neck and then used to slam me against the walls of the interrogation room. It was also placed around my neck when being taken out of my cell for interrogation and was used to lead me along the corridor. It was also used to slam me against the walls of the corridor during such movements.

Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks I was made to lie on a plastic sheet placed on the floor which would then be lifted at the edges. Cold water was then poured onto my body with buckets. They did not have a hose-pipe to fill the sheet more easily. This jail was not so well equipped for torture. I would be kept wrapped inside the sheet with the cold water for several minutes. I would then be taken for interrogation to a separate room. At the end of the interrogation I would be placed under hot lights to dry out thoroughly and warm up. This was sometimes done during the interrogation.

The interrogators threatened to infect me with HIV. I was given at least two injections by the doctor during this period, but I have no idea what they were for.

Female interrogators were also present which I found highly humiliating in my naked state. The female interrogators did not take part in physical ill-treatment.

After about two weeks the torture stopped. I was given some clothes, a tracksuit, to wear and was no longer kept in the standing position with my hands above my head. I was still shackled, by my ankles, but was allowed to sit or lie down in my cell. I was also provided with a blanket.

After approximately three weeks in Afghanistan I was transferred to another place. I was blindfolded and earphones were placed over my ears. I was transported in a sitting position, shackled by the ankles and by the wrists with my hands in front of my body. I think that the flight lasted probably more than eight hours. On this occasion the transfer was done using a military plane. If I shifted my position too much during the journey somebody hit me by hand on the head.

I arrived in the next place of detention during June 2003. I think I was detained underground as I had to walk down some stairs in order to reach the cell. My blindfold was then removed. The cell was about 4m x 5m. I was kept chained by my ankle shackles to a pin fixed in the floor. For the first month here I was not subjected to any torture.

I was not allowed to shower. Meals were provided three times a day in addition to Ensure and multivitamins. Toilet consisted of a bucket in the cell which was removed everyday. Loud music was playing twenty-four hours each day. I was provided with a Styrofoam mattress.

After about one month the torture began again. I was stripped naked and remained naked throughout the month of July. Also during this time I was again kept for several days in a standing position with my arms above my head and fixed with handcuffs and a chain to a metal ring in the ceiling. My lower leg was examined on a daily basis by a doctor using a tape measure for signs of swelling. I do not remember for exactly how many days I was kept standing, but I think it was about ten days The doctor finally ordered that I be allowed to sit on the floor, I was still kept with my arms extended above my head. This was very painful on my back. During the standing I was made to wear a diaper. However, on some occasions the diaper was not replaced and so I had to urinate and defecate over myself. I was washed down with cold water everyday.

In this place of detention they were rather more sophisticated than in Afghanistan because they had a hose-pipe with which to pour the water over me. After having been washed down with cold water in my cell I was taken for interrogation. On one occasion I heard sounds of a person being tortured next door. In this place of detention, female interrogators were again present while I was naked. One of them was particularly aggressive in her questioning. [He would not go further into detail on this subject]. However , I was not subjected to any more beatings.”

iii) Khaled Shaik Mohammed reported the following regarding his transfer to and detention in Afghanistan, where he was held for three days at the start of March 2003 and in his subsequent place of detention, where he was held from 06 March to 22 September 2003:

“During the transfer from Pakistan to Afghanistan my eyes were covered with a cloth tied around my head and with a cloth bag pulled over it. A suppository was inserted into my rectum. I was not told what the suppository was for. I was dressed in a shalwar kameez, shackled hands and feet and put sitting in a vehicle for the journey to the airport. I was then put in a sitting position on a plane. The transfer was OK, with no particular problems to report. The flight was short, only about 1 hour. I arrived at night. The transfer from the plane to the place of detention took about 15–20 minutes. During my time in this place of detention I could hear planes taking off and landing. I think the place was Bagram.

After arrival my clothes were cut off of me, the bag and blindfold were removed and photographs were taken of me naked. I remained naked throughout the three days I stayed in this place of detention.

I was checked by a doctor and asked about my medical history. I told the doctor about the pain I was still suffering from the beating in Pakistan. [During the two days he was detained at Rawlapindi he was questioned by a CIA agent who allegedly punched him several times in the stomach, chest and face. The same agent reportedly threw him on the floor and trod on his face three times. He was not allowed to sleep during his detention in Pakistan].

I was then placed in a cell, about 2m x 4 m, naked, where I was kept in a standing position with my hands cuffed and chained to a bar above my head. My feet were flat on the floor. At first I was questioned for about one hour with no other forms of ill-treatment. After about one hour I was taken to another room where I was made to stand on tiptoes for about two hours during questioning. Approximately thirteen persons were in the room. These included the head interrogator (a man) and two female interrogators, plus about ten muscle guys wearing masks. I think they were all Americans. From time to time one of the muscle guys would punch me in the chest and stomach. This was repeated during two nights.

Also during this period I was on four occasions taken to a separate room away from the main interrogation room. Here cold water from buckets was thrown onto me for about forty minutes. Not constantly as it took time to refill the buckets. After which I would be taken back to the interrogation room.

On one occasion during the interrogation I was offered water to drink, when I refused I was again taken to another room where I was made to lie of the floor with three persons holding me down. A tube was inserted into my anus and water poured inside. Afterwards I wanted to go to the toilet as I had a feeling as if I had diarrhoea. No toilet access was provided until four hours later when I was given a bucket to use. Whenever I was returned to my cell I was always kept in the standing position with my hands cuffed and chained to a bar above my head.

On one occasion I was taken to another cell and was allowed to sleep for a little while, I think for only about one hour, before being returned to my cell standing, naked with my hands shackled above my head.

Music was always playing in the corridor outside my cell, but it was not very loud. For a toilet a bucket was provided inside the cell. A guard came and lowered my hands to allow me to use it. However, I was not allowed to clean myself afterwards and was immediately again returned to the former position.

I was not allowed to pray. I could not bathe or wash. I was not provided with any time outdoors. Some Afghani style bread was given to me on some occasions, as a reward for when they thought I was cooperating.

After three days in Afghanistan I was dressed in a tracksuit. My eyes were covered with a cloth tied around my head. A cloth bag was then pulled over my head. Headphones were placed over my ears—playing music, but not too loud. I was transported about ten minutes by vehicle and then placed in a plane sitting, leaning back, with my hands and ankles shackled in a high chair. I fell asleep. The first proper sleep in over five days. I therefore don’t know how long the journey lasted.

On arrival the transfer from the airport to the next place of detention took about one hour. I was transported sitting on the floor of a vehicle. I could see at one point that there was snow on the ground. Everybody was wearing black, with masks and army boots, like Planet-X people. I think the country was Poland. I think this because on one occasion a water bottle was brought to me without the label removed. It had e-mail address ending in “.pl”. The central-heating system was an old style one that I would expect only to see in countries of the former communist system.

After arrival my clothes were again cut off of me, the bag and blindfold were removed and photographs were again taken of me naked. I was put in a cell with cameras where I was later informed by an interrogator that I was monitored 24 hours a day by a doctor, psychologist and interrogator. I think the cell was underground. I had to go down steps to get to it. It was about 3m x 4m with wooden walls.

It was here that the most intense interrogation occurred, led by three experienced CIA interrogators, all over 65 years old and all strong and well trained. There were the “emirs.” Although of course they never revealed their own names, I gave them names by which I could refer to them, all beginning with ‘Abu’. I think that ‘Abu Captain’ was of South American origin, whereas ‘Abu Hanan’ was perhaps of Moroccan origin and ‘Abu White’ was of Eastern European descent.

As the interrogation again resumed I was told by one of the “emirs” that they had received the green-light from Washington to give him “a hard time”. They never used the word “torture” and never referred to “physical pressure”, only to “a hard time”, I was never threatened with death, in fact I was told that they would not allow me to die, but that I would be brought to the “verge of death and back again”.

Apart from when I was taken for interrogation to another room, I was kept for one month in the cell in a standing position with my hands cuffed and shackled above my head and my feet cuffed and shackled to a point in the floor. Of course during this month I fell asleep on some occasions while still being held in this position. This resulted in all my weight being applied to the handcuffs around my wrists resulting in open and bleeding wounds. The cuffs around my ankles also created open, bleeding wounds. [Scars consistent with this allegation were visible on both wrists as well as on both ankles.] Both my feet became very swollen after one month of almost continual standing.

Initially I was interrogated for approximately eight hours each day. This gradually became less until after one month it was about four hours each day.

For the interrogation I was taken to a separate room. The number of people present varied greatly from one day to another. Other interrogators, including women, were also sometimes present along with the ‘emirs’. A doctor was also usually present. If I was perceived not to be cooperating I would be put against a wall and punched and slapped in the body, head and face. A thick flexible plastic collar would also be placed around my neck so that it could then be held at the two ends by a guard who would use it to slam me repeatedly against the wall. The beatings were combined with the use of cold water, which was poured over me using a hose-pipe. The beatings and use of cold water occurred on a daily basis during the first month.

In addition I was also subjected to ‘water-boarding’ on five occasions, all of which occurred during that first month. I would be strapped to a special bed, which could be rotated into a vertical position. A cloth would be placed over my face. Cold water from a bottle that had been kept in a fridge was then poured onto the cloth by one of the guards so that I could not breathe. This obviously could only be done for one or two minutes at a time. The cloth was then removed and the bed was put into a vertical position. The whole process was then repeated during about one hour. Injuries to my ankles and wrists also occurred during the water-boarding as I struggled in the panic of not being able to breathe. Female interrogators were also present during this form of ill-treatment and a doctor was always present, standing out of sight behind the head of bed, but I saw him when he came to fix a clip to my finger which was connected to a machine. I think it was to measure my pulse and oxygen content in my blood. So they could take me to breaking point.

After each session of torture I was put into a cell where I was allowed to lie on the floor and could sleep for a few minutes. However, due to shackles on my ankles and wrists I was never able to sleep very well.

The harshest period of the interrogation was just prior to the end of the first month. The beatings became worse and I had cold water directed at me from a hose-pipe by guards while I was still in my cell. The worst day was when I was beaten for about half an hour by one of the interrogators. My head was banged against the wall so hard that it started to bleed. Cold water was poured over my head. This was then repeated with other interrogators. Finally I was taken for a session of water boarding. The torture on that day was finally stopped by the intervention of the doctor. I was allowed to sleep for about one hour and then put back in my cell standing with my hands shackled above my head.

Music was playing 24 hours/day in the corridors, but not very loud. I was allowed to pray after about one month. Koran was given in April 2003. It was confiscated on four occasions during my stay in that place of detention. The toilet consisted of a bucket in the cell, which I could use on request, but I was not allowed to clean myself after toilet during the first month. I was allowed to shower twice during the first month. After these two showers I was allowed to sleep for a little while on the floor of my cell before being returned to the standing position with hands cuffed above my head. During the first month I was not provided with any food apart from on two occasions as a reward for perceived cooperation. I was given ‘Ensure’ to drink every 4 hours. If I refused to drink then my mouth was forced open by the guard and it was poured down my throat by force. At my request the Ensure was later provided a little warmed. I was weighed every day during the first month. This was done on a weekly basis later. At the time of arrest I weighed 78kg. After one month in detention I weighed 60kg.

I wasn’t given any clothes for the first month. Artificial light was on 24 hours a day, but I never saw sunlight. I was never taken outdoors.

After about one month I was moved to another cell. I was given clothes to wear. I was no longer kept in a standing position. I was only shackled by the ankles. I could shower once a week. The interrogation became less harsh. No more physical assault, but threats along the lines of “we will take you to another room” or by having the plastic collar put on the table in front of me during the questioning. I was provided with a Styrofoam mattress. They started to give me food twice a day. To begin with the it consisted only of rice and beans. Later, after June 2003, I began to receive some meals with sardines, canned meat and bread buns. The guards would sometimes bring the food already bitten, and would handle me roughly when they took me to the shower. These things improved after I complained to one of the ‘emirs’.

On June 4th I was moved to a third cell. This move occurred after I complained about the constant music that was still being played outside my cell. The new cell was a cage like structure built inside an underground room. I preferred it as there was no music and, as it was a cage structure instead of solid walls, the ventilation was better. I was again kept shackled by the feet, but not the wrists. Water was provided in two bottles. One for drinking, one for the toilet. Toilet paper was provided. Toilet still consisted of a bucket inside the cell. It was removed on a daily basis.

During the harshest period of my interrogation I gave a lot of false information in order to satisfy what I believed the interrogators wished to hear in order to make the ill-treatment stop. I later told the interrogators that their methods were stupid and counterproductive. I’m sure that the false information I was forced to invent in order to make the ill-treatment stop wasted a lot of their time and led to several false red-alerts being placed in the US.”

PART 3 OF 3 (ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CUSTODY cont'd.)

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Notes:

1. The ICRC has defined “undisclosed detention” broadly, to include: the detention of individuals by US authorities in undisclosed locations; the non-disclosure or hiding of detainees from the ICRC by US authorities and/or the denial of ICRC access to detainees known to the ICRC; and detention by third country authorities working in cooperation with US authorities, including the practice of rendition, when carried out in violation of the rules and principles of international law.

2. A list of the nine main written interventions was attached in annex to the 2004 report. In the 2006 report, a list of the 17 main written interventions was attached in annex.

3. This list contained 42 names in 2004, and 59 names in 2006. In both cases, the list included two children.

4. The content of this Note VerbaIe is acknowledged by the ICRC in its consolidated report of 18 April 2006.

5. The terms “detainee” and “detention” are also intended to cover “internees” and “internment”.

6. For four of these detainees, the first written request was made in January 2003; for nine detainees the first request was in 2004 (two in March, six in July 2004 and one in November 2004); and for one detainee the first request was made in November 2005. A complete list of the interventions made for each of these detainees has been attached in Annex 2. In the ICRC consolidated report on undisclosed detention of April 2006, these persons are identified in annex as identities number 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 38.

7. Report of ICRC Washington on the ICRC Visit to Fourteen Newly Arrived “High Value” Internees in Guantanamo Bay Internment Facility 06 October to 11 October 2006, WAS 06/210, 31 October 2006.

8. ‘Solitary confinement’ is the confinement of a detainee and the partial (where the restriction is nevertheless severe) or complete denial of contact with other detainees and/or the outside world. While solitary confinement often implies other forms of restrictions it does not necessarily require them.

9. The ICRC does not have access to the initial interrogation plan and use of techniques approved by the CIA. It has been informed by the Director of the CIA, General W. Hayden, that the objective of the CIA detention program was focused exclusively on the holding of foreign nationals for the purpose of extracting intelligence information in relation to the fight against terrorism, as directed by President Bush. Gen. Hayden outlined that the initial interrogation plan for a detainee was drafted by the interrogation team and submitted to the CIA headquarters for approval. Currently (and this may always have been the case, although the ICRC is not aware), both the interrogation plan and specific use of techniques must be approved by the Director or Deputy Director of the CIA.

10. Health personnel is nevertheless a broader term and should be understood to include physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses and other para-health staff.

11. Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN 1982; International Code of Medical Ethics World Medical Association 1949 (amended 1983); Declaration of Tokyo, World Medical Association 1975; Regulations in times of armed conflict, World Medical Association 1956, amended 2004; Resolution on the responsibility of physicians in the denunciation of acts of torture or cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment of which they are aware, World Medical Association 2003; International Council of Nurses Position Statement on Torture, Death Penalty and Participation by Nurses in Executions, Revised 2006; International Council of Nurses Position Statement on Nurses’ Role in the Care of Detainees and Prisoners. Revised 2006; International Council of Nurses Position Statement on Nurses and Human Rights. Revised 2006;World Psychiatric Association Declaration of Madrid, Amended 2002.

12. UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, United Nations 1955; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, UN General Assembly 1988.

13. Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN 1982.

14. Articles 71, 122, 126 of the Geneva Convention III (GC III); articles 25, 106, 107, 116, 138, 143 of the Geneva Convention III (GC IV).

15. Article 126 (2) GC III; article 143 (3) GC IV.

16. E.g. principles 16, 19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (1998); rule 37 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1977).

17. Enforced disappearance has been defined in article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006): “enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law”; as well as in the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992): “enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government or by organized groups or private individuals, acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law”.

18. E.g. articles 21, 118 GC III; articles 42, 78 GC IV; common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions; article 9 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966).

19. Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984).

20. The ICRC notes the remarks by General Hayden on 18 October 2006 that certain procedures would not be used in subsequent detention programs and the affirmation that common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions applied as a matter of law to the treatment of any future CIA detention program. It was also indicated that the CIA did not intend to undertake detention of the duration previously used and that a significant reduction may be considered.

21. For an elaboration on the procedural principles and safeguards that should be applied as a minimum to all cases of deprivation of liberty for security reasons, please see the ICRC document entitled “Procedural principles and safeguards for interment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence”, Jelena Pejic, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, number 858, pp. 375–391 (June 2005).

ANNEX 2

ICRC written interventions to the US authorities requesting information on the fourteen

PART 1 OF 13 (The Taguba Report)

The Taguba Report

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

March 2004

Table of Contents

• References
• Background
• Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations In Iraq (MG Miller’s Assessment)
• IO Comments on MG Miller’s Assessment
• Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq (MG Ryder’s Report)
• IO Comments on MG Ryder’s Report
• Preliminary Investigative Actions
• Findings and Recommendations
• Part One (Detainee Abuse)
o Findings
o Recommendations
• Part Two (Escapes and Accountability)
o Findings
o Recommendations
• Part Three (Command Climate, Etc…)
o Findings
o Recommendations
• Other Findings/Observations
• Conclusion
• Annexes

References

1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967

5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951

6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949

7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

8. DOD Directive 5100.69, “DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other Detainees,” 27 December 1972

9. DOD Directive 5100.77 “DOD Law of War Program,” 10 July 1979

10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994

11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6), 6 December 1994

12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996

14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12 February 1998

17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993

18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993

19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988

20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31 September 2000

21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5 September 2003

22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993

23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988

24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000

26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002

27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002

29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998

30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999

31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001

32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002

34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000

35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May 1994

36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985

38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001

39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984

40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001

41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003

42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Battalion (IR)

43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Guard Company

44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Escort Guard Company

45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002

46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999

47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003

48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003

49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003

50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003

51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003

52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003

53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December 2003

54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations, 13 December 2003

56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002 Edition

BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)

2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)

3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-6 into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:

a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));

b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;

c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;

d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. (ANNEX 4)

4. (U) LTG Sanchez’s request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities. In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)

5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)

6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG Miller’s team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. MG Miller’s team used JTF-GTMO procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)

7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller’s team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller’s Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that “sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees.” Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller’s team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also stated “it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.” (ANNEX 20)

3. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)

4. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also observed that the application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller’s team that the “guard force” be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that military police “do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.” The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)

REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS IN IRAQ (MG RYDER’S REPORT)

1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested by the Commander CJTF-7:

a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management

b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and accountability

c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system

d. (U) Integration of military detention and corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run corrections system

e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management

f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation standards

g. (U) Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees

h. (U) Detainee legal processing

i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including integration with law enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder’s team are beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is added in certain areas):

A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement, segregation, and accountability)

1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.) Though, there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities, though segregated in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific training during their mobilization period. Corrections training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and redeployed in January 2004. The 724thMP Battalion redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component units do not have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a five-year period. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its task organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and 24)

5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, require military police to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)

6. MG Ryder’s Report also made the following, inter alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of detainees:

a. (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD Policy. The process of screening security internees should include intelligence findings, interrogation results, and current threat assessment.

b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.

c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations, except the MEK security mission, under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2.

d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement operations in support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER’S REPORT

1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder’s Team was to observe detention and prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7 operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from US military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team are thorough and precise and should be implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during MG Ryder’s Team’s assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG Ryder’s Team in one critical aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with setting “favorable conditions” for subsequent interviews. These actions, as will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder’s Report and MG Miller’s Report, my investigation team immediately began an in-depth review of all available documents regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements from military police and military intelligence personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions involving that command for the past several months. (All ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)

2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two individuals who are experts in military police detention practices and training. These were LTC Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)

3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder’s and MG Miller’s Reports, the team reviewed numerous reference materials including the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205thMI Brigade’s Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and 94)

4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February 2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training sessions on approved detention practices. We continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the applicable reference materials within each team member’s area of expertise, and practiced investigative techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to arrange witness attendance, force protection measures, and general logistics for the team’s move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)

5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command, I directed that several critical witnesses who were preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on 3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART ONE)

(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)

2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)

REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)

2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)

3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372ndMP Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion and the 372ndMP Company were located within the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)

4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)

5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320thMilitary Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)

6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:

a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;

b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;

c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;

d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;

e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear;

f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;

h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

i. (S) Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a female Soldier pose for a picture;

k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;

l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.

7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company – Suspect

c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect

e. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade -- Suspect

f. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company

g. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion

h. (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI Battalion

i. (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade

j. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP Company

k. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company

l. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical Detachment

m. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company

8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;

b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;

c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;

e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;

g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick.

h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.

9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:

a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365

b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077

c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446

d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108

e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307

f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542

g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422

h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425

i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529

j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787

k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427

l. (U) Ameen Sa’eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362

m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)

10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder’s Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency’s (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to “set the conditions” for MI interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).

11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):

a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn statement regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, “that her job was to keep detainees awake.” She stated that MI was talking to CPL Grainer. She stated: “MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Grainer and Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”

b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement as follows: “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules and different SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic).” When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military Intelligence (MI) holds.” When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “ Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: “Loosen this guy up for us.” Make sure he has a bad night.” “Make sure he gets the treatment.” He claimed these comments were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has been handling the MI holds. Example being statements like, “Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff like that.”

c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked if he were present when any detainees were abused. He stated: “I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes.” He could not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but commented that, “if they wanted me to do that they needed to give me paperwork.” He was later informed that “we could not do anything to embarrass the prisoners.”

d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract translator was questioned about several detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): “They (detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what they did. They made them do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet, called them all kinds of names such as “gays” do they like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their hands together and their legs with shackles and started to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt.”

e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, a medic testified that: “Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down.”

12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)

13.(U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)

14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter experts in internment/resettlement operations, international and operational law, information technology, facility management, interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.

2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided with training by an international/operational law attorney on the specific provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.

3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee operations.

4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and notice of protections be made available in both English and the detainees’ language and be prominently displayed in all detention facilities. Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.

5. (U) That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.

6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Assessment Report, and my findings and recommendations in this investigation, all units in the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting internment/confinement/detainment operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.

7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by COMCJTF-7).

8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of detainee operations.

PART 2 OF 13 (The Taguba Report cont'd.)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART TWO)

(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:

REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)

2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex during the time period covered in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)

3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)

4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)

5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)

6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care, and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)

7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)

8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES 45-91).

9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)

10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a “Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP” and a “Training Outline” for transferring and releasing detainees, which appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)

11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is underutilized and often does not give a “real time” accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating. (ANNEX 56)

12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created “change sheet” to document the transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For proper accountability, it is imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)

13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)

14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)

15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)

16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal terms such as “band checks,” “roll-ups,” and “call-ups,” which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)

17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command. (Annex 37)

18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites. (Annexes 44, 67, 71, and 85)

19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance. (Annexex 76 and 82)

20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience. (Annex 21)

21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)

22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape that were probably “written off” as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)

23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)

24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing “Crimes Against the Coalition,” who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the “Detainee Release Authority” for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board’s recommendations to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)

25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)

26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)

28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR, even after several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak’s Statement)

30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc…), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this training. (Annexes 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)

33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees “ghost detainees.” On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law. (Annex 53)

34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from these reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:

a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional information was provided as requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)

b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)

c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that location. It is of particular note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the detainees’ native languages. (ANNEX 6)

d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)

e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)

f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)

g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)

h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed “Golden Spike,” the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)

j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)

k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)

m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 17)

n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)

o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)

q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10-15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)

36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities and were not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (Annexes 5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:

(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed and referenced series of recommendations for improving the detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of operations. (U) Accountability practices throughout any particular detention facility must be standardized and in accordance with applicable regulations and international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred from one location to another. (U) “Change sheets,” or their doctrinal equivalent must be immediately processed and updated into the system to ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees. (U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this investigation as well as any previous findings, recommendations, and reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and understood at the lowest level.(U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate facilities from any other category of detainee. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their detainees in real time and without waiting for their change sheets to be processed. This would also have the change sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS system can be utilized for this function. (U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances within the detainment facilities must be immediately reported through both the operational and administrative Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is resolved. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and guard mount. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at any given facility. The observations and corrective actions that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented as a matter of policy. (U) There must be significant structural improvements at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting, additional chain link fencing, staking down of all concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) . (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must be prominently displayed in English and the language of the detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention facility IAW AR 190-8. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other contractors’ access throughout the facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an authorized and easily identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from the masses of detainees in civilian clothes. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability. (U) The method for doing head counts of detainees within a given compound must be standardized. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use them to maintain standardized operating procedures and efficient accountability practices.

PART 3 OF 13 (The Taguba Report (Cont'd.)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I) personally interviewed the following witnesses:

1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

2. (U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

3. (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon, CFLCC SJA)

4. (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade

5. (U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade

6. (U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)

7. (U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

8. (U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion

9. (U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade

10. (U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

11. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

12. (U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-I, 800th MP Brigade

13. (U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade

14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-I (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

16. (U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

17. (U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

19. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

20. (U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion

21. (U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

22. (U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

23. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

24. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

25. (U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

26. (U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company

27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

28. (U) ILT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company

29. (U) ILT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade

30. (U) ILT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion

31. (U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company

32. (U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 20Sth MI Brigade

33. (U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion

34. (U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP

35. (U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion

36. (U) ISG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company

37. (U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion

38. (U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company

39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion

40. (U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company

41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

43. (U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

44. (U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP Detachment, 16th MP

45. (U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, S23rd MP Detachment, 937th Engi

46. (U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal and Canine Unit

47. (U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract Interrogator, CACI, 20Sth MI

48. (U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade (ANNEXES 45-91)

REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.

(ANNEXES 41 and 45)

2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go home when all the detainees were released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the 800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)

3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. MP units did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific missions. The training that was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)

5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had civilian corrections experience, including many who worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)

6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder’s Team, that the 800th MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21 battalions, and that the average battalion size element should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships. (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander’s Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR “SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION.”

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)

10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)

“TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant commander.”

11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I find that there was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as if they were responsible for the security, health and welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this removal and search for a replacement was communicated to the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing him with another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC (P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations of the Interview Team)

15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the MPs “ideas” that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEX 45)

16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp Bucca in May 2003. She stated that “about the same time those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers, the worst that’s gonna happen is, you’re gonna go home.” I think it important to point out that almost every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late October and early November 2003. The photographs and statements clearly support that the abuses occurred during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence that the decision of numerous MP personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)

17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff’s effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)

18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced standards:

a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)

1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

• Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.

2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally
• Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, 17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty

3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.
• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.

5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade

• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.

6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company

• Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be announced.

7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade

• GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was removed from the CSM list.

9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th MP Company

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,

• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol; filed locally.

12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,

• Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG Karpinski; filed locally.

d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as previously existed. (ANNEX 53)

19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq had very little contact during their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular visits to the various detention facilities where her Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum. (Multiple Witness Statements)

20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the difference in culture, the Soldiers’ quality of life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).

21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in detainee operations and proficiency or that serious accountability lapses that occurred over a significant period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with detainees if they existed at all, were not read or understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team )

22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most recent example of a poor leadership climate that “permeates the Brigade.” I totally concur with LTG Sanchez’ opinion regarding the performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
• Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
• Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct.
• Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum.
• Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
• Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
• Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her command.
• Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
• Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
• Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.

2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several months were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
• Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and to task organize to accomplish his mission.

4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to Soldier and not filed.
• Failing to take corrective action and implement recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
• Failing to take appropriate action and report an incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.

6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had “never” been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG Karpinski to “stay out of the towers” at the holding facility.
• Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements contradict this assertion.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
• Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his presence.

11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the locations of his interrogations, the activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of abuses.
• Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by “setting conditions” which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.

12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file and have his security clearance reviewed by competent authority for the following acts or concerns which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements.
• Did not have a security clearance.

13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability. (Annex 36)

PART 4 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS:

1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from a psychological perspective. He determined that there was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)

3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.

a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission requirements with little to no guidance from the 800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined, proficient, and appeared to understand their basic tasks.

b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers were proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.

c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing perimeter security and force protection at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve discipline throughout the FOB.

4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed and believe should be favorably noted include:

a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro, US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu Ghraib.

b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to military law enforcement.

c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported the incident to the chain of command.

CONCLUSION

1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies, and command directives in preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February 2004.

2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments are essential to establish the conditions with the resources and personnel required to prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.

Annexes

1. Psychological Assessment

2. Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM

3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation

4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba

5.15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003

6.15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003

7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003

8.15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003

9.15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004

10.15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004

11. SIR 5 November 2003

12. SIR 7 November 2003

13. SIR 8 November 2003

14. SIR 13 December 2003

15. SIR 13 December 2003

16. SIR 13 December 2003

17. SIR 17 December 2003

18. Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004

19. MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003

20. MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003

21. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001

23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949

25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004

26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004

27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004

28. 205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated

29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding witnesses

30. Investigation Team's witness list

31. FRAGO #1108

32. Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated

33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

34. CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June 2003

35. Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003

36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984

37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion

38. 310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP

39. 320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"

40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC) Slides, Undated

41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004

42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001

43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand

44. 800th MP Battalion’s TACSOP

45. BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice

48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade

49. LTC James O’Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade

50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical exploitation)

51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion

53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade

54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade

58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion

65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion

68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company

70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company

72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade

73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion

74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company

75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion

77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade

78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion

79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company

80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion

81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company

82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion

83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company

84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler

88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler

89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler

90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade

92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated

94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders

96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004

97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004

98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004

99. SIR 14 January 2004

100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004

101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion

102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski, 17 January 2004

103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion

104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003

105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company

106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company

PART 5 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Undated Psychological Assessment of Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib by Col. Henry Nelson, USAF Psychiatrist

AR 15-6 Investigation - Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

Certain factors can interact and contribute to horrific outcomes, such as the Iraqi detainee abuse at the end of 2003 at Abu Ghraib (also known as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility [BCCF]). This is clearly an example of aberrant behavior.

First, Soldiers were immersed in the Islamic culture, a culture that many were encountering for a first time. Clearly there are major differences in worship and beliefs, and there is the association of Muslims with terrorism. All these causes exaggerate differences and create misperceptions that can lead to fear or devaluation of a people. Second, quality of life at Abu Ghraib was poor, and lacking most amenities present in other camps in Iraq. The population at BCCF was disparate, consisting of hardened Iraqi criminals watched by corrupt Iraqi prison guards, as well as the varying types of detainees: males, females, juveniles, criminals, terrorists, and mentally ill. BCCF is a closed environment, an environment that would wear on its occupants (MPs, MI personnel, and detainees) over a prolonged period of time. Third, all present at Abu Ghraib were truly in personal danger. Daily mortar attacks from without and sporadic prisoner riots from within led to several deaths and numerous injuries of both Soldiers and detainees alike.

Fourth, command factors were a key player at the BCCF. There was not only a lack of interaction but also friction between the MP and MI command elements. A lack of proper training and supervision was present. There was a failure to respond to recommendations of corrective actions contained in several AARs, 15-6s, and even the recommendations highlighted in MGs Miller and Ryder assessment reports. Leaders were unwilling to accept responsibility. Discipline, when taken, was lenient, leading to the realization that the BDE or BN chains of command would essentially do nothing, thus contributing to a mentality that "I can get away with this."

Specifically, there were several commanders and NCOs who were ineffective leaders. Take, for instance, BG Karpinski, Cdr 800th MP BDE. On the bases of her four-hour interview and our examination of the interviews and sworn statements of others, we concluded that she was unable to delegate taskings and did many taskings on her own. Though with good intentions, she lessened or dismissed punishments recommended by her staff. She was painfully aware of several problems in the 800th MP BDE, including personnel, logistics, administration, and supplies, but she was not capable of demanding solutions from her chain of command. She felt herself a victim, and she propagated a negativity that permeated throughout the BDE.

Given this atmosphere of danger, promiscuity, and negativity, the worst human qualities and behaviors came to the fore and a perversive dominance came to prevail, especially at Abu Ghraib. Inadequate and immoral men and women desiring dominance may be drawn to fields such as corrections and interrogation, where they can be in absolute control over others. CPL Grainer had a civilian prison job. SSG Frederick was also in corrections. Through our investigation, we identified them as ringleaders of the abuse; but note carefully that they collaborated with other MP Soldiers and several unknown MI personnel, to include Soldiers as well as their U.S. civilian contract interrogators and interpreters. Witnesses report pairs of civilian interrogators and interpreters carrying out detainee abuse, as well as an interpreter raping a male juvenile detainee. In fact, the MI unit seemed to be operating in a conspiracy of silence. Still, it is important to remember that dominance in and of itself is not improper. In fact, interrogators knowingly dominate their subjects, and sometimes even intimidate, in order to obtain intelligence. But clearly the behavior at BCCF crossed the line. The sadistic and psychopathic behavior was appalling and shocking.

In CPI Grainer and SSG Frederick's area of responsibility at tier IA/lB of the Hard Site, it was commonplace for detainees to be abused. MP dog handlers cooperated with MI interrogators under the MPs' watch to use dogs to frighten, intimidate, and even bite detainees. ILT Raeder, a platoon leader and acting company commander of 372nd MP Company, was openly hostile and allowed his guards to carry illegal weapons. MP dog handler SGT Smith was disrespectful and racist (he said, "After working at the prison for so long, the dogs came not to like Iraqi detainees. They didn't like the Iraqi culture, smell, sound, skin tone, hair color, or anything about them."). Detainee abuse was common knowledge among the enlisted Soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Abuse with sexual themes (see below) occurred and was witnessed, condoned, and photographed, but never reported. Even officers witnessed abuse on several occasions or had knowledge of abuse at the BCCF.

As mentioned earlier, everyday life was extremely stressful. And several MP and MT Soldiers were especially indifferent and vindictive against detainees involved in any violence toward Coalition Forces or who exhibited deviant behavior. On 23 August 03, an MI Soldier kicked and beat a passive, cuffed detainee who was suspected of mortaring BCCF; this incident was witnessed by officers and NCOs alike. On 28-29 October 03, CPI. Grainer and SSG Frederick received three detainees involved in rape of a male juvenile. MI Soldiers instructed them to "rough them up." CPL Grainer and SSG Frederick shackled the three together, lying on the floor, simulating gay sex. On 8 November 03, MP guards brought seven hooded detainees to the Hard-Site who had rioted in Camp Ganci earlier that day. They were stripped, told to get on their hands and knees, and placed face forward in a pyramid. Other Soldiers stopped by to view. PFC England said, "We would joke around, everyone would laugh at the things we had them do."' On 24 November 03, a detainee shot a MP guard (who was unhurt) with a pistol smuggled in to him by the Iraqi prison guards. He sustained lethal shotgun rounds to his legs. Then later, after returning from the hospital, CPL Grainer beat him severely, including direct blows to his leg wounds.

Clearly some detainees at Abu Ghraib were totally humiliated and degraded. This is a classic example of the legal formula that "predisposition + opportunity = criminal behavior." Predisposition included the psychological factors of negativity, anger, hatred, and desire to dominate and humiliate. And, with an unsupervised workplace in which no threat of appropriate punishment would be forthcoming, there was opportunity. Moreover, competent authority needs to expedite the detainee release process so that detainees without intelligence value will be rapidly released. And we can learn from the program in place at Dover Air Force Base, where the remains of servicemen are received. Psychiatrists or psychologists are always present, and General Officers have the opportunity to observe the entire process of personnel conducting mortuary affairs operations, and how they cope with conditions of their workplace.

Finally, we must be ever ready to prevent the recurrence of such inhumane behavior to the best of our ability. But when such behavior occurs, the guilty must face swift, decisive, and appropriate justice. While justice is being served, an investigation team needs to analyze the organization and needs to deal with it accordingly. It seems incomprehensible that such misdeeds could happen in a facility, even in a prison complex as notorious as Abu Ghraib. But they did.

But BCCF would be a troublesome arena today even for a well trained MP or MI unit conducting detainee and interrogation operations. Compare and contrast the differences between the detention missions of the Soldiers of Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Desert Storm Soldiers dealt with male enemy prisoners in a war that lasted a matter of hours. At war's end, they released and repatriated the prisoners. In OIF-2, the war is ongoing with no end in sight, and the detainees are in fixed and exposed camp facilities. These detainees are male and female, young and old; they may be innocent, may have high intelligence value, or may be terrorists or criminals. No matter who they are, if they are at Abu Ghraib, they are remanded in deplorable, dangerous living conditions, as are the Soldiers. Every day, the Soldiers must deal with extremely frustrated and hostile detainees who are in total limbo concerning their fate and release; the Soldiers must always be on their guard. And, depending if they are MP or MI Soldiers, they are pressured to either prevent escape or obtain intelligence rapidly. Thus, BCCF has both depressive and anxiety-laden elements that would grind down even the most motivated Soldier and lead to anger and possibly loss of control.

This new "psychological battlefield" requires a new support system for today's MP guard and MI specialist. Of course they must receive all prerequisite training and be knowledgeable on international law and information technology. But they should receive respite away from these detention camps periodically. Physicians and chaplains are needed for the body and spirit, but mental health providers are needed for the mind. A psychiatrist or psychologist should be on the lookout for significant anger/depressive/anxiety symptoms, and he/she would also provide education and support to prevent Soldiers from any negative conditioning that could impair job performance. Our Soldiers deserve no less.

Assessment by:
COL Henry Nelson
USAF Psychiatrist
Member, AR 15-6 Investigation Team - 800th MP Brigade

PART 6 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

September 2003 Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller’s assessment regarding interrogation and intelligence operations in Iraq

MG Miller's Report

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (U)

1. (S/NF) Introduction -- From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller, US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation (Annex A) to HQ, CJTF-7, Baghdad, to conduct assistance visits to CJTF-7, TF-20, and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to discuss current theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. The team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations, and detention operations. The team used JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines.

2. (S/NF) Executive Summary -- The dynamic operational environment in Iraq requires an equally dynamic intelligence apparatus. To improve velocity and operational effectiveness of counterterrorism interrogation, attention in three major mission areas is needed. The team observed that the Task Force did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. Additionally, the corps commander's information needs required an in-theater analysis capability integrated throughout the interrogation operations structure to allow for better and faster reach-back to other worldwide intelligence databases. Last, the detention operations function must act as an enabler for interrogation.

(S/NF) The command has initiated a system to drive the rapid exploitation of internees to answer CJTF-7, theater, and national level counter terrorism requirements. This is the first stage toward the rapid exploitation of detainees. Receipt of additional resources currently in staffing will produce a dramatic improvement in the speed of delivering actionable intelligence and leveraging the effectiveness of the interrogation efforts. Our assessment is, given the implementation of the attached recommendations, a significant improvement in actionable intelligence will be realized within thirty days.

3. (S/NF) Functions: Integration - Synchronization - Fusion (Point of contact (POC) is MR D1c**************)

a. (U) Integration -- Defined as: to organize HUMINT collection and analytical resources under a coordinating authority that can rapidly task, direct, conduct analysis, and action intelligence gained from interrogations.

(S/NF) Observation -- HUMINT collection and analysis is being performed by several autonomous entities in the theater, resulting in duplication of effort and imperfect information flow.

(SJNF) Recommendation -- Establish a robust coordinating authority to direct and coordinate all HUMINT collection and analysis in Iraq. Supplement this authority with a collection management operation focused to support the needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Theater Commander and CJTF-7 Commanders' intelligence and targeting objectives. Additional resources arc required for the CJTF-7 CJ2X to sustain this effort.

(S/NF) Observation -- HUMINT collection priorities were not clearly defined, leading to ambiguous collection efforts. There are a large number of collection priorities that require a clear prioritization as to which requirements support the commander's critical information requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- CJTF-7 CJ2X has established a clear method of prioritization for collection requirements. Requirements are now being combined into areas of focus to drive interrogation tasking and operations.

b. (U) Synchronization -- Defined as: to establish a defined process and procedure to integrate the prioritization and tasking of all interrogation assets. (POC is MR J***************)

(SINF) Observation -- No written guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities was disseminated to units.

(SINF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- CJTF-7 is drafting approval documents containing the authorities, policies and practices to outline requirements to process, interrogate, and exploit security internees.

(S/NF) Observation -- DoD assets and other autonomous entities are active in the theater collecting information and conducting analysis under independent chains of command. Information sharing is not fully integrated. The various organizations are generally unaware of each other's capabilities, interests, and mutual information needs. They also lack protocols for coordinating access to internees, and for sharing the information collected and analysis performed.

(SINF) Recommendation -- CJTF-7 is establishing a HUMINT Collection and Targeting meeting that provides a weekly forum for system information sharing, internee access, and tasking protocols to fully leverage the participation of all entities active in the theater (to include Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Criminal Investigative Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Iraqi Survey Group) to support the CJTF-7 commander's intelligence and targeting objectives.

C. (U) Fusion -- Fusion is defined as assuring that all required resources and actions to support internee operations are properly integrated, supervised, executed and assessed to support the commander's intent. (POC is ***************)

(SINF) Observation -- The resiliency and global reach of GWOT targets requires much closer cooperation between the strategic analytical community and the collectors and analysts in the field. Military intelligence analysts at the CJTF-7 ACE, CJ2X, and in the field are closely focused on the tactical mission and are generally unaware of the assets and capabilities of the broader national intelligence community and the existence of dedicated CT analytical centers, such as DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) and the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Expedite the exchange of Counterterrorism information and analysis between collectors in the field and the national intelligence community by integrating the Interrogator Tiger Teams with analysts at the CJTF-7 CJ2X and national intelligence community through JITF-CT. Energize the analysis-collection feedback loop of the intelligence cycle with robust, timely, GWOT oriented, collection management planning and execution.

4. (U) Interrogation -- Setting the conditions to exploit internees to respond to questions that answer theater commanders' critical questions. (POC is ***************)

(S/NF) Summary -- Tactical interrogation operations differ greatly from strategic interrogation operations. The interrogators within CJTF-7 have been accomplishing the tactical mission, at a high rate of professionalism and effectiveness since the beginning of the war. As the CJTF transitions to a new phase of operations, the category of internees to interrogate and analytical backstopping required necessitates transition to strategic interrogation operations. The interrogation mission is hindered by an absence of analytical resources and reach-back data systems. The detention operation does not yet set conditions for successful interrogations. Interrogations are conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate detention operations, interrogation operations and collection management under one command authority.

(S/NF) Observation -- There is minimal analytical support to the interrogation mission. Interrogators continue to use tactical interrogation methods in a transitioning strategic environment.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Establish and train Interrogation Tiger Teams comprised of one interrogator and one analyst, both with SCI access. CJTF-7 has established an initial cadre of integrated Interrogation Tiger Teams from current assets and scheduled deploying interrogators and analysts to attend strategic interrogator and analyst training at Tiger Team University, USAICS, and Fort Huachuca in October 03.

(S/NF) Observation -- CJFT-7s two interrogation facilities operate with their own independent collection focus without an integrated coordinating element. Coordination between facilities is conducted informally and inconsistently.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Consolidate the interrogation mission at one Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)/strategic interrogation facility under ClTF-7 command. This action has been initiated.

(S/NF) Observation -- Detention operations do not enable the interrogation mission.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the JIDC Commander that sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees. This action is now in progress.

(S/NF) Observation -- The lack of awareness of available analytical databases by interrogators and analysts limits the ability to conduct effective integrated interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Train analysts to incorporate databases including DIMS, CT-link, web-safe, CIA Source, Harmony, and Coliseum in interrogation planning and execution. This training is provided at Tiger Team University and can be leveraged with a sustained theater training program.

(S/NF) Observation - -Analysts at JIDC (Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center) interrogation operations section have limited access to automated intelligence systems that would allow the analyst to reach back to national level resources. The primary collection facilities (Abu Gharib) requires at a minimum 2 JWICS terminal to meet full operational capability.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Provide the necessary systems and bandwidth to enable direct analytical support to interrogation operations. See paragraph 6 (Information Technology).

(S/NF) Observation -- There is no Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) to support interrogation operations. These teams comprised of operational behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists are essential in developing integrated interrogation strategies and assessing interrogation intelligence production.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Provide 1 BSCT to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Observation -- The system procedures to rapidly transfer/return fully exploited internee intelligence sources back to the internee general population or recommend their release require assessment and streamlining.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Assess and refine transfer criteria to support continued rapid exploitation of high value internees and the release of fully exploited or low value internees in a more timely manner.

(S/NF) Observation -- Task Force 20 (TF-20) lacks adequate number of trained interrogator-analyst Tiger Teams for mission requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation: That CJTF-7 provide TF-20 Tiger Team support.

(S/NF) Observation -- The application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. Legal review and recommendations of internee interrogation operations by a dedicated command staff judge advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Dedicate a judge advocate(s) to advise commanders and interrogation leadership on requirements to operate within approved interrogation authorities, responsible for the detention and intelligence missions. This action is in progress.

5. (U) Detention Operations (POC is) ***************

(U) Functions -- Provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence.

(S/NF) Summary -- The importance of the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence is vital for success and must be emphasized in the conduct of detention operations. It is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees. Joint strategic interrogation operations are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The pending establishment of the theater joint interrogation detention center at Abu Gharib will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized and focused strategic interrogation effort.

(S/NF) Observation -- Minimal operational procedures and guidance were available for internee in-processing, collection and integration of intelligence, security procedures, internee discipline standards and procedures for reacting to emergencies situations in the detention facilities.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Develop a comprehensive set of detention physical security SOPs. Conduct training for detention center leadership and staff on the implementation of these procedures. JTF-GTMO SOPs for physical security and detention operations were provided to CJTF-7 staff.

(S/NF) Observation -- Some of the detention facility guard force interviewed were unable to apply their standing orders and Rules of Engagement procedures to hypothetical situations -- . e.g. escaping internees.

(S/NF) Recommendations -- Scenario-based training for the current operational and future theater operational environment is recommended to ensure standing procedures (e.g. Rules of Engagement) are known and their application thoroughly understood by the detention leadership and staff.

(S/NF) Observation -- Detention operations must be structured to ensure detention environment focuses the internee's confidence and attention on their interrogators. The MP detention staff should be an integrated element supporting the interrogation functions and received orientation training to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Assign, train, and sustain interrogator and detention staff team building focused on improving the collection of intelligence. MP detention staff training programs utilized by JTF-GTMO were provided to CJTF-7 for consideration and baseline implementation.

Observation -- Disciplinary procedures for internees are arbitrary or not clearly defined.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- The unit is updating its operating procedures for implementing disciplinary measures related to detainee operations.

(S/NF) Observation -- Males, females and juveniles are detained in the same camp in close proximity to each other. Full utilization of a classification system that is sensitive to group dynamics is not currently in place.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- Procedures to segregate males, females, and juvenile internees in the detention facility to prevent unauthorized contact are being refined.

(S/NF) Observation -- Some detainees who had infectious medical conditions were detained in the general internee population. This mingling of internees could result in possible contamination of other detainees and soldier detention staff. Detainees suffering from apparent mental illness were segregated in a holding pen that was normally used for disciplinary purposes.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Special needs sections of the detention facility should be developed for internees with contagious medical conditions and internees who exhibit mental illness.

6. (U) Information Technology (IT) (POC is ***************)

CU) Functions -- IT focus is streamlined information gathering resulting in rapid intelligence analysis and exploitation.

(S/NF) Observation -- Current information management systems do not support rapid, integrated exploitation of intelligence community databases.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Create a robust automated knowledge center, incorporating information and documents currently located in diverse data stores to allow for sharing of all information on internees. (See Annex B for specific IT comments.)

7. (D) Conclusion -- Actions to improve the Task Force's ability to conduct counterterrorist strategic interrogations were being developed at the time of this report's drafting. Provision of resources is crucial to success. Expeditious fill of two leadership billets -- one as Chief of the HUMINT Operations Center (HOC) and the other as Chief, HUMINT Analysis Center (HAC), CJTF-7, is essential to enable successful joint, integrated interrogation operations. Concurrently, assignment of expert analysts is required to form Tiger Teams and populate the HAC.

GEOFFREY D. MILLER
Major General, U.S. Army

ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS

Team Leader
MG Geoffrey Miller, USA
JTF-GTMO
Commander

Synchronization Team

MR ***************
DIA
Former JTF-GTMO Joint Interrogation Group Dir.

MR ***************
DIAIDHS
Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief

MR ***************
CIA
Former JTF-GTMO CTC Chief

CDR *************** USNR
JITF-CT
Former JTF-GTMO Analysis Chief

LTC *************** USA
JATF SOUTH
Former JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate

CPT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Information Technology Chief

MR ***************
CITF
Former JTF-GTMO Crim. Invest. Task Force Chief

Interrogation Operations Team

LtCal *************** USAF
DIAlDHS
Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief

CW3 *************** USA
470th MI BDE
Former GTMO Saudi Team Chief

CW3 *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Central Asia Team Chief

SSGT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Central Asia Team Analyst

MSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Saudi Team Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Saudi Team Analyst

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Special Projects Interrogator

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Special Projects Analyst

Detention Operations Team

CSM *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Camp Delta Superintendent

CPT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Camp Delta Company Commander

ANNEX B: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS

The goal of a theater-wide intelligence information technology initiative is fused intelligence which will allow for a faster interrogation cycle, faster exchange of information, minimize manual processes, eliminate redundancy, manpower savings, rapid data mining, focused interrogation plan, and an automated collection plan.

ISSUES

There isn't sufficient bandwidth or connectivity available to support current interrogation operations and consolidated internee database for near-real time information sharing

• Some locations have SIPR connectivity but it is slow and unreliable. Some locations do not have enough SIPR drops to support the mission and personnel.

There are diverse data stores to include MS Excel spreadsheets, MS Access databases. MS Word documents that are not shared by the various internee camps

• There isn't a theater level network that reaches out to all the units for the purpose of sharing folder, files, and documents, with the exception of email. Email is not an effective way of sharing information for the purpose of conducting data mining and intelligence exploitation.

There are no standardized information gathering and reporting methods that will allow for tracking of information collected from internees from the time of capture and through the intelligence requirements management and interrogation process.

• There isn't a comprehensive collection management and dissemination system in place.

There isn't an effective method to link internees to other internees or associates, organizations, locations, and facilities or to associate documents to internees to allow analysis to quickly search all information pertaining to an internee.

OPTIONS

Implement a theater level network that supports folder, file, and document sharing.

• Ensure bandwidth is adequate to support the network traffic and all the users.
• Ensure that all units have access to the network with adequate number of workstations to support the mission, especially for those units that capture and/or initially process internees and those units that conduct analysis and interrogations.

Develop a database that incorporates the various data stores, from the time of capture and through the intelligence analysis and interrogation process.

• The web-based Joint Detainee Information Management System (JDIMS) developed for and currently utilized by JTF Guantanamo, with some tailoring and modifications, will be adequate to meet this need of a consolidated internee database. The database also contains a collection management and dissemination module that manages all requirements and reporting on internees. It also contains an online reports writing feature, which allows the analysts and interrogators to create reports and immediately share information.
• The Detention Information Management System (DIMS) also developed for and utilized by ITF Guantanamo to capture initial detainee information as well as operational data gathered by the military police, will allow for input of internee information from the time of capture and throughout their stay at the detention facilities when not being interrogated
• A Joint Detainee Information Management System-Iraq will share data with JTF Guantanamo detainee database and make it available to the intelligence community. By sharing detainee information, the intelligence community will benefit from a web-based single source of detainee information readily available to them via the SIPR network.
• A similar system should be implemented in Afghanistan for the detainee operations conducted there.

The goal of a worldwide-integrated detainee database is to address the needs of detainee interrogation operations and to share information regardless of location. It is the tool to bridge intelligence and technology in order to achieve information dominance and efficient operational control over the detainee/internee population and allow for near-real time data mining, information visualization, and intelligence exploitation to combat the Global War on Terrorism.

PART 7 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 12 October 2003
To: Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq
From: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lieutenant General, USA Commanding
Re: Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
BAGHDAD IRAQ
APO AE 09335

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
CJTF7 - CG

12 OCT 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR

C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335

SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

1. (S//NF) This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for security internees under the control of CJTF-7. Security internees are civilians who are detained pursuant to Articles 5 and 78 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War of August 12. 1949 (hereinafter. Geneva Convention).

2. (Sf 1 approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance approaches A as described in Enclosure 1. relating to security internees, subject to the following:

a. (S//NF) Use of these approaches is limited to interrogations of security internees under the control of CJTF-7.

b. (S//NF) These approaches must be used in combination with the safeguards described in Enclosure 2.

c. (S//NF) Segregation of security internees will be required in many instances to ensure the success of interrogations and to prevent the sharing of interrogation methods among internees. Segregation may also be necessary to protect sources from other detainees or otherwise provide for their security. Additionally, the Geneva convention provides that security internees under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of Coalition forces shall, where absolute military necessity requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication. Accordingly, these security internees may be segregated. I must approve segregation in all cases where such segregation will exceed 30 days in duration, whether consecutive nonconsecutive. Submit written requests with supporting rationale to me through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request

d. (S//NF) In employing each of the authorized approaches, the interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation: The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.

3. (S//NF) Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me through CJTF-7 C2, and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA will accompany each request

4. (S//NF) Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenance of good order and discipline among persons under Coalition control

S. (S//NF) This policy supersedes the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy signed on 14 September 2003.

6. (S//NF) POC is MAJ Daniel Kazmier, DNVT 558-0709, DSN 318 822-1050.

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

2 Encls
I. Interrogation Approaches (SI)
2. General Safeguards

CF: Commander, US Central Command

INTERROGATION APPROACHES (Security Internees)

(S//NF) Use of the following approaches is subject to the application of the general safeguards provided in enclosure (2). Specific implementation guidance with respect to approaches A-Q is provided in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52. Brigade Commanders may provide additional implementation guidance.

A. (S//NF) Direct: Asking straightforward questions. The most effective of all approaches, it is the most simple and efficient approach to utilize.

B. (S//NF) Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention. Possible incentives may include favorite food items, changes in environmental quality, or other traditional or regional comforts not required by the Geneva Convention.

C. (S//NF) Emotional Love: flaying on the love a security internee has for an individual or group. May involve an incentive, such as allowing communication with the individual or group.

D. (S//NF) Emotional Hate: Playing on the genuine hatred or desire for revenge a security internee has for an individual or group.

E. (S//NF) Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a security internee.

F. (S//NF) Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a security internee.

G. (S//NF) Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a security internee or calming him by convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated.

H. (S//NF) Pride and Ego Up: Flattering or boosting the ego of a security internee.

I. (S//NF) Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the pride or ego of a security internee.

J. (S//NF) Futility: Invoking the feeling in a security internee that it is useless to resist by playing on the doubts that already exist in his mind.

K. (S//NF) We Know All: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator already knows the answers to questions being asked.

L. (S//NF) Establish Your Identity: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator has mistaken the security internee for someone else. The security internee is encouraged to "clear his name."

M. (S//NF) Repetition: continuously repeating the same question to the security internee during an interrogation to encourage full and candid answers to questions.

N. (S//NF) File and Dossier: Convincing security internee that the interrogator has a voluminous, damning and inaccurate file, which must be corrected by the security internee.

O. (S//NF) Mutt and Jeff: An interrogation team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator. This approach is designed to cause the security internee to have a feeling of hostility toward one interrogator and a feeling of gratitude toward the other.

P. (S//NF) Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing Security internee to answer questions fully.

Q. (S//NF) Silence: Staring at the security internee to encourage discomfort.

GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

(S//NF) Application of these interrogation approaches is subject to the following general safeguards:

(i) limited to use by trained interrogation personnel; (ii) there is a reasonable basis to believe that the security internee possesses information of intelligence value: (iii) the security internee is medically evaluated as a suitable candidate for interrogation (considering all approaches to be used in combination): (iv) interrogators arc specifically trained for the approaches; (v) a specific interrogation plan, including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel has been developed: and (vi) there is appropriate supervision.

(U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a security internee with the least intrusive method, applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory personnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations.

(S//NF) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into account factors such as a security internee's current and past performance in both detention and interrogation; a security internee's emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses; assessment of approaches and individual techniques that may be effective; strengths and weaknesses of interrogators; and factors which may necessitate the augmentation of personnel.

(S//NF) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the security internee's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum: they are conducted in close cooperation with the detaining units. Detention regulations and policies established by detaining units should be harmonized to ensure consistency with the interrogation policies of the intelligence collection unit. Such consistency will help to maximize the credibility of the interrogation team and the effectiveness of the interrogation. Strict adherence to such regulations, policies and standard operating procedures is essential.

(S//NF) Interrogators must appear to completely control the interrogation environment. It is important that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary approaches depending on the security internee's cultural background, strengths, weaknesses, environment, extent of resistance training, as well as the urgency with which information believed in the possession of the security internee must be obtained.

(S//NF) Interrogators must ensure the safety of security internees, and approaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will ensure that security internees are allowed adequate sleep; and that diets provide adequate food and water and cause no adverse medical or cultural effects. Where segregation is necessary, security internees must be monitored for adverse medical or psychological reactions. Should military working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a handler at all times to ensure safety.

(S//NF) While approaches are considered individually within this analysis, it must be understood that in practice, approaches are usually used in combination. The title of a particular approach is not always fully descriptive of a particular approach. The cumulative effect of all approaches to be employed must be considered before any decision is made regarding approval of a particular interrogation plan.