The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:09 am

PART 1 OF 13 (The Taguba Report)

The Taguba Report

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

March 2004

Table of Contents

• References
• Background
• Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations In Iraq (MG Miller’s Assessment)
• IO Comments on MG Miller’s Assessment
• Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq (MG Ryder’s Report)
• IO Comments on MG Ryder’s Report
• Preliminary Investigative Actions
• Findings and Recommendations
• Part One (Detainee Abuse)
o Findings
o Recommendations
• Part Two (Escapes and Accountability)
o Findings
o Recommendations
• Part Three (Command Climate, Etc…)
o Findings
o Recommendations
• Other Findings/Observations
• Conclusion
• Annexes

References

1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967

5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951

6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949

7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

8. DOD Directive 5100.69, “DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other Detainees,” 27 December 1972

9. DOD Directive 5100.77 “DOD Law of War Program,” 10 July 1979

10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994

11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6), 6 December 1994

12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996

14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12 February 1998

17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993

18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993

19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988

20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31 September 2000

21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5 September 2003

22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993

23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988

24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000

26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002

27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002

29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998

30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999

31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001

32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002

34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000

35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May 1994

36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985

38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001

39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984

40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001

41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003

42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Battalion (IR)

43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Guard Company

44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Escort Guard Company

45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002

46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999

47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003

48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003

49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003

50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003

51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003

52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003

53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December 2003

54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations, 13 December 2003

56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002 Edition

BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)

2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)

3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-6 into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:

a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));

b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;

c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;

d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. (ANNEX 4)

4. (U) LTG Sanchez’s request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities. In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)

5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)

6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG Miller’s team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. MG Miller’s team used JTF-GTMO procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)

7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller’s team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller’s Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that “sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees.” Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller’s team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also stated “it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.” (ANNEX 20)

3. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)

4. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also observed that the application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller’s team that the “guard force” be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that military police “do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.” The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)

REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS IN IRAQ (MG RYDER’S REPORT)

1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested by the Commander CJTF-7:

a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management

b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and accountability

c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system

d. (U) Integration of military detention and corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run corrections system

e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management

f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation standards

g. (U) Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees

h. (U) Detainee legal processing

i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including integration with law enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder’s team are beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is added in certain areas):

A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement, segregation, and accountability)

1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.) Though, there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities, though segregated in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific training during their mobilization period. Corrections training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and redeployed in January 2004. The 724thMP Battalion redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component units do not have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a five-year period. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its task organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and 24)

5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, require military police to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)

6. MG Ryder’s Report also made the following, inter alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of detainees:

a. (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD Policy. The process of screening security internees should include intelligence findings, interrogation results, and current threat assessment.

b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.

c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations, except the MEK security mission, under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2.

d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement operations in support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER’S REPORT

1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder’s Team was to observe detention and prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7 operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from US military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team are thorough and precise and should be implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during MG Ryder’s Team’s assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG Ryder’s Team in one critical aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with setting “favorable conditions” for subsequent interviews. These actions, as will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder’s Report and MG Miller’s Report, my investigation team immediately began an in-depth review of all available documents regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements from military police and military intelligence personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions involving that command for the past several months. (All ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)

2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two individuals who are experts in military police detention practices and training. These were LTC Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)

3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder’s and MG Miller’s Reports, the team reviewed numerous reference materials including the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205thMI Brigade’s Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and 94)

4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February 2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training sessions on approved detention practices. We continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the applicable reference materials within each team member’s area of expertise, and practiced investigative techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to arrange witness attendance, force protection measures, and general logistics for the team’s move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)

5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command, I directed that several critical witnesses who were preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on 3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART ONE)

(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)

2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)

REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)

2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)

3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372ndMP Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion and the 372ndMP Company were located within the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)

4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)

5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320thMilitary Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)

6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:

a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;

b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;

c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;

d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;

e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear;

f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;

h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

i. (S) Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a female Soldier pose for a picture;

k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;

l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.

7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company – Suspect

c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect

e. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade -- Suspect

f. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company

g. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion

h. (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI Battalion

i. (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade

j. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP Company

k. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company

l. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical Detachment

m. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company

8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;

b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;

c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;

e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;

g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick.

h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.

9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:

a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365

b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077

c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446

d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108

e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307

f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542

g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422

h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425

i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529

j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787

k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427

l. (U) Ameen Sa’eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362

m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)

10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder’s Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency’s (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to “set the conditions” for MI interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).

11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):

a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn statement regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, “that her job was to keep detainees awake.” She stated that MI was talking to CPL Grainer. She stated: “MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Grainer and Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”

b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement as follows: “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules and different SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic).” When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military Intelligence (MI) holds.” When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “ Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: “Loosen this guy up for us.” Make sure he has a bad night.” “Make sure he gets the treatment.” He claimed these comments were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has been handling the MI holds. Example being statements like, “Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff like that.”

c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked if he were present when any detainees were abused. He stated: “I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes.” He could not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but commented that, “if they wanted me to do that they needed to give me paperwork.” He was later informed that “we could not do anything to embarrass the prisoners.”

d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract translator was questioned about several detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): “They (detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what they did. They made them do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet, called them all kinds of names such as “gays” do they like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their hands together and their legs with shackles and started to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt.”

e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, a medic testified that: “Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down.”

12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)

13.(U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)

14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter experts in internment/resettlement operations, international and operational law, information technology, facility management, interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.

2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided with training by an international/operational law attorney on the specific provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.

3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee operations.

4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and notice of protections be made available in both English and the detainees’ language and be prominently displayed in all detention facilities. Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.

5. (U) That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.

6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Assessment Report, and my findings and recommendations in this investigation, all units in the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting internment/confinement/detainment operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.

7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by COMCJTF-7).

8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of detainee operations.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:13 am

PART 2 OF 13 (The Taguba Report cont'd.)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART TWO)

(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:

REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)

2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex during the time period covered in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)

3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)

4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)

5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)

6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care, and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)

7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)

8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES 45-91).

9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)

10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a “Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP” and a “Training Outline” for transferring and releasing detainees, which appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)

11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is underutilized and often does not give a “real time” accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating. (ANNEX 56)

12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created “change sheet” to document the transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For proper accountability, it is imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)

13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)

14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)

15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)

16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal terms such as “band checks,” “roll-ups,” and “call-ups,” which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)

17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command. (Annex 37)

18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites. (Annexes 44, 67, 71, and 85)

19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance. (Annexex 76 and 82)

20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience. (Annex 21)

21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)

22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape that were probably “written off” as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)

23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)

24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing “Crimes Against the Coalition,” who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the “Detainee Release Authority” for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board’s recommendations to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)

25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)

26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)

28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR, even after several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak’s Statement)

30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc…), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this training. (Annexes 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)

33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees “ghost detainees.” On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law. (Annex 53)

34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from these reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:

a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional information was provided as requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)

b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)

c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that location. It is of particular note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the detainees’ native languages. (ANNEX 6)

d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)

e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)

f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)

g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)

h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed “Golden Spike,” the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)

j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)

k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)

m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 17)

n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)

o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)

q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10-15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)

36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities and were not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (Annexes 5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:

(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed and referenced series of recommendations for improving the detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of operations. (U) Accountability practices throughout any particular detention facility must be standardized and in accordance with applicable regulations and international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred from one location to another. (U) “Change sheets,” or their doctrinal equivalent must be immediately processed and updated into the system to ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees. (U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this investigation as well as any previous findings, recommendations, and reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and understood at the lowest level.(U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate facilities from any other category of detainee. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their detainees in real time and without waiting for their change sheets to be processed. This would also have the change sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS system can be utilized for this function. (U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances within the detainment facilities must be immediately reported through both the operational and administrative Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is resolved. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and guard mount. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at any given facility. The observations and corrective actions that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented as a matter of policy. (U) There must be significant structural improvements at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting, additional chain link fencing, staking down of all concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) . (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must be prominently displayed in English and the language of the detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention facility IAW AR 190-8. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other contractors’ access throughout the facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an authorized and easily identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from the masses of detainees in civilian clothes. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability. (U) The method for doing head counts of detainees within a given compound must be standardized. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use them to maintain standardized operating procedures and efficient accountability practices.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:14 am

PART 3 OF 13 (The Taguba Report (Cont'd.)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I) personally interviewed the following witnesses:

1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

2. (U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

3. (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon, CFLCC SJA)

4. (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade

5. (U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade

6. (U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)

7. (U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

8. (U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion

9. (U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade

10. (U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

11. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

12. (U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-I, 800th MP Brigade

13. (U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade

14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-I (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

16. (U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

17. (U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

19. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

20. (U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion

21. (U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

22. (U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

23. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

24. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

25. (U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

26. (U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company

27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

28. (U) ILT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company

29. (U) ILT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade

30. (U) ILT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion

31. (U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company

32. (U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 20Sth MI Brigade

33. (U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion

34. (U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP

35. (U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion

36. (U) ISG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company

37. (U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion

38. (U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company

39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion

40. (U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company

41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

43. (U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

44. (U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP Detachment, 16th MP

45. (U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, S23rd MP Detachment, 937th Engi

46. (U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal and Canine Unit

47. (U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract Interrogator, CACI, 20Sth MI

48. (U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade (ANNEXES 45-91)

REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.

(ANNEXES 41 and 45)

2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go home when all the detainees were released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the 800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)

3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. MP units did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific missions. The training that was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)

5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had civilian corrections experience, including many who worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)

6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder’s Team, that the 800th MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21 battalions, and that the average battalion size element should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships. (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander’s Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR “SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION.”

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)

10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)

“TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant commander.”

11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I find that there was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as if they were responsible for the security, health and welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this removal and search for a replacement was communicated to the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing him with another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC (P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations of the Interview Team)

15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the MPs “ideas” that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEX 45)

16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp Bucca in May 2003. She stated that “about the same time those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers, the worst that’s gonna happen is, you’re gonna go home.” I think it important to point out that almost every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late October and early November 2003. The photographs and statements clearly support that the abuses occurred during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence that the decision of numerous MP personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)

17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff’s effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)

18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced standards:

a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)

1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

• Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.

2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally
• Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, 17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty

3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.
• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.

5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade

• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.

6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company

• Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be announced.

7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade

• GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was removed from the CSM list.

9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400th MP Battalion

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th MP Company

• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,

• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol; filed locally.

12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,

• Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG Karpinski; filed locally.

d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as previously existed. (ANNEX 53)

19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq had very little contact during their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular visits to the various detention facilities where her Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum. (Multiple Witness Statements)

20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the difference in culture, the Soldiers’ quality of life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).

21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in detainee operations and proficiency or that serious accountability lapses that occurred over a significant period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with detainees if they existed at all, were not read or understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team )

22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most recent example of a poor leadership climate that “permeates the Brigade.” I totally concur with LTG Sanchez’ opinion regarding the performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
• Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
• Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct.
• Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum.
• Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
• Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
• Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her command.
• Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
• Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
• Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.

2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several months were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
• Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and to task organize to accomplish his mission.

4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to Soldier and not filed.
• Failing to take corrective action and implement recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
• Failing to take appropriate action and report an incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.

6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had “never” been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG Karpinski to “stay out of the towers” at the holding facility.
• Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements contradict this assertion.
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
• Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
• Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
• Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his presence.

11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the locations of his interrogations, the activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of abuses.
• Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by “setting conditions” which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.

12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file and have his security clearance reviewed by competent authority for the following acts or concerns which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

• Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements.
• Did not have a security clearance.

13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability. (Annex 36)
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:25 am

PART 4 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS:

1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from a psychological perspective. He determined that there was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)

3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.

a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission requirements with little to no guidance from the 800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined, proficient, and appeared to understand their basic tasks.

b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers were proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.

c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing perimeter security and force protection at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve discipline throughout the FOB.

4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed and believe should be favorably noted include:

a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro, US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu Ghraib.

b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to military law enforcement.

c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported the incident to the chain of command.

CONCLUSION

1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies, and command directives in preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February 2004.

2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments are essential to establish the conditions with the resources and personnel required to prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.

Annexes

1. Psychological Assessment

2. Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM

3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation

4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba

5.15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003

6.15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003

7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003

8.15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003

9.15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004

10.15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004

11. SIR 5 November 2003

12. SIR 7 November 2003

13. SIR 8 November 2003

14. SIR 13 December 2003

15. SIR 13 December 2003

16. SIR 13 December 2003

17. SIR 17 December 2003

18. Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004

19. MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003

20. MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003

21. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001

23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949

25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004

26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004

27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004

28. 205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated

29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding witnesses

30. Investigation Team's witness list

31. FRAGO #1108

32. Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated

33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

34. CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June 2003

35. Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003

36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984

37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion

38. 310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP

39. 320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"

40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC) Slides, Undated

41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004

42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001

43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand

44. 800th MP Battalion’s TACSOP

45. BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice

48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade

49. LTC James O’Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade

50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical exploitation)

51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion

53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade

54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade

58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion

65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion

68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company

70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company

72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade

73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion

74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company

75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion

77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade

78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion

79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company

80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion

81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company

82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion

83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company

84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler

88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler

89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler

90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade

92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated

94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders

96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004

97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004

98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004

99. SIR 14 January 2004

100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004

101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion

102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski, 17 January 2004

103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion

104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003

105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company

106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:27 am

PART 5 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Undated Psychological Assessment of Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib by Col. Henry Nelson, USAF Psychiatrist

AR 15-6 Investigation - Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

Certain factors can interact and contribute to horrific outcomes, such as the Iraqi detainee abuse at the end of 2003 at Abu Ghraib (also known as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility [BCCF]). This is clearly an example of aberrant behavior.

First, Soldiers were immersed in the Islamic culture, a culture that many were encountering for a first time. Clearly there are major differences in worship and beliefs, and there is the association of Muslims with terrorism. All these causes exaggerate differences and create misperceptions that can lead to fear or devaluation of a people. Second, quality of life at Abu Ghraib was poor, and lacking most amenities present in other camps in Iraq. The population at BCCF was disparate, consisting of hardened Iraqi criminals watched by corrupt Iraqi prison guards, as well as the varying types of detainees: males, females, juveniles, criminals, terrorists, and mentally ill. BCCF is a closed environment, an environment that would wear on its occupants (MPs, MI personnel, and detainees) over a prolonged period of time. Third, all present at Abu Ghraib were truly in personal danger. Daily mortar attacks from without and sporadic prisoner riots from within led to several deaths and numerous injuries of both Soldiers and detainees alike.

Fourth, command factors were a key player at the BCCF. There was not only a lack of interaction but also friction between the MP and MI command elements. A lack of proper training and supervision was present. There was a failure to respond to recommendations of corrective actions contained in several AARs, 15-6s, and even the recommendations highlighted in MGs Miller and Ryder assessment reports. Leaders were unwilling to accept responsibility. Discipline, when taken, was lenient, leading to the realization that the BDE or BN chains of command would essentially do nothing, thus contributing to a mentality that "I can get away with this."

Specifically, there were several commanders and NCOs who were ineffective leaders. Take, for instance, BG Karpinski, Cdr 800th MP BDE. On the bases of her four-hour interview and our examination of the interviews and sworn statements of others, we concluded that she was unable to delegate taskings and did many taskings on her own. Though with good intentions, she lessened or dismissed punishments recommended by her staff. She was painfully aware of several problems in the 800th MP BDE, including personnel, logistics, administration, and supplies, but she was not capable of demanding solutions from her chain of command. She felt herself a victim, and she propagated a negativity that permeated throughout the BDE.

Given this atmosphere of danger, promiscuity, and negativity, the worst human qualities and behaviors came to the fore and a perversive dominance came to prevail, especially at Abu Ghraib. Inadequate and immoral men and women desiring dominance may be drawn to fields such as corrections and interrogation, where they can be in absolute control over others. CPL Grainer had a civilian prison job. SSG Frederick was also in corrections. Through our investigation, we identified them as ringleaders of the abuse; but note carefully that they collaborated with other MP Soldiers and several unknown MI personnel, to include Soldiers as well as their U.S. civilian contract interrogators and interpreters. Witnesses report pairs of civilian interrogators and interpreters carrying out detainee abuse, as well as an interpreter raping a male juvenile detainee. In fact, the MI unit seemed to be operating in a conspiracy of silence. Still, it is important to remember that dominance in and of itself is not improper. In fact, interrogators knowingly dominate their subjects, and sometimes even intimidate, in order to obtain intelligence. But clearly the behavior at BCCF crossed the line. The sadistic and psychopathic behavior was appalling and shocking.

In CPI Grainer and SSG Frederick's area of responsibility at tier IA/lB of the Hard Site, it was commonplace for detainees to be abused. MP dog handlers cooperated with MI interrogators under the MPs' watch to use dogs to frighten, intimidate, and even bite detainees. ILT Raeder, a platoon leader and acting company commander of 372nd MP Company, was openly hostile and allowed his guards to carry illegal weapons. MP dog handler SGT Smith was disrespectful and racist (he said, "After working at the prison for so long, the dogs came not to like Iraqi detainees. They didn't like the Iraqi culture, smell, sound, skin tone, hair color, or anything about them."). Detainee abuse was common knowledge among the enlisted Soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Abuse with sexual themes (see below) occurred and was witnessed, condoned, and photographed, but never reported. Even officers witnessed abuse on several occasions or had knowledge of abuse at the BCCF.

As mentioned earlier, everyday life was extremely stressful. And several MP and MT Soldiers were especially indifferent and vindictive against detainees involved in any violence toward Coalition Forces or who exhibited deviant behavior. On 23 August 03, an MI Soldier kicked and beat a passive, cuffed detainee who was suspected of mortaring BCCF; this incident was witnessed by officers and NCOs alike. On 28-29 October 03, CPI. Grainer and SSG Frederick received three detainees involved in rape of a male juvenile. MI Soldiers instructed them to "rough them up." CPL Grainer and SSG Frederick shackled the three together, lying on the floor, simulating gay sex. On 8 November 03, MP guards brought seven hooded detainees to the Hard-Site who had rioted in Camp Ganci earlier that day. They were stripped, told to get on their hands and knees, and placed face forward in a pyramid. Other Soldiers stopped by to view. PFC England said, "We would joke around, everyone would laugh at the things we had them do."' On 24 November 03, a detainee shot a MP guard (who was unhurt) with a pistol smuggled in to him by the Iraqi prison guards. He sustained lethal shotgun rounds to his legs. Then later, after returning from the hospital, CPL Grainer beat him severely, including direct blows to his leg wounds.

Clearly some detainees at Abu Ghraib were totally humiliated and degraded. This is a classic example of the legal formula that "predisposition + opportunity = criminal behavior." Predisposition included the psychological factors of negativity, anger, hatred, and desire to dominate and humiliate. And, with an unsupervised workplace in which no threat of appropriate punishment would be forthcoming, there was opportunity. Moreover, competent authority needs to expedite the detainee release process so that detainees without intelligence value will be rapidly released. And we can learn from the program in place at Dover Air Force Base, where the remains of servicemen are received. Psychiatrists or psychologists are always present, and General Officers have the opportunity to observe the entire process of personnel conducting mortuary affairs operations, and how they cope with conditions of their workplace.

Finally, we must be ever ready to prevent the recurrence of such inhumane behavior to the best of our ability. But when such behavior occurs, the guilty must face swift, decisive, and appropriate justice. While justice is being served, an investigation team needs to analyze the organization and needs to deal with it accordingly. It seems incomprehensible that such misdeeds could happen in a facility, even in a prison complex as notorious as Abu Ghraib. But they did.

But BCCF would be a troublesome arena today even for a well trained MP or MI unit conducting detainee and interrogation operations. Compare and contrast the differences between the detention missions of the Soldiers of Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Desert Storm Soldiers dealt with male enemy prisoners in a war that lasted a matter of hours. At war's end, they released and repatriated the prisoners. In OIF-2, the war is ongoing with no end in sight, and the detainees are in fixed and exposed camp facilities. These detainees are male and female, young and old; they may be innocent, may have high intelligence value, or may be terrorists or criminals. No matter who they are, if they are at Abu Ghraib, they are remanded in deplorable, dangerous living conditions, as are the Soldiers. Every day, the Soldiers must deal with extremely frustrated and hostile detainees who are in total limbo concerning their fate and release; the Soldiers must always be on their guard. And, depending if they are MP or MI Soldiers, they are pressured to either prevent escape or obtain intelligence rapidly. Thus, BCCF has both depressive and anxiety-laden elements that would grind down even the most motivated Soldier and lead to anger and possibly loss of control.

This new "psychological battlefield" requires a new support system for today's MP guard and MI specialist. Of course they must receive all prerequisite training and be knowledgeable on international law and information technology. But they should receive respite away from these detention camps periodically. Physicians and chaplains are needed for the body and spirit, but mental health providers are needed for the mind. A psychiatrist or psychologist should be on the lookout for significant anger/depressive/anxiety symptoms, and he/she would also provide education and support to prevent Soldiers from any negative conditioning that could impair job performance. Our Soldiers deserve no less.

Assessment by:
COL Henry Nelson
USAF Psychiatrist
Member, AR 15-6 Investigation Team - 800th MP Brigade
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:28 am

PART 6 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

September 2003 Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller’s assessment regarding interrogation and intelligence operations in Iraq

MG Miller's Report

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (U)


1. (S/NF) Introduction -- From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller, US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation (Annex A) to HQ, CJTF-7, Baghdad, to conduct assistance visits to CJTF-7, TF-20, and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to discuss current theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. The team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations, and detention operations. The team used JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines.

2. (S/NF) Executive Summary -- The dynamic operational environment in Iraq requires an equally dynamic intelligence apparatus. To improve velocity and operational effectiveness of counterterrorism interrogation, attention in three major mission areas is needed. The team observed that the Task Force did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. Additionally, the corps commander's information needs required an in-theater analysis capability integrated throughout the interrogation operations structure to allow for better and faster reach-back to other worldwide intelligence databases. Last, the detention operations function must act as an enabler for interrogation.

(S/NF) The command has initiated a system to drive the rapid exploitation of internees to answer CJTF-7, theater, and national level counter terrorism requirements. This is the first stage toward the rapid exploitation of detainees. Receipt of additional resources currently in staffing will produce a dramatic improvement in the speed of delivering actionable intelligence and leveraging the effectiveness of the interrogation efforts. Our assessment is, given the implementation of the attached recommendations, a significant improvement in actionable intelligence will be realized within thirty days.

3. (S/NF) Functions: Integration - Synchronization - Fusion (Point of contact (POC) is MR D1c**************)

a. (U) Integration -- Defined as: to organize HUMINT collection and analytical resources under a coordinating authority that can rapidly task, direct, conduct analysis, and action intelligence gained from interrogations.

(S/NF) Observation -- HUMINT collection and analysis is being performed by several autonomous entities in the theater, resulting in duplication of effort and imperfect information flow.

(SJNF) Recommendation -- Establish a robust coordinating authority to direct and coordinate all HUMINT collection and analysis in Iraq. Supplement this authority with a collection management operation focused to support the needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Theater Commander and CJTF-7 Commanders' intelligence and targeting objectives. Additional resources arc required for the CJTF-7 CJ2X to sustain this effort.

(S/NF) Observation -- HUMINT collection priorities were not clearly defined, leading to ambiguous collection efforts. There are a large number of collection priorities that require a clear prioritization as to which requirements support the commander's critical information requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- CJTF-7 CJ2X has established a clear method of prioritization for collection requirements. Requirements are now being combined into areas of focus to drive interrogation tasking and operations.

b. (U) Synchronization -- Defined as: to establish a defined process and procedure to integrate the prioritization and tasking of all interrogation assets. (POC is MR J***************)

(SINF) Observation -- No written guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities was disseminated to units.

(SINF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- CJTF-7 is drafting approval documents containing the authorities, policies and practices to outline requirements to process, interrogate, and exploit security internees.

(S/NF) Observation -- DoD assets and other autonomous entities are active in the theater collecting information and conducting analysis under independent chains of command. Information sharing is not fully integrated. The various organizations are generally unaware of each other's capabilities, interests, and mutual information needs. They also lack protocols for coordinating access to internees, and for sharing the information collected and analysis performed.

(SINF) Recommendation -- CJTF-7 is establishing a HUMINT Collection and Targeting meeting that provides a weekly forum for system information sharing, internee access, and tasking protocols to fully leverage the participation of all entities active in the theater (to include Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Criminal Investigative Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Iraqi Survey Group) to support the CJTF-7 commander's intelligence and targeting objectives.

C. (U) Fusion -- Fusion is defined as assuring that all required resources and actions to support internee operations are properly integrated, supervised, executed and assessed to support the commander's intent. (POC is ***************)

(SINF) Observation -- The resiliency and global reach of GWOT targets requires much closer cooperation between the strategic analytical community and the collectors and analysts in the field. Military intelligence analysts at the CJTF-7 ACE, CJ2X, and in the field are closely focused on the tactical mission and are generally unaware of the assets and capabilities of the broader national intelligence community and the existence of dedicated CT analytical centers, such as DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) and the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Expedite the exchange of Counterterrorism information and analysis between collectors in the field and the national intelligence community by integrating the Interrogator Tiger Teams with analysts at the CJTF-7 CJ2X and national intelligence community through JITF-CT. Energize the analysis-collection feedback loop of the intelligence cycle with robust, timely, GWOT oriented, collection management planning and execution.

4. (U) Interrogation -- Setting the conditions to exploit internees to respond to questions that answer theater commanders' critical questions. (POC is ***************)

(S/NF) Summary -- Tactical interrogation operations differ greatly from strategic interrogation operations. The interrogators within CJTF-7 have been accomplishing the tactical mission, at a high rate of professionalism and effectiveness since the beginning of the war. As the CJTF transitions to a new phase of operations, the category of internees to interrogate and analytical backstopping required necessitates transition to strategic interrogation operations. The interrogation mission is hindered by an absence of analytical resources and reach-back data systems. The detention operation does not yet set conditions for successful interrogations. Interrogations are conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate detention operations, interrogation operations and collection management under one command authority.

(S/NF) Observation -- There is minimal analytical support to the interrogation mission. Interrogators continue to use tactical interrogation methods in a transitioning strategic environment.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Establish and train Interrogation Tiger Teams comprised of one interrogator and one analyst, both with SCI access. CJTF-7 has established an initial cadre of integrated Interrogation Tiger Teams from current assets and scheduled deploying interrogators and analysts to attend strategic interrogator and analyst training at Tiger Team University, USAICS, and Fort Huachuca in October 03.

(S/NF) Observation -- CJFT-7s two interrogation facilities operate with their own independent collection focus without an integrated coordinating element. Coordination between facilities is conducted informally and inconsistently.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Consolidate the interrogation mission at one Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)/strategic interrogation facility under ClTF-7 command. This action has been initiated.

(S/NF) Observation -- Detention operations do not enable the interrogation mission.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the JIDC Commander that sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees. This action is now in progress.

(S/NF) Observation -- The lack of awareness of available analytical databases by interrogators and analysts limits the ability to conduct effective integrated interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Train analysts to incorporate databases including DIMS, CT-link, web-safe, CIA Source, Harmony, and Coliseum in interrogation planning and execution. This training is provided at Tiger Team University and can be leveraged with a sustained theater training program.

(S/NF) Observation - -Analysts at JIDC (Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center) interrogation operations section have limited access to automated intelligence systems that would allow the analyst to reach back to national level resources. The primary collection facilities (Abu Gharib) requires at a minimum 2 JWICS terminal to meet full operational capability.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Provide the necessary systems and bandwidth to enable direct analytical support to interrogation operations. See paragraph 6 (Information Technology).

(S/NF) Observation -- There is no Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) to support interrogation operations. These teams comprised of operational behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists are essential in developing integrated interrogation strategies and assessing interrogation intelligence production.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Provide 1 BSCT to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Observation -- The system procedures to rapidly transfer/return fully exploited internee intelligence sources back to the internee general population or recommend their release require assessment and streamlining.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Assess and refine transfer criteria to support continued rapid exploitation of high value internees and the release of fully exploited or low value internees in a more timely manner.

(S/NF) Observation -- Task Force 20 (TF-20) lacks adequate number of trained interrogator-analyst Tiger Teams for mission requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation: That CJTF-7 provide TF-20 Tiger Team support.

(S/NF) Observation -- The application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. Legal review and recommendations of internee interrogation operations by a dedicated command staff judge advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Dedicate a judge advocate(s) to advise commanders and interrogation leadership on requirements to operate within approved interrogation authorities, responsible for the detention and intelligence missions. This action is in progress.

5. (U) Detention Operations (POC is) ***************

(U) Functions -- Provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence.

(S/NF) Summary -- The importance of the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence is vital for success and must be emphasized in the conduct of detention operations. It is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees. Joint strategic interrogation operations are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The pending establishment of the theater joint interrogation detention center at Abu Gharib will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized and focused strategic interrogation effort.

(S/NF) Observation -- Minimal operational procedures and guidance were available for internee in-processing, collection and integration of intelligence, security procedures, internee discipline standards and procedures for reacting to emergencies situations in the detention facilities.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Develop a comprehensive set of detention physical security SOPs. Conduct training for detention center leadership and staff on the implementation of these procedures. JTF-GTMO SOPs for physical security and detention operations were provided to CJTF-7 staff.

(S/NF) Observation -- Some of the detention facility guard force interviewed were unable to apply their standing orders and Rules of Engagement procedures to hypothetical situations -- . e.g. escaping internees.

(S/NF) Recommendations -- Scenario-based training for the current operational and future theater operational environment is recommended to ensure standing procedures (e.g. Rules of Engagement) are known and their application thoroughly understood by the detention leadership and staff.

(S/NF) Observation -- Detention operations must be structured to ensure detention environment focuses the internee's confidence and attention on their interrogators. The MP detention staff should be an integrated element supporting the interrogation functions and received orientation training to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Assign, train, and sustain interrogator and detention staff team building focused on improving the collection of intelligence. MP detention staff training programs utilized by JTF-GTMO were provided to CJTF-7 for consideration and baseline implementation.

Observation -- Disciplinary procedures for internees are arbitrary or not clearly defined.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- The unit is updating its operating procedures for implementing disciplinary measures related to detainee operations.

(S/NF) Observation -- Males, females and juveniles are detained in the same camp in close proximity to each other. Full utilization of a classification system that is sensitive to group dynamics is not currently in place.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- Procedures to segregate males, females, and juvenile internees in the detention facility to prevent unauthorized contact are being refined.

(S/NF) Observation -- Some detainees who had infectious medical conditions were detained in the general internee population. This mingling of internees could result in possible contamination of other detainees and soldier detention staff. Detainees suffering from apparent mental illness were segregated in a holding pen that was normally used for disciplinary purposes.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Special needs sections of the detention facility should be developed for internees with contagious medical conditions and internees who exhibit mental illness.

6. (U) Information Technology (IT) (POC is ***************)

CU) Functions -- IT focus is streamlined information gathering resulting in rapid intelligence analysis and exploitation.

(S/NF) Observation -- Current information management systems do not support rapid, integrated exploitation of intelligence community databases.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Create a robust automated knowledge center, incorporating information and documents currently located in diverse data stores to allow for sharing of all information on internees. (See Annex B for specific IT comments.)

7. (D) Conclusion -- Actions to improve the Task Force's ability to conduct counterterrorist strategic interrogations were being developed at the time of this report's drafting. Provision of resources is crucial to success. Expeditious fill of two leadership billets -- one as Chief of the HUMINT Operations Center (HOC) and the other as Chief, HUMINT Analysis Center (HAC), CJTF-7, is essential to enable successful joint, integrated interrogation operations. Concurrently, assignment of expert analysts is required to form Tiger Teams and populate the HAC.

GEOFFREY D. MILLER
Major General, U.S. Army

ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS

Team Leader
MG Geoffrey Miller, USA
JTF-GTMO
Commander

Synchronization Team

MR ***************
DIA
Former JTF-GTMO Joint Interrogation Group Dir.

MR ***************
DIAIDHS
Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief

MR ***************
CIA
Former JTF-GTMO CTC Chief

CDR *************** USNR
JITF-CT
Former JTF-GTMO Analysis Chief

LTC *************** USA
JATF SOUTH
Former JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate

CPT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Information Technology Chief

MR ***************
CITF
Former JTF-GTMO Crim. Invest. Task Force Chief

Interrogation Operations Team

LtCal *************** USAF
DIAlDHS
Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief

CW3 *************** USA
470th MI BDE
Former GTMO Saudi Team Chief

CW3 *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Central Asia Team Chief

SSGT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Central Asia Team Analyst

MSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Saudi Team Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Saudi Team Analyst

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Special Projects Interrogator

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Special Projects Analyst

Detention Operations Team

CSM *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Camp Delta Superintendent

CPT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Camp Delta Company Commander

ANNEX B: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS

The goal of a theater-wide intelligence information technology initiative is fused intelligence which will allow for a faster interrogation cycle, faster exchange of information, minimize manual processes, eliminate redundancy, manpower savings, rapid data mining, focused interrogation plan, and an automated collection plan.

ISSUES

There isn't sufficient bandwidth or connectivity available to support current interrogation operations and consolidated internee database for near-real time information sharing

• Some locations have SIPR connectivity but it is slow and unreliable. Some locations do not have enough SIPR drops to support the mission and personnel.

There are diverse data stores to include MS Excel spreadsheets, MS Access databases. MS Word documents that are not shared by the various internee camps

• There isn't a theater level network that reaches out to all the units for the purpose of sharing folder, files, and documents, with the exception of email. Email is not an effective way of sharing information for the purpose of conducting data mining and intelligence exploitation.

There are no standardized information gathering and reporting methods that will allow for tracking of information collected from internees from the time of capture and through the intelligence requirements management and interrogation process.

• There isn't a comprehensive collection management and dissemination system in place.

There isn't an effective method to link internees to other internees or associates, organizations, locations, and facilities or to associate documents to internees to allow analysis to quickly search all information pertaining to an internee.

OPTIONS

Implement a theater level network that supports folder, file, and document sharing.

• Ensure bandwidth is adequate to support the network traffic and all the users.
• Ensure that all units have access to the network with adequate number of workstations to support the mission, especially for those units that capture and/or initially process internees and those units that conduct analysis and interrogations.

Develop a database that incorporates the various data stores, from the time of capture and through the intelligence analysis and interrogation process.

• The web-based Joint Detainee Information Management System (JDIMS) developed for and currently utilized by JTF Guantanamo, with some tailoring and modifications, will be adequate to meet this need of a consolidated internee database. The database also contains a collection management and dissemination module that manages all requirements and reporting on internees. It also contains an online reports writing feature, which allows the analysts and interrogators to create reports and immediately share information.
• The Detention Information Management System (DIMS) also developed for and utilized by ITF Guantanamo to capture initial detainee information as well as operational data gathered by the military police, will allow for input of internee information from the time of capture and throughout their stay at the detention facilities when not being interrogated
• A Joint Detainee Information Management System-Iraq will share data with JTF Guantanamo detainee database and make it available to the intelligence community. By sharing detainee information, the intelligence community will benefit from a web-based single source of detainee information readily available to them via the SIPR network.
• A similar system should be implemented in Afghanistan for the detainee operations conducted there.

The goal of a worldwide-integrated detainee database is to address the needs of detainee interrogation operations and to share information regardless of location. It is the tool to bridge intelligence and technology in order to achieve information dominance and efficient operational control over the detainee/internee population and allow for near-real time data mining, information visualization, and intelligence exploitation to combat the Global War on Terrorism.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:05 am

PART 7 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 12 October 2003
To: Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq
From: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lieutenant General, USA Commanding
Re: Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy


HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
BAGHDAD IRAQ
APO AE 09335

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
CJTF7 - CG

12 OCT 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR

C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335

SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

1. (S//NF) This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for security internees under the control of CJTF-7. Security internees are civilians who are detained pursuant to Articles 5 and 78 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War of August 12. 1949 (hereinafter. Geneva Convention).

2. (Sf 1 approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance approaches A as described in Enclosure 1. relating to security internees, subject to the following:

a. (S//NF) Use of these approaches is limited to interrogations of security internees under the control of CJTF-7.

b. (S//NF) These approaches must be used in combination with the safeguards described in Enclosure 2.

c. (S//NF) Segregation of security internees will be required in many instances to ensure the success of interrogations and to prevent the sharing of interrogation methods among internees. Segregation may also be necessary to protect sources from other detainees or otherwise provide for their security. Additionally, the Geneva convention provides that security internees under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of Coalition forces shall, where absolute military necessity requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication. Accordingly, these security internees may be segregated. I must approve segregation in all cases where such segregation will exceed 30 days in duration, whether consecutive nonconsecutive. Submit written requests with supporting rationale to me through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request

d. (S//NF) In employing each of the authorized approaches, the interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation: The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.

3. (S//NF) Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me through CJTF-7 C2, and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA will accompany each request

4. (S//NF) Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenance of good order and discipline among persons under Coalition control

S. (S//NF) This policy supersedes the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy signed on 14 September 2003.

6. (S//NF) POC is MAJ Daniel Kazmier, DNVT 558-0709, DSN 318 822-1050.

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

2 Encls
I. Interrogation Approaches (SI)
2. General Safeguards

CF: Commander, US Central Command

INTERROGATION APPROACHES (Security Internees)

(S//NF) Use of the following approaches is subject to the application of the general safeguards provided in enclosure (2). Specific implementation guidance with respect to approaches A-Q is provided in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52. Brigade Commanders may provide additional implementation guidance.

A. (S//NF) Direct: Asking straightforward questions. The most effective of all approaches, it is the most simple and efficient approach to utilize.

B. (S//NF) Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention. Possible incentives may include favorite food items, changes in environmental quality, or other traditional or regional comforts not required by the Geneva Convention.

C. (S//NF) Emotional Love: flaying on the love a security internee has for an individual or group. May involve an incentive, such as allowing communication with the individual or group.

D. (S//NF) Emotional Hate: Playing on the genuine hatred or desire for revenge a security internee has for an individual or group.

E. (S//NF) Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a security internee.

F. (S//NF) Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a security internee.

G. (S//NF) Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a security internee or calming him by convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated.

H. (S//NF) Pride and Ego Up: Flattering or boosting the ego of a security internee.

I. (S//NF) Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the pride or ego of a security internee.

J. (S//NF) Futility: Invoking the feeling in a security internee that it is useless to resist by playing on the doubts that already exist in his mind.

K. (S//NF) We Know All: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator already knows the answers to questions being asked.

L. (S//NF) Establish Your Identity: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator has mistaken the security internee for someone else. The security internee is encouraged to "clear his name."

M. (S//NF) Repetition: continuously repeating the same question to the security internee during an interrogation to encourage full and candid answers to questions.

N. (S//NF) File and Dossier: Convincing security internee that the interrogator has a voluminous, damning and inaccurate file, which must be corrected by the security internee.

O. (S//NF) Mutt and Jeff: An interrogation team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator. This approach is designed to cause the security internee to have a feeling of hostility toward one interrogator and a feeling of gratitude toward the other.

P. (S//NF) Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing Security internee to answer questions fully.

Q. (S//NF) Silence: Staring at the security internee to encourage discomfort.

GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

(S//NF) Application of these interrogation approaches is subject to the following general safeguards:

(i) limited to use by trained interrogation personnel; (ii) there is a reasonable basis to believe that the security internee possesses information of intelligence value: (iii) the security internee is medically evaluated as a suitable candidate for interrogation (considering all approaches to be used in combination): (iv) interrogators arc specifically trained for the approaches; (v) a specific interrogation plan, including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel has been developed: and (vi) there is appropriate supervision.

(U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a security internee with the least intrusive method, applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory personnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations.

(S//NF) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into account factors such as a security internee's current and past performance in both detention and interrogation; a security internee's emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses; assessment of approaches and individual techniques that may be effective; strengths and weaknesses of interrogators; and factors which may necessitate the augmentation of personnel.

(S//NF) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the security internee's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum: they are conducted in close cooperation with the detaining units. Detention regulations and policies established by detaining units should be harmonized to ensure consistency with the interrogation policies of the intelligence collection unit. Such consistency will help to maximize the credibility of the interrogation team and the effectiveness of the interrogation. Strict adherence to such regulations, policies and standard operating procedures is essential.

(S//NF) Interrogators must appear to completely control the interrogation environment. It is important that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary approaches depending on the security internee's cultural background, strengths, weaknesses, environment, extent of resistance training, as well as the urgency with which information believed in the possession of the security internee must be obtained.

(S//NF) Interrogators must ensure the safety of security internees, and approaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will ensure that security internees are allowed adequate sleep; and that diets provide adequate food and water and cause no adverse medical or cultural effects. Where segregation is necessary, security internees must be monitored for adverse medical or psychological reactions. Should military working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a handler at all times to ensure safety.

(S//NF) While approaches are considered individually within this analysis, it must be understood that in practice, approaches are usually used in combination. The title of a particular approach is not always fully descriptive of a particular approach. The cumulative effect of all approaches to be employed must be considered before any decision is made regarding approval of a particular interrogation plan.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:08 am

PART 8 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 30 November 2003
To: Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Commander CJTF-7
From: Thomas M. Pappas, Col., MI Commanding
Re: Request for Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy


SECRET/NOFORN

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER
ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ APO AE 09335

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

AETV-MI

30 November 03

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, CJTF-7, ATTN: C2 (AETV-CJ2), BG(P) Fast, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342

Commander, CJTF-7, ATTN: Staff Judge Advocate (AETV-JA), COL Warren, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342

FOR Commander, CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy

1. Request exception to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy to authorize the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JDIC) interrogator to be authorized to use the Fear up Harsh and isolation approaches during interrogations with the following detainee,

a. Name: J [delete] [delete] K [delete]

b. ISN: 151363

c. Date request employment of approach: As soon as possible.

d. Circumstances of capture: Detainee is a Syrian male, [delete] years of age, captured in an attempted IED attack in Baghdad, IZ. Detainee is an admitted foreign fighter who came to commit Jihad against Coalition Forces in Iraq. He was captured with [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] and [delete] [delete] while attempting to set up an IED.

e. Assessment of detainee: Detainee is at the point where he is resigned to the hope that Allah will see him through this episode in his life, therefore he feels no need to speak with interrogators. Detainee will not answer open ended questions, has a smug attitude and is running counter approaches on interrogators. Detainee needs to be put in a position where he will feel that the only option to get out of jail is to speak with interrogators.

f. Potential information: Detainee can provide information related to safe houses, facilitators, financing, recruitment and operations of foreign fighter smuggling into Iraq. Detainee can also potentially provide names and target information of local facilitators in Ar-Ramadi. Detainee can also confirm information provided from others captured with him.

g. Limitations of approach: Detainee will be interrogated in the Camp Vigilant Steel site. Detainee argues that Allah is the only one that can decide his fate. Interrogators will establish control of detainee by allowing detainee to take this stance then implement a Fear up harsh approach. Interrogators will reinforce the fact that we have attempted to help him time and time again and that they are now putting it in Allah's hands. Interrogators will at a maximum throw tables, chairs, invade his personal space and continuously yell at the detainee. Interrogators will not physically touch or harm the detainee, will take all necessary precautions that all thrown objects are clear of the detainee and will not coerce the detainee in any way. If the detainee has not broken yet, interrogators will move into the segregation phase of the approach. Interrogators will coordinate with Military Police guards in the segregation area prior to initiation of this phase. For the segregation phase of the approach the MPs will put an empty sandbag onto the prisoners head before moving him out of Vigilant B. This measure will be for force protection purposes and transporting the detainee to the segregation area by HMMWV. MPs will be transporting the detainee with the interrogators present. During transportation, the Fear up Harsh approach will be continued, highlighting the Allah factor. Interrogators will take all necessary precautions in conjunction with the MPs to ensure detainee's safety during transport. Upon arrival at site, MP guards will take him into custody. MP working dogs will be present and barking during this phase. Detainee will be strip searched by guards with the empty sandbag over his head for the safety of himself, prison guards, interrogators and other prisoners. Interrogators will wait outside the room while detainee is strip searched. Interrogators will watch from a distance while detainee is placed in the segregation cell. Detainee will be put on the adjusted sleep schedule (attached) for 72 hours. Interrogations will be conducted continuously during this 72 hour period. The approaches which will be used during this phase will include, fear up harsh, pride and ego down, silence and loud music. Stress positions will also be used in accordance with CJTF-7 IROE in order to intensify the approach.

2. The approval for this approach is essential due to the information this detainee possesses. It will greatly enhance and expedite the collection effort in support of CJTF-7 Intelligence requirements and could potentially save countless lives of American soldiers in the future.

3. POC for this action is CPT Fitch, 205th MI Bde SJA at DNVT 302-559-4031 or via SIPR at c5cm205misja@205mi.c5.army.smil.mil or CP TWood, JIDC Interrogation OIC, at DNVT 302-559-1764 or via SIPR at Carolyn.wood@us.army.smil.mil.

THOMAS M. PAPPAS
COL, MI
Commanding

Exception to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy is granted/not granted.

AETV-MI
SUBJECT: Request for Exception to CJTF-7lnterrogation and Counter Resistance Policy

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
LTG, USA
Commanding
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:09 am

PART 9 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 19 January 2004
To: Commander, U.S. Central Command
From: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lt. Gen., USA Commanding
Re: Request for Investigating Officer


HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09093

CJTF7-CG

19 January 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command

SUBJECT: Request for Investigating Officer

1. I request that you appoint an investigating officer, in the grade of Major General or above, to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police Brigade. The Brigade is a theater asset, assigned to CFLCC, but TACON to CJTF-7.

2. Specifically, I request an investigation of the detention and internment operations conducted by the brigade from 1 November 2003 to the present. Recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes, and accountability lapses indicate systemic problems within the brigade and suggest a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. Several investigations, including a USACIDC investigation, into various aspects of the Brigade's operations are on-going. The purpose of this request is to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry, conducted by a senior leader from outside of CJTF-7, to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.

3. The CJTF-7 point of contact for this request is COL Marc Warren, DSN 318-836-1122.

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

CF:
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:11 am

PART 10 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

28 January 2004 Army’s Criminal Investigation Division report on allegations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib

DATE: 28 JAN 04

FROM: SAC, ABU GRHUYEB PRISON COMPLEX (CID)

TO: DIRECTOR, USACRC, USACIDC, FORT BELVOIR, VA
CDR, HQUSACIDC // CIOP-ZA //
CDR, 10TH MP BN (CID) (ABN) (FWD) // OPS //
CDR, 3D MP GROUP (CID) // OPS //
SJA, 4ID
LNO CID, CJTF-7 (FOR FURTHER D1STRIBUTION)
CDR, 800TH MP BDE
CDR, 320TH MP BN
CDR, 205TH MI BDE

SUBJECT: CID REPORT - 7TH STATUS/SSI - 0003-04-C:D:
83130-6C/5C2B/5Y2B/5Y2D/5Y2E/5X1/5M3/5X5/5X7

DRAFTER: PIERON, TYLER M.
RELEASER: ARTHUR, PAUL D.

UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SWORN STATEMENTS

File Number: 0013-04-CID609-
Location: Kuwait BO, 3D MP GRP (CID)
Date: 26 Jan 2004
Statement Of: WALLIN, NEIL ALLEN
SSN: [delete]
Org/Address: B CO., 109TH AREA SUPPORT MEDICAL BATTALION (ASMB), VERMILLION, SD 57069

I, NEIL A. WALLIN, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: I was assigned as a medic at the Abu Ghruyeb, Prison, in Baghdad, Iraq from Aug 03 to Dec 03. During that time I observed a couple incidents that occurred in the Hard Cell area of Camp Vigilant, Iraq. Camp Vigilant was one of four areas within the prison and it contained the Hard Cell area where priority prisoners where detained. Also the Hard Cells were used to house any person(s) who were considered to be high risk, either to themselves or others. Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainee's and cell 1B was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainee's. During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainee's were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down. This practiced was not continued after their integration to the prison. Sometime in Oct 03, I was asked to to evaluate a detainee we called "one of the three stooges" or "one of the three wise men". I do not know his real name. This detainee, who was in cell 1A, had a 2 1/2 inch laceration on his chin, which ran along his jaw bone and required about 13 stitches. At the time I evaluated the detainee, I observed blood on the wall near a metal weld, which I believed to be the place where the detainee received his injury. I do not know how he was injured of if it was done by himself or another. Later during my tour I also observed SGT [delete] slap the face of a detainee we called "Jihad Jerry" or "Gus". I believe his name was H [delete]. This detainee, who was in cell 1B, had taken several swings at SGT [delete] and was often times placed in restraints. This detainee was being evaluated because he refused to eat or drink and had to sustained by intravenous means. I do not think that SGT [delete] struck the detainee out of anger but rather to show the detainee that his assaults upon the corrections personal would not be allowed to go unpunished. Also this detainee had made verbal threats on several occasions that he would kill members of the prison staff. There was also another incident where I observed a video tape of a detainee we called "Shitboy". This detainee was known for inserting various objects into his rectum. This detainee was also known for consuming and throwing his feces and urine. The video tape contained a segment where this detainee was seen in four point restraints chained to a door. The detainee was seen banging his head against the wall, about five or six times, very hard.

Q: SA JONES

A: SGT WALLIN

Q: Do you know of any other instances where detainee's have been assaulted, abused or degraded?

A: No.

Q: Have you observed or have heard anything pertaining to the abuse or degradation of any of the detainee's?

A: No.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No. ///End of Statement///

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Irag

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: SMITH, Michael Joseph

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 320 MP__, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE: 27 Jan 04

TIME: 1717

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SGT

I, Michael S. Smith want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. Explain the incident with your dog when SSG ASHTON asked you to be present?

A. We were in one of the tiers at the hard site that was not being used. for controlled aggression training, when SSG ASHTON approached me about using my dog for an interview. It just so happened that I saw COL PAPPAS in the parking lot right after he asked about using my dog for the interview and he had stated that it was allowed. So myself and SGT CARDONA took our dogs over to the interrogation house they have. SSG KLESOWITCH briefed me on how he wanted the dog used. He wanted me to have the dog go and bark by the door, so I told him I would conduct a building search and the dog would sniff the door and sense there was someone there and then the dog would start barking. So at that point I took my dog over to the room where the detainee was and he did sniff under door and started barking. I took my dog out of the area. A little while later they came back to us and asked this time for us to bring both dogs over to the site of the interrogation. They explained the detainee would he sitting the door and the door open. We had both of our dogs at a 45-degree to him and they proceeded to bark. Prior to us bringing the dogs over to the room this time they said that we could not take the dogs into the room without a muzzle. When we got to the room the detainee was sitting in the doorway, with his feet in the doorway and the door was open. My dog and SGT CARDONA's dog were both barking at the detainee and we never got closer then 18 inches. Neither dog had a muzzle on.

Q. Did you ever see a written permission slip that a dog could be used for this interview?

A. No.

Q. Did you know at this time that a written memo was needed to use the dogs?

A. I did not know you needed a memo, COL PAPPAS had not told me anything about a memo when I had talked with him.

Q. Did it appear the detainee was afraid of the dogs?

A. I could not tell, because all of my concentration was on controlling my dog,

Q. Was your dog barking and growling at the detainee?

A. Yes.

Q. Did anyone ever ask you to muzzle your dog?

A. No.

Q. Were there any other events when you used your dog during an interview of a detainee?

A. Yes.

Q. Explain that incident?

A. SGT CARDONA and I were at the hard site doing patrol. SSG FREDERICK asked us if we could come by with the dogs because they SSG FREDERICK wanted to question a detainee about a window. We waited out side while they pulled the detainee outside into the hallway. Someone said OK, bring them in, when went in. I was the first one in, the detainee was lying down flat on the floor and he was nude. As I entered the room the detainee rose to his feet, took a 90-degree turn and went against the wall. I took a 45 degree angle on the inside of the building and SGT CARDONA was at the other 45 angle with an exit, CPL GRANER was directly in front of him, telling him to get down, get down. The man went to his knees for a couple of seconds and then Got up and went at CPL GRANER. The prisoner kicked GRANER one time in the chin. I peeled my dog off and CARDONA peeled his dog off at first. Since the prisoner was attacking an MP, he allowed his dog to go in and bite the detainee. CARDONA then called his dog off the detainee and pulled the dog back. GRANER then told the man again to get down, and the prisoner continues to be combative and went back at GRANER. CARDONA let his dog go again on the detainee and the dog bit the detainee again. CARDONA called the dog off and by that point there.was 5 to 6 MP's who took the prisoner to the floor and cuffed him.

Q. Was the detainee combative when you first walked into the area?

A. Not when he was lying on the ground. Once he saw the dogs he was not combative he was just not listening.

Q. Do you know if the detainee understood English?

A. No.

Q. Did the detainee show any emotion that you can recall?

A. He showed fear.

Q. Was the detainee crying?

A. I do not recall.

Q. Why do you think the detainee charged at GRANER?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Do you recall how many MP's were present when you first got there?

A. No

Q. Were you present when they gave the detainee medical attention?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who stitched up his wounds?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if anyone took any pictures during this event?

A Yes.

Q. Who took the pictures?

A. I do not know. but I have seen the pictures. SGT CARDONA needed the pictures for his documentation.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No.///End of Statement/// MJS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Michael J. Smith HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 27TH DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ

Signature of Person Administering Oath
WARREN D. WORTH

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: STEFANOWICZ, Steven Anthony

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

DATE: 27 Jan 04

TIME: 1204

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: CIV

I, Steven A. STEFANOWICZ, want to make the following Statement under oath:

Incident with hearing unusual sounds coming from the Segregation Hole in isolation wing alpha, around or about 20 DEC 03. After the conclusion of an interrogation that included SGT Mike Eckroth, Steve Stefanowicz and John Israel (terp) in the stairwell of Segragation. The detainee was returned into MP custody of SGT Cathcart and SSG Elloit. After the detainee was received by the two MP's, the interrogation team walked ahead of the MP's and detainee. The detainee was being placed into the Segregation Hole according to the approved interrogation plan and the sound of the detainee falling or possibly being struck was heard. The interrogation team looked back and the MP's were coming out of the facility and closed the door. Both SGT Eckroth and I looked at each other and asked what was the sound as we walked up the steps to the MP office area. Both of us (SGT Eckroth and Steve Stefanowicz) felt very uncomfortable with what we had heard and when the two MP's returned to the MP office area located on the second deck, in between section alpha and bravo, we confronted the MP's. The reaction of SGT Cathcart was that he was agitated with the comment or suggestion. SGT Cathcart did reply to our questioning, but I can't recall the exact words of his statement, other than he was not happy. Explanation of an approved interrogation plan. When an interrogation plan outside the approved Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) is requested by an interrogator, the plan must be reviewed and approved by Col Tom Papus and the Jag Officer. However, in some circumstance, this approval must go up to the office of General Sanchez for direct approval. In response to questions by the investigator and the special treatment of a detainee. The following is a description of the process of an ongoing interrogation. A detainee that I am actively interrogating was placed on an approved Sleep Meal Management Program. This program, has very specific and detailed rules required for implementation. In terms of what I have used recently over a 25 day period of time to interrogate the detainee. In this case, the detainee is provided with 4 hours of sleep per 24 hour period. The configuration of this sleep//wake program can be divided in any configuration and need, to be written out in detail for each day and approved through the appropriate chain of command, OIC, COL Papus and Jag. In this example, the final approving authority was COL Tom Papus. To elaborate on a typical 72 hour program recently used, the sleep/meal management portion cannot continue more that 72 consecutive hours. At which point, a 12 hour uninterrupted sleep session is mandatory before the program can continue. During a typical SMMS program, the MP's are responsible for administering the written program provided by the interrogator. A copy of the detailed, written program that they receive and keep on record in the office, during the duration of the session. In all cases, the NCO managing the alpha wing or responsible for the section are verbally briefed about the program, the details of the program, the detainee and intelligence value of the detainee (background). In addition, the MP's are advised that during the awake time period of an approved SMMS program, the MP's are allowed to do what is necessary to keep the detainee awake in the allotted period of time as long it adheres to approved rules of engagement and proper treatment of the detainee. For example, this current detainee does not like to conform to proper grooming standards. So, I've referred to the MP's to give the detainee his special treatment. This is to include, showering of the detainee (not excessively) daily if necessary, having the detainee brush his teeth and the maintaining of short hair and no facial hair. Hence, the MP's are not directed when and how this is to be administered, but that it can be used to keep the detainee awake when the detainee is more prone to sleep.

Q. Have you ever had an incident where one of your detainees was bruised or complained of being assaulted by any of the guards?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever verbally requested one of the guards to assault one of your detainees?

A. No.

Q Have you seen or heard any other type of suspicious incidents that would indicate abuse of the prisoners besides what you have listed in the above statement?

A. No

Q. Do you know of any types of pictures that show abuse of detainees?

A. No.

Q, Do you have anything else to add to this statement concerning the matters under Investigation'?

A. No.

///////////////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////////////////////

SAS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Steven A. STEFANOWICZ, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 22nd DAY OF JANUARY, 2004 AT ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ, APO

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA NEAL C. GRUHN

SWORN STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301: Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: SPENCER, LUCIANA NMN

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, WURZBURG, GM APO AE 09244 (DEPLOYED TO ABU GHRAIB PRISON)

DATE: 2004/01/21

TIME: 1149

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SPC

I. LUCIANA SPENCER , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

When I began working the night shift I discussed with the MP's what their SOP was for detainee treatment. They informed me that they had no SOP. I informed them of my IROE and made clear to them what I was and wasn't allowed to do or see. I made clear to them that their prison was their prison and they can handle buisness how they see fit, however i follow different rules and i asked them to respect the fact that i have to follow those rules. I am good friends with the MP's that work at this detention facility and they trust me. I also am very specific with those MP's as to what level of knowledge i want to have concerning this detention facility. I didn't see any acts of torture or mistreatment. The MP's did prepare prisoners prior to interrogations by haveing them do physical exercises and yelling at them. The interrogators would verbally discuss, with a MP, a detainee and his cooperativeness and various methods to deal with a detainee such as physical exercise at random hours of the night and yelling. I was aware that some MP's were taking pictures of detainees and had them on their computers. I have seen detainees naked. When a detainee threw his feces, the MP's had him take a cold shower then roll in the dirt outside then stand until he was dry then they showered him in cold water again. When the detainee was naked he was laughed at and yelled at. I have seen an MP slap a detainee. When a detainee was doing physical exercises as punishment then refused to continue after given a rest a MP encouraged him to continue.

Q. What does IROE?

A. Interrogation Rule of Engagement.

Q. What shift did you work on?

A. When I first got here I worked day shift for the first week. After that we moved to night shift.

Q. How much time did you spend in Isolation area during the night shift?

A. It depended on how many detainees we had in the isolation area. On average it would be two hours. Some nights longer depended on the interview.

Q. Where did the interrogations occur?

A. In the showers, stair well, or property room.

Q. Was there any MP's present during the interrogations?

A. No.

Q. Were the detainees clothed or unclothed during the interrogations?

A. During all mine they were.

Q. Is removing the clothing of the detainee a MI interrogation tactic?

A. I used it on one interrogation and my Team Leader did not approve of it. She thought it should have been more specified. Statements were taken and it was brought up to CPT WOODS and LTC JORDAN.

Q. What was the outcome of?

A. I was moved out of the Tiger Team and placed in Operations.

Q. What is a Tiger Team?

A. It is an interrogator and an analysist.

Q. Who were the MP's that worked on the night shift?

A. SSG FREDERICK, SGT GRANER and AMBUHL. These are the ones that I saw mostly working.

Q. Who was the MP that struck the detainee?

A. GRANER.

Q. Who else was present when this occurred?

A. Two other detainees, CPT BRlNSON might have been there, I can not remember who else was there. I am really unsure if CPT BRINSON was even there.

Q. How many times did GRANER strike the detainee?

A. Just once with a open hand.

Q. Who was the detainee?

A. He had a beard and dark hair. I did not know his name or NDRS #.

Q. Did you see GRANER strike, push to the floor, punch, kick or slap any other detainee?

A. No.

Q. Did you see GRANER posing detainees in sexual positions at any time?

A. No.

Q. Did you see GRANER engaged in sexual intercourse with detainees in the isolation area?

A. No.

Q. Did you see GRANER engaged in sexual intercourse with anyone else in the isolation area?

A. No.

Q. Was there anyone in the isolation area that was not authorized?

A. No.

Q. What time did you shift start in the isolation area?

A. It started about 2200 to 0800.

Q. Were pictures taken of the detainees in the isolation area?

A. Yes. I believe so. I never saw anyone, but there were cameras in the area. I know they look pictures of me in the area.

Q. Did you ever see FREDERlCK strike, kick, punch, push to the floor, and/or slap detainees?

A. No.

Q. Were you present at any time when detainees were beaten?

A. Other than the one slap, No.

Q. Did you punch, slap, kick, push to the floor, and/or jump on detainees?

A. No.

Q. Did you see anyone else punch, slap, kick, push to the floor, and/or jump on detainees?

A. Just the slap and then they are transporting detainees.

Q. What was the uniform for your team in the isolation area?

A. We would were DCU's without nametags.

Q. Did you observe pictures of the detainees in sexual positions?

A. I saw a screen saver for a computer that was up in the isolation area. The screen save had detainees naked in a pyramid.

Q. Do you know who took the picture?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whose computer it was?

A. No.

Q. Do you know who the detainees were?

A. No. All you saw was Asses.

Q. Did you see other soldiers who were not MP's in the isolation area after hours?

A. Just other MI soldiers.

Q. Were you involved in any abuse of the detainees?

A. No.

Q. Were you present for any of the abuse against the detainee?

A. Only the slap.

Q Did you report it to anyone?

A. No.

Q. Why did you not report it?

A. I did not think it was abusive.

Q. Do you recall when it occurred?

A. That was after I was working in operations, some time in Dec 03, before CPT BRISNSON left. I know it was on a Sunday as I watched football after I left. I think it was a Carolina game against possibly Green Bay.

Q. Did anyone else show you photos of the detainees in the hard site?

A. No.

Q. Has anyone discussed this case with you other than this office?

A. Yes, I was talking to SSG FREDERICK and he told me there was an investigation into detainee abuse.

Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?

A. No.//END OF STATEMENT///

Initials LS.

STATEMENT OF LUCIANA SPENCER TAKEN AT ABU GHRAIB DATED 21 JAN 04

AFFIDAVIT

I, Luciana Spender, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 21 DAY OF JAN, 2004 AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, ABU GHRAIB

Signature of Person Administering Oath
PAUL D. ARTHUR

SWORN STATEMENT

File Number: 0003-04-CID149-83130
Location: Baghdad Correctional Facility, Baghdad, Iraq
Date: 21 Jan 04
Time: 1520
Statement of: Samuel Jefferson PROVANCE
Grade/Status: E5/RA
SSN: [delete]
Org/Address: A 302nd MI BN

I Samuel Jefferson PROVANCE, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: Around the middle to the end of October I was talking to a female from the Nevada National Guard MP unit that was stationed here. She was very skinny, she was white, but very tanned, she had black and gray hair, and she was old. I don't remember her rank, but she was made the unit armorer during this time. She told me that they were the first unit here, and they were the ones who started setting this place up. She was the oldest female among that unit. She was telling me about writing these journals that talked about all of her experiences here in Iraq and the wrondoings she witnessed (and their cover up). In those journals she said there were killings, torture, you name it she said it. She was referring to all of the things that had been done here. She told me that the commander and the first sergeant hated her because she would voice opposition to them about the treatment of the people. She also told me that she mailed the journals home (to a friend or to herself) before they could be found so that the commander could not take them from her.

In late October SPC SCHLEGEL said that the MP's told her that these two detainees had raped a 14-year-old boy, so the MP's were handcuffing the detainees in contorted positions to each other and making it look like the two detainees were having sex with each other. I SPC SCHLEGEL told me that the detainees may have been naked at the time. She also said that the MP's made the detainees in isolation take their clothes off and wear women's underwear.

Around the end of October I was just discussing with SPC Hannah SCHLEGEL about how there were some bad things going on, as far as the prisoners are getting treated. She said yeah and she told me about a detainee who had gotten his eye busted open. SPC SCHLEGEL said that she asked the MP how his eye got busted, and the MP replied that he fell down.

When I returned from leave in the middle of December I was eating at the chow hall at Camp Victory, when I overheard SPC [delete] and three other people talking about what's going on at Abu Gharib. He was telling them about the things that the MP's were doing to the detainees. He said that he was invited to join in on these things, so he did. The MP's were using the detainees as practice dummies, like they would show each other how to knock someone out by knocking the detainee out. They did this while another detainee would watch, when the other detainee would start to get scared, the MP's would calm him down, and then hit him in some other way. He was also saying that the MP's were telling him how to hit the detainees so that you didn't leave a mark, and telling him what instruments to use so that they didn't leave marks.

I came back from leave in the beginning of December I was talking to SPC [delete] and she was telling me how the guards would bring the dogs down to the cells and use them to scare the detainees. She told me that she thought it was funny because after they would take the dogs away, one MP would bark like a dog, and they would all watch as the detainees would run from him because they thought there was a dog in the room.

When the people from my unit came up here to fill slots and act as guards, they were taken on a tour of the isolation area, when they were down there the MP's would tell them that they could do whatever they wanted to the detainees. I was told that all they ended up doing is yelling at the detainees and make them do PT. SGT BROWN told me that he was worried about his soldiers being exposed to that kind of behavior, and being encouraged to do so. SPC DELGADO, SPC HEIDENRICH, SPC GRIFFIN, SPC PAZDERSKI, SPC CAUDILL, and SPC KERSEY were all present for that. SPC KERSEY and SPC CAUDILL are not on the guard force; they are still doing analysis.

Q: SA Ryan D. BOSTAIN.

A: SGT Samuel C. PROVANCE.

Q: Do you know anybody specifically who was abusing the detainees?

A: Everything I know is what I've heard, all of these things take place down in isolation or in the booth.

Q: Do you know if anybody has taken any unauthorized photographs?

A: I know SPC [delete] had photos of the facility, but not of the detainees. I'm sure they were of sentimental value. Those photos were on the common drive, and I was told by my chain of command to delete the photos, so I did.

Q: Did SPC [delete] ever tell you if she was involved with the abuse of the detainees?

A: Just being there for the dog incident. She seemed really apathetic every time I said anything about it. She thought it was really funny to see the detainees run back into their cells from the dogs.

Q: Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?

A: Every time I said something about how I was worried about the treatment of the detainees, they would either say, thy are the enemy and if I was out there they would kill me, so they didn't care. I'm glad that something is finally being done, it's kind of shameful what's been going on.

Q: Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?

A. No. /// END OF STATEMENT /// SP

AFFIDAVIT

I, Samuel Jefferson PROVANCE, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS JAN 21, 2004 AT BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SPECIAL AGENT RYAN D. BOSTAIN, 6117 323RD MILITARY POLICE DETACMENT (CID) (DSE).

TRANSLATION OF SWORN STATEMENT PROVIDED BY A [DELETE] [DELETE] W [DELETE] Detainee # 151365, 1430/21 JAN 04:

'"I am the person named above. I entered Abu Ghraib prison on 10 Jul 2003, that was after they brought me from Baghdadi area. They put me in the tent area and then they brought me to Hard Site. The first day they put me in a dark room and started hitting me in the head and stomach and legs.

They made me raise my hands and sit on my knees. I was like that for four hours. Then the Interrogator came and he was looking at me while they were beating me. Then I stayed in this room for 5 days, naked with no clothes. They then took me to another cell on the upper floor. On 15 Oct 2003 they replaced the Army with the Iraqi Police and after that time they started punishing me in all sorts of ways. And the first punishment was bringing me to Room #1, and they put handcuffs on my hand and they cuffed me high for 7 or 8 hours. And that caused a rupture to my right hand and I had a cut that was bleeding and had pus coming from it. They kept me this way on 24, 25 and 26 October. And in the following days, they also put a bag over my head, and of course, this whole time I was without clothes and without anything to sleep on. And one day in November, they started different type of punishment, where an American Police came in my room and put the bag over my head and cuffed my hands and he took me out of the room into the hallway. He started beating me, him, and 5 other American Police. I could see their feet, only, from under the bag. A couple of those police they were female because I heard their voices and I saw two of the police that were hitting me before they put the bag over my head. One of them was wearing glasses. I couldn't read his name because he put tape over his name. Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, and they would hold the string from the bag and they made me bark like a dog and they were laughing at me. And that policeman was a tan color, because he hit my head to the wall. When he did that, the bag came off my head and one of the police was telling me to crawl in Arabic, so I crawled on my stomach and the police were spitting on me when I was crawling and hitting me on my hack, my head and my feet. It kept going on until their shift ended at 4 o'clock in the morning. The same thing would happen in the following days.

And I remember also one of the police hit me on my ear, before the usual beating, cuffing, bagging, dog position and crawling until 6 people gathered. And one of them was an Iraqi translator named [delete] he is a tan color, he has a mustache. Then the police started beating me on my kidneys and then they hit me on my right ear and it started bleeding and I lost conciousness. Then the Iraqi translator picked me up and told me "You are going to sleep". The when I went into the room, I woke up again. I was unconscious for about two minutes. The policeman dragged me into the room where he washed my ear and they called the doctor. The Iraqi doctor came and told me he couldn't take me to the clinic, so he fixed me in the hallway. When I woke up, I saw 6 of the American Police.

A few days before they hit me on my ear, the American police, the guy who wears glasses. he put red woman's underwear over my head. And then he tied me to the window that is in the cell with my hands behind my back until I lost consciousness. And also when I was in Room #1 they told me to lay down on my stomach and they were jumping from the bed onto my back and my legs. And the other two were spitting on me and calling me names, and they held my hands and legs. After the guy with the glasses got tired, two of the American soldiers brought me to the ground and tied my hands to the door while laying down on my stomach. One of the police was pissing on me and laughing on me. He then released my hands and I want and washed, and then the soldier came back into the room. and the soldier and his friend told me in a loud voice to lie down, so I did that. And then the policeman was opening my legs, with a bag over my head, and he sat down between my legs on his knees and I was looking at him from under the bag and they wanted to do me because I saw him and be was opening his pants, so I started screaming loudly and the other police starting hitting me with his feet on my neck and he put his feet on my head so I couldn't scream. Then they left and the guy with the glasses comes back with another person and he took me out of the room and they put me inside the dark room again and they started beating me with the broom that was there. And then they put the loudspeaker inside the room and they closed the door and he was yelling in the microphone. Then they broke the glowing finger and spread it on me until I was glowing and they were laughing. They took me to the room and they signaled me to get on to the floor. And one of the police he put a part of his stick that he always carries inside my ass and I felt it going inside me about 2 centimeters, approximately. And I started screaming, and he pulled it out and he washed it with water inside the room. And the two American girls that were there when they were beating me, they were hitting me with a ball made of sponge on my dick. And when I was tied up in my room, one of the girls, with blonde hair, she is white, she was playing with my dick. I saw inside this facility a lot of punishment just like what they did to me and more. And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances."

TRANSLATED BY:

Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib. Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:

Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: NELSON, Torin, Steed

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS:

DATE: 21 Jan 04

TIME: 11:44

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: Contractor

I, Torin S. Nelson want to make the following statement under oath:

As far as some of the things we talked about yesterday. The people I suggest you look at is [delete] J [delete], [delete] D [delete], these two gentlemen, I have looked at their files. I sat next to an interrogation that J [delete] was doing one day, where he was breaking a tables and chairs in the room with the detainee. MR D [delete] has a reputation for breaking the tables in the room. Look into file 15521 K [delete] [delete] A [delete]. He is my detainee now. One of the first times I interviewed him at the beginning of Jan 04, he showed me a large bruise to his left forearm that was about six to eight inches long, and he stated he got it from being grabbed and being thrown around. He had a bump on his forehead over his left eye that he related he received that from being thrown into a wall. He said that the interrogator grabbed him and threw him down. He is evasive and deceptive, but when he is talking about how people have treated him, I tend to believe it based on the stuff that I have heard and seen. Evidently the people who talking to him before I was working him were very hard on him. [Delete] J [delete] was the person working him before. M [delete] M [delete] I think his number is 155800. I would look at the interrogation on 12 Jan 04, of this detainee, and talk to the interpreter of that helped interview him. He should be able to give you more information. I am working his brother at the time. His story is very forth coming and very cooperative. Talk to SPC SCHLAGEL was working another detainee who is the brother of my detainee; this person related to SPC SCHALGELS detainee, I think the number is 155794, as well about this incident. Pull up the fill on this detainee M [delete]. After the first interview, [delete] J [delete] says to put this guy in isolation because he is not being forthright in his information. [Delete] J is a young interrogator, he is very excited and motivated, and he believes everyone here should be broken. Ali Darwiche, and interpreter he might have info. Simon has seen a lot of stuff that goes on. Simon is an interpreter with Titan as well. He has stated that he has witnessed some of the interrogators being ruff. I do not know if it was abuse. There is another incident SPC LUCIANA SPENCER was involved in where one of her detainees, she wanted to degrade him; she stripped him naked and made him walk back. She was moved into Bn Ops, and taken out of the interrogation role. LTC JORDAN would know more about that. I would really look at the files tor the detainees of D [delete] and J [delete]. A [delete] was the detainee that was allegedly taken and thrown out of the vehicle handcuffed. I believe the incident was witness by Ali Darwiche. He is on leave in the states and is getting married. You would have to go through Titan to get his info. A [delete] was sitting in the vehicle sandbagged, the interrogator who I think might have been D [delete] or J [delete], grabbed him and threw him out of the vehicle to the ground, the interrogator then yells at him for falling on the ground, and then started dragging or pulling the detainee by the cuffs. This information came from Ali Darwiche. We were doing an interview and he provided this information out side of what he was interpreting.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// End of Statement /// TSN

AFFIDAVIT

I, Torin S. Nelson HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 21st DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ.

Signature of Person Administering Oath
Warren D. Worth

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Rusafa II Prison Compound, Baghdad

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: A [delete] H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Rusafa II Prison Compound, Baghdad, Iraq

DATE: 20 Jan 04

TIME: 1520

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: ISN #13077

FILE NUMBER: 0003-04-CID149-83130

GRADE/STATUS: CIV/DETAINEE

I, H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete] want to make the following statement under oath:

When first I went to the hard site, the Americans soldiers took me, there were two soldiers, a translator named Abu Hamed. We stood in the hallway before the hard site and they started taking off our clothes one after another. After they took off my clothes the American soldier removed who was wearing glasses, night guard, and I saw an American female soldier which they call her Ms. Maya, in front of me they told me to stroke my penis in front of her. And then they covered my head again, and as I was doing whatever they asked me to do, they removed the bag off my head, and I saw my friend, he was the one in front of me on the floor. And then they told me to sit on the floor facing the wall. They brought another prisoner on my back and he was also naked. Then they ordered me to bend onto my knees and hands on the ground. And then they placed three others on our backs, naked. And after that they order me to sleep on my stomach and they ordered the other guy to sleep on top of me in the same position and the same way to all of us. And there were six of us. They were laughing, taking pictures, and they were stepping on our hands with their feet. And they started taking one after another and they wrote on our bodies in English. I don't know what they wrote, but they were taking pictures after that. Then, after that they forced us to walk like dogs on our hands and knees. And we had to bark like a dog and if we didn't do that, they start hitting us hard on our face and chest with no mercy. After that, they took us to our cells, took the mattresses out and dropped water on the floor and they made us sleep on our stomachs on the floor with the bags on our head and they took pictures of everything. Mr. Joyner shows up in the morning and give us our mattresses, blankets and food, but the second guy who wears the glasses was the opposite; he takes the mattresses, tie out hands, hit us and don't give us food. All that lasted for 10 days and the translator Abu Hamed was there. I only saw him when I arrived, but after that I knew he was there because I heard his voice during all of that. /// End of Statement ////

Translated By:
Lauriene H. DICE
Interpreter, Category II
Titan Corporation Inc.
Camp Doha, Kuwait

Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
Baghdad Correctional Facility
Abu Ghraib, IZ APO AE 09335

Verified By:
Johnson ISHO
Interpreter, Category II
Titan Corporation Inc.
Camp Doha, Kuwait

AFFIDAVIT

I, H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20 DAY OF JANUARY, 2003 AT RUSAFA II PRISON COMPOUND, BAGHDAD, IZ APO AE 09336

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA MANORA IEM

SWORN STATEMENT
LOCATION: Abu Ghurayb CID

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: LANGIANESE, SETH A.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 323 MI, JIDC, AG

DATE: 20 Jan

TIME: 0945

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: E-4/SPC/Active Duty

I, SETH ANTHONY LANGIANESE want to make the following statement under oath:

I was at the internet cafe, it was in December or January I am not sure when I was with SPC Porter and we were just checking our Emails, ect. When Porter started looking at Pictures an MP had down loaded from her camera, some were of the detainees on there knees -- it looked like Ganci Prisoners she had taken some from the sky above AG and she had some pics of her by a water buffalo ... I cannot remember what computer they were downloaded on and I am positive they won't still be there. The pictures were of the prisoners (looked like a whole camp) of the prisoners on their knees, hands behind there heads -- possibly why their camp was bein searched -- possibly 2-3 pics.

Q. Describe the MP you saw?

A. A female, by a water buffalo -- thats about all I remember.

Q. Do you know who this MP female is?

A. No, an MP.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// END OF STATEMENT /// SAL

AFFIDAVIT

I, SETH ANTHONY LANGIANESE HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20 DAY OF JAN, 2004 AT

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA WARREN D. WORTH

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: Porter, Canyon Elijah

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: JIDC, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq.

DATE: 20 Jan 04

TIME: 1025

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: E-4

I, SPC Canyon Porter want to make the following statement under oath:

At some point in the last two weeks to a month, I witnessed some pictures of detainees being stored on a computer at the internet cafe. At 1100 I left the FAC at the JIDC building to take my lunch/internet break. As usual, I stop by the internet cafe to check my email and on this occasion I also sent some pictures from my digital camera. I went to the folder I thought my pictures were stored in and came across 5-10 pictures that weren't mine, but I recognized as photos were of detainees, some praying. At the time I didn't think to check the clarity of the pictures, and I'm unsure if the detainees could be identified. Two of the pictures were of a female soldier, age 18-25, PFC-SPC, though I cannot recall her name. She had red hair and seemed to be of medium build. I assume that it was her photos, though they could have been taken by a friend. I am not certain that these pictures were sent via email, but that is almost always the case as there would be no other reason to save them on a computer. I sent of my emails and then went to lunch with a couple friends whom I don't recall at this time. As we were sitting to eat, the soldier in the pictures stood up at the table in front of me. As she put her gear on, I recognized her as the female from the pictures and pointed her out to my friends. I have not seen her since, but I would recognize her or her name if I did. At the time I thought it was incredibly stupid to do what she had done, but did not consider it terribly wrong as the photos did not appear to be demeaning. This is the first time I have brought this matter to anyone's attention, with the exception of my friends that day. end of statement CP

AFFIDAVIT

I, SPC Canyon E. Porter HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20th DAY OF JAN, 2004 AT

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA WARREN D. WORTH

Statements on 19 Jan 2004

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: KENNER, Jason A.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 372nd MP Co, Cumberland, MD, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE: 19 Jan 04

TIME: 1108

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SPC, Ad Res.

I, Jason A. Kenner want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. Have you ever been present when any detainees were abused?

A I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattress, sheets, and clothes.

Q. Who at MI instructed you to do this?

A. I do not really remember their names. I told them if they wanted me to do that they needed to give me paperwork. A few times prior to requiring paperwork I did take away mattresses and sheets.

Q. Is paperwork required in order to take away clothes, mattresses and sheets?

A. Before I left on leave it had started to be required.

Q. Did you ever take any thing away from a detainee that MI told you to without paperwork?

A. A few times before the paperwork stuff started. I don't believe anyone told me specifically that I could not do that; it is I just know not to do that. At one point we were informed that we could not do anything to embarrass the prisoners. As it was explained to me, if it would embarrass me, do not do it.

Q. What shift do you work on?

A. Day shift.

Q. Would you ever come to work and find prisoners that were handcuffed, nude, or both?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you give them their clothes back?

A. It would depend on if I were briefed if I could give them the clothes back.

Q. Did you ever work on the same tier as CPL GARNER and SSG FREDERICK?

A. A few times I did relieve GARNER, and a few times when I was a runner, SSG FREDERJCK would be in the office at the same time.

Q. Did you ever find that GRANER had taken something from a prisoner he should not have?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever seen any pictures that were taken of detainees?

A. No.

Q. Is there any events at the prison you feel CID should know about?

A. No.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A No. /// End of Statement /// JAK

AFFIDAVIT

I, Jason A. KENNER HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 19th DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ

Signature of Person Administering Oath
WARREN D. WORTH

Statements on 18 Jan 2004
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