The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 1:28 am

PART 6 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

September 2003 Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller’s assessment regarding interrogation and intelligence operations in Iraq

MG Miller's Report

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (U)


1. (S/NF) Introduction -- From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller, US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation (Annex A) to HQ, CJTF-7, Baghdad, to conduct assistance visits to CJTF-7, TF-20, and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to discuss current theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. The team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations, and detention operations. The team used JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines.

2. (S/NF) Executive Summary -- The dynamic operational environment in Iraq requires an equally dynamic intelligence apparatus. To improve velocity and operational effectiveness of counterterrorism interrogation, attention in three major mission areas is needed. The team observed that the Task Force did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. Additionally, the corps commander's information needs required an in-theater analysis capability integrated throughout the interrogation operations structure to allow for better and faster reach-back to other worldwide intelligence databases. Last, the detention operations function must act as an enabler for interrogation.

(S/NF) The command has initiated a system to drive the rapid exploitation of internees to answer CJTF-7, theater, and national level counter terrorism requirements. This is the first stage toward the rapid exploitation of detainees. Receipt of additional resources currently in staffing will produce a dramatic improvement in the speed of delivering actionable intelligence and leveraging the effectiveness of the interrogation efforts. Our assessment is, given the implementation of the attached recommendations, a significant improvement in actionable intelligence will be realized within thirty days.

3. (S/NF) Functions: Integration - Synchronization - Fusion (Point of contact (POC) is MR D1c**************)

a. (U) Integration -- Defined as: to organize HUMINT collection and analytical resources under a coordinating authority that can rapidly task, direct, conduct analysis, and action intelligence gained from interrogations.

(S/NF) Observation -- HUMINT collection and analysis is being performed by several autonomous entities in the theater, resulting in duplication of effort and imperfect information flow.

(SJNF) Recommendation -- Establish a robust coordinating authority to direct and coordinate all HUMINT collection and analysis in Iraq. Supplement this authority with a collection management operation focused to support the needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Theater Commander and CJTF-7 Commanders' intelligence and targeting objectives. Additional resources arc required for the CJTF-7 CJ2X to sustain this effort.

(S/NF) Observation -- HUMINT collection priorities were not clearly defined, leading to ambiguous collection efforts. There are a large number of collection priorities that require a clear prioritization as to which requirements support the commander's critical information requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- CJTF-7 CJ2X has established a clear method of prioritization for collection requirements. Requirements are now being combined into areas of focus to drive interrogation tasking and operations.

b. (U) Synchronization -- Defined as: to establish a defined process and procedure to integrate the prioritization and tasking of all interrogation assets. (POC is MR J***************)

(SINF) Observation -- No written guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities was disseminated to units.

(SINF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- CJTF-7 is drafting approval documents containing the authorities, policies and practices to outline requirements to process, interrogate, and exploit security internees.

(S/NF) Observation -- DoD assets and other autonomous entities are active in the theater collecting information and conducting analysis under independent chains of command. Information sharing is not fully integrated. The various organizations are generally unaware of each other's capabilities, interests, and mutual information needs. They also lack protocols for coordinating access to internees, and for sharing the information collected and analysis performed.

(SINF) Recommendation -- CJTF-7 is establishing a HUMINT Collection and Targeting meeting that provides a weekly forum for system information sharing, internee access, and tasking protocols to fully leverage the participation of all entities active in the theater (to include Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Criminal Investigative Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Iraqi Survey Group) to support the CJTF-7 commander's intelligence and targeting objectives.

C. (U) Fusion -- Fusion is defined as assuring that all required resources and actions to support internee operations are properly integrated, supervised, executed and assessed to support the commander's intent. (POC is ***************)

(SINF) Observation -- The resiliency and global reach of GWOT targets requires much closer cooperation between the strategic analytical community and the collectors and analysts in the field. Military intelligence analysts at the CJTF-7 ACE, CJ2X, and in the field are closely focused on the tactical mission and are generally unaware of the assets and capabilities of the broader national intelligence community and the existence of dedicated CT analytical centers, such as DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) and the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Expedite the exchange of Counterterrorism information and analysis between collectors in the field and the national intelligence community by integrating the Interrogator Tiger Teams with analysts at the CJTF-7 CJ2X and national intelligence community through JITF-CT. Energize the analysis-collection feedback loop of the intelligence cycle with robust, timely, GWOT oriented, collection management planning and execution.

4. (U) Interrogation -- Setting the conditions to exploit internees to respond to questions that answer theater commanders' critical questions. (POC is ***************)

(S/NF) Summary -- Tactical interrogation operations differ greatly from strategic interrogation operations. The interrogators within CJTF-7 have been accomplishing the tactical mission, at a high rate of professionalism and effectiveness since the beginning of the war. As the CJTF transitions to a new phase of operations, the category of internees to interrogate and analytical backstopping required necessitates transition to strategic interrogation operations. The interrogation mission is hindered by an absence of analytical resources and reach-back data systems. The detention operation does not yet set conditions for successful interrogations. Interrogations are conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate detention operations, interrogation operations and collection management under one command authority.

(S/NF) Observation -- There is minimal analytical support to the interrogation mission. Interrogators continue to use tactical interrogation methods in a transitioning strategic environment.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Establish and train Interrogation Tiger Teams comprised of one interrogator and one analyst, both with SCI access. CJTF-7 has established an initial cadre of integrated Interrogation Tiger Teams from current assets and scheduled deploying interrogators and analysts to attend strategic interrogator and analyst training at Tiger Team University, USAICS, and Fort Huachuca in October 03.

(S/NF) Observation -- CJFT-7s two interrogation facilities operate with their own independent collection focus without an integrated coordinating element. Coordination between facilities is conducted informally and inconsistently.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Consolidate the interrogation mission at one Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)/strategic interrogation facility under ClTF-7 command. This action has been initiated.

(S/NF) Observation -- Detention operations do not enable the interrogation mission.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the JIDC Commander that sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees. This action is now in progress.

(S/NF) Observation -- The lack of awareness of available analytical databases by interrogators and analysts limits the ability to conduct effective integrated interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Train analysts to incorporate databases including DIMS, CT-link, web-safe, CIA Source, Harmony, and Coliseum in interrogation planning and execution. This training is provided at Tiger Team University and can be leveraged with a sustained theater training program.

(S/NF) Observation - -Analysts at JIDC (Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center) interrogation operations section have limited access to automated intelligence systems that would allow the analyst to reach back to national level resources. The primary collection facilities (Abu Gharib) requires at a minimum 2 JWICS terminal to meet full operational capability.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Provide the necessary systems and bandwidth to enable direct analytical support to interrogation operations. See paragraph 6 (Information Technology).

(S/NF) Observation -- There is no Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) to support interrogation operations. These teams comprised of operational behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists are essential in developing integrated interrogation strategies and assessing interrogation intelligence production.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Provide 1 BSCT to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Observation -- The system procedures to rapidly transfer/return fully exploited internee intelligence sources back to the internee general population or recommend their release require assessment and streamlining.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Assess and refine transfer criteria to support continued rapid exploitation of high value internees and the release of fully exploited or low value internees in a more timely manner.

(S/NF) Observation -- Task Force 20 (TF-20) lacks adequate number of trained interrogator-analyst Tiger Teams for mission requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation: That CJTF-7 provide TF-20 Tiger Team support.

(S/NF) Observation -- The application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. Legal review and recommendations of internee interrogation operations by a dedicated command staff judge advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Dedicate a judge advocate(s) to advise commanders and interrogation leadership on requirements to operate within approved interrogation authorities, responsible for the detention and intelligence missions. This action is in progress.

5. (U) Detention Operations (POC is) ***************

(U) Functions -- Provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence.

(S/NF) Summary -- The importance of the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence is vital for success and must be emphasized in the conduct of detention operations. It is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees. Joint strategic interrogation operations are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The pending establishment of the theater joint interrogation detention center at Abu Gharib will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized and focused strategic interrogation effort.

(S/NF) Observation -- Minimal operational procedures and guidance were available for internee in-processing, collection and integration of intelligence, security procedures, internee discipline standards and procedures for reacting to emergencies situations in the detention facilities.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Develop a comprehensive set of detention physical security SOPs. Conduct training for detention center leadership and staff on the implementation of these procedures. JTF-GTMO SOPs for physical security and detention operations were provided to CJTF-7 staff.

(S/NF) Observation -- Some of the detention facility guard force interviewed were unable to apply their standing orders and Rules of Engagement procedures to hypothetical situations -- . e.g. escaping internees.

(S/NF) Recommendations -- Scenario-based training for the current operational and future theater operational environment is recommended to ensure standing procedures (e.g. Rules of Engagement) are known and their application thoroughly understood by the detention leadership and staff.

(S/NF) Observation -- Detention operations must be structured to ensure detention environment focuses the internee's confidence and attention on their interrogators. The MP detention staff should be an integrated element supporting the interrogation functions and received orientation training to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Assign, train, and sustain interrogator and detention staff team building focused on improving the collection of intelligence. MP detention staff training programs utilized by JTF-GTMO were provided to CJTF-7 for consideration and baseline implementation.

Observation -- Disciplinary procedures for internees are arbitrary or not clearly defined.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- The unit is updating its operating procedures for implementing disciplinary measures related to detainee operations.

(S/NF) Observation -- Males, females and juveniles are detained in the same camp in close proximity to each other. Full utilization of a classification system that is sensitive to group dynamics is not currently in place.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress -- Procedures to segregate males, females, and juvenile internees in the detention facility to prevent unauthorized contact are being refined.

(S/NF) Observation -- Some detainees who had infectious medical conditions were detained in the general internee population. This mingling of internees could result in possible contamination of other detainees and soldier detention staff. Detainees suffering from apparent mental illness were segregated in a holding pen that was normally used for disciplinary purposes.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Special needs sections of the detention facility should be developed for internees with contagious medical conditions and internees who exhibit mental illness.

6. (U) Information Technology (IT) (POC is ***************)

CU) Functions -- IT focus is streamlined information gathering resulting in rapid intelligence analysis and exploitation.

(S/NF) Observation -- Current information management systems do not support rapid, integrated exploitation of intelligence community databases.

(S/NF) Recommendation -- Create a robust automated knowledge center, incorporating information and documents currently located in diverse data stores to allow for sharing of all information on internees. (See Annex B for specific IT comments.)

7. (D) Conclusion -- Actions to improve the Task Force's ability to conduct counterterrorist strategic interrogations were being developed at the time of this report's drafting. Provision of resources is crucial to success. Expeditious fill of two leadership billets -- one as Chief of the HUMINT Operations Center (HOC) and the other as Chief, HUMINT Analysis Center (HAC), CJTF-7, is essential to enable successful joint, integrated interrogation operations. Concurrently, assignment of expert analysts is required to form Tiger Teams and populate the HAC.

GEOFFREY D. MILLER
Major General, U.S. Army

ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS

Team Leader
MG Geoffrey Miller, USA
JTF-GTMO
Commander

Synchronization Team

MR ***************
DIA
Former JTF-GTMO Joint Interrogation Group Dir.

MR ***************
DIAIDHS
Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief

MR ***************
CIA
Former JTF-GTMO CTC Chief

CDR *************** USNR
JITF-CT
Former JTF-GTMO Analysis Chief

LTC *************** USA
JATF SOUTH
Former JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate

CPT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Information Technology Chief

MR ***************
CITF
Former JTF-GTMO Crim. Invest. Task Force Chief

Interrogation Operations Team

LtCal *************** USAF
DIAlDHS
Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief

CW3 *************** USA
470th MI BDE
Former GTMO Saudi Team Chief

CW3 *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Central Asia Team Chief

SSGT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Central Asia Team Analyst

MSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Saudi Team Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Saudi Team Analyst

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Special Projects Interrogator

SSG *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Special Projects Analyst

Detention Operations Team

CSM *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Camp Delta Superintendent

CPT *************** USA
JTF-GTMO
Camp Delta Company Commander

ANNEX B: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS

The goal of a theater-wide intelligence information technology initiative is fused intelligence which will allow for a faster interrogation cycle, faster exchange of information, minimize manual processes, eliminate redundancy, manpower savings, rapid data mining, focused interrogation plan, and an automated collection plan.

ISSUES

There isn't sufficient bandwidth or connectivity available to support current interrogation operations and consolidated internee database for near-real time information sharing

• Some locations have SIPR connectivity but it is slow and unreliable. Some locations do not have enough SIPR drops to support the mission and personnel.

There are diverse data stores to include MS Excel spreadsheets, MS Access databases. MS Word documents that are not shared by the various internee camps

• There isn't a theater level network that reaches out to all the units for the purpose of sharing folder, files, and documents, with the exception of email. Email is not an effective way of sharing information for the purpose of conducting data mining and intelligence exploitation.

There are no standardized information gathering and reporting methods that will allow for tracking of information collected from internees from the time of capture and through the intelligence requirements management and interrogation process.

• There isn't a comprehensive collection management and dissemination system in place.

There isn't an effective method to link internees to other internees or associates, organizations, locations, and facilities or to associate documents to internees to allow analysis to quickly search all information pertaining to an internee.

OPTIONS

Implement a theater level network that supports folder, file, and document sharing.

• Ensure bandwidth is adequate to support the network traffic and all the users.
• Ensure that all units have access to the network with adequate number of workstations to support the mission, especially for those units that capture and/or initially process internees and those units that conduct analysis and interrogations.

Develop a database that incorporates the various data stores, from the time of capture and through the intelligence analysis and interrogation process.

• The web-based Joint Detainee Information Management System (JDIMS) developed for and currently utilized by JTF Guantanamo, with some tailoring and modifications, will be adequate to meet this need of a consolidated internee database. The database also contains a collection management and dissemination module that manages all requirements and reporting on internees. It also contains an online reports writing feature, which allows the analysts and interrogators to create reports and immediately share information.
• The Detention Information Management System (DIMS) also developed for and utilized by ITF Guantanamo to capture initial detainee information as well as operational data gathered by the military police, will allow for input of internee information from the time of capture and throughout their stay at the detention facilities when not being interrogated
• A Joint Detainee Information Management System-Iraq will share data with JTF Guantanamo detainee database and make it available to the intelligence community. By sharing detainee information, the intelligence community will benefit from a web-based single source of detainee information readily available to them via the SIPR network.
• A similar system should be implemented in Afghanistan for the detainee operations conducted there.

The goal of a worldwide-integrated detainee database is to address the needs of detainee interrogation operations and to share information regardless of location. It is the tool to bridge intelligence and technology in order to achieve information dominance and efficient operational control over the detainee/internee population and allow for near-real time data mining, information visualization, and intelligence exploitation to combat the Global War on Terrorism.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:05 am

PART 7 OF 13 (The Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 12 October 2003
To: Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq
From: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lieutenant General, USA Commanding
Re: Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy


HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
BAGHDAD IRAQ
APO AE 09335

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
CJTF7 - CG

12 OCT 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR

C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335

SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

1. (S//NF) This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for security internees under the control of CJTF-7. Security internees are civilians who are detained pursuant to Articles 5 and 78 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War of August 12. 1949 (hereinafter. Geneva Convention).

2. (Sf 1 approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance approaches A as described in Enclosure 1. relating to security internees, subject to the following:

a. (S//NF) Use of these approaches is limited to interrogations of security internees under the control of CJTF-7.

b. (S//NF) These approaches must be used in combination with the safeguards described in Enclosure 2.

c. (S//NF) Segregation of security internees will be required in many instances to ensure the success of interrogations and to prevent the sharing of interrogation methods among internees. Segregation may also be necessary to protect sources from other detainees or otherwise provide for their security. Additionally, the Geneva convention provides that security internees under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of Coalition forces shall, where absolute military necessity requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication. Accordingly, these security internees may be segregated. I must approve segregation in all cases where such segregation will exceed 30 days in duration, whether consecutive nonconsecutive. Submit written requests with supporting rationale to me through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request

d. (S//NF) In employing each of the authorized approaches, the interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation: The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.

3. (S//NF) Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me through CJTF-7 C2, and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA will accompany each request

4. (S//NF) Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenance of good order and discipline among persons under Coalition control

S. (S//NF) This policy supersedes the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy signed on 14 September 2003.

6. (S//NF) POC is MAJ Daniel Kazmier, DNVT 558-0709, DSN 318 822-1050.

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

2 Encls
I. Interrogation Approaches (SI)
2. General Safeguards

CF: Commander, US Central Command

INTERROGATION APPROACHES (Security Internees)

(S//NF) Use of the following approaches is subject to the application of the general safeguards provided in enclosure (2). Specific implementation guidance with respect to approaches A-Q is provided in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52. Brigade Commanders may provide additional implementation guidance.

A. (S//NF) Direct: Asking straightforward questions. The most effective of all approaches, it is the most simple and efficient approach to utilize.

B. (S//NF) Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention. Possible incentives may include favorite food items, changes in environmental quality, or other traditional or regional comforts not required by the Geneva Convention.

C. (S//NF) Emotional Love: flaying on the love a security internee has for an individual or group. May involve an incentive, such as allowing communication with the individual or group.

D. (S//NF) Emotional Hate: Playing on the genuine hatred or desire for revenge a security internee has for an individual or group.

E. (S//NF) Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a security internee.

F. (S//NF) Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a security internee.

G. (S//NF) Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a security internee or calming him by convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated.

H. (S//NF) Pride and Ego Up: Flattering or boosting the ego of a security internee.

I. (S//NF) Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the pride or ego of a security internee.

J. (S//NF) Futility: Invoking the feeling in a security internee that it is useless to resist by playing on the doubts that already exist in his mind.

K. (S//NF) We Know All: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator already knows the answers to questions being asked.

L. (S//NF) Establish Your Identity: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator has mistaken the security internee for someone else. The security internee is encouraged to "clear his name."

M. (S//NF) Repetition: continuously repeating the same question to the security internee during an interrogation to encourage full and candid answers to questions.

N. (S//NF) File and Dossier: Convincing security internee that the interrogator has a voluminous, damning and inaccurate file, which must be corrected by the security internee.

O. (S//NF) Mutt and Jeff: An interrogation team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator. This approach is designed to cause the security internee to have a feeling of hostility toward one interrogator and a feeling of gratitude toward the other.

P. (S//NF) Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing Security internee to answer questions fully.

Q. (S//NF) Silence: Staring at the security internee to encourage discomfort.

GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

(S//NF) Application of these interrogation approaches is subject to the following general safeguards:

(i) limited to use by trained interrogation personnel; (ii) there is a reasonable basis to believe that the security internee possesses information of intelligence value: (iii) the security internee is medically evaluated as a suitable candidate for interrogation (considering all approaches to be used in combination): (iv) interrogators arc specifically trained for the approaches; (v) a specific interrogation plan, including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel has been developed: and (vi) there is appropriate supervision.

(U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a security internee with the least intrusive method, applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory personnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations.

(S//NF) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into account factors such as a security internee's current and past performance in both detention and interrogation; a security internee's emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses; assessment of approaches and individual techniques that may be effective; strengths and weaknesses of interrogators; and factors which may necessitate the augmentation of personnel.

(S//NF) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the security internee's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum: they are conducted in close cooperation with the detaining units. Detention regulations and policies established by detaining units should be harmonized to ensure consistency with the interrogation policies of the intelligence collection unit. Such consistency will help to maximize the credibility of the interrogation team and the effectiveness of the interrogation. Strict adherence to such regulations, policies and standard operating procedures is essential.

(S//NF) Interrogators must appear to completely control the interrogation environment. It is important that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary approaches depending on the security internee's cultural background, strengths, weaknesses, environment, extent of resistance training, as well as the urgency with which information believed in the possession of the security internee must be obtained.

(S//NF) Interrogators must ensure the safety of security internees, and approaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will ensure that security internees are allowed adequate sleep; and that diets provide adequate food and water and cause no adverse medical or cultural effects. Where segregation is necessary, security internees must be monitored for adverse medical or psychological reactions. Should military working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a handler at all times to ensure safety.

(S//NF) While approaches are considered individually within this analysis, it must be understood that in practice, approaches are usually used in combination. The title of a particular approach is not always fully descriptive of a particular approach. The cumulative effect of all approaches to be employed must be considered before any decision is made regarding approval of a particular interrogation plan.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:08 am

PART 8 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 30 November 2003
To: Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Commander CJTF-7
From: Thomas M. Pappas, Col., MI Commanding
Re: Request for Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy


SECRET/NOFORN

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER
ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ APO AE 09335

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

AETV-MI

30 November 03

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, CJTF-7, ATTN: C2 (AETV-CJ2), BG(P) Fast, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342

Commander, CJTF-7, ATTN: Staff Judge Advocate (AETV-JA), COL Warren, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342

FOR Commander, CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy

1. Request exception to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy to authorize the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JDIC) interrogator to be authorized to use the Fear up Harsh and isolation approaches during interrogations with the following detainee,

a. Name: J [delete] [delete] K [delete]

b. ISN: 151363

c. Date request employment of approach: As soon as possible.

d. Circumstances of capture: Detainee is a Syrian male, [delete] years of age, captured in an attempted IED attack in Baghdad, IZ. Detainee is an admitted foreign fighter who came to commit Jihad against Coalition Forces in Iraq. He was captured with [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] and [delete] [delete] while attempting to set up an IED.

e. Assessment of detainee: Detainee is at the point where he is resigned to the hope that Allah will see him through this episode in his life, therefore he feels no need to speak with interrogators. Detainee will not answer open ended questions, has a smug attitude and is running counter approaches on interrogators. Detainee needs to be put in a position where he will feel that the only option to get out of jail is to speak with interrogators.

f. Potential information: Detainee can provide information related to safe houses, facilitators, financing, recruitment and operations of foreign fighter smuggling into Iraq. Detainee can also potentially provide names and target information of local facilitators in Ar-Ramadi. Detainee can also confirm information provided from others captured with him.

g. Limitations of approach: Detainee will be interrogated in the Camp Vigilant Steel site. Detainee argues that Allah is the only one that can decide his fate. Interrogators will establish control of detainee by allowing detainee to take this stance then implement a Fear up harsh approach. Interrogators will reinforce the fact that we have attempted to help him time and time again and that they are now putting it in Allah's hands. Interrogators will at a maximum throw tables, chairs, invade his personal space and continuously yell at the detainee. Interrogators will not physically touch or harm the detainee, will take all necessary precautions that all thrown objects are clear of the detainee and will not coerce the detainee in any way. If the detainee has not broken yet, interrogators will move into the segregation phase of the approach. Interrogators will coordinate with Military Police guards in the segregation area prior to initiation of this phase. For the segregation phase of the approach the MPs will put an empty sandbag onto the prisoners head before moving him out of Vigilant B. This measure will be for force protection purposes and transporting the detainee to the segregation area by HMMWV. MPs will be transporting the detainee with the interrogators present. During transportation, the Fear up Harsh approach will be continued, highlighting the Allah factor. Interrogators will take all necessary precautions in conjunction with the MPs to ensure detainee's safety during transport. Upon arrival at site, MP guards will take him into custody. MP working dogs will be present and barking during this phase. Detainee will be strip searched by guards with the empty sandbag over his head for the safety of himself, prison guards, interrogators and other prisoners. Interrogators will wait outside the room while detainee is strip searched. Interrogators will watch from a distance while detainee is placed in the segregation cell. Detainee will be put on the adjusted sleep schedule (attached) for 72 hours. Interrogations will be conducted continuously during this 72 hour period. The approaches which will be used during this phase will include, fear up harsh, pride and ego down, silence and loud music. Stress positions will also be used in accordance with CJTF-7 IROE in order to intensify the approach.

2. The approval for this approach is essential due to the information this detainee possesses. It will greatly enhance and expedite the collection effort in support of CJTF-7 Intelligence requirements and could potentially save countless lives of American soldiers in the future.

3. POC for this action is CPT Fitch, 205th MI Bde SJA at DNVT 302-559-4031 or via SIPR at c5cm205misja@205mi.c5.army.smil.mil or CP TWood, JIDC Interrogation OIC, at DNVT 302-559-1764 or via SIPR at Carolyn.wood@us.army.smil.mil.

THOMAS M. PAPPAS
COL, MI
Commanding

Exception to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy is granted/not granted.

AETV-MI
SUBJECT: Request for Exception to CJTF-7lnterrogation and Counter Resistance Policy

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
LTG, USA
Commanding
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:09 am

PART 9 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

Memo 19 January 2004
To: Commander, U.S. Central Command
From: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lt. Gen., USA Commanding
Re: Request for Investigating Officer


HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09093

CJTF7-CG

19 January 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command

SUBJECT: Request for Investigating Officer

1. I request that you appoint an investigating officer, in the grade of Major General or above, to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police Brigade. The Brigade is a theater asset, assigned to CFLCC, but TACON to CJTF-7.

2. Specifically, I request an investigation of the detention and internment operations conducted by the brigade from 1 November 2003 to the present. Recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes, and accountability lapses indicate systemic problems within the brigade and suggest a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. Several investigations, including a USACIDC investigation, into various aspects of the Brigade's operations are on-going. The purpose of this request is to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry, conducted by a senior leader from outside of CJTF-7, to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.

3. The CJTF-7 point of contact for this request is COL Marc Warren, DSN 318-836-1122.

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

CF:
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:11 am

PART 10 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

28 January 2004 Army’s Criminal Investigation Division report on allegations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib

DATE: 28 JAN 04

FROM: SAC, ABU GRHUYEB PRISON COMPLEX (CID)

TO: DIRECTOR, USACRC, USACIDC, FORT BELVOIR, VA
CDR, HQUSACIDC // CIOP-ZA //
CDR, 10TH MP BN (CID) (ABN) (FWD) // OPS //
CDR, 3D MP GROUP (CID) // OPS //
SJA, 4ID
LNO CID, CJTF-7 (FOR FURTHER D1STRIBUTION)
CDR, 800TH MP BDE
CDR, 320TH MP BN
CDR, 205TH MI BDE

SUBJECT: CID REPORT - 7TH STATUS/SSI - 0003-04-C:D:
83130-6C/5C2B/5Y2B/5Y2D/5Y2E/5X1/5M3/5X5/5X7

DRAFTER: PIERON, TYLER M.
RELEASER: ARTHUR, PAUL D.

UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SWORN STATEMENTS

File Number: 0013-04-CID609-
Location: Kuwait BO, 3D MP GRP (CID)
Date: 26 Jan 2004
Statement Of: WALLIN, NEIL ALLEN
SSN: [delete]
Org/Address: B CO., 109TH AREA SUPPORT MEDICAL BATTALION (ASMB), VERMILLION, SD 57069

I, NEIL A. WALLIN, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: I was assigned as a medic at the Abu Ghruyeb, Prison, in Baghdad, Iraq from Aug 03 to Dec 03. During that time I observed a couple incidents that occurred in the Hard Cell area of Camp Vigilant, Iraq. Camp Vigilant was one of four areas within the prison and it contained the Hard Cell area where priority prisoners where detained. Also the Hard Cells were used to house any person(s) who were considered to be high risk, either to themselves or others. Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainee's and cell 1B was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainee's. During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainee's were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down. This practiced was not continued after their integration to the prison. Sometime in Oct 03, I was asked to to evaluate a detainee we called "one of the three stooges" or "one of the three wise men". I do not know his real name. This detainee, who was in cell 1A, had a 2 1/2 inch laceration on his chin, which ran along his jaw bone and required about 13 stitches. At the time I evaluated the detainee, I observed blood on the wall near a metal weld, which I believed to be the place where the detainee received his injury. I do not know how he was injured of if it was done by himself or another. Later during my tour I also observed SGT [delete] slap the face of a detainee we called "Jihad Jerry" or "Gus". I believe his name was H [delete]. This detainee, who was in cell 1B, had taken several swings at SGT [delete] and was often times placed in restraints. This detainee was being evaluated because he refused to eat or drink and had to sustained by intravenous means. I do not think that SGT [delete] struck the detainee out of anger but rather to show the detainee that his assaults upon the corrections personal would not be allowed to go unpunished. Also this detainee had made verbal threats on several occasions that he would kill members of the prison staff. There was also another incident where I observed a video tape of a detainee we called "Shitboy". This detainee was known for inserting various objects into his rectum. This detainee was also known for consuming and throwing his feces and urine. The video tape contained a segment where this detainee was seen in four point restraints chained to a door. The detainee was seen banging his head against the wall, about five or six times, very hard.

Q: SA JONES

A: SGT WALLIN

Q: Do you know of any other instances where detainee's have been assaulted, abused or degraded?

A: No.

Q: Have you observed or have heard anything pertaining to the abuse or degradation of any of the detainee's?

A: No.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No. ///End of Statement///

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Irag

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: SMITH, Michael Joseph

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 320 MP__, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE: 27 Jan 04

TIME: 1717

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SGT

I, Michael S. Smith want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. Explain the incident with your dog when SSG ASHTON asked you to be present?

A. We were in one of the tiers at the hard site that was not being used. for controlled aggression training, when SSG ASHTON approached me about using my dog for an interview. It just so happened that I saw COL PAPPAS in the parking lot right after he asked about using my dog for the interview and he had stated that it was allowed. So myself and SGT CARDONA took our dogs over to the interrogation house they have. SSG KLESOWITCH briefed me on how he wanted the dog used. He wanted me to have the dog go and bark by the door, so I told him I would conduct a building search and the dog would sniff the door and sense there was someone there and then the dog would start barking. So at that point I took my dog over to the room where the detainee was and he did sniff under door and started barking. I took my dog out of the area. A little while later they came back to us and asked this time for us to bring both dogs over to the site of the interrogation. They explained the detainee would he sitting the door and the door open. We had both of our dogs at a 45-degree to him and they proceeded to bark. Prior to us bringing the dogs over to the room this time they said that we could not take the dogs into the room without a muzzle. When we got to the room the detainee was sitting in the doorway, with his feet in the doorway and the door was open. My dog and SGT CARDONA's dog were both barking at the detainee and we never got closer then 18 inches. Neither dog had a muzzle on.

Q. Did you ever see a written permission slip that a dog could be used for this interview?

A. No.

Q. Did you know at this time that a written memo was needed to use the dogs?

A. I did not know you needed a memo, COL PAPPAS had not told me anything about a memo when I had talked with him.

Q. Did it appear the detainee was afraid of the dogs?

A. I could not tell, because all of my concentration was on controlling my dog,

Q. Was your dog barking and growling at the detainee?

A. Yes.

Q. Did anyone ever ask you to muzzle your dog?

A. No.

Q. Were there any other events when you used your dog during an interview of a detainee?

A. Yes.

Q. Explain that incident?

A. SGT CARDONA and I were at the hard site doing patrol. SSG FREDERICK asked us if we could come by with the dogs because they SSG FREDERICK wanted to question a detainee about a window. We waited out side while they pulled the detainee outside into the hallway. Someone said OK, bring them in, when went in. I was the first one in, the detainee was lying down flat on the floor and he was nude. As I entered the room the detainee rose to his feet, took a 90-degree turn and went against the wall. I took a 45 degree angle on the inside of the building and SGT CARDONA was at the other 45 angle with an exit, CPL GRANER was directly in front of him, telling him to get down, get down. The man went to his knees for a couple of seconds and then Got up and went at CPL GRANER. The prisoner kicked GRANER one time in the chin. I peeled my dog off and CARDONA peeled his dog off at first. Since the prisoner was attacking an MP, he allowed his dog to go in and bite the detainee. CARDONA then called his dog off the detainee and pulled the dog back. GRANER then told the man again to get down, and the prisoner continues to be combative and went back at GRANER. CARDONA let his dog go again on the detainee and the dog bit the detainee again. CARDONA called the dog off and by that point there.was 5 to 6 MP's who took the prisoner to the floor and cuffed him.

Q. Was the detainee combative when you first walked into the area?

A. Not when he was lying on the ground. Once he saw the dogs he was not combative he was just not listening.

Q. Do you know if the detainee understood English?

A. No.

Q. Did the detainee show any emotion that you can recall?

A. He showed fear.

Q. Was the detainee crying?

A. I do not recall.

Q. Why do you think the detainee charged at GRANER?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Do you recall how many MP's were present when you first got there?

A. No

Q. Were you present when they gave the detainee medical attention?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who stitched up his wounds?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if anyone took any pictures during this event?

A Yes.

Q. Who took the pictures?

A. I do not know. but I have seen the pictures. SGT CARDONA needed the pictures for his documentation.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No.///End of Statement/// MJS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Michael J. Smith HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 27TH DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ

Signature of Person Administering Oath
WARREN D. WORTH

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: STEFANOWICZ, Steven Anthony

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

DATE: 27 Jan 04

TIME: 1204

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: CIV

I, Steven A. STEFANOWICZ, want to make the following Statement under oath:

Incident with hearing unusual sounds coming from the Segregation Hole in isolation wing alpha, around or about 20 DEC 03. After the conclusion of an interrogation that included SGT Mike Eckroth, Steve Stefanowicz and John Israel (terp) in the stairwell of Segragation. The detainee was returned into MP custody of SGT Cathcart and SSG Elloit. After the detainee was received by the two MP's, the interrogation team walked ahead of the MP's and detainee. The detainee was being placed into the Segregation Hole according to the approved interrogation plan and the sound of the detainee falling or possibly being struck was heard. The interrogation team looked back and the MP's were coming out of the facility and closed the door. Both SGT Eckroth and I looked at each other and asked what was the sound as we walked up the steps to the MP office area. Both of us (SGT Eckroth and Steve Stefanowicz) felt very uncomfortable with what we had heard and when the two MP's returned to the MP office area located on the second deck, in between section alpha and bravo, we confronted the MP's. The reaction of SGT Cathcart was that he was agitated with the comment or suggestion. SGT Cathcart did reply to our questioning, but I can't recall the exact words of his statement, other than he was not happy. Explanation of an approved interrogation plan. When an interrogation plan outside the approved Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) is requested by an interrogator, the plan must be reviewed and approved by Col Tom Papus and the Jag Officer. However, in some circumstance, this approval must go up to the office of General Sanchez for direct approval. In response to questions by the investigator and the special treatment of a detainee. The following is a description of the process of an ongoing interrogation. A detainee that I am actively interrogating was placed on an approved Sleep Meal Management Program. This program, has very specific and detailed rules required for implementation. In terms of what I have used recently over a 25 day period of time to interrogate the detainee. In this case, the detainee is provided with 4 hours of sleep per 24 hour period. The configuration of this sleep//wake program can be divided in any configuration and need, to be written out in detail for each day and approved through the appropriate chain of command, OIC, COL Papus and Jag. In this example, the final approving authority was COL Tom Papus. To elaborate on a typical 72 hour program recently used, the sleep/meal management portion cannot continue more that 72 consecutive hours. At which point, a 12 hour uninterrupted sleep session is mandatory before the program can continue. During a typical SMMS program, the MP's are responsible for administering the written program provided by the interrogator. A copy of the detailed, written program that they receive and keep on record in the office, during the duration of the session. In all cases, the NCO managing the alpha wing or responsible for the section are verbally briefed about the program, the details of the program, the detainee and intelligence value of the detainee (background). In addition, the MP's are advised that during the awake time period of an approved SMMS program, the MP's are allowed to do what is necessary to keep the detainee awake in the allotted period of time as long it adheres to approved rules of engagement and proper treatment of the detainee. For example, this current detainee does not like to conform to proper grooming standards. So, I've referred to the MP's to give the detainee his special treatment. This is to include, showering of the detainee (not excessively) daily if necessary, having the detainee brush his teeth and the maintaining of short hair and no facial hair. Hence, the MP's are not directed when and how this is to be administered, but that it can be used to keep the detainee awake when the detainee is more prone to sleep.

Q. Have you ever had an incident where one of your detainees was bruised or complained of being assaulted by any of the guards?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever verbally requested one of the guards to assault one of your detainees?

A. No.

Q Have you seen or heard any other type of suspicious incidents that would indicate abuse of the prisoners besides what you have listed in the above statement?

A. No

Q. Do you know of any types of pictures that show abuse of detainees?

A. No.

Q, Do you have anything else to add to this statement concerning the matters under Investigation'?

A. No.

///////////////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////////////////////

SAS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Steven A. STEFANOWICZ, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 22nd DAY OF JANUARY, 2004 AT ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ, APO

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA NEAL C. GRUHN

SWORN STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301: Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: SPENCER, LUCIANA NMN

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, WURZBURG, GM APO AE 09244 (DEPLOYED TO ABU GHRAIB PRISON)

DATE: 2004/01/21

TIME: 1149

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SPC

I. LUCIANA SPENCER , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

When I began working the night shift I discussed with the MP's what their SOP was for detainee treatment. They informed me that they had no SOP. I informed them of my IROE and made clear to them what I was and wasn't allowed to do or see. I made clear to them that their prison was their prison and they can handle buisness how they see fit, however i follow different rules and i asked them to respect the fact that i have to follow those rules. I am good friends with the MP's that work at this detention facility and they trust me. I also am very specific with those MP's as to what level of knowledge i want to have concerning this detention facility. I didn't see any acts of torture or mistreatment. The MP's did prepare prisoners prior to interrogations by haveing them do physical exercises and yelling at them. The interrogators would verbally discuss, with a MP, a detainee and his cooperativeness and various methods to deal with a detainee such as physical exercise at random hours of the night and yelling. I was aware that some MP's were taking pictures of detainees and had them on their computers. I have seen detainees naked. When a detainee threw his feces, the MP's had him take a cold shower then roll in the dirt outside then stand until he was dry then they showered him in cold water again. When the detainee was naked he was laughed at and yelled at. I have seen an MP slap a detainee. When a detainee was doing physical exercises as punishment then refused to continue after given a rest a MP encouraged him to continue.

Q. What does IROE?

A. Interrogation Rule of Engagement.

Q. What shift did you work on?

A. When I first got here I worked day shift for the first week. After that we moved to night shift.

Q. How much time did you spend in Isolation area during the night shift?

A. It depended on how many detainees we had in the isolation area. On average it would be two hours. Some nights longer depended on the interview.

Q. Where did the interrogations occur?

A. In the showers, stair well, or property room.

Q. Was there any MP's present during the interrogations?

A. No.

Q. Were the detainees clothed or unclothed during the interrogations?

A. During all mine they were.

Q. Is removing the clothing of the detainee a MI interrogation tactic?

A. I used it on one interrogation and my Team Leader did not approve of it. She thought it should have been more specified. Statements were taken and it was brought up to CPT WOODS and LTC JORDAN.

Q. What was the outcome of?

A. I was moved out of the Tiger Team and placed in Operations.

Q. What is a Tiger Team?

A. It is an interrogator and an analysist.

Q. Who were the MP's that worked on the night shift?

A. SSG FREDERICK, SGT GRANER and AMBUHL. These are the ones that I saw mostly working.

Q. Who was the MP that struck the detainee?

A. GRANER.

Q. Who else was present when this occurred?

A. Two other detainees, CPT BRlNSON might have been there, I can not remember who else was there. I am really unsure if CPT BRINSON was even there.

Q. How many times did GRANER strike the detainee?

A. Just once with a open hand.

Q. Who was the detainee?

A. He had a beard and dark hair. I did not know his name or NDRS #.

Q. Did you see GRANER strike, push to the floor, punch, kick or slap any other detainee?

A. No.

Q. Did you see GRANER posing detainees in sexual positions at any time?

A. No.

Q. Did you see GRANER engaged in sexual intercourse with detainees in the isolation area?

A. No.

Q. Did you see GRANER engaged in sexual intercourse with anyone else in the isolation area?

A. No.

Q. Was there anyone in the isolation area that was not authorized?

A. No.

Q. What time did you shift start in the isolation area?

A. It started about 2200 to 0800.

Q. Were pictures taken of the detainees in the isolation area?

A. Yes. I believe so. I never saw anyone, but there were cameras in the area. I know they look pictures of me in the area.

Q. Did you ever see FREDERlCK strike, kick, punch, push to the floor, and/or slap detainees?

A. No.

Q. Were you present at any time when detainees were beaten?

A. Other than the one slap, No.

Q. Did you punch, slap, kick, push to the floor, and/or jump on detainees?

A. No.

Q. Did you see anyone else punch, slap, kick, push to the floor, and/or jump on detainees?

A. Just the slap and then they are transporting detainees.

Q. What was the uniform for your team in the isolation area?

A. We would were DCU's without nametags.

Q. Did you observe pictures of the detainees in sexual positions?

A. I saw a screen saver for a computer that was up in the isolation area. The screen save had detainees naked in a pyramid.

Q. Do you know who took the picture?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whose computer it was?

A. No.

Q. Do you know who the detainees were?

A. No. All you saw was Asses.

Q. Did you see other soldiers who were not MP's in the isolation area after hours?

A. Just other MI soldiers.

Q. Were you involved in any abuse of the detainees?

A. No.

Q. Were you present for any of the abuse against the detainee?

A. Only the slap.

Q Did you report it to anyone?

A. No.

Q. Why did you not report it?

A. I did not think it was abusive.

Q. Do you recall when it occurred?

A. That was after I was working in operations, some time in Dec 03, before CPT BRISNSON left. I know it was on a Sunday as I watched football after I left. I think it was a Carolina game against possibly Green Bay.

Q. Did anyone else show you photos of the detainees in the hard site?

A. No.

Q. Has anyone discussed this case with you other than this office?

A. Yes, I was talking to SSG FREDERICK and he told me there was an investigation into detainee abuse.

Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?

A. No.//END OF STATEMENT///

Initials LS.

STATEMENT OF LUCIANA SPENCER TAKEN AT ABU GHRAIB DATED 21 JAN 04

AFFIDAVIT

I, Luciana Spender, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 21 DAY OF JAN, 2004 AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, ABU GHRAIB

Signature of Person Administering Oath
PAUL D. ARTHUR

SWORN STATEMENT

File Number: 0003-04-CID149-83130
Location: Baghdad Correctional Facility, Baghdad, Iraq
Date: 21 Jan 04
Time: 1520
Statement of: Samuel Jefferson PROVANCE
Grade/Status: E5/RA
SSN: [delete]
Org/Address: A 302nd MI BN

I Samuel Jefferson PROVANCE, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: Around the middle to the end of October I was talking to a female from the Nevada National Guard MP unit that was stationed here. She was very skinny, she was white, but very tanned, she had black and gray hair, and she was old. I don't remember her rank, but she was made the unit armorer during this time. She told me that they were the first unit here, and they were the ones who started setting this place up. She was the oldest female among that unit. She was telling me about writing these journals that talked about all of her experiences here in Iraq and the wrondoings she witnessed (and their cover up). In those journals she said there were killings, torture, you name it she said it. She was referring to all of the things that had been done here. She told me that the commander and the first sergeant hated her because she would voice opposition to them about the treatment of the people. She also told me that she mailed the journals home (to a friend or to herself) before they could be found so that the commander could not take them from her.

In late October SPC SCHLEGEL said that the MP's told her that these two detainees had raped a 14-year-old boy, so the MP's were handcuffing the detainees in contorted positions to each other and making it look like the two detainees were having sex with each other. I SPC SCHLEGEL told me that the detainees may have been naked at the time. She also said that the MP's made the detainees in isolation take their clothes off and wear women's underwear.

Around the end of October I was just discussing with SPC Hannah SCHLEGEL about how there were some bad things going on, as far as the prisoners are getting treated. She said yeah and she told me about a detainee who had gotten his eye busted open. SPC SCHLEGEL said that she asked the MP how his eye got busted, and the MP replied that he fell down.

When I returned from leave in the middle of December I was eating at the chow hall at Camp Victory, when I overheard SPC [delete] and three other people talking about what's going on at Abu Gharib. He was telling them about the things that the MP's were doing to the detainees. He said that he was invited to join in on these things, so he did. The MP's were using the detainees as practice dummies, like they would show each other how to knock someone out by knocking the detainee out. They did this while another detainee would watch, when the other detainee would start to get scared, the MP's would calm him down, and then hit him in some other way. He was also saying that the MP's were telling him how to hit the detainees so that you didn't leave a mark, and telling him what instruments to use so that they didn't leave marks.

I came back from leave in the beginning of December I was talking to SPC [delete] and she was telling me how the guards would bring the dogs down to the cells and use them to scare the detainees. She told me that she thought it was funny because after they would take the dogs away, one MP would bark like a dog, and they would all watch as the detainees would run from him because they thought there was a dog in the room.

When the people from my unit came up here to fill slots and act as guards, they were taken on a tour of the isolation area, when they were down there the MP's would tell them that they could do whatever they wanted to the detainees. I was told that all they ended up doing is yelling at the detainees and make them do PT. SGT BROWN told me that he was worried about his soldiers being exposed to that kind of behavior, and being encouraged to do so. SPC DELGADO, SPC HEIDENRICH, SPC GRIFFIN, SPC PAZDERSKI, SPC CAUDILL, and SPC KERSEY were all present for that. SPC KERSEY and SPC CAUDILL are not on the guard force; they are still doing analysis.

Q: SA Ryan D. BOSTAIN.

A: SGT Samuel C. PROVANCE.

Q: Do you know anybody specifically who was abusing the detainees?

A: Everything I know is what I've heard, all of these things take place down in isolation or in the booth.

Q: Do you know if anybody has taken any unauthorized photographs?

A: I know SPC [delete] had photos of the facility, but not of the detainees. I'm sure they were of sentimental value. Those photos were on the common drive, and I was told by my chain of command to delete the photos, so I did.

Q: Did SPC [delete] ever tell you if she was involved with the abuse of the detainees?

A: Just being there for the dog incident. She seemed really apathetic every time I said anything about it. She thought it was really funny to see the detainees run back into their cells from the dogs.

Q: Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?

A: Every time I said something about how I was worried about the treatment of the detainees, they would either say, thy are the enemy and if I was out there they would kill me, so they didn't care. I'm glad that something is finally being done, it's kind of shameful what's been going on.

Q: Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?

A. No. /// END OF STATEMENT /// SP

AFFIDAVIT

I, Samuel Jefferson PROVANCE, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS JAN 21, 2004 AT BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SPECIAL AGENT RYAN D. BOSTAIN, 6117 323RD MILITARY POLICE DETACMENT (CID) (DSE).

TRANSLATION OF SWORN STATEMENT PROVIDED BY A [DELETE] [DELETE] W [DELETE] Detainee # 151365, 1430/21 JAN 04:

'"I am the person named above. I entered Abu Ghraib prison on 10 Jul 2003, that was after they brought me from Baghdadi area. They put me in the tent area and then they brought me to Hard Site. The first day they put me in a dark room and started hitting me in the head and stomach and legs.

They made me raise my hands and sit on my knees. I was like that for four hours. Then the Interrogator came and he was looking at me while they were beating me. Then I stayed in this room for 5 days, naked with no clothes. They then took me to another cell on the upper floor. On 15 Oct 2003 they replaced the Army with the Iraqi Police and after that time they started punishing me in all sorts of ways. And the first punishment was bringing me to Room #1, and they put handcuffs on my hand and they cuffed me high for 7 or 8 hours. And that caused a rupture to my right hand and I had a cut that was bleeding and had pus coming from it. They kept me this way on 24, 25 and 26 October. And in the following days, they also put a bag over my head, and of course, this whole time I was without clothes and without anything to sleep on. And one day in November, they started different type of punishment, where an American Police came in my room and put the bag over my head and cuffed my hands and he took me out of the room into the hallway. He started beating me, him, and 5 other American Police. I could see their feet, only, from under the bag. A couple of those police they were female because I heard their voices and I saw two of the police that were hitting me before they put the bag over my head. One of them was wearing glasses. I couldn't read his name because he put tape over his name. Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, and they would hold the string from the bag and they made me bark like a dog and they were laughing at me. And that policeman was a tan color, because he hit my head to the wall. When he did that, the bag came off my head and one of the police was telling me to crawl in Arabic, so I crawled on my stomach and the police were spitting on me when I was crawling and hitting me on my hack, my head and my feet. It kept going on until their shift ended at 4 o'clock in the morning. The same thing would happen in the following days.

And I remember also one of the police hit me on my ear, before the usual beating, cuffing, bagging, dog position and crawling until 6 people gathered. And one of them was an Iraqi translator named [delete] he is a tan color, he has a mustache. Then the police started beating me on my kidneys and then they hit me on my right ear and it started bleeding and I lost conciousness. Then the Iraqi translator picked me up and told me "You are going to sleep". The when I went into the room, I woke up again. I was unconscious for about two minutes. The policeman dragged me into the room where he washed my ear and they called the doctor. The Iraqi doctor came and told me he couldn't take me to the clinic, so he fixed me in the hallway. When I woke up, I saw 6 of the American Police.

A few days before they hit me on my ear, the American police, the guy who wears glasses. he put red woman's underwear over my head. And then he tied me to the window that is in the cell with my hands behind my back until I lost consciousness. And also when I was in Room #1 they told me to lay down on my stomach and they were jumping from the bed onto my back and my legs. And the other two were spitting on me and calling me names, and they held my hands and legs. After the guy with the glasses got tired, two of the American soldiers brought me to the ground and tied my hands to the door while laying down on my stomach. One of the police was pissing on me and laughing on me. He then released my hands and I want and washed, and then the soldier came back into the room. and the soldier and his friend told me in a loud voice to lie down, so I did that. And then the policeman was opening my legs, with a bag over my head, and he sat down between my legs on his knees and I was looking at him from under the bag and they wanted to do me because I saw him and be was opening his pants, so I started screaming loudly and the other police starting hitting me with his feet on my neck and he put his feet on my head so I couldn't scream. Then they left and the guy with the glasses comes back with another person and he took me out of the room and they put me inside the dark room again and they started beating me with the broom that was there. And then they put the loudspeaker inside the room and they closed the door and he was yelling in the microphone. Then they broke the glowing finger and spread it on me until I was glowing and they were laughing. They took me to the room and they signaled me to get on to the floor. And one of the police he put a part of his stick that he always carries inside my ass and I felt it going inside me about 2 centimeters, approximately. And I started screaming, and he pulled it out and he washed it with water inside the room. And the two American girls that were there when they were beating me, they were hitting me with a ball made of sponge on my dick. And when I was tied up in my room, one of the girls, with blonde hair, she is white, she was playing with my dick. I saw inside this facility a lot of punishment just like what they did to me and more. And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances."

TRANSLATED BY:

Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib. Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:

Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: NELSON, Torin, Steed

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS:

DATE: 21 Jan 04

TIME: 11:44

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: Contractor

I, Torin S. Nelson want to make the following statement under oath:

As far as some of the things we talked about yesterday. The people I suggest you look at is [delete] J [delete], [delete] D [delete], these two gentlemen, I have looked at their files. I sat next to an interrogation that J [delete] was doing one day, where he was breaking a tables and chairs in the room with the detainee. MR D [delete] has a reputation for breaking the tables in the room. Look into file 15521 K [delete] [delete] A [delete]. He is my detainee now. One of the first times I interviewed him at the beginning of Jan 04, he showed me a large bruise to his left forearm that was about six to eight inches long, and he stated he got it from being grabbed and being thrown around. He had a bump on his forehead over his left eye that he related he received that from being thrown into a wall. He said that the interrogator grabbed him and threw him down. He is evasive and deceptive, but when he is talking about how people have treated him, I tend to believe it based on the stuff that I have heard and seen. Evidently the people who talking to him before I was working him were very hard on him. [Delete] J [delete] was the person working him before. M [delete] M [delete] I think his number is 155800. I would look at the interrogation on 12 Jan 04, of this detainee, and talk to the interpreter of that helped interview him. He should be able to give you more information. I am working his brother at the time. His story is very forth coming and very cooperative. Talk to SPC SCHLAGEL was working another detainee who is the brother of my detainee; this person related to SPC SCHALGELS detainee, I think the number is 155794, as well about this incident. Pull up the fill on this detainee M [delete]. After the first interview, [delete] J [delete] says to put this guy in isolation because he is not being forthright in his information. [Delete] J is a young interrogator, he is very excited and motivated, and he believes everyone here should be broken. Ali Darwiche, and interpreter he might have info. Simon has seen a lot of stuff that goes on. Simon is an interpreter with Titan as well. He has stated that he has witnessed some of the interrogators being ruff. I do not know if it was abuse. There is another incident SPC LUCIANA SPENCER was involved in where one of her detainees, she wanted to degrade him; she stripped him naked and made him walk back. She was moved into Bn Ops, and taken out of the interrogation role. LTC JORDAN would know more about that. I would really look at the files tor the detainees of D [delete] and J [delete]. A [delete] was the detainee that was allegedly taken and thrown out of the vehicle handcuffed. I believe the incident was witness by Ali Darwiche. He is on leave in the states and is getting married. You would have to go through Titan to get his info. A [delete] was sitting in the vehicle sandbagged, the interrogator who I think might have been D [delete] or J [delete], grabbed him and threw him out of the vehicle to the ground, the interrogator then yells at him for falling on the ground, and then started dragging or pulling the detainee by the cuffs. This information came from Ali Darwiche. We were doing an interview and he provided this information out side of what he was interpreting.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// End of Statement /// TSN

AFFIDAVIT

I, Torin S. Nelson HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 21st DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ.

Signature of Person Administering Oath
Warren D. Worth

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Rusafa II Prison Compound, Baghdad

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: A [delete] H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Rusafa II Prison Compound, Baghdad, Iraq

DATE: 20 Jan 04

TIME: 1520

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: ISN #13077

FILE NUMBER: 0003-04-CID149-83130

GRADE/STATUS: CIV/DETAINEE

I, H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete] want to make the following statement under oath:

When first I went to the hard site, the Americans soldiers took me, there were two soldiers, a translator named Abu Hamed. We stood in the hallway before the hard site and they started taking off our clothes one after another. After they took off my clothes the American soldier removed who was wearing glasses, night guard, and I saw an American female soldier which they call her Ms. Maya, in front of me they told me to stroke my penis in front of her. And then they covered my head again, and as I was doing whatever they asked me to do, they removed the bag off my head, and I saw my friend, he was the one in front of me on the floor. And then they told me to sit on the floor facing the wall. They brought another prisoner on my back and he was also naked. Then they ordered me to bend onto my knees and hands on the ground. And then they placed three others on our backs, naked. And after that they order me to sleep on my stomach and they ordered the other guy to sleep on top of me in the same position and the same way to all of us. And there were six of us. They were laughing, taking pictures, and they were stepping on our hands with their feet. And they started taking one after another and they wrote on our bodies in English. I don't know what they wrote, but they were taking pictures after that. Then, after that they forced us to walk like dogs on our hands and knees. And we had to bark like a dog and if we didn't do that, they start hitting us hard on our face and chest with no mercy. After that, they took us to our cells, took the mattresses out and dropped water on the floor and they made us sleep on our stomachs on the floor with the bags on our head and they took pictures of everything. Mr. Joyner shows up in the morning and give us our mattresses, blankets and food, but the second guy who wears the glasses was the opposite; he takes the mattresses, tie out hands, hit us and don't give us food. All that lasted for 10 days and the translator Abu Hamed was there. I only saw him when I arrived, but after that I knew he was there because I heard his voice during all of that. /// End of Statement ////

Translated By:
Lauriene H. DICE
Interpreter, Category II
Titan Corporation Inc.
Camp Doha, Kuwait

Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
Baghdad Correctional Facility
Abu Ghraib, IZ APO AE 09335

Verified By:
Johnson ISHO
Interpreter, Category II
Titan Corporation Inc.
Camp Doha, Kuwait

AFFIDAVIT

I, H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20 DAY OF JANUARY, 2003 AT RUSAFA II PRISON COMPOUND, BAGHDAD, IZ APO AE 09336

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA MANORA IEM

SWORN STATEMENT
LOCATION: Abu Ghurayb CID

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: LANGIANESE, SETH A.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 323 MI, JIDC, AG

DATE: 20 Jan

TIME: 0945

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: E-4/SPC/Active Duty

I, SETH ANTHONY LANGIANESE want to make the following statement under oath:

I was at the internet cafe, it was in December or January I am not sure when I was with SPC Porter and we were just checking our Emails, ect. When Porter started looking at Pictures an MP had down loaded from her camera, some were of the detainees on there knees -- it looked like Ganci Prisoners she had taken some from the sky above AG and she had some pics of her by a water buffalo ... I cannot remember what computer they were downloaded on and I am positive they won't still be there. The pictures were of the prisoners (looked like a whole camp) of the prisoners on their knees, hands behind there heads -- possibly why their camp was bein searched -- possibly 2-3 pics.

Q. Describe the MP you saw?

A. A female, by a water buffalo -- thats about all I remember.

Q. Do you know who this MP female is?

A. No, an MP.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// END OF STATEMENT /// SAL

AFFIDAVIT

I, SETH ANTHONY LANGIANESE HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20 DAY OF JAN, 2004 AT

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA WARREN D. WORTH

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: Porter, Canyon Elijah

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: JIDC, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq.

DATE: 20 Jan 04

TIME: 1025

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: E-4

I, SPC Canyon Porter want to make the following statement under oath:

At some point in the last two weeks to a month, I witnessed some pictures of detainees being stored on a computer at the internet cafe. At 1100 I left the FAC at the JIDC building to take my lunch/internet break. As usual, I stop by the internet cafe to check my email and on this occasion I also sent some pictures from my digital camera. I went to the folder I thought my pictures were stored in and came across 5-10 pictures that weren't mine, but I recognized as photos were of detainees, some praying. At the time I didn't think to check the clarity of the pictures, and I'm unsure if the detainees could be identified. Two of the pictures were of a female soldier, age 18-25, PFC-SPC, though I cannot recall her name. She had red hair and seemed to be of medium build. I assume that it was her photos, though they could have been taken by a friend. I am not certain that these pictures were sent via email, but that is almost always the case as there would be no other reason to save them on a computer. I sent of my emails and then went to lunch with a couple friends whom I don't recall at this time. As we were sitting to eat, the soldier in the pictures stood up at the table in front of me. As she put her gear on, I recognized her as the female from the pictures and pointed her out to my friends. I have not seen her since, but I would recognize her or her name if I did. At the time I thought it was incredibly stupid to do what she had done, but did not consider it terribly wrong as the photos did not appear to be demeaning. This is the first time I have brought this matter to anyone's attention, with the exception of my friends that day. end of statement CP

AFFIDAVIT

I, SPC Canyon E. Porter HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20th DAY OF JAN, 2004 AT

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA WARREN D. WORTH

Statements on 19 Jan 2004

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: KENNER, Jason A.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 372nd MP Co, Cumberland, MD, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE: 19 Jan 04

TIME: 1108

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SPC, Ad Res.

I, Jason A. Kenner want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. Have you ever been present when any detainees were abused?

A I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattress, sheets, and clothes.

Q. Who at MI instructed you to do this?

A. I do not really remember their names. I told them if they wanted me to do that they needed to give me paperwork. A few times prior to requiring paperwork I did take away mattresses and sheets.

Q. Is paperwork required in order to take away clothes, mattresses and sheets?

A. Before I left on leave it had started to be required.

Q. Did you ever take any thing away from a detainee that MI told you to without paperwork?

A. A few times before the paperwork stuff started. I don't believe anyone told me specifically that I could not do that; it is I just know not to do that. At one point we were informed that we could not do anything to embarrass the prisoners. As it was explained to me, if it would embarrass me, do not do it.

Q. What shift do you work on?

A. Day shift.

Q. Would you ever come to work and find prisoners that were handcuffed, nude, or both?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you give them their clothes back?

A. It would depend on if I were briefed if I could give them the clothes back.

Q. Did you ever work on the same tier as CPL GARNER and SSG FREDERICK?

A. A few times I did relieve GARNER, and a few times when I was a runner, SSG FREDERJCK would be in the office at the same time.

Q. Did you ever find that GRANER had taken something from a prisoner he should not have?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever seen any pictures that were taken of detainees?

A. No.

Q. Is there any events at the prison you feel CID should know about?

A. No.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A No. /// End of Statement /// JAK

AFFIDAVIT

I, Jason A. KENNER HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 19th DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ

Signature of Person Administering Oath
WARREN D. WORTH

Statements on 18 Jan 2004
admin
Site Admin
 
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:12 am

PART 11 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: NAKHLA, Adel L.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Titan Corporation, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facilityi, Abu Ghraib, Iraq 99335

DATE: 18 Jan 04

TIME: 1510

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: CIV

I, Adel Nakhla want to make the following statement under oath:

Q, Are you making this statement on your own free will?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been advised that you do not have to answer or questions or say anything?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you able to leave at this time if you decide to terminate this interview?

A. Yes.

Q. Has anyone threatened you in anyway?

A. No.

Q. Are you currently taking any medications that would impede your ability to answer these questions?

A. No.

Q. On 14 Jan 04, when you gave CID a sworn statement, was that a truthful statement?

A. I did not say the part of how I held the detainees foot that was on the floor so he would not run away.

Q. Why did you hold the foot down of the detainee?

A. So be would not run away and he would answer the question. I held it with my hand. Not in any powerful way.

Q. Did anyone ask you to hold the foot of the detainee?

A. No.

Q. Did anyone force you to hold the foot of the detainee?

A. No. I thought I was helping the MP's to get to the truth.

Q. How many interrogations have you been a part of since arriving at Abu Ghraib?

A. Maybe between 80 and 100 interviews.

Q. What agencies do you assist in the interviews?

A. MI and MP's, and some OGA.

Q. Have many times have you seen MI, MP, or OGA interrogate three detainees at the same time, handcuffed and nude, on the floor?

A. One time.

Q. Are you aware of the guidelines that are allowed by MI, MP and OGA when they are interviewing a detainee?

A. We were briefed on the guidelines. CPT WOOD briefed us back in November sometime.

Q. Was this briefing prior to the incident mentioned above?

A. After this incident.

Q. Do you think that what the MPs and the MI were doing to the three detainees was a correct form of interrogation?

A. No. I think they took matters into their own hands.

Q. Why was it not the correct form of interrogation?

A. Well first of all they wanted to interview the detainees they should have let MI talk to them. I do not think MPs are qualified here to do these interviews.

Q. So you realize this was an unauthorized interrogation?

A. I did not know if it was authorized or not.

Q. Did any of the men the detainees in this incident speak English?

A. No.

Q. Were you the only translator at this incident?

A. Yes, I even apologized to the detainees after this was down. I told them I thought what had happened was very degrading.

Q. What specifically did you tell the detainees to do?

A. Don't try to run away, stop right there, are you gay, do you like what is happening to you, are you all gays, you must like that position. These were some of the questions or things that I told them.

Q. Did you realize at the time that you were saying these things to the detainees that it was wrong to tell them these things the soldiers wanted you to say?

A. I do realize it was wrong at that time to say these things.

Q, Why was it was wrong to say these thing to the detainees?

A. Because it was degrading to them.

Q. Why did you translate these things anyway?

A. I thought that was what I was required to do as a translator.

Q. Did you ever receive any briefing how detainees would be treated?

A. No.

Q. Were you ever told who you could report detainee abuse to?

A. No. The only thing that is logical is to report it to your boss or to this unit.

Q. Do you feel what you said to these detainees was wrong?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever translate for GRANER or FREDERICK on any other occasion when they abused the detainees?

A. Just when they would shake them. Nothing that was significant.

Q. Have you ever hit or assaulted any detainee?

A. I just held his foot. and I shook them by grabbing their clothes.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Adel L. NAKHLA HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 18th DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ

Signature of Person Administering Oath
WARREN D. WORTH

STATEMENT OF Adel NAKHLA TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 18 Jan 04 CONTINUED:

Q. Was there ever a time when you were in a cell with a detainee alone?

A. 1 do not recall ever being alone in a cell with any detainee. I always have a guard present when I am in the cell.

Q. Have you ever been in a cell alone and the detainee was nude?

A. No not alone. Only when they were being questioned by MI or someone and I was translating.

Q. Did you ever engage in sexual intercourse with a male detainee?

A. No.

Q. Were you ever present when photographs of detainees were taken?

A. When they took the picture of the detainee that busted his chin, I was present for that.

Q. Who took this picture?

A. GRANER.

Q. Why did GRANER take the picture?

A. I do not know. Maybe to prove he was injured.

Q. How did this detainee get injured?

A. GRANER pushed the detainee against the wall.

Q. Did you witness this act?

A. No. I was upstairs at the time.

Q. Who else was there?

A. I think Megan AMBUHL was in the office up stairs; maybe FREDERICK or he came after.

Q. Why did GRANER push this detainee into the wall?

A. I do not know. GRANER did not say why he did it.

Q. Who stitched the detainee's chin up?

A. The medics and GRANER helped sew up the wound.

Q. Did you ever witness GRANER or FREDER!CK assault any other detainees?

A. To the extent of injury no, but they would shake the detainee around. Especially when they detainee was a high-ranking officer or political value.

Q, Did you ever take any pictures of the detainees?

A. No.

Q. Do you have a personal computer here?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever seen any other MP's conduct interviews of the detainees?

A. I have seen AMBUHL shake some of the detainees.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// End of statement ////

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY H [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete [delete]
Detainee # 19446, 1242/18 JAN 04:

"I was in the solitary confinement, me and my friends. We were treated badly. They took our clothes off, even the underwear and they beat us very hard, and they put a hood over my head. And when I told them I am sick they laughed at me and beat me. And one of them brought my friend and told him "stand here" and they brought me and had me kneel in front of my friend. They told my friend to masturbate and told me to masturbate also, while they were taking pictures. After that they brought my friends, H [delete] A [delete] N [delete] A [delete] H [delete] M [delete] and I, and they put us 2 on the bottom, 2 on top of them, and 2 on top of those and one on top. They took pictures of us and we were naked. After the end of the beating, they took us to our separate cells and they opened the water in the cell and told us to lay face down in the water and we stayed like that until the morning, in the water, naked, without clothes. Then one of the other shift gave us clothes, but the second shift took the clothes away at night and handcuffed us to the beds. The number or the guards was 4. Two of them male, and one of them had a chain tattoo on his arm and wearing eyeglasses. The other one had a tattoo on his back like a dragon. The female wearing eyeglasses was short and had short hair. The second female hair was yellow and she was medium height.

Q: IEM

A: H [delete] [delete[ delete] A [delete]

Q: How did you feel when the guards were treating you this way?

A: I was trying to kill myself but I didn't have any way of doing it.

Q: Did the guards force you to crawl on your hands and knees on the ground?

A: Yes. They forced us to do this thing.

Q: What were the guards doing while you were crawling on your hands and knees?

A: They were sitting on our backs like riding animals.

Q: When you were on each other, what were the guards doing?

A: They were taking pictures and writing on our asses.

Q: How many times did the guards treat you this way?

A: The first time, when I just go in, and the second day they put us in the water and handcuffed us.

Q: Did you see the guards treat the other inmates this way?

A: I didn't see, but I heard screams and shouts in another area."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10th Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (ClD), USAClD
Abu Gbraib Prison complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Cateogory II
Titan Corporation

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY K [delete] [delete] H [delete].
# 151108. 1300/18 JAN 04:

"In the name of God. I swear to God that everything I witnessed everything I am talking about. I am not saying this to gain any material thing, and I was not pressured to do this by any forces First, I am going to talk only about what happened to me in Abu Ghraib Jail. I will not talk about what happened when I was in jail before, because they did not ask me about that, but it was very bad.

1. They stripped me of all my clothes, even my underwear. They gave me woman's underwear, that was rose color with flowers in it and they put the bag over my face. One of them whispered in my ear. "today I am going to fuck you", and he said this in Arabic. Whoever was with me experienced the same thing. That's what the American soldiers did, and they had a translator with them, named Abu Hamid and a female soldier, who's skin was olive colored and this was on October 3 or 4, 2003 around 3 or 4 in the afternoon. When they took me to the cell, the translator Abu Hamid came with an American soldier and his rank was sergeant (I believe). And he called told me "faggot" because I was wearing the woman's underwear, and my answer was "no". Then he told me "why are you wearing this underwear", then I told them "because you make me wear it". The transfer from Camp B to the Isolation was full of beatings, but the bags were over our heads, so we couldn't see their faces. And they forced me to wear this underwear all the time, for 51 days. And most of the days I was wearing nothing else.

2. I faced more harsh punishment from Grainer. He cuffed my bands with irons behind my back to the metal of the window, to the point my feet were off the ground and I was hanging there. for about 5 hours just because I asked about the time, because I wanted to pray. And then they took all my clothes and he took the female underwear and he put it over my head. After he released me from the window, he tied me to my bed until before dawn. He took me to the shower room. After he took me to the shower room, he brought me to my room again. He prohibited me from eating food that night, even though I was fasting that day. Grainer and the other two soldiers were taking pictures of every thing they did to me. I don't know if they took a picture of me because they beat me so bad I lost consciousness after an hour or so.

3. They didn't give us food for a whole day and a night, while we were fasting for Ramadan. And the food was only one package of emergency food.

Now I am talking about what I saw:

1. They brought three prisoners completely naked and they tied them together with cuffs and they stuck one to another. I saw the American soldiers hitting them with a football and they were taking pictures. I saw Grainer punching one of the prisoners right in his face very hard when he refused to take off his underwear and I heard them begging for help. And also the American soldiers told to do like homosexuals (fucking). And there was one of the American soldiers they called Sergeant (black skin) there was 7 to 8 soldiers there also. Also female soldiers were taking pictures and that was in the first day of Ramadan. And they repeated the same thing the second day of Ramadan. And they were ordering them to crawl while they were cuffed together naked.

2. I saw [delete] fucking a kid, his age would be about 15-18 years. The kid was hurting very bad and they covered all the doors with sheets. Then when I heard the screaming I climbed the door because on top it wasn't covered and I saw [delete] [delete] who was wearing the military uniform putting his dick in the little kid's ass. I couldn't see the face of the kid because his face wasn't in front of the door. And the female soldier was taking pictures. [Delete] I think he is [delete] because of his accent, and he was not skinny or short, and he acted like a homosexual (gay). And that was in cell #23 as best as I remember.

3. In the cell that is almost under it, on the North side, and I was right across from it on the other side. They put the sheets again on the doors. Grainer and his helper they cuffed one prisoner in Room #1, named A [delete], he was Iraqi citizen. They tied him to the bed and they were inserted the phosphoric light in his ass and he was yelling for God's help. A [delete] used to get hit and punished a lot because I heard him screaming and they prohibited us from standing near the door when they do that. That was Ramadan, around 12 midnight approximately when I saw them putting the stick in his ass. The female soldier was taking pictures.

4. I saw more than once men standing on a water bucket that was upside down and they were totally naked. And carrying chairs over their heads standing under the fan of the hallway behind the wooden partition and also in the shower.

Not one night for all the time I was there passed without me seeing, hearing or feeling what was happening to me.

And 1am repeating the oath / I swear on Allah almighty on the truth of what I said. Allah is my witness."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY M [delete] J [delete] Detainee
# 152307. 1200/18 JAN 04:

"I am going to start from the first day I went into A1. They stripped me from my clothes and all the stuff that they gave me and I spent 6 days in that situation. And then they gave me a blanket only. 3 days after that, they gave me a mattress, and after a short period of time, approximately at 2 at night, the door opened and Grainer was there. He cuffed my hands behind my back and he cuffed my feet and he took me to the shower room. When they finished interrogating me, the female interrogator left. And then Grainer and another man, who looked like Grainer but doesn't have glasses, and has a thin mustache, and he was young and tall, came into the room. They threw pepper on my face and the beating started. This went on for a half hour. And then he started beating me with the chair until the chair was broken. After that they started choking me. At that time I thought I was going to die, but it's a miracle I lived. And then they started beating me again. They concentrated on beating me in my heart until they got tired from beating me. They took a little break and then they started kicking me very hard with their feet until I passed out.

In the second scene at the night shift, I saw a new guard that wears glasses and has a red face. He charged his pistol and pointed it at a lot of the prisoners to threaten them with it. I saw things no one would see, they are amazing. They come in the morning shift with two prisoners and they were father and son. They were both naked. They put them in front of each other and they counted 1, 2, 3, and then removed the bags from their heads. When the son saw his father naked he was crying. He was crying because of seeing his father. And then at night, Grainer used to throw the food into the toilet and said "go take it and eat it". And I saw also in Room #5 they brought the dogs. Grainer brought the dogs and they bit him in the right and left leg. He was from Iran and they started beating him up in the main hallway of the prison."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CiD) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY M [delete] [delete] M [delete] Detainee
# 150542. 1140/18 JAN 04:

"Before Ramadan, Grainer started covering all the rooms with bed sheets. Then I heard screams coming from Room #1, at that time I was in Room #50 and it's right below me so I looked into the room. I saw A [delete] in Room #1, who was naked and Grainer was putting the phosphoric light up his ass. A [delete] was screaming for help. There was another tall white man who was with Grainer, he was helping him. There was also a white female soldier, short, she was taking pictures of A [delete]. A [delete] is now in cell #50."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:

Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

Statements on 17 Jan 2004

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY S [delete] [delete] A [delete] Detainee # 150422. 1630/17 JAN 04:

"One of those days the guards tortured the prisoners. Those guards are Grainer, Davis and another man. First they tortured the man whose name is Amjid Iraqi. They stripped him of his clothes and beat him until he passed out and they cursed him and when they took off of his head I saw blood running from his head. They took him to solitary confinement and they were beating him every night.

The evening shift was sad for the prisoners. They brought three prisoners handcuffed to each other and they pushed the first one on top of the others to look like they are gay and when they refused, Grainer beat them up until they put them on top of each other and they took pictures of them. And after that they beat up an Iraqi whose name is A [delete] whom they ordered to stand on a food carton and they were pouring water on him and it was the coldest of times. When they torture him they took gloves and they beat his dick and testicles with the gloves and they handcuffed him to the cell door for half a day without food or water. After that they brought young Iraqi prisoners and Grainer tortured them by pouring water on them from the second floor until one of them started crying and screaming and started saying "my heart". They brought the doctors to treat him and they thought he was going to die. After they brought six people and they beat them up until they dropped on the floor and one of them his nose was cut and the blood was running from his nose and he was screaming but no one was responding and all this beating from Grainer and Davis and another man, whom I don't know the name. The Doctor came to stitch the nose and the Grainer asked the doctor to learn how to stitch and it's true, the guard learned how to stitch. He took the string and the needle and he sat down to finish the stitching until the operation succeeded. And then the other man came to take pictures of the injured person who was laying on the ground. And after that they beat up the rest of the group until they fall to the ground. Every time one of them fell on the ground they drag them up to stand on his feet. Grainer beat up a man whose name is A [delete] [delete] S [delete] and he was beating him until he gotten almost crazy. And he was telling him go up to the second floor as he was naked. And they opened the prisoners cells to see him running naked. And after they put him in his cell for four days they were pouring water on him and he couldn't sleep. Before that he was in cell number 4. They hanged him and he was screaming but no one helped him.

There was a translator named A [delete] A [delete] the [delete] He was helping Grainer and Davis and others whom I don't know, like they were watching a live movie of three young guys being put up by A [delete] A [delete] on top of each other. And everyone was taking pictures of this whole thing with cameras. This is what I saw and what I remember to be true."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADl
Translator. Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib. Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY A [delete] [delete] Y [delete, Detainee # 150425. 1445/17 JAN 04:

"One day while in the prison the guard came and found a broken toothbrush, and they said that I was going to attack the American Police; I said that the toothbrush wasn't mine. They said we are taking away your clothes and mattress for 6 days and we are not going to beat you. But the next day the guard came and cuffed me to the cell door for 2 hours. after that they took me to a closed room and more than five guards poured cold water on me, and forced me to put my head in someone's urine that was already in that room. After that they beat me with a broom and stepped on my head with their feet while it was still in the urine. They pressed my ass with a broom and spit on it. Also a female soldier, whom I don't know the name was standing on my legs. They used a loudspeaker to shout at me for 3 hours. it was cold. But to tell the truth in daytime Joiner gave me my clothes and at night Grainer took them away. The truth is they gave me my clothes after 3 days. they didn't finish the 6 days and thank you."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADl
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (CID) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USACIDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY M [delete] [delete] M [delete], Detainee # 150542, 1610/17 JAN 04:

"Two days before Ramadan Grainer the guard came with the other guards, they brought two prisoners and they made them take off all their clothes down to naked by the two guards Grainer and Davis and then they were beating them a lot. One of the prisoners was bleeding from a cut he got over his eye. Then they called the doctor who came and fixed him. After that they stated beating him again.

They removed all my clothes down to naked for seven days and they were bringing a group of people to watch me naked.

They brought a prisoner with a civil case, his name is S [delete]. He was brought by Grainer the guard and Davis and there was a third guard, I don't know his name. They beat him a lot then they removed all his clothing then they put wire up his ass and they started taking pictures of him.

Grainer used to hang the prisoners by hand to the doors and windows in a way that was very painful for several hours and we heard them screaming.

One day Grainer and Davis brought 6 generals and they stripped them down to naked. They started torturing them and taking pictures and they were enjoying that. When the doctor came to fix the injured person, Grainer took the needle from the doctor and started stitching the cut on the injured person.

A few days before Ramadan, Grainer and Davis, and another person that came with them used beat up a man named "A [delete]" who was in room number one. They were beating his very hard with a stick and Grainer was pissing on him and beating him for about a week until they injured his eye and the doctor came.

Grainer and Davis, and a third man, used to beat up a prisoner who was from [delete] and strip him all night. We heard him screaming all night.

Every time a new prisoner came Grainer and Davis stripped them, beat them and took pictures. I remember one prisoner named "W [delete]."

Important Point:

All the guards excluding Grainer and Davis are very good with the prisoners and the prisoners like them and respect them and are very happy with them. They give a good image of the United States and they prove by their good treatment the big difference between the Baath Party and the United States."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (ClD) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USAClDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

TRANSLATION OF VERBAL STATEMENT PROVIDED BY A [delete] [delete] H [delete]. Detainee # 152529, 1605/17 JAN 04:

"One the date of November 5, 2003, when the US forces transferred to Isolation, when they took me out of the car, an American soldier hit me with his hand on my face. And then they stripped me naked and they took me under the water and then he made me crawl the hallway until I was bleeding from my chest to my knees and my hands. And after that he put me back into the cell and an hour later he took me out from the cell the second time to the shower room under cold water and them he made me get up on a box, naked, and he hit me on my manhood. I don't know with what, then I fell down on the ground. He made me crawl on the ground. And then he tied my hands in my cell naked until morning time until Joyner showed up and released my hands and took me back to my room and gave me my clothes back. About two days later my interrogation came up, when it was done a white soldier wearing glasses picked me from the room I was in. He grabbed my head and hit it against the wall and then tied my hand to the bed until noon the next day and then two days later the same soldier and he took all my clothes and my mattress and he didn't give me anything so I can sleep on except my jump suit for 3 days. Then Joyner came and gave me a blanket and my clothes a second time."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (ClD) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USAClDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: BOLINGER, Matthew Scott

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 372nd MP Co, Cumberland, MD, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE: 17 Jan 04

TIME: 1950

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: CPL/E4

I, Matthew Scott Bolinger want to make the following statement under oath:

Maybe around the middle part of November 04, I was going to CPL GRANER's room with SPC ENGLAND, because she had to get something out of GRANER's room. SPC ENGLAND was under restriction from seeing GRANER for an inappropriate relationship. After we enter the room, we saw then [delete] now [delete], who was playing a video game in the room, and GRANER was also there. GRANER told me to check this out and that is when he pulled a CD out from under his mattress in a CD case. GRANER put the CD in the computer and then walk away to help ENGLAND find whatever it was she was looking for. As GRANER got up to walk away, the video popped up, it did not having any sound to it. There was a female bent over, kind of leaning over, she was in the prison, and [delete] was behind her. At one point the camera popped up and that is when I saw the person behind the girl and recognize that it was [delete] who was having sex with her. Then the camera moved to her face and I could really only see her eyes, and then it went back to showing both of them. I could not really see [delete] penetrating her, but his pants were around his ankles, and I could tell that he had no underwear at least that I could see. The underwear could have been with the pants around his ankles. The girl was completely nude. I got to see about 20 to 25 seconds of this video, and then GRANER quickly shut it off. GRANER was just moving very quick to get that video off the screen. [Big delete]

Q. Why do you think that [delete] and her were having sex?

A. Mostly from the motion of the girl's body. She would bounce, as his mid section would hit her. I have seen other people having sex before in videos and it looked like that.

Q. Do you know whom the girl was?

A. No.

Q. How do you know it was in the prison?

A. Cause you could see the corner of the jail cell through out the video.

Q. Do you know who was holding the camera?

A. I have no idea.

Q. What kind of pants did [delete] have on?

A. DCU.

Q. How far away did it appear the camera was from them when they were having sex?

A. It looked like it was really close. That is why you could only see a little at a time. They filled up the frame of the camera.

Q. Have you ever seen any other videos or images of the prison or detainees?

A. Just the ones of the females acting like they are urinating in the jail cells. I think it was in tier one in the back left hand side where the urinals in the floor are. The pictures were of both [delete] and [delete] they had their hands across their knees and their DCU pants around their ankles and they were acting like they were pissing in the toilets.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// END OF STATEMENT /// MSB

AFFIDAVIT

I, Matthew Scott Bolinger HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 17th DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHARIB PRISON, IRAQ

Signature of Person Administering Oath
WARREN D. WORTH

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Baghdad Correctional Facility

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: A [delete] N [delete] [delete]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Prison 2A, Baghdad Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, APO AE 09335

DATE: 17 Jan 04

TIME: 1731

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: ISN #7787

FILE NUMBER: 0003-04-CID149-83130

GRADE/STATUS: CIV/INTERNEE

I, N [delete [delete] [delete] A [delete] want to make the following statement under oath:

One day in Ramadan, I don't know the exact date; we were involved in a fight in Compound 2, so they transferred us to the hardsite. As soon as we arrived, they put sandbags over our heads and they kept beating us and called us bad names. After they removed the sandbags they stripped us naked as a newborn baby. Then they ordered us to hold our penises and stroke it and this was only during the night. They started to take photographs as if it was a porn movie. And they treated us like animals not humans. They kept doing this for a long time. No one showed us mercy. Nothing but cursing and beating. Then they started to write words on our buttocks, which we didn't know what it means. After that they left us for the next two days naked with no clothes, with no mattresses, as if we were dogs. And every single night this military guy comes over and beat us and handcuffed us until the end of his shift at 0400. This was for three days and he didn't serve us dinner except for bread and tea. If we had chicken, he would throw it away. The first night when they stripped us naked they made us get on our hands and knees and they started to pile us one on top of the other. They started to take pictures from the front and from the back. And if anyone want to know the details of this, take the negative from the night guard and you will find everything I said was true. The next day the day shift gave us clothes and when the night shift started, the same guard who tortured us the night before came and took the clothes and left us naked and handcuffed to the bed. At the end of his shift he uncuffed us and then he punch us in the stomach and hit us on the head and face. Then he goes home. I kept thinking what is he going to do to us the next night, this white man with the white glasses. When I see him I'm scared to death. Again, watch the pictures in his belongings. He and the two short female soldiers and the black soldier during this dark night. When we were naked he ordered us to stroke, acting like we're masturbating and when we start to do that he would bring another inmate and sit him down on his knees in front of the penis and take photos which looked like this inmate was putting the penis in his mouth. Before that, I felt that someone was playing with my penis with a pen. After this they make H [delete] [delete] stand in front of me and they forced me to slap him on the face, but I refused cause he is my friend. After this they asked' H [delete] to hit me, so he punched my stomach. I asked him to do that, so they don't beat him like they had beaten me when I refused to hit H [delete] N [delete] S [delete] H [delete] M [delete[ [delete] S [delete] H [delete} H [delete] H [delete A [delete] S [delete] those are the names of the people who were there at this night which we felt like 1000 nights.

Q: IEM

A: N [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete]

Q: How many soldiers were there that night?

A: 3 men and 2 women.

Q: Do you know the names of the soldiers?

A: I don't know the soldiers names, but I know what one of them looks like and this was their supervisor. The reason why I know him because I saw him every single night I spent there.

Q: What did the supervisor look like?

A: He's white, muscular, wearing clear medical glasses. He had a blu tattoo on one of his shoulders. I don't know which shoulder and I don't know what tattoo it resembled. And he works every night from 4 pm to 4 am. // End of Statement ///

Translated By:
Gawdat HUSSEIN
Interpreter, Category II
Titan Corporation Inc.
Camp Doha, Kuwait
Date: 17 Jan 04

AFFIDAVIT

I, N [delete] [delete] A [delete] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 14th DAY OF JANUARY, 2004 AT PRISONER INTERROGATION TEAM (PIT) (CID) (FWD), BAGHDAD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ABU GHRAIB, 09335

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA MANORA IEM

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: JOYNER, Hydrue S.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 372nd Military Police Company, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

DATE: 17 Jan 04

TIME: 1404

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: E5/Reserves

I, Hydrue S. JOYNDER want to make the following statement under oath:

I am assigned to the 372nd Military Police Company, currently assigned to the Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. I work at the hard site in the 1A Military Intelligence (M.I.) tier during the day shift: which is from 0400 to 1600 hours. On January 16th 2004 on or about 1400 hours I was interviewed by Agent PIERON about a situation of suspected prisoner abuse by Military Police personnel. As I stated in my interview I never personally witnessed any abuse by Military Police personnel. I was next asked to view digital pictures and video for identification of suspected Military Police personnel that may have been involved and any inmates that I may be able to identify. After viewing the digital pictures and video I did make positive identification on the following Military personnel, SSG FREDERICK; CPL GRANER; SPC ENGLAND: SPC HARMAN; and SPC SIVITS. I was also able to recognize the following inmates from the same digital pictures and video, inmate #20092 who was nicknamed ''Gus'' this inmate was released from the prison approximately two months ago, and two inmates who were suspected of committing rape; whose names I do not recall but their inmate numbers are [delete] and [delete]

Q: SA BOBECK

A: SGT JOYNER

Q: Did you ever see "Gus" having to crawl around like a dog?

A: No that didn't happen on my shift.

Q: Prior to this incident, did you ever hear of any rumors that abuse was occurring during the night shift?

A: I heard rumors, I thought it was prisoners making that up and I didn't think anyone would be that stupid.

Q: Do you know the inmate who had ''rapest" written on him?

A: No.

Q: Do you of any other inmates who may have been abused by the night shift?

A: Maybe "trigger".

Q: How did you feel when you saw the pictures on the CD?

A: It made me want to throw-up. I couldn"t believe what I was seeing.

Q: Do you know who any of the Military Intelligence personnel were in the pictures?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever been directed by the Military Intelligence personnel of any other government agency to "soften-up" a prisoner prior to the interrogation?

A: Yes. I would have them do physical training to tire them out.

Q: Do you know Steve (NFI)?

A: Yes, he would come in and interview prisoners and sometimes ask me show a prisoner "special attention".

Q: What did "special attention" mean to you?

A: Basically it meant to give the prisoner physical training or to making sure they were awake.

Q: Can you describe what the Military Intelligence personnel looked like?

A: I did not know any of their names and they did not use their names, They were all males, but none of them had any scars or tattoos or any distinctive mark that I could identify.

Q: Do you know anyone who still has any pictures of the abuse?

A: No.

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A: No. /// END OF STATEMENT /// HJ

AFFIDAVIT

I, Jydrue S. JOYNER, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 17th DAY OF JANUARY, 2004 AT ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ, APO AE 09335

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA SCOTT E. BOBECK

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY T [delete] [delete] D [delete], Detainee
# 150427. 1440/17 JAN 04:

"I went to the Solitary Confinement on the Sep/10/2003. I was there for 67 days of suffering and little to eat and the torture I saw myself. When I asked the guard Joyner about the time and he cuffed my hand to the door then when his duty ended the second guard came, his name is Grainer, he released my hand from the door and he cuffed my hand in the back. Then I told him I did not do anything to get punished this way so when I said that he hit me hard on my chest and he cuffed me to the window of the room about 5 hours and did not give me any food that day and I stayed without food for 24 hours. I saw lots of people getting naked for a few days getting punished in the first days of Ramadan. They came with two boys naked and they were cuffed together face to face and Grainer was beating them and a group of guards were watching and taking pictures from top and bottom and there was three female soldiers laughing at the prisoners. The prisoners, two of them, were young. I don't know their names."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (ClD) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USAClDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

Statements on 16 Jan 2004

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: TIRE 1A, Baghdad Correctional Facility

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: A [delete] A [delete] [delete]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Baghdad Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

DATE: 16 Jan 04

TIME: 1722

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: NDRS #151362

FILE NUMBER: 0003-04-CID149-83130

GRADE/STATUS: CIV/DETAINEE

I, A [delete] [delete] A [delete] want to make the following statement under oath:

I am A [delete] [delete] A [delete]. I was arrested on the 7 Oct 2003. They brought me over to Abu Ghraib Prison they put me in a tent for one night. During this night the guards every one or two hours and threaten me with torture and punishment. The second day they transferred me to the hard site. Before I got in, a soldier put a sand bag over my head. I didn't see anything after that. They took me inside the building and started to scream at me. The stripped me naked, they asked me, "Do you pray to Allah?" I said. "Yes," They said, "Fuck you" and "Fuck him." One of them said, "You are not getting out of here health, you are getting out of here handicap." And he said to me, "Are you married?" I said, "Yes." They said, "If your wife saw you like this, she will be disappointed." One of them said, "But if I saw her now, she would not be disappointed now because I would rape her." Then one of them took me to the shower, removed the sand bag, and I saw him, a black man, he told me to take a shower and he said he would come inside and rape me and I was very scared. Then they put the sand bag over my head and took me to cell #5. And for the next five days I didn't sleep because they use to come to my cell, asking me to stand up for hours and hours. And they slammed the outer door, which made a loud scary noise inside the cell. And this black soldier took me once more to the showers, stood there staring at my body. And he threaten he was going to rape me again. After that, they started to interrogate me. I lied to them so they threaten me with hard punishment. Then other interrogators came over and told me, "If you tell the truth, we will let you go as soon as possible before Ramadan," so I confessed and said the truth. Four days after that, they took me to the camp and I didn't see those interrogators anymore. New interrogators came and re-interrogated me. After I told them the truth they accused me of being lying to them. After 18 days in the camp, they sent me to the hard site. I asked the interrogators why? They said they did not know. Two days before led (End of Ramadan), an interrogator came to me with a women and an interpreter. He said I'm one step away from being in prison forever. He started the interrogation with this statement and end it with this statement. The first day of led, the incident of "Firing" happened. I got shot with several bullets in my body and got transferred to the hospital. And there, the interrogator "Steve" came to me and threaten me with the hardest torture when I go back to the prison. I said to him. "I'm sorry about what happened." He said to me, "Don't be sorry now, because you will be sorry later." After several days he came back and said to me, "If I put you under torture, do you think this would be fair?" I said to him, "Why?" He said he needed more information from me. I told him, "I already told you everything I know." He said, "We'll see when you come back to the prison." After 17 or 18 days, I was released from the hospital, went back to Abu Ghraib, he took me somewhere and the guard put a pistol to my head. He said, "I wish I can kill you right now." I spend the night at this place and next morning they took me to the hard site. They received me there with screaming, shoving, pushing and pulling. They forced me to walk from the main gate to my cell. Otherwise they would beat my broken leg. I was in a very bad shape. When I went to the cell, they took my crutches and I didn't see it since. Inside the cell, they asked me to strip naked; they didn't give me blanket or clothes or anything. Every hour or two, soldiers came, threatening me they were going to kill me and torture me and I'm going to be in prison forever and they might transfer me to Guantanamo Bay. One of them came and told me that he failed to shoot me the first time, but he will make sure he will succeed next time. And he said to me they were going to throw a pistol or a knife in my cell, then shoot me. Sometime they said, "We will make you wish to die and it will not happen." The night guard came over, his name is GRANER, open the cell door, came in with a number of soldiers. They forced me to eat pork and they put liquor in my mouth. They put this substance on my nose and forehead and it was very hot. The guards started to hit me on my broken leg several times with a solid plastic stick. He told me he got shot in his leg and he showed me the scare and he would retaliate from me for this. They stripped me naked. One of them told me he would rape me. He drew a picture of a woman to my back and makes me stand in shameful position holding my buttocks. Someone else asked me, "Do you believe in anything?" I said to him, "I believe in Allah." So he said, "But I believe in torture and I will torture you." When I go home to my country, I will ask whoever comes after me to torture you. Then they handcuffed me and hung me to the bed. They ordered me to curse Islam and because they started to hit my broken leg, I cursed my religion. They ordered me to thank Jesus that I'm alive. And I did what they ordered me. This is against my belief. They left me hang from the bed and after a little while I lost consciousness. When I woke up, I found myself still hang between the bed and the floor. Until now, I lost feeling in three fingers in my right hand. I sat on the bed, one of them stood by the door and pee'd on me. And he said, "GRANER, your prisoner pee'd on himself." And then GRANER came and laughed. After several hours GRANER came and uncuffed me, then I slept. In the morning until now, people I don't know come over and humiliate me and threaten that they will torture me. The second night, GRANER came hand hung me to the cell door. I told him. "I have a broken shoulder, I'm afraid it will break again, cause the doctor told me "don't put your arms behind your back." He said, "I don't care." Then he hung me to the door for more than eight hours. I was screaming from pain the whole night. GRANER and others use to come and ask me, "does it hurt." I said. "Yes." They said. "Good." And they smack me on the back of the head. After that a soldier came and uncuffed me. My right shoulder and my wrist was in bad shape and great pain. (When I was hung to the door, I lost consciousness several times) Then I slept. In the morning I told the doctor that I think my shoulder is broken because I can't my hand. I feel sever pain. He checked my shoulder and told me, "I will bring another doctor to see you tomorrow." The next day, the other doctor checked my shoulder and said to me, he's taking me to the hospital the next day for X-rays. And the next day he took me to the hospital and X-rayed my shoulder and the doctor told me, "Your shoulder is not broke, but your shoulder is badly hurt." Then they took me back to the hard site. Every time I leave and come back. I have to crawl back to my cell because I can't walk. The next day, other soldiers came at night and took photos of me while I'm naked. They humiliated me and made of me and threaten me. After that. the interrogators came over and identify the person who gave me the pistols between some pictures. And this guy wasn't in the pictures. When I told them that, they said they will torture me and they will come every single night to ask me the same question accompanied with soldiers having weapons and they point a weapon to my head and threaten that they will kill me; sometime with dogs and they hang me to the door allowing the dogs to try to bite me. This happened for a full week or more.

Q: IEM

A: A [delete] [delete] A [delete]

Q: Have you ever seen GRANER beating a prisoner?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever seen GRANER/any guards pile naked prisoners over each other?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever seen GRANER/any guards taking photographs of prisoners?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever seen GRANER/any guards taking photographs during punishment time?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever seen GRANER/any soldiers taking photographs while beating prisoners?

Q: Have you ever seen any soldier positioning naked prisoners on top of each other?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever seen any guard/American soldier position naked prisoners in sexual positions?

A: No. /// End of Statement ///

Translated By:
Gawdat HUSSEIN
Interpreter, Category II
Titan Corporation Inc
Camp Doha. Kuwait
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PlT) CID) (FWD)
Baghdad Correctional Facility
Abu Ghraib. IZ APO AE 09335

AFFIDAVIT

I, H [delete] [delete] [delete] [delete] A [delete] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 20th DAY OF JANUARY, 2003 AT BAGHDAD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ABU GHRAIB, IZ, APO AE 09335

Signature of Person Administering Oath
SA MANORA IEM

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT PROVIDED BY A [delete] [delete] [delete] F [delete], Detainee# 18470, 1610/16 JAN 04:

"On the third day, after five o'clock, Mr. Grainer came and took me to Room #37, which is the shower room, and he started punishing me. Then he brought a box of food and he made me stand on it with no clothing, except a blanket. Then a tall black soldier came and put electrical wires on my fingers and toes and on my penis, and I had a bag over my head. Then he was saying "which switch is on for electricity." And he came with a loudspeaker and he was shouting near my ear and then he brought the camera and he took some pictures of me, which I knew because of the flash of the camera. And he took the hood off and he was describing some poses he wanted me to do, and the I was tired and I fell down. And then Mr. Grainer came and made me stand up on the stairs and made me carry a box of food. I was so tired and I dropped it. He started screaming at me in English. He made me lift a white chair high in the air. Then the chair came down and then Mr. Joyner took the hood off my head and took me to my room. And I slept after that for about an hour and then I woke up at the headcount time. I couldn't go to sleep after that because I was very scared."

TRANSLATED BY:
Mr. Abdelilah ALAZADI
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation
Assigned to:
Prisoner Interview/Interrogation Team (PIT) (ClD) (FWD)
10TH Military Police Battalion (CID) (ABN) (FWD)
3rd Military Police Group (CID), USAClDC
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex (ABPC)
Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE 09335

VERIFIED BY:
Mr. Johnson ISHO
Translator, Category II
Titan Corporation

SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: HARMAN, Sabrina D.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 372nd MP Co., Cumberland MD, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE: 16 Jan 04

TIME: 1227

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [delete]

GRADE/STATUS: SPC, Ad Res.

I, Sabrina D. Harman want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. Were you truthful in your first statement to C1D?

A. No.

Q. What did not tell the truth about?

A. Writing rapist on the guy's leg.

Q. Was there anything else that you did not tell CID about?

A. Just stuff I did not remember.

Q. Did you take any of the photographs of the detainee's home during R&R leave?

A. Yes.

Q. Where are the photographs now?

A. In my apartment. The photographs are by the computer. They are on a CD rom. The CD is located in the CD rack, on the right hand side of the computer. I think it is blue or green case, all of the rest of them are red. It may have the word picture wrote on the outside of it.

Q. Did you show these photographs to anyone while home?

A. Kelly, my roommate.

Q. Whose apartment are these photographs in?

A. Mine. I pay the rent for the apartment.

Q. Will you give Army CID consent to retrieve the photographs from the apartment?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you email or show anyone else the photographs?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any more copies of the photographs here or anywhere else?

A. No.

Q. Who else has copies of these photographs?

A. FREDERICK, GRANER, M [delete], Ops 4th Platoon, 372nd; DARBY, L [delete], and R [delete] there are [delete; I am not sure which one has them.

Q. Who else might have copies of these photographs?

A. I know that people from MI have them because they were swapping pictures.

Q. Who was swapping pictures?

A. FREDERICK and I think GRANER as well. I do not know what type of pictures they were swapping.

Q. Did you ever talk to anyone else while home about the photographs?

A. Just the girl from CNN. We were at a club called Cobalt in DC. Somehow we got introduced and I told her were I worked. She told me were she worked. She gave me her business card, and we went our separate ways.

Q. Do you have her business card still?

A. Probably not, but Kelly might know her.

Q. Did you tell her the substance of the photographs?

A. I am sure I did, but I do not remember what I said.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No. /// End of Statement /// SH

AFFIDAVIT

I, Sabrina D. HARMAN HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATH, THIS 16th DAY OF JAN 04 AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, IRAQ.

Signature of Person Administering Oath
Warren D. Worth
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:23 am

PART 12 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

CV for Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, Commander 800th Military Police Brigade

Brigadier General JANIS LEIGH KARPINSKI, Military Intelligence (USAR)

Commander
800th Military Police Brigade
Uniondale, New York 11553-1002
since May 2003

YEARS OF COMMISSION SERVICE
Over 25 years

CURRENT OCCUPATION
Self employed as a Corporate Consultant for Executive Training Programs
and Corporate Improvement Programs, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED
Military Police Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES
Kean College of New Jersey - BA Degree - English/Secondary Education
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University - MAA Degree - Aviation Management
United States Army War College - MSS Degree - Strategic Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE
None recorded

Image

SUMMARY OF JOINT EXPERIENCE
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Senior Parachutist Badge

As of 01 January 2004

ADDENDUM TO RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

Colonel JANIS LEIGH KARPINSKI, Military Intelligence (USAR)

CURRENT OCCUPATION
Self employed as a Corporate Consultant for Executive Training Programs and Corporate Improvement Programs, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina

NATURE, SCOPE AND EXTENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Design, develop and implement executive training programs, management training programs, and corporate improvement strategies, with worldwide application. Contract proposals may encompass the scope of work, may include training objectives, realistic executive training experiences, improvement strategies, or business diversification plans. Training may include conducting appropriately stressful executive training, designed specifically to expose personnel to typically demanding executive situations and decision-making opportunities. The work involves travel to domestic and international locations.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

Postby admin » Sat Oct 12, 2013 2:27 am

PART 13 OF 13 (Taguba Report Cont'd.)

15 February 2004 selected portions of Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski’s testimony

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

At Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 15 February 2004:

MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. Army, CFLCC Deputy Commanding General deposing.

MASTER SERGEANT JOHN E. DAVIS, U.S. Army, CFLCC-SJA, Senior Court Reporter, has been detailed reporter for this interview and has been previously sworn.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JANIS L. KARPINSkI, U.S. Army, was sworn, and interviewed as follows:

Q. So let me ask you again. So the responsibility for the actions of those soldiers, that were charged by CID for mistreating those detainees should fallon the MI as opposed to the MPs?

A. The responsibility? No sir. I saw some of the pictures. The -- I think the MI gave the MPs the ideas. And I think ---

Q. So there's some complicity to that?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You're suggesting that there is?

A. ---- And I think that it became sport. And -- and even saying this makes me feel sick to my stomach, but, they were enjoying what they were doing and the MPs who saw this opportunity -- seized the opportunity. I don't know if they shared the ideas with the MIs or whatever they did, but there was definitely agreement, and -- then some of the procedures they were following, they just elaborated on. And -- and I would imagine and I don't know this to be fact, but would imagine it went something like this -- in the DFAC or when they were sitting around the Internet Cafe. "Oh yeah, you should see what we do to the prisoners sometime." "Can I come over and watch?" "Oh yeah. How about Thursday." And because we had a clerk over there who was thoroughly enjoying all of this sport, and the pictures anyway, and she was the girlfriend of the guy who was one of the kingpins in this. We had a guy from the maintenance who must have been one of the invited participants and -- these are bad people. That was the first time I knew that they would do such a thing as to bring a dog handler in there to use for interrogation. I had never heard of such a thing and I certainly didn't authorize it. And if I had heard about it, I would have stopped it. I don't believe we've ever had a dog in the hard facility.

Q. Speaking of dogs. Did you know that between the Army and the Navy dog handlers that they were not placed in their one command and control that they operated separately?

A. That was at the direction of -- I don't want to put anybody on the hook, but I believe it was CFLCC. It's a -- it's a CENTCOM asset.

Q. But, somebody requested for them.

A. We did. But there were already two dogs there. The MI either brought them from Anaconda or -- and they said they were strictly for their operation.

Q. Certainly, somebody requested for them. At least the three Navy dogs. That they would be placed under one command and control and be utilized properly without proper authority for employment.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you check on them?

A. No sir, I didn't.

Q. Okay. Alright. Given the circumstances then, do you believe that perhaps proper supervision at night since these events happened between the periods of 2200 and 0400 and who would you place that supervision responsibility to?

A. There is a and -- and it is precisely the reason that Sergeant Snyder is relieved from -- or suspended from his position right now. Because he was responsible. He was the Sergeant of the Guard; the NCOIC, whatever term they were using. He was all of those things. And a platoon sergeant.

Q. Did you know what the Platoon Leader or the Company commander were doing?

A. I do not. And I talked to the Captain Reese myself. And he said randomly he or the First Sergeant, or both of them would go through all of the facilities.

Q. During night or day?

A. Nighttime, daytime, afternoon, lunchtime, feeding time.

Q. Would you be surprised to hear that Captain Reese's priorities was not detain -- detention operations, it was improving the facilities seventy percent of the time?

A. I would be surprised to hear that, yes sir, because that's not what he told me.

Q. Alright.

A. And I don't -- what would he be improving? The LSA?

Q. I was just conveying to you what he put on his statement and he conveyed to me.

A. Because the contract there was for Iraqi contractor work to do the facility work, it was not for----

Q. That was what he conveyed and umm -- as far as he was concerned, his chain of command knew of his priorities. Thereby depended and over-relied on personnel who had correctional facilities experience. Did he tell you that?

A. He did not.

Q. Okay.

A. Him and the First Sergeant both talked about how they were fully involved in the operation. He didn't say anything about seventy percent of his time doing facilities management.

Q. He put that on the Sworn Statement. And that's exactly what he intimated in the----

A. Well, he's had enough time to figure out what the best avenue approach is, I guess.

Q. Well, let me put it this way. Knowing that the importance of that particular facility, how often did you talk to the company commanders?

A. I --

Q. Did you senior rate all the company commanders?

A. I did. Uh -- I saw all the company commanders. I -- I would tell you that the -- unfortunately, that the largest gap of time uh -- between seeing a company commander and between seeing a company commander and seeing him again was more than six weeks with Captain Merck.

Q. Would it surprise for you to know that there's at least one Company, the 320th as we speak today, or then at that time, that was assigned to that Battalion, 320th, and up until I believe two weeks ago was being utilized as a filler company?

A. [Pause] Would it surprise me to know that?

Q. That they were not employing him in his capability as a cohesive company with his capability, but yet he's being used as the -- you fill here, you fill there. So, basically, ----

A. his company was spread out.

Q. Right. And he doesn't have a function.

A. He -- if he's being used as filler, I mean, he's doing an MP mission.

Q. He's doing an MP mission that ----

A. The Company Commander doesn't have a ----

Q. ---- the Company Commander is not responsible for any specific mission because his Company was being utilized as a filler company. Individual ----

A. I would tell you ----

Q. ---- fillers, not as a platoon, not as a squad, it was fill this and fill that.

A. I will tell you, sir. It doesn't surprise me. Uh -- I didn't know about it, but like I said, I saw all those company commanders out there whenever I visited ----

Q. Sure, but nobody ever mentioned any problems of how things are being ----

A. No, because the personnel numbers were so serious and Major Sheridan was really making the best effort to get those internal taskings reduced. And it took a whole MP Company just to do the taskings. It got better when we got -- when the 82nd put a Company on the same compound.

Q. How many Companies did the 320th have?

A. Umm --

Q. Six, seven, eight?

A. No, no. The 372nd, the 670th, the 186th, and some of them were guard companies and some of them were combat support.

Q. You had the 229th, 229th MP Company's also there. It's an I and R Company.

A. Some of them come up -- some of them came up because we were getting ready to -- some of the other companies to leave.

Q. General Karpinski, what would you recommend for corrections of detainee abuses?

A. Sir, I -- I actually started to make some of the -- I think -- I started to implement for the rotational forces coming in. I called the Battalion Commanders that were coming in behind the rotational brigades when I could get in touch with them at their mob station. I told them that they needed to, ya know, get the people involved, to give briefings to their soldiers before they deployed over here about the potential for detainee abuse. The indicators -- the processes or procedures to head off infractions, to continue to reinforce it. Umm -- and I think that soldiers need to be reminded. I -- I -- at the -- at the guard mount, at shift change, on duty. You take an example of an MP company like the 320th MP Company, which is out at Abu Ghraib. They were down at Talil, they're a combat support company, but their First Sergeant and the Company Commander were very much involved in the Company and the operations. Talked to soldiers all the time, gathered them in small groups. The First Sergeant was fully engaged.

Q. Is that Captain Masterangelo?

A. It is.

Q. Would it surprise you that he was the one who is saying it is not utilized as a Company up there today? That he is being used a filler Company.

A. He's not being used as a filler Company, sir.

Q. How do you know that?

A. Well, I know what they're doing. They were the -- they were -- they're not doing a combat support MP mission, because that's how they -- they weren't deployed to do that mission. They -- couple of the teams, the driving teams were tasked to the TOC to do my PSD. My two vehicles were from the 320th MP Company. He had some MP units that were doing the escort missions down to CPA or down to Bucca if we were transporting prisoners. He would -- so he's got a variety of missions, but they're not filler personnel. He may have used some of his MPs to do some of the force protection towers. But there isn't a Company that's doing only force protection. I wish I had the luxury, I'm sure the battalions do too.

Q. His comment to me was, when I asked him, "What specifically is your mission set?" And-- then he mentioned something about I have compounds boom, boom, boom, boom. I don't recall those compounds, and I said, "So you're directly responsible for those compounds then?" He said, "No, that's relegated to Headquarters and Headquarters Company 220th MP Battalion. So what is your extent of your responsibility?" I said, "I just provide personnel." So in essence ----

A. Well that's not what his support form said, and that's not how he was rated, and that was never my impression when we walked to the different compounds that were under his control.

Q. Well, the support form -- the support form doesn't really, and you mentioned that that everybody should have -- could have mistaken your support form for that of command philosophy? Basically ----

A. Sir, I never focused on that. ----

Q. Well, I'm just making a comment to the comment you made.

A. Yes, sir. But ----

Q. ---- And so, basically, the Company Commander is given a mission and the Company Commander felt that he's got a capability to provide. And the Company Commander felt that he's not -- his capability's not being utilized. Cause I asked him directly, "What is your mission?" And his response to me was, "I'm a filler Company, sir." Today, I said, "How long has it been going on?" He says, "From the time I arrived until last week."

A. Well, that's not true. He was down at Talil, they didn't have a vigorous mission down at Talil, they went out and did the same thing. They did law enforcement, patrols, down to the prisons in Najaf.

Q. Do you know what the 229th MP Company's mission is?

A. They're responsible for the URF and for the compounds at Ganci.

Q. So, basically they're being utilized as a guard company?

A. They are. All of our MP units are being utilized as an escort guard or guard company for this confinement mission.

Q. Would it surprise you that Captain Jones trained himself and nobody ever validated him prior to deployment?

A. That does not surprise me.

Q. Did you know that he had prior experience as an MP, prior to taking command of that Company from the Virginia Army National Guard?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you know that he had to provide support to the canine unit, both Army and Navy, but he does not have command and control of those canine units?

A. That's with the HHC or with the Headquarters of the 320th?

Q. Somehow, somebody's yet to find a house where those dogs were. That's what I mean. It's knowing what each of those Companies do, because it's their capability that you want to utilize. Okay, what other recommendations would you make?

A. I think that the -- the span of control covering the whole country of Iraq is too big without the additional assets, either aviation assets, or transportation assets, engineer. General Wodjakowski did tell me several times that they did not do a good job of supporting us. We were running 15 civilian jails and 5 internment facilities, and he said, "You're running three internment facilities, how hard can that be?" He didn't know what we were doing.

Q. How often did -- you had the SUAs. I guess in the separate unit updates provided it depicted at least number of detain- detention centers you were -- you were operating; number of Iraqi prisons that you were overseeing or providing training for; number of other things that you were missioned for; number of detainees that were accounted for, based on the last report; and personnel situation and your operational revenues to accomplish that mission. Umm -- when those were posted, to include your maintenance capabilities, what was the -- what was the percentage -- what would you -- what would you consider as your C rating would be?

A. Overall?

Q. Overall.

A. C-3 at best.

Q. And that was amplified, you mentioned repeatedly to the Battalion, to the CJTF-7?

A. It was. I -- I said to -- now when Colonel -- General West came in, he wasn't there originally, I don't remember who his predecessor was who was the 4. But General West was -- and -- and General Davis who was the Engineer Commander at the time, both of them gave me tremendous support, but it was after we had found another way, another mechanism to do it.

Q. Sure. Which was network with your fellow general officers.

A. General.

Q. Networking with your fellow general officers, you know. Was that helpful to you?

A. They -- General West was very helpful. General Davis was very helpful. The CA guy who is General Kern, and said several times "I don't know anything about detention operations, but, ya know, tell me what else is going on." We couldn't get CA support. We could not get CA support. I spent time with General little bit of time with General Hahn and uh -- and really the only time General Sanchez or even General Wodjakowski spent any time or showed any interest in anything I was doing was when there was a problem.

Q. You -- previously you appeared very critical of General Sanchez or General Wodjakowski for their lack of concern or lack of support on behalf of your mission and on behalf of your soldiers. Would you kind of draw conclusions as to why that is? Your perception why that is?

A. I think that General Sanchez is (pause) I think that his ego will not allow him to accept a Reserve Brigade, a Reserve General Officer and certainly not a female succeeding in a combat environment. And I think he looked at the 800th MP Brigade as the opportunity to find a scapegoat for anything that his active component MI Brigade or his active component MP Brigade was failing at. And if I was not capable, why didn't he tell me? Why didn't somebody tell me sit down and let me give you some suggestions because when DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz came into the theater, the first time he came out to Baghdad Central he stayed an extra hour and forty-five minutes because he was so proud of me and what the MPs were doing. And he told General Sanchez that, and one night when he got behind schedule on another visit, he asked specifically if he could see General Karpinski before he left because he wanted to hear how the prisons were coming. And on the headphones in the helicopter, General Sanchez and General Fast, who was briefing him, he said, "Am I going to have an opportunity to see General Karpinski? Because she always does a good job for me." And I thought at that time, this is not a good thing. It is never good to be more popular than your boss. If I was not doing my job, I wasn't aware of it. And I'm sorry, but I took care of those soldiers, I took care of those detainees. We provided support beyond what anybody expected to the CPA to keep Ambassador Bremer out of trouble. Because when Major Pifrim and Colonel Spain were trying to push all the jails off on us in a briefing to General Sanchez, Major Pifrim said, "Well we don't care if they're eating or not, sir, that's the Iraqi's responsibility." And he corrected them. And we made sure that they were eating and that they did have water. They didn't. Because in spite of what General Sanchez was telling them, they were doing the easy thing. And I think General Sanchez has no use for Reserve component or National Guard soldiers. And he has little use, would not see it as time well spent, mentoring me. How dare I succeed as a female, as a Reservist, as an MP, in his combat environment? How dare I. And I became determined to show him that I would.

Q. Who would you pin the responsibility on the actions of those individuals at Abu Ghraib?

A. The MPs that were involved. That's who I'd pin it on and I'd pin it on Snyder, the Platoon Sergeant, and the First Sergeant, Captain Reese.

Q. You wouldn't pin it on anybody else but them?

A. I would -- it was Colonel Phillabaum's domain but it was Colonel Pappas' FOB. And he was the one who established the limitation for those cell blocks. He was the one, and Colonel Jordan was the one, whether he's here to say it or not, he was the one who set the rules. Major Sheridan limited them and influenced them to the extent he could by taking the MPs out of unhealthy and inappropriate settings. But they were still the guards in those cell blocks. And they were still the ones who did those things that they did to those detainees.

Q. Do you think proper training, supervision, and effective leadership, not just for that Battalion, but throughout the entire Brigade would have sufficed, could have prevented it?

A. No sir, no sir. Because it's not typical.

Q. Given the fact that that same Battalion was involved in the Bucca incident back 1n May?

A. Sir, I talked to -- was a different Company -- no that's not an excuse, I talked to Phillabaum and I talked to Dinenna, and I talked to them ----

Q. It's your Brigade.---

A. Yes sir, yes sir. ---- I talked to them the next day when I found out about it, when I was out there. I talked to all the Company Commanders and the First Sergeants. And -- and they asked good questions. And they raised the issues again about fair and decent treatment and when were they going to see magistrates, and when were they going to be able to give answers, and how can you say dignity and respect and then not give them anything that they're -- even the basics that they're entitled to: clean clothes, decent food, bed or a mat to sleep on. These are bad people and people who were led by bad people in that situation. But, once again, it was a good MP, a good soldier who turned them in. I talked to Phillabaum about the consistency in these events. And that isn't something you would put in an attribute column when you say, what did I do right or what did I do wrong in this situation. "Did you exploit the opportunity?" I asked him. "Did you exploit the opportunity to talk to soldiers if they were assigned to the Battalion and tell them, 'This is what happened at Bucca and this is not tolerated here.'?" And, no he didn't. Did he use the lessons learned? No he didn't. Did he know how to do it? I don't even know if he did.

Q. You think possibly a command policy memo from you or General Hill would have stipulated lessons learned at Bucca that it not be repeated?

A. 1 think that would have been extremely helpful. The other -- the other ----

Q. But none of those memos fell out and you didn't follow up on that memo?

A. No sir. And when the incident down at Bucca was resolved, we spent months working on it and -- and I don't wanna say me, because I don't wanna -- I can't take credit for the hard work that was done. The 32, the CID investigations, the supervision of them at Bag -- at -- down at Arifjan. I think it was the first time they were effectively supervised when Colonel Coulter got them under control. But the system failed us. And it was because the tenure had changed. And at about the same time when those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers. the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna go home.

Q. Where would you place them if they were not going to be remanded to go home?

A. It was supposed to go to a court martial, and it didn't. And Suggestion by a Company Commander out there at Baghdad Central, was that -- in front of everybody else, was that "Ma'am, everybody knows the reason it didn't go to a court martial was because they were protecting that Lieutenant Colonel who took a prisoner out to the clearing barrel and cleared his weapon into the clearing barrel right next to his head. And they wanted to be able to forgive him." So that was the change in attitude. And I said, ----

Q. Do you think that was associated in that?

A. Yes, sir. He said it there in front of a group of people and nobody turned around like they were shocked by this revelation. So I knew that that was what was permeating. What I told them during that meeting was, "Look, let me tell you something, the UCMJ system in my opinion is fair and impartial. And people who make decisions to go to court martials or take other actions, do so with extensive advice and study and everything else, whether you believe that or not, okay." This took seven months to complete. But, let's talk about results, okay? There were four cases. One that was considered a relatively weak case, was plea bargained out, and the individual signed a statement saying that this was planned, it was orchestrated, and there was definitely collusion or whatever that word is that they use.

Q. But did you know that the events actually happened since you were not there?

A. Alright, well, I only know it from the Article 32 from reviewing that case and then for recommending it go to court martial. But I do know the results and I know why they -- they gave that plea bargain, or the plea package to the first individual. And that individual signed statements saying this was planned, it was by design, Master Sergeant Girman orchestrated the plan. She told us exactly what to do, etc. etc. So, she gets an other than honorable and goes home, yes. And she understands her responsibility to come back in case it goes to a court martial. I said, "Do you realize that if we went to a court martial on any one of those cases, any of them if there were four or ten or twelve whatever the original number was, the were all going to be tried individually because that's your right under UCMJ. And do you realize that if we went to a court martial and the board said or the panel said, "Not guilty," those individuals come back as MPs and maybe back to the same unit or the same battalion. And is that a factor, considering your options? Absolutely. And I got a lot of stares that time, because there's another side to the story there, there's another perspective.

Q. I don't think unless they get a bar to re-enlistment that they'll ever make it back to wear the uniform.

A. Well, they won't now because they are permanently barred from coming back in. They are reduced. They are -- all of their benefits and privileges from this deployment are suspended. So, we get what we want from that action. And rather than take the risk -- I mean, I -- I didn't like it at first, but I understood it, after conversation with Captain Ray and Colonel Johnson. But, I wanted to make sure that the leadership element out there at Baghdad Central understood it because that seemed to be their concern that these guys knew that all they would get would be a trip home.

Q. Well, put in that perspective, then General Karpinski, when everything is put before the courts, and I have no reason why you will not be placed before the military court system, and the revelations of all these inhumane treatment of detainees. You think for one moment that those MPs that were accused of those allegations were not made complicit of those -- the unit that they served under, the battalion that they served under, the brigade that they served under, that they will reveal all sorts of things that will put your entire command under the microscope.

A. Absolutely.

Q. The fact of the matter is that that will be the second incident to which the 800th MP Brigade would be associated with potentially war crimes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How would you deal with that?

A. The same way I've dealt with other situations in this Theater of Operation. Tell the truth. And we were spread throughout the theater of Iraq with a mission and the MPs have countless examples of how well they performed and how professional they were and are. And do you get, out of 3,400 people; do you get some bad MPs? Yes. And do some of them have a history of this in their civilian job? Yes. And does their civilian employer have a responsibility to report these infractions to the military? No. Now were there mistakes made? Yes. And are we taking actions to make sure that they don't occur again? Yes. Can we guarantee they won't? No. Because we've never forged this road before.

Q. Nobody has.

A. Yes, sir. So we have to rely on values and those people have none, at least if the pictures tell the story. I don't care what their specialty is; it's just more offensive because they're MPs. What they did was vulgar and abusive. And I hope it -- it never reaches the media's attention. I can't -- I can't -- I didn't get a vote. Nobody said, "Okay, you're taking over command of the 800th MP Brigade now, and what happened before doesn't count." Because it does. And -- and all I can hope to do, is to make it better. Not on the run, not on the fly, but with conscientious -- conscientious effort and -- and leadership. I am a good leader. And taking all of this out of context, and using this example of what the 800th MP Brigade is capable of doing, is what is typical, I say, of what Sanchez is all about. I told my soldiers this morning when they were leaving, "You go home with your heads held high, because you did everything and more that was asked of you, expected of you, and you did it better than anybody else. You're all heroes to me, so no matter what is said, nobody can take it away from you." And I believe it, and I want those 19- and 20- and 35-year old soldiers to believe it, because it's true. And Sanchez doesn't give a flip about a soldier. And I never said that before. And he cares less about a Reservist and a Guardsman.

Q. You think in your heart that that's true.

A. Yes, yes, sir I do.

Q. Did you spread any of these thoughts with any of your civilians?

A. Never. Because what I said to them was, "General Sanchez has an enormous job. He was a division commander before." I used all the right expressions.

Q. Do you shift all this blame?

A. No I'm not. I'm not shifting all of anything. I'm taking responsibility, but the situation accurately is a shared responsibility. And they failed us and trying to cover their failures it's going to cost the 800th MP Brigade or me? Okay. Because it'll give me an opportunity to tell the truth. I know what they were doing and we kept finding a way to succeed. So they'd give us some more. When I took the -- when I briefed General Sanchez on the condition of the civilian jails and why the progress was so slow. He turns on me, and he says, "What's wrong with you Karpinski, you were briefing me just a month ago or five weeks ago that, you know, they were going to be on track and we were going to have capacity for 3,100 by now." And I said, "Sir, because the construction is not taking place. And I've been to every one of the facilities and I see no evidence of appropriate expenditure of funds; millions of dollars." I said, "I'm not a contractor, but I know what $25,000 worth of work should look like, and I know what $2 million worth of work should look like. And there's no evidence of it anywhere." "And what have you done?" "I went to the finance office at CPA. I looked for the IG's office at CPA. I looked for the GAO office at CPA. I talked to finance officer at Arifjan at the 377th. I talked to Colonel Warren. I talked to General Wodjakowski." "Well what happened to the money?" I said, "I don't know, sir. It was a cash operation and I suspect that the two subject matter experts borrowed some of it permanently." "Are you suggesting that they misappropriated funds?" "Yes sir, I am. If the evidence of the construction of the facilities is -- is what I have to go by, because there is no GAO and there's no IG at CPA. And they wouldn't show me the contracts that they let for all these places. But I do know that the only place where construction is taking place is at Abu Ghraib, because my MPs are there. They're not the contracting officer representatives." And he turned to his SJA and said, "Since this has been dumped in my lap, tell me the next step I take." He never came back and asked for information. He never came back and asked for the information I had, or the evidence I had accumulated. Nobody ever came back to me and said this is what took place. As a matter of fact, Colonel Warren said to me, "You want to steer clear of the issue." I'm not blaming General Sanchez or General Wodjakowski. I just want them to take responsibility for what they didn't do. And I don't ever expect a person like General Sanchez to change his personality or his way of thinking or his way of succeeding or anything else. I have only ever asked for a fair chance. And, no sir, he did not give it me or anybody in the 800th MP Brigade.

Q. Fair enough. Do you have any closing comments you want to make?

A. No, sir.

Q. Thank you General Karpinski.

Witness was warned and excused.

[Session completed at 2035 15 February 2004.]
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 1 OF 4

The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on International Human Rights Committee on Military Affairs and Justice's Report

Human Rights Standards Applicable to the United States' Interrogation of Detainees

April, 2004

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary/Introduction
• I. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
o A. CAT’s Definitions of – and Prohibitions against – Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
o B. CAT’s Prohibition against Torture and CID Treatment as Interpreted by the U.N. Committee Against Torture
o C. U.S. Law Implementing CAT’s Prohibitions against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
 1. U.S. Understandings and Reservations in Ratifying CAT
 2. The Implementation of CAT’s Prohibition against Torture in U.S. Legislation, Regulation and Case Law
 (a) U.S. Immigration Law and Torture
 (b) U.S. Extradition of Fugitives Who Face Threat of Torture
 (c) U.S. Implementation of CAT’s Criminal Law Requirements
 (d) U.S. Case Law Interpretations of Torture in Tort Claims
 (e) Conclusion: CAT’s Prohibition against Torture as Implemented in U.S. Legislation and Regulation
 3. CAT’s Prohibition against “Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment,” as Interpreted by United States Law
 (a) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Standards
 (b) Eighth Amendment Standards
o D. Enforcement of CAT under U.S. Law
 1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 – 2340B
 2. Uniform Code of Military Justice
o E. Summary
• II. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
o A. Application of the Geneva Conventions to the Afghan Conflict Generally
o B. Geneva III
 1. Relevant Legal Standards
 2. The United States’ Position
 3. Critiques of the United States’ Position
 (a) Article 5 Presumes POW Status Until the Determination of Status by a Competent Tribunal
 (b) The Taliban Detainees Were “Regular Armed Forces” and, therefore, Are Encompassed by Article 4(A) of Geneva III
 (c) Policy Arguments Favoring Broad Grant of POW Status to Non-Civilian Detainees from the War in Afghanistan
o C. Geneva IV
o D. Summary
• III. OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS
o A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
 1. Relevant Legal Standards
 2. Enforcement
 (a) U.S. Courts
 (b) The Human Rights Committee
o B. Organization of American States’ Instruments
 1. Relevant Legal Standards
 2. Enforcement
o C. Customary International Law and Jus Cogens
 1. Relevant Legal Standards
 2. Enforcement
• IV. SHOULD EXCEPTIONS BE MADE FOR THE “WAR ON TERROR”?: THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
o A. Legal Challenges to Interrogation Practices in Northern Ireland and Israel
 1. The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom
 2. Israeli Supreme Court Judgment Concerning The Legality Of The General Security Service’s Interrogation Methods
o B. The Legal and Moral Implications of the “Ticking Bomb” Scenario
• THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
• THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE
• APPENDIX A
o Letter 1: To President George W. Bush from Kenneth Roth (Human Rights Watch), dated 12/26/02
o Letter 2: To the Hon. George W. Bush from William Schulz (Amnesty Intl.), Kenneth Roth (Human Rights Watch), Gay McDougall (Intl. Human Rights Law Group), Louise Kantrow (Intl. League for Human Rights), Michael Posner (Lawyers Cmte. for Human Rights), Robin Phillips (Minn. Advocates for Human Rights), Len Rubenstein (Physicians for Human Rights), Todd Howland (RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights), dated 1/31/03
o Letter 3: To President George Bush from Ernest Duff, National Consortium of Torture Treatment Programs, dated 2/5/03
o Letter 4: To the Hon. Condoleezza Rice from Patrick Leahy (U.S. Senator), dated 6/2/04
o Letter 5: To Scott W. Muller (Genl. Counsel, CIA) from Miles F. Fischer (Chair, The Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y.) and Scott Horton (Chair, Cmte. on Intl. Human Rights), dated 6/4/03
o Letter 6: To William J. Haynes, II (Genl. Counsel, DOD) from Patrick Leahy (U.S. Senator), dated 9/9/03
o Letter 7: To Kenneth Roth (Human Rights Watch) from William J. Haynes II (Genl. Counsel DOD), dated 4/2/03
o Letter 8: To Miles F. Fischer and Scott Horton (Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y.) from Scott W. Muller (Genl. Counsel CIA) dated 6/23/03
o Letter 9: To Patrick J. Leahy (U.S. Senator) from William J. Haynes II (Genl. Counsel DOD), dated 6/25/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION

This Report is a joint effort of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York’s Committees on International Human Rights and Military Affairs and Justice, undertaken to consider allegations – reported in the press and by human rights and humanitarian organizations conducting their own investigations – that individuals detained by the United States at its military and intelligence facilities in connection with the initial War in Afghanistan and the subsequent ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, are being subjected to interrogation techniques that constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. [1] We note at the outset, however, that although this project was initially motivated by allegations regarding the treatment of detainees from the War in Afghanistan, the international law and human rights standards discussed herein – with the exception of Geneva Convention protections applicable only to situations of international armed conflict – apply broadly and with equal force to the treatment of detainees captured in other situations, including detainees picked up in other countries in connection with the broader “War on Terror.” [2] In this Report, we will examine the international legal standards governing United States military and civil authorities in interrogating detainees and propose ways of assuring that those standards are enforced.

THE ALLEGED INTERROGATION PRACTICES

These allegations first surfaced in December 2002, when the U.S. military announced that it had begun a criminal investigation into the death of a 22 year-old Afghan farmer and part-time taxi driver who had died of “blunt force injuries to lower extremities complicating coronary artery disease” while in U.S. custody at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. [3] Since then, details about interrogation techniques allegedly employed at U.S. detention facilities – most of which are off-limits to outsiders and some of which are in undisclosed locations – have come from government officials speaking on the condition that they would not be identified and from the few prisoners who have been released. Some examples of “stress and duress” interrogation “techniques” reportedly being practiced by U.S. Department of Defense (“DOD”) and Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) personnel at U.S. detention facilities include: forcing detainees to stand or kneel for hours in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, 24-hour bombardment with lights, “false-flag” operations meant to deceive a captive about his whereabouts, withholding painkillers from wounded detainees, confining detainees in tiny rooms, binding in painful positions, subjecting detainees to loud noises, and sleep deprivation. [4] In addition, the U.S. is reportedly “rendering” suspects to the custody of foreign intelligence services in countries where the practice of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogation is well-documented. [5]

THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES

The Association and others have written to U.S. government officials to ask whether there is any factual basis for these allegations and whether steps are being taken to ensure that detainees are interrogated in accordance with U.S. law and international standards prohibiting torture and “cruel, inhuman or degrading” treatment falling short of torture (“CID”). [6]

In response to inquiries from Human Rights Watch, U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes has stated that: “United States policy condemns and prohibits torture” and that, when “questioning enemy combatants, U.S. personnel are required to follow this policy and applicable laws prohibiting torture.” [7] CIA General Counsel Scott W. Muller, citing to the need to protect intelligence sources and methods, has responded to our inquiries by stating only that “in its various activities around the world the CIA remains subject to the requirements of U.S. law” and that allegations of unlawful behavior are reported by the CIA to the Department of Justice and are subject to investigation. [8]

In response to an inquiry made by U.S. Senator Patrick J. Leahy regarding U.S. policy, Haynes stated that U.S. policy entails “conducting interrogations in a manner that is consistent with the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), as ratified by the U.S. in 1994, and with the Federal anti-torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 - 2340A, which Congress enacted to fulfill U.S. obligations under the CAT.” [9] Haynes also stated that U.S. policy is “to treat all detainees and conduct all interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with” the U.S. obligation, pursuant to Article 16 of CAT, namely, “to prevent other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture” insofar as such treatment is “prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments.” [10] Haynes assured Senator Leahy “that credible allegations of illegal conduct by U.S. personnel will be investigated and, as appropriate, reported to proper authorities.” [11] Furthermore, Haynes stated that the U.S. does not “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite individuals to other countries where the U.S. believes it is ‘more likely than not’ that they will be tortured,” that “United States policy is to obtain specific assurances from the receiving country that it will not torture the individual being transferred to that country,” and that “the United States would take steps to investigate credible allegations of torture and take appropriate action if there were reason to believe that those assurances were not being honored.” [12]

Both Haynes and Muller have declined, however, to give details concerning the specific interrogation methods used by U.S. personnel at U.S. military and CIA detention facilities.

LEGAL STANDARDS PROHIBITING TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT

Although we are not in a position to investigate the factual basis for the allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading interrogation practices at U.S. detention facilities that have been made, we can describe the legal principles which should guide our military and intelligence personnel in their conduct. Accordingly, in this Report we examine the international and U.S. law standards against which the interrogation practices used on detainees should be assessed. We also address the question of whether there are any circumstances posed by the post-September 11 world in which abrogation of our country’s obligations to prevent and punish torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment should be permitted in the interrogation of terrorist suspects.

The Convention Against Torture.

First and foremost, the U.S. obligation to prohibit and prevent the torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees in its custody is set forth in the Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”), to which the U.S. is a party. [13] When the U.S. ratified CAT in 1994, it did so subject to a reservation providing that the U.S. would prevent “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” insofar as such treatment is prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments. [14] Thus, the U.S. is obligated to prevent not only torture, but also conduct considered cruel, inhuman or degrading under international law if such conduct is also prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In interpreting U.S. obligations, we look to the U.N. Committee Against Torture’s interpretations of CAT as well as U.S. case law decided in the immigration and asylum law context, under the Alien Tort Claims and Torture Victim Protection Acts and concerning the treatment of detainees and prisoners under the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments. We also examine the procedural mechanisms available under U.S. law to punish violations of CAT – including prosecution under federal criminal law (18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 - 2340A) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).

Other International Legal Standards which Bind the United States

While there is a dearth of U.S. case law applying CAT’s prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the interrogation context, there is a wealth of international law sources which offer guidance in interpreting CAT. Some of these international legal standards are, without question, binding on the U.S., such as: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”), [15] the law of jus cogens and customary international law. Another international legal instrument which has been ratified by the U.S. and is relevant to the interrogation practices being examined by this Report is the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. [16] Other sources, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [17] also provide guidance.

The applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the detainees from the War in Afghanistan, however, presents a more contentious issue. The Administration’s official position is that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to Al Qaeda detainees, and that neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda detainees are entitled to prisoner of war (“POW”) status thereunder. Nevertheless, the Administration has stated that it is treating such individuals “humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,” and that the detainees “will not be subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment.” [18] The Administration has never explained how it determines what interrogation techniques are “appropriate” or “consistent with military necessity,” or how it squares that determination with U.S. obligations under human rights and customary international law. For POW and civilian detainees who meet the relevant criteria of Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”) and Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Geneva IV”), respectively, all coercion is prohibited. [19] Moreover, any detainee whose POW status is in doubt is entitled to a hearing and determination by a competent tribunal and, pending such determination, any such detainee must be treated as a POW. Concern for the safety of U.S. forces weighs in favor of extending POW status liberally. At a minimum, all detainees – regardless of POW or civilian status – are entitled to humane treatment and prompt hearings under human rights and customary international law, including the protections of Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions (“Common Article 3”) and Article 75 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Related to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (“Additional Protocol I”). [20] We urge the U.S. to promptly establish proper screening procedures for all detainees, whether or not they served with forces that met the specific criteria of Geneva III.

Legal Standards which the United States Should Look to for Guidance

Other relevant sources of law, such as the seminal 1999 Israeli Supreme Court decision on interrogation methods employed by the Israeli General Security Service, Judgment Concerning The Legality Of The General Security Service’s Interrogation Methods, [21] and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, although not legally binding on the U.S., also offer useful guidance in our interpretation of CAT. These foreign decisions indicate that the “War on Terror” is not unprecedented. As the Israeli and Northern Ireland experiences demonstrate, the U.S. is not the only country to have faced terrorism within its borders, despite the unique tragedy of September 11 and the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction that could expand the loss of life by orders of magnitude. We can and should learn from the experience of other countries whose courts have grappled with the need to permit effective interrogation while at the same time upholding the standards of human rights and the rule of law.

Standards in the Time of Terror

There is an inherent tension between the need to obtain potentially life-saving information through interrogation of terrorist suspects and the legal requirement of upholding the standards set forth in CAT. We grappled with the question of whether there are any circumstances under which torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be permissible in a post-September 11 world. While we acknowledge the real danger posed to the United States by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, we concluded that there are no such exceptions to CAT’s absolute prohibition of torture.

Condoning torture under any circumstances erodes one of the most basic principles of international law and human rights and contradicts our values as a democratic state. Permitting the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody, perhaps under so-called “torture warrants,” not only harms the detainees themselves; it compromises the moral framework of our interrogators and damages our society as a whole. If U.S. personnel are allowed to engage in brutal interrogation methods which denigrate the dignity and humanity of detainees, we sanction conduct which we as a nation (along with the international community) has clearly determined is wrong and immoral. Accordingly, we unanimously condemn the torture of detainees under any circumstances. We note that U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on “cruel, inhuman or degrading” treatment, which has been made relevant to CAT by the U.S. reservation, is an extremely important source of guidance on this subject. On the other hand, much of this jurisprudence evolved in the context of domestic criminal justice administration, and how these precedents would be applied in a case arising out of the interrogation and detention covered by this Report is, in the absence of more definitive authority, a matter of some speculation.

Recommendations

We applaud the statements in William Haynes’ June 25, 2003 letter to Senator Leahy affirming the policy of the U.S. regarding its commitment to CAT. To make that policy meaningful, we make the following recommendations:

1. Training and Education. All law enforcement personnel, civilian or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of anyone under any form of detention or imprisonment should be informed and educated regarding the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as applied in practice. This requires, as provided in Article 11 of CAT, that the U.S. keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of such detainees. [22] Above all, commanders should not condone non-compliance nor permit an environment in which troops are encouraged to provide lip service to compliance but yet think that non-compliance is acceptable.

Given that CIA personnel are not generally subject to the UCMJ, possibly not even when accompanying the armed forces in the field, special procedures should be available to provide reasonable assurance that compliance with CAT is being taught and maintained by intelligence agencies. That assurance might best be provided by the applicable committees of the Congress exercising oversight responsibility in conjunction with the inspectors general of the applicable agencies.

2. Prompt Investigation of Violations. As required by Article 12 of CAT, the U.S. must ensure that allegations of abusive conduct are taken seriously and are fully and impartially investigated. [23] Thus, any individual who alleges that he or she has been subjected to torture must be provided with a meaningful opportunity to complain to, and to have his/her case promptly and impartially examined by, competent authorities. Steps must be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment and intimidation.

3. Expand the Scope and Reach of Section 2340. Consistent with its obligation under Article 4 of CAT to ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law [24] and since 18 U.S.C. § 2340 does not, by its terms, apply to acts constituting torture committed in extraterritorial detention centers under U.S. jurisdiction – the U.S. must expand the geographic reach of Section 2340 so that the prescriptions of CAT are applicable at all U.S. detention centers.

4. Fully Utilize the UCMJ. The U.S. must more fully utilize the procedures and protections available under the UCMJ to prosecute all violations of CAT by the armed forces or others subject to the UCMJ.

5. Independent Investigation of Human Rights Compliance in Other Countries. As provided by Article 3 of CAT, the U.S. must not “render” detainees to other countries where there are substantial grounds for belief that the detainees would be in danger of being subjected to torture. [25] In determining whether there are “substantial grounds for belief” that a detainee would be in danger of torture if rendered to another country, U.S. authorities must take into account all the relevant considerations concerning that country, including independently investigating whether there exists a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country. [26]

6. Grant POW Status to Detainees Whose Status is in Doubt and Possibly as a Matter of Policy. The U.S. should adhere to Geneva III’s requirement that any detainee whose POW status is in “doubt” is entitled to POW status – and, therefore, cannot be subjected to coercive treatment – until a “competent tribunal,” which must be convened promptly, determines otherwise. [27] We urge the U.S. to consider the policy grounds for extending POW treatment to regular force combatants, whether or not legally required to do so, as it has done in prior conflicts.

7. Prompt Screening and Hearings for All Detainees. In keeping with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions and human rights law, we urge the U.S. to provide proper screening procedures and hearings to all detainees. [28]

We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the international standards applicable to interrogation procedures.

THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE

The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) is the primary source of international law relevant to the treatment of detainees. [29] CAT has been ratified by the U.S., and its prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment have been implemented in our domestic law.

Specifically, U.S. law implements CAT’s prohibition against torture in the immigration and asylum contexts, under the Alien Tort Claims and Torture Victim Protection Acts, by criminal statute and under the UCMJ. Under CAT, the U.S. is also obligated to prevent “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” as defined in international law; however, by express reservation, the U.S. interprets this obligation in keeping with standards of treatment required by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, under CAT, American military and intelligence personnel involved in the interrogation of detainees may not torture those detainees, nor may they subject them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment that is, or would be, forbidden under the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments.

CAT'S DEFINITIONS OF -- AND PROHIBITIONS AGAINST -- TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT

CAT defines and prohibits torture, as defined, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in general terms. In addition, it also sets out steps ratifying countries must take to prevent, investigate, and criminalize acts of torture; [30] prohibits the extradition or other rendering (also known as “refoulement”) of a person to a country that would likely subject such person to torture; [31] creates a Committee to oversee the implementation of CAT by ratifying countries; and sets forth procedures for inquiries, individual communications, and inter-State complaints.

CAT’s preamble acknowledges that torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are already prohibited under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the ICCPR. Thus, rather than simply mirroring the prohibitions from these instruments, Article 1 of CAT provides additional guidance to states parties in preventing and punishing torture by setting forth an explicit definition of torture:

…torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.


This definition makes it clear that the result of torture need not be physical pain or suffering, but can also be mental. In addition, torture is defined to include such conduct undertaken for the purpose of obtaining information. Finally, the prohibition is not directed at private citizens, acting independently of government; it applies rather to acts committed by government officials and agents, or persons acting with official consent or acquiescence.

CAT’s prohibition of torture is absolute. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture. Specifically, Article 2(2) provides: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”

Although CAT does not provide a definition of CID punishment or treatment, Article 16 requires ratifying countries to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture….” This language suggests that cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is on a continuum with torture.

CAT requires each signatory state to prevent the commission of the prohibited acts within any territory under the state’s jurisdiction. Specifically, each ratifying country must ensure that any official who may be involved in the interrogation of anyone under any form of detention or imprisonment is informed of and educated about the prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. CAT also requires each ratifying country to ensure that allegations of torture and CID treatment are fully and impartially investigated. See CAT Articles 12 and 16(1).

CAT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE AND CID TREATMENT AS INTERPRETED BY THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE

The U.N. Committee Against Torture, created by CAT, is charged with monitoring implementation of the treaty by ratifying countries through the determination of individual complaints, considering country reports submitted under CAT, and resolving inter-State disputes. Given the importance of international standards in interpreting U.S. domestic law [32] as well as the recent Lawrence v. Texas decision, in which the U.S. Supreme Court expressly looked to foreign and international law for guidance, [33] U.N. Committee decisions are relevant to the assessment of whether the actions of U.S. personnel involved in the interrogation of detainees constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

The U.N. Committee has concluded that the following acts [34] constitute torture under CAT:

• daily beatings and detaining someone in a small, uncomfortable space for two weeks; [35]
• forcing someone to sleep on the floor of a cell while handcuffed following interrogation; [36]
• in severe cases, sleep deprivation; [37] and
• the threat of torture. [38]

Furthermore, the U.N. Committee has recommended that the use of a blindfold during questioning be expressly prohibited. [39] More generally, the U.N. Committee has expressed concern that States have defined torture too narrowly, covering only “systematic blows or other violent acts.” [40] The U.N. Committee has also expressed concern whether the penal law of one State was too narrow in defining torture because it failed to prohibit “certain aspects of torture, such as psychological pressure, threats and intimidation.” [41]

The U.N. Committee has found that the following acts amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under CAT:

• depriving someone of food and/or water; [42]
• in some cases, binding someone in a restraint chair; [43]
• the use by prison authorities of instruments of physical restraint that may cause unnecessary pain and humiliation;[44] and
• long periods of detention (two weeks or more) in detention cells that are sub-standard (this conduct may amount to torture if the period of detention is extremely long).[45]

The U.N. Committee has found that the following acts may amount to torture when used in combination with other forms of CID:

• being restrained in very painful conditions;
• being hooded;
• the sounding of loud music for prolonged periods;
• sleep deprivation for prolonged periods;
• violent shaking; and
• using cold air to chill. [46]

In sum, the U.N. Committee Against Torture has indicated that the classification of treatment as CID or torture is often a matter of severity, intensity, and the totality of the circumstances. Combining several forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment will frequently amount to torture, and ratifying countries are required under CAT to refrain from all such practices, whether they reach the level of severity to be considered torture or not. Thus, according to U.N. Committee jurisprudence, alleged interrogation practices such as forcing detainees to stand or kneel for hours in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, 24-hour bombardment with lights, binding detainees in painful positions, withholding painkillers from wounded detainees, and subjecting detainees to loud noises and sleep deprivation, at a minimum, constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and may, depending on the circumstances, rise to the level of torture. U.N. Committee decisions critical of blindfolding, psychological pressure and threats and intimidation strongly suggest that “false-flag” operations meant to deceive detainees about their whereabouts and “stress and duress” interrogation techniques are also prohibited.

U.S. LAW IMPLEMENTING CAT'S PROHIBITIONS AGAINST TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

The Senate adopted a resolution of advice and consent to U.S. ratification of CAT, subject to the declaration that it be deemed non-self-executing, on October 27, 1990. [47] The U.S. ratified CAT in October 1994, and CAT entered into force with respect to the United States on 20 November 1994. [48] The implementation in U.S. immigration, extradition, criminal and civil tort law of CAT’s prohibition against torture, as well as the express application of U.S. constitutional standards to CAT’s prohibition against CID treatment, indicates that many of the interrogation practices allegedly being used by the U.S. against detainees may be prohibited under international and U.S. law.

U.S. Understandings and Reservations in Ratifying CAT

The United States conditioned its ratification of CAT upon certain understandings related to CAT’s definition of torture in Article 1. In one such understanding, the U.S. specified that mental pain or suffering within the meaning of “torture” refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality. [49] Another U.S. understanding pertains to defects in criminal procedure: non-compliance with applicable legal procedural standards (such as Miranda warnings) does not per se constitute “torture.” [50]

When ratifying CAT, the United States also took the following reservation: “the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ only insofar as the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” [51]

The Implementation of CAT’s Prohibition against Torture in U.S. Legislation, Regulation and Case Law

CAT’s prohibition of official acts amounting to torture has been implemented in the United States through legislation, regulations and case law pertaining to, inter alia, (1) immigration, (2) claims of torture in removal and extradition proceedings, (3) criminal sanctions for torture, and (4) tort claims alleging torture. Through the application of these implementing laws and regulations, U.S. courts have interpreted CAT’s substantive provisions in a variety of contexts. [52]

U.S. Immigration Law and Torture

As previously noted, all countries that ratify CAT are obligated to ensure that detainees are not deported or extradited to countries where they are likely to be tortured. In 1998, the United States enacted the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (Oct. 21, 1998) (the “FARR Act”), implementing this obligation. In 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) promulgated regulations effectuating the FARR Act in the immigration and asylum context, providing aliens in exclusion, deportation or removal proceedings with grounds to seek withholding of removal based on CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2004), et seq. These regulations incorporate CAT’s definition of torture verbatim, with the following qualification: “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.” See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2) (2004). These regulations further define mental pain or suffering consistently with the U.S. understandings to CAT, and exclude from the definition of torture acts which result in “unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering.” See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2004).

A number of federal court cases and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions address torture claims in the immigration context. The BIA has held that the following abuses of detainees and prisoners, for example, amount to torture: “‘suspension for long periods in contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and…severe and repeated beatings with cables or other instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet,’…beatings about the ears, resulting in partial or complete deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete blindness.” Matter of G-A-, 23 I & N Dec. 366, 370 (BIA 2002) (internal citations omitted). [53] Furthermore, persons seeking asylum or withholding of removal have successfully challenged deportation under Sections 208 and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) when they have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Although “persecution” is not defined in the INA, it is understood to encompass treatment falling short of torture.

U.S. Extradition of Fugitives Who Face Threat of Torture

In the extradition context, torture claims are governed by regulations enacted by the Department of State under the FARR Act. Under these regulations, individuals sought for extradition may present a claim that they are likely to be tortured if surrendered to the requesting state. These claims are considered by the U.S. Secretary of State, who is responsible for implementing CAT’s obligation not to extradite an individual to a State where he or she is in danger of being subject to torture. Specifically, section 95 of 22 C.F.R. (2004) provides, in relevant part, that the Secretary of State must consider whether a person facing extradition from the U.S. “is more likely than not” to be tortured in the State requesting extradition, and that appropriate policy and legal offices must review and analyze the information relevant to the torture allegation. The extradition regulations, and the decisions interpreting them, [54] demonstrate that U.S. administrative bodies and courts view CAT’s prohibition against extradition to torture as binding on the U.S. even when the extraditable individual is accused of wrongdoing.

U.S. Implementation of CAT’s Criminal Law Requirements

18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A were enacted to fulfill CAT’s requirement that each ratifying country criminalize all acts of torture, including attempts to commit torture and complicity in torture. [55] Section 2340 defines torture as:

an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control. . .


“Severe mental pain or suffering” is also defined, using the same wording as the U.S. understandings concerning Article 1 of CAT set forth in Section I(C)(1) above. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340. As discussed further below, however, this statute applies only to U.S. nationals (or others present in the U.S.) who have committed or attempted or conspired to commit acts of torture “outside of the United States.” [56]

U.S. Case Law Interpretations of Torture in Tort Claims

Two U.S. statutes provide for civil suits against those who commit acts of torture abroad. The Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides that:

[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation – (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. [57]


The TVPA extends a civil remedy to U.S. citizen torture victims, while the ATCA provides a remedy for aliens only.

U.S. courts applying the ATCA and TVPA have found that the following acts constitute torture: subjecting detainees to interrogation sessions lasting 14 hours (Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Mass 1995)); beating with hands (Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420-423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996)); threatening with death (Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996)); and using techniques to exacerbate pain or injury (Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845-6 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Conclusion: CAT’s Prohibition against Torture as Implemented in U.S. Legislation and Regulation

U.S. domestic laws prohibiting, or providing a cause of action to victims of, torture are consistent with the standards of CAT. However, these U.S. statutes and regulations are limited to specific contexts – such as, refugee claims, extradition of foreign fugitives, criminalizing acts of torture committed outside the U.S. by U.S. officials, and providing compensation to victims of torture committed by aliens. Accordingly, the U.S. has yet to fulfill its obligation, under CAT, to enact laws which adequately prevent U.S. officials and individuals acting with their consent from subjecting any detainee to torture and which punish such conduct wherever it occurs.

CAT’s Prohibition against “Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment,” as Interpreted by United States Law.

As previously noted, the U.S.’s reservation to Article 16 of CAT provides that the United States considers itself bound by Article 16 only insofar as CID treatment is understood to mean “the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report states that this reservation is the outgrowth of concern that “degrading treatment or punishment . . . has been interpreted as potentially including treatment that would probably not be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution” and cites, as an example of what the United States would not find “degrading” under the U.S. Constitution, a holding by the European Commission of Human Rights that the refusal of authorities to give formal recognition to an individual’s change of sex might constitute degrading treatment. [58] This explanation suggests that the reservation was intended to prevent the importation of foreign social values or mores into U.S. law, rather than any view that international norms of CID treatment are out of step with U.S. law.

In assessing interrogation conduct under Article 16 of CAT, the U.S. should look to international standards defining cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. If such conduct is prohibited under international law, the U.S. is bound to prevent such conduct unless it would not be prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Committees take note that much of the case law under the three Amendments arises in the context of domestic criminal justice proceedings. How this jurisprudence would be applied in a case relating to the detention and interrogation of foreign combatants is not completely clear. For instance, on the one hand some of the special protections provided in the American criminal justice system with respect to interrogations would be of doubtful applicability, particularly considering an asserted state interest in national security. On the other, the absence of a legitimate state interest in punishment might mandate a higher standard of treatment of detainees generally.

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Standards

The Constitution’s guarantee of due process forbids compulsion to testify, at least for domestic law enforcement purposes, by fear of hurt, torture or exhaustion. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (armed Texas Rangers on several successive nights took defendant from county jail into the woods, whipped him, asked him each time about a confession, interrogated him from approximately 11 p.m. to 3 a.m. and warned him not to speak to anyone about the nightly trips); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions obtained by mock executions and whippings); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (defendant was taken into custody by police officers and for 36 hours thereafter was held incommunicado, without sleep or rest, and interrogated without respite by relays of officers, experienced investigators, and highly trained lawyers); see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946). However, the presence of unlawful police coercion motivated by “immediate necessity to find the victim and save his life” to extract a confession has been found by one appeals court to be insufficient to exclude a subsequent confession. [59]

Due process also prohibits actions taken under color of law that are “so brutal and offensive to human dignity” that they “shock the conscience.” [60] The Supreme Court has given content to the phrase “shocks the conscience” by reference to the spectrum of fault standards in tort law. Intentional infliction of injury unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action which could rise to the conscience-shocking level. [61] All applicable sources of law are consistent in prohibiting such extreme conduct.

Eighth Amendment Standards

The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” [62] In the context of law enforcement, U.S. courts have long held that the norms articulated under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause establish a minimum level of protection, applicable even to pretrial detainees. [63]

While the Supreme Court initially interpreted the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting only barbaric or torturous punishments, this interpretation was early broadened in two respects: (i) to prevent disproportionate punishments (Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)) and (ii) to address non-physical forms of cruel and unusual punishment (e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (in case involving denationalization as a punishment for desertion from the United States Army, the Court noted that “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” should inform interpretation of the Eighth Amendment)). In 1947, the Supreme Court recognized that wanton or unnecessary infliction of pain also constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).

In cases brought by prisoners under the Eighth Amendment alleging that excessive force was used against them by government officials, courts consider both the objective component (whether the wrongdoing was “harmful enough” to implicate the Eighth Amendment) and the subjective component (whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind) of the challenged conduct. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). In order to establish that the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation is satisfied, a prisoner need not prove he has sustained significant injury. However, the extent of injury suffered is one factor that may suggest “whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary” in a particular situation, “or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” [64] The subjective component involves, in the context of force used by prison officials, “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” [65]

ENFORCEMENT OF CAT UNDER U.S. LAW

18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 – 2340B


As stated above, the United States’ attempt to comply with its obligation under CAT to criminalize torture is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. Section 2340A criminalizes conduct by a U.S. national or a foreign national present in the U.S. who, acting under color of law, commits or attempts to commit torture outside the United States. The statute is exclusively criminal and may not be construed as creating any right enforceable in a civil proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340B. Section 2340A generally applies to acts committed by U.S. nationals overseas (everywhere except “all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States, including any of the places described in sections 5 and 7 of this title and Section 46501(2) of Title 49.”) When the Section was enacted the reach of the cross-referenced provisions, notably 18 U.S.C. § 7, was uncertain. [66] However, Section 7 was broadened in the USA PATRIOT Act to clarify jurisdiction over crimes committed against U.S. citizens on U.S. property abroad by extending U.S. criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed at its foreign diplomatic, military and other facilities, and by cross-reference excluded those places from the reach of Section 2340A. The resulting drastic limitation of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A appears unintended. We recommend that Congress amend Section 2340A to assure that it applies to U.S. government premises abroad without prejudice to the expansion of U.S. criminal jurisdiction under other statutes.

The U.S. did not enact a specific criminal statute outlawing torture within the United States, out of deference to federal-state relations and because it determined that existing federal and state criminal law was sufficient to cover any domestic act that would qualify as torture under CAT. [67] It is submitted that the inapplicability of state law to U.S. facilities abroad and the lack of other federal criminal law comparable to Section 2340A leaves a serious vacuum in carrying out the obligations of the U.S. under CAT.

Unfortunately the U.S. has never enforced 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, and has thereby fallen far short of its obligations under international law and its professed ideals. The United States has failed to utilize 18 U.S.C. § 2340A to prosecute either U.S. agents suspected of committing torture outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. or foreign torturers living within the United States. Indeed, Amnesty International reported in 2002 that in the eight years following the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2340 and § 2340A, not a single case had been brought under that section. [68]

Uniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ may be used to prosecute in courts-martial certain acts of ill-treatment carried out, whether within the United States or overseas, by American military personnel and possibly certain civilians accompanying such personnel. This federal statute is essentially a complete set of criminal laws that includes both crimes that are normally part of a criminal code as well as uniquely military and wartime offenses.

As a jurisdictional matter, the UCMJ applies worldwide (10 U.S.C. § 805), and persons subject to the UCMJ include any U.S. service member (10 U.S.C. § 802) as well as certain civilians “[i]n time of war … serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field” (10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)) and POWs (10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(9)). [69] Because courts-martial have jurisdiction to try “any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal” for any offense against the laws of war (10 U.S.C. § 818), the UCMJ would seem to apply also to “unlawful combatants” deemed by the Administration not to qualify for POW status under Geneva III.

The broad statutory application of the UCMJ to civilians associated in various ways with the armed forces has been judicially limited in deference to the requirements of Article III, Section II, of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments protecting the right to trial by jury. As so limited, the UCMJ does not apply to civilians who have no military status in peacetime, even if they are accompanying United States forces overseas as employees or dependents. Although courts’ interpretations of the terms “serving”, “accompanying” and “in the field” suggest a broad application, the “time of war” requirement is construed narrowly when applied to civilians. [70] As recently as 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [71] analyzed the propriety of the application of the UCMJ to civilians and stated:

As a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may not extend court-martial jurisdiction to cover civilians who have no military status in peacetime, even if they are accompanying United States forces overseas as employees or dependents.


Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152, 157, 1998 CAAF LEXIS 43 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The line of cases in this area generally focuses on the application of the UCMJ to civilian contractors and civilian dependents of service members. See, e.g., Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (civilian engineer employed by U.S. Navy in Vietnam was not subject to UCMJ); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (no jurisdiction over civilian dependents of service members stationed overseas in peacetime for capital offenses). No cases directly address whether CIA operatives conducting para-military operations with the regular armed forces or interrogations within a military base are considered civilians for purposes of UCMJ application. In Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court stated, “[e]ven if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely define the boundary between ‘civilians’ and members of the ‘land and naval Forces.’ We recognize that there might be circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed services . . . even though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform.” See 354 U.S. at 22. [72] In any event, where a CIA operative is a detached service member who has not been formally discharged from military service (as is often the case in practice), the UCMJ would generally apply to such person in time of war or peace.

The UCMJ provides the strongest substantive basis for potential prosecution of torture or CID treatment in federal criminal law, specifically outlawing cruel or unusual punishment, torture under 18 U.S.C. § 2340 and a variety of related offenses. Article 55 of the UCMJ provides that:

Punishment by flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment, may not be adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon any person subject to this chapter. The use of irons, single or double, except for the purpose of safe custody, is prohibited.


10 U.S.C. § 855. [73] Article 55 is unique in its specific definition of “cruel or unusual punishment” as a standard of treatment. [74] While most military courts have followed the Supreme Court's analytical framework of protections under the Eighth Amendment as they pertain to cruel and unusual punishment, [75] several military courts have found that Article 55 provides greater protections than those given under the Eighth Amendment. [76] It is notable that Article 55 applies at least the equivalent of the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment even if the victim is not otherwise entitled to constitutional rights (e.g., a non-citizen apprehended and detained outside the U.S. and arguably not entitled to such rights). [77]

Moreover, the UCMJ effectively provides a basis for the prosecution of military personnel in courts-martial for the offense of torture in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340. Article 134 of the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 934) provides:

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.


Article 134 makes punishable acts in three categories of offenses not specifically covered in any other article of the UCMJ: Clause 1 offenses involving disorders and neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline; Clause 2 offenses involving conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces; and Clause 3 offenses entailing non-capital crimes or offenses that violate Federal law.

In order to successfully charge an individual under Clauses 1 and 2 of this Article, the government must show: (i) that the accused did or failed to do certain acts; and (ii) that, under the circumstances, the accused’s conduct was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [78] Under Clause 1, the acts must be directly prejudicial to good order and discipline, rather than remotely so. Under Clause 2, discredit is interpreted to mean “injure the reputation of,” and encompasses conduct that brings the service “into disrepute or which tends to lower it in public esteem.” [79] With respect to Clause 3 offenses, as a general rule, any offense created by Federal statute may be prosecuted as an Article 134 offense. United States v. Perkins, 47 C.M.R. 259 (Ct. of Mil. Rev. 1973). [80]

Thus, a service member whose conduct is alleged to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2340, the federal enactment of CAT, could be prosecuted under Article 134 of the UCMJ, as a Clause 3 violation. Moreover, multiple counts alleging Article 134 violations also could be brought in such a situation, as such conduct could be construed as prejudicial to good order and discipline and/or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. Perkins, 47 C.M.R. at 263-264.

Finally, criminal charges for torture or CID conduct could be brought under a variety of other provisions [81]including “cruelty.” [82] The last of these offenses is generally intended to be applied to mistreatment of U.S. service members by their superiors, but by its terms it is not so limited and has been applied to intentional mistreatment of detainees. [83] And in instances where specific orders are in place regarding the treatment of detainees, as is recommended in this Report, failure to obey such orders is punishable under 10 U.S.C. § 892. A number of service members in Iraq are or have been investigated or tried for assaulting detainees, under the assault provision of the UCMJ (Article 128), and in at least one case the alleged assault occurred in the context of an interrogation. [84]

The UCMJ is thus the substantively most extensive body of federal criminal law relating to the interrogation of detainees by U.S. military personnel and, in time of war, its reach could possibly extend to civilians such as CIA agents accompanying such personnel. It prohibits such persons from subjecting detainees to torture and “cruel or unusual punishment” within or without the United States and regardless of the applicability of constitutional rights.
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Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka

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PART 2 OF 4 (The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on International Human Rights Committee on Military Affairs and Justice's Report CONT'D.)

SUMMARY

CAT’s prohibition against torture is absolute. By ratifying CAT, the United States has accepted that the prohibition of torture is non-derogable. Moreover, by implementing prohibitions against torture in immigration, extradition, criminal and civil tort law contexts, the U.S. has given CAT’s prohibition against torture the force of U.S. law. Furthermore, by stipulating that CAT’s prohibition on CID treatment or punishment means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. has made relevant the case law providing that detainees cannot be subjected to interrogation techniques that force them to answer law enforcement questions by “fear of hurt, torture or exhaustion,” Adamson v. California, supra; that are “brutal and offensive to human dignity,” Rochin v. California, supra; that fall below the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” Trop v. Dulles, supra; or which deliberately inflict force or pain (in the context of restoring prison order or safety), Hudson v. McMillian, supra. However, U.S. enforcement of CAT in our domestic criminal law – particularly with respect to acts of torture or CID treatment by U.S. civilians or by U.S. officials in extra-territorial areas under U.S. jurisdiction – has been incomplete. We urge the U.S. to fill in the gaps in preventing and punishing torture and CID treatment left by 18 U.S.C. § 2340A and to fully utilize the UCMJ to fulfill its obligations under CAT.

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are the core of the international law of armed conflict applicable to the treatment of detainees, albeit not the complete body of applicable law. The applicability of the Geneva Conventions to persons captured by the United States in connection with the War In Afghanistan and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, however, is highly controversial. The most hotly contested issue is whether those Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees who were captured before the creation of the Karzai government are entitled to POW status under Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”). This issue is of particular significance because Geneva III flatly prohibits “any form of coercion” of POWs in interrogation – the most protective standard of treatment found in international law. Likewise, Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Geneva IV”) protects “civilian” detainees who qualify as “protected persons” from “coercion.” [85] We also should note that the issues regarding Geneva III and Geneva IV are affected by whether the person was detained either before or after the Karzai government was established. Before the Karzai government, the U.S. was engaged in an international armed conflict with Afghanistan, which was governed by the Taliban (albeit the U.S. did not recognize that government). After the establishment of the Karzai government, the conflict in Afghanistan became an internal one – as the U.S. and other international organizations were present in Afghanistan with the consent of the Karzai government to assist in maintaining order. Geneva III and Geneva IV apply only in situations of international armed conflict and, therefore, ceased to apply once the Afghan conflict became an internal one. See Geneva IV, Art. 6.

In this section, we will examine the Administration’s position that Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not POWs under Geneva III and some critiques of the Administration’s position. We submit that, regardless of whether a detainee enjoys status as a POW or civilian protected person under the Geneva Conventions, the Conventions nevertheless are relevant to the interrogation of detainees in the following respects:

First, the requirements of humane treatment embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I protect all detainees captured in situations of international or internal armed conflict, regardless of “legal” status. [86] Of course, all detainees – including those captured outside of Afghan territory or in connection with the “War on Terror” – are entitled to the protection provided by human rights law, including CAT, the ICCPR and customary international law.

Second, notwithstanding its position on the POW status of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, the Administration has undertaken that it will treat all detainees in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva III. Accordingly, the interrogation techniques reportedly being used on detainees at Bagram and other U.S. detention facilities should be considered in light of the text and spirit of the Geneva Conventions.

Third, if there is doubt as to whether a detainee meets Geneva III criteria for POW status, that detainee is entitled to interim POW status until a “competent tribunal” determines his or her legal status. Because the U.S. government has not convened “competent tribunals” to determine the status of any detainees, all detainees for whom POW status is in doubt are entitled to interim POW status. [87]

Finally, even accepting the interpretation that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions contain gaps leaving certain detainees captured in the War in Afghanistan (i.e., citizens of co-belligerents and neutrals) without POW or “protected person” civilian status, the Geneva Conventions are supplemented by human rights law and customary international legal norms which have the force of law in the United States. For example, even where a detainee may not be entitled to a hearing under Geneva III, he is entitled to a hearing to determine the justification for his detention under Article 9 of the ICCPR. Many detainees may not be combatants at all and may be simply innocent bystanders mistakenly detained or wrongfully turned over to the U.S. military by the Northern Alliance. [88] They deserve prompt hearings in which they are given an opportunity to establish their non-combatant status.

APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT GENERALLY

Both the U.S. and Afghanistan are parties to the Geneva Conventions. Article 2 common to all four Conventions provides that the Conventions “apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict” between two or more parties to the Conventions so long as a state of war is recognized by a party to the conflict. The Conventions also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a signatory, even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance. See Geneva Conventions, Art. 2. Signatories to the Conventions are bound by its terms regardless of whether an additional party to the conflict is a signatory. Id. The Administration’s position is that the Geneva Conventions apply to the War in Afghanistan. [89]

GENEVA III

Relevant Legal Standards


Under Geneva III, combatants are entitled to POW status if they are members of the armed forces (other than medical personnel and chaplains). The specific requirements for combatant/POW status are set forth in Article 4 of Geneva III [90] and Articles 43 and 44 of Additional Protocol I. [91]

If there is any doubt as to whether captured persons meet Article 4’s criteria for POW status, such persons are entitled to interim POW status until a “competent tribunal” determines their legal status. [92]

Geneva III mandates that POWs be treated humanely at all times. This includes freedom from physical and mental torture, acts of violence, intimidation and insult, and exposure to public humiliation. [93] Pursuant to Article 14, POWs also “are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour . . . . [and] shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture.”

With respect to interrogation, in particular, Article 17 of Geneva III provides: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” Under Article 17, POWs are only obligated to provide their name, rank, date of birth, and army, personal or serial identification number or equivalent information. Geneva III does not, however, prohibit non-coercive interrogation of POWs. POWs may be interrogated, but they are not obliged to respond to such interrogation, nor may they be threatened, coerced into responding or punished for failing to respond. The Geneva Conventions also do not “preclude classic plea bargaining” – i.e., the offer of leniency or other incentives in return for cooperation. [94]

Thus, to the extent detainees from the War in Afghanistan are considered POWs or to the extent their POW status is in “doubt” pending the determination of status by a competent tribunal, interrogation tactics which rise to the level of “coercion” are prohibited by Geneva III.

The United States’ Position

In sharp contrast with past conflicts (such as Vietnam and Korea) in which it was U.S. policy to presume that military prisoners were entitled to POW status regardless of the possible nonqualification of their forces under Geneva III, from the very outset of the War in Afghanistan, United States officials labeled captured Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners “unlawful combatants,” and stated that the Geneva Conventions were, therefore, entirely inapplicable to their treatment. [95] The United States reasoned that Al Qaeda was not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions because: (1) Geneva III could not apply to members of a nonstate organization, such as Al Qaeda, (2) the conflict was not an internal conflict such that Al Qaeda members could benefit from the protection of Common Article 3, and (3) in any event, Al Qaeda members failed to meet the requirements set forth in Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva III. [96] The United States argued further that, since Afghanistan was not a functioning state during the conflict and the Taliban was not recognized as a legitimate government, Geneva III could not apply to the Taliban. [97]

After vigorous criticism was leveled against these arguments, Secretary of State Colin Powell requested that the Administration reconsider its position. [98] On February 7, 2002, in response to Powell’s comments, the Administration partially reversed its initial position. Although the Administration continues to argue that the Geneva Conventions are inapplicable to Al Qaeda captives, President Bush announced that Geneva III was applicable to the Taliban because both the U.S. and Afghanistan were signatories to the Convention and the parties had been involved in an armed conflict. However, President Bush further argued that because the Taliban had violated the laws of war and associated closely with Al Qaeda, “[u]nder the terms of the Geneva Convention … the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs.” [99] The decision in United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002), which specifically addresses the issue of whether the Taliban are entitled to POW status under Geneva III, sheds further light on the U.S. position. [100]

Critiques of the United States’ Position

International humanitarian and human rights organizations and legal bodies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), [101] the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, [102] Amnesty International, [103] the International Commission of Jurists, [104] the Secretary General of the United Nations, [105] the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [106] as well as certain U.S. and foreign international law scholars [107] have criticized the U.S. position on several grounds.

Article 5 Presumes POW Status Until the Determination of Status by a Competent Tribunal

Critics of the Administration position argue that non-civilian detainees from the War in Afghanistan either clearly qualify as POWs or their POW status is in “doubt.” Geneva III mandates that a detainee whose status is in “doubt” must be treated as a POW until his status is decided otherwise by a competent tribunal under Article 5. Indeed, Article 5’s presumption that captured combatants are entitled to POW status until their status is determined by a competent tribunal is one that has been consistently honored by the U.S. since World War II. [108] Moreover, like Article 5, customary international law also includes the principle that a competent tribunal must resolve any doubt about the status of a captured combatant. [109] We agree with critics of the Administration position that all combatants whose claim to POW status is “in doubt” must be treated as POWs until such doubt has been resolved by a “competent tribunal.” Accordingly, since no tribunals have been convened for detainees from the War in Afghanistan, all such detainees must be considered POWs under Geneva III.

The Taliban Detainees Were “Regular Armed Forces” and, Therefore, Are Encompassed by Article 4(A) of Geneva III

Critics of the Administration’s position that Taliban fighters are not entitled to POW status because they do not satisfy the requirements of Article 4(a)(2) of Geneva III [110] assert that Taliban captured in the War in Afghanistan are entitled to POW status either under: Article 4(a)(1) because they are “[m]embers of the armed forces” of Afghanistan; or Article 4(a)(3) as they are “[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government of an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.” [111]

Policy Arguments Favoring Broad Grant of POW Status to Non-Civilian Detainees from the War in Afghanistan

Several policy arguments favor granting POW status liberally even assuming that Geneva III does not apply to Taliban or Al Qaeda detainees captured in the War in Afghanistan.

First, depriving Taliban and Al Qaeda of POW status because they do not obey the laws of war sets a dangerous precedent, inviting other state parties to claim that another party is not obeying the rules of war and that they are, therefore, free from the obligations of Geneva III. International humanitarian law applies regardless of whether or not the other party to the conflict respects such laws. [112] Reciprocity arrangements are generally rejected in international humanitarian law as they can so easily be abused at the expense of civilians or persons rendered “hors de combat.” [113]

Second, it is in the U.S.’s self-interest to ensure that the Geneva Conventions – a regime of vital importance to the safety of our own armed forces – are interpreted as broadly as possible. Otherwise, an opposing state party could use the argument that the U.S. has violated the laws of war to deny captured U.S. soldiers POW status. In fact, North Korea and Vietnam have already used this argument as a basis to deny captured U.S. prisoners POW protections under the Geneva Conventions. [114] Indeed, it was reportedly these very examples that prompted Colin Powell, out of concern for the safety of U.S. forces, to request that President Bush reconsider the Administration’s initial position. [115]

We accordingly urge liberal extension of POW treatment where that would encourage reciprocal treatment of U.S. service personnel and advance more generally foreign policy and national security interests. We further believe that, even to the extent that POW status is denied to detainees, such detainees must be afforded the protections of international criminal law, as well as international human rights and humanitarian law.

GENEVA IV

Geneva IV applies in international armed conflicts to the same extent as Geneva III. It covers “protected persons” defined as “those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” See Geneva IV, Article 4. [116]

The fact that a person may have unlawfully participated in a conflict is not relevant to Geneva IV protections, apart from a significant national security exemption. The term “protected persons” includes persons detained as spies or saboteurs as well as other persons suspected of engaging in activities hostile to the security of the detaining power. Specifically, Article 5 provides:

Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State ….

In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.


As drafted, (i.e., the use of the words “the latter”), it would appear that the national security derogation is available only to the State on whose territory the conflict is occurring (i.e., in the War in Afghanistan, only to the Northern Alliance), and there is no authority whether or not an allied State, such as the United States, can benefit from such exemption.

In an exception of great importance in Afghanistan, given the number of third country participants in the conflict, “protected persons” does not include “[n]ationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention,” “[n]ationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State” and “nationals of a co-belligerent State … while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.” See Geneva IV, Article 4. For example, a Pakistani picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan would fall within the exceptions to “protected person” status under Geneva IV.

However, in no event would such provision permit the State to commit “grave breaches” as defined in Article 147, which includes torture or inhuman treatment and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, upon a “protected person”. See Geneva IV, Art. 146. Furthermore, to the extent that any physical or moral coercion (otherwise prohibited by Article 31 of Geneva IV) might fall below the level of “grave breach” and thus be derogable, the ICRC commentary to the national security derogations contained in Article 5 of Geneva IV, involving persons engaged in activities hostile to the security of the state notes that:

widespread application of the Article may eventually lead to the existence of a category of civilian internees who do not receive the normal treatment laid down by the Convention but are detained under conditions which are almost impossible to check. It must be emphasized most strongly, therefore, that Article 5 can only be applied in individual cases of an exceptional nature, when the existence of specific charges makes it almost certain that penal proceedings will follow. This article should never be applied as a result of mere suspicion.


Like POWs under Geneva III, “protected persons” under Geneva IV cannot be subjected to coercive interrogation tactics. Specifically, Article 31 of Geneva IV provides that “[n]o physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.” Article 32 further provides that “any measure of such a character as to the cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons” is prohibited and that “[t]his prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality, whether applied by civilian or military agents.”

By its terms, Geneva IV ceases to apply “on the general close of military operations” in the case of an international conflict. See Geneva IV, Art. 6. Whether military operations have reached a “general close” after the establishment of the Karzai government in June 2002 and whether the change in character of the conflict from an international one to a multi-national conflict within a single State against non-State opponents terminated application of Geneva IV are issues open to controversy. [117] Thus, the ability of some civilians captured in Afghanistan to claim “protected person” status under Geneva IV today is subject to additional debate. However, regardless of the characterization of the current conflict, torture and inhumane treatment of civilian detainees from the War in Afghanistan or the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, whether or not they qualify as “protected persons” under Geneva IV, is not permitted. All such persons are still entitled to the protections of international human rights law and to humane treatment under Common Article 3 and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I.

SUMMARY

None of the detainees from the War in Afghanistan or the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan fall outside of international humanitarian law. An individual detained during the armed conflict in Afghanistan – whether considered an international or internal armed conflict –is either protected by Geneva III as a POW, by Geneva IV as a civilian “protected person,” or, at the very minimum, by Common Article 3 and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. Of course, all detainees – regardless of where or when they were captured – are entitled to the protection of human rights law (including CAT and the ICCPR) and customary international law.

Detainees protected as POWs or civilians under Geneva III or Geneva IV cannot be subjected to coercion of any kind. In addition, those detainees whose POW status is in doubt are entitled to interim POW status until a competent tribunal determines otherwise. At least some Afghan detainees are entitled to such tribunals, and the U.S. is long overdue in providing any process whatsoever to detainees, many of whom may simply be innocent non-combatants, wrongfully detained. We, therefore, urge the U.S. to establish proper screening procedures for all detainees.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS

The legal standards set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and customary international law also apply to the treatment of detainees held by the United States.

THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS [118]

Relevant Legal Standards


Like CAT, the ICCPR expressly prohibits both torture and CID. Specifically, Article 7 of the ICCPR provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” [119] However, the ICCPR goes further than CAT in its non-derogability provision, expressly stating that neither torture nor CID treatment can be justified by exceptional circumstances such as war, internal political stability or other public emergencies. (See ICCPR, Art. 4). Article 10 also provides that: “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”

The Human Rights Committee, established under Article 28, adjudicates complaints filed by individuals or states parties alleging violations of the ICCPR. The Committee has found the following conduct to violate Article 7’s prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: threatening a victim with torture, prolonged solitary confinement and incommunicado detention, and repeated beatings. [120] Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has specifically criticized interrogation procedures such as handcuffing, hooding, shaking and sleep deprivation as violations of Article 7 in any circumstances. [121]

Although the ICCPR does not expressly prohibit states parties from “rendering” individuals to countries where they are likely to be mistreated, the Human Rights Committee has explained that, under Article 7, states parties “must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.” [122] Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee has stated that “[i]f a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances such that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant.” [123]

Enforcement

U.S. Courts


In ratifying the ICCPR, the U.S. Senate declared that Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing. Thus, while the Supreme Court has not squarely decided the issue, the majority of federal appeals courts have held that the ICCPR provides no privately enforceable rights and is not binding on federal courts. [124] The Second and Ninth circuit courts, however, have cited the ICCPR as evidence that customary international law prohibits arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention and torture. [125]

The Human Rights Committee

The Human Rights Committee is empowered to: (i) receive state party reports and comment on those reports (see ICCPR, Art. 40(4)); (ii) rule on complaints filed by a state party that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the ICCPR (see ICCPR, Art. 41); [126] and (iii) rule on complaints filed by individuals “who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies.” [127]

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES' INSTRUMENTS

Relevant Legal Standards


The U.S. is a member of the Organization of American States (the “OAS”). Article XXV of The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the “American Declaration”), which was adopted by the Ninth International Conference of the OAS in 1948, provides:

Every individual who has been deprived of his liberty has the right to have the legality of his detention ascertained without delay by a court, and the right to be tried without undue delay or, otherwise, to be released. He also has the right to humane treatment during the time he is in custody.


On June 1, 1997, the U.S. signed, but has not yet ratified, the American Convention On Human Rights (1969) (the “American Convention”). [128] Article 5 of the American Convention, which sets forth Rights to Humane Treatment, provides:

1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.

2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.


Moreover, pursuant to Article 27(2) of the American Convention, the Rights to Humane Treatment may not be suspended “[i]n time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party.”

With respect to the treatment of detainees, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the “Inter-American Commission”) – which represents all member countries of the OAS and was established under Chapter VII of the American Convention – has determined that, “when the State holds a person in detention and under its exclusive control, it becomes the guarantor of that person’s safety and rights.” [129] In this regard, the Commission has found the following practices to be violations of Article 5 of the American Convention: threats to summon family members and pressure them to “talk”; threats to kill detainees; blindfolding detainees and forcing them to run around; “prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication”; solitary confinement; confining detainees in small cells with other prisoners; keeping detainees in cells that are damp and/or without adequate ventilation; keeping detainees in cells without beds; forcing detainees to sleep on the floor or on newspaper; depriving detainees of necessary hygiene facilities; beatings with rifles; and kicks in various parts of the body, especially in the stomach. [130]

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the “Inter-American Court”) – established pursuant to Chapter VIII of the American Convention – has held that, “in order to establish if torture has been inflicted and its scope, all the circumstances of the case should be taken into consideration, such as the nature and context of the respective aggressions, how they were inflicted, during what period of time, the physical and mental effects and, in some case, the sex, age and state of health of the victims.” [131] “The violation of the right to physical and psychological integrity of persons is a category of violation that has several gradations and embraces treatment ranging from torture to other types of humiliation or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with varying degrees of physical and psychological effects caused by endogenous and exogenous factors which must be proven in each specific situation.” [132]

The Inter-American Court has found the following practices to violate Article 5 of the American Convention and/or Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture: [133] forcing detainees to stand blindfolded with their hands cuffed behind their backs; forcing detainees to listen to the cries of others being beaten; threatening detainees with physical torture; restriction of visiting rights; incommunicado detention; incarceration in solitary confinement and/or in a small cell with no ventilation or natural light; prohibiting detainees from engaging in physical exercise or intellectual efforts; deprivation of necessary hygiene facilities; deficient medical treatment; and throwing detainees to the ground. [134] “[A]ccording to international standards for protection, torture can be inflicted not only via physical violence, but also through acts that produce severe physical, psychological or moral suffering in the victim.” [135] The Inter-American Court also has held that: “Prolonged isolation and being held incommunicado constitute, in themselves, forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, harmful to the mental and moral integrity of the person and to the right of all detainees of respect for the inherent dignity of the human being.” [136]

Moreover, the Inter-American Court has warned that the fact that a State is confronted with terrorism does not, in itself, warrant the use of force:

Any use of force that is not strictly necessary, given the behavior of the person detained, constitutes an affront to human dignity . . . in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention. The need to conduct investigations and the undeniable difficulties inherent to combating terrorism are not grounds for placing restrictions on the protection of the physical integrity of the person. [137]


In a case brought before the Inter-American Commission by detainees alleging violations of the United States’ obligations under the American Declaration by U.S. armed forces in Grenada in 1983, Coard, et al. v. United States, the Inter-American Commission expressly extended the protections of human rights and humanitarian norms to extraterritorial conduct by U.S. military forces and criticized the U.S. for delay in providing procedure to detainees. [138] Acknowledging the need to balance between public security and individual rights, the Inter-American Commission in Coard held that: “What is required when an armed force detains civilians is the establishment of a procedure to ensure that the legality of the detention can be reviewed without delay and is subject to supervisory control. . . . [C]ontrol over a detention [cannot] rest[] exclusively with the agents charged with carrying it out.” Coard, at paras. 58-59.

Enforcement

The Inter-American Commission has competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to the American Convention. [139] “The main function of the Commission” is “to promote respect for and defense of human rights.” [140] Any person may lodge a petition with the Commission complaining of violation of the American Convention by a State Party, so long as effective domestic remedies available to the petitioner have been exhausted. [141]

On March 12, 2002, in response to a petition challenging detentions at Guantánamo Bay coordinated by the Center for Constitutional Rights, [142] the Inter-American Commission adopted precautionary measures addressed to the United States concerning the Guantánamo detainees. [143] Specifically, the Commission asked the U.S. “to take the urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantánamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal.” [144] In so doing, the Inter-American Commission explained:

[W]here persons find themselves within the authority and control of a state and where a circumstance of armed conflict may be involved, their fundamental rights may be determined in part by reference to international humanitarian law as well as international human rights law. Where it may be considered that the protections of international humanitarian law do not apply, however, such persons remain the beneficiaries at least of the non-derogable protections under international human rights law. In short, no person under the authority and control of a state, regardless of his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights. [145]


With regard to the Guantánamo Bay detainees in particular, the Inter-American Commission observed that: “[T]he information available suggests that the detainees remain entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States government. Absent clarification of the legal status of the detainees, the Commission considers that the rights and protections to which they may be entitled under international or domestic law cannot be said to be the subject of effective legal protection by the State.” [146] The Inter-American Commission further noted that, regardless of the legal status of the Guantánamo Bay detainees, their legal protections “may in no case fall below the minimal standards of non-derogable rights.” [147] Thereafter, the Commission issued a renewed request to the U.S. government for precautionary measures, stating that new factual allegations regarding torture or other ill-treatment of detainees “raise questions concerning the extent to which the United States’ policies and practices in detaining and interrogating persons in connection with its anti-terrorist initiatives clearly and absolutely prohibit treatment that may amount to torture or may otherwise be cruel, inhuman or degrading as defined under international norms.” [148]

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUS COGENS

Relevant Legal Standards


Customary international law has long prohibited the state practice of torture, without reservation, in peace or in wartime. [149] On December 9, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment. [150] The Torture Resolution together with CAT and the ICCPR – ratified by 133 and 151 States, respectively – embody the customary international law obligation to refrain from behavior which constitutes torture. [151] In addition, in 1985 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Pieter Koojimans, noted the widespread existing domestic legislation in many countries, including the United States, expressly or by implication prohibiting torture as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. [152]

The prohibition of torture is, moreover, one of the few norms which has attained peremptory norm or jus cogens status, and is recognized as such by United States courts. [153] Jus cogens is defined as a peremptory norm “accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” [154] While many international agreements expressly prohibit both torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, [155] it remains an open question as to whether jus cogens status extends to the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. What is clear, however, is that cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited by customary international law.

U.S. ratification of the ICCPR and CAT are clear pronouncements that we condemn the practice of torture and CID treatment and that we consider ourselves legally bound to prohibit such conduct. Indeed, in 1999, the United States issued a report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture categorically affirming that:

Every act constituting torture under the Convention constitutes a criminal offense under the law of the United States. No official of the Government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as justification for torture. United States law contains no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be employed on grounds of exigent circumstance (for example, during a “state of public emergency”) or on orders from a superior officer or public authority, and the protective mechanisms of an independent judiciary are not subject to suspension. [156]


Furthermore, the United States has enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act, [157] has imposed civil liability for acts of torture regardless of where such acts take place, [158] and has enacted the Torture Victims Relief Act, providing for monetary assistance for torture victims. [159] As previously discussed, not only does the U.S. Constitution prohibit cruel and unusual punishment or treatment by state officials (including under the military justice system), but almost all of the U.S. State constitutions have similar prohibitions. [160] Finally, a number of federal judicial proceedings have recognized that the right to be free from torture as well as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a norm of customary international law. [161]

In the State Department Country Reports On Human Rights Practices, for example, the United States has expressly characterized the following types of conduct – some of which are allegedly occurring at U.S. detention centers – as “torture” or “other abuse”: tying detainees in painful positions; forcing detainees to stand for long periods of time; incommunicado detention; depriving detainees of sleep; dousing naked detainees with cold water; denial of access to medical attention; interrogation techniques designed to intimidate or disorient; subjecting a detainee to loud music; forcing a detainee to squat or to assume “stressful, uncomfortable or painful” positions for “prolonged periods of time”; long periods of imprisonment in darkened rooms; verbal threats; and instilling detainees with the false belief that they are to be killed. [162] The following types of conduct have been defined as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment: stripping; confinement in severely overcrowded cells; beating; imprisonment in small containers; and threats against family members of detainees. [163]

Enforcement

As the Second Circuit stated in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980), the United States is bound by customary international law. Thus, in cases where jurisdictional hurdles have been met, the bans on torture, arbitrary detention, and at least some aspects of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment have been enforced by U.S. courts as violations of customary international law. [164]

SHOULD EXCEPTIONS BE MADE FOR THE “WAR ON TERROR”?: THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Notwithstanding the clear legal prohibitions against the use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in U.S. and international law, we considered whether, in a post-September 11 world, the threat posed by terrorists to the United States could ever justify the use of prohibited interrogation practices. We sought to answer the question of whether there are any circumstances in which torture and CID treatment in the interrogation of detainees should be permitted.

For additional guidance in answering these questions, we looked to the experiences of Northern Ireland and Israel, other places where the struggle between fighting terrorism and upholding the rule of law has been waged. Both the European Court of Human Rights and the Israeli Supreme Court have confronted the contradictory demands of national security and human rights against the backdrop of terrorism. The legal debate that infuses these courts’ seminal decisions on the use of torture and CID treatment in the interrogation of terrorist suspects offers guidance to the United States in interpreting CAT. These courts have ruled that there are no exceptions to the prohibition against torture and CID treatment. Their rulings express the conviction that the torture and CID treatment of detainees – even when those detainees are suspected terrorists – cannot be justified.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO INTERROGATION PRACTICES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND ISRAEL

The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom


The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “European Convention”) came into force in 1953. [165] Article 3 of the European Convention provides: “No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The judicial body primarily charged with interpreting and enforcing the European Convention is the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”). The ECHR has, in several decisions, applied the European Convention’s prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment to cases involving interrogation of suspected terrorists who pose a threat to national security.

The most important of these decisions is The Republic of Ireland. [166] The Republic of Ireland case was decided in a legal and political environment conditioned by several years of terrorism in Northern Ireland perpetrated by members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Loyalist groups. By March 1975, over 1,100 people had been killed, over 11,500 injured and £140 million worth of property destroyed. [167] To combat a campaign of violence being carried out by the IRA, in 1971, the Northern Ireland Government introduced regulations providing authorities with extrajudicial powers, including arrest for interrogation purposes and internment. [168]

The Republic of Ireland Decision is a landmark legal discussion of whether specific interrogation practices committed by British security forces against IRA detainees constituted torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. The impetus for the ECHR’s decision was the Republic of Ireland’s application before the European Commission of Human Rights alleging, among other things, that various interrogation practices – including specific practices referred to as the “five techniques” – amounted to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, in contravention of Article 3 of the European Convention. [169] The “five techniques” – described by the ECHR as methods of “disorientation” or “sensory deprivation” – include a number of practices allegedly being used today by U.S. interrogators:

• Wall-standing: Forcing a detainee to remain spread-eagled against a wall with his fingers placed high above his head against the wall, his legs spread apart and his feet positioned such that he must stand on his toes with the weight of his body resting on his fingers;
• Hooding: Keeping a dark bag over a detainee’s head at all times, except during interrogation;
• Subjection to noise: Holding a detainee in a room where there is a continuous loud and hissing noise;
• Deprivation of sleep; and
• Deprivation of food and drink. [170]

The European Commission of Human Rights unanimously found that the “five techniques” constituted torture, and that other challenged interrogation practices amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. [171] Although the British Government subsequently discontinued the “five techniques” and did not contest the underlying allegations of the case or the Commission’s findings in connection therewith, the Republic of Ireland nevertheless referred the case to the ECHR. [172] The ECHR took the opportunity to rule upon the legality of the “five techniques,” citing to the European Court’s responsibility “to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention.” [173]

In The Republic of Ireland decision, the ECHR explained that ill-treatment “had to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within Article 3, the assessment of which was necessarily relative, depending on all the circumstances, including the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, sometimes, the sex, age or state of health of the victim.” [174] The ECHR pointed out that, while the term “torture” attached “a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering,” the distinction between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment “derived principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.” [175] The ECHR held that since the “five techniques” “were applied in combination, with premeditation and for hours at a time, causing at least intense physical and mental suffering and acute psychiatric disturbances, they amount to inhuman treatment.” [176] The ECHR further held that since the “five techniques” aroused “in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, they were also degrading.” [177] The ECHR concluded that the “five techniques” violated Article 3’s prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment, but that they did not amount to torture. [178]

Israeli Supreme Court Judgment Concerning The Legality Of The General Security Service’s Interrogation Methods

As the Israeli Supreme Court notes at the outset of its Judgment Concerning The Legality Of The General Security Service’s Interrogation Methods, [179] the State of Israel “has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for both its very existence and security, from the day of its founding”:

Terrorist organizations have established as their goal Israel’s annihilation. Terrorist acts and the general disruption of order are their means of choice. In employing such methods, these groups do not distinguish between civilian and military targets. They carry out terrorist attacks in which scores are murdered in public areas, public transportation, city squares and centers, theaters and coffee shops. They do not distinguish between men, women and children. They act of cruelty and without mercy. [180]


In 1987, the Landau Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the GSS Regarding Hostile Terrorist Acts (the “Landau Commission”) was established to investigate the interrogation practices of the main body responsible for fighting terrorism in Israel, the General Security Service (the “GSS”), and to reach legal conclusions concerning them. The resulting Landau Report, [181] concluded: “The effective interrogation of terrorist suspects is impossible without the use of means of pressure, in order to overcome an obdurate will not to disclose information and to overcome the fear of the person under interrogation that harm will befall him from his own organization, if he does not reveal information.” [182] The Landau Report explained that: “The means of pressure should principally take the form of non-violent psychological pressure through a vigorous and extensive interrogation, with the use of stratagems, including acts of deception. However, when these do not attain their purpose, the exertion of a moderate measure of physical pressure cannot be avoided.” [183] The Landau Commission recommended, however, that GSS interrogators should be guided by clear rules “to prevent the use of inordinate physical pressure arbitrarily administered,” and formulated a code of guidelines (set forth in a secret part of the Landau Report) which defined, “on the basis of past experience, and with as much precision as possible, the boundaries of what is permitted to the interrogator and mainly what is prohibited to him.” [184] The Landau Commission asserted that the latitude it afforded GSS interrogators to use “a moderate measure of physical pressure” did not conflict with the standards set forth in international human rights conventions – such as the UDHR, the ICCPR and the European Convention – which prohibited torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. [185]

In 1999, in the GSS Interrogation Methods Decision, the Israeli Supreme Court took up the legality of certain interrogation practices employed by the GSS. The Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged that the Landau Commission had approved the use of “a moderate degree of physical pressure,” and that the Landau Commission’s recommendations had been accepted by the Israeli Government. [186] The interrogation methods considered by the Israeli Supreme Court in the GSS Interrogation Methods Decision were:

• Shaking: Forcefully shaking a detainee’s upper torso back and forth, repeatedly, and in a manner which causes the neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly.
• The “shabach” position: Forcing a detainee who has his hands tied behind his back to sit on a small and low chair whose seat is tilted forward and towards the ground, where one hand is placed inside the gap between the chair’s seat and back support, the detainee’s head is covered by an opaque sack falling down to his shoulders, and powerfully loud music is played in the room.
• The “frog crouch”: Forcing a detainee to crouch on the tips of his/her toes for five minute intervals.
• Excessive tightening of handcuffs: Using particularly small cuffs, ill-fitted in relation to the suspect’s arm or leg size.
• Sleep deprivation: A detainee is deprived of sleep as a result of being tied in the “shabach” position, being subjected to powerfully loud music or intense non-stop interrogations. [187]

In examining the legality of these GSS interrogation methods, the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged that, taken individually, some of the components of the “shabach” position have “legitimate” goals: for example, hooding prevents communication between suspects, the playing of powerfully loud music prevents the passing of information between suspects, the tying of the suspect’s hands to a chair protects investigators, and the deprivation of sleep can be necessitated by an interrogation. [188] According to the Israeli Supreme Court, however, there is a necessary balancing process between a government’s duty to ensure that human rights are protected and its duty to fight terrorism. The results of that balance, the Israeli Supreme Court stated, are the rules for a “reasonable interrogation” – defined as an interrogation which is: (1) “necessarily one free of torture, free of cruel, inhuman treatment of the subject and free of any degrading handling whatsoever”; and (2) “likely to cause discomfort.” [189] “In the end result,” the Court noted, “the legality of an investigation is deduced from the propriety of its purpose and from its methods.” [190]

Turning to the specific interrogation methods before it, the Court concluded that shaking, the “frog crouch,” the “shabach” position, cuffing causing pain, hooding, the consecutive playing of powerfully loud music and the intentional deprivation of sleep for a prolonged period of time are all prohibited interrogation methods. [191] “All these methods do not fall within the sphere of a ‘fair’ interrogation. They are not reasonable. They impinge upon the suspect’s dignity, his bodily integrity and his basic rights in an excessive manner (or beyond what is necessary). They are not to be deemed as included within the general power to conduct interrogations.” [192] The Israeli Supreme Court explained that restrictions applicable to police investigations are equally applicable to GSS investigations, and that there are no grounds to permit GSS interrogators to engage in conduct which would be prohibited in a regular police interrogation. [193]

In so ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court considered the “ticking time bomb” scenario often confronted by GSS interrogators:

A given suspect is arrested by the GSS. He holds information respecting the location of a bomb that was set and will imminently explode. There is no way to defuse the bomb without this information. If the information is obtained, however, the bomb may be defused. If the bomb is not defused, scores will be killed and maimed. Is a GSS investigator authorized to employ physical means in order to elicit information regarding the location of the bomb in such instances? [194]


The Israeli Supreme Court stated that it was prepared to presume that if a GSS investigator – who applied physical interrogation methods for the purpose of saving human life – is criminally indicted, the “necessity” defense recognized under Israeli Penal Law would be open to him in the appropriate circumstances. [195] The Israeli Supreme Court also acknowledged that the legislature could enact laws permitting the interrogation methods that its decision struck down. [196] However, the Israeli Supreme Court refused to imply from the existence of the “necessity” defense, as the State argued for it to do, “an advance legal authorization endowing the investigator with the capacity to use physical interrogation methods.” [197]

THE LEGAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE "TICKING BOMB" SCENARIO

As the Republic of Ireland and GSS Interrogation Methods Decision demonstrate, in the face of a terrorist threat there is an inherent tension between obtaining potentially life-saving intelligence information through abusive interrogation of detainees and upholding human rights:

In crystallizing the interrogation rules, two values or interests clash. On the one hand, lies the desire to uncover the truth, thereby fulfilling the public interest in exposing crime and preventing it. On the other hand, is the wish to protect the dignity and liberty of the individual being interrogated. [198]


International and human rights law is clear: torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees is prohibited. Those who would, nevertheless, support the use of moderate physical force, sensory deprivation or disorientation techniques in the interrogation of terrorist suspects argue that resort to such methods is, at times, the only way to prevent the death of innocent persons and is, therefore, justified in such cases as the “lesser of two evils.” Proponents of this view would argue that the legitimacy of an act can be measured by whether its utility exceeds its harm. On this point, the Landau Commission took the following position:

To put it bluntly, the alternative is: are we to accept the offense of assault entailed in slapping a suspect’s face, or threatening him, in order to induce him to talk and reveal a cache of explosive materials meant for use in carrying out an act of mass terror against a civilian population, and thereby prevent the greater evil which is about to occur? The answer is self-evident.

Everything depends on weighing the two evils against each other. [199]


In the case of detainees being held by the U.S. in connection with the “War on Terror,” however, the “ticking bomb” scenario is further complicated. Any utilitarian justification for subjecting these detainees to interrogation practices prohibited by CAT must necessarily be premised on the certainty (or, at least, the substantiated suspicion) that these individuals do, in fact, possess vital intelligence information. But, here, there is no such certainty. Instead, hundreds of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Bagram Air Force Base and other U.S. detention facilities have been detained for months without any type of hearing or legal challenge permitted to their detention.

Our answer to the question of whether torture of detainees should ever be permitted in a post-September 11 world is that there are no such circumstances. We condemn the use of torture in interrogation of detainees, without exception. By its terms, CAT permits no derogation of the prohibition against torture – stating that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” [200] As the Israeli Supreme Court has explained, “A democratic, freedom-loving society does not accept that investigators use any means for the purpose of uncovering the truth. ‘The interrogations practices of the police in a given regime are indicative of a regime’s very character.’” [201]

We recognize that some legal scholars and ethicists may well argue that circumstances exist (as in the “ticking bomb” scenario) in which torture and CID treatment in the interrogation of detainees should be permitted. However, we stress that torture of detainees – which is prohibited under international and U.S. law – is never permissible, and should be fully investigated and prosecuted in all cases.

* * *

In summary, the Association makes the following recommendations:

First, we urge the United States to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2340 to encompass the actions of military and intelligence personnel at U.S. facilities overseas, to fully utilize the UCMJ to protect all detainees from abuse and to independently investigate human rights compliance in countries to which we are “rendering” detainees.

Second, U.S. military and intelligence personnel involved in interrogation of terrorist suspects should be educated regarding the prohibition against torture and CID, and should receive training to comply with those rules.

Third, the U.S. should adhere to its commitments under the Geneva Conventions, extend POW treatment to regular force combatants as a matter of policy, and promptly establish proper screening procedures and hearings for all detainees.

Finally, the Association notes that particularly in these times of terrorism and violence, it is important to protect the rule of law and the standards of decency to which our nation and the community of nations are committed. As the Israeli Supreme Court has stated:

This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. [202]
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