Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report of the Joint

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report of the Joint

Postby admin » Tue Jan 24, 2017 7:32 pm

2d Session







S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress


JULY 20 (legislative day July 5), 1946 -- Ordered to be printed with illustrations




ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel

Washington, D.C., July 16, 1946

Hon. Kenneth McKellar,
President pro tempore of the Senate.

Hon. Sam Rayburn,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-ninth Congress, first session,  the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl  Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a full and complete  investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances  leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon  Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties assigned and respectfully submits herewith its report.

Sincerely yours,

Vice Chairman.


On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and Japan were at peace. Japanese ambassadors were in Washington in conversation with our diplomatic officials looking to a general settlement of differences in the Pacific.

At 7:55 a.m. (Hawaiian time) over 300 Japanese planes launched from 6 aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the american Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii. Within a period of less than 2 hours our military and naval forces suffered a total of 3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to: 188 planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels.

The attack was well planned and skilfully executed. The Japanese raiders withdrew from the attack and were recovered by the carriers without the latter being detected, having suffered losses of less than 100 in personnel, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines which had been dispatched from mother craft that coordinated their attack with that of the planes.

One hour after Japanese air and naval forces had struck the Territory of Hawaii the emissaries of Japan delivered to the Secretary of State a reply to a recent American note, a reply containing no suggestion of attack by Japan upon the United States. With the benefit of information now available it is known that the Japanese military had planned for many weeks the unprovoked and ambitious act of December 7.

The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise, cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. History will properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the military clique dominating the people of Japan at the time. Indeed, this responsibility Premier Tojo himself has already assumed.

We come today, over 4 years after the event, not to detract from this responsibility but to record for posterity the facts of the disaster. In another sense we seek to find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the future, to evolve constructive suggestions for the protection of our national security, and to determine whether there were failures in our own military and naval establishments which in any measure may have contributed to the extent and intensity of the disaster.

Foreword ...........................................................  xi
Introductory statement ............................................ xiii
Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack ..........    1
  Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................    1
  Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies ..    4
  Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis aggression ......................................................  10
  Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................  13
  Japanese proposal of May 12 ......................................  14
  Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ...................  15
  Temporary cessation of negotiations ..............................  16
  Freezing of assets ...............................................  18
  Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ...................................  19
  Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 .........................  26
  Advent of the Tojo Cabinet .......................................  28
  Arrival of Saburo Kurusu .........................................  30
  Negotiations versus deadlines ....................................  32
  Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi ..........  32
  United States memorandum of November 26 ..........................  38
  Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy November 28 to December 7 .....................................................  42
  Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington ....................  43
  Conclusions ......................................................  47
Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath .....................  53
  Formulation of the plan and date for execution ...................  53
  Nature of the plan ...............................................  54
  Departure for the attack .........................................  56
  Execution of the attack ..........................................  57
     Air phase .....................................................  57
     Submarine phase ...............................................  62
  Withdrawal of the striking force .................................  63
  Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result of the attack ..................................................  64
  Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result of the attack ..................................................  65
  Japanese losses ..................................................  65
  Summary comparison of losses .....................................  65
  State of readiness to meet the attack ............................  66
    Attack a surprise ..............................................  66
    Personnel ......................................................  66
    Antiaircraft ...................................................  67
    Aircraft .......................................................  68
  Action taken following the attack ................................  68
  Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............  69
  Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............  70
  Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and Hawaiian defensive forces ......................................  70
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ...............................  75
  Consciousness of danger from air attack ..........................  75
    Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ...........  75
    General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............  79
    Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier .............  81
    Concept of the war in the Pacific ..............................  87
    Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air attack .......................................................  88
  Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the imminence of war ..............................................  89
  Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the imminence of war .............................................. 100
  Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders from Washington ............................................... 103
      Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103
      Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104
      The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104
  Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
      On where the attack might come .............................. 107
      Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108
      "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109
      The "War warning" and training .............................. 110
      The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute distant reconnaissance .................................... 110
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
  Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119
      No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120
      Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121
     "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123
     Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125
     Interference with training ................................... 125
  The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
  The Short reply ................................................. 128
  Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27 dispatch ...................................................... 129
  The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
  General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131
  The "Lost" Japanese carriers Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
  The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
  Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
  Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
  Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
     Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142
     The "Manila message" ......................................... 142
     The Honolulu press ........................................... 142
  The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
  Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
  Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159
  Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159
  Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163
  Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167
  "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168
  Avoidance of war ................................................ 172
  Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179
     The "Magic" .................................................. 179
     Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180
  "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181
     Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181
     Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189
  The "Winds code" ................................................ 191
  "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192
  The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193
  Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195
  Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of November 27 ................................................... 198
  Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201
  The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204
  Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205
  The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206
  Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209
    The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210
    The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211
      First thirteen parts ........................................ 211
      Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212
      Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages apart from messages proper ................................ 219
        The fourteenth part ....................................... 221
  "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222
     Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224
     Choice of facilities ......................................... 225
     Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction messages ................................................... 226
  Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228
    Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228
    Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230
  Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232
  Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234
  Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237
     Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237
     Duties in Washington ......................................... 238
  Unity of command ................................................ 240
  General observations ............................................ 245
     The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245
     The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246
     Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246
Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251
  Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251
  Recommendations ................................................. 252
  Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation .......................................... 253
      Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254
      Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254
      Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information ............................................... 255
      The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255
      The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision ....................................... 256
      The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition ................................ 256
      Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257
      The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials ................................................. 257
      The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on  matters that are in doubt ................................. 258
      There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259
      Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259
      There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the original .................................................. 260
      Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261
      Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization .............................................. 261
      There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262
      Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information ................................ 262
An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263
      Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality ....................................... 263
      Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction ...................................... 263
      Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264
      Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies .................................................. 264
      No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265
      Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed ............................. 285
      The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265
      In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority .............................. 266
  Committee members signing the report ............................ 266
  Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266
Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack .......................................................... 269
  The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269
  The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269
  The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269
  The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270
  The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270
  The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270
  The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271
Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275
    Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275
      Army Air Forces ............................................. 275
    Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276
    Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276
      Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277
    Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277
       Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278
    List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278
    List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279
Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285
Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291
    Introductory statement ........................................ 291
    Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293
    The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300
    President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302
    Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia (August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305
  Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306
 Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
  President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message (September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310
  Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
  Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314
  Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions in the negotiations with the United States (September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316
  The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals (October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319
  Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the  Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325
  The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941) ......................................................... 326
  The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal" (November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331
  Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335
  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337
  Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States (November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344
  The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal" (November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355
  Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United States and demands an agreement on that basis (November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360
  The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
  The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-American conversations and at the same time moves additional  Japanese troops into southern Indochina  (November 27- December 7, 1941) ................................ 387
  The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405
  Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409
  President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411
  President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415
  The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421
  The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424
Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469
  Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469
  Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471
  Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471
  Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code" execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475
Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army installations ................................................... 489
    Geographical considerations ................................... 489
    Navy and Army installations ................................... 490
      Navy ........................................................ 490
      Army ........................................................ 491
    Illustrations ................................................. 499
The Minority Pearl Harbor Report
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Tue Jan 24, 2017 7:33 pm

On November 15, 1945 the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack held its first public hearings  pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-Ninth Congress,  first session, as follows: [1]
September 6, 1945
Mr. BARKLEY submitted the follow concurrent resolution, which was considered, modified, and agreed to
SEPTEMBER 11, 1945
House concurs
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That  there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of  the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate  (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to  be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House  of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the  majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies  in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the  remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall  be filled in the same manner as in the ease of the original selection.  The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its  members.
SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or  following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in  the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the  Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946,  the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as  it may deem advisable.
SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact  that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided  for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held  against him in examining his military status for credits in the service  to which he belongs.
SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof,  is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the  sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-Ninth Congress  (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the  attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers,  and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to  procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it  deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such  hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.
(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of  such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as  it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the  compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as  amended, for comparable duties.
(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall  be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half  from the con-
[1] The authority of the committee is to be found in S. Con. Res. No.  27, 79th Cong. 1st sess., passed by the Senate on September 6, 1945, and  concurred in by the House of Representatives on September 11, 1945, and  as extended by both Houses under S. Con. Res. No. 49. 79th Cong., 1st  sess., and by S. Con. Res. No. 54. 79th Cong., 2d sess. 
tingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman.
Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.
Attest:                          LESLIE L. BIFFLE,
Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.
Attest:                          SOUTH TRIMBLE,
On 70 days subsequent to November 15 and prior to and including May 31, 1945, open hearings were conducted in the course of which some 15,000  pages of testimony were taken and a total of 183 exhibits received  incident to an examination of 43 witnesses.
Of assistance to the committee and its work were the testimony and  exhibits of seven prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor  attack, including inquiries conducted by the Roberts Commission. [2]  Admiral Thomas C. Hart, [3] the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [4] the Navy  Court of Inquiry, [5] Col. Carter W. Clarke, [6] Maj. Henry C. Clausen,  [7] and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. [8] For purposes of convenient reference  there has been set forth in appendix A to this report a statement  concerning the scope and character of each of these prior proceedings,  the records of which total 9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318  witnesses and the attendant 469 exhibits. The records of these proceedings have been incorporated as exhibits to the record of the  committee which encompasses approximately 10,000,000 words. 
All witnesses appeared under oath and were afforded the fullest  opportunity to offer any and all information which was regarded as  having any relationship whatever to the disaster. In the course of  examination by committee counsel and the committee members themselves,  an effort was made to elicit all facts having an immediate or remote  bearing on the tragedy of December 7, 1941. It is believed the committee  has succeeded through its record in preserving for posterity the  material facts concerning the disaster.
The figures and witnesses in the drama of Pearl Harbor ran the gamut of  officials of the executive branch of the Government. The principal  personalities in the picture were the President of the United States,  Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; the  Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson; the Secretary of Navy Frank Knox;  the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations.  Harold R. Stark; the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet Husband E.  Kimmel; and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Walter C.  Short. In appendix B to this report there are set forth the names and  positions of the ranking Army and Navy officials in Washington and at  Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the principal witnesses in  the various proceedings.
The committee's investigation has extended to the files of all pertinent branches of the Government. Instructions in this regard from the  President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, to various departments  will be found in appendix C to this report. The committee through its  counsel requested Miss Grace Tully, custodian of the files of the late  President Roosevelt, to furnish the committee all 
[1] For proceedings of the Roberts Commission, see committee exhibit No. 143.
[2] For proceedings of the Hart Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 144.
[3] For proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, see committee exhibit No. 145.
[4] For proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, see committee exhibit  No. 146.
[5] For proceedings of the Clarke investigation, see committee exhibit No. 147.
[6] For report of investigation conducted by Major Clausen, see  committee exhibit No. 148.
[7] For proceedings of the Hewitt inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 149.
papers in these files for the year 1941 relating to Japan, the imminence of war in the Pacific, and the general Far Eastern developments. She  furnished such papers in response to this request as she considered  might be involved and stood ready to testify before the committee at any time.
All parties in interest have attested to the fact that they have been  afforded a full, fair, and impartial public hearing before the  committee. All witnesses who retained counsel Admiral Stark, Admiral  Kimmel, and General Short were given the opportunity to be examined by  their counsel if they so desired, and to submit questions to committee  counsel to be asked other witnesses. 
The following action was not taken by the committee for the reasons indicated:
(1) Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was not called before the  committee as a witness for the reason that his health would not permit.  Mr. Stimson did, however, submit a statement under oath for the  committee's consideration and the answers supplied by him to  interrogatories propounded were considered by the committee. He supplied  the portions of his personal diary requested by committee counsel and  informed the committee that the portions of his diary now in evidence  are the only portions thereof having any relationship to the Pearl  Harbor investigation.
(2) Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew appeared before the committee  as a witness and testified to material appearing in his personal diary  having a relationship to the events and circumstances of the Pearl  Harbor attack. On the basis of his personal representation that no  additional material pertinent to the subject of the committee's inquiry  appeared in his diary beyond that to which he had testified, the  committee did not formally request or otherwise seek to require the  production of Mr. Grew's complete diary. 
(3) A request by one member of the committee for the appearance of the former Prime Minister of England, Mr. Winston Churchill, was disapproved  by a majority of the committee. At the time Mr. Churchill was a guest in  the United States and it was not felt that he should with propriety be  requested to appear as a witness.
(4) A request by one member of the committee for production by the State  Department of all papers relating to the so-called Tyler Kent case was  disapproved by a majority of the committee. The State Department had  advised that these papers were in no way pertinent to the subject of the  committee's inquiry, and, additionally, members of the committee had  discussed the question with Mr. Kent who advised that he possessed no  facts that would in any way have relationship to the Pearl Harbor  attack.
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull appeared before the committee but  was forced to retire by reason of failing health before completion of  the examination by all members of the committee. Mr. Hull subsequently  responded to interrogatories propounded by the committee.
The committee has conceived its duty to be not only that of indicating  the nature and scope of responsibility for the disaster but also of  recording the pertinent considerations relating to the greatest defeat  in our military and naval history. Only through a reasonable amount of  detail is it possible to place events and responsibilities in their  proper perspective and give to the Nation a genuine appreciation of the  salient facts concerning Pearl Harbor. For this reason our report is 
of somewhat greater length than was initially believed necessary. It is to be recalled in this connection, however that the over-all record of  the committee comprehends some ten million words. It was felt therefore  that the story of the antecedent, contemporaneous, and succeeding events  attending the disaster could not be properly encompassed within a report  any more concise than that herewith submitted.
We believe there is much to be learned of a constructive character as a  result of the Japanese attack from the standpoint of legislation and,  additionally, for guidance in avoiding the possibility of another  military disaster such as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, in the section  devoted to recommendations there are set forth, in addition to the  recommendations proper, a series of principles, based on errors revealed  by the investigation, which are being commended to our military and naval services for their consideration and possible assistance.
Our report does not purport to set forth or refer to all of the enormous  volume of testimony and evidence adduced in the course of the Pearl  Harbor investigation. It is believed, however that the material facts  relevant to the disaster have been outlined in the report. The  committee's record and the records of all prior investigations have been  printed and are available for review and study. It is to be borne in  mind that the findings and conclusions are based on the facts presently  in our record after an exhaustive investigation.
We desire to acknowledge particular gratitude to those who have acted as  counsel to the committee for their excellent work during the course of  the investigation and for their magnificent assistance in compiling the  facts for the committee in order that we might draw our conclusions,  which are necessarily those of the committee only.
In the following pages an effort has been made to present a review of  the diplomatic and historical setting of the Pearl Harbor attack  followed by a picture of the Japanese attack itself. Set forth  thereafter are separate treatments of responsibilities in Hawaii on the  one hand and responsibilities in Washington on the other. Situations  existing in our Army and Navy establishments having a proximate or  causative relationship to the disaster have been distinguished from  those which, while not to be condoned, are regarded as having no direct  or reasonable bearing on the conditions prevailing at Hawaii, preceding  and in the wake of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning December 7, 1941. To assist in following and better appreciating the story of the  attack there has been outlined in appendix F the geographical  considerations and military installations playing a role in and relating to the disaster.
Throughout the report italics have been freely employed to facilitate reading and to bring out more clearly matters regarded as of particular  importance.
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Tue Jan 24, 2017 7:39 pm

For several months prior to December 7, 1941, the Governments of the United States and Japan had been engaged in conversations with a view to  settlement of fundamental differences existing in the Far East. To  appreciate the realistic basis upon which the Government of the United  States participated in the negotiations it is necessary to consider  briefly the course of modern Japanese history in order to gauge her  diplomatic and military purposes. These purposes become apparent through  an outline review of Japanese aggression: [1]
Upon the conclusion of a successful war against China in 1895 Japan  annexed Formosa and indicated her purpose, not then realized, of  establishing herself in China.
Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 effected a foothold in  Manchuria through acquisition of a lease of the Kwantung territory and  ownership of the South Manchuria Railway, at the same time acquiring  southern Sakhalin. 
In 1910, after many years of encroachment, Japan annexed Korea. (In 1904  she had guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity.)
In the midst of the First World War Japan in 1915 took advantage of the  situation to present to China her notorious Twenty-one Demands.
In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-Allied plan whereby not exceeding  some 7,000 troops of any one power were to be sent to Siberia to guard  military stores which might subsequently be needed by Russian forces, to  assist in organizing Russian self-defense, and to aid in evacuating  Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. Seizing upon this opportunity the  Japanese conceived the idea of annexing eastern Siberia, in which she  was unsuccessful, and sent more than 70,000 troops.
Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the agreements concluded. One of these agreements was the Nine  Power Treaty which was designed to provide for China full opportunity to  develop and maintain a stable government. Japan pledged herself to the  principles and policies of self-restraint toward China which was the  cornerstone of the Nine Power Treaty. Japan agreed to respect the  sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity  of China, and agreed to use her influence to establish the principle of  equal opportunity in that country. Following the advent of the Cabinet  of General Tanaka in 1927 Japan adopted a positive policy toward China  and manifested an increasing disposition to interfere in Chinese  internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, subsequently  establishing the puppet regime of Manchukuo. (This action was a flagrant  violation of her agreements
[1] See committee record, pp. 1076-1085. Committee record references  throughout this report are to page numbers of the official transcript of  testimony, which are represented in the printed Hearings of the  Committee by italic numerals enclosed in brackets.
at the Washington Conference and was in complete disregard of her obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the renunciation  of war as an instrument of national policy.) [2] The Japanese delegate  to the League of Nations had stated on November 91, 1931: " We want no  more territory." The end of 1932 saw Japanese occupying the whole of  Manchuria. Later they moved southward and westward occupying vast areas  of China. When the League of Nations adopted the report of the Lytton  Commission appointed by the League to investigate the Manchurian  situation, Japan walked out of the Assembly on February 24, 1933. On  March 27 of the same year Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw  from the League. [3]
On February 21,1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs dispatched  a note to the American Secretary of State expressing the conviction that  no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is  fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". [4] Yet on April 17, 1934  a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "hands off China"  statement making clear a purpose to compel China to follow the dictates  of Japan and to permit only such relations with China by other countries  as the Japanese Government saw fit.
In a formal declaration Japan on December 29,1934 announced her purpose  to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed  at Washington on February 6, 1922. [5] Thereafter she prepared her  armaments with a view to launching the invasion of China.
Conversations between Japan and Nazi Germany culminated in the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, to which Italy adhered in 1937. The  pact marked the genesis of the "Axis." Thus the parallel courses of  aggression being followed by these countries blended in an expression of  their common designs in foreign policy. [6]
Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident between Japanese  and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan in July of 1937 began wholesale  invasion of China. The lawless acts of the Japanese military in carrying  forward the invasion was a disgusting and degrading episode of rape,  theft, and murder. In the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking  on December 13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble  pages in history. Yet on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince  Konoye, stated, "In sending troops to North China, of course, the  Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent  statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." Again on October  28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Japan never looks upon the  Chinese people as an enemy." As observed by Secretary Hull: "Japan  showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian  populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese  homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by  acts of horror and cruelty."
[2] Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy. 1931-41 (State  Department publication), p. 4. committee exhibit No. 28.
[3] Id., at p. 7.
[4] Id., at p. 18.
[5] Id., at p. 12.
[6] Id., at p. 41.
On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze River. [7]
(A proposal made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, on May  18, 1939 to the Secretary of State, contained the thesis that world  peace could only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper  places in the world". It was suggested subsequently that Hiranuma was  prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a  conference if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out  Great Britain and France on the settling of European problems. [7a] The  proposal was received by the American Government with interest. The  suggestion was made that Japan could assist in attaining the objective  of world peace by settling the "armed conflict and consequent political  disturbances in the Far East today." This suggestion reminded the  Japanese Government of "the methods of Japan in relations with China",  which perturbed American opinion. In consequence, the proposal of  Hiranuma withered with the Japanese refusal to settle her "incident"  with China, and to indicate her good faith in proposing a search for  world peace.) 
On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any  development * * * that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East  Indies." But following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany,  Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies asking far-reaching  concessions, the effect of which, if acceded to, would have made the  Indies a virtual Japanese colony. In August and September of 1940 with  German assistance Japan extorted from Vichy France an agreement whereby  Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina.
On September 27, 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact along with  Germany and Italy an alliance pointed directly at the United States. [8]  As stated by Secretary Hull: "It was designed to discourage the United  States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan  and Germany had completed their program of conquest in Asia and Europe,  when they could turn on the United States then standing alone."  Commenting on the Tripartite Pact, Premier Konoye was quoted in the  press of October 1940, as having said:
"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of  Japan, Germany, and Italy and continues persistently its challenging  attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan  is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic  relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan  and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce  Russia, Britain, and the United States to suspend their operations in  assisting the Chiang regime."
On July 30, 1941 Japanese aircraft bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy at that  place. On the following day Japan assured the Government of the United  States that her military would discontinue bombing the city area of  Chungking. Yet only 11 days later on August 11 the American Embassy  reported that during
[7] Id., at pp. 52 53.
[7a] Committee exhibit No. 177.
[8] The pact provided that Germany Italy and Japan would assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the  powers was attacked *by a power not then involved in the European war or  in the Chinese-Japanese conflict*. Peace and War p. 84.
[NOTE: Italics in the original text have been marked with asterisks in  the plain text version. LWJ]
the preceding 4 days Chungking had been delivered unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids. Repeatedly Japan gave assurances that  American lives and property in China would be respected. Despite her  pledges ever increasing numbers of cases were reported of bombing of  American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.  Secretary Hull summarized the picture in the following words: "Time and  again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China  would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put  into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up,  discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied,  and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily  detained, and subjected to indignities."
The bold aggression launched by Japan in 1931 in complete violation and  disregard of treaty obligations stands in irreconcilable conflict with  the policy [9] voiced by the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, on January  17, 1933:
"I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the  cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."
In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt dedicated  the Nation to the policy of the good neighbor:
"* * * the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does  so, respects the rights of others the neighbors who respects his  obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a  world of neighbors."
From that time forward, despite repeated efforts and discussions on the part of the Government of the United States to incline the Government of  Japan to a peaceful policy in the Orient, she proceeded in July of 1937  to invade China. In consequence of this policy of aggression by the  Empire of Japan, the Secretary of State made public a statement of  fundamental principles of international policy with a view to rallying  all countries to the support of peaceful processes. The Secretary said  on July 16, 1937: [10]
"I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions  arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.
"Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains  which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but  which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world.  Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are  threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations  either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious  hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another  affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore  feel warranted in making in fact, I feel it a duty to make a statement  of this Government's position in regard to international problems and  situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.
"This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of  peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We  advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of  policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations.  We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by  processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advo-
[9] Committee record, pp. 1084-1094.
[10] Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-41. (State Department publication), vol. 1, pp. 325-326.  Committee exhibit No. 29.
cate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the  principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of  provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes  carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We  believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and  performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for  revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps  toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We  advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international  trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge  upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment.  We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the  necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security,  we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in  proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid  entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in  cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the  principles hereinbefore stated."
The principles announced in the statement of July 16, 1937, were given  express application to the Chinese situation in a statement of the  Secretary of State on August 23, 1937: [11]
"The situation in Shanghai is in many ways unique. Shanghai is a great  cosmopolitan center, with a population of over three million, a port  which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which  there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and  varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other  countries of the world. At Shanghai there exists a multiplicity of  rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries,  including the United States.
"In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in  facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of  American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it  is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals  appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled  elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small  detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending  the present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no  mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward  maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the  intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and  such remains its desire and expectation.
"The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the  present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate  question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United  States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately  connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the  general principles of policy to which attention was called in the  statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval  from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion  that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively  govern international relationships.

"When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or  the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all  nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the  controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We  urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles  which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most of the world,  should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable  throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles  set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is  comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many  treaties; including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg- Briand Pact of Paris.
"From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have  been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the  important of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We  have been participating constantly in consultation with interested  governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. The Government does not  believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in  extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the  purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those  objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our  well-
[11] Id., at pp. 355-356.
defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this  Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far  Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our  people and making effective the policies especially the policy of peace  in which this country believes and to which it is committed."
On October 6, 1937, a release by the Department of State stated among  other things: [12]
"The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to  Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee  of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's  examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the  treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of  the League of Nations today, October 6.
"Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far Fast the  Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the  Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered  to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both  parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation  in the Far Fast.
"The Secretary of State, in statements made public on July 16 and August  23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in  regard to international problems and international relationships  throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities  which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan.  Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the  United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to  be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in  the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of  other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by  process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations  for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established  obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of  treaties.
"On October 6 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles,  emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation  pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within  nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered  to by all, that international anarchy destroys every foundation for  peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security  of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital  interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for  treaties and international morality be restored.
"In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that  the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which  should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the  provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding  principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and  to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the  conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in  general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations."
Pursuant to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the United  States in November of 1937 with 18 other nations participated in a  conference convened at Brussels with a view to "study peaceable means of  hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far  East. The Government of Japan refused repeatedly to participate in the  conference which prevented bringing the conflict in China to an end and  resulted in the conference suspending its work on November 24. [13]
The President late in 1937, exercising the discretion provided by law,  refrained from applying the provisions of the Neutrality Act to the  conflict between China and Japan. This position was assumed in  recognition of the fact that the arms-embargo provisions of the act  worked to the detriment of China and to the benefit of Japan. [14] 
[12] Id., at pp. 396-397.
[13] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1087, 1088; also Peace, and War, pp. 51, 52.
[14] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, p. 1088.
On July 26, 1939, the following notification was given the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State: [15]
"EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States has  been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between  the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what  changes may need to be made toward better serving the purpose for which  such treaties are concluded. In the course of this survey, the  Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the  Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan  which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contains provisions  which need new consideration. Toward preparing the way for such  consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting  American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in  Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its  desire that this treaty be terminated, and, having thus given notice,  will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to  expire six months from this date."
In explaining the foregoing action Secretary Hull testified [16] that  the Treaty of commerce and Navigation was not affording adequate  protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied  portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most- favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of  retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. With the termination of  the treaty on January 26, 1940, the legal impediment to placing  restrictions upon trade with Japan was removed. 
In the face of widespread bombings of Chinese civilians by the Japanese,  the Government of the United States placed into effect "moral  embargoes," adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. [17] On  July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers  and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to  the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose  armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations. In  1939 the "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane  manufacture and to facilities for production of high-quality gasoline.  [18] Following passage of the act of July 2, 1941, restrictions were  imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing  number of exports of strategic materials. These measures had the  additional purpose of deterring and expressing the opposition of the  United States to Japanese aggression. [19]
On April 15, 1940, when questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's  position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussion in the Netherlands East Indies, the  Japanese Foreign Minister replied: 20
"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies,  Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in  ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East  Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to  say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing  to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.
"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce  repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not  only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above- mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of coexistence and  co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from  the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these  considerations, the Japanese Government cannot
[15] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, p. 189; also committee record. p. 1088.
[16] Committee record, p. 1088.
[17] Id.
[18] Peace and War, p. 89
[19] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1088,1089.
[20] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 281.
but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation  of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands  East Indies."
Referring to the foregoing statement the Secretary of State made the  following comments on April 17, 1940: 21 
"I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for  Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese  Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies.
"Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly  affect the interests of many countries.
"The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international  relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend  for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the  Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on  the east. They are also an important factor in the commerce of the whole  world They produce considerable portions of the word's supplies of  important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et  cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend  substantially upon them for some of these commodities.
"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any  alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be  prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in  the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.
"This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application  and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in  notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and  Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was  directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of  the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United  States, the British Empire, France and Japan as parties to the treaty  signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular  possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific  Ocean sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which  each of those Governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to  respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular  possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean."
"All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the   basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation  for the rights of other nations and nonintervention in their domestic  affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the  faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when  needful, by orderly processes.
"It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States as it is  no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments that the attitudes  and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and  that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the  Pacific area, but also in every part of the world."
The situation existing during 1940 was summarized by Secretary Hull in  his testimony before the committee: [22]
"Throughout this period the united States increasingly followed a policy  of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This  took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of  Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American  rights. Loans and credits aggregating some $200,000,000 were extended in  order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the  acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other  military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against  Japan.
"During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind, and I was explaining to Members of Congress and other Americans with  whom I came in contact, that it was apparent that the Japanese military  leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific  area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South  Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration  with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had  the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order  in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.
[21] Id., at p. 282.
[22] Committee Record, pp. 1089-92.
"I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced  a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations  with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to  find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon  this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider  their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social  aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan,  if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not  have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social  welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half of the  world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United  States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop  internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded  the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable  relations.
"During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at  all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had  always felt that if a government makes a  threat it ought to be ready to  back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as  possible.
"I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by  previously modifying our neutrality Act, been in a position to send  military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might  well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back  the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm,  and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more  than we did in the face of the world situation."
In his address to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt  declared [23] that "at no previous time has American security been as  seriously threatened from without as it is today." He observed that the  pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number  of independent nations with the aggressors still on the march  threatening other nations, great and small. The national policy of the  Government of the United States was outlined by the President as  committed to an all-inclusive national defense, to full support of  resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and thereby  were keeping war away from our hemisphere, and to the proposition that  principles of morality and considerations for our own security would  "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors."
In a statement on January 15, 1941, in support of the Lend-Lease Act  before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives,  Secretary Hull said: [24]
"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the  start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a  dominant position in the entire region of the Eastern Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain  that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an  area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world.  As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade  routes in that region."
As Secretary Hull testified [25]-
"I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized,  ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests and  that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the  security of the Western Hemisphere.""
The hope of the United States, therefore, for mediation and conciliation based on peaceful processes was overshadowed by an uncompromising and  relentless aggressor who had cast her lot with the Axis in the  Tripartite Pact of September 1940 and voiced her slogan of domination by  force in the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."
[23] See Committee record pp. 1092, 1093.
[24] Committee record, p, 1093.
[25] Id.
The backdrop of activity by Japan's partners left little doubt as to the program and methods of the Axis: [26]
On October 14,1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference  coincidentally giving notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations.
On October 3,1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia.
In violation of the Locarno Pact Hitler proceeded in March of 1936 to  occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland.
On March 11, 1938, German forces entered Austria and 2 days later  proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria.
At Munich on September 29, 1938, Hitler and Mussolini extorted a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland.
In violation of pledges given at Munich, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on March 14,1939.
With further German aggression, war broke out in Europe on September 1, 1939, which as Secretary Hull stated "weakened the position of all  countries. Including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in  the Pacific." He presented the picture in the following  terms:

"In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful military machine remained intact.
"Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of  ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The  countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses.
"It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East  would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in  Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would  aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe."
With each threatened "annexation" or "occupation" of countries bordering on Germany up to the invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt had made an  appeal for the settlement of differences without recourse to force or  the threat of force; but the United States in line with its traditional  aloofness in European affairs had adopted no positive measures to deter  Hitler's course of aggression. In the face of the inexorable trend of  Axis militarism, however, progressive steps were taken by the Government  of the United States to build our defenses and throw our weight on the  side of France and Great Britain. For purposes of convenient reference  it would be well to review briefly these steps.
Addressing the Congress in extraordinary session on September 21, 1939,  the President recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our  citizens and our ships be restricted from dangerous areas in order to  prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. On  November 4 the arms embargo was repealed, thereby permitting large  shipments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had  been ordered by Great Britain and France before the outbreak of war, to  be shipped across the Atlantic for use in combating Nazi aggression.
[26] See committee record, pp. 1093-1095.
[27] Peace and War, pp. 69, 70.
In an address on June 10, 1940, at Charlottesville, Va., the President announced the policy of extending the material resources of the United  States to the opponents of force. He said:
"We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this  Nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of  those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have  equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. [28]"
With a view to strengthening the defenses of the Eastern Hemisphere an  agreement was made on September 2, 1940, between the United States and  Great Britain whereby the latter received 50 over-aged destroyers and  the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in  Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the islands of Bermuda, the  Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua. Referring to this  agreement, the President stated that the value to the Western Hemisphere  "of these outposts of security is beyond calculation." He considered  them essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America,  the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and  our eastern and Gulf seaboards. [29]
On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was  enacted, marking another important step for national defense. The act  included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces should  not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States  Territories and possessions. It marked, for the first time in the  history of the United States, the adoption of compulsory military  training of manpower when the Nation was not at war. [30]
President Roosevelt, in an address of December 29, 1940, observed that  the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear they intended not only to  dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave  the whole of Europe and to use the resources of Europe to dominate the  rest of the world. He pointed out that although some of our people liked  to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no concern to us, it was  a matter of most vital concern that European and Asiatic war makers  should not gain control of the oceans which led to the Western  Hemisphere. He pointed out that if Great Britain went down the Axis  Powers would control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the  high seas, and would then be in a position to bring enormous military  and naval resources against this hemisphere. Warning of the danger  ahead, the President stated the Government was planning our defense with  the utmost urgency and in it we must "integrate the war needs of Britain  and the other free nations resisting aggression." Referring to the need  for increased production, the President said we must have more ships,  more guns, more planes; we must be the great "arsenal of democracy."
With the signature of the President on March 11, 1941, the lend-lease  bill became law. This bill provided the machinery enabling the United  States to make the most effective use of our resources for our own needs  and for those whom, in our own self-defense, we were determined to aid.  Secretary Hull expressed the belief that this act would make it possible  for us to allocate our resources in ways best
[28] Id., at p. 76.
[29] Id., at p. 83.
[30] Id., at p. 84.
[31] Id., at pp. 86, 87.
calculated to provide for the security of the United States and of this continent. [32]
On April 10, 1941, the Department of State announced an agreement  regarding Greenland, recognizing that as a result of a European war  there was danger that Greenland might be converted into a point of  aggression against nations of the American Continent. This agreement  accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of assisting  Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status, and granted to the  United States the right to locate and construct airplane landing fields  and facilities for the defense of Greenland and this continent. [33]
In an address on May 27, 1941, the President declared an "unlimited national emergency," stating that our whole program of aid for the  democracies had been "based on a hard-headed concern for our own  security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wished  to live." He stated that every dollar of material that we sent helped to  keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere and every day they were  held off gave us time in which to build more guns and tanks and planes and ships. [34]

On July 7, 1941, the President announced that in accordance with an  understanding reached with the Prime Minister of Iceland, forces had  arrived in Iceland in order to supplement and eventually to replace the  British forces which had been stationed there to insure the adequate  defense of that country. The President pointed out that the United  States could not permit the occupation by Germany of a strategic outpost  in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack  against the Western Hemisphere. [35] Subsequently there was instituted  an escort to Iceland of United States and Iceland shipping. [36]
In a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister  Churchill, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated on  August 14, 1941. [37]
In a message of August 15, 1941, in which he was joined by Prime  Minister Churchill, the President advised Premier Stalin that the United  States and Great Britain had consulted together as to how best they  could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to provide the  Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most urgently needed and  that many shiploads had already left for the Soviet Union and more would  leave in the immediate future. [38]
On September 11, 1941, as a result of several incidents fully  demonstrating a grave menace to the vital interests of the United  States, the President warned that from that time forward, if German or  Italian vessels of war entered the waters the protection of which was  necessary for American defense, they would do so "at their own peril."  [39]
Despite the announcement of the "shooting orders", ships of the United  States and other American Republics continued to be sunk in the Atlantic  Ocean by Nazi submarines. In view of this situation and in view of the  fact that the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited the arm-
[32] Id., at p. 100.
[33] Id., at pp. 103, 104.
[34] Id., at p. 111.
[35] Id., at p. 111.
[36] See committee record, p. 6111.
[37] "Peace and War," p. 111.
[38] Id., at p. 113.
[39] Id., at pp. 113-115.

ing of United States merchant ships engaged in foreign commerce and prevented United States merchant ships from carrying cargoes to  belligerent ports, it became increasingly difficult to obtain shipping  for the cartage of lend-lease supplies to Great Britain and other  nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United  States. Accordingly, on October 9, 1941, the President asked Congress to  modify the Neutrality Act. On November 17, 1941, in a joint resolution  of the Congress, sections of the act were repealed permitting United  States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to belligerent ports  anywhere. [40]
In contrast with our historic aloofness in European affairs, it was the  traditional policy of the United States, based upon territorial,  commercial, and humanitarian interests, to maintain a concern in the  Pacific. This policy had its inception in the enunciation of the Hay  open-door policy toward China in 1899 which formed the cornerstone of  the Nine-Power Treaty, adopted concurrently with the Washington Naval  Treaty of 1922. [41]
To implement this policy Japan's course of aggression was countered by a  series of deterrent measures in addition to those relating generally to  the Axis or applying more specifically to the European situation. These  measures included material aid to China, curtailment of trade with  Japan, and basing of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii.
Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador, was received by the  President on February 14, 1941, at which time reference was made to the  progressive deterioration of relations between Japan and the United  States. President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador Nomura might  desire to reexamine and frankly discuss with the American Secretary of  State important phases of American-Japanese relations. Secretary Hull  made the following observations concerning the initial conversations  with the Japanese Ambassador: [42]
"On March 8 (1941) in my first extended conversation with the Japanese  Ambassador I emphasized that the American people had become fully  aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to  profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.
"On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The  President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters  between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash  and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion  regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister  Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and  air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious  concern and suspicion.
"On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.  I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which  our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that  the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its  present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which  our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between  nations should rest, as follows:
"(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each  and all nations;
"(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
[40] Id., at pp. 115-117.
[41] Id., at p. 168.
[42] Committee record, pp. 1103, 1104.
"(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
"(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.
"I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to  consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as  would be consistent with those principles."
The Japanese Ambassador on May 12 presented a proposal for a general settlement the essence of which was (1) that the United States should  request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan and, if the  Generalissimo should not accept the advice of the United States, that  the United States should discontinue its assistance to the Chinese  Government; (2) that normal trade relations between Japan and the United  States should be resumed, and (3) that the United States should help  Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural  resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the Southwest  Pacific area. [43] This proposal contained an affirmation of Japan's  adherence to the Tripartite Pact with specific reference to Japan's  obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto  *if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the  Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly  excepted*. In referring to the proposal Secretary Hull said: [44]
"The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that  they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas  whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources,  facilities, and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to  station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense  against communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of  China proper and inner Mongolia. 
"Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese  proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility  of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific  area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood."
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Ambassador Grew on May  14, 1941, that he and Prince Konoye were determined that Japan's  southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means "*unless  circumstances render this impossible.*" Replying to the inquiry as to  what circumstances he had in mind the Foreign Minister referred to the  concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures.  When it was pointed out by Ambassador Grew that such measures were  defensive in character, the Japanese Minister observed that the measures  in question were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public which  might bring pressure on the Government to act. [45]
President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, as has been indicated, proclaimed  the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and declared in a  radio address on the same day that our whole program of aid for the  democracies had been based on concern for our own security. [46]
[43] There were also other provisions, which Japan eventually dropped.  calling for joint guaranty of Philippine independence, for the  consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a  nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and  Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the  speedy restoration of peace in Europe.
[44] Committee record, pp. 1104-1106.
[45] See committee record, pp. 1106, 1107.
[46] Id., at p. 1107.
Secretary Hull commented as follows with respect to preliminary  conversations with Ambassador Nomura: [47]
"During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the  purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference.  We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points the necessity of  Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States  should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of  the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another  country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory;  application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial  relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of  Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were  seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an  instrument of peace.
"The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form  of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was  suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed  to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by  self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further  effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of  the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of  economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated  any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the  Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the  interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed  settlement with our stated principles."
In violation of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression pact, Germany  attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Russia  removed the restraining influence on the western flank of Japan and the  life-and-death struggle of the Soviet Union for existence was seized  upon by the Government of Japan to realize its dreams of empire in the  Far East.
In an intercepted message of July 31, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington  Embassy the reaction of Japan to the war between Germany and Russia was  unequivocally expressed: [48]
 "Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent  opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we  are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion.  The opportunist disposition of Japan was cogently expressed much earlier  in a dispatch of September 12, 1940, from Ambassador Grew to the State  Department: [49]
"Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that *the army and other elements in the country  see in the present world situation a golden opportunity to carry into  effect their dreams of expansion*; the German victories have gone to  their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed  implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued that the war  will probably (*) in a quick German victory and that it is well to  consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still  acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German  naval power might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East; they  have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States  although carefully watching our attitude. *The ability of the saner  heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been  and is doubtful*. * * *
"Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide.  Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from  attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers;  *she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly  and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the  weakness of others*. Her policy of southward expansion
[47] Id., at pp. 1108,1109.
[48] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 9.
[49] Committee exhibit No. 26.
is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. And is a thrust at the British Empire in the east.
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2 at which "the  fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was  decided" Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale.  From one to two million reservists and conscripts were called to the  colors. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were  suddenly recalled; restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan;  strict censorship of mails and communications was effected; and  conditions were generally imposed throughout the Empire presaging a  major military effort. The Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme  that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never  before approached in its history. The United States was charged with  using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The  Japanese press warned that if the United States took further action in  the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese- merican relations would  face a final crisis. [50] This false propaganda was clearly designed to  condition the Japanese public for further military aggression.
In an intercepted dispatch of July 2, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin for the  confidential information of the Japanese Ambassador and staff, the  policy of Japan was expressed in the following terms: [51]
"1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world  peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity,  regardless of how the world situation may change. 
"2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of  the China Incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing  southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection."
In a second part of the same message Japan outlined the "principal  points" upon which she proposed to proceed:
"For the purpose of bringing the Chiang Regime to submission, increasing  pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means  of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions  shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and  various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in  the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be  reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French  Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German  war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained,  every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall  be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations  shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available  shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining  the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power  Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed*."
During July of 1941 reports were received that a Japanese military  movement into southern Indochina was imminent. The Government of the  United States called to the attention of Japan the incompatibility of  such reports with the conversations then under way looking to an  agreement for peace in the Pacific. Asked concerning the facts of the  situation, the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 explained the Japanese  movement into southern as well as northern Indochina by observing that  Japan feared, first, that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs, and  raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by
[50] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 339, 340.
[51] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 1, 2.
de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina  and, second, that Japan believed certain foreign powers were determined  to encircle Japan militarily and for that reason occupation of southern  Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary  measure. [52]
The explanation of Ambassador Nomura is in interesting contrast with an  intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo: [53]
"Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is  as follows:
"1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable  resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in  thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry  this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary,  alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying  farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not  wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because  we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.
"2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be  to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the  international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack.  This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may  arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China  peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force,  occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of  French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum  to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will  play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will  need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two * * *."
In commenting on the observations made by Ambassador Nomura, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells on July 23, 1941, pointed out that any  agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government  at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on  Vichy by Germany; and in that consequence this agreement could only be  looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world  domination and conquest. He further observed that conclusion of the  agreement under discussion by the Secretary of State and Ambassador  Nomura would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to  Japan than she could secure through occupation of Indochina; that the  policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy  or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not  menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been  concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the  Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of  the underlying principles stood for by the United States. He pointed out  that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as  constituting notice that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a  policy of force and conquest, and, since there was no apparent basis  calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as  a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan  was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and  conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary  said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State with whom he had  talked a few minutes before could not see any basis for pursuing further  the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been  engaged. [54]
On July 24 Mr. Welles made a statement to the press in which he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina in substantially the
[52] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 340.
[53] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.
[54] See Foreign Relations, vol., II, p. 341.
same terms as in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese  Ambassador. He further pointed out that the actions of Japan endangered  the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to  jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials  such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and  that the steps being taken by Japan endangered the safety of other areas  of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands. [66] 
Also, on July 24, 1941, in the face of a progressive movement by Japan  into southern Indochina, the President proposed to the Japanese  Government that French Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country.  This proposal contemplated that Japan would be given the fullest and  freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and  other raw materials which on the basis of Japan's own representations  she was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the  President's proposal. The answer of Japan was characteristically  pragmatic and well described in the following language: [56]
"Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern  Indochina. Japan's constant expansion of her military position in the  southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of  the United States along with that of other powers. By this further  expansion in southern Indochina, Japan virtually completed the  encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces  within striking distance of vital trade routes. *This constituted an  overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other  powers that were at peace with Japan*. It created a situation in which  the risk of war became so great that the United States and other  countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of  avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military  forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence  that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese  infiltration into Thailand. With Japan's armed forces poised for further  attacks the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare  chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause  Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those  circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government  of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other  governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with  Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step as an open  warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense."
With the unsuccessful attempt to bring to a halt Japanese aggression in  Indochina no further conversations were held on the subject of an  agreement until August of 1941.
It was clear that positive action must be taken under the circumstances for reasons well expressed by Secretary Hull in his testimony: [57]
"The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for four  years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in  its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done  this notwithstanding constant violation by Japanese authorities or  agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in  neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and  statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread  conquest by force and even threatening the United States. The American  Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while  wielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amiable relations with  Japan. It had desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of  their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful  policies.
[55] Id.
[56] Id., at p. 342.
[57] Committee record, pp. 1111-1113.
"The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an  agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a  feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. We had  made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a  program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that  if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any  countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, our Government would  expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to  the region threatened.
"While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible  Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's  determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies.  Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs had  declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was  based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of  her military activities was in progress, especially since early July.  Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese  Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by  Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese  Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an  authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there  for further southward movements."
Confronted with the implacable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt  issued an Executive Order on July 26, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in  the United States. This order brought under control of the Government  all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese  interests were involved. The effect of the order was to bring to virtual  cessation trade between the United States and Japan. [58]
It should be noted that shortly before large Japanese forces went into  French Indochina, late in July, a change was effected in the Japanese  Cabinet whereby Admiral Toyoda took over the portfolio of Foreign  Affairs from Mr. Matsuoka. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the  new Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Nomura made emphatic and  repeated protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable  settlement of Pacific problems. Despite these representations of  peaceful intentions, the Japanese Government continued with mobilization  in Japan, and dispatched increasing numbers of armed forces to  Manchuria, Indochina, and south China. Bombing of American property in  China continued, including bursts which damaged the American Embassy and  the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking. [59] An intercepted message of July  19, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin presented a candid estimate of the change  in the Japanese Cabinet: [60]
"The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign  policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the  principles of the Tripartite Pact"
The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24, but on August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal  which, so he stated, purported to be responsive to that of the  President. This proposal provided among other things:
(1) For removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan;
[58] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 343.
[59] Id., at p. 343
[60] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 3.  
(2) For "suspension of its (the United States') military measures in the southwest Pacific area";
(3) For the exercise of good offices by the United States for the initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China;
(4) For withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement between Japan and China;
(5) For recognition by the United States of Japan's special position in Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops.
Throughout the negotiations it had been specified or implied that Japan would expect the United States, in the proposed exercise of its good offices between China and Japan, to discontinue aid to China. The Japanese proposal of August 6 completely ignored the proposal of the President to which it was allegedly responsive. It asked either expressly or by implication that the United States remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; discontinue furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their far eastern possessions; discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and acquiesce in Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was committed. The Japanese Government in return offered not to station Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area.
On August 8 Secretary Hull informed Japan's Ambassador that the Japanese proposal was not responsive to the President's proposal of July 24. Ambassador Nomura thereupon inquired whether it might be possible for President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments. [61] This suggestion was made pursuant to a dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura which related in pertinent part: [62]
"We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation.
"In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.
"Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific."
The sincerity of Japan's desire for peace and the appraisal of any hopes for a satisfactory settlement from such n meeting necessarily had to be viewed in the light of a statement only 7 days earlier in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura: [63]
[61] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p, 344.
[62] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 12
[63] Id., at p. 10.
"Thus, *all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact*. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action."
On August 18, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs orally observed to Ambassador Grew that the only way to prevent the strained relations between the United States and Japan from further deterioration would be through a meeting of President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister. Strict secrecy concerning the proposal was urged upon our Ambassador for the reason that premature announcement of the meeting would result in the project being "torpedoed" by certain elements in Japan. The Japanese Government's concern for preserving the secrecy of the proposed meeting between the President and Premier Konoye is fully evinced in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on September 3, 1941: [64]
"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, *that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner*.
"In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald- Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.  
"The government is not afraid of the above-mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this ease.
"Because of the circumstances being what they are we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval.)
"Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan."
The fact that the Konoye Cabinet desired the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Premier to be strictly secret for the reason that premature disclosure would result in frustration of the move by hostile elements in Japan would indicate beyond doubt that there existed in Japan a formidable opposition to efforts designed to achieve an improvement in relations with the United States. [65] Further, secrecy with respect to such a meeting would accomplish the additional purpose from the Japanese viewpoint of disguising from her Axis partners, Germany and Italy, the fact that steps might be undertaken which would in any way compromise Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact.  
[*There will be found in Appendix D a detailed and comprehensive review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, during the critical period from the Atlantic Conference through December 8, 1941, in the light of the facts made public by this committee, to which reference is hereby made.*]
In connection with the proposed meeting it should be noted that President Roosevelt returned to Washington on August 17 from the  
[64] Id., at p. 25.
[65] See Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, committee exhibit No. 173.
Atlantic Conference at which the far eastern situation had been discussed with Mr. Churchill. It had been agreed by both the President and Prime Minister Churchill that more time was needed by both the United States and Britain to prepare their defenses against Japanese attack in the Far East. It was further agreed that steps should be taken to warn Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr. Churchill were in agreement that this Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Government of Japan and thereby leave open to her a reasonable and just alternative to the aggressive course which she had mapped out for herself.
Upon his return to Washington from the Atlantic Conference, the President on August 17 handed the Japanese Ambassador two documents, one pointing out that the principles and policies under discussion in conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring the security of the United States. [66] In the second document reference was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion of August 8 that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Minister meet with a view to discussing means for adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. Reaffirmation was made of this Government's intention not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States had long been committed and of its intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting aggression.  
It was pointed out that informal conversations with the Japanese Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program involving the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a program would contemplate cooperation by all nations of the Pacific toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with a far greater measure of certainty than could any other program. The statement was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government of the United States was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to
[66] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 656.  

exchange news. It was also stated that, before renewal of the conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of force and conquest, "we could not," the President said to the Ambassador, "think of reopening the conversations."
On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed the President a message from Premier Konoye urging a meeting between the heads of the Governments of the United States and Japan to discuss all important problems in the Pacific. This message was accompanied by a statement of the Japanese Government in which assurances were given, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intentions and her desire to seek a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the United States had long been committed. The qualifications were voiced in the following terms: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in east Asia"; Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet Japanese neutrality treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention of using "without provocation" military force against any neighboring nation. [67]
On September 3 the President handed the Japanese Ambassador the following "oral statement." [68]
"Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows:
"On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows:
"1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
"2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.
"3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
"4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.
"In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon
[67] Id., at pp. 346, 347.
[68] Id., at pp. 589-59l.
the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.
"The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or preferences by force.
"The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might mate to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial, and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference.
"It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force believe.
"The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth."
The formal reply of the President to the Japanese Prime Minister was handed Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and follows: [69]
"I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.
"I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.
"I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.  
"In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed, and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself."
"I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if  
[69] Id., at pp. 591, 592.
widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that *we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement*. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion."
The decision to defer any meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister pending preliminary discussions of fundamental and essential questions was deliberate and well considered. Secretary Hull testified fully concerning the considerations attending the decision: [70]
"A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe [70a] would have been a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken by our Government involved several important considerations.  
"We knew that *Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous*. We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past and contemporary record was replete with instances of military aggression and expansion by force. *Since 1931 and especially since 1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national policy*.
"Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce Japan's commitments in the alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through self-defense in the European war. *They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the alliance*.
"Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a *practice of offering general formulas* and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down the general assurances.
"A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would have had important psychological results.
"It would have had a *critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese*.
"If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon them.
"*If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.*
"The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps toward reversion to peaceful courses, as, for example, adopting the President's proposal of July 24 regarding the neutralization of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina.
"It was clear to us that *unless the meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.*
"The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be overlooked.
"He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its principal cities and industrial regions.
"He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S. Panay on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.
[70] Committee record, pp. 1120-1124. For a thoroughgoing discussion of events and circumstances attending the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, see Appendix D.
[70a] It is to be noted that except in those instances where the name appears in direct quotations, the Japanese Prime Minister's name is spelled Konoye, rather than Konoe.
"He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious outrages in Nanking in 1937.
"He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon which the Japanese Government, even throughout the 1941 conversations, stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese troops in North China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a permanent stranglehold on China.
"He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in 1940 with the Chinese Quisling regime at Nanking a "treaty" embodying the stranglehold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
"Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minster when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.
"As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their course of conquest, *we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with Konoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all, unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move in a peaceful direction*. I was opposed to the first Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich.
"Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the realities in the situation.
"Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in view of the factors mentioned the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoe nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible. [71]"
On September 6 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the following proposal: [72]
"The Government of Japan undertakes:
"(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;
"(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan;
"(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self- defense, and, in ease the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;
"(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;
"(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;
[71] The Konoye Memoirs reflect that the Japanese Navy approved the idea of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister whereas the Army viewed such a meeting as of questioned desirability. After outlining his ideas with respect to such a meeting Prince Konoye observed: "Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day (August 4, 1941) was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover, anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came in writing, as follows:
" 'If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present artificial situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. *If, therefore it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's revised plan to the N plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final effort is made the army is not necessarily in disagreement.*
" 'However (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the President such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity; (2) *you shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America.'*
"The War Minister was of the opinion that 'failure of this meeting is the greater likelihood.' " See committee exhibit No. 173, pp. 30, 31. [72] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 608, 609.  
"(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs;
"(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.
"The Government of the United States undertakes:
" "(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;
" "(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above;  
" "(e) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;
" "(d) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement] reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." "
Secretary Hull made the following comments with respect to the foregoing Japanese proposal: [73]
"On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in the draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted *so long as pursued* on an equitable basis" [italics added] clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan. [74]"
From time to time during September of 1941 discussions were held between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador. On September 27, Ambassador Nomura presented a complete redraft of the Japanese proposals of September 6, following the form of the American proposals of June 21. On October 2, Secretary Hull replied to the proposals made by the Japanese Ambassador during September, handing the Ambassador an "oral statement" reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining our Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. He said: [75]
"Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime
[73] Committee record, pp. 1118,1119.
[74] The Konoye Memoirs reveal that on September 6 an imperial conference was held at which were determined the basic principles of the Japanese Empire's national policy. Among these principles was the understanding that in case there was no way found for attainment of Japanese demands by early in October of 1941 the Empire should at once determine to make up its mind to get ready for war against the United States Great Britain and the Netherlands. Committee exhibit No. 173.
[75] Committee record, pp. 1124-1126.
Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles so as to reach a meeting of minds on essential questions. It was stated in conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that such a meeting could be held.
"During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of Japanese leaders. For example, Captain Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 as having declared in a public speech:
" "America, feeling her insecurity * * * , is carrying out naval expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.
" "*The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching for action, when needed.*
" "In spite of strenuous efforts by the government, the situation is now approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should set about on its primary mission." "
It is of interest to note the Japanese estimate of Secretary Hull's position in the negotiations, reflected in an intercepted message of September 15 from Nomura to Tokyo: [76]
"Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one." "
The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, and was replaced on the following day by a new cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo. On October 17 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted manifesting a disposition by the Tojo Cabinet to continue the negotiations: [77]
"The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.
"The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.
"Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.'
The situation existing from the advent of the Tojo Cabinet to the arrival of Saburo Kurusu in Washington on November 15 to assist Ambassador Nomura in the conversations was depicted by Secretary Hull as follows. [78]
"On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by Maj. Gen. Kiyofuku Okamoto:
" "Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common coprosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered.
[76] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 27.
[76a] For a complete discussion of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, see Appendix D.
[77] Id., at p. 76.
[78] Committee record, pp. 1127-34.  
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" "For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation."
"Clearly the Japanese war lords expected to clinch their policy of aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions.
"On October 30, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and facts," and here thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces.
"The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of State to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a break-down in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles.
"In the last part of October and early November messages came to this Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United States issue a warning to Japan.
"At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this, even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends.
"I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations recommended:
" "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.
" "That material aid to China be accelerated constant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
" "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.
" "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."
"I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a show-down with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.
"On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Generalissimo was told that from our information it did not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was indicated that American air units could not be sent and that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist China.

"On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.
"Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense
"On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West" he said and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."
"Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations.
"On November 7, the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China, Japanese forces in Indochina, and the principle of nondiscrimination. That proposal contained nothing fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government
"In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States
"In the first half of November there were several indeterminate conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. I pointed out that this represented but one part of the general settlement we had in mind. This draft declaration of economic policy envisaged that Japan could join with the United States in leading the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed to desire.
"On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the conversations be brought to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply to their outstanding proposals, I was impelled to comment to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15 that the American Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums.
"On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the President."
Mr. Kurusu in his initial conversation with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull indicated that Prime Minister Tojo desired a peaceful adjustment of differences. At the same time it was clear that Kurusu had nothing new to suggest concerning Japan's participation in the Tripartite Pact or the presence of her troops in China. The President reiterated the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two countries and to effect a peaceful settlement of divergent positions in the Pacific. The Secretary of State, setting forth his comments at the conference, stated: [79]
[79] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 740, 741.
"Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five, or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan."
In a further conversation with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on November 18, Secretary Hull's observations were related in the following terms: [80]  
"The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said that a difficult situation was created when, for example, telegrams of congratulation were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity, and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences."
During the discussion Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a modus vivendi or a temporary arrangement to tide over the abnormal situation. [81] They offered as a possibility return to the status prevailing prior to July 26, 1941, when Japanese assets in the United States were frozen following Japan's entry into southern French Indochina. To this suggestion, Secretary Hull replied: [82]
"I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina would be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I said that it would be difficult for our Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless we believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. I said that I would consult with the representatives of other countries on this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister of my talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited arrangement."
[80] Id., at p. 363.
[81] See committee record, p. 1135.
[82] Id.
In a conversation with the Secretary of State on November 19, the Japanese emissaries made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and regarded herself as bound to carry out its obligations. Through all of the discussions it was evident that Japan was pressing for an early decision. In a series of "deadlines" (now known to have been keyed to the contemplated departure of the task force that struck Pearl Harbor) contained in intercepted messages from Tokyo to Washington the urgency of the negotiations was explained:
November 5, 1941, circular No. 736. [83]  
"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations from falling into chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."  
November 11, 1941, circular No. 762. [84]
"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.
I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view "of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. Attitude in the minimum amount of time. *At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.*
"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A."
November 22, 1941, circular NO. 812. [85]
"To both you Ambassadors.  
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans, *if the signing can be completed by the 29th* (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."
During a conversation with Secretary Hull on November 20 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which was in fact an ultimatum, reading as follows: [86]
[83] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.
[84] Id., at p. 116.
[85] Id., at p. 165.
[86] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, pp. 366, 367.  
"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo- China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.
"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.
"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo- China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.
"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.
"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.
"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.
"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."
In his testimony Secretary Hull observed with respect to the foregoing proposal: [87]
"On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition *an ultimatum*.
"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to revert to peaceful courses."  
There can now be no question that Japan intended her proposal of November 20 as an ultimatum. It was their final proposal [88] and a deadline of November 25, subsequently changed to November 29, had been set for its acceptance. It was a proposal which the Government of Japan knew we could not accept. It was the final gesture of the Tojo Cabinet before launching the vast campaign of aggression which the military overlords of Japan had long before decided upon.
The critical situation culminating in consideration of a modus vivendi was revealed by Secretary Hull: [89]
"On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must
[87] Committee record pp. 1136-1138.
[88] In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 19 the Japanese Government stated in referring to the ultimatum presented to the United States on the following day: "If the United States consent to this cannot be secured the negotiations will have to he broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts." Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 155.
[89] Committee record pp. 1138-1141.
be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final proposal."
"*The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world*. By midsummer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being at least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting.
"*There was never any question of this country forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.*
"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.
"*The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a showdown*.
"There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.
"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.
"Three possible choices presented themselves.
"Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese war lords could then have told their people that the American Government not only would make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.
"Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that event the Japanese war lords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false, for military attack.
"Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.
"The last course was the one chosen."
Full consideration was given by officials of our Government to a counterproposal to the Japanese note of November 20, including the thought of a possible modus vivendi. It was recognized that such an arrangement would demonstrate the desire of the United States for peace and at the same time afford a possible opportunity for the Army and Navy to continue its preparations. From November 22 to 26 the President, State Department, and the highest military authorities discussed a modus vivendi, a first draft being completed on November 22. Revised drafts were prepared on November 24 and 25. The final draft of November 25, which is being set forth in its entirety in view of the testimony that has been adduced concerning it, was as follows: [90]
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and
[90] See Committee Exhibit No. 18.
treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently, the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.  
"On November 20, the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed.  
"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows:
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.
"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.
"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its force in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land, or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that area.
"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:
"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.
"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
"(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.
"(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
"(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month.
"(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
"(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.
"(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.
"The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph 4 above.
"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British, and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 4 above.
"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace law, order, and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
"8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of 3 months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period."
The tentative modus vivendi was submitted for consideration to the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China. The ultimate decision to abandon it was made for reasons best set forth in Secretary Hull's testimony: [91]
"On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus vivendi aspect.
"As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24 and of November 25, contained two things: (1) The possible modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested example of how those principles could be applied that which has since been commonly described as the 10-point proposal.
"I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20.
"It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.
"So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.
"It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious
[91] Committee Record, pp. 1146-1147.  
risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.
"The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement.
"In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended to the President and he approved my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day."
The very serious reaction of the Chinese to the suggested modus vivendi is clearly set forth in a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from an American adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking: [92]
"After discussion with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "modus vivendi" now arrived at with Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory."
There is no possibility whatever that the modus vivendi would have been accepted by the Japanese. In an intercepted dispatch of November 19 [93] the Japanese Ambassadors suggested to Tokyo that there were three courses open to the Empire: (1) maintain the status quo, (2) break the "present deadlock" by an advance under force of arms, or (3) devise some means for bringing about a mutual nonaggression arrangement. In favoring the third alternative it was stated:
"* * * as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by 4 years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long-drawn-out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude to greater achievement to come later * * *."
Replying to the foregoing suggestion, Tokyo advised on November 20 [94] that "under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for
[92] Communication from Owen Lattimore in Chungking to Lauchlin Currie, Presidential Assistant handling Chinese matters, in Washington. See Committee exhibit No. 18.
[93] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 158.
[94] Id., at p. 160.  
saving the present situation. We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our No. 798. [95] Please understand this. The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion."
It is significant to note that when Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a modus vivendi to Secretary Hull on November 18, the Japanese ambassadors very obviously had not consulted their Tokyo superiors. When they did on November 19, Tokyo replied the following day rejecting the idea completely, as indicated above.
Writing in his diary for November 25, 1941, Secretary Stimson, in referring to the tentative draft of a modus vivendi, clearly indicated an appreciation of the fact that it would not be acceptable to the Japanese: [96]
"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought as I read it, but l don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do, namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil."
Had our Government submitted the tentative modus vivendi, it is clear that Japan would have rejected it, and Chinese morale and resistance would very probably have been seriously impaired if not destroyed.
The modus vivendi was designed to accompany a statement of principles with a suggested example of how the principles could be applied. With the decision not to propose a modus vivendi, the Secretary of State on November 26 presented to the Japanese Ambassador its accompanying material which was as follows: [97]
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respec-
[95] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 155.
[96] See committee record, pp. 14417, 14418.
[97] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 766-770.
tively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.
"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.
"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of *a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.*
"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:
" "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
" "(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
" "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
" "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes."
"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
" "(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.
" " (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
" "(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw- material supplies
" "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
" "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries."
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:  
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.
"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indochina.
"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the unite States and on American funds in Japan.
"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall he interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement."
The foregoing reply was clearly not an ultimatum from the standpoint of the Government of the United States. On the contrary it was an admirable statement of every honorable principle for which the United States has stood for many years in the Orient. Ambassador Grew characterized the November 26 note of Secretary Hull as follows: [98]   
"NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
"Our Government has handed to the Japanese a 10-point draft proposal for adjusting the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge objective, and statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically everything that she has ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. By adopting such a program she would be offered free access to needed raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial cooperation and support, withdrawal of the freezing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with us. If she wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries of East Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East Asia
[98] Grew, Ten Years in Japan (1944), pp. 482, 483. Committee exhibit No. 30.
Co-Prosperity Sphere)-which most of her extremists do want-and if she pursues her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all of the A B C D powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to the status of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she can obtain without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she allegedly started fighting strategic, economic, financial, and social security."
Referring to the November 26 note Secretary Stimson said: [99]
"I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental principles on which we had stood for so long and which *I felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor and prestige in the world*. I submit, however, that no impartial reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in the terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only too quick to seize upon it and give that designation for their own purposes."
As suggested by Mr. Stimson, Japan did choose to regard it as an ultimatum consistent with her purposes. Her note of November 20, it is apparent, was the final diplomatic move and failing to secure the concessions demanded the November 26 reply of the United States was seized upon by the war lords of Japan in subsequent propaganda as their excuse for the attack on Pearl Harbor which they had planned for many weeks. It is to be noted in this connection that the Japanese task force was enroute for its attack on Pearl Harbor before the American note of November 26 was delivered to the Government of Japan. At the time of receiving the note from Secretary Hull, Kurusu stated the Japanese Government would be likely "to throw up its hands" when it received the proposal; that he felt the response which had thus been given to the Japanese proposal of November 20 could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations. [100] A dispatch from Ambassador Grew to the State Department on December 5 reflected the strong reaction in Japan. [101]
Secretary Hull said: 102
"It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give false meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an "ultimatum." This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and aggrandizement."
In press conferences on November 26 and 27, Secretary Hull outlined the status of American-Japanese relations. [103]
The decision to stand by basic American principles was the only honorable position under the circumstances. [104] To have acceded to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 would have been indefensible. Firmness was the only language Japan understood. As Ambassador Grew had stated in his celebrated "green light" dispatch of September 12, 1940, to the State Department: [105]
"Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers (including Japan) from attaining their objectives * * *.
"If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand * * *.
"In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese- American relations progressively precarious."
[99] See committee record, p. 14393
[100] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 375.
[101] Committee Record, p. 1821-24.
[102] Committee Record, p, 1153.
[103] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1153 et seq.
[104] Id., p. 1155.
[105] Committee exhibit No. 26.
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Tue Jan 24, 2017 8:01 pm

That firmness, the only language the Japanese understood, failed to dissuade them cannot redound to our regret but only to the ignominy of the Empire of Japan.
An intercepted dispatch NO. 844 from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy on November 28 left little doubt of the fraudulent character of the negotiations thereafter and is a classic example of Japanese deceit and duplicity: [106]
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 [107] and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can."
The following dispatch, while the attack force was en route to Pearl Harbor, was sent from Tokyo to Washington on December 1: [108]
"The date (November 29) set in my message #812 [109] has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information) * * *"
After November 26 Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu conferred with the President and Secretary Hull on several occasions but with nothing new being developed looking to a peaceful settlement.
On the morning of December 6 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted advising that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was being transmitted:
"I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being."
This dispatch indicated that subsequent instructions would be forthcoming concerning the time for presenting the reply to the Government of the United States. By approximately 7 p. m. on the evening of December 6 the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese memorandum had been intercepted, decoded, and made ready for distribution to authorized recipients by our military. These 13 parts were a long recapitulation of the negotiations with the purposes of Japan colored with pious hue and those of the United States perverted into a base and ulterior scheme "for the extension of the war." The thirteenth part concluded on the note that
"therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal (American proposal of November 26) as a basis of negotiations."
[106] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.
[107] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.
[108] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 208.
[109] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 165, setting the date November 29 as the deadline for effecting an understanding.
The fourteenth part was intercepted early on the morning of December 7 and was available for distribution at approximately 8 a. m. It stated that- [110]
"obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war."
With the observation that this intention had been revealed during the course of the negotiations and the "earnest hope of the Japanese Government * * * to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost", the Japanese memorandum closed with the statement:
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."
Nowhere in the memorandum was there any indication or intimation of an intention to attack the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations were to be broken merely that it was impossible to reach an agreement through the then current negotiations. Coincident with the receipt of the full reply, instructions were issued to Japan's representatives for its delivery to the American Government at an hour keyed to the time set for the assault on Pearl Harbor. On the previous evening, President Roosevelt had dispatched an earnest appeal to the Emperor of Japan for the preservation of peace in the Pacific. [111] The infamous character of the Japanese reply was voiced by Secretary Hull to the Japanese ambassadors who were making delivery 1 hour after [112] the first bombs had fallen on Pearl Harbor: [113]
"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."
With a view to effecting the fullest liaison between the diplomatic and military arms of the Government, there was created in the light of the approaching emergency a body familiarly referred to as the War Council. This Council consisted of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and, on occasion, the Chief of the Army Air Forces. [114] It met at the call of the President, and during the fall of 1941 it was in frequent session. Secretary Hull said:
[110] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245.
[111] See Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 784-786. Several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack had begun Ambassador Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the Japanese 14-part memorandum replying to the American note of November 26 was to be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President's appeal. See Peace and War, p. 148.
[112] The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed to deliver the Japanese note to the American Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on Sunday December 7. They made the appointment pursuant to the instruction; however, they later postponed for 1 hour their previous appointment, stating the delay was due to the need of more time to decode the message they were to deliver.
[113] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 787.
[114] For a rather full discussion of liaison between the various departments, see testimony of Secretary Stimson, Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 4041 et seq.  
"The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings." [116]
In addition to the War Council, another liaison body, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, was created during 1940, with a view to holding weekly meetings, which were scheduled for 9:30 each Tuesday morning. Secretary Stimson said: [116]
"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and * * * just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Navy, and myself were in constant contact."
And again: [117]
"During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the President."
During 1941 Rear Adm. R. E. Schuirmann was the Director of the Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and had as one of his duties liaison with the State Department. He made the following observations concerning State Department liaison: [118]
"A "Liaison Committee" consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would take notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were "off the record" discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the record" discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials."
Admiral R. W. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, summarized the liaison with the State- Department as follows: [119]
"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. *He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move*. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War
[115] Committee record, p. 1144.
[116] Roberts record, pp. 4051-4053, 4078-4079.
[117] Committee record, p. 14386.
[118] Hart record. p. 405.
[119] Id., at p. 257.           
Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Wavy Departments to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. *I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling.*"
At a regular Cabinet meeting on November 7 the President inquired of Secretary Hull as to whether he had anything in mind. In replying Secretary Hull testified: [120]
"I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. [121]"
Secretary Stimson stated: [122]
"On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed as that relations had become extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. [123]"
At a meeting of the war council on November 25 Secretary Hull pointed out that the leaders of Japan were determined and desperate, and, in his opinion, the Japanese military was already poised for attack; that they might attack at ally time and at any place. He emphasized the probable element of surprise in Japanese plans, that "virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy." [124]
At the same meeting of the council the President warned that we here likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday, or "the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." [125]
On the morning of November 26, Secretary Hull advised Secretary Stimson that he had about decided not to make the proposition of the 3-month truce, the modus vivendi, that he had discussed with Secretaries Knox and Stimson on November 25 "the Chinese, for
[120] Committee record, p. 1131.
[121] In an address delivered on November 11, 1941, Secretary Knox warned that the Nation was confronted not only by the necessity for extreme measures or self-defense in the Atlantic but was "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world on the far side of the Pacific." See committee record at pp. 1131, 1132.
[122] Committee record, pp. 14387, 14388.
[123] In an address on November 11, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. He said at the waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West" and were threatening "to engulf our own shores"; that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1317 and at any "at any moment war may be forced upon us." See committee record, p. 1132.
[124] Id., at p. 1144 See also statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.
[125] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.
one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the morale of their own people." [126] Secretary Stimson said: [127]
"Early that morning (November 27) I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what is final word had been with the Japanese-whether he had handed them the proposal for three months' truce, or whether he had told them he had no other proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole matter off. His words were: "*I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox the Army and the Navy.*" I then called up the President, who gave me a little different view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that the statement contained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a threat of any kind."  
With reference to his remarks before the War Council on November 28, Secretary Hull stated: [128]
" * * * I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. *I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy*. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make *the element of surprise a central point in their strategy* and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination."
Addressing a public rally in Japan on November 30, Premier Tojo stated: [129]
"The fact that Chiang-Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting [pitting?] the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.
"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance."
Following a conference with military leaders concerning the Japanese Premier's address, Secretary Hull called the President at Warm Springs, Ga., urging him to advance the date set for his return to Washington. The President accordingly returned to Washington on December 1. [130]
In testifying before the Navy inquiry conducted by Admiral Hart, Admiral Schuirmann stated in reply to a query as to whether the State Department's estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as conveyed to the Navy Department was in accord with the statements contained "on page 138 of the book *Peace and War*": [131]
"I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary expressed the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the probability of attack at various points. However, the particular meetings which he mentioned, I do not know if I was present. I cannot make any positive statement that he did not make such a statement. However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor Secretary Hull phoned me saying in effect, "*I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of me but I want you to know that I don't seem to be able to do anything more with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone.*" I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I reported the conversation to Admiral Stark."
[126] Committee record, pp. 14391,14392.
[127] Id., at pp. 14392, 14393.
[128] Committee record, pp. 1160, 1161.
[129] See committee record, p. 1162
[130] Id., at p. 1163.
[131] Hart record, p. 412,
Referring to a meeting at the State Department on the morning of December 7, Mr. Stimson said: [132]
"On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten- thirty and we talked the whole matter over. *Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the blow will strike*. We three stayed together in conference until lunchtime, going over the plans for what should be said and done."
Considering all of the observations made by Secretary Hull to Army and Navy Officials in the days before December 7, 1941, it is difficult to imagine how he could have more clearly and forcefully depicted the manner in which relations between the United States and Japan had passed beyond the realm of diplomacy and become a matter of cold military reality. [133] This thought was expressed by General Marshall when he testified to a distinct recollection of Mr. Hull's saying: "*These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared.*" [133a]  
That there was the fullest exchange of information between the diplomatic and military arms of the Government is further indicated by the manner in which intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages were distributed. These messages, familiarly referred to as "Magic" and discussed in detail elsewhere in this report, contained detailed instructions and proposals from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy and the comments concerning and contents of American proposals as forwarded to Tokyo by its ambassadors. This materials not only indicated what Japan and her ambassadors were saying but literally what they were *thinking*. This material was available to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans in both the Army and Navy, and the heads of the intelligence branches of both the services, among others.  
Beginning in 1931 Japan embarked on a career of conquest no less ambitious nor avowed than that of the Nazis. Despite American protests she overran and subjugated Manchuria. In 1937, bulwarked b her Anti- Comintern Pact with Germany of the preceding year, she invaded China. In 1940 she seized upon the struggle for survival of the western powers against Hitler's war machine to conclude an ironclad alliance with Germany and Italy aimed directly at the United States. Thereupon she set about to drive the "barbarians" from the Orient and to engulf the Far East in her Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which was to be her bastion for world conquest. As early as January of 1941 the dominating military clique prepared for war on the United States and conceived the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Hailing the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, as a divine wind" securing her northern flank, Japan within a period of 2O days adopted a crucial policy followed by an all-out mobilization for war Almost immediately thereafter she invaded Southern French Indochina for the purpose "when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack." She boldly declared in an intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941:
[132] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 4081. See also committee record, p, 14428.
[133] For a record of Mr. Hull's conferences, consultations, and telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941, and arrangements for contacts between the Departments of State, War, and navy in 1940 and 1941, see committee record, pp. 1166-1176. See also committee record, p. 1180.
[132a] Committee record, p. 3079.
"After the occupation of French Indochina, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part."
The invasion of southern Indochina resulted in the freezing of asset and virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.  
On November 20, 1941, the Empire of Japan delivered all ultimatum to the Government of the United States. It required that the United States supply Japan as much oil as she might require; that we discontinue aid to China, withdrawing moral and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to resort to peaceful methods. The ultimatum contained no tenable basis for an agreement, a fact well known to and contemplated by the Tojo Cabinet.
During all of the negotiations, Japan qualified and restricted every intimation of her peaceful purposes. With each succeeding proposal it became abundantly apparent that she did not intend to compromise in any measure the bellicose utterances and plans of conquest of her military masters. She uniformly declared her purpose to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite Pact-aimed directly at the United States. She refused to relinquish the preferential commercial position in the Orient which she had arrogated to herself. She demanded a victor's peace in China and would give no effective recognition to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Her clear purpose was to maintain a military and economic overlordship of China.
The story of our negotiations with the Empire of Japan during the year 1941 epitomizes the traditional purpose of the United States to seek peace where compatible with national honor. Conversations were carried forward with the representatives of that nation in the hope of bringing to an end the frightful aggression that had brought sorrow, death, and degradation to the Orient for almost a decade. At the same time it was realistically recognized that the negotiations afforded precious time to improve our own capacity for self-defense, the appalling need for which was becoming daily more apparent as the Axis dreams of world conquest pushed relentlessly toward realization.
That there were elements in Japan who desired peace is unquestioned. But for many years the Government of that nation had be divided into two schools of thought, the one conceivably disposed to think in terms of international good will with the other dominated by the militarism of the war lords who had always ultimately resolved Japanese policy. [134] It was this monstrous condition which, from the time of Japan's emergence as a power in world affairs, resulted in her military acts invariably belying her diplomatic promises. The United States therefore in looking to any final settlement had properly before it the substantial question of whether those in Japan who might wish peace possessed the capacity and power to enter a binding and effective agreement reasonably designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East. It was for this reason that our Government insisted Japan offer some tangible proof of her honest purpose to abandon a policy of aggression. No such proof or disposition to provide it was at any time forthcoming.
[134] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p, 1120.
In considering the negotiations in their entirety the conclusion is inescapable that Japan had no concessions to make and that her program of aggression was immutable. When the Konoye Cabinet could not secure an agreement giving Japan an unrestrained hand in he Orient it was replaced by a Cabinet headed by General Tojo. Tojo made one gesture in the form of an ultimatum to realize Japan's ambitions without fighting for them. When he realized such a price or peace was too high even for the United States, his Government launched the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor while instructing her ambassadors in characteristic duplicity to maintain the pretense of continuing negotiations. [135]
It is concluded that the diplomatic actions of the United States provided no provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. It is further concluded that the Secretary of State fully informed both the War and Navy Departments of diplomatic developments and that he in a timely and forceful manner clearly pointed out to these Departments that relations between the United States and Japan had passed beyond the stage of diplomacy and were the hands of the military.
[135] The Japanese force to strike Pearl Harbor actually left Hitokappu Bay for the attack at 7 p.m., November 25, Washington time, before the United states note in reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 was delivered to Japan's ambassadors on November 26.
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Tue Jan 24, 2017 8:05 pm

The evidence tends to indicate that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was originally conceived and proposed early in January of 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the combined Japanese fleet, who at that time ordered Admiral Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have told Onishi about February 1, [2] "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the United States Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." [3] During the latter part of August 1941, all feet commanders and other key staff members were ordered to Tokyo by Yamamoto for war games preliminary to formulation of final operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was held continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, and on September 13 an outline incorporating the essential points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as *Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1*, was completed. On November 5, 1941, this operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders. The date, November 5, is in consequence properly to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.
Under the heading "Preparations for the outbreak of war," operation order No. 1 provided that " when the decision is made to complete over- all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the *approximate* date (Y-day) for commencement of operations and announcing 'first preparations for war.' " The order further provided that "the time for the outbreak of war (X-day) will be given in an Imperial general headquarters order." The details of the plan with respect to the Pearl Harbor attack were worked out by members of the naval general staff operations section, combined fleet operations staff, and first air fleet operations staff.
Admiral Yamamoto on November 7 issued combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2 relating: "First preparations for war. Y-day will be December 8." Consistent with the definition of Y-day as given in operation order No. 1, December 8 (December 7, Honolulu time) was thus established only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. The imperial general headquarters,
[1] The chief sources of information concerning the attack are translations of captured Japanese documents, interrogations of prisoners of war, and reports submitted by general headquarters, supreme commander for the Allied Powers, comprising questionnaires filled out since VJ-day by former members of the Japanese naval high command. See committee exhibits Nos. 8, 8A, 8B, 8O, and 8D.
For purposes of convenience, the term Hawaii is used throughout this report as synonymous with the Territory of Hawaii.
[2] Unless otherwise stated the time indicated is Tokyo time. To obtain the corresponding time in Washington and Honolulu, 14 hours and 19 1/2 hours, respectively, should be subtracted from Tokyo time. See committee exhibit No. 6, item 4.
[3] See committee exhibit No. 8D.
however, issued an order on December 2 stating, "The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on December 8," thereby announcing X-day as defined in operation order No. 1. The tentative approximate date for the attack selected on November 7 and defined as Y-day in consequence became the final precise date, X-day.
The Japanese imperial headquarters navy section, in discussions prior to November 7, generally recognized December 8 as a propitious date from an operational viewpoint and decided upon this date in conjunction with the leaders of the combined fleet. It was noted that from the standpoint of a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area December 10 would have been suitable in view of the dark of the moon. But it was expected the United States Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter Pearl Harbor on Friday and leave on Monday. Sunday, December 8, was therefore decided upon with the understanding that, to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn as possible; that is, approximately 1 hour before sunrise. An imperial naval order issued on December 1 stated: "*Japan * * * has reached a decision to declare war ors the Untied States of America, British Empire, and the Netherlands.*" [4]
Three possible avenues in approaching Hawaii for the attack presented themselves: The northern course, which was used; a central course which headed east following the Hawaiian Islands; and a southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south. Because of the absolute requirement that the element of surprise be a factor in the attack, the northern course was selected since it was far from the United States patrol screen of land-based aircraft, and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels.
Screening destroyers were to be sent ahead of the Japanese Fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the force was to make a severe change in course and endeavor to avoid detection. If the striking force was detected prior to the day before the attack, it was planned to have the force return to Japanese waters without executing the attack. On the other hand, should the force be detected on the day before the attack, the question of whether to carry home the attack or to return was to be resolved in accordance with local conditions. [5] If the attack should fail, the main force of the Japanese Navy, located in the Inland Sea, was to be brought out to the Pacific in order to return the striking force to home waters.
According to Japanese sources interviewed since the defeat of Japan, the sources of information employed in planning the attack included public broadcasts from Hawaii; reports from naval attaches in the Japanese Embassy, Washington; public newspapers in the United States; reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack; and information obtained from crews and passengers
[4] See committee exhibit No. 8D.
[5] Had the American Fleet left port it is reported that the Japanese force would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around Oahu and was prepared to attack. If the American Fleet could not be located the striking force was to withdraw. See committee exhibit No. 8.
of ships which had called at Honolulu in mid-November. [6] It also appears that Japan was receiving the same type of espionage information from its Honolulu consul as from other Japanese diplomatic establishments. [7]
The Japanese plan of operation was predicated on certain assumptions with respect to the United States Pacific Fleet: (1) That the main body of the fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, Hawaii time; (2) that a carrier could be moved from Japanese home waters across the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance; (3) that should the two foregoing assumptions be in error, a reserve group of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American Fleet (4) that a powerful carrier air strike against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effective, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet, and (5) that such a strike could achieve also the destruction of American land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage.
Incident to preparations and discussions on September 6 and 7 relating to operation order No. 1, it was decided that no landing on the island of Oahu should be attempted since (1) it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing within less than a month after the opening of hostilities; (2) it was recognized that the problems of speed and supply for an accompanying convoy would have rendered it unlikely that the initial attack could be accomplished without detection; and (3) insuperable logistic problems rendered landings on Oahu impractical. In formulating the final plans it was determined that a torpedo attack against ships anchored in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method of putting the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area out of action for a long period of time. Two obstacles to a torpedo attack were considered: The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow; and the fact that it was probably equipped with torpedo nets. In order to overcome the first difficulty it was decided to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from extremely low altitude. Since the success of an aerial torpedo attack could not be assured because of the likelihood of torpedo nets a bombing attack was also to be employed.
[6] It is reported that Japanese agents in Hawaii played no part in the attack. See committee exhibit No. 8.
The location of the anchorages shown on the maps recovered from the attacking force was determined on the basis of the indicated sources beginning in the early part of 1941.
It has been reported that the intelligence section of the Japanese naval general staff was having a most difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian ea. Because of this, the intelligence section had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from naval officers at Washington, newspapers and magazines published in America, American radio broadcasts signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at Honolulu, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and similar sources. According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor or out on training was deduced. By combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of United States Fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at Honolulu, the training areas of the fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplanes at Hawaii were deduced in the same way. From newspapers and magazines published in the United States, material was obtained for deduction of America's war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, Army strength at Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines, and other places.
It is reported from Japanese sources that the reports from foreign diplomatic establishments and commercial firms in foreign countries were regarded as not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a "special write-up, and were considered on their own merits." See committee exhibit No. 8C.
[7] See committee exhibit No. 2.
The complete plan of the attack was known in advance to members of the Navy general staff, the commander in chief and chiefs of staff, and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters and first air fleet headquarters. Portions of the plan were known to the Navy Minister, the Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval officers. It has been reported that the Japanese Emperor knew in advance only the general outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials in the United States, including Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything concerning the plan prior to the attack.
The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, were based on the desire for military conquest, security, and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural resources. With respect to the Pearl Harbor attack, operation Order No. 1 stated: "In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be cut. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight." [8]
On or about November 14 [9] units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force were ordered to assemble in Hitokappu Bay, located in the Kurile Islands, [10] this operation being completed by November 22. On November 25 the commander in chief of the combined Japanese Fleet issued the following order: [11]
(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for dawn of X-day (exact date to be given by later order).  
Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against enemy counterattack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.
(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.
(c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of November 26 and advance to 42 N. And 170 E. (standing-by position) on the afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling. (The actual time of departure was 9 a. M. November 26, Japan time-1:30 p. m., November 25, Hawaii time.)
Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the striking force consisted of 6 aircraft carriers, including the Akagi, the flagship of Admiral Nagumo; 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 8 train vessels, and approximately 360 planes, which
[8] Other factors included (1) rendering impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the South Seas operation, including the Philippine Islands, and (2) the defense of Japan's mandated islands. See committee exhibit No. 8.
[9] Other information obtained indicates that the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued the following order on November 7 ("The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret will assemble in Hitokappu Bay by November 22 for refueling." Committee exhibit No. 8.
[10] Also referred to as Tankan Bay (Etorfu Islands, Kuriles), and Tankappu-Wan.
[11] See committee exhibit No. 8.
participated in the attack. Other submarines had proceeded from the Inland Sea independent of the striking force. [12]
At 9 a. m., November 26, [13] the Japanese Fleet departed under complete radio silence from Hitokappu Bay for its destination 200 miles north of Oahu. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the need for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts were posted, but no searches or combat air patrols were flown. [14] The anticipated difficulty in refueling at sea because of weather conditions did not materialize, since the weather proved uniformly calm. On or about December 2 all ships were darkened, and on December 4 the rendezvous point (42 north; 170 east) was reached and the combat ships fueled to capacity from the tankers. The cruise had been entirely uneventful, no planes or ships having been sighted. [15]
The green light to execute the attack had been sent by Admiral Yamamoto from his flagship, the Yamato, on December 2. The message was "Niita Kayama Nobore," translated "Climb Mount Niitaka," which was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack." [16]
On the night of December 6-7 (Hawaii time) the "run-in" to a point 200 miles north of Oahu was made at top speed, 26 knots. Beginning at 6 a. m. and ending at 7:15 a. M., December 7, a total of ;60 planes were launched in three waves. The planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes, it is reported that two type Zero reconnaissance  
[12] The following allocation of forces for the attack was made (see committee exhibit No. 6, item 17):
Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi NAGUMO
BatDiv 3 (1st Section) (HIEI, KIRISHIMA), 2 BB
CarDiv 1 (KAGA, AKAGI)
CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA), 2 CA
DesRon 1 (ABUKUMA, 4 DesDivs), 1 CL, 16 DD.
8 Train Vessels.
Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi SHIMIZU.
I-class submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3) (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 SS.
Midget submarines, 5 M-SS.
6 Train Vessels.
[13] The corresponding time in Washington would be 7 p m. November 25.
[14] A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, staff communication officer of the striking force. Admiral Nagumo and his staff believed that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since stations KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Admiral Nagumo felt that American forces were still oblivious of developments. For several days prior to the attack the Jap force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the southwestern sector from Oahu. Committee exhibit No. 8D.
[15] To disguise the move against Pearl Harbor the main Japanese force in the Inland Sea area and the land based air units in the Kyushu area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the task force was still in training in the Kyushu area. See committee exhibit No, 8.
[16] Committee exhibit No. 8d.
[17] The time hereafter indicated is Hawaiian time unless otherwise specified.  
seaplanes were launched at approximately 5 a. m., December 7, to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage just before the attack, reaching their destination about 1 hour before arrival of the attack planes. [18]
The Japanese aircraft participating in the operation included 81 fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers, and 40 torpedo bombers. Five distinct phases were noted in the execution of the attack, as recounted from the Navy point of view: [19]
Phase I: Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting from 7:55 a. m. to 8:25 a. m.
Phase II: Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a. m. to 8:40 a. m.
Phase III: Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a. m. to 9:15 a. m.
Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 a. m. and 9:45 a. m.
Phase V. Warning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a. m.
The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore. In the statement submitted for the consideration of the committee and in his testimony, Rear Adm. R. B. Inglis set forth a review of the various phases of the attack: [20]
"Phase I: 7:55-8:25 a. m. Combined Torpedo Plane and Dive Bomber Attacks
"The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time (namely, 7:55 a. m.) Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island and concentrated on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.
"At the time of the attack Navy planes (patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type) were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then, as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit on hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship California and which fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight. However, 33 of the Navy's best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.
"As soon as the attack began, the commander of patrol wing 2 broadcasted from 1. Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is *not* drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.
"At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low- flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay.
"About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes, similar to one of the Navy's light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced bombing and strafing. No. 3 hanger received a direct hit during this attack, and
[18] See committee exhibit No. 155
[19] For a description of the attack as obtained from Japanese sources since VJ-day, see committee exhibits Nos. 8 and 8B, p. 10.
[20] Committee record, pp. 85-103.
our planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save those planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 36 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack; 6 of these were damaged, and 3 were in the air on patrol south of Oahu.
"Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes. It was delivered by 2 squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machinegun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the treetops, reverse their course and attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon Navy utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the marines themselves.
"Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid had subsided. Pilots aching to strike at the enemy in the air viewed the wreckage which until a few minutes before had been a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. Altogether 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines, unable to find anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter lanes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.
"Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor Japanese dive bombers were effective, *the torpedo planes did the most damage*. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy hip objectives. Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of the fleet. At least in the great majority of eases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.
"Four separate torpedo plane attacks were made during phase I. The major attack was made by 12 planes, which swung in generally from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low altitudes (within 50 to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the southeast side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships (namely, the Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and California) were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.
"During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.
"The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and the minelayer Oglala both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the Oglala and exploded against the side of the Helena. The blast stove in the side plates of the Oglala. Submersible pumps for the Oglala were obtained from he Helena but could not be used since no power was available because of damage to the ship's engineering plant.
"The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked the seaplane tender Tangier, the target ship Utah, and the light cruisers Raleigh and Detroit The Raleigh was struck by one torpedo, and the Utah received two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a. m. At first it was feared that the Raleigh would capsize. Orders were thereupon given for all men not at the guns to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.
"The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had recently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After she had listed to about 40 degrees, the order was given to abandon ship This order was

"executed with some difficulty, as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely Later knocking was heard within the hull of the Utah. With cutting tools obtained from the Raleigh a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman, second class, who had been entrapped in the void space underneath the dynamo room.
"An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the Utah and Raleigh were placed, were designated carrier berths and that a carrier was frequently moored in nearby F-9.
"The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. Another torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah.
"It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in these 4 attacks was 21.
"In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types of bombs were employed light, medium, and incendiary.
"During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14- inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a ravaging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby interfering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship Tennessee in the adjacent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire.
"The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by two heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California, she had to be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the Tennessee, where he organized a party of West Virginia survivors to help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which covered the water between the Tennessee and Ford Island.
"The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.
"Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in 4 groups were active during phase I.
"Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a. m. All outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the Oklahoma, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the Pennsylvania, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking condition; the California was down by the stern; the Arizona was a flaming ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.
"Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, defensive action on the part of the feet was prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of less than 5 minutes, practically all battleship and antiaircraft batteries were firing. The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.
"During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within the harbor proper. The destroyer Helm, which had gotten under way just prior to the attack, was just outside the harbor entrance when, at 8:17 a. m., a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately submerged. The Helm opened fire at 8:19 a. m., when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.
"Phase II: 8:25-8:40 a. m. Lull in Attacks
"This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity continued, although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard, the battleships Maryland, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, and various light cruisers and destroyers.
"Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under that heading.  
"At 8:32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to starboard and capsized.
"During phase II there was still relatively little ship movement within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had received orders at 7:51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact the Ward in defensive in sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the Curtiss and Tangier, the Monaghan proceeded a high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight. The Monaghan thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.
"The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The Monaghan then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that the Monaghan got under way, the destroyer Henley slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan down the channel.  
"Phase III: 8:40-9:15 a m. Horizontal Bomber Attacks  
"The so-called "lull" in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area.
"During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated, causing a ire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.
"The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the California with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.
"Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had participated n earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.
"Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately 8 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.
"It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to the Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.
"During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1 bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the main deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.
"During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the Curtiss' gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship, spattering burning gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.
"Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a. m. The Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the South channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to each open water they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-dock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to, make a turn in the channel, the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.
"Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten under way at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about 9:40 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.
"Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at 10-10 dock. The Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9, but shortly thereafter she capsized.
"At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship Maryland.

"Phase IV: 9:15-9:45 Dive Bomber Attacks
"During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal bomber attacks described in phase III.
"Phase V: 9:45 Waning of Attacks and Completion of Raid  
"By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading Navy aerial searches, both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its home waters without being contacted by any American units."
An outline review of the Japanese attack on Army planes and installations is as follows: [21]
"Hickam Field
"(Army planes at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast with approximately 10 feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose of another.)
"First attack (lasting about 10 minutes): At about 7:55 a. m. nine dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and three additional planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven more dive bombers attacked the hangar line from the east.
"Second attack (lasting between 10 and 15 minutes): At about 8:25 a. m. between six and nine planes attacked the No. 1 Aqua System, [21a] the technical buildings, and the consolidated barracks. During and immediately after this bombing attack, Army planes on the parking apron were attacked with gunfire. About 8:26 a. m. a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, possibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area.
"Third attack (lasting about 8 minutes): At 9 a. m. from six to nine planes attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dispersed. At about the same time from seven to nine planes bombed the consolidated barracks, the parade ground and the post exchange.
"Wheeler Field
"(Army planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.)
"First attack (lasting approximately 15 minutes): At 8:02 a. m. 25 planes dive-bombed the hangar lines, machine-gun fire was also employed during the attack.  
"Second attack (lasting less than 5 minutes): At 9 a. m. seven planes machine-gunned Army planes being taxied to the airdrome.
"Bellows Field  
"(The P-40's were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals; the reconnaissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater intervals)
"First attack: At 8:30 a single Japanese fighter machine-gunned the tent area.
"Second attack (lasting about 15 minutes): At about 9 a. m. nine fighters machine-gunned the Army planes."
Haleiwa Field was not attacked and after 9:45 a. m. there were no further attacks on Army installations. The evidence indicates that a maximum of 105 planes participated in the attacks on the airfields, it being noted that some of the planes included in this number may have taken part in more than one attack.
Prior to completion of the surprise attack the advance Japanese expeditionary force of submarines was under the command of the striking force commander, Admiral Nagumo. The precise move-
[21] See testimony of Col. Bernard Thielen, Committee Record, pages 104- 111.
[22] A hydrostatic pass for the fuel-pumping system. See committee record, p. 105.

ments of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed that most of these units departed from Japanese home waters in late November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area by way of Kwajalein. A few of the submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, proceeded directly to Hawaii. The functions assigned to the submarines in operations order No. 1 were: [22]
(a) Until X-day minus 3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and report on any strong American forces discovered.
(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking force in advance of the movement of that force to insure an undetected approach.
(c) Until X-day minus 5, the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.
(d) On X-day the submarines in the area were to "observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight, he will be pursued and attacked."
With orders not to attack until the task force strike was verified, the force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions on the evening of December 6 in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the Pacific Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air raid. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor, discharging its torpedoes harmlessly. None of the five midget submarines rejoined the Japanese force. [23]
The I-class submarines maintained their patrols in the Hawaiian area after the attack and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain he status of the American Fleet and installations. In the event of virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the operation plan provided that one submarine division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic. At least one submarine (the I-7) was dispatched to the Oregon coast on or bout December 13.
Upon completion of the launchings of aircraft at 7:15 a. m., December 7, the fleet units of the Japanese striking force withdrew at high speed to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. And 1:30 p.m., whereupon the force proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving on December 23. En route two carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers were detached on December 5 to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. The
[22] See committee exhibit No. 8.
[23] All midget submarine personnel were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. Committee exhibit No. 8.
original plans called for the retiring force to strike at Midway if possible but this strike was not made, probably because of the presence of a United States task force south of Midway. [24]
Of the vessels at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, [25] the following were either sunk or damaged: [26]
Type Name Extent of damage
Battleships Arizona Sunk.
California Do.
West Virginia Do.
Oklahoma Capsized.
Nevada Heavily damaged.
Maryland Damaged.
Pennsylvania Do.
Tennessee Do.
Light Cruisers Helena Heavily damaged.
Honolulu Damaged.
Raleigh Heavily damaged.
Destroyers Shaw Do.
Cassin Heavily damaged (burned).
Downes Do.
Repair Ship Vestal Badly damaged.
Minelayer Oglala Sunk.
Seaplane Tender Curtiss Damaged.
 Auxiliaries Utah Capsized.
The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven hundred and forty-nine wounded survived. None were missing. [26a]
A total of 92 naval planes (including 5 scout planes from the carrier Enterprise) were lost and an additional 31 planes damaged. [27] At the Ford Island Naval Air Station one hangar was badly damaged by fire and another suffered minor damage. A complete hangar, in which planes were stored, was destroyed at Kaneohe Naval Air Station along with the planes therein and the seaplane parking area was damaged. At the marine base at Ewa a considerable amount of damage was suffered by material installations, machinery tentage, and buildings. Damage at the base to aircraft was extremely heavy inasmuch as the primary objective was aircraft on the ground, the attacks being made on individual aircraft by enemy planes using explosive and incendiary bullets from extremely low altitudes. [28]
[24] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be separated from the wide-scale operations of which it was a part. On the evening of December 7, Japanese forces struck Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippine Islands, Wake and, on the morning of December 8, Midway.
[25] The vessels in Pearl Harbor included 8 battleships: 2 heavy cruisers; 6 light cruisers; 29 destroyers; 5 submarines; 1 gunboat; 8 destroyer minelayers; 1 minelayer; 4 destroyer minesweepers; 6 minesweepers, and 24 auxiliaries. Committee exhibit No. 6.
[26] Units of the Pacific Fleet not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack included: (1) Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island. (2) Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton, consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, was about 460 miles southeast of Midway en route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers. (3) Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown, consisting of one heavy cruiser and five destroyer minesweepers, had just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft. (4) Other units of the fleet were on isolated missions of one type or another. See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 52-55.
[26] See committee exhibit No. 6.
[26a] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 131.
[27] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 128, 135, 136.
[28] See committee exhibit No. 6.
The Army suffered a total of 600 casualties, including 194 killed in action and 360 wounded. [29]
A total of 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action this figure including aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged planes which were subsequently stripped for parts. [30]
In addition, extensive damage was inflicted on Army installations as reflected by photographic evidence submitted to the committee. [31]
It has been estimated by our own sources, that the Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of them being dive-bombers and torpedo planes, as a result of Navy action. Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each, carrying two torpedoes, were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered. From reports available it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. One officer, an ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the submarine which grounded off Bellows Field. [32]
General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire. [33]
Information developed through Japanese sources indicates, however that a total of only 29 aircraft were lost and all of the 5 midget submarines.
As a result of the December 7 attack on Hawaii, military and naval forces of the United States suffered 3,435 casualties; Japan, less than 100. We lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. We suffered severe damage to or loss of 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines. The astoundingly disproportionate extent of losses marks the greatest military and naval disaster in our Nation's history. [35] The only compensating feature was the many acts of personal valor during the attack.
[29] In addition 22 were missing in action, 2 died (nonbattle), 1 was declared dead (Public Law 490), and 21 died of wounds. Committee exhibit No. 5.
[30] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 130. In a statement by General Short concerning events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, a total of 128 Army planes are indicated as having been damaged in the raid. See Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7.
[31] See committee record, p. 130; exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.
[32] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 128.
[33] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 139
[34] Committee exhibit No. 8B.
[35] The Japanese estimate of losses inflicted was: 4 battleships, 1 cruiser, and 2 tankers sunk, 4 battleships heavily damaged; 1 battleship lightly damaged; and 260 planes destroyed. Committee exhibit No. 8.
[36] In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired. References to individual valor are replete with such acts as:
(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment while they themselves needed help.
(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from flooded compartments.
(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.
(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.
(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.
(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships were sinking.
(7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off their own sinking vessels.
For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses. (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 131, 132.)
On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 66 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during the December 7 attack. ( Testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record. p. 133.)
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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The Japanese attack came as an utter surprise to the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii. The Army was on an alert against sabotage only with the planes, which were on 4 hours' notice, lined up side by side as perfect targets for an attack. The state of readiness aboard naval vessels was the usual state of readiness for vessels in port. Fifty percent of the Navy planes were on 4 hours' notice. Although the Hawaiian forces were completely surprised, two significant events occurred on the morning of December 7 which indicated a possible attack.
The first indication came at 3:50 a. m. when the United States coastal minesweeper Condor reported sighting the periscope of a submerged submarine while approximately 1 3/4 miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys, an area in which American submarines were prohibited from operating submerged. [37] The Navy destroyer Ward was informed and, after instituting a search, sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing a target repair ship en route to Honolulu harbor. This submarine was sunk shortly after 6:45 a. m. No action was taken apart from dispatching the ready-duty destroyer U. S. S Monaghan to proceed to sea, to close the net gate to Pearl Harbor, and to attempt to verify the submarine contact report. The presence of the submarine was not interpreted as indicating the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor. [38]
The second indication of an attack came at approximately 7:02 a. m., December 7, when an Army mobile radar unit detected a large number of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3 east of north. [39] These planes were the Japanese attacking force. The aircraft warning information center, which closed down at 7 a. m. on the morning of December 7, was advised of the approaching planes at 7:20 a. m. An Army lieutenant, whose tour of duty at the information center was for training and observation and continued until 8 a. m., took the call and instructed the radar operators in effect to "forget it." His estimate of the situation appears to have been occasioned by reason of a feeling that the detected flight was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that were scheduled to arrive at Hawaii on December 7.
A summarized statement of Navy personnel actually on board ship at the beginning of the attack is as follows: [40]
On board
Commanding officers of battleships .................. 5 out of 8.
Commanding officers of cruisers ..................... 6 out of 7.
Commanding officers of destroyers ................... 63 percent.
Damage control officers of battleships .............. 6 out of 8.
[37] See committee exhibit No. 112 p. 96.
[38] See discussion, infra, of the submarine contact on the morning of December 7.
[39] See committee exhibit No. 155.
[40] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 103.  
On board
Average percentage of officers:
Battleships (approximate) .......................... 60 to 70 percent.
Cruisers, battle force (approximate) ............... 65 percent.
Destroyers, battle force (approximate) ............. 50 percent.
Average percentage of men:
Battleships ........................................ 95 percent.
Cruisers, battle force ............................. 98 percent.
Destroyers, battle force ........................... 85 percent.
There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval shore installations.
In the case of the Army, a summary report compiled by the Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent of the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., December 7. [41]
All naval antiaircraft batteries, consisting of 780 guns, were ship- based; that is, located on the ships in Pearl Harbor. At the time of the attack, roughly one-fourth of all antiaircraft guns were manned, and within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and firing. It appears that all naval batteries were in operating condition; the number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be negligible. All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on board, except in a few instances where removal was necessary because of repairs in progress, and ammunition was ready at the guns in accordance with existing directives. Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10 minutes after the beginning of the attack. [42]
In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and times at which antiaircraft units were in position: [43]
In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire
Sixty-fourth A (searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m.
(alerted at 8:15 a.m.) B (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11:00 a.m.
E (searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor (Time not known)
F (3-inch) at Pearl City 11:05 a.m.
G (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 10:00 a.m.
I (37-mm) at Aliamanu (Known only
K (37-mm) at Hickam Field that batteries
L (37-mm) at Hickam Field were in position before 11:45 a.m.)
M (37-mm) at Wheeler Field 11:55 a.m.
Ninety-seventh A (searchlight) at Fort Kamehameha 8:34 a.m.

(alerted between 7:55 and 8:10 a.m.). F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha 8:55 a.m.
G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 8:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett 10:20 a.m.
Ninety-eighth. A (searchlight) at Schofield Barracks (Time not known.)
B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9:55 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump, south of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station 1:15 p.m.
G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station 1:15 p.m.
H (3-inch) at Waipahu High School 1:30 p.m.
[41] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 114.
[42] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 123, 124.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 5.
In position and ready to fire
Regiment Battery        
Two Hundred and A (searchlight) at Ewa (Time not Fifty-first known)
B (3-inch) at West Loch 11:45 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m.
D (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard
Pearl Harbor 12:41 p.m.
F (37-mm) at Navy Recreation
area 12:30 p.m.
G (37-mm) at tank farm,
Schofield Barracks 11:00 a.m.
H (37-mm) at Navy Yard 12:05 p.m.
One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting down two enemy planes at that time.
The foregoing table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries, 27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in several instances not for a considerable period of time after the attack.
The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units appears to have been occasioned largely by the time required for moving into position and the fact that ammunition was not readily accessible to the mobile batteries. [44]
Seven Navy patrol flying boats were in the air at the time of the attack. Three of these planes were engaged in a routine search of the fleet operating area approximately 120 miles south of Oahu and the remaining four were engaged in inter-type tactical exercises with United States submarines near Lahaina Roads. Eight Scout bombers that had been launched from the carrier Enterprise, which was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, for the purpose of searching ahead of the ship and then landing at Ewa, arrived during the attack and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed after the attack while the remaining five were lost. [45] The majority of the Navy planes were on 4 hours' notice. [46]
In the case of the Army, planes were generally on 4 hours' notice. Between 25 and 35 planes, these being fighters, took off after the attack began and before it was concluded. [47]  
An effort was made in the course of and after the attack, through planes already in the air and those that could get into the air during  
[44] Colonel Thielen stated "* * * only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and Artillery units of the Twenty- fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount of machine gun and rifle ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells were in the ordnance storage depots principally at Schofield Barracks." Committee record, pp. 119, 120.
The situation with respect to artillery ammunition was testified to by General Burgin as follows: "They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field position. They were not in field positions." Roberts Commission Record, pp. 2604-2605.
[45] See committee record, pp. 71, 72.
[46] Admiral Bellinger stated that of 69 patrol planes at Oahu, 2 were on 15-minute notice, 8 on 30 minute notice, 9 were undergoing repairs, and 42 were on 4 hours' notice. Committee record, p. 9303.
[47] See committee exhibit No. 5.
and following the attack, to locate the Japanese carrier force but to no avail. The attacking planes withdrew and were recovered by the fleet units without the latter being detected.
While it appears some planes under Navy direction were assigned to search the sector to the north of Oahu, generally regarded as the dangerous sector from the standpoint of an air attack, they were diverted to the southwest by reason of a false report that the Japanese carriers were in that direction. [48]
The deplorable feature of the action following the attack was the failure of the Navy and Army to coordinate their efforts through intelligence at hand. The same Army radar unit that had tracked the Japanese force in, plotted it back out to the north. [49] Yet this vital information, which would have made possible an effective search, was employed by neither service. [50]
The principal vessels in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were 8 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 29 destroyers. Inasmuch as there were no naval antiaircraft shore batteries in or around Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack, these warships provided the chief antiaircraft defense. The ship-based antiaircraft batteries totaled 780 guns, 427 of which had an effective range of from 500 to 2,500 yards and the remainder from 5,000 to 12,000 yards. [51]
The Navy is indicated to have had a total of 169 planes at Hawaii prior to the attack, 71 of which were patrol bombers and 15 fighter planes. [52] It is to be noted, however, that Admiral Bellinger in a report to Admiral Kimmel on December 19, 1941, concerning the viability and disposition of patrol planes on the morning of December 7 indicated 69 patrol planes as being at Hawaii. His tabulation was as follows: [63]
In commis- Top available Under repair Ready at In air
sion for flight base
At Kaneohe 36 33 3 30 3
At Pearl 33 28 5 24 4
At Midway 12 11 1 4 7
-- -- -- -- --
Total 81 72 9 58 14
It thus appears that a total of 61 patrol planes were available for flight as of December 7. Fifty-four of the patrol planes were new PBY- 5's that had been recently ferried to Hawaii between October 28 and November 23, 1941. Admiral Bellinger indicated that the new
[48] Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said he did not get the information as to the probable location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack for some 2 days. There was a great deal of confusion including false civilian reports of troop parachute landings and a false report from one of own planes concerning an enemy carrier to the south. A chart showing the position of the Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7 but was not shown the Navy until the afternoon. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 564.
With further respect to the confusion that prevailed, Captain Rochefort stated that when the attack began his communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the "direction finder" stations, located at Lualualei and Aiea, and that in consequence no bearings on the attacking Japanese force were received by his unit. He commented that the failure of communications was the result of an accident, caused by Army personnel setting up new circuits. See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 63, 64.
[49] See committee exhibit No. 155 for original radar plot of Opana station, December 7, 1941.
[50] Admiral Kitts said that on December 8 while in conference with General Davidson he was shown a plot showing planes coming in to Oahu and going out again. This plot was not reported to the Navy until Kitts saw it on December 8. See Hewitt inquiry record, p. 520.
[51] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 122.
[52] See committee exhibit No. 6.
[53] See committee exhibit No. 120

PBY-5's were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an absence of spare parts. He pointed out that 12 of the patrol planes indicated as available for fight had returned from Midway on December 5 after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake since October 17, and were in relatively poor material condition because of the extended operations. [54]
While radar equipment was available on three of the battleships and on one seaplane tender, it was not being manned inasmuch as the height of the land surrounding Pearl Harbor rendered ships' radar ineffective. [55]
As of December 6, 1941, General Short had a total of 42,959 officers and men under his command. The principal elements of the Hawaiian Department were 2 infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air Force. [66]
The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command had a total of 213 antiaircraft guns. [57] Eighty-six were 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile); 20, 37-millimeter; and 107 caliber .50.
The Army on December 7, prior to the attack, had a total of 227 planes [58] located principally at Hickam, Wheeler, and Bellows Fields. They consisted of 12 heavy bombers; 36 medium bombers (obsolescent); 14 light bombers (2 obsolescent); 152 pursuit planes (53 obsolescent); and 13 observation planes. [59] Eighty-seven of these planes for one reason or another were not available for flight, including 6 of the heavy bombers and 58 of the pursuit planes. Ninety-four pursuit planes (including 30 of the obsolescent craft) were available for flight.
In addition, the Army had six mobile radar units which were available and in operating condition. [60]
The Japanese attacking force brought to bear 360 planes incident to the attack; whereas the Army and Navy together had a total of 402 planes of all types, not taking into account those not available of flight on the morning of December 7. The operating strength of the opposing forces by comparison follows:
[54] Id.
[55] The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship search radar on December 7 were the battleships Pennsylvania, California, and West Virginia and the seaplane tender Curtiss. The radar equipment these ships was not manned since the height of the land around Pearl Harbor would have made it ineffective. The equipment of the Curtiss was put into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that on the Pennsylvania began to operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results. There were no naval radar stations on shore in Hawaii. See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 82.
[56] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 64; also committee exhibit No. 5.
[57] The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command included: 4 16-inch guns, 2 14-in guns (obsolescent), 4 12-inch guns (2 obsolescent), 4 3-inch seacoast guns, 36 155-millimeter guns, 86 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile), 20 37-millimeter antiaircraft guns, and 107 caliber .50 antiaircraft guns. Committee exhibit No. 5.
[58] The statement of General Short of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7, reflected the status of planes as follows: Pursuit planes in commission, 80; pursuit planes out of commission, 69; reconnaissance planes in commission, 6; reconnaissance planes out of commission, 7; bombers in commission, 39; bombers out of commission, 33.
[59] See committee exhibit No. 5.
[60] Three additional radar units calling for permanent installation were not as yet in operating condition.  
Japanese attacking force
Fighters ................................................... 81 [61]
Dive bombers ............................................... 135
Horizontal bombers ......................................... 104
Torpedo planes ............................................. 40
Defending forces
Available for Not available
flight for flight
Fighters .......................... (30 obsolescent) 108 59
Army bombers ...................... (21 obsolescent) 35 27
Navy patrol bombers ................................ 61 8
Navy scout bombers ................................. 36 1
Army observation planes ............................ 11 2
Miscellaneous Navy planes .......................... 45 1
(Planes from carrier Enterprise which joined the defense) 8
Army-Navy antiaircraft ............................. 993 guns
A comparison of losses or severe damage in summary form is as follows:
Japanese attacking force Defending force [62]
Personnel (less than) ............... 100 ............... 3,435
Planes ............................. 29 ............... 188
Ships ............................... 0 ............... 18*
Submarines (midget) ................. 5 ............... 0
Facilities. (Extensive damage to Army and Navy installations on Oahu.)
*8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels.
The extreme disproportion of Army and Navy losses to equipment and facilities at hand is traceable to the complete surprise of the commanders in Hawaii when the Japanese struck on the morning of December 7. The Japanese employed, it is true, a powerful attacking force, much more powerful than they had been thought capable of utilizing in a single tactical venture. They executed the attack with a skill, daring, and military know-how of which we thought them incapable. However, as reflected by the comparison of relative strength, the Hawaiian commanders had formidable defensive forces which, if properly coordinated and brought into play should have been capable of inflicting severe damage on the Japanese raiders and repelling the attack to a degree. How great the losses that might have been inflicted on the attacking force and the extent to which the attack might have been repulsed will forever remain a matter of conjecture. The real power of the defenses of Hawaii was not brought into the fight. [62a]
There can be no question that some damage would have been inflicted irrespective of the state of alertness that might have prevailed; for as a military proposition it is agreed that some attacking planes will invariably get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack. This is largely true no matter how fully equipped and how alert a garrison may be. [63] But this fact does not draw forth the con-
[61] It is reported that of the Japanese fighter planes, 39 were kept around the carriers as interceptors in case the American planes get in the air and made an attack. Committee Exhibit No. 8D. (Enclosure 1, p. 2)
[62] It is interesting to note that Admiral Bloch testified that had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the dry-docks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and ships of the fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that *the oil storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air*. See Hart Inquiry Record, p. 94.
[62a] It is interesting to note that the Japanese had estimated the air strength in Hawaii at roughly twice the actual strength and had expected to lose one-third of the striking force, including two of the aircraft carriers. See discussion "The Role of Espionage in the Attack", Part III, infra.
[63] It appears agreed as a military proposition that carrier-borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to repel successfully a carrier attack. See, for example, testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 686; also Admiral Stark, Id., pp. 1023, 1024.  
As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. Once launched, attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or antiaircraft gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get through and inflict damage." See Navy Court of Inquiry Report, committee exhibits Nos. 157 and 181.
clusion that the attacker cannot and must not be made to pay and pay heavily.
The disaster of Pearl Harbor lies in the failure of the Army and Navy to make their fight with the equipment at hand-it was not that they had no equipment, for they did, but that they did not utilize what they had. This failure is attributable to the complete surprise with which the attack came. It is proper, therefore, to inquire at this point to determine whether the Hawaiian commanders should thus have been surprised and, more particularly, whether they were justified in employing their defensive facilities in a manner least calculated to meet the Japanese on the morning of December 7.
(The responsibilities relating to the disaster affecting both Hawaii and Washington will be found treated in Parts III and IV, respectively, infra.)
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack at a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet it. [1] One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the failure to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The question therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have been surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the morning of December 7, 1941? [2]
The estimate of both Admirals Richardson [3] and Kimmel [4] in a letter which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the war or committed an overt act against the United States our position would be primarily defensive in the Pacific. [5] There were outlined in the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated, including:
"(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. "
It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security
[1] See section "State of Readiness," Part II, supra.
[2] The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: "Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the Fleet air arm, the naval carriers with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of anti-sabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. *In short everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.*" See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157
[3] Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as commander in chief of the Pacific.
[4] Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 and served in that capacity until December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his selection was made because he was regarded as preeminently qualified for the position of commander in chief.
[5] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70.
measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. Thereafter there were set forth observations concerning the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu.
Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, observing among other things: [6]
"The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. *If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.*
"In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the Fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:
"(1) Air bombing attack.
"(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
"(3) Sabotage.
"(4) Submarine attack.
"(5) Mining.
"(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
"Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.
"Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.
"The counter measures to be considered are:
"(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
"(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
"(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire
"(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
"(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
"The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quit possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles. * * *"
The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command. [7]
The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of the Secretary of Navy in the following terms: [8]
"1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian
[6] Committee Exhibit No. 10.
[7] Admiral Kimmel testified: "* * * I saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, early in February 1941." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286.
[8] Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24.
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to old a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.
"2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes, nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at: San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.
"3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route) and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine gun}. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.
"4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.
"5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation, and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas in Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable or large-scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.
"6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective."
In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27, 1941, [9] Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority.
It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dispatch dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the subject "Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor": [10]
"1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:
" "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."
"2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.
[9] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[10] This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now Captain) A. H. McCollum on January 31, 1941. See committee exhibit No. 15.
The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the Peruvian Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24 were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the same time and are in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of February 1 was an estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese plan to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then present disposition and employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Secretary's letter relates to the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in contemplation of future conflict with Japan. The communications apparently were so interpreted by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations he said: [11]
"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay."
In a letter of February 15, 1941 [12] the Chief of Naval Operations wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the congestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverability limited the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A similar communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, among others, requesting his recommendations and comments concerning the matter. [13]
In a letter of March 20, [14] Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmel was in agreement with this recommendation until such time as a light efficient net was developed. [15]
However, in June of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows: [16]
"1. * * * Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:
" "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."
"2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
"3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo- plane attack, it may
[11] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[12] Id., No. 116.
[13] Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941.
Committee exhibit No. 116.
[14] See Committee exhibit No. 116.
[15] Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12, 1941,
Committee exhibit No. 116
[16] Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to commandants of all naval districts. Committee exhibit No. 116. This communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter of February 17,1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain limitations with respect to air torpedo attack. Note 13, supra.  
be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms [16a] or more) is much more likely.
"4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms. [17]"
The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived views concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo attack were in error.
Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington in June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the feet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of the harbor, and similar matters. [18]
On February 7, 1941, General Short [19] assumed command of the Hawaiian Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he had the benefit of conversations with General Herron, [20] his predecessor, with respect to problems prevailing in the Department. Significantly General Herron had been directed by the War Department on June 17, 1940, to institute an alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid. [21] This alert was an all- out endeavor with full equipment and ammunition and lasted 6 weeks. It was suspended after the 6-week period and thereafter resumed for some time. Planes had been dispersed and gun crews alerted with the ammunition available. The Commanding General lead the benefit of all the plans and operations incident to the so-called "Herron alert" as a guide in estimating the steps to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy attack.
General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7, set forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack from the air. [22]

Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter to General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsibility of General Short in his new command. [23] This letter, which referred to a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there was need for additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration of the Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of the situation; and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mind that the first concern is to protect the feet.
On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall [24] pointing out, among other things, the great importance of (1) cooperation with the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) improvement of the
[16a] A fathom is 6 feet.
[17] The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval Operations to secure from the Bureau of Ordnance more efficient light- weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116.
[18] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367.
[19] Lt. Gen Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941.
[20] Maj. Gen. Charles B. Herron.
[21] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215.
[22] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237.
[23] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3.
[24] Id., at pp. 4-9.
antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the important needs of the Department.
On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: [25]
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."
In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941, [26] General Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter [27] General Short again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense. A letter dated March 28, 1941, [28] from General Marshall made reference to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison.
On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows: [29]  
"Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them: [30]
"1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
"2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above agreement.
"3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.
"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.
"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.
"Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will interest you."
In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent maneuvers: [31]
"The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field
[25] Id., at p. 10.
[26] Id., at pp. 11, 12.
[27] Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17.
[28] Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18.
[29] Id., at pp. 19, 20
[30] See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier", infra.
[31] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36.
Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise."
On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated:
"I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly, will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. [32]"
The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to General Short: [33]
"The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.
"*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii."
On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel [34] but that it appeared the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. [35]
From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up the defense against air attack.
There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier.
[32] Id., at pp. 40, 41.
[31] Id., at p. 42.
[34] In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See committee exhibit No. 53.
[35] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the following with respect to category D: [36]
"Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C (coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine- gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force."
As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was that of the Army. [37] It was recognized that- [38]
"* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases * * *. "
The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941. Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor [39]  
"There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit.
"Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that are *now* available.
"A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are."
In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier". [40] This plan was signed and placed in effect on April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint
[36] "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 6.
[37] Id.
[38] Id., at p. 42.
[39] Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512.
[40] See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 7.  
Army and Navy basic war plans [41] and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked.
Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the Army and Navy were recognized:
"a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
"b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces."
One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*."
On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [42] was prepared and approved by General Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement was entered into             
[ "in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war."
It was recognized that
"*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District) *agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted * * *"
Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of radar.
On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area. The situation was summarized in the following terms: [43]
(1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained; uncertain, and varying.
(2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration of war.
[41] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5.
[42] Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 44.
(3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.
(4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.
(5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from our intelligence service.
The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 but that this could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. [44]
The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin- Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred: [45]
"(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
"1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
"2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
"3. A combination of these two.
"(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.
"(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.
"(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape
[44] In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*"
This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared. As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120.
[45] Committee exhibit No. 44.
and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack."
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised form on October 14, 1941. [46] This fleet order was predicated on two assumptions, one being [47]
"That a declaration of war may be preceded by
"(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.
"(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
"(3) A combination of these two."
Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out
"It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack "
"it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."
A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: [48]  
"The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.
* * * * * * *
"Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu.
* * * * * * *
"* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.
* * * * * * *
[46] Id.
[47] Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement. Admiral Kimmel replied:
"*An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.* I felt, as the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor, and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence would make us guard against." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287. [48] See committee exhibit No. 13.
"It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:
"(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
"(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at close at range.
"(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.
* * * * * * *
"The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:
"(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack.
"(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack.
"(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.
"(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day of the attack
* * * * * * *
"He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.
"a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.
"b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0 (due north) counterclockwise to 180 around Oahu, the next probable*, the quadrant 180 counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90 to 0 ."
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of their situation. [49] The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action." [50] It is equally clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in
[49] Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he (Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p 1753.
He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any." Id.
[50] Committee exhibit No. 44.  

Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a responsibility resting in Hawaii. [51]
From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared detailed arrangements to meet this threat.
It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to war.* [52] The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles governing contemplated action, including: [53]
"Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort."
In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: [54]
"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."
Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5," which was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. [55] On July 21, 1941, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This
[51] The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157.
[52] Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part IV, infra, this report.
[53] Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5.
[54] Id., at pp. 5, 6.
[55] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred to as "WPL-46."  
plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September 9, 1941. [56] It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to facilitate that effort.
In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area." One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against surprise attack by Japan."
Under phase IA (initial tasks Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was "to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the Marshall Island area."
From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration. [57] The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in harbor. [53] Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission.
Considering all of the information made available to the commanding officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal declaration of war.
It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality.
[56] Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)."
[57] Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3
[58] As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and General Short, through information available to them, were adequately informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense of the fleet and the fleet base.
In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set forth the following comments in a postscript: [59]
"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in- Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"
In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently.
On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the "southern route." [60] Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to war with the United States at all.
The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval districts: [61]
[59]Committee exhibit No. 106.
[60] Id.
[61] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1.
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In a letter of April 3, 1941, [62] Admiral Stark expressed his observations on the international situation to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion of the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral Stark stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific Fleet. He then discussed the dangers facing Britain and stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that for some time Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and the United States in the Far East. Admiral Stark instructed the addressees to watch this situation closely. He expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the question was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about 2 months, but there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he suggested that as much time as available be devoted to training.

Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an information addressee in all dispatch reports and to furnish one copy of all intelligence reports directly to him. [63]

In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions; and that it be made a cardinal principle that he be immediately informed of all important developments as soon as they occur and by the quickest secure means possible. [64]

[62] Committee exhibit No. 106.

[63] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3.  

[64] Admiral Kimmel said:

"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence is one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, *thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions*.  

"*It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important development as they occur and by the quickest secure means available*." See committee exhibit No. 106.


In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel visited Washington at which time matters of naval policy were reviewed with him. [65]

On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised "for action" by the Chief of Naval Operations, [66] that the unmistakable deduction from information obtained from numerous sources was that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy, supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups; that his policy probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed out that an advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations held to the opinion that Japanese activity in "the south" would be confined for the present to seizure and development of naval, army, and in bases in Indochina. The dispatch stated that the Japanese neutrality pact with Russia would be abrogated and the major military effort on the part of Japan against Russia would be toward the latter's maritime provinces probably toward the end of July, although the attack might be deferred until after the collapse of European Russia. It was pointed out that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic Forts had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by August 1, that the movement of Japanese "flag shipping" from Japan had been suspended and additional merchant vessels were being requisitioned. With an admonition to secrecy, instructions were issued to inform the principal army commanders and the commander in chief's own immediate subordinates.

In another dispatch of July 3, [67] Admiral Kimmel was advised for action that definite information had been received indicating that between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an order for 7 of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and that under routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to move to the Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that in Japanese business communities strong rumors were current that Russia would be attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite move by the Japanese might be expected during the period July 20 to August 1, 1941. On July 7 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information of the substance of three intercepted dispatches, including one of July 2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: [68]


And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: [69]


[65] See Navy Court of Inquiry record page 113.

[66] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 4.

[67] Id., at p. 5.

[68] Id., at p. 6.

[69] Id. This dispatch and that indicated, note 68, supra, were based on the so-called Magic. For a discussion of Magic see Part IV, this report.



The Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch of July 15, [70] sent Admiral Kimmel for information, supplied intelligence received to the effect that within "the next day or two," Japan would begin commercial negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would propose "in the name of mutual defense" Japan's taking over southern French Indochina naval and air bases; and that at the same time Japan would attempt to station army and navy air forces peacefully with French agreement, if possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy objected Japan had decided to use force; and that Japan did not intend to move farther south or interfere with colonial government. On the basis of the information received it was observed that the Japanese move was necessary to guarantee supplies from "Colony and Thailand" and to prevent "Syrian type British action"; and that while Tokyo wished to avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States, if possible, the risk was regarded as necessary.

In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information, he was advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy requiring an answer by July 20 71 The six points were specified as:

(1) Japan to send necessary Army and Wavy air forces to southern French Indochina;

(2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases;

(3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely;

(4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes;

(5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing;

(6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet cost of occupation.  

This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that the Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and, of intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out its plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States interfered.

On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information concerning the substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Canton to Tokyo, as follows: [72]


[70] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic.

[71] Id., at page 9. This dispatch was also based on Magic.

[72] Id., at p. 10. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.



On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had changed there would be no departure from the principle that the Tripartite Pact formed the keystone of Japan's national policy and that the new Cabinet would also pursue the policy of the former cabinet in all other matters. [73] In another dispatch, supplying information concerning an intercepted Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the Japanese Army had made all preparations and had decided to advance regardless of whether Vichy France accepted her demands. [74]

Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941, [75] sending a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other things, a 2-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Ambassador Nomura. Admiral Stark expressed the thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid open rupture; stated they had a very plain talk; and observed that he, Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He advised that Nomura discussed at length Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indochina. Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indochina bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. He said that, of course, there was the possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted his in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but that conditions were not getting better.

On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that beginning July 26 the United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan and that it was expected these sanctions would embargo all trade between Japan and the United States, subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material. [76] It was further pointed out that funds in the United States would be frozen except as they may be moved under licensing. In estimating the situation it was observed:

"*Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile eventualities.*"

[73] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11.

[74] Id., at p. 12.

[75] Committee exhibit No. 106.

[76] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14.


In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941, [77] Admiral Stark discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that "after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He stated he thought it fairly safe to say that the opinion was generally held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I. [78] but that Admiral Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August. He commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Admiral Stark said his thought had been that while Japan would ultimately go into Siberia she would delay doing so until she had the Indochina-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia. A postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that       

. "*obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual*."

Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that scheduled sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in other than China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound. [79]

The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel, among others, for action: [80]

[77] Committee exhibit No. 106.

[78] Netherlands East Indies.

[79] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 15.

[80] Id., at p. 16.

[81] Chief of Naval Operations.



In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941. [83] Admiral Stark discussed, among other things, the status of the Japanese situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them but just what they were going to do he did not know. He said he had told one of Japan's statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained. Admiral Stark said he had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he wished the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral Stark of September 12, 1941 [84] such as whether he should not issue shooting orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said:

"As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941, [85] and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the Navy Regulations. [86] The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i. e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued:

"If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Going on, Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty. In this letter, Admiral Stark inquired:

"* * * would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull had informed him that the conversations with the Japanese had

[82] Addressees.

[83] Committee exhibit No. 106.

[84] Id.

[85] Id.  

[86] These regulations provide for the use of force in self- preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.  


practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there as some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. A second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambassador Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark observed that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark said he had again talked to Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary would make one more try. He said that Secretary Hull kept him, Admiral Stark, pretty fully informed; and, if there was anything of moment, he would of course hasten to let Kimmel know.

With this letter there was enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among other things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.

The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action: [87]  


Referring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October 17 to Admiral Kimmel: [88]

"Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility", in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any ease after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."  

In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said:  

"Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid

[87] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.

[88] Committee exhibit No. 106.  


on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry. [89]"  

On October 17, 1941) Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacific United States flag shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to be routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and well clear of the Japanese Mandates. [90] On the same day he was advised for action that-


Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23 at until further orders all Army and Navy "trans-Pacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo" would be escorted both ways between Honolulu ad Manila. [92]

On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant vessels appeared in progress. [93]

A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7 commented, among other things: [94]

"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser!" A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn't look good."
On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating among other things: [95]
"The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and  

[89] Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated October 17 prepared by Admiral Schuirmann with respect to the change in the Japanese Cabinet, stating:

"I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

"The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties."

After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed disapproval of the acts committed the Japanese military but remedial action had not been taken, that Konoye himself had declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may have restrained the *extremists* among the military it had not opposed Japan's program of expansion by force; that when opportunities arise during the "coming months" which seemed favorable to the military for further advance, they would be seized; and that the same "bill of goods," regarding the necessity of making some concession to the moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" had been offered to the United States since the days when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann concluded:

"Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but *in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power" (Committee exhibit No. 106).

[90] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 21.

[91] Id., at p. 22.

[92] Id., at p. 23.  

[93] Id., at p. 24.  

[94] Committee exhibit No. 106.

[95] Id. As an enclosure to this letter, Admiral Stark forwarded a copy of a joint memorandum for the President which he and General Marshall had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption "Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation." This memorandum was prepared with respect to dispatches received indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed dispatching American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a discussion of this memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report.


Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view."

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message marked for action: [96]  


The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel read: [97]

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for, or we may do nothing I think it is more likely to be "anything." "

On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral Kimmel for action: [98]  


[96] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for action to commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and commandants of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts.

[97] Committee exhibit No. 106.

[98] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief et the Asiatic Fleet. It has been referred to throughout the proceedings as the "War Warning."

[99] Special naval observer.


The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, referring to the November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kimmel for his information: [100]


On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kimmel a dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. The dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain an aggressor and call upon Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally and give Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya. [100a]

[100] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action to the naval commanders on the west coast.

[100a] This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action, read:



On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following information for action: [101]


And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for his information: [102]


On December 4, 1941, a dispatch [103] was supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter.

A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6 [104] for action stated that "in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of communication to support "our current operations an special intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment.

From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the imminence of war with that nation.


The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The

[101] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts.

[102] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District.

[103] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44.

[104] Id., at p. 45.  
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