Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report of the Joint

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 2:08 am

Minority Report Cont'd.


matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so imminent as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation or that war. Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an overt act by Japan an attack on territory of the United States. Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and dispositions necessary to that end were taken.

During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meetings, discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that attack or overt act. Yet when the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the attack effectively.

In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding conclusions and more of the same kind that could be cited. This failure cannot all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the President of the United States.

This does demonstrate the weakness of dependence on the political head of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the operating activities of the military branches, particularly in the areas of intelligence. The major lesson to be learned is that this coordination should be done in advance of a crisis.

17. *High authorities in, Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities or their failures in this respect*.

The first part of this conclusion calls for no special citations of authority. In reports of the President's Commission, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Navy Court of Inquiry, three points in this respect are accepted as plain facts: (1) The ultimate power to allocate arms, ammunition, implements of war, and other supplies was vested in the President and his aide, Harry Hopkins, subject to the advice of General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (2) General Short and Admiral Kimmel made repeated demands upon their respective Departments or additional material, which they represented as necessary to the effective defense of Pearl Harbor; and (3) Washington authorities, having full discretion in this regard, made decisions against General Short and Admiral Kimmel and allocated to the Atlantic theater, where the United States was at least nominally at peace, materiel, specially bombing and reconnaissance planes, which were known to be absolutely indispensable to efficient defense of Pearl Harbor. (See exhibits 106 and 53, request for materials.)

The decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made by the President in March 1940, over the protest of Admiral Richardson.


The second part of this conclusion may be arguable from the point of view of some high world strategy, but it is not arguable under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The President it is true had powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941. But his first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was to care for the defense and security of the United States against a Japanese attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the allocations of materiel, especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he made or authorized decisions which deprived the Hawaiian commanders of indispensable materiel they could otherwise have had and thus reduced their defensive forces to a degree known to be dangerous by high officials in Washington and Hawaii.

When this decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made certain definite facts in relation to such base must be presumed to have been fully known and appreciated by the responsible command at Washington.

The base is a shallow-water bass with limited base mobility, with no chance for concealment or camouflage and without enough air beaches to properly park the necessary defensive air equipment. Entrance to the base is by a narrow winding channel requiring sorties at reduced speed, and in single file, and presenting the possibility of a blockade of the base by an air or submarine attack on the entrance.

The base is surrounded by high land immediately adjacent to the city of Honolulu, thereby affording full public familiarity with installations and movements within the base at all times.

The base is located on an island where the population was heavily Japanese, and where, as was well known, Japanese espionage was rampant, and making it probable that any defensive insufficiency of any kind or nature would be open to Japanese information.

All of the fuel for the base must be transported, by tanker, from the mainland more than 2,000 miles away, thus intensifying the necessity for complete defensive equipment and supplies for the base.

The waters about Oahu are of a depth facilitating the concealed movement of submarines, and the near approach of submarines to the shore, thereby favoring such methods of hostile attack.

The approaches to Oahu cover a full circle of 360 , with open sea available on all sides.

The situation thus confronting the Pacific Fleet upon reaching its Pearl Harbor base seems entirely clear. Before the base could be a safe base, it must be supplied with adequate defense facilities, which facilities must be in kind and amount in relation to the physical characteristics of the base above referred to. An absence of adequate defensive facilities directly increased the peril of the fleet. Since the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made at Washington, the responsibility for providing proper base defense for the fleet rested primarily upon Washington. (See Stark letter, November 22, 1940, Tr., Vol. 5, p. 706 ff.) It becomes important, therefore, to consider what defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl Harbor base, whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if not, the reasons for such failure.

The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense of the Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions,


the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of long-distance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance covering a 360 perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol planes, with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in operation, and a sufficient number of available crews to permit a continuous patrol.  

Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any attack which might be considered possible. This would require approximately 175 planes.

The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable number of antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammunition and sufficient experienced crews for ready operation.

The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and baffles. It would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together with ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant recourse to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of the Pearl Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a more or less defenseless situation except for the defense power of their own ship batteries. The British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, Italy, brought the question of torpedo bomber defense to the fore. Admiral Stark wrote on November 22, 1940 expressing fear of a "sudden attack in Hawaiian waters" on the fleet, and asking about torpedo net protection. (Tr., Vol. 5, p. 707.) Admiral Richardson, then in command, expressed no anxiety about the security of the fleet, and thought torpedo nets unnecessary, but thought security to the fleet must be carried out, even at the expense of fleet training and extra discomfort. Approximately four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon the attack was the result of torpedoes fired by torpedo-bombing planes tacking the base at low altitudes. Against such an attack, anti-torpedo baffles and nets would have been of extraordinary value.

The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly discovered device known as radar, which before December 7 had been sufficiently perfected to permit the discovery of approaching planes more than 100 miles away.

It seems to be agreed that it is not the duty of the fleet, ordinarily, to furnish its own base defense. That duty is supposed to be performed by the base defense itself, usually in the hands of the Army. The fleet, however, is always to be expected to furnish every available defensive effort it has, in event of an attack upon a base. The record discloses that with full knowledge of the defense necessities inherent in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the dangers and peril imposed upon the fleet while based at the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the equipment essential to a proper protection of the fleet at such base, it was decided by President Roosevelt to remove the fleet from the mainland bases and base it at Pearl Harbor.

The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl Harbor until the attack on December 7, the high command at Hawaii, both in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military authorities at Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at the Pearl Harbor base (Exhibits 53 and 106). Nowhere in the record


does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of the requests for defense equipment made by the high command in Hawaii. On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was expressly recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to provide the equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages, the requested defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied.

It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii than for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble with such an explanation is that Hawaii was the only non-mainland base charged with the defense of a major part of our Pacific Fleet, and the equipment supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient. The Philippines received much equipment which might well have gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii could have been defended, whereas no one expected the Philippines to be able to stand a direct Japanese onslaught. General Marshall reported to the President in March 1941 (Exhibit 59) that "Oahu was believed to be the strongest fortress in the world" and practically invulnerable to attack and that sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause great damage.

The Government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and the Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no issue as to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point out that such decision resulted in the failure of the military authorities in Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the defense of the base and the fleet while in the base. As we have said, such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon the Pacific Fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that in view of the obligations assumed by the Government in other military theaters, and to which we have just referred, and the consequent inability of the Government to properly contribute to the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, that the only alternative left which might have relieved the fleet from the resultant peril would have been to have changed the original decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and *thereupon return the fleet to its several mainland bases*. It appears obvious that the safety of the fleet would have been helped by such removal. The perimeter of a defense at a mainland base would only be 180 instead of 360 , thus permitting distant patrol reconnaissance by one-half as many planes. The transportation and supply facilities to the mainland base would be immensely improved, as would all necessary communication facilities. The mobility of the fleet at a mainland base would have been improved and the concentration of the fleet in a single limited base would have been avoided. *We therefore are of the opinion that the fleet should not have been based at Pearl Harbor unless proper base defenses were assured*.

Since no such change in policy was approved, and the fleet remained based at Pearl Harbor without the necessary defense equipment to which we have referred plus the fact that the precise status of the defense weakness must be assumed to have been open to the unusual Japanese espionage operating in Hawaii, and therefore that the Tokyo war office must be assumed to have been cognizant of the status of affairs at Pearl Harbor, we are forced to conclude that the failure to remove the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the mainland must be viewed


as an important relevant factor necessarily involved in the success of the Japanese attack on December 7.

The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, between February 1 and December 1, 1941, an abundance of long-distance patrol planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit 172 shows that the Army received between February 1 and December 1, 1941, approximately 600 long-distance bombers capable of flying loaded, missions, of 1,200 miles or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii and 35 went to the Philippines. During the same period the Navy received approximately 560 similar long- distance bombers, of which approximately 175 were assigned to carriers in the Pacific. During the same period the Army received approximately 5,500 antiaircraft guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the Philippines. If it be true that it was found necessary to send this equipment elsewhere, as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii instead of having high priority, occupied a subordinate position.

We have referred to the unavoidable vulnerabilities of the Pearl Harbor base, together with the identification of the essential defense equipment necessary for its proper defense. We likewise noted the demands made by the high command at Hawaii for such equipment, the agreement that such equipment was proper and necessary, and the continued and increased peril imposed upon the fleet by the failure to provide such equipment.

It seems proper here to note the extent to which the Pearl Harbor base was deprived of needed and essential equipment.

(1) We have pointed out that the perimeter of Oahu defense covered 360 . Full defense reconnaissance would likewise be required for the full 360 . The evidence discloses that it would take approximately 200 patrol planes to furnish such reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance would require flights of not less than 750 miles from Oahu. The evidence shows that the wear and tear upon patrol planes engaged in such distant operations would be heavy, that a certain proportion of available planes would have to be under repair and adjustment, and that only about one-third of the assigned planes would be available for a particular day's patrol. In a similar way, in connection with the overhaul and repair of planes, a proper store of repair parts would be essential and of even greater importance, spare crews for the operation of the planes would be required, since the same crew could not fly such patrol missions daily.

The record seems to establish that there were available at Pearl Harbor on December 7, approximately 85 patrol planes suitable for distant patrol, of which not to exceed 55 were in operable condition. The supply of spare parts was not ample, nor were there sufficient extra crews for a continuous operation.

With reference to fighter planes, the situation was not so acute. An estimate appears in the record that 185 fighter planes would be necessary to defend the base, and there were, on December 7, 105 available fighter planes, which, if properly alerted, would have been available for base defense.

The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used as a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater.


We agree that Admiral Kimmel was faced with a sharp dilemma. He was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Under WPL-46 he was given specific duties which required him to have his fleet ready for action promptly upon the breaking out of war. He had available 50 or 60 patrol planes, and he would need these planes in aid of fleet movements if his fleet was to take the offensive against the enemy. If he used these patrol planes for base defense, such heavy duty would reduce their efficiency and ultimately put them up for repair in event the distance patrol duty should cover an extended period. In such an event his fleet could not sail against the enemy as required by WPL-46 because his patrol planes would be out of commission. He had therefore to make a choice between fleet training and preparation and base defense. He says his decision not to carry on distant reconnaissance was based upon his belief, in common with his staff, that Pearl Harbor was not in danger from a Japanese attack. We think in making such a decision Admiral Kimmel was unjustified in concluding, first, that there was no danger of attack at Pearl Harbor, and, second, that such a decision did not violate the fundamental proposition that no disposition should be taken which unnecessarily increased fleet peril. The absence of distant reconnaissance immediately imperiled fleet safety. We therefore think the abandonment of distance reconnaissance was unjustified.

(2) The fuel reserves were insufficient, limiting full use of the fleet at sea, required constant augmentation from the mainland, and the location of such fuel supplies was such as to make them vulnerable to any raiding attack. The fleet was required to come into the base at frequent intervals to refuel. The facilities at the base made such refueling slow. The fleet was without a sufficient supply of fast tankers to permit refueling at sea, and there was ever present the inescapable fact that a destruction of the fuel supply would necessarily immobilize the entire fleet.

(3) It is difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to the sufficiency of the antiaircraft batteries and supplies available at Pearl Harbor on December 7. General Short testified as to the number of guns available on December 7, 1941, as compared with the number available in December 1942. It is apparent that the antiaircraft gun equipment had been much augmented during the year following the Pearl Harbor attack. The difficulty we have with respect to the antiaircraft batteries situation, as with the available force of fighter planes, is that practically none of these guns were alerted on December 7, and ammunition was not readily available, the crews serving them were not in attendance, and the only seeming excuse for such conditions was the common belief that there was no danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore no reason for any battery alert. Even if there had been twice as many batteries (or fighter planes) available, there is no reason to believe the condition of alert would have been different.

The ships in the harbor were not provided with proper torpedo protection. The letter of June 13, 1941, with respect to the use of aerial torpedoes, seems to demonstrate the responsibility of the high command at Washington to provide a torpedo defense. Such a defense was well known and could have been provided and, if provided,


might have obviated the greatest source of damage suffered by the fleet during the raid, even though Admiral Richardson in 1940 thought such defense unnecessary. But it could not have been provided at Hawaii; it had to come from Washington. Washington's advices on the subject did more harm than good, because they intimated that an attack was possible even in shallow water, but at the same time, negatived the probability of attack. (See letter of June 13, 1941, Ex. No. 116, letter from Chief of Naval Operations (R. E. Ingersoll) to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, among others.)

The installation of the radar in Hawaii was inexcusably delayed. It was a method of defense peculiarly essential in Hawaii. It was known that there were insufficient planes and insufficient guns to protect the base, and this made the availability of radar all the more necessary. It seems we could have priority for radar protection in New York and other mainland points, where no attack was probable; but none in Hawaii, where radar information was essential. The result was that fixed radio installations were not accomplished at all prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and such fixed installations would have furnished the most distant services. The mobile sets available had, by reason of the delay, been operating only on a short experimental basis. There was a scarcity of trained operators. The operators were trying to learn and operate at the same time. The selected hours of operation, which proved of vast importance, were not wisely fixed. Service stopped at 7 a. m., the very time when the danger was acute.

No suitable information center had been established, and it is conceded that such a center was essential to radar information. This was particularly true at Hawaii, because radar had not yet been developed the point where the nationality of approaching planes could be ascertained. The information as to whether approaching planes were, therefore, friendly or enemy, depended upon the constant presence at an information center of representatives of the military services who could instantly advise as to location of friendly planes. No such information center was established, and no assignment of trained operators to such stations was ever made. Thus, there was no one on duty who could have known whether the approaching planes were enemy planes, or, instead, our own B-17's, en route from the mainland.

The lack of material does not appear to be the fault of a failure of appropriations by Congress to the Army and Navy. A table showing these appropriations as requested by the President in his budget estimates and as finally passed by Congress follows:
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 2:15 am

Minority Report Cont'd.


The fatal error of Washington authorities in this matter was to undertake a world campaign and world responsibilities without first making provision for the security of the United States, which was their prime constitutional obligation.  

18. *Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for a Japanese attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military administration requires taking note of the fact that they were designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington all of whom were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed forces of the United States*.

This conclusion is self-evident, especially in view of all that goes before, and needs no comment.

19. *The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its intimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence information, direction of affairs, and constitutional duty to plan the defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost. Washington authorities failed in (1) and the commanding officers of Hawaii failed in (2)*.

In the discharge of these responsibilities neither the high authorities in Washington nor the commanders in Hawaii acted upon the assumption or belief that Hawaii could or would be the point of any hostile attack. Therefore, in discharging their respective responsibilities neither the Washington authorities nor the field commanders interpreted those responsibilities in the terms of danger to Hawaii. Many of the failures of performance can be attributed to this cardinal fact. The question presented to this committee is: "Were they justified in such an assumption or belief ?" And the answer is emphatically, "No."

Evidence set forth in this report in detail is ample to show that in the period approximately from May 1940 to December 7, 1941, the high authorities at Washington assumed so much of the direction of affairs at Hawaii as to remove many of the basic responsibilities from the commanders in the field. The result was to reduce the discretion of the commanders in the field by those things which they were ordered to do by directions from Washington and not to do certain things unless they were so ordered from Washington. Another result of this practice was to lull the commanders in the field into awaiting instructions from Washington.

Being charged with the responsibility attaching to the highest command in Washington and having taken so much of the responsibility and direction of affairs away from the commanders in the field, the high authorities in Washington themselves failed in the performance of their responsibilities, as the evidence in the conclusions of this report clearly shows.

Nevertheless the commanders in the field were left with sufficient responsibility which they were under obligation to discharge as field commanders of the major outpost in the Pacific defense of the United


States. There is adequate and sufficient evidence to show that they failed to discharge that responsibility.

While great emphasis and analysis has been made of such warning messages sent to Admiral Kimmel as those of November 24, 1941 November 27,1941, and November 28, 1941 (see Conclusion No. 13), attention should be directed to many other messages reflecting the nature of the diplomatic and naval relations between Japan and the United States immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Among these is the message of December 3, 1941, sent from the Washington Office of Naval Operations for action to Admiral Kimmel. This message informed him that Japanese diplomatic posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London had been instructed "to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn confidential and secret documents". A second message on the same day sent from Washington to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet and marked as information to Admiral Kimmel gave further data on destruction of code machines and secret documents at various places including "all but one copy of other systems" at Washington.

On December 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was informed by Washington Naval Operations that Guam was to destroy all secret and confidential publications, retaining only minimum secret code channels for essential communications and was to be ready instantly to destroy all classified matter retained.

While none of these messages placed Hawaii at the prime center of danger, they certainly reflected the last critical stages in diplomatic relations. It is well known in diplomatic and military circles that destruction of codes, code machines, and secret documents is usually the last step before breaking off relations between governments. War does not necessarily have to follow, but it may follow either simultaneously or close on the heels of the destruction of codes. Other messages and events, supplemented by daily reports of the crisis in Honolulu newspapers, should have raised the significance of the information in the hands of Admiral Kimmel. Yet he testified that he "didn't consider that of any vital importance." (Tr. Vol. 39, p. 7477.)  

General Short did not receive copies of these messages sent from Washington Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel regarding the destruction of codes. Admiral Kimmel had the express responsibility, as part of his duty to effect liaison with General Short, to communicate this vital information to General Short. He failed to do so.

Admiral Kimmel should have been aware of the meaning of code destruction and of the Japanese reputation for surprise action. He should have been vigilant. He owed this to his position as commander of the fleet which was closely related to the scene of expected hostilities.

Admiral Kimmel failed in the performance of this obligation.

While General Short did not receive the information from Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese were destroying codes and secret papers, he did have partial notice about these developments. At a staff conference on the morning of December 6, in the presence of the Chief of Staff for General Short, Col. George W. Bicknell had reported that Japanese consuls were burning their papers (Exhibit 148). General Fielder testified that he was present at the staff conference and informed General Short that the Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers (Exhibit 148).


Before the Roberts Commission General Short testified that he did not know that these consular records were being burned (Roberts Commission Record, p. 1620). Later, before our Joint Committee, he corrected this earlier testimony to say that he had been advised on the morning of December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers (Tr. Vol. 45, pp. 8398, 8399). The evidence on this point is not decisive and it is certainly an open question, not determined by the testimony, whether he also knew that the codes were being destroyed.

The evidence as to General Short's knowledge of the burning of papers and the destruction of codes is therefore much less clear and precise than in the ease of Admiral Kimmel. As a contributing fact or in the circumstances bearing upon General Short's failure to be prepared to meet the Japanese attack, this evidence must be discounted.

The contribution of the Hawaiian commanders to the Pearl Harbor disaster was the failure of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at and, and to employ every facility at their command in preparing for the Japanese attack, even though these facilities were inadequate. The attack came as an astounding, bewildering, and catastrophic surprise to the commanders at Hawaii. They realized that air attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a possibility. Specifically, they failed

(a) To appreciate fully the character of their responsibilities as commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, even though such warnings as they had received from Washington had been inadequate. They failed to carry out the principle of command by mutual cooperation.

(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and tighten up their defenses.

(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security and to exchange fully all significant intelligence.

(d) To institute reconnaissance with such limited forces at their disposal on a basis expected to detect an attack from without

(e) Their radar was in an experimental stage and vital information revealed by it was improperly evaluated; their planes were grouped wing to wing on the field; a large number of officers and men were not at their posts; their ammunition was not immediately at hand for action.

(f) To effect a state of readiness throughout their commands consonant with the character of the warnings sent them and designed to meet an attack from without.

(g) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command, which, although limited, were adequate at least to minimize the force of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.

(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence available at Hawaii affecting the performance of their duties as outpost commanders.

(h) The significance of Japanese submarines sighted early on the morning of December 6, was not properly weighed and information


about such submarines was not diligently transmitted to responsible, authorities for action.

The commanding officers in Hawaii had a particular responsibility for the defense of the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. This responsibility they failed to discharge. The failure of the Washington authorities to perform their responsibilities provides extenuating circumstances for the failures of these commanders in the field.

These failures in Washington were:

(a) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel and General Short adequate information of diplomatic negotiations and of intercepted diplomatic intelligence which, if communicated to them, would have informed them of the imminent menace of a Japanese attack in time for them to fully alert and prepare the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(b) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel and General Short such vital intercepted Japanese intelligence information as the "bomb plot" messages and the "dead-line messages" which, if so communicated, would have served as specific warnings of impending hostile attack. In particular, the "bomb plot" messages directly concerned the safety of the fleet and security of the naval base at Pearl Harbor (and at no other place) and if communicated to the Hawaiian commanders would have informed them of specific Japanese designs affecting Pearl Harbor in time for them to alert and prepare their defense.

(c) By conflicting and imprecise messages and orders high Washington authorities created such a condition of confusion relative to what the Hawaiian commanders were to do and were not to do about alerting and preparing for defense at Pearl Harbor, as to remove from such commanders that clear responsibility which would have otherwise attached to them by reason of their positions.

(d) High Washington authorities positively misled the commanders at Hawaii by indicating in messages sent to Hawaii the probability that Japanese hostile actions were likely to take place at points in the Southwestern Pacific without mentioning the danger of attack at Hawaii. From their superior information of Japanese designs and intentions the high Washington authorities were in a better position to evaluate Japanese actions than were the Hawaiian commanders. Having directed the attention of the Hawaiian commanders to probable Japanese action at points other than Pearl Harbor, the high Washington authorities misled the Hawaiian commanders and so contributed to their unpreparedness in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(e) High Washington authorities took over so much of the detailed direction of affairs respecting operations of the Pacific Fleet and of the Hawaiian naval base as to limit narrowly the discretion and freedom allowed to the Hawaiian commanders. Having thus weakened the individual obligations of the Hawaiian commanders and having failed correspondingly to provide them with clear and adequate orders, high Washington authorities reduced the responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(f) Having failed to provide the Hawaiian commanders with sufficient, adequate, and appropriate materiel and equipment for the defense of Hawaii, high Washington authorities compelled the Hawaiian commanders to make choices of action jeopardizing their defense


which they would not have made on their own responsibility had they had the needed materiel and equipment; and this failure in Washington was a strong factor in the failure of the defense at Hawaii.

(g) The responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders was further reduced by explicit orders from Washington not to do anything to alarm the civil population and that the high authorities in Washington: desired Japan to commit the first overt act.

(h) Having assumed so much of the detailed direction of affairs relating to Hawaiian defense, Washington authorities had the obligation to correct all wrongful decisions at Hawaii which had been made in response to Washington orders. A crucial decision of this kind was made by General Short when he alerted his command only against sabotage in response to orders in the message of November 27, 1941. With superior knowledge of impending danger and having the immediate obligation to correct General Short's error of judgment, Washington authorities, particularly Gen. George C. Marshall and Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, did not do so but permitted General Short to assume that he had done all that had been required of him. This error, as later proved, left the defenses at Hawaii particularly vulnerable to external attack.  

(i) In the critical hours from the afternoon of December 6 to 10:30 a. m. on December 7, Washington authorities failed to take the instant action called for by their special knowledge of Japanese messages on those days which would have placed the Hawaiian commanders on the specific alert for probable danger to Hawaii.

The conclusion that "everybody" in the chain of authority "from the higher officials here in Washington down through the lieutenant who disregarded the radar message at Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, December 7, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them," was expressed by Representative Clark in the form of a question put to Admiral Kimmel (Tr., Vol. 39, p. 7331). Admiral Kimmel replied: "I think you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than me." Mr. Clark then said "That is all I have, Mr. Chairman."

The word "muffed" is colloquial and rhetorical, not precisely descriptive; and the word "situation" is as vague as it is general. But Representative Clark's idea translated into plain English fairly describes events and actions from November 25 to December T. "Everybody from the higher officials here in Washington down through the lieutenant" at Pearl Harbor failed to take many actions that in the very nature of things were to be expected of him, failed to discharge obligations necessarily attached to his office, and must bear a share of the responsibility for the catastrophe according to the extent of his powers and duties.

In extenuation of failures on the part of high authorities in Washington two statements were often made by witnesses who appeared before the Committee. First, it is easy to see *now* the mistakes and failures made by high authorities but this is merely "hindsight." Second, those high authorities were busy men carrying heavy burdens in their respective offices burdens so heavy that many failures on their part must be excused.

Undoubtedly, hindsight is often easier and better than foresight. But the exercise of prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge in his possession is a bounden duty imposed on every high authority


in the Government of the United States by the powers and obligations of his office. For every failure to exercise prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge in his possession he must bear a corresponding burden of responsibility for the consequences that flow from that failure. By virtue of his office he is presumed to have special competence and knowledge; to act upon his special knowledge, and to be informed and alert in the discharge of his duties in the situation before him.

The introduction of hindsight in extenuation of responsibility is, therefore, irrelevant to the determination of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor.

The question before this Committee is: What did high authorities in Washington know about Japanese designs and intentions; what decisions did they make on the basis of their knowledge; and what actions did they take to safeguard the security of the American outposts?

With regard to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they were certainly carrying heavy burdens in preparing the armed forces of the United States for war; in making war plans; in building up an Army and Navy (which they knew were not yet ready for war), and in struggling for a postponement of the war until the Army and Navy were better prepared to cope with the foe. With regard to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, it may be said Justly that they were carrying heavy burdens also. But all these officials, as Secretary Stimson's diary demonstrates, spent many days before December 7 in general discussions which led to no decisions. This they did at a time when they possessed special knowledge of Japanese designs and were acquainted with their own intentions and resolves and certainly had the leisure to do the one obvious duty dictated by common sense that is draw up a brief plan for telling the outpost commanders just what to do in a certain contingency on receipt of orders from Washington.

That contingency was a Japanese attack on American possessions somewhere. Secretary Stimson records that "the question (during those days) was how we (the President, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark) should maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves." In any event, inasmuch as the President decided against appealing to Congress for a declaration of war on Japan, they were all waiting for the Japanese to fire the first shot! And in those circumstances it was their duty to prepare definite plans and procedures for action in meeting that attack.

This is exactly what they did not do at any time before December 7. They had plans for action or actions by the armed forces of the United States *if* Congress declared war or *if* by some process the United States got into or entered the war. War plans (for example, Rainbow No. 5 which was WPL-6) were to go into operation only after war had begun and were not intended for preparation in meeting surprise attack.

They prepared no plan giving the outpost commanders instructions about the measures they were to take in preparing for and meeting a Japanese attack on American possessions when and if it came. This plan could have been drawn up in a few hours at most and set down


in two or three typewritten pages at most. With modifications appropriate to the various outposts this plan could have been sent to the respective commanders by couriers or swifter means of communication. And a procedure could have been adopted for instructing the commanders by one word in code, or a few words, to put plans for meeting Japanese attack into effect. No such plan was drawn up or at all events no such plan was sent to the commanders. No procedure for giving them the code word or words for action under any plan or procedure was ever adopted by the authorities in Washington whose official duty it was to prepare, with all the resources at their command, for meeting the Japanese attack which they privately recognized as an imminent menace.

Of particular infractions of duty in Washington, which were numerous and are written large in the evidence before the Committee, a few illustrations may be given in summary form:

Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull were in a substantial measure responsible for the confusion that resulted in equivocal form of the so- called warning message to General Short on November 27.

Secretary Stimson called up Secretary Hull early in the morning of November 27 and Secretary Hull declared positively:

"I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox the Army and the Navy."

Secretary Stimson then called up President Roosevelt and the President gave him "a little different view." But from the President, that day, Secretary Stimson got the President's approval

"that we should send the final alert namely that he (General Short along with other Commanders) should be on the qui vive for any attack."

Secretary Stimson and General Gerow started the draft of the warning message with the words: "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated." Secretary Stimson, after a conversation with Secretary Hull over the telephone, altered this definite statement to read:

"Negotiations with Japan *appear* to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government *might* come back to continue,"

thus introducing confusion into a sentence of crucial importance. (Stimson, Diary: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, pp. 120 ff.)

General Marshall and General Gerow admitted to the Committee that they made a mistake in failing to reply to General Short's report to the War Department on November 27, that he put into effect the alert against sabotage. This reply referred to the message of November 27 by number so there could be no mistake as to what it answered. It was in reply to the words of the message to Short on November 27 and the words "report measures taken." They also assumed full responsibility for that mistake (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3126-3164).

General Marshall could not recall that he had made, after November 27, any inquiries as to the measures taken by General Short in Hawaii (Tr., Vol. 17, p. 2905). In other words, he apparently had no information about the steps taken for the defense of Pearl Harbor during the ten critical days of mounting war tension, when Washington authorities were, through intercepts of Japanese messages, becoming increasingly certain about Japan's steps toward war, except General Short was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy. Alerted


to sabotage meant the planes were bunched on the field and in no position to take to the air quickly.

Responsible officers in the War Department told the Committee they failed to reach General Marshall after the receipt of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese memorandum had been intercepted late in the afternoon of December 6. General Marshall testified that he had an orderly at his home to receive calls when he was away at night and hence he could have been reached (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2941). He also testified that he was unaware of any effort to locate him at his home or elsewhere by messenger or telephone during the evening of December 6 or the morning of December 7 until he was taking his shower after a ride in the park.

Secretary Stimson interfered with efforts of General Marshall and General Gerow to postpone the breach with Japan until the Army and Navy were ready to meet a Japanese attack with better prospects of success. The Secretary insisted that in asking for the delay no recommendation should be made to the President advising a reopening of conversations with the Japanese representatives. In fact, conversations had not been formally closed on November 26 (Tr., Vol. 20, p. 3325; Vol. 22, p. 3668- 69).

Secretary Hull made "several general statements" to General Marshall on diplomatic matters but did not read to him or give him a copy of the November 26 memorandum to Japan in advance of delivery (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3076). Secretary Hull gave confused and conflicting statements to Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark and, so far as the evidence before the Committee goes, Secretary Hull did not at any time tell them definitely that relations with Japan were ipso facto ruptured, as he had learned from intercepted Japanese messages. In other words, Secretary Hull's words and actions during the last few weeks of tension added to the uncertainty that reigned in the War and Navy Departments. Despite all his conferences with representatives of the two Departments, he went ahead changing his plans and notions without giving them information respecting his crucial decisions.

It was with sufficient reason that Admiral Stark, on November 2S, wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel, saying:

"I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I know is that we may do most anything, and that the only thing to be prepared for; or we may do nothing I think it more likely to be anything (Tr., Vol. 36, p. 6713)."

This letter reached Admiral Kimmel on December 3, adding to the confusion already created by the war-warning message of November 27.

This message to Admiral Kimmel differed in one respect from the message sent by the War Department to General Short: it stated definitely that "the negotiations with Japan * * * have ended." But not content with that, the Navy Department, two days later, sent to Admiral Kimmel another dispatch quoting the War Department's message to General Short as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest possibility of resumption (Tr., Vol. 36, p. 6729)."

After stating in its message of November 27 that "Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days," the Navy De-


partment immediately added: "An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is possibly indicated * * *." Since there was not a line in the message about a possible expedition against Hawaii, these words, according to legal and common-sense usage, warranted Admiral Kimmel in concluding that an attack on Pearl Harbor was not expected by the Navy Department and that he was not to expect such an attack.

In explaining to Representative Keefe how he expected Admiral Kimmel to expect an attack on Pearl Harbor in view of the fact that the Navy Department's message mentioned only points in the Far East as possible points of attack, Admiral Stark gave probably the best explanation available to him:

"That is true, but the attack we envisaged down there we stated that the makeup and so forth of this amphibious expedition (in the Far East), not a raiding force or a carrier force, but an amphibious expedition and the points of that amphibious expedition might be so and so. There was no question, there had not been in my mind at any time, of an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian Island * * * (Tr., Vol. 35, p. 6521)."

Of the many instances showing failures of Washington authorities to cooperate and keep one another duly informed when such acts of duty were vital to the interests of the United States, none was more fateful than actions on the so-called modus vivendi proposed by Japan on November 20, 1941.

Item 1 of the Japanese proposal read:

"Both the Governments of Japan and the United states undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern and Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where Japanese troops are stationed."

Item 2 read:

"The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area."

Wholly apart from the merits or demerits of these and other items in the Japanese proposal of November 20, here was an opportunity at least to prolong "the breathing spell" for which General Marshall and Admiral Stark were pleading in their efforts to strengthen the armed forces of the United States for war. On November 5, General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented a strong plea to the President begging for time in which to make the Army and Navy ready for war. While the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi was under consideration by the President and Secretary Hull, General Marshall and Admiral Stark prepared another plea for the postponement of the breach with Japan so that the Army and Navy could be made stronger in striking or defensive power. They did not ask for any surrender of American principles; they merely called for delay.

The Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi offered an opportunity to stop for a few weeks the advance of Japanese armed forces into the Southeastern and Southern area the advance which, according to American war plans, made in cooperation with British and Dutch officers, provided for American action against Japan or American participation in a war against Japan. It is true that President Roosevelt had not committed the United States officially to these plans but, according to the testimony of Admiral Stark, "the President except officially, approved of" the basic principles of these plans. (Tr., Vol.


35, pp. 6370-72.) American official War Plan WPL-46 was based on them. Whether written in binding agreements or not, American, British, and Dutch authorities acted in concert just as if binding pacts had been made. The Japanese, as Washington clearly learned from the intercepts, also acted upon the assumption that American, British, and Dutch agreements for concerted action existed.

President Roosevelt evidently deemed it both feasible and desirable to reach some kind of modus vivendi with Japan with a view to a possible settlement in general or in any event a prolongation of negotiations with Japan until American armed forces were better prepared for war. Proof of this was found in a penciled memorandum written by the President for the Secretary of State "not dated but probably written shortly after November 20, 1941," that is, after the receipt of the Japanese proposal (Exhibit 18).

President Roosevelt's memorandum for Secretary Hull with regard to the possible terms of the modus vivendi with Japan read:


"1. U. S. to resume economic relations some oil and rice now more later.

"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).

"3. Japan not to invoke tripartite pact even if the U. S. gets into European war.

"4. U. S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to take no part in their conversation.

* * * * * * *

"Later in Pacific agreements."

Besides the President's instructions or suggestions, Secretary Hull had before him the "outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan," which had been carefully prepared by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. Henry Morgenthau's "outline" with a covering note, dated November 19, 1941, was presented to Secretary Hull, initialled M. M. H. (Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs). The covering note informed Secretary Hull that all the senior officers of the Division concurred with Mr. Hamilton in the view that "the proposal is the most constructive one I have seen." Mr. Hamilton urged Secretary Hull to give most careful consideration to the proposal promptly, and suggested that the Secretary make copies of the proposed "outline" available to Admiral Stark and General Marshall and arrange to confer with them as soon as they had had an opportunity to examine the "outline" (Exhibits 18; 168).

With the President's instructions or suggestions and Secretary Morgenthau's "outline" before him, Secretary Hull considered the terms of a possible agreement with Japan as the basis of a general settlement or an indefinite continuation of negotiations in connection with the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. This is no place to give a fifty- page summary of the record of the events connected with Secretary Hull's operations. Nor is it necessary to discuss the merits of the case. But the following recital of facts illustrates the confusion and lack of cooperation that prevailed in Administration circles.

Secretary Hull drafted a memorandum for at least a kind of truce with Japan.
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Secretary Hull discussed his proposals with British, Dutch, and Australian representatives in Washington.

Secretary Hull had a conference on the proposals with Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox at his office on November 25. Of this conference Secretary Stimson noted in his Diary:

"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought as I read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14417)."

The next day, November 26, Secretary Hull told Secretary Stimson over the telephone that he had about made up his mind not to give the proposal for the three months' truce to the Japanese but "to kick the whole thing over." Under pressure coming from Chiang Kai-shek, Winston Churchill and others, relative to the modus vivendi Secretary Hull refrained from making an independent decision on this important step and it appears he was led to decide it without thought of the military capacities necessary to back up our diplomatic position. On that day, November 26, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt, kicked the whole thing over and sent to the Japanese the now famous memorandum which Japan treated as an ultimatum. In taking this action Secretary Hull gave no advance notice to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, who were then preparing their second careful memorandum to the President begging for a postponement of war with Japan until the Army and Navy could make better preparation for waging it. Moreover, it should be noted that Secretary Hull did not give to the British and Australian representatives any advance information about his sudden decision "to kick the whole thing over."

When Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt, made this decision on November 26 and handed his memorandum to the Japanese ambassadors on November 26, he was practically certain that the Japanese government would reject his proposals and that a break in relations would be a highly probable consequence of his action.

For this statement there is sufficient evidence from Secretary Hull himself. In his account of the meeting with the Japanese representatives, when he presented the memorandum to them, Secretary Hull reported that, after reading the document, Mr. Kurusu said "that when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese Government, that Government would be likely to 'throw up its hands'; that this response to the Japanese proposal (the so-called modus vivendi proposal from Tokyo) could be interpreted as tantamount to the end of the negotiations." So certain was Secretary Hull of the coming breach that, according to his account, he declared on November 25 and November 28 at a meeting of "high officials" that "the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy" (Peace and War, 1931-1941, [1943, p. 144]). Some exchanges with the Japanese occurred after November 27, 1941, but none of these exchanges altered in any respect the situation created by Secretary Hull's memorandum of November 26 to Japan.  

If Secretary Hull or any other high authority in Washington had any doubt whether the Japanese would treat the memorandum of November 26 to Japan as an ultimatum, that doubt must have been


entirely cleared up 2 days later. On November 28, the Army intercepted a message from Tokyo to the two Japanese Ambassadors in Washington which expressed the views of the Japanese Government on Secretary Hull's document. The Japanese message characterized it as "this humiliating proposal" and as "quite unexpected and extremely I regrettable." The Japanese message also informed the Ambassadors that the reply of the Japanese Government would come in 2 or 3 days and that "the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable." Washington also knew that the deadline had been fixed for November 29, and that after that "things would automatically happen." The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed not to give the impression that "the negotiations are broken off" and told: "From now on do the best you can."

In short, on November 28, 1941, Washington authorities had available to them definite and conclusive information that the breach with Japan was near at hand and that the reply from Tokyo would signalize that breach. More definitely than the first 13 parts of the Japanese message intercepted on the evening of December 6, this notice from Tokyo to its representatives in Washington on November 28 meant a rupture of relations with the United States. If the 13 parts meant war to the President, the Japanese message on November 28 also meant war. Hawaii knew nothing of these intercepts of December 6 and 7 until after the attack.

These instances of failure on the part of high authorities in Washington to perform acts of duty and judgment required by their respective offices, and many others that could be cited, merely point to the greatest failure of all, namely, the failure of those authorities to organize for the war they regarded as immediately imminent. Here the conclusions reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to the War Department apply to the whole executive department of which it was a part:

"A few men, without organization in a true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been the result of carefully directed commands, instead of actions taken by conference. We were preparing for war by the conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference method; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their content by compromise instead of by command * * * (Report, pp. 12-13)."

To this comment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board should have added that powerful individuals among these authorities were reaching decisions on their own motion and taking actions of a dangerous nature on their own motion, despite all the conferring, talking, and compromising, were proceeding as if there was no organization in the Government of the United States that was charged with preparing for and waging war.

Nor is this confusion and pulling at cross purposes to be explained away by any such vague assertion as the Army Pearl Harbor Board offered: "that it was a product of the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a democracy." Failures to perform duties commensurate with the powers vested in officials by the Constitution and the law cannot be justified by appeals to any overriding requirements of democracy. Provisions for organizing the executive department and the supreme command of the armed forces of the United States were incorporated in the Constitution and the laws, and


adequate powers to *organize and unify for operating purposes* all subsidiary agencies were vested in the President of the United States. (See Conclusion 16.)

Going down the line along the chain of authority to the commanders in Hawaii, it must be said that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were as negligent in certain respects as their superiors in Washington. They were aware that a Japanese attack at some point was impending and, despite any general expectation that the attack would come in the Far East, they were under obligations to be intently on guard themselves. But they failed to affect the close cooperation, especially between December 3 and December 7, that was required by their special knowledge and official duties. Each of them showed an unwarranted indifference to what the other was doing in the way of scanning the horizon, watching for signs of trouble, and preparing for the worst. Finally, they failed to make the best and most efficient disposition and use of the material they possessed in the discharge of grave responsibilities imposed on them.

20. *In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting the American outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6 and Sunday morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to take that quick and instant executive action which was required by the occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the establishment of the Republic to our own times*.

Before noon on Saturday of December 6, 1941, the President was aware that a situation had been established which, by a unanimous decision of himself and his War Cabinet reached 8 days before, made an American- Japanese war a matter of a very few hours. He and his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and his Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, had discussed on November 28 the presence of a Japanese expeditionary force at sea. It was their decision that if this expeditionary force got around the southern point of Indo-China, it would be a terrific blow to the British, Dutch, and Americans. "This must not be allowed." It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight and if the British fought we would have to fight. "And it now seems clear that if this expedition were allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot * * *" (Tr. Col. [sic] 70, p. 14, 425). At 10:40 on the morning of December 6, the State Department was advised by Ambassador Winant that the British had sighted a Japanese task force in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam headed for the Kra Peninsula or Thailand. The Japanese had passed the southern point of Indo-China.

In testifying before the Joint Committee as to the significance of this information Under Secretary Welles said:  

"I should say that the chances had diminished from one in a thousand to one in a million that war could then be avoided (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1324)."

No word of this situation went to the American commanders at Pearl Harbor.

Although the War Cabinet, as early as November 28, had anticipated the situation of noon of December 6 as making war inevitable, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations not only did not


advise the commanders in the field as to this situation, but also exhibited so little concern approximately 20 hours later that the Chief of Staff went horseback riding on the morning of December 7 and the Chief of Naval Operations, having spent the evening at a theater, got to his office late on the morning of the 7th. Each of these officers knew on the morning of December 7 that a Pacific war would start within a few hours and, by their own judgment and that of the President, that such war must involve the United States. In the light of the situation known to them and to the president and his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on the morning of December 7, and in view of the decisions reached in anticipation of such a situation, an alert should have been sent to Hawaii prior to the alert sent by commercial able by General Marshall on December 7 at 11:50 a. m., which alert did not reach the Hawaiian commanders prior to the attack the November 27 and all prior alerts having been confusing, misleading, and imprecise.

Before 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6, 1941, President Roosevelt had reached a great decision as to the immediate imminence of the war which he had long expected. He had then finished reading the first 13 parts of the intercepted memorandum which was to be presented to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador and special agent on the next day, and had said to his aide, Harry Hopkins, in substance, "This means war." In reply to a comment by Mr. Hopkins, the President had also indicated that the United States could not strike the first blow for the purpose of preventing any sort of surprise (Tr., Vol. 63, pp. 12441- 12443).

The President's evaluation of the intelligence before him as to the probable day, hour, and place of the coming Japanese attack is nowhere in the evidence before this Committee. But, given all the information that had come to him during the preceding days, he had every reason for assuming that the day and hour could not be far off (conclusions 3 and 10). The place on which the first Japanese blow would fall was within the territory and possessions of the United State where outpost commanders were on guard.

Between 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 16 hours were to pass. The President had at his disposal at least 15 hours in which to inform those outpost commanders of impending danger, to add new and urgent warning to the indefinite warnings that had been sent out during previous days and weeks.

The President's acquaintance with the nature of warfare, and it was by no means elementary, must have convinced him that the consequences of the first magnitude would flow from the success or failure of the United States armed forces in meeting the Japanese attack when it came. Unqualified success on the part of the American forces could wreck Japanese war plans and cripple Japanese armed forces. Disaster to the armed forces of the United States could, and probably would, prolong the war for months or years, with all that was entailed in American blood and treasure.

In this situation, having decided about 10 p. m. December 6, that the intercepted message meant war, the most imperative duty that confronted the President was that of alerting his immediate subordinates in Washington and, either directly or through them, the outpost commanders. This duty was imposed upon him by the circumstances and


by the obligations of his office as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States in peace and war. Of all the men in the branches of civil and military administration responsible for the security and defense of the United States, the President alone was endowed with ultimate power under the Constitution and the laws. Means of swift communication were at his elbow. Willing aides civil and military and naval were at his beck and call

The most powerful men next to the President in authority men bound to obey his orders and serve without stint, were not far from the President's side; and anyone of them, if so instructed, could have found and alerted all the others. Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark were nearby. They could be reached quickly by means of communication at the President's command.

Indeed, Capt. Alwin D. Kramer, who had carried the 13-part intercept to the White House for delivery to President Roosevelt by Commander Schulz (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10665 ff.; Vol. 63, p. 12437), immediately turned his attention to the task of alerting the President's chief subordinates. Captain Kramer tried to reach Admiral Stark by telephone and failed; he likewise failed to reach Admiral Turner (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10149; Vol. 56, pp. 10667-10673).

Thereupon Captain Kramer telephoned to Secretary Knox, found him at home, and took to Secretary Knox the intercepted message and other documents. After the receipt of the papers, Secretary Knox, realizing at once their significant nature, called up Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson and arranged with them for a meeting at the State Department on Sunday morning at 10 o'clock. Having completed this arrangement Secretary Knox instructed Captain Kramer to bring all the important messages in question to the State Department at 10 o'clock Sunday morning (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10467). Thus, as Captain Kramer testified, on Saturday night he had reached the top man in the White House and the top man in the Navy (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10681).

According to the testimony of Col. Rufus Bratton, chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, of the War Department, the 13-part message was sent to the State Department on Saturday night. Colonel Bratton stated:

"So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in this message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a message that he had gent to the Japanese Government, gathered up his folder, put it in the pouch, locked the pouch, and personally delivered it to the night duty officer in the State Department sometime after 10 o'clock that night. I told the night duty officer whose name I have forgotten, that this was a highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned, and that I would like to have it sent out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with him, securing from him a receipt for what I had given him (Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12052-12053)."

Thus it is evident that about 10 o'clock Saturday night President Roosevelt could have reached Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and Secretary Knox in a few minutes, had he chosen to do so.

What about General Marshall and Admiral Stark, to whom the President under the law could go directly with orders for operations? If not at home, they should have been in places known to their orderlies or assistants, for the War and Navy Departments had been alerted, lights were burning all night in offices of those Departments; and  


responsible officers were there waiting for news and orders. News of the intercepted Japanese messages had been delivered to Army authorities about nine o'clock that night before it had been delivered to Secretary Knox, head of the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10765).

The White House was alerted. The President's naval aid was standing by at the White House on the evening of December 6.

Within less than an hour President Roosevelt, convinced that the 13-part message meant war, could have brought to his side one or more of the four men immediately responsible for war action under his direction, could have taken council with them, and could decide upon the orders necessary to alert all the outpost commanders before midnight.

In this situation with these powers and obligations entrusted to him, what did the President do? Recognizing the gravity of the hour and the occasion, he was moved to act at first. He tried to reach by telephone, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and at the first attempt failed. Apparently it was reported to the President that Admiral Stark was at a theater. What then? According to the testimony of Commander Schulz, who had brought the 13-part message to the President's room in the White House, the President said in the presences of the commander, that he did not want to cause any undue alarm by having Admiral Stark paged or otherwise notified in the theater, "because he (the President) could get him (Admiral Stark) within perhaps another half hour" (Tr., Vol. 63, pp. 12443-44).

Apparently the President did communicate with Admiral Stark later that evening. But the evidence before the Committee is indirect, for Admiral Stark's mind seems to be a complete blank as to his whereabouts and doings on the evening of December 6, 1941. When he testified before the Committee at its regular hearings, the admiral was under the firm impression that he did not talk with the President over the telephone on that evening, but then confessed that he might be mistaken. Later however, at a special session of the Committee on May 31, 1946, Admiral Stark testified that a friend, Capt. H. D. Krick, had recently given him some information on the point. Captain Krick had informed Admiral Stark that they had been together on the evening of December 6, 1941 and that the admiral had been in communication with the President over the telephone. But this recent information did not refresh the admiral's memory, for he declared at the special session of the Committee that he still had "no recollection whatever of any events of that evening" (Tr., Vol. 71, p. 14723 ff.).

With regard to anything that passed between the President and Admiral Stark that evening, assuming that Captain Krick's memory is good, the record before this Committee is as empty as Admiral Stark's mind.

What did the President do on Sunday morning between his rising hour and about 1:25 p. m. (Eastern standard time, 7:55 Honolulu time) when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began?

During this lapse of hours, additional news of Japanese designs was in Washington.

About 5 o'clock in the morning of December 7, the fourteenth part of the Japanese message reached the Navy Department. Although it could have been decoded in less than half an hour, that


operation was delayed in the office and this fourteenth part did not come into the hands of Captain Kramer until about 7:30 a. m. Another inexplicable delay occurred. Captain Kramer did not deliver this message to the White House until 10 or 15 minutes before 10 on Sunday morning (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10718). But 2 hours or more then remained in which to put the outpost commanders of full defensive war alert.

On or about 10:30 on Sunday morning, two other highly informative messages were delivered at the White House (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10743 ff.).

The first was the intercepted Japanese government message instructing the Japanese ambassador to deliver the fourteen-part reply to the Secretary of State at 1 P. m. December 7 (Washington time).


From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941.
Re my #902

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person. Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Army 25844
JD: 7144 Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

The second was a message from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington, marked "extremely urgent." It ordered Japanese agents, after deciphering the fourteenth part, the notice as to delivery, at 1 o'clock, and two other messages to destroy at once the remaining cipher machines and all machine codes (Ex. 1, pp. 248-249) A notice that carried a war warning to high authorities in Washington.

Meanwhile General Marshall, who testified that he did not see President Roosevelt between November 28 and the afternoon of December, reached his post in the War Department. Before him lay the final 14-part message and the message stating that the delivery to Secretary Hull was to be at 1 o'clock. On the basis of this and other information, in his possession, General Marshall concluded that war was at hand, that the hour "one o'clock" was indicative of "some very definite action" by the Japanese at 1 o'clock, and that a new and definite warning message should go to General Short the message that did not reach General Short until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was over (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2926 ff.)

During the hours from 10 o'clock Saturday night to 11 o'clock Sunday morning, President Roosevelt had at his command not only the latest intercepts and his own knowledge of diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain and Japan but also special knowledge that had come to him *before* the evening of December 6; for example:

(1) The message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin telling him to see Hitler and Ribbentrop and

"say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker an anyone dreams (Ex. 1, p. 204)."


This message, received in Washington on November 30, so moved President Roosevelt that he expressed a desire to retain or have a copy of it (Tr., Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).  

(2) The message transmitted at 10:40 o'clock in the morning of December 6 by Ambassador Winant in London from the British Admiralty, stating that large Japanese expeditionary forces were moving swiftly toward Kra a threat which was to bring into play American-British war plans for combined action against Japan unless the President refused to give official sanction to the plans he had approved "except officially."

Knowing all these things and more besides, including the zero hour of 1 o'clock fixed by the Japanese Government for the delivery of the message that meant a de facto rupture of relations, unable under the Constitution to commit the overt act of striking Japan at once, waiting for the Japanese to fire "the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves," President Roosevelt was under direct and immediate obligation to make certain that urgent messages be sent to the outpost commanders, including General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and sent not later than 11 o'clock on Sunday morning by the swiftest possible means of communication.

For his failure to take this action Saturday night, December 6, or early Sunday morning, December 7, President Roosevelt must bear a responsibility commensurate with his powers and duties under the Constitution, with his position as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and with the trust vested in him as the Chief Executive by the people of the United States.

21. *The contention committing from so high an authority as President Truman on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor," cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken*.

How could the desire of the American people in the months before December 7, 1941, to keep out of war be responsible for the *specific failures* of Washington and Hawaii in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

How could Congress be to blame for unpreparedness when it enacted into law greater defense appropriations than the President and his Budget Bureau recommended? (See Conclusion No. 17.)

How could the American people be held responsible for the secret diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of the many secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed, the high authorities in Washington seemed to be acting upon some long-range plan which was never disclosed to Congress or to the American people.

A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its peril. If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the exclusive secret information of the President and his advisors, public opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by their leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their leader's actions.

On December 1, 1941, it was known to the Secretary of War and to the President and his close advisors that Japan had informed Hitler on December 1 that war was imminent. They knew this by intercepting the following message from Tokyo to Berlin:


From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
#985. (Part 1 Of 3) [a]
Re my Circular #2387. [b]

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 [c]). In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Army 25552 JD: 6943 Translated 12-141 (NR)

(Source: Exhibit No. 1, page 204.)

The Secretary of War, the President and his advisors also were fully aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that these movements would involve the United States in war.

Notwithstanding this intimate knowledge of the imminence of war the Secretary of War told the American people as late as December 5 that the negotiations with Japan were still in progress. Also, despite the extreme gravity of the situation, known fully to the "War Cabinet," the President permitted the Senate and the House of Representatives to adjourn on December 4 and 5 respectively until noon of December 8 without having informed them of the impending danger to the country. (See Conclusion 20.) This seems to follow consistently the understanding observed by Mr. Hull when he gave to the President a proposed draft of a message to Congress which was never used. Mr. Hull said: "I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities." (Exhibit 19; see also Conclusion No. 2.)

How could the American people be responsible for the warlike operations conducted from Washington over which the people had no control and about which they were never informed?

In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its advance if imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy which relies upon the enemy's first overt act to insure effective popular support for the Nation's final war decision is both outmoded and dangerous in the atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more tragic and damaging than that of December 7, 1941, there must be constant close coordination between American public opinion and American diplomacy.

Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty even in the atomic era. Whether or not the Pearl Harbor tragedy could have been avoided

[a] Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.

[b] Not available.

[c] See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.


by diplomatic means is a most appropriate matter for consideration by all concerned with the 3,000 American boys who there lost their lives.

Exhaustive attention has been given to the military aspects of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor and an invaluable record has been compiled for future students of the situation.

A far less complete record has been written of its diplomatic aspects and here there is the most urgent need of further exploration in justice to the future generations of Americans who may learn here a little of the lessons for which America has paid so great a price.

How to avoid war and how to turn war if it finally comes to serve the cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy today as yesterday. Here, too, much cannot be known regarding all the petty episodes that finally add up to war. No war comes in a moment. War is the sum of many minor decisions and some that are major. In this diplomatic aspect the Pearl Harbor investigation has sadly failed to live up to the lofty prospectus with which it was launched

In the light of these facts and of the foregoing conclusions, the charge that the "country" is to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor cannot be sustained.


In our opinion, the evidence before this Committee indicates that the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not of laws or powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested responsibilities. No legislation could have cured such defects of official judgment, management, cooperation, and action as were displayed by authorities and agents of the United States in connection with the events that culminated in the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

This demonstrates the weakness of depending on the political head of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the activities of the military branches, particularly in the area of intelligence, and unification of command. The major lesson to be learned is that this coordination should be accomplished in advance of a crisis.


Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Committee and having analyzed the same in the foregoing Conclusions of Fact and Responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following final and ultimate conclusion:

The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for defense rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of *interdependent* responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the field in charge of the fleet and of the naval base. (See Conclusion No. 19.)

The evidence clearly shows that these two areas of responsibilities were inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii. The commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready successfully to meet hostile attack at Hawaii without indispensable information, materiel, trained manpower and clear orders from Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in


readiness without the alert and active cooperation of the commanders the spot.

The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential the defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military authorities:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War.
FRANK KNOX Secretary of the Navy.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL General, Chief of Staff of the Army.
HAROLD R. STARK Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.  
LEONARD T. GEROW Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the military commanders:

WALTER C. SHORT Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and serious failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.

Secretary of State, CORDELL HULL, who was at the center of Japanese- American negotiations bears a grave responsibility for the diplomatic conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor but he had no duties as a relevant link in the military chain of responsibility stemming from the Commander in Chief to the commanders at Hawaii for the defense at Pearl Harbor. For this reason and because the diplomatic phase was not completely explored we offer no conclusions in his case.

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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 2:25 am

574              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              575



  Conversations                                                  506-508
  Modus vivendi                                             511, 561 ff.
  Parallel action                                           538, 561 ff.
American people:
  Not to blame for Pearl Harbor                                  570 ff.
  Must be informed                                                   571
Army-Navy intelligence services:
  Intercepts                                          504, 514, 515, 524
  Distribution of information                              520, 524, 525
  Uncovers Japanese reaction to November 26 note           525, 532, 564
  Destruction of Japanese codes                                      526
  On December 6-7 messages                                  520, 526 530
  Information withheld from Hawaii                              531, 532
  Dead-line messages                                            515, 532
  Delays in translating secret information                           539
Army Pearl Harbor Board [APB]                                        495
  Report on intercepts                                               515
  Expectation of Hawaiian attack                                     524
  "Winds messages"                                                   526
  Reports information withheld from Hawaii                           531
  Finds information to Hawaii insufficient                      533, 537
  Finds "war warnings" conflicting                                   534
  Notes failure to prepare Hawaii                                    543
  Stimson diary                                                      559
  Notes Washington failures                                          564
Atlantic Conference: Roosevelt-Churchill discussion              508-509
Barkley, Senator Alben W.: Expounds resolution for investigation
                                                            495-496, 533
Beardall, Admiral John R.: December 6-7 messages                     528
Bellinger, Martin: Report on Hawaii                                  523
Bicknell, Lt. Col. George W.: Reports burning of Japanese papers     554
Bomb-plot messages:
  Indicate Hawaiian attack                        516 ff.; 523, 524, 556
  Washington aware of                                                525
Bratton, Col. Rufus S.:
  Distributes bomb-plot messages                                     519
  December 6-7 messages                                         528, 567
Brewster, Senator Owen:
  Dissent with majority                                              493
  Duty of Joint committee                                            496
British Embassy: Messages                                            501
Chiang Kai-shek:
  Modus vivendi                                                 512, 563
  Roosevelt message regarding Japanese                               522
Chief of Naval Operations (see Stark): Receives secret information
Chief of Staff (see Marshall): Receives secret information           504
Churchill, Winston:
  Roosevelt-Churchill messages                                  501, 502
  Atlantic conference discussions                               508, 509
  On Roosevelt appeal to Congress                               510, 530
  On fleet at Hawaii                                                 522
  On modus vivendi                                                   563

576             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

  Appeal to                                      510, 512, 513, 530, 558
  Appropriations for military operations              524, 549, 550, 570
  Power to declare war                                               530
  Powers conferred on President by                               541-542
  Permitted to adjoin at crucial time                                571
Constitution                                                     496-497
  Duties of President under                                          541
Coolidge Calvin: Enforces freedom of investigation                   499
Dead-line messages                                              515, 532
December 6-7, 1941: Intercepted Japanese messages           520, 526-530
Federalist, The: On nature of Federal executive                      541
Ferguson, Senator Homer:
  Dissent with majority                                              493
  Duty of joint committee                                            496
  Written questions to Stimson                                   500-501
Fielder, Lt. Col. K. J.: Informs General Short on Japanese codes and
  papers                                                             554
Gerow, Gen. Leonard T.:
  December 6-7 messages                                              527
  Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message         536, 557, 559
  On "war warning" message                                           559
  Found responsible                                                  573
Great Britain:
  United States cooperation with                                 508-509
  "Winds messages"                                                   526
Grew, Joseph C.:
  Diary denied                                                       501
  Letter on war strategy                                             506
  Urges Roosevelt-Konoye conference                                  509
  Warns of surprise attack                                           521
  On position of Hawaii                                              523
Halifax, Lord:
  Modus vivendi                                                      502
  Warned of surprise attack                                          521
Hamilton, Maxwell M.: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement      562
Hart, Admiral Thomas C.: Inquiry on "winds messages"                 526
  Defense                                              505, 544 ff., 553
  Bomb plot messages concerning                                  516 ff.
  As fleet base                                                  545 ff.
  Failures at                                                   555, 572
Herron, General: 1940 alert to                                       536
Hitler, Chancellor: Warned of Japanese-American war
                                                 615, 525, 532, 569, 570
Hopkins, Harry:
  Unavailable to committee                                           497
  December 6-7 messages                                         528, 566
Hull, Cordell:
  Illness prevents cross-examination of                         497, 501
  Modus vivendi                               501-502, 510, 511, 561 ff.
  Conference of November                                    25, 503, 511
  Diplomatic duties of                                               506
  Roosevelt-Konoye conference                                        509
  Turns war problem over to Army-Navy                                510
  Draft message to Congress                                     511, 571
  On American neutrality                                             512
  Receives secret information                                        520
  Aware of surprise attack                                           521
  Expected war with Japan                                            524
  December 6-7 messages                                     527-530, 567
  On "war warning" message                                           559
  Fails to inform General Marshall                                   560
  Fails to inform Cabinet officials                                  560
Ingersoll, Admiral Royal E.:
  Testimony on "winds messages"                                      526
  December 6-7 messages                                              528
  Consulted on fleet data                                            528
  On warning Hawaii                                                  540
  On defense of Hawaii                                               549

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             577

Jaluit: Japanese fleet at                                        531-532
  Surprise attacks                                    504; 521, 534, 539
  Warned by Roosevelt                                                509
  Intent to attack United States                                515, 569
  Dead-line dates                                               515, 531
  Message to Berlin                                             515, 571
  Bomb plot messages                                             516 ff.
  Rupture of relations with United States                       532, 564
  Modus vivendi                                                  561 ff.
  Aware of American-British-Dutch parallel action                561 ff.
Japanese Emperor: Message to                                         513
Joint Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee:
  Duty                                                 495 496, 497, 533
  Difficulties of                                                497-502
  Partisan character                                            498, 500
  Form of report                                                 502-503
  Conclusions of fact and responsibility                         503 ff.
  Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers                     555
  Diplomacy not thoroughly investigated (see also Table of contents)
Keefe, Representative Frank B.: On expectation of attack             561
Kimmel, Admiral Husband E                                            496
  Confusing orders to                                 504, 532, 533, 560
  Entitled to bomb plot messages                                     519
  Not adequately informed                        521, 531, 532, 534, 538
  Not warned December 6-7                                            529
  November 24 message                                                534
  November 27 message                                           535, 537
  On Hawaiian defense                                           548, 553
  Messages sent to                                                   554
  Liaison with General Short                                         554
  Failures at Hawaii                                       555, 565, 573
  Failures in Washington concerning                                  556
  Letter from Admiral Stark on United States plans              535, 560
Knox, Frank:
  Unavailable to committee                                           497
  Modus vivendi                                             501, 561 ff.
  Conference of November 25                                     503, 511
  Receives bomb plot messages                                        518
  Receives secret information                                        520
  Attitude toward Japanese war                                       523
  December 6-7 messages                                     528-530, 567
  Duty to alert Hawaii                                          530, 558
  Blamed by President's Commission                                   533
  Prime responsibility                                               573
Konoye, Premier: Conference proposal to Roosevelt                    509
Kramer, Commander A. D.:
  Distributes bomb plot messages                                     518
  December 6-7 messages                                    528, 567, 569
Krick, Capt. H. D.: Refreshes Stark's memory about December 6        568
Kurusu, Mr.: On Secretary Hull's message                             563
Leahy, Admiral William D.: Concerning fleet at Hawaii                522
Lend-Lease Act: President's powers under                             544
MacArthur, General: Secret information available to                  534
Marshall, George C.:
  Modus vivendi                                                      502
  Conference of November 25                                     503, 511
  American-British-Dutch conversations                           507-509
  Appeals for time                                              512, 561
  Receives bomb plot messages                                        519
  Receives secret information                                        520
  December 6-7 messages                           527-530, 540, 560, 569
  Duty to alert Hawaii                                530, 559, 565, 566
  Blamed by President's Commission                                   533
  Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message         536, 537, 559
  Duty to prepare Hawaii                                        543, 546
  Prime responsibility                                               573

578              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Marshall Islands: Japanese fleet at                                  531
McCollum, Capt. Arthur N.: Attempts to alert Kimmel                  540
Miles, General Sherman:
  December 6-7, messages                                         527-528
  Testimony on information withheld from Hawaii                      531
  Admits difficulties in Army-Navy intelligence                      539
Morgenthau, Jr., Henry: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement    562
Navy Court of Inquiry                                                495
  Report on intercepts                                               515
  Reports information withheld from Hawaii                           531
  Finds information to Hawaii insufficient                           533
  Criticizes "war warning" message                                   534
  Recommendations                                                    534
  Notes failure to prepare Hawaii                                    543
Navy Department (see Knox, Stark)                                    498
  Notice of end of negotiations                                 510, 511
  Requested to furnish fleet data                                    528
  Blamed by President's Commission                                   533
  Confusing messages to Hawaii                        533, 536, 560, 561
  November 24 messages to Kimmel                                     534
  November 27 message to Kimmel                                  535-537
  On Hawaiian defense                                            543 ff.
Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister: Warned of Japanese-American War
                                                      515, 525, 532, 569
Richardson, Admiral J. O.:
  Inquiry about Japanese war                                         506
  Protest against fleet at Hawaii                               522, 543
  Fleet defense                                                 545, 549
Roberts commission                                                   495
  Shortcomings of                                                    497
  Finds information to Hawaii insufficient                      533, 534
  Exonerates Washington officials                                    533
  Notes War Department failure                                       536
  Expectation of war in Far East                                     538
  Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers                     555
Roberts, Justice Owen: Failure to gather evidence                    497
Roosevelt, Franklin D.:
  Unavailable to committee                                           497
  Papers unavailable                                                 501
  War tactics                                                   503, 558
  Conference with Cabinet                                            503
  Aware of probable attack on Hawaii       504, 521, 522, 524, 538, note
  Postpones address to Congress                            504, 530, 558
  Responsibility for coordinatio                  505, 514, 539, 540 ff.
  Fails at crucial time                505, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570
  Diplomatic duties of                                               506
  War strategy                                                  506, 558
  American-British-Dutch conversations                          507, 538
  Atlantic conference discussions                                508-509
  Roosevelt ultimatum of August 17                                   509
  Tactics pending Japanese war                        510, 511, 513, 558
  Conference on imminence of war                                511, 515
  Hampered by neutrality laws                                        512
  Interest in Japanese message to Berlin                   515, 532, 571
  Receives bomb-plot messages                                        518
  Messages of December 6-7                             520, 528-530, 565
  Receives secret information                                        521
  On fleet at Hawaii                                                 522
  Duty to alert Hawaii                                     524, 530, 558
  Detailed direction of fleet operations             528, note, 543, 544
  On modus vivendi                                               561 ff.
  Permits Senate and House to adjourn at crucial time:               571
  Prime responsibility                                               573
  "Winds messages"                                                   526
  Possible attack by Japan                                           535

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               579
Sadtler, Col. Otis K.: On "winds messages"                           526
Schulz, Commander L. R.:
  Testimony                                                          511
  Delivery of December 6 message to Roosevelt                        567
Short, Walter C                                                      496
  Confusing orders to                                           504, 532
  Entitled to bomb-plot messages                                     519
  Receives Marshall warning too late                             529-530
  Not adequately informed                        531, 532, 533, 534, 538
  November 27 message                                           535, 537
  On Hawaiian defense                                           548, 553
  Testimony before Roberts Commission                                555
  Failures at Hawaii                                       555, 565, 573
  Failures in Washington concerning                             556, 557
  Singapore conversations. (See American-British-Dutch conversations.)
Stark, Harold R.:
  Conference of November 25                                     503, 511
  American-British-Dutch conversations                           507-509
  Appeals for time                                              512, 561
  Receives bomb-plot messages                                        518
  Receives secret information                                        520
  December 6-7 messages                           527-530, 539, 540, 568
  Consulted on fleet data                                            528
  Duty to alert Hawaii                                530, 540, 565, 566
  Blamed by President's Commission                                   533
  Letter to Kimmel on United States action                      535, 560
  Duty to prepare Hawaii                                        543, 545
  Reply to Keefe on expectation of attack                            561
  Prime responsibility                                               573
State Department (see also Hull, Welles)                             498
  Views on neutrality laws                                           512
  Permits Japanese consuls at Hawaii                                 514
  Attitude toward Japanese war                                       523
Stimson, Henry L.:
  Illness prevents testimony of                                 497, 500
  Diary                                                    500, 512, 559
  Fails to answer questions                                      500-501
  Modus vivendi                                             502, 561 ff.
  Conference of November 25                                     503, 511
  Seeks end of Japanese negotiations                            512, 560
  On appeal to Congress                                              513
  Receives bomb-plot messages                                        519
  Receives secret information                                        520
  Aware of surprise attack                                      521, 524
  December 6-7 messages                                     527-530, 567
  Requests Pacific Fleet data                                        528
  Duty to alert Hawaii                                530, 536, 558, 559
  Blamed by President's Commission                                   533
  Neglect of Hawaii                                                  534
  On "war warning" message                                           559
  Aware of Japanese message to Berlin                                571
  Prime responsibility                                               573
Truman (Mead) committee: Procedure                               499-500
Truman, Harry:
  Executive orders dealing with evidence                             497
  Truman committee procedure                                         499
  Blame of American people not sustained                        506, 570
Tully, Grace: Control over Roosevelt papers                          501
Turner, Admiral R. K.:
  Testimony on winds messages                                        526
  December 6-7 messages                                          527-528
  On warning Hawaii                                                  540
Walsh, Senator Thomas: Teapot Dome investigation                     499
War Cabinet                                            513-515, 528, 540
War Council                                            513-515, 528, 540

580             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

War Department (see also Stimson, Marshall)                          498
  Notice of end of negotiations                                  510-511
  Information withheld from General Short                            532
  Blamed by President's Commission                                   533
  Conflicting messages to Hawaii                           533, 535, 536
  November 27 message to Short                                  535, 537
  On Hawaiian defense                                            543 ff.
War-warning messages                                        532-537, 559
Washington authorities:
  Responsibilities and failures of                              
          504-505, 510, 522, 523, 530, 538, 539, 540, 553, 555, 559, 572
  Attitude toward Japan                                              513
  Knowledge of bomb-plot messages                                516 ff.
  Expectation of attack on Hawaii                                    524
  Knowledge of Japanese intentions                         525, 537, 565
  Duty to alert Hawaii                            530-531, 534, 536, 558
  Sends confusing orders                                        532, 536
  Undertakes detailed direction of affairs                      533, 553
  Exonerated by President's Commission                               533
  Directs attention away from Pearl Harbor                       537-538
  Failure to prepare Hawaii                                          543
  Responsible for Hawaiian defense                                   553
  Modus vivendi                                                  561 ff.
  Secret diplomacy                                                   570
Welles, Sumner:
  Modus vivendi                                                      502
  Memorandum on Atlantic Conference                                  509
  On avoidance of war                                                565
Wheeler, Senator Burton K.:
  Freedom to investigate                                             499
  Daugherty investigation                                            499
Wilkinson, Admiral T. S.:
  December 6-7 messages                                          527-528
  On warning Hawaii                                                  540
Winant, Ambassador: Message on Japanese movements          522, 565, 570
Winds message                                                    525-526
WPL-46: Meaning                                       535 note, 548, 558
Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr.: No investigation of                       501
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