220 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. *Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial (Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured*. This is inevitable.
In the foregoing dispatch the Japanese Government stated it would send a reply to Nomura and Kurusu within 2 or 3 days. This presupposes the presence and *availability* in Washington of these ambassadors to receive the reply. Clearly, therefore, war between Japan and the United States was not to eventuate *until* the reply had been received in Washington, otherwise the Japanese ambassadors would not be available for the purpose of receiving such reply. By the same token war would not eventuate until the ambassadors had an opportunity to *deliver* the reply, otherwise little or no purpose would be served in sending it whatever.
Knowledge of this fact should have intensified alertness in the War and Navy Departments to such a point that from the moment the 14-part reply started coming in, all hands should have been on the qui vive and additionally an adequate number of responsible officers should have been actually at their stations with full authority to act in any emergency throughout the night of December 6-7. This statement is of course subject to the observation that Japan had indicated in the pilot message that the full reply would not be received until the following day, Sunday, December 7, and even that was not certain; that instructions would be sent in a separate dispatch with respect to the time of presentation and "the situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it (the reply) I want you to please *keep it secret for the time being*." Further, it is clear from the evidence that the receipt of the pilot message and portions of the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum served as basis for special measures taken by the War and Navy Departments to insure prompt handling, decoding, and distribution of this magic material on the evening of December 6. The naval officers who received the first 13 parts on the evening of December 6 appear to have regarded them as requiring no action during the evening. Within the Army the first 13 parts were seen by the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, who in view of the fact that the fourteenth part had not been received and the further fact that this message appeared to him to be of interest primarily to the State Department, decided that it required no further distribution within the Army that evening but should be delivered to the State Department. [297a] But the fact that the message was being received removed the last *known* barrier to Japan's taking military action. [298]
In consequence, it is not believed the War and Navy establishments in Washington were sufficiently alerted on the evening of December 6
[297] As has been indicated, the evidence is in dispute as to whether the first 13 parts were in reality delivered to a watch officer at the State Department on the evening of December 6. See Note 280a, supra.
[298] However, it should be noted that Ambassador Nomura in a dispatch to Tokyo of November 26, 1941, stated: "The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by declaration for internal and external* consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 183.
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with a view to receiving the Japanese reply. As events turned out, however, there was nothing contained in the first 13-parts to have served as basis for additional warnings to outposts already regarded adequately alerted. The information contained in the first 13-parts of the 14-part message did not add to the sum total of information already supplied the commanders in Hawaii who had been warned of war and advised "hostile action possible at any moment." It did not point to Hawaii. It did not provide the essential *where* or, with any degree of definitiveness, the *when* of the attack. There is no intelligence contained in the first 13-parts which this Committee can conclude could reasonably be expected to have changed the decisions already made in Hawaii.
*The Fourteenth Part*
At 2:38 a. m., December 7, there was filed in Tokyo and intercepted by a Navy monitoring station between 3:05 and 3:10 a. m. the fourteenth and final part of Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26. [299] This message as subsequently decoded by the Navy read as follows: [300]
"(Part 14 of 14)
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to reserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present: negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific rough cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.*"
The fourteenth part was available in the Navy Department for distribution at some time between 7:30 and 8:00 a. m. [301] Captain Kramer made delivery within the Navy Department shortly after a. m. The delivery to the White House and to Secretary Knox, who was at the State Department for a 10 a. m. meeting with Secretaries Hull and Stimson, was made shortly before 10 a. m. Distribution of the fourteenth part within the War Department was begun at 9 a. m. with subsequent delivery to the State Department.
It is to be noted there is no statement that Japan intended to declare war on the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations were to be broken merely that the current negotiations cannot produce an agreement. The fourteenth part is much less severe than the strongly worded first 13 parts would have indicated. Admiral Beardall testified as follows with respect to delivery of the fourteenth part o the President: [302]
"As I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10:00 o'clock on Sunday morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best of my recollection, was the 14th part of this 13-part message that came in the night before, which delivered to him.
[299] Committee exhibit No. 41.
[300] Id., No. 1, p. 245. As forwarding instructions to the radio station handling the fourteenth part there appeared at the beginning the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT".
[301] Committee record, pp. 10461-10463.
[302] Id,, at pp. 14010, 14011.
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Asked if there was any discussion or conversation with the President when he made the delivery, Admiral Beardall testified: [303]
"No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying though, which marks this in my mind, that *it looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations*."
Admiral Beardall further testified that at the time of delivering the fourteenth part to the President there was nothing in the manner of the President which would indicate he was expecting an attack within a period of hours; that there "was no alarm, or no mention of this, mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that he was expecting an attack." [304]
As to the question whether termination of negotiations would indicate certain war it is significant to note that the Japanese Ambassadors themselves stated in a message to Tokyo dated November 26, 1941: [305]
"We suppose that *the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States*, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable * * *."
From a review of the fourteenth part it is clear that nothing is added to what was already known with respect to Japan's reaction to Secretary Hull's note. To be sure it is observed that the "hope * * * to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost" and "in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." But these facts had already been known for several days and the only paramount considerations at this time were *when* and *where* Japan would strike. A thorough consideration of the fourteen-part message, when viewed in the light of all other intelligence already available in Washington, reflects no added information, particularly of a military character, which would serve further to alert outpost commanders who had already been supplied a "war warning" and informed that "hostile action possible at any moment." [305] This conclusion is partially modified to the extent that actual delivery of the fourteen part message to the American Government might be construed as removing the last diplomatic obstacle, in the minds of the Japanese, to launching an attack.
"ONE O'CLOCK" AND FINAL CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES
Two messages intercepted on the morning of December 7 have received paramount consideration the celebrated "one o'clock" message specifying the time for delivery of the Japanese 14-part memorandum to the Government of the United States and the message setting forth final instructions to the Japanese Embassy concerning
[303] Id.
[304] Committee record, p. 14047.
[305] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.
[306] General Marshall stated: "* * * the particular part which affected me and caused me to act was not the 14 parts. It was the one o'clock, which, unfortunately, they put on the bottom of the pile and I read through everything before I came to that." committee record, p. 13805.
Referring to the Japanese 14-part memorandum, Admiral Turner said: "I did not consider that that message and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree, because I was certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately between the United states and Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture Of the situation had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of November 27, and confirmed definitely by the later dispatches regarding the destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders for our people to destroy codes in exposed positions." Committee record, p. 5099.
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the destruction of codes and secret papers. The latter was as follows: [307]
"After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, [308] #908, [309] and #909, [310] please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents."
This message was intercepted shortly after the one o'clock message but from the evidence it appears that both these intercepts were distributed at approximately the same time. The "one o'clock" message read as follows: [311]
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."
This dispatch was filed by the Japanese at 4.18 a. m. December 7 and intercepted by a Navy monitoring station at 4:37 a. m. [312] It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at approximately 7 a. m. thereupon being sent to the Army for translation inasmuch as there was no translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. Translated copies of the "one o'clock" message appear to have been returned to the Navy at approximately 9 a. m. Captain Kramer testified [313] that upon his return to the Navy Department at 10:20 a. m. he found the "one o'clock" message and thereafter, between 10:30 and 10:35 a. m., delivered it to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where a meeting was in progress. Delivery was then made within approximately 10 minutes to an aide to Secretary Hull at the State Department and thereafter within roughly another 10 minutes, to a Presidential aide at the White House. In the course of delivery to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and to Secretary Hull's aide mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time, was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. *No mention was made that the time indicated an attack at Pearl Harbor*. [314]
Delivery of the "one o'clock" message within the War Department was made at some time between 9 and 10 a. m. General Marshall after being advised at his quarters that an important message had been received, arrived at his office at some time between 11:15 and 11:30 a. m. where he saw for the first time the 14-part memorandum, General Gerow, General Miles, and Colonel Bratton, among others, being present. After completion of his reading of the memorandum General Marshall came to the "one o'clock" message and appears to have attached immediate significance to it. He testified that he and the officers present in his office were certain the hour fixed in the "one o'clock" message had "some definite significance;" that "something was going to happen at 1 o'clock;" that "when they specified a day,
[307] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 249.
[308] The dispatch set forth, infra, concerning delivery at 1 p. m., December 7, of the 14-part memorandum.
[309] No. 908, dated December 7, read: "All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." Committee exhibit No. 1., p. 248.
[310] No. 909, dated December 7, read: "(From Bureau Chief Yamamoto to Commerical Attache Iguchi and his staff as well as to Secretary Yuki) I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[311] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[312] Id., No. 41.
[313] Committee record, pp. 10470-10479.
[314] See testimony of Captain Kramer before the committee; also Captain McCollum, committee record, p. 9275.
224 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that of course had significance, but not comparable to an hour;" and, again, that it was "a new item of information of a peculiar character." [315] At 11:30 or 11:40 a. m. General Marshall telephoned Admiral Stark [316] and, upon learning the latter had read the message, proposed that a warning be sent immediately to all theaters concerned. It should be noted that the exact time of Admiral Stark's arrival at the Navy Department is not definitely established although it is known that he was there by 10:30 a. m. on the morning of December 7, at the very latest. [317] Admiral Stark hesitated because he regarded the theater commanders as already alerted and he was afraid of confusing them further. [318] General Marshall nevertheless wrote in longhand the draft of a warning message to the Western Defense Command, the Panama Command, the Hawaiian Command, and the Philippine Command, as follows: [319]
"The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly."
He instructed Colonel Bratton to take the foregoing message immediately to the message center to be dispatched by radio but as Colonel Bratton was leaving the room, Admiral Stark called to request that there be placed on the dispatch the "usual expression to inform the naval officer". The following was therefore added in handwriting, by General Marshall, "Inform naval authorities of this communication" [320]
EVENTS ATTENDING TRANSMITTAL OF THE DECEMBER 7 DISPATCH
By 11:50 a. m. the handwritten warning had been delivered by Colonel Bratton to Colonel French, [321] in charge of the message center. When Colonel Bratton returned, General Marshall inquired as to how much time would be required to encipher and dispatch the message. Not understanding the explanation, he instructed both Colonels Bratton and Bundy to obtain a clearer picture from the message center. These two officers upon returning advised that the message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes. Still not being satisfied, General Marshall is indicated to have sent the
[315] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Report, pp. 7, 8; committee record, p. 13806.
[316] See committee exhibit No. 58.
[317] See committee record, p. 5813. The testimony of some witnesses indicates Admiral Stark arrived at the Navy Department as early as 9 a.m.
[318] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 7, 8. Admiral Stark said: "During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall called me on the phone to ask if I knew of it. I told him I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time of presentation on to the various commanders in the Pacific. *My first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that I hesitated to send more*. I hung up the phone, and not more than a minute or two later I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p. m. and that I would go along with him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications were such that he could get it out quickly because our communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He replied that he felt they could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include in the dispatch instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites" Committee record, p. 5676.
[319] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 21.
[320] Id.
[321] Col Edward F. French.
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Two officers back again and their report upon returning was regarded as satisfactory; that is, he felt assured from what he was told that the warning would be received by the pertinent commanders before 1:00 p. m. [322]
After receiving the message Colonel French personally took charge of its dispatch. Learning that the War Department radio had been out of contact with Honolulu since approximately 10:20 a. m. he hereupon immediately decided that the most expeditious manner of getting the message to Hawaii was by commercial facilities; that is, Western Union to San Francisco, thence by commercial radio to Honolulu. The message was filed at the Army signal center at 12:01 a. m. (6:31 a. m., Hawaii); teletype transmission to Western Union completed at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m., Hawaii); received by RCA Honolulu 1:03 p. m. (7:33 a. m., Hawaii); received by signal office, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at approximately 5:15 p. m. (11:45 a. m., Hawaii) after the attack. It appears that the teletype arrangement between RCA in Honolulu and Fort Shafter was not operating at the particular hour the message was received with the result that it was dispatched by a messenger on a bicycle who was diverted from completing delivery by the first bombing.
CHOICE OF FACILITIES
Colonel French testified that important messages to be transmitted immediately had previously been sent by commercial means when there was interference on the Army circuit between Honolulu and the War Department; that on the morning of December 7 Honolulu appeared to be in touch with San Francisco; that he had a teletype connection from his office to the Western Union office in Washington and knew Western Union had a tube connecting with RCA across the street in San Francisco; that RCA had 40 kilowatts of power whereas his set had 10 kilowatts; and that he concluded the fastest means of transmission would be via Western Union and RCA. He stated that he acted within his authority in deciding to send the message by commercial means and did not tell General Marshall how the message was going. [323]
Colonel French stated further that he had not considered using the telephone; that the telephone was never used by the signal center; that it was unsuitable for a classified message, and that, in any event "if they wanted to use the telephone that was up to the individuals themselves, Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned." [324]
According to General Marshall, the telephone was not considered as a means of transmission, or that it may have been considered but would not have been used, he was quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first; that if he had thought he could put a telephone call through, he would have called General MacArthur first, and then would have called
[322] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 8-10,14. There is some testimony indicating only two trip were made by Colonel Bratton to the message center.
[323] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 188, 195; Roberts Commission Record, pp. 1843, 1844, 1846.
[324] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 189-205.
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the Panama Canal. He observed that it was important to send the message in code because it was not known what "one o'clock meant" and that it might have meant only a termination of diplomatic relations or some action in southeast Asia. General Marshall pointed out that there was no secrecy in the telephone and that he was trying to gain time and yet had to be careful not to "precipitate the whole business" or do anything which could be construed as an act of war; that it was important not to disclose to the Japanese our reading of their codes. [325]
With respect to the matter of using Navy radio facilities, Colonel French stated that the Navy used more power than did the Army and occasionally the Army asked the Navy to communicate messages but that in practice they did not use the Navy for expediting traffic to Honolulu. He considered the possible use of Navy transmission of the warning message but decided against it since it would have required time to determine whether the Navy was also having trouble getting through to Hawaii and the message would have had to be delivered from the Navy at Pearl Harbor to Fort Shafter. [326]
General Marshall had no knowledge on the morning of December 7 that the Army radio could not establish contact with Hawaii nor that the Navy had a more powerful radio to Honolulu. [327] It is to be noted that the message got through to addressees other than Hawaii prior to the attack.
After the event it is easy to find other means of communication which General Marshall might have employed. This will always be the case. It is clear from the record, however, that he selected a secure means dictated by the contents of the message and was assured after two or three requests for verification that the message would get through in adequate time. It did not reach Hawaii because of a failure in communications concerning which he could not have known and concerning which he was not advised. It was the failure of communications and not the selection of an improper channel that occasioned the delay.
While it is not regarded as contributing to the disaster, for reasons hereinafter to appear, it is considered extremely regrettable that Colonel French did not advise the Chief of Staff upon his inability to employ the Army's radio, the anticipated means of communication, particularly when he realized the great importance of the message and the-personal concern of the Chief of Staff for its expeditious transmittal.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "ONE O'CLOCK" AND CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES
No one knew or presumed to know definitely just what the time "one o'clock" meant. [328] Indeed, the warning sent by the Chief of
[325] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Record, pp. 10-14. See also Roberts Commission record, p. 1803.
[326] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 203, 204. Roberts Commission record, p. 1844.
[327] Roberts Commission record, p. 1801.
[328] Admiral Stark observed: "My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that and as there was no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be just as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not to send too much, it might create the story of 'wolf'." Committee Record, page 5815. In this regard it is to be noted that Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel said that he thought there had been too much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. See Hart Inquiry Record, page 64.
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Staff stated "*just what significance the hour set may have we do not know*." Despite this fact the Hawaiian commanders have asserted or implied that if they had received this information at the earliest possible moment on the morning of December 7, they would have anticipated a surprise air attack upon Pearl Harbor and have instituted appropriate defensive measures accordingly. [329] It is to be noted, however, that one of the asserted justifications by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for their not having taken the necessary defensive measures prior to December 7 was the fact that the warnings they had received, while indicating that war was imminent, pointed to southeast Asia and not to Hawaii as the likely point of attack.
There was nothing in the fact that the Japanese ambassadors were to present their Government's reply to the American note of November 26 at 1 p. m., December 7, pointing any more to an attack on Hawaii than to any other point to which General Marshall directed is dispatch: Panama, the west coast, the Philippines. The intelligence contained in the "one o'clock" intercept indicated no more than the distinct possibility that *some* Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m.
What Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have done upon receiving this intelligence or the Marshall dispatch before the attack necessarily speculative.
Testifying before the Roberts Commission concerning that portion of the December 7 warning pointing out that instructions had been issued for the Japanese Embassy to destroy its code machine immediately, General Short was asked whether his dispositions would have been changed if the message had reached him, say three hours before he attack. He replied: [330]
"General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either to at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a complete attack, because it looked so significant.
"The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up?
"General SHORT. The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered the code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ultimatum."
It is to be noted that when appearing before the Roberts Commission, General Short insisted he had no knowledge concerning the destruction by Japanese diplomatic representatives of codes and confidential papers, prior to December 7. As has been seen, the evidence before this committee reflects that he received substantially this information on December 6.
Admiral Kimmel has likewise suggested that the fact the Japanese Washington Embassy had been ordered to destroy its code machine would have been of greater significance to him than information received on December 3 that the Embassy, among others, had been ordered to destroy "most of its codes." [331] With respect to the latter
[329] General Short said: "This message (the one o'clock message) definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washington time." Committee Record, page 7992.
[330] Roberts Commission record, pp. 1619, 1620.
[331] Committee record, pp. 7476, 7477.
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intelligence Admiral Kimmel has testified: [332] "I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it * * *" Significantly, however, on December 6 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District advised the Navy Department: "believe local consul has destroyed all but one system * * *" [333]
It is concluded that the information contained in the Japanese intercept of December 7 instructing the Washington Embassy to destroy its remaining code machine, added little if any information to that already possessed by Admiral Kimmel concerning Japanese destruction of codes and confidential matter; and that if the intelligence supplied him in this regard on December 3 did not serve to warn of the immediate imminence of war the information concerning the destruction of the Japanese code machine on the morning of December 7 would not have effectively modified the situation. In the case of General Short, as elsewhere pointed out, it appears that while Admiral Kimmel did not supply him with the intelligence he had received concerning the destruction of codes, the Commanding General none-the-less received information of an equivalent character.
We believe, however, that the "one o'clock" intercept should have been recognized as indicating the distinct possibility that some Japanese military action would occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7 Washington time. If properly appreciated, this intercept should have suggested a dispatch to *all* Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.
SIGNIFICANT MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER THE ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING HAWAIIAN DEFENSES
One of the most unfortunate circumstances attending the handling of Magic is the fact that several very significant messages were not translated until after the attack. After December 7, 13 messages [334] between Tokyo and Honolulu from November 24 to December 6 were translated, several of these differing markedly from any of the messages between these points translated prior to December 7. Three of the 13 messages were from Tokyo, two of which related to instructions and interest concerning fleet locations and movements [335] with the third, however, containing for the first time an inquiry from Tokyo concern-
[332] Id., at P. 7477.
[333] The extreme importance of codes being destroyed in the consulates was expressed by Admiral Ingersoll in his testimony:
"I considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, 'this is a war warning' in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off . . .
"The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.
"Now in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hongkong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, *it meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleet as soon as we got it* * * *" Committee record, pp. 11286, 11287.
[334] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 16-29.
[335] Id., at pp. 18, 26.
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ing the defenses of the fleet in port. The latter message dated December 2 (translated December 30) read: [336]
"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets."
The messages translated after December 7 from Honolulu to Tokyo so reflect for the first time that information relating to the defenses at Pearl Harbor was being collected and supplied to Japan. In a message of November 24, Tokyo was advised that on the preceding night five mine layers had conducted mine-laying operations outside the harbor. [337] A November 28 message reported, "there are eight 'B-17' planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?)"; that "12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January"; and that "there has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." [338]
Of extreme significance are two messages of December 6 (both translated December 8) one of which reads as follows: [339]
"Re the last part of your #123. [340]
"1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, there are limits in the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. *I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places*."
"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."
The other message of December 6 from Honolulu to Tokyo reported, among other things, "it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." [341]
Also of particular interest is a message from Honolulu on December 3 [342] establishing a "number code" to indicate whether warships of a given category were preparing to sortie or had departed. A system
[336] Id., at p. 21. This message was transmitted from Hawaii and was translated by the Army in Washington, the translation bearing the notation, "This message was received on December 23."
[337] Translated December 16, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, p 17.
[338] Translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 19.
[339] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 27, 28. Army translation. *The record indicates that this information was taken from material published in newspapers*.
[340] See committee exhibit No 2, p. 21.
[341] Id., p. 29. Army translation.
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of houselights, newspaper want ads and bonfires, in addition to the use of a sail boat, was designed to indicate the code numbers. While I this system of communication did not relate to the defenses of Hawaii it was clearly in anticipation that the normal channels for transmitting information regarding the movements of the feet might be cut off and that a visual means of communication, probably to submarines offshore, was desired. It is also to be noted that no provision was made in the code for transmitting information concerning the departure of ships after December 6.
This message was decrypted and translated in rough form on December 6 by a civilian translator in the Navy Department, it having been received from a radio intercept station of the Army at Fort Hunt, Va. While Captain Kramer testified he had no positive recollection of having seen the translation prior to the attack, the evidence tends to indicate that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6 but that on account of the pressure of work on other important diplomatic messages, including the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14- part memorandum, no action was taken on the translation until December 8. [343] It is to be noted that this intercept of December 3 was in a code system referred to as "PA-K2" whereas the important Japanese 14- part reply which started coming in on the afternoon of December 6 was in the so-called Purple code system. The Purple was afforded first priority which, it appears, explains Captain Kramer's not giving undivided attention to the PA-K2 dispatch of December 3 together with the fact that this message was badly garbled and the civilian translator who handled it, while proficient in Japanese, had not as yet had adequate experience concerning the handling of the intercepted dispatches. [344]
CONSIDERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN TRANSLATIONS
Of the 13 messages between Tokyo and Honolulu intercepted before December 7 but not translated until after the attack, 5 were transmitted on or after December 4. The evidence shows that because of technical difficulties a delay of 3 days in transmitting, decoding, and translating such messages was not unusual or unreasonable. [345]
[343] Id., pp. 22-24.
[345] See Hewitt Inquiry Record, pp. 588, 589; also pp. 511-515.
*Captain Safford stated that on the week end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traffic on a busy day *. Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 756.
[346] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, pp. 9283, 9284. The December 3 dispatch from the Honolulu consul was obtained by the district intelligence officer of the Navy in Hawaii and was turned over on December 5, 1941, to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, Being in the more simple PA-K2 system the unit in Hawaii while capable of breaking the message down did not decrypt and translate it until after the attack.
[345] In discussing the matter of delays in securing the translations of the Magic, General Miles stated:
"* * * it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up.
"In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila.
"Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in Washington by air mail.
"So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington but also the actual intercepting of the message in the field and the transmission of those messages to Washington." Committee record, pp. 2111, 2112.
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The same difficulty partially explains the delays ranging from 5 to 9 days in decoding and translating six of the eight messages transmitted prior to December 4.
Of the remaining two messages, one dated November 24 was not translated until 20 days after it had been received in Washington. The key in which this message was transmitted was not recovered until about December 16. The other is the message from Tokyo, dated December 2, requesting information as to observation balloons and antimine nets at Pearl Harbor. A transmission of this message was intercepted by a Navy station on the west coast on December 2 and was received by the Navy on December 6 by air mail. This version of the intercept text, however, was badly garbled and the actual decoding and translating was based on a copy obtained from the Honolulu office of a radio corporation after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The two messages transmitted from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, reporting the absence of barrage balloons, torpedo nets, and air reconnaissance, were intercepted by an Army station on the west coast at 7:22 p. m. on December 6 and 12:42 a. m. on December 6, respectively (Washington time), but were not processed as rapidly as were the diplomatic messages transmitted from Tokyo to Washington on the same night. On the basis of experience as to the contents of messages over particular circuits and in particular codes, the very highest priority was given to messages between Tokyo and Washington transmitted in the most secure Japanese code, the so-called Purple, and the "pilot message" of December 6 had alerted the services to what was coming on the Tokyo- Washington circuit.
The messages from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 were transmitted in the PA-K2 code system, a relatively insecure Japanese code and one past experience had shown was not ordinarily used for messages which Tokyo considered of the highest importance. The actual content of any message could not of course be known until it had been decoded and translated, and before the attack there was no reason to suspect that the two messages sent from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 would prove of unusual interest. It is to be noted, however, that the low-grade PA-K2 system was virtually the only code available to the Honolulu consul after he had destroyed his major codes pursuant to instructions from Tokyo on December 2. [346]
Despite the unfortunate fact that these messages were not processed prior to December 7, no basis exists for criticizing the system which was set up for decrypting and translating the intercepted Japanese messages and for determining the priorities in the processing of the various classes of messages. The evidence shows that throughout the period of tense relations between the United States and Japan in 1941, the important diplomatic messages were intercepted, transmitted to Washington, decoded and translated, and disseminated with utmost speed. Not infrequently they were in the hands of the authorized recipients of Magic in our Government as soon as they were in the
[346] See exhibit No. 1, pp. 215, 216.
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hands of the Japanese addressees. Many of the civilian and military personnel engaged in handling the Magic worked long hours far in excess of those prescribed with no additional compensation nor special recognition. *The success achieved in reading the Japanese diplomatic codes merits the highest commendation and all witnesses familiar with Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives*. [347]
CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON WHICH WAS NOT SUPPLIED HAWAII
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have complained that they were wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington through the Magic which would have altered completely their estimate of the situation and would have resulted, if it had been supplied them, in a proper alert and appropriate dispositions consistent with an adequate defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. In a prepared statement, read before the committee, Admiral Kimmel said: [348]
"The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action four years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.
"Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on November 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the West Coast. I would have gone to sea with the Fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the Fleet to meet an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the Fleet fueled, however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time of detachments of various units of the main body of the Fleet."
In the last analysis, however, there are only four messages or groups of messages which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contend pointed to Pearl Harbor as a likely place of attack; i. e., the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches, [349] the deadline messages, [350] the dispatches which indicated the fraudulent nature of Japanese negotiations after November 28, [350a] and the dispatch specifying 1 p. m., December 7, as the time for delivery of the Japanese memorandum to the Secretary of State. [350b]
Referring to the berthing plan (and related dispatches) Admiral Kimmel said, [350c] "These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to
[347] See note 113, supra.
[348] See committee record, pp. 6805, 6806.
[349] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.
[350a] See section "Dispatches Indicating Fraudulent Nature of Negotiations after November 28, 1941," supra.
[350b] See section "Significance of the 'One o'clock' and Code Destruction Messages," supra.
[350c] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.
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an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Additionally, he has indicated that the dispatches concerning the deadlines and fraudulent negotiations [350d] pointed to Pearl Harbor.
During the course of committee examination General Short was asked whether, "outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into five divisions," there was any information among the Magic intelligence which pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon any other place. He replied: [350e]
"That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery of the message was at 1 p. m. Washington time, which would be shortly after dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication."
At another point, referring to the "harbor berthing plan" and the so- called "one o'clock" message, General Short said, [350f] "I think those two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor" and that the other intercepted messages related to the "more tense situation as it developed."
As heretofore pointed out, we are unable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in view of the evidence indicating it was not such. [350g] We are of the opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with other information and intelligence available to them, in making their estimate of the situation.
We believe that the deadline messages and the messages indicating fraudulent Japanese diplomacy after November 28 in themselves no more indicated Hawaii as a likely point of attack than any other point in the Pacific. The equivalent of this intelligence was supplied Admiral Kimmel in the dispatch of November 27 beginning, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" and advising, "negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." It was supplied General Short in the November 27 warning, stating, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."
The "one o'clock intercept", as previously indicated, was an unusual piece of intelligence suggesting the distinct possibility that some
[350d] See committee record, pp. 6791-6793.
[350e] Committee record, pp. 8126, 8127. At another point, when asked if his thought was that the Magic messages that were not sent Hawaii would have been more important than the messages he did receive, General Short said: "There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m. which could have been sent to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack. These two messages would have meant something to me." Committee record, p. 8201.
[360f] Id., at pp. 8126-8128.
[350g] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.
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Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m. but it did not reasonably point to Pearl Harbor any more than to any other place in the Pacific. This intelligence indicated the need for particular alertness at 1 p. m. to meet the dangers contemplated on the basis of estimates already made as to where a Japanese attack might come.
The burden of the statements of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the committee is that Washington withheld vital information from them. In fact, Admiral Kimmel has charged that the Navy Department's handling of Magic constituted an affirmative misrepresentation. On the basis of the evidence before the committee, this charge is without foundation in fact.
Both Hawaiian commanders all but ignore the fact that they are properly chargeable with possessing far more vital intelligence indicating an attack on Hawaii than was in the hands of anyone in the War or Navy Departments. They had, among other things, correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. From these assumptions and the estimate and action taken on the basis of information available to them, it is problematical as to what steps would have been taken by the Hawaiian commanders had they received all of the intelligence which they contend was withheld from them.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON
The evidence reflects that virtually everyone in Washington was surprised Japan struck Pearl Harbor at the time she did. Among the reasons for this conclusion was the apparent Japanese purpose to move toward the south the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula; and the feeling that Hawaii was a near-impregnable fortress that Japan would not incur the dangers of attacking. The latter consideration necessarily contemplated that Hawaii was alert and that the enemy would be met with the full weight of Army and Navy power provided for defense. It is apparent, however, that an attack on the fleet by Japan at some time was regarded as a distinct possibility. The warning messages sent the Hawaiian commanders contained orders requiring defensive measures against this possibility. Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans in the Navy Department, is the only officer in Washington in the higher echelons who indicated a strong belief that Hawaii would be attacked he testified that he