Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report of the Joint

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Tue Jan 24, 2017 11:56 pm

Exhibit D Cont'd.

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then asked whether, under such circumstances, it believed the proposed  Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would be likely to contribute to the high  purposes "which we have mutually had in mind." The reply concluded by  stating that it was the belief of the United States Government that  renewed consideration of the fundamental principles which it had long  advocated would aid in reaching a meeting of minds in regard to the  essential questions on which agreement was sought and would thus lay a  firm foundation for the proposed meeting, and that it was the  President's earnest hope that a discussion of the fundamental questions  might be so developed that the meeting could be held (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 656-661). After reading the reply, Ambassador Nomura commented that  he thought his Government would be disappointed because of its very  earnest desire to hold the meeting, but that in any case he would  transmit it to his Government, which he did the same day (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 655; ex. 1, p. 50). He added that he was convinced that the  Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no  ulterior purpose. He said, however, that in view of the difficulties of  the internal situation in Japan, he did not think his Government could  go any further at this time (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655).

In a memorandum bearing the same date, October 2 (Washington time),  which was distributed to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in  addition to Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and other high officers  in the War Department, Colonel Hayes A. Kronor, Acting Assistant Chief  of Staff, G-2, reached the following conclusions:

"10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of  leaders nor economic concessions at this point would be of any material  advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw  from the Axis were obtained prior to the conference. * * *

"11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the  Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before  us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis  Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and  economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time,  the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the  Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the  Tripartite Pact.  The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy"  by the United States is still clearly indicated (ex. 33)."

The following undated note, in Secretary Stimson's handwriting, appears  at the end of his copy of the above memorandum:

"Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them  strongly.  I believe however that during the next three months while we are rearming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an  explosion by the Japanese Army. Put concretely this means, that while I  approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should  not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President  and P. M. [1] I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held  would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally  important relations with China (ex. 33)."

Admiral Stark testified before the Committee that he neither opposed or  approved the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and  Premier Konoye. He continued:

"I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the  President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss  something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement  regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished (tr.  6308).

[1] Prime Minister Konoye.

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In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull set forth at length the considerations which were taken into account in determining  the position to be taken by the United States Government regarding the  proposed "leaders conference" (tr. 1120-1124).

The next day, October 3 (Washington time), after he had forwarded the United States reply to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister  Toyoda a long report on the situation in the United States as he saw it.  His report began by stating

"although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. Talks have finally  reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an  absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United  States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope  to penetrate through (ex. 1, p. 51-52)."

He expressed the view that an "understanding" between Japan and the  United States hinged on one point, the problem of the evacuation of the  Japanese troops from China (ex. 1, p. 53).

During the next 2 weeks the Japanese Foreign Office made repeated  efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo to have the United States  Government state what further assurances it desired from the Japanese  Government, emphasizing that the position of Premier Konoye was daily  growing more difficult. Also during this period, Ambassador Nomura  appears to have incurred the displeasure of Foreign Minister Toyoda. In  a message to the Foreign Minister on October 8 (Washington time), the  Ambassador indicated that he agreed with many of Secretary Hull's  criticisms of the Japanese proposals of September 6, which the Foreign  Office had prepared. He expressed the opinion that

"In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did  we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal  conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees  we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated  concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We  limited the area to which the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment  would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was  geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the  question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China  (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands  which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that  they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact.  These points you probably already know (ex. 1, p. 59)."

As the result of repeated instructions from the Foreign Minister to obtain from Secretary Hull an expression of his views regarding the  three major points of difference between the two Governments, i. e.,  which had developed in the earlier conversations, namely, (1) the  withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan's obligations under the  Tripartite Pact, and (3) nondiscrimination in international trade,  Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on October 9 (Washington  time) (vol. II, pp. 670 672). The Ambassador's report of this meeting  (ex. 1, p. 61) was plainly unsatisfactory to Foreign Minister Toyoda,  for on October 10 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador  Nomura that he was well aware of the Ambassador's opinions and that what  he wanted was "the opinions of the American officials and none other."  Saying that "slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has  reached the decisive stage," and that he was doing his utmost "to bring  about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this  senseless procrastination," he told Ambassador Nomura:

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"You do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with  these parleys. You do not tell me how Hull answers. You do not tell me  anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire  me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what  they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you  interview Hull or the President of the United States, please take  Wakasugi or Iguchi with you and please send me without delay the  complete minutes of what transpires (ex. 1, p. 63)."

On the same afternoon, October 10 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda  requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and during their conversation  told Ambassador Grew that Ambassador Nomura had been "unable to provide  the information" he had asked for and that-

"a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit  through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received,  would have measurably accelerated the present conversations (ex. 30, p.  454)."

The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew that in order to prevent  further delay he was requesting the Ambassador to ask his Government to  reply to the following question:

"The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United  States with reference to certain questions proposals which are  apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will  the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its  consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government  which would be satisfactory to the American Government (ex. 29, vol. II,  p. 678)?"

 He continued by saying that since

"he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the  question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to  assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral  Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the  personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official  in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to  undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the  Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in  the event that it was decided to send the official in question to  Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on  the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the  official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the  United-States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the  Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would  transmit his inquiry to my Government.

"In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to  me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of  expediting the progress of the conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679)."

Ambassador Nomura replied to Foreign Minister Toyoda's message of October 10 (Japan time) on the same date (Washington time):

"What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and they  claim that our policy is semipacific and semiaggressive. They say that  our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements  and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory  talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters  mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other  objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not  understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at  least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance  with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. *I am sure  that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a  conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.*

"In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they  have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider  at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of  their answer of the 2nd (ex. I, p. 63).

On October 13 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled instructions  to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington,

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Mr. Wakasugi, who had just returned to Washington after 2 weeks in  Japan, to call upon Under Secretary Welles. In his message, the Foreign  Minister said that he was particularly anxious to be advised as soon as  possible as to whether he could assume that the United States had no  particular disagreements other than the three major points and whether  the United States would submit a counterproposal to the Japanese  proposals of September 27. He said:

"The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, and it is becoming  absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of  Japanese-U S relations is to be accomplished (ex 1, p 64)."

Counselor Wakasugi talked with Under Secretary Welles on the afternoon of October 13 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 680-686). Admiral Nomura sent two  reports of that meeting to Tokyo, on the same day (ex. 1, pp. 66-68).  His first report stated that so far as Mr. Welles knew there were no  obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference other than  the three major points, though there might be one or two others, and  that the United States had no intention of submitting any  counterproposal other than those of June 21 and October 2. His second  report was a more detailed description of the Welles-Wakasugi meeting.  In reply, the Foreign Minister said that these reports had "clarified  many points" and "that there is no need for us to make any further move  until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the  concrete proposal any further" (ex. 1, pp. 69-70).

In Tokyo, the Japanese Government also made frequent overtures to the officials at the American Embassy. Thus, early on October 7 (Japan  time), the Premier's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor  Dooman (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 662-663) and complained that the failure of  the preliminary conversations to make any progress had made the  Premier's position difficult. He concluded his remarks with the comment  that

"the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American  Government to give specifications with regard to the character of the  undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut  reply as not forthcoming to bring the conversations to a close (ex 29,  vol. II, p 663)."

This meeting appears to have been preliminary to a meeting the same  morning between Ambassador Grew and the Foreign Minister, at the  latter's request. At that meeting, as on the occasion of subsequent  calls by Mr. Terasaki on Counselor Dooman and Ambassador Grew on October  8 and 9, the Japanese endeavored to obtain comments on the American  reply of October 2. It was again indicated that the Japanese Government  wished to know more definitely what undertakings the United States  Government wanted it to give. These efforts culminated in Foreign  Minister Toyoda's request of Ambassador Grew on October 10 that he  submit that question to Secretary Hull. On that occasion Ambassador Grew  commented at length on the opinion he had conveyed the day before to the  Foreign Minister, that the reports he had received of plans to dispatch  additional Japanese troops to Indochina in substantial numbers "could  not but seriously and adversely affect these conversations (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 679).

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GERMANY DEMANDS THAT JAPAN WARN THE UNITED STATES THAT WAR BETWEEN  GERMANY AND ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD LEAD TO WAR BETWEEN JAPAN  AND THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT

(October 1941)

The intercepted Japanese messages show that during the latter part of September and the early part of October both the German and Italian  Ambassadors sought to obtain from Foreign Minister Toyoda confidential  information regarding the Japanese-American conversations. In contrast  with the policy followed by his predecessor, Foreign Minister Matsuoka,  from whom the Axis partners had obtained such information, Foreign  Minister Toyoda declined to give them any (ex. 1, p. 71).

Failing in this, after the German attacks on American merchant vessels  and the movement in the United States for revision of the Neutrality  Act, the Germans took a stronger line. This became known to the United  States not only from intercepted messages but also through statements  made by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau, to  Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on October 15 (Japan time). Mr. Amau told  Ambassador Grew

"that the German Government is insistently pressing for the issuance of  a statement by the Japanese Government in confirmation of the  interpretation given to the Tripartite Pact by Mr. Matsuoka, to the  effect that Japan will declare war on they United States in the event of  war occurring between Germany and the United States. As a reply,  although it has not yet been decided when or whether such reply will be  rendered to the German Government, the Japanese Government is  considering a formula of a noncommittal nature to the effect that  maintenance of peace in the Pacific is envisaged in the Tripartite Pact  and that the attention of the American Government has been sought for  its earnest consideration of Japan's obligations under the Pact (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 686)."

The following day, however, Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador  Nomura that early in October

"the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to  the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese  Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to  attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would  inevitably arise between Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and the  United States, on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the  convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and  might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United  States. We have not as yet submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider  carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The  German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request, and  there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any  longer. While Japan, on the one hand, finds it necessary to do something  in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power  Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is  desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations.  Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United  States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my  separate telegram #672 and as would not affect the Japanese-American  negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me  and you (ex. 1, p. 71)."

The proposed "warning" to the United States sent to Ambassador Nomura in  the Foreign Minister's separate telegram #672 was as follows:

"The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war.  Should, however, the

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recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a  state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite  Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in  its sincere desire that not only the German American relations will  cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be  alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now  requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government (ex. 1,  p. 71)."

Foreign Minister Toyoda never had an opportunity to select the  "appropriate moment" for the delivery of his warning, because the next  day Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet resigned *en bloc*. The German  Ambassador continued to press for action by Foreign Minister Togo;  Admiral Toyoda's successor, but by November 11 (Japan time) when the  Foreign Minister communicated with Ambassador Nomura concerning it, far  more vigorous measures were contemplated by the Japanese. Foreign  Minister Togo's reply erred on the side of understatement:

"I explained (to the German Ambassador) that there is a good chance that it would be more effective, under the present circumstances, for us to  present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations  to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether  a mere representation would bear any fruit (ex. 1, p. 117)."

THE KONOYE CABINET FALLS, AND AMBASSADOR NOMURA ASKS PERMISSION TO RETURN TO JAPAN

(October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941)

The attitude of the Japanese representatives in the conversations in  Washington and in Tokyo during the latter part of September and the  early part of October reflected developments within the Japanese  Government during that period. In turn, the course of those developments  was directly affected by the far-reaching decisions which had been made  at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time).  As has been  seen, it is now known that at that conference it had been decided that  if "by the early part of October" there should be "no reasonable hope"  of having the Japanese "demands" agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations

"we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against  America (and England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

This decision, according to Premier Konoye, had established a dead line  "beyond which negotiations could not proceed." The Japanese Government  "came more and more to feel that we were approaching a show-down" (ex.  173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 43).

As Ambassador Nomura had told Secretary Hull, with the presentation of its new proposals of September 6, its proposals for basic peace terms  with China on September 23, and its revision of the American proposals  of June 91 which had been delivered to Secretary Hull on September 27,  the Japanese Government took the position that there was nothing more  that it desired to say and that the next move was up to the United  States. In his memoirs, Premier Konoye criticizes the action of the  Japanese Foreign Office in submitting three proposals during September  without deciding that it would proceed with the September 27 plan  "alone, in complete disregard of the plans of the past" (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 46).

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This action, which left the Japanese intentions confused, was largely  responsible for the fact that the United States Government, in its reply  of October 2 (Washington time), had asked for a further clarification of  the Japanese intentions.

It is now known that before the United States' reply of October 2 was received in Tokyo and as a result of the fact that the deadline set on  September 6 was approaching at a faster rate than the conversations were  progressing, Premier Konoye began frequent conferences with members of  his Cabinet. He conferred on September 24 and 25 (Japan time) with the  War Minister, Navy Minister, Foreign Minister, and President of the Navy  Planning Board. From September 27 to October 1 (Japan time) he had  discussions with the Navy Minister "concerning the atmosphere in his  circle." On October 4 (Japan time), after receipt of the United States  reply of October 2, Premier Konoye had an audience with Emperor  Hirohito, following which there was a Joint Conference attended by the  chiefs of the Japanese High Command. On the evening of October 5 (Japan  time) he conferred with General Tojo, the War Minister, to whom he expressed the opinion "that he would continue negotiations (with the   United States) to the very end" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).

On the evening of October 7 (Japan time), General Tojo called on Premier  Konoye and declared that the Army would find it difficult to submit to  the withdrawal of its troops from China. In view of this attitude, on  October 8 (Japan time) Premier Konoye conferred with the Navy Minister  and the Foreign Minister concerning "methods of avoiding a crisis." He  met twice with Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 10 (Japan time), the  day on which the Foreign Minister asked Ambassador Grew to inquire from  the United States Government what additional assurances it desired the  Japanese Government to give. A Joint Conference was held on October 11  (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).

On Sunday, October 12 (Japan time), Premier Konoye called a meeting  attended by himself and the Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs,  together with the President of the Planning Board, which he described in his memoirs as "almost the last conference relative to peace or war."  Before the meeting he had learned that the Navy, although not desiring a  rupture in the negotiations, and wishing as much as possible to avoid  war, nevertheless was unwilling to state this publicly, and would  therefore leave the question of peace or war up to the Premier. At the  meeting, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs, the Navy Minister  stated:


"We have now indeed come to the crossroads where we must determine  either upon peace or war. I should like to leave this decision entirely  up to the Premier.  And, if we are to seek peace, we shall go all the  way for peace. Thus, even if we make a few concessions, we ought to  proceed all the way with the policy of bringing the negotiations to  fruition. * * * If we are to have war, we must determine upon war here  and now. Now is the time. We are now at the final moment of decision. If  we decide that we are not to have war, I should like to have us proceed  upon the policy that we will bring negotiations to fruition no matter  what happens (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."

In reply to this, Premier Konoye said:

"If we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I  myself would decide on continuing the negotiations (ex. 173. Konoye  Memoirs, p. 50)."

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General Tojo, the Minister of War, objected, saying:

"This decision of the Premier's is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought  we not to determine here whether or not there is any possibility of  bringing the negotiations to fruition? *To carry on negotiations for  which there is no possibility for fruition, and in the end to let slip  the time for fighting, would be a matter of the greatest consequence*  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."

General Tojo then asked Foreign Minister Toyoda whether he thought there was any possibility of bringing negotiations to fruition. In answer to  this question, the Foreign Minister replied that the most difficult  problem was the question of the withdrawal of troops from China. He continued:

"if in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from  its former assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if  on this point the Army states that it will be all right to make  concessions, however small they may be, then we cannot say that there is  no hope of bringing the negotiations to fruition (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 50)."

General Tojo, however, would not yield, saying:

"The problem of the stationing of troops, in itself means the life of the Army, and we shall not be able to make any concessions at all (ex.  173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."

According to Premier Konoye, although the conference lasted 4 hours, no  conclusion was arrived at before the meeting adjourned.  The following  day, October 13 (Japan time), Premier Konoye reported the situation to  Emperor Hirohito and Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and  a leader of the "senior statesmen." The next day the Premier met with  General Tojo before the Cabinet meeting and again asked his considered  opinion concerning the problem of the stationing of troops in China,  saying that he had a very great responsibility for the "China Incident,"  which was still unsettled, and that he found it difficult to agree "to  enter upon a greater war the future of which I cannot at all foresee."  He then urged, according to his memoirs, that Japan "ought to give in  for a time, grant to the United States the formality of withdrawing  troops, and save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war"  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 51).

In response to this, General Tojo declared

"if at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps that  are more and more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop.  The problem of withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the  honor and of seizing the fruits, but, to this, I find it difficult to  agree from the point of view of maintaining the fighting spirit of the  Army (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51)."

Premier Konoye records that thus General Tojo did not move from the  position he had taken, and the talk ended at odds. According to his  memoirs, at the Cabinet meeting which followed, General Tojo at the  outset "strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the Japanese- American negotiations should no longer be continued."  No further  reference to the question of continuing the negotiations was made at the  Cabinet meeting, as none of the Cabinet ministers would answer General  Tojo (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51.)

That evening General Tojo is reported to have sent a message to Premier  Konoye in which he said, in effect, that if the Navy's decision to  entrust the question of peace or war to the Premier was due to a desire  on the part of the Navy not to have a war, then the Imperial Conference  on September 6 "will have been fundamentally

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overturned," as the decisions reached at that conference would not have taken into account such an attitude on the part of the Navy. He then  expressed the belief that the entire Cabinet should resign and "declare  insolvent everything that has happened up to now and reconsider our  plans once more." He said that it was very hard for him to ask the  Premier to resign but that, as matters had come to pass, he could not  help but do so, and begged the Premier to exert his efforts toward  having the Emperor designate Prince Higashikuni, the Chief of the  General Staff, as the next Premier, in the belief that only an imperial  prince would have power to keep control of the Army and the Navy and to  refashion a plan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52).

The next day, October 15 (Japan time), Premier Konoye was received by  Emperor Hirohito, to whom the Premier reported the foregoing  developments. The Emperor expressed doubts concerning the desirability  of naming Prince Higashikuni the next Premier, saying, according to  Premier Konoye:

"In time of peace it would be all right, but in a situation in which we  fear that there may be war, and when we also think further of the  interests of the Imperial House, I question the advisability of a member of royalty standing forth (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52)."

That evening the Premier secretly discussed the situation with Prince  Higashikuni, who said he desired several days to think the matter over.  However, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs, the situation would not  permit further delay, and the following morning all of the Cabinet  members submitted their resignations. The next day the "senior  statesmen" met in consultation regarding the selection of the next  Premier, but Prince Konoye did not attend (ex. 1, 3, Konoye Memoirs, pp.  52-53). Instead, he submitted a long letter explaining in detail the  chain of events leading to the resignation of his Cabinet (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, appendix IX, pp. 87-91).

Several of the intercepted Japanese messages confirm Prince Konoye's  emphasis upon the Army's stand regarding the withdrawal of Japanese  troops from China as one of the main causes of the resignation of the  Konoye Cabinet. Thus, on October 15 (Washington time), shortly after the  Cabinet meetings in Tokyo at which General Tojo refused to make any  concessions regarding the evacuation of troops from China, Ambassador  Nomura reported to the Foreign Office that the Japanese military attache  at the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been

"instructed by the Headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an  inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops.  They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand  regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point (ex. 1, p. 70)."

On October 17 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador  Nomura that the Cabinet had resigned, saying:

"The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is  true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the  matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However,  regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the  United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated.  There shall be no changes in this respect.

"Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single  purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before (ex. 1, p.  76)."

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The Imperial Command to form a new Cabinet was given on October 17 (Japan time) to General Hideki Tojo, who not only became Premier but  also took the portfolios of the War and Home Ministries.  In addition to  having been War Minister in the preceding Cabinet of Premier Konoye,  General Tojo was an Army officer on the active list. The same day,  Premier Konoye's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor  Dooman at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and through him conveyed to  Ambassador Grew from the Premier

"a very interesting explanation of the circumstances which had led to  the fall of the cabinet and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister  to ensure the appointment of a successor who would continue the  conversations with the United States.  The circumstances were  extraordinarily dramatic and constitute what may in future be regarded  as one of the really big moments in Japanese history (ex. 30, p. 458)."

Mr. Ushiba also delivered to Ambassador Grew a letter from Prince Konoye in which he stated that he felt certain

"that the Cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have  been carrying on up till today (ex. 30, p. 457)."

The following week, a "reliable Japanese informant" gave Ambassador Grew  the following account of the events leading up the resignation of the  Konoye Cabinet:

"The informant called on me at his own request this evening. He told me  that just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet a conference of the  leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces  had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to  pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with  the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended  this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the  latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the  Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the  armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand  necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a  position effectively to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of  Prince Konoye, and the appointment of General Tojo who, while remaining  in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to  conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations (ex.  29, vol. II, p. 697)."

On October 16 (Washington time), in a conversation with Lord Halifax,  the British Ambassador in the United States, Ambassador Nomura said:

"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal differences  between on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who wished to reach  agreement with the United States by not insisting on the third point  mentioned above (the right to station troops in China), and on the other  hand those who thought that not to insist on this point would involve  too great a loss of face.

"But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy. The  Emperor was in favor of peace, and even if a general were made Prime  Minister, it was unlikely that the Emperor's wishes would be  disregarded.

"The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United  States press today was of no importance, and might be disregarded.

"Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the United  States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid  for it (ex. 158)."

Two days later, on October 18 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura  cabled his congratulations to the new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo,  at the same time expressing his fear that he would not "be able to  accomplish much in the future" and asking the new Foreign Minister's  approval of his returning to Japan "in the near 

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future so that I may personally report the situation here" (ex. 1, p. 79). He expressed similar views in a message (ex. 1, p. 80) to the  Japanese Navy Minister on October 20 (Washington time), and in a message  to the new Foreign Minister 2 days later in which he said:

"I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. * * * Nor do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the  bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical  existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee  from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way  that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return  to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured  your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my  rudeness (ex. 1, p. 81)."

On October 23 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador  Nomura that the outcome of the negotiations would "have a great bearing  upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue,"  and expressed the hope that the Ambassador would see fit "to sacrifice  all of (his) personal wishes and remain at (his) post" (ex. 1, p. 82).  On November 4 (Japan time), the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador  Nomura to "compose yourself and make up your mind to do your best."  Finally, on November 5 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura cabled the  Foreign Minister that after careful consideration "I have decided to  continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be" (ex.  1, p. 100).

THE TOJO CABINET FORMULATES ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"

(November 5, 1941)

As the result of the Cabinet crisis in Japan, the State Department in Washington considered the dispatch of a personal message from President  Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito urging Japan to join with the United  States to preserve peace in the Pacific area, but stating that if Japan  should start new military operations the United States "would have to  seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to  prevent any extension" of the war (ex. 20). Such a message was not sent,  however, pending clarification of the situation in Japan and the  policies of the new Japanese Government (ex. 20; tr. 4494-4501).

Commencing October 17 (Japan time) the Tojo Cabinet engaged in  preparations for a formal determination of the policies it would follow,  and such a determination was made at an Imperial Conference on November  5 (Japan time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador  Nomura received only general instructions from the Japanese Foreign  Office concerning the course he should follow in further talks with the  Americans. He was, however, advised on October 21 (Japan time) that

"the new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere  desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our  country has said practically l she can say in the way of expressing of  opinions and setting forth our stands. *We feel that we have now reached  a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to  urge the United States to reconsider her views.*

"We urge therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or  Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our  country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this  matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal  United States counter proposal to our proposal of 27 September (ex. 1,  p. 81)."

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These instructions were concurred in by the Japanese War and Navy Ministers (ex. 1, p. 84).

In accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions, Minister  Wakasugi called on Under Secretary Welles on October 24 (Washington  time). The Minister told the Under Secretary that the new Japanese  Government desired to follow the policy of the preceding Government and  to continue the conversations without delay, adding that in his belief  the new Government

"had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense  public opinion to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that  the conversations be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily (ex.  29, vol. II, p. 693)."

He then asked whether the United States had as yet any counterproposals  to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Government on  September 27. In reply, Mr. Welles made it clear that the United States  would be glad to continue the conversations, but suggested that recent  belligerent public statements by high Japanese officials and the tone of  the Japanese press were not helpful to the atmosphere in which the  conversations would take place. When Minister Wakasugi pointed to a  recent speech by Secretary of the Navy Knox in which Mr. Knox had said  that a Japanese-American war was inevitable and that the United States  Navy was on a "24- our basis," Mr. Welles said that this simply showed  the effect on the Navy of the statements being made in Japan. In reply  to the Minister's inquiry regarding the possibility of counterproposals  being submitted by the United States, Mr. Welles said that the United  States position was fully set forth in its draft proposals of June 21  and the statement delivered to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, and that  for this reason he did not think any counterproposals by the United  States were called for. The conversation concluded with a discussion of  the possibility of taking up the three major points of disagreement in  the following order: (1) Economic nondiscrimination, (2) Japan's status  under the Tri-Partite Pact, and (3) the China question (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 692-697). A full report on this conversation was immediately sent to  Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 1, pp. 82-84).

Four days later Minister Wakasugi cabled his own lengthy appraisal of  the general attitude of the United States (ex. 1, pp. 86-87). The basic  United States policy, he said, was the crushing of the so-called  Hitlerism, which he defined as "the establishment of a new order through  the force of arms." Because the United States "presumed" that Japan  intended to develop the French Indo-China and Thailand area "under the principle of our military's coprosperity sphere, in a monopolistic  manner, and through the force of arms," as contrasted with America's  principle of economic nondiscrimination, there had arisen "a clash of  ideologies." He said that there was every indication that the United  States Government was "anxious to adjust the relationship between the  two nations," but that he doubted that it would make any concessions  from its proposals of June 21 and October 2. He expressed the opinion  that the United States had completed its preparations "in the event of  the worst," and that "a course of economic pressure plus watchful  waiting" had been decided on. He felt, however, that all was not  hopeless and that by "good-naturedly" continuing the talks there would  be opened up "ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use  of world developments." He concluded his report by saying:

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"However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local  differences by insisting upon our freedom of action (sic), we must have  our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated,  but that our national relations will be severed.

"The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the  talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly  formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet  establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay  our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that  would be to our best interest (ex. 1, p. 87)."

On October 30 (Japan time) in Tokyo the new Foreign Minister received  the diplomatic corps individually, and during the course of his talk  with Ambassador Grew he expressed his desire that the Japanese-American  conversations be continued and be successfully brought to a conclusion  without delay, and he asked Ambassador Grew's cooperation to that end  (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 699-700). Ambassador Grew noted that, compared  with Admiral Toyoda who had preceded him, the new Foreign Minister was  "grim, unsmiling, and ultra- reserved" (ex. 30, p. 465). The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that he had told Ambassador Grew that  Japanese-American relations got worse unfortunate results would ensue, a  statement substantially similar to the statement he had made to Sir  Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, on October 26 (Japan time) (ex.  1, p. 91).

The great activity in Tokyo during the period immediately after the  formation of the Tojo Cabinet, and the attitude with which that Cabinet  approached the continuance of the Japanese-American conversations, is  illustrated by Foreign Minister Togo's message No. 725 of November 4  (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura:

"1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the  edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever  adjusting them.  In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy,  *the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some  days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are  at length able to bring forth a counterproposal for the resumption of  Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the  Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 and 727).*  This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the   conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

"2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no  longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain  pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States  of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to  gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, *but this is our  last effort. Both in name and spirit this counterproposal of ours is,  indeed, the last.* I want you to know that. *If through it we do not  reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be  ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the  brink of chaos.* I0 mean that the success or failure of the pending  discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of  Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this  die.*

"When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt  that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some  understanding we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and  yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick  and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with.  Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of  the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things,  our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes,  too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this  to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who  think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell  you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our  long-suffering. Nay, when it come to a question of our existence and our  honor, when the time comes we will defend them without wrecking the cost.  If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this  position of ours,

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there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. *This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time use are making our  last possible bargain,* and I hope that we can thus settle all our  troubles with the United States peaceably.

"3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward *to what may come at the end at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations* the  Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much  better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be  for the whole world situation.

"4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is  your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your  being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you  please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind  to continue to do your best?  I hope you will. Now just as soon as the  conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to  go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to  tell them *how determined we are* and try to get them to foster a speedy  understanding.

"5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there,  so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in  Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the consensus of the American  officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these  things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me  know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting  anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, *I want you to  follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to  know there will be no room for personal interpretation (ex. 1, pp. 92- 93).*"

The day the Foreign Minister sent the long message quoted above, he  cabled Ambassador Nomura the substance of two Japanese counterproposals  to be used in the conversations, if they should be approved at the  Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time). The first proposal was  designated "Proposal A," and was described as "*our revised ultimatum*";  its provisions were referred to as "*our demands*" (ex. 1, pp. 94-95).  The second proposal, designated "Proposal B," was to be used in case of  "remarkable" differences between the Japanese and American views, "since  the situation does not permit of delays." It was advanced, the Foreign  Minister said, with the idea of making "*a last effort to prevent  something happening*" (ex. 1, p. 96-97).

At the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time), the  counterproposals developed in the conferences and discussions which had  gone before were taken up and approved in the form previously sent to  Ambassador Nomura. Foreign Minister Togo immediately cabled the  Ambassador that he should resume the conversations, and instructed him  to submit "Proposal A" first.  The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador  that if it should become apparent that an agreement based upon "Proposal  A" could not be reached, "we intend to submit *our absolutely final  proposal*, Proposal B." He continued:

"4. As stated in my previous message, *this is the Imperial Government's  final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very  critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted*. * * *

"5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time  limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a  friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept  our proposal (ex. 1, p. 99)."

The intercepted messages show that the Japanese Government intended to  insist not only on a written agreement signed by the United States but  also to require the United States to "make Great Britain and the  Netherlands sign those terms in which they are concerned" (ex. 1, pp.  98-99). Although the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura to  avoid giving the Americans the impression that "there is a time limit,"  he made it clear to the Ambassador (No. 736) that such a dead line had  been fixed:

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 335

"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that  arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th  of this month.* I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the  circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this  thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations  *from falling into chaotic condition.* Do so with great determination  and with unstinted effort, I beg of you (ex. 1, p. 100)."

The record before the Committee does not show whether or not the  decision to submit the foregoing counterproposals was the only decision  made at the Imperial Conference on November 5. It is now known, however,  that on that date the Navy promulgated its "Combined Fleet Top Secret  Operation Order No. 1" to all Japanese Fleet and task force commanders  (tr. 482). The record does not show whether the issuance of this order  was made known to the Japanese Foreign Office.

Order No. 1, itself, was brief:

"COMBINED FLEET ORDER

"Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT  BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the  Separate Volume (ex. 8)."

The separate volume, which was attached to Order No. 1, prescribed the  operations to be conducted (a) in case war with the United States, Great  Britain, and the Netherlands "begins during the China Operations," and  (b) in case war with Russia "begins during the War with the United  States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China" (ex. 8). It stated:  "The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great  Britain and the Netherlands," and provided that, in such event, "In the  east the American Fleet will be destroyed" (ex. 8).

Order No. 1 had been in course of preparation since the latter part of  August. From September 2-13 (Japan time) a war plans conference had been  held continuously at the Naval War College in Tokyo. It was during this  same period, on September 6 (Japan time), that an Imperial Conference decided:

"If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having  our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will  immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America  (England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

On September 13 (Japan time) an outline containing the essential points  of Order No. 1 had been completed at the Naval War College, but the  Order itself was not promulgated until immediately after the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) (ex. 8).

AMBASSADOR GREW WARNS THAT WAR WITH JAPAN MAY COME "WITH DRAMATIC AND  DANGEROUS SUDDENNESS"

(November 3, 1941)

During the period which immediately preceded the Imperial Conference on  November 5 (Japan time), Ambassador Grew was endeavoring to determine  what the policies of the Tojo Government would be. Among the sources of  his information was "a reliable Japanese informant" who called on the  Ambassador on October 25 (Japan time) and again on November 3 (Japan  time). On both occasions the information imparted by the informant fell  short of disclosing to Ambassador Grew the actual decisions affecting  the United States which were
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being made by the Tojo Cabinet, as described above, but was sufficient  to convince the Ambassador that the situation u-as approaching a crisis.  He recorded that on November 3 he was told that the new Japanese  Government "had reached a definite decision as to how far it was  prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an  adjustment of relations with the United States," and that "this  information had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor  on the afternoon of November 2" (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 701).  In his testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Grew said, referring  to the period immediately following the fall of the Konoye Cabinet:

"I took about two weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite  sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going  to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an  agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers  crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent  the telegram of November 3 (tr. 1908)."

In the telegram of November 3 (Japan time) to which Mr. Grew referred,  he warned Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles that

"Japan's resort to measures which might (make) war with the United  States inevitable may come *with dramatic and dangerous suddenness* (ex. 15)."

The telegram summarized his opinions on the general situation in Japan.  In it he noted that the strong policy which he had recommended in his  telegram of September 12, 1940 (ex. 26), called the "green light"  telegram because it gave the go-ahead signal for economic sanctions  against Japan, together with the impact upon Japan of political  developments abroad had brought the Japanese Government "to seek  conciliation with the United States." If those efforts should fail, he  foresaw a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan back once more to its  former position "or still further back," leading

"to what I have called an "all out, do or die" attempt to render Japan  impervious to foreign economic embargoes, even risking national hara  kiri rather than cede to foreign pressure. * * * such a contingency is  not only possible but probable (ex. 15)."

Ambassador Grew went on to express his opinion that the view that the  progressive imposition of drastic economic measures, while attended with  some risk of war, would probably avert war, was

"a dangerously, uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of the United States (ex. 15)."

Conceding that in discussing the "grave and momentous" subject of  whether American needs, policies, and objectives justified war with  Japan if diplomacy should fail, he was "out of touch with the  Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon," and that his purpose  was only to "ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan  through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush  headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States," he warned  that

"it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations  for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace  should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on  the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber  rattling (for) the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's  high pressure diplomacy. *Japan's resort to measures which might (make)  war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and  dangerous suddenness (ex. 15).*

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The State Department file copy of Ambassador Grew's telegram of November  3 (Japan time) bears the following handwritten note:

"Paraphrase of this telegram in full given to Commander Watts, ONI, by telephone on November 8, 1941 (ex. 15)."

On November 17 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew cabled Secretary Hull and  Under Secretary Welles as follows, referring specifically to the last sentence of his November 3 warning:

"In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval  actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict,  7 am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would  exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative  and surprise.* It is important, however, that our Government not (repeat  not) place upon us, including the military and naval attaches, major  responsibility for giving prior warning."

[Discontinuous text]

"We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations  which might be forthcoming against such areas and we are taking every  precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and  naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen  with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that  our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible  the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning (ex. 15)."

Ambassador Grew testified that he had no knowledge or indication  whatever of the assembling of the Japanese naval striking force for the  attack on Pearl Harbor, or that at the war games conducted by Admiral  Yamamoto at the Naval War College in Tokyo between September 2 and 13  (Japan time) the final plans were being formulated for the attack (tr.  1481). He further testified that although he knew that a meeting of the  Japanese Cabinet took place on December 1, he "did not (know) and could  not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on Pearl  Harbor (tr. 1615), and that, with the single exception of the  information upon which his message of January 27, 1941 (Japan time) (ex.  15) was based, he had no information of any character prior to the  attack on Pearl Harbor which indicated the possibility of such an attack  by the Japanese (tr. 1477).

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK APPEALS TO GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED  STATES FOR AID

(October 28-November 4, 1941)

During the latter part of October, the Japanese began extensive troop  concentrations at Haiphong on the coast of northern French Indochina,  and steady streams of Japanese military supplies and materials were  reported arriving at Hainan (off the northern coast of French Indochina)  and at Formosa. As a result of these and other Japanese military  movements, which were interpreted in Chungking as foreshadowing an early  invasion of Yunnan Province for the purpose of taking the city of  Kunming and severing the Burma Road, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made  strenuous efforts to obtain British and American air support for his  ground forces in that area.

On October 28 at his first meeting in Chungking with General Magruder, the head of the recently arrived United States military mission to  China, the Generalissimo asked General Magruder to

[1] Ambassador Grew's message of January 27 1941 (Japan time) follows  "My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from  many sources including a Japanese sour e that the Japanese military  forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States to attempt  a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military  facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact  that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the  information" (ex 15) Paraphrased copies were promptly sent by the State  Department to Military Intelligence Division (Army) and Office of Naval  Intelligence (Navy) (ex. 15).

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inform Washington at once of the threatening situation, and urged that  President Roosevelt "intercede with London to make available the  Singapore air forces to support his defense." He pled with General  Magruder that the President "be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on  Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an  attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests." He  insisted that if the Japanese should take Kunming and thus sever the  Burma Road, Chinese resistance would end and a Japanese attack on the  Malay Peninsula would inevitably follow. He believed his land forces  could resist the anticipated attack only with air support, which he did  not have and which only the British air forces at Singapore could  furnish in time. General Magruder immediately radioed the  Generalissimo's plea to Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, after  discussing the interview with Ambassador Gauss (ex. 47).

In Washington, on the morning of October 30 (Washington time), Mr. T. V.  Soong handed to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, a message from  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which repeated the substance of what the  Generalissimo had said to General Magruder.  Chiang's message urged the  United States "to use strong pressure on Britain to send Singapore Air  Force to cooperate with Colonel Chennault in order to save democratic  position in Far East" and stressed the critical nature of the situation (ex. 16-A). Secretary Morgenthau sent the Generalissimo's message to  President Roosevelt on the same day, without written comment and the  President forwarded it to Secretary Hull with this handwritten note:

"C. H. Can we do anything along these lines? How about telling Japan a  move to close Burma Road would be inimical? F. D. R. (Ex. 16-A)."

n November 1 (Washington time), Secretary Hull called a conference at  the State Department which was attended by, among others, the Secretary,  Under Secretary Welles, and Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, for that  Department, and by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans  Division, for the War Department and Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, Director  of the Central Division, for the Navy Department.  The conference was  called for the purpose of discussing what action should be taken in  response to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's plea. Secretary Hull  expressed the opinion that "there was no use to issue any additional  warnings to Japan if we can't back them up," and the Secretary therefore  desired to know whether "the military authorities would be prepared to  support further warnings by the State Department." A second meeting in  the same connection was held at the State Department the following day  (ex. 16)."

General Gerow submitted a report on these meetings to General Marshall  on November 3 (Washington time) in which he pointed out that the  Military Intelligence Division's (G-2's) latest estimate did not support  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's conclusions as to the imminence of a  Japanese move toward Kunming, though agreeing that the fall of Kunming  would seriously affect Chinese resistance to Japan. After reviewing the  strength of the United States forces in the Philippines and concluding  that the dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison there  would leave the island of Luzon open to serious risk of capture, General  Gerow's report summarized certain "strong" opinions of the War Plans Division, which were stated as follows:

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"a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain sound; viz.:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.

(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.

(3) Military counter action against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan (which were          then enumerated).

[Discontinuous text]

"d. *Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action

"e. * * * *Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint, at the earliest, about the middle of December  1941,* when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat  to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to  delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March  1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected  strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.  (ex. 16)."

The weekly meeting of the Army-Navy Joint Board scheduled for November 5  (Washington time) was held on the afternoon of November 3 (Washington  time). The question of aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek received  more attention than any other item on the agenda (ex. 16). Admiral Royal  E. Ingersoll presented the situation as the Navy saw it and General  Marshall gave the Army's viewpoint.  Admiral Schuirmann reported on the  two meetings at the State Department and read a memorandum (tr. 5520- 5523) prepared by Dr. Hornbeck in which the latter stated his personal  opinion in favor of a firm representation to Japan, even though war  might result.  Among other things, General Marshall said that it was his  information that "the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide  upon the national policy by November 5," apparently referring to the  intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo regarding the  Imperial Conference to be held in Tokyo on that date. He expressed the view that

"Until powerful United States Forces had been built up in the Far East,  it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. *It  appeared that the basis of U. S. Policy should be to make certain minor  concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These  concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar  trade restrictions (ex. 16).*"

Following these discussions the Joint Board decided that

"War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a  memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's  proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take  the following lines:

"Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

"Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

"Oppose the movement and employment of U.S. Military forces in support of Chiang Kai-shek.

"Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

"Suggest agreement with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

"Point out the effect and cost a U.S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U.S.

"Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific  (ex. 16)."

That evening, November 3 (Washington time), the State Department  received a telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking to the effect  that while it was not yet certain that Japan would undertake an invasion  of Yunnan from Indochina, it was believed certain that in any case large Japanese air forces would operate against the

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Burma Road and any volunteer air forces in China, and that accordingly, if Anglo-American air units were sent into Yunnan, they should be in  sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air  concentrations. "Half or token measures " the Ambassador advised, "would  prove dangerous" (ex. 47).

The next morning, November 4 (Washington time), the State Department  received from the Chinese Embassy a personal message to President  Roosevelt from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (ex. 47). This message  quoted a lengthy message which the Generalissimo had sent directly to  Prime Minister Churchill, in which the Generalissimo expressed  substantially the same views as those he had communicated to General  Magruder, and urged that the British air force in Malaya, "with American  cooperation," be sent to his assistance to resist the anticipated  assault on Yunnan and Kunming. The Generalissimo then urged the United  States "to draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an  active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation," saying that

"unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of  winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately  and in her own time (ex. 47)."

Neither the Generalissimo's message addressed to the Prime Minister nor  his message addressed to the President made any further reference to the  proposal that a warning to Japan be issued by Britain or the United  States. On the 4th Secretary Hull held separate conferences at the State  Department with Secretary Knox, and with General Marshall and Admiral  Ingersoll (tr. 1171, 1173).

The next day, November 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt received  the following message from Prime Minister Churchill:

"I have received Chiang Kai-shek's attached appeal addressed to us both for air assistance. You know how we are placed for air strength at Singapore. Nonetheless, I should be prepared to send pilots and even some planes if they could arrive in time.

"What we need now is a deterrent of the most general and formidable character. The Japanese have as yet taken no final decision, and the  Emperor appears to be exercising restraint. When we talked about this at Argentia you spoke of gaining time, and this policy has been brilliantly  successful so far. But our joint embargo is steadily forcing the  Japanese to decisions for peace or war.

"It now looks as if they would go into Yunnan cutting the Burma Road  with disastrous consequence for Chiang Kai-shek. The collapse of his  resistance would not only be a world tragedy in itself, but it would  leave the Japanese with large forces to attack north or south.

"The Chinese have appealed to us, as I believe they have to you, to warn  the Japanese against an attack on Yunnan. I hope you might remind them  that such an attack, aimed at China from a region in which we have never  recognized that the Japanese have any right to maintain forces, would be  in open disregard of the clearly indicated attitude of the United States  Government. We should, of course, be ready to make a similar  communication.

"No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan because we are so  much tied up elsewhere. But of course we will stand with you and do our  utmost to back you in whatever course you choose. I think myself, that  Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in. Please let me  know what you think (ex. 158)."

President Roosevelt did not reply to Prime Minister Churchill until 2  days later. In the meantime, General Marshall and Admiral Stark  submitted to him, under date of November 5 (Washington time), a joint  memorandum (ex. 16) pursuant to the action of the Joint Board referred  to above. In their joint memorandum

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General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the various  communications from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which have been  mentioned above, and to Secretary Hull's request for advice "as to the  attitude which this Government should take" toward a Japanese offensive  against Kunming and the Burma Road, and stated that the question they had considered was

"whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive  military operations with U. S. Forces against Japan, to prevent her from  severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well disguised, would lead to war."

In answering this question, General Marshall and Admiral Stark then advised the President:

"At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior  to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic  offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would  have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels  from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An  unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous  merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now  considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of  naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose  the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

"The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct  defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the  defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The  Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air,  and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous  undertaking. By about the middle of December 1941, United States air and  submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat  to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces  in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February  or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a  point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in   operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time,  additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have  arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area  against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

"Until such a time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang Kai-shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United  States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective  of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and  Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In  any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against  Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the  Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) *War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while  building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan  attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United  States is of very great importance.* Military action against Japan  should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

"(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British    Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

"(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100  East or south of 10  North; or into Portuguese Timor, New    Caledonia, or Loyalty Islands.

"(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should  be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and  weakening Japan's economic position.

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"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand, except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia,  would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government

"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields,  should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the  United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

"Specifically, they recommend:

"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention  against Japan in China be disapproved.

"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated  to the maximum practicable extent.

"*That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan (ex. 16).*

Secretary Hull testified that he

"was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the  Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be  sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American  foreign policy considerations were involved that material to China  should be accelerated as much as feasible and that aid to the American  Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally *I concurred completely  in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been  striving for months to avoid a showdown with Japan, and to explore every  possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan.  That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President  and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.* (tr. 1130)."

On November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent the following  reply, prepared in the State Department, to Prime Minister Churchill's message of the 5th:

"We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China.

"We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are taking, together with continuing efforts to  strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar  efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's  hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal  warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an  opposite effect.

"This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention,  study, and effort.

"I shall probably not, repeat not, make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your  close official circle that I have said above (ex. 16-B)."

The record shows that on November 8, Secretary Hull conferred at the State Department with General Miles, head of the Military Intelligence  Division (G-2), General Staff (tr. 1173), and on November 10 with  Secretary Knox (tr. 1171). On the latter date he sent to President  Roosevelt a draft of a proposed reply to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.  The next day the President dictated the following brief note to his  aide, General Watson, which was attached to the Secretary's draft and read:

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"I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to  me when he comes (ex. 16)."

Written on the same sheet of paper, below the typewritten note to General Watson and apparently after the conference with Dr. Hu Shih, the  Chinese Ambassador, appears the following, in the President's  handwriting:

"C. H.  O. K. to send. F. D. R. (EX. 16)."

The draft was then returned to the State Department, where the message  in final form was handed to Dr. Hu Shih late in the afternoon of  November 14 (Washington time) for transmittal to Generalissimo Chiang  Kai-shek. In it President Roosevelt described briefly the intensive  consideration that had been given to the Generalissimo's appeal, and continued:

"Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world  situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that  the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is  along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease  materials and facilitating the building up of the American Volunteer air  force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present,  as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We  are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the  Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are  calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In-addition, our  program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly  expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with  great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving  expedition of increasing expedition of increasing amounts of material  for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems  which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in  the most practicable ways possible.

"I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the  foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering,  adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to  strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward  safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be  developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and  naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being  steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they  do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from  Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole  situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive  preparations in their territories to the south.

"This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government  of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of  aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view  upon Japan on every appropriate occasion (ex. 16)"

In accordance with the joint recommendation that had been made by  General Marshall and Admiral Stark, no warning was delivered to Japan as  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had urged.

It is clear that the movement of additional Japanese troops into northern French Indochina had a twofold purpose. On the one hand he  troops were an immediate threat to China by their proximity to Yunnan  Province, the Burma Road, and Kunming on the north and northwest.  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid recognized the immediacy  of that threat. On the other hand, the additional Japanese forces  increased the potential threat to the British Malay States and  Singapore, and to the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. The  price the Japanese Government hoped to exact from the United States and  Great Britain for the removal of this latter threat had been determined  at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time). The subsequent  fall of the Konoye

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Cabinet and accession of General Tojo in October had only increased  Japan's determination to use this potential threat to blackmail the  United States, if possible, into (1) ceasing all aid to China, (2) accepting a military and naval status in the Far East inferior to that  of Japan, and (3) furnishing all possible material aid to Japan.  Furthermore, since the Japanese Army at no time evidenced a willingness  to withdraw its troops from China, or to agree not to use northern  French Indo-China as a base for operations against China it would seem  clear that the Japanese strategy was not only to blackmail the United  States into granting those ".minimum demands" but also, having  accomplished that, to turn on China from northern French Indochina and  thus to expedite the liquidation of the "China Incident" and the  establishment of a Japanese " just peace" in the Far East.

JAPAN DELIVERS ITS NEXT-TO-LAST PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES

(November 10, 1941)

After the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) the Japanese-American conversations were "on the last lap" as far as the Japanese  Government was concerned (ex. 1, p. 101). Immediately after that  conference the final Japanese diplomatic, naval, and military maneuvers  began. The instructions Foreign Minister Togo sent to Ambassador Nomura  to resume the talks and to present proposal "A" to the United States  Government had their counterparts in operational orders issued to the  Japanese Navy and, without doubt, to the Japanese Army as well. Those  orders contemplated naval, air; and troop dispositions which were  commenced immediately. Many of those dispositions were detected and  observed by the United States, Great Britain, or the Netherlands, but  the major Japanese naval movement was successfully kept secret by the  Japanese until the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7,  1941.

It is imperative to an accurate appraisal of this closing period of the  Japanese-American conversations to keep in mind those Japanese military  and naval dispositions. Reports of the military movements toward the  south and alarms about Japanese naval movements (except the one toward  Pearl Harbor) reached Washington and the State Department during  November as the Japanese Ambassadors were presenting their final  proposals, and again, as in July, discredited the intentions of the  Japanese Government. Commencing in the middle of November the American  consuls at Hanoi and Saigon in north and south French Indochina reported  extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina  (tr. 1138). About November 21 (Washington time) the State Department  received word that the Dutch had information that a Japanese naval force  had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese mandated  islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies (ex. 21; tr. 1138).

It is now known that at the same time a powerful Japanese naval striking  force, its formation and purpose successfully kept secret, was  assembling in a northern Japanese harbor for the attack on the United  States Pacific Fleet, under orders issued on or about November 14 (Japan  time). On November 21 (Japan time) the commander in chief of the combined Japanese fleet was directed to order his forces

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to advance to the area in which they were to wait in readiness and to  station them in such positions that

"in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of  hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation  promptly (tr. 43S7)."

On November 25 (Japan time) the commander in chief issued an order which  directed the naval striking force to "advance into Hawaiian waters and  upon the very opening of hostilities * * * attack the main force of the  United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow" (tr. 437). The  order provided, however, that

"Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach  an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all  the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and  return to their bases (tr. 437)."

The striking force sailed from Hitokappu Bay in northern Japan at 9 a.  m. November 26 (Japan time), or about 7 p. m. on November 25 (Washington  time) (tr. 450).

In the meantime, it had been decided in Tokyo to send Saburu Kurusu,  former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to Washington to assist  Ambassador Nomura. On the evening of November 4 (Japan time) Mr. Kurusu  told Ambassador Grew that the mission had been broached to him "only  yesterday afternoon" (ex. 3O, p. 471), although it appears from the  comments made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on October  10 (Japan time) that the matter had been under consideration for some  time. Arrangements were made by the State Department for the Pan- American Clipper to be held in Hong Kong for 2 days to permit Mr. Kurusu  to travel on that plane, and he left Tokyo early on November 5 (Japan  time). Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 4  (Japan time) of this development, saying that Ambassador Kurusu was  being sent to assist Ambassador Nomura and to be his "right- and man" in  view of "the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your  request on instructions from me" (ex. 1, p. 97). Two days later the  Foreign Minister cabled that the reason for Ambassador Kurusu's dispatch "so quickly" was "to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations  soon to follow." The officials of the Japanese Army and Navy, the  Foreign Minister said, were "pleased with the special dispatch of the  Ambassador" (ex. 1, p. 101).

In Washington, as soon as he received Foreign Minister Togo's  instructions to resume the conversations, Ambassador Nomura arranged a  meeting with Secretary Hull. At that meeting, which took place on the  morning of November 7 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura informed the  Secretary that he had now received instructions from the new Japanese  Government, and that he wished to resume the conversations. He then said  that the new Japanese Cabinet had deliberated on the various questions  at issue between the two Governments

"with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make,  having due regard for the situation in the Far East and the attitude of  public opinion in Japan (vol. II, p. 707)."

He said that of the three principal questions on which there were  divergent views, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile  the views of the two Governments on two, namely, nondiscrimination in  international trade and Japan's obligations under the Tripartite

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Pact. He realized that the difficulties of reaching an agreement on the  third, the China question, were greater. So saying, he handed to  Secretary Hull a document (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 709-710) containing  formulae relating to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and to  nondiscrimination in international trade. This document was, he said, to  be taken in conjunction with the United States proposals of June 21 and  October 2 and the Japanese proposal delivered to the Secretary on  September 27. It embodied the substance of the provisions of proposal  "A" regarding those two points, but was silent regarding the question of  Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull expressed  the hope that some concrete statement concerning the latter point could  be worked out that would be of help, but Ambassador Nomura said it did  not seem to him any further statement was necessary than had already  been made, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government which  "manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific." During the  conversation Secretary Hull again mentioned that before entering into  any formal negotiations he intended to discuss the matter with the  Chinese, the British, and the Dutch (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 708).  Ambassador Nomura requested a meeting with President Roosevelt, which  was subsequently arranged for November 10 (Washington time).

The afternoon of November 7 (Washington time), Secretary Hull attended a  Cabinet meeting at the White House. The situation in the Far East  appears to have been uppermost in the minds of those present; especially  the President, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson. Secretary Stimson  had had a conference with the President the day before, November 6  (Washington time), and had recorded in his daily notes that he and the  President had talked

"about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the  messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he  thought he might say. *He was trying to think of something which would  save us further time.*  He suggested he might propose a truce in which  there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the  Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that  meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw  two great objections to that; first, that it tied up our hands just at a  time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our  reinforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would  feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him  that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington  conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because  the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese  know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into  such an arrangement (tr. 14414-14415)."

The morning of the next day, November 7 (Washington time), Admiral John  R. Beardall, President Roosevelt's naval aide, at the President's  direction, requested the appropriate officers in the Navy Department to  arrange for the delivery to the President of complete translations of  the intercepted Japanese messages, rather than memoranda briefly  summarizing the messages as had been delivered theretofore under the  existing agreement between the Army and the Navy in that connection.  Such arrangements were made and, commencing November 12 (Washington  time), complete translations were delivered each day to Admiral Beardall for delivery to President Roosevelt. According to reported statements  made by Admiral Beardall at the time, the President told him that he  (the President) "was in fact either seeing or being told about the  material through Hull" (tr. 14525-14526).

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According to Secretary Stimson's notes of the Cabinet meeting on  November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt took-

"what be said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on  the question of the Far East-whether the people would back us up in case  we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. It was a  very interesting talk the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had  since I have been there. He went around the table first Hull and then  myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in  feeling the country would support us.  He said that this time the vote  is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of  the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a  following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be  done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if the  Cabinet had known and they did not know except in the case of Hull and  the President what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready  we are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416)."

Secretary Hull testified that at this Cabinet meeting after President  Roosevelt turned to him and asked whether he had anything in mind

"thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the  international situation. I went over fully developments in the  conversations with Japan and *emphasized that in my opinion relations  were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a  military attack anywhere by Japan at any time*. When I finished, the  President went around the Cabinet. *All concurred in my estimate of the  dangers.* It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country  would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

"accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on  November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted  with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic,  but we were " likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side  of the world on the far side of the Pacific"; and the Pacific no less  than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.

"On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated  that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the  same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations  bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking  high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening  more and more with each passing day "to engulf our own shores." He  warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;  that "at any moment war may be forced upon us" (tr. 1131-1132)."

Statements which were made by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Grew  in Tokyo 3 days later, on November 10 (Japan time), show the attitude  with which the Japanese Foreign Office was approaching the conversations  during this period immediately following the Imperial Conference on  November 5. After informing the Ambassador that new proposals had been  sent to Ambassador Nomura for presentation to the United States  Government, the Foreign Minister urged the necessity of a speedy  settlement, saying that national sentiment would "not tolerate further  protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion" and that the position  was "daily becoming more pressing." He said that the new proposals  represented the "maximum possible concessions by Japan," and handed to  the Ambassador the texts of the two documents submitted to Secretary  Hull on November 7. During the Foreign Minister's comments on these  documents, he expressed the desire that the British Government should  conclude an agreement with Japan simultaneously with the United States,  in view of Great Britain's interests in the Pacific. The Foreign  Minister told Ambassador Grew that he felt that the United States did not adequately appreciate the realities of the situation in the Far  East. Referring to the steadily increasing population of Japan, he stated it

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was necessary to assure the raw materials necessary for the existence of  that population and that unless the United States realized this fact as  among the realities of the situation, a successful conclusion to the  conversations would be difficult. Ambassador Grew told the Minister that  his statements penetrated to the heart of the whole problem, since one  of the fundamental purposes of the conversations was to open a way for  Japan to obtain such necessary supplies, together with a full flow of  trade and commerce and market for her industries, but by peaceful means  as opposed to the use of force. In reply to this the Minister said, as  reported by Ambassador Grew, that

"He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he  thought that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and  economic relations between the United States and Japan. The freezing by  the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many  important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is  capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the  direct use of force. He hoped that the American Government would take  into consideration circumstances of this character and realize the  possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic  pressure, might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures  of self-defense (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 714)."

The Minister saw no inconsistency between insisting that Japan would not  give up the fruits of 4 years of hostilities in China and at the same  time accepting the principle of refraining from aggression and the use  of force (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 710-714; ex. 1, pp. 109-111).

Ambassador Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt took place at the  White House on the morning of November 10 (Washington time), with  Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi present. At this meeting the  Ambassador read from a prepared document an explanation of the proposals  he had been instructed by his Government to present (i. e., proposal "A"), the substance of which (except as regards the Tripartite Pact) he  had already communicated to Secretary Hull on November 7. Regarding the  first question, the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in  international trade, he said that his Government had now decided to  accept its application in all Pacific areas, including China, upon the  understanding that the principle would be applied uniformly to the rest  of the world as well. As to the second question, the attitude of the two  Governments toward the European war, he stated that his Government was  not prepared to go further in black and white than the language  contained in its proposal of September 27, which was:

"Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in  the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor  jointly for the early restoration of world peace.

"With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration  of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by  considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United  States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide  entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite  Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, and would likewise determine  what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in  accordance with the said interpretation (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 638)."

He added that if the United States was in a position to give assurance that it had no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the  term "protection and self-defense," his Government would be prepared to  reciprocate. Concerning the third question, the stationing and  withdrawal of troops from China and French Indochina, Ambassador Nomura  submitted the following formula:

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"With regard to the Japanese forces which have been dispatched to China  in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of  North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao  (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required  duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and  China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as  general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal  will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China  and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of  peace and order.

"The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial  sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present  stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled  or an equitable peace is established in East Asia (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  716)."

The Ambassador said that this formula clearly indicated that the  stationing of Japanese troops in China was not of a permanent nature,  and that however desirable the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China might be, it was "impracticable under the  present circumstances." In a written statement, which he then read,  Ambassador Nomura said that as viewed from the Japanese side it seemed  that the United States had remained adamant in its position and had  shown little sign of reciprocation to "concessions" by the Japanese with  the result that "in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has  arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government." He  continued:

"People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic  blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern  warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the  supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from  home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only  way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and  satisfactory understanding with the United States without any  unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties,  the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the  conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for  the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. *My Government  therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort* for  that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of  your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 717)."

In reply, President Roosevelt read a brief statement which concluded:

"We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable  results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall  continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we  understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that  the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue  peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification  should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 718)."

The President referred to the improvement of American relations with the  South American countries under the "good neighbor policy" as compared to  the policy of force that had been employed by the United States in some  cases. Then, according to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo the same day

"Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them  impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this  expression should be translated as "method of living" (ex. 1, p. 116)."

Ambassador Nomura reported that it was not clear to him what the phrase "modus vivendi" really meant, and that he intended to ascertain whether the President was referring to, possibly, "a provisional agreement" (ex.  1, p. 116).
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Exhibit D Cont'd.

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Upon receipt of Ambassador Nomura's report, Foreign Minister Togo cabled the Ambassador that there were

"indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the  exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that  the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under  present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore it is  essential that settlement be realized by about that time.* The session  of Parliament opens on the 15th * * *. The government must have a clear  picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You  can see, therefore, *that the situation is nearing a climax and that  time is indeed becoming short.*

"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in  view of the above-mentioned situation, will you redouble them? When  talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to  them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S.  attitude in the minimum of time.  At the same time do everything in your  power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not  they will accept our final proposal A (ex. 1, pp. 116-117)."

Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister that Secretary  Hull had agreed to study the Japanese proposals the following day,  Armistice Day, and that his next meeting with the Secretary was  scheduled for the afternoon of November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p.  118).

On November 11 (Japan time), as the result of statements made by Foreign  Minister Togo to him on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 1, p; 91), the  British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, called on the Foreign  Minister upon instructions from the British Foreign Office and urged the  desirability of a supreme effort to reach an agreement with the United  States, saying that when the point of actual negotiations was reached  the British Government would be ready to join in seeking an agreement  (ex. 1, pp. 117-118; ex. 158). Secretary Hull was informed of the  instructions to the British Ambassador in Tokyo during a conversation  with Lord Halifax on November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 158). During the  conversation between Foreign Minister Togo and Sir Robert Craigie, the  Foreign Minister went to great lengths to convince the British  Ambassador how critical the situation was, saying that in the view of  the Japanese Government the negotiations had reached the final phase,  that the Imperial Government had made its " maximum concessions," and  that if the United States refused to accept those terms and sign the  agreement "within a week to ten days," it would be "useless" to continue  the negotiations, as the Japanese domestic political situation would  permit "no further delays in reaching a decision." He emphasized this  latter point in his report of the conversation to Ambassador Nomura,  saving that it was "absolutely impossible that there be any further  delays," that while there were indications that the United States  Government was "still under the impression that the negotiations are in  the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions," as far as Tokyo was concerned, "this is the final phase," and  expressed the "fervent" hope that Ambassador Nomura would do-

"everything in (his) power to make them realize this fact and bring  about an agreement at the earliest possible moment (ex. 1, p. 119)."

At the meeting between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on November  12 (Washington time), the Ambassador said that his new Government had  asked him to emphasize its desire to expedite a

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 351

settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people  were becoming impatient and a session of the Diet was impending. He  expressed the hope that "within a week or ten days" some agreement could  be reached. Secretary Hull commented that the matters submitted on  November 10 were being worked on as rapidly as possible, and that as  soon as a good basis had been reached in the exploratory conversations  the United States could then approach the Chinese Government and sound  out their attitude. He had previously handed to the Ambassador a  document setting forth his general ideas relating to mutual conciliation between Japan and China. In response to a question from Minister  Wakasugi, who was also present, Secretary Hull hinted that Japan and  China might be "brought together" by the United States, but did not say  in so many words that the United States would mediate between them. The  conversation ended with Secretary Hull expressing the hope that he might  have something by way of comment on the Japanese proposals on November  14 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 722-726). According to Ambassador Nomura's  report to Tokyo, Secretary Hull also indicated that the British and the  Dutch were being informed generally of the nature of the conversations,  and that if a basis for negotiations should be worked out, it was  possible that they might sign with the United States, although the  Secretary "could not guarantee this" (ex. 1, p. 120). Ambassador Nomura  told the Foreign Minister he was not "satisfied with their attitude  toward taking up negotiations," and he sent Minister Wakasugi to see one  of Mr. Hull's advisors the following day to press for an early decision.  During that conversation, Mr. Wakusugi said that the public in Japan was  becoming impatient "and almost desperate," and that he hoped for a  clear-cut answer the next day as to whether the United States would  accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified through  November 10, or desired changes therein, or whether the United States'  proposal of June 21 was its final proposal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 729- 731; ex. 1, pp. 123-125). Similar representations concerning the need  for immediate agreement were made to Ambassador Grew on November 12  (Japan time), including statements that the negotiations had reached  their final phase, that Japan had made the greatest possible  concessions, and that "a very critical and dangerous state of affairs  will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully  concluding the negotiations" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 719-722).

Secretary Hull testified that:

"during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they  were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies * * *  the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power,  about the 16th, I think, of October * * * and the Konoye Government  fell.

"While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the  conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of  duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward  more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous  demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not  go on without something serious happening.

[Discontinuous text]

The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that  during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by  persuasion and threats and other methods to yield its basic principles,  so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course  of aggression and conquest (tr. 1178-1179) .

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On November 14 (Japan time), although he knew that Ambassador Nomura had  scheduled a meeting with Secretary Hull for November 15 (Washington  time) at which proposal "A" would be further discussed Foreign Minister  Togo cabled the Ambassador the English text to be used in presenting  proposal "B", and told the Ambassador he would be notified when to  present that "absolutely final proposal" to the United States Government  (ex. 1, pp. 125-126). This message was translated and available in  Washington on November 14 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 126). The same  day Ambassador Nomura cabled the Foreign Minister a long report (No.  1090) in which, although he realized he would be "harshly criticized,"  he cautioned against precipitate action:

"I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

"I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations,  and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite  patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must  tell you the following:

"1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American  Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part  either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their  command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are  contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of  preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward;  they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather  than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It  is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich  conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be  such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been  passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate  peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in  evidence.

"3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China,  and insofar as possible she is assisting Chiang. For the sake of peace  in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of  China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to  the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the  United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

"4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese  Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are  regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any  case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers  are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and  closer with the Axis.

"5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence  and our lives it naturally follows that we will have to fight England  and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will  participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central  America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those  of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for  their economic existence on the United States, and must maintain a  neutrality partial thereto.

"6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory  or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do  not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out  till the end will be the victor.

"7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and  deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and  as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength  to the Pacific.

"Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German  and Italian Navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength  into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that  should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there  would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there  has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now  many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal  questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the  Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be  carried out through the Pacific area.

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"8. *Though I cannot be a hundred percent sure of the present situation  in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition  must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding  that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am  going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be  harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan  permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be  the best plan (ex. 1, pp. 127-129).*"

The Foreign Minister's reply came back promptly and unequivocally:

"For your Honor's own information.

1." I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my  gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our  Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight  harder than you ever did before.

"2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so  and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only  to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you  please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait  and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, *I am  awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the  question.* I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in  my #736, and there *will be no change.* Please try to understand that.  You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States  to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a  solution *on the basis of our proposals*, and do your best to bring  about an immediate solution (ex. 1 p. 137- ).*

The next day, November 15 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on  Secretary Hull and the Secretary handed the Ambassador a statement, in  writing, regarding the formula proposed by the Japanese Government on  November 10 (Washington time) for dealing with the question of  nondiscrimination in international trade. After noting that in its  proposal, the Japanese Government recognized

"the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial  relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China,  *on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied  uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well* (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  734),"

the statement suggested that the meaning of the condition attached by  the Japanese was not entirely clear. It was assumed that the Japanese  Government did not intend to ask the United States Government to accept  responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside its  sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with  the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the  consent and cooperation of all other governments. The statement then reviewed the efforts of the United States over recent gears to reduce  tariff barriers, and suggested that similar action by Japan would be a  "long forward step" toward the objective set forth in the Japanese  proposal. The need for the proviso noted above was then questioned, and  it was suggested that the proviso might well be omitted. The statement  was accompanied by a draft of a proposed joint United States-Japanese  declaration on economic policy, which Secretary Hull told Minister  Wakasugi constituted the United States reply to the Japanese proposal on  the question of nondiscrimination in international trade (ex. 29, vol.  II, pp. 731-737).

Ambassador Nomura then stated that his Government regarded the  conversations as having progressed to the stage of formal negotiations.  In reply to this, Secretary Hull said that until the conversations had  reached a point where he could call in the British, the Chinese, and the  Dutch and say that there was a basis for negotiation, the conversations  were exploratory. He pointed out that whereas the United States proposal  of June 21 made it clear that the settlement under discussion related to  the entire Pacific area, the proposal the

Page 354 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

previous Japanese Government had submitted on September 27 narrowed the  application of the proposals regarding economic nondiscrimination and  peaceful intent to the southwestern Pacific, and he then requested that  the new Japanese Government give assurances on that point. He said that  it would be difficult for him to go to the British and the Dutch and say  that Japan was willing to enter upon a peaceful program but at the same  time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany. The  Secretary said that if the United States made an agreement with Japan  while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call  upon Japan to go to war with us, this would cause "so much turmoil in  the country that he might be lynched." He asked the Ambassador whether  the United States Government could assume that if the Japanese  Government entered into an agreement with it the Tripartite Pact would  become a "dead letter." When Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether this was an  answer to the Japanese proposal on the question of Japan's relations  under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull said the United States would  be better able to reply after receiving an answer to the question he had  just raised. Ambassador Nomura said he was afraid the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government, though there was no  material difference between the policies of the new Government and the  previous Government. Secretary Hull said that the new Japanese  Government seemed to be taking the attitude that the United States  Government must reply "at once" to their points, and that he did not  think that his Government

"should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese  Government under circumstances where the United States had been pursuing  peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government had been  violating law and order (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734)."

He concluded by saying that when he had heard further from the new  Japanese Government regarding its peaceful intentions, and when the  question of nondiscrimination could be cleared up as suggested in the  proposals he had handed to Ambassador Nomura during the meeting, and  also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that some solution  could be reached on the question of stationing troops in China. The  Secretary emphasized at the same time that he did not desire any delay  and that he was working as hard as he could to bring about a wholly  satisfactory and broad settlement. It was agreed that there should be a  further meeting after Ambassador Nomura had received instructions from  his Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-734; ex. 1, p. 132).

In his report of this meeting to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura said that he  had told Mr. Hull he felt his Government would be "very disappointed"  over these replies. He continued:    -1

"Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did  clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They  harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion  (ex. 1, p. 137)."

There is no evidence before the Committee indicating that at that time  Ambassador Nomura had any knowledge that the Japanese naval striking  force had already started assembling for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 355

THE TOJO CABINET REFUSES TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTION LESS FAVORABLE TO  JAPAN THAN ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"

(November 18-19, 1941)

Ambassador Kurusu reached Washington on November 15 (Washington time) (tr. 1133). On the morning of November 17 (Washington time), with  Ambassador Nomura, he called on Secretary Hull prior to their meeting  with President Roosevelt. After he had been  introduced, Ambassador  Kurusu said, among other things, that he was fully assured of Premier  Tojo's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States, and  that Premier Tojo was optimistic regarding the possibility of settling  the differences in respect to nondiscrimination in international trade  and Japan's attitude toward the European war, but felt that there were  greater difficulties in the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from  China. Before the meeting with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura  handed Secretary Hull two documents which he said the Japanese  Government was submitting in response to the questions that had been  raised at the conference on November 12 regarding Japan's peaceful  intentions and the scope of the proposed understanding between the two  Governments (ex. 29, vol. It, pp. 738-739).

At the meeting at the White House, Ambassador Kurusu was formally  received by President Roosevelt. The conversation was largely devoted to  a discussion of the relation of Japan and the United States to the war  in Europe and to the China problem. Concerning the latter the President  said that at a suitable stage the United States would, so to speak,  "introduce" Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with  the remaining adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been  determined. Secretary Hull explained at length that America's military  preparations were for defense before it was too late, that the United  States was on the defense in the present Pacific situation and that  Japan was the aggressor. The conference ended with the understanding  that both Ambassadors would see Secretary Hull the next morning (ex. 29,  vol. II, pp. 740-743).

At that meeting at the White House no effort was made by either side to  solve the three major points of difference between the two countries,  and there is no evidence before the Committee of any contact between  representatives of the two Governments on the afternoon of November 17  (Washington time). However, as Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo the  next day (No. 1135), that evening the two Japanese Ambassadors "went to  call on a certain Cabinet member." "This," they cabled the Foreign  Minister, "is what he told us":

"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and  the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no  ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the  great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle  approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do  something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her  peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with  oil and it would probably lead to the re-establishment of normal trade  relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so  long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the  Americans (ex. 1, p. 154)."

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There are indications in the record before the Committee that this meeting between the two Japanese Ambassadors and a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening before their meeting with Secretary Hull was more than a coincidence. Under Secretary Welles testified before the Committee in another connection that he had been told by Secretary Hull "and other individuals" that Mr. Frank Walker, then Postmaster General and as such a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, was "negotiating" with the Japanese and that he thought Mr. Walker "had conversations both with Admiral Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well" (tr. 1319-1320). Furthermore, the record of outside telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows that at 6:25 p. m. on November 17, before the meeting of the two Japanese Ambassadors with the "certain Cabinet member," Postmaster General Walker talked with Secretary Hull, and that he also talked with Secretary Hull at 9:22 o'clock the next morning, November 18 (Washington time) before Secretary Hull's conference at 10:30 o'clock with the two Ambassadors (ex. 179).

The suggestion made that evening by the Cabinet member that some action by Japan to show her peaceful intentions, "such as  evacuating French Indochina," would open the way for the United States  to relax its freezing orders was substantially the proposal made by the two Ambassadors to Secretary Hull at their meeting with him at 10:30 the next morning. While at that meeting the greatest emphasis was placed on the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, during the discussion of this subject, after Secretary Hull had pointed out that the American public would never understand an agreement between Japan and the United States if Japan continued to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura said that the situation in the southwest Pacific was now critical, with the United States and Great Britain reinforcing their armed forces in Singapore and the Philippine Islands to counter Japan's sending troops to French Indochina. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked, if the tension could be relaxed, an atmosphere could be created in which the talks could continue. Ambassador Kurusu then said that the freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it could; he said that what was needed now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. Secretary Hull asked to what extent a relaxation of freezing would enable ,Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that

"what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get  control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence."

Ambassador Nomura then asked whether there was any hope of a solution some small beginning toward the realization of "our high ideals" and continued by suggesting:

"*the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the  date in July when following the Japanese move into southern French  Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect.* [1] The  Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo  on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn  from French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. *The  Secretary said

[1] While the Japanese move that precipitated the United States freezing  order was into *southern* French Indochina, Japanese troops had moved  into northern French Indochina in 1940.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 357

that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long  way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan  was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes  of conquest.* The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of  fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first  step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the  Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered  by the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750)."

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu pursued their suggestion further at a conference with Secretary Hull the next day, November 19 (Washington time). Ambassador Nomura told the Secretary that they had reported to their Government the conversation of the preceding day and were momentarily expecting instructions.

"The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador (Nomura) felt about the  possibilities. *The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the  suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed  before the Japanese moved into south Indochina in the latter part of  July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing  measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if  something could be done on his suggestion, it could serve to relieve  that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations.*  The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would  go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.  The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in  Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a  peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some  time.

"The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now  appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the  Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing  measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in  mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further  efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so  far diverged. The Ambassador agreed (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 751)."

In reporting to Tokyo on November 18 (Washington time) the substance of their conversation with Secretary Hull on that day, the two Japanese Ambassadors had, in fact, dispatched four separate telegrams (ex. 1, pp. 146, 149, 151, 152), each of which outlined the suggestion they had made, thereby indicating the importance the two Ambassadors attached to it. The sending of four telegrams may also have reflected the fact that they had already received from the Foreign Minister the English text of proposal "B", which was far more drastic than their suggestion and was, they knew, regarded in Tokyo as Japan's "absolutely final proposal." Furthermore, they had been told by the Foreign Minister that they would be notified when to present it to Secretary Hull. The two final telegrams show that both Japanese Ambassadors regarded a return to the status prior to freezing as the only means to success in the negotiations. In his message (No. 1133) Ambassador Kurusu said:

"In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think  there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in  harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that *as a stopgap for  the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a  "time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock,  ask them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for  assurance regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.*

"*In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested  the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July*, but in view of the  progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent  to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory  aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal "B" or for our promise in  vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China * * * Please  have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re "time limit"  and * * * as we desire to press for a

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 358

speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at  once (ex. 1, pp. 151-152)."

In his message (No. 1134) to the Foreign Minister Ambassador Nomura  outlined at greater length what he and Ambassador Kurusu had in mind:

"In our conversations of today, *as a practical means of alleviating the  ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful  situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing  before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the  evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French  Indo-China.

"Hull, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan had clearly  demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain,  the Netherlands and other interested powers."

"In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the  American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in  China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal  situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the  Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the  Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather,  exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans  insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to  other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to  bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions.  In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of  successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B"  immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if  we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". *Therefore, looking at  it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to  presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a  practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of  goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in  Proposal "B", and then to try to proceed with the solution of other  questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced  that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.*

[Discontinuous text]

"The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not  interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises  in effect. *It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to  withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and  materials are made available to us.*"

"Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133  (ex. 1, pp. 152-3)."

The temporary arrangement suggested by the two Japanese Ambassadors was  summarily rejected by the Japanese Government in Tokyo. On November 19  (Japan time), in a message in which he referred to the Ambassadors'  messages No. 1133 and No. 1134 above, Foreign Minister Togo emphasized  that in the negotiations consent could be given only "within the scope  of the instructions of this office." He told Ambassador Nomura that

"the internal situation in our country is such *that it would be  difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo- China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act  will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that  would come up to the B proposal.* With the situation as urgent as it is  now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the  amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your  message, then to push on for an understanding.

"*The Ambassador (Kurusu) did not arrange this with us beforehand, but  made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting  the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result  in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore,  having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797, 800  and 801) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government,  and no further concessions can be made.*

*If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will  have to be broken off*; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth  your very best efforts (ex. 1, p. 155).

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Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister in Tokyo his  astonishment at the Japanese Government's unwillingness to consider  seriously the suggestion he and Ambassador Kurusu had made. His message  (No. 1136), dated November 19 (Washington time) follows in full:

"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the  Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation  and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and  the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality.  There are now three ways which the Empire might take

"(1) Maintain the status quo.

"(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.

"(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.

"No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war  preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a  state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In  other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.

"No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the  present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our  objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. *My #1134 of  yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by  the government is beyond my power of comprehension*, but as I view it,  the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China  incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an  opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a  large scale. *I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary  "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude  to greater achievements to come later.*

"I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary  to my message of yesterday (ex. 1, p. 158)."

In a separate message Ambassador Nomura requested the Foreign Minister  to "convey the above (message) to the Prime Minister" (ex. 1, p. 158).

In reply to this Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 20 (Japan time) that:

"under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by  you, as we have stated in our message, would not suffice for saving the  present situation.*"

"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock *except for you to push  negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our  #798.* Please understand this.  *The Premier also is absolutely in  accord with this opinion* (ex. 1, p. 160)."

Message No. 798 referred to in the next preceding paragraph was the  message the Foreign Minister had sent on November 19 (Japan time) which  rejected Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for a "provisional arrangement"  and instructed him to present proposal "B," the Japanese Government's  "absolutely final proposal."

Foreign Minister Togo's message of November 20 (Japan time), which thus  finally and conclusively rejected the suggestion made by Ambassadors  Nomura and Kurusu, was sent not only after the Foreign Minister had  received the Ambassadors' four telegrams of November 18 (Washington  time), including No. 1133 and No. 1134 quoted in part above, but also  after the Foreign Minister had received Ambassador Nomura's message No.  1135 of the same date, reporting on the meeting of the two Ambassadors  with the member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening of  November 17 (Washington time). Consequently, the record before the  committee shows that the Japanese Government, including Premier Tojo,  refused to consider the provisional arrangement suggested by Ambassadors  Nomura and

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Kurusu with knowledge not only that Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss  it with the British and the Dutch thus indicating, in the light of his  prior statements, that he believed a basis for negotiations had been  suggested by the two Ambassadors but with the further knowledge that  practically the same suggestion had been made to Ambassadors Nomura and  Kurusu by a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet.

The seriousness with which the Japanese Government regarded the stage  that had now been reached in the negotiations is evidenced by the fact  that on November 15 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Office sent out a  circular message to its officials abroad, including those in Washington,  prescribing "the order and method of destroying the code machines in the  event of an emergency" (ex. 1, p. 137). Four days later the Foreign  Office sent out circular messages establishing the so-called "winds  code," to be used in case of an emergency and the cutting off of  international communications. The receipt of a message implementing this  code was to be the signal to "destroy all code papers, etc." (Ex. 1, pp.  154-155). Those two messages were sent from Tokyo before Japan's  "absolutely final proposal" was presented to Secretary Hull, and appear  to have been the first Japanese messages intercepted which dealt with  the destruction of codes, code machines, et cetera.

JAPAN DELIVERS ITS ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND  DEMANDS AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS

(November 20, 1941)

On November 20 (Washington time), Thanksgiving Day, Ambassadors Nomura  and Kurusu called at the State Department. Ambassador Kurusu told  Secretary Hull that they had referred to their Government the suggestion  Ambassador Nomura had made at the meeting 2 days before for a return to  the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into southern  French Indochina in July. He said that both he and Ambassador Nomura had  anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in  moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the  Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal "on that  basis." He said that the Japanese proposal represented an amplification  of the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made (ex. 29 vol. II, p. 753)

The proposal which Ambassador Kurusu then read and handed to Secretary  Hull was the second formula, proposal "B," approved at the Imperial  Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) as a "last effort to  prevent something happening." In his messages to Ambassador Nomura,  Foreign Minister Togo had described it as "an ultimatum" (ex. 1, p. 99),  as "our absolutely final proposal" (ex. 1, p. 99), and as "our last  possible bargain" (ex. 1, p. 93). As originally drawn up and approved,  proposal "B" had consisted of four provisions, each of which was  contained in the Japanese proposal of November 20 (ex. 1, pp. 97,99; ex.  29, vol. II, pp. 755-756). "If necessary," those four provisions were to  be supplemented by others dealing with the three points previously at  issue in the conversations i. e., the evacuation of troops from China  and French Indochina, the Tripartite Pact, and nondiscrimination in  international trade. In the English text of proposal "B" cabled to  Ambassador Nomura on November 

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14 (Japan time), specific provisions covering those three points were  added to the original four provisions (ex. 1, p. 126). However, the  Foreign Minister's instructions to Ambassador Nomura on November 19  (Japan time) to present proposal "B" had also directed him to delete the  provisions dealing with nondiscrimination in international trade and the  Tripartite Pact, leaving only the provision relating to evacuation of troops in addition to the four provisions approved on November 5 (Japan  time) (ex. 1, p. 156). But whereas the formula concerning the evacuation  of troops which Ambassador Nomura had presented to Secretary Hull on  November 7 (Washington time) had covered the evacuation of Japanese  troops from both China and French Indochina, the provision contained in  the Japanese proposal of November 20 covered the evacuation of Japanese  troops from French Indochina only. To this, possibly with an eye to the  suggestion made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 18,  the Japanese Government had added a provision for the transfer of their  troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina "upon  the conclusion of the present arrangement." [1]

As read and delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Kurusu, the  Japanese proposal follows in full:

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to  make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern  Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo- China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now  stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration (If peace  between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in  the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to  remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo- China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of  the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final  agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a  view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which  the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to  restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the  freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required  quantity of oil.  "5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such  measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the  restoration of general peace between Japan and China (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 755-756).

When Ambassador Kurusu handed the Japanese proposal to him Secretary  Hull said that he would examine and study it sympathetically. Secretary  Hull referred to the fact that the United States was supplying aid to  both Great Britain and China, and indicated that until Japan made it  perfectly clear that her policy was one of peace it would be impossible  to cease aiding China. However Ambassador Kurusu observed in connection  with paragraph 5 of the proposal that it "might be interpreted to mean  that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that  negotiations were started."  (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 753-755.)

In his testimony before the Committee Secretary Hull summarized the  Japanese note of November 20 in these words:

[1] Secretary Hull testified that the conditional offer of the Japanese  "to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was  meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern  Indochina within a day or two and furthermore they placed no limit on  the number of troops they might continue to send there." (Tr. ;4261.)

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"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to  Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing  measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China and  for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese  government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed  forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no  limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into  Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until  after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the  establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there  were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into  southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there  were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh  Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to  the north of Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The  proposal contained no Provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and  to revert to peaceful courses (tr. 1137-38)."

It is now known that the Japanese note of November 20, was in fact, a  restatement in more peremptory terms of Japan's "minimum demands"  determined at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on September 6 (Japan  time). As applied to the United States, the three major Japanese  "demands" decided upon at that Imperial Conference were, that the United  States would not "intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the China Incident", i. e., would cease all aid to China; that the United  States would "take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to  the defense of the Empire"; and that the United States would " cooperate  with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials" (ex. 179,  Konoye Memoirs, pp. 77-78). In an intercepted message to Ambassador  Nomura which was translated and available in Washington on November 24  (Washington time), Foreign Minister Togo said:

"our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of  Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American  petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p.  172)."

Secretary Hull testified that the Japanese must have known that their  proposal was

"an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years  exploration of each others situations and attitudes (tr. 1181)."

He continued

"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly  unthinkable.  It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in  Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with  Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the  United States abandon its principles and policies.  It would have meant  abject surrender of our position under intimidation (tr. 1140)."

Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, as well as other high officials  of the Government, not only knew from the intercepted Japanese messages  already mentioned that the note the Japanese delivered on Thanksgiving  Day, November 20, was their "absolutely final proposal," they also knew  from the same source that the Japanese Government had fixed November 25  (Japan time) as the dead line by which the written agreement of the  United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to its demands were to  be obtained. On November 22 (Washington time), the following intercepted  message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was translated  and available in Washington:

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my  #736 (November 25). You should know this, however, I know you are  working hard. Stick"

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"to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to  bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your  ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by  the 26th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your  conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes  can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and  the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have  decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it that the dead line  absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going  to happen.* Please take this into your careful consideration and work  harder than you ever have before (ex. 1, p. 165)."

Even with four added days of grace, the situation was, Secretary Hull  testified,

"critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired  to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution  and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this  country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need for time to  prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a show-down.

"There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically  vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws (tr. 1140)."

Neither Secretary Hull nor President Roosevelt, nor any of their  advisors, knew, however, that almost simultaneously with the delivery in  Washington of the Japanese ultimatum of November 20, the Imperial  Japanese General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered the commander in  chief of the Japanese combined fleet to direct the Japanese naval  striking force, already assembling in a harbor in northern Japan, to  "advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness" for the  attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 437).

THE UNITED STATES REPLIES

(November 26, 1941)

The United States reply was handed to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in  the late afternoon on November 26 (Washington time), 6 days after the  delivery of the Japanese ultimatum (tr. 1147). Those 6 days were a  period of intense activity, involving not only the highest officials in  the United States Government but also the highest officials of the  British, Dutch, Australian, and Chinese Governments.

From time to time Secretary Hull had told the Japanese Ambassadors that  when his conversations with them got beyond the exploratory stage he  would talk with the representatives of the British, Dutch, and Chinese Governments. On November 18 (Washington time), after the Japanese  Ambassadors suggested a return to the status prior to the freezing  orders in July, Secretary Hull told them he would consult the British  and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  750). Immediately after that conference, Secretary Hull requested the  British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, to call on him. Secretary Hull's  memorandum of his conversation with the Minister is as follows:

"I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking  Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the  purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that  the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful  settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon  at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two  opposing policies of conquest by force on the one hand and a
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policy of peace, law, and order on the other. I went on to say that the  three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in  former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of  Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of  commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made  no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite  Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a  brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would  enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of  peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea  of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and  maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be  so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes  on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps  in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating  its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few  months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a  general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually  developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more  satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the  more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite  commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with  respect to these two points."

"I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese  that if their Government cared to present something on this point. I  would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of  consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should  be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the  Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they  would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said  to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful  policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far  in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might  need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated (ex. 168)."

The next day the Australian and Netherlands Ministers called separately  on Secretary Hull, at his request, and to each he gave the substance of  his talk with the British Minister (ex. 168).

Before turning to a discussion of the preparation of the United States'  reply to the Japanese note of November 20, it is important to recall  briefly the evidence before the Committee of the consideration given  earlier in November to-

"the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese  to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a  breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a  subsequent general agreement (Hull, tr. 1128)."

At the Joint Board meeting on November 3 (Washington time) which  followed the conferences called by Secretary Hull to determine whether  "the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings"  by the United States to Japan as urged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,  General Marshall had expressed the view that

"the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions  which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be  a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions (ex.  16)."

The Joint Board had decided that the War and Navy Departments would  prepare a memorandum for President Roosevelt which would, among other  things, oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan as urged by the  Generalissimo advocate State Department action to put off hostilities  with Japan as long as possible, and suggest that an agreement be made  with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months. However, the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark  actually submitted to President Roosevelt on November 5 contained only  the first of the Joint Board's

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recommendations; no reference was made in the memorandum to the second  or third points recommended by the Board and mentioned above (ex. 16).

The day after the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum was given to President  Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson

"had an hour's talk alone with the President with regard to the Far  Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was  coming from Japan.  The thing uppermost in his mind was how to gain more  time (tr. 14386-14387)."

In his notes of that talk with the President, Mr. Stimson recorded:

"The President outlined what he thought he might say. *He was trying to  think of something which would give us further time.* He suggested that  he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement of armament  for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their  arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis (tr.;  14414)."

At the Cabinet meeting the next day, November 7, the President had heard  Secretary Hull's estimate of the situation in the Far East and had  polled the Cabinet as already described (tr. 14415). On November 10,  during his talk with Ambassador Nomura, the President had made reference  to a "*modus vivendi*," and after this meeting, in his report to Tokyo,  Ambassador Nomura had said he intended to find out whether the President  referred to "possibly, a provisional agreement" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  718; ex. 1, p. 11G).  Again, in his report to Tokyo of the meeting with  President Roosevelt on November 17, Ambassador Nomura had commented  that, in connection with a remark by the President that the United  States desired to preserve peace in the Pacific,

"I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind (ex. 1, p. 139)."

It was on the evening of the same day that the two Japanese Ambassadors  had called on a member of the President's Cabinet and had been told that  the President "was very desirous of an understanding between Japan and  the United States," and if Japan would do something real to show her  peaceful intent, "such as evacuating French Indo-China," the way would  be open "for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to  the re-establishment of normal trade relations" (ex. 1, p. 154).

Exhibit 18 before the Committee includes the following undated, penciled  memorandum in President Roosevelt's handwriting:

"6 months

"1. U. S. To resume economic relations some oil and rice now more later.

"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or  any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).

"3 Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U. S. gets into  European war.

"4 U. S. to *introduce* Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to  take no part in their conversations.

"Later on Pacific agreements. (Ex. 18). [Italics in original.]"

Attached to the President's memorandum, which was obtained from the  files of the State Department, is a cover sheet on which appears the  following typewritten note: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President  to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after  November 20, 1941)" (ex. 18). However, the fact that the memorandum  suggests only that Japan should not be permitted to send "more troops to  Indochina or Manchurian Border," whereas by November 18 the Japanese  Ambassadors were suggesting to Secre-

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tary Hull the withdrawal of Japanese troops from at least southern  French Indochina, would seem to indicate that the memorandum may have  been written by the President before the latter date.

Likewise, since early in November the State Department had been giving  intensive study to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement,  knowing that

"The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to  keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to  prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We  considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or  keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the  integrity of American principles (Hull, tr. 1128)."

Two of those suggestions were used in preparing the United States' reply  to the Japanese note of November 20. On November 11 (Washington time),  the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had submitted to  Secretary Hull a draft of a proposal intended to serve as a

"transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not  only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to,  but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement  of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and  provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from  Japan (ex. 18)."

This draft proposal consisted of two parts, the first of which contained  a statement of principles and mutual pledges with respect to economic  relations which followed closelythe lines of the counterproposals made  to the Japanese on several prior occasions beginning in April. The second part contemplated immediate Japanese-Chinese negotiations during  which there would be an armistice between those countries and the United  States would hold in abeyance the shipment of supplies of a military  character to China and Japan would not increase or supply its military  forces in China and French Indochina. Upon the conclusion of a peace  settlement between Japan and China the United States was to negotiate  with both China and Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations  (ex. 18).

On November 18 (Washington time), Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau  sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull a draft of a proposed  comprehensive settlement between Japan and the United States (ex. 168).  This draft was revised in the Far Eastern Division of the State  Department the same day and copies of the revised draft entitled  "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and  Japan," were sent at once to General Marshall and Admiral Stark for  their consideration (ex. 18). As revised, the proposal set forth in  summary form various steps "proposed" to be taken by the United States  and Japanese Governments, respectively (ex. 18). The evidence before the  Committee shows that on the same day, November 19, Secretary Hull had  two meetings with Admiral Schuirmann, through whom the State Department  maintained liaison with the Navy Department (tr. 1173), and that a  conference attended by Admiral Stark for the Navy Department and by  General Gerow for the War Department (General Marshall was out of town)  was held at the State Department on the morning of November 21  (Washington time) at which the "Outline" was discussed. At that  conference Secretary Hull requested both Admiral Stark and General Gerow  to

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submit their comments on the "Outline" from the military and navaI standpoint (ex. 18).

This they did the afternoon of the same day, November 21  (Washington.time). In his memorandum General Gerow said that he believed  General Marshall would concur in the views which he expressed concerning  the "Outline" and advised Secretary Hull that on the basis of a hasty  study War Plans Division saw "no objection to its use as a basis for  discussion." He said that 

"the adoption of its provisions would attain *one of our present major  objectives-the avoidance of war with Japan.* Even a temporary peace in  the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the  Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material  assistance to the British both of which are highly important.

"The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to  all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. *War Plans  Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of  our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan*  (ex. 18)."

General Gerow suggested the deletion from the "Outline" of a provision  which would require Japan to withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria  except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided Russia  withdrew all her troops from her far eastern front except for an  equivalent remainder, on the ground that such a provision would probably  be unacceptable to Russia. He requested that the War Department be given  an opportunity to consider the military aspects of any major changes  that might be made in the proposal (ex. 18).

In his memorandum, Admiral Stark objected to provisions in the "Outline"  which would place limitations on American naval forces in Pacific  waters, commit the United States to use its influence toward causing  Great Britain to cede Hong Kong to China, and require Japan to sell to  the United States a specified tonnage of merchant vessels. He agreed  with General Gerow that the provision concerning the withdrawal of  Japanese troops in Manchuria should be deleted. He made several  suggestions regarding the phrasing of other provisions, and ended his  memorandum with the comment that while the provisions of the "Outline"  might be assumed to abrogate the Tripartite Pact on the part of Japan, it would be helpful if that could be specifically stated (ex. 18).

The following day, November 22 (Washington time), there was completed in  the State Department the first draft of a counterproposal in reply to  the Japanese note of November 20. This draft counterproposal was in two  sections. The first section contained a proposed *modus vivendi*. As an  alternative to the Japanese proposals of November 20, and was prefaced  by a brief statement of the circumstances leading to its preparation.  Revised drafts of this section were prepared on November 24 and 25. From  November 22 to November 26 the *modus vivendi* project was discussed and  given intensive consideration within the State Department, by President  Roosevelt and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy, including  Secretaries Stimson and Knox and General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The  *modus vivendi* was also discussed with the British, Australian,  Chinese, and Dutch Governments, principally through their diplomatic  representatives in Washington. Such revisions as were made in the  original draft of this section are discussed

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in connection with the final draft of November 25, which is set forth in  full below.

The second section of the November 22 draft consisted of two parts. The  first part contained the statement of principles and mutual pledges with  respect to economic relations which had been prepared by the State  Department's Far Eastern Division on November 11.  The second part was  based primarily upon the "Outline" sent by the State Department to the  War and Navy Departments on November 19, modified, however, in  accordance with the suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Gerow  in their memoranda of November 21 to Secretary Hull mentioned above. The  changes made in this section in the succeeding drafts of November 24 and  November 25 were few in number and, as so modified, this section became  the reply to the Japanese note of November 20 which was handed by  Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington  time).  Secretary Hull testified that all who saw the *modus vivendi*  section also saw the section which became the United States reply of  November 26 (tr. 14363).

The final, November 25 (Washington time), draft of the *modus vivendi* section was as follows:

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the  Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months  informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a  settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area  based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing  among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability  of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the  principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other  countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial  opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon  international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and  pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international  conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in  reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a  peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the  Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous  of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and  peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward  creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the  conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be  in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in  the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such  *modus vivendi* include as one of its provisions some initial and  temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and  normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.

"*On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary  of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken  respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the  United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to  accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain  features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the  fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under  consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is  committed.*

"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute  to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to  afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the  Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of  peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the  Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the  Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary *modus  vivendi*, as follows:

"MODUS VIVENDI

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,  both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their  national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace  throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs  therein.

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"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they  have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force  into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern  or the northern Pacific area.

"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed  forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace  those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to  the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval,  land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the  position of the Government of the United States with regard to the  presence of foreign troops in that area.

"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify  the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the  extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the  United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their  peoples:

"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the  sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the  purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at  Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese  obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds  in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk.  It is  understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of  which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the  adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United  States.

"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree

(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon          a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs          will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two  governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of    outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

"5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the  extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the  United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach  the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those   Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph  four above.

"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,  the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in  reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the  Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions  and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and  exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice,  which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between  the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and  which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

"8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three  months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the  instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a  peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an  extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period (Ex. 18.)"

Comparison of this final draft of the *modus vivendi* section and the  prior drafts of November 22 and November 24 shows that paragraphs

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1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above were contained in each draft and remained the same in substance throughout, with but few changes in text. In paragraph  3, the final draft added the proviso contained in the second sentence  and omitted specific mention of a limitation of 25,000 upon the total  number of Japanese troops to remain in French Indochina, retaining from  the prior drafts, however, the limitation expressed in terms of "the  number there on July 26,1941." Paragraph 4 was the same in both the  final draft and the draft of November  24, but differed from the  corresponding provision in the November 22 draft, which had been as  follows:

"The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the  freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United  States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to  remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American  assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain  subject to the respective export control measures which each country may   have in effect for reasons of national defense (ex. 18)."

During the 5 days from November 22 to November 26, inclusive, the State  Department was the focal point of great activity. After the preparation  of the November 22 draft of the *modus vivendi* and in accordance with  his conversations with the British Minister on November 18 and the  Netherlands and Australian Ministers on November 19, on Saturday,  November 22 (Washington time), Secretary Hull arranged a meeting at the  State Department with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador; Dr. Hu Shih,  the Chinese Ambassador; Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister; and Mr.  Richard G. Casey, the Australian Minister. His report of that meeting   follows in full:

"The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and the Netherlands  Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later  on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been  carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this  year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during  that time and need not be repeated here.

"I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a *modus  vivendi*, I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese  Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my  proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal.  There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was more  desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for  section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the  present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese.  Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this  preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was  somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China  arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is  very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision  in our proposed *modus vivendi* which would block a Japanese attack on  China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would  commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three  months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a  question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving  attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would  accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed  temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations  looking toward a general agreement on the basic  questions (ex. 18)."

Secretary Hull's memoranda of his subsequent conversations with those  who attended this meeting show that each of them immediately reported to  their respective Governments, for comment, the terms of the Japanese  note of November 20 to the United States and of the November 22 draft of  the proposed *modus vivendi* (ex. 18)."

Later that day, November 22, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on  Secretary Hull. The Secretary told them that he had

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 371

talked with the representatives of the other Governments mentioned  above, and

"that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things  (meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in  such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing.  The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the  suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be  settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that  their intentions were peaceful.

"The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the  representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen  in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the  course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to  the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador   and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move  last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases  by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the  fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments  because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the  conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal  civilian consumption.

"The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting  a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese  statesmen are talking about a peaceful course whereas in the American  press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked  why was there not some Japanese statesmen backing the two Ambassadors by  preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and  other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there  would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she  desired, that the Japanese Government knows that.

"The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard  to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan  out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese  Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates  to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador  could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful  intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and  other persons in this country (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 757-758)."

Later, Secretary Hull commented that Japan made it very difficult by leaving troops in Indochina. Ambassador Kurusu replied-

"that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indo-China in order to  bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement  of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indo-China  altogether.

"The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that  also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indo- China, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the  pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should  get out of Indo-China.

"Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told  Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should  be made by the Japanese side (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 760)."

After further discussion of the troop situation in Indochina. Ambassador  Nomura pressed Secretary Hull for an answer to the Japanese proposal of  November 20. In reply, the Secretary said

"that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his  answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to  confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned  after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He  repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the  Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 761)."

Ambassador Nomura "disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard  for an answer * * * and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to  wait until Monday" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761). Ambassador Nomura sent two  reports of this meeting to Tokyo (ex. 1, pp. 167-169,170-171), in one of  which he observed:

Page 372 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk,  and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the  same (ex. 1, p. 171)."

The two Ambassadors did not meet with Secretary Hull again until  Wednesday afternoon, November 26 (Washington time), when the Secretary  gave them the United States reply (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-770) .

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meetings or conferences  outside the State Department regarding the *modus vivendi* the next day,  Sunday, November 23 (Washington time).  However, Monday, November 24  (Washington time), like the preceding Saturday, was a day of great  activity. A new draft of the entire counterproposal was completed in the Department over the weekend (ex. 18). During the early part of the   afternoon Secretary Hull had telephone conversations with Secretary  Stimson and Secretary Knox, as well as a conference with Admiral  Schuirmann (tr. 1166). At 3:30 p. M., Secretary Hull had a conference at  the State Department with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, at which  the new draft was discussed in detail (tr. 1166; ex. 18). During this  conference General Marshall expressed the opinion that 25,000 Japanese  troops in French Indo-China, the maximum permitted under the current  draft of the *modus vivendi*, would not be a menace (ex. 18). Following  his conference with General Marshall and Admiral Stark at the State  Department, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Loudon, and Mr. Casey called  on Secretary Hull at his request, and to each of them he handed copies  of the latest draft of the *modus vivendi*. The Secretary's memorandum  of that meeting records that they spent an hour reading the draft and  taking notes to send back to their Governments. The memorandum  continues:

"The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000  Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General  Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that  25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not  recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we  were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily  because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time  is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be  more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the  Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the  point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are  not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that  such an outbreak may soon occur any day after this week unless a  temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of  public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more  practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general  agreement.

"The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed  figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out  and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would  be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course  for three months and set forth the advantages to each of having  additional time in which to make further preparations, et ectera, et  ectera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be  thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought  of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered  that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to  this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands  Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested  in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the  same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to  be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the  entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of  preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about  these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I  was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the  lack of interest and

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lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the  Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his  Government and that it would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. I  then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the  Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and  attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion (ex.  18)."

Later that day Secretary Hull sent to President Roosevelt a draft of a  proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill.  The  proposed message summarized the Japanese note of November 20, saying  that the Japanese Ambassador had "represented" that the conclusion of  such a "modus vivendi" might give the Japanese Government opportunity to  develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and  comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that "the  domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent  some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal."  The message pointed  out that the Japanese proposal "would apparently not exclude advancement  into China from Indo-China " It went on to say that the United States  Government proposed to inform the Japanese Government that in its  opinion the Japanese proposals contained features "not in harmony with  the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general  settlement" to which each Government had declared that it was committed,  and then summarized the terms of the *modus vivendi* which was being  considered by the United States Government as an alternative proposal.  The message advised the Prime Minister that the British Ambassador in  Washington had been informed and was informing the British Foreign  Minister (ex. 18). President Roosevelt returned the draft message to  Secretary Hull with the notation "O. K., see addition. F. D. R." (Ex.  18). The "addition" referred to by the President was the following  sentence which he had written in longhand for insertion at the end of  the message:

"This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance  or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not  very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon  (ex. 18)."

The message, with the sentence added by the President, was sent to the  Prime Minister at 11 p. m. That evening, November 24 (Washington time),  through Ambassador Winant in London (ex. 18).

The next day, Tuesday, November 25 (Washington time), the draft  counterproposal was once more revised in the State Department. This was  the final revision of the section containing the *modus vivendi*. At  9:30 a. M. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox met with Secretary Hull  at the State Department for their "usual Tuesday morning meeting" (tr.  14,390), which Secretary Stimson described in his notes:

"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was  going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately  safeguarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don't  think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was  so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do;  namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or  threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her  neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient  quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was  particularly applicable to oil.  We had a long talk over the general  situation (tr. 14,417-14,418)."

It is clear that Secretary Stimson's description of the *modus vivendi*  as "so drastic" refers to the limited nature of the trade concessions to  be made by the United States under it.

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At noon that day the so-called "War Council" composed of President  Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and General Marshall and  Admiral Stark met at the White House. The discussion centered on the  Japanese situation. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the  President

"brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as  soon as) next .Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an  attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The  question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the  first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. [1] It was a  difficult proposition. Hull laid out his general broad propositions on  which the thing should be rested the freedom of the seas and the fact  that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy  of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such  expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an  encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our  vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President  that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in  notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into  Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to  point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation  of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing  that (tr. 14,418-14,419)."

In addition to Secretary Hull's testimony regarding this meeting (tr.  1144), the record before the Committee contains a copy of a letter  written by the Secretary to the Roberts Commission a little over a month  after the meeting. In that letter, after stating that at the meeting of  the War Council on November 25, as well as the meeting on November 28,  he had "emphasized the critical nature" of the relations between the  United States and Japan, the Secretary continued:

"I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of  an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese  were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force;  and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the  hands of the Army and the Navy.  At the conclusion I with due deference  expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should  include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of  surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at  various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of  defense and of coordination for purposes thereof (ex. 174)."

General Marshall testified that he had "a very distinct recollection of  Mr. Hull's saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, 'These  fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared" (tr. 3079).

Admiral Stark, who attended the War Council meeting on November 25,  added a postscript concerning it to a letter of that date which he sent  to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. In the postscript, he described the  comments of the President and the Secretary of State:

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.  I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long  talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as  did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise  attack (ex. 100)."

After the meeting at the White House, Secretary Hull returned to the  State Department and Secretary Stimson to the War Department.  Secretary  Stimson recorded in his notes:

[1] With reference to this sentence in Secretary Stimson's notes,  General Marshall testified: "* * * they were trying to arrange a  diplomatic procedure, rather than firing of a gun, that would not only  protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese  couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they  did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we  were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not  a military order. It was not a military arrangement" (tr. 13801).
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Exhibit D Cont'd.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 375

"When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a  Japanese) expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from  Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships 30,  40, or 50 ships-and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called  up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the  President of the menace from G-2 (tr. 14419)."

Secretary Hull's record of telephone calls shows a call on that day from  Secretary Stimson at 4:30 p. m. (tr. 1166), and the record of outside  telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows such a call at  4:25 p. m. and that the call was completed (tr. 5545.  The latter  record also shows that Postmaster General Walker telephoned Secretary  Hull four times that afternoon (tr. 5545-5546). The first call was at  12:27 p. M., while the meeting at the White House was in progress, and  was not completed. The other calls, which were completed, were at  3:30,4:05, and 5:30 p.m.

In the meantime reports were reaching Washington of the reactions of the  Chinese, Dutch, and British Governments to the terms of the proposed  *modus vivendi*. As noted above, the Netherlands Minister informed  Secretary Hull at the conference on the afternoon of November 24  (Washington time) that his Government would support the *modus vivendi*  proposal. The next day the Minister formally transmitted to Secretary  Hull his Government's comments on the Japanese note of November 20 and  the proposed *modus vivendi* (tr. 4471-4474).  The comments of the  British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, were contained in a  memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on the same day by Lord Halifax, the  British Ambassador (ex. 18). That memorandum expressed the willingness  of the British Foreign Office to leave to Secretary Hull the decision  whether to reject the Japanese proposals or make a counterproposal. It  took the position that the Japanese proposals should be regarded " as  the opening movement in a process of bargaining," and suggested that if  a counterproposal should be made, "our demands should be pitched high  and our price low." On this basis it was suggested "for the  consideration of the United States Government" that any counterproposal

"should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo-China not merely of  the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval,  military and air forces with their equipment and for the *suspension of  further military* advances in China in addition to satisfactory  assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern  Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of  existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited  quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian  population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war  potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no  shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course  only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces  took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar  nature from Japan if we required them.

"Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any  interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which  must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United  States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have  to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and  is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on  more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned (ex. 18).  (Italics in original.)"

Prime Minister Churchill's reply to President Roosevelt's message of  November 24 reached the State Department early on the morning of  November 26 (ex. 23). In it the Prime Minister said:

"Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord  Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which  Foreign"

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Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle  this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is  only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not  having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse  our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard  of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We  feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves (ex. 23)."

The views of the Chinese Government had already been made known to the  United States Government. The Chinese Foreign Minister, to whom on  November 22 the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had cabled the  substance of the Japanese note of November 20 and the proposed *modus  vivendi*, sent the following message to the Chinese Ambassador on  November 24:

"After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed strong reaction.  He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside  the Chinese question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking  a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of  China. * * * We are * * * firmly opposed to any measure which may have  the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or  of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China. Please  inform the Secretary of State (ex. 18)."

On November 25, Owen Lattimore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's American  advisor, cabled Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's  administrative assistants:

"After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's  conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have  never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or  unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in  China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in  China would dismay the Chinese. Any 'Modus Vivendi' now arrived at with  Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to  the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British  prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the  resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against  occidental treachery.  It is doubtful whether either past assistance or  increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at  this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's  fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the  Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if  the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of  Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory (ex. 18)."

The same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled Mr. T. V. Soong in  Washington the following message, which the latter promptly delivered to  Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox:

"I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram  yesterday.  Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox  and Stimson immediately.

"Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should  relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if  reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency,  the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two  months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November  an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They  have even come to a silent but nonetheless definite understanding with  the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any  relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of  that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has  been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the  entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith,  and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most  tragic epoch in the world will be opened.  The Chinese army will  collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans,  so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the  situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China  alone.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 377

"We could therefore only request the United States Government to be  uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies  from China, is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or  freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American  attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its  fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the  break-down of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with  the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our  resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do  not indeed know how history in future will record this episode (ex.  18)."

The evening of November 25 (Washington time), Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese  Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull and delivered to him a copy of the  Chinese Foreign Minister's telegram quoted above. According to Secretary  Hull's memorandum of the conversation, the Ambassador endeavored to  explain Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to the *modus  vivendi* on the ground that the Generalissimo was not thoroughly  acquainted with the over-all international aspects of the Japanese  situation, and viewed it only from his own situation in Chungking (ex.  18). The Secretary's memorandum continued:

"I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and  Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into  war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further  their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the  second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for  conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful  settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on  conversations and making some progress thus far, and the Japanese are  urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of  a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the  proposed *modus vivendi* is really a part and parcel of the efforts to  carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been  fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador  and to others.

"I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek  almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how  extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the  first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to  require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to  protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent  danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation which we  have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter  relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to  the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace  agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve  the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area,  including Singapore the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the  United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes.  All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue  for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that  the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might  let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent  increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we  can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we  are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near  Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a  military drive southward.

"The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back  to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the  situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly  spirit (ex. 18)."

The same evening, whether before or after his talk with Secretary Hull  is not clear from the record before the Committee, Dr. Hu Shih called on  Dr. Stanley E. Hornbeck, political advisor to the Secretary. After  expressing to Dr. Hornbeck his complete confidence that the United  States "would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue no  course of 'appeasement' ", the Chinese Ambassador repeated what

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he had said at the conference the preceding day regarding the second and  third points of the *modus vivendi*, evidencing the concern of his  Government that point 2 would leave Japan free to continue operations  against China and that point 3 would not sufficiently limit the number  of Japanese troops in Indo-China to dispel the Japanese threat to the  Burma Road. He expressed the hope that the *modusvivendi* would be made  more restrictive (ex. 18).

In the meantime, other intercepted Japanese messages available to  Secretary Hull before delivery of the United States reply on November 26 (Washington time), in addition to the messages (ex. 1, pp. 155, 160) in  which the Japanese Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that a return  to the status prior to the freezing orders was not enough and that it  would be necessary to have a solution that would "come up to the B  proposal," had indicated that the Japanese Government would accept  nothing less than the terms of that proposal. Thus, on November 24  (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura:

"Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration  of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation of the freezing  legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with  the exception of clauses 6 and 7. (*Note*. Clauses 6 and 7 were not  included in the Japanese proposal of November 20.) Therefore, our demand  for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies  goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as  well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172)."

Again on November 26 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Togo cabled  Ambassador Nomura that "our final proposal envisages an agreement on the  basis of the 'B' proposal in toto" with the two exceptions already noted  (ex. 1, p. 176). The same day the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador  Nomura that as soon as he reached a settlement on the basis of the  November 20 note

"it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods  in connection with clauses 2 and 3 (*Note*: clauses 3 and 4 of the  November 20 note) of that proposal. Of these goods the acquisition of  petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the  Empire. Therefore, * * * prior to the signing of an understanding, and  at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes  known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following  lines:

"4,000,000 tons per year from the United States (ex. 1, p. 177)."

On November 21 (Washington time) Ambassador Kurusu had called on  Secretary Hull and handed him a letter which he proposed to sign as a  clarification of Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. The  proposed letter asserted that the Pact did not in any way infringe the  sovereign rights of Japan as an independent state; that Japan was free  to make its own interpretation; that the Japanese Government would not  become involved in war "at the behest of any foreign power"; and that it  would " accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for  the maintenance of its security and the preservation of its national  life against active injustice" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 757). The record of  the conversations shows that the substance of all of these assertions  had been made by the Japanese many times before. Secretary Hull asked  the Ambassador whether he had anything more to offer on the whole  subject of a peaceful settlement, and Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 756). Secretary Hull described this incident in his  testimony:

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 379

"The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was  talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that,  and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to  offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, 'No.'

"So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal and what  their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter (tr.  1181)."

Secretary Hull had also received a report from Ambassador Grew of his  talk with Foreign Minister Togo on November 24 (Japan time), during  which the Foreign Minister stated that the withdrawal of the Japanese  troops from southern to northern Indochina was the maximum concession  Japan could make "in any event", and that Japan would be willing to have  President Roosevelt act as "introducer" between Japan and China "with  the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action  prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan," I. E., cease  all aid to China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 762-763).

On Wednesday, November 26 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson talked  with Secretary Hull at 9:15 a. M. And again at 9:50 a. m., according to  the White House telephone records (tr. 5546). Mr. Stimson summarized the  conversations in his notes:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up  his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on  the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over to tell  them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected  to that proposition when he showed it to them; that is, to the  proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving  to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the  interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a  special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that  they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that  the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has  asked to see me and I had called Hull up this morning to tell him so and  ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said  above that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in  respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no  further action to propose (tr. 14,420)."

On his return to the State Department from the War Council meeting the  preceding day, Secretary Hull had been told by Secretary Stimson that  the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50  ships at Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the  China coast south of Formosa. Secretary Stimson had also telephoned  President Roosevelt about this, and had sent copies of the intelligence  report to him. A few minutes after his telephone conversations with  Secretary Hull on the morning of November 26, Secretary Stimson  telephoned the President to inquire whether he had received the report  on the Japanese expedition. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the  President

"fairly blew up jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't  seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an  evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were  negotiating for an entire truce-an entire withdrawal (from China) they  should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-china, I told him  that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy  Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent  last night and sent it over to him by special messenger (tr. 14,420- 14,421)."

The record before the Committee contains the following "Memorandum for  the President," dated November 26 (Washington time) and signed by  Secretary Stimson:

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JAPANESE CONVOY MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDO-CHINA

"About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese  Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move  approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000  already there by previous agreement.

"Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from  ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been  assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could  mean a force as great as 50,000 but more probably a smaller number.  Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat  carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment.  Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships  leave been seen south of Formosa.

 "The officers concerned in the Military Intelligence Division feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal  movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to  the Vichy Government.

"I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular  field (ex. 98)."

At 6:54 p. M. That day the following priority message was dispatched from the Navy Department:

"From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines

"Admiral Hart will deliver to you a copy of a despatch which with my  approval the CNO and the COS addressed to the senior Army and Navy  commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the  Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrisons and naval forces on  the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region  as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US Forces.  However, I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of  Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai  and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in  China, Formosa, and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some  character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its  strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road,  Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.  Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I consider it possible  that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of  hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further  informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval  and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General  MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the  President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I  am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people.  Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public  pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more  difficult. Roosevelt (tr. 13,861-13,862)."

The evidence before the Committee shows that at about 1:20 p. m. that  day, November 26, Secretary Hull telephoned n Stark (tr. 1166, 5546),  that Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull at 2:35 p. m. after attempting  to telephone General Marshall (who was out of town) at 1:28 (tr. 5546),  and that late that afternoon Secretary Hull conferred at the White House  with President Roosevelt (tr. 1147). The Secretary was preceded at the  White House by the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, and Mr. T. V. Soong  (ex. 179). Secretary Hull testified that on November 26 he recommended  to President Roosevelt and that the President approved the Secretary's  calling in the two Japanese Ambassadors and handing them the proposals  contained in the second section of the counterproposal that had been  under consideration at the State Department, while withholding the modus  vivendi plan (tr. 1147). President Roosevelt was, Secretary Hull  testified, "thoroughly familiar" with both sections of the  counterproposal (tr. 14, 312). The record before the Committee contains the following memorandum dated November 26 (Washington time) from  Secretary Hull for President Roosevelt:

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"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

"With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the  Japanese Government, namely:

"(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic,  peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made  a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on,  if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on  this subject.

 "(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the  conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature  of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the  conversations.

"In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the  half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the  Netherlands, and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide  publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will  naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast  importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way  departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to  all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested  in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this  time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the  comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at  the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.

"/S/ CORDELL HULL (ex. 18)."

In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull gave a more  detailed statement of the considerations which led to his recommendation  to the President: 

"I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese  military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were  demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended  later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme  last-word proposal of November 20.

 "It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other  high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal  was remote.

"So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese,  it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton,  oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.

"It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American  opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the  supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese  Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments  were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable  or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that  the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major  blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear  that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did  not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it,  especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance  and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly  evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

"The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were  being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the  other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing  Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to  restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered  all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and  mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to  Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It  still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's  decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually  extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic  effort in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be  worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort  should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement  (tr. 114S1147). "

Upon his return to the State Department from his conference with President Roosevelt, at 5 p. M. Secretary Hull met with Ambassadors

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Nomura and Kurusu at the Department and handed them, in reply to the  Japanese note of November 20, the second section of the counterproposal  which had been under consideration since November 22, together with an  explanatory statement. The explanatory statement was the first section  of that counterproposal as quoted herein (pp. 70-71) modified by the  deletion of the modus vivendi and with further changes made necessary  thereby. It reviewed briefly the objectives sought in the exploratory  conversations, and stated that it was believed that some progress had  been made with respect to the general principles involved. Note was  taken of the recent statements of the Japanese Ambassadors that it would  be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to that successful  outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be  agreed upon, to be in effect while the conversations looking toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area were  continuing. It was stated that the United States Government most  earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of the  discussions to this end. The statement continued:

"The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on  November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this  Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part  of the general settlement under consideration and to which each  Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the  United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be  likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under  law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that  further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to  the practical application of the fundamental principles already  mentioned.

"With this object in view *the Government of the United States offers  for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but  simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical  exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as  something to be worked out during our further conversations.*

"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap  between our draft of June 21, 1941. and the Japanese draft of September  25, by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a  comprehensive Pacific settlement. *This plan contains provisions dealing  with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we  have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for  worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress  toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be  expedited (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 767)."

The outline of a proposed basis for agreement which Secretary Hull  handed to the Japanese Ambassadors follows, in full:

"Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment.

"WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.

"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOB AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  JAPAN

"SECTION I

"*Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy*

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both  being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national  policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the  Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that  they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using  military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that,  accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and  give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon  which their relations with each other and with all other governments are  based:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and  sovereignty of each and all nations.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 383

"(2) The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other  countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial  opportunity and treatment."

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and  conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies  and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and  processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have  agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing  recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will  actively support and practically apply the following principles in their  economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.

"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition  of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw  material supplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming  countries and populations as regards the operation of international  commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and  arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential  enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may  permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of  all countries.

"SECTION II

"Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the  Government of Japan

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will  endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British  Empire China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and The United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland, and Thai Governments an  agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to  respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event  that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of  Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking  such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the  threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the  Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential  treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would  use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of  treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and  police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will  not support militarily, politically, economically any government or  regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of  China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,  including rights and interests in and with regard to international  settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of  1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British  and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in  international settlement's and in concessions and under the Boxer  Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will  enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and  Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation  treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including  an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan  will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds  in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the  dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose,  half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

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"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has  concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in  such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this  agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the  Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other  governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic  political and economic principles set forth in this agreement (ex. 167;  ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 768-770)."

Ambassador Grew was fully informed the same evening of the sub-stance of the United States' reply. (Tr. 4513-4522; ex. 75.)

The record before the Committee shows that, commencing with the first  draft of an American counterproposal on November 22 (Washington time),  all the officials of the United States Government who were consulted by  Secretary Hull regarding the proposed modus vivendi necessarily saw and  considered the successive drafts of the foregoing so-called "Ten Point"  note, since from the outset the provisions which, as revised, became the  "Ten Point" note had constituted the second section of the  counterproposal and had been attached to the first section containing  the modus vivendi. The record also shows that the provisions of the "Ten  Point" note probably received more attention from the high officers of  the Army and Navy than did the terms of the modus vivendi, since the  part containing the so-called "Ten Points" was based primarily upon the  State Department's revision of the Morgenthau suggestions of November  18. It will be recalled that that revision was sent to the Army and Navy  for comment on November 19, and was the subject of the conference at the  State Department on November 21 attended by General Gerow and Admiral  Stark, who thereafter submitted their comments and suggestions to  Secretary Hull in memoranda of the same date. As has already been  pointed out, the first section of the "Ten Point" note was based almost  entirely upon the statement of principles contained in the draft  proposal submitted by the State Department's Far Eastern Division to  Secretary Hull on November 11, which in turn had been frequently  discussed with the Japanese during the six months since the  conversations began in the spring of 1941.

Returning to Secretary Hull's meeting with Ambassadors Nomura and  Kurusu, after the Japanese had read the documents handed them by the  Secretary, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether this was the United States  reply to their proposal.

"The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as  there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the  United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United  States we have a political situation-to deal with just as does the  Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which  have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a  natural reaction among the public in this country. *He said that our  proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial  cooperation, to which, however, were not referred to in the outline for  fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding.* He also referred to  the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the  Ambassador of the ambition that had been his *of settling the  immigration question* but that the situation had so far prevented him  from realizing that ambition (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 764).

Ambassador Kurusu then commented adversely on various provisions of the  American note, saying among other things that he did not see how his  Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4), and that if this  represented the idea of the American Government he did not see how any  agreement was possible. He said that when they reported the United  States' answer to their Government "it would be

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 385

likely to throw up its hands". He suggested that it might be better if  they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents  further informally in Washington. Later, he said that he felt the reply  could be interpreted "as tantamount to meaning the end." He asked  whether the United States was interested in a modus vivendi. Secretary  Hull replied that he had explored that and that he had done his best in  the way of exploration (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-766).

In reply to Ambassador Kurusu's suggestion that the document should be  discussed informally before reporting it to Tokyo

"The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents  carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were  trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a  result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all  that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go  at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so  much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about  some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has  lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a  document which would present a complete picture of our position by  making provision for each essential point involved.

"The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public  feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if  he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan  should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies  ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He  reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they  were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries  neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our  permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina  affects our direct interests (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 765)."

At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura asked whether the  two Ambassadors could see President Roosevelt, and Secretary Hull  replied that he had no doubt the President would be glad to see them at  any time. The Ambassador also said that he would like to have the  counselor of the Japanese Embassy call on Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, one  of the Secretary's principal advisors on Far Eastern affairs, the next  day "to discuss further details" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 766).

Secretary Hull testified:

"The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's  foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the  situation in the Far East as embodied in the ten points contained in the  document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the  Japanese representatives in the course of the informal exploratory  conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in  question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable  policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country  and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis  for further conversations.

*                *                 *                *               *

"Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the  Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked  out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either  Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the  conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there  was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task  of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter  how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was  given to the Japanese Government (tr. 1151-1152)."

*Before their meeting with Secretary Hull late in the afternoon of  November 26 (Washington time)*, the two Japanese Ambassadors had sent a  joint telegram to Foreign Minister Togo in which they recognized, *even  before Secretary Hull delivered the " Ten Point" note to them,*

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that the negotiations were for all practical purposes at an end. They told the Foreign Minister:

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of  having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we  let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so,  the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, *if indeed they may not  already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete* (ex. 1,  p. 180)."

They then asked the approval of the Foreign Minister of the only  remaining suggestion they had to offer, as a device to obtain more time.  The Ambassadors suggested, with "grave misgivings," that they be  permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt wire  Foreign Minister Togo (not Emperor Hirohito) that "for the sake of  posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will co-operate for  the maintenance of peace in the Pacific * * * and that you in return  reply with a cordial message." The Ambassadors asked that their request  be shown to the Navy Minister (ex. 1. p. 189).

While Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu were meeting with  Secretary Hull at the State Department, and at their direction, the  counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, using the trans-Pacific  telephone, informed the Foreign Office in Tokyo that the meeting was in progress and that "the future of the present talks would be decided  during the course of today's conversation" (ex. 1, p. 179). In making  this call, Mr. Wakasugi used a telephone code established earlier that  day in a message from the Foreign Minister which said "the situation is  momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long" (ex. 1, p.  178). There is no evidence before the Committee of the use of a trans-Pacific telephone code in connection with the negotiations prior to the  establishment of this code by the Japanese Foreign Office before the  American note was delivered on November 26 (Washington time).

Almost immediately upon his return to the Japanese Embassy, Ambassador  Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the trans-Pacific telephone. He told the Chief of the American Division, Kumaicho  Yamamoto:

"I have made all efforts, *but they will not yield*. I sent a cable  expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. [1] The  situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of  accomplishing it (ex. 1, p. 179)."

He continued

"I rather imagine you had expected this outcome (ex. 1, p. 180)."

To which Bureau Chief Yamamoto replied:

"Yes, I had expected it, but I wished to exert every effort up to the  final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished (ex. 1, p.  180)."

That evening Ambassador Nomura cabled three reports to the Foreign  Minister of the Ambassadors' meeting with Secretary Hull. The first was  a brief resume of the "Ten Point" note, accompanied by this comment:

"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and  said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to  Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why  did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well,  England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then,  too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a  number of important Japanese in speeches have

[1] The message referred to above in which the Ambassadors said "Our failure and humiliation are complete".

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been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover,  there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us  complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in  these two hard proposals, or we think so (ex. 1, p. 182)."

The third telegram was a detailed account of the meeting (ex. 1, pp.  183-185). The second telegram consisted of general comments on the  situation (ex. 1, pp. 182-183). In it Ambassador Nomura showed great  concern lest some "independent action" taken by Japan *while the  negotiations were continuing* should place upon Japan the responsibility  "for the rupture of the negotiations." He pointed out that "up to the  present we have only been able to press them for an early solution.  During this time we have not expressed any final intention!" Recognizing  that "such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict  military secret," the Ambassador recommended:

"consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of  course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations  be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to  the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and  external consumption.* I would like, if such a course is followed, to  make representations here at the same time (ex. 1, p. 183)."

THE TOJO CABINET MAKES A PRETENSE OF CONTINUING THE JAPANESE- AMERICAN  CONVERSATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME MOVES ADDITIONAL JAPANESE TROOPS INTO  SOUTHERN INDOCHINA

(November 27-December 7, 1941)

The record before the Committee thus shows that there was little hope or  expectation in Washington on November 27, either among those in the  United States Government who were familiar with the Japanese-American  conversations or on the part of the two Japanese Ambassadors, that the  Tojo Government in Tokyo would continue the conversations. Nevertheless,  as requested by Ambassador Kurusu the day before, a meeting with  President Roosevelt was arranged for 2:30 p. m. on November 27  (Washington time) at the White House.

That morning, before the White House conference, Secretary Hull held a  "special and lengthy" press conference at which he reviewed the Far  Eastern situation and particularly the state of the Japanese-American  conversations in much greater detail than had been true of the statement  made to the press late the preceding afternoon, following his conference  with the two Japanese Ambassadors (tr. 1154- 161). That statement had  said only that the Japanese Ambassadors had been handed for their  consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back  and forth during recent weeks, and that it was unnecessary to repeat  what had been said so often in the past that it rested on certain basic  principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in  the light of many repetitions (ex. 167). At Secretary Hull's press  conference on the morning of November 27, he emphasized that from the  beginning he had kept in mind that the groups in Japan led by the  military leaders had a plan to conquer by force half of the earth with  half its population; that this movement had started in earnest in 1937,  and carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of  conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of  justice or fair play. The Secretary said that from the beginning, as the  world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy, the   United States had sought to keep
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alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing  viewpoint in international relations, but that it was no easy undertaking. He then briefly reviewed the nature of the conversations he had  had with the Japanese, commencing in the spring of 1941, to determine  whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area might  not be possible. He said that while the conversations during the  preceding several months had been purely exploratory, for the past 10  days or so all phases of the basic questions presented and of  suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States  as close together as possible had been explored, on the theory there  might thus be reached the beginning of some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations in the Pacific area, including  the United States. He said that during the conversations it had been  necessary to keep in mind not only the political situation in Japan but  also the activities of the Japanese Army and Navy, and he cited the  fact:

"that we had known for some days * * * that the Japanese were pouring  men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indo-China.  * * * There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make  attacks some-where there around Siam, any time within a few days (tr.  1156-1157)."

He said that if the Japanese established themselves in Indochina in  adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they would have a base  not only for operations against China but the whole South Sea area. The  Secretary said that the United States Government had exhausted all its  efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese; and that  those efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general  agreement. On November 26, he continued, because he had found there was  so much confusion and so many collateral manners brought in, while at  the same time high Japanese officials in Tokyo continued to proclaim  their old doctrine of force he had thought it important to bring the  situation to a clear perspective by restating the fundamental principles  to which the United States was committed and at the same time show how  those principles could be applied to a number of specific conditions  which would logically be a part of a broad basic settlement in the  entire Pacific area. When he was asked whether he expected the Japanese  to come back and talk further on the basis of what he had given them on  November 26, Secretary Hull replied that he did not know, but that the  Japanese might not do that. In reply to a question whether it could be  assumed there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept the  principles to which he had referred and go far enough to afford a basis  for continuing the conversations, the Secretary said there was always a  possibility but that he would not say how much probability there might  be.

Secretary Hull's press conference took place at about 10 o'clock that  morning. Both before and after it, at 9:17 and 11 o'clock, the Secretary  talked with Secretary Stimson regarding the state of the negotiations;  he also talked with Admiral Stark that morning (tr. 1167, 5547).  Secretary Stimson's notes for that day (November 27) describe his two  conversations with Secretary Hull:

"A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and  movement south by the Japanese of a large Expeditionary Force moving  south from Shanghai and evidently headed towards Indo-China with a  possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma  Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but prob-

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ably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position  from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives. The first thing in the morning I call up Hull to find out what his  finale has been with the Japanese whether he had handed them the new  proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he  suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me  now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have  washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox the  Army and the Navy." I then called up the President. The President gave  me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up  with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards  that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our  constant and regular position.

"General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of  our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated  Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in  the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the  reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs.

"Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General  Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence  very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and  Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I  didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States  or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The  main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur.  We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an  alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the  telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the  final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack  and telling him how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went  over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally  got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I  got the exact statement from him of what the situation was (tr. 14,421- 14,423)."

Because of its relationship to events which followed, it is necessary  here to refer briefly to the background of Secretary Stimson's  observation in his notes that General Gerow and Admiral Stark desired  "to seek for more time." It will be recalled that on November 5, in  connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for British and  American aid, General Marshall and Admiral Stark had concluded that

"war between the United States and Japan should be avoided while  building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan  attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United  States is of very great importance (ex. 16)."

As has been seen, one of the major considerations in the modus vivendi  proposal was the desire of the military and naval authorities "for more  time." However, at the War Council meeting on November 25 attended by  General Marshall and Admiral Stark, Secretary Hull stated that there was  "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan"  (ex. 174, Item 13). The next day, at an Army-Navy Joint Board meeting,  General Marshall and Admiral Stark directed the preparation of a  memorandum to President Roosevelt regarding what steps should be taken  if the negotiations with Japan should end without agreement. The meeting  on November 27 described by Secretary Stimson in his notes for that day  was also described in a memorandum for General Marshall  prepared the same day by General Gerow:

"2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of  War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the  Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint  message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy  attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you  and Admiral Stark

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directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation  to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He  was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be  shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.
 
 "3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made  (copy attached) (ex. 45)."

In his prepared statement submitted to the Committee, Secretary Stimson  stated that at the meeting with General Gerow and Admiral Stark,  

"I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time  but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or  of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on  our part (tr. 14, 394)."

General Marshall summed up his viewpoint and that of Secretary Stimson  in his testimony before the committee: 

"He (Secretary Stimson) was very much afraid he feared that we would  find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our  disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when  the Japanese actually broke peace. 

"He also felt very keenly that; and thought about this part a great deal  more than I did because it was his particular phase of the matter, that  we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to  sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that. 

"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I  was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we  would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular  time. 

"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will  say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which  allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a  hopeless situation before the peace was broken and mine, which as I say  were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we  should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible  deficiencies in our defensive arrangements (tr. 13,820-13,821)."

The memorandum for President Roosevelt, although dated November 27  (Washington time), was signed by General Marshall upon his return to Washington on November 28 (Washington time), with the minor changes  suggested by Secretary Stimson, and was as follows:    

"Memorandum for the President 

"Subject: Far Eastern Situation. 

"If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack:  the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the  Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

"There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the  Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent  Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward. 

"The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct  attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat  exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.  

"Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives  involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly  within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the  Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful,  the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of  Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to  operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies; might relieve  internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic  pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road,  Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast. 

"The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to  gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to  the 

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Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The  process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate  concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000  are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is  important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before  hostilities commence. 

"Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long  as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more  positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval  and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered  and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands.  War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to  Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China. 

"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch  military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military  counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan  attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the  United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies,  or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100o east or  south of 10o north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty  Islands. 

"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is  advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of  communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a  Japanese advance to the west of 100o east or south of 10o north,  immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent  that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might  lead to immediate hostilities should be taken. 

"It is recommended that: 

"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military  counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens  United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;  

"*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the  United States, the British and the Dutch governments that advance beyond  the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;* 

"*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and  Dutch for the issuance of such warning.*

"[S] G. C. MARSHALL

"[S] H. R. STARK (ex. 17)."

Before the meeting at the White House at 2 p. M. On November 27  (Washington time), Secretary Hull conferred briefly alone with President  Roosevelt (ex. 58). When the two Japanese Ambassadors arrived,  Ambassador Nomura seized the first opportunity to say that they were  disappointed over the failure of any agreement for a modus vivendi.  President Roosevelt expressed his grateful appreciation and that of the  United States Government to the peace element in Japan which had worked  hard in support of the movement for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific  area, and made it clear that the United States was not overlooking what  that element had done and was still ready to do. He added that most  people in the United States wanted a peaceful solution of the Pacific  problems, and that while he had not given up yet, the situation was  serious and that fact should be recognized. He pointed out that the  Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had had the effect of a cold  bath on the people of the United States as well as on the United States  Government, and intimated that a second such bath appeared to be in the  offing. He said that throughout the conversations there had been no real  indication of a desire for peace by any of Japan's leaders, and that  this also had had its effect on the conversations. According to his  memorandum of the meeting, Secretary Hull then 

"made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in  control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and  talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would  get anywhere as has been so  

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clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of  co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in  certain areas are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the  policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military  agencies of the political economic, social, and moral affairs of each of  the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that  direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military  and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern  Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any real progress made on a peaceful course (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 772)."

During the conversation, Ambassador Kurusu suggested that the trouble  was not with fundamentals so much as with their application. However,  with reference to a recent remark of President Roosevelt about  "introducing" Japan and China, when the Ambassador asked who would take  such action and the President said "both sides" meaning Japan as well as  China the Ambassador pointed out "that from a practical standpoint that  would be very difficult to accomplish" (ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 770-772). 

According to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo, as the meeting ended,  President Roosevelt told the Ambassadors that he was leaving the next  day, Friday, for Warm Springs, Ga., for a rest and was planning to  return the following Wednesday. He said that he would like to talk with  the Ambassadors then and would be very gratified if some means of  settlement could be discovered in the meantime (ex. 1, pp. 192-194). In  addition to Ambassador Nomura's cabled report of the meeting, Ambassador  Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the voice  code previously arranged, and said that in the conversation with the  President "there wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of  yesterday." He asked how things were in Tokyo, and was told that a  crisis appeared "imminent." The Ambassador reported that the United  States wanted to continue the negotiations, but Bureau Chief Yamamoto  said "we can't yield." The Ambassador concluded by saying that there was  nothing of particular interest in the day's talk with President  Roosevelt, except that the southward advance of Japanese troops was  "having considerable effect" (ex. 1, pp. 188-191).    

The record shows that President Roosevelt had an appointment with  Admiral Ernest J. King at 3:45 p. m. immediately after his conference  with the two Japanese Ambassadors (ex. 58), and that at about 4:00 p. m.  Secretary Stimson telephoned and talked with Secretary Hull (tr. 1167,  5547). At 5:00 p. m. Secretary Hull telephoned Admiral Stark, but was  unable to reach him and talked with Admiral Schuirmann instead (tr.  5547). 

In addition to the conversations Secretary Hull had with officials of  the United States Government on November 27 (Washington time), the  Secretary and Under Secretary Welles also conferred that day with  representatives of three of the governments that had been consulted in  connection with the proposed modus vivendi. The Netherlands Minister  called and handed Secretary Hull a memorandum of the same date in which  the Netherlands Foreign Minister took the position that inasmuch as the  modus vivendi proposal was only the beginning of negotiations, the  military and economic concessions suggested therein as a start seemed to  be "quite far reaching" and that it was "most unlikely" that Japan would  at the present moment leave the Axis (ex. 18). The Australian Minister,  Mr. Casey, also called on Secretary Hull and asked whether the 

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modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently. When Secretary Hull said he so considered it, Mr. Casey 

"expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of  Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further  consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British   communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong  for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation  but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with  qualifications such as were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter  fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by  all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt  unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here,  would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their  liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be  feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese, and I replied  that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the  Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government (ex. 18)."

Also that morning the British Ambassador "urgently" called on Under  Secretary Welles. The Under Secretary's memorandum of their conversation  noted that Lord Halifax said that Secretary Hull had telephoned him the  previous evening and told him the nature of the United States' reply to  Japan, and continued: 

"The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to  the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese  Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which  had so recently been under discussion. 

"I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in  this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was  the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier  proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated  questions by the British Government in regard thereto. 

"Lord Halifax said he could not understand this inasmuch as he had  communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British  Government.  

"To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the  President yesterday could hardly be regarded as "full support," but on  the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.    

"Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express  the objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say  that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese  objections and that he had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador  that in view of the fact that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek  was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent  the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem to him, Lord Halifax, that  the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the  Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the  modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He said that he  felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was based partly  on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction  because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan  and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown  of Chinese morale.

"I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already  very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased  in number. I said these reports likewise indicated that the threat  against Thailand was imminent. I said, in conclusion, that it was  evident from the information received here that the Japanese were  preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the  situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated (ex. 18)."

While on November 27 (Washington time) both Secretary Hull and Under  Secretary Welles thus believed the situation could not be more serious,  the record before the Committee indicates that the political adviser to  the Secretary, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, was less concerned. In a  memorandum of that date entitled "Problem of Far Eastern relations  Estimate of Situation and certain probabilities," Dr. 

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Hornbeck expressed the opinion that he did not believe the United States  was "on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." He stated that in  his opinion there was less reason on November 27 than there was a week  before for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make war on  the United States. "Were it a matter of placing bets," he wrote, "the  undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and  Japan will *not* be at 'war' on or before Decem-15 [sic]." (Tr. 5523- 5537). [Italics in original.] 

Apart from the remark of Bureau Chief Yamamoto during his telephone  conversation with Ambassador Kurusu the evening of November 26  (Washington time), when Yamamoto told the Ambassador that he had  expected that the United States would not yield to the demands made by  the Japanese Government in its note of November 20, and Yamamoto's  remark the next day in his telephone conversation with the Ambassador  that Japan "can't yield," there is no evidence before the Committee that  the Japanese Foreign Office furnished the two Japanese Ambassadors any  official comment or instructions as to their next step until November 28  (Japan time). That day Foreign Minister Togo cabled the following  instructions: 

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite  of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating  proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. *The  Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.*  Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this  American proposal which l will send you in two or three days, the  negotiations *will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I  do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken  off.* Merely say to them that you awaiting instructions and that,  although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to  your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just  claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the  Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and  conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States  has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish  negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man  you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present  circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. [1] From now on  do the best you can (ex. 1, p. 195)."

This message, in the above form, was available in Washington on November  28 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 195), whether before or after the War  Council meeting that day is not known definitely, although, as noted  below, there is some indication that it was not available until  afterward. 

The War Council met at noon at the White House, with President  Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary  of the Navy Knox, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark present. Secretary Hull repeated the comments he had made 3 days before, at the  War Council meeting on November 25, emphasizing again that there was  "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan,"  that the Japanese were likely "to break out at any time with new acts of  conquest," employing the element of surprise as "a central point in  their strategy," and that the "safeguarding of our national security was  in the hands of the Army and the Navy" (Tr. 1203). Earlier that day  Secretary Stimson had received from the Military Intelligence Division  (G-2) a summary of the available information regarding Japanese military  and naval move-

[1] This has reference to the suggestion made by the two Ambassadors on  November 26 (Washington time) that they be permitted to propose to  Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt send a personal message to  Foreign Minister Togo (ex. 1, p. 180). 

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ments in the Far East, and had taken it to President Roosevelt and  suggested that he read it before the War Council meeting, which the  President had called. In his notes of the meeting, Secretary Stimson  said:  

"When we got back there at 12:00 o'clock he had read the paper that I  had left with him. The main point of the paper was a study of what the  Expeditionary Force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed  South, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an  attack on the Philippines or a landing of further troops in Indo-China,  or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on  Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he pointed out that  there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into  an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra  Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop  the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good  suggestion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that  the present move that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of  about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere completely  changing the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could  address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already  had on land in Indo-China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if  this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo- China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or  further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers,  Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines.  It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we  discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into  the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if  the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that  if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of  going.

"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the  Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't  think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the  other, which we didn't think we could do; that the only thing for us to  do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a  certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The  President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from  himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at  the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem  to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President.  In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be  couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn  an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of  the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I  said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the  United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an  address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have  to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this ides of a  message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his  letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not  publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send  his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and  then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more  understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the  final decision at that time and the President asked Hull and Knox and  myself to try to draft such papers (tr. 14,424-14,426)."

Shortly after the meeting ended, President Roosevelt left for Warm  Springs, Ga., telling reporters that the Japanese situation might  require his return at any time. [1]
 
Also on November 28, the Netherlands Minister called on Secretary Hull  to inquire what reactions the Secretary had had from the Japanese  situation. The Secretary recorded that he handed the Minister  

"three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina  area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with  equipment, vessels, trans- 

[1] Earlier that day he had informed the press that American merchant  vessels sailing the Pacific would not be armed "under existing  circumstances." When asked how long he expected the existing  circumstances to prevail, the President had replied that that question  "should be asked In Tokyo" (Washington Post, November 29, 1941). 

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ports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He  examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the  Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very  serious situation.  

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally  in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I  abandoned on Tuesday evening. November twenty-fifth. Or practically  abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true  facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early  Wednesday morning, November twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese  later ill the day the document containing a proposed draft of an  agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this  Government stands and has stood for, for many years. Especially  including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I  reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the  continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the  Pacific area and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and  parcel of these conversations and their objectives intended to  facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing  that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic  principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement.  The Minister said he understood the situation (tr. 4475-4476)."

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called on Dr. Hornbeck that  day to inquire whether the Japanese-American negotiations had in fact  "broken down" as, he said, was stated in a message the British armed  authorities had received from the United States armed authorities. [2]  Dr. Hornbeck told the Minister that so far as he was aware neither  Government had "declared or indicated" that the negotiations were  terminated, but that he was not in a position to confirm or deny the  statement referred to by the Minister (ex. 18). At 7 o'clock that  evening the State Department sent a telegram to Ambassador Gauss in  Chungking which summarized the Japanese demands of November 20 and the  terms of the proposed modus vivendi. The telegram briefly reviewed the  circumstances which led to the decision to withhold the modus vivendi  from the United States reply of November 26, concerning which Ambassador  Gauss had been previously informed, describing in some detail for the  Ambassador's information the position regarding the modus vivendi taken  by the Chinese Government (ex. 18). 

According to Secretary Stimson, the rest of the week-end after the war  council meeting on Friday "was largely taken up with preparing a  suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress"  (Tr. 14403). The record before the Committee shows that Friday afternoon  Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull on the White House telephone at 2:49  o'clock and talked with one of the officials of the State Department's  Far Eastern Division, and that at 5:25 o'clock Secretary Stimson called  Secretary Hull and talked with Dr. Hornbeck (Tr. 5548). The next day,  Saturday, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson and Secretary  Knox sent to Secretary Hull suggested drafts, which they had prepared,  of the proposed message to Congress decided upon the day before (ex.  161). In an attached note in his handwriting, Secretary Stimson  described his suggestions as a "memo which may be helpful as to certain  portions of the message to the Congress." Secretary Knox also forwarded  a copy of his suggestions to President Roosevelt en route to Warm  Springs, with an accompanying letter in which he said that he had had  the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in preparing the  summation of the military situation contained in his draft. He told the President: 

[2] The message referred to appears to have been the Navy "war warning"  dispatch of November 27 (Washington time) to Admiral Hart and Admiral  Kimmel, which was sent to the United States Naval Observer in London  with instructions to "inform British" (ex. 37). 

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"The news this morning indicates the Japs are going to deliberately  stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am  extremely hopeful that you will get a two or three day respite down  there and will come back feeling very fit (ex. 161)."

It seems probable that Secretary Knox's information that the Japs were  stalling "for two or three days" was based on Foreign Minister Togo's  message quoted above, in which the Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that with a report of his Government's views on the United  States' reply of November 26 "which I will send you in two or three  days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured" (ex. 1, p. 195). While  this is not conclusive as to whether or not that message was available  before the War Council meeting on November 28 (Washington time), it does  indicate that, although the message was translated by the Navy on  November 28 it was not seen by Secretary Knox until "this morning", i.  e., November 29 (Washington time). 

The suggestions sent by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox to  Secretary Hull were combined in a single draft (ex. 161-A), which then  underwent extensive revision and modification. The revised draft was  ready by noon the same day, Saturday, November 29 (Washington time),  according to a handwritten note accompanying a copy of it which Dr.  Hornbeck sent to Secretary Stimson the next day (ex. 161-A). It was  accompanied by a draft of a proposed message to Emperor Hirohito and by  the following memorandum for President Roosevelt dated November 29  (Washington time): 

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

"There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress to which  draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material  contributions, and the officers of the Department made further  contributions, which together comprise the draft of proposed message. 

"In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to  go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to  read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week end and  give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions. 

"I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible  message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as  on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except  for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such  complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to on yesterday.   

"If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to  defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the  Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that  you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our  relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached. 

"I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched in code to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor  through appropriate channels (ex. 19)."

The draft of a message to Emperor Hirohito was brief. In it, after  referring to the long period of unbroken peace between the United States  and Japan, the President was to state that he was addressing the Emperor  "because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in  formation." He was then to continue: 

"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to  deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence  of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain  tragic possibilities.    

"The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which  your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their  enlightened decisions 

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and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and  better courses thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both  countries and to the peoples of other lands.    

"Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address  myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your  Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark  clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of  restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both  our people may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the  Pacific area (ex. 19)."

The draft of the proposed message to Congress was longer, a document of  some twenty typewritten pages (ex. 19). It will be remembered that the  War Council had decided on November 28 that the message was to be a message "to the people of the. United States" as well as "an address to  Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the  danger happened" (tr. 14426). If the President should send the message  to Emperor Hirohito, that, the War Council had decided, was to be "one  thing and a secret thing," as a message to an Emperor could not be  publicized as a message to Congress could, and the President was to make  his speech to Congress "as a separate and more understandable thing to  the people of the United States" (tr. 14426). The proposed message began  with these words: 

"GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: I come before you to report to you on  serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in  the Far East. Relations between the United States and the Japanese  Empire have reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay  before you the essential facts of the situation and their extremely  serious implications (ex. 19)."   

It then briefly reviewed the development of American foreign policy in  the Far East since 1833, discussing American relations with China, the  acquisition by the United States of sovereignty over the Philippines  with its attendant responsibilities, and the relations between the  United States and Japan since 1908, including a brief discussion of the  Nine Power Treaty of 1921. It considered the policy of aggression  followed by the Japanese first in Manchuria commencing in 1931 and then  in China, during the course of which American lives and property had  been imperiled and damaged in disregard for American rights under  existing treaties. 

The proposed message then took up the relationship of Japan to Germany  and Italy in their scheme of world-wide conquest. It pointed out that in  flat defiance of its covenants Japan had invaded and sought to overthrow  the Government of China and that step by step the Japanese armed forces,  passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the  Philippine Islands, had invaded and taken possession of French Indo-China. It continued: 

"Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into  the territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where  they would directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China's  lifeline, and, to the South, the port and Straits of Singapore through  which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between  the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.  

"To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening  activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation  of the mandate under which she received the custody of those islands,  she has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and  fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the  Philippines. 

"By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western,  northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process  go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital  interests of the United States. 

*               *                 *              *              *

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This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds  unmistakable threats to our interests, especially our interest in peace  and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the  Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific. 

 
Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations of justice, humanity, and fair dealing are restored, we  will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already  transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler  seeks dominion by ruthless force (ex. 19). 

It was then pointed out that throughout the period in which Japan had  been making it clear that this was her program, the Government of the  United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that  Japan's best interests lay in maintaining and cultivating friendly  relations with the United States and other countries that believe in  orderly and peaceful processes. Reference was made to the 8 months of  conversations with the Japanese which had been carried on by the  Secretary of State and the President for the purpose of arriving, if  possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments, and the  principles for which the United States had stood, as set forth in the  United States note of November 26 to Japan, were summarized. It was  stated that in this effort the United States Government had had the  agreement and support of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia,  the Netherlands, and China. Every effort had been made, it was said,  toward reaching a fair and workable agreement, and to commit Japan to  practices in line with the principles advocated by the United States. 

These efforts, the proposed message continued, had failed, and Japan had  refused to change her position or her practices, and relations between  the two nations were threatened with rupture. The supreme question  presented to the United States, it was said, was the question of self- defense; the immediate question was whether the United States would, or  would not, stand by while Japan went forward with a program of conquest.  The effects of that program of conquest, if successful, on China and the  Philippines were then described, and it was said that  

If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon, and  were to succeed in conquering, the regions which they are menacing in  the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies  and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports  from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports  in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of  commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and  with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an  interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic (ex. 19). 

The proposed message then concluded by stating that the United States  did not want war with Japan, but that if war should come, the fault and  responsibility would be those of Japan, and that the primary cause would  have been the pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression. The policy of  the United States and its relation with Japan should not be influenced  by fear of what attacks, acting unlawfully and with resort to force,  Japan might make upon the United States  

but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and  security and 

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justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it  is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make  upon us because of our pursuit of that course (ex. 19)."

Also on November 29 (Washington time), the British Ambassador called on  Secretary Hull to learn of any further developments in the Japanese  situation, especially with reference to the question of the proposed  modus vivendi. As Secretary Hull described the conversation:

"This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for  the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments  resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly  impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and  safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for  example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different  Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the  State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding  into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the  facts are. I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located  here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press  and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have  correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which  is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too  fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et  cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the  recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that  it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's  loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing  the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying  and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the  British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable  back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same  zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening  and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were  now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement  between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a  procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this  calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by  peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter  into with China.

"*I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with  Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the  officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I  have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great  confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country  and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of  resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move  suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the  peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer  and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on  the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited  conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble  and requires the utmost boldness and risk.*

"*I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberate Japanese  Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to  see whether the German Army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added  that the extremist fire-eating elements in Japan who have preached a  general forward movement supported by the Army and Navy have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to clamor for such a movement,  would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation  but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have  advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to  consider this possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that  they would virtually halt and engage in some movements into Thailand and  into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian front. The  Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did  not disagree with what I said about the badly confused mechanics for the  conduct of diplomatic relations between several of our countries in  these critical times (ex. 18). *"

Also that day the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, called on Secretary  Hull and intimated that he was prepared to suggest to the Japanese  Ambassador that Australia would be glad to act as mediator between Japan  and the United States. In his memorandum of the

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conversation, Secretary Hull noted that he gave the matter no serious attention, except to tell the Minister 

"that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of a  move of that kind. I interrupted him to make this conclusive comment  before the Minister could make a detailed statement of the matter on the  assumption that he would develop a set of facts along lines that he  began to intimate (ex. 174)."

That afternoon the State Department received from Ambassador Grew the  text of a Japanese note protesting the alleged flight of an American  airplane over the island of Formosa on November 20, claiming this was a  violation of Japanese territory and requesting that the matter "be  brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned."  Ambassador Grew was informed on December 6 (Washington time) that the  requested action had been taken, and that on November 24 an unidentified  airplane had carried out a reconnaissance of Guam (ex. 130). The same  afternoon (November 29) Secretary Hull received a request from the  British Ambassador for a copy of the text of the United States' note of  November 26 to send to the British Foreign Minister, to whom the general  character of the note had previously been communicated (ex. 158). A copy  of the note was sent to the Ambassador by Under Secretary Welles the  following Tuesday (tr. 1338). Also that afternoon the State Department  instructed American diplomatic and consular offices at Saigon, Bangkok  and Singapore to report "all movements of military or naval units"  promptly to the American Consul at Manila, who was told to transmit such  information to Admiral Hart, the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet  (ex. 21).

Overshadowing the other events of the day, however, was an Associated  Press report of a speech made by Premier Tojo in Tokyo before a rally  sponsored by the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" and the "Dai  Nippon East Asia League," in commemoration of the first anniversary of  the Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo and the  Wang Ching-wei regime in Japanese-occupied China (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  122). [1] In his speech, Premier Tojo said:

"It is certainly the most fortunate lot of the three powers to have the  privilege of collaborating together under this banner for cutting open  the thorny way, and 1 year has already gone by since we started this  honorable work together, and if it is not the greatest task of the  present century what else can it be.

"However if we look around we find that there are still many countries  who are indulging in actions hostile to us. In fact they are trying to  throw obstacles in the way of the construction of the East Asia co- prosperity sphere and are trying to enjoy the dream of exploitation of  East Asia at the cost of the 1,000 million populace of the East Asiatic  peoples to satisfy their greed of possession.

"The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain,  America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young  men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of  Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East  Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp  the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the  United States.

"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice  from East Asia with a vengeance (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 148)."

The reports of this speech by Premier Tojo commenced coming in on  November 29, the date fixed by Foreign Minister Togo as the final  deadline before which Ambassador Nomura was to obtain the written

[1] Extracts from Premier Tojo's speech were carried in American  newspapers on November 30 under such headlines as "Japan Threatens to  Purge Asia of U. S. And Britain" (Washington Post, November 30, 1941). 
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agreement of the United States to the Japanese demands of November 20 or  else things would "automatically" begin to happen (ex. 1, p. 165). It must be assumed Secretary Hull was aware of this and of the Foreign  Minister's message to Ambassador Nomura stating that the negotiations  would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days (ex. 1, p. 195). 

Late Saturday evening, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Hull  telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm Springs and had a lengthy  conversation with him, after which the President's press secretary told  reporters:

"In view of the reported statement an Associated Press dispatch by the  Premier of Japan, the President tonight is of the opinion that he may  have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad  schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday before noon (tr. 14337)."

Secretary Hull testified that "the gravity of the situation was evident  from many sources", and that as Premier Tojo's statement reflected the  extreme acuteness of the situation, "in that sense it may be said that  the statement prompted my telephone call and the President's return"  (Tr. 14,340).

In the meantime, after cabling Ambassador Nomura on November 28 (Japan  time) that he did not wish the Ambassador "to give the impression that  the negotiations are broken off" (ex. 1, p. 195), Foreign Minister Togo  had followed up that message with another the next day in which he  instructed the Ambassador:

"*We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:*

"The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial  position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the  claims of both sides.

"However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be  made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which  ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the  prestige of the Imperial Government.

"With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. Government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

"*(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does  not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations)* (ex. 1, p.  199)."

This message was translated and available in Washington on Sunday,  November 30 (Washington time). Late that evening Ambassador Kurusu  telephoned Bureau Chief Yamamoto in Tokyo that arrangements had been  made for the two Ambassadors to meet with Secretary Hull the next  morning, Monday. The Ambassador reported that President Roosevelt was  returning to Washington the next day because of Premier Tojo's speech,  and cautioned against such "ill-advised statements," saying that it put  the two Ambassadors "in a very difficult position." When Yamamoto urged  the Ambassador to continue the negotiations, Ambassador Kurusu said they  would need Tokyo's help, and both the Premier and the Foreign Minister  would need "to change the tone of their speeches."  Ambassador  continued:

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of  happenings in the South.  You understand that don't you? (Ex. 1, p.  207)"

Yamamoto replied:

"Yes, yes (ex. 1, p. 207)."

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Secretary Hull testified that he telephoned the President that Sunday  [1] "after conferring With our military regarding the Japanese Prime  Minister's bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far  Eastern situation" (tr. 1163). The record shows that the Secretary had  two telephone conversations that morning with Admiral Stark at 10:30 and  12:08 o'clock (tr. 1167). Admiral Stark attended the Secretary's  conference with President Roosevelt at 11:45 a. m. The next day  immediately following the President's return to Washington, and it would  seem probable that the arrangement for Admiral Stark to attend that  conference was made during the Secretary's telephone conversations with  him.

At 1:28 o'clock Sunday afternoon there was received in the State  Department, through Ambassador Winant in London, the following message  from Prime Minister Churchill for President Roosevelt:

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war  between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret  or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by  Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequence. I realize your  constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into  war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the  dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider  whether, *at the moment which you judge right which may be very near*,  you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel  you to place the gravest issues before Congress", or words to that  effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a  joint declaration, and in any ease arrangements are being made to  synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for  presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it  might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the  war (ex. 24)."

Also that Sunday both the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, and the  British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, called on Secretary Hull. The  Australian Minister gave the Secretary the substance of a talk he had  had with Ambassador Kurusu. Secretary Hull recorded:

"This amounted to very little and there was really nothing new in what  he said except that Kurusu made it repeatedly clear that the Japanese  were very desirous of continuing conversations with this Government. The  Minister then referred to his notes and said that the British Ambassador  desired to urge, along with him, the Australian Minister, that I do the  best possible to continue our relations with Japan so as to avoid a  military conflict at this time, the idea being that they needed more  time for preparation to resist in the Pacific area. This view has been  asserted constantly during recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the  Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister (ex. 168)."

One of the purposes of the British Ambassador's call was to hand  Secretary Hull the following memorandum:

"MOST SECRET

"There are important indications that Japan is about to attack Thailand  and this attack will include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic  points in the Kra isthmus.

"We have plans for the rapid movement of a force from Malaya to hold a  line across the Kra isthmus in the neighborhood of Singora. Time is the  essence of this plan, particularly at this season of the year when the  Kra isthmus is water logged. Consequently great tactical advantage lies  with the side which gets there first.

"R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for  three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East  has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake  air recon-

[1] Newspaper accounts of Secretary Hull's s activities that Sunday  state that the Secretary again telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm  Springs before his departure for Washington (Washington Post, December  1, 1941).

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naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. Commander in  Chief Far East, has asked for permission to move into Kra isthmus, if  air reconnaissance establishes the fact that escorted Japanese ships are  approaching the coast of Thailand, and he asks for an immediate decision  on this point.

"To allow the Japanese to establish themselves so near the Malay  frontier would be an obvious threat to Singapore even though at the  present season it might not develop at once. We have also to bear in  mind the encouragement which the Japanese success would give to their  extremists. Demands of appetite would grow and other Far East peoples  would be correspondingly depressed. It looks therefore as though, to  ensure the defense of Singapore and for wider reasons we might have to  take the proposed action to forestall the Japanese (ex. 21)."

In his memorandum of his conversation with the British Ambassador  Secretary Hull stated that the Ambassador 

"was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States would do if  the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base  on the Kra Isthmus. *I said that the President was returning tomorrow  morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on  Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to  notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry*. * * *  The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his  Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He  assured me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps that  we might pursue to this end (ex. 21)."

The next day Lord Halifax sent Secretary Hull a copy of a telegram he  had received from the British Foreign Office, "as the point may possibly  arise in the course of your discussions this morning." "You will  remember," he wrote the Secretary, "you mentioned the point to me as I  was leaving your office yesterday" (ex. 158). The Foreign Office  telegram was as follows:

"It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the  question of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our  treaty of nonaggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know  therefore that we have given careful consideration to this point.

"In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the  grant of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty.  Similarly  (although we have as yet made no communication to the Thai Government)  we should not feel we could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering  Thailand if a Japanese invasion occurred or was clearly impending.  But  it would be greatly preferable if in these eventualities we could act in  co-operation with the Thai Government.  If therefore it were decided to  undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best to secure  Thai's consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the Thai  Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of   leakage to the Japanese (ex. 158).

Thus the record before the Committee shows that as President Roosevelt  returned to Washington from Warm Springs, the information available to  his advisors in Washington indicated that a crisis was fast approaching,  if not already at hand.

A series of intercepted Japanese messages that were translated and  available in Washington the next day, December 1 (Japan time), fully  confirmed this view. In a telegram dated December 1 (Japan time) to  Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the Ambassador  that 

"The date set in my message No. 812 has come and gone and the situation  continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United  States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been instructing the  Press and others that though there are some wide differences between  Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing.

(The above is for only your information) (ex. 1, p. 208).

That same day the Japanese Foreign Office informed the Ambassador that its four offices "in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 405

have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to  dispose of them," and that the machine in Batavia had been returned to  Japan (ex. 1, p. 209). From a message dated November 29 from the  Japanese Ambassador in Thailand to Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo, it  was learned that the Ambassador was conspiring with the pro-Japanese  faction in Thailand to place that country in a position where it would  be compelled to declare war on Great Britain. The Japanese Ambassador in  Thailand reported to Tokyo that the question of joint military action  between Thailand and Japan had been brought up in the Thai Government, but that the Government had expressed a desire to pursue a course of  strict neutrality. He told Foreign Minister Togo that the Thai  Government 

"had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether  they be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered  Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper,  she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. *For the  purpose of accomplishing this Japan should carefully avoid Thai  territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of Kotaparu in  British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade  Thailand from Patanbessa.*

"*The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.* This  strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has  the approval of Chief of Staff Bijitto. Our naval Attache has advised  the Naval General Staff also, I think (ex. 1, p. 203)."

While the record before the committee shows that all of these Japanese  messages were translated and available in Washington on December 1, it  does not show the exact hour when translation was completed. It  therefore cannot be said with certainty which, if any, of the messages  were seen by Secretary Hull before his conference with the Japanese  Ambassadors that morning, or which of the messages were seen by  President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark before their  conference immediately after the President's return to Washington from  Warm Springs.

THE INVASION OF THAILAND BY JAPANESE FORCES FROM FRENCH INDOCHINA  APPEARS IMMINENT

(December 1-7, 1941)

Thus on December 1 (Washington time) there was much information in  Washington that pointed toward Thailand as the next objective of  Japanese aggression. Geographically, Thailand lies between French  Indochina on the east and Burma on the west, and, with the Gulf of Siam,  between French Indochina on the northeast and the British Malay States  on the south. After the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina  in late July, Thailand thus became a barrier between those forces and  two possible objectives, the Burma Road on the one hand and Singapore on  the other. This strategic location of Thailand had been emphasized by  General Marshall and Admiral Stark in their joint memorandum of November  5 (Washington time) when they concluded that no military action against  Japan should be undertaken by the United States unless, among other  contingencies, the Japanese should move their forces "into Thailand to  the west of 100  east (i.e., toward the Burma Road) or south of 10   north" (i. e., toward Singapore) (ex. 16).

It is desirable here to review briefly the situation with respect to  Thailand as it had developed since July. The record before the Com-

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mittee shows that after the Japanese invasion and occupation of French  Indochina late in July, the Thai Government, fully aware of Thailand's  strategic position and importance to the Japanese, on August 12  (Washington time) had formally asked the State Department whether, in  the event Thailand should be attacked and should resist attack, the  United States Government would extend material assistance to it, the  Thai Government having determined and formally announced that it would  defend itself against attack by any other country. Mr. Maxwell M.  Hamilton, then Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, to  whom the question was presented, had advised the Thai Minister that the  matter would be taken up with higher officers of the Department and that  he would then communicate further with the Minister (ex. 169, item 6).  The Thai Minister had previously made informal inquiry of the State  Department to the same effect, after Secretary Hull had stated at a  press conference on August 6 (Washington time) that the United States  was becoming increasingly concerned over events in the southwestern  Pacific area (ex. 169, item 1-6). Again on August 14, the Thai Minister  had called at the State Department and stated that he had received  another telegram from his Government which, "in the gravity of its tone,  indicated that a critical state had been reached in respect of the  threat of invasion." He had further stated that he had been instructed  "to spare no effort to obtain an expression of the views of the American  Government in this situation," and that the Thai Government was ready  and able to purchase in America the arms it needed (ex. 169, item 7).

On August 15 (Washington time) the State Department had received from  the United States Minister at Batavia in the Netherlands East Indies a  telegram containing the substance of a message from the Netherlands  Minister of Colonies in London to the Governor-General of the  Netherlands East Indies. In it the Minister of Colonies advised the  latter that he had been assured by the British Foreign Minister that in  the event of an attack by Japan upon the Netherlands East Indies; the  British Empire would back up the Netherlands completely. The Governor- General was also advised that a further conference would soon be held in  London with the British Foreign Minister in this connection 

"since it has become clear now that the United States and England will  not resist Japanese occupation of Thailand with force of arms. It is  also brought to your attention that any guarantee or certainty of United  States participation by force of arms is absolutely excluded (ex. 169,  item 8)."

Secretary Hull had conferred with the Thai Minister in Washington on  August 18 (Washington time). In reply to the Minister's previous  inquiries as to the attitude of the United States Government toward  Thailand if Thailand should be attacked and should endeavor in good  faith to defend itself, Secretary Hull had stated that the United States  had been aiding China in many ways against the aggression of Japan and  that, in the contingencies mentioned, the United States Government would  place Thailand in the same category (ex. 169, item 9).

The next action of importance in connection with Thailand appears to  have occurred on October 27 (Washington time), when the British Minister  in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, discussed the Thailand situation  with Under Secretary Welles and left with him two memoranda dated  October 25 dealing with possible material aid to

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 407

Thailand, including guns, ammunition, planes and aviation gasoline and  lubricating oil, by Great Britain and the United States (ex. 169, item  13). It will be recalled that it was about this time that Generalissimo  Chiang Kai-shek had appealed to Great Britain and the United States for  planes and pilots to defend the Burma Road against an anticipated attack  by the Japanese from northern French Indochina. The American reply to  the British memoranda of October 25 had been delayed in order that both  of these matters could be considered at the same time (ex. 169, item  11). On November 6 (Washington time), that reply, in the form of an aide  memoire, had been handed to the British Minister (ex. 169, item 13). The aide memoire pointed out that for some weeks it had been the policy of  the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to  priority and export applications filed on behalf of the Thai Government  and, whenever practicable in the face of demand from other areas upon  American production, to take favorable action upon such applications.  Regarding the proposals contained in the British memoranda, the United  States reply commented that the British proposal to require the  acceptance of British instructors along with the howitzers and field  guns which were to be offered to the Thai Government might serve as a  pretext upon which the Japanese Government might exert additional  pressure upon Thailand. As to planes, the memoranda suggested that the  British might wish to consider the release to Thailand of a number of  airplanes at Singapore which it was understood were in excess of the  number for which pilots were available there. If this should not be  practicable, it was suggested that if the British should decide to make  available to Thailand planes from those being supplied to it from the  United States, the United States Government would be agreeable to such  an arrangement. Concerning aviation gasoline and lubricating oil, it was  stated that a reply would be made in the near future, after further  investigation (ex. 169, item 13). 

On November 18 (Washington time) the State Department had advised the  American Minister at Bangkok that it had explored the possibility of  making available to the Thai Government antitank and antiaircraft guns  and ammunition, but that it had been found impossible to spare any of  such items at the moment (ex. 169, item 15). Four days later, on  November 22 (Washington time), the State Department had advised the  American Minister at Bangkok that the question of supplying planes to  Thailand had been under active consideration by the British and the  United States Governments but that neither Government was in a position  to supply any planes to Thailand at the present time. The Minister had  been advised that the supplying of aviation gasoline and aviation  lubricating oil had also been under consideration, and that the British  Government was prepared to furnish limited amounts of aviation gasoline  and the United States Government was endeavoring to arrange to supply  aviation lubricating oil (ex. 169, item 16). The same day reports had  reached the State Department from the British Embassy of Japanese  requests for the use of Thai airfields for "survey flights" and for  aviation gasoline, presumably for such flights (ex. 169, item 17).

The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, had called on Under Secretary  Welles on November 25 (Washington time) regarding a report from the  British Minister at Bangkok that the Thai Government was again becoming  very shaky and that unless some practical action were

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taken by Great Britain and the United States the Japanese influence  would again become predominant. The British Ambassador had reported that  title aviation gasoline and artillery the British had given the Thai  Government had been regarded by the latter as completely insufficient  "and had had no appreciably beneficial effects." When Lord Halifax had  said that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining  airplanes, the Under Secretary had said that the United States was  building up its air strength as rapidly as possible in the Philippines  and that he had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark  that the planes the United States had in the Philippines were infinitely  more valuable to the United States there than they would be in Thailand.  The British Ambassador had then suggested on behalf of his Government  that the situation "might be ameliorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to  Thailand by the United States." Under Secretary Welles had said that  this matter would be given immediate consideration (ex. 169, item 18).

On November 27 (Washington time) the State Department had advised the  American Minister at Bangkok concerning renewed instructions which were  given on November 22 to American diplomatic and consular officers in  Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hongkong and French Indochina  regarding the withdrawal of American citizens from those areas, and had  authorized him to inform American citizens in Thailand of those  instructions (ex. 169, item 20). The next day the Thai Minister had  called at the State Department and stated that he feared a Japanese  attack on Thailand was imminent. He had said that Thailand would resist  any such attack with all its forces. Referring to the statement  previously made to him that the United States would place Thailand in  the same category as China and would offer assistance in the case of an  attack by an aggressor, he had suggested that immediate consideration be  given to making planes and other supplies available to Thailand. He had  been advised that the matter would be promptly brought to the attention  of the appropriate authorities (ex. 169, item 23).

On November 29 (Washington time) the State Department had received a  telegram from the American Minister at Bangkok stating that on the  previous day the Thai Prime Minister had urged his people to be neutral  but to prepare to fight if war became inevitable. The Thai Prime  Minister had been reported as saying 

"that Great Britain and the United States had promised not to attack  Thailand and that the Japanese Ambassador had guaranteed that Japanese  troops in Indo-China are not intended for attack on this country in any  circumstances (ex. 169, item 28)."

On December 1 (Washington time), the day President Roosevelt returned to  Washington, from Warm Springs, the Thai Minister, accompanied by his  military attache, called at the State Department and described in detail  the general military situation in Thailand, stating that the military  equipment now most urgently needed by Thailand was heavy artillery,  bombing planes, and pursuit planes. The Minister expressed the hope that  means could be found to make this equipment available immediately in  order that Thailand might be better able to resist aggression by Japan  (ex. 169, item 26).

The following day the State Department sent a telegram to the American  Consul at Singapore requesting him to render all possible assistance in  connection with the immediate delivery of small quanti-

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ties of appropriate aviation lubricating oils to Thailand, arrangements  for which, the Department said, had been tentatively agreed upon between  representatives of this Government and representatives in Washington of  the British and the Netherland Governments (ex. 169 item 28).

GERMANY TELLS JAPAN THE TIME IS RIPE 10 STRIKE AT THE UNITED STATES, AND  PROMISES TO JOIN WITH JAPAN IN WAR AGAINST THE  UNITED STATES (November 29, 1941)

Several additional intercepted Japanese messages between Tokyo and  Berlin that were translated and available in Washington on December 1  (Washington time) disclosed that Germany once again was exercising  pressure upon Japan under the Tripartite Pact. In a message dated  November 29, 1941, from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in Berlin to  Foreign Minister Togo, the Ambassador reported a conversation he had had  with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the day before, following a  conference of high German Government and military officials at the  official residence of Chancellor Hitler. The Ambassador reported that it  was an absolute certainty that at that conference Japan's moves were  discussed in connection with discussion of the German war against  Russia. He quoted von Ribbentrop as saying:

"It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without  losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be  a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so  important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and  establishes her European New Order all the military might of Britain and  the United States will be concentrate against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the  very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We  have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of  the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of  the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the ease, and if Japan reaches a decision  to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will  not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would  bring about favorable results for Japan herself (ex. 1, p. 200)."

The Japanese Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister in Tokyo that von  Ribbentrop had said that the Germans would like to end their war with  Russia during the next year, and that he had then continued

"should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States,  Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely  no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the  United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on  that point (ex. 1, p. 202)."

Foreign Minister Togo replied to this message on November 30 (Japan  time). His message was in three parts, only the first and third of which  were ever intercepted. [1] Both of those parts were translated and  available in Washington, however, on December 1 (Washington time):

"1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April  during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere  efforts of the

[1] In this connection, the War Department advised the Committee that  the microfilms of Japanese files received from General MacArthur's  headquarters did not contain the second part of this message (tr.  13665).


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Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. *Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.*

* * * * * *

"4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

"5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

"6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set far a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

"Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message (ex. 1, pp. 204-205)."

In the separate message (#986) referred to above, Foreign Minister Togo reviewed the course of the Japanese-American negotiations for Ambassador Oshima's benefit. He stated that during the 6 months of negotiations

"the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tripartite Alliance as the cornerstone of the international policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation, and that Japan had based her hopes for a solution between Japan and the United States definitely within the scope of that Alliance (ex. 1, p. 205)."

The Foreign Minister said that the American and Japanese views on the question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina "were completely in opposition to each other." He said that the United States had taken the position that as long as the Imperial Government of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States, and that the United States had begun to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Japanese Government from the Tripartite Alliance. "That is to say," the Foreign Minister continued,

"it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuance of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with the third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in ease the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is

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more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China they did 80 repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy (ex. 1, p. 206)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RETURNS TO WASHINGTON AS THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION MOVES RAPIDLY TOWARD A CLIMAX

(December 1, 1941)

When the two Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull on Monday morning, December 1 (Washington time), it was their first conference with the Secretary since their meeting with him and President Roosevelt 5 days before. Ambassador Nomura's description of their arrival at the State Department shows that many assumed the Ambassadors had requested the meeting with the Secretary to present the Japanese Government's reply to the American note of November 26. Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo:

"Upon our arrival at the State Department we found not only newspapermen, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these spectators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic (ex. 1, p. 210)."

At the start of the conference Ambassador Kurusu asked the reason for President Roosevelt's sudden return to Washington, and Secretary Hull indicated that one of the reasons was the recent "loud talk" of the Japanese Premier. The Ambassador endeavored to minimize the Premier's recent speech and stated, in accordance with the instructions he had received from Tokyo, that the American note of November 26 had been communicated to his Government and that within a few days the Japanese Government's observations concerning it would be presented to the Secretary. He said that his Government believed its proposals of November 20 to be equitable, and had found it difficult to understand the position taken by the United States Government. He had been directed, he said, to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to request the United States Government to make "deep reflection of this matter." He said that the Japanese offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indo-China still stood (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 772-774)

Secretary Hull replied that the United States Government had to take into account the "bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo" and that there never would be possible any peaceful arrangements if such arrangements had to be based upon principles of force. Later, the Secretary called attention to reports received from the press and other sources

"of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and endeavored to make it clear that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out that we cannot be sure what the Japanese military leaders are likely to do, that we do not know where the Japanese Army intends to land its forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still but will have to puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretary explained that this situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the Ambassador could do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese Government. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing should come

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out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals seem to carry the two sides further away than before.

"The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in view of all the threats that had been made. He pointed out that the acts of the Japanese militarists had effectively tied the hands of the Ambassadors and he did not know whether the Ambassadors could succeed in having anything accomplished toward untying their hands. Mr. Kurusu brought up again his contention made on previous occasions that China had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties to flaunt Japan, and commented that if we don't look out China will sell both the United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he has been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and utterances. He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if something quick is not done something awful was about to happen; that they kept urging upon the Secretary the danger of delay, and kept pressing the Secretary to do something. He said that in view of all the confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought to the stage where he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atmosphere; that his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals, and that these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal which we had offered the Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first on the points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything that Japan was doing and saying was in precisely the opposite direction from the course we have been talking about in our conversations, and that these should be reversed by his government before we can further seriously talk peace (vol. II, pp. 775-776)."

The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded people coming out in Japan and expressing themselves, whether anybody in Japan would be free to speak unless he preached conquest. When the Ambassador commented that the Japanese People were not talking about conquest, Secretary Hull pointed out that everyone in America understood the implications of such terms as "New Order in East Asia" and "Co- prosperity sphere". The Secretary went on to say:

"that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan, that there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan does not have to use a sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of the table. He pointed out that equality of opportunity is in our opinion the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 776-777)."

When Ambassador Kurusu, after remarking that war in the Pacific would be a tragedy, added that the Japanese people believed that the United States wanted to keep Japan fighting China, and to keep Japan strangled, and that they believed they were faced with the alternative of surrendering to the United States or fighting, Secretary Hull said that he had practically exhausted himself here, that the American people were going to assume that there was real danger to this country in the situation, and that there was nothing he could do to prevent it (ex. 29, vol. 2, p. 777).

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Togo that during the conference Secretary Hull had emphasized:

"The tone and trend of the 'Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs, and the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China (ex. 1, p. 210)."

He reported that from the beginning of the conference the Secretary had worn "a deeply pained expression," but that during the course of their explanations the Secretary "showed visible signs of relief (ex. 1, p. 210).

President Roosevelt reached Washington from Warm Springs shortly before noon on Monday, December 1, and went directly to

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the White House for his conference with Secretary Hull and Admiral Stark. [1] It will be recalled that in Secretary Hull's memorandum of his conversation with the British Ambassador the day before, the Secretary stated that he laid before President Roosevelt on Monday " all phases" of the matters he discussed with the British Ambassador, which had included the Ambassador's inquiry as to "what the United States would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus", and that "the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry" (ex. 21). Clearly, a further subject discussed at the White House conference was Secretary Hull's conversation that morning with the Japanese Ambassadors. It would also seem probable that at the conference the other events mentioned above that had occurred after the President's departure the preceding Friday were discussed. These included Secretary Hull's revised draft of the proposed message to Congress and the accompanying draft of a message to Hirohito; the significance of Premier Tojo's speech; the information received from the British Ambassador concerning a possible Japanese move into Thailand, which appeared to be confirmed that day by the intercepted Japanese message revealing the intrigues of the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand; Prime Minister Churchill's plea for similar or joint declarations by the United States and Great Britain that "any further act of aggression" would "lead immediately to the gravest consequence," at whatever moment the President should judge right "which may be very near"; and the intercepted Japanese messages showing that the Japanese Government was only making a pretense of continuing the conversations. In addition, the President, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark must be assumed to have seen either before or after the White House conference the exchange of messages between the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin showing the strong German pressure on Japan to make war on Great Britain and the United States and the Japanese reply that "*war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan * * * quicker than anyone dreams*."

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meeting between President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, during the period December 1-7 (Washington time), and no reference to such a meeting has been found in newspaper accounts of President Roosevelt's activities that week. However, the Washington Post reported on December 2 that after the President's conference on December 1 with Secretary Hull and Admiral Stark, the President had a luncheon conference with Mr. Harry Hopkins, who had been driven to the White House from the Naval Hospital for that purpose, returning to the Naval Hospital after the conference; that thereafter

[1] The next day referring to this meeting the Washington Post reported:

"President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and military moves relating to Japan as the lights of peace flickered low in the Orient and Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador told reporters that 'there must be wise statesmanship to save the situation.'

"It was in a tense atmosphere that the President reached the White House from Warm Springs shortly before noon to receive a report from Secretary of State Hull on his conversation yesterday morning with official Japanese representatives and to confer with diplomatic, naval and personal advisers.

"Washington reports indicate that Japan is massing troops in southern Indochina for a possible military move into Thailand which an authoritative statement made here last week indicated the United States could not tolerate. In Manila the leaves of United States naval and military forces have been canceled and London reports said military and air forces are being mobilized in the Netherlands East Indies (Washington Post December 2, 1941)."
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

Postby admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 12:53 am

Exhibit D Cont'd.

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the President called Under Secretary Welles to the White House for a brief conference, after which the Under Secretary "on orders" conferred briefly with Lord Halifax; and that after the latter conference Sir. Welles returned to the White House for a further conference with the President that lasted an hour and a half. The record before the Committee does not show what matters were discussed at the conference between Under Secretary Welles and the British Ambassador. [1]

In the absence of other evidence concerning the subjects discussed at the White House conference that noon, the evidence before the Committee of action taken that evening and the next morning at the direction of President Roosevelt is important. Just before midnight that day, December 1 (Washington time), the Navy Department sent the following dispatch, marked priority, to Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet:

"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one vessel off the Indo-China coast between, Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques and one vessel off Pointe De Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At the same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures (ex. 37)."

In Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) the Japanese Cabinet met at the official residence of Premier Tojo. Domei, the authoritative Japanese news agency, issued a report stating that at the meeting the Japanese Cabinet had decided to continue negotiations with the United States, despite the divergence of views of the two Governments. In a telegram to Secretary Hull received the evening of December 1 (Washington time), Ambassador Grew reported that

"Tonight's newspapers reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations (ex. 25)."

As already noted, Ambassador Grew testified before the Committee that although he knew that the Cabinet meeting took place, he "did not (know) and could not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 1615).

[1] The record before the Committee does, however, contain the following: On December 6, 1941, Captain John Creighton, the United States Naval Attache at Singapore, sent a message to Admiral Hart, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, at Manila which stated, among other things, that Brooke Popham (the British commander in chief at Singapore) received Saturday from War Department London quote: 'We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: 1. We are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips Invasion any other part of Siam * * *.' " (tr. 13520-13521) Captain Creighton testified before the Committee that he did not know or recall who it was that gave him the information upon which this message was based, or where that person had obtained the information, and that it was really nothing more than rumor (tr. 13530). Upon receipt of this message, Admiral Hart, on December 6, 1941, sent the following message to Admiral Stark in Washington: "Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you." (Ex. 40) Admiral (now Senator) Hart testified that he never received a reply to his message (tr. 12850-12851). In this connection see also the discussion infra of the second message received by the State Department on December 6 (Washington time) from Ambassador Winant in London regarding the two Japanese naval convoys moving toward the Kra Isthmus in which Ambassador Winant said. Among other things: "British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" (ex. 21) and Under Secretary Welles testimony before the Committee in connection therewith.  


PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 415

However, it is now known that at this meeting the Japanese Cabinet gave its formal approval to the commencement of hostilities against the United States, and that immediately thereafter an Imperial Naval Order was issued on instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters:

"Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a position to declare war on the United States of America (tr. 438)."

By that time, the Japanese naval striking force which had left its rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time) had steamed nearly half the distance to Pearl Harbor.

In Washington, however, Ambassador Nomura that day cabled the Foreign Minister there were indications that the United States desired to continue the negotiations "even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles" (ex. 1, p. 213).  

He continued:

"If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

"We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace (ex. 1, p. 213)"

It seems doubtful that Ambassador Nomura would have sent this message, if in fact he knew that that day the Tojo Cabinet had formally approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States. The Foreign Minister's message in reply to the Ambassador's suggestion, which was translated and available in Washington on December 3 (Washington time), avoided any reference to the Cabinet's action:

"As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposals failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. Please be advised of this decision (ex. 1, p. 224)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASKS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN ITS PURPOSE IN MOVING ADDITIONAL TROOPS INTO SOUTHERN INDO-CHINA

(December 2, 1941)

The next day, Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time), the two Japanese Ambassadors called on Under Secretary Welles at the latter's request, Secretary Hull being ill and absent from the State Department. Under Secretary Welles told the Ambassadors that he had been asked by President Roosevelt to communicate to them the following, which he then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces per-

416 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

mitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma, against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.

"Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government (vol. II, p. 779)."

Ambassador Kurusu said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions but that he would communicate the foregoing statement immediately to his Government. Then followed an inconclusive discussion of the general situation, during which Under Secretary Welles pointed out that the settlement which the United States was offering Japan in the United States note of November 26 (Washington time) was one which would assure Japan of peace and the satisfaction of Japanese economic needs much more certainly than any other alternative which Japan might feel was open to her. Ambassador Kurusu said that in view of the actual situation in the Far East there were points in the United States proposal of November 26 which the Japanese Government would find it difficult to accept. When asked by Under Secretary Welles whether a reply to the American proposal would be received from the Japanese Government, Ambassador Nomura answered in the affirmative, but said that it might take a few days in view of the important questions which it raised for the Japanese Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 778-781).

In his report of this conversation to Foreign Minister Togo, Ambassador Nomura said:

"Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233 (ex. 1, pp. 222-223)."

Soon after his meeting with the two Japanese Ambassadors, Under Secretary Welles attended a meeting at noon at the White House at which, in addition to President Roosevelt and Mr. Welles, only Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox were present. Secretary Stimson described the meeting in his notes as follows:

"I left for the White House conference at 12:00 o'clock and there were present there just Knox, Sumner Welles and myself, as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China just what they are going to do and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 417

but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, and he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us (tr. 14,427)."

That afternoon, at his press conference, President Roosevelt was asked

"if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States Government do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent asked if the President could give any indication of the nature of the information requested from the Japanese representatives this morning. The President said let us put it this way, and this answers again many questions at the same time. Since last April we have been discussing with the Japanese some method to arrive at an objective that is permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it seemed that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that objective there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We were therefore somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent troops to a specific over-all total into Indo-China after very brief negotiations with the Vichy Government at the conclusion of which the Vichy Government let it be understood clearly that they had agreed to this number of troops principally because they were powerless to do anything else.

"Sometime later conversations were resumed with the United States and again we made it perfectly clear that the objective we were seeking meant the taking of no additional territory by anyone in the Pacific area. We received word the other day that there were large additional bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds, including troops, planes, war vessels, etc., in Indo-China and that other forces were on the way. Before these forces had arrived the number of forces already there had greatly exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the number on the way were much greater, and the question asked this morning very politely, at my request, was as to what the purpose and intention of the Japanese Government was as to the future, eliminating the necessity of policing Indochina which is a very peaceful spot and we hope to receive a reply in the near future.

"In reply to a question as to whether any time for a reply had been set, the President said that there had naturally been no time limit set (ex. 167)."

The same day Ambassador Nomura sent a special report to the Japanese Foreign Office concerning this press conference, as follows:

"On the 2d in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo- China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-China had both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations (ex. 1, p. 223)."

Also that day the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Terasaki, called on officials of the State Department's Far Eastern Division and delivered a document in which it was denied that Premier Tojo had ever made the speech attributed to him on November 30. Mr. Terasaki claimed that when Ambassador Kurusu referred to the Premier's speech in his telephone conversation with Bureau Chief Yamamoto the preceding Sunday evening, Yamamoto had been nonplused and had asked "What speech?" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 777-778). The record of that telephone conversation before the Committee shows no such statement by Yamamoto; on the contrary Yamamoto is shown to have taken no exception to Ambassador Kurusu's references to the Premier's speech (ex. 1, pp. 206-207). That day the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, delivered to the State Department a memorandum in further explanation of the position of the Chinese

418 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Government on the modus vivendi, which ended by stating that the Chinese Foreign Minister had expressed

"great gratification in the latest reply of the Secretary (Hull) to the Japanese envoys, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental principles repeatedly enunciated by the United States Government (ex. 18)."

Two intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations generally were translated and available in Washington on Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time). One was a message sent from the Foreign Office in Tokyo to Washington on November 27 (Japan time), for retransmittal by Washington to Japanese diplomatic establishments in various North and South American cities. "With international relations becoming more strained," the message set up an emergency system of dispatches in hidden word codes to be used in communicating with those establishments. These emergency dispatches consisted of instructions regarding radio communications and the evacuation of Japanese Embassies, messages stating that relations between Japan and countries whose names were to be inserted were not in accordance with expectations or had been severed, and messages stating that Japan's armed forces had clashed with the armed forces of countries whose names were to be inserted or that Japan and countries whose names were to be inserted were entering a "full fledged general war" (ex. 1, pp. 186-188). The second message was from Hsinking to Tokyo, dated November 28, and contained the following:

"In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo *in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States* are as outlined below. We are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any questions regarding them, please wire me at once.

"I. Policy. *On the outbreak of war with England and the United States*, after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo.

"The control of such property as they might leave behind will be administered by the Manchukuo Government (ex. 1, p. 198)."

On December 3 (Washington time) Secretary Hull held a press conference at which he repeated in large measure the statements he had made at his press conference on November 27 (Washington time), making it plain that at no time had the Japanese Government shown any disposition to modify its basic policies, which he described as at complete variance with those of the United States (tr. 1163). [1] That afternoon the Secretary had a telephone conversation with Admiral Stark at 4:45 o'clock (tr. 1167).

That day, and again the next day, the State Department received telegrams from the American Minister at Bangkok expressing the hope of the Thai Government

"that the American and British Governments will issue public statements to the effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand (ex. 169, item 30)."

Other than Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's conference with Under Secretary Welles on December 3, and Foreign Minister Togo's reply to Ambassador Nomura's suggestion regarding a "leaders conference", both of which have been mentioned above, there is no evidence before the Committee of other

[1] Cf. Washington Post, December 4, 1941.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 419  

intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations generally that were translated and available in Washington on December 3 (Washington time).

The next morning, Thursday, December 4 (Washington time), six majority and minority leaders of the Senate and House met with President Roosevelt for 2 hours and thoroughly canvassed the Far Eastern situation "in connection with the defense of our own territories and vital interests in the Far East", and were reported to have left the White House "with the impression that the situation is critical, but will not necessarily come to a show-down with the presentation of Japan's reply" to the President's request for an accounting for the continued Japanese troop movements into southern French Indochina (Washington Post, December 5, 1941). That afternoon at 2:15 o'clock the President conferred for an hour with Secretary Knox (ex. 58). As he left the meeting Secretary Knox told reporters that, among other things, he knew definitely that there would be an investigation of the publication that day by the Chicago Tribune, practically in full, of a copy of United States plans for fighting a global war if it should eventuate, "the most highly secret paper in the possession of the Government" (tr. 14,411; Washington Post, December 5, 1941). At 3:30 o'clock, President Roosevelt conferred at the White House with Secretary Hull (ex. 58). That evening, according to a message dated December 6 (Washington time) from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo

"those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude (ex. 1, p. 247)."

In explanation of this information, Ambassador Nomura told the Foreign Minister that-

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and Hull we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret) (ex. 1, p. 247)."

That day, Thursday, December 4, there were translated and available in Washington the first intercepted Japanese messages from Tokyo directing the destruction of code machines and machine codes by the Japanese Embassy in Washington. As already noted, there had been translated and available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) a message sent from Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) which informed the Japanese Embassy in Washington that the Japanese diplomatic offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to abandon the use of code machines and to "dispose of them." This message had specifically stated, however, that regardless of other instructions, "the U. S. (Office) retains the machines and the machine codes" (ex. 1, p. 209). However, on December 2 (Japan time), in one of the intercepted messages translated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time), the Japanese Foreign Office had instructed the Japanese Embassy in Washington to destroy one code machine unit completely, as well as to burn all telegraphic codes except "those now used with the machine," and the various other codes. The Embassy was also instructed


420 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

to dispose of "all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents" at the time and in the manner "you deem most proper" (ex. 1, p. 215). This message was followed by a second message on December 4 (Japan time) which gave more detailed instructions concerning the burning of certain codes recently brought to Washington by a Japanese official from the Japanese Embassy in Mexico City, and directed that a certain code keying be kept in Ambassador Nomura's custody "until the last moment" (ex. 1, p. 231).

Admiral Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, testified that about the 4th or 5th of December, in connection with the delivery of "Magic" to the President, he called the President's particular attention to a message about the burning of codes. He testified that to the best of his recollection the gist of his conversation with the President was as follows:

"I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which he read very carefully, and he said "Well, when do you think it will happen?" I said, "Most any time" (tr. 14035-14036)."

He testified that when the President said, "When do you think it sill happen," he understood the President to mean, "When is war going to break out, when are we going to be attacked, or something" (tr. 14037).

A third intercepted message translated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time) was from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Foreign Office, in which the Ambassador said:

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it I8 expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls (ex. 1, p. 227)."

Also that day there was translated and available in Washington Foreign Minister Togo's reply, dated December 3 (Japan time), to Ambassador Nomura's report of his and Ambassador Kurusu's conference with Secretary Hull on December 1 (Washington time). In it, the Foreign Minister put forward arguments for the Ambassadors' use in their forthcoming meeting with Secretary Hull. The Foreign Minister claimed that the United States was using the recent statements of Japanese officials and the Japanese troop movements in the South "as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. Negotiations," and complained that Britain, the United States and others had been making military preparations against Japan "at an increasing tempo" and had been acting in a "more and more antagonistic manner of late. "We are insisting", the Foreign Minister said, "that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the United States are launched" (ex. 1, pp. 225-226).

On December 5 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew sent a rush telegram to Secretary Hull in which he stated:

"You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of "fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and that no intimation whatever has been given out that the proposal, if implemented would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that security political as well as economic which she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well- balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 421

is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the putt of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.

"It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably complete evacuation of China. Would be strong and indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befogged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as possible after consultation with the Japanese Government, but even without the latter's assent if that should not be forthcoming (tr. 1821- 1823)."

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ITS TROOP MOVEMENTS IN FRENCH INDOCHINA ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY THE CHINESE

(December 5, 1941)

In the meantime, on December 3 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo had sent Ambassador Nomura his message No. 875 containing the Japanese Government's formal reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry regarding the movement of additional Japanese troops into southern French Indochina (ex. 1, p. 224). This reply took the position that the Japanese reinforcements were a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory. Ambassador Nomura had regarded the reply as unsatisfactory, and had at once cabled the Foreign Minister:

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once (ex. 1, pp. 227-228)."

The Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Nomura had come back the next day:

"What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message (ex. 1, p. 232)."

Accordingly, on December 5 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull and presented their Government's reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.

[1] It is significant that press reports which reached Washington early in the morning of December 5 (Washington time), stated that in Tokyo that day the authoritative Japanese news agency had announced that "Japan cannot accept" the provisions of the United States' note of November 26. Domei was reported to have said: "Such a document cannot serve as a basic datum in Japanese-American negotiations henceforth". These statements, together with Japanese comment critical of Secretary Hull's remarks at his press conference on December 3 (Washington time), were carried in morning newspapers in Washington on December 5 under such headlines as "JAPAN 'CAN'T ACCEPT' TERMS" and "JAPAN EXPECTED TO REJECT TERMS" (Washington Post December 5, 1941). Secretary Hull conferred for a short time with President Roosevelt before his meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors (Washington Post, December 6, 1941).

422 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

781-783). The Japanese reply as handed to the Secretary follows in full:

Reference is made 1;e your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indochina. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indochina. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan std France (vol. II, p. 784).

After reading the reply, Secretary Hull said:

that he understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina (vol. II, p. 781).

Ambassador Nomura then repeated to the Secretary the gist of the Foreign Minister's message of December 3 (Japan time) mentioned above, claiming that the Japanese were alarmed over increasing naval and military preparation of the "ABCD" powers in the southwest Pacific, and asserting that the Japanese Government was "very anxious" to reach an agreement with this Government and that the United States ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated. The remainder of the conversation consisted largely of a repetition of matters expressed many times before by both the Japanese. And the Secretary (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 781-783).

That morning, December 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt had received a memorandum from Under Secretary Welles passing on to him a suggestion from the Australian Prime Minister that if Sir. Wendell Willkie should visit Australia with the "imprimateur" of the President, his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Government. The President had immediately dictated a letter to Mr. Willkie regarding this, in which he said:

"There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if the Japanese continued their forward progress against the Philippines, Dutch Indies or Malaya or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter (ex. 111). "

Following his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary Hull had lunch at 1 o'clock at the White House with President Roosevelt, after which both the President and the Secretary attended a full Cabinet meeting at 2 o'clock (ex. 58).

That day the American Minister at Bangkok reported to the State Department that he had been informed by the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand had told the Minister that the Japanese forces in Indochina "definitely would not be used to invade Thailand and that they were concentrated for use against the Burma Road" (ex. 169, item 31). Also that day, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull, who recorded that the Ambassador

"said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates to the matter of defense against Japan. I expressed my appreciation (tr. 14,515)."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 423

The evening of December 5 (Washington time) the State Department sent a telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via Peiping by naval radio for the information of the American Embassy in Chungking and the American consul at Hong Kong containing instructions applicable to all offices in Japan Japanese-occupied areas in China, Hong Kong Indochina, and Thailand. Those instructions were

"intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera (tr. 1967-A)."

The telegram included the following paragraph concerning the destruction of codes:

"It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained (tr. 1967-D)."

It ended as follows:

"The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary measure and the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to enable the officers concerned to deal with a sudden emergency. The concerned officers should quietly formulate plans to deal with an emergency if and when it arises. It is highly desirable that discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be avoided (tr. 1967- E)."  

Previously, on November 27 (Washington time), the day after the delivery of the United States reply, the State Department had sent a telegram to Ambassador Grew which strongly suggested the probability that the Japanese-American conversations might "lapse" and result "in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan," and that he should quietly prepare for that eventuality (ex. 18). Also, on November 19 (Washington time), the State Department had sent a telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via Shanghai by naval radio for the information of the American Embassies at Chungking, Peiping, and the American consul at Hong Kong, in which it was stated that the Department desired that  

"the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the the [sic] present facilities (tr. 4508 4509)."  

The telegram of November 19 (Washington time) was the last of three major warnings sent by the State Department during 1940 and 1941 advising American nationals to leave the Orient, the other major warnings have been sent on October 6, 1940, and February 11, 1941 (tr. 4502-4508).

On December 5 (Washington time), there was translated and available in Washington a message sent 2 days earlier by Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo in which the Ambassador said:

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand (ex. 1, p. 227).

At the Japanese Embassy in Washington that day, Councilor Iguchi cabled the Japanese Foreign Office, in response to its instruc-

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tions to destroy one code machine unit and to burn all telegraphic codes except those used with the machine:

"We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine (ex. 1, p. 236)."

The Foreign Office promptly replied that its instructions regarding code machines were:

"of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and *for the time being* to continue the use of the other (ex. 1, p. 237)."

Both of these intercepted Japanese messages were translated and available in Washington the next day.

THE LAST HOURS

(December 6-8, 1941)

The next day was Saturday, December 6 (Washington time). In the southwest Pacific, the Japanese naval and military forces whose movements in and toward French Indochina had commenced in earnest soon after the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) and had been observed both by British and American forces based in Malaya and in the Philippines, had begun their final dispositions. It is now known that at the same time, in the mid-Pacific some 6,000 miles away, the Japanese naval force that had left its rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time) still undiscovered and now almost within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands was steaming at high speed toward its target, the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

While reports of the final Japanese movements in the southwest Pacific began to reach Washington before noon on December 6 (Washington time), the record before the Committee conclusively shows that no one in the United States Government or in its military and naval forces, either in Washington or in the field, knew of the approach of the Japanese naval striking force to the Hawaiian Islands.

That morning, at 10:40 o'clock, the State Department received the following telegram from Ambassador Winant in London, marked "Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret to the Secretary and the President":

"British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers (ex. 21)."

The State Department file copy of this message bears the stamp "Sent to the President," but does not indicate the hour when that action was taken. The same information had been received in Washington by the Navy Department earlier that morning in a message sent by Admiral Hart from Manila at 7:55 a. m. (Washington time) to Admiral Stark (tr. 4344, ex. 66). The information so received by the Navy Department was communicated to the State Department in a memorandum of December 6 signed by Admiral Schuirmann (ex. 66). Secretary Hull's engagement books for that day show that he had an appointment with Admiral Schuirmann at 1:50 p. m. (Tr. 1168), at which time the memorandum was presumably handed to the Secretary by Admiral Schuirmann. Similar information was received  

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in the State Department from the War-Department early the next morning (tr. 14,290). The record of outside telephone calls through the White House switchboard on December 6 shows that Secretary Hull was again called by Secretary Stimson at 12:58 p. m. and by Admiral Stark at 1:09 p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). At 3:05 p. m. that afternoon the State Department received a second message from Ambassador Winant, marked "Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret for the Secretary," containing additional information concerning the Ambassador's earlier message regarding the Japanese naval movement. The second message follows in full:

"Again from Cadogan. Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday.

"Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our naval despatch. Latter stating 3 a. m. Greenwich time, by despatch as given me 3 a. m. London time. Believe former correct.

"British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax.

"Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your number 5682, December 5 although I had previously pressed on him each of the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the exception of paragraph seven which I agree is not clear and which I will clear up with him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to do with the insertion of the reference to the I. L. O.

"I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place in the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over private wires in ease you wish to communicate with me [1] (ex. 21). "

At 5:15 o'clock that afternoon Secretary Hull again telephoned Admiral Stark (tr. 1168).

That morning at 11 o'clock the State Department received the following telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking:

"The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed a member of my staff yesterday that "the British wanted to move into Thailand but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of the American attitude." He said that this report came from a very reliable source in the United States. I attach no significance to the report except as indicative of an interesting and somewhat prevalent tendency to play up the situation (ex. 169, item 32)."

At 6 p. m. that day the Department sent a telegram to the American Minister at Bangkok informing him that he might assure the Thai authorities that the extension of credit to Thailand for its current needs was fully agreed to in principle and that the Department expected no delay in working out the details with the appropriate lending agencies of the United States Government (ex. 169, item 33).

In the meantime, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull had given renewed attention to the proposal to send a message to Emperor Hirohito. It will be recalled that a draft of such a message had been prepared the preceding Saturday and probably discussed the next

[1] Under Secretary Welles was questioned at length by Senator Ferguson regarding the "message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram quoted above (tr. 1300-1316; 1337-1340). At Senator Ferguson's request, Mr. Welles undertook to make a special search for the message (tr. 1316), after which he reported to the Committee that it was his understanding that the message in question was the message from President Roosevelt which he communicated to the Japanese Ambassadors on December 2 (Washington time) and a copy of which he sent to the British Ambassador the same day (tr. 1338). The State Department advised Committee counsel that no written record of the message referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram could be found in its files, and that accordingly it must be assumed the message was oral (tr. 1300). See in this connection the discussion supra of Under Secretary Welles reported conference with Lord Halifax on December 1 (Washington time).

Telegram number 5682 referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram appears in the record before this Committee as exhibit No. 166. It does not deal with the situation in the Far East in any way.

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Monday by the Secretary with the President upon his return from Warm Springs. The next day, Tuesday (December 2), Secretary Stimson had recorded in his notes:

"The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country (tr. 14,427)."

Secretary Hull testified that he was in consultation with President Roosevelt at all stages of the drafting of the President's message to the Emperor (tr. 14,297). The record contains a note in President Roosevelt's handwriting, undated but bearing a stamp showing that it was received in Secretary Hull's office on December 6, which reads:

"DEAR CORDELL: Shoot this to Grew I think can go in grey code-saves time I don't mind if it gets picked up.

"F. D. R. (ex. 20)."

The message to Emperor Hirohito attached to the President's memorandum was returned to the President attached to a "Memorandum for the President," also dated December 6 and initialled by Secretary Hull, as follows:

"There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone.

"If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once (ex. 20)."

Beneath Secretary Hull's initials appears the following in President Roosevelt's handwriting:

"C. H. O K send the amended p. 3 to the British Ambassador & send a copy to me. F. D. R. (ex. 20)."

The amended page 3 bears the President's handwritten "O.K.," followed by his initials (ex. 20). There is no explanation in the record before the Committee of the reason for the President's instruction to send a copy of the amended page three to the British Ambassador.

The first three and last paragraphs of the message as thus finally revised were substantially the same as those of the draft message attached to Secretary Hull's memorandum of November 29 to the President. The remainder of the message sent comprising the main part consisted of material that is not found in any of the drafts in evidence before the Committee. Secretary Hull testified that the message actually sent to the Emperor

"was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the White House as well as material contained in the drafts prepared in the State Department during the preceding weeks (tr. 14,264)."

At 8 o'clock that evening (December 6), the State Department dispatched to Ambassador Grew a brief telegram stating that an important telegram to him was being encoded and that it contained the text of a message from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, to be communicated by Ambassador Grew to the Emperor at the "earliest possible moment" (ex. 20). Both messages were initialled for Secretary Hull by Dr. Hornbeck (ex. 20), which may indicate that after approving the message in final form the Secretary had left the Department for the day. The telegram containing President Roosevelt's
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Exhibit D Cont'd.

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message to Emperor Hirohito was dispatched from the State Department at 9 o'clock that evening (ex. 20). The message follows in full:

"Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. Vs e have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

"I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

"!More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement v I h the Vichy- Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saving that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

"During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.  

"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.  

"I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval, and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world (vol. II, pp. 784-786)."

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Also at 9 o'clock that evening a telegram from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was dispatched by the State Department, instructing the Ambassador to communicate to Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek a copy of President Roosevelt's message to Emperor Hirohito, for the Generalissimo's confidential information. This telegram was also initialled for the Secretary by Dr. Hornbeck. After quoting the President's message in full, the telegram concluded:

"In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Government circles adverse comment (tr. 14,517)."

The final comment may well have been intended to forestall comment such as the Generalissimo had made at the time the modus vivendi was under consideration.

Ambassador Grew testified that he first learned of the President's message the evening of December 7 (Japan time) while listening to a radio broadcast from San Francisco (tr. 1501-1503; ex. 30, pp. 486-487). He immediately instructed Mr. Dooman, the Embassy Counselor, to stand by, and not long thereafter the first, short telegram from Secretary Hull was received. Although it showed on its face it had been received in Tokyo at 12 noon (Japan time), an hour after its dispatch from Washington at 11 a. m. (Japan time), the Secretary's second telegram containing President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor was not delivered at the Embassy until 10:30 p. m. "In other words," Ambassador Grew testified, "the telegram appears to have been delivered to the Japanese post office, which handled telegrams, 1 hour after its receipt, and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until-10:30 p. m." (Japan time) (tr. 1501), or 8:30 a. m. December 7 (Washington time). Ambassador Grew saw Foreign Minister Togo at about a quarter past 12 that night. He read President Roosevelt's message aloud to the Foreign Minister, handed him a copy, and then requested an audience with the Emperor to present the President's message personally. Not until after Ambassador Grew had found it necessary to repeat his request did the Foreign Minister agree to present the matter to the Throne, (tr. 14,516).

To return to events in Washington, President Roosevelt's appointments for Saturday, December 6, as shown by his engagement book were two, both at the White House and both in the morning. The first was at 10 o'clock with Justice William O. Douglas, and the second was at 11:15 o'clock with Budget Director Harold O. Smith (ex. 58). The President had no scheduled appointments that afternoon. That evening the President and Mrs. Roosevelt entertained at dinner at 8 o'clock at the White House (ex. 58). Apart from the evidence already mentioned of the President's activities that day in connection with his message to Emperor Hirohito, the only other evidence before the Committee affirmatively showing the President's activities before the White House dinner that evening is a statement contained in a letter dated May 22, 1946, from an official of the Australian Legation in Washington in answer to certain inquiries made by the Committee through the State Department (tr. 14,631-14,632). Referring to a telegram from the Australian Minister for

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External Affairs in Canberra to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom in London, a paraphrase of which is quoted below, that letter states:

"The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Australian Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister- at Washington. This message was dispatched from Washington at 9:30 p. m. On December 6th, 1941. *The information contained therein regarding the procedure to be followed by the President had come orally from the President late in the afternoon of December 6th.*" (Tr. 14,631).

The paraphrase of the Australian Minister for External Affairs' telegram is as follows:

"Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's Governments. I point out that message from Australian Minister at Washington just received notes that

"1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.

"2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening

"(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,

"(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington (tr. 13, 741-13, 742)."

It would seem clear that the "draft" referred to in the telegram quoted above was the document, a copy of which was obtained by the Committee from the files of President Roosevelt, attached to an unsigned memorandum dated December 7, 1941, on stationery bearing the official seal of the British Government (tr. 13,738). The memorandum was as follows:

"The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government.

"The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text. They are being consulted urgently.

"The Netherlands government have been given a copy of the draft (tr. 13,738)"

The draft declaration to the Japanese Government which was attached to this memorandum was as follows:

"YOUR EXCELLENCY:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.

"His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in consultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's Governments viewed with the same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily augmented.

"There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concentration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand.

"Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to


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be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on territories of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments feel it incumbent upon them, however, to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand.

"His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the contrary, preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest with Japan (tr. 13738-13740)."

It would seem clear that the foregoing draft is the draft warning to Japan "concurred in" by the Australian Minister for External Affairs in his telegram to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, which was dispatched from Canberra the evening of December 7 (tr. 14,631-14,632).

In connection with these documents, it will be recalled that the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum of November 27 to President Roosevelt had recommended that

"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

"*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war*; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

"*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning (ex. 17).*"

It will be also recalled that on Sunday, November 30 (Washington time), the State Department had received through Ambassador Winant a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt in which the Prime Minister, while stating that he realized the President's "constitutional difficulties," begged the President to consider at such moment as the President should judge right "which may be very near," the President should not tell Japan "that any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress or words to that effect." The Prime Minister had said that this was the one important method that remained "unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries," and that Great Britain would "make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24).

There is thus evidence before the Committee that by the late afternoon of December 6 the President had determined upon a procedure which contemplated that his message to Emperor Hirohito, as the first step (which he took despite the views of those of his advisors who felt that it would have little effect), would be followed, as recommended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and previously discussed at length with his principal Cabinet advisors, and as urged by Prime Minister Churchill, by a warning to Japan by the United States Government, with similar warnings by the Governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands. The warning recommended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark was to be given "in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand," and by late Saturday afternoon the progress of the Japanese naval force around Cambodia Point had

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made such an advance an imminent probability. While both General Marshall (tr. 13809) and Admiral Stark (tr. 13760) testified that to the best of their recollection they were not consulted regarding the President's procedure outlined in the Australian message quoted above, that procedure followed the recommendation made in their joint memorandum of November 27 to the President so far as a warning to Japan was concerned.

In this connection it should be noted that according to Secretary Stimson, President Roosevelt planned to give his warning to Japan in his proposed message to Congress. He said:

"The final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given (tr. 14482).

* * * * * * *

"The President was in fact during the early part of December engaged in preparing an address to Congress which would incorporate such a warning, and was also considering a special telegram to the Emperor. Before the address to the Congress was delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7th (tr. 14478).

"The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the address to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning (tr. 14487)."

Both the State Department, with respect to its files, and Miss Tully as custodian of the President's files, were requested by the Committee to furnish it with all information and documents relating to the proposed British warning and the telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs mentioned above (tr. 14628-14629; 14632-14633). The State Department searched its files twice and after the second search advised the Committee that no material relevant to those documents had been found (tr. 14629). Miss Tully advised the Committee that a further search of President Roosevelt's files had not disclosed any additional documents or memoranda regarding the documents in question. Regarding the message from the Australian Minister at Washington to Canberra, Miss Tully reported that she believed that "he and the late President discussed the subject but, of course, no record was ever made of such conversations" (tr. 14634).

The preceding day, perhaps at the meeting of his Cabinet, President Roosevelt had requested Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox to compile for him the information available in their respective Departments concerning Japanese air, ground, and naval forces in French Indochina and adjacent areas. A memorandum dated December 5, 1941, based on Office of Naval Intelligence estimates, was transmitted by Secretary Knox to Secretary Hull with a covering, undated memorandum signed by the Secretary stating that the figures attached were those concerning which he had just talked with Secretary Hull on the telephone (ex. 175). A similar memorandum, dated December 6, and prepared by the Military Intelligence Division, was transmitted by Secretary Stimson to Secretary Hull on the same day with a covering letter in which Secretary Stimson specifically referred to the President's request of "yesterday" (ex. 175). The information contained in the memoranda, together with information received in the State Department from American diplomatic and consular sources, was combined in the State Department in a "Memorandum for the President," dated December 6, as follows:

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"Japanese Forces and Recent Increase in Japanese Military Material and Equipment in Indochina

"According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon, received by them from French military sources in Indochina and not confirmed it is estimated that there are at present in northern Indochina (Tongking) 25,000 Japanese troops and 80,000 in southern Indochina, making a total of 105,000, and that there are at the outside some 450 Japanese planes in Indochina. According to a statement made December 4 by the Governor General of Indochina to our Consul at Hanoi, there are approximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina, a little less than 30,000 being in Tongking and the balance in the south. The estimate of 105,000 is considered to be approximately correct by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

"According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, 21 transports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol from Manila, 12 submarines were sighted at sea northeast of Saigon proceeding south and nine of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay with other naval units including several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi reported on December 5 information from a reportedly reliable source that there were in Camranh Bay 30 transports carrying an estimated division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao reported on December 1 that for the preceding ten days an average of about three transports had left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms.

"An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer of our Embassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending large amounts of military equipment and material into Indochina. According to our Consul at Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently landed in Indochina includes, as estimated by French military sources, 3,400 trucks and tractors, 600 automobiles, 500 motorcycles, 260 tanks (categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine guns, 1,300 submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles.

"The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began November 21 with the arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the landing of 20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,000 troops from northern Indochina southward and the subsequent landing of additional troops at both Saigon and Haiphong, those landed at the latter place proceeding southward by train.

"At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese troops and an unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as bombers can fly from Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct or via Waichow Island off Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China (ex. 175)."

Secretary Hull testified that he was most invariably at home in the evening "working on Departmental matters," and that while it was possible he might be mistaken, it was his best recollection that he was "at home on the night of December 6, 1941" (tr. 14,315-14,317). The record before the Committee shows that at 8:45 o'clock that evening Secretary Hull had a telephone conversations with Secretary Knox, lasting not over 2 minutes (ex. 58; tr. 1168). While Secretary Hull's records indicate that he called Secretary Knox (tr. 1168), the records of the While House switchboard operators indicate that Secretary Knox called Secretary Hull that evening at 8:45 p. m., between two calls to Secretary Stimson made by Secretary Knox at 8:30 and 8:47 p. m. (Ex. 58). It is not clear from the record [1] before the Com-

[1] Captain Kramer testified that before delivering copies of the first 13 parts to the White House, to Secretary Knox, and to Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson (then Director of Naval Intelligence), he telephoned the several persons to whom he customarily made deliveries of intercepted Japanese messages, and that he commenced these phone calls at about a quarter of 9 (tr. 10446-10450). He testified that he did not begin deliveries that evening until after 9 a. m., and that he did not reach Secretary Knox's apartment until after 9:15 p. m. (tr. 10451). He further testified that Secretary Knox read the lengthy 13 parts before making any telephone calls (tr. 14454). On the basis of this testimony, Secretary Knox s phone calls could not have been made before 9:30 p. m., whereas the actual records made at the time show that the first of Secretary Knox's three calls to Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull was made an hour earlier at 8:30 p. m., and that his telephone conversation with Secretary Hull occurred at 8:45 p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). This evidence leaves two major alternatives (1) Captain Kramer's memory with respect to times that evening was faulty and the times he gave should all be moved back at least an hour, making his arrival at Secretary Knox's apartment prior to 8:30 p. m. Under such circumstances it would have been possible for Secretary Knox's reading of the 13-part message to have been the immediate reason for arranging the meeting of the three Secretaries the next morning, provided it is also assumed that the meeting was not arranged during the several conversations among the three Secretaries earlier that Saturday; and (2) Captain Kramer's memory

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mittee whether or not Secretary Knox's three telephone calls through the White House switchboard were the calls, "apparently to Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson" according to Captain Kramer (tr. 10676), made by Secretary Knox after he received and read that evening the first 13 parts (Annex E attached hereto) of the intercepted message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura containing the Japanese Government's reply to the United States note of November 26. Secretary Knox gave instructions that the first 13 parts of that message, together with any additional intercepted messages that might become available during the night, should be brought to him at the meeting at 10 o'clock the next morning at the State Department which had been arranged with Secretaries Hull and Stimson (tr. 10676-10677). Captain Kramer, who delivered the 13 parts to Secretary Knox that evening, testified that the Secretary agreed with the conclusion he had placed on it, "that it aimed toward a conclusion of negotiations" (tr. 10676), and that nothing was said by the Secretary with respect to taking any action on the message (tr. 10454-10455).

There is no evidence before the Committee that Secretary Hull saw the intercepted Japanese message containing the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply before Sunday. Secretary Hull testified that he could not "recall definitely the exact time" when he first saw that message (tr. 14299). Regarding the so-called "pilot message" which preceded it, Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, who was in charge of the delivery of "magic" to the Secretary of State, testified before the Committee that the "pilot" message, which was sent by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nomura on December 6 (Japan time) and was translated and available in Washington the afternoon of December 6 (Washington time), was distributed to the Secretary of State around 3 p. m. That afternoon (tr. 12049-12050). That message (#901) was as follows:

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions (ex. 1, pp. 238-239)."

Colonel Bratton's testimony in this regard is uncontradicted, and it is therefore reasonable to conclude, since deliveries of "magic" were made directly to the Secretary of State's office, that Secretary Hull

[Footnote 1 continued from previous page] with respect to times that evening was correct. Under such circumstances it must follow that the meeting of the three Secretaries the next morning had been arranged before Secretary Knox knew of or saw the 13 part message, unless the assumption is also made that Secretary Knox made a second series of calls after 9:30 p. m. to Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson that were not made through the White House switchboard and, in the ease of Secretary Hull, went unrecorded.

In this general connection, Secretary Hull testified.

"As r recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a desire to continue our discussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indo China" (tr. 14318).

The log of the duty officer at the Navy Department that Saturday evening contains an entry showing that *at 8 p. m.* Secretary Stimson's aide telephoned that Secretary Stimson desired certain specified information regarding American, British, Dutch, Japanese, and Russian naval vessels in the Pacific before 9 a. m., the next morning, that Secretary Knox, among others, was consulted in regard to this, and that Secretary Knox directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 10 a. m. The next morning (tr. 13946-13947, ex. 162). This would seem to indicate that the meeting of the three Secretaries had been arranged prior to 8 p. m. On Saturday, December 6.

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saw the "pilot" message that afternoon before leaving the State Department. In the case of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message, however, the evidence before the Committee as to whether or not the first 13 parts were delivered to the State Department before the morning of December 7 (Washington time) is contradictory [1] and as stated above there is no evidence before the Committee that the first 13 parts were seen by Secretary Hull Saturday evening, December 6 (Washington time).

The evidence before the Committee is uncontradicted, however, that the first 13 parts were delivered to President Roosevelt a little after 9:30 o'clock the evening of December 6 (Washington time). At that time, the President and Mr. Harry Hopkins, who was one of the guests at the White House dinner party, were in the President's study on the second floor of the White House. Commander Schultz, an assistant to Admiral Beardall, naval aide to the President, who personally handed the intercepted messages to the President, testified that he gained the impression the President was expecting them, and that the President read the messages and then handed them to Mr. Hopkins, who was pacing back and forth slowly. His testimony continued:

"Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance "This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces; that is, their deployment and-

"Mr. RlCHARDSON. Can you regal what either of them said?

"Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first that since war was imminent, that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them-

"The CHAIRMAN. When all was what?

"Commander SCHULZ. When all was most opportune for them. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next.

"The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal.

"Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people."

[1] Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into his office some time between 9 and 10 o'clock that night and that he was in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (tr. 12049). He further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night duty officer at the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night telling the duty officer that it was a "highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned" and that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull's quarters which he was assured would be done (tr. 12052-12053). This testimony is directly contrary to the affidavit of Col. Clyde Dusenberry, then Colonel Bratton's chief assistant in the Clausen investigation. In his affidavit Colonel Dusenberry stated that he specifically recalled the intercepted message in question and that "It started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning *to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts* and *I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept* about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department *as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State*. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas D. Handy who upon reading it said to me: "This means war " or words to that effect. *None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941* because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night" (Clausen, p. 50).

Colonel Dusenberry's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the testimony of Gen. Sherman Miles, then Chief Of the Military Intelligence Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenberry, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson and the others on the War Department's "magic" distribution list received on December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were translated that day up to midnight "*except the first 13 parts of the 14-part message*" (tr. 4123-4124).  


PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 435

Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record."

"The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

"During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

"Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?

"Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

"Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was it from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

"Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the National Theater was mentioned in my presence, and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case.

"Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else except Stark?

"Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there was not (tr. 12436-12444)."

Captain Krick, who testified that he was at the National Theater that evening with Admiral Stark, recalled that when he and Admiral Stark returned to the latter's home, one of Admiral Stark's servants advised the admiral that there had been a White House call during the evening (tr. 14757). According to Captain Krick's testimony, Admiral Stark retired immediately to his study on the second floor where he had a White House phone (tr. 14755). He returned between 5 and 10 minutes later, and told Captain Krick that

"conditions in the Pacific were serious; that was the substance of it, that conditions with Japan were in a critical state, something of that sort (tr. 14757)."

Captain Krick testified that while he could not recall that Admiral Stark had said upon his return, "I have talked with the President of the United States", he had

"heard, of course, the statement of the servant that there had been a White House call, and the Admiral retired immediately, and he may have stated that he was going to call the White House; but I have the distinct impression that the conversation was with the White House (tr. 14758)."

There is no evidence before the Committee of any other action taken by President Roosevelt the night of December 6 (Washington time).

A report that the Japanese Embassy in Washington had burned its codes and ciphers the preceding evening was received in the State Department from the Navy Department on December 6 (Washington time) (ex. 174). Intercepted Japanese messages which were translated in Washington that day, in addition to the first 13 parts of the 14-part message, included a message dated December 3 (Japan time) instructing the Japanese Embassy in Washington to keep its "hidden word" code lists "until the last moment" (ex. 1, p. 226); a message

436 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

requesting Ambassador Nomura to have certain Embassy officials "leave (Washington) by plane within the next couple of days" (ex. 1, p. 234); Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's meeting with Secretary Hull the day before; and a message dated December 3 from the Japanese Ambassador in Rome to Foreign Minister Togo reporting on his conference that day with Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano (ex. 1, pp. 228-229). In the latter report the Ambassador stated that at the conference he had described the developments in the Japanese- American negotiations as set out in message No. 986 from Foreign Minister Togo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin (which was translated and available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) as has already been described). During the course of the conference in Rome, the Japanese Ambassador asked Mussolini and Ciano, if Japan should declare war on the United States and Great Britain,

"would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point" (ex. 1, p. 229)."

The fourteenth and final part of the intercepted Japanese message containing the text of the Japanese Government's reply to the United States' note of November 26 was translated and available in Washington the next morning, Sunday, December 7 (Washington time). The record before the Committee shows that it was delivered to President Roosevelt in his bedroom at the White House about 10 o'clock that morning by Admiral Beardall, the President's naval aide (tr. 14010; 14033). Admiral Beardall testified that when the President had read it and such other messages as accompanied it in the delivery pouch, he turned to the admiral and remarked that it looked as if the Japanese were going to break off negotiations (tr. 14011; 14034). While Captain Kramer testified that he made a second delivery of "magic" to the White House that morning, at about 11 o'clock, Admiral Beardall testified that he had no recollection of delivering any other "magic" messages to the President (tr. 14034), or of seeing the President again, until after he received word at home about 2 o'clock that afternoon of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 14015).

Secretary Hull testified that he had no record of nor did he recall

"having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on December 6, 1941 and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my best recollection, I was available during all that period (tr. 14319)."

He testified that on Saturday and Sunday up to the time of the Japanese attack he

"was in constant contact * * * with officers of the State Department and of the Army and Navy * * *. It would be impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern Indo-China was very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements their probable destination, etc. (Tr. 14319-14321)."

That Sunday morning Secretaries Knox and Stimson met with Secretary Hull at the State Department. Secretary Hull testified that, according to his best recollection, the subject of that conference

"was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 437

"For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this information from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this Japanese armada had left its jumping-off point and was sailing toward the Kra Isthmus and * * * Prime Minster Tojo had made a speech * * * a little before this. But that, along with these actual movements, especially these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I think of our conference.

* * * * *

"Senator LUCAS. In the conversations that you had with Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the 7th was there anything said in that conversation about the likelihood of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor?

"Mr. HULL. Nothing. As you understand, the attack was then on apparently. The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which would greatly endanger the situation.

"Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get your last answer Will you read it, please?

"Mr. HULL. I said the attack was under way, according to the dispatches on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay of Siam or Thailand, but it was, so far as my impression extended, moving toward the Kra Isthmus, which was probably a threat all the way down toward Singapore, down the peninsula, and not far from Malaya (tr. 1605-16O6)."

The record before the Committee shows that all 14 parts (Annex E) of the intercepted Japanese message containing the Japanese reply to the. United States note of November 26 were delivered to Secretary Knox at the State Department a few minutes before the meeting of the three Secretaries (tr. 10468), and that the intercepted message in which Foreign Minister Togo directed Ambassador Nomura to deliver the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that day (ex. 1, p. 248) was handed to one of Secretary Hull's private secretaries at about 10:45 o'clock (tr. 10473). These deliveries were made by Captain Kramer, who testified that at the time of the second delivery he mentioned to Mr. Hull's private secretary the tie-up between 1 p. m. Washington time and "the scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Era Peninsula" (tr. 10472).

A further indication of the matters discussed at the conference of the three Secretaries at the State Department that Sunday morning is a memorandum entitled "Location of U. S. Naval Forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of 7 December 1941" in evidence before the Committee (ex. 176). In the upper right hand corner of this memorandum appears the following handwritten note: "SECNAV (2), 1000", meaning, apparently, two copies for the Secretary of the Navy at 10 o'clock. This note, considered in conjunction with the log of the duty officer at the Navy Department the preceding evening (ex. 162), leaves little doubt that the memorandum was prepared expressly for the conference at the State Department that morning. The memorandum listed the major ships of the United States, Japanese, British, Dutch, and Russian fleets in the Pacific Ocean by name, and the destroyers and submarines in those fleets by number, giving their location "as of 7 Dec. 1941". The Japanese cruisers and destroyers referred to in the Hart message to the Navy Department and the Winant telegrams to the State Department the day before were listed as "off southern Indochina." The bulk of the Japanese Navy was listed as in the two major Japanese naval stations at Kure and Sasebo on the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Included among the Japanese ships listed by name as in those two Japanese naval stations that morning were all of the ships which, it is now known, were at that very moment less than 300 miles north

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of the Hawaiian Islands in the act of launching their bombers and torpedo planes for the Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

Secretary Stimson's notes for that day, which appear to have been written the following day, describe in greater detail the meeting of the three Secretaries.

"Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see the Japanese envoys at one o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the appointment and did not come until later as it turned out, till 2:00 o'clock or after. * * * The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indo China, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malaya. The British were very much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought (tr. 14428-14429)."

The statement dictated by Secretary Hull as referred to in Secretary Stimson's notes, follows:

"PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT BY HULL

"(See Record, December 7)

"The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fire-eaters, is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably means Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be governed militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi- slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some fifteen conquered nations of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful peoples off the high seas.

"At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended.

"More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one-half of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to their individual or their mutual advantage.

"This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of each and all of our civilized institutions (tr. 14433-14434)."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 439

Secretary Knox's statement was as follows:

"SUGGESTION BY KNOX

"(See Record, December 7)

"1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world situation.

"2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will automatically not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize her entire effort.

"3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to lose theirs.

"4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are almost certain to be next, being then practically Japanese-surrounded.

"5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be stated any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly to let together and if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody may be left out on a limb).

"6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a direction that threatens the United States will be met by force. The President will want to reserve to himself just how to define this. The following are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement into Thailand; or any movement into Thailand west of 100 east and South of 10 North this in accordance with the recommendations of the British and Dutch and United States military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against British, Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in the Pacific area (tr. 14435-14436)."

After the meeting at the State Department, Secretary Stimson went to his home for lunch (tr. 14428). Secretary Knox returned to the Navy Department. Both his aide, Admiral Beatty, and his confidential assistant, Major Dillon, testified that he arrived there from he State Department probably about 11:30 o'clock, possibly a little later (tr. 10239, 10253, 10260). Secretary Hull remained at the State Department. At about noon the Japanese Embassy telephoned the State Department and asked for an appointment for Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that afternoon. Somewhat later the Embassy telephoned again and requested that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 p. m., as Ambassador Nomura was not quite ready (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 786).

That morning the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, Mr. W. G. Hayter, called at the State Department on an official of the Far Eastern Division. In response to an inquiry whether there was any news, Mr. Hayter is reported to have said

"after some hesitation, that the British Minister in Thailand had sent a message to the (British) Foreign Office, which began "For God's sake" and which was endorsed by the Thai Foreign Minister requesting that British armed forces *not* move into Thailand" (ex. 169, item 34). [Italics in original.]"  

At 1:50 o'clock that afternoon the Navy Department received the following dispatch from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H.:

"Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not drill (tr. 14204)."

When this message was brought to Secretary Knox, he was talking with Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, in Major Dillon's office, who testified that after reading the message, the Secretary exclaimed: "My God, this can't be true, this must mean the Philippines" (tr. 10262).

Secretary Stimson recorded in his notes for that day that

"just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on he telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard the news?" said, "Well, I have heard the telegrams which have come in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh no, I don't mean that. They have
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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Exhibit D Cont'd.

440 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an excitement indeed (tr. 14428-14429)."

Secretary Hull testified that President Roosevelt telephoned him before the Japanese Ambassadors reached the State Department and told him "There was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked" [1] (tr. 1594). He continued:

"I discussed before they came whether I would accredit that report as the unquestioned truth of the situation and refuse to admit them or whether in view of the extremely delicate relations I would leave open the one chance in ten or more that the report was not correct. I proceeded to receive and confer with them although I felt that the chances were altogether virtually certain that the report was true (tr. 1594)."

The Japanese Ambassadors arrived at the State Department at 2:05 p. m., but were not admitted to Secretary Hull's office until 2:20 p. m. (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 786). According to the official State Department record of the meeting Ambassador Nomura stated

"that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 p. m. the document which he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need of more time to decode the message. The Secretary asked why he had specified one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that that was his instruction.

"The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o'clock (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 786-787)."

The document Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull was the full text of the memorandum contained in the 14-part message that had been before the three Secretaries at their conference that morning, the first 13 parts of which had been seen by Secretary Knox and President Roosevelt the evening before. The full message as intercepted before its delivery to Secretary Hull is printed as Annex E attached hereto. Secretary Hull testified that the first few pages defined "the Japanese attitude just the reverse of what it was," as "Peace, peace, peace," and the next few pages defined the American attitude "as just the reverse of what it was" (tr. 1594). The final paragraph, which had been contained in the fourteenth part of the intercepted message and had not been seen by either the President or any of the three Secretaries before 10 o'clock that morning, was as follows:

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great British and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations* (ex. 1, p. 245; ex. 29, vol. II, p. 792)."

Secretary Hull testified that at the time he

"felt and knew of the extreme probability that the Pearl Harbor report was true. I felt like taking liberties in talking to them about their government in what would not be diplomatic language in ordinary times (tr. 1595)."

Secretary Hull interrupted his reading of the memorandum to ask Ambassador Nomura whether the memorandum was presented under

[1] Under Secretary Welles also testified that he first learned of the attack through a telephone call from President Roosevelt (tr. 1322; 1362-1373)."

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 441

instructions from the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that it was. When he finished reading, Secretary Hull turned to the Japanese Ambassador and said:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 787)."

According to the official State Department records of the meeting the two Japanese Ambassadors "then took their leave without making any comment" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 787).

Later that afternoon, Secretary Hull issued the following statement:

"Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the United States.

"At the very moment when representatives of the Japanese Government were discussing with representatives of this Government, at the request of the former principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan were preparing and assembling at various strategic points to launch new attacks and new aggressions upon nations and peoples with which Japan was professedly at peace including the United States.

"I am now releasing for the information of the American people the statement of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area, which I handed to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.

"I am likewise releasing the text of a Japanese reply thereto which was handed to me by the Japanese Ambassador today. Before the Japanese Ambassador delivered this final statement from his Government the treacherous attack upon the United States had taken place.

"This Government has stood for all the principles that underlie fair dealing, peace, law and order, and justice between nations and has steadfastly striven to promote and maintain that state of relations between itself and all other nations.

"It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent professions of a desire for peace has been infamously false and fraudulent (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 793)."

The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had begun at 1:25 o'clock that Sunday afternoon (Washington time). It was followed almost immediately by a Japanese attack upon Thailand at various places on its land and sea frontiers. Five and half hours after the attack on Thailand commenced the Thai Government gave the order to cease fire (ex. 169). At 3 p. m. On December 7 (Washington time) the first Japanese attacks on Singapore were made; at 3:40 p. m. (Washington time) the Japanese attacked Khota Baru in British Malaya; at 6:10 p. m. (Washington time) they attacked the Gulf of Davao in the Philippine Islands and the Island of Guam (tr. 14127)

In Tokyo, in the meantime, after receiving from Ambassador Grew a copy of President Roosevelt's message to Emperor Hirohito, Foreign Minister Togo had gone to Premier Tojo's official residence with a summary translation of the President's message, and there, at an emergency conference with the Premier and the other members of the Cabinet, had determined the line of action to be taken (ex. 132, item 1, p. 2). At 7 a. m., December 8 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew was awakened by a telephone call from an official of the Japanese Foreign Office who requested him to call on Foreign Minister Togo as soon as possible (ex. 30, p. 493). When Ambassador Grew arrived, Foreign Minister Togo, "grim and formal," handed him the Japanese Government's memorandum breaking off the negotiations. The Foreign Minister said that he had been in touch with Emperor Hirohito,

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who desired that the memorandum be regarded as his reply to President Roosevelt's message. Ambassador Grew reported to the State Department that the Foreign Minister thereupon made to him the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

" "Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore, desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

" "Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact" (ex. 178)."

Following his conference with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Togo arranged a conference with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie. Upon his arrival, the Foreign Minister informed the British Ambassador that it had become necessary to break off the Japanese-American negotiations, and handed him a copy of the memorandum he had previously given to Ambassador Grew (ex. 132, item 2).

While Foreign Minister Togo was holding his conferences with the American and British Ambassadors, a meeting of the Committee of Advisement of the Privy Council, attended by all of the other members of the Japanese Cabinet and certain other Japanese governmental officials, was in progress in the Imperial Palace. At this meeting the committee considered and approved an Address of Advisement to the Throne and a draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war against the United States and Great Britain. One of the officials present at the meeting asked Premier Tojo what Germany's attitude would be. Premier Tojo replied that "Germany's entrance in the war in our support is almost certain, and negotiations to that effect are now in progress" (ex. 132, item 3). Following the meeting of the Committee of Advisement, a full session of the Privy Council in the presence of Emperor Hirohito, was held in the Imperial Palace. At this meeting the address to the Throne was presented and unanimously approved. Later that morning, Ambassador Grew received the following communication:

"EXCELLENCY:

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a state of war between Your Excellency's country and Japan beginning today.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

"SHIGENORI TOGO,
"Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"(Ex. 30, p. 499.)"

In Washington, Sunday evening, December 7 (Washington time), a meeting of the Cabinet called by President Roosevelt took place in the White House at 8:30 o'clock (tr. 14430). The President opened the meeting by stating that it was the most serious Cabinet meeting that had taken place since 1861, and he then described the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor so far as it was known at the time. After this the President read a draft of a brief message to Congress which he had prepared. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the draft

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presented much the same thoughts as were actually presented the following day to Congress (tr. 14431). The Cabinet meeting lasted over three-quarters of an hour, after which the majority and minority leaders of Congress joined the President and the Cabinet for a meeting which lasted for over 2 hours. At this meeting the President reviewed the events of the preceding weeks and described the events of that Sunday in Washington and at Pearl Harbor. The President asked whether the members of Congress would invite him to appear before a joint session the following day and was told that they would. He said that he could not tell them exactly what he was going to say, because events were changing so rapidly (tr. 14431-14432; ex. 160).

The next day, December 8 (Washington time), shortly after noon, President Roosevelt delivered the following address before a joint session of Congress:

"TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

"Yesterday, December 7, 1941 a date which will live in infamy the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

"The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.

"It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

"The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

"Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

"Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

"This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

"Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

"As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

"Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

"No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

"I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.

"Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.

"With confidence in our armed forces with the unbounded determination of our people we will gain the inevitable triumph-so help us God.

"I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 793-794)."

Within an hour after President Roosevelt finished his address, the Senate and House of Representatives, acting independently, passed

444 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the following resolution, the Senate by a vote of 82 to 0 and the House of Representatives by a vote of 388 to 1:

"JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the people of the United States and making provisions to prosecute the same

"Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

"*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 795)."

The declaration of war against Japan was signed by President Roosevelt at 4:10 p. m. that afternoon, December 8 (Washington time).
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