Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report of the Joint

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 101
evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the Navy. [105] General Short, however, was supplied either directly from the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii adequate information concerning the critical international situation and the impending likelihood of war with Japan.
The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General Short. [106]
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. [107]
The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: [108]
"THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." "
In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams" [109] the War Department advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its estimate of the situation in the following terms:
"TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. [110]"
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations [111] advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. [112]
[105] See committee record, pp. 2220-2222.
[106] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1.
[107] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2.
[108] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279.
[109] Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General.
[110] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.
[111] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5

[112] See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.
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A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading in part as follows: [113]
"* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * * INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. [114]"
The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" [115] contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact see this warning.
On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall" [116] was sent General Short by the War Department: [117]
"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS."
The following dispatch signed 'Miles', [118] and also dated November 27, was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: [119]
"JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY."
On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short, as follows: [120]
"CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY FORTY FIVE). ALSO
[113] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6.
[114] This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were not made ready prior to the December 7 attack.
[115] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[116] Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.
[117] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.
[118] Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence.
[119] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.
[120] Id., at p. 13.
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DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS. [120a]"
Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [121]
"ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30 45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES. AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY.
"IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD."
A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles", [122] was sent the assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to
"CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. [123]"
ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM WASHINGTON
DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
In the dispatch of October 16 [124] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation;
[120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17.
[121] Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams."
[122] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20.
[123] This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report.
[124] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.
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that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United States and Great Britain; and that he should
"take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments* [126] as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."
Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas. [126]
On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter [127] these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [128]
"OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is what next?"
DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
In the dispatch of November 24 [129] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces
"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet [130] and would appear designed to acquaint him with the mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an estimate of probable Japanese action. [131] No action appears to have been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had already taken. [132]
"WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27
The dispatch of November 27 began with the words: [133] "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." [134] It stated that negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
[125] Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709.
[126] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709.
[127] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[128] Id.
[129] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32.
[130] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53.
[131] Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee record, p. 5159.
[132] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299.
[133] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[134] Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained." Committee record, p. 6717.
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Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46."  
After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. [135] Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following deployments were made and action taken:
1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping. [136] The sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November 26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part
"in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav [137] has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. [135]"
Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go; that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense." [139] Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it. [140]
2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance [141] despite the fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no knowledge of the dispatches of October
[135] The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
[136] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299.
[137] Office of Naval Operations.
[138] Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart inquiry record, p. 299.
[139] Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298.
[140] Id., at p. 43.
[141] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318.
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16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine. [142] The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's superior. [142a]  
3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. [143]
4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts. [144] However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. [145]  
5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to a distance of 525 miles. [146]  
6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes were searching the sector 120 to 170 from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. [147]
Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating
"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and
[142] See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318.
[142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143.
[143] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751
[144] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115
[145] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395.
[146] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751.
[147] See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684.
It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm. Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp. 70-73.  
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Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [148]"
While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the war warning, [149] this action combined with the other steps above- mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path, bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of- ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. [150] The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl Harbor by surprise. [151] *Nothing was done, however, to detect an approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest, recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. [152]
EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27, ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME
Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. [153]
The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch [153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that just where the attack might come could not be predicted. [154]
[148] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.
[149] See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313.
[150] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752.
[151] In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9321, 9324.
[152] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324, 9325, also 9436, 9437.
[153] Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 301.
[153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98, supra.
[153b] For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra.
[154] Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words "in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299.
It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in the "war warning" *an amphibious operation to the South* is to be distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction* mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an amphibious expedition and a surprise aggressive movement is such that a war warning in making reference to such an expedition in no way superseded the estimate of surprise aggressive action mentioned in the November 24 dispatch. See in this regard the testimony of Admiral Turner, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 997, 1020.
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The fact that Admiral Kimmel was ordered to take "an appropriate *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" indicated that his situation was subject to possible danger requiring such action. [155] It was Washington's responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel its best estimate of where the major strategic enemy effort would come. [156] It was Admiral Kimmel's responsibility as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to be prepared for the worst contingency, and when he was warned of war and ordered to execute a defensive deployment it was necessarily in contemplation that such action would be against all possible dangers with which the Hawaiian situation was fraught. [157]
OTHER DISPATCHES RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 27
Admiral Kimmel stated that two other dispatches which he received on November 27 were affirmative evidence that the War or Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable. [158] The first of these dispatches read: [159]
"Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament."
The second read: [160]
"*In order to keep the planes of the second marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use Op Nav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats; essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Naval supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations? Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable."
Both of these dispatches, however, were dated November 26, the day before the war warning dispatch. The latter dispatch was not to be controlled by messages which antedated it. The reinforcing of Wake and Midway was left up entirely to Admiral Kimmel both as to feasibility and desirability. [161] The fact that other outposts needed reinforcements and steps were outlined in that direction did not elim
[155] In this connection it is to be noted that the "war warning" dispatch was directed for action to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36). This would appear to be an indication to Admiral Kimmel that the same defensive action was expected of him as of Admiral Hart in the Philippine area who was located in the path of the Japanese move to the south: that the message of November 27 placed in the same category exposed to the same perils and requiring the same action the Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets.
[156] See testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 839-842.
[157] See discussion regarding "Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack " Part III p. 75 et seq., supra.
[158] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6716, 6717.
[159] Committee exhibit No. 112, p. 54.
[160] Id., at p. 55.
[161] Admiral Kimmel testified before the Nay Court of Inquiry that he regarded the proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the marine planes for expeditionary duty as a suggestion and not a directive. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 307.
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inate the necessity for the defense of Hawaii, the best-equipped outpost the United States possessed, nor remove it as a possible point of attack. The same is true with respect to the use of Hawaii as a crossroads for dispositions going to the Philippines or elsewhere; Hawaii was the only point we controlled in the Pacific which had adequate facilities to be such a crossroads.
"PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDICAPS" INDICATED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL
In his testimony Admiral Kimmel has suggested that one can appreciate the "psychological handicaps" that dispatches he received placed upon the Navy in Hawaii. He stated:
"In effect, I was told:
"Do take precautions" [162]
"Do not alarm civilians" [163]
"Do take a preparatory deployment" [164]
"Do not disclose intent" [165]
"Do take a defensive deployment" [166]
"Do not commit the first overt act." [167]
In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the only cautions mentioned, which were contained largely in Army messages, were not to alarm civilians, not to disclose intent, and not to commit the first overt act. To have deployed the fleet; to have instituted distant reconnaissance; to have effected a higher degree of readiness, on a maneuver basis if necessary none of these steps would have alarmed the civilian population of Hawaii, [168] have disclosed intent, or have constituted an overt act against Japan. Admiral Kimmel's contention must be judged in light of the fact that on November 28 on his own responsibility, [169] he instructed the fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas. [170] The Office of Naval Operations acquiesced in this order to depth bomb submarine contacts. Admiral Halsey, prior to departing for Wake Island on November 28, received orders from Admiral Kimmel which he interpreted as permitting him to sink "even a Japanese sampan" if he found it. [171] Asked by Admiral Halsey as to how far he "should go" Admiral Kimmel replied, "Use your common sense." [172]  
[162] Referring to the dispatch of October 16 advising of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and stating in part, "You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan." See committee exhibit No. 37.
[163] Referring to a portion of the dispatch of November 28 sent Admiral Kimmel for information and incorporating a portion of an Army message sent the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which latter message stated in part, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act * * *. Measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." See committee exhibit No. 37.
[164] Referring to the dispatch of October 16, note 162, supra.
[165] Referring to the dispatches of October 16 and November 28, notes 162 and 163, supra.
[166] Referring to the "war warning" dispatch of November 27. Committee exhibit No. 37.
[167] Referring to the dispatch of November 28, note 163, supra.
[168] There had been air raid drills at Pearl Harbor on April 24, May 12, 13; June 19; July 10, 26; August 1, 20; September 5, 27; October 13, 27; and November 12, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 120.
[169] As stated by the Navy court of inquiry: "* * * he (Admiral Kimmel) has issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and *ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan*, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule 'shoot first and explain afterwards'." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
[170] See dispatch No. 280355 from Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet with a copy for information to the Office of Naval Operations; committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. For a description of the fleet operating sea areas, see committee exhibit No. 6, Item 3.
[171] See Hart inquiry record, p. 43.
[172] Id., at pp. 297, 298.

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The "war warning" dispatch of November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet contained no cautions, admonitions, or restraints whatever. [173]
THE "WAR WARNING" AND TRAINING
It has been pointed out by Admiral Kimmel that had he effected all-out security measures upon receiving each alarming dispatch from Washington, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war. [174] To appraise the merit of this observation it is necessary to consider the nature of instructions with respect to training under which the fleet operated. Admiral Kimmel has stated he was under a specific injunction to continue the training program, referring in this connection to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations dated April 3, 1941. [175]
In this letter, however, the Chief of Naval Operations had stated the question was *when* and not *whether* we would enter the war and that in the meantime he would advise that Admiral Kimmel devote as much time as may be available to training his forces in the particular duties which the various units might be called upon to perform under the Pacific Fleet operating plans. Clearly the suggestion that training be conducted was made pending a more critical turn indicating the imminence of war. The dispatch of November 27 with vivid poignance warned of war with Japan. It stated that negotiations with Japan looking to stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had *ceased* and that an *aggressive move* by Japan was expected *within the next few days*. The time for training for a prospective eventuality was past the eventuality, war, was at hand. [175] In none other of the dispatches had the commander in chief been so emphatically advised that war was imminent. Indeed the November 27 dispatch used the words "war warning," an expression which Admiral Kimmel testified he had never before seen employed in an of official dispatch in all of his 40 years in the Navy. Manifestly the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would not expect that it would be necessary for the Navy Department to advise him to put aside his training now that war was imminent. The "war warning" provided adequate indication that the primary function thereafter was not training but defense against a treacherous foe who had invariably struck without a declaration of war.
THE TERM DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT AND FAILURE TO INSTITUTE DISTANT RECONNAISSANCE
Admiral Kimmel has made particular reference to the fact that the term "defensive deployment" was nontechnical and that it was to be
[173] Referring to the November 27 warning, Admiral Stark said: "This message begins with the words 'This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.' These words were carefully weighed and chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words 'war warning' had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation. We considered the picture as we saw it and we felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we thought would convey what we felt." Committee record, pp. 5650, 5651.
[174] Committee record p. 6703, see also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, p. 9350.
[175] Committee record p. 6702. For letter see committee exhibit No. 106.
[176] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel stated, after outlining the circumstances attending the decision, testified: "* * * I made the decision on the 27th of November not to stop training in the Fleet but to continue until further developments." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 285.
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effected "preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." This plan called for a raid upon the Marshall Islands by the Pacific Fleet very shortly after hostilities with Japan should begin. Admiral Kimmel has pointed out that the prime purpose of the raids was to divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. He has observed that the only patrol planes of consequence at Pearl Harbor were assigned to the fleet and that these planes would be required in the raid on the Marshalls. He further pointed out that he had only 49 patrol planes in flying condition, an insufficient number to conduct each day a 360 distant reconnaissance from Oahu. In this connection he observed that to insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it was necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles and that this required 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours to cover the 360 perimeter. He testified that, of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make a 16-hour flight every day and therefore for searches of this character over a protracted period 250 patrol planes would be required. He observed that a search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name and that he manifestly had an insufficient number of planes for this purpose. [177] In consequence of this situation, Admiral Kimmel decided to undertake no distant reconnaissance whatever from Pearl Harbor and regarded the deployment of the task forces and other measures already indicated as an adequate defensive deployment within the terms of the order contained in the war warning. [178]
In this connection, as heretofore pointed out, Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt Inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating
"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [179]"  
He further stated that the language with respect to a defensive deployment in the war warning was a "direction" and that he considered the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment; that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment; and that the major portion of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and reinforcements were sent to Midway and Wake. He said, however, that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act but that
"no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements. [180]"
Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said that following the war warning of November 27 the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans. [181]
[177] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6752-6750.
[178] See committee record, pp. 6759-6761; also Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 1144, 1145.
[179] In Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.
[180] Id., at pp. 323, 324.
[181] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 372, 373.
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Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans, who had a principal part in preparing the November 27 war warning, testified as follows with respect to the term *defensive deployment*: [182]
"Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite attention to the fact that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to each, but both in identical terms.
"A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best positions from which to execute the operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL-6 is to defend the territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal zones, and to defend our shipping.
"Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama.
"The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the commandants of districts to take precautions against subversive activities but we did not tell them to make any defensive deployment.
"The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment.
"The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii so that a proper deployment for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated the landings.
"Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position of Hawaii was to the north because there were not little outlying islands there from which observation could have been made, since there was no possibility of detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deployment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against approach, which the long-range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have been in considerable danger, but that was what they were there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them.  
"Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be moved, would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider arc.
"Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent submarines, as many as were available, out into a position from which they could exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against approaching vessels.
"It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for submarines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send them into Japanese waters."
[182] Committee record, pp. 5168-5172.
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With respect to the same matter, Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness measures, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures, and that the plans previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. [183]
In considering the validity of Admiral Kimmel's position that the order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment is inseparable from the language "preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL-46" it is necessary to consider what the purport of the message would have been without the words "execute an appropriate defensive deployment." In such case Admiral Kimmel might conceivably have been partially justified in making all preparations with a view to carrying out the tasks assigned after war began. But under the terms of the dispatch as received by him he was to do something else. He was to execute a defensive deployment preparatory to carry-ing out these tasks a defensive deployment before war broke.
Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel received for his information the message of November 28 directed for action to the naval commanders on the west coast. [184] After quoting the Army dispatch of November 27 to the commander of the Army Western Defense Command, this message stated: "* * * Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." The west coast commanders were not ordered to effect a defensive deployment, only to *be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46*. Here was a clear indication to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet that he was to do something significantly more than merely getting prepared to carry out war tasks. He was to execute a *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out such tasks.
And among Admiral Kimmel's tasks under the war plans, prior to outbreak of war, were the maintenance of fleet security and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan." As has already been seen in the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier it was recognized that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas and a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor; that it appeared "the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." 185
[183] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 54-62, 84. Asked what was meant by the "defensive deployment" in the message of November 27, Admiral Stark said: "My thought in that message about the defensive deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing and perhaps he did to it was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it."
"* * * *a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces to the maximum effect to avoid surprise and if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangement which had previously been made for just this sort of thing*." Committee record, pp. 5705, 5706.
[184] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38.
[185] See committee exhibit No. 44.
Admiral Bellinger testified that in his opinion an air attack was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. Committee record, p. 9355. He further testified that the Martin-Bellinger estimate was not an estimate of the strategy that the Japanese would employ in starting the war but rather an estimate covering the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, in other words, that it was not an estimate which indicated that Japan was going to strike against Oahu as part of their national strategy but rather if they were going to strike Oahu this was the estimate of how it would be done. Committee record, p. 9382.  
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Re: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:Report of the J

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114 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
With the clear recognition that Japan might attack before a declaration of war and with a war warning carrying an order to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to performing tasks during war, it is difficult to understand why Admiral Kimmel should have concluded that no distant air reconnaissance should be conducted, particularly in the dangerous sector to the north. Apart from radio intelligence which will be later discussed, distant reconnaissance admittedly was the only adequate means of detecting an approaching raiding force in sufficient time to avoid a surprise attack. Certainly the sector from the west to the south was covered, partially at least, by the three task forces. And yet the most dangerous sector, the 90 counterclockwise from due north to due west, the sector through which the Japanese striking force approached, was given no attention whatever. [186] Admiral Bellinger testified that had distant reconnaissance been conducted it would have been to the north [187] and, although he was responsible for Navy patrol planes, Admiral Bellinger was not even shown the war warning. [188]
Admiral Kimmel has suggested that under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Admiral Bloch was responsible for distant reconnaissance and had the latter desired planes he could have called upon the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. [189] This suggestion, apart from being incompatible with Admiral Kimmel's stating he made the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, is not tenable. Admiral Bloch had no planes with which to conduct distant patrols and Admiral Kimmel knew it. [190] While he was on the ground, it was the responsibility of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to take all necessary steps in line with a defensive deployment and in recognition of the realities at Hawaii to protect the fleet. [191]
Admiral Kimmel's assertion that only a 360 -distant; reconnaissance is worthy of the name ignores the fact that a 90 arc to the southwest was being partially covered, a fact concerning which he has made a point in testifying before the committee. Manifestly, to have conducted reconnaissance to any extent would have been more effective than no reconnaissance at all. [192] And Admiral Kimmel had adequate
[186] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Committee record, pp. 9369, 9370; also section "Plans for the Defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," Part III, this report.
[187] Committee record, pp. 9324, 9325; also Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 506, 507.
In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked what he could consider the most probable areas of approach for a surprise attack launched from carriers against Pearl Harbor. He replied: "I testified before the so-called Roberts Commission that I thought the northern sector was the most probable. I thought at the time that the aircraft had come from the north the time I testified I mean and I didn't wish to make alibis. However, I feel that there is no sector around Oahu which is much more dangerous than any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from any direction. There is no outlying land which prevents this, and you have got a 360 arc, minus the very small line which runs up along the Hawaiian chain. From the southern, we have observation stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the closest Japanese possession is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. I would say that while all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would probably search the western 180' sector first." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305.
[188] Committee record, pp. 9305, 9306; also 9362, 9363.
[189] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125.
[190] The Navy Court of Inquiry found "The Naval Base Defense Officer (Admiral Bloch) was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
[191] Admiral Bellinger testified that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. Hart Inquiry record, p. 125.
[192] Admiral Bellinger testified that covering certain selected sectors was a possible and feasible operation.
Admiral Kimmel admitted that "Of course, any patrol run has some value. I will admit that as far as surface ship." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1125.
Admiral Stark testified: "When you haven't got enough planes to search the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it can you cover." Committee record p. 5702.
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patrol planes to conduct distant reconnaissance for an extended period throughout the most dangerous sectors. The evidence reflects that there were 81 planes available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. [193] Estimates of the number which can properly be regarded as in a state of readiness to conduct reconnaissance flights from Oahu as of December 7 range from 48 to 69. In addition the Army had six long-range bombers [194] which were available to the Navy under the plans for joint air operations at Hawaii. Even with the minimum estimate of 48 and the conservative basis of employing each plane only once every 3 days, [195] a sector of 128 could have been covered daily for several weeks. [196] This fact, when considered with the reconnaissance sweeps from Midway and by the task forces, leaves clear that the most dangerous sectors could have been fully covered. [197] In all events it would have been entirely possible and proper to have employed aircraft to any extent available for distant reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, using submarines, destroyers, or other vessels in the less dangerous approaches to Oahu. [198] That substantial and effective distant reconnaissance could have been conducted is demonstrated by the fact that it was instituted immediately after the attack despite the fact that over half the available planes were rendered inoperative by the attack. [199]
Yet Admiral Kimmel contends that use of all his available planes would have unduly impaired his ability to carry out the offensive measures assigned the Pacific Fleet in the event of war. [200] The evidence establishes, however, that his plans for the conduct of
[193] See committee exhibit No 120.
[194] Admiral Bellinger stated; however, that the Army reported 8 B-17's available for December 6 1941. Committee record, p. 9307
[195] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9328, 9329.
[196] Id., Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 480-507. See also committee record, p. 9330 where Bellinger stated the patrol could be maintained for 11 days to 2 weeks, perhaps longer. Admiral Bellinger testified that 1 patrol plane could cover 8' to 700 miles. Committee record p. 9325.
[197] Admiral Davis, fleet aviation officer, said that the entire 360' circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most important. He said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and maintained a long-range 360' search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft. Hart Inquiry record, pp. 98, 99; 240, 241.
[198] The evidence before the committee contradicts the following conclusion of the Navy Court of Inquiry: "Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty (reconnaissance) even if the necessary number be available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarines over an extensive sea area is a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war." *The committee regards the employment of surface vessels for the purpose of reconnaissance as sound military procedure where reconnaissance is imperative and the more adaptable facilities, patrol planes, are not sufficiently available. See also note 192, supra.
It is highly significant that the Commandant of the *15th Naval District (Panama*) was taking the following action, as reported by General Andrews to the War Department under date of November 29, 1941: "In the Panama Sector, *the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol*. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance." See Committee Exhibit No. 32, p. 18.
[199] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9371, 9372.
[200] In his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: "Having covered the operating areas by air patrols it was not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans."
When questioned concerning the time that Admiral Kimmel would be expected to start a raid against the Marshall Islands after war began, Admiral Ingersoll stated that Admiral Kimmel "*could have chosen any date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.*" If I can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what islands were fortified, and so forth, and upon the receipt of that intelligence base their plans. As a matter of fact, I think we were trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connections with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor." Committee record, p. 11457.
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offensive operations, after outbreak of war, contemplated the use of a maximum of 24 patrol planes. [201] Even if this number were deducted from those available, there were still sufficient planes to have covered at least the entire dangerous northwest sector. The offensive tasks of the future did not justify disregarding the danger that the Pacific Fleet might be caught by surprise while still in port and before offensive operations could begin.
In making the decision not to conduct distant reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel erred. [202] In determining whether making the decision that he did evinced poor judgment consideration must be given his responsibility as commander in chief and the realities of his situation. It was essentially his duty to protect the Pacific Fleet from all dangers to the utmost of his ability. He knew that the primary function of the Pacific Fleet in the early stages of the war was a defensive one, save for sporadic raids and limited offensive operations, in recognition o the fact that our Pacific Fleet was inferior to that of Japan. He was ordered to effect an appropriate defensive deployment. This was a general directive consistent with his specific suggestion that the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. [203] He was given free rein to effect defensive security, in line with his more intimate knowledge of the detailed and peculiar problems affecting the Pacific Fleet, prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Pacific war plans. He knew that one of the tasks before the outbreak of war was guarding against a possible surprise attack by Japan. He knew that the only effective means of detecting a surprise raiding force in adequate time to combat it was by distant reconnaissance. He knew the Japanese reputation for deceit and treachery. He knew the greatest danger to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the possibility of an air raid. He knew that the maintenance and protection of the fleet while in its base constituted a fundamental element in making military dispositions at Pearl Harbor. He had been categorically warned of war. He knew or must have known that the necessity of Japan's striking the first blow required of him greater vigilance consistent with his fundamental duty as commander in chief to prepare for the worst contingency. He had adequate facilities to patrol the most dangerous approaches to Pearl Harbor. The decision was not a simple one, but, failing to resolve his dilemma by seeking advice from the Navy Department, [204] Admiral Kimmel displayed poor judgment in failing to
[201] See committee record, p. 9316 et seq.
As to the use of long-distance patrol Planes by Admiral Kimmel in prospective raids on the Marshall Islands under the war plans, Admiral Ingersoll stated: "The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600 miles, or somewhere m the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the Marshalls from which the planes could operate. They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnston and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them, that is 600 miles from those positions." Committee record, p. 11450.
[202] There is no substantial evidence of any specific discussions between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning" concerning the advisability or practicability of distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral McMorris, war plans officer, thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The commander of the fleet patrol Planes, Admiral Bellinger, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no discussion with him concerning the matter.
[203] See memorandum from Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 23, 1941, committee exhibit No. 106.
Admiral Stark testified that the handling of the Pacific Fleet was up to the commander in chief: "* * * it was then up to the Commander in Chief on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washington, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been handling the fleet. That was not my job." Committee record, p. 5705. [204] Referring to the order to execute an appropriate "defensive deployment," Admiral Kimmel stated: "This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me. I decided that what was meant was something similar to the disposition I had made on October 16, which had been approved by the originator of both these dispatches (Chief of Naval Operations), and I therefore made the dispositions which I have outlined." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 305.
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employ every instrumentality at his command to defend the fleet. [205] Conceding for purposes of discussion that Admiral Kimmel's decision to employ none of the fleet patrol planes for distant reconnaissance was a reasonable military decision under the circumstances the very fact of having made such decision placed upon him the affirmative responsibility of determining that every other available means for reconnaissance was being employed to protect the fleet. His determination not to conduct long-range reconnaissance is of itself a recognition by him that it was his obligation to provide such reconnaissance. He knew that the Army was depending upon him for certain defensive measures. [206] Further, the fact that there was an agreement with the Army at Hawaii whereby the Navy was to perform distant reconnaissance placed upon Admiral Kimmel the obligation of advising General Short that he had decided not to conduct such reconnaissance. Indeed, General Short, who saw the war warning, testified that in his opinion the "defensive deployment" which the Navy was directed to execute "would necessarily include distant reconnaissance." [207] Admiral Kimmel's clear duty, therefore, in the absence of Navy reconnaissance was to confer with General Short to insure that Army radar, antiaircraft, and planes were fully utilized and alerted. None of these things were done. And there appears to be no substantial reason for failure to call upon the Army, consistent with the joint plans, for the six long-range bombers which were admittedly available to the Navy at Hawaii for the asking. [208]
ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE "WAR WARNING"
As has been seen, following the warning dispatch of November 27 no distant reconnaissance as such was instituted. [208a] This meant that there was no adequate means whatever taken by the Navy to detect
[205] The Navy Court of Inquiry found "It is a fact that the use of fleet patrol planes for daily long-range all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time." The committee is in essential disagreement with this conclusion. Admiral Kimmel was warned in categorical fashion of war on November 27, 2 days after the Japanese Task Force bad left Hitokappu Bay and while on the way to Pearl Harbor. *It is difficult to imagine hour it would hare been possible from Washington to have narrowed the limits of time in which Japan might strike in any more timely fashion, particularly inasmuch as Radio Intelligence had lost track completely of substantial carrier units of the Japanese Fleet*. This being true, distant reconnaissance was the only possible means of detecting the striking force within adequate time to prepare to meet the attack. There was no other channel for indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time or otherwise.
Going on, the Navy Court of Inquiry stated: "It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of fleet planes available." The court is here of course referring to all- around reconnaissance from Oahu. *As has been clearly indicated, there were adequate facilities for patrolling the more dangerous sectors, a procedure that was practical, feasible, and desirable*.
[204] As stated by the commander in chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King: "In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because principle, this is not normally a fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciate properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have bee strong enough for self-defense. The fact that *it was* not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the fleet in the defensive measures." See "Second Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157.
Admiral King also observed, "I think * * * that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general." Id.
[207] Committee record, pp. 7926, 7927.
[208] See in this connection testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, p. 9310.
[208a] When questioned as to any reason why Admiral Kimmel should not have had long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through to the time Japan struck, with whatever planes we had eve if it were only "three," Admiral Ingersoll replied: "I had every reason to expect that he would do that and I was surprised that he had not done it. As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had gotten in undetected * * * I expected that it would be done not only because the plane were there, but because this (WPL-46) plan inferred that it was going to be done. It never occurred to him that it was not being done." Committee record, p. 11420.  
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the approach of a raiding force in sufficient time to repel it or effectively minimize the force of an attack. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel were operating in accordance with schedules prepared as of November 22, 1941, stressing training operations. These schedules were not changed prior to the attack.
No effort was made to secure the available long-range bombers of the Army for reconnaissance.
No change was made in the condition of readiness of vessels in Pearl Harbor which had been in effect for a considerable period of time preceding November 27. [209] This condition of readiness has been referred to as "an augmented Navy No. 3," the No. 3 condition being the lowest state of readiness. [210] The three conditions of readiness established for the Navy were:
No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action imminent.
No. 2. Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity.
No. 3. Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter.
While it appears that condition No. 3 prevailed subsequently during wartime at Pearl Harbor and is the condition normally maintained in port, there nevertheless was an extensive distant reconnaissance designed to alert the fleet to a higher condition of readiness prior to possible attack and to afford a considerable measure of protection. This means of protection was not available to the fleet on the morning of December 7. [211]
[209] In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked: "On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack, can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?" Admiral Kimmel replied: "The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL 41 had been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was in effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander of Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned at all times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, manned on the date in question." P. 278
The three conditions of readiness with respect to naval base defense, as set forth in 2CL-41 follow:
Condition I. General quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer.
Condition II. One-half of antiaircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer.
Condition III. Antiaircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector) manned and ready (minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by naval base defense officer.
See committee exhibit No. 44.
Admiral Kimmel was asked whether, upon receipt of the November 27 war warning, he consulted with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on any measures of security to be adopted in the Fourteenth Naval District that were different from any then in effect. He replied that he discussed the message with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District but no additional measures of security were deemed advisable as a result of the conversation. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 303.
[210] While virtually all antiaircraft guns aboard ship were firing within 10 minutes, only about one-fourth were "ready machine guns" available to fire immediately. Inasmuch as by far the greatest damage was effected by the torpedo planes in the first wave, a higher degree of readiness would have reduced beyond question the effectiveness of this initial thrust. Admiral Kimmel said: "*Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would hare been enormously less*." Roberts record, p. 547.
For the indicated reason the conclusion of Navy Court of Inquiry that "a higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to the defense" is in error. See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157.
[211] In its report, the Navy Court of Inquiry has observed: "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval Personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it would not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.
This statement contains within itself the certain proof of its invalidity. It was for the very reason that it could not be known when an attack would take place that it was essential a higher degree of readiness prevail. If it were possible to know with definitiveness when the attack would come the necessity for a higher state of readiness would be obviated until the time for the attack had approached. Furthermore, the extreme state of readiness suggested by the court is a far cry from the lowest conditions of readiness which prevailed at the time of the attack in both the Army and Navy Commands.
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No change was effected in the state of readiness of naval aircraft. The aircraft on the ground and the patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take to the air promptly. Approximately 50 percent of the planes on December 7 were on 4 hours' notice.
Having elected to institute no distant reconnaissance by aircraft, no effort was made to inaugurate patrols by surface or subsurface craft to compensate and partially serve in lieu of distant reconnaissance by planes. [212] The evidence shows there were 29 destroyers and 5 submarines in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. [213] While the employment of surface craft or submarines in lieu of distant air reconnaissance is not altogether satisfactory or fully effective, it nonetheless would have provided a measure of protection more to be desired than no reconnaissance whatever.
No effort was made to maintain a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible raiding forces approaching through the dangerous northern sector. [214]
No change was made in the schedules of ships proceeding to Pearl Harbor with a view to maintenance of a minimum force at harbor with provision for entry into port at irregular intervals.
After the decision to institute no distant reconnaissance, the Navy did not check or otherwise maintain effective liaison with the Army as to the readiness of Army antiaircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.
ESTIMATE AND ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT WITH RESPECT TO THE WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27
The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department does not appear to have taken any appreciable action, apart from his normal training operations, on the basis of any information received by him with respect to our critical relations with Japan prior to the warning of November 27 from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall.
This dispatch, No. 472, [215] advised that negotiations with Japan appeared terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue; that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment. It stated that if hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that Japan commit the first overt act. It pointed out, however, that this policy should not be construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. It ordered the commanding general, prior to hostile Japanese action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary but admonished that these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. It instructed that should hostilities occur, General Short should carry out the tasks assigned in the war plans insofar as they applied to Japan. He was to limit the dissemination of "this highly secret information to minimum essential officers" and to report measures taken.
[212] See note 192, supra.
[213] Committee exhibit No. 6.
[214] Id.
[215] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.

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Within 30 minutes of receiving this dispatch and after consulting only with his chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, [216] General Short replied to the War Department as follows: [217]
"Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. SHORT."
As a result of the November 27 dispatch General Short decided to institute alert No. 1, the lowest of three alerts provided for the Hawaiian Department. The three alerts were: [218]
No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. *No threat from without*.
No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1.
No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, pre- pared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.
At the same time that he ordered alert No. 1, the commanding general directed that the Interceptor Command, including the Aircraft Warning Service (Radar) and Information Center, should operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily. In addition, it should be noted that the six mobile radar stations operated daily except Sunday from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work. [210] In explaining his reasons and the considerations responsible for his instituting an alert against sabotage only, General Short has stated: (1) That the message of November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii; [220] (2) that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities; [221] (3) that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act; [222] (4) that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; [223] and (5) that instituting alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian Department. [224]
NO WARNING OF ATTACK ON HAWAII
The first statement by General Short that there was nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii will be considered. Implicit in this contention is the assumption that, despite the known imminence of war between the United States and Japan and the fact that he commanded a Pacific outpost,
[216] Colonel Walter C. Phillips. See committee record, pp. 7945, 7946.
[217] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12.
[218] See committee exhibit No. 44. See also testimony of General Short, committee record pp. 7944, 7945.
[219] Testimony of General Short, committee record, p. 7946.
[220] General Short said, "There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack." Committee record, p. 7929.
[221] Committee record, p. 7929.
[222] Id., at p. 7927.
[223] Id., at p. 7946 et seq.
[224] Id., at pp. 7948-7951.
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it was not his duty to be on the alert against a threat from without. This assumption does not appear to be supported by military doctrine or the logic of the Hawaiian situation prior to the attack. [225]
The wording of the November 27 dispatch indicated the possibility of an attack from without in ordering General Short to undertake reconnaissance. The only conceivable reconnaissance which could have been undertaken by the Army was through employment of aircraft or radar, either or both of which would be in contemplation of an attack from without. General Marshall had told the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department much earlier, with emphasis and clarity, that the function of the Army in Hawaii was to defend the fleet base. Despite this fact, when warned that Japan's future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment and when his attention was called to the necessity for reconnaissance, General Short proceeded to institute an alert against sabotage only. This was done although there had not been one single act of sabotage on the islands up to that time; for that matter, there were no acts of sabotage thereafter, although this danger in Hawaii had been recognized by both the Hawaiian Department and Washington. [225a]. However, in all of General Short's correspondence with General Marshall the subject of sabotage was not emphasized and scarcely discussed. Quite to the contrary, the letters referred repeatedly to aircraft and antiaircraft defense.
DISPATCHES INDICATING THREAT OF SABOTAGE
We will now consider the contention made by General Short that he received other messages emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities, which to his mind confirmed the accuracy of his judgment in instituting an alert against sabotage only. All of these messages, however, were received after the warning dispatch of November 27 and after he had replied thereto. [226] They could not, therefore, have influenced in any way his decision to institute an alert against sabotage only.
The first of the messages concerning possible subversive activities was signed by General Miles and was dated November 27. It pointed out that hostilities may ensue and that subversive activities may be expected. This message made definitely clear that subversive activities and sabotage were not all that might be expected but hostilities as well. In this connection, however, General Short has referred to the fact that sabotage was a form of hostile action. [227]  
On November 28 the Hawaiian Department received two dispatches from the War Department specifically warning of the danger of sabotage and subversive activities. [228] To the first of these dispatches which was signed by General Adams, the Adjutant General, the
[225] As expressed by Secretary Stimson in his statement submitted for the committee's consideration: "The outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied ." Committee record, pp. 14405, 14406.
[225a] See in this connection an aide memoire concerning "Defense of Hawaii" prepared by the War Department and presented to the President by General Marshall in May of 1941. Part IV, Note 42, infra.
[226] Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 10,13, and 34.
[227] General Short said: " 'Hostile action at any moment' meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action." Committee record, p. 7929.
[228] For the full text of these two dispatches see pages 102 and 103, supra.
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following reply (directed to the Adjutant General) was made on November 29: [229]
"Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five) and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish him and to continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department, to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters."
The reply (directed to General Arnold) to the second dispatch was not received in the War Department until December 10, 1941. [230]
General Short, as heretofore indicated, has referred to the two dispatches from the War Department of November 28 warning of the danger of sabotage and subversive activities as confirming his original decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. It is significant, however, that the army commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines received these same dispatches warning of subversive activities that were received by the Hawaiian commander. [230a] They did not deter the commanders at these other places from taking full and complete measures to alert their commands or convey to their minds that defense against sabotage was the only action required. [230b]
The November 27 warning to General Short concerning possible hostile action at any moment was signed by General Marshall a command directive whereas the dispatches relating to sabotage and subversive activities were signed by subordinate officials of the War Department. Inasmuch as General Marshall's message contained no reference to sabotage whatever, it would seem fair to suggest that upon receiving subsequent dispatches from subordinate War Department officials warnings of this danger there should have been aroused in the Commanding General's mind the thought that perhaps he had misjudged the purport of the original warning. The evidence reflects that any reference to sabotage or subversive activities was deliberately omitted from the warning message sent General Short (and the commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines) on November 27 in order "that this message could be interpreted only as
[229] Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 17, 18.
[230] Id, at pp. 19, 20.
[231] See Committee exhibit No. 35, p. 2.
[230b] For dispatches reflecting the full and complete measures taken by these commanders (Panama, West Coast, the Philippines) see Committee exhibit No. 32 pp. 11,15,15a, 16,18, 18a, and 18b.  
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warning the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without. [230c]
General Short stated that he assumed the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance [230d] and that he was relying on the Navy to give him timely warning of an attack, indicating thereby that he realized the warning messages required precautionary measures against all possible contingencies. It naturally follows that his failure to take the action required by the November 27 warning was not due to the subsequent emphasis on the specific danger of subversive activities but rather by reason of his failure to institute liaison with the Navy failure to determine what the Navy was really doing as he advised the War Department he had done, and his unwarranted assumption that even though he did not himself institute precautionary measures against the danger of an air attacks, the Navy would do so.
"DO-DON'T" CHARACTER OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH AND AVOIDANCE OF WAR
As earlier indicated, General Short has referred to the November 27 dispatch as a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as all overt act to test the merits of this contention it is necessary to aline the directives and intelligence beside the prohibitions and admonitions:
Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest pos- sibilities that the Japanese Govern- ment might come back and offer to con- tinue. Japanese future action unpre- dictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
Report measures taken. Should hos- tilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan.
If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
But these measures should be car- ried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.
Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.
The first admonition appearing in the foregoing dispatch is a statement of traditional American policy against the initiation of war *if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires the prospective enemy to commit the first overt act*. This General Short already knew. Certainly he did not have in mind committing an overt act against Japan. There was nothing here to restrict the commanding general's
[230c] See testimony of General Gerow, Committee record, pp. 2696-2698.
[230d] See committee record, p. 7927.
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contemplated plan of action. Indeed, the dispatch itself clearly pointed out that the policy should not be construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. [231] The very fact that Japan must commit the first overt act emphasized the need for greater vigilance and defensive effort.
The prohibition in the dispatch was that reconnaissance and "other measures" should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. This was incorporated in the message because of the large number of Japanese inhabitants and it was felt that nothing should be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly precipitate an incident which would give Japan an excuse to go to war saying we had committed the first overt act. [232] No one appreciated more than General Short the abnormally large percentage of Japanese among the population of Hawaii. He knew that 37 percent or approximately 160,000 of the population were of Japanese descent, some 35,000 being aliens. This was one of the principal reasons for the alert against sabotage. [233]
The civil population was inured to Army and Navy maneuvers which were going on continuously. [234] To have taken any of the logical steps to defend Oahu reconnaissance, 24 hour operation of radar, effecting a high state of aircraft and anti-aircraft readiness would not have alarmed a population accustomed to simulated conditions of warfare. [235] In this respect the November 27 dispatch from the War Department interjected no deterrent to full and adequate defensive measures.
The admonition to limit dissemination of the information in the dispatch to minimum essential officers was within the complete discretion of the Commanding General. Dissemination of the information was to follow and not precede the selection of the proper alert; and there were no restrictions in the November 27 warning which should have precluded General Short's instituting an alert commen-
[231] Mr. Stimson stated: "When General Short was informed on November 27 that 'Japanese action unpredictable' and that 'hostile action possible at any moment,' and that the policy directed 'should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense,' we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him " Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14397, 14398.
[232] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14397. This admonition was not included in the message to General MacArthur but was contained in the message to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. See committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 8, 9.
[233] It is to be noted that one of the best criterions that General Short possessed to determine what might alarm the civil population was the so-called Herron Alert during the summer of 1940. This was an all- out alert with complete dispersal of planes and troops with ammunition at the guns and reconnaissance being conducted. There was no disturbance of the civil population resulting from this action. See in this connection Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2738, 2772, 2772, 3096, 3097.
[234] *General Maxwell Murray testified that the action required by Alert No. 1 taking over water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols all over, all important bridges guarded,-was just as much of an alarm to the people that something was anticipated "as if they had gone to the beaches" all out alert*. See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 3096, 3097.
[235] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel testified: "I discussed the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor with the commanding general on various occasions. We simulated such attack; we sent planes in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how many times, but several times, during the year I was out there, and we put the defending planes or other elements into operation." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1131.
Testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked whether there were any drills furthering joint Army-Navy exercises. He replied: "Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each week. For about 2 to 3 months prior to December 7,1941, we conducted the drills once every 2 weeks This was in order to insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when the drills were held weekly there were too many people excused due to overhauling a plane or some work that they considered essential and more important than taking part in drills." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, P. 296.
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surate with the warning and orders contained therein. [235] Perhaps, after the event the warning message could be improved upon. It nevertheless was adequate and its orders should have been carried out with an appreciation of the implications of the warning it conveyed.
COMMANDING GENERAL'S RELIANCE ON THE NAVY
It is apparent from the evidence that General Short was depending on the Navy to give him timely and adequate warning of any enemy force approaching Hawaii. He stated that from repeated conversations with the Navy he knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south; that he knew the Navy had task forces at sea with reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands, which would render an air attack highly improbable; that the War Plans Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff, Admiral McMorris, had stated that there was no chance of a surprise attack on Oahu; that it was only through the Navy that he could obtain information concerning the movement of Japanese vessels; and that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility. [237]
General Short's unfortunate predicament on the morning of December 7 was occasioned to a degree by reason of his reliance on the Navy to provide him timely warning. However, the fact that he was relying on the Navy does not excuse General Short for his failure to determine whether his assumptions with respect to what the Navy was doing were correct. He assumed operations of the task forces rendered an air attack highly improbable; he assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance from Oahu; he assumed the Navy would advise him of the location and movement of Japanese warships. Yet a simple inquiry by General Short would have revealed that the task forces effected no coverage of the dangerous northern approaches to Oahu; that the Navy was not conducting distant reconnaissance; and that the Navy did not know where the Japanese carrier strength was for over a week prior to December 7. We can understand General Short's dependence on the Navy, but we cannot overlook the fact that he made these assumptions with no attempt to verify their correctness.
INTERFERENCE WITH TRAINING
General Short has pointed out that the factor of training was considered in selecting Alert No. 1; that the use of Alerts 2 or 3 would
[236] In commenting concerning the November 27 warning sent General Short, Secretary Stimson said: "This message has been characterized as ambiguous and described as a 'do-don't' message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the civil population and this possibly to precipitate an incident and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act." Further: "*All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed in these high posts of command.*" Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14396, 14397.
[237] Committee record, page 7946 et seq.
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126 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have seriously interfered with his training mission. He observed that the soldiers and officers of his command were in large part relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks and that regular training was essential. He stated that the War Department dispatch of November 27 "had not indicated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended or abolished, and that all troops were to go immediately into tactical status." [238]  
General Short has pointed out that the Hawaiian Air Force had the particular mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17's to the Philippine Islands. He recalled that on September 8, 1941, 9 trained combat teams were sent to the Philippines; that before November 27, 18 trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland and 17 more teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes; and that 12 more combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. He observed that only 6 of his 12 Flying Fortresses were in condition and available for the training and that it was imperative General Martin make maximum use of these planes for training. He felt that if war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, the training considerations would give way but that every indication was that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the far Pacific and not at Hawaii. [239]
As has been earlier indicated, however, the very fact of having suggested to General Short that he undertake reconnaissance was an indication of the possibility of an attack on Hawaii from without. This committee believes that the warning dispatch of November 27 was ample notice to a general in the field that his training was now secondary that his primary mission had become execution of the orders contained in the dispatch and the effecting of maximum defensive security.
THE ORDER TO UNDERTAKE RECONNAISSANCE  
The very fact that General Short noted the order with respect to undertaking reconnaissance contained in the dispatch of November 27 and thereafter instituted an alert against sabotage only demonstrates a failure to grasp the serious circumstances confronting his command. It is to be recalled in this connection that Army commanders in the Philippines, at Panama, and on the West Coast, upon receiving the dispatch of November 27 in substantially the same terms as General Short, instituted full measures adequately to alert their commands. [240]
The observation has been made by General Short that he presumed the man who prepared the message of November 27 ordering him to undertake reconnaissance was unfamiliar with the fact that the Navy
[238] Id., at pp. 7948, 7949.
[239] Id.
[240] See Committee Exhibit No. 32, pp. 11, 15 16 and 18 for replies, pursuant to the warning messages of November 27, from General MacArthur in the Philippines, General DeWitt on the West Coast, and General Andrews at Panama.
General MacArthur replied under date of November 28: "Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Around security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy."
A significant portion of the reply from General Andrews follows: "In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance."
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was responsible for distant reconnaissance. [241] It is inconceivable, however, that in the face of a specific directive with respect to reconnaissance General Short should not have requested clarification from the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean what it had unequivocally said and had failed to take into consideration the Navy's responsibility for reconnaissance. This fact takes on added importance when it is realized that the November 27 dispatch was the first and only dispatch General Short had received signed by General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, since becoming commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It was a *command directive* which should have received the closest scrutiny and consideration by the Hawaiian general.
Certainly the least that General Short could have done was to advise Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch and consult with them at once concerning the fact that he had been directed to undertake reconnaissance if he presumed the Navy was to perform this function. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the very document wherein the Navy assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance, contained in an annex thereto provision for joint operations *when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer agree that a threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent*. The failure to appreciate the necessity for following through on an order to undertake reconnaissance is not in keeping with the good judgment expected from the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.
It is further to be borne in mind that General Short had six mobile radar units which were available for reconnaissance use. He ordered their operations from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., in addition to the normal training operation of radar during the day, but failed to provide the necessary officers handling the equipment with the knowledge that war was at hand in order that they would intelligently attach significance to information which the radar might develop. In testifying before the committee concerning the operation of radar, General Short said: [241a] "That (the radar) was put into alert during what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily." The very fact that radar was ordered operated at all was in recognition of the danger of a threat from without; indeed it was only in contemplation of such a threat that General Short would have been supplied radar at all. [242]
[241] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 4436, 4437.
[241a] Committee record, p. 8054.
[242] In a statement submitted for the committee's consideration, Mr. Stimson said: "You will notice that this message of November 27th specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles, and to do so in darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19th, which indicated very satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (A. P. H. B. 4064, et seq.). When we specifically directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that *all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy would be employed*. On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing instructions to the theatre commanders were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy commands. Committee record, pp. 14398, 14399.  
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THE SHORT REPORT
It is recalled that the dispatch of November 27, No. 472, carried instructions to report measures taken and that General Short, referring to the dispatch by number, advised that the Hawaiian Department was "alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." As paraphrased and reviewed in the War Department, this reply read: "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty seven." [243] No action was taken by the War Department following receipt of this reply.
General Short has stated that the silence and failure of the War Department to reply to his report of measures taken constituted reasonable grounds for his belief that his action was exactly what the War Department desired. He has pointed out that if the action taken by him was not consistent with the desires of the War Department it should have informed him of that fact. [244]
The question at this point, however, is not whether Washington should have replied to General Short's dispatch but whether the commanding general was entitled to believe that his reply had adequately informed Washington that he had or had not carried out the orders contained in General Marshall's warning of November 27. [245] General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for failure to follow up to insure that the alert to prevent sabotage was not the only step taken by the Hawaiian Department under the circumstances. No one in Washington appears to have been impressed with or caught the fact that General Short's report of measures taken was inadequate and not sufficiently responsive to the directive. This failure of supervision cannot be condoned.
However, a reasonable inference from the statement "liaison with Navy" was that through liaison with the Navy he had taken the necessary steps to implement the War Department warning, including the undertaking of reconnaissance. This was clearly recognized by General Short. In testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board he was asked the question: [246] "In your message of November 27, you say, 'Liaison with the Navy.' Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?"
"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing."
"Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? "General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it, because they signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff."
[243] See committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12.
[244] Committee record, p. 7965 et seq.
[245] Referring to General Short's reply, Secretary Stimson said: "* * * he then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had faded to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent sabotage' was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his message that 'liaison' was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27th had specifically directed reconnaissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect." Committee record pp. 14408, 11409.
[248] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 380.
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General Short was not entitled to presume that his responsibilities as Commander of the Hawaiian Department had been discharged or shifted to the War Department through dispatch of his reply. [247] This conclusion is most fully appreciated when he admittedly was not clear concerning the order to undertake reconnaissance. [248] The War Department was entitled to expect the commanding general had carried out the order to effect reconnaissance or in the alternative that he would have requested clarifying instructions. Conceding that General Short presumed the War Department would correct him if he was in error, the fact that supplemental instructions were not issued does not serve to remove that error. Had he made no report whatever the situation in Hawaii on the morning of December 7 would have been the same.
Although General Short specifically advised the War Department on November 27 that he was maintaining "liaison with Navy" the evidence is unmistakably clear, as will subsequently appear, that he did not establish liaison with the Navy concerning the action to be taken pursuant to the Department's warning message.
ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH
Apart from instituting an alert against sabotage and ordering the operation of radar from 4 to 7 a. m. no other appreciable steps were taken by the commanding general to prepare his command for defense against possible hostilities. [249]
No change was made in the state of readiness of aircraft which were on four hours' notice. There was therefore no integration of aircraft and radar, even in the latter's limited operation from 4 to 7 a. m. The maximum distance radar could pick up approaching planes was approximately 130 miles. With the Army aircraft on 4 hours' notice a warning from the radar information center would have been of little avail.
Operation of radar was not instituted on a 24-hour basis. It was so operated immediately after the attack, although as a matter of fact it was not until December 17 that the aircraft warning service was placed under complete control Of the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, handling the training phases, removed from the picture. [250]
No action was taken with a view to tightening up the antiaircraft defenses. [251] The ammunition for the 60 mobile antiaircraft guns was
[247] See committee record, pp. 4420, 4421
[248] Referring to the testimony of General Gerow to the effect that the commanding general's report would have been perfectly clear if he had indicated he was alerted against sabotage only (see note 247, supra) General Short commented that General Gerow "was unwilling to read my message and admit it meant what it said, no more and no less". Yet General Short failed to accord the war Department the same privilege he was taking; that is, that the order to undertake reconnaissance *meant what it said, no more and no less*. See committee record, pp. 7967, 7968.
[249] Referring to the action taken by General Short, Secretary Stimson stated: "* * * to cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief." See statement Of Secretary Stimson submitted for the committees consideration; committee record, p. 14408.
[250] committee record, p. 8379.
[251] In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked which service was charged with repulsing enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire on December 7, 1941. He replied: "The Army, I should say, had the prime responsibility. The plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all guns, including 30 calibers and even shoulder rifles by the marines in the navy yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition, it provided that the batteries of all ships should take part in shooting down the planes." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 295.

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located in Aliamanu Crater, between 2 and 3 miles from Fort Shafter. [252] The crews of the antiaircraft guns were not alerted in such manner as to provide effective defense even with maximum warning from the radar information center.
As in the case of Admiral Kimmel, no effective action was taken with a view to integration and coordination of Army-Navy facilities for defense.
THE "CODE DESTRUCTION" INTELLIGENCE
As has been seen, Admiral Kimmel was advised "for action" on December 3 of information received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent on December 2 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, *Manila, Washington*, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents. [253]
Testifying with respect to the foregoing intelligence, Admiral Kimmel stated that both he and his staff noted that *most* of the codes and ciphers *not all* were to be destroyed and that this information appeared to fit in with the information "we had received about a Japanese movement in South East Asia." He commented that Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communication system in the event her action in southeast Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over diplomatic residences. [254]
Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he had received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential documents. He testified: "I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it * * * ." [255]
General Short, on the other hand, has complained that he was not provided this intelligence and has indicated it would have been of the greatest significance to him. Referring to the intelligence concerning the fact that Washington had been ordered to destroy its code machine [256] General Short said: "The one thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of three or four days * * *." [257] He further testified that had the Navy given him any of the dispatches received concerning the destruction of codes he would have gone into a more serious alert. [258]
In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence taken by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have agreed that this was the most significant information received between November 27 and December 6 with respect to the imminence of war. Indeed, the overwhelming weight of the testimony is to effect that orders to
[252] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 2604-2697.
[253] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40.
On the same day Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information of the substance of an intercepted Tokyo dispatch of December 1 ordering London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy (their code) machine. It was stated that the Batavia (code) machine had already been sent to Tokyo and on December 2 Washington was also directed to destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, that the British Admiralty had reported London Embassy had complied. Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41.
[254] Committee record, p. 6723.
[255] Id., at p. 7477.
[256] This advice was contained in a December 7 dispatch from the War Department which was not received by General Short until after the attack. This dispatch will be found discussed in detail, Part IV, infra.
[257] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.
[258] Committee record, p. 8397.
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destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing war within a very few days. [259]
It is concluded that the failure of Admiral Kimmel to supply this intelligence to General Short was inexcusable and that the purport of this information was to advise the commander in chief within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when Japan might be expected to strike. While orders to burn codes may not always mean war in the diplomatic sense, it very definitely meant war and soon in a military sense after the "war warning" of November 27. Admiral Kimmel received this intelligence less than 4 days before the attack; it gave him an opportunity to correct his mistake in failing to institute distant reconnaissance and effect a state of readiness commensurate with the likelihood of hostilities after the November 27 war warning. Nothing was done General Short was not even informed.
On December 4 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information of orders instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter. [260] This intelligence was of the greatest significance. It meant that not only was war almost immediately at hand but that a landing operation by Japan against Guam was regarded as a possibility. Nothing was done.
On December 6 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel advising, for action, that in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands he was authorized to order destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." [261] This dispatch suggested the possibility of landing operations against our outlying islands including Wake and Midway.
GENERAL SHORT'S KNOWLEDGE OF DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATTER BY JAPANESE CONSULATE
The evidence reflects that although Admiral Kimmel received significant information on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments as well as in our own outlying possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short. Despite this fact it appears that the commanding general obtained adequate information concerning the destruction of confidential matter by Japanese diplomatic establishments. Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, stated that he learned from Navy sources in Hawaii about December 3 that diplomatic representatives of Japan in Washington,
[259] see Part IV, infra re code destruction.
[260] Committee exhibit No .37, p. 44.
[261] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 45.
A memorandum submitted by the Navy Department concerning this dispatch under date of January 29, 1946 stated OpNav dispatch 061743 was transmitted to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. December 6, 1941 Washington local time" (committee record, p.11441).  
It is to be noted that during committee examination Admiral Kimmel was asked whether he had testified as to when he had received the message of December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers referred to in the preceding paragraph Admiral Kimmel said "I will look at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received but to the best of my recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It is an even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the attack. I think I didn't get it until after the attack. * * * I have no record upon which I can definitely state that. I can only state my recollection."
Going on, Admiral Kimmel said "*At any rate, if I did receive this before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the circumstances. * * * And that (referring to the message) was not particularly alarming*," see committee record pp. 7649,7650.
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London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere were destroying their codes and papers. He further stated that about the same time he learned from the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI that the latter had intercepted a telephone "message from the Japanese consulate Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese consul general was burning and destroying all his important papers." Colonel Bicknell said: [262]
"In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere."
General Fielder stated that he was present at the staff conference and that on December 6 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. [263] Colonel Phillips also stated that this information was given by him to General Short.
The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI stated that on December 3 the district intelligence officer of the Navy asked him if he could verify information that the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers; that about 2 hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone conversation between the cook of the Japanese consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu in the course of which the cook stated that the consul general was "burning and destroying all his important papers." He stated that he immediately gave this information to the district intelligence officer of the Navy and the assistant G-2 of the Army; and thereupon sent a dispatch to Director J. Edgar Hoover in Washington: "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." [264]
In testifying before the Roberts Commission General Short stated that he received no information from his intelligence officer until after the attack that the consular records were being burned. He stated: [265]
"As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day."
Before the committee, however, General Short corrected his former testimony, stating that he had been advised on the morning of December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers. [266]  
While the evidence would indicate that General Short was advised on December 6 that the Japanese consul was burning his *codes* and *papers*, a point has been made by the commanding general that his information was limited to the fact that the consul was burning his papers without reference to *codes*. Even conceding this to be true, the fact that the consul was burning his papers after General Short had been informed hostilities were possible at any moment was of adequate import to impress the commanding general with the fact that our relations with Japan were extraordinarily critical. It is
[262] See affidavit. Dated February 25, 1945, of Colonel Bicknell before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148.
[263] See affidavit of Colonel (now General) Kendall J. Fielder dated May 11, 1945, before Major Clausen.
[264] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen.
[265] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620.
[266] Committee record, pp. 8398, 8399.
concluded that General Short received prior to the attack substantially the intelligence concerning the destruction of codes and confidential papers *by Japanese diplomatic representatives*, although he was not informed by Admiral Kimmel of the very significant fact that the Navy Department had issued orders for the destruction of codes *in certain of our own outlying possessions*.
THE "LOST" JAPANESE CARRIERS RADIO INTELLIGENCE AT HAWAII
Perhaps the most vital intelligence available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet indicating Pearl Harbor as a possible point of attack was that gathered from his own Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii. This unit was engaged in "traffic analyses"; that is, identifying, locating, and determining the movements of Japanese warships through their call signals. The location of vessels was effected through radio- direction methods. [267]
Information of a similar type was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Fortnightly intelligence bulletins incorporating information received from the radio intelligence units in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence. These bulletins were made available to Admiral Kimmel.
Because of conflicting reports that had been received concerning Japanese naval movements and the further fact that reports received from the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines) were considered the most reliable, the Chief of Naval Operations on, November 24 advised the commanders in chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, among others, that other reports should be carefully evaluated and sent to the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District for action and to the Office of Naval Operations for information. After combining all incoming reports the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was to direct dispatches to the Office of Naval Operations with copies to Admiral Kimmel for information setting forth his evaluation and best possible continuity. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on November 26 advised the Office of Naval Operations and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District in summary form of information with respect to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. This dispatch expressed the belief that a strong concentration of Japanese submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. The estimate of the situation was to the effect that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while some units might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls. On the same day, the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines advised, among others, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Office of Naval Operations, in commenting on the November 26 dispatch from Hawaii, that traffic analysis for the past few days indicated that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet (Japanese) was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two
[267] See testimony of Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 182-292.
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sections, the first of which was expected to operate in the south China area, the second, in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included Carrier Division 3 "Ryujo, and one Maru." This dispatch further pointed out that the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandated Islands and that his best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. The opinion was expressed that this evaluation was regarded as reliable.
Periodically after November 27, 1941, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet as well as from other observers confirming the movement of important Japanese naval forces southward from Japan. These reports, however, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, did not indicate the movement of any Japanese carriers.
The Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice after November 27 of preparing daily summaries of the information received through its traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications. [268] These summaries were submitted each day to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Layton, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. On November 28, an intelligence summary, reviewed by Admiral Kimmel, stated there was no further information concerning the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day he received the November 28 summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon United States Naval Communications and "is getting results." There was no information set forth in the summary with respect to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29, indicating that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the commander in chief, Second Fleet. On December 1, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated with respect to carriers that the presence of a unit of "plane guard" destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed. The Fortnightly Intelligence Summary dated December 1 [269] received by Admiral Kimmel from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington stated, among other things, with respect to the Japanese naval situation that " * * * the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." This summary related to information obtained during the 2 weeks preceding its date of December 1 and the Washington estimate of the situation was necessarily based on radio intelligence information received largely from the Philippines and Hawaii before the sudden and unexplained change in the call signals of Japanese vessels on December 1. The December 1 summary, which Admiral Kimmel received from Captain Layton stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on December 1; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of 6 months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated:
"*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale*."
[268] For these summaries, see committee exhibits Nos. 115 and 115a.
[269] Committee exhibit No. 80.  
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This statement was underlined by Admiral Kimmel. The summary also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and that as to carriers there was "no change."  
On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1 at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, concerning the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako- Takao area Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4, which included four carriers, and the Kasuga Maru (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "*Koryu* (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.
Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate, the reason being that Layton considered the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts. [270]  
On December 2, 1941, according to Captain Layton, he and Admiral Kimmel had the following conversation: [271]
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect."
Captain Layton observed that the incident was impressed on his mind and that Admiral Kimmel was pointing out to him his complete ignorance as to the location of the Japanese carrier divisions. However, the very reference by Admiral Kimmel to the carriers rounding "Diamond Head" was recognition by him of this possibility and his complete lack of knowledge as to where they might be. Admiral Kimmel and Captain Layton discussed
"radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and yet the over-all picture that it will produce. *Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never be detected by visual or other sighting*. [272]"
The December 2 radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3, read as follows:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
The Radio Intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4 stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5 contained no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6 stated "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."
Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only way by which Admiral Kimmel would have obtained in-
[270] See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 212.
[271] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 212, 213.
[272] Testimony of Captain Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 215.
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formation as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by distant air reconnaissance. Knowledge of the location of Japanese carriers was vital to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two carrier divisions very definitely could not be located. The service calls of Japanese vessels were changed on December 1, a most unusual procedure inasmuch as they had been changed only a month previously on November 1. Admiral Kimmel fully appreciated the significance of this change and actually underscored the statement submitted to him: "*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale*." It would appear Admiral Kimmel regarded the preparation to be in anticipation of a Japanese movement to South East Asia.
The presumption was made that inasmuch as the Japanese carriers could not be located they were in home waters. It was fully known, however, that the missing carriers of Japan were not engaged in a movement to the south since such an operation would be open to visual observation by our forces in the Philippines as well as by friendly powers. In consequence, only two reasonable alternatives remained either the carriers were in home waters or they were engaged in an operation under radio silence in some direction other than to the south. It was Admiral Kimmel's duty to be prepared for the alternative most dangerous to him. Had he concluded that the unusual change in service signals on December 1 clothed a Japanese major operation, perhaps to the eastward at Hawaii, he could have predicted within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when such an attack would come. [273]
Admiral Kimmel has referred to the lack of exactitude of radio intelligence and the fact that this was not the first instance in which his staff had been unable to get a line on the location of Japanese vessels. [273a] Recognizing all of the vagaries of radio intelligence analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with his responsibility as commander in chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant information relating to when and, to a degree, where the Japanese would possibly attack.
[273] Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed: "I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the 'war warning' and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits." See "Fourth Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157.

And again: "The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack." Id.
[273a] In this regard, Admiral Kimmel stated, among other things: "The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight to fourteen days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the location of the greater number of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty- four days in twelve separate periods each ranging from nine to twenty- two days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain." Committee record, pp. 6727, 6728.
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THE "MORI CALL"
The Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 6 delivered to responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript of an intercepted trans-Pacific radiotelephone conversation [274] between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" [275] and an individual in Japan. The transcript of this conversation indicated, among other things, that the individual in Japan was interested in the daily flights of airplanes, particularly large planes, from Honolulu; whether searchlights were being used; and the number of ships present at Pearl Harbor. Reference was made during the conversation to various flowers, [276] the significance of which was not known, but which conceivably could have been an open code employed to convey information concerning the presence or absence of fleet vessels to the approaching Japanese attack force, which could have listened in on the conversation.
Instead of taking action on the basis of the conversation, the office of the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy decided that it should be studied further by a Japanese linguist. This was not done until after the attack and in consequence the transcript of the conversation was not seen by Admiral Kimmel before December 7. The transcript was delivered to General Short and his G-2 on the evening of December 6 by Colonel Bicknell, his assistant G-2, the latter attaching great significance to the matters discussed. Colonel Bicknell stated that the special agent in charge of the FBI was alarmed at what he considered the military implications of the Mori conversation with respect to Pearl Harbor and that he, Bicknell, concurred in this view, considering the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. He stated, however, that "both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them the message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about." [277] No action whatever was taken by General Short.
Regardless of what use the Japanese made of the "Mori call," the conversation should have been, on its very face, of the greatest significance to the responsible commanders in Hawaii. Members of the Mori family were the subject of investigation by the FBI, a fact known to the intelligence offices of both the Army and Navy. An interest by Japan in the daily flights of "large airplanes" and whether searchlights were employed could have but one meaning to alert Commanders who were properly vigilant and should have been prepared for the worst in the knowledge that hostilities were imminent a desire to know whether air reconnaissance was being conducted and whether searchlights were employed for defense against air attack. The undecipherable and suspicious reference to flowers should have intensified alertness by reason of the very fact that the true meaning could not be gathered. *The Mori call pointed directly at Hawaii*.  
The decision of the District intelligence Office of the Navy to place the matter aside for further study was inexcusable and reflects the apathetic state of alertness throughout the Navy command.
[274] See committee exhibit No. 84 for complete transcript of the conversation.
[275] The Mori family included Dr. Motokazu Mori, his wife Mrs. Ishiko Mori, his father Dr. Iga Mori, and his son Victor Motojiro Mori. The family was the subject of security investigations in Hawaii.
[276] In the course of the conversation the question was asked, "What kind of dowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply was: "Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now."
[277] See affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell dated February 25, 1945, before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148.
138 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DETECTION OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE ON MORNING OF DECEMBER
The U. S. S. Condor, a minesweeper, at 3:42 a. m. (Honolulu time) December 7, reported sighting a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor in a defensive area where American submarines had been restricted from operating while submerged. The Condor by visual signal reported this sighting to the U. S. S. Ward, a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol between 3:50 and 3:58 a. m. After receiving this information the Ward searched for the submarine for approximately one and one-half hours without results. It thereupon contacted the Condor, inquiring as to the distance and course of the submarine that was sighted. At 5:20 a. m. the Condor replied but the Ward was unable to effect the submarine's location on the basis of this information. The commander of the Ward thought the Condor had been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine and made no report to higher authority. [278] The radio conversation between the Ward and the Condor was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point Oahu, a radio station under the jurisdiction of the Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as the conversation was solely between the ships, was not addressed to the Section Base, and no request was made that it be relayed, the radio station did not report it to higher authority.
At 6:30 a. m. The U. S. S. Antares, arriving off Pearl Harbor with a barge in tow, sighted a suspicious object which appeared to be a small submarine. The Antares notified the Ward, asking it to investigate, and at approximately 6:33 a. m. observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two "smoke pots" near the object. At 6:40 the Ward sighted an unidentified submarine apparently following the Antares. The Ward opened fire at 6:45 and the Antares, observing the fire of the Ward, noted about the same time that a Navy patrol plane appeared to drop depth charges or bombs on the submarine. When the submarine keeled over and started to sink, the Ward ceased firing and then dropped depth charges.
At 6:51 the Ward radioed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area." The captain of the Ward followed this dispatch with a supplemental message at 6:53: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." This information was received by the Chief of Staff to Admiral Bloch at 7:12 and by the Duty Officer of Admiral Kimmel at 7:15. Admiral Kimmel stated he received this information between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m.
Admiral Bloch, according to his testimony, was informed by his Chief of Staff, but in view of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief duty destroyer could take care of the situation; that Admiral Kimmel to whom the information had been referred had the power to take any action which might be desired. [279] Admiral Kimmel testified: [280]
"Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the Ward's report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer to assist the Ward,
[278] See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 87-92; 428, 429.
[279] Id., at pages 414 416; 452-469. For further details concerning this incident, see Hewitt inquiry exhibits Nos. 18, 73, 75, and 76.
[280] Committee record, p. 6760-6770.
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and the efforts then underway to obtain a verification of the Ward's report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been been verified in the past."
It is to be noted, however, that in Admiral Kimmel's own statement he refers to only two reports concerning possible submarine contacts after November 3 in addition to the Ward incident. He stated: [281]
"* * * On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. Helena reported that a radar operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158- 23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine."
The reported sighting of a submarine periscope at 3:42 a. m. on the morning of December 7, in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, even though not verified, should have put the entire Navy command on the qui vive and when at 6:40 a. m. The presence of a submarine was definitely established, the entire Navy command should have been on a full alert. In the Martin-Bellinger estimate annexed to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan it was pointed out that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. Admiral Kimmel in his letter to the Fleet, 2CL-41 (Revised), *dated October 14, 1941*, made this identical statement and followed it with the words: [282] "The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant *in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means*."
The evidence does not reflect that the sighting and sinking of a submarine, particularly in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, was of such frequent occurrence as to justify the failure to attach significance to the events of the morning of December 7. This is especially true when it is realized that a war warning had been received and Admiral Kimmel's own estimates indicated the extreme significance of submarine activity. As a matter of fact the Condor and Ward incidents appear to be the *first* instance of reported sighting and sinking of a submarine since the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan.
The reported sighting was at 3:42 a. m., *over 4 hours before the Japanese air force struck*. Appearing before the Roberts Commission, General Short commented as follows with respect to the Ward incident: [283]
"That would under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack."
[281] Id, at p. 6769.
[282] Hewitt inquiry exhibit No. 8; committee exhibit No. 44.
[282] Roberts Commission record, p. 311.
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140 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The supposed sighting of a submarine at 3:42 a. m. And the attack upon a submarine at 6:45 a.m., December 7, should have been recognized as immediate basis for an all-out alert to meet all military contingencies. [284]
RADAR DETECTION OF JAPANESE RAIDING FORCE
The army radar was scheduled for operation on Sunday morning, December 7 from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. [284a] The normal operation for training purposes after 7 a. m. Was discontinued for this particular Sunday by reason of special authorization obtained from the control officer.
At one of the more remote aircraft warning stations, Opana, Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott had been on duty from 4 to 7 a. m. Inasmuch as they were waiting for the army truck to return them to quarters for breakfast, it was decided to operate the radar after 7 a. m. in order that Private Lockard, who was skilled in the operation of the radar detector, might afford his partner additional instruction. As the machine was being adjusted, Private Lockard saw on the radar screen an unusual formation he had not previously seen in the machine. Inasmuch as the indicator reflected a large number of planes coming in and he was confident there was nothing like it in the air, he felt that the machine must be at fault. After additional checking he found, however, that the machine was operating properly and concluded at 7:02 a. m. that there was a large number of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3 east of north. [285]
After some discussion concerning the advisability of informing the information center, Private Lockard called the center at 7:20 a. m. advising that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from the direction indicated. It is to be noted that, as General Short stated, "At 7 a. m. all the men at the information center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment and left." [286] The switchboard operator was unable to do anything about the call and accordingly, since the information center personnel had departed, referred it to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps whose tour of duty at the center was until 8 a. m. He was there solely for training and observation.
Lieutenant Tyler, upon being advised of the approach of a large number of planes, told Private Lockard in substance and effect to "forget it." He assumed that the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that were scheduled to arrive on December 7.
[284] In the light of the known and declared significance to be attached to the presence of a Japanese submarine in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, this committee does not concur in the implications of the conclusion made by the Navy Court of Inquiry that: "There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single sub marine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent " See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157.
[284a] In the course of examination by Counsel, General Short was asked it radar was put on the alert after the warning of November 27. General Short replied: " That was put into alert during. what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily."
Asked if just putting the radar into operation as effective without an Information Center that worked with it, General Short said: " The information center was working with it." Committee record page 8054.
The evidence reflects that installation of three permanent radar stations had not been completed. The mobile sets had been in operation, however, for some time prior to December 7 with very satisfactory results See in this regard Note 287, infra.
[285] For complete discussion, see testimony of Joseph L. Lockard, Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1014-1034; Navy Court of Inquiry record p. 628-343; testimony of George E. Elliott, Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 994-1014; Navy Court of Inquiry record, pages 644-659; and committee record, p. 13380-13499.
[286] Committee record, p. 7976,
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General Short stated: [287]
"If he (Tyler) had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. * * *. It would have made a great difference in the loss * * *. It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action."
In testifying before the joint committee, General Short said: [288]
"If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall after the information center was manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate the carriers."
If the Army command at Hawaii had been adequately alerted, Lieutenant Tyler's position would be indefensible. He was at the information center for training and observation, had no knowledge on which to predicate any action, and accordingly should have consulted higher authority. His fatal estimate "Forget it" was empty assumption. The fact that Lieutenant Tyler took the step that he did, merely tends to demonstrate how thoroughly unprepared and how completely lacking in readiness the Army command really was on the morning of December 7.
Further, the evidence reflects that Privates Lockard and Elliott debated the advisability of informing the Information Center concerning the approach of a large number of planes. It would appear that this unusual information concerning a large number of planes so unusual in fact that Private Lockard stated he had never before seen such a formation should have provided immediate and compelling reason for advising the Information Center had the necessary alert been ordered after the November 27 warning and the proper alertness pervaded the Army command.
While it was not possible with the then state of radar development to distinguish friendly planes from hostile planes, this fact is of no application to the situation in Hawaii; for in a command adequately alerted to war any presumptions of the friendly or enemy character of approaching forces must be that they are enemy forces. It is to be noted General Short has stated that if Lieutenant Tyler had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time to disperse the planes and to have reduced the losses. The real reason, however, that the information developed by the radar was of no avail was the failure of the commanding general to
[287] Roberts Commission record, pp. 312, 313. However, in a memorandum dated November 14, 1941, Lt. Col. C . A. Powell, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department, stated: "In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. The exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.
"As soon as the planes were assembled they proceeded toward Hawaii. *This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor* . . ."
A copy of this memorandum was forwarded under date of November 19, 1941, to Mr. Harvey E. Bundy special assistant to the Secretary of War. See committee exhibit No. 136.
[288] Committee record, p. 7977.  
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order an alert commensurate with the warning he had been given by the War Department that hostilities were possible at any moment.
OTHER INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY ARMY AND NAVY IN HAWAII
CHANNELS OF INTELLIGENCE
Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii had responsible intelligence officers whose duty it was to coordinate and evaluate information from all sources and of all pertinent types for their superiors. The record reflects full exploitation of all sources for this purpose including the interview of passengers transiting Hawaii. The record also reflects that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in Hawaii were supplying Army and Navy intelligence officers with data available. [289]
The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI at Honolulu, for example, stated that on or about November 28, 1941, he received a radio communication from Director J. Edgar Hoover to the effect "that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen" and that, on the same day, he delivered this information to responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers in Hawaii. [290]
THE "MANILA MESSAGE"
Both the Army and Navy intelligence offices received about December 3, 1941, the following dispatch from a British source in Manila through a British representative in Honolulu: [291]
"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indochina:
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks, and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. *Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South*.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."  
The assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stated he gave the foregoing intelligence to General Short. [292]
THE HONOLULU PRESS
The information available in the Hawaiian Islands from the press and the attendant state of the public mind in the days before Pearl Harbor can to a great extent be gathered from a recitation of the headlines appearing in Honolulu newspapers. Among the headlines were the following: [293]
[288a] Illustrative of the insufficiency of the radar alert is the fact that although the charts plotting the Japanese force in and plotting the force as it retired were turned over to higher authority during the course of the attack, this information was not employed to assist in locating the Japanese task force and it appears no inquiries were made concerning it for a considerable period of time after the attack.
[289] See testimony of Col. George W. Bicknell before the joint committee, committee record, pp. 13536-13620.
[290] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen; Clausen investigation, pp. 88-91.
[291] See exhibits, Clausen investigation.
[292] See supplemental affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell, dated August 14, 1945, before Clausen.
[293] Committee record, p. 13622-13627.
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Honolulu Advertiser
November 7, 1941
"Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases."
"Japan Waits Before Move in Far East-Aggression in Pacific Appears Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S."
"Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials Offensive May Start in Middle East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present."
November 13, 1941
"Tokyo Radio Asserts War is Already on Any Military Moves Only Logical Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says."
"Envoy Undismayed Carries Broad Powers to Act Kurusu Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope."  
November 14, 1941
"Japanese Confident of Naval Victory."
November 26, 1941
"Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China."
"Hull Reply to Japan Ready."
November 27, 1941
"U.S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement Full Surrender Demanded in U. S. Statement."
"Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades."
November 28, 1941
"Parris Island, S. C. This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points thereby differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over London. The marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special training school on these balloons."
November 29, 1941
"U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East-Washington Insists on Maintenance of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army."
"U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road Protective Force of 200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese."
November 30, 1941
"Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness."
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"Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops alerted."
December 1, 1941  
"Japanese Press Warns Thailand."
"Burma Troops Are Reinforced British, Indian Units Arrive Rangoon."
"F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis."
December 2, 1941
"Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S. Thailand Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges."
"Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations Prepares for Action in Event of Failure."
"Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization."
"Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay."
December 3, 1941
"Huge Pincer attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted Pepper Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns."
"U S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves Americans Prepare for Any Emergency; Navy Declared Ready."  
December 4, 1941
"Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session."
"Japanese Pin Blame on U. S. Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R."
December 5, 1941
"Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate-Spy Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. By State Department."
"Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today."
"Japan Calls in Nationals."
"Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents."
December 6, 1941
"America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo China Hull May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall."
"Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front Military Observers Say Few Units Have Been Posted in North."
December 7, 1941
"F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis-Japanese Deny Massing Troops for Thai War."
"British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards May Isolate Concession to 'Prevent' Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors."
"Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army."  
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Honolulu Star Bulletin
November 10, 1941
"Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor."
December 1, 1941
"U. S. Army Alerted in Manila Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows."
"Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension."
December 4, 1941
"Japan Spurns U. S. Program Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible."
December 5, 1941
"Japan Parries Open U. S. Break."
"Further Peace Efforts Urged Tokyo Claims Policy 'Misunderstood' in Washington as One of Force and Conquest."
December 6, 1941
"Singapore on War Footing Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions State of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given."
"New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock with U. S. Proposed."
It would seem difficult to imagine how anyone upon reading the newspapers alone [294] could have failed to appreciate the increasing tenseness of the international situation and the unmistakable signs of war.[295]
THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE IN THE ATTACK
It has been suggested that Admiral Kimmel and General Short should be charged with knowledge that the Japanese were conducting extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and by reason thereof they should have exercised greater vigilance commensurate with the realization that Japan knew everything concerning the fleet, the fleet base and the defenses available thereto. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that superior intelligence possessed by Japan concerning Pearl Harbor conditioned her decision to strike there or,
[294] Referring to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Secretary Stimson expressed this idea in the following terms:
"Even without any such message (the War Department dispatch of November 7) the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such matters." Statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14408.
[295] Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have made a point of the fact that after the warnings of November 27 they were dependent on the newspapers for information concerning the state of negotiations and from the press, gathered that the conversations were still continuing. It is to be recalled, however, that the "code destruction" intelligence was made available after November 27 and indicated with unmistakable clarity that effective negotiations were at an end. In any event it would appear anomalous that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would permit unofficial newspaper accounts to take precedence over official War and Navy Department dispatches, setting forth the break-down in negotiations. Admiral Kimmel, himself, admitted that he did not act on newspaper information in preference to official information supplied to him by the Navy Department, after having previously observed that he obtained a major portion of his "diplomatic information from the newspapers." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 306, 307.
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otherwise stated, that Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 if she had not the benefit of unusual and superior intelligence. Virtually every report that has been heretofore prepared concerning the disaster has referred to the probability of supposed extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and the peculiar vulnerability of the fleet base to such activity by reason of the surrounding mountainous terrain. [296]
There is evidence before the committee, however, which reveals several salient considerations indicating that Japanese Hawaiian espionage was not particularly effective and that from this standpoint there was nothing unusual about the Hawaiian situation. It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence had nothing whatever to do with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Among the considerations giving rise to this conclusion are the following:
1. Radar equipment was available on Oahu for use in detecting approaching planes. That Japan knew of radar and its capabilities would seem clear if for no other reason than on November 22 her consul in Panama advised her that the United States had set up airplane detector bases and "some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away." [297] The attacking force was actually detected through radar over 130 miles from Oahu. Had Japanese espionage developed the fact that radar was in use at Hawaii and so advised Tokyo of that fact, it would seem unlikely that the attacking planes would have come in for the raid at high altitude but, on the other hand, would have flown a few feet above the water in order to take advantage of the radar electrical horizon presupposing of course that Japan possessed at least an elementary working knowledge of radar and its potentialities.
2. Perhaps the greatest single item of damage which the attacking force could have inflicted on Oahu and our potential for effectively prosecuting the war would have been to bomb the oil-storage tanks around Pearl Harbor. [298] These tanks were exposed and visible from the air. Had they been hit, inexplicable damage would have resulted. Considering the nature of installations that were struck during the attack, it is questionable whether Japanese espionage had developed fully the extraordinary vulnerability of the oil storage to bombing and its peculiar and indispensable importance to the fleet.
3. The evidence before the Committee reflects that other Japanese consulates were supplying Tokyo as much information as the Honolulu consulate. [299] Information supplied by the Manila and Panama consuls was detailed in character and related meticulously to defenses available and those in process of development. It appears that it was not until a few days before December 7 that the Honolulu consul supplied his Japanese superiors any significant information concerning the defenses of Oahu, and
[296] See reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157.
[297] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 49.
[298] Admiral Bloch pointed out that, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the dry-dock repair shop, barracks, and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the fleet, the United States would have suffered more insofar as the prosecution of the war was concerned. See Hart inquiry record, p. 94. It is, of course, known that the Japanese knew generally as to the location of the oil-storage tanks as reflected by a map recovered after the attack. See Hewitt inquiry, exhibit No. 30.
[299] From evidence before the Committee it appears that the Manila and Panama consuls were supplying Tokyo more information and of a type far more indicative of an attack than that received concerning Hawaii. See section "Ships in Harbor Reports," Part IV, infra, this report.
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at a time when the attacking force was already on its way to Pearl Harbor. [300]
4. The Japanese task force left Hitokappu Bay on November 25 with December 7 set as the time for the attack. This departure, it would seem clear, was in anticipation of the failure to secure concessions from the United States through further negotiations. The date December 7 had been recognized as suitable for the attack in discussions prior to November 7. It is hardly credible that superior intelligence should have precipitated or otherwise conditioned the attack when the decision to strike on December 7 was made many days earlier and, manifestly, in the interim between the decision and the attack date the entire defensive situation at Hawaii could have changed. [301] As a matter of fact two of our task forces left Pearl Harbor while the raiders were en route for the attack.
5. It is apparent from the evidence obtained through Japanese sources since VJ-day that the decision to attack on December 7 was made on the basis of the general assumption that units of the fleet ordinarily came into Pearl Harbor on Friday and remained over the week end. [302] With this realization providing adequate odds that substantial units of the Pacific Fleet would-be in Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, that date was selected.
6. In February of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have stated,
"If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed. [303]"
This statement is clearly in line with the premise laid down by several witnesses before the committee that Japan would open her attack on us by hitting our Pacific Fleet wherever it might be whether at Pearl Harbor, Manila, Panama, or on the west coast in order to immobilize it as a threat to Japanese moves to the south. [304] The fleet happened to be based at Pearl Harbor and in consequence that was where Japan struck.  
7. The "Mori call," to which reference has heretofore been made, was on the evening of December 5. It would appear doubtful that Japan should have been seeking information just before the attacking the rather inexpert manner displayed in the call if she possessed any wealth of intelligence gleaned through espionage agents in Hawaii.
8. Investigation conducted in Japan since VJ-day indicates as a matter of fact, that espionage agents, apart from the consul and his staff, played no role whatever in the attack. [305] The sources of information employed, according to Japanese interviewed, were naval attaches to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, public newspapers in the United States, American radio broadcasts (public), crews and passengers on ships which put in at Honolulu, and general information. [306]
[300] See committee exhibit No. 2.
[301] Committee exhibit No. 8.
[302] Id.
[303] Committee exhibit No. 8D.
[304] See testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, committee record, pp. 9115-9288; testimony of Capt. Ellis Zacharias, committee record, pp. 8709-8778, 8909 9044.
[305] See committee exhibit No. 8. Also note 6, Part II, this report.
[306] Id.
148 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. As late as December 2, Tokyo was solicitously asking its Honolulu consul
"whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise me whether the warships are provided with antimine nets. [307]"
On December 6, the Honolulu Consul advised Tokyo:
"In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation. [308]"  
The foregoing is hardly indicative of any superior sources or facilities for obtaining intelligence. It is reported that the decision to employ a horizontal-bombing attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with an air- torpedo attack was for the reason that Tokyo could not determine whether ships at Pearl Harbor were equipped with torpedo nets and the horizontal bombing could be depended upon to inflict some damage if the torpedo attack failed. [309]
10. In planning for the attack, Japan made elaborate precautions to protect the raiding task force which was of itself very formidable, probably more so as a striking force than the entire fleet based at Pearl Harbor. A large striking force was held in readiness in the Inland Sea to proceed to assist the raiding force if the latter were detected or attacked. [310] It is proper to suggest that such precautions would seem unlikely and misplaced if Japan had known through superior espionage information that there was no air or other reconnaissance from Oahu and the defenses were not properly alerted. The evidence reflects that the raiding task force probably determined the extent of reconnaissance through plotting in our plane positions with radio bearings. Further, the Japanese force followed the broadcasts from Honolulu commercial radio stations on the theory that if the stations were going along in their normal manner, the Hawaiian forces were still oblivious to developments. [311]
11. In moving in for the attack on December 7, the Japanese ran the risk of tipping over the apple cart by sending out scouting planes a considerable period of time ahead of the bombers. [312] They took the further risk of having several submarines in the operating sea areas around Pearl Harbor. If Japan had possessed extraordinary intelligence concerning the state of Hawaiian defenses or lack thereof, it would seem improbable that she would have invited disaster by taking such risks.
12. Reference has been made to the large number of semiofficial consular agents that were stationed in Hawaii, the implication being they were engaged in widespread espionage activity Yet the facts before the committee reflect no evidence that these agents committed a single act of espionage, except as it may be inferred from the information sent by the Honolulu consul to Tokyo, which as will be indicated was no more extensive than was being received from other consulates.
[307] See committee exhibit No. 2, p. 21.
[308] Id., at pp. 27, 28.
[309] See committee exhibit No. 8.
[310] Id.
[311] See committee exhibit No. 8D.
[312] Id.
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13. It would seem likely that Japan expected some of the most effective striking units of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the carriers, to be in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The raiders, for example, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, bombed a vessel with lumber on its upper deck, apparently thinking it was a carrier. In the light of retrospection and the experiences of the war, it is suggested that Japan would not have indulged the Pyrrhic victory of destroying our lumbering battleships if she had not also hoped to find the fast striking units of the fleet.
14. Japanese estimates in the late fall of 1941 as to the disposition of United States air strength in the Pacific were, with respect to Hawaii, as follows: Fighter planes, 200; small attack planes, 150; 4-engine planes, 40; 2-engine planes, 100; reconnaissance and patrol planes, 35; and flying boats, 110, for a total of 635 planes. [312a] This estimate is roughly twice that of the actual number of planes at Hawaii and reflects a thoroughly erroneous impression as to the ratio of planes in a particular category. The inability to make an approximation of enemy strength within more narrow limits of exactitude can hardly be credited as superior intelligence.
15. In the last analysis it is difficult to believe that Japanese espionage was actually able to develop satisfactorily the real strength of our Pacific Fleet. In December of 1941 the Japanese fleet was superior to our fleet in the Pacific. The latter would have been unable, based on the testimony of witnesses questioned on the subject, to have proceeded, for example, to the aid of General MacArthur in the Philippines even had Pearl Harbor not been attacked. Our war plan in the Pacific, particularly in the early stages, was essentially defensive in character, save for sporadic tactical raids.
If the Japanese really knew the weakness of the Pacific Fleet they must also have known that it did not present a formidable deterrent to anything Japan desired to do in the Far East. As already suggested, the question presents itself: *Why, if Japanese espionage in Hawaii was superior, would Japan invite the unqualified wrath of the American people, weld disunited American public opinion, and render certain a declaration of war by the Congress through a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor when the only real weapon we had, our Pacific Fleet, presented itself no substantial obstacle to what Japan had in mind*? A logical answer would seem to be that Japan had not been able to determine and, in consequence, was not cognizant of our real naval weakness in the Pacific.[312b] The extremely large raiding force and the excessive number of attacking planes would appear to be further confirmation of this conclusion.  
[312a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Committee record, p. 14626.
[312b] When questioned as to the deterring effect the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 might have on Japanese aggressive action in the Far East, Admiral Ingersoll declared: "The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity." Committee record, p. 11370.  
It appears that the statement by Admiral Ingersoll concerning his estimate of Japanese knowledge concerning the capacity of the Pacific Fleet is illogical and completely incompatible with the risks entailed by Japan in attacking Pearl Harbor. During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, *it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that one AKAGI class carrier, and one SORYU class carrier would be lost*. See committee record, p. 457.

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From the foregoing considerations it is proper to suggest that the role played by espionage in the Pearl Harbor attack may have been magnified all out of proportion to the realities of the situation.
The Japanese diplomatic establishments and others did, however, have uncensored channels of communication with Tokyo as a result of statutory restrictions imposed upon our own counterespionage agencies by the Communications Act of 1934. The position assumed in 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission was expressed in a memorandum dated September 29, 1944, by the Chairman, James Lawrence Fly, as follows: [312c]
"The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (see. 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radio-telegraph, cable telegraph, or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941."
*The situation should never again be permitted whereby the efforts of our Government to combat forces inimical to our national security are hamstrung by restrictions of our own imposition which aid the enemy.*
LIAISON BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT
Consistent with instructions from the Chief of Staff, [313] General Short set about immediately upon assuming command of the Hawaiian Department to establish a cordial and cooperative relationship with Admiral Kimmel and his staff. That he was successful is undisputed and there can be no doubt that a bond of personal friendship developed between the commanders of the Army and the Navy in Hawaii. They addressed themselves to the task of preparing for war and set about to perfect plans for defense resulting in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. As has been seen, this plan was thorough, despite the recognized limitations of equipment, well conceived and if timely invoked using all of the facilities at hand was adequate to effect maximum defensive security. The evidence reflects, however, that personal friendship was obviously confused with effective liaison at a time when the latter was indispensable to the security of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. [314]
They exchanged the warning messages of November 27 and discussed their import. They did not, however, in the face of these warnings sit down with one another to determine what they together had and what they could jointly do to defend the fleet and the fleet base. This action and this alone could have demonstrated effective liaison in a command by-mutual cooperation. After reading the "war warning" sent Admiral Kimmel, General Short assumed the
[312c] See report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
[313] General Short testified: "The one thing that that letter (letter of February 7,1941, from General Marshall) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else." Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 355.
[314] The Army Pearl Harbor Board, it should be noted, said: "General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated." See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
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Navy would be conducting distant reconnaissance when ordered to effect a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war tasks. [315] Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army in the face of the warnings would be on an all-out alert. [316] In fact, he testified he didn't know the Army was alerted to prevent sabotage only that he thought they were on an all-out alert; and that he didn't know they had any other kind of alert. He also assumed the Army radar would be in full operation. Even though General Short testified that he conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 2, and 3 and they talked over every phase of what they were doing [317] these fatal assumptions still persisted. In short, when the time came for really effective liaison it was entirely absent.
The Navy failed to advise General Short of information received on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments and in our own outlying islands. [318] General Short testified that had he known of these messages he would have ordered a more "serious alert." [319]
On November 26 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District expressed to the Chief of Naval Operations the belief, based on radio intelligence, that a strong Japanese concentration of submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet, were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. In spite of the believed dangerous proximity to Hawaii of possible Japanese carrier units, the commanding general was not advised of this highly significant information. [320] While this information was questioned the same day by the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, it nevertheless displays the futility of General Short's assumption that the Navy would keep him informed of the location of Japanese warships.
On November 28, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet directed a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations with a copy to Admiral Kimmel for information concerning the establishment by Japan of the celebrated "winds code" to be employed in "ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts" to advise when "diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed." 321 Certain Japanese phrases were set up to indicate a break of relations with the United States, England and the Netherlands, and Russia. Efforts were made by the Navy at Hawaii to monitor for a broadcast employing this code. On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with a copy to Admiral Kimmel, advising of Japanese broadcast frequencies. [322] Despite the importance which was attached to the winds code at the time, General Short has testified this information was not supplied him by the Navy in Hawaii. [323]
[315] Committee record pp. 7926, 7927.
[316] Yet it is difficult to understand why he should have expected such an alert when in his statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel said: "On November 28th the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed (with General Short). We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with Thailand most probably and Malaya the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order named. *In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii*" (p. 31 of statement). See committee exhibit No. 146
[317] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 242, 251.
[318] See committee record, pp. 8366-8368
[319] Id., at p. 8397.
[320] Id., at p. 8261.
[321] Committee exhibit No. 142. See discussion of "Winds Code," Part. IV, infra.
[322] Committee record p. 8374.
[323] Id., at p. 8374.
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Beginning November 30, Admiral Kimmel made a daily memorandum entitled: "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next twenty-four hours," the last of these memoranda being reviewed and approved by him on the morning of December 6. Although conferences were held with Admiral Kimmel subsequent to the initiation of these memoranda, General Short has testified he did not know of these steps being taken by the Navy. [324] There is some indication that Admiral Kimmel acted as arbiter of what information General Short received. [325]
Admiral Bellinger, who was not shown the war warning, has stated that between November 27 and December 7 he did not confer with the Army Air Force commander, General Martin, regarding long-range reconnaissance. [326] In other words, there were no discussions during this critical period between the two officers responsible for the air arms of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. It is to be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin prepared the estimate of possible Japanese action against Hawaii which reflected in such startling detail what did occur on the morning of December 7.
At 3:42 a. m. On December 7 (Honolulu time) a Navy mine sweeper reported the sighting of a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor in the defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. Between 6:30 and 6:45 a. m. a submarine was sunk in naval action. Both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch knew of this prior to the attack. Although the Martin-Bellinger estimate of possible enemy action had stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier, General Short was not advised of the fact that the submarine had been sighted and sunk.
The Army radar at 7:02 a. m. December 7 detected a large contingent of airplanes which turned out to be the attacking force approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles away. This information was not supplied the Navy until after the attack.
Although the Army radar plotted the withdrawal to the north of the Japanese force after the attack, this vital information was not employed following the raid in searches for the raiders. [327] This situation is traceable to faulty liaison and a complete failure in integration of Army-Navy effort.
The Navy maintained a liaison officer in the Army operations section for purposes of informing the Fourteenth Naval District concerning action being taken by the Army. No liaison officer, however, was maintained in the Navy operations section by the Army, although an
[324] Id, at pp. 8375-8378.
[325] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry Admiral Kimmel was asked: "Did your organization exchange intelligence with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?" Admiral Kimmel replied:
"We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had his interests restricted to the defense of Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and the ones to which he expected to send his forces. He was primarily interested in the probability of attack where his forces were stationed, and in general the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, or was confined to his interests. My own interests covered a much greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought would be useful to him. I did not inform the Commanding General of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Marshalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for taking the additional chance of having such information divulged by giving it to any agency who would have no part in the execution of the plan."
See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 282.
[326] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 672.
[327] Committee record, pp. 9343-9346.
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officer was assigned on an 8-hour shift to the harbor patrol. [328] That Admiral Kimmel was completely oblivious of what the Army was really doing evinces the ineffectiveness of the liaison that was maintained by the Navy in the Army operations section.
No conferences were held by Admiral Kimmel and General Short between December 3 and the attack. [329]
General Short said: 330 "I would say frankly that I imagine that as a senior admiral, Kimmel would have *resented it* if I tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out. * * * "
The considerations which apparently occasioned Admiral Kimmel's failure to acquaint himself with what the Army was doing were voiced by him as follows: 331
"* * * when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, *it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them*."
And yet when asked whether, in the method of mutual cooperation, it was necessary for one commander to know what the other commander was doing and what his plans were, Admiral Kimmel admitted that this knowledge was necessary. [332]
While such concern for the sensibilities of another may have social propriety, it is completely out of place when designed to control the relationship of two outpost commanders whose very existence is dependent upon full exchange of information and coordination of effort. [333] It defeats the purpose of command by mutual cooperation and is worse than no liaison at all. At least, without the pretense of liaison, each commander would not be blindly relying on what the other was doing.
It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period November 27 to December 7. [334] There was but little coordination and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the responsible commanders really knew what the other was doing with respect to essential military activities. [335]
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The consideration overshadowing all others in the minds of the Hawaiian commanders was the belief and conviction that Pearl Har-
[328] Id., at pp. 8205, 8206.
[329] See committee record, p. 8204
[330] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363.
[331] Roberts Commission record, p. 631.
[332] Id.
[333] The Army Pearl Harbor Board, for example, commented: "Apparently Short was afraid that if be went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his lob, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy which he was charged with securing " See Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
[334] Admiral McMorris, Chief of War Plans to Admiral Kimmel, admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether the Army antiaircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he assumed they were in a state of readiness. "* * * Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that from own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. *We were a bit too complacent there*. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their antiaircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together as a more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. *Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or of the watches being kept*." Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 330-332.
[335] See committee record, p. 8205
During the course of examination Admiral Kimmel was asked: "In other words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?" He replied: "And neither did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time." Committee record, p. 7053.  

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bor would not be attacked. [336] It explains the reason for no effective steps being taken to meet the Japanese raiders on the morning of December 7. This was not occasioned through disregard of obligations or indifference to responsibilities but rather because of unfortunate errors of judgment. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department failed to appreciate the demands of their situation and the necessities of their responsibility in the light of the information and warnings they had received. More than anyone else it cannot be doubted that Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have desired to avoid the disaster of December 7. But unfortunately they were blinded by the self-evident; they felt that Japan would attack to the south and Hawaii was safe. Their errors of judgment were honest mistakes yet errors they were.
The evidence reflects that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel addressed themselves assiduously to the task of training and other wise preparing the outpost of Hawaii and the Pacific Fleet for war Throughout their respective tenures as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet they manifested a keen awareness of the imperative necessity that personnel and material be increased commensurate with the realities and responsibilities in the Pacific. From the time of assuming command throughout the year 1941 their correspondence with the War and Navy Departments is replete with clear statements concerning shortages in equipment and expressions of the need for improving Hawaiian defenses. As will subsequently appear, they were successful in effecting marked improvement in the situation generally and the potential capacity of Hawaii to defend itself particularly. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were conscientious and indefatigable commanders. They were relentless in what they regarded as the consuming need in their commands training and preparation for war.
One of the major responsibilities of Admiral Kimmel and the major responsibility of General Short was defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and the Pacific Fleet. They knew that an air attack on Hawaii was a possibility; they knew this to be the most dangerous form of attack to Oahu; they knew that extensive efforts had been made to improve Hawaiian defenses against air attack; they had been warned of war; they knew of the unfailing practice of Japan to launch an attack with dramatic and treacherous suddenness without a declaration of war; they had been given orders calling for defense action against an attack from without; they were the commanders of the Hawaii outpost. In the face of this knowledge it is difficult to understand that the withering Japanese attack should have come without any substantial effort having been made to detect a possible hostile force and with a state of readiness least designed to meet the onslaught. That the responsible commanders were surprised that Japan
[336] During the course of counsel's examination of Admiral Kimmel, he was asked this question: "The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the establishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor?" and Admiral Kimmel replied; "*If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that there was a 50-50 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it would hare changed my viewpoint entirely*. I didn't believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers." Committee record, p. 7054.
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struck Hawaii is understandable; that they should have failed to prepare their defenses against such a surprise is not understandable. [337]
The estimate of the situation made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short is not altogether incredible in the light of the inevitable lassitude born of over 20 years of peace. [338] But the fact that their inaction is to a degree understandable does not mean that it can be condoned. The people are entitled to greater vigilance and greater resourcefulness from those charged with the duty of defending the Nation from an aggressor.
Hawaii is properly chargeable with possessing highly significant information and intelligence in the days before Pearl Harbor, including: Correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7. Despite the foregoing, the estimate was made and persisted that Hawaii was safe from an air attack although the very assumptions made by the Army and Navy commanders are implicit with the contemplation of an attack from without. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. [339]
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have insisted they received no information that Hawaii was to be attacked Yet commanders in the field cannot presume to expect that they will be advised of the exact time and place an enemy will attack or indeed that their particular post will be attacked. As outpost commanders it was their responsibility to be prepared against surprise and the worst possible contingency. [340] They have suggested that the War
[337] This distinction was clearly recognized by Admiral Ingersoll when he was asked if he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. He replied: "*I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected that was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, 'How in the hell did they get in there without somebody finding it out*?' " Committee record, p. 11310
[338] Admiral Kimmel stated: "* * * and what is so often overlooked in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair is that we were still at peace and still conducting conversations, and there were limits that I could take with planes and aviators. We were still in the peace psychology, and I myself was affected by it just like everybody else." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, page 1126, 1127.
[339] See note 336, supra.
[340] Incident to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the following interrogation occurred:
Question. "In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?"
General Short. "Yes."
Question: "That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war college teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?"
General Short, "The worst." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 436 and 437.
The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated: "It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation to *select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks*." (Citing Army Pearl Harbor Board record Pp. 1121, 2662.) Bee committee exhibit 1st for APHB Report.
Mr. Stimson said, " One of the basic polices of the Army command, which has been adhered to throughout the entire war, and in most instances with complete success, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission but not to interfere with him in the performance of it." Stimson's statement, committee record, p. 14397.
Testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board General Herron, General Short's predecessor, was asked the question: "I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command (General Herron on June 17,1940 had been directed by Washington to institute an alert): Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?" He replied: "I always felt that I was entire responsible out there and I had better protect the island." See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 228; also pp. 213-215.
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156 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
and Navy Departments possessed additional information which they were not given. But the fact that additional information may have been available elsewhere did not alter fundamental military responsibilities in the field. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the responsible military commanders at Hawaii. They were officers of vast experience and exemplary records in their respective services. That Admiral Kimmel and General Short were supplied enough in formation as reasonably to justify the expectation that Hawaiian defenses would be alerted to any military contingency is irrefutable. [341] That there may have been other information which could have been supplied them cannot becloud or modify this conclusion. It is into the nature of this further information that we shall hereafter inquire.
[341] And yet Admiral Kimmel has indicated he felt he was entitled to more warning. In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, he said: "I had many difficult decisions to make but none which required more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of alert status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a nature that I felt training could continue. *I felt that I was entitled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak of war*. I am convinced that my estimate based on the intelligence received was correct." (P. 38 of statement.) See committee exhibit No. 146.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 157
PART IV
RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON
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PART IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON
BASING THE PACIFIC FLEET AT HAWAII
Beginning in May of 1940 the entire American Pacific Fleet operated in the Hawaiian theater with Pearl Harbor as its base. [1] Prior to that time the fleet had been based on the west coast with certain contingents operating from time to time in the Hawaiian area. Admiral James O. Richardson, who was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in 1940, stated that while the fleet was in Hawaii incident to exercises during the summer of 1940 he received instructions to announce to the press that "at his request" the fleet would continue at Hawaii for the purpose of carrying out further exercises. [2] It was his understanding that the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was with a view to its providing a restraining influence on Japan. [3] At the time of original contemplation it appears that the fleet was to remain at Hawaii on a relatively temporary basis. [4] Admiral Richardson did not concur in the decision to station the fleet there and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations. [5] He testified with respect to his objections as follows: [6]
"My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation inadequate airfields.  
"A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields
"There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.
"Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training.
"For those reasons, and because I believed that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast."
As a result of a visit to Washington in July of 1940, Admiral Richardson stated he gained three distinct impressions: [7]
"*First*. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;
"*Second*. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan;
"*Third*. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of  
[1] See committee exhibit No. 9 for file of correspondence between Admirals Stark and Richardson concerning, among other things, the matter of basing the fleet at Hawaii. For a description of the base at Pearl Harbor see appendix F to this report.
[2] Committee record, p. 669.
[3] See committee record, p. 682, also Navy Court of Inquiry, pp. 1057, 1058.
[4] Committee record, p 668.
[5] See committee exhibit No. 9.
[6] Committee record, pp. 674, 675.
[7] See memorandum dated October 22 1940 from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations. Committee exhibit No.
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material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaii area."
In a memorandum for the Secretary of Navy dated September 12, 1940, Admiral Richardson pointed out several disadvantages from a Navy point of view of retaining the fleet in the Hawaiian area and stated: [8]
"If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific coast bases?"  
During October of 1940 while in Washington he talked with President Roosevelt at which time the President informed him that the Pacific Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson testified: [9]
"I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action. I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations."
He stated that the President's comment to the foregoing was in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having a restraining influence on the actions of Japan." [10]
Admiral Richardson testified that he replied that he still did not believe this to be the case and that he knew the Pacific Fleet was disadvantageously disposed to prepare for or to initiate war operations, whereupon the President said: [11] "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward."
It is clear from consideration of the evidence that Admiral Richardson's position was based on the feeling that the fleet could be better prepared for war if based on the west coast and not because he feared for the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. [12] In a letter to Admiral Stark on November 28 concerning the matter of the security of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area he said : [13] "*This feature of the problem
[8] Committee exhibit No. 9.
[9] Committee record pp. 682, 683.
[10] Committee record, p. 683.
[11] See, however, in this connection the testimony of Mr. Sumner Welles, committee record, pp. 1124,1125.
[12] Committee exhibit No. 9. This comment was made by Admiral Richardson pursuant to a letter from Admiral Stark dated November 22, 1940, in which the latter had stated, among other things: "Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of the Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of the units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures."
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does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for.*" Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Richardson did not raise any question concerning the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as a reason for bringing it back to the west coast. [14]
Referring to the decision to base the fleet at Hawaii Admiral Kimmel stated: [15]
"When I assumed command, the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to train the Fleet for war were in the process of being moved from the West Coast to Hawaii. The Fleet had been practically without gunnery practice for nearly a year due to the previous uncertainty as to the location of its base. Any further uncertainty would have delayed the availability of the mobile facilities to maintain, repair and train the Fleet. The resulting loss of time in starting intensive training would have been disastrous. This was my view when I took command. My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision already made months before to keep the Fleet in Hawaiian waters."
Admiral Kimmel stated that during his visit to Washington in June of 1941, he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, including air attack, blocking of the harbor and similar matters. He said that generally he felt the fleet should not remain at Pearl Harbor but he made no protests and submitted no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers. [16]
Regardless of the position taken by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet during 1940 with respect to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, extensive measures were taken thereafter and long before the outbreak of war to improve the fleet's security at Hawaii. [17] The Secretary of State, as well as our Ambassador to Japan were satisfied that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations. [18] Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese Foreign Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that "the continued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas * * *." [19] As Secretary Hull stated, [20] "The worst bandit * * * doesn't like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him at * *. They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not." The degree to which the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters influenced Japanese action necessarily cannot be precisely determined but the fact is the Japanese did not strike at the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay barrier for more than a year and a half after it was contemplated she would make such a move.
The wisdom and merit of the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii cannot be divorced from the high Government policy of which that decision was a part. As has elsewhere been observed, the traditional interest of the United States in the Pacific and our determination
[14] committee record, p. 5687.
[15] committee record, pp. 6661, 6662.
[16] Navy court of inquiry record, p. 367.
[17] See section, infra, "Defensive Facilities Available in Hawaii."'
[18] See testimony of secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1203-1205, 1452, 1464, 1603, 1608; testimony of Mr. Grew, committee record, pp. 1570, 1738, 1919, 1969.
In a letter of April 3, 1941, to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Stark expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. See committee exhibit No. 106.
[19] See "Foreign Relations," vol. II, p. 69.
[20] Committee record, p. 1603.
162 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to aid the valiant Chinese fighting under insuperable odds the Juggernaut of Japanese aggression made imperative our taking every reasonable step which would assist in deterring the insatiable Japanese ambition for conquest and at the same time bolster flagging Chinese morale. Basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was but one of the steps taken in this direction. [21]
The fact that it had been decided to make Hawaii the base of the fleet did not require that all of the battleships and other substantial fleet units should be *in* Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 after the responsible commander had been warned of war and ordered to execute an appropriate *defensive deployment*. [22] The very words defensive deployment could have meant nothing if not that the fleet should be moved and stationed in such manner as to afford maximum defensive security not only to the fleet itself but to the Hawaiian Islands, the west coast, and the Panama Canal as well. This order required the deploying of vessels in the Hawaiian waters; which afforded the commander in chief a vast scope of operations, and it was left to his judgment and discretion as to what specific action was required consistent with his responsibilities. It has certainly never been suggested that because a particular harbor has been designated as the base for a fleet its vessels are thereby restricted to that harbor, particularly after an order has been issued for their employment.
It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet as exposed to any greater danger by reason of the fact that it was based at Hawaii. The 360 perimeter of the islands afforded unlimited avenues for operations and the maximum channels for escape in the event of attack by a hostile superior force. The west coast, on the other hand, afforded only a 180 scope of operation with no avenues for escape from a superior attacking force and left only the alternative of proceeding into the teeth of such a force. Nor does it appear that the fleet was exposed to any greater danger from the standpoint of espionage by reason of its being at Hawaii. [23] The evidence before this Committee reflects that Tokyo was receiving as much information, if not more information, from its diplomatic establishments which operated outside the restraining counterespionage efforts of our own Government, located in Panama, on the west coast, and in Manila as from the Honolulu consulate. [24] There is a strong possibility that Japan would have taken the Hawaiian Islands by amphibious operations as she did in the case of so many other outlying Pacific Islands had the fleet not been based at Pearl Harbor. [25] Fur-
[21] See Part I, supra, "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack."
[22] In the course of counsel's examination, Admiral Turner was asked:
"During this time after around November 27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?"
Admiral TURNER. "No, there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or all of it would be at sea."
Question. "Well, why did you assume that?"
Admiral TURNER. "Well, that was the place for them under Admiral Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment." Committee record, pp. 5224, 5225.
The evidence reflects that the Office of Naval Operations in Washington did not know the exact location of the various units of the Pacific Fleet. See committee record, p. 13956.
[23] See section "The Role of Espionage in the Attack," Part III, this report.
[24] In referring to Japanese espionage activity, Admiral Stark said: "We had felt that *not only in Hawaii* but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew everything we were doing." Committee record, p. 5707.
[25] In the course of his testimony before the committee, General Short was asked whether he believed, assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the west coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were other wise the same, the Japanese could have made a landing with the striking air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did. He replied: "It would have been thoroughly possible. If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made the landing." Committee record pp. 8293, 8294.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 163
thermore, had the fleet been based on the west coast a raid on our west coast cities and the Panama Canal could not have been entirely repulsed. For it is agreed as a military proposition that even with the most effective resistance to an enemy air attack some units will inevitably get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack.
In this connection, the opinion has been expressed by several naval witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet *wherever it might be* at the very outset of hostilities with a view to immobilizing it, temporarily at least, as a restraining and deterring influence on Japanese sea-borne operations in Pacific Far Eastern waters. [26] Under this view, which has the weight of logic and the experience of December 7, the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore no conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to attack our Pacific Fleet.  
As has been indicated, the basing of the fleet at Hawaii is inseparable from the global plan of operations in which the Pacific Fleet was to perform only one phase. It was an integral part of our policy and action in the Atlantic and can only be questioned save as one presumes to challenge the policies of the United States Government from 1937 to 1941 and our determination to aid the impoverished free peoples of the world striving in desperation to stem the overpowering tide of Axis aggression and world conquest.
DEFENSIVE FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN HAWAII
There can be no question that Hawaii was regarded as the best equipped of our outposts and possessed the greatest potential for its own defense. [27] In this connection General Marshall testified: [28]
"I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital installation, but *we also felt that that was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, the commanders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense*.
"MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux, with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half delivered and half still to go.  
"The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, seriously inadequate in planes and, of course, of vast importance to anything in the Pacific.
"*The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point*.
"Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to attack it."
The correspondence between the Chief of Staff and General Short during 1941, [29] as well as that between the Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Kimmel, [30] manifest clearly the mutual desire to improve
[26] See section, supra, Part III, "The Role of Espionage in the Attack."
[27] In the course of committee examination Admiral Turner was asked: "Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared for that attack at the time it did come?"
Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, within the limits of the material improvements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready for war."
Question. "You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?"
Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide. *We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the fleet and the command ashore*." Committee record, pp. 5253, 5254.
[28] Committee record, pp. 13792, 13793.
[29] See committee exhibit No. 53.
[30] Id., No. 106.

164 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the utmost the defensive facilities available to the Hawaiian commanders. But both General Marshall and Admiral Stark, in addition to their interest in Hawaii, had the enormous task and responsibility of allocating to many places, consistent with an ever-expanding global conflict, the military and naval equipment that was produced during the year 1941. [31] They had the obligation to spread the results of our productive efforts in those quarters where the needs and exigencies appeared in their best judgment to be most pressing. Our defensive facilities on the mainland were in great need of improvement Panama and the Philippines were in woeful need of additional equipment; the Nation had committed itself to aiding the Chinese who had been fighting Japanese aggression for 4 years with little more than sheer courage and the will to exist as a nation; we were determined that supplies being shipped under lend-lease should not be destroyed by German and Italian raiders before they reached their destination necessitating thereby the building up of our naval power in the Atlantic: we were determined to aid Britain and Russia to the extent of our capacity for our own self- protection before the overpowering might of the German war machine had destroyed the last vestige of resistance on the continent of Europe and we were left alone to stem the Axis thrust for world conquest all of these considerations were a part of the problem posed for the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations in making allocations of the materiel at hand. It should be noted that most of the lend-lease transfers effected prior to December 7, 1941, were in a category in which, by the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, it was provided that transfers to foreign governments could be made only after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. The Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations personally approved these transfers. [32]
The only justifiable allegation concerning the shortage of equipment at Hawaii relating to the failure to detect the Japanese task force was the fact that insufficient long-range patrol planes were available to conduct a 360 distant search from Oahu. As has been seen, however, adequate patrol planes were on hand to cover the vital and more dangerous sectors. [33] Referring to the lack of long-range planes, it is in order to determine the extent to which such planes were available and conceivably might have been sent to Hawaii.
In the case of 210 B-17's and B-24's, Army heavy bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance, delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, none were shipped under lend-lease and a total
[31] In a letter of November 7,1941, Admiral Stark pointed out to Admiral Kimmel the difficulties experienced through shortage of material needs: "I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles but he is up against it for DDs for escort and defense against raiders." (Admiral King at the time was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.) Committee record, p. 5575.
[32] See letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissions, Department of State, concerning the organization of Lend-Lease. Committee record, p. 14095 et seq.
[33] See Part III, supra.
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of 113 were sold for cash to foreign countries; 12 B-17's were shipped to Hawaii and 35 to the Philippines. [34]
With respect to Navy planes, there were no lend-lease transfers of long- range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the same period. Of a total of 835 Navy planes of all types delivered during this period, February 1 to November 30, 582 were delivered to the Navy and 253 to foreign countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway) under cash transactions. Of the 582 planes delivered to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area, 146 of the planes being assigned to carriers. [35]
It appears that of 3,128 Army and Navy planes of various types delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, only 177 were shipped under lend-lease to foreign countries and none of these were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. The record is clear, therefore, that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations did not prejudice our own defenses in approving excessive allocations to foreign governments. A brief review of the improvement effected in the Hawaiian situation during the year 1941 will serve to demonstrate the manner in which the exigencies and problems prevailing in the Pacific were recognized.
The total number of Army planes in the Hawaiian Department was virtually doubled between January 31 and December 7, 1941, having been increased from 124 to 227 planes. The number of B-17 four-motored bombers was increased from none on January 31 to 21 as of May 31, 1941, this number subsequently being reduced to 12 by reason of the transfer of 9 B-17's to the Philippines in September. As of September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 109 13-17's  
[34] See enclosure to War Department memorandum to committee counsel dated March 20,1946, committee exhibit No. 172. In response to a request of the general counsel of the Committee, the War Department on March 20, 1946, transmitted a tabulation supplied by the Army Air Forces reflecting, among other things the total deliveries and types of American-produced planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, without any break-down as to months. This tabulation reflects a total of 579 planes delivered having a maximum range *without bombs* in excess of 1,600 miles. In addition to this figure, the tabulation shows 836 planes delivered having ranges of 2,000 and 1,120 miles with no break-down indicating how many planes were produced in a particular range category. The tabulation of plane deliveries was not introduced as an exhibit by the general counsel until May 23, 1946. General Marshall appeared before the committee for the second time on April 9, 1946, but he was asked no questions concerning the dispositions of these planes, it being noted that General Marshall had earlier testified that Hawaii had received priority consideration in the disposition of equipment. Although the tabulation delivered by the War Department on March 20 was available to the Committee counsel it was not available to the members of the committee for consideration and examination at the time General Marshall appeared on April 9.
The committee has thus been placed in the position of not having inquired concerning the adaptability, design, and potentialities of these planes with ranges exceeding 1,600 miles; of not having determined where they may otherwise have been disposed and the exigencies requiring such dispositions; of not having determined whether there were crews available to man these planes, of not having determined whether ferrying facilities were available had they been directed to Hawaii; of not having determined exactly when the planes were delivered to determine whether they could have been sent to Hawaii before December 7, 1941; and of not having determined whether they would satisfy the distant reconnaissance requirements in Hawaii, among other things.  
In the latter connection, however, it is to be noted that General Martin, commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Forces, under date of August 20, 1941, recommended the War Department give consideration to the allotment of "B-17D type airplanes or *other four-engine* bombers with equal or better performance and operating range" for reconnaissance purposes, committee exhibit No. 13. It would appear that in the making of aircraft dispositions the indicated needs of the Hawaiian Department would be a controlling consideration.
It appears from the evidence before the committee that only 210 of the Army-type planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, were four-engine bombers of a type adaptable to the type of long distance reconnaissance required by the plans and requirements of the Hawaiian commanders. It is to be noted that a tabulation of factory deliveries of bombers to foreign countries appearing on page 12991 of the Committee record is superseded by Committee exhibit No. 172.
[35] See enclosure to Navy Department memorandum to committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172.
166 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
disposed: 21 in Hawaii, 7 in Panama, and 81 in the continental United States. [36] The number of P-40 pursuit planes was increased from none in January to 99 as of November 30; and the number of P-36's from 19 to 39. [37]
In the case of the Navy at Hawaii, during January of 1941 a squadron of 12 PBY-3's left the west coast for the Hawaiian area. In April a second squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3's also moved to Hawaii. In October and November of 1941, 3 squadrons of 12 planes each and 1 squadron of 6 planes, then in the Hawaiian area, returned to the west coast and exchanged their PBY-3's for PBY-5's after which they returned to Hawaii. During this same period the third squadron of Patrol Wing 1, equipped with 12 new PBY-5's left the west coast for Hawaii. This represents an over-all increase of 36 in the number of patrol planes between January 1 and November 30 1941. [38] During the period February 1 to November 30, 1941, 146 planes were assigned to carriers in the Pacific; and on May 13, 1941, 18 planes arrived at Ewa Field, Hawaii, being assigned to a marine scout bomber squadron. [39]
The Committee did not inquire into the matter of allocations, generally, of Army and Navy planes or other equipment to points other than to Hawaii. There is no evidence before us that General Marshall and Admiral Stark made dispositions of the materiel available [40] inconsistent with their best judgment in the light of the situation as it could be viewed in the days before Pearl Harbor. [41]  
The question of whether Japan would have struck Hawaii had additional equipment been available there must be considered in light of the fact that in their estimates made in the fall of 1941, the Japanese placed the number of aircraft in Hawaii at roughly twice that of the actual air strength. Further, during the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units. [41a] It was specifically assumed that one Akagi- class carrier and one Soryu-class carrier would be lost.
It is clear that immediately after December 7 every effort was made to increase the materiel facilities in Hawaii as much as possible,
[36] Memorandum from War Department dated December 13, 1945. See committee record p. 14595.
A study contemplating 360 long-distance reconnaissance and attacks, submitted by the commander of the Army Air Forces in Hawaii on August 20, 1941, and endorsed by the Army commander, called for 180 Army 4- engine bombers, the B-17's. Committee exhibit No. 13. As of December 7, there were only 148 B-17's in the entire Army; 35 of these were in the Philippines, 12 at Hawaii, 8 in the Caribbean area, 6 at Atlantic bases, and 87 in the continental United States. Committee record, pp. 2865, 2866.
[37] Army aircraft in Hawaiian Department as reflected by AAF monthly inventories. See also committee exhibit No. 5.
[38] See enclosure to Navy memorandum for committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172.
[39] Id.
[40] As expressed by Mr. Stimson "During those days in November 1941 we at the War Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of men and ammunitions than either of the other three important Pacific outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more capable of defense." Statement of Mr. Stimson to the committee. Committee record, p. 14,407.
[41] Admiral Stark testified that he gave to Admiral Kimmel all that he could of what he had Committee record, pp. 5701-5704.
He said: "We were not able to give the commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet all the ships and men he wanted but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted." Committee record, p. 5575.
On November 25, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, in part; "We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two- ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy." Committee record, p. 5578.
[41a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Committee record, p. 14626. See further, committee record, p. 457.
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necessarily at the expense of sacrificing the needs of other installations. The evidence reflects, however, that it was a very considerable period of time after the attack before the Nation's production of war materials was sufficient to approach satisfaction of all the Hawaiian requirements.
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short had repeatedly requested more equipment, and that their needs and requests were not ignored [42] is made clear by the improved situation effected during 1941. [43] The same requests made by the Hawaiian commanders were coming from many other commanders and many other quarters. As virtually all witnesses have testified, alert commanders are always striving to improve and increase their equipment, facilities, and personnel; and it is doubtful if at any time even during the war any commander ever had all he wanted or thought he needed. [44]
It is necessarily speculative as to how additional equipment in Hawaii might have altered the situation on December 7 inasmuch as the facilities which were available were not brought into the fight. [45]
TRANSFER OF PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TO THE ATLANTIC
In May of 1941 three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy basic war plan, WPL-46. [46] In a letter to Admiral Stark dated September 12, 1941, Admiral Kimmel expressed concern regarding possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic: [47]
"The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the status quo out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced and, in event of hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive. [48]"
[43] In an aide memoir concerning "Defense of Hawaii" submitted by the War Department to the President in May of 1941, the following observations were made:
"*The Island of Oahu*, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.
"To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense. Without air superiority this is an impossible task.
"*Air Defense*. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately, 50 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit.
"Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.
"In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East." Committee exhibit No. 59.
[43] As pointed out by Admiral Stark, "During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied." Committee record, p. 5587. See in this connection the Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, for the year ending June 30, 1941. Committee record pp. 5587-5589.
[44] See testimony of Admiral Turner committee record, p. 5254, concerning the insatiable desire of field commanders for materiel. He said: "* * * you never have enough, you always want more and you want things to be better."
[45] Admiral Turner testified he believed that the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii was sufficient on December 7 1941, to have defeated or greatly reduced the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted Committee record, pp. 5258, 5259.
[46] See statement of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591.
[47] Committee exhibit No. 106. See testimony of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591.
[48] Admiral Kimmel commented in his prepared statement to the committee: "When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made." Committee record, p. 6680.  
168 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Replying on September 23, Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [49]
"We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year."
The transfer of the Pacific Fleet units in May of 1941, it would appear, had as its immediate objective the possibility of their engaging in an expedition to take the Azores, [50] in order that these vital Portuguese possessions might not fall into German hands. The occasion for taking the Azores, however, did not materialize and, as stated by Admiral Stark, "it just went on diplomatically there". [51] The fleet units, formerly attached to the Pacific Fleet, were not returned to Pearl Harbor but were employed further to augment the Atlantic Fleet, particularly in the vicinity of Iceland.
The record reflects that the transfer of a portion of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic in May of 1941 was in line with the basic war plans which recognized the Atlantic as the principal theater of operations and was designed to forestall the possibility of an indispensable strategic area falling into German hands. The transfer was an inextricable part of the over-all military policies prepared to meet the Axis threat. [52]
"ABCD" UNDERSTANDING?
A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of proceedings to determine whether the government of the United States had entered into an agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands committing this Nation to war upon Japan in the event British or Dutch possessions were attacked by the Japanese. [52a] It is clear from evidence before the committee that no agreement was entered into in this regard. The President and his Cabinet, while momentarily expecting an attack by Japan, recognized and observed the constitutional mandate that this government could only be committed to war by a declaration of the Congress.
Recognizing the inevitable Consequences of the Tripartite Pact, representatives of the War and Navy Departments participated during 1941 in a series of staff conversations with military and naval experts
[49] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[50] In a letter to Admiral Kimmel of May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark stated, among other things, "Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army, of course, will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt." Committee record, pp. 5607, 5608.
[51] Committee record, pp. 13977, 13978.
In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "How would you attack and take the Azores without a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them."  
He replied: "I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I don't think we would have. * * * I always construed that situation, with regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready if an emergency arose there." Committee record. p. 13979.
[52] See Part I, pp. 10-13, supra, this report. It does not appear from the evidence that additional Fleet units would have assisted in detecting the approaching Japanese striking force, in view of the dispositions made by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, or otherwise have materially aided in the defense against an air attack. As previously suggested, had the major Fleet units transferred to the Atlantic in May of 1941 been in Pearl Harbor on December 7 they, too, would in all probability have been destroyed. See in the latter connection, Part II, pp. 69 72, this report.
[52] This inquiry appears to have been largely precipitated by a remark attributed to Prime Minister Churchill during an address before the House of Commons on January 27, 1942. He is quoted as having stated "On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectations had not been falsified by the events." See Committee record, p. 1286.  
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 169
of Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands. [53] The first of these meetings, initiated by the Chief of Naval Operations [54] and limited to American and British representatives, was held in Washington from January 29 to March 27, 1941. The official report of the conversations, referred to as "ABC-1," points out specifically that the discussions were held with a view "to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, *should the United States be compelled to resort to war*." [56] The report states clearly that the plans to accomplish this purpose, as embodied in the report, were subject to confirmation by the highest military authorities in the United States and Great Britain and by the governments of both countries as well. [56] This was in accord with the joint statement of the position the American representatives would take, made by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff on January 27 at the outset of the conversations. [57]
"ABC-1" was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy and by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, [58] thereafter being submitted to the President on June 2, 1941. On June 7 the President returned "ABC-1" without formal approval; pointing out that since the plan had not been finally approved by the British Government, he would not approve it at that time but that in case of war the report should be returned to him for approval. [59]
Shortly after the staff conversations in Washington military and naval representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands conferred in April of 1941 at Singapore in order to draft a plan for the conduct of operations in the Far East based on "ABC-1." In the instructions sent the commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet [60] prior to the Singapore conversations it was emphatically pointed out that the results of such conversations were likewise subject to ratification by the governments concerned and were to involve no political commitment by the United States. [61] The report of the conversations, [62] referred to as "ADB", explicitly recognized that no political commitments were implied. [63] Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff withheld their approval feeling that
[53] Admiral Stark said: "In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might also be faced perhaps concurrently with a war in the Pacific. With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 1941." Committee record, p 5572.
[54] Admiral Stark was asked; "* * * it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you communicated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to discuss collaboration between the two navies?"
Admiral STARK: "That is correct, in case of war."
Question: "Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?"
Admiral STARK: "My own."
Question: "Did you discuss the subject with the President?"
Admiral STARK; "I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the President until later I had done it."
[55] See committee exhibit No. 49 for a full report of the staff conversations.
[56] Committee exhibit No. 49.
[57] Id.
[58] See committee record, p. 2617.
[59] Id., at pp. 2619, 2620.
[60] Id,, at p. 6320.
[61] Id., at p. 5123.
[62] For the report of the Singapore conversations, see committee exhibit No. 50.
[63] In testifying concerning the Singapore conversations, Admiral Turner said: "In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities. "None of the ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War or the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were being held from time to time." Committee record. p. 5122.

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some of the statements in the report had political implications. [64] One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was subsequently incorporated *as a recommendation* in the joint memoranda of November 5 and 27 which the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military counteraction should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or directly. threatened the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100 east or south of 10 north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. [65]
As elsewhere pointed out, it was mutually understood at the Atlantic Conference in August of 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the Governments of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the Far East. [66] It was agreed, however, that steps should be taken to make clear to Japan that further aggressive action by her against neighboring countries would result in each country being compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate rights of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety and security. [67] Accordingly, upon returning to Washington the President on August 17, 1941 informed the Japanese Ambassador that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in line with a program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. [68]
During the latter half of 1941 negotiations to meet the American objections to the "ADB" report proceeded slowly until discussions were opened in the Far East in November between Admiral Hart, commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Phillips, the British Far Eastern naval commander. Soon after the out-break of war, the two commanders completed arrangements for initial American and British naval dispositions to meet probable Japanese action in the Far East. Admiral Hart's report of his conversations with Admiral Phillips was received in the Navy Department about 11 p. m., December 6, 1941, and was approved in a dispatch sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations on December 7 after the attack on Pearl Harbor. [69]
On December 6, 1941, Admiral Hart cabled the Chief of Naval Operations concerning a report received from Singapore that the United States had "assured British armed support under three or four eventualities". [70] None of the witnesses who were questioned on this
[64] See committee exhibit No. 65. Also testimony Of Admiral Turner, committee record, pp. 5118, 6119.
[65] See section, infra, Avoidance of War.
[66] See Part I, this report.
[67] Id.
[68] Id.
[69] See testimony of Admiral Stark before the joint committee.
[70] Admiral Hart's dispatch was based on a communication which he had received on December 6, l941, from Capt. John M, Creighton, who was a naval attache in Singapore, as follows: "Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London Quote We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: Affirm we are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam; Baker if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense; Cast if Japs attack us the British. Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra, second if the Nips violate any part of Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch. Unquote." Committee record, pp. 13520,13521.
In the course of his testimony before the committee Captain Creighton stated he had no knowledge of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain or the Dutch and that the report transmitted to Admiral Hart must have come to him second-hand. Committee record, pp. 13516- 13637.
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point, including Admiral Hart, [71] was aware of any evidence to substantiate the report. In his testimony, the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that the report may have been based on a misconception as to the state of negotiations following the Singapore conference. [72] There is no evidence to indicate that Japanese knowledge of the "ABC" and "ADB" conversations was an inducing factor to Japan's decision to attack the United States coincident with her thrust to the south. Indeed, the idea of attacking us at Pearl Harbor was conceived before these conversations were initiated. [73] Manifestly any estimate which the Japanese made of American probable action was based on this country's long-standing Far Eastern policy and the course of diplomatic negotiations, and not on nonpolitical, technical discussions on a staff level. [74]
It should be noted that on November 7 the President took an informal vote of his Cabinet as to whether it was thought the American people would support a strike against Japan in the event she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The following significant statement appears in the diary of Secretary Stimson for December 2:
"The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. [75]"
From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis for the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing he United States to war against Japan in the event of an attack by her upon the British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the President and his Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem to the Congress should our position in the Far East become intolerable. [76] Further, the reports of the 1941 staff conversations contain clear disclaimers of any political commitments and the voluminous records relating to these conversations will be searched in vain for any suggestion that an agreement binding the United States to go to war was made. Additionally, all the witnesses who were questioned on the point [77] including the ranking military and naval leaders of he country at the time testified that *in these meetings the constitutional prerogative of the Congress to declare war was scrupulously re-  
[71] Committee record, pp. 12785-12875.
[72] Id., at p. 6317.
[73] See Part II, this report re Japanese plans for the attack.
[74] Before the committee, General Marshall was asked: "Let us assume first that they (the Japanese) knew that we were going to go to war if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us assume on the other hand that they knew we were not going to participate unless we were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge?"  
He replied: "Japanese Psychology being what it is and the Japanese Army domination being what it was their general scheme for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the Southwest Pacific being known now, I don't think that would have had any particular effect one way or the other." Committee record, p. 13786.
[75] See statement of Mr. Stimson. Committee record, p. 14427.
[76] Admiral Stark said: "Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned." Committee record, p. 13875.
Again, " * * * as to our striking after declaration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable us, and our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then that our safety was imperiled we did not fight, I think it would have been done in a constitutional manner." Committee record, pp. 13892-12893. Further, " * * * I do again make the statement, and I want it clear on the record, so far as my thoughts were concerned, that if Japan had not attacked and if conditions had become intolerable to our national safety because of what she was doing, and that would have been through the Congress." Committee record, p. 13895.
[77] See testimony of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, General Gerow before the committee.
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spected. [78] The preliminary planning done at these conferences manifested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out by the Axis. [79] This planning saved precious time and lives once Japan struck.
While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record that the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States Britain and the Netherlands would act in concert. An intercepted November 30 dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin stated in pertinent part: [80]
"* * * it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations (England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China) and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
A message of December 3 which was intercepted from the Washington Embassy to Tokyo related: [81]  
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war is a definite certainty, in the event of an occupation of Thailand."
There is nothing, however, in the foregoing intelligence having any relationship to the Hawaiian situation; to have advised the commanders there that the Japanese regarded an attack upon the British or Dutch as tantamount to an attack upon the United States would have added nothing they had already been categorically warned that hostile action by Japan against the United States itself was possible at any moment.
AVOIDANCE OF WAR
As has been seen in considering the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack, every effort was made compatible with national honor to forestall the inevitable conflict with Japan. The policy of the United States *condemned aggression*; the policy of Japan was *predicated on aggression*. It was only a question of time, therefore, before these two irreconcilable principles would engender war. [82] Officials of our Government were faced with the problem of effecting a delicate balance between gaining time to improve our military preparedness on the one hand and not forsaking our principles, national honor, and Allies on the other.
[78] That the certain prerogative of the Congress to declare war was recognized in discussions with other governments is revealed by the following dispatch from Ambassador Winant to the State Department dated November 30, 1941, transmitting a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt:
"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. *I realize your constitutional difficulties* but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near you should not *say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress*' or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war." Committee exhibit No. 24. See also testimony of General Marshall, committee record, pp. 2785 2786.
[79] In the course of counsel's examination, General Gerow was asked: "* * * has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations?"
He replied: "Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir * * * at one time I think we had plans against almost everybody sir, and I think that is the practice of every general staff of every nation." Committee record pp. 2673, 2674.
As stated by Admiral Stark, "It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency." Committee record, p, 13977.
[80] Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 205.
[81] Id., at p. 227. For a full treatment of the matter, however, indicating that no agreement whatsoever existed for military action on our part in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand, see committee exhibit No. 169.
[82] See Part I, supra, this report.
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In summing up the salient features of the situation as they appeared o him in November of 1941, Mr. Stimson said: [83]
"1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.
"2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately fighting Germany England, Russia, or China should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we would be required to go in.
"3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nevertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines even if we had to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were building up in the Philippines.
"4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor."
It should be noted that in October of 1940 the President advised Admiral Richardson that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies the United States would not enter the war
"that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. [84]"
On October 30, 1941, a message was received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek indicating his belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming (Yunnan), located on the Burma Road, was imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. [85] The Secretary of State requested the advice of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as to the attitude which this Government should assume toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road. In a joint memorandum for the President dated November 5 they set forth the following conclusions and recommendations, after reviewing the situation in China: [86]
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:
"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any ease, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.
"(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:
"(1) *A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies*;
"(2) *The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the loyalty Islands*.
"(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.
[83] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14385.
[84] Testimony of Admiral Richardson, committee record, pp. 683, 684.
[85] See committee exhibit No. 16A. Similar messages were received through the American ambassador in Chungking, the Magruder Mission and the United States naval attache. Exhibits Nos. 16, 16A.
[86] Committee exhibit No. 16.  

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"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.
"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.
"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
"Specifically, they recommend:
"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.
"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.
"That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."
The reply of the President to Chiang Kai-shek's message was handed to the Chinese Ambassador on November 14 and followed the recommendations of General Marshall and Admiral Stark. It pointed out that it did not appear preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack and observed, among other things: [87]
" * * * Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our lend- lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition. Our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible."
In a joint memorandum for the President, prepared under date of November 27, 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark pointed out that "if the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces." [88] They observed that:
"*The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time*. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. *Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base.
[87] Id.
[88] Committee exhibit No. 17.
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Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.
"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken *only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, Nets Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands* [89]
"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.
"It is recommended that:
"Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory, as above outlined;
"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war, prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;
"Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning. [90]"
It is to be noted that the foregoing memorandum was dated November 27, 1941, the day after the Secretary of State had delivered our Government's reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. The evidence shows, however, that the memorandum was considered at an Army- Navy Joint Board meeting on the morning of November 26, following the meeting of the War Council on the preceding day at which Secretary Hull had stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. [91] The memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations conveys two cardinal thoughts governing the approach of the military to the negotiations; i. e., *the most essential thing was to gain time, and the precipitance of military action should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy*. In this connection General Marshall referred to the reaction of the Army and Navy to the dropping of the thought of a modus vivendi in the following terms: [92]
"My recollection is, and I have a fairly clear recollection of our disappointment that from the military point of view, meaning Army and Navy, that we would not gain any more time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from a military point of view."
[89] General Marshall testified that this paragraph referred to the conference of military leaders held in Singapore in April of 1941. He was asked: "When you say that the Dutch, British, and the United States military authorities had *agreed* to that action did you mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to recommend it to their governments?"
General Marshall replied: "*Agreed to recommend it*. They had no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated * * *." Committee record, pp. 2784, 2785.
[90] See note 78, supra, and note 111, infra.
[91] With reference to the Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit No. 17), Admiral Ingersoll recalled that he "* * * presented at a Joint Board Meeting on apparently the day before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at the Joint Board Meeting. The only satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that." Committee record, p. 11366.
[92] Committee record, p. 13775.  
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In pointing out the distinction between his approach and that of Secretary Stimson, [93] General Marshall said: [94]
"He [Secretary Stimson] was very much afraid he feared that we would find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese actually broke peace.
"He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.
"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular time.
"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrangements."
It is apparent from the memorandum of November 27 that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations desired more time insofar as consistent with national policy and not at the expense of forsaking the honor of the Nation. As General Marshall testified: [95]
"Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was struggling with the means to fight. * * * *I wanted time, and the question was how much time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position.*"
Further, the memorandum relates to the matter of precipitance of war by the United States; that is, no affirmative steps should be taken by the United States to bring about war with Japan "precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy."
As observed in reviewing the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack, the November 26 note of our Government to Japan was not a precipitant of war it was merely a laudable restatement of the principles for which we had stood for many years in the Orient. There can, therefore, be no question that the delivery to Japan of the American note of November 26 was not in any way in contravention of the expressed position of our own military. Furthermore, Tokyo advised her emissaries in Washington on November 20 that a modus vivendi would not be acceptable to Japan, [96] and in consequence had our Government submitted a modus vivendi to the Japanese, no more time would have been afforded the Army and Navy. General Marshall and Admiral Stark had themselves recommended that we take military counter-action should Japan attack the very territory which she was already poised to attack in the event she failed to secure the demands contained in the Japanese ultimatum of November 20*. [97]
Indeed, at the very time Japan's ambassadors were discussing a temporary truce, her military was continuing its move to the South. Secretary Stimson's diary for November 26, 1941, reflects the following comments, among others: [98]
[93] In this diary for November 27, Mr. Stimson commented: "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part." Committee record p. 14422.
[94] Committee record, p. 13821.
[95] Id., at p. 13822.
[96] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 160.
[97] Id., No. 17.
[98] Committee record, p. 14420  
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". . . . I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He fairly blew up-jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce an entire withdrawal (from China) they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-China. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special messenger."
It is to be noted that Mr. Stimson's diary for November 25, 1941, describes a meeting at the White House attended by the President; Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson; General Marshall; and Admiral Stark. It states, in part: [99] "There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade [100] brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked (as soon as) next Monday without warning, and the question was what we should do. *The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition*." [101]
In referring to Mr. Stimson's comment concerning maneuvering the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves, [102] General Marshall testified: [103]
"* * * they were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement."
The Chief of Staff stated that Secretary Stimson was referring to what the *diplomatic* procedure was to be; not the *military* procedure. [104]
On November 28 Secretary Stimson called upon the President inasmuch as Military Intelligence had supplied him a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and "it amounted to such a statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up." Referring to his conversation with the President on this occasion, Mr. Stimson wrote in his diary: [105]
"He (the President) branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told him I could see two. His alternatives were first,  
[99] Id., at p. 14418.
[100] This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe.
[101] Mr. Stimson pointed out in this connection that our military and naval advisers had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it. Committee record, p. 14418.
[102] In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "Now, I want to know why if you know, there was a distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of the first shot."
He replied: "Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking one of them I think it was in October or November, along in there, between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the Salinas, I believe it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We considered it our job to get that material through not simply to use this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action on it. There were certain waters defined, and limits established, which, I believe, we called our waters. The President's speech shows it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that area they would do so at their peril. They came in and attacked us. As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area, and we did do it * * * I think that that situation is not comparable to what was going on in the Pacific, where the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay incident." Committee record, pp. 13981, 13982.
[103] Committee record, p. 13801.
[104] Id., at p. 13799.
[105] Id., at p. 14423.
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to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one."
Mr. Stimson set forth the following observations concerning the War Council meeting on November 28: [106]
"It was the consensus that the present move (by the Japanese) that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing some where completely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion of every one that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. *It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed*. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.
"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the final decision at that time and the President asked Hull, and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers."
Mr. Stimson's diary for December 2, 1941, contains the following comments concerning a meeting at the White House: [107]
"The President went step by step over the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of southern Indo-China just what they are going to do and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that *he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us*."
On December 6 President Roosevelt dispatched his appeal to the Emperor; and, after the bombs had already fallen on Hawaii, our Ambassador in Tokyo was informed that it was desired the Japanese Memorandum of December 7, which was keyed for delivery to the United States coincident with the attack on Pearl Harbor, be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President. [108]
[106] Id., at pp. 14424, 14425.
[107] Id., at p. 14427.
[108] See Part I, supra, this report.
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It is clear from the evidence that the feeling of the President and his advisers that the United States must fight if the British and Dutch ere attacked was predicated on the necessities of our own security and not occasioned by reason of any formal commitment or agreement requiring such action on the part of the United States. [109] That our Government was hoping to avoid war long after any real hope existed [110] made manifest by the fact that the President contemplated sending warning to Japan on "Tuesday afternoon or evening" (December 9) if no answer was received from the Emperor by Monday (December 8.) [111] In referring to the appeal to the Emperor, Mr. Hull said: [112]
"The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping- off place in Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, *the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute*."
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON
THE "MAGIC"
With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness, regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commendation, the War and Navy Departments collaborated in breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted and decoded messages between Japan and her diplomatic establishments, the so-called Magic, a wealth of intelligence concerning the purposes of the Japanese was available in Washington. [113]
Both the Army and Navy maintained several stations throughout the United States and in the Pacific for the purpose of intercepting Japanese radio communications. These stations operated under instructions mandating from Washington and forwarded the intercepted traffic to Washington without themselves endeavoring to decode or translate the material. The only exception to this procedure was in the case of the Corregidor station which had been provided with facilities for exploiting many of the Japanese diplomatic messages in view of its advantageous location from the standpoint of intercepting Tokyo traffic. [114]
Insofar as the commanding officers in Hawaii were concerned they received none of the Magic save as it was supplied them by the War and Navy Departments in the original, paraphrased, or captioned form or, operationally, through instructions predicated on this source of intelligence. While the highest military officials in Washington did not know the precise nature of radio intelligence activities in Hawaii, it is clear that those charged with handling the Magic did not
[109] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14418. Also committee exhibits Nos. 16, 17.
[110] Admiral Stark was asked: "Was not that our intention (of doing anything possible to prevent war with the Japanese) right up to December 7, if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principles?"
He replied: "Yes, sir, and we had been working for months on that, and the record is complete in that regard." Committee record, p. 13915.
[111] See committee record, pp. 13741, 13742.
[112] See Secretary Hull's replies to committee interrogatories. Committee record, p. 14266.
[113] See committee exhibits Nos. I and 2. For a discussion of Magic and its great significance to the prosecution of the war see letters dated September 25 and 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey. Committee record pp. 2979-2989.
[114] For a discussion of the mechanics of the Magic see testimony of Admiral Noyes and Capts. L. F Safford and A. D. Kramer of the Navy, and Cols. Otis K. Sadtler and Rufus Bratton of the Army; before the committee.
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180 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rely upon either the Army or Navy in Hawaii being able to decode the diplomatic messages which were decoded in Washington. However both Admirals Stark and Turner testified that they were under the impression that Japanese diplomatic messages were being decode by the Navy in Hawaii. [115] No justification for this impression existed in fact apart from the failure of these officers to inform themselves adequately concerning Navy establishments. [116] Under arrangements existing during 1941 between the Army and the Navy in Washington the decoding and translating of Magic was divided between the Army Signal Intelligence Service under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer and a unit in the Navy, known as OP-20-G, under the control of the Director of Naval Communications. The responsibility for decoding and translating messages was allocated between the two services on the basis of the dates of the messages with each service ordinarily handling all messages originated on alternate days, the Army being responsible for even dates and the Navy, for odd dates This procedure was flexible in that it was departed from in order to expedite the handling of material as the occasion demanded or in the case of any unusual situation that might prevail in one or the other of the services.
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO DISSEMINATION OF MAGIC
The Magic intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes were being broken. [117] Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the Secretary of Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the Army was responsible for distribution of Magic within the War Department and to the State Department; the Navy, for distribution within the Navy Department and to the White House. Any disclosure of the fact that the Japanese messages were being decoded or any disclosure of information obtainable only from that source would inevitably have resulted in Japan's changing her codes with attendant loss completely of the vital Magic. This fact was responsible for the translated material being closely held among a
[115] See committee record, p. 5095.
[116] Admiral Stark testified: "I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was told that he could. *However, I want to make it plain that that did not influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent*. I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which (would) be of high interest to them. Regardless of what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that affirmative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters which I thought they should have." Committee record, p. 5793
[117] During the course of his testimony, General Miles was asked: "Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?"
He replied: "That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to decode them should be confirmed to the least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington. * * *
"The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode Japanese messages, in their best code, was of incalculable value to us, both in the period when war threatened and most definitely during our waging of that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the distribution of those messages and of the constantly increasing closing in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret." Committee record, pp. 2092, 2093.
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few key individuals, in addition necessarily to those who processed the messages.
The policy generally prevailed in the days before Pearl Harbor that the Magic materials were not ordinarily to be disseminated to field commanders. [118] This policy was prescribed for the reason that (1) the Japanese might conceivably intercept the relayed Magic intelligence and learn of our success in decrypting Japanese codes: [119] (2) the volume of intercepted traffic was so great that its transmission, particularly during the critical period of diplomatic negotiations, would have overtaxed communication facilities; and (3) responsibility for evaluation of this material which was largely diplomatic in nature was properly in Washington, where the Magic could be considered along with other pertinent diplomatic information obtained from the State Department and other sources. There was no inflexible rule, however, which precluded sending to theater commanders in proper instances, either in its original form as paraphrased or in the form of estimates, conclusions, or orders based wholly or in part upon Magic. Important information derived therefrom was from time to time sent to the Hawaiian commanders by the Navy Department in paraphrased form or in the form of estimates. [120] The War Department, on the other and, did not send the Magic to the field, for the reason that the Army code was not believed to be as secure as that of the Navy. [121]
For purposes of the investigation Magic fell generally into two categories: first, messages relating to diplomatic matters of the Japanese Government; [122] and second, messages relating to espionage activities by Japanese diplomatic representatives, particularly with respect to American military installations and establishments. [123]
The decision not to endeavor to supply field commanders all of the Magic intelligence as such was a reasonable one under the circumstances. However, it is incumbent to determine whether responsible commanding officers were otherwise supplied the equivalent of intelligence obtained from the Magic materials.
"SHIPS IN HARBOR" REPORTS
NATURE OF CONSULAR ESPIONAGE
In addition to the Magic materials relating strictly to diplomatic negotiations, a great many messages between Japan and her diplomatic establishments were intercepted reflecting espionage activities by the consular staffs. [124] These intercepts related in the main to instructions sent by Tokyo and replies pursuant thereto concerning the movement and location of American ships and the nature of military and defensive installations.
[118] For a discussion concerning this matter, see letter dated April 22, 1941, from Capt. Arthur N. McCollum in Washington to Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. Committee record, pp. 12917- 12923.
[119] This factor applied principally to the Army. See testimony of General Miles. Note 121, infra.
[120] See committee exhibit No. 37, pp. 4-12, 40, 41.
[121] In testifying concerning the matter of distributing Magic to field commanders General Miles was asked; "Do I understand from your answer that these messages intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?"
He replied: "They were not. In some cases the substance of some messages were sent to Hawaii, and all most always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code." Committee record, pp. 2091, 2092.
[122] Committee exhibit No. 1.
[123] Id., No. 2.
[124] Id.
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The Hawaiian commanders have strongly insisted that messages to and from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu clearly indicated Japan's intention to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. They contend they were wrongfully deprived of this information, basing this contention to a great extent on an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo of September 24, 1941 [125] issuing the following instructions to its Honolulu Consulate: [126]
"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.) [127]"
The foregoing message, No. 83, has been gratuitously characterized throughout the proceedings as the "bomb plot message", the "harbor berthing plan", and by similar terms. Three other intercepted messages relate in a pertinent manner to the September 24 dispatch and to Tokyo's interest in the fleet at Pearl Harbor:
(1) In a message from Tokyo to the Honolulu Consul, dated November 15, 1941 (translated December 3, 1941) it was stated: [128]
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."
(2) An intercept from Tokyo dated November 20, 1941 (translated December 4) read: [129]
"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation."
(3) An intercept of November 29 (translated December 5) stated: [130]
"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements?"
Referring to the indicated messages, Admiral Kimmel testified: [131]
"In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information  
[125] Translated October 9.
[126] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 12.
[127] Some of the subsequent reports from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu were made pursuant to the instructions contained in the September 24 dispatch from Tokyo. See committee exhibit No. 2 pp. 13 and 14.
[128] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 13.
[129] Id., at p. 15.
Captain Kramer testified with respect to the blank, a garble, in this message between the words "fleet" and "bases" that he believed the original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would read: "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases." Committee record, pp. 1162-1163
[130] Committee exhibit No. 2, 15 p.
[131] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.
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which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. *These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor*. The information sought and obtained with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor."
In the same connection General Short testified: [132]  
"While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, *because such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in Hawaii*. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington new of this Japanese espionage. *This message, analyzed critically, is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor*."
In endeavoring to evaluate the intercepted dispatch of September 4 and related dispatches, it is to be borne in mind that the Japanese were insistent in their desire to secure information concerning the location and movements of American vessels everywhere and not merely at Pearl Harbor. There are no other dispatches before the committee, however, in which *Tokyo* manifested an interest concerning the disposition of ships *within* a harbor, as in the case of the "berthing plan," as distinguished from the desire to know whether a vessel was at a particular harbor. Viewing the September 24 instructions to her Honolulu consul in this light, it would appear that Tokyo vas manifesting an unusual interest in the presence of our Pacific fleet and the detailed location thereof in Pearl Harbor.
The evidence reflects, however, that no one in Washington attached he significance to the "berthing plan" which it is now possible to read into it. To determine whether failure to appreciate the plan represents a lack of imagination and a dereliction of duty, we consider now the contentions of the officers who saw this intelligence before December 7, 1941, and the circumstances under which it was received in Washington.
At the time the "berthing plan" was translated, the practice was being followed by Captain Kramer of preparing a gist of intercepted messages to expedite consideration of them by recipients. [133] Asterisks were employed along with the gist to provide an indication of the significance of messages one asterisk meant "interesting messages"; two asterisks, "especially important or urgent messages." [134] The gist relating to the berthing plan read: [135] "Tokyo directs special reports In ships with(in) Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact location" and was indicated by one asterisk
[132] Id., at p. 7989
[133] The practice of preparing gists is indicated to have been discontinued during the month of November 1941, for the reason that the President insisted on seeing the original messages "because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, someone would change the meaning." See testimony of Captain Safford, Hewitt Inquiry Record, p. 408, also Clarke Inquiry Exhibit No. 23.
[134] Committee record pp. 11206, 11207.
[135] Id., at pp. 11207, 11208.
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as being an "interesting message". In explaining his estimate of the message, Captain Kramer testified: 136
"* * * Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do not believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going over days' traffic with various recipients; I do not believe it was interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service.
"I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and *I believe it was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt on the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communications.*
"That view is substantiated by many factors.
"One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already in existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional funds for quarterly allotments, and so forth to cover telegraphic expenses. Those expenses were usually paid and furnished in part when so requested by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think explain, probably, the handling of this particular message, sir."
Upon being asked what evaluation he placed on the harbor berthing plan and related intercepts, Admiral Wilkinson testified: [137]
"The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out that reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of information, whether by photography or by written report or otherwise.
"We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we had gotten from them there had been indications of movements and locations of ships; in the papers that they had there were instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of ships except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philippines because there were agencies finding that information there.
"My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and these data together was that these dispatches were part of the general information system established by the Japanese. We knew also that certain information had been sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the bombing target significance which now appears."
And again: [138]
"* * * the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what her state of readiness was and the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted to know everything they could not only about the movement of the ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and not a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to those that were present where they were located with reference to state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at doublebanked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take some time to go out."
Admiral Wilkinson thought he had mentioned to one or more officers that the Japanese seemed curious as to the lay-port in Pearl Harbor and testified "at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their nicety of intelligence." [139]
On the other hand, Admiral Stark, who stated he had no recollection of having seen the berthing plan and accompanying messages prior to the attack, testified: [140]
[136] Id., at p. 1160.
[137] Id., at pp. 4620, 4621.
[138] Id., at pp. 4622, 4623.
[139] Id., at p. 4624.
[140] Id., at pp. 5788, 5789.
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"These messages are of a class of message which gives positions of ships in harbor, gives locations. The message, however, is distinctly different from the usual type of ship report, which simply would say, "So many ships" or give their names, in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the location of ship in the harbor in her particular berth.
"I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two places were ships were reported like in Puget Sound, in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch while of a class is of a character which is different.
"In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can read into now, as indicating the possibility or at least the ground work for a Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have in the light of hindsight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection of anybody ever having given that significance at the time."
Asked if he felt significance should have been attached to the plan at the time it was received, Admiral Stark said: [141]
"It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only say that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were likewise vitality interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed it out. There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japanese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put down as just another example of their great attention to detail.
"If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I might have read into it because it is different, I might have said, "Well, this is unusual. I wonder why they want it?" I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not. I simply did not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened."
Captain McCollum, [142] who was not in Washington at the time the harbor berthing plan was intercepted or translated, suggested certain reasons why the plan would not have been interpreted as a "bombing plot." [143] He observed that beginning in 1935 the Japanese Navy was apparently not satisfied with the type of intelligence forwarded by the consular agents and in consequence undertook to set up an observation net of its own, particularly on the west coast of the United States, but that it was his feeling the Japanese had been unable to put naval observers into the consulate at Honolulu. Therefore. As he testified: [144]
"As we estimated it, the consul general at Honolulu was receiving, through the Foreign Office at the instance of the Japanese Naval Department, explicit directions of the type of intelligence that was needed, much more in detail than any of the other key consulates on the west coast, because he did not have the benefit of the services of a Japanese Naval Intelligence officer within his consulate.
"Therefore this thing here, if I saw it, I am quite certain I would have felt it was just another move to get explicit information, to cut down the frequently voluble type of reports made by consular officials which the Jap Navy did not like."
Captain McCollum further pointed out that the matter of how ships were anchored and where they were anchored was designed to indicate the facility with which the fleet was prepared to *sortie*, considering that the anchorage at Pearl Harbor is "chopped up" into a number of more or less independent locks. He testified: [145]
"To give a general statement of where the ships were, the stuff they are requiring here, would require a rather long-winded dispatch, where the same device such as breaking it up into areas A, B, and C, such a simple device could be used. With
[141 Id., at pp. 5790, 6791.
[142] Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.
[143] Captain McCollum left Washington on September 24 and did not return until October 11. Committee record, p. 9195.
[144] Committee record, pp. 9140, 9141.
[145] Id., at pp. 9178, 9179.  

186 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
this area discovered, a rather simple and short dispatch would suffice to give the essential information as to the location of the fleet and also an indication of their readiness for sortie. I would suggest that that is a reasonable, tenable hypothesis as to why they wished information, apparently, in this detail."
In summary, Captain McCollum stated he would not now necessarily regard the harbor berthing plan as a "bombing plan" unless "I had known Pearl Harbor had been bombed." [140]
It appears clear that there were many other messages between Tokyo and her consulates, received in Washington, indicating a likely Japanese purpose to attack at points other than at Hawaii. [147]
These messages indicate a definite interest in the state of defenses at many points. A dispatch from Tokyo on October 16 to its Seattle consul instructed "Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes report it at once." [148] In the same message the Consulate was instructed to report on the movement and basing of warships at least once every 10 days, "As long as there is no great change," but a report was to be submitted "Should more than 10 vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time." A June 23, 1941 dispatch from Tokyo to Mexico instructed: [149] "Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to Panama * * *. Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the naval attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns." While no instructions from Tokyo to Panama are available subsequent to August 2, 1941, the reports to Tokyo contain detailed information concerning the location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location and camouflage of petroleum supply tanks, location and strength of artillery patrols, radar detectors and their range, map procurement and other matters which would obviously be of interest only if an attack on the Panama Canal were contemplated. [150] While some of these messages were translated after December 7, they have a distinct bearing on whether, before the event, the harbor berthing plan was reasonably designed to be a harbinger of the December 7 attack. [151]
With respect to other messages concerning defenses, Tokyo on August 1 requested Manila to obtain information "regarding the camouflage and distinguishing marks of the American naval and military aeroplanes in Manila". [152] On October 4 Tokyo instructed Manila "to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west, and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc." [153] Tokyo instructed Manila on November 5, pursuant to a request of the "Naval General Staff", to obtain information with respect to each port of call concerning "(1) conditions at airports on land", "(2) types of planes at each, and number of planes", "(3) warships; also machinery belonging to land forces", and "(4) state or progress being made on all equipment and establishments." [154] On November 15 Tokyo requested Manila to "make investigations again" as to the number of large bombers in
[146] Id., at p. 9141.
[147] See committee exhibit No. 2.
[148] Id., at p. 111.
[149] Id., at p. 122.
[150] Id., at pp. 31-52
[151] General Marshall stated he was always in fear of a surprise attack on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii. Navy Court of inquiry record, p. 863.
[152] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 54.
[153] Id., at p. 72.
[154] Id., at p. 82,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 187
the Philippines. [155] Some 50 messages between Manila and Tokyo during the period August 1 to December 1, 1941, contained detailed information concerning airfields, air strength and activity, strength and activity of land forces, location of antiaircraft guns, and other items of defense. [156]
Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20 that a warship under repair at Bremerton, Wash. Had "the upper part of the bridge and left side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint". [157] A message of September 6 from Tokyo to Singapore and Batavia requested detailed information concerning various types of fishing vessels should Japan "require the use of these fishing vessels". [158] On October 22 a message from Tokyo to Singapore reflected a specific request, on behalf of the vice chief of the Japanese General Staff, for information concerning the air forces stationed in the Federated Malay States. [159] Another dispatch from Tokyo to Batavia on the same day stated that the Assistant Chief of Staff desired an inspection and report "on the air force in the Dutch Indies" in regard to training, information, and aerial combat methods; organization, types, number, and location of planes; and types and number of planes being sent from England and the United States. [160]
The exhibits are replete with evidence of the interest of Tokyo not only in the state of defenses but in ships as well, at many different points. For example, an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to San Francisco of November 29 read: [161] "Make full report beginning December 1 on the following: Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed (or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea." Nor was the Honolulu consul the only one reporting the exact location of ships in harbor. Manila advised Tokyo on November 12 that on the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port "She is tied up at dock No. 7 * * *." [162] And again on November 22, Manila advised Tokyo, among other things, that a camouflaged British cruiser entered port In the "morning of the 21st and anchored at pier No. 7 * * *." [163] Other examples of such reports will be hereinafter set forth.
Even today, of course, we do not know as a matter of fact that the "berthing plan" was a bomb plot. On the basis of testimony before he committee, the desire to know or the supplying of information with respect to the location of vessels *within* a harbor is not of itself conclusive that its only purpose was in contemplation of an attack inasmuch as such information also has the value of indicating what ships are under repair and the readiness of vessels for sortie. [164] For example, Seattle advised Tokyo on September 20, "Saratoga class aircraft carrier, 1 ship (*tied up alongside the pier*)" at Bremerton. [165] San Francisco advised Tokyo on October 2, "One Oklahoma class battle-
[155] Id., at p. 91.
[156] Id., at pp. 54-98.
[157] Id., at p. 109.
[158] Id., at p. 101.
[159] Id.. at p. 102.
[160] Id.. at p. 102.
[161] Id.. at p. 115.
[162] Id.. at p. 87.
[163] Id.. at p. 94.
[164] See Committee record, pp. 4622, 4623, 9178, and 9179.
[165] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 109.
188 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ship has arrived in port and is *moored in front of the Bethlehem shipbuilding yard*. [166] It may be argued that if obtaining information concerning the location of ships within a harbor should be construed as definitely indicating a purpose to attack the ships at harbor then these messages would logically appear to indicate a purpose to attack at Bremerton and at San Francisco.
In seeking to determine whether the harbor berthing plan was in reality a "bomb plot" it is noted that in making his report of December 5 [167] and his last report of December 6 [168] to Tokyo concerning vessels at Pearl Harbor, the Honolulu consul did not employ the system established in the plan for indicating the location of ships within the harbor. In the report of December 5, he said:
" * * * the following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers * * *."
In the last report, the consul said:
"On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were (garble) and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th: 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left) * * *."
Failure to use the plan for indicating the location of ships within the harbor at the only time when it could have materially assisted the attacking force in locating ships as targets for bombing, that is on December 5 and 6 immediately before the attack, raises a serious question as to whether the berthing plan was in reality a bomb plot at all.
Japanese interviewed since VJ-day have asserted that intelligence obtained from the consulates was regarded as of little importance. They did not include the intelligence under discussion in listing the information which the Task Force employed in planning and executing the attack on December 7. [168a]
The record reflects that no one in Washington interpreted the harbor berthing plan of September 24 and related dispatches as indicative of an attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor or was in any way conscious of the significance of the messages which it is now possible to read into them. There was in consequence no conscious or deliberate withholding of this intelligence from the Hawaiian commanders. General Marshall, and Admirals Stark, Turner, and Ingersoll testified they had no recollection of having seen these dispatches. [169]
The peculiar division of Pearl Harbor into many lochs, the insatiable desire of Japan for meticulous information concerning vessels of other governments everywhere, the manner in which the berthing plan lent itself to convenience of communications, the fact that Tokyo was repeatedly instructing its consulates to cut down on traffic, the feeling in Washington that Tokyo had no naval observer in Honolulu and in consequence more detailed instructions to its consulate there were required, Japan's natural interest in full information concerning our Pacific Fleet base, the many intercepted dispatches indicating a likely
[166] Id., at p. 110.
[167] Id., at p. 26.
[168] Id., at p. 29.
[168a] See Part II, this report concerning Japanese plans for the attack; also section "The Role of Espionage in the Attack", Part III, this report.
[169] Committee record, pp. 2912, 5788, 5108, and 11311. Admiral Stark said: "We have been over this bomb plot thing from start to finish, all of us in the front office, and I still not only have no recollection of having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not see it." Committee record, p. 13969.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 189
Japanese attack at points other than at Pearl Harbor all of these considerations necessarily entered into the appraisal of the berthing an. It may be contended that under such circumstances it would be manifestly unfair to criticize an officer with many other responsibilities [170] for failure to interpret properly a message, considered before the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan, which we single out after the event for minute analysis and conclude may have been designed to assist the Japanese in the bombing of Pearl Harbor. [171]  
Similarly, it may be argued that the absence of apparent interest by Japan in the defenses at Hawaii when compared with the avid interest manifested in the defense facilities in the Philippines, Panama, Singapore, Batavia, and on the west coast is indicative, in the days before December 7, of the fact that Hawaii was a much less likely point of attack than these other places; and that in this light, Tokyo's detailed interest in our ship locations and movements was subject to the reasonable construction that Japan desired to be warned in advance any contemplated action by our fleet and was not seeking information with a view to an attack upon it or, otherwise stated, that she desired information with a view to the fleet's availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target. [172] Further, that Pearl Harbor was the base of the Pacific Fleet, the only substantial deterrent to complete freedom of action by the Japanese Navy in Pacific waters and that in consequence thereof an unusual interest by Japan in the location of our fleet units would appear quite understandable. It may be proper to insist that since Pearl Harbor was the fleet base, Japan could be reasonably sure that substantial fleet units would be located there at virtually all times; [173] and that, with this in mind, failure to manifest an interest in the defenses of Hawaii when compared with such an interest shown at other points has a distinct bearing on whether the information exchanged between Tokyo and Honolulu concerning ship locations and movements could have pointed in any way to likelihood of an attack at Pearl Harbor. In this connection, the evidence does reflect that none of the intercepted messages translated before the attack, between Tokyo and Honolulu for over a year prior to December 7, contain any reference to the defenses of the Army or Navy in Hawaii as distinguished from locations of fleet units.
From these considerations it may be contended that a careful comparison and evaluation of messages relating to espionage activities by Japan's diplomatic establishments would not have reasonably indicated in the days before December 7 any greater likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor than was warned against in the dispatches sent the Hawaiian commanders on November 27. [174]
CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO SHIPS IN HARBOR REPORTS
Despite the foregoing observations, we think there are certain circumstances which distinguish the request for detailed information on
[170] See committee record, pp. 2131-2138.
[171] General Miles observed: "* * * this message taken alone would have been of great military significance but it was not taken alone unless you look at it by hindsight, which focuses all light on the event which did happen. It was one of a great number of messages being sent by the Japanese to various parts of the world in their attempt to follow the movements of our naval vessels, a matter which we knew perfectly well they were doing, and which we ourselves were doing in regard to the Japanese." Committee record, p. 2100.
[172] See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 407
[173] This appears to be the premise assumed by the Japanese in planning and launching the attack. See Part II, this report.
[174] Committee exhibits Nos. 32 and 37, pp. 9 and 36, respectively.

190 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor from similar or other requests for information concerning other points. War with Japan was admittedly probable for months before it actually occurred. Many of our highest military and naval authorities considered it all but inevitable. As the imminence of war increased so increased the importance of our Pacific Fleet, the home base of which was Pearl Harbor, for in the broad picture of the Pacific, the fleet was our strong arm of defense. Safety and fitness of the Pacific Fleet was of prime importance, and any communication or information bearing thereon should have been given prompt and full consideration by competent authority. We realize the exceedingly great demands upon the intelligence divisions of the War and Navy Departments occasioned by reason of the great flood of intelligence coming in from all parts of the world in the days before Pearl Harbor. Nor do we overlook the Japanese policy of acquiring detailed information of every kind from many points. It may be fair to attribute to this and other considerations the failure to see anything of unusual significance in the request of September 24 for detailed information as to the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor; but it is difficult to escape the feeling that, when the message of November 15 was translated on December 3 referring to the critical relations between Japan and the United States and requesting that the "ships in harbor report" be made irregularly but at least twice a week and directing that extra care be taken to maintain secrecy, it should have raised in someone's mind the thought that this intelligence was highly important because it dealt with that which was most vital to our safety in the Pacific the Pacific Fleet. The message of November 20, translated December 4, directing a comprehensive investigation of "the fleet (garble) bases" in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation should not have lessened such interest. [175]
It cannot be forgotten that a surprise attack by air on Pearl Harbor had been listed and understood, both in Washington and Hawaii, as the greatest danger to that base. We must assume that military men realized that in order to execute successfully such an attack the Japanese would necessarily need detailed information as to dispositions at the point of attack. It would seem to be a natural consequence that if Japan undertook an attack on Pearl Harbor she would seek to acquire such detailed information and in point of time as nearly as possible to the hour of such attempt.
We are unable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in view of the evidence indicating it was not such. [176] We are of the opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with other information and intelligence available to them, in making their estimate of the situation.
[175] It may be argued that the fact that a "war warning" had been sent the Fleet on November 27 along with the code destruction intelligence before these latter messages were translated had a bearing on or possibly conditioned the failure to attach significance to them.
[176] Admiral Kimmel said: "These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.
General Short said: "* * * such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack on Hawaii." Committee record, p. 7989.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 191
THE "WINDS CODE" [177]  
On November 19, 1941, Tokyo set up a code designed to be employed in daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts or general intelligence broadcasts in the event ordinary commercial channels of communication were no longer available. Two circular [178] dispatches Nos. 2353 and 2354 were translated by the Navy Department: [179]
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington 9 November 1941
Circular #2353
" "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added n the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast.  
"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. [1]
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITA NO KAZE KUMORI. [2]
"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. [3]
"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
"Forward as urgent intelligence."
[1] East wind rain.
[2] North wind cloudy.
[3] West wind clear.
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"19 November 1941
"Circular #2354
"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
"(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, "HIGASHI"
"(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA"
"(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.), "NISHI".
"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
"Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."
These intercepts were confirmed by a dispatch from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Office of Naval Operations dated November 28, 1941; [180] a message directed to the State Department from its diplomatic representative in Batavia dated December 4, 1941; [181] and a dispatch from the Army's military representative in Batavia, reading as follows: [182]
"Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain, United States. North wind cloudy, Russia. West wind clear, England with attack on Thailand, Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text."
The foregoing message was sent "deferred" by naval communications for General Miles of the War Department and was not decoded until the morning of December 5, 1941.
Both the War and Navy Departments extended themselves in an effort to monitor for a message in execution of the winds code. Exten-
[177] A detailed record study of the winds code will be found set forth as Appendix E to this report.
[178] The circular dispatches were designed for Japanese diplomatic establishments generally.
[179] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155.
[180] Id., No. 142.
[181] Id.
[182] Id.
 
192 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sive evidence has been taken concerning the matter, the preponderate weight of which indicates that no genuine execute message was intercepted by or received in the War and Navy Departments prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Investigation conducted in Japan strongly indicates no execute message was dispatched before the attack and the British and Dutch, who were also monitoring for an execute message, have advised that no such message was intercepted. [183] A reasonable construction of the code is that it was designed for use in the event ordinary commercial channels of communication were no longer available to Japan, a contemplation which did not materialize prior to Pearl Harbor. The fact that a message "West wind clear," applying to England, was broadcast after the attack tends to confirm this conclusion. [184] Inasmuch as the question of the winds code has been one of the few disputed factual issues in the Pearl Harbor case, there has been set forth in Appendix E to this report a detailed study of the matter.
*Based on the evidence it is concluded that no genuine "winds" message in execution of the code and applying to the United States was received by the War or Navy Departments prior to the attack on December 7, 1941*. It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined not to be execute messages.
Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, we believe that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of Japan.  
"HIDDEN WORD" CODE
In addition to the winds code the Japanese in a dispatch on November 27 established another emergency system of communications that has been familiarly referred to as the "hidden word" code. [185] The dispatch establishing this code, which was sent as a circular to all diplomatic establishments, stated: "With international relations becoming more strained, the following system of dispatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect" and further "in order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indicator." Thereafter, a number of code words, apparently arbitrarily chosen, were set forth with the meaning of each word placed opposite thereto. Among the code words were: HATTORI meaning "Relations between Japan and * * * (blank) are not in accordance with expectation"; KOYANAGI meaning "England"; and MINAMI meaning "U. S. A."
On the morning of December 7 a circular telegram from Tokyo was intercepted reading: [186]
"URGENT 92494 *KOYANAGI* RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI *HATTORI MINAMI* KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU DENPOO ARITASS STOP TOGO.
[183] Id.
[184] Id.
[185] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 186-188. The original code was supplemented by a dispatch of December 2 from from Tokyo to Singapore which was translated after the attack. Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 216-219.
[186] Committee exhibit No. 142-B.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 193
The translation as made by the Navy of the foregoing hidden-word message was distributed in Washington to authorized recipients of, Magic at 11 a. m. on December 7 in the following form: [187]
"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."  
This was not the complete message, which should have been translated: "Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States." [188] The reason for the message having been distributed on the morning December 7 with the words *United States* omitted is explained by the fact that Captain Kramer in his haste occasioned by the necessity delivering other messages, including the "one o'clock message" overlooked the code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation." He indicated that later discovered the error and telephoned at "a quarter of one or 1 o'clock" the correction to his superior and an officer of Military Intelligence. [189]
It is clear that the hidden-word message as literally translated [190] contained no information of any import not already greatly overshadowed, as will hereinafter appear, by other intelligence available on the morning of December 7 even had the words *United States* been included at the time of distribution.
THE "DEADLINE MESSAGES"
The following message, No. 736, from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, relating to the then current Japanese United States negotiations, was intercepted on November 5, 1941: [191]
"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."
On November 11, 1941 another message from Tokyo to Washington, o. 762, was intercepted, referring to the deadline set in the message November 5: [192]
"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications at the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.
"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power
[188] The Army translation of the message supplied in March 1944 read as follows "Relations between Japan and _______ are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States." Committee exhibit No. 142-B.
[189] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 133-136.
[190] Id, at pp. 579-581.
[191] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.
[192] Id., at pp. 116, 117.
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to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. *At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal*.
"We would appreciate being advised of your opinion on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A."
The deadline was again referred to in a dispatch of November 15 from Tokyo to Washington, stating: [193]
"It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.
"Whatever the case may be, *the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one*. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date."
Referring to a dispatch from its Washington Ambassador, the following message from Tokyo was intercepted on November 16: [194]
"I have read your #1090, [195] and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
"What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. [196] Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."
Responding to requests of its Ambassadors, [197] in an intercepted message of November 22, 1941, Tokyo extended the deadline date from November 25 to November 29 in the following terms: [198]
"To both you Ambassadors.
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; *if the signing can be completed by the 29th*, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, *we have decided to wait until that date*. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."
As a follow-up to the foregoing message, Tokyo on November 24, 1941, advised its Ambassadors that the time limit set in the message of November 22 was in Tokyo time. [199]
It is clear from the foregoing messages that "things are automatically going to happen" after November 29, Tokyo time. It is equally clear from information now available that the happening was to be the contemplated departure of the Japanese task force to attack
[193] Id., at p. 130.
[194] Id., at pp. 137, 138.
[195] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 127-129.
[196] Id., at pp. 92-94.
[197] Id., at p, 159.
[198] Id., at p. 165.
[199] Id., at p. 173.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 195
Pearl Harbor. But the question is not what the deadline messages are en now to mean but what they reasonably conveyed to officials in Washington in the days before December 7.
Tokyo had indicated the extreme importance of time as the dead line approached: [200] "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days." But does this importance and the fact of the deadline indicate an attack at Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, an attack on the United States elsewhere? It must be recalled that on August 17, following the Atlantic Conference, President Roosevelt advised the Government of Japan that if she took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring the security of the United States. [201] It is not unreasonable to conclude that, failing to secure a satisfaction of her demands by November 29, Japan had determined to launch a program of aggression which she felt would involve her in war against the United States. The extensive employment of her forces to the south after November 29, it would reasonably appear, was regarded as the action to be taken upon expiration of the deadline date. Washington had expressed this estimate to Admiral Kimmel on November 27: [202]
"The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo."
One of the factors considered in dispatching the "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel on November 27 was that of alerting the Fleet before the cut-off date of November 29. [203] We believe that the dispatch of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel beginning, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" and the dispatch to General Short of the same date advising that "hostile action possible at any moment" was the equivalent of and in fact was of greater significance than the so-called "deadline messages" merely informing that things would automatically happen after November 29.
Based on what is now known concerning the plan of the Japanese attack, it is believed that in contemplation of the future intelligence such as the deadline messages could well be supplied field commanders as an item of information for their assistance along with dispatches designed to alert and to supply them with an estimate of the situation.
DISPATCHES INDICATING FRAUDULENT NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER NOVEMBER 28, 1941
The following message (No. 844) from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, intercepted on November 28, 1941, indicated that negotiations thereafter were to be a sham and fraud: [204]
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts, but in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. *Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send
[201] See Part I, supra "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack".
[202] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[203] See testimony of Admiral Turner. It also appears that the November 24 warning to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was sent with a view to the deadline date of November 25.
[204] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.
196 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off*. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the pinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me about in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances that you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can".
In the light of hindsight, an intercepted dispatch of November 29 (translated November 30) portrayed the extent of Japanese guile in perpetrating the fraud: [205]
"Re my #844.
"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines: The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.
"However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions n East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.
"With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what as become of the basic objectives that the U S. Government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.
"(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)"
It is to be noted in passing that the foregoing dispatch, without benefit of retrospection, conceivably suggested at the time of its interception, the possibility that Japan was putting out a "feeler" with a view to our withdrawing from the position assumed in Secretary Hull's note of November 26.
In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to its Washington Ambassador on December 1 it was observed that the deadline date of November 9 had come and gone with the situation continuing to be increasingly critical, however, "to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though here are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)" [206]
During a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Yamamoto in Tokyo and Kurusu on November 27 (translated November 28) instructions were issued to Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break them off." [207]
The following significant trans-Pacific conversation was had between Kurusu and Yamamoto on November 30: [208]
"KURUSU. It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one (i.e., telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)
"YAMAMOTO. Yes. I see.
"KURUSU. The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.
"Y. Is there any special significance to this?
"K. The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here.
[205] Id., at p. 199.
[206] Id., at p. 208.
[207] Id., at pp. 188-191.
[208] Id., at pp. 206-207.  
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 197  
"Y. Is that so.
"K. Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving.
"(Pause.)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements Please tell Mr. Tani.
"Y. We are being careful.
"K. We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged up. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this. (i. e. Premier's speech.)
"(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)
"K. What about the internal situation? (In Japan.)
"Y. No particular _____ (one or two words faded out)
"K. Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?
"Y. Yes.
"K. *You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches*! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion.
"Y. When will you see them. The 2nd?
"K. Let's see this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here.
"(Pause.)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?
"Y. Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?
"K. I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime.
"Y. Well then Goodbye."
Admiral Kimmel in testifying before the joint committee said: [209]
"The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect; that the plan was such importance that it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.
"What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negations as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.
"Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo- China * * * "No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy" (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, Committee Transcript, page 453.) The troop movements to southern Indo- China were the subject of formal diplomatic exchanges between the two governments of Japan and the United States.
* * * * *
"Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese government from this formal representation of the United States that our government was aware of the movement in do-China. The United States expressed its concern about potential Japanese action against the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising these objectives.
"Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted to her envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion the United States, it must have been apparent to a careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on a deadline date of November 29 had put into effect an operation, which was to consume a substantial time interval before its results were apparent to this government, and which appeared susceptible of effective concealment in its initial phases."
[209] Committee record, pp. 6791-6793.
198 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The observations of Admiral Kimmel are well taken, however, they are colored by knowledge of subsequent events. He has stated that on or after November 29 "A Japanese *plan* of action automatically went into effect" whereas the Japanese had stated that after that date "things are automatically going to happen." He comments that "negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan" whereas it is only after the event that this ruse could be apparent. He refers to the "concealed Japanese plans" and observes that Japan's open move to the South could not be the "automatic move." This premise presupposes that the "automatic move" was to be concealed, a fact which was not and could not be known until after the attack.
Admiral Kimmel makes reference to the intensification of Japanese activity to the south about November 29 [210] but fails to consider that this activity was subject to the reasonable construction that the "automatic move" was the move to the South and the desire to "stretch out" negotiations was a natural step in seeking to prevent a thwarting of Japanese plans in that direction before she was fully poised for attack. That the Japanese movement to the South effectively diverted attention from other points and effectively disguised the strike against Pearl Harbor is indisputable. But this is known only after the attack.
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to attach to the fraudulent character of Japanese negotiations after November 28 the greatest significance to see that it clothed a Japanese action fraught with typical treachery. But it is clear from the evidence that the salient questions in the minds of responsible officials in Washington in the few days before Pearl Harbor was not *Would the Japanese attack*? but *when* and *where* would she attack? The fact that an attack would come was the considered judgment of our military. The Tokyo dispatch of November 28 did not supply the highly essential information which was desired. Neither the intercepted dispatches from Tokyo indicating the fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28 nor the deadline messages supplied the *when* or *where* of the attack. We do not believe that this intelligence, if taken together, would have predicted Pearl Harbor as a likely place of attack.
To have advised Admiral Kimmel and General Short on November 28 that negotiations thereafter were a Japanese fraud could not have suggested itself strongly to officials in Washington who had only the day before told these commanders: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days"; and "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."
STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ARMY DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27
It is to be recalled that the "war warning" dispatch of November 27 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel related, with respect to the status of our diplomatic relations with the Japanese, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of condi-
[210] Id.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 199
tions in the Pacific *have ceased* * * *." The message from the War Department to General Short, on the other hand, stated "Negations with Japan appear to be terminated to *all practical purposes with only the *barest possibilities* that the Japanese might come back and offer to continue."
The statement has been made that the estimate of the diplomatic situation given General Short was not accurate and left the impression ere was still a possibility of the negotiations continuing whereas we were in reality at "sword's point" with Japan. [211]
The message stated negotiations appeared to be terminated to *all practical purposes* with *only the barest possibilities* that the Japanese might offer to continue. To be sure Secretary Hull had advised the Secretary of War on the morning of November 27 that he had "broken the whole matter off" had abandoned the idea of a modus vivendi and that he had washed his hands of it and "it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy." [212] But this was precisely the duty of the Secretary of State *to advise the Army and Navy when the probabilities were that negotiations had passed beyond the diplomatic age and were in the hands of the military*. Secretary Hull was indicating that he had given up the idea of a temporary diplomatic truce with Japan and was expressing his personal and official feeling that the Japanese Government would not respond to our Government's note of November 26 in such manner as to permit further negotiations. Mr. Hull did not *know* that Japan would not possibly reply with a counter proposal nor did anyone in our Government in Washington at the time the November 27 dispatch was prepared.
In recounting the circumstances attending the November 27 dispatch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (as well as to Panama, the Western Defense Command, and the Philippines) Secretary Stimson stated that he telephoned the President on the morning of November 27 suggesting that a final alert be sent pointing out that commanders be on the qui vive for any attack and explaining the exact situation. He stated the President approved his idea. As related by Mr. Stimson: [213] "Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the military staff. [214] As the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending the the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the forming of this message myself. In order that it should be strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which was then incorporated in the first sentence of the messages."
[211] See committee exhibit No. 167. The comment of the Army Pearl Harbor Board was: "This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced that war would come."
[212] See Part I, supra, section "Diplomatic and Military Liaison in Washington."
[213] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14395.
[214] General Marshall who ordinarily would have prepared such a dispatch was in North Carolina on November 27 incident to troop maneuvers. It appears that prior to his departure from Washington he had discussed generally with General Gerow the matter of sending a warning message to our outpost commanders. The message was finally prepared by Secretary Stimson in collaboration with General Gerow, among others. See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 14394, 14395.

200 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is to be noted that, according to Mr. Stimson's diary, after Secretary Hull had told him the matter was now in the hands of the Army and Navy, he called the President who gave him a little different view "He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position." [215] It was later during the day, while in conference with the Secretary of Navy and General Gerow incident to preparing the warning dispatch, that Mr. Stimson called Mr. Hull [216] and "got the exact statement from him of what the situation was." [217] And from information available on November 27 there was *only the barest possibility*, precisely the statement in the warning, that Japan would accept or respond with a counter proposal to the note of November 26.
It is to be noted that it was not until November 28 that a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted stating in part: [218]
"* * * with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off."
While this message would indicate at the time and we now know it to be a fact that Japanese negotiations were thereafter a fraud, on the very next day, November 29, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted stating, [219] "We wish you would make *one more attempt* verbally along the following lines," thereafter suggesting a line of approach in the discussions and concluding, "In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." Here there is manifested more than a "bare possibility" that the Japanese would continue the negotiations and had this *Magic* message been supplied General Short there is no doubt he would have concluded the same thing even after November 27. Indeed, had Admiral Kimmel and General Short been supplied all of the diplomatic messages reviewed by this Committee it is concluded that their estimate of the diplomatic situation would not have gone beyond a belief that there was only the barest possibility that Japan would continue the negotiations; for the messages indicate throughout a conflicting and variable disposition by Japan. With respect to pursuance of the negotiations and her desire for peace. [220]
*The message to General Short is regarded as more accurately stating the status of the diplomatic negotiations than did the Navy message advising flatly that negotiations had ceased*. The action taken by the Navy was with a view to making clear beyond question the seriousness [221] of the situation whereas the Army message, as stated by Secretary Stimson, sought to give General Short the *exact* diplomatic situation. It is to be noted that General Short had available the
[215] Committee record, p. 14422.
[216] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p. 1188.
[217] See Mr. Stimson's diary committee record, p. 14423; see also pp. 2686, 2687.
[218] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.
[219] Id., at p. 199.
[220] See in this connection the testimony of Admiral Leigh Noyes, committee record, pp. 12720-12722 It should be noted that Captain McCollum said: "I discounted anything which showed that they were not going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt that they were going to jump on us, that I was convinced that the situation between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt that way I certainly should not have put my office on a 24-hour basis early in November." Committee record, p. 9268.
[221] See testimony of Admiral Turner, committee record, p. 5163.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: 201
Navy estimate of the situation inasmuch as he saw the "war warning" of November 27 just as Admiral Kimmel, in turn, saw the War Department warning of the same date.
Even conceding for purposes of discussion that the dispatch to General Short should have contained the same statement as did the Navy message; that is, "negotiations * * * have ceased", such does not in any way alter the responsibilities in the case. Certainly in any situation no commanding officer will determine his course of action on the basis of the bare possibility that negotiations may be continued. How much more is this true when in the same message he is told that hostilities are possible at any moment and is given orders indicating the necessity for defense against an attack from without!
It is in fact believed that had the message been otherwise worded, stating only that there was a *possibility the negotiations would be ruptured* and carrying the same orders, it was the duty of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to gird his defense against the implications of that possibility. General Short was advised there was only the barest possibility that negotiations were *not already ruptured*.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE SHORT REPLY OF NOVEMBER 28
It is to be recalled that General Short's reply to the warning message of November 27 signed "Marshall," [222] read: [223]
"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad our seven two twenty seventh."
The evidence reflects that it was the responsibility of the War Plans Division of the War Department to prepare the warning and the orders it contained for approval by the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War. [224] Having instructed the commanding general in Hawaii to report measures taken, it was the responsibility of the War Plans Division to review the report and to advise the Hawaiian commander in the event the action taken by him was not in keeping with the desires of the War Department. The brief report of action taken, as sent by General Short, was initialed by General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division and by the Secretary of War. [225] The evidence is not clear as to whether the report was seen by General Marshall inasmuch as it was not initialed by him although he did initial other reports from overseas garrisons to which the Short report may have been attached. [226]
[222] For reference convenience, this dispatch was as follows:
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting as you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7)
[223] See exhibit No. 32, p. 12. This is the form of the message as paraphrased and reviewed in the War Department. The message as sent read: "Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Short." It was addressed to the *Chief of Staff*.
[224] See testimony of General Gerow, committee record, p. 2687 et seq.
[225] Id.
[226] Id.
202 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Marshall testified: [227]
"I do not remember whether or not I saw General Short's reply, but the presumption must be that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to intervene which I did not do."
General Gerow testified that when the reply from General Short came through he assumed it was in answer to the G-2 message that was sent by General Miles to the Hawaiian Department [228] concerning the likelihood of subversive activities. [229] He stated that after seeing the reply he sent it to Colonel Bundy (now deceased) [229a] who headed the "plans group" and that "it is reasonable to assume that he may possibly have interpreted the message to mean, or the part of the message which said 'liaison with the Navy,' that the commanding general out there had instituted protective measures against sabotage and was working with the Navy to arrange for other defensive measures, including reconnaissance." [230] It should be noted that General Gerow did not discuss the matter with Colonel Bundy but merely suggested this as a reasonable assumption from the way the message was worded General Gerow said: "I think my executive officer, or the chief of any plans group, might possibly have interpreted the message that way, and that is why it was not brought back to me and my attention invited to the fact that it did not explicitly cover the operation." [231] He observed that the reference to a "No. 472" meant nothing to him at the time since this number was put on the outgoing message by the Signal Corps and was not the number assigned the document by the War Plans Division. [232]
General Gerow admitted that no inquiry was sent to General Short with respect to his report of action taken and that in the light of subsequent events he felt "it might have been desirable to send such an inquiry, and had such an inquiry been sent it would probably have developed the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not at that time carrying out the directive in the message signed 'Marshall'." [233] He remarked that "if that had been done, there would have been an opportunity to correct the situation" but that he did not believe "the message could necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage measures only were being taken." [234] After stating that he interpreted the report of General Short to be in reply to the Miles message concerning subversive activities and noting that such an interpretation left him without any reply whatever from the Hawaiian Department with respect to the November 27 warning,
[227] Committee record, p. 3010. See also in this connection. Committee Record, pp. 2899 and 3088.
[228] This message, addressed to G-2 Hawaiian Department, read: "Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commander General and Chief of Staff only." Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.
[229] Committee record, p. 2714
[229a] Col. Charles W. Bundy was killed in a plane crash shortly after the attack while en route to Pearl Harbor.
[230] Id, at pp. 2713, 2714. In this connection Secretary Stimson said: he (General Short) then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent sabotage' was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his message that liaisons was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically directed reconnaissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect." See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 14408, 14409.
[231] Committee record, pp. 2716, 2717.
[232] Id., at p. 2715.
[236] Id., at p. 2716.
[234] Id.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 203
General Gerow explained: "I was handling a great many papers at that time, and it was the responsibility of the officers in my division to check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention anything of importance that required action on my part." [235] He further observed that it did not occur to him that General Short would not take some reconnaissance and other defensive measures after receiving the November 27 message "he was an experienced commander and it never entered my mind that he would not take such action." [236] In the course of counsel's examination reference was made to the following comments by Secretary Stimson with respect to the investigation conducted by the Army of the Pearl Harbor disaster: [237]
"Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of actions, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action.
"While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.
"The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of he measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done, and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted."
General Gerow was asked if he felt the foregoing was a fair statement of the situation. He replied: [238]
"Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on War Plans Division, and *I accept that responsibility as Chief of War Plans Division*."
Upon being asked if it were not the function of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War to follow up on General Short's report, General Gerow stated: [239]
"No, sir, I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, and I had a group of 48 officers to assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those messages were checked, and if an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans Division should have drafted such an inquiry and presented it to the Chief of Staff for approval. As I said, I was chief of that division, and it was my responsibility."
[235] Committee record, p. 2717.
[236] Id., at pp. 2719, 2720.
[237] Id., at pp. 2727, 2728. See also committee exhibit No. 167.
[238] Committee record pp. 2726-2729. In the course of Committee examination of General Marshall the following questions were propounded and answers were given:
Question: "Well, a large number of people saw it (the Short reply)? General Gerow saw it and General Gerow testified here that when he saw it he thought first that it was a response to a telegram sent out by G-2 relating to sabotage and when his attention was called to the fact, when I asked counsel to ask him some further questions and his attention was called to the fact that this was a direct response to your telegram No. 472 of the 27th and was addressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed his position and said, 'I as Chief of Operations or Chief of War Plans assume full responsibility.'
"Now, I think it is only fair, General Marshall, in the conduct of this examination in ascertaining the facts to find out whether or not, just as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same responsibility that he did?"
Answer: "I said earlier in this hearing, Mr. Keefe, in relation to the very thing you are talking about, when I was questioned in regard to General Gerow's statement, that I thought there was a difference; that he had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility. Is that an answer to your questions?"
Question: "He had a direct responsibility?"
Answer: "And I had the full responsibility."
Question: "And you had the full responsibility. Well, just what do you mean by that?"
Answer: "His was in concern to the handling of the details of the matter and he had a responsibility there. I am responsible for what the General Staff did or did not do."
See Committee Record, pp. 3727, 3728.
204 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As earlier pointed out, the War Plans Division had the duty of issuing operational orders and directives; it directed an order to General Short on November 27, instructing him to report measures taken; it failed properly to supervise the report submitted by the commanding general pursuant to direction. General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division, saw the report of measures taken in the Hawaiian Department and presumed it was in response to a dispatch from Military Intelligence warning of the likelihood of subversive activities. This is not a tenable premise, however, inasmuch as the report by General Short was addressed to the Chief of Staff and was therefore a reply to the warning of November 27, signed "Marshall"; a reply to the message concerning subversive activities would not have been addressed to the Chief of Staff unless the latter had signed the message, which was not the case. [240] Furthermore, the reference by General Short to the number of the message to which he was replying necessarily entailed calling from file the original outgoing dispatch in the event there was any doubt or presumptions necessary in gauging to what the commanding general's report was responsive. Knowing that a reply from General Short had been called for, it was incumbent upon the War Plans Division to follow closely the receipt of such reply and to insure that the action taken was in accordance with that desired. While the reply from General Short was ambiguous and misleading, it was nevertheless the duty of War Plans to require a clear and unequivocal response. By its sheer brevity and lack of detail alone, the report should have suggested the possibility that the official mandate had not been adequately implemented.
The supervision by the War Plans Division in this instance was slipshod. General Gerow, as head of the Division, must bear his share of responsibility for this serious error, a responsibility which he has unhesitatingly assumed. The primary responsibility, however, rests with the appropriate subordinates of General Gerow who had the duty and responsibility for supervision of details. [241]
THE "BERLIN MESSAGE"
An intercepted message from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 30, 1941 (translated December 1) follows: [242]
"The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. *Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams*."
[240] Id., at pp. 2721-2724.
[241] See section "Nature of Responsibilities," infra.
[242] Dispatch No. 985, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 204.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 205  
Another message of the same date from Tokyo to Berlin read, in part: [243]
"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. *That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause*."
And again: [244]
"The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. *This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations*. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia the Netherlands, and China they did so repeatedly. *Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy*."
This valuable intelligence added to the total of information pointing to the mounting tenseness of relations but does not materially add to that which was supplied our Hawaiian outpost in the warnings of November 27, insofar as the prime duties of the commanders there were concerned. These messages merely confirmed the conclusions already voiced three days earlier to the outpost commanders that war was imminent; that negotiations had ceased to all practical purposes; that hostile action was possible at any moment.
CODE DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE
As has already been observed, Admiral Kimmel was advised by the Navy Department concerning the intercepted messages relating to the destruction of codes in various Japanese diplomatic establishments. [245] While Admiral Kimmel failed to supply General Short this intelligence it is apparent that the commanding general otherwise obtained substantially the equivalent of this information. He was not, however, supplied such information directly by the War Department.
In explaining the reason for the Army's not sending the code destruction intelligence to Hawaii, General Miles testified: [246]
"The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure
[243] Dispatch No. 986, committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 205-206.
[244] Id., at p. 206.
[245] See Part III, supra; also committee exhibit No. 37. For the original intercepted messages concerning destruction of codes see committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 209, 215, 216, 236, 249, among others.
[246] Committee record, p. 2221.  
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206 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there."
The reason advanced by General Miles is consistent with the general practice of the Army not to distribute Magic to field commanders for security reasons. [247] While it appears that in some instances the Navy in Hawaii was specifically advised to inform the Army of messages received, the failure to instruct Admiral Kimmel to so inform General Short concerning the Japanese destruction of codes did not by inference or otherwise indicate that this intelligence should not be supplied the Army. Considering that Hawaii was a command by mutual cooperation, the War Department was properly privileged to take for granted that there was a full exchange of information between the Army and Navy commanders, [248] particularly after General Short had specifically stated in his reply to the Department's warning of November 27 that he had established *liaison with the Navy*.
The overwhelming preponderance of testimony by Army and Navy experts is to the effect that the destruction of codes and confidential documents under the circumstances prevailing in early December of 1941 meant war from a military standpoint. [249] It is clear that Washington adequately discharged its responsibility in transmitting this information to Hawaii. With the failure, however, of Admiral Kimmel to read into this intelligence what it is agreed should have been self-evident to him, it is believed that in contemplation of the future the intelligence as well as the departmental appraisal and estimate thereof should be supplied field commanders. [250]
THE MCCOLLUM DISPATCH
The Navy Department in Washington had available substantially the information which was in the possession of Admiral Kimmel with respect to radio intelligence concerning the location and movements of Japanese vessels. It knew, as did Admiral Kimmel, that substantial carrier units of the Japanese Fleet could not be located. This information was carefully considered by the Office of Naval Intelligence. [251] Capt. Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, was particularly charged with handling radio intelligence material and it was he who drafted the dispatch of November 24,
[247] See section "The 'Magic' ", supra.
[248] See committee record, pp. 2220-2224. Secretary Stimson stated: "It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short." See statement of Secretary Stimson with respect to Army Pearl Harbor Board's report, committee exhibit No. 157.
[249] Admiral Turner, for example stated: " * * * the destruction of codes in that manner and in those places in my mind and experience is a definite and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals or other places those codes are destroyed. * * * It indicates war within two or three days." Committee record, pp. 5294, 5295.
It is to be noted that Washington did not minimize the significance of the code destruction intelligence despite the fact there were indications this move by Tokyo might be in anticipation of the possibility that the United States would close down her consulates. The following intercepted dispatch of December 3, 1941, from Washington to Tokyo is of pertinence in this regard: "*If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls*." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 227.
[250] Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel said: " * * * the Department sent me a message that these codes were being burned, and I feel, while that was good information, that they might very well have enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant, I didn't draw the proper answer, I admit that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclusion from what I got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that, with no amplification, was not near as valuable as it would have been if they had amplified and drawn the conclusions. See Roberts Commission record, p. 589.
[251] See committee record, pp. 9119, 9120.
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1941, [252] to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, a copy of which as sent Admiral Kimmel for information, instructing that the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District serve in effect as a clearinghouse for data concerning Japanese naval movements inasmuch as the information obtainable in the Philippine area was considered Lost reliable.
Captain McCollum prepared a memorandum dated December 1, 1941, pointing out that Japanese "service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, 1 December 1941". [253] He also prepared another memorandum bearing the same date summarizing the generally critical situation with respect to Japan. [254] At a meeting attended by Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, Turner and Wilkinson, among others, in the Navy Department on the morning of December 1, Captain McCollum personally read his memorandum last-mentioned, pointing out the imminence of war or rupture of diplomatic relations. He requested information as to whether the fleets in the Pacific had been adequately alerted and testified: "I was given a categorical assurance by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that dispatches fully alerting the fleets and placing them on a war basis had been sent." It is significant that at this time neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Captain McCollum had knowledge of the "war warning" message to Admiral Kimmel. [255]
About December 4, 1941, Captain McCollum prepared a dispatch designed to alert naval outposts, based in part on his memorandum of December 1 outlining the critical situation in the Far East. He testified: [256]
"Captain McCollum. * * * I was put in the rather difficult position of not personally knowing what had been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it was none my business. As I pointed out to you, the basis of this memorandum the formation it was based on was actually as of about the 28th of November. As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our naval attaches in Tokyo Peiping, Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all of their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes were destroyed.
"We were getting reports from our observers of the Japanese task force which was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our planes were sighting forces moving; our submarines were trailing them. We had some little information in addition. I still did not know what had been sent to the fleet.
"I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty much as is this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further and stated that we felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was taken by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd, and together we went in to see Admiral Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact at the function of evaluation of intelligence; that is, the drawing of inferences therefrom, had been transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division. I was directed to take that dispatch and present it for the consideration of Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, which I did.
"Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of corrections in it, striking out all except the information parts of it, more or less, and then showed me for the first time the dispatch which he had sent on the 27th which I believe is referred to as the "war warning" dispatch, and the one which was sent, I believe, on the 24th wasn't it?
"COUNSEL. That is right.
"Captain MCCOLLUM (continuing). Which preceded that dispatch, and said did not I think that was enough. I said, "Well, good gosh, you put in the words 'war warning'. I do not know what could be plainer than that, but, nevertheless I would like to see mine go too."
[252] Dispatch No. 242239, committee exhibit No. 37, p. 33.
[253] Committee exhibit No. 85.
[254] Id., No. 81.
[255] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, p. 9112-9123; also testimony of Admiral Wilkinson.
[256] Committee record, pp. 9130-9134.
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"He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the way I corrected it or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it" or words to that effect
"I cannot presume to remember precisely.
"I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and he said "Leave it here with me for a while," and that is all.
"Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was prepared on a dispatch blank in no sense means it was an official dispatch. It was merely my recommendation to my superiors which they were privileged to throw in the wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of the official file. It is nothing other than a recommendation for the dispatch officer. I have written dozens of dispatches for the admiral, and he could either throw them away, or use them. There is no record kept of that sort of thing."
Admiral Turner's testimony with respect to the foregoing incident is as follows: [257]
"COUNSEL. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum sometime between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indicated or showed a view that some further warning ought to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about that?
"Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, and I was here yesterday when Senator Ferguson read my testimony from the Navy Court of Inquiry, and I was a little confused in that. I had nothing to refer to, I had not received any warning of more than 2 or 3 days about the proceedings and since that time in going over it myself and thinking about it I arrived at what I believe is a correct statement on that subject.
"From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with drafts of memoranda to the CNO concerning the situation and we would discuss them. I think that he had such a memorandum about the 1st of December but I do not believe that it was intended to go out as a dispatch but merely for the information of the Chief of Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen such a memorandum but I have a recollection of that.
"Now, about the 1st or 2d of December and this is sure, I am completely sure of this, I remember it very distinctly about the 1st or 2d of December Commander McCollum came into my office and handed me a proposed dispatch written on one sheet of paper and approximately the length of the dispatch of November 27 which he proposed that the Chief of Naval Operations send out to the fleets concerning the imminence of war. It covered the same ground approximately as the CNO dispatches of the 24th and 27th.
"Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in ONI had seen those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had seen them.
"COUNSEL. YOU mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches?
"Admiral TURNER. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and 27th, and he said "No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed them to him and said, "Well, read these over and then see if you think your dispatch ought to go."
"He sat down and read them over and handed them back to me and he said, "No" and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the same general coverage but was not as specific as these two messages.
"COUNSEL. Not as specific as those two that were sent?
"Admiral TURNER. Not quite; no, sir.
"COUNSEL. Can you give us any information from your recollection as to what his proposed dispatch contained?
"Admiral TURNER. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the situation and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and he had prepared himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the commander in chief. I did not ask him not to send it but I just merely said, "See if you think it ought to go after you read these dispatches" and he read the two dispatches and he said, "No." He said, "That is enough." "
Admiral Wilkinson had no independent recollection of the event attending the McCollum dispatch. [258]
It is regarded as extremely regrettable that the proposed dispatch of Captain McCollum is not in existence in order that an objective estimate of its contents might be made. Captain Safford in testifying before Admiral Hart, stated: [259]
[257] Id., at pp. 5217-5219.
[258] Id., at pp. 4655-4658.
[259] Hart inquiry record, p. 360.
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"* * * On the 4th of December 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message," and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander in Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy and had with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to see it if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left, a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent."
The statement by Captain Safford that the proposed dispatch referred to an implementation of the "winds code" was contradicted by Captain McCollum who categorically testified that his dispatch contained no reference to a winds execute message and that, in fact, his knowledge no such message had been received. [260] As elsewhere pointed out, the conclusion is made from all of the evidence that no execution message based on the "winds code" was ever received in the War or Navy Departments prior to December 7.
The fact that Admiral Kimmel already possessed the vital intelligence with respect to the "lost" Japanese carriers and the unusual change in service calls on December 1 would necessarily have conditioned any consideration of an additional warning to him based hereon. However, considering all of the significant intelligence available around December 1, Captain McCollum, not knowing of the warning dispatches, prepared at sometime between December 1 and 4 an alerting message which he felt should have been dispatched. Admiral Turner looked with disfavor on this message for the reason hat he felt it added nothing to what had already been supplied the fleet and the further fact that he regarded responsible commanders as adequately alerted, an attitude which prevailed throughout the War and Navy Departments. Captain McCollum, too, regarded the war warning" of November 27 as fully adequate but testified he would also "like" to see his warning transmitted. There is no evidence before the Committee indicating with any degree of accuracy the contents of the so-called McCollum dispatch to assist in determining whether it may have added anything to the warning dispatches of November 27 to the Hawaiian commanders. [261]
EVENTS OF DECEMBER 6 AND 7, 1941
An extensive amount of testimony has been taken concerning the events of December 6 and 7, 1941, attending the interception, distribution, and action taken with respect to four diplomatic dispatches from Japan to her Washington ambassadors. These four dispatches, each of which will elsewhere be discussed fully, were:
(1) The so-called "Pilot Message," No. 901, on December 6 advising that a long 14-part memorandum for the United States
[260] Committee record, p. 9134.
[261] This same observation would apply with respect to a warning dispatch said to have been prepared a the War Department by Colonel Otis K. Sadtler which allegedly was not sent for the reason that military outposts were regarded as adequately alerted. The facts concerning the "Sadtler message" are seriously in doubt.

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was to be sent as a result of the American proposal of November 26 and that instructions concerning the time of presentation to the United States would be provided in a separate message. [262]
(2) The 14-part memorandum, message No. 902 (transmitted in English) to be presented to the Government of the United States. The first thirteen parts were intercepted on December 6 and the fourteenth part on the morning of December 7. [263]
(3) The message, No. 907, intercepted on December 7, directing the Japanese Ambassador to submit the 14-part memorandum to the United States at 1 p. m., December 7, Washington time. [264]
(4) Message No. 910, intercepted on December 7, directing that the remaining cipher machine (in the Japanese Washington Embassy) be destroyed along with all code machines and that similar disposition be made of secret documents. [265]
Considering the time that has elapsed there has been an understandable amount of discrepancy with respect to the recollection of the participants as to the exact time of handling the foregoing messages in Washington. However, as subsequently will appear, composite consideration of all the testimony tends to present a reasonably satisfactory picture. It is to be recalled that in December of 1941 the Army and Navy cryptographic units were dividing the work incident to decoding and translating Japanese diplomatic messages, the Magic, with the Army generally assuming responsibility for messages bearing even dates of the month and the Navy, the odd dates. [266] Immediately upon decoding and translating messages both the War and Navy Departments each received copies. It was the responsibility of the Army to make distribution of Magic within the War Department and to the Secretary of State, while the Navy was responsible for distribution within the Navy Department and to the White House.
THE PILOT MESSAGE  
At 6:56 a. m. on December 6 there was filed in Tokyo and between 7:15 and 7:20 a. m. intercepted by a Navy monitoring station [267] a dispatch that has come to be known as the "Pilot Message": [268]
"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
"2. This separate message is a very long one. *I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being*.
"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."  
A teletype sheet containing this message in Japanese code was received by the Army from the Navy at 12:05 p. m., December 6. [269] There is no documentary evidence available as to the exact time of decoding, translating, and typing of the pilot message by the Army
[262] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238, 239
[263] Id., at pp. 239-245.
[264] Id., at p. 248.
[265] Id., at p. 249.
[266] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 122.
[267] See committee exhibit No. 41.
[268] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238, 239.
[269] Id., No. 41.  
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apart from the fact that these operations were completed on December Capt. Alwyn D. Kramer was primarily responsible for distribution of Magic on behalf of the Navy. He initially testified before the committee that he was quite certain the pilot message was contained in the folder also containing the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum which were distributed by him during the evening of December 6. [270] Captain Kramer subsequently modified this testimony, based on a study of records available in the Navy Department relating to the Magic materials. He testified: [271]
"Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so-called pilot message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot message had arrived sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December 1941, or Saturday evening, and that I believed it was distributed Saturday evening with the Japanese note and other papers. I find as a result of my study last night that *the pilot message was not disseminated, at least in the Navy, until Sunday morning subsequent to 10 o'clock*, at the time when the so-called hidden-word message and a number of other short messages, including the 1 o'clock message, were disseminated."
It would seem in consequence, from the best testimony available, hat no distribution was made of the pilot message in the Navy Department or to the White House until the morning of December 7. However, it is to be noted that Admiral Wilkinson testified he saw the pilot message before leaving the Navy Department on December 6. [272]
It appears on the other hand that distribution of the message in the War Department and to the State Department was made during the afternoon of December 6. Col. Rufus Bratton, who was responsible for distribution of Magic by the Army, testified: [273]
"Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon (December 6) about 3 o'clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in person or whether one of my assistants did it, but I do recall discussing the subject both with General Miles and General Gerow Saturday afternoon. [273a]"
The military significance of the pilot message will be treated in connection with the discussion of the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum.
THE 14-PART MEMORANDUM
*First 13 Parts*
The first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum were received in the Navy Department between 11:49 a. m. and 2:51 p. m. on December 6. [274] They had been decoded and typed in the Navy Department and were ready for distribution by approximately 9 p. m. on that late. Copies were thereupon delivered to the War Department. [275]
Captain Kramer in making distribution of this material on behalf of the Navy arrived at the White House between 9:30 and 10 p. m., delivering the first 13 parts to Commander Schulz, [276] an assistant to Admiral Beardall, [277] the President's naval aide, with the request they be given the President at the earliest possible moment. Commander Schulz did thereafter deliver the messages to the President who along
[270] Committee record, p. 10677.
[271] Id., at p. 10739.
[272] Id., at p. 4659.
[273] Id., pp. 12049, 12050.
[273a] The evidence tends to indicate some doubt, however, as to whether the "Pilot Message" was seen by General Marshall on December 6. See Committee record, p. 3472.
[274] Committee exhibit No. 41.
[275] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 152-171.
[276] Lt. (now Commander) Lester Robert Schulz.
[277] Admiral John R. Beardall.
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with Mr. Harry Hopkins read their contents. Kramer then proceeded to the Wardman Park Hotel where delivery was made to Secretary Knox, who read the dispatches. He then went to the home of Admiral Wilkinson where a dinner party was in progress attended by Admiral Beardall, General Miles, and of course, Admiral Wilkinson, among others. The first 13 parts were read by these officers. [278] Kramer returned to the Navy Department at approximately 1 a. m. and thereafter retired upon seeing that the fourteenth part of the Japanese memorandum had not been received. [279] Copies of the first 13 parts were delivered on the evening of December 6 by an unidentified representative or representatives of the Navy Department to Admirals Ingersoll and Turner at their homes. [280]  
The testimony with respect to distribution of the 13 parts by the, Army is conflicting, the weight of the evidence indicating, however, that no distribution was made to authorized recipients in the War Department on December 6. The evidence is in dispute as to whether they were delivered to a watch officer at the State Department on the evening of that date. [280a]
The evidence indicates that the first 13 parts were read on the evening of December 6, by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton [281] It is concluded from the evidence of record that the message was not seen by Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, or General Gerow [282] prior to the morning of December 7.
*Analysis and Significance of First 13 Parts Proper*
In view of the conflicting interpretations that have been placed o the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum, they are being set forth in their entirety: [283]
[278] Committee record, pp. 4663-4666.
[279] Id., at pp. 10451 et seq.
[280] Id., at pp. 5097 11295.
[280a] Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into his office some time between 9 and 1 o'clock that night, and that he was in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (committee record 12049). He further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night duty officer at the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night, telling the duty officer that it was a "highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned" and that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull's quarters, which he was assured would be done committee record 12052-12053). This testimony is directly contrary to the affidavit of Col. Clyde Dusenbury, then Colonel Bratton's chief assistant, in the Clausen investigation. In his affidavit, Colonel Dusenbury stated that he specifically recalled the intercepted message in question and that "it started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning *to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept* about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Col. Thomas D. Handy, who, upon reading it, said to me: "This means war," or words to that effect. *None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941* because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night" (Clausen Investigation committee exhibit No. 148, p. 50).
Colonel Dusenbury's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the testimony of Gen. Sherman Miles, then Chief of the Military Intelligence Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and the others on the War Department's "magic" distribution list received on December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were translated that day up to midnight "*except the first 13 parts of the 14-part message*" (committee record 4123-4124).
[281] Captain McCollum is indicated to have seen the first 6 or 7 parts before leaving his office on December 6. Committee record, pp. 9232, 9233.
[282] See committee record, p. 2741.
[283] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245.  

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MEMORANDUM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
(Part 2 of 14)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.
(Part 3 of 14)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental (75 letters garbled) The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
(Part 4 of 14)
Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo- China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
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(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
(Part 5 of 14)
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.
The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
(Part 6 of 14)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual Practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
(Part 7 of 14)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 215
(Part 8 of 14)  
Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
(Part 9 of 14)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged. On the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.
(Part 10 of 14)  
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr (45 letters garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
(Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n (50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament of East Asia.  
(Part 12 of 14)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding
216 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chunking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.  
(Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. *Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation*.  
6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed, with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND* (probably "and as") presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** (probably "China, can but") be concluded that. All these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
The foregoing message is a long and argumentative rehash of the Japanese-American negotiations. The motives and proposals of the Japanese Empire are clothed in language of the most blathering terms whereas the purposes of the United States are assigned a base character. The language employed in the first 13 parts is much stronger than had theretofore been employed by Japan in her proposals. In the thirteenth part it is stated, "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation." Taken from its context this statement would indicate that Japan is rejecting the November 26 note of our Government and would possibly suggest that the current negotiations were to be broken off at some time in the near future. But as pointed out by Admiral Wilkinson, "It is one thing to break off negotiations and another thing to break off diplomatic relations. The same negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier and then resumed." [284]
Commander Schulz, who delivered the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the President, testified that the President read the message and "Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance, '*This means war*'. [285] Mr. Hopkins agreed and they discussed then for perhaps 5 minutes the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment." [286]
[284] Committee record, p. 4668.
[285] Asked what his action would have been had he known of the President's remark, General Marshall said: "I can't say. *I doubt if I would have sent anything on that statement of the President at that time*." Committee record, p. 13804.
Admiral Stark was asked: "* * * if you had known that the President did say something in substance 'This means war,' about the 13-part message, was there anything you would have done that night except to read the message? Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in the way of backsight or hindsight that you would have done that you did not do?"
He replied: "It would not be backsight or hindsight, because when I read it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to cause me to take any further action on it," Committee record, pp. 13912, 13913.
[286] Committee record, p. 12441.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 217
To the query as to whether he could recall what either the President or Mr. Hopkins said, Commander Schulz testified as follows: [287]
"Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I in definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first, that since war was imminent, that the Japanese tended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them when all was most opportune for that. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next.
"The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal.
"Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to be at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not strike e first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and said, effect, "No we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people. Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we a good record."
"The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we would not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.
"During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin as not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication at tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.
"COUNSEL. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?
"Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.
"COUNSEL. Now, that was from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?
"Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the national Theater was mentioned in my presence and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in theater where I believe the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and at if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case. [287a]"
In considering the remark [288] by the President to Mr. Hopkins that the first 13 parts meant war it is significant that there was no indication as to *when* or *where* war might be expected. [288a] The testimony of Commander Schulz should be considered with that of Admiral Beardall, to which reference will hereafter be made, in seeking to determine the reaction of the President to the full Japanese 14-part memorandum.
[287] Id., at pp. 12441-12444.
[287a] The evidence tends to indicate that following his return home after the theater, Admiral Stark was advised that the White House had called, and that he did thereupon call the White House. See testimony. Capt. H. D. Krick, U. S. Navy, before the committee.
[288] Referring to the comment made by the President, General Marshall testified: "He didn't tell me, and didn't tell the Secretary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing" (13 parts). Committee record, p. 13803.
[288a] In connection with the remark attributed to the President it is to be noted that at a meeting of the War Council on November 25, President Roosevelt warned that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday, for the "Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390.
 
218 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The estimate given the first 13 parts by witnesses before the committee who reviewed them on the night of December 6 follows: [289]
"Admiral TURNER. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe was about 11:30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the officer who showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that dispatch, and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very important, but as long as those officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my function to take any action."
* * * * *
"Admiral INGERSOLL. [290] * * * when I read the 13 parts there was nothing on which the Navy Department as such could that night take action. The gist of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese position we had known, of course, all along."
* * * * *
"Admiral WILKINSON. [291] * * * both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.
"The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next morning.
* * * * *
Admiral Wilkinson agreed that he, General Miles, and Admiral Beardall discussed the first 13 parts and referred to it as more or less a "white paper" or diplomatic communication "A justification for the Japanese position". [292]
"General MILES. [293] I called him for the purpose of finding out what had been done, what was going to be done with these first 13 parts, but I wish to call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the first 13 parts as such was not of great military significance. We had already discounted through many days the fact that in all probability the Japanese reply to our note of November 26 would be unfavorable and that was all that the first 13 parts told us. When we got the fourteenth part we saw quite a different picture, when we got the 1 p. m. message we saw quite a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6 that I could see.
"Captain KRAMER. [294] I have stated that the first part I recollect seeing is part 8. If you will refer to that you will see that there is nothing in that part in fact, the last half of that part quotes the United States note that was materially different than the general tenor of previous notes back and forth between the United States and Japan.
"When the first 13 parts were complete I did however, have that distinct impression, that this note was far and appreciably stronger language than earlier notes had been and that it indicated a strong probability that the Japanese were concluding any further negotiations.
* * * * *
"Colonel BRATTON [295] * * * I considered the presence of the 13 parts in Washington relatively unimportant militarily that evening.
"I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still consider it now. They contributed no information, they contributed no additional information to the matters that we already had from magic and other sources as to the impending crisis with Japan.
"The message was incomplete. It ended on the note, in the thirteenth part: "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation "
"This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of State, not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of General Staff for it was not an ulti-
[289] Committee record, p. 5097.
[290] Id., at p. 11377.
[291] Id., at p. 4665.
[292] Id., at p. 4667.
[293] Id., at pp. 2482, 2483.
[294] Id., at pp. 10445, 10446.
[295] Id., at pp. 12057, 12058.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 219
latum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of diplomatic relations."
The committee has noted the emphasis, publicity and speculation concerning the whereabouts of General Marshall, the Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, on the evening of December 6. General Marshall has testified that while he could not recall his whereabouts with certainty he presumed he was at home. Admiral Stark could not recall his whereabouts, but the evidence establishes that he was at the National Theater seeing *The Student Prince*. [295a] Similar emphasis has been placed on the fact that the Chief of Staff was horseback riding on the morning of December 7, as was his Sunday-morning custom. The first 13 parts were neither delivered to nor read by either General Marshall or Admiral Stark on the evening of December 6. In any event, the question of their whereabouts on Saturday evening, December 6, is by any construction unimportant inasmuch as both officers saw nothing in the first 13 parts to serve as basis for additional warnings o our outposts when they read them on the morning of December 7. [295b] In this connection, it is to be noted that the evidence conclusively establishes that no conferences were held at the White House or elsewhere with respect to the Pacific situation by ranking military and executive officials on the evening of December 6, 1941.
The consensus of testimony by officers of the War and Navy Departments is to the effect that the first 13 parts, as such, of the 14-part message bore little or no military significance. [296] While they revealed a position assumed by Japan to which our Government could not subscribe there was no statement that negotiations were to be ruptured and certainly no intimation of the treacherous attack to be delivered at Pearl Harbor the following morning. From the "pilot message" it was clear that a fourteenth part was to be transmitted and that it would probably be received on December 7. Considering this fact and the further fact that the first 13 parts gave no indication of immediate military action by Japan, there was no occasion on the evening of December 6 to dispatch additional warnings to outposts, already regarded as alerted, on the basis of a message that was manifestly not complete. It is clear there was no intelligence contained in the message itself which had not been known for some time.
*Military Significance of "Pilot" and 14-Part Messages Apart from Messages Proper*
An intercepted dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington ambassadors had stated, referring to Mr. Hull's note of November 26: [297]
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern-
[295a] See note 287a, supra.
[295b] General Marshall said: "* * * the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as the 14th part. That was a message of direct importance to the Secretary of State and of related importance, of course, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy who had been collaborating with him in his relationship in the dealings with Japan." Committee record, p. 3095.
For Admiral Stark's estimate of the first 13 parts see Note 296, infra.
[296] Admiral Stark stated that he regarded the first 13 parts, when he saw them on the morning of December 7, as routine, a rehashing of the attitude of the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating over a period of weeks or months. In other words, that the 13 parts by themselves carried no implication other than indicated; that it was a rehashing, a restatement of their attitude. Committee record, p. 13722.
[297] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.
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