Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report of the Joint

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ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. *Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial (Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured*. This is inevitable.
In the foregoing dispatch the Japanese Government stated it would send a reply to Nomura and Kurusu within 2 or 3 days. This presupposes the presence and *availability* in Washington of these ambassadors to receive the reply. Clearly, therefore, war between Japan and the United States was not to eventuate *until* the reply had been received in Washington, otherwise the Japanese ambassadors would not be available for the purpose of receiving such reply. By the same token war would not eventuate until the ambassadors had an opportunity to *deliver* the reply, otherwise little or no purpose would be served in sending it whatever.
Knowledge of this fact should have intensified alertness in the War and Navy Departments to such a point that from the moment the 14-part reply started coming in, all hands should have been on the qui vive and additionally an adequate number of responsible officers should have been actually at their stations with full authority to act in any emergency throughout the night of December 6-7. This statement is of course subject to the observation that Japan had indicated in the pilot message that the full reply would not be received until the following day, Sunday, December 7, and even that was not certain; that instructions would be sent in a separate dispatch with respect to the time of presentation and "the situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it (the reply) I want you to please *keep it secret for the time being*." Further, it is clear from the evidence that the receipt of the pilot message and portions of the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum served as basis for special measures taken by the War and Navy Departments to insure prompt handling, decoding, and distribution of this magic material on the evening of December 6. The naval officers who received the first 13 parts on the evening of December 6 appear to have regarded them as requiring no action during the evening. Within the Army the first 13 parts were seen by the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, who in view of the fact that the fourteenth part had not been received and the further fact that this message appeared to him to be of interest primarily to the State Department, decided that it required no further distribution within the Army that evening but should be delivered to the State Department. [297a] But the fact that the message was being received removed the last *known* barrier to Japan's taking military action. [298]
In consequence, it is not believed the War and Navy establishments in Washington were sufficiently alerted on the evening of December 6
[297] As has been indicated, the evidence is in dispute as to whether the first 13 parts were in reality delivered to a watch officer at the State Department on the evening of December 6. See Note 280a, supra.
[298] However, it should be noted that Ambassador Nomura in a dispatch to Tokyo of November 26, 1941, stated: "The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by declaration for internal and external* consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 183.
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with a view to receiving the Japanese reply. As events turned out, however, there was nothing contained in the first 13-parts to have served as basis for additional warnings to outposts already regarded adequately alerted. The information contained in the first 13-parts of the 14-part message did not add to the sum total of information already supplied the commanders in Hawaii who had been warned of war and advised "hostile action possible at any moment." It did not point to Hawaii. It did not provide the essential *where* or, with any degree of definitiveness, the *when* of the attack. There is no intelligence contained in the first 13-parts which this Committee can conclude could reasonably be expected to have changed the decisions already made in Hawaii.
*The Fourteenth Part*
At 2:38 a. m., December 7, there was filed in Tokyo and intercepted by a Navy monitoring station between 3:05 and 3:10 a. m. the fourteenth and final part of Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26. [299] This message as subsequently decoded by the Navy read as follows: [300]
"(Part 14 of 14)
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to reserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present: negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific rough cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.*"
The fourteenth part was available in the Navy Department for distribution at some time between 7:30 and 8:00 a. m. [301] Captain Kramer made delivery within the Navy Department shortly after a. m. The delivery to the White House and to Secretary Knox, who was at the State Department for a 10 a. m. meeting with Secretaries Hull and Stimson, was made shortly before 10 a. m. Distribution of the fourteenth part within the War Department was begun at 9 a. m. with subsequent delivery to the State Department.
It is to be noted there is no statement that Japan intended to declare war on the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations were to be broken merely that the current negotiations cannot produce an agreement. The fourteenth part is much less severe than the strongly worded first 13 parts would have indicated. Admiral Beardall testified as follows with respect to delivery of the fourteenth part o the President: [302]
"As I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10:00 o'clock on Sunday morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best of my recollection, was the 14th part of this 13-part message that came in the night before, which delivered to him.
[299] Committee exhibit No. 41.
[300] Id., No. 1, p. 245. As forwarding instructions to the radio station handling the fourteenth part there appeared at the beginning the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT".
[301] Committee record, pp. 10461-10463.
[302] Id,, at pp. 14010, 14011.
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Asked if there was any discussion or conversation with the President when he made the delivery, Admiral Beardall testified: [303]
"No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying though, which marks this in my mind, that *it looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations*."  
Admiral Beardall further testified that at the time of delivering the fourteenth part to the President there was nothing in the manner of the President which would indicate he was expecting an attack within a period of hours; that there "was no alarm, or no mention of this, mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that he was expecting an attack." [304]
As to the question whether termination of negotiations would indicate certain war it is significant to note that the Japanese Ambassadors themselves stated in a message to Tokyo dated November 26, 1941: [305]
"We suppose that *the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States*, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable * * *."
From a review of the fourteenth part it is clear that nothing is added to what was already known with respect to Japan's reaction to Secretary Hull's note. To be sure it is observed that the "hope * * * to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost" and "in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." But these facts had already been known for several days and the only paramount considerations at this time were *when* and *where* Japan would strike. A thorough consideration of the fourteen-part message, when viewed in the light of all other intelligence already available in Washington, reflects no added information, particularly of a military character, which would serve further to alert outpost commanders who had already been supplied a "war warning" and informed that "hostile action possible at any moment." [305] This conclusion is partially modified to the extent that actual delivery of the fourteen part message to the American Government might be construed as removing the last diplomatic obstacle, in the minds of the Japanese, to launching an attack.
"ONE O'CLOCK" AND FINAL CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES
Two messages intercepted on the morning of December 7 have received paramount consideration the celebrated "one o'clock" message specifying the time for delivery of the Japanese 14-part memorandum to the Government of the United States and the message setting forth final instructions to the Japanese Embassy concerning
[303] Id.
[304] Committee record, p. 14047.
[305] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181.
[306] General Marshall stated: "* * * the particular part which affected me and caused me to act was not the 14 parts. It was the one o'clock, which, unfortunately, they put on the bottom of the pile and I read through everything before I came to that." committee record, p. 13805.
Referring to the Japanese 14-part memorandum, Admiral Turner said: "I did not consider that that message and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree, because I was certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately between the United states and Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture Of the situation had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of November 27, and confirmed definitely by the later dispatches regarding the destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders for our people to destroy codes in exposed positions." Committee record, p. 5099.
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the destruction of codes and secret papers. The latter was as follows: [307]
"After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, [308] #908, [309] and #909, [310] please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents."
This message was intercepted shortly after the one o'clock message but from the evidence it appears that both these intercepts were distributed at approximately the same time. The "one o'clock" message read as follows: [311]
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."
This dispatch was filed by the Japanese at 4.18 a. m. December 7 and intercepted by a Navy monitoring station at 4:37 a. m. [312] It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at approximately 7 a. m. thereupon being sent to the Army for translation inasmuch as there was no translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. Translated copies of the "one o'clock" message appear to have been returned to the Navy at approximately 9 a. m. Captain Kramer testified [313] that upon his return to the Navy Department at 10:20 a. m. he found the "one o'clock" message and thereafter, between 10:30 and 10:35 a. m., delivered it to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where a meeting was in progress. Delivery was then made within approximately 10 minutes to an aide to Secretary Hull at the State Department and thereafter within roughly another 10 minutes, to a Presidential aide at the White House. In the course of delivery to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and to Secretary Hull's aide mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time, was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. *No mention was made that the time indicated an attack at Pearl Harbor*. [314]  
Delivery of the "one o'clock" message within the War Department was made at some time between 9 and 10 a. m. General Marshall after being advised at his quarters that an important message had been received, arrived at his office at some time between 11:15 and 11:30 a. m. where he saw for the first time the 14-part memorandum, General Gerow, General Miles, and Colonel Bratton, among others, being present. After completion of his reading of the memorandum General Marshall came to the "one o'clock" message and appears to have attached immediate significance to it. He testified that he and the officers present in his office were certain the hour fixed in the "one o'clock" message had "some definite significance;" that "something was going to happen at 1 o'clock;" that "when they specified a day,  
[307] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 249.
[308] The dispatch set forth, infra, concerning delivery at 1 p. m., December 7, of the 14-part memorandum.
[309] No. 908, dated December 7, read: "All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." Committee exhibit No. 1., p. 248.
[310] No. 909, dated December 7, read: "(From Bureau Chief Yamamoto to Commerical Attache Iguchi and his staff as well as to Secretary Yuki) I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[311] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[312] Id., No. 41.
[313] Committee record, pp. 10470-10479.
[314] See testimony of Captain Kramer before the committee; also Captain McCollum, committee record, p. 9275.
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that of course had significance, but not comparable to an hour;" and, again, that it was "a new item of information of a peculiar character." [315] At 11:30 or 11:40 a. m. General Marshall telephoned Admiral Stark [316] and, upon learning the latter had read the message, proposed that a warning be sent immediately to all theaters concerned. It should be noted that the exact time of Admiral Stark's arrival at the Navy Department is not definitely established although it is known that he was there by 10:30 a. m. on the morning of December 7, at the very latest. [317] Admiral Stark hesitated because he regarded the theater commanders as already alerted and he was afraid of confusing them further. [318] General Marshall nevertheless wrote in longhand the draft of a warning message to the Western Defense Command, the Panama Command, the Hawaiian Command, and the Philippine Command, as follows: [319]
"The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly."
He instructed Colonel Bratton to take the foregoing message immediately to the message center to be dispatched by radio but as Colonel Bratton was leaving the room, Admiral Stark called to request that there be placed on the dispatch the "usual expression to inform the naval officer". The following was therefore added in handwriting, by General Marshall, "Inform naval authorities of this communication" [320]
EVENTS ATTENDING TRANSMITTAL OF THE DECEMBER 7 DISPATCH
By 11:50 a. m. the handwritten warning had been delivered by Colonel Bratton to Colonel French, [321] in charge of the message center. When Colonel Bratton returned, General Marshall inquired as to how much time would be required to encipher and dispatch the message. Not understanding the explanation, he instructed both Colonels Bratton and Bundy to obtain a clearer picture from the message center. These two officers upon returning advised that the message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes. Still not being satisfied, General Marshall is indicated to have sent the
[315] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Report, pp. 7, 8; committee record, p. 13806.
[316] See committee exhibit No. 58.
[317] See committee record, p. 5813. The testimony of some witnesses indicates Admiral Stark arrived at the Navy Department as early as 9 a.m.
[318] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 7, 8. Admiral Stark said: "During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall called me on the phone to ask if I knew of it. I told him I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time of presentation on to the various commanders in the Pacific. *My first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that I hesitated to send more*. I hung up the phone, and not more than a minute or two later I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p. m. and that I would go along with him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications were such that he could get it out quickly because our communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He replied that he felt they could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include in the dispatch instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites" Committee record, p. 5676.
[319] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 21.
[320] Id.
[321] Col Edward F. French.
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Two officers back again and their report upon returning was regarded as satisfactory; that is, he felt assured from what he was told that the warning would be received by the pertinent commanders before 1:00 p. m. [322]
After receiving the message Colonel French personally took charge of its dispatch. Learning that the War Department radio had been out of contact with Honolulu since approximately 10:20 a. m. he hereupon immediately decided that the most expeditious manner of getting the message to Hawaii was by commercial facilities; that is, Western Union to San Francisco, thence by commercial radio to Honolulu. The message was filed at the Army signal center at 12:01 a. m. (6:31 a. m., Hawaii); teletype transmission to Western Union completed at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m., Hawaii); received by RCA Honolulu 1:03 p. m. (7:33 a. m., Hawaii); received by signal office, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at approximately 5:15 p. m. (11:45 a. m., Hawaii) after the attack. It appears that the teletype arrangement between RCA in Honolulu and Fort Shafter was not operating at the particular hour the message was received with the result that it was dispatched by a messenger on a bicycle who was diverted from completing delivery by the first bombing.
CHOICE OF FACILITIES
Colonel French testified that important messages to be transmitted immediately had previously been sent by commercial means when there was interference on the Army circuit between Honolulu and the War Department; that on the morning of December 7 Honolulu appeared to be in touch with San Francisco; that he had a teletype connection from his office to the Western Union office in Washington and knew Western Union had a tube connecting with RCA across the street in San Francisco; that RCA had 40 kilowatts of power whereas his set had 10 kilowatts; and that he concluded the fastest means of transmission would be via Western Union and RCA. He stated that he acted within his authority in deciding to send the message by commercial means and did not tell General Marshall how the message was going. [323]
Colonel French stated further that he had not considered using the telephone; that the telephone was never used by the signal center; that it was unsuitable for a classified message, and that, in any event "if they wanted to use the telephone that was up to the individuals themselves, Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned." [324]
According to General Marshall, the telephone was not considered as a means of transmission, or that it may have been considered but would not have been used, he was quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first; that if he had thought he could put a telephone call through, he would have called General MacArthur first, and then would have called
[322] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 8-10,14. There is some testimony indicating only two trip were made by Colonel Bratton to the message center.
[323] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 188, 195; Roberts Commission Record, pp. 1843, 1844, 1846.
[324] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 189-205.  
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the Panama Canal. He observed that it was important to send the message in code because it was not known what "one o'clock meant" and that it might have meant only a termination of diplomatic relations or some action in southeast Asia. General Marshall pointed out that there was no secrecy in the telephone and that he was trying to gain time and yet had to be careful not to "precipitate the whole business" or do anything which could be construed as an act of war; that it was important not to disclose to the Japanese our reading of their codes. [325]
With respect to the matter of using Navy radio facilities, Colonel French stated that the Navy used more power than did the Army and occasionally the Army asked the Navy to communicate messages but that in practice they did not use the Navy for expediting traffic to Honolulu. He considered the possible use of Navy transmission of the warning message but decided against it since it would have required time to determine whether the Navy was also having trouble getting through to Hawaii and the message would have had to be delivered from the Navy at Pearl Harbor to Fort Shafter. [326]
General Marshall had no knowledge on the morning of December 7 that the Army radio could not establish contact with Hawaii nor that the Navy had a more powerful radio to Honolulu. [327] It is to be noted that the message got through to addressees other than Hawaii prior to the attack.
After the event it is easy to find other means of communication which General Marshall might have employed. This will always be the case. It is clear from the record, however, that he selected a secure means dictated by the contents of the message and was assured after two or three requests for verification that the message would get through in adequate time. It did not reach Hawaii because of a failure in communications concerning which he could not have known and concerning which he was not advised. It was the failure of communications and not the selection of an improper channel that occasioned the delay.
While it is not regarded as contributing to the disaster, for reasons hereinafter to appear, it is considered extremely regrettable that Colonel French did not advise the Chief of Staff upon his inability to employ the Army's radio, the anticipated means of communication, particularly when he realized the great importance of the message and the-personal concern of the Chief of Staff for its expeditious transmittal.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "ONE O'CLOCK" AND CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES
No one knew or presumed to know definitely just what the time "one o'clock" meant. [328] Indeed, the warning sent by the Chief of
[325] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Record, pp. 10-14. See also Roberts Commission record, p. 1803.
[326] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 203, 204. Roberts Commission record, p. 1844.
[327] Roberts Commission record, p. 1801.
[328] Admiral Stark observed: "My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that and as there was no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be just as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not to send too much, it might create the story of 'wolf'." Committee Record, page 5815. In this regard it is to be noted that Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel said that he thought there had been too much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. See Hart Inquiry Record, page 64.
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Staff stated "*just what significance the hour set may have we do not know*." Despite this fact the Hawaiian commanders have asserted or implied that if they had received this information at the earliest possible moment on the morning of December 7, they would have anticipated a surprise air attack upon Pearl Harbor and have instituted appropriate defensive measures accordingly. [329] It is to be noted, however, that one of the asserted justifications by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for their not having taken the necessary defensive measures prior to December 7 was the fact that the warnings they had received, while indicating that war was imminent, pointed to southeast Asia and not to Hawaii as the likely point of attack.
There was nothing in the fact that the Japanese ambassadors were to present their Government's reply to the American note of November 26 at 1 p. m., December 7, pointing any more to an attack on Hawaii than to any other point to which General Marshall directed is dispatch: Panama, the west coast, the Philippines. The intelligence contained in the "one o'clock" intercept indicated no more than the distinct possibility that *some* Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m.
What Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have done upon receiving this intelligence or the Marshall dispatch before the attack necessarily speculative.
Testifying before the Roberts Commission concerning that portion of the December 7 warning pointing out that instructions had been issued for the Japanese Embassy to destroy its code machine immediately, General Short was asked whether his dispositions would have been changed if the message had reached him, say three hours before he attack. He replied: [330]
"General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either to at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a complete attack, because it looked so significant.
"The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up?
"General SHORT. The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered the code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ultimatum."
It is to be noted that when appearing before the Roberts Commission, General Short insisted he had no knowledge concerning the destruction by Japanese diplomatic representatives of codes and confidential papers, prior to December 7. As has been seen, the evidence before this committee reflects that he received substantially this information on December 6.
Admiral Kimmel has likewise suggested that the fact the Japanese Washington Embassy had been ordered to destroy its code machine would have been of greater significance to him than information received on December 3 that the Embassy, among others, had been ordered to destroy "most of its codes." [331] With respect to the latter
[329] General Short said: "This message (the one o'clock message) definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washington time." Committee Record, page 7992.
[330] Roberts Commission record, pp. 1619, 1620.
[331] Committee record, pp. 7476, 7477.
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intelligence Admiral Kimmel has testified: [332] "I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it * * *" Significantly, however, on December 6 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District advised the Navy Department: "believe local consul has destroyed all but one system * * *" [333]
It is concluded that the information contained in the Japanese intercept of December 7 instructing the Washington Embassy to destroy its remaining code machine, added little if any information to that already possessed by Admiral Kimmel concerning Japanese destruction of codes and confidential matter; and that if the intelligence supplied him in this regard on December 3 did not serve to warn of the immediate imminence of war the information concerning the destruction of the Japanese code machine on the morning of December 7 would not have effectively modified the situation. In the case of General Short, as elsewhere pointed out, it appears that while Admiral Kimmel did not supply him with the intelligence he had received concerning the destruction of codes, the Commanding General none-the-less received information of an equivalent character.
We believe, however, that the "one o'clock" intercept should have been recognized as indicating the distinct possibility that some Japanese military action would occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7 Washington time. If properly appreciated, this intercept should have suggested a dispatch to *all* Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.
SIGNIFICANT MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER THE ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING HAWAIIAN DEFENSES
One of the most unfortunate circumstances attending the handling of Magic is the fact that several very significant messages were not translated until after the attack. After December 7, 13 messages [334] between Tokyo and Honolulu from November 24 to December 6 were translated, several of these differing markedly from any of the messages between these points translated prior to December 7. Three of the 13 messages were from Tokyo, two of which related to instructions and interest concerning fleet locations and movements [335] with the third, however, containing for the first time an inquiry from Tokyo concern-
[332] Id., at P. 7477.
[333] The extreme importance of codes being destroyed in the consulates was expressed by Admiral Ingersoll in his testimony:
"I considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, 'this is a war warning' in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off . . .
"The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.
"Now in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hongkong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, *it meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleet as soon as we got it* * * *" Committee record, pp. 11286, 11287.
[334] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 16-29.
[335] Id., at pp. 18, 26.
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ing the defenses of the fleet in port. The latter message dated December 2 (translated December 30) read: [336]
"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets."
The messages translated after December 7 from Honolulu to Tokyo so reflect for the first time that information relating to the defenses at Pearl Harbor was being collected and supplied to Japan. In a message of November 24, Tokyo was advised that on the preceding night five mine layers had conducted mine-laying operations outside the harbor. [337] A November 28 message reported, "there are eight 'B-17' planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?)"; that "12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January"; and that "there has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." [338]
Of extreme significance are two messages of December 6 (both translated December 8) one of which reads as follows: [339]
"Re the last part of your #123. [340]
"1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, there are limits in the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. *I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places*."
"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."
The other message of December 6 from Honolulu to Tokyo reported, among other things, "it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." [341]
Also of particular interest is a message from Honolulu on December 3 [342] establishing a "number code" to indicate whether warships of a given category were preparing to sortie or had departed. A system
[336] Id., at p. 21. This message was transmitted from Hawaii and was translated by the Army in Washington, the translation bearing the notation, "This message was received on December 23."
[337] Translated December 16, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, p 17.
[338] Translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 19.
[339] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 27, 28. Army translation. *The record indicates that this information was taken from material published in newspapers*.
[340] See committee exhibit No 2, p. 21.
[341] Id., p. 29. Army translation.

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of houselights, newspaper want ads and bonfires, in addition to the use of a sail boat, was designed to indicate the code numbers. While I this system of communication did not relate to the defenses of Hawaii it was clearly in anticipation that the normal channels for transmitting information regarding the movements of the feet might be cut off and that a visual means of communication, probably to submarines offshore, was desired. It is also to be noted that no provision was made in the code for transmitting information concerning the departure of ships after December 6.
This message was decrypted and translated in rough form on December 6 by a civilian translator in the Navy Department, it having been received from a radio intercept station of the Army at Fort Hunt, Va. While Captain Kramer testified he had no positive recollection of having seen the translation prior to the attack, the evidence tends to indicate that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6 but that on account of the pressure of work on other important diplomatic messages, including the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14- part memorandum, no action was taken on the translation until December 8. [343] It is to be noted that this intercept of December 3 was in a code system referred to as "PA-K2" whereas the important Japanese 14- part reply which started coming in on the afternoon of December 6 was in the so-called Purple code system. The Purple was afforded first priority which, it appears, explains Captain Kramer's not giving undivided attention to the PA-K2 dispatch of December 3 together with the fact that this message was badly garbled and the civilian translator who handled it, while proficient in Japanese, had not as yet had adequate experience concerning the handling of the intercepted dispatches. [344]
CONSIDERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN TRANSLATIONS
Of the 13 messages between Tokyo and Honolulu intercepted before December 7 but not translated until after the attack, 5 were transmitted on or after December 4. The evidence shows that because of technical difficulties a delay of 3 days in transmitting, decoding, and translating such messages was not unusual or unreasonable. [345]
[343] Id., pp. 22-24.
[345] See Hewitt Inquiry Record, pp. 588, 589; also pp. 511-515.
*Captain Safford stated that on the week end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traffic on a busy day *. Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 756.
[346] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, pp. 9283, 9284. The December 3 dispatch from the Honolulu consul was obtained by the district intelligence officer of the Navy in Hawaii and was turned over on December 5, 1941, to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, Being in the more simple PA-K2 system the unit in Hawaii while capable of breaking the message down did not decrypt and translate it until after the attack.
[345] In discussing the matter of delays in securing the translations of the Magic, General Miles stated:
"* * * it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up.  
"In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila.
"Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in Washington by air mail.
"So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington but also the actual intercepting of the message in the field and the transmission of those messages to Washington." Committee record, pp. 2111, 2112.  

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The same difficulty partially explains the delays ranging from 5 to 9 days in decoding and translating six of the eight messages transmitted prior to December 4.
Of the remaining two messages, one dated November 24 was not translated until 20 days after it had been received in Washington. The key in which this message was transmitted was not recovered until about December 16. The other is the message from Tokyo, dated December 2, requesting information as to observation balloons and antimine nets at Pearl Harbor. A transmission of this message was intercepted by a Navy station on the west coast on December 2 and was received by the Navy on December 6 by air mail. This version of the intercept text, however, was badly garbled and the actual decoding and translating was based on a copy obtained from the Honolulu office of a radio corporation after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The two messages transmitted from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, reporting the absence of barrage balloons, torpedo nets, and air reconnaissance, were intercepted by an Army station on the west coast at 7:22 p. m. on December 6 and 12:42 a. m. on December 6, respectively (Washington time), but were not processed as rapidly as were the diplomatic messages transmitted from Tokyo to Washington on the same night. On the basis of experience as to the contents of messages over particular circuits and in particular codes, the very highest priority was given to messages between Tokyo and Washington transmitted in the most secure Japanese code, the so-called Purple, and the "pilot message" of December 6 had alerted the services to what was coming on the Tokyo- Washington circuit.
The messages from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 were transmitted in the PA-K2 code system, a relatively insecure Japanese code and one past experience had shown was not ordinarily used for messages which Tokyo considered of the highest importance. The actual content of any message could not of course be known until it had been decoded and translated, and before the attack there was no reason to suspect that the two messages sent from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 would prove of unusual interest. It is to be noted, however, that the low-grade PA-K2 system was virtually the only code available to the Honolulu consul after he had destroyed his major codes pursuant to instructions from Tokyo on December 2. [346]
Despite the unfortunate fact that these messages were not processed prior to December 7, no basis exists for criticizing the system which was set up for decrypting and translating the intercepted Japanese messages and for determining the priorities in the processing of the various classes of messages. The evidence shows that throughout the period of tense relations between the United States and Japan in 1941, the important diplomatic messages were intercepted, transmitted to Washington, decoded and translated, and disseminated with utmost speed. Not infrequently they were in the hands of the authorized recipients of Magic in our Government as soon as they were in the
[346] See exhibit No. 1, pp. 215, 216.
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hands of the Japanese addressees. Many of the civilian and military personnel engaged in handling the Magic worked long hours far in excess of those prescribed with no additional compensation nor special recognition. *The success achieved in reading the Japanese diplomatic codes merits the highest commendation and all witnesses familiar with Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives*. [347]
CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON WHICH WAS NOT SUPPLIED HAWAII
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have complained that they were wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington through the Magic which would have altered completely their estimate of the situation and would have resulted, if it had been supplied them, in a proper alert and appropriate dispositions consistent with an adequate defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. In a prepared statement, read before the committee, Admiral Kimmel said: [348]
"The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action four years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.
"Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on November 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the West Coast. I would have gone to sea with the Fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the Fleet to meet an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the Fleet fueled, however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time of detachments of various units of the main body of the Fleet."
In the last analysis, however, there are only four messages or groups of messages which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contend pointed to Pearl Harbor as a likely place of attack; i. e., the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches, [349] the deadline messages, [350] the dispatches which indicated the fraudulent nature of Japanese negotiations after November 28, [350a] and the dispatch specifying 1 p. m., December 7, as the time for delivery of the Japanese memorandum to the Secretary of State. [350b]
Referring to the berthing plan (and related dispatches) Admiral Kimmel said, [350c] "These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to
[347] See note 113, supra.
[348] See committee record, pp. 6805, 6806.
[349] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.
[350a] See section "Dispatches Indicating Fraudulent Nature of Negotiations after November 28, 1941," supra.
[350b] See section "Significance of the 'One o'clock' and Code Destruction Messages," supra.
[350c] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780.
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an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Additionally, he has indicated that the dispatches concerning the deadlines and fraudulent negotiations [350d] pointed to Pearl Harbor.
During the course of committee examination General Short was asked whether, "outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into five divisions," there was any information among the Magic intelligence which pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon any other place. He replied: [350e]  
"That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery of the message was at 1 p. m. Washington time, which would be shortly after dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication."
At another point, referring to the "harbor berthing plan" and the so- called "one o'clock" message, General Short said, [350f] "I think those two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor" and that the other intercepted messages related to the "more tense situation as it developed."
As heretofore pointed out, we are unable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in view of the evidence indicating it was not such. [350g] We are of the opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with other information and intelligence available to them, in making their estimate of the situation.
We believe that the deadline messages and the messages indicating fraudulent Japanese diplomacy after November 28 in themselves no more indicated Hawaii as a likely point of attack than any other point in the Pacific. The equivalent of this intelligence was supplied Admiral Kimmel in the dispatch of November 27 beginning, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" and advising, "negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." It was supplied General Short in the November 27 warning, stating, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."
The "one o'clock intercept", as previously indicated, was an unusual piece of intelligence suggesting the distinct possibility that some
[350d] See committee record, pp. 6791-6793.
[350e] Committee record, pp. 8126, 8127. At another point, when asked if his thought was that the Magic messages that were not sent Hawaii would have been more important than the messages he did receive, General Short said: "There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m. which could have been sent to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack. These two messages would have meant something to me." Committee record, p. 8201.
[360f] Id., at pp. 8126-8128.
[350g] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.
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Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m. but it did not reasonably point to Pearl Harbor any more than to any other place in the Pacific. This intelligence indicated the need for particular alertness at 1 p. m. to meet the dangers contemplated on the basis of estimates already made as to where a Japanese attack might come.
The burden of the statements of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the committee is that Washington withheld vital information from them. In fact, Admiral Kimmel has charged that the Navy Department's handling of Magic constituted an affirmative misrepresentation. On the basis of the evidence before the committee, this charge is without foundation in fact.
Both Hawaiian commanders all but ignore the fact that they are properly chargeable with possessing far more vital intelligence indicating an attack on Hawaii than was in the hands of anyone in the War or Navy Departments. They had, among other things, correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. From these assumptions and the estimate and action taken on the basis of information available to them, it is problematical as to what steps would have been taken by the Hawaiian commanders had they received all of the intelligence which they contend was withheld from them.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON
The evidence reflects that virtually everyone in Washington was surprised Japan struck Pearl Harbor at the time she did. Among the reasons for this conclusion was the apparent Japanese purpose to move toward the south the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula; and the feeling that Hawaii was a near-impregnable fortress that Japan would not incur the dangers of attacking. The latter consideration necessarily contemplated that Hawaii was alert and that the enemy would be met with the full weight of Army and Navy power provided for defense. It is apparent, however, that an attack on the fleet by Japan at some time was regarded as a distinct possibility. The warning messages sent the Hawaiian commanders contained orders requiring defensive measures against this possibility. Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans in the Navy Department, is the only officer in Washington in the higher echelons who indicated a strong belief that Hawaii would be attacked he testified that he

[admin]

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regarded such an attack as a "50-50 chance." [351] Asked if he had gained this impression around December 1 as a result of the Japanese; ship-location reports, [352] he testified: [353]
"No. That had been the opinion all along, expressed by the Navy Department expressed in Hawaii, expressed by the War Department, expressed by everybody else, that there was a strong possibility that there would be an attack, a raid, that is, against Hawaii. That was merely following along the line the Navy officers and Army officers had been thinking about for 25 years or more. There was no change."
When asked why, around November 27, if the Navy felt in this way about the chances of an air raid on the fleet in Pearl Harbor some further message was not sent suggesting this possibility, Admiral Turner stated: [354]  
"That had been in correspondence right along. The dispatch of November 27 fully covers it, in my opinion. I think on the 5th, the afternoon of the 5th of December, after convassing [sic] the situation with officers in my Division, I went to Admiral Ingersoll's office and we talked for an hour as to what more the Navy Department could do to warn the forces in the field, the fleets, what ought to be done, should we send any more dispatches, or what. We came, both, to the conclusion that everything had been done covering the entire situation that ought to be done and we then proceeded into Admiral Stark's office, discussed the same question with him for 15 minutes, and *it was the unanimous decision that the orders that we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive deployment were were sufficient*.
"*What was he going to take a defensive deployment against Just one thing. That the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there."
The foregoing thoughts expressed by Admiral Turner characterized the feelings of all the ranking officers of the War and Navy Departments: *that the Hawaiian commanders had been adequately alerted to all contingencies*. Admiral Stark stated, "We considered we had fully alerted them (referring to the 'war warning' of November 27) with the directives which were given both by the Army and by ourselves * * * We felt we were fully alerted. Our plans were ready, if
[351] It is to be noted that the record clearly indicates that Admiral Turner's estimate of a possible attack on Hawaii was not based on any intelligence which he possessed indicating such an attack but rather on his personal appraisal of possible Japanese action.
In this connection Captain McCollum said: "I was not surprised at the Japanese attack, sir. I was astonished at the success attained by that attack, sir. * * * I do not mean by that statement to imply that I had any knowledge that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and I wish to state categorically that there was no bit of intelligence that I had at my disposal that definitely to my mind indicated at the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, but I had * * * for many years felt that in the event an outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan that the Japanese would make a very finite attempt to strike the fleet at or near the commencement time of those hostilities." Committee record, pp. 9259, 9260.
The following committee examination reflects the feeling of Captain McCollum with respect to a possible Japanese attack on our fleet:
Question: "And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet?"
Captain McCollum: "That is correct."
Question: "The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet."
Captain McCollum: "They not only would do that, but that there was historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war with us.
Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their war with Russia in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in 1914 was started in that way. * * * Attacking their fleet and timing a declaration of war on presentation of the final notes." Committee record, pp. 9275, 9276.
[352] Radio Intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers.
[353] Committee record, p. 5200.
[354] Id., at p 5201.  
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war broke, in all theaters." [355] General Marshall said, "In our opinion the commanders had been alerted." [356] As expressed by Mr. Stimson: [357]
"We assumed that when he (General Short) had been warned that hostile action was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that General Short did receive, not only from Washington but from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis."
Captain McCollum, who had suggested (not knowing the "war warning" had been sent) an additional warning dispatch, stated in referring to the dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on November 27: [358]
"It does not come in the life of most naval officers to receive or see a message containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message containing the information "This is a war warning," indicated clearly that the Department expected a war to break out there at any moment from then on.
"* * * I think that a commander to whom such a message as that is addressed must assume that war is going to break out over his forces and take the steps necessary to cover it."
The consummate confidence that field commanders were adequately alert on the basis of dispatches sent them is manifested by the reluctance of Admiral Stark to dispatch a message based on the "one o'clock intercept." As stated by General Marshall: "I asked him if he had read the final message referring to one o'clock. He stated that he had, and I proposed an immediate message to all theaters concerned. *Admiral Stark hesitated, because he said (he) had alerted them all and he was afraid of confusing them further*." [359]
As indicated, the record reflects the judgment of responsible officers in both the War and Navy Departments that they had fully and I adequately alerted our military outposts before December 7. [360] We believe that Admiral Kimmel and General Short received sufficient information to justify the expectation that they would be fully alert to the implications of their military responsibilities in Hawaii. In this connection it is to be noted that all other outpost commanders, receiving the warning messages of November 27 in substantially the same form as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short, took full and ample measures to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the fact that war was imminent. Hawaii was the *only* outpost that failed to institute a proper alert.
[355] Id., at pp. 13733, 13747.
[356] Id., at pp. 13792, 13793.
[357] see Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record p. 14398.
[358] Committee record, pp. 9194, 9195, 9281, 9282. McCollum said: "I had been given to understand that they (the Fleet) had been thoroughly alerted * * * and on their toes." Committee record, p. 9156.
[359] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pages 7, 8.
[360] General Miles said: "G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information. The essential information contained in the Chief of Staff's November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The information emphasized the increasing tension of the crisis.
"But these things were known in Hawaii. *That Fortress, like a sentinel on post had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered to be redundant*." Committee record, p. 2216.  

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NATURE OF RESPONSIBILITIES
In seeking to make an assessment of responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster, apart from that which is forever Japan's, it is imperative that the duties and obligations existing in Hawaii be placed in the proper perspective with respect to those attaching to Washington. She responsibility of the commander in the field with his well-defined scope of activity is manifestly to be distinguished from that of the officer in Washington who is charged with directing the over-all operations of the military on a global basis.
DUTIES IN HAWAII
It has been a cardinal principle of military theory to select capable commanders for our outposts, give them broad directives, [361] and leave to their discretion and good judgment the implementation of the Departmental mandate consonant with their more intimate and detailed familiarity with the peculiar problems existing in their particular commands. [362] Admiral Kimmel and General Short were selected because of their impeccable records for two of the most important field commands of the Navy and Army Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department these two officers were primarily and fundamentally responsible they were the men to whom Washington and the Nation were properly entitled to look for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal frontier.
With respect to Hawaii and the fleet, theirs were the obligations to plan for war, to train for war, and to be alerted for war when it came. The first two of these obligations they discharged in an exemplary [manner but in the case of the third, alertness for war, they failed. [363] All of the intelligence, thought, and energies of the field commander are to be devoted to his command. He is to apply all information and intelligence received to his particular situation. He is not privileged to think or contemplate that he will not be attacked. On the contrary, he is to assume and to expect that his particular post will be attacked. He cannot wholly assume that others will inform him
[361] It is to be recalled, as heretofore pointed out, that Admiral Kimmel said: "* * * the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by *broad policy and objective rather than by categorical instructions*." Letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, dated May 26, 1941. See committee exhibit No. 106.
[361] Referring to the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Turner said: "After reading these splendid plans that had been sent in by the Commander in Chief, and by the Fourteenth Naval District, why, my feeling was that these people knew their business. They knew what to do about it, probably a lot more than I did, or the rest of us here, because they were the ones that were on the firing line." Committee record, p. 5211. See also testimony of General Gerow, committee record, p. 2719.
[362] In striking contrast with the failure to effect adequate readiness in Hawaii is the manner in which the Russians prepared to meet in June and July of 1941 the possibility of a Japanese thrust against the Soviet Union. An intercepted dispatch from Vladivostok to Tokyo on July 3, 1941, stated: "Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet *any eventuality*. However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. *Evidently the preparations are intended* for defense against Japan." Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 125. See also committee record pp. 7509-7512.
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when and where the foe will strike. He is "like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied." [364]
The commanders in Hawaii were clearly and unmistakably warned of war with Japan. They were given orders and possessed information that the entire Pacific area was fraught with danger. They failed to carry out these orders and to discharge their basic and ultimate responsibilities. They failed to defend the fortress they commanded-their citadel was taken by surprise. Aside from any responsibilities that may appear to rest in Washington, the ultimate and direct responsibility for failure to engage the Japanese on the morning of December 7 with every weapon at their disposal rests essentially and properly with the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii whose duty it was to meet the enemy against which they had been warned.
DUTIES IN Washington
The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy had the over-all responsibility for supervision of our military and naval operations and establishments everywhere, including Hawaii. Theirs was the obligation of determining that all of the equipment available was supplied the field commander which would assist him in discharging his responsibilities. [365] In supplying equipment it was their duty to consider the demands for material from many quarters in the light of the commitments and interests of the United States to estimate where the most dangerous and likely point of enemy attack might be and then to effect dispositions which in their best judgment most nearly satisfied the exigencies of the hour. They discharged this duty to the best of their ability.
They had the duty of alerting our outposts in view of the critical situation in our relations with Japan in the days before December 7 and of informing them of probable enemy action. [366] In the dispatch of November 27, sent Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, there was outlined what at the time was regarded and appeared to be the major strategic effort of the enemy. The Japanese major effort did follow the course outlined in the dispatch. Pearl Harbor was not known to be a point of Japanese attack but it was known that such an attack was a possibility and both responsible commanders in Hawaii were accordingly ordered to take action contemplated to meet this possibility.
[364] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14406.
[365] See committee record, pp. 2764-2771; 5594, 5595. Also see committee exhibit No. 42.
[366] Admiral Turner said "My function was to give the major strategic over all picture for the use of my superiors and disseminate that." Committee record, p. 5074.
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The officers in the intelligence and war plans divisions of the War and Navy Departments handling matters in the Pacific had a *particular* responsibility with respect to the magic intelligence just as the Hawaiian commanders had a particular responsibility for the defense f the fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. It was the duty of these officers to evaluate and disseminate the magic in the form of estimates, as originally obtained, or otherwise. This responsibility they failed to discharge with that his degree of skill and imagination which this intelligence warranted. [367]
In the case of the War Plans Division of the War Department, once it had warned General Short of hostilities, issued order in contemplation of this contingency, and directed him to *report measures taken*, it thereby assumed responsibility for reviewing the report of action and advising the commanding general in the event the measures taken by him were not in accordance with those desired.
While the report submitted by General Short was ambiguous and disarmingly terse, it was the duty of the War Plans Division through the exercise of proper supervision to require a reply reflecting with clarity that there had been satisfactory compliance with the departmental orders. [368]
Hawaii was but one of many points of concert to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated by the Chief of Staff, "the only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point." [369] Theirs was the obligation of mapping the strategy of global war, of advising and counseling the President and others on military and naval matters, of following and encouraging the progress of preparation for defense in the event of war, of outlining and justifying to the Congress the manifold needs of the Army and Navy, of over-all responsibility for many military and naval outposts and interests, of disposing and allocating the scanty
[367] As expressed by Mr. Stimson: "A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event." See statement of the Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. [368] In this connection, however, the marked distinction between the character of the responsibility resting on the War Plans Division and that reposing in General Short was expressed by Mr. Stimson:
"It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941 the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction, and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible." See statement of the Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Committee exhibit No. 157.
[369] Committee record, p. 13793.

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materials of war consistent with the overwhelming demands and requirements from many quarters, and of performing the innumerable functions of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations in a democracy that was all too slowly preparing itself against the inevitable day of war. [370] Such diversity and magnitude of responsibilities is to be distinguished from that of the outpost commander with his singleness of purpose and well-defined sphere of activity. It was the duty of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to alert our military and naval garrisons which they attempted to do and felt assured they had done. To superimpose the administrative burden of supervising details would be to enmesh them in such a confusing and bewildering network of detail as to defeat the very purpose for which the positions of Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations were created.
UNITY 0F COMMAND
The evidence adduced in the course of the various Pearl Harbor investigations reveals the complete inadequacy of command by *mutual cooperation* where decisive action is of the essence. Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii failed to coordinate and integrate their combined facilities for defense in the crucial days between November 27 and December 7, 1941. While they had been able over a period of time to conceive admirable plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consistent with the system of mutual cooperation, when the time came for the implementation of these plans they remained hollow and empty contracts that were never executed. Had the responsible commanders conferred together in such manner as to reach joint decisions consonant with their plans, the system of mutual cooperation would have proved adequate. It is clear, however, that this system presents unnecessary and inevitable opportunities for personal failures and shortcomings. The ubiquitous tendency to "let George do it," to assume the other fellow will take care of the situation, is an inseparable part of command by mutual cooperation.
The tragic assumptions made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short concerning what the other was doing are a manifestation of this fact. Each was the victim of the natural human reluctance to pry into what is regarded as another's business. [370a] The commander in chief assumed that the Army would be on a full alert the antiaircraft, the aircraft warning service, and the interceptor command yet he
[370] Mr. Stimson said: "Our General Staff officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of the offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible. * * * The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation which has suffered some of the horrors of the greatest and most malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust to them if this complete difference of atmosphere was not given the weight which it deserves." Statement of Mr. Stimson to the Committee. Committee record, pp. 14410, 14411.
[370a] See testimony of General Short, Committee record, pp. 8122, 8123.
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did not inquire to determine whether this was the case, apparently because it might not "sit very well" with General Short. [371] The, commanding general assumed that the Navy would be conducting reconnaissance which would afford him adequate warning in order properly to alert his command. Yet he did not inquire as to whether, the Navy was conducting the reconnaissance upon which he was relying or his protection, presumably because he felt such an inquiry might be "resented" by Admiral Kimmel. [372]
The conduct of operations in this state of joint oblivion was possible n a command by *mutual cooperation*; but none of these false and unwarranted assumptions could have obtained under *unity of command*. Under the latter system a single commander would have been charged with complete responsibility; all of the warnings, intelligence, and orders would have been his to interpret, estimate, and implement; it would have been his duty only to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realities of the situation. Conceivably, a single commander might have arrived at the same estimate as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short; namely, that Hawaii would not be attacked. But such a decision would have been clear-cut and devoid f all the anomalous and incompatible assumptions that are in strange contradiction of the estimate made by the Hawaiian commanders that their outpost was safe. He would not have arrived at a conclusion concerning the defensive measures required on a fallacious assumption with respect to the decisions and defensive measures of someone else, nor could he have interpreted the same order at once in two different and inconsistent ways.
Furthermore, in a command by mutual cooperation there is the unfailing likelihood of conflicting and overlapping prerogatives. In the case of the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, it was the joint mission of the Army and Navy to hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, each being specifically charged with supporting the other. It was necessary that the local commanders jointly agree upon the existence of the appropriate emergency as a condition precedent to the detailed allocation of specific missions as between the two services. The Navy was primarily responsible for distant reconnaissance and long-range attacks against hostile vessels, while the Army was charged with short- range defense. In the case of each of these defensive measures, one service was charged with supporting the forces of the other service having primary responsibility; and particularly, in the case of air operations, the service having the primary responsibility was to control the available planes of the other service. This was a sliding and shifting arrangement with respect to primary responsibility depending on the nature of the attack. The mutual agreement required by such operations would necessarily be forth-
[371] See Roberts Commission record, p. 631.
[372] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363.
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coming only when a particular type of attack was sufficiently imminent as to suggest the advisability of the Army or the Navy, as the case might be, assuming primary responsibility to meet the attack. [373]
*The completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Navy in Hawaii at a time when the fullest exchange of intelligence was absolutely imperative dictates that military and naval intelligence, particularly, must be consolidated*. [374] The extraordinarily anomalous situation of the one hand not knowing what the other hand knew or was doing should never be permitted to exist again.
Invocation of unity of command was within the scope of the authority of the responsible commanders in Hawaii, upon agreement as to the service that should exercise command, [374a] or of the Secretaries of War and Navy, acting jointly. [375] Inasmuch as there was a complete failure of the system of mutual cooperation on December 7, 1941, and unity of command had not been effected by or imposed upon the Hawaiian commanders, it is proper to inquire as to the reason for unity of command not having been invoked at least as soon as it was known that hostilities were possible at any moment.
The evidence reflects that during the period from November 27 to December 7 the leading subject of conferences between Admiral Kimmel and General Short was the question and near-dispute as to whether the Army or the Navy should exercise command over the islands of Wake and Midway after the Marines on these islands were relieved by Army troops. [376] No agreement was concluded in this regard before the outbreak of war. If neither would agree to the
[373] See section, supra, concerning plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Part III this report.
[374] *General Marshall said he thought unity of consolidation (sic) or centralization of military and naval intelligence was very necessary*. Committee record, p. 2966.
[374a] Admiral Kimmel testified that he never had any discussions with the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command into effect. He said he would not have effected unity of command, or accepted responsibility for the Army actions, without reference to the Navy Department. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 296, 297.
[375] See committee exhibit No. 44. General Gerow said: "A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, *joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned*. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services." See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48.
[376] Admiral W. W. Smith testified: "He (Admiral Kimmel) had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the marines off the outlying islands, and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain their for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to be taken off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion on this with General Short and his staff, the commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans officer, the Operations Officers and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, 'We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore.' That was a shock all of us and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, 'Then, they will be no damn good to me.' The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand. *The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, 'If I have the man these islands, I shall have to command them.' Admiral Kimmel replied, 'No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports,' or words to that effect, and General Short said, 'Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them.' That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out*," Hart inquiry record, pp. 40, 41.
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other's commanding Wake or Midway, it is not in the least surprising unexpected that neither one of the commanders would have agreed to subordinate himself and his entire command to the other.
In the case of Washington, the matter of establishing unity of command at our outposts was under consideration and discussion by le War and Navy Departments throughout the year 1941 and especially during the few weeks prior to December 7. [377] No decision, however, was reached concerning unity of command at Hawaii or at any of our outposts until the responsible officials were confronted by war with powerful adversaries on two fronts and the barrier of departmental prerogative had been severely jolted by the Pearl [arbor disaster. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy during 1941 ad considered specific proposals for unity of command as made by each of the services but prior to December 7 no effective agreement was reached as to which service should exercise command at a particular outpost. It generally appears, however, that it was agreed le system of mutual cooperation in the Caribbean, at Panama and t Hawaii should be replaced by unity of command. The Navy proposed that command in the Caribbean be vested in the Navy; at 'Panama in the Army, except when major naval forces were based ere; and at Hawaii in the Navy, except when no major naval forces ere based there. [378] The Army, on the other hand, proposed unity of command in all coastal frontiers, command to rest in the Army except hen a major portion of the fleet was operating against comparable hostile forces within the range of possible support by Army aviation and when the Army and Navy commanders should agree to transfer command from one to the other. [379]
In view of these conflicting proposals following virtually a year of discussion, General Gerow, chief of War Plans in the War Department, recommended to the Chief of Staff on November 17, 1941, that the system of command in the outposts remain by mutual cooperation, thereby suggesting abandonment of the idea of unity of command. [380] In testifying before the committee, General Gerow explained his action by stating he thought the only way to have effective unity of command was for the heads of the Army and Navy to say that "So and so is in command, and he is in command from now on." He observed that [381] "You cannot vary that command
[377] See committee record pp. 2749-2761, also 2963 et seq.
[378] Committee record pp. 2750-2757 see also committee exhibit No 48.
[379] Id.
[380] Id. General Gerow recommended: "That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee." See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48.
Referring to this memorandum, General Marshall stated in a memorandum for General Gerow dated December 5, 1941: "I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval section of the Joint Planning committee. However I think it is important that a general policy, or what might be called an explanation, should first be decided on, expressed in carefully considered sentences as to the *application* of unity of command.
"A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum and you have covered it orally to me, but no where is it presented in a concise form." Committee exhibit No. 48A.
[381] Committee record, p. 2757.
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from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must be responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must be responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it." He pointed out that the joint Army-Navy planning committee had contemplated an arrangement whereby command would shift back and forth from the Army to the Navy and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack or defense. [382] General Gerow said that he thought the system of mutual cooperation would be better than such a continual switching of command. [383] He commented:
"I did not think either the Army or Navy Planning Group would agree to say wholeheartedly 'You take everything and it will be agreeable to us'. Neither would agree to that." [384] He agreed that it would be necessary that "somebody at the top had to knock their heads together and tell them what to do." [385] General Marshall epitomized the essentially human proclivities characterizing the situation: [386]
"I have said this before: I will repeat it again. *It is a very simple thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man*. But that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among ourselves and always will continue to be so."
The ultimate result was that no agreement was reached between the War and Navy Departments before Pearl Harbor for the establishment of unity of command in our military and naval outposts. The factors and considerations attending eventual invocation of unity of command were expressed by the Chief of Staff in a letter dated December 20, 1941, to General Short's successor, Gen. Delos C. Emmons: [387]
"Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning units of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.
"For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions have been unavailing. *All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some off the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control*. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.
"I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.
[382] Id.
[383] Id., at p. 2758.
[384] Id.
[385] Id.
[386] Committee record pp. 2962, 2963.
[387] See committee exhibit No. 48; also committee record pp. 2759- 2761.
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"Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. *These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency*.
"This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him is morning, You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you."
The foregoing considerations evince more than mere reluctance and procrastination toward effecting action by command rather than by joint agreement; they reveal that inherent in our system of separate services there exists the basic deficiency of conflicting interests which precipitate serious and unnecessary obstacles to the solution of pressing military problems. It is to be necessarily noted, however, that while considering the advisability of unity of command, Washington was assuming that the system of mutual cooperation was working within its limitations and that local commanders were fully discharging their responsibilities. It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster at the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed. [388]  
As earlier indicated, the failure to integrate and coordinate Army-Navy efforts in Hawaii appears to have been attributable to a feeling n the part of each commander that he would intrude upon the prerogatives of the other and thereby invite similar intrusion if he inquired as to what the sister service was doing. In Washington, the failure to impose unity of command was occasioned by the inability of the Army and the Navy as entities to agree upon a basis for unified command.  
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
THE "WYMAN MATTER"
The Committee has carefully reviewed the investigation conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board with respect to the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district engineer in the Hawaiian Department, insofar as his activities may have relationship to the Pearl Harbor disaster. [389] The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded from the evidence that Wyman performed the duties of district engineer in a wholly unsatisfactory manner. Under his administration, engineering and construction work in the Hawaiian Department was defective and was characterized by delays.
The activities of Wyman and his associates were not fully inquired into by the Committee inasmuch as they did not appear to have contributed in any material or proximate manner to the disaster for
[388] In the course of counsel's examination, General Marshall was asked: "Without asking you any questions about the unity of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and Navy Departments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any views as to the wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as compared with war?"
The Chief of Staff replied "*I think it is an imperative necessity*." [389] See in this regard the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157.  

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reasons heretofore set forth. [390] It is recommended, however, that the Wyman matter be investigated by an appropriate committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
THE PHILIPPINE ATTACK
The Committee has considered in the course of its proceedings the Japanese attack on the Philippines on December 7, 1941, and has concluded that this attack bears no relevant relationship to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In consequence, the Philippine attack was not made the subject of detailed inquiry although the reader will find an account of this attack in the committee's record. [391]  
PRIOR INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We have not presumed to pass judgment on the nature of or charges of unfairness [392] with respect to seven prior inquiries and investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack, feeling that by conducting a full and impartial hearing our report to the Congress along with the Committee's record would present to the American people the material and relevant facts of the disaster. The Committee does desire to observe, however, that charges to the effect that the original report of the Roberts Commission was abridged, modified, or amended, or portions deleted were found to be without foundation in fact. [393] Prior investigations were conducted during the course of the most devasta-
[390] As has been seen the disaster was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and material losses of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese.
[391] See in this regard, Committee record, pp., 14133-14173,
[392] In referring to the inquiry conducted by the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel has stated (Committee record, pp. 6809-6811):
(1) That he was told he was not on trial (Roberts Commission record, p. 581);
(2) That he was not permitted to be present at the testimony of other witnesses or to examine or cross-examine them;
(3) That the Roberts Commission was informed of or impressed with the fact that Hawaii was given all of the information available to the Navy Department (referring in this regard to committee record, pp. 4893- 5022);
(4) That it appeared the so-called Magic was freely discussed before the Commission and in consequence the latter likely received the impression that the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were either forwarded by Washington by Admiral Kimmel or available to him in Hawaii.
Testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated:
(1) That the Commission's investigation was not intended to be a trial. "This seemed to me a preliminary investigation, like a grand jury investigation, and I did not think, for our report, that was to be taken as precluding every one of the men mentioned in it from a defense before his peers. In other words, you would not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. *It was not a trial. * * * It was an investigation and it was the formation of a judgment to be handed the President*." (Committee record, pp. 8801, 8802).
(2) That, as indicated, one would not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. He observed the proceedings were closed and every witness asked to observe secrecy for the reason "that there were questions of broken codes. We were informed that the Army and Navy were getting invaluable information every day, that the Japanese did not realize that their codes were broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary about even telling us about the thing for fear there might be some leak from our Commission. Of course, if we held open hearings there was a chance we might do a great damage to our forces, our military program" (id., at pp. 8788, 8789).
(3) That the Roberts Commission knew outposts were not getting the Magic. "We knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the breaking of the code" (id., at p. 8813).  
(4) That "*We were never shown one of the Magic messages*" nor the substance thereof (id., at pp. 8828, 8829) although the Commission did know codes were being broken and generally what was obtained from the traffic (id., at p. 8829; also pp. 8836, 8846).
[393] See testimony of Mr. Justice Roberts before the Committee. Committee record, pp. 8779-8908.
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ing war in history and within the necessary limitations of secrecy imposed by war and the national security. Public hearings concerning he disaster were properly deferred until the cessation of hostilities; to have done otherwise would have been to imperil the entire war effort. Parties in interest during previous inquiries, who for necessary security reasons did not have the full and ready access to information throughout the war that may have been desired, did have such information available for consideration before the Committee. Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as well as others, have attested to the full, fair, and impartial hearing which they were afforded by the Committee.
It is believed that with the additional evidence developed since VJ-Day and the greater accessibility of witnesses, together with the greater scope of inquiry conducted, we are in a much better position to form proper estimates and conclusions concerning responsibilities elating to the disaster than has heretofore been possible because of the proper and necessary restrictions within which other inquiries: and investigations were conducted during wartime.
Shortly after the disaster both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were retired from active duty. Consideration was thereafter given by the War and Navy Departments to the question of whether the errors made in Hawaii justified proceedings by court martial. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were requested in the interest of the nation's war effort to waive their rights to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial by general court martial for the duration of the war and 6 months thereafter. [394] Both these officers properly and commendably did so waive their rights. It was the duty of the offices of the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the Navy to consider the facts of the disaster as relating to the responsibilities of he Hawaiian commanders, even though after inquiry and deliberation it was determined that the errors were errors of judgment and of derelictions of duty.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were catapulted by the Empire of Japan into the principal roles in one of the most publicized tragedies of all time. That improper and incorrect deductions were drawn by some members of the public, with consequent suffering and mental anguish to both officers, cannot e questioned, just as erroneous conclusions were made by others with respect to the extent and nature of responsibility in Washington. But this is the result of the magnitude of public interest and speculation inspired by the disaster and not the result of mistreatment of anyone. The situation prevailing at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 in the wake of the Japanese attack cast everyone, whether immediately or remotely concerned, beneath the white light of world scrutiny.
[394] See Committee exhibits Nos. 170, 171.
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PART V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked act of aggression by the Empire of Japan. The treacherous attack was planned and launched while Japanese ambassadors, instructed with characteristic duplicity, were carrying of the pretense negotiations with the Government of the United States with a view to an amicable settlement of differences in the Pacific.
2. The ultimate responsibility for the attack and its results rests on Japan, an attack that was well planned and skillfully executed. contributing to the effectiveness of the attack was a powerful striking force, much more powerful than it had been thought the Japanese were able to employ in a single tactical venture at such distance and under such circumstances.
3. The diplomatic policies and actions of the United States provided no justifiable provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on this Nation. The Secretary of State fully informed both the War and Navy Departments of diplomatic developments and, in a timely and forceful manner, clearly pointed out to these Departments that relations between the United States and Japan had passed beyond the age of diplomacy and were in the hands of the military.
4. The committee has found no evidence to support the charges, made before and during the hearings, that the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of Navy tricked, provoked, incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into attacking this Nation in order that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from the Congress. On the contrary, all evidence conclusively points to the fact that they discharged their responsibilities with distinction, ability, and foresight and in keeping with the highest traditions of our fundamental foreign policy.
5. The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government officials made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national honor and endangering our security, to avert war with Japan.
6. The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and material losses, of the Army and the Navy institute measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese.
7. Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time that she did. Yet officers, both in Washington and Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack; they realized this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a possibility; and they were adequately informed of the imminence of war.
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8. Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed
(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle of command by mutual cooperation.
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence
(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of their equipment.
(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.
(f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command, which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them.
9. The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty.
10. The War Plans Division of the War Department failed to discharge its direct responsibility to advise the commanding general he had not properly alerted the Hawaiian Department when the latter, pursuant to instructions, had reported action taken in a message that was not satisfactorily responsive to the original directive.
11. The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments failed:
(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and November 20 (the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other information available to them, in making their estimate of the situation.
(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the "one o'clock" intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December
7. If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.
12. Notwithstanding the fact that there were officers on twenty-four hour watch, the Committee believes that under all of the evidence the War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and 7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the evidence in the Committee's record, the following recommendations are respectfully submitted:
That immediate action be taken to insure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts.
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That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon effecting a unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received. The assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions. Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded the important role which it deserves.
That effective steps be taken to insure that statutory or other restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other forces inimical to the Nation's security and to the handicap of our own intelligence agencies. With this in mind, the Congress should give serious study to, among other things, the Communications Act of 1934; to suspension in proper instances of the statute of limitations during war (it was impossible during the war to prosecute violations relating to the "Magic" without giving the secret to the enemy); to legislation designed to prevent unauthorized sketching, photographing, and mapping of military and naval reservations in peacetime; and to legislation fully protecting the security of classified matter.
That the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district engineer in the Hawaiian Department, as developed by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, be investigated by an appropriate committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
That the military and naval branches of our Government give serious consideration to the 25 supervisory, administrative, and organizational principles hereafter set forth.
SUPERVISORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN OUR MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS REVEALED BY THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
The Committee has been intrigued throughout the Pearl Harbor proceedings by one enigmatical and paramount question: *Why, with one of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7 Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur*? The answer to this question and the causative considerations regarded as having any reasonably proximate bearing on the disaster have been set forth in the body of this report. Fundamentally, these considerations reflect supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies which existed in our Military and Naval establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor. In the course of the Committee's investigation still other deficiencies, not regarded as having a direct bearing on the disaster have presented themselves. Otherwise stated, all of these
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deficiencies reduce themselves to principles which are set forth, not for their novelty or profundity but for the reason that, by their very self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they were ignored.
It is recognized that many of the deficiencies revealed by our investigation may very probably have already been corrected as a result of the experiences of the war. We desire, however, to submit these principles, which are grounded in the evidence adduced by the Committee, for the consideration of our Army and Navy establishments in the earnest hope that something constructive may be accomplished that will aid our national defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 7, 1941. We do this after careful and long consideration of the evidence developed through one of the most important investigations in the history of the Congress.
1. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility
Reviewing the testimony of the Director of War Plans and the Director of Naval Intelligence, the conclusion is inescapable that the proper demarcation of responsibility between these two divisions of the Navy Department did not exist. War Plans appears to have insisted that since it had the duty of issuing operational orders it must arrogate the prerogative of evaluating intelligence; Naval Intelligence, on the other hand, seems to have regarded the matter of evaluation as properly its function. It is clear that this intradepartmental misunderstanding and near conflict was not resolved before December 7 and beyond question it prejudiced the effectiveness of Naval Intelligence.
In Hawaii, there as such a marked failure to allocate responsibility in the case of the Fourteenth Naval District that Admiral Bloch testified he did not know whom the commander in chief would hold responsible in the event of shortcomings with respect to the condition and readiness of aircraft. [1] The position of Admiral Bellinger was a wholly anomalous one. He appears to have been responsible to everyone and to no one. The pyramiding of superstructures of organization cannot be conducive to efficiency and endangers the very function of our military and naval services.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates
The testimony of many crucial witnesses in the Pearl Harbor investigation contains an identical note: "I thought he was alerted"; "I took for granted he would understand"; "I thought he would be doing that." It is the same story each responsible official seeking to justify his position by reliance upon the fallacious premise that he was entitled to rely upon the assumption that a certain task was being performed or to take for granted that subordinates would be properly vigilant. This tragic theme was particularly marked in Hawaii.
The foregoing was well illustrated in Admiral Kimmel's failure to appreciate the significance of dispatches between December 3 and 6, advising him that Japanese embassies and consulates, including the
[1] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 1522.
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Embassy in Washington, were destroying their codes. Navy Department officials have almost unanimously testified that instructions to burn codes mean "war in any man's language" and that in supplying Admiral Kimmel this information they were entitled to believe he could attach the proper significance to this intelligence. Yet the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet testified that he did not interpret these dispatches to mean that Japan contemplated immediate war on the United States. That the Navy Department was entitled to rely upon the feeling that Admiral Kimmel, as a responsible intelligent commander, should have known what the burning of codes meant appears reasonable; but this is beside the point in determining standards for the future. The simple fact is that the dispatches were not properly interpreted. Had the Navy Department not taken for granted that Kimmel would be alerted by them but instead have given him the benefit of its interpretation, there could now be no argument as to what the state of alertness should have been based on such dispatches. With Pearl Harbor as a sad experience, crucial intelligence should in the future be supplied commanders accompanied by the best estimate of its significance.
3. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information
Admiral Stark hesitated about sending the "one o clock" intelligence to the Pacific outposts for the reason that he regarded them as adequately alerted and he did not want to confuse them. As has been seen, he was properly entitled to believe that naval establishments were adequately alert, but the fact is that one Hawaii was not in a state of readiness. This one exception is proof of the principle that any question as to whether information should be supplied the field should always be resolved in favor of transmitting it.
4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised
Perhaps the most signal shortcoming of administration, both at Washington and in Hawaii, was the failure to follow up orders and instructions to insure that they were carried out. The record of all Pearl Harbor proceedings is replete with evidence of this fundamental deficiency in administration. A few illustrations should clearly demonstrate this fact.
In the dispatch of November 27, 1941, which was to be considered "war warning," Admiral Kimmel was instructed to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." Very little was done pursuant to this order with a view to a *defensive* deployment; the Navy Department did nothing to determine what had been done in execution of the order. Yet virtually every responsible Navy Department official has testified as to what he "assumed" Kimmel would do upon receipt of this dispatch. While it appears to have been the policy to leave the implementation of orders to the local commander, as a matter of future practice it would seem a safer policy to recognize as implicit in the delegation of authority or the issuance of orders the responsibility of inspecting and supervising to determine that the delegated authority is properly administered and the orders carried out.
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The story of Admiral Kimmel's administration of the Pacific Fleet and supervision of the Fourteenth Naval District as well as General Short's administration of the Hawaiian Department in the critical days before December 7 is the epitome of worthy plans and purposes which were never implemented. The job of an administrator is only half completed upon the issuance of an order; it is discharged when he determines the order has been executed.
5. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision
In the November 27 warning sent General Short he was ordered "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary" and to "report measures taken." The commanding general reported: "Re your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." This message from General Short was not clearly responsive to the order. Yet during the 9 days before Pearl Harbor not one responsible officer in the War Plans Division of the War Department pointed out to the commanding general his failure to alert the Hawaiian Department consistent with instructions As a matter of fact, it does not affirmatively appear that anyone upon receipt of General Short's reply "burdened" himself sufficiently to call for message No. 472 in order to determine to what the report was responsive.
6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition
It has been suggested, in explaining why additional warnings were not sent to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, that it was desired to avoid crying "wolf" too often lest the department commanders become impervious to the significance of messages designed to alert them. The McCollum message, for example, was not dispatched for the reason that overseas garrisons were regarded as fully alerted. Admiral Noyes is alleged to have referred to the proposed dispatch as an insult to the intelligence of the commander in chief inasmuch as he felt Admiral Kimmel had received adequate information Although the exact provisions of the McCollum dispatch are unknown, it would seem to have been a safer practice to have sent this additional warning to intensify and insure alertness over a period of time through repetition, particularly under the critical circumstances prevailing between November 27 and December 7, 1941.
No consideration appears to have been given to the thought that since nothing occurred for 9 days after the warnings of November 27 there would be a lessening of vigilance by reason of the simple fact that *nothing did occur for several days* following such warnings. Of course, this observation has little or no application to the Hawaiian situation; for had Japan struck on November 28, the next day after the warnings, the same lack of readiness would substantially have prevailed as existed on the morning of December 7. There could have been no lessening of alertness there for the reason that the Hawaiian commands were at no time properly alert.
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7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence
Beyond serious question Army and Navy officials both in Hawaii and in Washington were beset by a lassitude born of 20 years of peace. Admiral Kimmel admitted he was affected by the "peace psychology" just like "everybody else." As expressed by Admiral McMorris, "We were a bit too complacent there." The manner in which capable officers were affected is to a degree understandable, but the Army and the Navy are the watchdogs of the Nation's security and they must be on the alert at all times, no matter how many the years of peace.  
As indicated in the body of this report, there was a failure in the War and Navy Departments during the night of December 6-7 to be properly on the qui vive consistent with the knowledge that the Japanese reply to our Government's note of November 26 was being received. The failure of subordinate officials to contact the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations on the evening of December 6 concerning the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum is indicative of the "business as usual" attitude. Some prominent military and naval officials were entertaining and, along with other officers, apparently failed to read into the 13 parts the importance of and necessity of greater alertness.
Of a similar tenor is the remark of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the "lost" Japanese carriers "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head * * *?" Or the observation attributed to General Short with respect to the transcript of the "Mori" conversation that it looked quite in order and was nothing to be excited about.
The people are entitled to expect greater vigilance and alertness from their Army and Navy whether in war or in peace.
8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials
On occasion witnesses have echoed the sentiment that the Pearl Harbor debacle was made possible, not by the egregious errors or poor judgment of any individual or individuals but rather by reason of the imperfection and deficiencies of the system whereby Army and Navy intelligence was coordinated and evaluated. Only partial credence, however, can be extended this conclusion inasmuch as no amount of coordination and no system could be effected to compensate for lack of alertness and imagination. Nevertheless, there is substantial basis, from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence. *And the assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work over an extended period of time should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions*.
The professional character of intelligence work does not appear to have been properly appreciated in either the War or Navy Departments. It seems to have been regarded as just another tour of duty,  
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as reflected by limitations imposed on the period of assignment to such work, among other things. The committee has received the distinct impression that there was a tendency, whether realized or not, to relegate intelligence to a role of secondary importance.
As an integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor investigations graphically portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Navy Departments (1) for selection of men for intelligence work who possess the back ground, capacity, and penchant for such work; (2) for maintaining them in the work over an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating data received; and (3) for the centralization of responsibility for handling intelligence to avoid all of the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent.
9. The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal; there should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt
Despite the fact that the record of testimony in the Pearl Harbor proceedings is filled with various interpretations as to what War and Navy Department dispatches meant, in not one instance does it appear that a subordinate requested a clarification. General Short was ordered to undertake reconnaissance, yet he apparently ignored the order assuming that the man who prepared it did not know of his special agreement-with the Navy in Hawaii whereby the latter was to conduct distant reconnaissance. He chose to implement an order which manifestly he did not understand, without the presumption that the man who prepared it did not know what he was doing, rather than request clarifying instructions. On November 27 Admiral Kimmel received a message beginning with the words: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Every naval officer who has testified on the subject has stated that never before in his naval experience had he ever seen a dispatch containing the words "war warning"; Admiral Kimmel testified that never before in his some 40 years as a naval officer had he seen these words employed in an official dispatch. In the same message there was another term, "defensive deployment," which the commander in chief manifestly did not clearly understand. In spite of his apparent uncertainty as to the meaning of the message, Admiral Kimmel, it can be presumed, chose to endeavor to implement it without seeking advice from the Navy Department.
While there is an understandable disposition of a subordinate to avoid consulting his superior for advice except where absolutely necessary in order that he may demonstrate his self-reliance, the persistent failure without exception of Army and Navy officers, as revealed by the investigation, to seek amplifying and clarifying instructions from their superiors is strongly suggestive of just one thing: That the military and naval services failed to instill in their personnel the wholesome disposition to consult freely with their superiors for the mutual good and success of both superior and subordinate. One witness, upon being asked why an explanation was not requested replied, in effect: "Well, I have found the asking is usually the other way"; that is, the superior asking the subordinate Such a situation is not desirable, and the services should not be prejudiced by walls of "brass."
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10. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials
As reflected by an examination of the situation in Hawaii, there was failure to employ the necessary imagination with respect to the intelligence which was at hand.
Washington, like Hawaii, possessed unusually significant and vital intelligence. Had greater imagination and a keener awareness of the significance of intelligence existed, concentrating and applying it to particular situations, it is proper to suggest that someone should have concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack.
The committee feels that the failure to demonstrate the highest imagination with respect to the intelligence which was available in Hawaii and in Washington is traceable, at least in part, to the failure accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which it deserves.
11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness
The evidence before the Committee reflects an unusual number of instances where military officers in high positions of responsibility interpreted orders, intelligence, and other information and arrived opposite conclusions at a time when it was imperative for them to estimate the situation and to arrive at identical conclusions.
Admiral Kimmel was ordered to execute an *appropriate defensive deployment*. Everyone in Washington in testifying before the committee seems reasonably certain as to just what this meant; Admiral Kimmel did not feel that it required his doing anything greatly beyond what he had already done, even though he knew that Washington knew what he had previously done. In using the words "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning" everyone in Washington felt the commander in chief would be sharply, incisively, and emphatically warned of war; Admiral Kimmel said he had construed the messages he had received previously as war warnings. Everyone in Washington felt that upon advising Hawaii the Japanese were destroying their codes it would be understood as meaning "war in any man's language"; Admiral Kimmel said that he did not consider this intelligence of any vital importance when he received it.
The War Department warned General Short that hostilities were possible at any moment, meaning armed hostilities; General Short felt that sabotage was one form of hostilities and instituted an alert against sabotage only. Washington ordered the commanding general undertake reconnaissance; the latter took for granted that the war Department had made a mistake and proceeded in effect to ignore the order on the basis of this assumption. General Short was instructed to report the measures taken by him pursuant to departmental orders. He replied that his department was alerted against sabotage and that he had effected liaison with the Navy; the Director of War Plans saw the reply and took for granted the commanding general was replying to a different warning concerning subversive activities, at the same time suggesting that some of his subordinates may have interpreted the reply to mean that, in effecting liaison with

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the Navy, General Short had necessarily carried out the order to conduct reconnaissance.
General Short said he thought the order given Admiral Kimmel to execute a defensive deployment necessarily required distant reconnaissance; the commander in chief did not so interpret the order Admiral Kimmel saw the warning General Short received and took for granted the Army would be on a full alert designed to protect the fleet base.
As has been seen, an objective consideration of the warnings received by the Hawaiian commanders indicates they were adequate. But on the basis of the disaster, in the future *adequacy* cannot be regarded as sufficient. Dispatches must be unmistakably clear, forth right, and devoid of any conceivable ambiguity.

The committee feels that the practice, indulged by the Navy, of sending to several commanders an identical dispatch for action, even though the addressees may be located in decidedly different situations is distinctly dangerous. In the preparation of messages to outposts the dispatch to a particular officer should be applicable to his peculiar situation. What may well be characterized as the "lazy" practice of preparing a single dispatch should be replaced by a more industrious and effective system whereby a separate "individualized" dispatch is sent to each commander whose particular situation varies greatly from that of another commander or there may be reason for him because of distance or other factors to believe so.
It is believed that brevity of messages was carried to the point of being a fetish rather than a virtue. Dispatches must be characterized by sufficient amplitude to be meaningful not only to the sender but beyond reasonable doubt, to the addressee as well.
12. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to inquire that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning and significance of the original
To preserve the security of their own codes the War and Navy Departments followed the natural and proper practice of paraphrasing messages received. From a review of several messages as paraphrased the committee is of the opinion that the utmost caution and care should be employed in preserving the original meaning of material. One classic example will serve to illustrate this point.
In replying to the War Department's directive of November 27, 1941, General Short said:
"Re your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy."
As paraphrased upon receipt at the War Department, this message read:
"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy re your 472."
It is to be recalled that the Army and Navy had entered into a special agreement at Hawaii whereby the Navy assumed responsibility for long- range reconnaissance. Therefore, having ordered General Short to undertake reconnaissance, a reasonable construction of his message as paraphrased would be that the commanding general, through liaison with the Navy, had made the necessary arrangements for reconnaissance as instructed in the War Department's warning of November 27. The message which Short actually
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sent however, cannot so easily be afforded this construction. The seriousness of this matter lies in the fact that failure to conduct long-range reconnaissance at Hawaii was the prime factor responsible for the Army and Navy having been caught flat-footed. Conceivably, had the message as paraphrased not been misleading, the War Department might well have followed up on General Short's message, pointing out that he had failed to take the necessary action to alert his command.
13. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations  
Reviewing the Pearl Harbor evidence there are, in both the War and Navy establishments, several illustrations of inflexible procedures that could not be or at least were not subjected to sufficient alteration to satisfy the exigencies of the situation. Everything seems perforce to have followed a grooved pattern regardless of the demands for distinctive action. The idea of proceeding "through channels" was carried to an extreme.
Among the best illustrations of this fact was the failure of Admiral Kimmel to advise Admiral Newton that the "war warning" had been received. Admiral Newton was departing from Pearl Harbor with some of the most vital units of the Pacific Fleet, yet because the table of organization indicated Admiral Brown to be Newton's superior, the commander in chief did not take it upon himself to insure that Newton was fully informed as to the critical situation between the United States and Japan, and relied upon the usual procedure whereby Brown would keep Newton advised of developments.
14. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization.
The Magic intelligence was preeminently important and the necessity for keeping it confidential cannot be overemphasized. However, so closely held and top secret was this intelligence that it appears the fact the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more importance than the *information* obtained from decoded traffic. The result of this rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, was charged with combating espionage, sabotage, and un-American activities within the United States. On February 15, 1941, Tokyo dispatched to Washington a detailed outline as to the type of espionage information desired from this country. [2] The FBI was never informed of this vitals information necessary to the success of its work, despite the fact that the closest liaison was supposed to exist among the FBI, Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence.

Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, who was in charge of the intelligence branch of G- 2, has testified that he at no time was permitted to avail himself of the Magic. And this despite the fact that to effectively perform
[2] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 117, 118.
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his work he should have known of this intelligence and one of his subordinates, Colonel Bratton, was "loaned" to General Miles to distribute magic materials to authorized recipients.
While, as previously indicated, it is appreciated that promiscuous distribution of highly confidential material is dangerous, it nevertheless should be made available to all those whose responsibility cannot adequately and intelligently be discharged without knowledge of such confidential data. It would seem that through sufficient paraphrase of the original material the source of the information could have been adequately protected. Certainly as great confidence could be placed in ranking officials of various departments and bureaus of the Government as in the numerous technicians, cryptographers, translators, and clerks required for the interception and processing of the Magic.
15. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident
Virtually every witness has testified he was surprised at the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This was essentially the result of the fact that just about everybody was blinded or rendered myopic by what seemed to be the self-evident purpose of Japan to attack toward the south Thailand, Malaysia, the Kra Peninsula, and perhaps the Philippines and Guam. Japan had massed ships and amphibious forces, had deployed them to the south, and had conducted reconnaissance in that direction. So completely did everything point to the south that it appears everyone was blinded to significant, albeit some what disguised, handwriting on the wall suggesting an attack on us elsewhere.
The advice of the Army lieutenant to the radar operators to "forget it" when they informed him of the approach of a large number of planes appears to have been based on the self-evident assumption that the planes were Army or Navy craft on patrol or the expected B-17's due to arrive from the west coast.
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information  
Before the committee Admiral Turner testified that he regarded an attack on Pearl Harbor as a 50-50 possibility. Assuming this to be correct, there can be little doubt, considering the position he held as Director of War Plans in the Navy Department, that he could have given the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusion had he been disposed to do so. As a matter of fact Admiral Turner had the principal hand in preparing the November 27 "war warning.
As has been seen, the orders contained in the war warning necessarily carried the implication of an attack from without; however, the dispatch did not reflect the likelihood of an attack upon the fleet with the degree of likelihood manifested by Admiral Turner in indicating to the committee his estimate of the situation. Admiral Turner's position would be indefensible were his estimate based on any information or intelligence he may have possessed. It appears, on the other hand, that his conclusion was predicated on a rather long-standing impression in the Navy that an attack on our Pacific Fleet by Japan could be expected at one time or another. It is regarded as
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unfortunate, however, that Admiral Turner did not see fit to give to he Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusions outlined, with benefit of retrospection, in such detail before the committee.
17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility
It would seem that War and Navy Department officials both in Washington and Hawaii were so obsessed by an executive complex hat they could not besmirch their dignities by "stooping" to determine what was going on, or more especially what was not going on, in their organizations. Examples should illustrate this observation.
Admirals Stark and Turner both have testified they "thought" the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was receiving the Magic intelligence. Yet in a period of over 6 months, with relations between the United States and Japan mounting in tenseness and approaching a crisis, neither of these ranking officers determined for a fact whether the fleet was receiving this information.
In the case of Hawaii, the evidence indicates failures on the part of the commanding general and the commander in chief to actually determine what was going on in their organizations. Additionally, in a command by mutual cooperation it was as important that Admiral Kimmel know what General Short was doing, and vice versa, as that he know what the fleet itself was doing. But, as has been heretofore pointed out, neither of these officers really verified whether his assumptions concerning what the other was doing were correct.
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality
The record tends to indicate that appraisal of likely enemy movements was divided into *probabilities* and *possibilities*. Everyone has admitted that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was regarded as at east a possibility. It was felt, however, that a Japanese movement toward the south was a probability. The over-all result was to look for the probable move and to take little or no effective precautions to guard against the contingency of the possible action.
While it appears satisfactorily established that it is the basic responsibility of an outpost commander to prepare for the worst contingency, it is believed that this premise has been applied more in theory than in practice. The military and naval branches of the government must be continuously impressed by, and imbue their personnel with, the realization that failure can be avoided over an extended period of time only by preparation for any eventuality, at east when hostilities are expected.
19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction
On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet a dispatch concerning the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, pointing out, among other things, that "since the U. S. And Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan
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may attack these two powers." But on October 17, referring to this dispatch, Admiral Stark, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, said: "Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our dispatches you know about all that we do. *Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility'; in fact, I tempered the message handed to me considerably*.
It appears to have been a generally accepted practice in the Navy for the Chief of Naval Operations to supplement official dispatches by correspondence of a quasi-personal nature. [3] Despite this fact, it is regarded as an extremely dangerous practice for the Chief of Naval Operations to express an opinion on a personal basis to an outpost commander which has the inevitable effect of tempering the import of an official dispatch. Were it not for the fact that Admiral Stark supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet highly pertinent and significant information after his letter of October 17 and before December 7, the manner in which he emasculated the October 16 dispatch would be inexcusable. However, as has been seen in this report, some of the most vital intelligence and orders relating to Japan were supplied Hawaii during November and December of 1941.
20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization
This principle is the result of the general impression obtained by the committee concerning the relationship between the Army and the Navy as well as concerning certain intra-organizational situations which existed. The relationship, understanding, and coordination between the War Plans Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence were wholly unsatisfactory. The War Plans Division, particularly, appears to have had an overzealous disposition to preserve and enhance its prerogatives.
The whole story of discussions during 1941 with respect to unity of command is a picture of jealous adherence to departmental prerogatives and unwillingness to make concessions in the interest of both the Army and Navy. The same comment is applicable to the near dispute between Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to which of them should command Wake and Midway when the marines were replaced by soldiers. It is proper to suggest that, had both the commanding officers in Hawaii been less concerned between November 27 and December 7 about preserving their individual prerogatives with respect to Wake and Midway and more concerned about working together to defend the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in the light of the warnings they had received, the defensive situation confronting the Japanese on the morning of December 7 might well have been entirely different.
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies
One of the more "human" aspects of the testimony of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short is the manner in which each sought to bring out their personal friendship for the purpose of demonstrating
[3] Admiral Stark said: "I might point out, in passing, that there was nothing unusual in this so-called 'personal' correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief it was a long-established custom when I took office." Committee record, p. 5594.  
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the close relationship that existed between them. They played golf together; they dined together but they did not get together on official business in such manner as to insure that each possessed the same knowledge of the situation as the other and to effect coordination and integration of their efforts.
22. No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task
Both the commanding officers in Hawaii have offered as explanation and excuse for failure to perform various supervisory and administrative responsibilities in their commands the fact that they had countless and manifold duties in their respective positions as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. Additionally, Admiral Kimmel has referred to the extraordinarily competent staff which he had in Hawaii. The most fundamental responsibility that both commanders had under the circumstances, however, was to make certain beyond any reasonable doubt that there was an integrated and coordinated employment of defensive facilities consistent with the principle of command by mutual cooperation. No excuse or explanation can justify or temper the failure to discharge this responsibility which superseded and surpassed all others.
23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed
In Washington, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, and Captain McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of that Division, were not adequately and currently informed as to the nature of the dispatches being sent to our outposts emanating from the War Plans Division. Subordinate officials in both the War and Navy Departments failed to appreciate the importance and necessity of getting to both General Marshall and Admiral Stark the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14-part memorandum immediately on the evening of December 6. Colonel French did not inform the Chief of Staff that he had been unable to raise the Army radio in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. In Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel failed to insure that Admiral Bellinger, who was responsible for Navy patrol planes, knew of the war warning of November 27. Admiral Newton, as previously pointed out, was permitted to leave Pearl Harbor with a task force completely oblivious of any of the warning messages. General Short, construing the caution to disseminate the information in the warning of November 27 to "minimum essential officers" in a too-narrow manner, failed to inform the essential and necessary officers of his command of the acute situation in order that the proper alertness might pervade the Hawaiian Department.
2. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility
The committee has been very much concerned about the fact that there was no way in which it could be determined definitely that any individual saw a particular message among the Magic materials. It
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does not appear that any record system was established for initialing the messages or otherwise fixing responsibility. The system existing left subordinate officers charged with the duty of disseminating the Magic at the complete mercy of superior officers with respect to any question as to whether a particular message had been delivered to or seen by them.
25. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority
Witnesses have testified rather fully as to what their responsibilities were, both in Washington and at Hawaii. However, it does not appear that any of them, except the highest ranking officers, possessed any real authority to act in order decisively to discharge their responsibilities. It cannot be presumed that it will be possible to meet the exigencies of an emergency if the officer charged with the duty of acting at the time the emergency arises does not possess the necessary authority to follow through on the situation. There should be a close correlation between responsibility and authority; to vest a man with responsibility with no corresponding authority is an unfair, ineffective, and unsatisfactory arrangement.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Chairman.
JERE COOPER, Vice Chairman.
WALTER F. GEORGE.
SCOTT W. LUCAS.
J. BAYARD CLARK.
JOHN W. MURPHY.
BERTRAND W. GEARHART.
FRANK B. KEEFE (with additional views).
(Senators Brewster and Ferguson are filing minority views.)
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE
INTRODUCTION
The committee report is divided into five parts. Part I deals with the diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack. Part II describes the actual attack and its aftermath. Part III discusses responsibilities in Hawaii. Part IV discusses responsibilities in Washington, and Part V includes certain recommendations of the committee. Scattered throughout the entire five sections of the committee report are conclusions with respect to individuals in charge of carrying out our diplomatic, military, and naval obligations prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I find myself in agreement with most of these conclusions and recommendations. The voluminous facts contained in the committee report have been accurately assembled from the enormous record compiled by the committee. Any criticism which I may have toward the marshaling of facts in the committee report is directed to the manner in which such facts have been used to sustain the various arguments and conclusions indulged in in the committee report.
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It correctly states that both Washington and Hawaii were surprised at the attack upon Pearl Harbor. It is apparently agreed that both Washington and Hawaii expected the initial attack to come in the Asiatic area. What was done in Washington as well as what was done in Hawaii was admittedly done in the light of the universal military belief that Hawaii was not in danger from an initial attack by Japan. If this belief was unjustified, as I believe it was, then the mistake lies on the Washington doorstep just as much as it does upon that of Hawaii. Throughout the long and arduous sessions of the committee in the preparation of the committee report, I continuously insisted that whatever "yardstick" was agreed upon as a basis for determining responsibilities in Hawaii should be applied to the high command at Washington. This indicates in a general way my fundamental objection to the committee report. I feel that facts have been martialed [sic], perhaps unintentionally, with the idea of conferring blame upon Hawaii and minimizing the blame that should properly be assessed at Washington.
A careful reading of the committee report would indicate that the analysis of orders and dispatches is so made as to permit criticism of our commands in Hawaii while at the same time proposing a construction which would minimize the possibility of criticism of those in charge at Washington.
I think it is true that none of the military chiefs at Washington or Hawaii thought the attack would come at Pearl Harbor. I conclude hat they all thought it would come first in the Far East. Obviously this was a fatal mistake, and I agree that the mistake was without proper justification and that neither Hawaii nor Washington should be excused from criticism for having made it. I think that the facts in this record clearly demonstrate that Hawaii was always the No. 1 point of danger and that both Washington and Hawaii should have known it at all times and acted accordingly. Consequently I agree hat the high command in Hawaii was subject to criticism for concluding that Hawaii was not in danger. However, I must insist that the same criticism with the same force and scope should apply to the high command in Washington. It is in this respect that I think the tenor of the committee report may be subject to some criticism.
I fully agree with the doctrine relating to the placing of responsibility in military officers in the field and their resulting duty under such responsibilities. I agree that they must properly sustain this burden in line with the high and peculiar abilities which originally gave them their assignments.
In the execution of their vitally important duties, however, the officers at the front in the field are fairly entitled to all aids and help lad all information which can reasonably be sent to them from the all-powerful high staff command in Washington. If both commands are in error, both should be blamed for what each should have done and what each failed to do respectively. The committee report, I feel, does not with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring responsibilities at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian commanders. I cannot suppress the feeling that the committee report endeavors to throw as soft a light as possible on the Washington scene.
In order to clearly appraise the contentions herein expressed, I feel compelled to restate some of the basic military aspects of the Pearl Harbor disaster as shown by the evidence.

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MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
During the year 1941 the United States Pacific Fleet was based in Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian island of Oahu. It had proceeded to the Hawaiian area for Fleet exercises in the spring of 1940. Its scheduled return to its regular bases on the west coast was delayed from time to time. From these delays there gradually emerged evidence of the President's decision to retain the Fleet in the Hawaiian area, to deter Japan from aggression in the Far East. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, protested this decision with a vigor which caused him to be relieved of command He believed that the readiness of men and ships of the Fleet for war operations would impress Japan rather than its presence in Hawaii, where facilities to render it ready for war were greatly inferior to those available on the west coast. Richardson was succeeded in command by Admiral H. E. Kimmel in February 1941. The appointment of Kimmel was made on his record as a capable officer. There was no political or other favoritism involved. At this time the decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii was an established fact. Pearl Harbor was the only anchorage in the Hawaiian area offering any security. It was then, however, an extremely deficient Fleet base. Its exposed position rendered concealment of Fleet movements practically impossible in an area filled with Japanese agents. The Army's equipment for antiaircraft defense was meager. The local Army-Navy defense forces did not have sufficient long-range patrol planes to perform effective distant reconnaissance, even if the patrol planes of the fleet were made available to augment the handful of Army reconnaissance planes.
Under these circumstances, the position of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area was inherently untenable and dangerous. The Fleet would sacrifice its preparations for war, and its potential mobility in war, if it concentrated its resources on the defense of its base. Moreover, with only four tankers suitable for fueling ships at sea, ships of the Fleet had to come into Pearl Harbor for refueling, to say nothing of maintenance and repair, and the necessary rest and relaxation of crews. Once the ships were in Pearl Harbor, with its single channel, they were a target for any successfully launched air attack from carrier-borne planes. The severity of the attack might be mitigated, but damage to the ships found in port was inevitable. To prevent a hostile carrier from successfully launching planes required that it be first discovered and attacked. Discovery, other than by lucky accident. Required air reconnaissance of the perimeter of a circle of 800-mile radius from Oahu. The Fleet did not at any time have patrol planes sufficient in number to carry out such reconnaissance. The Japanese task force which raided Oahu on December 7, 1941, was composed of six carriers. The Pacific Fleet had on that date three carriers, one of which was on the Pacific coast for repair, leaving only two immediately available in the area of a prospective sea engagement. An engagement at sea would have found the preponderant strength with Japan.
Although the Fleet was placed by the President in the Hawaiian area in 1940 as an implement of diplomacy and as a deterrent to Japan, its strength was appreciably reduced in April and May of 1941. At that time, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four cruisers and eighteen destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and trans
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ferred to the Atlantic. The President directed the Chief of Naval Operations to consult the British Chiefs of Staff on the proposal to effect this transfer. They gave their opinion "that the consequential reduction in the strength of the United States Pacific Fleet would not unduly encourage Japan" (exhibit 158, letter from Admiral Danckwerts to Admiral Turner, April 28, 1941). The transfer to the Atlantic was then carried out. The Commander in Chief of the United States pacific Fleet was not asked for his opinion. The Chief of Naval Operations wrote him about the proposed transfer stating "I am telling you, not arguing with you" (exhibit 106, letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, dated April 19, 1941).
The primary mission assigned the Pacific Fleet under existing Navy War Plans was the making of raids on the Marshalls. These were to divert Japanese strength from the so-called Malay barrier. No existing War Plan of the United States in 1941 contemplated that the Pacific Fleet would go to the rescue of the Philippines or resist Japanese naval forces attacking the Philippines. The Pacific Fleet was so inferior to the Japanese Navy in every category of fighting ship that such a mission was considered too suicidal to attempt. The American public in 1941 was deluded about the fighting strength of our Fleet in the Pacific, by irresponsible utterances from men in authority. Japan was under no such misconception. Her consular agents in the Hawaiian islands needed only their eyesight, and possibly binoculars to appraise correctly the strength of the Fleet.  
An inferior Fleet, under enemy surveillance in an exposed naval base without resources to protect it could only avert disaster by. Receiving the best possible evidence of the intentions of its potential enemy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet in 1941 recognized that information was essential to his making appropriate dispositions to meet any crisis. He formally requested the Chief of Naval Operations that he "be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available" (exhibit 106, Official Letter CINCPAC to CNO, dated May 26, 1941).
The best evidence of Japanese intentions in the year 1941, available to the United States Government, were messages exchanged; between the Government of Japan and her diplomatic consular agents abroad. These were intercepted by the Army and Navy. These were decoded and translated in Washington. The President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations regularly received these intercepted messages.
The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted messages in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely that Japan would attack the United States. At a meeting of the President and his so-called War Council on November 25, 1941, according to Mr. Stimson's notes the President stated: "that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (Stimson Statement, page 47). There was abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan intended to attack the United States, Japan had fixed a deadline date of November 25, extended to November 29, for reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at least six Japanese messages emphasizing this deadline. If the deadline date passed without agreement, the Japanese government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are auto-

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matically going to happen." The necessity for agreement by the deadline date was stressed by Japan in these terms: "The fate of Our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days"; "We gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die" (exhibit 1, page 137, 93). On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced "deadline" date, the United States government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note which the intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a "humiliating proposal", impossible of acceptance (exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to "rupture" negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American note of November 26 (exhibit 1, p. 195). To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious Japan instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (exhibit 1, p. 208). A message from the Japanese government to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated by the Navy in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed to
"immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of developments. * * * *Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams*. [Italics supplied.]"
The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the intercepted messages (R. 10887). On December 2, 1941 elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States" (exhibit 1, p. 198).
In the "bomb plot" or "ships in harbor" message of September 24 the Japanese government gave detailed instructions to its Consul-General in Hawaii as to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five sub areas. An alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese government instructed the consul:
"With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly.) If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf."
This despatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 9, 1941 (exhibit 2, p. 12).
On September 29, 1941, the Japanese Consul in Hawaii replied to his government. He established a system of symbols to be used in designating the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor. This despatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 10, 1941.
On November 15, 18, 20, and 29 the Japanese government urgently called for information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, pp. 13 and 15). On November 15 the Japanese Consul in Honolulu was directed to make his "ships in harbor report" irregu-
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lar but at the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in September (exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined, because relations between Japan and the United States were described as "most critical." On November 18, the Japanese Consul General reported to Tokyo the locations of the ships in the various sub areas of Pearl Harbor, giving minute descriptions of the courses, speed and distances apart of destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 15). On November 29 reports were requested even though there were no movements of ships. These despatches were intercepted, decoded and translated in Washington on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941.
The "bomb plot" or "ships in harbor" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. Of other American harbor was divided into sub areas by Japan. In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to this message Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general hereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With this message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the Fleet, but as to the presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor the reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of instructions emanating from the government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers of the high command in Washington have admitted before us that this message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (R. 3036, 4014; 4874; 2100-2102; 1313-11314; 6390, 6094; 5378).
Lt. Commander Kramer of Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor "bomb plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (R. 11209). It bore the notation "interesting message" (R. 11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows:
"Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (R. 11207)."
Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the 'bomb plot' message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division (R. 12083). The message was discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (R. 12105). They discussed possible significance of the message, as indicating a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (R. 12105). In the course of these discussions Officers in Naval Intelligence stated that
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the Japanese were wasting their time in getting such meticulous detail about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor because the Fleet would not be in Pearl Harbor when the emergency arose (R. 12105). Despite the fact that the "bomb plot" message and related intercepts dealing with the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor were delivered to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they testified before the Committee that they have no recollection of ever seeing them (R.2911-2912 5787-5792). No intimation of these messages was given to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. On the contrary, Admiral Kimmel had been advised by the Navy Department on February 1, 1941:
"* * * no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future (exhibit 15)."
In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no effort to conceal the movements or presence of her naval forces in Southeast Asia (R. 453). The movements of her troops in Indo-China at that time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 779). Yet, the intercepts showed that some Japanese plan went into effect automatically on November 29 from which Japan hoped to divert American suspicion by a pretext of continued negotiations. What was its nature? Only the President and his top advisers in Washington had this information.
Despite the elaborate and labored arguments in the report and despite the statements of high ranking military and naval officers to the contrary, I must conclude that the intercepted messages received and distributed in Washington on the afternoon and evening of December 6 and the early hours of December 7, pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor:
1. The "Pilot Message". This was a message from Japan to her Ambassadors in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was ready and being sent to them in fourteen parts; that it was to be treated with great secrecy pending instructions as to the time of its delivery, and that the time for its delivery was to be fixed in a separate message (exhibit 1, p. 238).
2. The first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply. This included all but the last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary of State on December 7 (exhibit 1, pp. 239-244).
3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and the message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p. M., Washington time, December 7 (exhibit 1, p. 248).
The "Pilot Message" was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 A. M. Washington time December 6, it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 A. M. Washington time December 6 and forwarded to the Navy Department. It was sent by the Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about noon, Washington time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was decrypted, translated and distributed about 3 P. M. Washington time by the Army to Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the War Plans Division, General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intelligence General Miles (R. 12050). In the Navy Department the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, received the so-called Pilot Message prior to 6 P. M. Washington time
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December 6 (R. 4658). He had previously told his subordinates to be on the lookout for the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave instructions that the Pilot Message was to be delivered to Admiral Stark (R. 4661 4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, received the Pilot Message" in the evening of December 6 (R. 5440-5442). Admiral Stark and General Marshall each deny that on December 6 he had knowledge of the Pilot Message (R. 3473; 5813). We find on the testimony of General Miles and Colonel Bratton that the "Pilot Message" was delivered to General Marshall during the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (R. 3589-3590; 12049- 12050). This Pilot Message bid that Japan's reply to the American note of November 26 was about to be sent from Tokyo to Washington, and indicated that a rupture of diplomatic relations or war was a matter of hours.
On the evening of December 6, between 9 P. M. and midnight Washington time, the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to the United States were delivered to the President, Mr. Knox, the office of the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence (R. 10453-10455; 12052-12054). After reading this message the President stated "This means war" (R. 12441). He later telephoned Admiral Stark about the critical turn of events (R. 14757-14759). When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning (R. 10675-10681).
Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 A. M. Sunday morning the following information:
"Compilation of men of war in Far East, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian; *also compilation of American men of war in the Pacific Fleet, without locations*, and a list of American men of war in the Atlantic without locations, [Italics supplied, R. 113988.]"
Admirals Stark, Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o'clock Sunday December 7 (R. 13988). This was done. The compilation showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 176).
In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 A. M. Washington time, the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 P. M. Washington time was available in the Navy Department in Washington (R. 10694-10701). This was eight and one-half hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal subordinates have testified before us that they had knowledge of this message about 10:30 A. M. (R. 4675, 9146-9148, 10469). This was five and one-half hours after it had been received in the Navy Department It was about three hours before the attack. The relation of P. M. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was pointed out to Admiral Stark. (R. 9146-9148; 9154- 9156; 9236-9254; 4679; 585) Admiral Stark was urged by the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the Fleet (R. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the Army had the "1 pm message" by 9 A. M. Washington time, immediately appreciated its significance, but did not succeed in bringing it to General Marshall's attention until nearly several hours later (R. 12077-12078; 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding
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in Virginia. No action was taken by the Army until he saw and read the 1 P. M. message and related intercepts, at which time he sent a message to General Short which went over commercial facilities and was received after the Pearl Harbor attack (R. 2935-2939; 8396) Admiral Stark took no action on this information except to agree to the inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General Short to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (R. 5814-5816).
Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 P. M. message at their conference about 10:30 A. M. Washington time December 7 (R. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and the Philippines was brought to their attention (R. 10473-10475). Mr. Stimson's notes describing the Sunday morning conference state:
"Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike (Stimson statement, p. 59)."
The 1 P.M. message was delivered to the President about 10:30 A. M. (R. 10476).
Why did the high command in Washington fail to disclose promptly to Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and other American commanders in the field the information available in Washington, Saturday night and early Sunday morning? In seeking the answer to this question we have encountered failures of memory and changes in sworn testimony. I am constrained to reach these conclusions:
As a result of his conversation with the President late Saturday night December 6, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, did receive notice of a critical turn in Japanese-American relations (R. 14757-14759). Even if it be assumed that he had no inkling until that time of vital information which had been available to him for at least six hours, the call from the President should have provoked his active and immediate efforts to elicit from his subordinates the data which they possessed as to the immediacy of war. *He failed to make such efforts*. Sunday morning, when the Saturday messages are known to have come to his attention together with the 1 P. M. message, he again did not take action, despite the recommendations of the Chief of Naval Intelligence that a warning be sent to the Fleet. He failed to exercise the care and diligence which his position required.
General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, had the "Pilot Message" available to him on the afternoon of Saturday, December 6. This placed on him an obligation to make sure he would promptly receive the subsequent information which the Pilot message indicated would be soon forthcoming. He did not do so. In placing himself outside of effective contact with his subordinates for several hours on Sunday morning, he failed to exercise the care and diligence which his position required.
The alleged failure of the chief subordinates of Admiral Stark and General Marshall to furnish them promptly with the intercepted messages on Saturday night was unusual for two reasons. First, it was a departure from the usual routine for the distribution of intercepts. Second, these two were the only usual recipients of intercepts who testified that the messages were not brought to their attention on Saturday night. Neither Admiral Stark nor General Marshall made
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any effort thereafter to ascertain why such a colossal breakdown should occur in the functioning of their staffs on the eve of war (R. 3490- 3491; 6215).
I have pointed out that during the critical period prior to the attack, the Administration in Washington made certain over-all policy decisions as to how to deal with the Japanese crisis. One decision was that Japan should commit the first overt act against the United States; and thus resolve the dilemma in which the Administration's secret diplomacy had placed it. The other was to be in instant readiness to strike at Japan to check her further aggression against the British and Dutch in Far East Asia. Certainly the information and orders sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel prior to the attack reflected the policy adopted in Washington.
General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not informed about the most important diplomatic steps in 1941. They were not informed of the parallel action agreement at the Atlantic Conference or the warning to Japan which followed. They were not informed of the significant terms of the American note to Japan of November 26. They were not informed of the commitment made to Great Britain, as set forth in the Brooke-Popham telegram of December 6. They did not receive the vital intercepted Japanese messages or any condensation or summary of them. In response to Admiral Kimmel's request for information in his letter of May 26, 1941, he did receive, in July 1941 from the Navy Department the actual text of seven intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages (exhibit 37, pp. 6-12). In the week before the attack he received the text of another intercepted message describing the Japanese intrigue in Thailand. Kimmel testified that he believed that he was getting all pertinent information affecting the Pacific Fleet. This was the assurance Admiral Stark had given in response to the definite request in the letter of May 26, 1941. The Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, Captain Layton, wrote to Captain McCollum, his opposite number in Naval Intelligence in Washington, on March 11, 1941, to urge that intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic be sent to the Fleet. McCollum's reply satisfied Layton that the Fleet would receive diplomatic traffic which affected its actions (R. 12923). But the vital intercepts were not sent to Admiral Kimmel or General Short. The fact that a few intercepts were sent to Admiral Kimmel shows that the withholding of others was not attributable to fear of the security of Naval communications and consequent prejudice to the Secret of Magic. The "bomb plot" message and related intercepts would have been of incalculable value both to General Short and Admiral Kimmel. Yet they were given no intimation of their existence.
The message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel warned him of the threatened Japanese move in southeast Asia and ordered him to be ready to execute a Fleet offensive against the Marshalls required by War Plans. Readiness for an offensive at some distance from Hawaii precluded concentrating the limited resources of the Fleet; upon the defense of its base, which no despatch from the Navy Department mentioned as a point of attack. The offensive missions prescribed by the War Plans required the full use of the patrol planes of the Fleet. These planes were recently acquired and required alterations and maintenance work to put them in shape for war. The planes were too few for full distant searches from Hawaii. Partial  
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searches were properly considered of doubtful value and involved the risk of making the planes useless for the reconnaissance required in the raids on the Marshalls at the time when they would be needed. Task forces at sea and patrol planes going to and from outlying islands carried out such distant reconnaissance as was feasible. As suggested by the Navy Department on November 27, the two carriers of the Pacific Fleet were sent on missions to outlying islands. Lacking air protection the battleships appeared better disposed in port than at sea. The fuel limitations and other logistic deficiencies of the Pacific Fleet were so acute that it was physically impossible to keep the whole Fleet or major portions of it, at sea for extended intervals The disposition of the ships and the use of patrol planes on and after November 27 were logical and reasonable in view of the message of that date.
On the evening of December 6, in response to Secretary Stimson's request and at the direction of Secretary Knox, the Navy Department compiled from its records a summary showing that all the major ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor. At this time the information available in Washington showed that war was only hours away. Yet the two Secretaries and the high command made no effort to direct any change in the dispositions of the Fleet as shown in the Navy Department summary. They took no steps to furnish Admiral Kimmel the information which they possessed as to the imminence of war. Consequently they deprived him of any chance to alter his dispositions in the light of that information. I conclude that Secretaries Stimson and Knox and the high command in Washington knew that the major units of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 6-7, 1941, and were satisfied with that situation.
The message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel illustrates one feature of the pre-Pearl Harbor plan of action of the Administration. The Fleet was to be in readiness for offensive raids on the Marshalls to counter the Japanese advance in southeast Asia. The message sent to General Short by General Marshall on November 27, 1941 shows the other feature of the Administration's plan of action to make sure that the Japanese would strike first so that the offensive by the Fleet would be approved by the American public. The message to General Short stated:
"If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as no, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent (exhibit 32 p. 7)."
General Marshall testified that instructions about the "overt act" were put into the message on the personal order of the President (R 3443- 3447). In addition the War Department sent three other messages to the Army and Army Air Forces in Hawaii, on November 27 and 28, all of which were directed to sabotage and subversive activities. One of these messages from the War Department on November 28 stated:
"Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm (exhibit 32, p. 13)."
The Navy Department also cautioned Admiral Kimmel against committing the first overt act. On November 29 he received from the
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Navy Department the substance of the Army's message to General Short with the additional directive
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act (exhibit 7, p. 38)."
On November 27, 1941, General Short reported to General Marshall the measures he had taken in response to General Marshall's message. His reply specifically referred to General Marshall's message by its number: It stated: "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage, liaison with the Navy. Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh" (exhibit 32, p. 12). The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army, General Leonard T. Gerow, saw General Short's reply, noted and initialed it (exhibit 46). This reply was routed by General Gerow to General Marshall, Chief of Staff. Some question has arisen as to whether General Marshall in fact actually saw General Short's reply in order that the reader may have the exact facts, I desire to report the evidence, question and answer, beginning page 1420 of the printed record:
"Mr. KEEFE. NOW with the country on the brink of war, General Marshall, you laving the then impression as you have stated it a few moments ago, that Japan was liable to precipitate war by attacking any time any place, it would be highly important to the Chief of Staff to see to it that the orders which he had given were carried out, would it not?
"General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. Now when General Short's message came back the evidence indicates, somewhat inconclusively perhaps, that it was part of three or four papers, the top one being the reply of MacArthur, then Short, then a route sheet, the MacArthur message being on top and that bears your endorsement with your initials.
"General MARSHALL Correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. Your initials do not appear on the Short message but they do show the initials of the Secretary of War and the War Plans Department, General Gerow. Now am I correct in the assumption from an understanding of your evidence on that point that you think you must have seen the Short message although you did not initial it, having initialed the top one?  
"General MARSHALL. That was my assumption, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. Well, is that a mere assumption or is it a fact?
"General MARSHALL. I stated I did not recall, sir; that I must assume that I had seen it.
"Mr. KEEFE. Well, if you saw that Short message, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff it imposed some responsibility upon you, did it not?
"General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. It was addressed to you as Chief of Staff, was it not?
"General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. And the very telegram itself indicates that it is in response to the command order which you had issued to him?
"General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. And it was a message which attempted on the part of Short to convey to you as Chief of Staff the nature of the alert under which he was operating?
"General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. That was his response to your order?
"General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have read the various statements, General Marshall, that you have made at various times in connection with this matter. You recall that when you were before the Army board first you were somewhat confused about those things because you thought that at some time in November there had been a change in alert numbers. Do you remember that?
"General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. NOW, it is perfectly clear now that a reading of this message indicates that there isn't any alert number specified in Short's wire.
"General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. SO that puts that out of the picture, doesn't it?
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"General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.  
"Mr. KEEFE. So we get down to the simple fact that here is a message from your commanding general in the bastion of defense in the Pacific to which all of our defenses, as you have testified, were tied, in which he tells you that he is alerted to prevent sabotage, liaison with Navy. Now in all fairness, General Marshall in the exercise of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have proceeded to investigate further and give further orders to General Short when it appeared that he was only alerted against sabotage?
"General MARSHALL. As I stated earlier, that was my opportunity to intervene and I did not do it.
"Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you say that was your opportunity. That was your responsibility, was it not?
"General MARSHALL. You can put it that way, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to put it that way. I am asking you. You used the words "that was your opportunity," I do not want an opportunity to arise in the future discussion of this matter to have a conflict of words and not to be able to understand just want you meant. Do I understand that your use of the word "opportunity" is synonymous with responsibility?
"General MARSHALL. Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world. This was a matter of great importance. It had gone into the machine, it had been sent out, the acknowledgments had come back. They passed the important messages over my desk. I noted them and initialed them; those that I thought the Secretary of War ought specifically to see I put them out for him to see, to be sure that he would see it in case by any chance he did not see the same message.
"I was not passing the responsibility on to the Secretary of War. I merely wanted him to know.
"Now the same thing related to these orders of the War Department. I was responsible. I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not a bookkeeping machine and it is extremely difficult, it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had merited.
"Now in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff. I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself.
"Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, let me put it in another way. You have now stated it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see to it that General Short out there in Hawaii, which you have described as being your bastion of defense, to see that he was alerted, and if he misinterpreted your order to see that that order was carried out.
"General MARSHALL. That is my responsibility, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have stated it correctly, haven't I?
"General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, you have."
Subsequently, in the same examination (printed record pp. 1422-1423) General Marshall stated that General Gerow had a direct responsibility in this matter and that he had full responsibility as Chief of Staff. General Marshall was very fair. He admitted that a tragic mistake had been made, and while it was the direct responsibility of General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, to have "caught" General Short's reply and to have immediately advised his Chief of Staff, yet General Marshall as Chief of Staff did assume over-all responsibility for failure of the Washington headquarters to interpret and evaluate General Short's reply and to see to it that he was on an all-out alert in accordance with the command directive issued in the message from Marshall to Short on November 27. The Secretary of War saw, noted and initialed General Short's reply. (Exhibit 46). It was the responsibility of General Marshal] to see that Genera] Short was properly alerted (R. 3723). General Short, after being ordered to report his state of readiness to General Marshall, was entitled to assume that this state of readiness was satisfactory to the
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Chief of Staff unless he heard to the contrary (R. 3443). Neither General Marshall, General Gerow nor Secretary of War Stimson made any criticism or suggestion to General Short about the condition of his alert in Hawaii in the ten-day period prior to the attack. Because of their silence General Short was led to believe that the Chief of Staff approved his alert against sabotage. I believe that Secretary Stimson, and Generals Marshall and Gerow, understood the nature of his alert which was plainly indicated in the reply itself, I further believe they were satisfied with General Short's alert until the blow fell on Hawaii.
On June 17, 1940, General Marshall had placed the Hawaiian Department on all-out war alert by the following message (exhibit 52):
"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."
General Marshall followed up this alert with great care and received considerable detailed information about it. (Exhibit 52.) He described the information which caused the alert in 1940 in a letter to the Commanding General in Hawaii, General Herron, as follows:
"You have no doubt wondered as to the alert instructions sent to you on the 17th. Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii.
"Presumably such a raid would be in the interest of Germany and Italy, to force the United States to pull the Fleet back to Hawaii.
"Whether the information or deductions were correct, I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were by discouraging any overt act (exhibit 52, p. 13)."
On November 27, 1941, the information which General Marshall had showed a far more severe crisis in Japanese-American relations than existed in June of 1940. As his letter to General Herron shows he felt that this all-out alert in Hawaii in 1940 may have discouraged. the Japanese from attacking that area. Yet he did not repeat on November 27, 1941, his message of June 17, 1940, to Hawaii with its clear-cut order: "*Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid*." He assigned as a reason for not doing so, the fact that in the message of November 27, 1941, "you had to include instructions of the President regarding overt acts" (R. 3975).
Mr. Stimson describes the preparation of the Army message of November 27 to General Short as follows:
"If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan as first consideration. In Hawaii because of the large numbers of Japanese habitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly precipitate an incident and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act (Stimson statement, p. 21-22)."
Again on December 7, Mr. Stimson noted in his diary:
"When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would
 
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unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed (Stimson statement, p. 62)."
The same fear of publicity, alarm, or anything which might savor of a first overt act by the United States, rather than by Japan, is reflected in the President's message to High Commissioner Sayre in the Philippines on November 26, 1941. After describing the crisis in Japanese-American relations, the President directed Mr. Sayre to impress upon the President of the Philippines "the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult" (R. 13861-13862).
On Saturday night December 6 the President read the first 13 parts of the final Japanese diplomatic note, remarked "This means war," and decided to get in touch with the Chief of Naval Operations (R. 12442, 12443). He learned that the Chief of Naval Operations was at the theater. He then stated that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged. The fact that the Admiral had a box reserved was mentioned. The President did not wish him to leave suddenly because he would surely be seen and undue alarm might be caused (R. 12444).
General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk to call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday morning December 7, nearly two hours before the attack, and give him the same information which he sent in the delayed telegram which reached General Short after the attack. General Marshall testified that among the possible actors which may have influenced him against using the scrambler telephone was the possibility that the Japanese could construe the fact that the Army was alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act (R. 3390).
"The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act that forced action on their part (R. 3193)."
The concept of an "incident" as a factor which would unify public pinion behind an all-out war effort either in the Atlantic or Pacific had influenced the thinking of officials in Washington for a long time. Many plans which might have produced an incident were from time to time discussed and considered. As early as October 10, 1940 Secretary Knox had advised Admiral Richardson, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of a plan the President was considering to shut off all trade between Japan and North and South America. This would be accomplished by means of a patrol of American ships in two lines extending from Hawaii westward to the Philippines, and from Samoa toward the Dutch East Indies (R. 792). This plan was to be instituted in the event Japan retaliated against Great Britain upon the reopening of the Burma Road scheduled for October 17, 1940 (R. 792). Admiral Richardson was amazed at this proposal and stated that the Fleet was not prepared to put such a plan into effect, nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of action (R. 793).
On February 11, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations in a Memorandum for the President, described the President as considering a plan to send a detachment of vessels to the Far East and perhaps to permit a "leak" that they were going out there (exhibit 106). He quoted the President in the same memorandum as stating that he
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would not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that he did not want to take a chance on losing five or six. Again, in a letter of April l9, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations quoted the President as saying to him:
"Betty, just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to keep them popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing (exhibit 106)."
On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel
"Day before yesterday the President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition (exhibit 106)."  
On July 25, 1941 the Chief-of Naval Operations wrote Admiral Kimmel to the effect that he might be called upon to send a carrier-load of planes to Russia via one of the Asiatic Russian ports (exhibit 106). "I don't know that you will, but the President has told me to be prepared for it, and I want you to have the thought." Admiral Kimmel replied to this suggestion as follows:
"I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered (as is highly probable), will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese- American war. If we are going to take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think of more effective ways for gaining initial advantage. In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to invite war. If we have decided upon war it would be far better to take direct offensive action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method which will be more advantageous to ourselves (exhibit 106)."
On July 31, 1941, Admiral Stark sent Admiral Kimmel a copy of a letter to Captain Charles M. Cooke as follows:
"Within 48 hours after the Russian situation broke I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc., etc., etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up, that strive as we would it just is not in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.  
"The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know only Hitler can answer (exhibit 106)."
Again Admiral Kelly Turner, War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations stated, in describing United States-British Staff conversations on War Plans in 1941:
"It was felt by the Naval Department that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a ease the United States would, if possible, initiate *efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be able to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe* (testimony of Admiral R. K. Turner before Admiral Hart, Pp. 251, 252, question 10, exhibit 144). [Italics supplied.]  

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On November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet which commenced with this unusual statement:
"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this despatch (exhibit 37, p. 39)."
The President's directions were that the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." The minimum requirements to establish these ships as United States men of war would suffice in manning them. These requirements were: command by a Naval officer and the mounting of a small gun and one machine gun. The employment of Filipino crews with the minimum number naval ratings was authorized. The ships were to observe and report by radio Japanese movement in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The President prescribed the point at which each vessel was to be stationed. One vessel was to be stationed between Hainan and Hue; one between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques; one off Pointe De Camau (exhibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the Japanese advance down the coast of Indo-China, and towards the Gulf of Siam. The Navy Department did not originate this plan (R. 11351). The Navy Department would not have directed it to be done unless the President had specifically ordered it (R. 11351). Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila (R. 11350). So far as the Navy Department was concerned, sufficient information was being received from this air reconnaissance (R. 11351). Had the Japanese fired upon anyone of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an overt act on the part of Japan (R. 11352).
AFTERMATH OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Eleven days after Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Commission was appointed by the President to find the facts about the Pearl Harbor attack. Its duty was:
"to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy * * * and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."
General Marshall and Admiral Stark were witnesses at the first meeting of the Commission. Their testimony was not given under oath and was not recorded. Neither was that of their chief subordinates, Admiral Turner and General Gerow. The Commission examined General Short and Admiral Kimmel under oath in Hawaii. They were not permitted to be present during the testimony of other witnesses, to examine or cross-examine them, or to know what evidence had been presented.
The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. It did not inquire about what information these intercepts contained or who received them. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this Committee: "I would not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic) if it had been shown to us." (R., vol. 47, p. 8836). Misleading statements made to the Roberts Commission by high ranking naval officers in Washington to the effect that
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Admiral Kimmel had all the information available to the Navy Department (R.4891-4900, 4893, 4895, 5021-5022) went unchallenged.
The Roberts Commission's failure to inquire into the Japanese intercepts and their distribution and evaluation in Washington, prevented it from correctly assessing responsibility for the disaster. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in Washington. They could not then have honestly forgotten their whereabouts at important times. When the Roberts Commission bypassed the facts about the intercepted messages, it nearly buried the truth about Pearl Harbor. Its report became the indictment of two officers based upon incomplete evidence.
The Roberts report was published January 25, 1942. General Short, reading it in the press, was dumbfounded and immediately called his friend General Marshall on the telephone to inquire whether he should retire. Marshall advised him to "stand pat," but told Short he would consider the telephone conversation "authority" for Short's retirement if it became necessary (R. 8446). On the same day, the Secretary of the Navy directed that Admiral Kimmel in San Francisco be informed that Short had submitted a request for retirement (exhibit 121). This information was immediately telephoned to Kimmel. Kimmel, who had not previously thought of retiring, construed the telephone message as a request that he do so and submitted a formal request for retirement dated January 26, 1942. General Short, who thought it was not fair to General Marshall to have to act only on the basis of a telephone conversation, sent to Marshall a formal request for retirement in writing, addressed to the Adjutant General dated January 25, 1942. On January 26 General Marshall recommended to Secretary of War Stimson that General Short's application for retirement be accepted "today" but that it be done "quietly without any publicity at the moment" (R. 8459) Admiral Stark requested the Army to keep him advised about Short's retirement as he proposed to "communicate this fact to Admiral Kimmel in the hope Kimmel will likewise apply for retirement" (R. 8459). However, on January 28, 1942, he sent a telephone message to Kimmel to the effect that the previous telephone notification about Short's retirement was not intended to influence him. Thereupon Admiral Kimmel submitted his letter of January 28, 1942, to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he stated: "I desire my request or retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service" (exhibit 121).
The President personally directed the method of handling the requests for retirement of Kimmel and Short. On January 29, 1942, he instituted a three-point program for dealing with the matter. The Army and Navy were to act together. After a week's waiting they were to announce that Kimmel and Short had applied for retirement and that their applications were under consideration. After another week had passed, public announcement was to be made that the applications had been accepted with the condition that acceptance did not bar subsequent court-martial proceedings. Court-martial proceedings, however, were to be described as impossible without the disclosure of military secrets. The wording of the condition in the acceptance was troublesome to the Administration. The President, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and Attorney General Biddle
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labored over the language (R. 8462, 8464, exhibit 171). The Administration wanted to avoid public criticism for having barred court martial proceedings. On the other hand, it did not wish to stimulate the public or the two officers to expect or demand court-martial proceedings (R. 8464, 8467). Finally language as suitable as possible was agreed upon. The phrase to be used in accepting the retirement applications was "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action." Admiral Kimmel and General Short were each retired by letters so worded, dated respectively, February 16 and February 17, 1942. The Secretary of the Navy, in announcing the Navy's action, stated that he had directed the preparation of charges for court martial of Admiral Kimmel alleging dereliction of duty. The public were informed that a trial could not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.
The public reaction was as planned. Kimmel and Short were considered solely responsible for Pearl Harbor. The Roberts report considered by Justice Roberts as only an indictment, became, in effect, a conviction. The two officers were helpless. No court martial could be had. They had no way of defending themselves. They remained in ignorance of what evidence the Roberts Commission had heard. Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel on February 21, 1942:
"Pending something definite, there is no reason why you should not settle yourself in a quiet nook somewhere and let Old Father Time help the entire situation which I feel he will if for no other reason than he always has (exhibit 121)."
The high civilian and military officials in Washington who had skillfully maneuvered Kimmel and Short into the position of exclusive blame knew at the time all the hidden facts about Pearl Harbor, at least as much and probably mole than this investigation has been able to uncover. As the two-year statutory period for instituting court-martial proceedings was about to expire, Kimmel and Short were requested by the Secretaries of War and Navy to waive the Statute of Limitations. Admiral Kimmel did so but with the provision that any court martial be held in "open court" (exhibit 171). General Short did likewise (R. 8496-8499). Similar requests were not made of other officers, not even of those who before this Committee publicly accepted responsibility for certain failures of the high command in Washington.
In June of 1944 the Congress directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to conduct investigations into the Pearl Harbor attack. The War Department denied the Army Board of Investigation access to the intercepted messages. General Miles, Director of Military Intelligence, at the time of Pearl Harbor, was ordered by General Marshall not to testify on the subject of the intercepts (R. 11843). For a considerable period the Navy Court of Inquiry was denied access to the same material (exhibit 195). After repeated demands by Admiral Kimmel, the Navy Department released this restriction upon its own Court. The War Department finally followed the same course. For the first time, late in the Board's proceedings, Army officers were permitted to testify before the Army Board as to all details regarding the intercepts (R. 12035). But many important Army witnesses had already testified under the limitations previously ordered.  
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In the fall of 1944 the Army Board and Navy Court made their reports to the Secretaries of the War and Navy. These reports were critical of the conduct of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. The findings were not made public. The Navy Court exonerated Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel's request to read its report was refused by the Secretary of the Navy (R. 6811). The Secretaries of War and Navy instituted further secret investigations dispensing with the services of the three-man Board and Court previously established, and each entrusting the conduct of proceedings to a single officer. Admiral Kimmel's request to be present at the further Navy investigation, to introduce evidence, to confront and cross-examine witnesses was denied by the Secretary of the Navy (R. 6812). The affidavits and testimony at the further investigations contain many instances where witnesses gave evidence materially different from that which they had previously sworn to before the Army Board and the Naval Court. These changes were especially marked in testimony of certain key witnesses on the subject of the dissemination and evaluation of the intercepted messages in Washington. Again, before this Committee these same witnesses further changed their testimony from that worn to twice previously, or pleaded lapses of memory.
The record of the high military and civilian officials of the War and Navy Departments in dealing with the Pearl Harbor disaster from beginning to end does them no credit. It will have a permanent bad effect on the morale and integrity of the armed services. The Administration had ample opportunity to record and preserve all the acts about Pearl Harbor, even if their public disclosure needed to wait upon the war's end. This was not done. The policy adopted was to lace the public responsibility for the disaster on the commanders in the field, to be left there for all time. The policy failed only because suppression created public suspicion, and the Congress was alert.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This investigation has not brought to light all the facts about Pearl Harbor. We have been denied much vital information. Mr. Stimson did not answer certain important interrogations which, in consideration of the state of his health, were submitted to him in writing. He has also denied to the Committee his diary entries for the days December 2 to December 6, 1941. These were significantly omitted from his written statement. Mr. Hull's health permitted only a brief appearance before us and no examination by the minority members of he Committee. Written interrogatories were submitted as to when le first saw or obtained information as to the contents of certain vital intercepted messages, including the 1 P. M. Message. Mr. Hull answered: "I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned of the contents of the messages you cite" (R. 14316). "I do not recall" was an answer frequently received from other important witnesses. Messrs. Maxwell Hamilton, Eugene Dooman and Stanley Hornbeck, State Department officials who played important roles in 941 in our Far Eastern diplomacy, have not testified. We have been denied Ambassador Grew's diary. In December 1941 General Bedell Smith was secretary to the General Staff of the Army. He did not testify. His possible knowledge of the distribution of intercepted
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messages to General Marshall on Saturday evening, December 6, was not investigated. Admiral (then Captain) Glover was the duty officer in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations on December 6 1941. His log for that night contained the vital information about Mr. Stimson's interest in precise locations of the ships of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Glover sent the Committee a telegram but did not testify. Mr. Welles' memoranda of Atlantic Charter conferences was obtained from State Department only after his oral testimony before us had been completed.
On the evidence before us I concur in the findings of the committee with respect to responsibilities of our commanders in Hawaii. I believe that the "mistakes of judgment" referred to in the committee report are directly related to the failures of the high commands in Washington to have their organizations fully alerted and on a war footing and that those in command at the Washington level must bear their full share of the responsibility for the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.
I further conclude that secret diplomacy was at the root of the tragedy. The United States had warned Japan that an advance to Malaya or the Dutch East Indies would mean war with this nation The President gave Great Britain assurances of our armed support in such event. What Japan and Britain knew, our commanders in the field and our own people did not know. Washington feared that national unity could not be attained unless Japan committed the first overt act. Accordingly, the Army in Hawaii was put on an anti-sabotage alert, a defensive posture containing the least possible risk of incident in Hawaii which Japan might claim was an overt act by the United States. The mobilization of American public opinion in support of an offensive by the Pacific Fleet against Japan was to be accomplished, if at all, by a message to Congress "at the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities." This message was to be the prelude to hostilities by the United States if Japan attacked the British and the Dutch at the outset of the war and did not attack this nation. A direct attack by Japan against the United States at the outset of hostilities would make such a message unnecessary. Mr. Stimson's diary describes the plan succinctly: "The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." In formulating this plan undoubtedly Washington was influenced by public promises to keep us out of war unless attacked.
With full knowledge of Japan's intentions prior to the attack, Washington had one plain duty to the American people. That duty was to inform them of their peril. This was not done. Washington had a further duty to make sure that our forces were ready to meet the attack by furnishing their commanders afield and afloat with all available information, or by evaluating that information and giving them appropriate clear and categoric instructions.
Those who find in various instances of poor coordination between the services the causes of Pearl Harbor are satisfied with a superficial explanation. The state of readiness of our armed forces in the field was a refection of over-all policy adopted on the highest level in Washington. The President had delivered to him the Japanese intercepted messages and possessed much more information about Japanese plans and intentions than any field commander. He gave most minute
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directions to commanders in the field, even as to the scouting positions of individual ships, when he thought such directions necessary. A merger of the armed forces and unity of command in Hawaii in November and December, 1941, could not have eliminated the dangers in the policy of maneuvering Japan into striking the first blow. That policy would still have shaped the orders given, as well as the information sent to a single commander in the field.
Those who find American public opinion responsible for Pearl Harbor accept an entirely false theory. Enlightened public opinion is based on accurate public information. The American people, if kept well informed of their real diplomatic position, do not need an incident to unite them. If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the exclusive, secret information of the President and his advisers, public opinion will not be enlightened. The very nature of the consequent public alarm places the armed forces of the Nation in effective readiness and may even deter an enemy from executing its planned attack. The best deterrent to a predatory Japan in late 1941 was a thoroughly informed and obviously alerted America.
In this connection it will be noted that when the reports of the Army Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry were submitted to President Truman on August 30, 1945, he made the following statement:
"I have read it (the Pearl Harbor reports) very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that the whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself pursued. The country was not ready for preparedness. Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was stifled. Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness he was vilified for doing it. I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor."  
An examination of the facts ought to compel any person to reject this conclusion. The record clearly demonstrates how the Army and Navy get the funds needed for national defense. The Army and Navy are required to submit their respective estimates each year to the Bureau of the Budget. This Bureau acting for the President conducts hearings and finally makes recommendations to the President as to the amounts to be recommended to the Congress for appropriation. The Congress is in effect the people of America. The record discloses that in the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, the Army and Navy jointly asked for $26,580,145,093. This is the combined total of Army and Navy requests made to the Bureau of the Budget. In the same period the President recommended to the Congress that it appropriate to the combined services $23,818,319,897. The Congress actually made available to the Army and Navy in this period $24,943,987,823. Thus it is apparent that the President himself recommended to the Congress in the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, that it appropriate for the Army and Navy $2,761,826,033 less than had been requested by the Army and Navy. The people's representatives in the Congress gave to the Army and Navy in the form of appropriations and authorizations for expenditure $1,256,667,926 more than the President had recommended in his budget messages to the Congress.
The mere recital of these undisputed figures should dispose of the contention that "the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor." I am including herein for ready reference a complete statement:  

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Asked Budget Congress
1934 $320,900,513 $280,746,841 $280,066,381
1935 305,271,321 288,960,155 283,862,094
1936 361,351,154 331,799,277 363,224,957
1937 467,022,915 391,065,510 401,914,645
1938 468,204,851 436,495,336 439,872,423
1939 630,803,130 598,016,016 611,848,391
1940 1,019,342,730 995,442,760 970,822,098
1941 13,612,977,763 13,067,553,812 13,487,184,058
Total 17,185,874,377 16,390,079,707 16,828,795,047
Total both services 17,185,874,377 16,390,079,707 16,828,795,047 9,394 271,553 7,428,240,190 8,115,192,776
Total 26,580,145,930 23,818,319,897 24,943,987,823
Roosevelt cut. $2,761,826,033.
Congress restored: *$1,256,667,926* of the Budget cut.
Another subject that has been bandied about the country for a number of years relates to what has been frequently referred to as the failure or refusal of Congress to fortify the island of Guam. The contention has been made that Congress refused to appropriate money to fortify the island of Guam and that as a result of such failure the entire war in the Pacific in its initial stages was lost to the Japanese
The fact is that no proposal was ever submitted to the Congress involving the fortification of Guam. The Navy did request an appropriation of five million dollars for the purpose of dredging the harbor at Guam (Stark testimony, record pp. 6546-6547). The first request of the Navy was rejected by the Congress. Thereafter, the appropriation requested by the Navy was passed with only one vote against it. The dredging operation was being carried on when war broke out with Japan.
It is interesting to note that "Rainbow No. 5", which is the Joint Chiefs' of Staff worldwide war plan, placed the island of Guam in Category "F" (record p. 6535). The following questions and answers tell the story:
"Mr. KEEFE. NOW, I would like to ask a question which bothered me with respect to your Rainbow No. 5, which places the island of Guam in what is called Category F.
"Admiral STARK. I have the category here.
"Mr. KEEFE. Now will you state for the record what Category F means?
"Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We have that, I am sure. This is out of Joint Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation, and they are put in categories of defense, A, B, C, D, E, and F.
"Mr. KEEFE. Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now give us what Category F means.
"Admiral STARK. Category F: "Positions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy."
"Mr. KEEFE. Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at the time this basic war plan was devised it was the considered opinion of both the Army and Navy that it could not be defended and it therefore was placed in Category F that required those on the island, through demolition or otherwise, to destroy anything of value to the enemy and to permit it to be taken?
"Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. And to surrender?
"Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
"Mr. KEEFE. That is right, is it not?
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"Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir (record, p. 6537)
"Mr. KEEFE. Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and the capture of Guam by the Japs were improvements on the harbor being made at that time or had they been completed?
"Admiral STARK. They had not been completed. Of course, I recall very clearly the legislation with regard to that. I do not know just what their status was at is moment. I had obtained from Congress the appropriation, I believe it was $6,000,000, for certain improvements to the harbor. You recall the first year lost it by six votes, and the following year it went through almost unanimously, by one vote being opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that I do not recall at the moment.
"Mr. KEEFE. With those improvements completed, Guam would still be in category F, would it not?
"Admiral STARK. In the same category, Category F. The improvements were not such as improved the defense of Guam but very little.
"Mr. KEEFE. Even with the improvements that were requested and contemplated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the Joint Army and Navy Board, could not be successfully defended due to the power that Japan had in the mandated islands surrounding it, is that right?
"Admiral STARK. That is correct (record, p. 6547)."
These simple facts as disclosed to the public for the first time in these hearings should effectively dispose of the contention that "Congress refused to fortify the Island of Guam, and hence the United States suffered tremendous loss in the initial stages of the war with Japan." In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its advance if imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy which relies upon the enemy's first overt act to insure effective popular support for the nation's final war decision is both outmoded and dangerous in the atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more tragic and damaging than that of December 7, 1941, there must be constant close coordination between American public opinion and American diplomacy.

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Appendix A

PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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APPENDIX A

PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THE ROBERTS COMMISSION 

The Roberts Commission was organized under an Executive order, dated December 18, 1941, of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which defined the  duties of the Commission thus: "To ascertain and report the facts  relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory  of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The purposes of the required inquiry and  report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions  of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy  personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on  the occasion mentioned; and, if so, what these derelictions or errors  were, and who were responsible therefor." This inquiry was commenced on  December 18, 1941, and was concluded on January 23, 1942. The record of  its proceedings and exhibits covers 2,173 printed pages. Members of the  Commission were Sir. Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme  Court, Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy,  retired; Rear Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, retired; Maj.  Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, retired; and Brig. Gen. Joseph  T. McNarney, United States Army.

THE HART INQUIRY

The inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, United States Navy,  retired, was initiated by precept dated February 12, 1944, from  Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to Admiral Hart "For an Examination of  Witnesses and the Taking of Testimony Pertinent to the Japanese Attack  on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii." The precept stated " * * *  Whereas certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge  pertinent to the foregoing matters, are now or soon may be on dangerous  assignments at great distances from the United States * * * it is now  deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or  unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that  their testimony, pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack, be recorded  and preserved, * * *" This inquiry was commenced on February 12, 1944,  and was concluded on June 15, 1944. The record of its proceedings and  exhibits covers 565 printed pages.

THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD  

The Army Pearl Harbor Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and by  order dated July 8, 1944, of The Adjutant General, War Department. The  board was directed "to ascertain  

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and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to make  such recommendations as it may deem proper." The board held sessions  beginning July 20,1944, and concluded its investigation on October 20,  1944. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 3,357 printed  pages. Members of the board were Lt. Gen. George Grunert, president;  Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Ma;. Gen. Walter A. Frank.

THE NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 

The Navy Court of Inquiry was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and by  order dated July 13, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.  The court was ordered to thoroughly "inquire into the attack made by  Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7  December 1941 * * * and will include in its findings a full statement of  the facts it may deem to be established. The court will further give its  opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame  incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and  in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious  blame incurred, will specifically recommend what further proceedings  should be had." The court held sessions beginning July 24, 1944, and  concluded its inquiry on October 19, 1944. The record of its proceedings  and exhibits covers 1,397 printed pages. Members of the court were  Admiral Orin G. Murfin, retired, president; Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus,  retired, and Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews, retired.

THE CLARKE INQUIRY

The investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke "regarding the  manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled" was  pursuant to oral instructions of Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of  Staff, United States Army. Colonel Clarke was appointed by Maj. Gen.  Clayton Bissell, Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, under authority of a letter dated September 9, 1944, from  The Adjutant General. This investigation was conducted from September 14  to 16, 1944, and from July 13 to August 4, 1945. Testimony was taken  concerning the handling of intercepted Japanese messages known as Magic,  the handling of intelligence material by the Military Intelligence  Division, War Department, and the handling of the message sent by  General Marshall to Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short at Hawaii on the morning of  December 7, 1941. The record of the proceedings of this investigation,  together with its exhibits, covers 225 printed pages.

THE CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced on December 1, 1944, that  the report of the Army Pearl Harbor board had been submitted to him, and  that: "In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I  have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until  all the facts are made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of  every witness in possession of material

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facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to  accomplish this result." By memorandum dated February 6, 1945, for Army  personnel concerned, Secretary Stimson stated that "Pursuant to my  directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December  1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the  investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor  Board." This investigation was commenced on November 23,1944 and was  concluded on September 12, 1945. The record of its proceedings and  exhibits covers 695 printed pages.

THE HEWITT INQUIRY   

The inquiry conducted by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, United States Navy, was initiated under precept dated May 2, 1945, from Secretary of the Navy  James Forrestal to conduct "Further investigation of facts pertinent to  the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December  1941." The precept stated that upon review of the evidence obtained by  the examinations conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart and by the Navy  Court of Inquiry, "the Secretary (of Navy) has found that there were  errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service  both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary has further found  that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible  evidence. Accordingly he has decided that the investigation directed by  Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until  the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be  obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. * * * You are hereby  detailed to make a study of the enclosures (Proceedings of Hart Inquiry  and Navy Court of Inquiry) and then to conduct such further  investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who  may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack,  and to reexamine any such person who has been previously examined, as  may appear necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby." This  inquiry commenced on May 14, 1945, and was concluded on July 11, 1945.  The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 1,342 printed pages.

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APPENDIX B

NAMES AND POSITIONS OF PRINCIPAL ARMY AND NAVY OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AND AT HAWAII AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK ALONG WITH THE LEADING WITNESSES IN THE VARIOUS PROCEEDINGS

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APPENDIX B

NAMES AND POSITIONS OF PRINCIPAL ARMY AND NAVY OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AND AT HAWAII AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK ALONG WITH THE LEADING WITNESSES IN THE VARIOUS PROCEEDINGS

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL WAR DEPARTMENT DEC. 7, 1941

Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson.
Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall.
Deputy Chiefs of Staff:
General Administration and Ground Forces, Maj. Gen. William Bryden.
Armed Forces and Supply, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore.
Air, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold.
Secretary, General Staff, Col. Walter Bedell Smith.
Assistant Secretary, General Staff, Col. John R. Deane.
G-1 (Personnel Division). Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip.
G-2 (Intelligence Division), Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles.
Administrative Branch, Col. Ralph C. Smith.
Counterintelligence Branch, Lt. Col. John T. Bissell.
Intelligence Branch, Col. Hayes A. Kroner.
Administrative Section, Lt. Col. Moses W. Pettigrew.
Situation Section, Lt. Col. Thomas J. Betts.
Far Eastern Section, Col. Rufus S. Bratton.
Assistant, Col. Carlysle C. Dusenbury.
G-3 (Operations and Training Division), Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle.
G-4 (Supply Division), Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell.
War Plans Division, Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow.
Executive officer, Maj. Charles K. Gailey, Jr.
Plans Group, Col. Charles W. Bundy.
Projects Group, Col. Robert W. Crawford.
Chief Signal Officer, Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead.
Operations Branch, Col. Otis E. Sadtler.
Traffic Division and Signal Center, Col. Edward T. French.
Signal Intelligence Service, Col. Rex W. Minckler.
Principal Cryptanalyst, William F. Friedman.
Communication Liaison Division, Lt. Col. W. T. Guest.

ARMY AIR FORCES

(Under over-all command of General Marshall)

Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold.
Chief of Air Staff, Brig. Gen. Martin F. Scanlon.
Air Forces Combat Command, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons.
Air Corps, Maj. Gen. George Brett.

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ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL, NAVY DEPARTMENT, DEC. 7, 1941

Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark.
Administrative aide and flag secretary, Capt. Charles Wellborn, Jr.
Aide, Capt. John L. McCrea.
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll.
War Plans Division, Rear Adm. Richmond E. Turner.
Pacific Ocean and Asiatic Areas Section, Capt. Robert 0. Glover.
Central Division (State Department liaison), Capt. R. E. Schuirmann.
Ship Movements Division, Vice Adm. Roland M. Brainard.
War Information Room, Rear Adm. F. T. Leighton.
Intelligence Division, Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson.
Domestic Branch and Assistant, Rear Adm. Howard F. Kingman.
Foreign Branch, Capt. William A. Heard.
Far Eastern Section, Capt. Arthur H. McCollum.
Communications Division, Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes.
Assistant, Capt. Joseph R. Redman.
Security (Intelligence) Section, Capt. L. F. Safford.
Translation Section, Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer (on loan from Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Division).
Cryptographic Research:
(Decrypting) Section:
Senior watch officer, Lt. (jg) George W. Lynn.
Watch officers, Lt. (jg) Alfred V. Pering,
Lt. (jg) F. M. Brotherhood,
Lt. (jg) Allan A. Murray.
Correlating and Dissemination Section, Lt. Fredrick L. Freeman.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, DEC. 7, 1941

Commanding General, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short.
Chief of Staff, Col. Walter C. Phillips.
G-1 (Personnel), Lt. Col. Russell C. Throckmorton.
G-2 (Intelligence), Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder.
Assistant G-2, Lt. Col. George W. Bicknell.
G-3 (Operations and Training), Lt. Col. William E. Donegan.
G-4 (Supply), Col. Morrill W. Marston.
Assistant G-4, Maj. Robert J. Fleming.
Adjutant General, Col. Robert H. Dunlop.
Chemical Warfare, Lt. Col. G. F. Unmacht.
Ordnance, Col. W. A. Capron.
Judge Advocate General, Col. T. H. Green.
Provost Marshal, Lt. Col. Melvin L. Craig.
Engineer, Col. A. K. B. Lyman.
Quartermaster, Col. William R. White.
Finance, Col. E. S. Ely.
Signal Corps, Lt. Col. Carrol A. Powell.
Inspector General, Col. Lathe B. Row.
Surgeon General, Col. Edgar King.
Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson.
Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray.
Coast Artillery Command, Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin.

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HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

(Under over-all command of General Short)

Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin.
Chief of Staff, Col. James A. Mollison.
Intelligence, Col. Edward W. Raley.
Signal Officer, Lt. Col. Clay I. Hoppough.
Eighteenth Bombardment Wing, Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph.
Fourteenth Pursuit Wing, Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson.
Hickam Field, Col. W. E. Farthing.
Wheeler Field, Col. William J. Flood.
Bellows Field, Lt. Col. Leonard D. Weddington.

STAFF OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET AND U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, DEC. 7, 1941

Commander in chief, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.

Chief of Staff and personal aide, Capt. W. W. Smith.
Flag Secretary and personal aide, Lt. Comdr. P. C. Cross-eye.
Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, Capt. W. S. DeLany.
First assistant operations officer, Commander R. F. Good.
Second assistant operations officer, Lt. Comdr. H. L. Collins.
War Plans Officer, Capt. Charles H. McMorris.
Assistants, Commander V. R. Murphy,
Commander L. D. McCormick,
Lt. F. R. DuBorg.
Assistant War Plans and Marine Officer, Col. O. T. Pheifer, United States Marine Corps.
Communications officer, Commander M. E. Curts.
Assistant, Lt. (jg) W. J. East, Jr.
Security officer, Lt. Allan Reed.
Radio officer, Lt. Comdr. D. C. Beard.
Public Relations officer, Lt. Comdr. W. W. Drake.
Assistant, Lt. (jg) J. E. Bassett.
Maintenance officer, Commander H. D. Clark.
Medical officer, Capt. E. A. M. Gendreau, United States Marine Corps.
Gunnery officer, Commander W. A. Kitts III.
Aviation officer, Commander Howard C. Davis.
Aerologist and personnel officer, Lt. Comdr. R. B. Black.

Commander, Navy Pacific Fleet Air Wing, Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger.
Also commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings 1 and 2; commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor; commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force (under commandant, Fourteenth Naval District as naval base defense officer, Pacific Fleet.)
Operations officer, Capt. Logan C. Ramsey.

Commander Battle Force (Task Force 1), Vice Adm. W. S. Pye.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Task Force 2), Vice Adm. William F. Halsey.
Commander Scouting Force (Task Force 3), Vice Adm. Wilson Brown.
Commander Task Force 4, Rear Adm. Claude C. Bloch.

278  PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Commander Submarines Scouting Force (Task Force 7), Rear Adm. Thomas Withers.
Commander Task Force 9, Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger.
Commander Base Force (Task Force 15), Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, DEC. 7, 1941

Commandant (also commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Frontier; commandant, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard; commander of local defense forces, and, as an officer of Pacific Fleet, the naval base defense officer; commander Task Force 4, United States Pacific Fleet), Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch.
Chief of Staff, Capt. J. B. Earle.
Intelligence officer, Capt. Irving H. Mayfield.
Counterespionage Section, Lt. Willlam B. Stephensen.
Communications Security (Intelligence) Unit, Commander Joseph J. Rochefort.
Translator, Col. Alva B. Lasswell, United States Marine Corps.
Cryptanalyst, Lt. (jg) F. C. Woodward,
Commander Wesley A. Wright (on loan from staff of Admiral Kimmel, where he was assistant communications officer).

LIST OF WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND THEIR ASSIGNMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 7, 1941

Beardall, John R., rear admiral; naval aide to President Roosevelt.
Beatty, Frank E., rear admiral; aide to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.
Bellinger, P. N. L., vice admiral, commander Hawaiian Naval Base Air Force (commander Patrol Wing 2).
Bicknell, George W., colonel, assistant chief, Military Intelligence Service, Hawaiian Department.
Bratton, Rufus S., colonel, chief, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Service, War Department.
Clausen, Henry C., lieutenant colonel, [1] Judge Advocate General's Office, assisting Army Pearl Harbor Board and conducting supplemental investigation for Secretary of War.
Creighton, John M., captain, U. S. N., naval observer, Singapore.
Dillon, John H., major, U. S. M. C., aide to Secretary Knox.
Elliott, George E., sergeant, A. U. S., operator at Opana radar detector station, Oahu, T. H.
Gerow, Leonard T., major general, Chief, War Plans Division, Army General Staff, War Department.
Grew, Joseph C., United States Ambassador to Japan.
Hart, Thomas C., admiral, commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.
Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State.
Ingersoll, Royal E., admiral, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.
Inglis, R. B., rear admiral, [1] presented to committee Navy summary of Pearl Harbor attack.

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Kimmel, Husband E., rear admiral, commander in chief, United States Fleet; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.
Kramer, A. D., commander, Section Chief, Division of Naval Communications, handling translations and recovery of intercepted Japanese codes
Krick, Harold D., captain, U. S. N., former flag secretary to Admiral Stark.
Leahy, William D., admiral, Chief of Staff to the President.
Layton, Edwin T., captain, U. S. N., fleet intelligence officer, Pacific Fleet.
Marshall, George C., general, Chief of Staff, United States Army, War Department.
McCollum, Arthur N., captain, U. S. N., Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
Miles, Sherman, major general, Chief, Military Intelligence Service, Army General Staff, War Department.
Noyes, Leigh, rear admiral, Chief, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Phillips, Walter C., colonel, Chief of Staff to General Short.
Richardson, J. O., admiral, former commander in chief, United States Fleet and Pacific Fleet.
Roberts, Owen J., Mr. Justice, [1] Chairman, Roberts Commission.
Rochefort, Joseph John, captain, U. S. N., communications intelligence officer, Pacific Fleet.
Sadtler, Otis K., colonel, Chief, Military Branch, Army Signal Corps, War Department.
Safford, L. F., captain, U. S. N., Chief, Radio Intelligence Unit, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Schukraft, Robert E., colonel, Chief, Radio Intercept Unit, Army Signal Corps, War Department.
Schulz, Lester Robert, commander, assistant to Admiral Beardall.
Short, Walter C., major general, commanding general, Hawaiian Department.
Smith, William W., rear admiral, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel.
Sonnett, John F., lieutenant commander, [1] Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, and assistant to Admiral H. K. Hewitt in his inquiry.
Stark, Harold R., admiral, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.
Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War (sworn statement and sworn replies to interrogatories only).
Thielen, Bernard, colonel, [1] presented to committee Army summary of Pearl Harbor attack.
Turner, Richmond K., rear admiral, Chief, War Plans Division, Navy, Department.
Welles, Sumner, Under Secretary of State.
Wilkinson, T. S., rear admiral, Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
Zacharias, Ellis M., Captain, United States Navy, commanding officer, U. S. S. Salt Lake City, Pacific Fleet.

[1] Denotes witness whose connection with this investigation relates to his assignment after December 7, 1941.

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LIST OF LEADING WITNESSES IN PRIOR PROCEEDINGS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE, AND THEIR ASSIGNMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 7, 1941

Arnold, H. H., general, commanding general, Army Air Forces, War, Department.
Bissell, John T., colonel, executive officer, Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
Bloch, Claude C., admiral, commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier; Pearl Harbor Naval Base defense officer.
Brotherhood, Francis M., lieutenant (junior grade), watch officer, Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Brown, Wilson, rear admiral, commander, Scouting Force (Task Force 3) Pacific Fleet.
Calhoun, W. L., vice admiral, commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet.
Crosley, Paul C., commander; flag secretary to Admiral Kimmel.
Curts, M. E., captain, U. S. N., communication officer, Pacific Fleet, and liaison officer, Radio and Sound Division.
Davidson, Howard C., major general, commanding general, Fourteenth Pursuit Wing, Hawaiian Air Force.
Davis, Howard C., rear admiral, fleet aviation officer, Pacific Fleet.
DeLany, Walter S., rear admiral, Chief of Staff for Operations, staff of commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.
Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, colonel, assistant to Col. R. S. Bratton, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
Fielder, Kendall J., colonel, Chief, Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department.
French, Edward F., colonel, officer in charge, Traffic Division and Signal Center, Signal Corps, War Department.
Friedman, William F., principal cryptanalyst, Signal Intelligence Service, Signal Corps, War Department.
Halsey, William F., admiral, commander Aircraft Battle Force (Task Force 2), Pacific Fleet.
Hamilton, Maxwell M., Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department.
Heard, William A., captain U. S. N., Chief, Foreign Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
Herron, Charles D., major general, former commanding general, Hawaiian Department.
Hornbeck, Stanley K., adviser on foreign relations, State Department.
Kitts, Willard A., III, rear admiral, fleet gunnery officer, staff of commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.
Kroner, Hayes A., brigadier general, Chief, Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
Lockard, Joseph L., lieutenant A. U. S., operator OPAN radar detector station, Oahu, T. H.
Lynn; George W., lieutenant commander, senior watch officer, Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
MacArthur, Douglas, general, commanding general, United States Army Forces in the Far East.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 281

Martin, F. L., major general, commanding general, Hawaiian Air Force.
Mayfield, Irving H., captain U. S N., Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District.
McDonald, Joseph P., sergeant, Five Hundred and Eightieth Aircraft Warning Company, assigned as telephone switchboard operator, operations center, Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department.
McMorris, C. H., rear admiral, war plans officer, staff of commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.
Murray, Allan A., lieutenant commander, watch officer, Cryptographic (Decrypting) Unit, Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Newton, J. H., vice admiral, commander, Cruisers Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.
Nimitz, C. W., admiral, Chief, Bureau of Navigation (now Personnel), Navy Department.
O'Dell, Robert H., lieutenant A. U. S., assistant military attache, American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, under Col. Van S. Merle-Smith, military attache.
Pering, Alfred V., lieutenant commander, watch officer, Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Pettigrew, Moses W., colonel, executive officer, Intelligence Group Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
Poindexter, Joseph B., governor, Governor of the Territory of Hawaii.
Powell, C. A., colonel, chief signal officer, Hawaiian Department.
Pye, William S., vice admiral, commander Battle Force (Task Force 1), Pacific Fleet.
Ramsey, Logan C., captain U. S. N., operations officer, Commander Patrol Wing 2 (Admiral Bellinger), Pacific Fleet, and Commander Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area.
Redman, Joseph R., rear admiral, Assistant Director, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Schuirmann R. E., rear admiral, Director, Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.
Shivers, Robert L., special agent in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Honolulu, T. H.
Smith-Hutton, H. H., captain U. S. N., naval attache, United States Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.
Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War.
Sutherland, Richard K., lieutenant general, Chief of Staff to General MacArthur.
Taylor, William E. G., commander, temporary duty with Army Interceptor Command, Hawaiian Air Force, as adviser for establishment of aircraft warning service.
Tyler, Kermit A., lieutenant colonel, executive officer, Eighth Pursuit Squadron, Hawaiian Air Force, on duty December 7, 1941 at information center, Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department.
Willoughby, C. A., major general, Chief, Military Intelligence Division, staff of General MacArthur.
Wilson, Durward S., major general, commanding general, Twenty-fourth Division, Hawaiian Department.
Withers, Thomas, rear admiral, commander submarines, Pacific Fleet.

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APPENDIX C

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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APPENDIX C

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, October 13, 1945.

Hon. ALBEN W. BARKLEY, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: Replying to your letter of the 5th, regarding the appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to consult with the  committee and its counsel, I am appointing Judge Latta, who has been in  charge of all the files in the White House for the past 28 years.

Any information that you want will be cheerfully supplied by him.

For your information all the files of the previous administration have  been moved to the Archives Building and Hyde Park. If there is any  difficulty about your having access to them I'll be glad to issue the  necessary order so that you may have complete access.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

[Copy]

AUGUST 28, 1945.

Memorandum for

The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The Attorney General.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Director of the Budget.

The Director of the Office of War Information.

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent  release to the public, except with the specific approval of the  President in each case, of  Information regarding the past or present status, technique or  procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any  cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States  Government or any Department thereof.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Restricted.

286 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Memorandum for-

The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of Navy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings and make public pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of that attack, a specific exception to my memorandum  dated August 28, 1945, relating to the release of information concerning cryptanalytic activities, is hereby made as follows:

The State, War, and Navy Departments will make available to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for such use as the committee may determine, any information in their possession material to the investigation, and will respectively authorize any employee or member of the armed services whose testimony is desired by the committee to testify publicly before the committee concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation.

(Signed) Harry S. Truman,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Approved October 23, 1945.

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, November 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND BUREAUS, INCLUDING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack reads as  follows:

SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

In order to assist the joint committee to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or  following the attack, you are requested to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, if they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to give any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the committee's investigation.

You are further requested to authorize them whether or not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the committee.

This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or agencies, whether they are in the armed services or not and whether or  not they are called to testify before the joint committee.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND BUREAUS, INCLUDING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

With further reference to my letter of November 7, 1945, addressed to the above executives, you are requested further to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, whether or not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to come forward and disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed to the committee.

This does not include any files or written material.

(Handwritten) O. K.

H. S. T.

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Appendix D

REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  JAPAN, AND RELATED MATTERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN AUGUST, 1941  THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 1941

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

This appendix reviews, upon the basis of the record before the Committee and in greater detail than in Part I of the report to which it is  annexed, the diplomatic conversations between the United States and  Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941  through December 8, 1941. While it is not to be regarded as including  all of the material contained in the record before the Committee that  touches upon those conversations during that period, it does attempt to  set forth the material facts in connection therewith.

Prior to the Committee's investigation, nearly all of the information  concerning the diplomatic conversations during 1941 between the United  States and Japan that had been made public was contained in the official  State Department publications, "Peace and War" (ex. 28) [1] and "Foreign  Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29), together  with former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's book, "Ten Years in Japan" (ex.  30), which were published during the war and were subject to wartime  restrictions. To the basic material contained in those publications, the  Committee has added hundreds of documents, personal as well as official,  from the files of the State Department and of the late President  Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, the Committee has received in  evidence hundreds of messages between the Japanese Foreign Office in  Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington as intercepted,  translated, and available at the time to high official; in the United  States Government in Washington, including President Roosevelt and  Secretary of State Cordell Hull. There 1S also before the Committee  testimony of former Secretary of State Hull and of former United States  Ambassador in Japan Joseph. C. Grew, a prepared statement and answers to  interrogatories submitted by former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,  and collateral (regarding diplomatic matters) testimony of Gen. George  C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other high-ranking officers of  the Army and Navy. The record before the Committee also contains  hundreds of captured Japanese documents, as well as reports of  interrogations conducted in Japan for the supreme allied commander, Gen.  Douglas MacArthur, at the request of the Committee, many of which are  directly concerned with the diplomatic events immediately preceding  Pearl Harbor, including an authoritative translation of the memoirs of  Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier of Japan until October

[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to exhibits introduced at the hearings before the Committee.

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16, 1941. This mass of testimony and documentary evidence, from so many different and independent sources, and including official documents of  the Japanese and other governments, as well as of the United States  Government, affords countless opportunities for verification by cross-checking

By interweaving the diplomatic material contained in the documentary  evidence and testimony before the Committee, this appendix attempts to  reconstruct chronologically the significant events in the diplomatic  conversations between the United States and Japan during the 4 months  that immediately preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Only  thus, for example, can the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages  between Tokyo and Washington be examined in the surrounding  circumstances in which they were first seen by high officials in the  United States Government, for those messages were the day-to-day  instructions sent by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to the  Japanese Ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of guiding them in  their conversations with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, and the  Ambassadors' reports and comments to the Japanese Foreign Office  concerning those conversations. While in American hands the diplomatic  messages between Tokyo and Washington not only provided Secretary Hull  and President Roosevelt with advance knowledge of the Japanese plans for  the conduct of the conversations but also were one of the most important  and significant types of intelligence information available to the Army  and Navy in Washington, they did not contain any information pointing  toward Pearl Harbor as a possible target of Japanese attack.

Since the report to which this appendix is annexed discusses in detail  the military aspects and implications of the diplomatic conversations  between the United States and Japan and of the intercepted Japanese  diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington, no attempt is made  here to tie in the events on the "diplomatic front" with the various  warning messages sent by the Army and Navy from Washington to the  commanders in the Pacific, although the latter messages were to a  considerable extent based upon the state of Japanese-American diplomatic  relations at the time they were dispatched. Neither does this appendix  attempt to describe the process of building up American military  strength in the Pacific area which was underway during the period in  question, although by taking up the Marshall-Stark joint memoranda of  November 5 and November 27 in connection with the events that gave rise  to each, it does indicate in general terms the over-all military and  naval considerations that affected American policies in the Pacific  during the latter part of 1941. Parenthetically, it may be noted here  that the inherent relationship between diplomatic policies and military  and naval power was succinctly stated by Secretary Hull when he  testified before the Committee that soon after he came to the State  Department he learned that the representatives of the aggressor nations  with whom he talked "were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our  Army," and that the diplomatic strength of the United States went up or  down with their estimate of what the United States Army and Navy "amounted to."

The record before the Committee shows that the United States Government  participated in the conversations with Japan in an effort to dissuade  the Japanese Government from its course of military aggression and its  Axis ties with Germany and Italy. The fact that

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the United States was engaging in such conversations with Japan was  believed to strengthen the position of the elements in that country who  disapproved of the policies of those who dominated the Japanese  Government; success in negotiations with Japan on the basis of the  principles to which the United States Government adhered would have had  many material and other advantages for both the United States and Japan.  American participation in the conversations had the further purpose of  giving the United States Army and Navy more time to prepare their  defense of areas in the Pacific regarded as vital to the safety and  security of the United States. Recognition of this dual purpose is the  key to an understanding of the day-to-day course of the conversations.  Every action taken, every move made, on the American side must be  considered in the light of those objectives.

BRIEF RESUME OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO THE  ATLANTIC CONFERENCE

This narrative begins in August, 1941 with the President of the United  States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in conference on a  warship off the coast of Newfoundland, discussing how to prevent the  outbreak of war with Japan. It ends on December 7-8, 1941 with Japanese  bombs falling on ships of the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl  Harbor, with Japanese troops invading Thailand and British Malaya, and  with other Japanese attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippine  Islands, Guam, Wake, and Midway. 

Into the intervening 4 months were crowded events the causes of which lay deeper and were more fundamental than the Japanese occupation of  southern French Indochina in July or the breaking off of the Japanese- American conversations and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United  States which had immediately followed that Japanese move. By August  1941, there was but a slim chance that the Japanese Government would  "reverse the engine," as Ambassador Grew expressed it, and abandon the  course of aggression through force of arms to which it had been  committed. Although it was true that the informal conversations in  Washington between the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo  Nomura, had revealed an apparent willingness on the part of the Japanese  Government to go along with certain of the peaceful principles to which  the United States was committed, *provided those principles were stated  in sufficiently general terms to make their application in specific  situations wholly unpredictable*, those conversations had disclosed  three crucial points of difference between the two Governments: the  question of nondiscrimination in international trade, the question of  the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and the question of  Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact.

During the latter part of January 1941, through private Japanese and  American citizens, the suggestion had reached President Roosevelt and  Secretary Hull that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity  to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward the  "China Incident" (ex. 29, vol. II, PP. 328-329; ex. 179).  The initial  reaction of the United States Government had been one of caution (ex.  29, vol. II, P. 330).  Secretary Hull testified that -

"In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide  divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had  been pursuing

[Pairs of asterisks have been used to replace italics in the original text.  LWJ]

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in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement.   Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the  signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling  for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would  contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we  should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

"We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful,  fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific  area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and  beliefs of the American people.  Moreover, the President and I  constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military  authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having  time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United  States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to  enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line  with our need to rearm for self-defense.

"The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's  course of aggression.  We realized that so much was involved in a  reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any  substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would  require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an  endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We  carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a  basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not  only to Japan but to all countries (tr. 1101-11025)." [1]

In his early conversations with Ambassador Nomura, who reached  Washington in February 1941, Secretary Hull had expressed the hope that  the Japanese Government might have something definite in mind that would  offer a practical approach to a general settlement of the problems in  the Pacific, and had indicated the willingness of the United States  Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might  offer that was consistent with the principles to which, the Secretary  had made it clear, the United States was committed (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  331-332).  Secretary Hull testified as follows regarding his meeting on  April 16, 1941, with Ambassador Nomura:

"On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.  I pointed out that *the one paramount preliminary question about which  our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that  the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its  present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which  our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between  nations should rest*, as follows:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;

(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to  consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as  could be consistent with those principles (tr. 11041104)."

As the result of these early conversations, on May 12 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassador had presented to Secretary Hull, upon  instructions from his Government, a document (Annex A attached hereto)  containing a proposal for a general settlement between the United States  and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 418-425). This document had revealed  authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in  mind as the basis for an agreement

[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to  pages of the transcript of the hearings before the Committee.

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between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 332). Between May 12 and June 21, there had taken place a number of conferences  between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador at which the Japanese  proposal and related matters were discussed.  In the meantime a  counterproposal by the United States had been prepared, and on June 21  (Washington time) this counterproposal (Annex B attached hereto) had  been handed to the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 483-492).

On June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia. The German attack upon  Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which were to have  far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations.  It had quickened  the appetites of those in the Japanese Government who believed that  then, or never, Japan's destiny was in her own hands. Intensive  consideration had immediately been given in Tokyo to the question  whether Japan should not attack Russia at once (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,  p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka in particular had urged this course.  According to the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier  at the time, the attention of the Government became so centered upon  this question that the American counterproposal of June 21, which by  that time had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in  Washington, became completely side-tracked until after an Imperial  Conference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of war with Russia  had been temporarily shelved in favor of "an advance into the southern  regions," and it had been decided that, first of all, the plans "which  have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be  prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern  territories" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) It is  now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) it was  also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotiations with the United  States should break down, "preparations for a war with England and  America will also be carried forward"; that all plans, including the  plan to use Japan's military strength to settle the Soviet question if  the German-Russian war should develop to Japan's advantage, were to be carried out

"in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America;"

and that

"In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America  into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations  under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and  method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 71)."

The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time)  had been cabled by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese  Ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the same  day:

"(National Secret)

"At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd 'The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation' were decided. This Policy consists of the following two  parts. The first part 'The Policy' and the second part 'The Principal Points.' (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep 

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the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity,  regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, *and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward* in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, *increasing  pressure shall be added from various points in the south*, and by means  of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions  shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and  various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in  the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be  reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French  Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German  war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained,  every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall  be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations  shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available  shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining  the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power  Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed* (ex. 1, pp.  1-2)." [1]

It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which was translated and available in Washington [2] on July 8 (Washington time),  did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference respecting the United States.

Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan had  proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up from 1  to 2 million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese merchant  vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restrictions upon  travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail and  communications. The Japanese press had dwelt constantly on the theme  that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never  equaled in all Japanese history. The United States had been charged with  using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The  Japanese press had warned that if the United States took further action  in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would  face a final crisis (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 339-340).

Largely as a result of disagreements within the Japanese Government regarding the reply to be made to the American proposals of June 21,  Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet had resigned *en bloc* on July 16  (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 20-24). Prince Konoye had  then been ordered by Emperor Hirohito to organize the new Cabinet, which  he had done, the only important change being the appointment of Admiral  Toyoda as Foreign Minister, in place of Yosuke Matsuoka (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 25)  The views of the latter had been one of the principal  causes of the disagreements within the Government regarding its reply to  the

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all italics in this appendix have been supplied.

[2] The expression "translated and available in Washington," as used in  this appendix, means that English translations of the particular  intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were available at the time  stated to those officials of the United States Government in Washington  to whom the Army and Navy were distributing "Magic" at the time. It  should be borne in mind that all such messages to which reference is  made in this appendix were so available: specific reference has been  made to the date when a message became available only in those instances  where knowledge of the exact date is important.

While the information contained in the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was available at the time, the information contained herein  which is derived solely from captured Japanese documents (exhibits 8 and  132) and from the memoirs of Prince Konoye (exhibit 173) was not, of  course, available at the time.

American proposals of June 21. Following this Cabinet change while  Premier Konoye and the new Foreign Minister in Tokyo and Ambassador  Nomura in Washington had made emphatic and repeated protestations of  Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific  problems, the messages from Tokyo to Washington had contained such  statements as "there is more reason than ever before to arm ourselves to  the teeth for all-out war" (ex. 1, p. 8). The bombing of American  property in China had continued, including bursts which damaged the  American Embassy and the U. S. S. TUTUILA at Chungking (ex. 29, vol. II,  p. 343). An intercepted message of July 19 (Japan time) from Tokyo to  Berlin had contained the following estimate of the change in the  Japanese Cabinet:

"The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection  with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign  policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the  principles of the Tripartite Pact (ex. 1, p. 3)."

In the meantime, the movement of Japanese troops and ships in accordance with the Japanese plans for the "southward advance" had begun in  earnest, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 340; ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).  Those military and naval movements, plus the failure as yet of the  Japanese Government to make any reply to the American proposals of June  21, had led Under Secretary Welles, upon instructions from the Secretary  of State, to inform Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that  Secretary Hull "could not see that there was any basis now offered for  the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been  engaged" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). About this time, Colonel Hideo  Iwakuro and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, who had been advising Ambassador Nomura in  the conversations, left Washington and returned to Japan. On July 24  (Washington time), in a conference with the Japanese Ambassador attended  by Under Secretary Welles and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval  Operations, President Roosevelt had proposed that, if the Japanese  Government would withdraw its forces from French Indochina, he would  endeavor to obtain from the British, the Chinese, and the Netherlands  Governments, and the United States Government itself would give, a  solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a  neutralized country, provided the Japanese Government would give a  similar commitment (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 527-530). Nevertheless, the  Japanese troop movements into French Indochina had continued, and on  July 26 (Washington time) President Roosevelt had issued an Executive  order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 267). The effect of this order had been to bring about very soon  the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan (ex.  29, vol. II, p. 343).

In a message dated July 31 (Japan time), which was translated and  available in Washington on August 4 (Washington time), the new Foreign  Minister had advised Ambassador Nomura that since the Imperial  Conference on July 2 (Japan time) the Japanese Government had been  devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of the policies  there decided upon. He told the Ambassador:

"Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire

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must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep.  That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

"That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

[Discontinuous text]

"We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

"6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order  to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for  each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean  to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not  necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should  trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each  use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

"Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a  determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the  Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an  Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those  objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to  engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action. (Ex. 1, pp. 9- 10.)"

In the meantime, a reply to the American proposals of June 21 had been  transmitted on July 25 (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura in Washington  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). He had not presented it to Secretary  Hull, however, because of the change in Japanese Cabinets, because he  thought it would not be acceptable to the United States Government, and  because he had received no instructions from the new Cabinet as to how  to proceed under the circumstances (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).  Still another proposal had then been drawn up in Tokyo and this new  proposal had been presented to Secretary Hull on August 6 by Ambassador  Nomura with the statement that it was intended to be responsive to  President Roosevelt's suggestion for the neutralization of French  Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 546-550). The new Japanese proposal had  asked, either expressly or by implication, that the United States

"(1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2) suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue  furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for  the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the  Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan's assertion and exercise of  a special military position and a permanent preferential political and  economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to  procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States  and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was  committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station  Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than  Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina  for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the  menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well  as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the  southwestern Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 344)."

About this time, in Tokyo, Premier Konoye had determined to propose a  personal meeting between himself and President Roosevelt (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, p. 29). It is now known that he had presented this idea  to the Ministers of War and Navy on August 4 (Japan time). Before that  day ended, the Navy Minister had expressed complete accord and had even  anticipated the success of the proposed conference (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 30). The Minister of War, General Tojo, however, had replied  in writing as follows:

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"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the  United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which  are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the  same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created.  For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The  attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime  Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's  intention to attend such a meeting *with determination to firmly support  the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"  Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the  United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the  Empire even after this final effort is made*, the Army is not  necessarily in disagreement.

"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if after making  preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with  someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a  lesser capacity. (2) *You shall not resign your post as a result of the  meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be  prepared to assume leadership in the war against America* (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, pp. 30-31)."

On August 7 (Japan time) Premier Konoye had been instructed by Emperor  Hirohito to proceed immediately with arrangements for the meeting (ex.  173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). That day the Premier had sent a telegram to  Ambassador Nomura, which was translated and available in Washington on  August 8 (Washington time), directing him to propose such a meeting (ex. 1, pp. 12-13).

Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had met on August 8 (Washington  time), and at that meeting the Ambassador had presented the proposal for  a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. Secretary Hull  had informed the Ambassador that the new Japanese proposal of August 6  was not responsive to President Roosevelt's suggestion of July 24  (Washington time) mentioned above, and, regarding the proposal for a  meeting between the President and Premier Konoye, had said that it  remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find  means of shaping its policies along lines that would make possible an  adjustment of views between the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  550-551).

The next day, August 9 (Washington time), Secretary Hull had conferred  with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, who had inquired about the  amount of aid the United States Government would be able to give in case  the Japanese should attack Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Secretary  Hull recorded:

"I replied that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a  broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to  invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and  continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to  the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape  of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade  routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad  military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in  Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel.  I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the  problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this  Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of  resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive  situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American  naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain  at the same time. I said that in the event of further Japanese movements  south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a  conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine  more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in  the light of the statement I had just made (ex. 28, pp. 710-711).

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Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the Atlantic  Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before either of the  two last-mentioned conferences, [1] the foregoing summarizes briefly the  immediate background for that Conference so far as relations between the  United States and Japan were concerned. The Japanese move into southern  French Indochina while at the same time in Washington Ambassador Nomura  was engaging in conversations with Secretary Hull looking toward a  peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific, and the consequent  breaking off of those conversations, together with the freezing of  Japanese assets in the United States, had brought relations between the  two countries to a critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the  Japanese forces were establishing themselves, was an area of great  strategic importance. From it, those forces could strike in many  directions, toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China  Sea lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailand and  the Chinese province of Yunnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and the Burma Road, over which American supplies for China were moving. To the south,  at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the British naval base at  Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philippines lay the Netherlands East  Indies, with rubber, oil, and other materials needed by Japan for the  purposes to which the Japanese Government was committed.

When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23  (Washington time) that the conversations were at an end, he said that  the United States could only assume, first-

"that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the  United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy  of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts  on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety  in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume *that  the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon  a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in  the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that  region* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525).

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE

(August 9-14, 1941)

The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,  each accompanied by high officials of their respective Governments, took  place at sea near Argentina, Newfoundland, during the second week in  August 1941. At it the President and the Prime Minister agreed upon the  joint declaration of principles which has since become known as the  Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364).  Their conversations also dealt with  steps which Great Britain and the United States were taking for their  safety in the face of the policies of aggression of the German  Government and other governments associated with the German Government.  They discussed such matters as the proposed occupation of the Canary  Islands by the British Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy  route into the

[1] Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however, that he believed he (Welles) left Washington for the Atlantic Conference the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254).

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British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the  Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occupied  by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against Axis  aggressors (ex. 22-C).  The President and the Prime Minister also  discussed the situation in the Far East. During those discussions Mr.  Churchill submitted a proposal for parallel declarations by the United  States, British, and Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves  of military aggression. [1] This proposal also contemplated that the  Russian Government would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22).  The final discussion of Mr. Churchill's proposal occurred on August 11  (ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles' record of that  discussion

"The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements  handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

"The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the  implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that  she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their  economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval  defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including  the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of  which were particularly unacceptable (ex. 22-C)."

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, and  after expressing his strong feeling that "every effort should be made to  prevent the outbreak of war with Japan," he stated the procedure with  respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his return to  Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would inform Ambassador  Nomura that if the Japanese Government would give satisfactory  assurances that it would not further station its troops in the  Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the  Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be withdrawn,  the United States Government-would-resume the informal conversations  with the Japanese Government. He said that he would further state that  if Japan should refuse to consider this procedure and should undertake  further steps in the nature of military expansions, in his belief  various steps would have to be taken by the United States  notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures might  result in war between the United States and Japan (ex 22-C).  Mr.  Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex 22-C).

There was then discussed-

"the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a  statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the  Soviet Union (ex. 22-C)."

Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue involved  was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of conquest by force  in the entire Pacific and suggested that the statement which the  President intended to make 

"might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern  Pacific area (ex. 22 C).

[1] The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941,  just before the Lend-Lease Act described by Prime Minister Churchill as  "the Bill on which our hopes depend" was enacted by Congress, the Prime  Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon  President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull their desire for some action by  the United States "to deter the Japanese" (ex. 158).

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The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this, and "*it was decided that the step to be taken by the President* [1] would be taken  in that sense" (ex. 22-C).

Consideration was then given the question whether or not President  Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a  statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indochina and  Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ultimately made by the  President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention British policy concerning  those countries this latter proposal appears to have been dropped (ex.  29, vol. II, pp. 554-559).

Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia several days  before President Roosevelt, at the latter's request.  Upon his arrival,  he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there, and, at the  President's further request, he prepared the initial draft (ex. 22) of  the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of his final  conversation with the President before leaving Argentia (tr. 1259). A  revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles on August 16,  1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secretary and his  advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communicated to Ambassador  Nomura by the President (tr. 1272).

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION AND AT THE  SAME TIME OFFERS TO RESUME THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS

(August 17, 1941)

President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, August 17 (Washington time). Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura met with the  President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the President's  request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124). [2] Mr. Roosevelt  read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document

[1] The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or  not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the  British Government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the  United States Government.

The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the  Committee are three memoranda prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex.  22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by  President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime  Minister Churchill's proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the  President's procedure did not call for parallel action by either the  British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr.  Churchill had proposed. Nor, as is the case of Mr. Churchill's proposal,  was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being  left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise  given by the President to Mr. Churchill "was limited to the fact that a  warning would be given" (tr. 1422) and that the only agreement reached  between the President and the Prime Minister was "that the President  made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United  States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to  the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the  President on August 17" (tr. 1428).

While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by  President Roosevelt was to "take parallel action with the British  Government in warning the Japanese Government" (tr. 12354) and that he  "took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement" (i. e.  promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is  also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him  that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles  said, "the President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember,  did not make that specific statement" (tr. 1446). Moreover, as  previously noted, the Welles' memoranda neither state nor indicate that  any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and  there is no evidence before the Committee showing that action parallel  to the President's warning to Japan was ever taken by the British  Government. On the other hand both "Peace and War" {ex. 28, p. 129) and  "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941" (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 345) refer to an "agreement" to take parallel action made by  President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course,  neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the  Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee,  Secretary Hull referred to such an "agreement." Though again Secretary  Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116).

[2] This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the  discussions in this appendix of other meetings in Washington or Tokyo  between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese  Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department  records of such meetings appearing in Volumes I and II of " Foreign  Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29) and upon  intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo reporting  such meetings, the Committee exhibits in which such messages appear  being indicated-in all eases. Reference is made to such records and  reports, only the material portions of which have been quoted or  summarized here.

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drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwithstanding the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States and  Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific  and the President's suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the  "neutralization" of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had  continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far East  and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the document, President  Roosevelt said that the United States Government felt that at the  present stage "nothing short of the most complete candor on its part in  the light of the evidence and indications" in its possession would tend  to further the objectives sought. He then warned Japan against further aggression, saying:

"Such being the ease, this Government now finds it necessary to say to  the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any  further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination  by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of  the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all  steps which it may deem necessary toward safe- guarding the legitimate  rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and  toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 556-557)."

On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the sincerity of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese- American  diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government's desire to be advised  as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt  and Premier Konoye and of resuming the informal conversations which had  been terminated by the United States in July because of the Japanese  occupation of southern French Indochina. He stated, however, that he  felt no further explanations regarding his Government's actions in  French Indochina, in addition to the views already expressed to Secretary Hull, were necessary. 

The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a second document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese proposal of August  8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself and Premier Konoye and  to the Japanese desire for resumption of the informal conversations. The  President said that the United States Government would be prepared to  resume the conversations provided the Japanese Government felt that  Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist  activities, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along  the lines of the program to which the United States was committed. His  statement concluded:

"the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of  the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal  conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both  Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or  proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be  so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as  to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has  repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 559)."

In Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo on this meeting, he emphasized  the "graveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views Japanese-U. S.  relations." The Ambassador expressed the view that the Japanese proposal  for a "leaders' conference" between President Roosevelt and Premier  Konoye had "considerably eased" the attitude of the United States  Government and that there was no room for doubt "that the President  hopes that matters will take a turn for the better" (ex 124).

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The next day, August 18 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent a  message to Prime Minister Churchill describing his meeting with  Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the President did not  learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambassador's request  on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of the informal  conversations. In his message, the President told Mr. Churchill that

"I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in  the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the  proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made  to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the  statement we had discussed (ex. 70)."

The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not the  British Government took "parallel action" to the warning given Japan by  President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified before the  Committee that he took it for granted that the British Government took  such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would  probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the  State Department has advised the Committee, that its files contain no  record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480).  Furthermore, as late as  November 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message  to the President saying that "one important method remains unused in  averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain  declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further  act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest  consequences. * * * We would, of course, make a similar declaration or  share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24); and the evidence further shows  that on December 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a  draft of a proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other  hand, on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the  Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said:

"But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by  aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking  to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing  as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying  the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China.  Japanese armies have been  wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them  carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now  they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They  snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French.  They menace by their  movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and  menace the Philippine islands under the protection of the United States.

"It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to  secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with  infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will  give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We  earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say:  That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves  unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356; 4480- 4481)."

While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was broadcast  by radio, Under Secretary Welles testified that in his opinion this  address did not constitute "parallel action" of the kind proposed by Mr.  Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles'

[admin]

Exhibit D Cont'd.

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judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form  of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356). [1]

On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a message to  Congress describing the meeting at Argentina (tr. 1359-1364).  This  message embodied the text of the "Atlantic Charter" and referred in  general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made no  specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan. Under  Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to issue a  warning to Japan or of the President's warning, itself, would not have  been conducive to a successful result in attempting to find a peaceful  solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan (tr. 1277).

JAPAN PROTESTS UNITED STATES SHIPMENTS OF OIL TO RUSSIA

(August 27, 1941)

The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's request on August 17  (Washington time) for a " clearer statement than has yet been furnished  as to its present attitude and plans" was not received until August 28  (Washington time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador  Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign Office an increasing interest on  the part of President Roosevelt in participating in the resumption of  the Japanese-American negotiations and stated that, in his opinion, "the  President is the one who shows the most interest in the 'leaders  conference' " (ex. 124). About the same time the Ambassador received a  report from Tokyo concerning the Foreign Minister's talk with Ambassador  Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at which Ambassador Grew indicated that  he would give the proposed meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On  August 23 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura  that "everything in our power" was being done " to rush our reply to the  United States and at the same time to bring about the 'leaders  conference' at an earlier date" (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador  Nomura called of Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted  the "leaders conference" to take place before October 15. The reason he  gave for this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be created  that Japan " had given in in the face of the threat of 'encirclement' "  if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a reported  British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date (ex. 124;  ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568).

At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott, received intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to ship oil to  Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting vessels had  already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succession, and that  the oil would undoubtedly be used by Russia for an attack upon Japan.  General Ott repeated this information to the Vice Minister for Foreign  Affairs during an interview on August 19 (Japan time), and in reply the  Vice Minister said that the problem of American oil was receiving very  careful attention (ex. 132-A, item C). The nest day, and again on August  22 (Japan time), the Foreign

[1] There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K.  Hornbeck, Political Advisor to Secretary Hull, dated, however, February  28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941, the  British and American Governments "served on Japan a strong warning"  against further extending her courses of aggression (ex. 108).

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Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the attention  of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should become  known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron, airplanes, and  other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this might  have an adverse effect upon Japanese-American relations (ex. 1, p. 19;  ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary Hull during their  conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that the shipment of oil by  the United States to Russia through Japanese waters "would naturally  give the Japanese real concern at an early date" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.  566). A more urgent message concerning this matter was sent from Tokyo  to Ambassador Nomura on August 26 (Japan time) requesting him to "make  representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may  reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general  viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations" (ex. 1, p.  21 ) . Representations of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in  Tokyo the next day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27  (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull  against American shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters.  Secretary Hull stated that only two tankers were involved and that the  shipments were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 570).

PREMIER KONOYE SENDS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT URGING  THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"

(August 28, 1941)

Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt's statement of August 17 (Washington time) in a personal message which Ambassador Nomura handed  to the President at a conference at the White House on the morning of  August 28 (Washington time). The Premier's message was accompanied by a  statement which the Japanese Government intended to be responsive to the  President's suggestion that it would be helpful if that Government would  furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans than had  as yet been given (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572).

In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that the  meeting between himself and the President be arranged "as soon as  possible." He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations that  were terminated in July had been "quite appropriate both in spirit and  content," nevertheless

"the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion  confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet  the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may  produce unforeseen contingencies

"I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the  Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all  important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific  area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation.   Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary be left to negotiations  between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573)."

The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye's message referred, among  other things, to the-

"principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States  Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a  program for the Pacific area

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and continued

"The Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest  manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be  applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world.  Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 575)."

However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding Japan's  peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were qualified or  conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its  troops from Indochina, but only "as soon as the China incident is  settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; concerning Soviet- Japanese relations it was said that Japan would take no military action  "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese  neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese Manchukuo or take any  action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese  Government had no intention, it was said, of using, "without  provocation" military force against any neighboring nation (ex. 29, vol.  II, pp. 573-576).

Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President Roosevelt "  vas well pleased" with the Premier's message (ex. 124).  The President  had said, he cabled, "I am looking forward to having approximately three  days talk with Prince Konoye", but that Hawaii was out of the question  as a meeting place and that he would prefer Juneau, Alaska. The  Ambassador quoted the President as having "smilingly and cynically" said  during his reading of the message:

"Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I  wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those  conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during  Secretary Hull's conversations with your Excellency (ex. 124)."

The evening of the same day, August 28 (Washington time), Ambassador  Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the Secretary his ideas  concerning the arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting.  During this conversation, the Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Nomura  the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed  meeting "an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were  involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations."  The Secretary said that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in  an agreement, serious consequences from the point of view of both  Governments would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the  purpose of the proposed meeting should be "the ratification of essential  points agreed upon in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577).  Ambassador Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the  comment:

"In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is  considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in  fairly close agreement the "leaders conference" will not materialize  (ex. 124)."

GERMANY SUSPECTS TREACHERY

(August 29-30, 1941)

It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador Nomura left  the White House following his conference with President Roosevelt and  Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that

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the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President from  Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by Secretary Hull  or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the record before the  Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124); however, as a result  of the disclosure, Foreign Minister Toyoda became greatly concerned that  the proposed "leaders conference" should be kept absolutely secret,  fearing the project would fail if news of it should leak out before a  settlement was reached. The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura  twice on August 29 (Japan time) urging him "to take every precaution" to  guard against leaks (ex. 124).

This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conversations  and the proposed "leaders conference" was a major reason for calls by  the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on  Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan time) and for a call  by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time)  (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-587, 583-585). During his first  conversation with Ambassador Grew, the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at  some length on the unfortunate effects of the publicity in Washington  about Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and then  communicated to the Ambassador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda  that (1) the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay  and (2) pending the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States  postpone the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the  order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew's  memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki "under no  illusion" that the United States Government would find it possible to  agree to either of the "preposterous requests" contained in (2) above  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura's conference with Secretary  Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned largely with  discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the positions taken  by the press in Japan and the United States. The Secretary took  advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what would happen if an  agreement should not be reached at the proposed "leaders conference,"  and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be made to reach an  agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting (ex.  29, vol. II, pp. 583-585).

As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity, Ambassador Nomura wrote a  brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (Washington time) requesting  his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The Secretary  replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he would "be glad  to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the  foregoing respect, to every extent practical" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579,  586). However, apparently believing that some official comment was  needed in view of the rumors and speculation in Tokyo about Ambassador  Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt, at 2:30 p. M. On August 29  (Japan time). The Japanese Foreign Office released an official statement  that Ambassador Nomura had called on President Roosevelt on August 28  and had delivered to the President a message from Premier Konoye stating  "Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan  and the United States" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew  advised Secretary Hull of this announcement later the same afternoon  (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579).

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Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of "the exceedingly  complex domestic situation" and the consideration which had to be given  to "our relations with Germany and Italy" (ex. 124).  What the Foreign  Minister had in mind in the first connection is indicated by his cable  to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan time), in which he said:

"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial  talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the  Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25)."

In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese  documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of Premier  Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the German  Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau,  and demanded to know whether the Premier's message departed from the  policy determined at the Imperial Conference on July 2, which had been  secretly communicated to the German Government, and whether the Cabinet  was contemplating any change in that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The  Vice Minister replied that the message did not mean that there had been  "a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in  our relations with the Axis." The reason for sending the message, he  told the Ambassador, "was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific" and  to attempt "to start conversations between the two parties." Ambassador  Ott suggested that "precautions must be taken against America's scheme  to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her  advantage," to which the Vice Minister replied that "we have given the  matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan  with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon  Germany and Italy." "Our aim," he said, "is to keep her (America) from  joining in the war." The German Ambassador then requested an interview  with Foreign Minister Toyoda, which took place on the afternoon of  August 30 (Japan time). At that interview General Ott again demanded to  know whether the intentions of Japan were still as secretly communicated  to Germany on July 2. The Foreign Minister denied that there had been  any change in Japan's intentions, and stated that Japan's preparations  to avail herself of any new developments "are now making headway." The  German Ambassador said:

"In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities  thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an  attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up  taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion  might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese  government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that  it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your  Excellency's views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A, item C)."

Admiral Toyoda replied:

"In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the  same as in the past; nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item  C)."

The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported to Tokyo on October 1, 1941,  that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone in the  German Foreign Office was "thoroughly disgusted with Japan."  He said  that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in

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general toward Japan was getting bad could not be covered up, and that if Japan were to go ahead with the negotiations without consulting  Germany, "there is no telling what steps Germany may take without  consulting Japan" (ex. 1, pp. 4849).

In Italy, the impression created by the Japanese-American talks was not  enthusiastic, as the Japanese Ambassador in Rome reported to the Foreign  Office on September 30:

"Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in  the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the  Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the  newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are  concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As  for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first  anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite  Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people  (ex. 1, p. 44)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REPLIES TO PREMIER KONOYE'S MESSAGE

(September 5, 1941)

President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura his reply to Premier  Konoye at a conference at the White House on the afternoon of September  3 (Washington time) (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 588-592). The President's  reply mentioned the reference in the statement which had accompanied the  Premier's message to the basic principles to which the United States  Government had long been committed and the President's desire to  collaborate in making these principles effective in practice. The  President stated that his deep interest in this matter made it necessary  for him to observe and take account of developments both in the United  States and Japan which had a bearing on Japanese-American relations, and  that he could not avoid taking cognizance of indications

"of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely  entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful  collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure both of  us earnestly desire to follow (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."

The President then suggested:

"that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring  to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and  essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I  have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical  application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance  of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement  accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this  suggestion (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."

The President also read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement  which referred to the American proposals of June 21 (Washington time)  and to the fact that subsequent conversations bad disclosed that there  were divergences of view between the two Governments with respect to  certain fundamental questions dealt with in those proposals. Reading  from the statement, the President expressed the desire of the United  States Government "to facilitate progress toward a conclusive  discussion" and its belief 

"that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above  mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific  questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of  the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under  reference (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 591)."

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In connection with this statement, it will be remembered that the second Konoye Cabinet had resigned on July 16 (Japan time) and had been  replaced by the third Konoye Cabinet the next day (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 24).

In his memorandum of the conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary  Hull wrote:

"Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his  (i. e. Ambassador Nomura's) Government to clarify its position on the  question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three  fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered  in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the  discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into  Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 588)."

JAPAN PRESENTS NEW PROPOSALS IN A NEW FORM

(September 6, 1941)

It is now known that about the time President Roosevelt was meeting with Ambassador Nomura, new Japanese proposals were being discussed at a  Joint Conference of Japanese Foreign Office and War and Navy officials  in Tokyo. According to Premier Konoye, these new proposals were intended  by the Foreign Office to bring up only "immediate and concrete problems"  and to focus the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and the  Premier on those problems. The Foreign Office took the position that it  was difficult to predict how long it would take to consider all of the  important fundamental principles dealt with in the proposals which had  been under consideration by the two Governments before the freezing  orders, and that consequently "the present crisis might not be averted"  if it should be necessary to consider all of those principles (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, p. 37). The new proposals were approved at the Joint  Conference mentioned above and were given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign  Minister Toyoda the next day, September 4 (Japan time), with the request  that they be transmitted to Secretary Hull by the Ambassador to overcome  any possibility of inaccuracy in handling by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 593).

Ambassador Nomura presented the new proposals to Secretary Hull at a  meeting on September 6 (Washington time). He explained that although the  new proposals had been prepared by the Japanese Government before it  received President Roosevelt's reply of September 3 (Washington time),  nevertheless his Government believed that the contents of the new  proposals constituted a reply to the President.  He said that the  proposals were also in response to the view expressed by Secretary Hull  at the conference with him on the evening of August 28, namely, that it  would be desirable for the two Governments to reach an agreement in  principle on the fundamental questions involved before making  arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 606-607)

As presented to Secretary Hull the new Japanese proposals were as follows:

DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1941

The Government of Japan undertakes:

a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the    United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;

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(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not,    without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan;

(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-   defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact    by Japan shall be independently decided;

(d) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the    realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;    

(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be    carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of    nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will    cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of    natural resources in the said area which it needs;

 (g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of  normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in  connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control    regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

"The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;

(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above;

(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;

(d) that the United States will immediately (upon settlement) reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal (ex. 29, vol.   II, pp. 608-609)."

Secretary Hull testified that these new Japanese proposals-

"were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese  draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their  obligations under the Tripartite Pact.  There was a qualified  undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort  to military action against any region south of Japan.  No commitment was  offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to  China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's  territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in  China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in  wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of  nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula  contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United  States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an  equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under  which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be  conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan (tr. 1118-1119)."

On September 9 (Washington time) Secretary Hull cabled to Ambassador Grew a series of questions to be submitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda  regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government in offering certain  of the new proposals, especially those relating to China (ex. 29, vol.  II, pp. 610-613). The Foreign Minister's replies to these questions were  received by Ambassador Grew on September 13 (Japan time) and promptly  cabled to Washington (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 620-624).

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On September 15 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister Toyoda that it seemed that the matter of the preliminary  conversations had been entrusted to Secretary Hull. He said that in such  conversations the United States would want to be advised of the peace  terms Japan would propose between Japan and China and would refuse to  act as intermediary unless the terms were fair and just; therefore, he  said, it would be necessary to outline the terms in advance of the  proposed "leaders conference." He also reported that the United States  wanted to arrange matters with Britain, China, and the Netherlands in  advance of the proposed conference, so that those countries would not  get the impression the United States was trading them off (ex. 1, p.  27). Two days later, Ambassador Nomura cabled that there were  "considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. Conference" at a  recent United States Cabinet meeting and that "there is no mistaking the  fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the  preliminary arrangements can be made" (ex. 1, p. 28). On September 22  (Washington time), he cabled a long report to the Foreign Minister  concerning conditions and attitudes in the United States generally. His  report concluded with the following estimate:

"Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up  forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be  restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render  economic assistance to Japan (ex. 1, p. 31)."

In the meantime, in Tokyo at Joint Conferences on September 6 and 13  (Japan time), the Japanese Government had determined the basic peace  terms which it was prepared to offer to China (ex. 132-A, item D). A  document containing those terms (Annex C attached hereto) was handed to  Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23 (Washington time),  having been communicated by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew in  Tokyo on September 22 (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 631-633).  During this conference with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura reiterated  the desire of his Government to have the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting take  place at the earliest possible opportunity. He told the Secretary that  the several documents which he had now presented were a full expression  of everything the Japanese Government desired to say, and that anything  further pertaining to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to the  proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II,  pp. 634-635). However, on September 27 (Washington time), he delivered  to Secretary Hull a further document (Annex D attached hereto), which  had been prepared in the form, and along the lines, of the American  proposals of June 21 (Washington time) and had been approved at a Joint  Conference on September 20 (Japan time). The new document, it was said,  incorporated all that the Japanese Government had communicated to the  American Government since June 21. A similar document had been delivered  to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 636-641).

On September 27 (Japan time) ceremonies were held in Tokyo celebrating  the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. That day Foreign Minister  Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and asked the  Ambassador to convey to President Roosevelt, through Secretary Hull, the  anxiety of Premier Konoye and the entire Cabinet

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lest the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might be indefinitely  delayed, stating that all preparations had been made by the Japanese  Government. During this conference he described to Ambassador Grew in  considerable detail his Government's position regarding the  conversations (ex. 29, vol. I1, pp. 641-645). The Foreign Minister  cabled his remarks to Ambassador Nomura, saying that "in view of  internal and external circumstances in our country, we cannot keep  postponing matters forever" (ex. 1, p. 33). Ambassador Nomura  communicated the gist of the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary  Hull on September 29 (Washington time). He said that while he was well  aware of the United States Government's position and had communicated it  to Tokyo, nevertheless, his Government had instructed him to press for  an answer to the Japanese proposal. AS his personal opinion, he judged  that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the heads of  the two Governments, it might be difficult for Premier Konoye to retain  his position and that he then would be likely to be succeeded by a less  moderate leader (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 652).

AMBASSADOR GREW SUPPORTS THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"

(August-September 1941)

In Tokyo Ambassador Grew had reached the conclusion that if the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should not be held, or if it should be long  delayed, the Konoye Cabinet might fall. He had first learned of the  proposed "leaders conference" at a meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda  on August 18 (Japan time.) During the Foreign Minister's lengthy remarks concerning the proposed meeting, Ambassador Grew had commented on  Japan's progressive southward advance and the fact that, in spite of all  peaceful assurances, the United States Government in the light of the  steps Japan had taken "could only be guided by facts and actions and not  words." Notwithstanding the doubts reflected in these statements, at the  conclusion of the Foreign Minister's remarks Ambassador Grew had said  "that in the interests of peace, (he) would give the proposal (for a  meeting) his own. Personal support" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 559-564).  Ambassador Grew reported the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary  Hull the following day in a message which included the following, as  paraphrased in the State Department:

"that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will  have to the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for  Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at  his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility  of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this  Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful  consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese  history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not  crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the  approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The  good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President  Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the  Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship,  such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister  Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently  insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific (ex. 29, vol.  II, p. 565)."

A month later, in a personal letter dated September 22 (Japan time) to  President Roosevelt, which apparently did not, however, reach

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  Page 315

Washington until after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, he referred to  his conversations with Premier Konoye "who," he said

"in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements  in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's  relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for  having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now  sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to  hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of  policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has  led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business  and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in  Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her  commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present  Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than  has been the ease in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that  this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than  Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in  carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of  international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The  alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased  probability of war * * *. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can  come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree,  the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to  implement those terms." (Ex. 178.)"

A week later, on September 29 (Japan time), following his meeting with  Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27 referred to above, Ambassador  Grew cabled a long report to Secretary Hull, in which "in all deference  to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary  Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter  is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan," he stated  at length his appraisal of the existing situation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  645-650). The most significant part of this report was the following, as  paraphrased in the State Department:

"8. Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese  Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut  commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to  principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations  will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet  and its supporting elements desiring *rapprochement* with the United  States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is  hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time.  If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and  probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's  being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this  may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these  will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans,  while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a  situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war.  *The logical  outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the  formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the  disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the  United States.* There is a question that such a situation may prove to  be more serious even than the failure to produce a entirely satisfactory  agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and  Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.  648-649)."

In connection with Ambassador Grew's reference to the "viewpoint of the  American Embassy in Japan," in his testimony before the Committee he  said:

"I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to  any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even  know that they existed (tr. 1481)."

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And again:

"I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents  the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo, and we were  deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the  President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or  telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State  Department from time to time documents of a secret nature, so of course  the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more  information than we had available to us (tr. 1903-1904)."

JAPAN DETERMINES ITS MINIMUM DEMANDS AND ITS MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

(September 6, 1941)

It is now known that in the meantime, in Tokyo far-reaching decisions had been made. The "Policy of the Imperial Government" which was decided upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had provided that in carrying out a southward advance the Government would not be deterred "by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America." It had also been decided at that conference that in carrying out Japan's preparations for war with Russia and in the use of Japan's military strength against Russia in case the German-Soviet war "should  develop to our advantage,"

"all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in  such a way as to place no serious obstacles *in the path of our basic  military preparations for a war with England and America* (ex. 173,  Konoye Memoirs, pp. 70-71)."

When the Japanese advance into southern French Indochina during the  latter part of July had brought about the termination of the  conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and the  American freezing order, Premier Konoye had come forward early in August  with his proposal for a "leaders conference" between President Roosevelt  and himself. While this proposal had received the support of the  Japanese Navy, it had been supported by the Japanese Army only provided  the Premier intended

"*to carry out a war against America if the President of the United  States still failed to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire*  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31).

As tension increased in Tokyo, the Japanese Army General Staff began  advocating the immediate breaking off of negotiations with the United  States and the opening of Japanese-American hostilities, and Premier  Konoye discussed this question at innumerable conferences with the Army  and Navy Ministers during the latter part of August (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, p. 39-40).

It is now known that during those conferences there were developed  "Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government"  which set forth the manner in which the Government would proceed in  carrying out the plans "for the southern territories" decided upon at  the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time). Premier Konoye submitted  these new "Plans" to the Emperor informally on September ,5 (Japan time)  in the form of an agenda for an Imperial Conference the next day, as  follows:

"1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved  in a war with America (and England and Holland), in order to secure our  national existence, *we will proceed with war preparations so that they  be completed approximately toward the end of October*."

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"2. At the same time, *we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America and England*. Japan's  minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England),  together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the  attached document.

"3. *If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of  having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned  above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war  against America (and England and Holland).*

"Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern  territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid.  Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from  forming a united front against Japan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

According to Premier Konoye, on examining the "Plans", Emperor Hirohito  was impressed by the fact that the document seemed "to give precedence  to war over diplomatic activities." The Premier explained that the order  of business in the agenda did not indicate any differences in degree of  importance. The Emperor then summoned the Chiefs of the Army and Navy  General Staffs. When they came, he questioned them sharply concerning  the probable length of hostilities in the event of a Japanese-American  conflict, and then asked whether it was not true that both of them "were  for giving precedence to diplomacy." Both answered in the affirmative  (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs pp. 40-41).

At the Imperial Conference the next day, September 6 (Japan time) the "Plans" were decided upon and approved (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 40).  However, at the Conference first the President of the Privy Council and  then Emperor Hirohito asked for a clarification of the views of the  Government as to whether the emphasis was not being placed by the  Government upon war rather than diplomacy. When none of the Supreme  Command replied, and only the Navy Minister representing the Government,  the Emperor is reported to have rebuked the Supreme Command by  indicating that he was striving for international peace. After this the  Chief of the Navy General Staff assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of  the Supreme Command were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and  "advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way  out."  According to Premier Konoye, the Conference adjourned "in an  atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 41).

Japan's "minimum demands" in the negotiations with America and England,  as approved at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time), were  as follows, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs:

"1. America and England would be required to agree not to intervene in, or obstruct, the settlement by Japan of the "China Incident", to close  the Burma Road, and to cease all aid of any kind to China.

"2. America and England would be required to agree to take no action in  the Far East which offered a threat to the Japanese Empire, and not to  establish military bases in Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies,  China, or Far Eastern Soviet Russia or increase their existing Far  Eastern military forces over their present strength. In this connection  Japan would not consider any demands 'for the liquidation of Japan's  special relations with French Indo-China'."

"3. America and England would be required to agree to cooperate with  Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials; to restore trade  relations with Japan and "furnish her with the

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"raw materials she needs" from British and American territories in the  Southwest Pacific; and to assist Japan in establishing close economic  relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies (ex. 173, Konoye  Memoirs, appendix V, pp. 77-78)."

The "maximum concessions" Japan was prepared to make in return for agreement to her "minimum demands" were as follows:

"1. Japan would not use French Indochina as a base for operations  against any neighboring countries 'with the exception of China'.

"2. Japan would be prepared to withdraw her troops from French Indochina 'as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East'."

"3. Japan would be prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the  Philippine Islands (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, p. 78). In  other words in an effort to take all possible advantage of the world  situation, the Japanese Government (determined at the Imperial  Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that the least Japan would accept  from America and England in return for the withdrawal of her troops from  French Indochina would be the agreement of America and England to cease  all aid to China, to accept a military and naval status in the Far East  inferior to Japan, and to furnish all possible material aid to Japan.  Furthermore, Japan did not intend to perform her part of the "bargain"  until after "a just peace" had been established in the Far East. From  the Japanese standpoint, this latter qualification meant after the  settlement of the "China Incident" by Japan on her own terms. The  substance of these "minimum demands" was contained in the ultimatum  which the Japanese Government later delivered to the United States on  November 20 (Washington time).

The evening of the same day, September 6 (Japan time), Premier Konoye,  with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese Ministers of War, Navy,  and Foreign Affairs met with Ambassador Grew at a private house under  conditions of extraordinary secrecy. In his notes of the meeting,  Ambassador Grew wrote that the Premier had requested that his statements  be transmitted personally to President Roosevelt in the belief that they  might amplify and clarify the approach which he had made through  Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Grew noted that the Premier and,  consequently, the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly  agreed with the four principles put forward by Secretary Hull as a basis  for the rehabilitation of Japanese-American relations. [1] In his  memoirs, however, Prince Konoye stated that when at this meeting  Ambassador Grew asked for his views regarding Secretary Hull's four  principles he said "that they were splendid as principles but when it  came down to actual application a variety of problems arose" and that it  was in order to solve those very problems that he deemed it necessary to  hold the meeting with President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p.  42). Ambassador Grew noted that Premier Konoye had strongly urged that  no better opportunity for the improvement of Japanese-American relations would be presented, and that the Premier had

[1] In a memorandum dated October 7 (Japan time) recording a conference  which he had on that date with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador  Grew noted that the Foreign Minister told him that Ambassador Nomura had  been instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the statement in the  United States memorandum of October 2 (Washington time) (*see infra*)  that Premier Konoye "fully subscribed" to the four principles should be  modified to indicate that the Premier subscribed "in principle" (ex. 29,  vol. II, p. 664).

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said that he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army  and Navy, who were already choosing their delegates to the proposed  conference. Premier Konoye had said, he noted, that he could control any  opposition from within the Government, and that he was determined to  spare no effort, despite all elements and factors opposing him to crown  his present endeavors with success. The Ambassador wrote that during the  conversation he had outlined in general terms

"the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the  failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by  former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently in all sincerity"

and had stated that, as the result

"the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese  promises or assurances."

He noted that Premier Konoye had expressed the earnest hope that in view  of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with  the President could be arranged "with the least possible delay" (ex. 29,  vol. II, pp. 604-606).

THE UNITED STATES ASKS JAPAN TO CLARIFY ITS NEW PROPOSALS

(October 2, 1941)

Thus, as September ended the Japanese Government, on the one hand, was  vigorously asserting the urgent and pressing need to go forward with the  proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting at the earliest possible moment. It is  now known that this desire for haste reflected the decision of the  Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that

"*If by the early part of October* there is no reasonable hope of having  our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will  immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and  England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

On the other hand, the United States Government, knowing nothing of  these plans but nonetheless skeptical of Japan's peaceful intentions,  was insisting that before the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should  take place the two Governments should preliminary agree upon the  fundamental matters under consideration when the conversations were  broken off in July after the Japanese military occupation of southern  French Indochina. This latter position had been taken in the reply to  Premier Konoye which President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura on  September 3, and had been repeated many times by Secretary Hull in his  subsequent conversations with the Ambassador.

The Committee has obtained from the files of President Roosevelt a  memorandum in Secretary Hull's handwriting, on White House stationery,  apparently written by the Secretary for the President before the latter  left Washington for Hyde Park about September 25 (Washington time) (ex.  179; ex. 1, p. 40). This memorandum summarized Secretary Hull's views at the time:

"My suggestion on Jap situation for you to read later*." 

"C.H.

"When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you, he indicated a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as  getting troops out of China, Tripartite Pact, nondiscrimination in trade  in Pacific."

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"We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in  principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success  of the conference.

"Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic  questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau.

"My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first  sought the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position *now*,  and earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal  attitude so we can start discussions again on agreement in principle  before the meeting, and reemphasizing your desire for a meeting (ex.  179). [Italics in original.]"

President Roosevelt sent his comments to Secretary Hull from Hyde Park in the following memorandum dated September 28 (Washington time):

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

"I wholly agree with your penciled note to recite the more liberal  original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting,  point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot  go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement  in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.

"F. D. R.

"(Ex. 179.)"

On October 2 (Washington time), Secretary Hull handed to Ambassador Nomura the United States' reply to the Japanese Government's proposals  of September 6 and its subsequent statements of September 23 (Annex c)  and September 27 (Annex D). This reply briefly reviewed the course of  the conversations thus far, pointing out that developments from early  August up to September 6 had seemed to justify the United States  Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected  to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive  program covering the entire Pacific area. The reply continued:

"It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the  United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by  the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese  Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for  discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two  Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent  explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of  this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the  principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had  been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese  Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting  into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and  maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area (ex. 29,  vol. II, pp. 658-659)."

It was then noted that the Japanese assurances of peaceful intent  continued to be qualified by phrases the need for which was not readily  apparent; that in the economic sphere the new proposals were restricted  to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area, rather than the entire  Pacific area, as before; and that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's  intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and  French Indochina would be most helpful in making known Japan's peaceful  intentions, as would additional clarification of the Japanese  Government's position with respect to the European war. The reply continued by stating that from what the Japanese Government had so far  indicated in regard to its purposes, the United States Government had  derived the impression that Japan had in mind a program by which the  liberal and progressive principles adhered to by the United States would  be circumscribed in their application by qualifications and exceptions.  The Japanese Government was