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[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, 25 November 1944
[1] 25 Nov 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.
You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.
Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:
No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.
Board's Conclusions in General:
The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.
It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions later.
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[2] Board's Conclusion As to General Short:
Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars:
"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.
"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.
"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.
"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300.)"
Short's Defenses:
General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked: it is a question of the validity of his defenses.
Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 395.)
He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297, 4442.)
[3] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr. Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) His failure to provide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong." (Tr. Short 4440.)
Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron 238: King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151- 152; Powell 3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381.)
Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and
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the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 12 p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54- 7.)
These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his training program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible air attack.
Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427.)
The Board in its conclusion stated:
"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. (Rep. 300.)"
[4] General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:
"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a *surprise attack* upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor, (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied.)"
Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned
* * *."
The letter proceeded:
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. (Roberts Report, p. 5.)"
The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5.) Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing [sic] Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369.)
On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter containing the following statement:
"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us *during the first six hours of known hostilities*, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a *surprise raid by Air* and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat
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in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. (Tr., Marshall 17) (Italics supplied.)"
On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from *air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of *first priority*. (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied.)"
[5] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation at length and stating:
"The most serious situation with reference to an *air attack* is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack. (Tr., Marshall 21.) (Italics supplied.)"
Short further stated:
"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. (Tr. Marshall 24.)"
On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:
"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the *anti- aircraft* defense. (Tr., Marshall 27.) (Italics supplied.)"
General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job. (Tr., Marshall 27.)
On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055.)
Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5. 64.) (Italics supplied.)
[6] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such
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data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293.)
On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grace [sic] situation, that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. The radio concluded:
"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan. (Tr. Short 279.)"
Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278.)
Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055.)
On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers
"* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. (Tr. 3688.)"
[7] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:
"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent. (Tr., Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264.)"
Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694.)
On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that
"* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. [Tr., Bratton D. 289-291.)"
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Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that
" * * * From all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring. (Tr., Bicknell 1439- 1440.)"
Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer Of the Pacific Fleet, testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 Of the Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the vicinity Of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041.)
[8] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that
"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch. (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 1503-C.)"
This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.) Short said, "I do not think I ever got that message. * * * I might have I seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414.)
On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:
"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (Tr., Gerow 4259.)"
The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:
"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile [9] Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281)"
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This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G- 2 as follows:
"Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears at the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that hostilities may begin*. (Tr., Gerow 4260.) (Italics supplied.)"
The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy Department, reading as follows:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spenavo informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. (Tr., Gerow 4262.)"
Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469.)
"The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176. ) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422.) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Short 294-296.)"
[10] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8.) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770.) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short's G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414.) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513.) There were two Navy messages on December 1941, the first on information copy to Kimmel of advice to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187.) Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514.)
In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broadcasts from Tokyo "that you must obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton
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B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.)
On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A- based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510.) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.
[11] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military significance" as a Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.)
Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of "air surprise."' (Tr., Short 387-388.) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:
"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would he delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start * * *."
General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.)
General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929),
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testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 941. (Tr., DeLany 1727.)
General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance * * *." (Tr., Short 4442.)
[12] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages.
Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294.) As Short testified:
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short 437.)"
Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during he attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471.)
Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453.)
The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300.)
Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows:
"[13] * * * This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * * (Tr., Short 280 281.)"
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Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within *and from without*.
Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:
"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.)"
As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962). Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."
He testified:
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was to little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., Short 437.)"
When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:
"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy knowing what information they had and what they were doing.
"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?
"[14] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380)"
Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the war Department. * * * (Tr. Gerow 4262)"
The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)
On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (I) of the Plan which
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provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr. Kimmel 1745)
Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377- 380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)
General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:
"* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)"
[15] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that
"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)"
Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:
"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)"
It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his reexamination of his decision.
Reconnaissance: Means Available:
Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469- 70) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft
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for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470)
[16] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)
According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and *could run reconnaissance of a sort*, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated:
"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu. Around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)"
How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:
"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told*. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel 1739; Tr. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)"
Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)
According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance,
"flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872)
"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)"
Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324,374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been
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needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598,1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A- 20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says,
"* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr. Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)"
General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress.
Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the umber of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications.
I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):
"[18] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu, to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7 1941 no distant reconnaissances were conducted except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and in connection with such operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched however constituted but small areas of the total are of 360' and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.
"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded measure of security against a surprise air attack.
"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance if any, being conducted by the Navy."
Information Not Received by Short; In General;
Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.
It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside
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from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed.
[19] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G- 2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr. Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242- 243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)