Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: "Prevent the Re-Emergence of

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Re: Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: "Prevent the Re-Emergence

Postby admin » Mon Mar 21, 2016 8:51 am

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0845, 29 Feb 92

Revised Draft for Scooter Libby

Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (U)

This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of. the internal as well as well as the external Soviet empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in US global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a US-led system of collective security and the creation of a prosperous and democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. We are in a position to provide for our security with far fewer forces and considerably less resources than required in the past. The challenge is to adapt and reduce our forces consistent with this much more favorable security environment and, further, to continue shaping the developing environment in a way that we need not return to the more costly, albeit necessary, policies of the past. The choices we make in this new situation will set the nation's direction into the next century.

I. Objectives and Goals (U)

A. Enduring National Objectives (U)

(U) Despite current uncertainties, our fundamental objectives endure. The central objective of US defense policy is to preserve the freedom of the United States, while avoiding war if possible. Helping other countries preserve or obtain freedom and peace is in part a means to this objective, and in part an end in itself. The extent of our assistance to others is partly specified by our alliance commitments, and partly a matter of prudent response to circumstances; but neither our principles nor our abilities permit us to defend our interests alone. To achieve these broad objectives, we seek:

• (U) to deter military attack against the United States, its allies, and other important countries; and to ensure the defeat of such attack should deterrence fail.

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• (U) to increase US influence around the world, to further an atmosphere conducive to democratic progress, and to protect free commerce and ensure US access to world markets, associated critical resources, the oceans, and space.

• (U) to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

• (C) to retard the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

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B. Defense Strategy Goals (U)

(U) These objectives can be translated into two broad strategy goals that lend further clarity to our overall defense requirements.

(S) Our first goal is to avoid the reemergence of a new rival posing a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This dominant consideration underlies the new regional defense strategy and requires us to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources could, under consolidated control, generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, Northeast Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. We focus attention on these regions because they represent the principal sources of global power which could challenge US interests and security, but we remain aware that there are other regions where US military power could be required.

(S) The second goal is to address sources of regional instability in ways that promote international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic government and open economic systems. These objectives are especially important in deterring conflict in regions important to US security because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations. While we cannot assume responsibility for righting every wrong, we must be able to address selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies.

III. The Regional Defense Strategy (U)

A. Defense Strategy Aims (U)

1. Shaping the Future Security Environment (U)

(U) The new regional defense strategy is designed not simply to react to reductions in the Soviet threat, but to help shape the future security environment. With the passing of the traditional Cold War threat -- a global war beginning on short notice in Europe -- we have identified some missions and forces no longer needed. But shaping our future security environment means more than simply accounting for such changes in anticipated threats. World events repeatedly defy even near term predictions; our ability to predict events over longer periods is even less precise. History is replete with instances of major, unanticipated strategic shifts over multi-year time frames, which sophisticated modern forces take many years to build. A proper appreciation for uncertainty is critical for a strategy that builds forces today for crises 5, 10, or 20 years away. We can help shape our future environment, and hedge against both anticipated threats and uncertainty, safely, and relatively cheaply compared to the past.

(U) The regional defense strategy seeks to help, shape the future. The containment strategy we pursued for the past 40 years successfully shaped the world we see today. Our willingness to match the build-up in Soviet military power during the Cold War and our deployment of forces forward in Europe and the Pacific that allowed democracy to develop and flourish in those areas contributed to the very substantial peaceful changes that we see occurring today in the world.

(U) Future peace and stability will continue to depend in large measure upon our willingness to maintain forward presence and to retain high-quality forces that enable response to crises that threaten our interests. The future may also come to depend on others' perceptions of our will and capability to reconstitute forces and to deter or defend against strategic attack, should that prove necessary. Maintaining that posture will be absolutely crucial in heading off future crises and dissuading future aggressors from challenging our vital interests. The regional strategy has already shaped our future for the better. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf kept a critical region from hostile control, strengthened our ties with moderate states, and preserved world access to a critical region.

2. Strategic Depth (U)

(U) Our successes have pushed back in several ways the threats we may face. The threats have become remote, so remote they are difficult to discern. The regional defense strategy seeks to maintain that situation.

(U) During the Cold War our position was lacking strategic depth. With only a week or two of warning, we faced the prospect of a Warsaw Pact offensive that could in short order subjugate Europe and push us to the brink of nuclear war. Now the democratic liberation of Eastern Europe, the passing of the Soviet Union, the creation of independent states in Russia and Ukraine, and the ascendency of democratic forces in the Commonwealth have both reversed the basis of a massive offensive threat to the West, and opened the way to a whole new strategic relationship in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

(U) Today we have no global challenger, except with respect to strategic nuclear forces. No country is our match in conventional military technology or the ability to apply it. There are no significant alliances hostile to our interests. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world are our friends. No region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile non-democratic domination. Near-term threats in these regions are small relative to our capabilities and those of our allies. We have great depth for our strategic position. The threats to our security have become more distant, not only physically but in time as well. A challenger to our security would have to overcome our formidable alliances and their qualitative advantages. The events of the last three years have provided America with strategic depth in which to defend our national interests that we have lacked for decades.

(U) The regional defense strategy is designed to take advantage of this position and preserve capabilities necessary to keep threats small. Our tools include political and economic steps, as well as security efforts to prevent the emergence of a non-democratic aggressor in critical regions. On the security side, through forward presence, sustained crisis response capabilities, and a continued technological edge, we can help to preclude potential aggressors from beginning regional arms races, raising regional tensions, or gaining a dangerous foothold toward hostile, regional domination. We can maintain the alliances and military capabilities necessary to our regional strategy. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to capitalize on a vacuum and presented a regional challenge again, or if a new antagonistic superpower or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we have won through 40 years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure it or those that would be required if we lost it.

3. Maintaining Alliances and Coalitions (U)

(U) Maintaining our alliances will continue to be an essential part of the regional defense strategy. The US will maintain and nurture its alliance commitments in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. Unlike the Cold War, however, the US will play a qualitatively new role -- that of leader and galvanizer of the world community, but not always greatest contributor of manpower, materiel, or financial resources. As alliance partners acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the US will be able to reduce its military commitments overseas without incurring significant risks. These changes, however, must be managed carefully to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of US commitment.

(S) Coalitions hold considerable promise for promoting collective action to regional or local aggression, as in the Gulf War. Like that coalition, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the US will be an important factor in assembling coalitions and stabilizing crisis situations. American leadership in security issues will be a key element in fostering a democratic and peaceful international security system.

(C) We should recognize that leadership, in some cases, will be taken by others, such as international or regional organizations, and we must accept and encourage this. Nevertheless, the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response. This requirement will affect the type and level of presence we maintain in key areas of the world.

4. Defense Strategy Foundations (U)

1. Technological Superiority (U)

(U) Technological superiority was critical to our success in the Gulf War. A primary goal of our strategy is to maintain that superiority in key areas in the face of reductions in force structure and the current defense industrial base, and in a global environment of technological proliferation.

(U) US forces must continue to be at least a generation ahead in those technologies which will be decisive on future battlefields. Future generations must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in Desert Storm. To provide such high quality forces for tomorrow, we must, in the first instance, maintain a robust research and development program. Our investment in innovation must reach and be sustained at levels necessary to assure that US-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

(U) Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. The best technology in the world cannot alone win battles. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must create incentives and eliminate disincentives for the defense industry to invest in new processes, facilities and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

(U) To make certain the best technology is available to meet the demands of our defense strategy, we must build on our comparative advantages in stealth, space-based systems, sensors, precision weapons and advanced training and C3I technologies.

2. Quality Personnel (U)

(U) The Gulf War demonstrated that the quality of our military personnel is the key factor in success in war. The success of the Base Force concept will depend on our ability to attract and retain the best qualified personnel through an appropriate incentive structure as we transition to lower force levels. The US military will attain the Base Force force structure by FY 1995. In the subsequent years, we will seek to preserve the quality of our force at a level 25 percent lower than in FY 1990 in what may be an austere budgetary environment. Continued efforts will be required to terminate unneeded programs; close, coordinate or realign military bases; streamline our defense infrastructure and procedures; and maintain a proper balance between active and reserve forces.

3. Core Competencies (U)

(U) Core competencies are the leadership, doctrine, and skills needed to retain mastery of critical warfare capabilities. Retaining the lead in core military competencies will be a high defense priority for the FY 1994-1999 period.

4. Robust Alliances (U)

(U) The Cold War and the Gulf War illustrate the array of security challenges that can best be met with the help of an extensive system of security arrangements. In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. We have built longstanding alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented "zone of peace" encompassing more than two-thirds of the world's economy. The continued vitality of NATO and our alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, and others will remain a foundation of our security. The creation of an ad hoc coalition in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield illustrates the use of our unique ability to unite others in response to aggression. This will be critical to future responses. In the long run, preserving and expanding on these security arrangements will be just as important as either the successful containment of the Soviet union or our defeat of Iraq. Alliances and security arrangements take many years to establish and, if lost, could take a generation or more to recover.

B. Defense Strategy Elements (U)

(U) The regional defense' strategy requires an effective strategic deterrent capability, including strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses. It necessitates a capable forward presence of air, ground, and naval forces, although reduced significantly from earlier levels and changed in many instances to reflect basing arrangements and reasonable expectations concerning force availability. Further, the strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with modern, highly capable forces. It requires also that we remain mindful of future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute additional forces, if necessary.

1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense (U)

(S, NF) Deterring nuclear attack remains the highest defense priority of the nation, even though the threat of strategic attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the political collapse of the Soviet Union. Strategic nuclear forces are essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that Russia will retain even under a modified START regime and implementation of the nuclear initiatives announced by then President Gorbachev in the fall of 1991 and President Yeltsin in January 1992. Our nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of a revitalized or unforeseen global threat, while at the same time helping to deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction through the threat of retaliation.

(C) Positive changes in our relationship with the Commonwealth states and the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe have all but eliminated the danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. At the same time, the threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and an accidental or unauthorized missile launch resulting from political turmoil has grown considerably. The result is that the United States, our forces, and our allies and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic missiles.

(U) The Gulf War raised the specter of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation and their delivery by missiles from hostile and irresponsible states like Iraq. A secure retaliatory capability should deter their use by a rational enemy but does not protect against accidental, miscalculated or irrational use. The President called upon Russian leaders in his September speech to join in taking "immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited missile strikes -- whatever their source."

(U) Defensive forces will provide active defense of population centers and military targets against ballistic missile strikes. A global missile defense capability will help to ensure that neither the United States nor any future coalition partners is deterred by missile threats if it is necessary to employ military force in support of US interests. Limited deployment of defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses would undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles. In addition, defenses offer an alternative means of responding to ballistic missile attacks.

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(U) In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of offensive forces while creating the proper balance between offense and defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction from any source. For now this requires retaining the readiness of our remaining nuclear deterrent forces. In addition, we must complete the offensive modernization and upgrades for the forces we have retained. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of an appropriately sized GPALS system.

2. Forward Presence (U)

(U) The regional defense strategy emphasizes the criticality of maintaining US presence abroad, albeit at reduced levels. This is another enduring, though newly refined principle of US security policy. In the new strategy forward presence provides a key basis for sizing active forces.

(U) US forward presence forces send an unmistakable signal to allies and adversaries alike of our enduring commitment to a region. They help prevent the emergence of dangerous vacuums that have potential to incite historical regional antagonisms or suspicions and which fuel arms races and proliferation or tempt would-be regional and local aggressors to seek gains through the use of force -- especially in this era of fragile and changing regional balances. Forward presence is critical to maintaining a strong network of security relationships, to helping shape the future strategic environment in ways favorable to our interests, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats. It supports our aim of continuing to play a leadership role in international events.

(U) Forward forces also provide a capability for initial rapid response to regional and local crises or contingencies that may arise with little or no warning. Indeed, our forward forces should increasingly be capable of fulfilling multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than deterring in a more limited sense by being trained and prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Special operations forces can help resolve conflict peacefully or deal effectively with selected low-intensity and terrorist threats. They are invaluable economy of force instruments of forward presence.

(C) Forward basing, of necessity, must become more flexible to accommodate changing regional configurations and to allow for a more dynamic character in our alliance relationships. This is true for our withdrawal from the Philippines, but it will be true elsewhere as well, including Panama. Basing and access arrangements will evolve along with our regional commitments, but must remain oriented on providing visible, though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for responding to crises, large and small.

(C) Europe is experiencing fundamental transformation, In security terms, the changes there allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels, while at the same time retaining an effective theater nuclear component. In this new environment, a substantial American presence in Europe will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly some states of the former Soviet Union seek to be integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. It provides options for selected action should future leaders decide it to be in our interest. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as those countries seek a new identity through integration and possibly the emergence of a common foreign and security policy.

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(C, NF) In East Asia and the Pacific, the peace we have helped to secure for our allies has facilitated long-term economic growth and now enables our allies to undertake a greater share of the regional security burden.

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(U) In the Persian Gulf region, as an aftermath of the Gulf War, our traditional maritime presence is enhanced through arrangements for quicker return of land-based air and ground forces. We will focus on more prepositioning of munitions and materiel in-theater through additional maritime prepositioned forces or POMCUS provided by friendly states; increased ABM defenses; and improved in-theater command, control, and communications. Longer-term US presence in the region will depend upon a host of factors, including the evolving regional balance and the prospects for a lasting Middle East accord.

(U) In other regions, as the need for our military presence continues or as we see that some new or additional form of presence might further stability, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits of air, ground, naval, and SOF forces, training missions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning, and security and humanitarian assistance. These more subtle forward presence operations most tangibly reflect the type of commitment we can expect in a dynamic global environment. This implies a more mobile and focused role for our presence forces rather than an appreciable increase in the overall level of activity.

(U) Reductions in forward presence involve risks, and precipitous actions may produce unanticipated and highly costly results from which it is very difficult to recover. The potential for increased risks can take several forms, not all necessarily related to decreases in our presence, but they can be exacerbated by lack of attention in this area. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

3. Crisis Response (U)

(C) The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of our the regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges.

(S) One trait most crises share is that they have potential to develop on very short notice. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or no notice, a role best suited to the Active Component. Over time we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency with combat and most support forces drawn wholly from the Active Component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Reserve Component forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the US capability to respond to another contingency.

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Mobility forces must be capable of accomplishing a major force deployment within current planning parameters.

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4 . Reconstitution (U)

(U) With the demise of the Cold War global threat, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant -- so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision.

(C) Because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need arise. The new strategy therefore prudently accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat, in order to refocus resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the long-term foundations of our strategic posture.

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(S, NF) Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new antagonistic superpower or some emergent alliance of hostile regional hegemons. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy must refocus on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of any potentially hostile entity that could pursue regional or global domination in competition with the US and our allies.

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D. Challenges and Opportunities (U)

(S) With the demise of the Soviet global military challenge, military threats in regions critical to US security will be our primary concern. These regions include Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important interests at stake in the Middle East, Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

(U) To appreciate the applicability and relevance of our strategy to specific regional situations requires a more detailed analysis of the linkages and cross-currents within and among various regions. This also requires a more complete discussion of how the regional defense strategy will accomplish its dual mission of both protecting US national interests and concurrently sustaining our commitment to stability and order.

1. Former Soviet Onion (U)

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by significantly greater cooperation. It already has reduced significantly our defense requirements. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to support the efforts of its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome. At the same time, we must hedge against the possibility that democracy could fail. Our challenge is to construct the security hedges against democratic failure in such a way that we do not preclude future cooperation with a democratic Russia or increase the likelihood of failure.

(S) For the immediate future, key US concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries.

(S) Our goal is to ensure the completion of Soviet/Russian troop withdrawals from Germany and Poland. We should also encourage Moscow to undertake significant unilateral force reductions beyond those already negotiated.

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(S) Outside Europe, the former Soviet threat in Southwest and Southeast Asia has been significantly reduced by the Soviet/Russian withdrawals from these areas and the impending end of military and economic assistance to former clients. The announced withdrawal of Soviet military elements from Cuba is another important step.

(S) Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the Soviet Union's successor state does not threaten US and Western interests is democratization and economic reform.

2. East/Central Europe (U)

The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have eliminated the large-scale military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia is creating a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe. However, the US must keep in mind the long history of conflict in Eastern European, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union.

(S) The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. The liberation of Eastern Europe -- the gateway to Western Europe -- provides strategic depth to Western Europe and significantly reduces our most urgent defense requirements in this region.

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3. Western Europe (U)

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4. East Asia/Pacific (U)

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(S) We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode US naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture.

5. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)

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We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

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(S) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten US friends or upset the regional balance of power.

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(S) The presence of drug production and trafficking in Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will support the efforts of US counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

6. I.atin America and the Caribbean (U)

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of US security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition. the US must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit narcotics, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

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(S) The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to foster stability. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet US responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

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(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a national security priority of the Department of Defense. Our programs must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the US. In particular, we should assist Peru in its efforts to overcome a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. Our programs must provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the US, and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.

7. Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

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III. Programming for the Base Force

A. Introduction

1. (U) Purpose. This section constitutes definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense for formulation of the FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda, to be used in conjunction with the Fiscal Guidance published by the Secretary on 14 February 1992.

2. (C) Overall Program Priorities. To support national objectives and strategy while making the profound programmatic adjustments appropriate to the current strategic and fiscal environment, the Department must maintain effective strategic deterrence; continue adequate though reduced levels of forward presence; provide robust capabilities for regional crisis response; and provide reconstitution capabilities to forestall or counter any future global challenger. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic forces, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most areas of the force, so we must give priority to retaining adequate levels of force structure. It is imperative, however, that we maintain this force at levels of readiness (training, manning, and equipping) adequate for deterrence and timely crisis response. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of crisis response operations is also of great importance. For modernization, a profound slowing in the Soviet modernization that long drove programs enables a new acquisition strategy, focussed on selected research and advanced development to keep our qualitative edge in systems and doctrine, with greatly reduced emphasis on procurement.

B. Strategic Forces

1. (S) Offensive Forces. Program for base force levels as follows. This force will provide sufficient capability to support U.S. deterrent strategy, assuming CIS forces are reduced to START levels, the strategic environment continues to improve, and our modernization goals are attained. With partial downloading of the Minuteman ICBMs, this force will conform with the START treaty. (Bomber figures are total aircraft inventory.)

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2. (S) Defenses. Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against ...

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Re: Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: "Prevent the Re-Emergence

Postby admin » Tue Mar 22, 2016 2:59 am

Memo Re Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999
from National Security Council (Don) to Larry
4/23/92

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/23

Larry --

NSC staff edits at paperclips. While some may appear as editorial, they are "conforming language" with some Presidential speeches planned for the next two months. The Middle East comments are burning issues. Thanks for the opportunity.

Don [illegible]

cc:
PP (Zal/Wade)
R&P (Dale/Dave)
Larry
Carol
SL (orig)

SECRET/NOFORN DRAFT

Defense Planning: Guidance. FY 1994-1999 (U)

(U) This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union -- the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two great successes, there has been a less visible one, the integration of the leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices ate therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. The policies that we adopt in this new situation will set the nation's direction for the next century. Guided by a fundamentally new defense strategy, we have today a compelling opportunity to meet our defense needs at lower cost. As we do so, we must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS ( U )

(U) The national security interests of the United States are enduring, as outlined in the President's 1991 National Security Strategy Report: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and-growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

(U) These national security interests can be translated into four mutually supportive strategic goals that guide our overall defense efforts:

• Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source, against the United States, its citizens and forces, and to honor our historic and treaty commitments.

• The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, avoids the renationalization of security policies, and provides security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary to deal with them is a key feature of our regional defense strategy.

• The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies. These regions include Europe, East Asia, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Consolidated, nondemocratic control of the resources of such a critical region could generate a significant threat to our security.

• The fourth goal is to reduce sources of regional instability and limit violence should conflict occur, by encouraging the spread and consolidation of democratic government and open economic systems, and discouraging the spread of destructive technology, particularly of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, we must encourage other nations to respect the rule of law and each other's economic, social, ethnic, and political interests.

(U) To reach these goals, the United States must show the leadership necessary to encourage sustained cooperation among major democratic powers. The alternative would be to leave our critical interests and the security of our friends dependent upon individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive, or ineffective. We must also encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new republics of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic political systems and free markets so they too can join the democratic "zone of peace."

(U) A collective response will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different from our own. Where our allies interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we must maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests. Such capabilities are essential to our ability to lead, and should international support prove sluggish or inadequate, to act independently, as necessary, to protect our critical interests. Moreover, history suggests that effective international, multilateral action is most likely to come about as a response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.

(U) We cannot lead if we fail to maintain the high quality of our forces as we reduce and restructure them. As a nation we have never before succeeded in pacing reductions without endangering our interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but at a pace that avoids breaking the force or sending misleading signals about our intentions to friends or potential aggressors. An effective reconstitution capability is important as well, since it signals that no potential rival could quickly or easily gain a predominant military position.

(U) At the end of World War I, and again to a lesser extent at the end of World War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order achieved through extraordinary American sacrifice could be sustained without our leadership and significant American forces. Today, a great challenge has passed; but other threats endure, and new ones will arise. If we reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common efforts to meet future challenges and to shape the future environment in ways that will give us greater security at lower cost.

II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (U)

A. Regional Focus (U)

(U) The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We can shift our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to a focus on the less demanding regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future. In this way, we can work to shape the future environment and to preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also work to preclude the emergence of a hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one the Soviet Union presented in the past. In so doing we can provide the underpinnings of a peaceful international order in which nations are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.

(U) In this more secure international environment there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements. But the world remains unpredictable and well-armed, causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We must not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave a vacuum in a region critical to our interests. Such a vacuum could make countries there feel vulnerable, which in turn can lead to excessive military capabilities and an unsteady balance of one against another. If we do stand back it will be much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation for which we hope.

B. Underlying Strategic Concepts (U)

(U) The Department of Defense does not decide when our nation will commit force. However, decisions today about the size and characteristics of the forces we are building for tomorrow can influence whether threats to our interests emerge and, if they do emerge, whether we are able to decisively defeat them. Four concepts illustrate this relationship.

(U) Planning for Uncertainty. An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict becomes even worse as the time frame becomes longer.

(U) Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a short-term planning horizon. The military capabilities that we have today and the ones we will have for the next few years are largely the product of decisions made a decade ago. Much of the capability that we are eliminating now cannot be restored quickly, and cuts that are precipitous will do long-lasting damage even to the capabilities that remain. Thus, even if we had great confidence in our projections of the security environment for the next two or three years, we should not base defense planning on such a relatively short time horizon.

(U) We are building defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain, given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future President with the capabilities five, ten or fifteen years from now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot be defined with precision today.

(U) Shaping the Future Security Environment. America cannot base its future security merely on a shaky record of prediction or even a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks as well to help shape the future. Our strategy is designed to anticipate and to encourage trends that advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is not simply within our means; it is critical to our future security.

(U) The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. By our refusal to be intimidated by Soviet military power, we and our allies molded a world in which Communism was forced to confront its contradictions. Even as we and our allies carried the defense burden required in the Cold War, democracy was able to develop and flourish.

(U) One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result. If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including republics of the former Soviet Onion, particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty years of effort. Our goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the defense community of democratic nations, so that they can become a force for peace not only in Europe but also in other critical regions of the world.

(U) Cooperative defense arrangements enhance security, while reducing the defense burden for everyone. In the absence of effective defense cooperation, regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to bring critical regions under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might eventually force the U.S. at much higher cost to protect its interests and counter the potential development of a new global threat.

(U) Maintaining highly capable forces is critical to sustaining the U.S. leadership with which we can shape the future. Such leadership supports collective defense arrangements and precludes hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that we will use our significant military power only as a force for peaceful democratic progress.

(U) Strategic Depth. America's strategic position. is stronger than it has been for decades. Today, there is no global challenger to a peaceful democratic order. There are no significant hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends. The threat of global, even nuclear war, once posed by massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inner German border, first receded hundreds of miles east and has since transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation.

(U) Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of a global challenge, but our strategic position has improved in regional contexts as well. Today, no region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, nondemocratic domination. Near-term threats in critical regions are small, relative to our capabilities and those of our friends and allies. Soviet Communism no longer exacerbates local conflicts, and we need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote problem could affect the balance of power between us and a hostile global challenger. We have won great depth for our strategic position.

(U) In this regard, it is important to note the effect on our strategy of the fact that the international system is no longer characterized by Cold War bi-polarity. The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. Developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine in light of the new defense strategy whether and to what extent particular challenges engage our interests. These changes and the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining the extent to which U.S. forces must be committed to safeguard shared interests.

(U) The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic position in one of the regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East/Persian Gulf region under Saddam's influence, Saddam struggles to retain control in Iraq, Iraq's dangerous military has been greatly damaged, our ties with moderate states are stronger, oil flows in adequate amounts at reasonable prices, and Arabs and Israelis have for the first time in many years met to discuss peace.

(U) Our strategy is designed to preserve this position by keeping our alliances strong and our threats small. Our tools include political and economic measures and others such as security assistance, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance, as well as security measures to prevent the emergence of a nondemocratic aggressor in critical regions. We bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world's leading democracy. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to present a regional challenge again, or if a new, antagonistic global threat or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we won through forty years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure this strategic depth or those that would be required if we lost it.

(U) Continued U.S. Leadership. U.S. leadership, essential for the successful resolution of the Cold War, remains critical to achieving our long-term goals in this new era. The United States continues to prefer to address hostile, nondemocratic threats to our interests wherever possible through collective security efforts that take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends. However, sustained U.S. leadership will be essential for maintaining those alliances and for otherwise protecting our interests.

(U) The sense that regional aggression could be opposed by the U.S. will be an important factor in inducing nations to work together to stabilize crises and resist or defeat aggression. For most countries, a general interest in international stability and security will not be enough to induce them to put themselves at risk simply in the hope that others will join them. Only a nation that is strong enough to act decisively can provide the leadership needed to encourage others to resist aggression. Collective security failed in the 1930s because no strong power was willing to provide the leadership behind which less powerful countries could rally against Fascism. It worked in the Gulf because the United States was willing and able to provide that leadership. Thus, even when a broad potential coalition exists, leadership will be necessary to actualize it.

(U) The perceived capability of the U.S. to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even in those cases where we do not actually do so. It will not always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will promote the assumption of leadership by others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations. But we will not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary. A future President will thus need to have options that will allow him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act to protect our critical interests. In the end, there is no contradiction between US leadership and multilateral action; history shows it is precisely US leadership is the necessary prerequisite for effective international action.

(U) As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict. Once lost, that moment cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Five years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to plan forces befitting our role in the world. And we paid dearly for our error.

(U) Our defense program for FY 1994-1999 must provide the ready forces, the mobility, the forward presence and strength to launch remains and may actually increase through this decade. The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces, but also to have the ability to extend protection to others. Like "extended deterrence" provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended protection" for friends and allies and further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles, who cannot necessarily be deterred by offensive forces alone.

(U) Limited deployment of defenses against limited strikes will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility and thus the cost effectiveness of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles.

(U) In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a secure nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must complete needed offensive modernization and upgrades. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of ballistic missile defenses against limited strikes.

(U) Forward Presence. Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition. The role that forward presence plays in the regional defense strategy is outlined in the paragraphs below. Regionally-specific policy issues are treated in detail in Part III, "Regional Goals and Challenges." Programmatic guidance on the subject is given in Part IV.

(U) We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits. Forward basing of forces and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the capability to project forces into vital strategic areas.

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We will continue to encourage

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in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security.

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contributions in securing maritime approaches is one example. We will also persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation with advanced allies such

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We must plan to continue to safeguard critical SLOCs linking us to our allies and trading partners.

(U) The East Asia Strategy Initiative of April 1990 remains the framework for adjustments to our forward-deployed forces in the  region. Because our Pacific friends and allies are assuming greater responsibility for their defense, we can restructure our forces and reduce the number of ground and support forces forward deployed there. As Phase I of our planned withdrawals we anticipate that more than 25,000 troops will be withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. Plans to remove additional forces from

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have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the

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In time we will look to implement Phases II and III of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, with the objective of keeping substantial forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

(C) Despite recent positive trends toward political liberalization and market-oriented economic reforms, the East Asia and Pacific region continues to be burdened by several legacies of the Cold War: the Soviet annexation of the Northern Territories of Japan, the division of the

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The end of Communism in Europe is likely to bring pressure on remaining Communist regimes with unknown consequences for regional stability. We should continue to pursue the opening

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but also should ensure that

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has the modernized armaments needed to defend itself as provided by the

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(C) Our most active regional security concern remains the conventional military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail. Our overall objective with regard to the Korean peninsula is to support its peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people. We should plan to maintain an alliance relationship with a unified democratic Korea.

(U) The emergence of ASEAN as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive development.

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will increase our presence compared to the pre-crisis period. We will want to have the capability to return forces quickly to the region should that ever be necessary. This will entail increased prepositioning of equipment and material

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improved in-theater command, control, and communications; and a robust naval presence. We will also strengthen our bilateral security ties and encourage active regional collective defense.

(C) We can strengthen stability throughout the region by sustaining and improving the self-defense capabilities of

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other regional friends. The United States is committed to the

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and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to

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confidence in its security and

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strategic cooperation contribute to the stability of the entire region; as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf war. At the same time, our assistance to our

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to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for

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(U) We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

(C) We will build on existing bilateral ties and negotiate multilateral agreements to enhance military access and prepositioning arrangements and other types of defense cooperation. These protocols will strength and broaden the individual and collective defense of friendly states.

(U) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons and reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles. Here the Regional Security and Arms Control Working Group established in Moscow offers a valuable venue. We also continue to work with the leading suppliers of conventional weapons to the region (as in the President's 1991 Middle East arms control initiative) to prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

(C) We will seek constructive, cooperative relations with

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strive to moderate tensions between them and endeavor to prevent the further development of weapons of mass destruction on the subcontinent. In this regard, we should work in South Asia as elsewhere to have all countries adhere to the NPT, to place their nuclear energy facilities under IAEA safeguards, and to adopt confidence building and other measures designed to reduce pressures that lead to arms races or the actual use of arms.

(U) The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism complicates our relations with regional countries. We will contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

D. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States seeks ~ to sustain the extraordinary democratic progress of the last decade and maintain a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting democratic consolidation and the efforts of the democratic nations in the region to defend themselves against the threat posed by insurgency and terrorism and foster democratic consolidation. In addition, the United States must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

(C) Absent a change in regime, Cuba will pose an area of special concern for the United States throughout the 1990s. Despite Cuba's rapid economic decline, Castro will retain the hostile intent that has for decades sought to undermine democratic progress in Central and South America and a disproportionately large military which, despite declining readiness, could threaten regional stability. Cuba's growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the near-to mid-term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation could generate new challenges to U.S. policy.

(C) The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to strengthen their democratic institutions. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

(C) The small island-states of the eastern Caribbean remain vulnerable to destabilization. We should explore ways of strengthening the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security system and assist it in improving

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(U) We will face new difficulties maintaining a ground presence in Latin America. Following implementation of the Panama Canal treaty, we will have no permanent bases on the Latin America mainland. The general trend toward democratization and peace in

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