EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenge

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 7:39 am

Appendix K: Indoor Air and Dust Test Results

EPA conducted indoor air monitoring and indoor dust wipe sampling in the weeks after the collapse. This EPA indoor air monitoring (prior to the FEMA-funded residential cleanup) was limited primarily to testing for asbestos in buildings. EPA's dust wipe sampling tested for metals, PCBs, and dioxin.

On September 13, 2001, 14 air samples were collected from 26 Federal Plaza, 290 Broadway, and Chase Manhattan Plaza, and analyzed for asbestos. All samples were analyzed by TEM and the results converted to PCM equivalent readings in fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc). One of the 14 samples exceeded the New York City standard for asbestos clearance of .01 f/cc (see Table K-1).

Table K-1: Indoor Air Test Results from September 13, 2001

Image

Address / Sample ID / Sample Volume [1] / PCM Analysis f/cc / PCM Analysis f/mm2 [2] / TEM Analysis f/cc / TEM Analysis s/mm2 / TEM Analysis fs = .5-5 [3] / TEM Analysis s > 5 [4]

Chase Manhattan Plaza / 571 / np / na / na / 0.0098 / na / na / na /
26 Federal Plaza (13th floor) / 16370 / np / na / na / 0.0064 / na / na / na
26 Federal Plaza (13th floor) / 16371 / np / na / na / <0.0033 / na / na / na
26 Federal Plaza (Lobby S.) / 16372 / np / na / na / 0.0072 / na / na / na
26 Federal Plaza (Lobby W.) / 16373 / np / na / na / 0.0037 / na / na / na
26 Federal Plaza (39th floor) / 16374 / np / na / na / <0.0038 / na / na / na
26 Federal Plaza (38th floor) / 16375 / np / na / na / <0.0039 / na / na / na
26 Federal Plaza (26th floor) / 16376 / np / na / na / <0.0038 / na / na / na
290 Broadway (8th floor) / 27490 / np / na / na / 0.0042 / na / na / na
290 Broadway (Lobby) / 27491 / np / na / na / <0.0043 / na / na / na
290 Broadway (22nd floor N.) / 27492 / np / na / na / <0.0041 / na / na / na
290 Broadway (22nd floor S.) / 27493 / np / na / na / 0.004 / na / na / na
290 Broadway (LL-1) / 27494 / np / na na / 0.013 / na na na
290 Broadway LL-2 / 27495 / np / na na / 0.0044 / na / na / na

KEY:

np = sample volume not provided on data sheets.
na= not analyzed for this metric.

NOTES:

[1] = sample volume for TEM (AHERA method) is 1200 liters for 25 mm filter
[2] = fibers per millimeter squared
[3] = structures equal to or greater than 0.5 micrometers and less than or equal to 5 micrometers in length
[4] = structures greater than 5 micrometers in length


During the period September 17 to November 3, 2001, EPA collected dust wipe samples within four buildings: Stuyvesant High School, Public School 234, Manhattan Borough Community College, and the Jacob Javits Convention Center. The samples were analyzed for various metals at all locations, while at Stuyvesant and the Community College samples were also collected and analyzed for PCBs and dioxin. Fifty-four percent of the sample results were below the minimum

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detection limit, while the remaining 46 percent detected contaminants in varying levels. The highest recorded amount for each pollutant at each location is shown in Table K-2.

Table K-2: Highest Recorded Readings for Dust Wipe Samples

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On September 26, 2001, bulk dust samples from 110 Greenwich were collected and analyzed for various pollutants. For those pollutants where a screening level existed, the test results were all below the applicable soil screening levels contained in EPA's Hazard Evaluation Handbook. Table K -3 presents the results of testing at 110 Greenwich.

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Table K-3: Bulk Dust Sampling at 110 Greenwich

Image

[1] = All samples collected on September, 2001.

[2] = Residential soil screening level from EPA's Hazard Evaluation Handbook. Only accounts for health risk from ingestion.

[3] = No result reported in NYC Response database.

On October 10, 2001, two bulk dust samples inside 100 Church Street were collected and analyzed for asbestos. The results of this testing, done at the Department of Justice's request, found that one of the samples contained 1.1 percent asbestos while the other was non-detect.

On October 23, 2001, 10 air samples were collected at 100 Church Street and analyzed for asbestos. The samples were analyzed by both the TEM and PCM methods. All TEM results were below the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2 and all PCM results were below .01 f/cc. This testing was performed on the 18th and 19th floors after these floors had been cleaned.

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Table K-4: Indoor Air Test Results from October 23, 2001

Image

KEY:
np = sample volume not provided on data sheets.
na= not analyzed for this metric.

NOTES:
[1] = sample volume for TEM (AHERA method) is 1200 liters for 25 mm filter
[2] = fibers per millimeter squared
[3] = structures equal to or greater than 0.5 micrometers and less than or equal to 5 micrometers in length
[4] = structures greater than 5 micrometers in length

General Services Administration Monitoring of Federal Buildings

From September 13, 2001, through January 2, 2002, the General Services Administration, which is responsible for Federal building management, arranged for indoor environmental testing at Federal buildings located at 290 Broadway, 26 Federal Plaza, 201 Varick Street, and 1 Bowling Green. Over 100 air samples were analyzed and all samples were below the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2. All but four air samples analyzed by TEM were non-detect for asbestos. The four samples that detected asbestos all occurred between September 13 and September 19, 2001. Two samples showed 25 s/mm2 and two samples could not be analyzed because the filters were overloaded. The only testing for asbestos in dust was conducted on September 14, 2001. Three dust samples collected in the lobby of 290 Broadway and two collected outside the building on September 13, 2001, showed the presence of chrysotile asbestos by TEM analysis. The results for these tests only reported whether asbestos was present or not, not the percentage of asbestos in the sample. Table K-5 through K-7 provide more information on the results of indoor testing of Federal buildings.

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K-5: Asbestos Air Testing

Image

K-6: Asbestos Dust Testing at 290 Broadway

Image

K-7: Non-Asbestos Air Sampling Results

Image

Other Indoor Air Studies

"Characterization of Particulate Found in Apartments After Destruction of the World Trade Center." [18] This study was conducted at the request of the Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force. This study selected two residential apartment buildings for sampling -- one presumed to have significant WTC dust contamination and the other not -- based on their locations. Six air samples were collected from inside one apartment building and five from the other. All 11 samples were analyzed by the TEM method. The study found higher levels of

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18 Eric J. Chatfield, Ph.D., Chatfield Technical Consulting Limited, and John R. Kominsky, M.Sc., CIH, CSP, CHMM, Environmental Quality Management, Inc.; October 12, 2001.

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airborne asbestos in apartment building expected to have WTC dust contamination. Further, the study found that asbestos levels in both buildings exceeded the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2:

• Asbestos concentrations ranged from 6,277 to 10,620 s/mm2 in the building expected to experience significant WTC dust contamination.
• Asbestos concentrations ranged from 141 to 379 s/mm2 in the building not expected to experience significant WTC dust contamination.

"Health Risks from Exposures to Asbestos and Inorganic Metals Due to Collapse of the World Trade Center. [19] The results of the aforementioned "Characterization of Particulate Found in Apartments After Destruction of the World Trade Center" study were analyzed by a consultant for the Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force to address possible health risks to residents and workers from exposure to the levels of inorganic metals and asbestos contamination found in the study.

"Final Report of the Public Health Investigation to Assess Potential Exposures to Airborne and Settled Surface Dust in Residential Areas in Lower Manhattan, NYCDOH, and ATSDR." [20] This was the largest study in terms of buildings analyzed and was conducted by ATSDR and NYCDOH. The final report was issued in September 2002. The study collected dust and air samples in and around 30 residential buildings (encompassing 59 apartment units) in Lower Manhattan, along with 4 buildings north of 59th Street for comparison purposes. Of the 59 apartments sampled, 50 -- or 85 percent -- had been reportedly cleaned (professionally or otherwise) prior to ATSDR 's sampling.

The study concluded that the increased risk of cancer or other adverse lung health effects from prolonged exposure to WTC dust was greater than 1-in-10,000 for those areas sampled. This risk was based on several worst-case scenario assumptions. These worst-case assumptions were that apartments tested would not be cleaned after sampling, all fibers detected were asbestos, and the levels detected in the study represented long-term levels. The report noted that for individuals who frequently clean their apartments using HEPA vacuums and damp cloths/mops or take part in the EPA cleaning program, it was unlikely their exposure would resemble worst-case conditions. The report noted that when evaluating the health risks from indoor contamination, it did not take into account the potential effects of high doses of dust, fibers, and other materials that people in the WTC area at the time of the attacks may have experienced. The report noted these exposures could add to the public's risk of long-term health effects.

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19 Dr. E.B. Ilgren, MD, MA, D Phil, October 11, 2001.

20 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, as part of the World Trade Center Environmental Assessment Workgroup, September 2002.

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 7:44 am

Appendix L: Details on Use of Respirators at Ground Zero

Reports on Lack of Respirator Use


An October 2001 report [21] by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences discussed worker safety issues at the WTC site for the period up to October 5, 2001. The report's observations generally focused on construction workers at the site and not Fire Department rescue team or Federal disaster assistance personnel. According to the report:

• Respiratory protection was rare with the exception of heavy equipment operators. Further, workers were observed in the smoke plume emanating from the pile without hard hats, eye wear, or respirators.
• Workers did not decon [decontaminate] after leaving the site. The hand/face and boot wash stations did not appear to be used by most of the workers.
• During the September 22-26, 2001, period, an increase in worker protection was observed, notably respiratory protection. Vehicles leaving the site began to be hosed down.
• There was no evidence that any safety and health program was operating at the site. The lack of an operating safety and health program was confirmed by various support personnel, workers, and government officials.

A January 2002 report [22] prepared by a certified industrial hygienist for the Operating Engineers National Hazmat Program noted that during the period October 2 -16, 2001, less than half of the heavy equipment operators regularly used respirators when working on the "pile" at Ground Zero, and often this use decreased to less than one-third of the workers. This report, which discussed respiratory protection lessons from the WTC disaster, concluded that the respirators NIOSH recommended for use at the site were correct and sufficiently protective provided that they were properly tested and conscientiously worn.

In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report noted that workers conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh Kills landfill were wearing half-face respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvek suits. The author noted that respiratory protection compliance by workers at Fresh Kills was reported to be approximately 90 percent as

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21 "Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) Response to the World Trade Center Disaster: Initial WETP Grantee Response and Preliminary Assessment of Training Needs," Donald Elisburg, John Moran, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences WETP, National Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health Training, October 6, 2001.

22 "Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster," Bruce Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15,2002.

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opposed to 30-50 percent compliance at the WTC site. The author observed that:

". ..debris is pulled by workers from the smoking, twisted wreckage of the World Trade Centers and then wetted and hauled to a site where the debris is carefully sorted by workers wearing more protective clothing, much more consistently."


Moreover, the author noted that workers at the landfill were officially informed that not wearing respirators would result in disciplinary action. OIG investigators from our New York office who participated in the recovery operations confirmed the report's conclusions about the difference in respiratory use between the WTC and landfill sites.

EPA Actions to Encourage Respirator Use

As demonstrated by a fact sheet prepared on September 11, 2001, EPA's emergency response officials immediately recognized the need for and recommended the use of air purifying respirators [23] at Ground Zero (a copy of this document is available on our OIG web site). EPA officials told us this fact sheet was provided to a FEMA official, but was not issued. We contacted a FEMA representative who told us that the flyer was not issued because it was decided that New York City should handle worker protection issues.

EPA also provided respirators for workers at the site. According to a May 1, 2002, letter from EPA's Region 2 Administrator to Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Senator George Voinovich (R-OH), EPA had distributed 22,100 air purifying respirators and 30,500 sets of P100 particulate cartridges to New York City by September 22, 2001. Additionally, 600 respirators (MSA and 3m brand) and 2,000 cartridges (GME-P100) were provided to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and the New York State Department of Health. The bulk of EPA-procured equipment was transported from EPA's Edison facility by the New York National Guard to the New York City Office of Emergency Management for distribution to response workers.

As the rescue phase progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they were concerned about the lack of respirator use at Ground Zero and outlined these concerns in a letter to NYCDOH dated October 5, 2001. This letter outlined the threat of potential exposure of workers to hazardous substances. The letter noted that EPA "... has recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers utilize personal protective equipment and the personal wash stations to prevent the spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes, cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc." The letter stated that EPA had observed very inconsistent compliance with its recommendations, but did not have the authority to enforce compliance with non-EPA/United States Coast Guard employees. The letter concluded by recommending that the Incident Commander adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety Plan. A copy of the letter is in Appendix P.

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23 NIOSH recommended the use of half-face negative pressure respirators with P-100, organic vapor/acid gas (P-100/0V/AG) cartridges. Respirators must be properly fitted to provide adequate protection against airborne hazards.

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Health Impacts of Lack of Respirator Use at Ground Zero

Two studies documented acute health effects suffered by emergency and construction workers at Ground Zero. A study [24] of firefighters who responded to the collapse concluded that intense, short-term exposure to material generated during the collapse of the World Trade Center was associated with bronchial responsiveness and the development of cough. The study found that the following percentages of firefighters developed "World Trade Center cough" that was severe enough to require at least 4 weeks of medical leave:

• 8 percent of the firefighters with a high level of exposure to contaminants at the site (i.e., present at the WTC collapse).
• 3 percent of the firefighters with a moderate level of exposure to contaminants at the site (i.e., present within first 2 days after the collapse).
• 1 percent of the firefighters with a low level of exposure to contaminants at the site (i.e., present within 3-7 days of the collapse).

Initial findings of medical examinations of workers directly involved in rescue and recovery efforts also found evidence of acute health impacts. Preliminary results of these examinations released in January 2003 and reported in the Washington Post concluded that 78 percent of those sampled had suffered lung ailments and 88 percent had experienced ear, nose, and throat problems in the months immediately following the attack. Further, a September 2002 report [25] by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine concluded that protection of workers at Ground Zero was "seriously inadequate." The report noted that the response of workers in the first few hours and days after the attack without regard to their personal safety was laudable and understandable. However, according to the Mount Sinai report, a lack of enforcement of worker protection measures in the weeks and months that followed was not excusable.

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24 "Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site," David J. Prezant, M.D., et al, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, No.11, September 12, 2002.

25 "Lesson Learned tor Public Health from September 11, 2001: A One-Year Perspective, " Philip J. Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., et al, September 2002.

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 7:44 am

Appendix M: Cleaning Procedures for Residents Opting to Have Their Residences Cleaned

Cleaning Procedures Scope of Work
A

Scope of Work
B

Common Areas Cleaned if requested by the building owner. Procedures included vacuuming, wet wiping, and cleaning of carpets using a water extraction cleaner. Surface not cleaned by wet methods to be vacuumed two times. Cleaned if requested by the building owner. Procedures included vacuuming, wet wiping, and cleaning of carpets using a water extraction cleaner. Additionally, all surfaces except for carpet and fabric covered furniture to be cleaned a second time.
HVAC Systems HVAC systems determined to be impacted by WTC dust to be cleaned in accordance with a site-specific scope of work prepared by the monitoring contractor and approved by EPA. In the event that the entire HVAC system needs cleaning, a separate site-specific contract will be awarded by NYCDEP for the work. Work to be completed before initiation of cleaning of common spaces and residences in the building. HVAC systems determined to be impacted by WTC dust to be cleaned in accordance with a site-specific scope of work prepared by the monitoring contractor and approved by EPA. Work to be completed before initiation of cleaning of common spaces and residences in the building.
Residences Cleaned using HEPA vacuums, water extraction cleaners, and wet wiping. First foot of all exhaust duct work to be vacuumed. Cleaned using HEPA vacuums, water extraction cleaner, and wet wiping. First foot of all exhaust duct work to be vacuumed. Additionally, all surfaces except for carpet and fabric covered furniture to be cleaned a second time.
Worker Protection No specific measures described in the scope of work. Residents not allowed in work areas, except residents may be present in their residence during cleaning when the work area can be isolated by barriers.
Asbestos abatement procedures to be employed include, among others: use of personal protective equipment including respirators, a properly enclosed decontamination system, posting of warning signs, isolation barriers to seal off openings, and all waste generated during the cleaning being treated as asbestos-containing waste and disposed in accordance with applicable rules and regulations.

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 7:48 am

Appendix N: Details from EPA and Non-EPA Lessons Learned Reports

Recommendations of EPA Lessons Learned Reports

Headquarter's Lessons Learned Report


1. Clarify Involvement of Senior EPA Leaders, and Confirm Authority of Emergency Response Personnel in Decision-Making and Communications During National Emergencies

1. Issue a national policy for EPA's implementation of a NIIMS-type ICS structure to meet its needs in responding to national emergencies.

2. Ensure all EPA emergency personnel are trained and equipped to effectively implement EPA's ICS (including relevant portions of the NCP).

3. Develop a process to involve senior EPA management in policy and strategic decision-making as appropriate for national emergencies.

4. Revise Regional and area plans to incorporate national ICS policy.

5. Develop a national terrorism training and exercise strategy/program using ICS to strengthen on-scene and management response coordination.

2. Revisit, and Revise as Needed, Existing Internal and External Emergency Response Coordination Plans and Structures; Conduct Interagency Training and Exercises to Solidify Government-wide Understanding of Roles, Responsibilities, and Capabilities

1. Examine existing coordination structures within the Agency (e.g., NICT, Regional Incident Coordination Team (RICT)) to ensure adequate participation and efficient operational capability.

2. Consider how to better use the NRT and the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) during national emergencies, and ways to quickly access the senior leadership of member organizations.

3. Better educate EPA's responders in the existing EPA, OSHA, and State roles for the protection of the health and safety of all responders.

4. Collaborate with OSHA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies to clarify the Agency's role in assuring protection of the health and safety of all responders.

5. Develop a structure for intra-agency coordination that encompasses all levels of management during national emergencies.

6. Communicate new and revised structure and processes to emergency response staff and all involved levels of agency leadership.

7. Coordinate with the OHS to develop a coherent coordination strategy for all responders during national emergencies; specifically, address the need to improve emergency coordination with the FBI.

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3. Develop an Emergency Response Infrastructure to Address both Data Analysis Issues and Information Management

1. Clearly define a process for approving and coordinating the release of information to other agencies and the public; ensure program staff on aa and Office level (e.g., OSWER and OERR) review information before it is released.

2. Establish a forum for Regional emergency response, Regional labs, and OERR's analytical staff to specify and address analytical needs during emergencies.

3. Ensure that prompt communication of analytical results to emergency response staff is addressed in response procedure revisions.

4. Continue the Environmental Assessment Workgroup (EAWG) to address interagency sampling and analysis needs.

5. Ensure laboratory analysis and data management of health, safety, and risk information are incorporated in emergency response plans.

6. Work with OHS and other emergency response organizations to have EPA designated the lead agency for environmental data during national emergencies when both EPA and other agencies are conducting environmental analyses.

7. Ensure that sufficient laboratory capabilities for national emergencies are readily available to all Regions.

4. Develop EPA Policies and Procedures for Public Information Dissemination During National Emergencies, Within Established Emergency Response Plans and Structures

1. Continue developing a network of tools to facilitate public communication.

2. Clarify roles, authorities, protocols, and contingency plans for Headquarters, Regional, Community Outreach, and Regional Press Office staff during national emergencies.

3. Coordinate with OHS, CEQ, and other response partners to identify and address obstacles to timely and consistent presentation of environmental information during national emergencies.

5. Increase the Agency's Emergency Response Resources, and Address the Unique Demands of OSC Positions in Human Resource Processes

1. Assess additional personnel needs for responding to national emergencies while maintaining emergency response preparedness.

2. Establish Western Environmental Response Team (WERT)

3. Pursue personnel classification and associated human resource practice changes to acknowledge the unique expectations and demands placed on OSCs during national emergencies.

4. Support WERT readiness needs.

5. Identify geographic distribution and readiness of supplies, equipment, and contractor capacity.

6. Identify and meet emergency response staff personal safety needs, including providing both equipment and training/exercises.

7. Assess additional analytical program resource needs for national emergencies.

8. Establish a process to support responders logistically during national emergencies.

9. Clearly articulate additional equipment response resource needs in the budget requests for FY 2003 and beyond.

6. Invest in the Safety and Security of EPA Staff and Facilities, Including Telecommunications Needs

1. Review all COOPs to ensure all facilities are included, and bring COOP planning, training, and exercises in line with current threats.

2. Improve and update employee evacuation planning.

3. Review stress management assistance provided to Headquarters, Regions 2 and 3, and ERT. Assess stress levels of EPA emergency response employees, and determine whether additional action should be taken.

4. Address, using currently available resources, all possible facility security needs, at both government-owned and private buildings.

5. Provide telecommunications redundancy nationwide that will provi(je for ongoing communication (voice and data) to EPA's workforce during a national emergency, as well as emergency notification systems.

6. Provide central communication principles using the web to ensure EPA employees are given the latest, most recent information.

7. Determine whether a Headquarters-sponsored stress management system should be more formally deployed in future national emergencies.

8. Broaden health monitoring for OSCs and other Agency response personnel to make it consistent nationwide.

9. Systematically follow through on facility security improvements requiring additional resources.

7. Identify and Address National Environmental Vulnerabilities

1. Complete EPA efforts to identify national environmental vulnerabilities posed by public and private utilities/facilities.

2. Coordinate with State, local, and other environmental regulators to plan for reducing environmental vulnerabilities.

3. Increase technical support by EPA and States to identify and assist in corrective actions to reduce vulnerabilities

4. Increase inspections to identify and oversee corrective actions to reduce environmental vulnerabilities caused by permit or regulation violations.

5. Examine EPA's authorities and regulations to identify any changes needed to effectively address vulnerabilities.

Region 2 Lessons Learned Recommendations

Overarching Recommendations


1. EPA Region 2 should undertake an effort to connect with senior officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Health and Human Services on a routine basis to ensure EPA mission is clearly understood.

2. Region 2 needs to develop a comprehensive approach to emergency management and response, perhaps based upon the NFPA 1600 Standard, that includes all divisions in the region. This would::

• Spread responsibility across the organization so that one division is not the sole source of information, staffing responsibilities, decision making, and documentation.

• Provide for a consistent, expandable and contractible structure and process for the Region that is understood across organizational boundaries.

• Routinize emergency/disaster response.

3. Region 2 should identify a team of dedicated people who will respond in the event of a new crisis. This would limit the stress on personnel who might otherwise be pulled from the current response to another, as well as allowing designated staff to prepare, to the extent possible, for the possibility of mobilization. This could be accomplished by assigning an individual to a particular task until they are directly and explicitly relieved. In addition, a feedback mechanism could be established to encourage and solicit concerns during and after a response.

4. The Region's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) needs to be reviewed and updated.

5. Senior leadership of Region 2 and Regional staff not currently assigned to emergency response who might respond in a disaster, should participate in introductory training and education on basic disaster management and response. This would include intergovernmental relationships that are inherently different than typical Superfund emergency response and removal.

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6. Public information, risk communications, and crisis communications must be organized and strategized in advance of a disaster. Region 2 should develop a comprehensive approach -which includes Headquarters and regional Federal and State partners -on how to handle crisis communications. Then, in a disaster event, relationships are established, lines of coordination and communication are established, and communications/public affairs officers can focus on tactics rather than trying to develop a framework in the midst of the emergency. Mechanisms should be in place for resolving differences about the interpretation of risk and the appropriate response.

7. Nationally, EPA should examine policies and procedures for ESF #10 activation and coordination with USCG to ensure roles and responsibilities are executed according to the FRP.

Additional Recommendations

1. As soon as possible, educate Region 2 personnel and management on Agency and Region responsibilities and authorities during a disaster or crisis with emphasis on the relationship between the Stafford Act, FRP, National Contingency Plan (NCP) and ICS. Include suggested peer relationships with counterpart agencies at all levels, but especially at the senior management level (e.g., regional administrators).

2. National Issue - Adopt an incident management system that is consistent across all regions, has common terms and plugs into other crisis/consequence management structures. National and regional management systems should be compatible.

Regional Issues - Create Regional crisis management structure, staffed by people with authority, commitment and qualifications, to improve roles and communication between management and OSCs. Develop an incident management system for Region 2 that:

• Expands or contracts as needed to address both crises and routine events.

• Prescribes specific people to fill roles during an event. The Coast Guard "watch quarter station bill" or synchronization matrix may serve as a model.

• Includes mechanism for provision of resources, "protect" incident managers.

• Has agreements, plans and procedures for internal communications during a crisis.

• Includes a crisis management team that supports the incident management system in terms of the Region 2 operating principles.

Regional Interagency Coordination Team (RICT)

• Training for backup staff

• Mobilize Regional resources

• Signed agreement by Division Directors

• Ensures leadership/managerial backup

Regional Incident Command System (ICS)

• Dedicated and known backup

• Clear commander

• Known ability to expand and contract

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

• Physically separate from branch

3. Develop a Regional Strategy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for communicating risk to the public during a crisis.

• Include processes and resources needed to obtain and manage information.

• Include links to incident management structure, data management mission.

• Include defined up-front risk parameters and benchmarks.

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4. Develop a logistics and support capability for incident management system that:

• May include standing/expedient contracts, especially for sampling and analytical services, as well as data management.

• Obtains facilities and other support resources.

• Includes resource management and contracts in the development.

• Include processes for intra and inter-agency coordination.

5. Develop agreements and processes for the emerging data generation and management mission including:

• Developing methods and demonstrating a commitment to plan (identify data monitoring objectives, sampling and analytic methods, and benchmarks).

• Ensure the process/system is flexible and could include external contributors and users. Define users and contributors.

6. Need a corporate philosophy on how to manage expectations in a crisis (internally outside of Region 2 emergency responders and externally). Consider:

• Expectations of elected officials and the public

• Part of incident management system specific to health and well-being

7. Develop a crisis management plan. SOPS, COOP, should address all issue categories

• Mechanism for elevating to Incident of National Significance

• Separate policy and communications priorities from operational priorities

• Establish protocol for continuing response if local/State counterparts are unavailable for any reason

• Inventory of regional resources

• Expedited contract authorities

8. Clearly identify scope and boundaries of work within authorities and expertise. (e.g. logistical tasks) (e.g. accept only Mission Assignment with authority?)

• Educate Region 2, EPA Headquarters, and other Federal and State agencies about scope, boundaries and authorities with emphasis on the relationship between the Stafford Act, FRP , NCP and ICS.

• Manage expectations

• Establish and maintain relationships and contacts

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Major Conclusions of Non-EPA Lessons Learned Reports

Lessons Learned for Public Health from September 11, 2001: A One Year Perspective; Philip J. Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., Jordan Slutsky, Angali Garg, M.S., Mona Lisa Mouallem, Lauri Boni; Center for Children's Health and the Environment of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine; September 2002:


• Inadequate preparation for disaster as public health authorities had not established partnerships with agencies outside the health field

• Unclear lines of authority which resulted in poor risk communications, a disorganized approach to worker health and safety, and failure to agree on who should clean up residences.

• Neither workers or the public were provided accurate information on health risks in the first weeks after the attacks.

• Protection of workers was seriously inadequate

• Lack of exposure standards for chemicals in settled dust or on surfaces inside buildings

Lessons Learned on Environmental, Occupational, and Residential Exposures From the Attack on the World Trade Center; Paul J. Lioy, Ph.D. and Michael Gochfeld, M.D., Ph.D; American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

• Improved data collection for emergencies is needed. This should include development of:

• improved portable and flexible emergency response monitors,

• strategies for the rapid acquisition of settled particulate material samples in catastrophic events that yield resuspendable dust/smoke, and

• a rapid method for determination of site-specific and event-specific analyses that could cause acute or chronic effects.

• Need to develop emergency response standards for:

• community evacuation, worker re-entry, and residential/commercial re-entry, in various community or occupational zones at increasing distances from a disaster site, and

• Short-term exposure in establishing evacuation and restricted entry zones, and determining an "all clear" based on potential acute health outcomes.

• Need to develop a formal post-disaster cleanup protocol and a lead agency to implement the program so that cleanup can proceed without delay. Also need to develop a set of residential dust/smoke clearance levels to permit safe re-entry after cleanup.

• Need to conduct research on the design of respirators to ensure that they will be used in emergency response. Many of the existing non-air pack respirators are heavy and not easily worn over the nose and mouth during complex operations.

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Risk Communication in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Disaster, George D. Thurston, S.cD. and Lung Chi Chen, PhD, American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

• The public wants facts upon which they can make individual decisions, not just reassurances.

• The government needs to develop peer-reviewed pollution benchmarks of "acceptable" and "unacceptable" exposures applicable to such disaster situations and make them available to the public and media.

• Physicians, scientists, and other exposure/health effects experts need to be consulted regarding the appropriateness of government monitoring and health effects assessments on a real-time basis.

Perspective on the Tragedy at the World Trade Center, Joel Shutro, American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

• A new regulatory framework regarding potentially toxic exposures is needed,

• Government agencies saw their role as reassuring the public or said little, rather than use their position as a bully pulpit to provide the public with information they could use to make informed decisions,

• The absence of strong enforcement and leadership on the part of EPA, OSHA, PESH, the New York City Department of Health and New York City Department of Environmental Protection resulted in unnecessary exposure of workers and community residents to toxic substances,

• A uniform sampling protocol and centralized collection of all testing results is needed, and Government agencies appear to have ignored their own precedents [e.g. government intervention in Gramercy Park and Libby, Montana].

Health Effects of World Trade Center Site Workers, Stephen Levin, MD, Robin Herbert, MD, Gwen Skloot, MD, Jamie Szeinuk, MD, Alvin Teirstein, MD, David Fischler, MD, Debra Milek, MD, George Piligian, MD, Elizabeth Wilk-Rivard, MD, and Jacqueline Moline, MD; American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

• The importance of an advisory to health care providers ASAP to assist with their evaluation and clinical management of the physical and psychological problems WTC-related patients experienced.

• Immediate capture of registry (contact) information for volunteers and workers.

• Rapid distribution of appropriate respiratory protection and a peer-based structure for encouraging consistent use.

• Rapid mobilization of resources for pro-active medical evaluation/treatment -- respiratory, musculoskeletal, and psychological -- during the weeks following exposure at the disaster site.

• Testing of indoor settings, including analysis of settled dust and aggressive air monitoring, to establish a gradient of exposure with distance from Ground Zero to guide recommendations regarding clean-up and reoccupancy.

• Communication by public health agencies regarding exposure hazards in lay language, with focus not only on long-term cancer risks, but on short-term health consequences as well.

• Greater attention to human health experience, rather than exclusive focus on air monitoring
for the usual suspects.

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Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster, Bruce Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002:

• The chosen respirators were correct.

• Compliance with the requirements was poor at Ground Zero.

• Workers received mixed messages about the importance of wearing respiratory protection.

• Achieving high compliance with respiratory requirements is not unrealistic in these situations.

Safety and Health of Heavy Equipment Operators at Ground Zero, Bruce Lippy, CIH, CSP, American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

• Except for asbestos, the few excess pollutant readings at the site were almost always associated with specific tasks.

• In the eagerness to declare the New York Financial District safe for re-occupancy, Government communications blurred the distinctions between the OSHA and EPA asbestos standards.

• The lack of a clear command structure at the site thwarted efforts to enforce the use of personal support equipment and other risk-reduction measures.

• Need to consider the use of OSHA's Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard in responding to terrorist incidents.

Firefighter Safety and Health Issues at the World Trade Center Site, Ronald Spadatora, Deputy Assistant Chief, Fire Department of New York, American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

• Safety controls must be instituted by the uniformed services for the protection of the rescuers no matter how great the life hazard,

• The Site Safety Officer role in the FDNY's Incident Command Structure is a crucial one. This position must be filled immediately at the scene of a terrorist attack or similar event,

• Schedule an adequate number of Safety Chiefs on duty at any given time,

• Firefighters must be informed of the dangers in their work environment prior to the start of the detail, when possible,

• A universal-fit respirator cartridge should be available to rescue workers,

• Respirators should have built-in voice emitters to enhance communication, and

• Lighter personal protective equipment (hard hat, military fatigues/boots, safety glasses/goggles) for rescue and recovery workers must be made readily available.

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Appendix O: Details on Health-Based Benchmarks Needed

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels. EPA is responsible for a program involving entities inside and outside the government to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs). These guidelines are developed by the National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances. The AEGLs address exposures to pollutants that last for 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours, and are established to address three potential types of health impacts from these acute exposures: non-disabling, disabling, and death. This program has finalized a limited number of AEGLs; however, none of the finalized guidelines addressed the primary pollutants of concerns for Lower Manhattan after September 11. EPA's Office of Research and Development and the Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances are currently working to establish needed AEGLs.

Sub-Chronic Guidelines. EPA also did not have sub-chronic guidelines for the contaminants found in Lower Manhattan on September 11. A TSDR defines sub-chronic as exposures lasting 2 weeks to 1 year. In general, EPA's benchmarks have focused on lifetime cancer risk over a 30-year exposure period. Because sub-chronic guidelines did not exist for the WTC pollutants of concern, these 30-year benchmarks were adjusted to fit the situation found at WTC. For example, to assess sub-chronic (1 year) exposure to dioxin in the ambient air, EPA took the dioxin 30-year exposure benchmark and adjusted it to reflect a 1-year exposure by multiplying the 30-year exposure benchmark by 30. These guidelines should be developed, to the extent possible, before a disaster strikes so that the process can be properly peer reviewed and any necessary revisions made before they are needed.

Indoor Air Benchmarks. EPA also did not have risk-based indoor air or bulk dust benchmarks for the pollutants found in dust deposited indoors. A work group formed after September 11, consisting of officials from Federal, New York State, and New York City agencies, developed indoor air benchmarks for COPCs resulting from the WTC towers collapse. These benchmarks, identified in a document entitled "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks," were initially published in draft in September 2002. The document was peer reviewed and a revised interim final version was published in Apri1 2003. The COPC report could be used as a starting point in developing health benchmarks for additional pollutants that may be encountered in future disasters. EPA 's Homeland Security Strategy includes plans to identify chemical and biological substances for which indoor air reference levels (benchmarks) may be needed, and establish advisory indoor air reference levels for the substances identified.

Health-Based Benchmarks for Asbestos. As addressed in Chapter 2, health-based asbestos standards for indoor and outdoor air do not exist. The AHERA standard, used as a primary WTC benchmark to communicate asbestos risk for ambient air, is the filter background contamination level estimated when the TEM protocol was developed. Filters with smaller asbestos contamination levels are now available, so that smaller concentrations of asbestos can now be

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reliably measured. The TEM analysis of asbestos data in response to the WTC disaster suggests that the minimum detection limit may now be approximately 15 to 20 s/mm2.

A significant issue with regard to indoor spaces was the potential exposure from asbestos in dust. In assessing the need for asbestos abatements in indoor spaces in New York Cit , the City relied on the NESHAP definition of asbestos-containing material, which defines asbestos-containing material as 1 percent or more asbestos by volume. This is not a health standard, and dust with less than 1 percent asbestos could pose a health risk. Risk assessors employ a mathematical formula to estimate the amount of asbestos in dust that can be expected to become airborne in order to evaluate the potential risk to human health from asbestos in dust. This factor is known as the "K Factor." However, this factor is not deemed reliable at this time. The panel that completed the peer review for EPA' s indoor standards did not endorse the asbestos-settled dust benchmark because the "the K-factor methodology is, at this time, inadequate for predicting inhalation exposure from asbestos surface loading measurement."

We believe EPA should review the AHERA standard and determine whether the standard needs to be revised in light of the fact that better filters are available today, and continue the work of the indoor COPC group to develop health-related screening levels for asbestos in dust.

Benchmarks for Exposure to Multiple Pollutants. The synergistic impacts of multiple pollutants on human health in the aftermath of an air quality emergency, such as occurred on September 11, are unknown. Synergistic effects have been documented between asbestos and cigarette smoke. For example, the lung cancer risk from exposure to asbestos is increased if the individual exposed to asbestos is a cigarette smoker. Researchers interviewed indicated that there could be other synergistic effects caused by the wide array of pollutants generated by the collapse of the WTC, but research is not available to make this determination.

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Appendix P: EPA Letter Concerning Worker Protection

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION 11
EDISON, NEW JERSEY 08837

OCT 05 2001

Mr. Kelly R. McKinney, P.E.
Associate Commissioner
Bureau of Regulatory and Environmental Health Services
The City of New York
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
125 Worth Street, Room 616, CN-32
New York, NY 10013

Dear Mr. McKinney:

Health and safety concerns for workers at the World Trade Center Disaster Site (WTC) has been a concern from the beginning of the response. In addition to standard construction/demolition site safety concerns, this Site also poses threats to workers related to potential exposure to hazardous substances. Sources of hazardous substances include (1) building materials from the destroyed buildings (primarily asbestos), (2) hazardous materials that were stored in the buildings (refrigerants, hazardous wastes, ethylene glycol, compressed gas cylinders, etc.), and (3) products of combustion being omitted from the fires that continue to burn within the debris piles. EPA, along with a number of other federal, state and your agency, has been gathering information about these threats to worker health. Air sampling by EPA and others indicates that asbestos and other contaminants are present in the air at the WTC. EPA has recommended, and continues to recommend that workers at the Site wear respiratory protection.

In addition, EPA has recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers utilize personal protective equipment and the personnel wash stations to prevent the spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes, cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc. We have observed very inconsistent compliance with our recommendations, however, we do not have authority to enforce the worker health and safety policies for non-EPA/USCG employees. Therefore, EPA believes the Incident Commander should adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety Plan. If there is anything I can do to assist you concerning this matter, please feel free to call me at (732) 321-6656.

Sincerely yours,

Bruce Sprague, Chief
Response and Prevention Branch

cc: FCO, FEMA

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Appendix Q: EPA Response to the Draft Report

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20480

AUG 8 2002

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum for EPA's Response to Inspector General's (Draft) Evaluation Report: "EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse -- Challenges, Success, and Improvements." (Assignment Number 2002-0000702

FROM: Marianne Lamont Horinko
Acting Administrator

TO: Nikki Tinsley
Inspector General

This memorandum transmits the Agency's consolidated response to the subject draft report ("Draft Report"). With this memo, I formally request the EPA's comments be included as part of the final version of the official report.

The unprecedented terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the enormity of its aftermath compelled responding government agencies to write a new book on disaster response. While the Draft Report acknowledges the situation that the nation -- and New York City in particular -- confronted following the disaster, the nature of its criticisms, conclusions and recommendations do not reflect those circumstances. In fact, this document is infected with the attitude that somehow "business as usual" conduct should have prevailed.

See Appendix R Note 1

I am exceedingly proud of the response that the men and women of EPA made in the aftermath of the World Trade Center collapse. Along with other first responders, our people were there within hours of the attack and hundreds of our specialists devoted long hours under difficult conditions to provide assistance and information. EPA responded with its heart as well as its science to protect the health of the public and the workers involved in rescue and recovery. In all, we took over 25,000 samples and conducted a quarter of a million measurements of nearly 700 potential contaminants.

See Appendix R Note 2

EPA's response was extraordinary, especially when examined in the chaotic context in which we and other governing bodies found ourselves. EPA began monitoring immediately for contaminants -- without benchmarks or standards that applied to the disaster situation such as ambient asbestos -- and we did it without electricity, in the midst of firefighting and rescue

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operations, in the midst of high security concerns, and surrounded by construction equipment moving debris. The New York City Emergency Command Center was destroyed, agencies' New York offices were closed, communications services in Lower Manhattan were inoperative, and airlines were shut down.

Given the magnitude of the disaster, the massiveness of the response, the very real security issues at stake, and the many entities involved, it was essential that the Executive Branch coordinate the federal response. At a time of national emergency, the people expect the government to speak with one voice.

See Appendix R Note 3

Indeed, one of the key lessons learned is the need for centralized communications during times of national crisis. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security institutionalized the coordination of communications in one Department. The Draft Report, however, goes to great length to erroneously criticize federal efforts, specifically the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), to coordinate health and safety communications.

EPA, along with other agencies and departments responsible for environment, health and safety, acted to provide the best health and safety guidance to those who lived and worked in Lower Manhattan, based on available data and using our best professional judgment under extraordinary circumstances. We continuously monitored the environmental effects of the explosion, fire and ultimate collapse of the WTC buildings. We made this data available as widely and as transparently as possible. Our public statements at every stage conveyed our best professional advice based on the most current data available.

See Appendix R Note 4

We continue to evaluate our response to identify improvements that can be made in how we manage and respond to future situations of this magnitude. A few weeks after the attacks, EPA commissioned a formal report, conducted by an objective outside contractor, to assess the "lessons learned" from these events. Many of the "lessons learned" that we have been implementing since 2002, anticipated most of those the Draft Report now highlights. We are making every effort to strengthen our planning and response systems to be as ready as possible for any unforeseen catastrophic event, and we are committed to continuing to provide the public with the best possible environmental information and assistance in times of national crises.

See Appendix R Note 5

The Report lacks sufficient acknowledgement of our efforts to implement our "lessons learned," and is flawed in its lack of recognition in other areas such as:

EPA's message was communicated to different audiences.

• For the "general public," EPA stated from the beginning that people living and working in lower Manhattan were not exposed to levels of contaminants in the outdoor air that EPA believed would pose a significant long-term health threat. See Appendix R Note 6
• EPA advised people experiencing acute health problems to see their physician, and stressed that workers at the site faced a higher risk and must wear protective respiratory gear (supplied by EPA and other agencies).

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• EPA also emphasized that people returning to dusty homes and workplaces should have these spaces professionally cleaned by asbestos contractors

The Report erroneously focuses on five early Agency press releases, neglecting the extensiveness of EPA's communications.

See Appendix R Note 7

• EPA undertook a massive outreach program, which included hundreds of medial interviews (print, radio, TV), participation in public forums, distributions of tens of thousands of fact sheets and handouts, and extensive usage of the Internet (including information in three languages).

An immediate and continuing problem in measuring and communicating environmental risk associated with the WTC dust/debris cloud was the fact that for many of the contaminants of concern, there were no health based standards.

• The need for such standards could not have ever been reasonably anticipated.
• Even for asbestos, the contaminant of greatest concern, there was no applicable standard covering the situation in Lower Manhattan.
• In exercising its professional judgment, EPA consulted with experts in environmental health and science at federal, state and local levels.

See Appendix R Note 8

Could things have been done better? Certainly. Were mistakes made? Without a doubt. But like other agencies of government in the wake of this event, EPA has reviewed its response, asked tough questions about its conduct, and begun the process of change and improvement.

To be a valid basis for planning, the Draft Report needed to capture the things that went right -- and the vast majority of our efforts did -- as well as what needs to be improved. This Report simply seems out of touch with the reality of what took place at the World Trade Center, and thus it trivializes both the horrendous event that occurred and the extraordinary efforts of EPA and other responders.

See Appendix R Note 9

By ignoring that good work, ,the Report leaves a bruised population wondering once again if their government properly served them at their time of greatest need. The fact is, the dedicated people of the EPA -- and government at all levels -- rose to the challenge of the World Trade Center disaster ... and performed out courage and distinction.

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EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse:
Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement
Draft Report
Office of the Inspector General

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Response to the World Trade Center collapse was unprecedented in the challenges it presented to federal, state and local emergency responders. EPA undertook immediate efforts to ascertain the presence of contaminants from the collapse and fires, and to assist FEMA and New York City in all phases of the subsequent recovery and cleanup. EPA's activities included sampling and analysis of ambient air and water; wash down and decontamination of vehicles; removal and disposal of hazardous materials; vacuuming of dust and debris from streets; supplying personal protective equipment; assisting Financial District in retrieval of electronic files/papers; and provision of data and health information to the public. To illustrate the magnitude of the activities conducted at the site, over 25,000 samples were taken representing 227,000 measurements of 692 potential contaminants. The initial response continued until May 2002 and at times, involved as many as 290 EPA and U.S. Coast Guard personnel, and 200 Agency contractors.

See Appendix R Note 10

While the report acknowledges the unprecedented nature of the response to the terrorist attack upon the WTC, many of its findings and recommendations imply that the response could have been conducted in a manner consistent with a standard regulatory approach, e.g. implementation of NESHAPs asbestos regulations. Further, the report does not recognize that the WTC response and clean up efforts were conducted in the absence of adequate background concentrations for the contaminants of potential concern, e.g., typical levels of asbestos or dioxin in an urban apartment. Having such information available would have greatly simplified the effort to delineate areas that were impacted and determine when indoor residential environments were cleaned to pre-event condition. Additionally, the report does not acknowledge the Agency's massive campaign to provide quality information to the public -- through hundreds of media interviews, tens of thousands of fact sheets and handouts and innovative use of the internet, including information in three languages. Lastly, and most importantly, the report fails to recognize the nature of decision making in a catastrophic emergency. We must accept that a future incident may involve a scenario o;r contaminant that we simply cannot foresee. This means that while work can and should be done to develop protocols, standards and benchmarks -- when an event of the magnitude of the World Trade Center attack occurs, many decisions will based on the best professional judgment of emergency responders from all branches and levels of government, through the leadership ranks of the Department of Homeland Security.

See Appendix R Note 11

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CHAPTER 2: EPA STATEMENTS ABOUT AIR QUALITY NOT ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED

Report Conclusions/Recommendations:


• Conclusion: "EPA's early statements about air quality were incomplete in that they lacked necessary qualifications and not supported by data available at the time. CEQ influenced the final message in EPA's air quality statements. Competing considerations, such as national security concerns and the desire to reopen Wall Street, also played a role in EPA's air quality statements. The "safety" of the air in Lower Manhattan after the collapse of the WTC towers is still being debated and studied. However, given the current lack of health-based benchmarks, the lack of research data on synergistic effects, and the lack of reliable information on the extent of the public's exposure to these pollutants, the answer to whether the outdoor air around WTC was "safe" to breathe may not be settled for years to come."
• Recommendation: That the EPA Administrator develop procedures for emergency risk communication to ensure that EPA's public pronouncements regarding health risks and environmental quality are adequately supported with available data and analysis.

EPA Response:

The EPA "statement" referred to in the report was made days after the attack, based on air sampling at seven sites surrounding the WTC site. The Agency knew, from testing conducted at the time of the 1993 WTC bombing, that asbestos was the primary contaminant of concern outside the WTC site. Following 9/11, the news media was filled with stories about possible asbestos contamination of the air. Tens of thousands of residents and hundreds of thousands of workers were displaced and scared. EPA's initial statement was made in direct response to the public's concern about asbestos contamination. The EPA press release from which the statement was quoted detailed the monitoring that led to the statement and made it clear that further monitoring for asbestos and other contaminants would take place. EPA subsequently made this and extensive additional monitoring data available on an interactive Web site that allowed people to track data at mapped monitoring stations.

See Appendix R Note 12

EPA never withheld data from the public and sampling results were reported out as soon as they were reviewed. Results were communicated in discussions with media representatives, federal, state and local officials, elected officials and interested citizens. The Agency did coordinate press releases with the Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ). This is neither unusual nor unexpected during a catastrophic disaster on the scale

See Appendix R Note 13

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of the WTC attacks. EPA acknowledges that there are lessons to be learned about how to communicate more effectively, especially in the difficult area of risk communication, and has made this a priority as it implements "lessons learned" from both 9/11 and the Columbia accident. EPA's Homeland Security Strategic Plan includes goals which commit EPA to use reliable information to ensure informed decision-making and to disseminate timely, quality environmental information to all levels of government, industry and public.

See Appendix R Note 13

Chapter 3: EPA's RESPONSE TO INDOOR ENVIRONMENT CONSISTENT WITH STATUTES AND REGULATIONS BUT MAY HAVE DELAYED NEEDED HEALTH PROTECTION

Report Conclusions/Recommendations:


• Conclusion: "For indoor environment concerns resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers, EPA had the authority to act under CERCLA but was not obligated to do so, Guidelines exist for determining whether an emergency response is warranted; however, these guidelines are not definitive. Under the NCP, it was within EPA's discretion to defer to New York City the responsibility for responding to indoor contamination concerns. EPA's action was consistent with the FRP, which is intended to supplement local government response.
• Although EPA acted within its discretion, a 1998 Presidential directive and the more recent National Strategy for Homeland Security task EPA with taking the leadership role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. EPA needs to work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to determine the nature and form with which the Federal government should assume a more direct role in addressing indoor environment concerns, under what circumstances this direct role should occur, and the oversight mechanisms to be employed when local agencies undertake such responses. In the WTC case, the delay in providing a government-organized and adequately mointored cleanup in Lower Manhattan may have contributed to unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants by unprotected workers and residents."
• Recommendations: That the EPA Administrator coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMa, and other appropriate Federal agencies, and those State and local governments having jurisdiction over potential terrorist targets to:

Develop protocols for determining how indoor environmental concerns will be handled in large-scale disasters, to include addressing:

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• The agency or agencies responsible for testing and/or overseeing testing of indoor spaces;
• Sampling methods to be used in analyzing indoor contamination;
• Benchmarks to be used in assessing whether the indoor contamination pose a threat;
• Under what circumstances government-assisted cleanups are warranted;
• How these cleanups will be funded; and
• The agency or agencies responsible for communicating testing results and appropriate cleaning instructions.

Develop and publish oversight criteria and State and local agency reporting requirements for those agencies involved in cleaning up buildings and other disasters.

EPA Response:

EPA disagrees that unprotected residents and workers may have experienced unnecessary exposures to asbestos or other pollutants as a result of delay in providing a government-organized and adequately monitored cleanup in Lower Manhattan. From the beginning, FEMA, New York City and State, as well as EPA provided advice to residents on cleanup methods (wet wiping/mopping, HEPA vacuuming) that has proven effective. In addition, residents with more than minimal dust, were urged to use professional, asbestos abatement cleaners. FEMA provided financial assistance to residents to enable them to relocate while cleanup was being done, and New York City provided guidance and cleanup requirements to building owners. All this took place in the absence of a "Government-organized cleanup." Subsequent EPA studies show that the basic cleaning techniques that were recommended were effective in reducing dust and reducing dust to below health based benchmarks where these could be identified. In summary, EPA feels that the advice and assistance provided was sufficient to enable the affected population to take appropriate action to minimize further risk.

See Appendix R Note 14

With respect to the outside environment, EPA provided personal protective equipment, repeatedly stated that workers at Ground Zero should use this equipment and were at greater risk than the surrounding population. Additionally, the Agency consistently raised concerns over the use of protective equipment to local officials. Additionally, EPA separately advised anyone with acute symptoms to consult with their physicians and acknowledged that sensitive populations, such as those with respiratory illnesses might react differently than the general population, and also should consult their physicians.

See Appendix R Note 15

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In summary, EPA's initial role in support of New York city and State officials in no way created additional health risk to workers or residents. In fact, EPA and other federal, state and city agencies responded to the best of their abilities to reduce potential risk as quickly and as reasonably as possible. EPA generally agrees with the recommendations concerning coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies, and that the topic of roles and responsibilities for all levels of government regarding potential contamination of indoor spaces should be further explored. The Agency further agrees that consideration should be given to possible identification of sampling methods, benchmarks, circumstances where government-assisted cleanups are appropriate, funding support and communications.

CHAPTER 4: ASBESTOS EMISSION CONTROL WORK PRACTICES INCONSISTENT

Report Conclusion/Recommendation:


• Conclusion: "Although many steps were taken to reduce asbestos emissions from the WTC site, problems were encountered in fully implementing the applicable NESHAP requirements for emergency situations, such as ensuring that trucks transporting debris were adequately wetted down before leaving the WTC site. Further, the placement of WTC debris, unloading and transfer operation near schools and residences compounded the potential impact of not implementing normally required NESHAP requirements. Given the likelihood that many buildings across the country may contain asbestos, EPA and State and local agencies need to establish improved monitoring and oversight procedures for ensuring appropriate NESHAP work practices are followed in responding to situations that cause widespread damage."
• Recommendation: The EPA Administrator ensure that EPA Regional and Headquarters personnel are aware of the "Guidelines for Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos," including its application in the event of future terrorist attacks or other disasters. EPA develop specific monitoring, reporting and oversight procedures for ensuring that federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate asbestos NESHAP work practices, including initiating enforcement actions when EPA observes violations of NESHAP work practices.

EPA Response:

In the immediate aftermath of WTC collapse and fires, "ensuring" compliant work practices was extremely difficult. This was not for lack of knowledge about what should be done, but rather as a matter of practically implementing these practices under extreme conditions of duress. Search and rescue operations were going on in the presence of

See Appendix R Note 16

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debris removal including removing molten steel beams from the site. Search, rescue and construction equipment surrounded the site. EPA worked with New York City and State agencies to set up truck routes, wet-down stations, on-site wetting of debris, wetting at the barges, and wash stations for workers on the pile at Ground Zero. Given the physical impediments and the intensity of the situation, it took time to implement best work practices fully. As the various federal, state and local agencies became organized in their response and set up communications with debris cleanup contractors, these problems were eliminated, to the maximum extent possible. With respect to the recommendations, EPA agrees that the regulations for NESHAPS should be reviewed to determine whether additional procedures are necessary to provide to federal, State and local responders. Additionally, the applicability of NESHAPS to disaster situations may need to clarified.

See Appendix R Note 16

CHAPTER 5: AIR QUALITY-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS NOT EFFECTIVE IN GETTING PUBLIC AND WORKERS TO TAKE RECOMMENDED PRECAUTIONS

Report Conclusion/Recommendation:


• Conclusion: "The public wanted better information about air quality than they received from government sources. A NYCDOH study, other lessons learned reports, and testimony provided at various hearings suggest that the public did not receive adequate air quality information and that individuals cleaned their residences without using proper procedures and personal protection. In addition, workers at Ground Zero may not have used respirators due, in part, to inadequate EPA and other government communication.
• EPA was one of many governmental and non-governmental agencies that communicated health risk to the public. The levels of non-adherence to the risk communications o;f these governmental agencies suggests that all the participating levels of government need to re-examine their policies, procedures, and practices for ensuring that the necessary precautions are consistently followed."
• Recommendations: That the EPA Administrator coordinate with FEMA and other applicable Federal agencies to clearly establish Federal agency responsibilities, roles and procedures during an emergency response that ensure that:
• Workers responding to emergencies are adequately protected by the development and strict enforcement of health and safety plans.
• Health hazard information is effectively communicated to emergency response crews.

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• Sufficiently detailed health risk information is effectively communicated to the public, including actions that the public should take to reduce their potential exposure to harmful pollutants.

EPA Response:

With respect to worker safety on or near the debris pile at Ground Zero, although OSHA had direct responsibility, EPA supported them in many ways. EPA immediately provided a large supply of respirators for the workers, followed by a long-term and concerted effort to educate workers about the need to wear the masks. Further, EPA's worker-safety message was stressed repeatedly in news releases, media interviews, public meetings and appearances, on the Agency's WTC Web site, in flyers and posters at the worker wash station that EPA provided.

See Appendix R Note 17

With respect to the public's reported need for better information, EPA and other federal, State and local agencies provided the most comprehensive and up to date information available. As mentioned earlier in response to Chapter 1, extensive air monitoring data was available on an interactive Web site and air sampling results were reported out as soon as they were reviewed in discussions with media representatives, federal, state and local officials, elected officials and interested citizens. While government agencies, including EPA, should examine risk communication tools and skills in emergency situations and make improvements, the public sometimes wants information that is simply not scientifically available, or is not available quickly. EPA feels that the efforts made in conjunction with New York City and State, FEMA and OSHA provided reasonable assurance that worker's and the general public's exposure to contaminants was minimized.

As the report acknowledges, EPA has initiated actions to improve risk communications to the public, and with regard to worker safety, is participating in a FEMA-led Interagency effort to provide uniform occupational safety and health policy under the Federal Response Plan.

CHAPTER 6: FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS CURRENT WTC RESPONSE

Report Conclusion/Recommendation:


• Conclusion: "Extensive ambient monitoring data collected after September 11 demonstrated that outdoor air quality levels around Lower Manhattan eventually returned to pre-September 11 levels. As such, EPA does not need to take additional actions to address outdoor ambient air quality concerns specifically related to the collapse of the
• WTC towers.

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• EPA, in cooperation with FEMA and New York City, has initiated a large-scale indoor cleanup. In our opinion, this cleanup should meet the minimum criteria for protecting human health that EPA has established for Superfund cleanups. Also, the indoor cleaning and testing program should employ aggressive testing in all residences and treat buildings as a system. Additionally, EPA should evaluate the potential health risks for pollutants of concern in work spaces and for geographic areas north of Canal Street, in Brooklyn, and any other areas where meteorological data show pollutants of concern may have been deposited."
• Recommendation: That the EPA Administrator ensure that EPA Region 2:
• Submit the revised "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks: document to TERA for a second peer review."
• Implement a post-cleaning testing program to ensure that, in addition to asbestos, the indoor cleanup program has reduced residents' risk of exposure from all of the identified COPCs to acceptable limits.
• Due to concerns over possible re-contamination of residences cleaned under the Indoor Air Residential Assistance program, EPA should treat buildings as a system and implement a post-cleaning verification program to ensure that residences cleaned by the program have not been re-contaminated.
• Work with FEMA and OSHA to assess whether the ongoing residential testing and cleaning program should be expanded to address potential contamination in work spaces in Lower Manhattan, or whether other measures need to be taken to ensure that work spaces are not contaminated with WTC dust.

EPA Response:

EPA, in conjunction with New York City and FEMa, has initiated and nearly completed a large-scale indoor cleanup under the Federal Response Plan -- not Superfund and the program has met the criteria for protecting human health. Under this program EPA did cleanign and testing in 675 building "footprints" as identified in the city's building inventory. From NYC records, there appear to be about 22,000 residential units below Canal Street. There are 2,323 building footprints which would also include approximately 1550 commercial buildings. If a cleanup program were expanded to include all of these buildings fo;otprints and the commercial space therein, it would be a monumental undertaking which EPA studies and data indicate is not necessary

See Appendix R Note 19

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First, the vast mass of dust and debris from the WTC collapse has been removed. This is a result of cleanup during the response actions, the Ground Zero cleanup, cleanup of building exteriors by the private sector and New York City. Second in 95% of the over 4,100 residences cleaned and tested or tested only, the asbestos in the air results were non-detect. Lastly, cleanup techniques of wet-mopping, wet wiping and HEPA vacuuming were found to be successful in achieving health-based benchmarks for WTC contaminants of concern. EPA focused upon a cleanup program for residences, because this is where individuals spend the most time and where the greatest need for assistance in conducting cleanup and getting reassurance was evident.

See Appendix R Note 20

Regarding the need for "aggressive" air sampling, EPA notes that scientists and physicians expert in environmental health issues advised EPA at a meeting convened by the New York Academy of Medicine in June 2002, that aggressive sampling was not a representative condition for testing and potential exposure. In addition, EPA's Confirmation Cleaning Study did not find a measurable difference in the use of modified or aggressive air disturbance technique in sampling.

See Appendix R Note 21

Lastly, EPA did evaluate the potential for health risks, qualitatively, for areas North of Canal Street, in Brooklyn, and beyond. The determination was that lower Manhattan was the principal impact area where the mass of building materials from the collapse was deposited and where the most fire plume exposure occurred. In addition, EPA's judgment is that commercial establishments had alternative sources of assistance to fund cleanup activity. EPA and OSHA have coordinated throughout the indoor cleanup program, and OSHA has agreed to investigate any complaints by workers in commercial establishments of dust exposure.

See Appendix R Note 22

With respect to the recommendation that EPA submit the revised "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment" for a second peer review, the Agency disagrees. EPA does agree that, as part of its efforts to develop indoor health based benchmarks, a protocol for establishing these would be usefully peer reviewed. Such a general protocol could take into account what was done for the WTC Contaminants of Potential Concern (COPC). EPA does not see any benefit to further peer review of the WTC specific document.

See Appendix R Note 23

With respect to the recommendation that EPA implement a post-cleaning testing program to ensure that, in addition to asbestos, the indoor cleanup program has reduced residents' risk of exposure from all of the identified COPCs to acceptable limits, the Agency disagrees. EPA believes that the health based asbestos in air clearance testing is effective in reducing the potential for risk related to WTC contaminants. The results of the Confirmation Cleaning Study support this, and the study results provide effective guidance for additional cleanup where there are continued concerns.

See Appendix R Note 24

With respect to the recommendation that due to concerns over possible re-contamination of residences cleaned under the Indoor Air Residential Assistance program, EPA should

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treat buildings as a system and implement a post-cleaning verification program to ensure that residences cleaned by the program have not been re-contaminated, EPA disagrees. EPA has done post-cleaning testing in common spaces, in residences. EPA does not believe further testing to assure there has not been recontamination is needed. The testing results to date do not show widespread exceedences; the vast amount of dust from the WTC and streets and buildings (exterior and interior) has been removed. Retesting would involve over 4,000 dwelling units with an average of 5 asbestos in air samples per unit, or at least 20,000 additional samples. Cleanup work in lower Manhattan has largely been completed.

See Appendix R Note 25

With respect to the recommendation that EPA work with FEMA and OSHA to assess whether the ongoing residential testing and cleaning program should be expanded to address potential contamination in work spaces in Lower Manhattan, or whether other measures need to be taken to ensure that work spaces are not contaminated with WTC dust, EPA disagrees. As previously mentioned, EPA focused upon a cleanup program for residences, because this is where individuals spend the most time and where the greatest need for assistance in conducting cleanup and getting reassurance was evident. Further as stated above, the Agency has no data to support the need for a massive testing and cleanup program in Lower Manhattan.

See Appendix R Note 26

CHAPTER 7: EPA SHOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Report Conclusion/Recommendation:


• Conclusion: "Although many organizations were involved in addressing air quality concerns resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that, ultimately, the public and others expect EPA to monitor and resolve environmental issues, even though EPA may not have the overall responsibility to resolve these issues or the necessary resources to address them. These issues range from collecting, interpreting and communicating environmental information to cleaning up any environmental contamination. EPA must be prepared to take a leadership role, within the evolving framework established by the Department of Homeland Security and existing statutes, in fulfilling its mission of "protecting human health and the environment," if another large-scale disaster occurs."
• Recommendations (summary):
• EPA should work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to share information on likely targets and threats and collaboratively develop approaches to address these threats.

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• EPA should define and clarify internal EPA organizational roles and responsibilities in responding to large-scale disasters. This should include designating teams of Agency experts -- at both the National and Regional level -- that can be mobilized to quickly provide needed technical support during a response. These areas may include specialized sampling techniques, exposure modeling and assessment, and risk assessment.
• EPA should develop and improve health-related benchmarks that can be used to assess health risk in emergencies (specific list recommended)
• EPA should develop an emergency quality assurance sampling plan to be used as a guidance for monitoring environmental conditions after a large-scale disaster. It should address monitoring objectives, sampling and analytic methods, and siting of monitors.

EPA Response:

With respect to the conclusion, EPA emphasizes that, at the WTC response, it certainly did exercise its opinions and judgments on matters impacting human health and the environment and will continue to do so within the context of its authorities and its role under the Federal Response Plan. With respect to the recommendations, it should be recognized that the Department of Homeland Security looks to EPA and other agencies to assist them in identification of potential targets and critical infrastructure. In fact, EPA has already provided much of the information recommended, to DHS. EPA collects the data under various legislative and regulatory programs and uses it to develop approaches and establish plans of action for protection of public health and safety in collaboration with State and local agencies. EPA generally agrees with the other Chapter 7 recommendations

See Appendix R Note 27

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 8:02 am

Appendix R: OIG Evaluation of EPA's Response to the Draft Report

Transmittal Memorandum


Note 1 -- We believe the report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations properly consider the unprecedented circumstances in which the response to the WTC tragedy was carried out. For instance, we point out the unprecedented nature of these events in the first line of the Executive Summary and the first line of Chapter 1. We do not believe that a response to such a tragedy can be conducted under a business as usual attitude. However, an emergency response should not preclude the Agency from following previously established guidance and practices regarding public safety and protection from hazardous substances conceived and designed to be applied in times of crisis. This position is consistent with the intent of EPA's Guidelines for Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos issued in 1992. These guidelines were issued after emergency responses to three incidents in 1989 focused attention on the need to consider asbestos along with other emergency response activities. Additionally, although the initial emergency response was carried out under trying conditions, as time passed the crisis nature of the response subsided and the Agency had the opportunity to consider its actions carefully before continuing its response efforts. For example, decisions regarding the approach to addressing indoor contamination evolved over time, after extensive deliberations, and well after the initial emergency response had subsided. We also note that, except for the recommendations in Chapter 6, the Agency agreed with the recommendations in five other chapters of the report, which does not suggest that we misunderstood the circumstances that the Nation, EPA, or the City faced following the disaster.

Note 2 -- We agree that the Agency should be proud of the response of its men and women in the aftermath of the WTC attacks and collapse. We also agree that the Agency's response was made under extremely trying circumstances as detailed in Chapter 1 of the report. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this report are in no manner intended to disparage the valiant contributions of EPA personnel, or those of any other responding organization.

Note 3 -- We agree with the need for coordinated federal efforts and the concept of centralized communications during a time of national emergency. In the report we recommend that EPA develop emergency communications policy and procedures which are consistent with the "Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication," the fifth of which is to "coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources."

We do not believe the report "goes to great length to erroneously criticize" CEQ's efforts "to coordinate health and safety communications." In accordance with the first assignment objective, the report appropriately examines the analytical basis for EPA's major public communications regarding air quality. To the extent that reassuring words were added to EPA's draft press release and cautionary words were deleted, it

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is important to understand the basis for such changes in the Agency's risk communications. The report also provides the former EPA OCEMR Associate Administrator's explanation for why EPA's press releases did not discuss health effects or contain a recommendation that residents obtain professional cleaning. Additionally, as noted by the former EPA Chief of Staff, factors other than protecting human health and the environment entered into the determinations of the information that would be communicated to the public, including national security considerations and the desire to re-open Wall Street.

Note 4 -- We agree that EPA made its data available to the public. However, based on the documentation we reviewed and our discussions with numerous environmental experts, both within and outside of EPA, we do not agree that the Agency's statement on September 18, 2001 that the air was safe to breathe reflected the Agency's best professional advice. In contrast, based on the circumstances outlined in Chapter 2 of the report, it appeared that EPA's best professional advice was overruled when relaying information to the public in the weeks immediately following the disaster.

Note 5 -- We applaud EPA's efforts to evaluate its response and implement changes. We believe the report sufficiently acknowledges EPA's efforts to implement its "lessons learned." The draft report's Executive Summary acknowledges EPA's "lessons learned" efforts and highlights specific actions the Agency initiated. In addition, Chapter 7 of the report discusses EPA's "lessons learned" efforts in great detail.

Note 6 -- We do not believe the report "is flawed in its lack of recognition" of the issues discussed. In regard to the absence of a long-term health threat, the Agency did not have a sound basis for reaching this conclusion at the time for the numerous reasons detailed in the report. Further, as noted in the report, the position that EPA took regarding WTC is inconsistent with the Agency's historical position that there is no safe level of asbestos.

In regard to the comment about the Agency advising people who were experiencing acute health problems to see their physician, no supporting documentation has been identified which shows that EPA instructed residents to see their physicians. We also provided agency officials with the opportunity to provide us with documentation which supported specific statements, but none has been provided to date.

In regard to EPA discussing acute health problems, we reviewed extensive information on EPA's risk communications, including all of the documents and videocassettes which were provided by Region 2 and EPA's Office of Public Affairs. We agree there were instances where documentation indicated agency spokespersons discussed acute health problems. However, as detailed in the draft report, EPA's press releases generally did not discuss potential acute health problems or the need to see a physician (except for rescue and cleanup workers at Ground Zero). The words "physician," "doctor," "acute," "symptoms," and "sensitive," do not appear in any of EPA's WTC press releases. Considering the totality of all the information we reviewed, it is our opinion that EPA did not communicate a clear, or consistent message on this subject. We agree that EPA advised rescue and cleanup workers to

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take safety precautions. This agreement is detailed on page 9 of the draft report and illustrated in Appendix P.

We do not agree that EPA "emphasized" the need for professional cleaning because this concept was not discussed in EPA's press releases. According to the OCEMR Associate Administrator, a recommendation to obtain professional cleaning was deleted from an EPA press release by a CEQ official. As detailed in the draft report, EPA's press releases referred the public to a New York City Department of Health web site which recommended that people clean their own residences and businesses using wet rags, wet mops, and HEPA vacuums.

Note 7 -- We do not believe that "The Report erroneously focuses" on five early Agency press releases. We reviewed many different types of information from many different sources including videocassettes which were provided by Region 2. We made extensive efforts to locate all relevant records. For example, by contacting the Administrator's Press Secretary and Scheduling Director, we were able to determine the date of a videotaped newscast which showed the Administrator advising the public orally about obtaining professional cleaning on October 26, 2001. Similarly, we worked closely with Region 2 officials and agreed with their analysis that EPA's web site recommended professional cleaning at least as early as December 11, 2001. In summary, although EPA's subsequent communications sometimes added information or clarification to the message presented in the press releases, the Agency's overall message of reassurance about long-term health impacts did not change.

In regard to the comment in the response to the draft report about EPA's "massive outreach program," we note, as detailed in the draft report, that a NYCDOH study, other lessons learned reports, and testimony provided at various hearings indicated that the public did not receive adequate air quality information and that individuals cleaned their residences without using proper procedures or personal protection.

Note 8 -- We agree there were no health-based standards for many of the pollutants encountered in the aftermath of the WTC attacks, and the report does not intend to find fault with EPA or any other government organization for not having developed those benchmarks beforehand. However, we do not agree with using certain criteria-based benchmarks -- particularly the NESHAP asbestos- containing material definition of one percent asbestos -- as health-related benchmarks when environmental professionals clearly acknowledge that this standard is not protective of health.

Note 9 -- The Agency is to be commended for its proactive approach to analyzing its response to the WTC collapse and initiating improvements to its emergency response capabilities. We disagree with the Agency's comment that this report "trivializes both the horrendous event that occurred and the extraordinary efforts of EPA and other responders." The primary objective of the report is to ensure that, if such a tragedy were to happen again; the public and emergency responders impacted by the disaster would receive the best available advice, protection, and assistance that the Government can provide.

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General Observations

Note 10 -- We agree that the Agency's response to the WTC collapse was unprecedented and enormous in terms of resources and human effort. Page 5 of the draft report acknowledged the many other activities -- in addition to the air quality related activities - -that EPA conducted in response to this tragedy.

Note 11 -- We agree that the Agency undertook extraordinary efforts to provide information to the public and we acknowledge that the documents we reviewed indicated EPA provided full disclosure of sampling results. However, in our opinion, the importance of Agency press releases should not be minimized. As detailed in the draft report, EPA press releases result from a deliberative process that should reflect the Agency's official position on significant issues. Press releases are made available to essentially all news media and may well be quoted or paraphrased in radio, television, and other forms of communication. In our opinion, the Agency could have provided more complete and more useful information in its press releases.

We also agree that future incidents may involve scenarios that cannot be anticipated. In order to address this possibility, the draft report recommends that EPA designate teams of Agency experts -- at both the National and Regional level -- who can be mobilized quickly to provide needed technical support during a response, and that the Agency develop expert panels that can be used to quickly develop health-related benchmarks in emergency situations.

Chapter 2

Note 12 -- We fully recognize the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the time the statement was made about the air being safe to breathe. However, for the reasons detailed in the draft report, there was insufficient information to support the statement made and the principle of acknowledging uncertainty was relevant.

We disagree with the assertion that EPA's statement about the air being safe to breathe would clearly be understood by New Yorkers as applying exclusively to asbestos. The press release sentence which preceded the subject statement asserts that New Yorkers are "not being exposed to excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful substances ..." The same press release also states that sample tests results are "below established levels of concern for asbestos, lead and volatile organic compounds."

Note 13 -- We agree that, to our knowledge, EPA never withheld data from the public, and the draft report makes this point (page 10). The draft report does not imply that it is "unusual" or "unexpected" for the Agency to coordinate with CEQ during a "catastrophic disaster." In such a situation we would expect EPA to coordinate with numerous government entities and any non- government entity that could provide needed services. However, we would expect EPA to remain fully committed to its

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mission of "protecting human health and the environment" during a catastrophic disaster. We understand that national security considerations or the desire to re-open Wall Street may affect certain communications. However, in our opinion, if such considerations cause EPA to omit or change statements that would otherwise have been made in its efforts to fulfill its mission, the Agency risks harm to its long term credibility as an authoritative source of health information for the public in times of crisis. EPA needs to acknowledge significant collaborations and, where necessary, qualify its communications appropriately. We agree with the goals of EPA's Homeland Security Strategic Plan which commit EPA to disseminating quality environmental information to all levels of government, industry and the public.

Chapter 3

Note 14 -- We agree that, from the beginning, EPA and other government entities provided advice to residents to cleanup indoor spaces using wet rags, wet mops, and HEPA vacuums. As detailed in the draft report, EPA's Administrator and various Agency spokespersons orally advised the public to obtain professional cleaning when the dust was in their residences was "more than minimal," "a heavy amount," etc. However, we note the Agency's web site referred readers to NYC guidance and that a NYCDOH press release reassured residents that it was "unnecessary to wear a mask" while cleaning indoor spaces, and if a HEPA filtration vacuum was not available, simply "wetting the dust down with water and removing it with rags and mops is recommended."

In regard to potential exposures to asbestos and other contaminants, we note that a study of immigrant workers used to clean indoor space contaminated with WTC dust disclosed that these workers were not provided with personal protective equipment. The study reported that these workers reported health symptoms including coughing, sore throat, nasal congestion, chest tightness, headaches, fatigue, dizziness, and sleep disturbances that worsened after September 11, 2001. Further, a NYCDOH survey conducted in October 2001 found that the majority of residents polled had not followed the recommended cleaning procedures of using wet rags and HEPA vacuums. With respect, to the effectiveness of the cleaning studies, we note that EPA's Confirmation Cleaning Study report dated May 2003 found that:

...one to three cleanings were necessary to reduce contamination levels to below health-based benchmarks, and the number of cleanings required generally correlated with the levels of contamination initially identified in the units.

We continue to believe unprotected workers and residents may have experienced unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants.

Note 15 -- We agree EPA repeatedly stated that workers at Ground Zero should wear respirators, and that the Agency raised these concerns to local officials as discussed in Appendix L of the report. However, EPA's advice that workers wear respirators was directed to Ground Zero workers at the debris pile, and not to workers who cleaned contaminated indoor spaces outside the perimeter of Ground Zero. In regard to EPA's statements

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that they repeatedly advised sensitive sub-populations and people experiencing acute symptoms to consult a physician, we note that these warnings were not presented in EPA's press releases. We attempted to verify the extent to which EPA advised these other groups through other forms of communication. For example, we reviewed briefing notes prepared for public meetings that EPA [sic]. These briefing notes showed that EPA officials intended to discuss sensitive populations at two public meetings in October 2001. We also reviewed newspaper and other news articles to determine when EPA publicly provided such advice. Based on the evidence EPA provided to us, and our own independent research, we were not able to conclude that EPA "... repeatedly advised anyone with acute symptoms to consult with their physicians ..."

Chapter 4

Note 16 -- We acknowledge the difficulty in implementing NESHAP work practices in the aftermath of the WTC collapse and agree that these work practices should not be implemented to the detriment of rescue operations in any emergency situation. However, even in the aftermath of an emergency, appropriate measures should be taken to the extent practical to reduce the exposure of emergency responders, clean-up crews, and the surrounding public to asbestos emissions.

Note 17 -- We agree that EPA conducted many activities to support efforts to alert Ground Zero workers to health-related issues, and we discuss these actions in Appendix L of the report.

Note 18 -- EPA notes that the public sometimes wants information that is not scientifically available, or is not available quickly. We agree that this may sometimes be the case. EPA guidance in discussing the 4th rule of the "The Seven Cardinal Rule of Risk Communication" states: "If you do not know an answer or are uncertain, acknowledge it and respond with the answer as soon as possible."

Chapter 6

Note 19 -- The Agency states that there are many residential and commercial buildings below Canal Street, and that a cleanup program including all of them would be a monumental undertaking that EPA studies and data indicate is not necessary. We agree that this would require a significant effort. However, the former EPA Administrator stated in September 2001 that the President made it to clear to spare no expense and to do everything needed to make sure the people of New York City were safe as far as the environment was concerned.

We agree that the vast amount of outdoor dust and debris has been removed, and thus exterior sources for contamination of indoor spaces have been significantly reduced. However, any indoor spaces contaminated with WTC dust that have not been cleaned using proper techniques will likely remain contaminated. The Agency notes that in

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95% of the residences that were cleaned and tested or cleaned only, the asbestos readings were non-detect. It is encouraging that 95% were non-detect. However, it is not clear which sampling methods were used in obtaining these readings, what asbestos levels were present in the remaining 5 percent, and whether EPA believes possible asbestos contamination in 5 percent of the residences is acceptable. See note 24 for our comments regarding cleaning effectiveness.

Note 21 -- Concerning the use of aggressive sampling, we agree that the use of a leaf blower does not represent normal activity in a residence. Neither does the use of a leaf blower represent normal activity in a school room, although the AHERA standard requires its use for clearing a school room after an asbestos abatement. Under a standard asbestos cleaning, all items in a room would be cleaned thoroughly, even documents as was done when cleaning a courthouse in Titusville, FL. In a private residence, especially when cleaning is voluntary and the owner can refuse to have individual items touched, it is extremely difficult to ensure that each item is cleaned of every microscopic asbestos fiber, yet this degree of cleaning should be the intent of the cleanup. Use of a blower prior to aggressive sampling serves to stir up the air, re-entrain dust and fibers in the air stream, and allow negative air filtration equipment to trap fibers that have been missed in the wet cleaning process or skipped entirely. It thus can be as much a cleaning procedure as a sampling procedure. We believe it is a necessary adjunct to the type of cleaning performed in NYC.

Note 22 -- We accept EPA's statement that Agency officials qualitatively evaluated the potential for health risks beyond the current boundaries established for the residential cleanup. However, if a future disaster were to occur, we believe the boundaries of any government-organized cleanup should be based on a systematic, quantitative approach to determining the extent of contamination.

Note 23 -- EPA issued a revised "World Trade Center Indoor Environment Assessment: Selecting Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks," as well as a "Response to Peer Review Comments on the Report." We note that both these documents cite the "World Trade Center Background Study Report" and the "Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study" which were issued in April and May 2003, respectively. Neither of these documents were available when the TERA panel peer reviewed the original COPC document in October 2002. In light of the significant, detailed comments that the peer review panel had on the original report, the detailed responses made in EPA's response document, and the fact that additional information is now available that was not available during the first peer review, we continue to believe it is appropriate that EPA re-submit the revised report, with newly issued supporting documentation, for peer review.

Note 24 -- EPA states the belief that "... health-based asbestos-in-air clearance testing is effective in reducing the potential for risk related to [other] WTC contaminants." We note that 82% of the residential units re-cleaned during the Cleaning Study [Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study, Vol. i, pp.113-114] had to be re-cleaned because the sampling filters were too clogged with dust to be analyzed. While we agree with the decision to re-clean residences under this circumstance, we

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also interpret this to mean that, after cleaning, the units were still too dusty to pass the clearance test over 80 percent of the time. This is evidence that the cleaning process, although conducted under close EPA oversight, was often not successful. We had no evidence that this cleaning process would be more successful under the oversight of others, nor that the risks from exposure to other contaminants would be significantly reduced when the residence passes the asbestos clearance test.

Note 25 -- Our recommendation applies to the interior building system in buildings with central heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), composed of furnace/cooling coils and condenser, plenum, filtration system, supply ducts, and return ducts or return open air plenums. We continue to believe that these buildings should be treated and cleaned as an entire building system rather than as individual apartments because of the high likelihood that uncleaned subparts of the system will re-contaminate the entire system when the system is re-energized after cleaning of registers/ducts in a single or small group of apartments. We do not believe the absence of "widespread exceedences" provides sufficient assurances that public health is protected. EPA's own regulations state that asbestos is a known human carcinogen with no known safe level of exposure.

Note 26 -- As indicated on page 9 of its response, EPA indicates that it has coordinated with OSHA throughout the indoor cleaning program, and that OSHA is prepared to address worker complaints. While we commend EPA and OSHA for coordinating on this issue, we continue to believe EPA, OSHA, and FEMA should assess the need for a work space cleaning program and formally come to an agreement as to whether or not work spaces should be addressed pro-actively by a cleaning program.

Chapter 7

Note 27 -- Based on the events that unfolded after September 11, 2001 it is clear that the public looks to EPA for its advice and opinions on issues related to the environment. We expect that the public and the Department of Homeland Security will continue to look to EPA for its professional advice and judgment on matters related to the environment.

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 8:04 am

Appendix S: New York City's Response to Draft Report Excerpts

THE CITY OF NEW YORK
LAW DEPARTMENT

August 4, 2003

BY FACSIMILE AND OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. Rick Beusse
U.S. EPA Office of the Inspector General
Mail Drop: N-283-01
RTP, North Carolina 27711

Re: City of New York's Response to Draft Evaluation Report: EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Lessons Learned, Assignment No. 2002-0000702

Dear Mr. Beusse:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the revised excerpts from the Draft Evaluation Report: EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Lessons Learned, Assignment No. 2002-0000702. This response is on behalf of The City of New York (the "City"). In addition to this response, the City requests that you consider the City's response to the initial excerpts that the EPA forwarded to the City. That response was made by letter dated July 7, 2003 from this office to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), a copy of which is enclosed, and was supported by submissions of documents by letters dated July 10, 21 and 22, 2003.

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Page 2
Mr. Rick Beusse
August 4, 2003

Before commencing on the excerpts that were forwarded to the City, we note that although this office requested the entire draft report so that the City would best be able to address the portions of the report concerning the City, only excerpts were supplied. Without access to the entire draft report to place sections concerning the City into context, the City is disadvantaged in providing comments to the excerpts. However, portions of the excerpts concerning the City compel a response by the City and the City hereby responds to the best of its ability, as follows:

1. The third sentence in the first paragraph on page 1 of the excerpts of the revised draft report is misleading. The sentence implies that the EPA assumed a lead role in responding to indoor environmental concerns because of criticism of the City. It implies furthermore that criticism of the City was warranted. The evidence does not support a conclusion that the EPA took a lead role with respect to this issue solely because of criticism of the City. There were a number of factors present at that time which appear to have influenced the EPA, including criticism of the EPA and the initial availability of federal funds at that time to address this issue. More importantly, there is no evidence that any criticism of the City with respect to indoor environmental concerns was warranted. Also, the sentence refers to EPA initiating a multi-agency task force at that time. This implies that this was the first time that federal, state and City agencies worked together to address this issue. The documents supplied by the City show that federal, state and City agencies worked together beginning September 12, 2001 to address a wide variety of environmental issues, including indoor environmental concerns. We recommend that the sentence be revised to read "EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency chaired a multi-agency task force to continue to address concerns about the indoor environment."

2. The City has similar comments with respect to the paragraph labeled "Indoor Contamination Response" on page 1. This paragraph refers to concerns raised by public and elected officials and specific criticism of the City. Again, including this criticism appears to imply that the criticism was warranted, particularly since the City's position is not presented. We note that in the same paragraph, where criticism of the EPA is set forth, the EPA's position is presented in rebuttal to the criticism. The City believes that the evidence does not support the criticism of the City. For example, criticism concerning delegating testing and remediation efforts to building owners and residents in unwarranted. The City did not delegate this responsibility to owners and residents. The owners and residents always have had this responsibility, it was never the City's responsibility to do this and consequently the City could not delegate what it did not have. Similarly, there is no evidence that the City did not enforce proper procedures for cleaning asbestos where it had the enforcement authority or that the City gave improper

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Page 3
Mr. Rick Beusse
August 4, 2003

advice to the public on testing and cleaning procedures. As noted in the City's previous submission dated July 7, 2003, the EPA adopted the City's advice to its citizens. Moreover, including these criticisms implies that there was asbestos in these buildings. There is no evidence to support a claim that any significant number of buildings were contaminated with asbestos. Both the sampling conducted by many agencies and the City's response to complaints concerning asbestos, where out of over 300 responses to complaints there was only 1 finding of asbestos above the threshold level, demonstrate that asbestos containing material was not present above the threshold level in these buildings. References to criticisms are also not appropriate for this substantive section of the EPA report. The City does not dispute that there was criticism, but the criticism is relevant to whether the City and EPA followed the appropriate statutes, regulations and procedures. While the criticism may provide an impetus for conducting an evaluation, it does not provide any substantive basis for the findings in the report. To include the criticism in the substantive portion of the report in the manner in which it is included erroneously implies that the criticism has been substantiated and is unduly prejudicial to the City. Accordingly, the City recommends that this paragraph be deleted.

3. Concerning the second sentence in the paragraph labeled "Initial Actions Taken by New York City and EPA " on page 1, although the City was not provided with the documentation, the City has been informed that there is EPA documentation concerning an alleged statement by the City that it would not be requesting federal assistance. The documentation, which appears to be quoted on page 4 and 5 of the revised report, refers to a conversation between the EPA and the U.S. Public Health Service and the New York State Department of Health, where these agencies allegedly relayed to EPA the alleged statement by the City. It is impossible for the City to comment on the source of the statement given its vagueness and the fact that it is not attributed to any individual or agency. The City can, however, confirm that the statement is contrary to its repeatedly expressed position that it welcomed any authorized federal assistance at that point in time. To include this statement and purport to characterize the City's position based on a single, unattributed, out-of-context statement is unfair to the City. This is not the type of reliable evidence that should be required to support findings in an Inspector General report, The City therefore recommends that the statement be deleted.

4. Concerning the last sentence in the first full paragraph on page 2, the City believes EPA Region 2's comment that it did not want to take a more assertive stance because it would create a confrontation is not valid for more reasons than just that EPA was the lead agency for Emergency Support Function #10. From September 12, 2001 to the end of the Response Effort, the EPA was thoroughly involved in the effort. EPA had a "seat at the table" as demonstrated by the documents submitted by the City. Moreover, there was a cooperative relationship between EPA and the City. The EPA provided support for the Response Effort's overall health and medical response, which coordinated both environmental health and worker safety issues. In fact, when at a point in time during the Response Effort, EPA suggested that its functions be transitioned to a contractor, the City urged the EPA not to do this and to continue to maintain an on-site

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presence and be part of the team. To suggest that EPA could not become more assertive or involved because it would create a confrontation is inconsistent with the evidence.

5. The first paragraph in the section labeled "New York City's Initial Response" on page 2 is misleading. It fails to mention that the City's policy and practice in the past was to hold building owners responsible for maintaining a safe environment and when necessary cleaning up their buildings. In other previous disasters, the federal government did not provide for federal funding to municipalities to clean privately owned buildings or property. The City consequently had no authority to request reimbursement for this activity and no authority to enter privately owned buildings to effect such a cleanup without the owner's consent or the finding of imminent hazard. Thus, the second sentence is misleading. We recommend that the first three sentences be modified as follows: "Consistent with past practices and federal law, building owners were initially held responsible for cleaning their own buildings. According to New York City officials, the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was discussed with FEMA and the EPA. Initially, the federal position was that the Stafford Act, the statute which provides authority for federal disaster response, did not provide direct funding to the City for cleanup of privately owned buildings. During this discussion, the federal agencies were informed that owners of privately owned buildings would be responsible for funding the cleanup of their buildings and agreed with this course of action. Building owners, who needed help, were directed to the Disaster Assistance Service Center (DASC) where they could apply for financial assistance from FEMA."

6. Concerning the first full paragraph on page 4, which begins, "NYCDEP officials told us ...," the paragraph is misleading in that there never had been a certification program to determine the level of compliance with NYCDEP instructions concerning cleaning of privately owned buildings. Also, the paragraph does not reflect the proactive efforts of the NYCDEP and the fact that NYCDEP not only told EPA it cleaned all of the rest of the buildings, but provided documentation. The City suggests that the first sentence be revised to read, "NYCDEP officials told us they have never had and did not create a certification program, nor did they have authority to create such a program, to determine the level of compliance with their instructions regarding the testing and cleaning of asbestos inside buildings. unless a complaint was made or an asbestos abatement notification was filed with the City." The City suggests that an additional sentence be added that states, "However, NYCDEP made significant efforts, including establishing an additional "hotline" to insure that residents could obtain information concerning asbestos cleanup and could report any asbestos related problems." We suggest that the last sentence of the paragraph be revised to read, "NYCDEP officials provided documentation that the remaining buildings were cleaned by NYCDEP with FEMA funding."

7. With respect to the first full paragraph on page 5, which alleges that New York City officials told EPA that the City would not be requesting EPA assistance with respect to sampling and reoccupation issues, without further information such as who the New York City officials were, or even what New York City agency they represented, it is

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impossible for the City to comment on the source of the allegation. Again, the City at that time was willing and eager to accept all authorized federal assistance. Moreover, as shown in the documents submitted by the City, the City had accepted U.S. Public Health Service and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) assistance in conducting indoor air sampling. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the City to refuse the assistance of the EPA -- another federal agency -- in this matter. In fact, EPA participated in the discussion with ATSDR concerning the protocol for the Indoor Air Study. The City has already commented concerning the alleged statement made on September 30, 2001, which is referenced in this paragraph (see item 3, above) and will not repeat its comments. The City recommends that the two sentences that refer to the statements allegedly made on October 9, 2001 and September 30, 2001 be deleted.

8. The City believes that the paragraph labeled "Multi-Agency Residential Cleanup Undertaken" on page 5 is somewhat misleading. The second sentence suggests that the sole basis for EPA's involvement in indoor air in February 2002 was that it believed the City could not handle all the issues involved in this matter. This is not accurate. First, EPA did not just become involved in indoor issues in February 2002. As shown by the documents submitted by the City, EPA was involved in indoor air issues as early as September 29. 2001. Second, there were a number of events that coalesced around February 2002 that brought about more involvement in indoor issues by the EPA, including, public criticism of the EPA and, perhaps most importantly, the initial avai1ability of federal funding for indoor cleaning of private residences. Therefore, the City recommends that the second sentence be deleted.

9. The first paragraph in the section labeled "EPA Role on Indoor Environment" on page 5 is misleading. It refers to the portion of the NCP which allows a state or local agency to take the lead role in the case of a hazardous substance release. However, in this case. the site was not declared a hazardous waste site. We recommend that a footnote be added to this sentence noting that the site was not declared a hazardous waste site.

10. In the first paragraph of the subsection labeled "Cleaning Instructions" on page 6, the report opines that as a result of the failure of the City to recommend that residents obtain professional cleaning, long term health risks may have been increased for individuals who cleaned their residences without using respirators and other professional cleaning equipment. This is speculation that is not supported by the evidence. Indoor air sampling data along with the "Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study," completed by EPA Region 2 in May 2003, confirm that the methods recommended by the City, and adopted in the EPA website, were appropriate. Accordingly, we recommend that this paragraph be deleted.

11. The last paragraph in this section is also inaccurate. The City strongly contests the current opinion of asbestos medical experts contained in the first sentence of this paragraph. First, a huge body of test results established that asbestos contamination in indoor air was virtually nonexistent. Also, the conclusion of the experts completely ignores the practicality of the situation, in that for respiratory protection to be effective,

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the user must be fit tested first and also that it is medically dangerous for an individual to wear a respirator without being medically cleared. Finally, the last two sentences of the paragraph are sheer speculation. There is no evidence as to how the individuals cleaned their residences. More importantly, as noted previously, there is no evidence of asbestos contamination in indoor air that would support the requirement to use abatement procedures or support the speculation that if abatement procedures were not used, health risks would be increased. Accordingly, this paragraph should be deleted.

12. Page 7 provided to the City is blank.

13. As a technical correction, in the first paragraph on page 8. the New York State Department of Labor, not the Department of Environmental Conversation, is delegated the responsibility for implementing federa1 regulations under the NESHAP program.

14. Concerning the first full paragraph on page 9 of the draft report. the City believes that given the prominent mention of the NESHAP notification requirement, this paragraph should include a sentence indicating that the EPA, because of its involvement, had functional notice of the demolition and everything concerning the demolition and that, as a practical matter, notification would not likely have changed the manner in which demolition was conducted. We recommend that the following sentences be added at the beginning of the paragraph. ""While the EPA and other agencies were not provided formal written notice of the WTC demolition activities, the EPA and other regulatory agencies had notice, in advance, of the demolition activities and the manner in which they were being conducted as a result of these agencies' invo1vcment in the Response Effort. EPA and the other regulatory agencies did not object to these activities and even if formal written notification was provided, it is doubtful the activities would have been conducted in any different manner."

15. As the only intact asbestos containing material encountered at the WTC site was below grade, the City recommends that the first sentence of the first paragraph on page 10 be revised to read. "Both NYCDDC and EPA officials told us that asbestos containing material (e.g., pipe wrapping. steel insulation) was only encountered below grade, and when it was encountered during removal it was tested and treated in accordance with asbestos abatement procedures."

16. The last sentence of the footnote on page 11 should be modified to provide a more complete explanation. The sentence should read, "Furthermore, they stated that the vehicles did not require decontamination since they were not transporting hazardous waste as defined by the EPA under 40 CFR Part 260-280. While decontamination procedures were not required, wash down procedures were mandated."

17. The first paragraph in the section labeled "Transfer of Debris to Barges" on page 12 is misleading and unfairly prejudicial to the City. It is based on citizen complaints rather than substantial evidence. The testimony of people complaining may be a useful starting point for analysis but it must be evaluated very carefully. This has

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not been done here. This paragraph, without any critical evaluation at all, seems to accept all of the complaints as true. The verifiable evidence available, however, suggests that the complaints are unfounded, Only one aspect of the testimony is true. The trucks transporting WTC debris were not marked as carrying hazardous waste. They were not marked in this manner because they were not carrying hazardous waste as defined by the EPA. This is just one example of testimony that should have been critically evaluated before being included in the report. Of more concern is the uncritical acceptance of trucks not being wetted down properly and trucks not being covered properly, both allegedly resulting in the release of dust. The area around Stuyvesant High School was among the most thoroughly monitored in the City. There is no data to show that this area was contaminated by the operation of the transfer station for WTC debris from trucks to barges in the vicinity of the High School. Thus, if there was a release of dust, it was so insignificant as to present no risk at all to health and safety and should not be highlighted in this report. EPA, itself, represents that air sampling concerning barge operations indicated that 99.83% of the samples were below the screening levels. The City consequently recommends that this paragraph be deleted.

18. The paragraph that begins at the bottom of page 12 should be modified. The last sentence reports that there was lead found in the ventilation system of Stuyvesant High School. The sentence also reports that it was not determined whether this lead was from WTC fallout. Environmental monitoring in lower Manhattan indicates that airborne lead levels averaged over 90 days (from September 2001 through November 2001) did not exceed the EPA National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) of 1.5 ug/m3. Given these results and the ubiquity of tetraethyl lead in urban environments from its use in leaded gasoline, it is very unlikely that the lead found in the ventilation system was from WTC fallout. Even if it was, this has nothing to do with the City's response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. While this may be of some academic interest, it has no place in this part of the report. The City recommends that this sentence be deleted

19. The first paragraph in the section labeled "Asbestos Levels During Demolition and Debris Removal" is misleading. It unduly emphasizes that after September 2001 there were 7 air monitoring samples which exceeded the AHERA standard. The paragraph fails to mention that EPA collected a total of 12,676 ambient samples in lower Manhattan for phase contrast light microscopy analysis and 8,872 samples for transmission electronic microscopy analysis. Considered in this context, the fact that there were only seven exceedances demonstrates that the response actions taken were appropriate. The report mischaracterizes the seven exceedances as showing the sporadic presence of asbestos in the ambient air. Given the extensive monitoring, less than one exceedance per month can hardly be characterized as "sporadic." We recommend that the paragraph be revised to delete the table showing the exceedances and any reference to the table be deleted. Also, the reference that two of the exceedances were near Stuyvesant High School should be deleted. Reference to Stuyvesant implies that this location should be given preference over other locations near the site. The fourth sentence of the paragraph should be revised to read, "Out of approximately 21,000

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samples taken from October 2001 through May 2002 there were only seven exceedances of the AHERA standard."

20. The second full paragraph on page 20 beginning, "The indoor residential cleanup program" is inaccurate. The second sentence states that the Governor of New York did not declare a public health emergency. In fact. the Governor declared a "general emergency," which is construed to include a public health emergency, Also, the fourth sentence states that the City indicated that an indoor cleanup was not necessary. This is not correct, At no time did the City indicate that an indoor cleanup was not necessary. In fact, early in the "Response Effort," the City inquired concerning the availability of federa1 funds to pay for such a cleanup. The City also widely disseminated guidelines. for building owners and tenants to clean indoor spaces. The City accordingly recommends that the second sentence be modified to delete the phrase, "and the Governor of New York did not declare a public health emergency for this incident." We recommend that the fourth sentence of the paragraph be deleted.

21. We strongly recommend that the respirator sections contained within pages 16 through 19 be completely taken out of this report. Work place safety and personal protective equipment are matters within the jurisdiction of OSHA, These matters are, therefore, inappropriate for assessment by EPA-OIG. Further, much of the material concerning respirators appears to be based on two reports that arc inaccurate, incomplete and insufficiently researched. If these sections remain in the report, we advise the following: The section entitled "Respirator Use at Ground Zero Lacking" should be changed to "Respirator Use at Ground Zero." Within that section, the first sentence should be changed to read: "A widely publicized aspect of the WTC response was the less than 100% compliance with requirements to use respirators by rescue and construction crews," since there was not a total lack of respirator use. The second sentence should be changed to: "It was beyond the scope of this review to determine the extent of noncompliance with respirator requirements and why this occurred" for the same reason. The fourth sentence within that section should read: "Our limited work in this area indicated that respirators were widely available but provisions of the site requirements for using respirators were not fully complied with for a number of reasons" since there was a plethora of respirators at the site. The sixth sentence contains several inaccuracies and should be changed to: "Other reasons appeared to include the respirators' interference, due to the state of the technology, with the ability of emergency workers to communicate and conflicting messages about the air quality at Ground Zero."

22. The section entitled "Reports on Lack of Respirator Use" on page 17 should be completely deleted because, while it purports to represent a total picture of site operations, it in fact presents a very narrow and skewed snapshot by the author, who was at the site for a very limited number of hours, and who misidentified a key City agency -- the Department of Design and Construction -- and its role in the rescue and recovery efforts. The bullet points should be taken out with the exception of the point starting with "During the September 22-26 period," because there were thousands of rescue and clean-up workers on the site and a DDC official monitoring safety at the site personally

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observed many who did wear respirators diligently. There are hundreds of photographs that depict the use of respiratory equipment and hard hats. Respirator use was tracked and enforced throughout the response to the disaster. In addition, this was not a hazardous waste operation. OSHA defines the scope of a "hazardous waste operation" as "clean up operations required by a governmental body, whether federal, state, local or other, involving hazardous substances that are conducted at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites." Although the debris produced by the collapse of the WTC did contain minor concentrations of various contaminants, including asbestos, fiberglass and alkaline cement dust, extensive sampling never indicated the presence of hazardous waste as defined by the EPA in Resource Conservation and Recovery act regulations 40 CFR Parts 260-280. In addition, there was an aggressive safety and health effort underway, spearheaded by the DDC and OSHA working in close collaboration. Beginning September 12, 2001, daily health and safety meetings were held and attended by multiple City, State and Federal agencies, including EPA, FEMA, OSHA, DEC, DDC DOH, DEP, FDNY, NYPD and OEM, together with the contractors' safety personnel, at which air monitoring and PPE protocols were discussed and established. There was a preliminary "Accident Prevention Plan" in place from September 14, 2001 through October 29, 2001, at which time the World Trade Center Emergency "Environment Safety and Health Plan" went into effect. Teams of safety and health professionals worked around the clock providing "direct intervention" to get workers to comply with basic safety and health requirements, especially the use of PPE. There were as many as 30 safety professionals on site each day. OSHA employees were constantly roving the site with safety equipment, and provided hands-on instruction and preliminary fit checking at IS 89 and at supply caches on the site. There are tens of thousands of documents which record these multi-agency health and safety concerns, many of which have already been provided to the EPA. Additional documents can be provided upon request.

23. On page 18, the first sentence beginning with "In contrast" should read as follows: "In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report noted that workers conducting WTC debris, sorting and inspection at the Fresh Kills landfill wore half-face respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvek suits." The language that the work at Fresh Kills was handled as a "hazardous wate operation" should be eliminated because WTC debris at the Fresh Kills landfill, and at Ground Zero, did not call for a hazardous waste response under OSHA or EPA standards, nor was it handled as such. The next sentence should begin: "The author opined" to avoid an erroneous impression that the reported information was an EPA finding. The sentence beginning "In other words" is inaccurate and should be replaced with: "The author's perception was the PPE use was more prevalent at the Fresh Kills landfill than at the WTC site." The report as written is again misleading in describing the debris as hazardous waste, and mischaracterizes the Fresh Kills landfill operation, which presented its own unique, multi-faced challenges, as "less hazardous."

24. On page 19 the first sentence of the first full paragraph beginning "As the rescue phase progressed," should be changed to read as follows: "As the rescue phase

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progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they were concerned about the less than 100% compliance with respirator requirements at Ground Zero and outlined these concerns in a letter to NYCDOH, dated October 5, 2001." The third sentence of that paragraph should read "The letter noted that EPA had recommended and continued to recommend that workers at the site wear respiratory protection, and that workers comply with procedures to prevent them from spreading debris from the site to their homes, cars, and other locations." Again, "decontamination" and "contaminants" language assumes a hazardous waste operation, and this was not such an event.

To make it easier to understand our proposed modifications to the respirator sections contained within pages 16 through 19, I have enclosed a copy of the excerpts from the draft report with interlineations containing our proposed language.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment concerning the revised draft report. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or my staff.

Very truly yours,

Kenneth A. Becker
Chief, World Trade Center Unit

Enclosures

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Re: EPA'S Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Chall

Postby admin » Fri Mar 25, 2016 8:05 am

Appendix T: OIG Evaluation of New York City's Response to Draft Excerpts

The following numbered notes respond to the numbered comments in New York City's response in Appendix S.

1. We agree that there were a number of factors that caused EPA to assume a lead role in responding to indoor environmental concerns, and that only presenting the criticism of NYC and not EPA would be misleading. Our draft already recognized that EPA was criticized as well and that this also influenced their actions regarding indoor concerns. The sentence has been clarified by deleting the lead-in clause that only cited criticism of New York City. The sentence now reads as follows:

EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency initiated a multi-agency task force to address concerns about the indoor environment.


2. We presented the criticism as background information that is necessary for the reader to understand the information that follows and to put this information into proper context. Regarding indoor asbestos contamination, evidence does not support the City's contention that there is "no evidence to support a claim that any significant number of buildings were contaminated with asbestos." Appendix K to our report points out that an October 12, 2001 study of two residential buildings -- one presumed to have significant WTC dust contamination and the other not -- found that both buildings had significant asbestos contamination, ranging from 6,277 to 10,620 s/mm2 in one building and from 141 to 379 in the other building -- all of which are above the 70 s/mm2 level. As we also point out, from September 2001 to September 2002 (when the indoor testing and cleaning program was implemented), many residents returned and cleaned their own residences, leaving it unknown as to the level of WTC dust contamination that actually was deposited in their residences. Further, EPA recent cleaning confirmation study report notes that one to three cleanings were necessary to achieve the health related clearance levels. We do not believe changes are needed.

3. We do not agree with removing the cited information. In our opinion, an EPA Regional Administrator's letter to a United States Congressman is evidence that we can cite in our report. Further, EPA's Situation Reports represent evidence we can cite as these are contemporaneous documents, that are completed soon after events are observed. We have included NYC's position on this issue by adding the following sentence to the paragraph:

New York City officials disagreed with the characterizations of their statements presented in these documents and told us that they repeatedly expressed the position that the City welcomed any authorized federal assistance at that time.


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4. No change is needed as this portion of the draft was removed during the editing process.

5. The City's position has been included in the final report as follows (revised sentences in italics):

Initially, building owners were held responsible for cleaning up their own buildings, including interiors and exteriors. According to New York City officials, the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was discussed with FEMA and EPA, and the initial federal position was that the Stafford Act (the implementing statute for the FRP did not provide direct funding to New York City for this cleanup. New York City officials said that during this discussion they informed the federal agencies that building owners would be responsible for funding the cleanup of their buildings and the federal agencies agreed with this position. Under this arrangement, owners of rental units were responsible for cleaning apartment walls, ceilings, and floors; common areas, such as hallways and lobbies; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, when deemed necessary as explained in guidance provided by New York City. Renters were responsible for cleaning personal belongings. In resident-owned condominiums, residents were responsible for cleaning their units, while building owners were responsible for cleaning common areas and HVAC systems.


6. No change is needed as this phrase was deleted during the editing process.

7. See response to note 3.

8. See response to note 1 where we explain that there were a number of factors that caused EPA to assume a lead role in responding to indoor environmental concerns. However, according to the EPA Chief of Staff, who was highly knowledgeable of EPA's reasons for becoming involved in indoor environmental concerns, EPA's reasons were as stated. Further, recognizing the importance of this information, we confirmed this and other information obtained from the Chief of Staff in writing.

9. A site does not have to be officially declared a "hazardous waste site" in order to engage state/local response. The NCP Part 300.500 contains the state role provisions. Nothing in this section precludes state/local involvement based on a formal declaration of the site. CERCLA and the NCP plainly allow states to respond on their own to non-NPL sites, and to decide whether to become the lead or support agency in Fund-financed sites. Nonetheless, NYC's suggested footnote has been added to ensure clarity in describing the response.

10. The cited sentence is based on evidence presented in the report which suggests that persons cleaning apartments that contained WTC dust may have increased their long-term health risks if they did not wear appropriate personal protective equipment. In regard to the "Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study," the study report notes that 1 to 3 cleanings were necessary to achieve the health-related clearance levels, with the number of cleanings related to the extent of dust in the unit. Further, the clearance levels

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were established to correspond to a 1 in 10,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer. As a matter of comparison, for a Superfund site cleanup the desired cleanup goal is a 1 in 1,000,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer with a minimum goal of 1 in 10,000.

11. See response to note 2.

12. No comment needed.

13. Suggested change made.

14. Section clarified by adding the following statement:

New York City officials maintained that EPA had functional notice of NESHAP related activities through its participation at these meetings and that it was doubtful that notification would have changed the manner in which these activities were conducted.


15. The report already points out that asbestos removal activities prior to September 11, 2001, were of accessible asbestos materials, not all asbestos materials. No change made.

16. The last sentence of the footnote was revised as follows:

They also said that the vehicles did not require decontamination since they were not transporting hazardous waste as defined by EPA under 40 CFR Part 260-280; and while decontamination procedures were not required, wash down procedures were mandated.


17. Testimony at EPA Superfund Ombudsman, Congressional, New York State Assembly, and New York City Council hearings is sufficient evidence to indicate a concern with removal activities. The OIG draft report presents a balanced discussion of this issue, as the testimonial evidence was supplemented with the results of ambient air readings in the area around the barge as well as a consultant's opinion on the impact this may have had on Stuyvesant High School.

18. Questions about lead contamination at Stuyvesant High School were raised in the news as well as at EPA Superfund Ombudsman hearings. This information was retained in the final report.

19. This paragraph was moved to Chapter 2 and revised during the editing process. During this process the specific statements questioned by New York City were eliminated. Further, the final report now includes the total number of air samples analyzed by the TEM method.

20. This paragraph was revised to eliminate the reference to a "public health emergency." The correct reference should be "immediate hazard." We retained the FEMA officials' statement about New York City's position on the formal indoor cleanup program because this was the position presented to us during our October 21, 2002 interview with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's Assistant Commissioner for

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Environmental Health. We have also retained reference to the memorandum provided by he EPA Region 2 Administrator. The questioned paragraph was revised as follows:

The indoor residential cleanup program was administered by EPA and New York City. FEMA officials told us that they normally do not fund indoor cleanups of private spaces related to a disaster unless an immediate hazard is declared. FEMA officials told us that New York City officials indicated a formal cleanup program was not needed. Therefore, in May 2002, the EPA Region 2 Administrator provided FEMA with a memorandum that furnished the necessary justification to authorize funding.


21. With regard to federal agency responsibilities, we agree that worker safety and personal protective measures are within the jurisdiction of OSHA. However, protecting human health and safety in an emergency is a shared goal, and one in which EPA actively supported OSHA. Additionally, EPA was criticized for its efforts in this area and may again face similar challenges in the future. Therefore, this is a legitimate topic for us to address in our report.

22. The cited report is a public document, issued by a Federal Agency, therefore it is sufficient evidence for us to cite. In addition, the report's findings related to safety measures at the site were corroborated by press accounts, our interviews, and reports from various officials present at the site. Further, we do not agree with New York City's interpretation of RCRA regulations. Asbestos, is a hazardous substance under CERCLA and, therefore, the OSHA definition of a hazardous waste operation as involving hazardous substances is appropriate. Therefore, we have retained this section in our report.

23. This section was revised to better reflect the cited report's information and to eliminate any misperception that the author's conclusions are those of our report. The section was revised as follows:

In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report noted that workers conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh Kills landfill were wearing half-face respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvek suits. The author noted that respiratory protection compliance by workers at Fresh Kills was reported to be approximately 90 percent as opposed to 30-50 percent compliance at the WTC site. The author observed that:

"...debris is pulled by workers from the smoking, twisted wreckage of the World Trade Centers and then wetted and hauled to a site where the debris is carefully sorted by workers wearing more protective clothing, much more consistently. "

Moreover, the author noted that workers at the landfill were officially informed that not wearing respirators would result in disciplinary action. OIG investigators from our New York office who participated in the recovery operations confirmed the report's conclusions about the difference in respiratory use between the WTC and landfill sites.


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24. We do not agree with characterizing respirator use at Ground Zero as "less than 100% compliance." We agree that the paragraph should be revised to directly quote the cited letter and to eliminate the use of the term "decontamination." The paragraph was revised to read as follows:

As the rescue phase progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they were concerned about the lack of respirator use at Ground Zero and outlined these concerns in a letter to NYCDOH dated October 5, 2001. This letter outlined the threat of potential exposure of workers to hazardous substances. The letter noted that EPA "has recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers utilize personal protective equipment and the personal wash stations to prevent the spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes, cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc." The letter stated that EPA had observed very inconsistent compliance with its recommendations, but did not have the authority to enforce compliance with non-EPA/United States Coast Guard employees. The letter concluded by recommending that the Incident Commander adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety Plan. A copy of the letter is in Appendix P.


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