Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of Se
Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:22 pm
Year / "Big picture" developments / Terrorist attacks and "tactical" counterterrorist actions / U.S. "strategic" responses to the terrorist threat / Other intelligence actions and issues
1993 / Bin Ladin in Sudan
26 Apr. [Intelligence warns that [ ] is increasingly convinced that U.S. is working for its overthrow, and may be preparing to sponsor terrorist attacks against U.S.
Interests in the country.
May .[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
26 Feb. World Trade Center bombing.
20 Mar. Sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway kills 12, sickens 5000. Aum Shinrikyo responsible.
23 Mar. Rendition of Abu Halima, suspect in World Trade Center bombing [ ] to FBI custody.
14 Apr. Iraqi Intelligence Service attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait thwarted.
24 Jun. Arrest of 8 subjects- including 5 Sudanese-plotting to bomb NY City landmarks-U.N. building, 26 Federal Plaza, and Lincoln/Holland tunnels.
2 Jul. Shaykh Abdel Rahman is detained by FBI in connection with the World Trade Center bombing.
25 Aug, Shaykh Rahman is indicted. Rahman is the spiritual leader of both Gama'at al- Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
2 Apr. [CIA paper characterizes UBL as Independent actor [who] sometimes works with other individuals or governments [ ] [ ] [to] promote militant Islamic causes throughout the region. . . " [His group almost certainly played a role in an earlier bombing directed against U.S. interests].
20 Apr. NID: [Hundreds of Islamic militants received training during the past year at military camps in Afghanistan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Sep. [CIA file summary prepared on UBL reports that [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Sep. CIA HQ sends requirements to overseas stations to assess vulnerability of UBL network [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
30 Nov. [Identification of intelligence targets associated with UBL and terrorist-related activities].
1994
[ ] Feb. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
9 Mar. UBL denies link with terrorism in interview with London-based Saudi opposition paper, Al Quds Al-Arabi.
14 Aug. Sudan hands over Carlos the Jackal to France.
Fall. Taliban movement established in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
11 Dec. Philippines airliner bombed. 1 passenger killed.
24 Dec. Members of the Armed Islamic Group seized an Air France flight to Algeria; they apparently intended to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. The four terrorists were killed during a rescue effort.
30 May. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
11Oct. CIA Office of Inspector General inspection of CIA's Counterterrorist Center finds that threats posed by some state- sponsored and leftwing terrorist groups have declined while threats from radical religious, ethnic, and non-government terrorist groups have increased. . . Biggest weakness was limited ability to warn of impending attack. Difficulty of penetrating terrorist groups caused this weakness..
1995
[ ] Nov. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
7 Jan. Philippine police discover Ramzi Yousefs bombmaking lab and arrest accomplice Abdul Hakjm Murad. Captured materials revealed Yousef's plot to blow up the Pope, U.S., and Israeli embassies in Manila, United Airlines aircraft flyjng Asian routes, and to crash a plane into CIA HQ. Murad also tells Philippine authorities that Yousef was involved in the World Trade Center bombing and planted bomb on the Philippine airliner in Dec 94.
10 Feb. Ramzi Yousef extradition from Pakistan.
19 Apr. Bombing of Murrah Federal Bldg in Oklahoma City.
Jun. Assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa. UBL- authorized operation. Linkages to Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Egyptian al-Gama'at Islamiya.
[-] Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[-] Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
13 Nov. Office of Personnel Management/Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh bombed. Five Americans killed in this incident. Information eventually suggests UBL and CDLR were responsible. [ ] [ ].
[ ] Dec. Ramzi Yousef associate and al-Oaida lieutenant Wali Khan Amin Shah is captured [ ] [ ]. He is deported to the United States and convicted. on terrorism charges.
25 Jan. CTC briefs NSC. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
2 Mar. President signs Presidential Decision Directive 35 providing overarching intelligence guidance. Terrorism is a Tier 1 B issue. Intelligence requirements: collection information on plans/intentions inside terrorist circles, increase Near East, South Asia, and Islamic cultural and language expertise, expansion of analytic cadre.
21 Jun. Presidential Decision Directive 39 supersedes NSDD- 207. Calls for reducing terrorist capabilities; aggressive IC program, including covert action; return of indicted terrorist to U.S., including by force if necessary, as a matter of highest priority. Also confirmed and clarified FBI's role in counter- terrorism.
Jul. National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism. Judges that foreign terrorists will attempt an attack in the U.S. in the next year or two. Bombing of World Trade Center crossed a threshold to more large- scale attacks. Most likely threat of attack in the U.S. would be from transient groupings of individuals similar to that drawn together by Ramzi Yousef. Threat also from established groups: Hezbollah, Gama'at al-Islamiya, Hamas, and Jama'a al-Fuqra. (Neither UBL nor al-Oa'ida mentioned. UBL is mentioned as a terrorist financier in a Mar 95 finished intelligence report from CIA's [ ] office)
Spring. [ ] provides most significant reporting on UBL to date [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ]Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ].
Late 1995. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
1996
Spring 1996. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Spring 1996. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
10 Jul. London daily, The Independent, publishes an updated interview with UBL in Afghanistan. UBL declares that the killing of Americans in the Khobar Towers bombing marked the beginning of the war between Muslims and the U.S.
23 Aug. UBL issues a "fatwa" authorizing attacks against Western military targets in the Arabian Peninsula.
3-4 Sep. Operation Desert Strike. Cruise missile strikes against Iraq.
11 Sep. Egyptian government issues an arrest warrant for UBL based on UBL's longtime support of Egyptian terrorist groups like EGI and EIJ.
Sep. Taliban comes to power in Aghanistan; takes Kabul.
Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[Winter. Information indicates UBL considers jihad worldwide.]
Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Feb. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Spring 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Spring 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
26 May. Saudi government extends formal recognition of the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The decision immediately follows reports that the Taliban have extended their control into northern Afghanistan.
Late 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
25. Jun. Khobar Towers bombing. l19 U.S. service members killed. [A June 2001 U.S. Indictment charged that the Saudi Hezbollah, with support from Iran, carried out the attack. According to the indictment, Iran and its surrogate, the Labense Hezbollah, recruited and trained the bombers, helped direct their surveillance and assisted in planning the attack].
31 Oct. Kenyan authorities arrest and later deport [ ] [ ] [ ] reportedly connected to a terrorist plot against the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.
8 Jan. [UBL] station established in CTC.
15 Feb. U.S. Embassy Khartoum closes.
24 Apr. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Directs Secretary of State, in conjunction with Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury to designate any organization that meets certain criteria as a foreign terrorist organization (criteria: must engage in terrorist activity that threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States).
[ ] Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
2 Aug. DCI briefs Democratic leaders: the terrorist threat is increasing, it is a national security issue and human intelligence is at the heart of the effort against terrorism.
22 Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
28 Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Early 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
10 Apr. [DDO briefs SSCI on covert action. UBL unit is running [ ] operations. It is focusing these operations to collect data that can be used to build target packages, which, in turn, can be used in future contingencies to render UBL and/or dismantle the ability of his organization to wage terrorism. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Apr. Update to 1995 terrorism National Intelligence Estimate.
Spring 1997. Foreign liaison service says it is studying the early 1997 proposal for a joint operation [ ].
Nov. Secretary Albright trip to South Asia.
[ ] Apr. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] May. [ ] [ ] [ ]
[Summer 1996. A volunteer claimed that [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Summer 1996. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Summer 1996. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[Late 1996. [ ] reports [ ] indicate that UBL is much more of a terrorist- rather than just a terrorist financier- than the CIA has previously thought. Reporting provides significant new details about UBL and his terrorist support infrastructure known as "Al Qaeda." [Note: first reference to Al Oaeda].
[Late 1996. Bin Ladin Unit develops most detailed information yet regarding UBL's intentions].
[ ] Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
30 Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] One number in Kenya is associated with significant UBL- related activities and individuals, including Wadi el- Hage, one of UBL's most important lieutenants. El-Hage is a dual U.S.- Lebanese citizen.
Early 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Feb. CTC has identified Muhammed Atef as UBL's key lieutenant. Alias Abu Hafs al- Masri.
Spring 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ].
[Fall 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Late 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [].
Late 1997. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
1998
23. Feb. Bin Ladin fatwa calling for jihad against U.S. military and civilian targets anywhere in the world. Fatwa represents a shift from criticizing the states in the region and attacks the U.S. instead.
16 Mar. Letter sent from UBL to Egyptian press complaining about U.S. occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. "Let them rest assured of the weakness and cowardice of American Soldiers. They are fastest to fail and least persevering in the fire of war. We will never forget how they disappeared in the wake of Riyadh and Khobar incidents."
May 11-13. India conducts nuclear tests. Pakistan conducts nuclear tests May 28.
26 May. UBL press conference. UBL declared his supporters would strike U.S. targets in the Gulf. Indicated the results of his jihad would be "visible" within weeks. He also talked about "bringing the war home to America." [Note: this is possibly a call for attacks in the U.S.]
12. Jun. In an interview with a U.S. journalist, UBL indicates he may attack a U.S. military passenger aircraft using antiaircraft missiles. At a press conference in the previous month, he indicated the results of his jihad would be "visible" within weeks.
[ ] Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ].
Jul. UBL remains in Afghanistan, changing his location frequently. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. He remains on good terms with the Taliban, [Unconfirmed reporting] claimed UBL was considering attacks in the U.S.
21-23 Aug. [Media reports concerning UBL electronic communications.
1 Dec. Intelligence Community assessment of UBL ... "UBL is actively planning against U.S. targets and already may have positioned operatives for at least one operation ... Multiple reports indicate UBL is keenly interested in striking the U.S. on its own soil. According to [ ] [ ], Al Qaeda is recruiting operatives for attacks in the U.S. but has not yet identified potential targets."
17 Dec. Operation Desert Fox. Strikes against Iraq.
Late Dec. "It is a religious duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction to defend Muslims," according to a UBL interview in Christmas 1998. UBL has been seeking CBRN materials, expertise and other resources since the early 1990s.
Jan-Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
May. Police in Europe arrest 60 members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GI) to pre-empt threats to the coming World Cup in Paris.
Jun. Officers [ ] [ ] raid homes and NGO offices of Mustafa Majid and Mohammed Fouda [ ] linked to UBL. [ ] [ ] [ ].
Summer 1998. Liaison service captures [ ] a member of a UBL cell in Europe. [ ] [ ] [ ].
7 Aug. UBL bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. 224 killed, 5000 injured.
20 Aug. U.S. military strike against UBL terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and pharmaceutical plant in Sudan suspected of producing chemical weapons.
Fall 1998 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
21 Aug. [Recap: DCI eight committee briefing regarding why CIA concluded that UBL was responsible for the bombings in Afrida. DCI noted large number of renditions of UBL supporters].
[ ] Sep. [ ] [ ], Abu Hajer, who is head of UBL's computer operations and weapons procurements, was arrested abroad. Hajer is the most senior-level UBL operative arrested to date.
18 Sep. DCI briefs members of Congress on bombings. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] DCI noted that the FBI is following 3 or 4 Bin Ladin operatives in the U.S.
[ ] Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
28 Jan. DCI Worldwide Threat Brief. "... issues range from the proliferation of WMD to international terrorism, drug trafficking, information warfare, and international financial turmoil..." "In addition to traditional terrorist groups, the U.S. faces an increasing threat from transnational groups, such as UBL's organization..."
6 Mar. C/CTC, et al., brief Congressional staff on the CTC strategic plan for FY98 ..." [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Apr. U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Richardson visits Kabul and Sherbergan.
18 May. [ ] [ ] [ ]
22 May. President signs PDD-62 on counter-terrorism and PDD-63 on infrastructure protection [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] PDD-63 establishes the national infrastructure Protection Center.
10 Jun. UBL indicted by federal grand jury, Southern District of New York. Sealed indictment. Conspiracy to destroy national defense utilities.
[ ] Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
2 Sep. DCI testimony to SSCI/HPSCI. "Key elements of CIA's offensive strategy against UBL include: hit UBL's infrastructure; work with liaison to break up cells and carry out arrests; disrupt and weaken bin Ladin's businesses and financies; [ ] [ ]; recruit or expose his operatives; ... pressure on the Taliban; and enhancing unilateral capability to capture him.
4 Nov. Bin Ladin and Mohammed Atef Indicted in Southern District of New York. Also announcement made of reward for the two under State Department rewards program.
4 Dec. DCI memo. "We are at war ... I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community."
[ ] Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
10 Mar. C/CTC briefs SSCI staff. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[Summer [ ] [ ] suggest UBL is planning attacks in the U.S. [ ] says plans are to attack in NY and Washington. Information mentions an attack in Washington probably against public places. UBL probably places a high priority on conducting attacks in the U.S. ... CIA has little information about UBL's operatives in the U.S.]
Summer 1998. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Summer 1998. [ ] [ ] [Information indicates that UBL is interested in publicity and attacks involving mass casualties].
29 Jul. CTC warns of possible Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack by UBL. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Sep. [Information indicates UBL has considered conducting attacks in the U.S. The near-term threat to Americans is greater in Europe, where UBL's infrastructure is better established].
[Fall 1998. [ ] claimed that UBL's next target would possibly involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it].
Fall 1998. [Information indicates al-Qa'ida is trying to establish an operative cell within CONUS to strike at the heart of U.S. interests and [ ] [ ] [ ] trying to recruit U.S. citizen Islamists and U.S.-based foreign nationals. No targets were mentioned but NYC was cited as a center of recruitment efforts].
Fall 1998. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Fall 1998. [Collection against UBL satellite phone ends, following media leaks].
Fall 1998. [UAE UBL cell is attempting to recruit a group of 5 to 7 young men from the United States to travel. to the Middle East for training. This is in conjunction with planning to strike U.S. domestic targets.
The report also mentions UBL affiliates in major U.S. cities].
Fall 1998. Several reports note that UBL is considering a new attack, using biol.ogical toxins in food, water, or ventilation systems of U.S. embassies. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Dec. [ ] reports member of UBL was planning operations against U.S. targets. Plans to hijack U.S. aircraft proceeding well. Two individuals [ ] [ ] had successfully evaded checkpoints in a dry run at a NY airport [ ] [ ] [ ]
1999
17 Feb. Operation Noble Anvil. U.S. combat operations against Serbia due to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
Spring [ ] [ ] the Taliban's fear of airstrikes had led the group to press UBL to act more discreetly. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Spring, [ ] UBL supporters in Afghanistan are experimenting with enhancing conventional explosives with radioactive material. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jun. [ ] [ ] began staging first operation to attack a U.S. ship in Yemen.
Jul. Kargil crisis. Kashmir.
[ ] Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jul. [ ] [ ] the Taliban leadership reaffirmed its commitment not to oust UBL.
Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Al Qaeda's capabilities have suffered from arrests of key operatives.
24 Aug. A truck bomb exploded at Mullah Omar's compound in Afghanistan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Aug. Bin Ladin's organization has decided to target high-ranking U.S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence, though no particular plans have been made or approved [ ].
12 Oct. Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Musharraf ousts Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless military coup.
Fall 1999. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Late 1999. Al-Mihdar at UBL camp in Afghanistan.
Winter. Muhammad Atta reportedly sighted at UBL facility in Afghanistan. Marwan al-Shehhi at the UBL guesthouse in Kandahar [ ] [ ].
[ ] Jan. [Arrests [ ], including 2 senior operatives, have provided leads to potential targets. Information indicates U.S. naval facility was the principal target. Some terrorist planning continues, including one operation abroad and another in connection with associates in a foreign country. Another report states that [ ] plans an attack soon.
24 Jun. Eight Iraqis tied to al-Qaida arrested in Amman based on tip [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Aug. [ ] [ ].
[ ] Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Nov. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Dec. [Foreign authorities arrested a [ ] team of terrorists which planned New Year's Eve attack on pilgrims in Jordan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Members of the team have direct links to al-Qa'ida [ ] [ ] [ ]
Dec. Senior al-Qaida operatives [ ] detained based on CIA information. [ ] confirm [ ] involvement in facilitating explosives and poisons training for UBL operatives.
Dec. 14. Ahmed Ressam arrested at U.S.-Canadian border with bomb-making chemicals and detonator components. Intended target was Los Angeles International Airport.
[ ] Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Dec. Disruption operations:
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
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[ ] [ ] [ ]
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
4 Jan. U.S. Attorney General approved establishment of the National Threat Warning System.
Feb. State Department demarches Taliban for supporting UBL [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Feb. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
7 Jun. Director FBI puts Bin Ladin on FBI's "10 Most Wanted List."
24 Jun. DCI at SSCI hearing: "...We have seen numerous reports that Bin Ladin and his associates are planning terrorist attacks against U.S. officials and facilities in a variety of locations, including in the U.S."
[ ] Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jul. Tashkent diplomatic efforts on Afghanistan to influence Taliban, persuade it to expel UBL.
Jul. CTC rethinking disruption operations [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Sep. CTC has engaged with SOCOM and JSOC in capture discussions. JSOC has been tasked to begin planning.
10 Sep. [CTC conference on UBL. "We are at war with UBL. We have been working against UBL for over four years ... during this period, we have been able to:
٠Stop at least two UBL attacks against U.S. interests abroad
٠Render over 30 foreign nationals abroad
٠Significantly damage UBL's infrastructure
٠Put doubt in UBL's mind about security of his operations and operatives]
Oct. 8 State Department designates Al Qaeda a foreign terrorist organization. Current state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, Cuba.
15 Oct. UN deplores provision of safe haven to UBL and demands his rendering to some country. On 14 Nov. 99, sanctions are to begin which ban most foreign flights of Ariana except for humanitarian need adn the Hajj. Freezes funds for Taliban except on humanitarian groups.
[ ] Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
21 Nov. FBI elevates counter-terrorism to a standing division within FBI HQ separate from the National Security Division. FBI has 26 JTTFs in operation.
[ ] Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
20 Dec. [DCI sends report on Milennium threat to all liaison services. The item describes arrest of Algerian in Seattle and mounting evidence that UBL and other extremists intend to launch attacks against U.S. interests abroad and at home].
Jan. Counterterrorism supplemental enables NSA to initiate development [ ] [ ].
[ ] Jan.[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
May [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
23 Aug. A cooperating witness in the Africa bombings case mentioned that a former U.S. Special Forces member from California, Ali Mohammed, provided training to UBL operatives in Africa and a bombing suspect in Haroun.
27 Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
26 Oct. CTC's priorities are disrupting UBL operations and recruiting penetrations; [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
8 Dec. According to CTC, accepting the theory that UBL wants to inflict maximum casualties, cause massive panic, and score a psychological victory, then UBL may be seeking to attack between 5 and 15 targets on the Millennium. "Because the U.S. is UBL's ultimate goal ... we must assume that several of these targets will be in the U.S. ..."
[ ] Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
2000
5 Jan. Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi hold meetings with a senior UBL field operative in Malaysia and Bangkok between 5 and 8 Jan. 2000.
[ ] Mar. [UBL planning operations to kidnap U.S. diplomats or civilians in [ ] [ ] to hold as bargaining chips. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Mar. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
1 Jul. Atta and Al-Shehhi begin flight training at Huffman Aviation and Jones Flying Services.
[ ] Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
30 Sep. Taliban issued press statement on unknown aircraft seen over Kandahar allegedly looking for UBL.
[ ] Oct. [UBL reportedly forced to postpone bombing of [ ] U.S. embassies. Still planning attacks in several locations [ ] [ ]. Targets include U.S. facility abroad].
21 Dec. Hijackers Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi receive their pilots' licenses.
19 Apr. [Bin Ladin organization is assessed to be in the throes of advanced preparations for a major attack, most probably on an American or Israeli target. The information does not mention the target of the attacks, nor the venue or dates. At the hub of activity is an al-Qa'ida figure. Target and date uncertain. The information implies a bomb against a major target].
23 Apr. The second wave of 9-11 hijackers arrives throughout the easter seaboard between late April and late Jun. 2001.
May. [ ] [ ] extensive efforts [ ] to get a videotape of UBL the widest public airing. Just before East Africa bombings, UBL used media to predict news to [ ].
[Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jun. Reporting [ ] [ ] indicated operatives linked to UBL's organization expect their near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences such as destabilizing governments or causing major casualties.
4. Jul. Mihdhar enters U.S. at JFK Airport.
Jul. Extremists associated with UBL [ ] continued to expect imminent attacks on U.S. interest but operational delays may persist, probably in response to enhanced U.S. security measures.
Jul. [Reports indicate UBL planning unspecified attacks on U.S. facilities abroad].
Jul. [Over the last [ ] weeks, there have been over 25 reports alluding to an impending attack. Never before has the Intelligence Community seen so many indicators.].
Aug. Clandestine [ ] [ ] and media reports indicate UBL has wanted to conduct attacks in the U.S. since 1997 ... Al-Qa'ida members -- including some who are U.S. citizens -- have resided in or traveled to the U.S. for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks.
3 Aug. The IC continues to estimate that [ ] extremists associated with Al Qaeda are now prepared to conduct one or more terrorist attacks at any time. The IC continues to believe that the most likely locales for such attacks are on the Arabian Peninsula, the Middle East and Europe.
25 Aug. Between 25 and 31 Aug. 9/11 hijackers buy tickets for Sep. 11, 2001.
Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
9 Sep. Assassination of Afghan Northern Alliance Leader Masood by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists.
3 Jan. Bombing of USS The Sullivans aborted. An explosives-laden boat sank as it was launched in Aden harbor.
Jan. Al-Qaida operative [ ] detained at CIA behest. He is deported and admits he has received training at Al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan.
Feb. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
3 Mar. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Apr. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Oct. [Four foreign extremists with links to UBL arrested abroad and then released due to insufficient evidence].
12 Oct. USS Cole bombing. Aden, Yemen. 17 U.S. sailors killed.
13 Oct. Explosion damages UK Embassy in Yemen.
Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Nov. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
10 Nov. [ ] FBI rendition of al-Qaida operative based in Africa.
Fall 2000. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Dec. North Africans in Frankfurt, Germany Meliani Group arrested. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
15 Feb. Recap: Since May 98, more than [ ] terrorists captured and delivered to U.S. or foreign law enforcement. Since summer 2000, these have included: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
19 Feb. Four persons associated with UBL network arrested in Frankfurt, German.
[ ] 1 Feb. [ ] confirms press accounts of two arrests in Yemen regarding USS Cole. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Feb. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Feb/ [ ] [ ] extremist tied to Ahmed Ressam, had been arrested [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Apr. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Apr. [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] April [ ] [ ] [ ]
Spring 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] May [Foreign authorities seize terrorist suspect. Links to Ressam Millennium cell].
May. UK law enforcement officials released all of the Algerian extremists who were recently arrested in London. [ ] [ ] [ ] One [ ] [ ] [ ] was immediately re-arrested on a French warrant. The leader of the cell [ ] also was re-arrested on immigration charges pending possible deportation. Both individuals had prior knowledge of Ressam's abortive attack on LAX.
[ ] May. [Spanish police arrested Frankfurt terrorist cell member].
[ ] May. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ], a Middle East service arrested [ ] suspected terrorists in their involvement in planning of terrorist attacks against diplomatic personnel and/or interests [ ] [ ].
Jun. [Foreign officials arrested [ ] individuals who [ ] are members of Al Qaeda organization and were planning to bomb the U.S. embassy and other U.S. facilities [ ] [ ].
Jul. British re-arrest Algerian [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] knew of Ressam's terrorist plans. Ressam said UBL was aware of his terrorist plans and intentions in the U.S.
Jul. [ ] [ ] a cell of international Islamic extremists [ ] [ ] [ ] involved in anti-U.S. terrorist planning. Even with the arrests, attacks may still be planned [ ] [ ] [ ].
Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jul. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
16 Aug. Zacarias Moussaoui detained by INS.
Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ]
11 Sep. World Trade Center/Pentagon/Stony Creek attacks.
7 Oct. Operation Enduring Freedom commences.
[ ] Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
16. Jul. CTC briefing to House Committee on Government Operations and Reform. C/CTC lists accomplishments, i.e. [ ] disruptions of terrorists' organizational planning over the past two years. Helped render more than 30 terrorists in other countries since [ ], more than half of whom were associates of UBL's Al Qaeda.
19 Dec. Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1333 strongly condemning use of Afghanistan under control of Taliban for sheltering and training terrorists and demands its cessation. Also demands, per UNSCR 1267 (1999) that Taliban turn over UBL to appropriate country where he is indicted, etc., and close all terrorist camps under Taliban control. Issues list of sanctions including arms embargo, freezing of UBL and Al Qaeda assets, and other economic sanctions.
6 Feb. DCI classified worldwide threat breif: "...this year the thrust of terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities and interests come to the forefront ... UBL, his associates remain most immediate and serious threat. UBL's commitment to striking against the U.S. undiminished ... strong indications planning new operations ... capable of mounting multipole attacks with little or no warning."
6 Feb. Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB): The discovery of multiple terrorist plots since October shows an energized international "jihad movement" is raising the threat to U.S. interests, particularly in the Middle East and Europe. Most significant spike in activity since the time of the Millennium. Stems in part from changes in bin Ladin's practices. To avoid implicating himself and his Taliban hosts, he has allowed cells in his network to plan attacks more independently.
9 Feb. As a result of an evaluation by the USS Cole task force, DCI has directed CTC to form a strategic analysis group to help put context into threat reporting and to think out of the box.
10 May. DCI tells Senate Appropriations Committee hearing terrorism is on the rise especially against the U.S. Eighty percent increase since 1998. Strategic initiative is to pre-empt terrorist plans, and it is paying off with disruptions that include[s] and bin Ladin plots Despite successes, limits to what we can do. Generally not have specific time-and-place warning of attacks. Likely to be attack against U.S. interests over the next year.
5 Jun. DC/CTC briefing for HPSCI" "What worries me is that we're on the verge of more attacks that are larger and more deadly -- not necessarily CBRN, but could go that way also."
Jun. THREATCON Delta declared. U.S. naval ships in Persian Gulf ports head to sea.
24 Jun. Multiple current threats. Martyrdom threat possible in Jordan. USS Cole investigation threatens terrorists. Africa bombing sentences handed out. [ ] [ ] threats in Bahrain,k Saudi Arabia, Israel. [ ] [ ] threat in Europe. Yemen threat. [ ] [ ] threat in Indonesia, India, Turkey, [ ] [ ] threat to U.S. embassies, [ ] [ ] in the Phillipines.
28 Jun. "Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning. They are waiting us out, looking for a vulnerability.
30 Jul. U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1363. Stresses obligation of U.N. member states to comply with UNSCRs 1267 and 1333, respectively, which calls on Taliban to cease its support of terrorists in the territory it controls and the turning over of UBL to appropriate authorities. Offers assistance to states including those bordering on Afghanistan to increase their capability to implement measures imposed by above resolutions, which include an arms embargo and freezing of UBL assets.
1 Aug. CIA Inspector General report on CTC: "well-managed fulfilling interagency responsibilities for DIC, made progress on problems previously identified, particularly relationship with FBI. Customers did identify gaps -- plans and intentions of key terrorist groups and timely, specific warning of attack.
16 Aug. CTC Assessment for every UBL operative that we stop, an estimated 50 operatives slip through our loose net undetected. Based on recent arrest, it is clear that UBL is building up a worldwide infrastructure which will allow him to launch multiple and simultaneous attacks with little or no warning.
10 Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
10 Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
17 Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jan. DCI announced Abu Zubaida the #1 terrorist target.
[ ] Feb. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Mar. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Mar. [ ] [ ].
Mar. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
May. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Sep. [ ] [ ]
Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Sep. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Fall 2000. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ]
Oct. [ ] [ ] [ ].
Nov. [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Dec. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Early 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jan. Photos taken [ ] [ ] of al-Mihdhar and associates shown to shared CIA-FBI asset. Asset identifies associate as bin Atash, suspected planner of Cole bombing.
[ ] Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] Jan. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
29 Jan. CTC briefing on al Qa'ida to SSCI. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. Some 70,000 to 120,000 people trained in the camps in Afghanistan since 1979.
[ ] Feb. [ ] [ ], a liaison service identified, and invited CIA to participate in tasking, a sensitive asset with [ ] [ ] [ ].
Early 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Apr. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
Spring 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Spring 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
May. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] May [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jun. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Spring 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Jull. [ ] [ ] [ ].
Summer 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
[ ] Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Summer 2001. [ ] [ ] [ ].
Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Aug. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
23 Aug. Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar added to TIPOFF watchlist. Al-Hazmi arrived in U.S. January 15, 2000, no record of his departure. Al-Mihdhar departed June 10, 2000, returned July 4, 2001.
10 Sep. In the hours just prior to the 9/11 attacks, NSA obtains two pieces of information suggesting that individuals with terrorist connections believed something significant would happen on September 11. No specific indication of time, place, or type of expected event. Because of the nature of the processes involved, NSA is unable to report the information until September 12.
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:26 pm
APPENDIX
SELECTED EVENTS IN THE CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORISM
1982-2001
Unclassified
Selected events in the chronology of terrorism, 1982-2001
[Symbol] Terrorist incident
[Symbol] Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States
[Symbol] Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons
[Symbol] Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States using airplanes as weapons
[Symbol] Communications Intercepts suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities
SELECTED EVENTS IN THE CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORISM
1982-2001
Unclassified
Selected events in the chronology of terrorism, 1982-2001
[Symbol] Terrorist incident
[Symbol] Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States
[Symbol] Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons
[Symbol] Information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States using airplanes as weapons
[Symbol] Communications Intercepts suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:29 pm
APPENDIX
CIA/FBI FAILURES
IN REGARD TO
TWO OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS,
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION,
AND
THE MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION
(ADAPTED FROM A CHART PRESENTED
BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN
AT THE OCTOBER 17, 2002
JOINT INQUIRY HEARING)
CIA/FBI FAILURES IN REGARD TO TWO SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS,
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION, AND THE MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION
(BASED ON CHART PRESENTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN AT OCTOBER 17, 2002 JOINT INQUIRY HEARING)
al-Mihdhar
1.1/5/00 - CIA acquires Midhar's passport information with multiple entry U.S. visa but does not watchlist him.
2. 1/8/00 - CIA does not notify FBI when it learns Mihdhar has left Malaysia and, again, does not watchlist him.
3. 3/5/00- CIA Headquarters does not read cable on Hazmi travel to U.S., so does not consider likelihood that Mihdhar traveled with him. CIA does not check to determine whether Mihdhar is in the U.S. until 8/21/01 - 17 months later.
4. 1/2001 - CIA does not watchlist Mihdhar after learning he was in Malaysia with Khallad, aka Tawfiq bin Attash, planner of the bombing of USS Cole.
5. 6/11/01- CIA analyst at N. Y. meeting with FBI is aware of Mihdhar travel and visa information but does not pass it on to FBI because "it does not mean anything to [him]" and he does not have permission to reveal operational details.
Al-Hazmi
1. 1/9/00 -CIA has information to determine Hazmi ' s full name and learns that Hazmi left Malaysia with Mihdhar on 1/8/00 but does not watchlist Hazmi. Nor does it notify the FBI about the Hazmi travel.
2. 1/9/00- CIA does not check U .S. immigration records to determine whether Hazmi, like Mihdhar, has a U.S. multiple entry visa which had been used on 4/3/99).
3. 3/5/00 - CIA Headquarters does not read cable noting Hazmi travel to U.S., so does not watchlist Hazmi or notify the FBI that he is in the country .
4. 1/2001 -CIA does not watchlist Hazmi after learning he was in Malaysia with Khallad, aka Tawfiq bin Attash, planner of the bombing of USS Cole. "
FBI Failures
1. 1/5100 -CIA notifies FBI about Malaysia meeting, but FBI does not watchlist Mihdhar.
2. 8/28/01 -FBI NY agent request for full criminal investigation is denied by FBI Headquarters official. Agent decries the "wall: preventing the sharing of intelligence information with criminal investigators.
Phoenix 7/10/0 1 Electronic Communication
1. FBI RFU does not direct that FBI field offices establish liaisons with aviation schools around the country as requested by the Phoenix agent who wrote the Electronic Communication.
2. FBI RFU fails to share the Phoenix Electronic Communication with other agencies prior to September 11, the FBI's analytical unit, or any of the FBI's field offices.
3. FEI's New York field office receives the Phoenix Electronic Communication, but does not to take action, although personnel there knew that al-Qa'ida had previously received flight training in the U.S.
al-Hazmi
1. 8/28/01 -After Mihdhar and Hazmi are placed on watchlist, FBI opens investigation on Mihdhar, but not Hazmi. FBI does not check whether Hazmi extended his original U.S. visa (an extension applied for on 7/12/00, and ranted on 6/18/01.
Moussaoui lnvestigation August -September 2001
1. FBI Headquarters and agents in Minneapolis misunderstand legal standard for obtaining a FISA order, believing they have to link Moussaoui to a "recognized foreign power." Minneapolis wastes time and resources trying to connect Chechen rebels, which FBI did not consider a "recognized foreign power," to al-Qa'ida.
2. On August 24, CTC alerts CIA stations worldwide about Moussaoui. FBI waits until September 4 to send teletype to Intelligence Community and other government agencies, noting that Moussaoui was in custody, but not describing any particular threat, i.e., that he might be connected to a larger plot. The teletype did not recommend that addressees take action or look for additional indicators of a terrorist attack.
3. FBI does not connect Moussaoui with heightened threat in Summer 2001, the Phoenix Electronic Communication, or Mihdhar and Hazmi's entry into U.S.
APPENDIX
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 07/10/2001
To: Counterterrorism
Attn: RFU
SSA [ ]
IRS [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
New York
From: Phoenix [ ]
Contact: SA [ ] [ ]
Approved By: [ ]
Drafted By: [ ]
Case ID #: (S) [ ] (Pending)
Title: (S) [ZAKARIA MUSTAPHA SOUBRA;
IT-OTHER [ ] ]
Synopsis: (S) UBL [ ] supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in the State of Arizona.
(S) Derived From: G-3
De3classify On: XI
Full Field Investigation Instituted: 04/17/2000 (NONUSPER)
Details: (S) [The purpose of this communication is to advise the Bureau and New York of the possibility of a coordinated effort by USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges. Phoenix has observed an inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest who are attending or who have attended civil aviation universities and colleges in the State of Arizona. The inordinate number of these individuals attending these type of schools and fatwas [ ]
SECRET
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: [ ] 07/10/2001
[ ] gives reason to believe that a coordinated effort is underway to establish a cadre of individuals who will one day be working in the civil aviation community around the world. These individuals will be in a position in the future to conduct terror activity against civil aviation targets.
(S) Phoenix believes that the FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison: FBIHQ should discuss this matter with other elements of the U.S. intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix's suspicions. FBIHQ should consider seeking the necessary authority to obtain visa information from the USDOS on individuals obtaining visas to attend these types of schools and notify the appropriate FBI field office when these individuals are scheduled to arrive in their area of responsibility.
(S) Phoenix has drawn the above conclusion from several Phoenix investigations to include captioned investigation and the following investigations: [ ], a Saudi Arabian national and two Algerian Islamic extremists [ ]
(S) Investigation of ZAKARIA MUSTAPHA SOUBRA was initiated as a result of information provided by [ ] a source who has provided reliable information in the past. The source reported during April 2000 that SOUBRA was a supporter of UBL and [ ]. SOUBRA arrived in Arizona from London, England on 08/27/1999 on an F-1 student visa to attend EMBRY RIDDLE UNIVERSITY (ERU), Prescott, Arizona. ERU only teaches courses related to the field of aviation. SOUBRA is an Aeronautical Engineering student at ERU and has been taking courses in "international security" relating to aviation. SOUBRA, within weeks of his arrival at Prescott, Arizona, [ ] supporting UBL, at Mosques located throughout Arizona. SOUBRA has also organized anti United States and Israeli demonstrations in the area of ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (ASU), Tempe, Arizona. He has also established and organized an Islamic student association on the ERU campus organizing the Muslim student population on the ERU campus.
(S) Phoenix has identified several associates of SOUBRA at ERU who arrived at the university around the same time that he
SECRET
2
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
did. These individuals are Sunni Muslims who have the same radical fundamentalists views as SOUBRA. They come from Kenya, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, India, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. SOUBRA's associates are (S)
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) The above individuals are involved with SOUBRA and regularly participate in meetings with him in Prescott, Arizona.
(S) FBIHQ, IRS [ ] RFU, wrote an analytical paper on the [ ] dated 11/09/1999, in support of FBINY investigation captioned: [ ] research paper can be found in [ ]. The following information was gleaned from IRS [ ] research paper.
SECRET
3
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) "The Fatwa is jihad against the U.S. and British government, armies, interests, airports (emphasis added by FBI Phoenix), and instructions and it has been given because of the U.S. and British aggression against Muslims and the Muslim land of Iraq ... we ... confirm that the only Islamic Fatwa against this explicit aggression is Jihad. Therefore the message for the British governments or any other government of non-Muslim countries is to stay away from Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan, Arabia, etc. ... or face full scale war of Jihad which it is the responsibility and duty of every Muslim around the world to participate in ... We ... call upon ... Muslims around the world including Muslims in the USA and in Britian [sic] to confront by all means whether verbally, financially, politically or militarily the U.S. and British aggression and do their Islamic duty in relieving the Iraqi people from the unjust sanctions."
(S) SOUBRA was interviewed by FBI Phoenix on 04/07/2000 and 05/11/2000 at his residence. On 04/07/2000, interviewing Agents observed photocopied photographs of UBL, IBN KHATTAB and wounded Chechnyan Mujahadin tacked to his livingroom wall. SOUBRA admitted to [ ] in the State of Arizona. SOUBRA stated that he considers the United States Government and U.S. Military forces in the Gulf as "legitimate military targets of Islam." He also stated that the targeting of the U.S. Embassies in Africa was "legitimate." SOUBRA denied having received any military training. However; Phoenix believes that SOUBRA was being less than truthful in this
SECRET
4
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
regard. SOUBRA was defiant towards interviewing Agents and it was clear that he was not intimidated by the FBI presence. It is obvious that he is a hardcore Islamic extremist who views the U.S. as an enemy of Islam. Investigation of SOUBRA is continuing.
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
SECRET
5
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) Phoenix believes that it is more than a coincidence that subjects who are supporters of UBL are attending civil aviation universities/colleges in the State of Arizona. As receiving offices are aware, Phoenix has had significant UBL associates/operatives living in the State of Arizona and conducting activity in support of UBL [WADIH EL-HAGE, a UBL lieutenant recently convicted for his role in the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa, lived in Tucson, Arizona for several years during the 1980s. [ ]
SECRET
6
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
[ ]
(S) This information is being provided to receiving offices for information, analysis and comments.
SECRET
7
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
LEAD (s) :
Set Lead 1:
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
(S) The RFU/UBLU is requested to consider implementing the suggested actions put forth by Phoenix at the beginning of this communication.
Set Lead 2:
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
(S) Read and Clear
SECRET
8
CIA/FBI FAILURES
IN REGARD TO
TWO OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS,
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION,
AND
THE MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION
(ADAPTED FROM A CHART PRESENTED
BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN
AT THE OCTOBER 17, 2002
JOINT INQUIRY HEARING)
CIA/FBI FAILURES IN REGARD TO TWO SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS,
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION, AND THE MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION
(BASED ON CHART PRESENTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN AT OCTOBER 17, 2002 JOINT INQUIRY HEARING)
al-Mihdhar
1.1/5/00 - CIA acquires Midhar's passport information with multiple entry U.S. visa but does not watchlist him.
2. 1/8/00 - CIA does not notify FBI when it learns Mihdhar has left Malaysia and, again, does not watchlist him.
3. 3/5/00- CIA Headquarters does not read cable on Hazmi travel to U.S., so does not consider likelihood that Mihdhar traveled with him. CIA does not check to determine whether Mihdhar is in the U.S. until 8/21/01 - 17 months later.
4. 1/2001 - CIA does not watchlist Mihdhar after learning he was in Malaysia with Khallad, aka Tawfiq bin Attash, planner of the bombing of USS Cole.
5. 6/11/01- CIA analyst at N. Y. meeting with FBI is aware of Mihdhar travel and visa information but does not pass it on to FBI because "it does not mean anything to [him]" and he does not have permission to reveal operational details.
Al-Hazmi
1. 1/9/00 -CIA has information to determine Hazmi ' s full name and learns that Hazmi left Malaysia with Mihdhar on 1/8/00 but does not watchlist Hazmi. Nor does it notify the FBI about the Hazmi travel.
2. 1/9/00- CIA does not check U .S. immigration records to determine whether Hazmi, like Mihdhar, has a U.S. multiple entry visa which had been used on 4/3/99).
3. 3/5/00 - CIA Headquarters does not read cable noting Hazmi travel to U.S., so does not watchlist Hazmi or notify the FBI that he is in the country .
4. 1/2001 -CIA does not watchlist Hazmi after learning he was in Malaysia with Khallad, aka Tawfiq bin Attash, planner of the bombing of USS Cole. "
FBI Failures
1. 1/5100 -CIA notifies FBI about Malaysia meeting, but FBI does not watchlist Mihdhar.
2. 8/28/01 -FBI NY agent request for full criminal investigation is denied by FBI Headquarters official. Agent decries the "wall: preventing the sharing of intelligence information with criminal investigators.
Phoenix 7/10/0 1 Electronic Communication
1. FBI RFU does not direct that FBI field offices establish liaisons with aviation schools around the country as requested by the Phoenix agent who wrote the Electronic Communication.
2. FBI RFU fails to share the Phoenix Electronic Communication with other agencies prior to September 11, the FBI's analytical unit, or any of the FBI's field offices.
3. FEI's New York field office receives the Phoenix Electronic Communication, but does not to take action, although personnel there knew that al-Qa'ida had previously received flight training in the U.S.
al-Hazmi
1. 8/28/01 -After Mihdhar and Hazmi are placed on watchlist, FBI opens investigation on Mihdhar, but not Hazmi. FBI does not check whether Hazmi extended his original U.S. visa (an extension applied for on 7/12/00, and ranted on 6/18/01.
Moussaoui lnvestigation August -September 2001
1. FBI Headquarters and agents in Minneapolis misunderstand legal standard for obtaining a FISA order, believing they have to link Moussaoui to a "recognized foreign power." Minneapolis wastes time and resources trying to connect Chechen rebels, which FBI did not consider a "recognized foreign power," to al-Qa'ida.
2. On August 24, CTC alerts CIA stations worldwide about Moussaoui. FBI waits until September 4 to send teletype to Intelligence Community and other government agencies, noting that Moussaoui was in custody, but not describing any particular threat, i.e., that he might be connected to a larger plot. The teletype did not recommend that addressees take action or look for additional indicators of a terrorist attack.
3. FBI does not connect Moussaoui with heightened threat in Summer 2001, the Phoenix Electronic Communication, or Mihdhar and Hazmi's entry into U.S.
APPENDIX
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 07/10/2001
To: Counterterrorism
Attn: RFU
SSA [ ]
IRS [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
New York
From: Phoenix [ ]
Contact: SA [ ] [ ]
Approved By: [ ]
Drafted By: [ ]
Case ID #: (S) [ ] (Pending)
Title: (S) [ZAKARIA MUSTAPHA SOUBRA;
IT-OTHER [ ] ]
Synopsis: (S) UBL [ ] supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in the State of Arizona.
(S) Derived From: G-3
De3classify On: XI
Full Field Investigation Instituted: 04/17/2000 (NONUSPER)
Details: (S) [The purpose of this communication is to advise the Bureau and New York of the possibility of a coordinated effort by USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges. Phoenix has observed an inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest who are attending or who have attended civil aviation universities and colleges in the State of Arizona. The inordinate number of these individuals attending these type of schools and fatwas [ ]
SECRET
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: [ ] 07/10/2001
[ ] gives reason to believe that a coordinated effort is underway to establish a cadre of individuals who will one day be working in the civil aviation community around the world. These individuals will be in a position in the future to conduct terror activity against civil aviation targets.
(S) Phoenix believes that the FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison: FBIHQ should discuss this matter with other elements of the U.S. intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix's suspicions. FBIHQ should consider seeking the necessary authority to obtain visa information from the USDOS on individuals obtaining visas to attend these types of schools and notify the appropriate FBI field office when these individuals are scheduled to arrive in their area of responsibility.
(S) Phoenix has drawn the above conclusion from several Phoenix investigations to include captioned investigation and the following investigations: [ ], a Saudi Arabian national and two Algerian Islamic extremists [ ]
(S) Investigation of ZAKARIA MUSTAPHA SOUBRA was initiated as a result of information provided by [ ] a source who has provided reliable information in the past. The source reported during April 2000 that SOUBRA was a supporter of UBL and [ ]. SOUBRA arrived in Arizona from London, England on 08/27/1999 on an F-1 student visa to attend EMBRY RIDDLE UNIVERSITY (ERU), Prescott, Arizona. ERU only teaches courses related to the field of aviation. SOUBRA is an Aeronautical Engineering student at ERU and has been taking courses in "international security" relating to aviation. SOUBRA, within weeks of his arrival at Prescott, Arizona, [ ] supporting UBL, at Mosques located throughout Arizona. SOUBRA has also organized anti United States and Israeli demonstrations in the area of ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (ASU), Tempe, Arizona. He has also established and organized an Islamic student association on the ERU campus organizing the Muslim student population on the ERU campus.
(S) Phoenix has identified several associates of SOUBRA at ERU who arrived at the university around the same time that he
SECRET
2
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
did. These individuals are Sunni Muslims who have the same radical fundamentalists views as SOUBRA. They come from Kenya, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, India, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. SOUBRA's associates are (S)
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) The above individuals are involved with SOUBRA and regularly participate in meetings with him in Prescott, Arizona.
(S) FBIHQ, IRS [ ] RFU, wrote an analytical paper on the [ ] dated 11/09/1999, in support of FBINY investigation captioned: [ ] research paper can be found in [ ]. The following information was gleaned from IRS [ ] research paper.
SECRET
3
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) "The Fatwa is jihad against the U.S. and British government, armies, interests, airports (emphasis added by FBI Phoenix), and instructions and it has been given because of the U.S. and British aggression against Muslims and the Muslim land of Iraq ... we ... confirm that the only Islamic Fatwa against this explicit aggression is Jihad. Therefore the message for the British governments or any other government of non-Muslim countries is to stay away from Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan, Arabia, etc. ... or face full scale war of Jihad which it is the responsibility and duty of every Muslim around the world to participate in ... We ... call upon ... Muslims around the world including Muslims in the USA and in Britian [sic] to confront by all means whether verbally, financially, politically or militarily the U.S. and British aggression and do their Islamic duty in relieving the Iraqi people from the unjust sanctions."
(S) SOUBRA was interviewed by FBI Phoenix on 04/07/2000 and 05/11/2000 at his residence. On 04/07/2000, interviewing Agents observed photocopied photographs of UBL, IBN KHATTAB and wounded Chechnyan Mujahadin tacked to his livingroom wall. SOUBRA admitted to [ ] in the State of Arizona. SOUBRA stated that he considers the United States Government and U.S. Military forces in the Gulf as "legitimate military targets of Islam." He also stated that the targeting of the U.S. Embassies in Africa was "legitimate." SOUBRA denied having received any military training. However; Phoenix believes that SOUBRA was being less than truthful in this
SECRET
4
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
regard. SOUBRA was defiant towards interviewing Agents and it was clear that he was not intimidated by the FBI presence. It is obvious that he is a hardcore Islamic extremist who views the U.S. as an enemy of Islam. Investigation of SOUBRA is continuing.
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
SECRET
5
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) [ ]
(S) Phoenix believes that it is more than a coincidence that subjects who are supporters of UBL are attending civil aviation universities/colleges in the State of Arizona. As receiving offices are aware, Phoenix has had significant UBL associates/operatives living in the State of Arizona and conducting activity in support of UBL [WADIH EL-HAGE, a UBL lieutenant recently convicted for his role in the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa, lived in Tucson, Arizona for several years during the 1980s. [ ]
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6
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
[ ]
(S) This information is being provided to receiving offices for information, analysis and comments.
SECRET
7
SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Phoenix
Re: (S) [ ] 07/10/2001
LEAD (s) :
Set Lead 1:
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
(S) The RFU/UBLU is requested to consider implementing the suggested actions put forth by Phoenix at the beginning of this communication.
Set Lead 2:
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
(S) Read and Clear
SECRET
8
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:41 pm
ENTIRE Connection - Entire Connection - [1]
May 29, 2003
No. 070 P. 11
2002 1:25 PM
1 CMLML02
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] code then press enter
SECRET
[ ] [ ] C=Cover M=Modify D=Discontinue T=Transfer
Serial : 71
SECRET
F1=Help F3-Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F7 Bkwd F8=Fwd F12=Cancel F15=Print 00.009
May 29, 2003
NO. 070 P. 10
ENTIRE Connection - [Entire Connection - [1]
12/06/01 Modify Leads
14:03:20
View Lead, then press Enter
: [ ]
: Covered
: COUNTERTERRORISM
: WASHINGTON, D.C.
: [ ]
: 07/27/2001 Time: 0150 PM
: 09/25/2001 Time: 0500 PM
: 08072001 Time: 0433 PM
> COVERED - CONSULTED WITH UBLU, NO ACTION AT THIS TIME
RECONVENE ON THIS ISSUE ............
> ...... Disp [ ] [ ] 199M-PX-67026 (S)
> ....
> ...........................
> Y
F1=Help F3-Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F7 Bkwd F8=Fwd F12=Cancel F15=Print
14,017
APPENDIX
MOUSSAOUI-RELATED FBI FIELD AGENT NOTES AND FIELD OFFICE/HEADQUARTERS E-MAILS*
_______________
* The contents of this Appendix have been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice so as to avoid any impact on the prosecution of Zacharias Moussaoui.
May 29, 2003
No. 070 P. 11
2002 1:25 PM
1 CMLML02
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] code then press enter
SECRET
[ ] [ ] C=Cover M=Modify D=Discontinue T=Transfer
-- / -- / Lead / Sent To / -- / Set / Assigned / Stat
-- / -- / -- / COUNTERTERRORISM / WASHINGTON, D.C. / 07/27/01 / 07/30/01 / C
-- / -- / -- / NEW YORK / NEW YORK, NEW YORK / 07/27/01 / 07/30/01 / A
-- / -- / -- / COUNTERTERRORISM / -- / 04/06/01 / 04/06/01 / C
-- / -- / -- / PHOENIX / PHOENIX, AZ / 04/06/01 / 04/11/01 / C
-- / -- / -- / PHOENIX / -- / 02/20/01 / 03/01/01 / C
-- / -- / -- / COUNTERTERRORISM / WASHINGTON, D.C. / 12/15/00 / 01/02/01 / C
-- / -- / -- / COUNTERTERRORISM / WASHINGTON, D.C. / 12/15/00 / 01/02/01 / C
-- / -- / -- / LONDON / LONDON, ENGLAND / 12/15/00 / 12/19/00 / C
-- / -- / -- / PHOENIX / PHOENIX, AZ / 06/19/00 / 06/20/00 / C
-- / -- / -- / COUNTERTERRORISM / WASHINGTON, D.C. / 05/01/00 / 11/27/00 / C
-- / -- / -- / ILLEGIBLE / COLUMBUS, OHIO / 05/01/00 / 05/16/00 / C
-- / -- / -- / NEW YORK / NEW YORK, NEW YORK / 05/01/00 / 00/18/00 / D
Serial : 71
SECRET
F1=Help F3-Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F7 Bkwd F8=Fwd F12=Cancel F15=Print 00.009
May 29, 2003
NO. 070 P. 10
ENTIRE Connection - [Entire Connection - [1]
12/06/01 Modify Leads
14:03:20
View Lead, then press Enter
: [ ]
: Covered
: COUNTERTERRORISM
: WASHINGTON, D.C.
: [ ]
: 07/27/2001 Time: 0150 PM
: 09/25/2001 Time: 0500 PM
: 08072001 Time: 0433 PM
> COVERED - CONSULTED WITH UBLU, NO ACTION AT THIS TIME
RECONVENE ON THIS ISSUE ............
> ...... Disp [ ] [ ] 199M-PX-67026 (S)
> ....
> ...........................
> Y
F1=Help F3-Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F7 Bkwd F8=Fwd F12=Cancel F15=Print
14,017
APPENDIX
MOUSSAOUI-RELATED FBI FIELD AGENT NOTES AND FIELD OFFICE/HEADQUARTERS E-MAILS*
_______________
* The contents of this Appendix have been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice so as to avoid any impact on the prosecution of Zacharias Moussaoui.
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:42 pm
APPENDIX
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ANALYSIS OF U.S. ANTHRAX ATTACKS
LIMDIS FOUO
SUMMARY OF JOINT INQUIRY REVIEW OF ANTHRAX ATTACKS
In October 2001, the Congress, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and elements of the domestic infrastructure were the targets of anthrax attacks that eventually killed five Americans. The Joint Inquiry requested that the General Accounting Office review those attacks, focusing on the difficulty of producing and spreading anthrax, mail as a delivery system, the status of USPS efforts to detect anthrax, the federal investigation into the attacks, and how the government is preparing for other incidents.
When the Joint Inquiry report was filed, the GAG investigation had been substantially completed, with an initial finding that no consensus exists among experts regarding the ease with which terrorists or a disgruntled scientist could effectively produce and disseminate anthrax on U.S. soil. According to the GAG, technical experts believe that it would be very difficult to overcome technical and operational challenges to produce and deliver biological warfare agents sufficient to cause mass casualties.
According to the experts the GAG interviewed, delivery of anthrax by mail is not as efficient a method of producing mass casualties as military technologies. However, in the public's mind and in terms of economic damage, anthrax powder in the mail represents a potentially significant problem. The USPS effort to defend against biological agents illustrates a key aspect of homeland defense: the distinction between reactive and proactive operational environments. Whereas the nation's posture had been to prevent attacks against military facilities, the anthrax attacks targeted civilian facilities that unprepared to react.
LIMDIS FOUO
LIMDIS FOUO
According to the GAG, the FBI is aware of numerous anthrax incidents throughout the United States, which were random in nature and determined to be hoaxes. Because this was the first time the FBI responded to an actual attack, however, there was some initial confusion about the investigative roles and responsibilities of various agencies. The Bureau has recognized the need to involve subject-matter experts and, as a result, its investigative teams include scientists, criminal investigators, hazardous- material experts, investigators from other federal agencies, and federal laboratories.
As a result of the anthrax attacks, the FBI and other investigative agencies have increased attention on chemical and biological threats. These agencies have reached agreements delineating roles and responsibilities, increased liaison with public health officials, developed a Center for Disease Control and FBI handbook for conducting investigations, and identified state and local officials who need security clearances for access to classified information.
To date, no connection has been established between the anthrax attacks and the terrorist attacks of September 11.
A copy of the GAG report follows.
LIMDIS FOUO
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ANALYSIS OF U.S. ANTHRAX ATTACKS
LIMDIS FOUO
SUMMARY OF JOINT INQUIRY REVIEW OF ANTHRAX ATTACKS
In October 2001, the Congress, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and elements of the domestic infrastructure were the targets of anthrax attacks that eventually killed five Americans. The Joint Inquiry requested that the General Accounting Office review those attacks, focusing on the difficulty of producing and spreading anthrax, mail as a delivery system, the status of USPS efforts to detect anthrax, the federal investigation into the attacks, and how the government is preparing for other incidents.
When the Joint Inquiry report was filed, the GAG investigation had been substantially completed, with an initial finding that no consensus exists among experts regarding the ease with which terrorists or a disgruntled scientist could effectively produce and disseminate anthrax on U.S. soil. According to the GAG, technical experts believe that it would be very difficult to overcome technical and operational challenges to produce and deliver biological warfare agents sufficient to cause mass casualties.
According to the experts the GAG interviewed, delivery of anthrax by mail is not as efficient a method of producing mass casualties as military technologies. However, in the public's mind and in terms of economic damage, anthrax powder in the mail represents a potentially significant problem. The USPS effort to defend against biological agents illustrates a key aspect of homeland defense: the distinction between reactive and proactive operational environments. Whereas the nation's posture had been to prevent attacks against military facilities, the anthrax attacks targeted civilian facilities that unprepared to react.
LIMDIS FOUO
LIMDIS FOUO
According to the GAG, the FBI is aware of numerous anthrax incidents throughout the United States, which were random in nature and determined to be hoaxes. Because this was the first time the FBI responded to an actual attack, however, there was some initial confusion about the investigative roles and responsibilities of various agencies. The Bureau has recognized the need to involve subject-matter experts and, as a result, its investigative teams include scientists, criminal investigators, hazardous- material experts, investigators from other federal agencies, and federal laboratories.
As a result of the anthrax attacks, the FBI and other investigative agencies have increased attention on chemical and biological threats. These agencies have reached agreements delineating roles and responsibilities, increased liaison with public health officials, developed a Center for Disease Control and FBI handbook for conducting investigations, and identified state and local officials who need security clearances for access to classified information.
To date, no connection has been established between the anthrax attacks and the terrorist attacks of September 11.
A copy of the GAG report follows.
LIMDIS FOUO
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
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GAO
Accountability Integrity Reliability
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
December 6, 2002
The Honorable Bob Graham,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Porter J. Goss
Chairman, Permanent Select Cornri1ittee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Subject: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax Attacks
The purpose of this letter is to transmit a copy of our statement for inclusion in the Committee record, regarding our response to your request to collect information on the October 2001, anthrax in the United States using the United States Postal Service (USPS) as a vehicle. To address this objective, we specifically drew upon the biodetection work we are conducting at the USPS and tile chemical-biological defense work we are performing at the Department of Defense. We have also collected the Federal Bureau of Investigation's response to last year's anthrax attacks, and analyzed new information regarding the steps necessary to produce dry anthrax spores.
This statement has been designated "Limited Official Use Only" because of the sensitive nature of the information it contains. Release to the public could be detrimental to the government and/or public safety. Recipients should not discuss or release this report to anyone whose official duties do not require access to the information it contains. This report should be safeguarded when not being used and destroyed when no longer needed. It is my understanding that your procedures for handling materials submitted to the Committee will fully address these concerns.
This assignment was conducted by staff from our Applied Research and Methods team and office of Special Investigations under assignment code 460539. If you have any questions, please contact Sushil Sharrna, Assistant Director, Center for Technology and Engineering, at (202) 512-3460, Don Fulwider, Assistant Director, office of Special Investigations at (202) 512-7413, or me at (202) 512-6412. We can also be reached at SharimaS@gao.gov, FulwiderD@gao,gov, or RhodesK@gao.gov, respectively.
Sincerely yours,
Keith A. Rhodes
Chief Technologist
Director, Center for Technology and Engineering
Applied Research and Methods
Page 2
Accountability Integrity Reliability
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
December 6, 2002
The Honorable Bob Graham,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Porter J. Goss
Chairman, Permanent Select Cornri1ittee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Subject: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax Attacks
The purpose of this letter is to transmit a copy of our statement for inclusion in the Committee record, regarding our response to your request to collect information on the October 2001, anthrax in the United States using the United States Postal Service (USPS) as a vehicle. To address this objective, we specifically drew upon the biodetection work we are conducting at the USPS and tile chemical-biological defense work we are performing at the Department of Defense. We have also collected the Federal Bureau of Investigation's response to last year's anthrax attacks, and analyzed new information regarding the steps necessary to produce dry anthrax spores.
This statement has been designated "Limited Official Use Only" because of the sensitive nature of the information it contains. Release to the public could be detrimental to the government and/or public safety. Recipients should not discuss or release this report to anyone whose official duties do not require access to the information it contains. This report should be safeguarded when not being used and destroyed when no longer needed. It is my understanding that your procedures for handling materials submitted to the Committee will fully address these concerns.
This assignment was conducted by staff from our Applied Research and Methods team and office of Special Investigations under assignment code 460539. If you have any questions, please contact Sushil Sharrna, Assistant Director, Center for Technology and Engineering, at (202) 512-3460, Don Fulwider, Assistant Director, office of Special Investigations at (202) 512-7413, or me at (202) 512-6412. We can also be reached at SharimaS@gao.gov, FulwiderD@gao,gov, or RhodesK@gao.gov, respectively.
Sincerely yours,
Keith A. Rhodes
Chief Technologist
Director, Center for Technology and Engineering
Applied Research and Methods
Page 2
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
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United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Testimony
Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives
Tuesday, December 10, 2002
DIFFUSE SECURITY THREATS
Information on U.S. Domestic Anthrax Attacks
Statement for the Record by Keith Rhodes,
Chief Technologist,
Center for Technology and Engineering
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This statement has been designated "Limited Official Use Only" because of the sensitive nature of the information it contains. Release to the public could be detrimental to the government. Recipients should not discuss or release this statement to anyone whose official duties do not require access to the information it contains. This statement should be safeguarded when not being used and destroyed when no longer needed.
Released by GAO 6/12/03
GAO
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability
GAO-O3-323T
Limited Official Use Only
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Joint Committee:
As you requested in your letter of October 31, 2002, we are pleased to submit our statement for the record on the anthrax threat. We collected this information as part of several ongoing and completed projects dealing with the anthrax threat, the anthrax vaccine, and technologies to detect and identify anthrax spores, [1] that is, anthrax in a powder form. As you requested, my testimony will focus on the following questions: (1) How easy is it to produce and weaponize anthrax? (2) What studies were conducted to test mail as a weapon delivery system? And (3) what is the status of the United States Postal Service's (USPS) efforts to detect anthrax in the mail? You also requested that we provide an overview of federal law enforcement agencies' initial investigation in response to the October 2001 anthrax attack and how these agencies are preparing for similar incidents in the future.
In conducting our work on anthrax production processes, we identified and consulted with a "Wide range of current and retired experts in anthrax and biological weapons production processes from the U.S. Army's Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, a principal site of biological weapons testing; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, Maryland; the Institute of Genomic Research, Bethesda, Maryland; the University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona; and the United Kingdom.
In conducting our work on lJSPS's efforts to detect anthrax in the mail, we reviewed documents associated with USPS efforts to procure anthrax detection devices, met with USPS officials, and also met with industry experts and vendors representing the technologies USPS is considering. We also met with officials of the Canadian Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) and observed the results of their tests of anthrax in mail in an office setting.
Finally, in conducting our work on how law enforcement agencies responded to the October 2001 anthrax attack, we contacted representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Criminal
_______________
[1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but Challenges Remain, GA,0-02-365 (Washington, D.C., April 23, 2002) and Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing and Cost Benefit Analysis before Implementation, GAO-O2-838 (Washington, D.C. August 22, 2002).
Limited Official Use Only
Page 1 GaO-03-323T
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Enforcement, Forensics and Training (OCEFT); the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit and Washington Field Office; USPS's Manager for Environmental Management, Incident Commander for the Brentwood facility, and Postal Inspector; and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Public Health Preparedness and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
The work on which this statement is based began m November 2001 and has continued through November 2002, and it was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Background
As of October 2002, intelligence assessments have not changed since 1990 for chemical and biological warfare threats on the battlefield or by terrorists. This is especially true, intelligence analysts told us, in terms of the numbers of countries suspected of developing anthrax spores, the types of biological agents these countries are known to possess, and their ability to weaponize and deliver such agents. [2] Unfortunately, for assessing a similar nonbattlefield threat, there are no current data on which to base an estimate apart from data on the October 2001 attack.
As to the-terrorist threat, according to officials at the State Department's Diplomatic Security and at the Central Intelligence Agency, no clear evidence exists at this time that U.S. missions or interests overseas are threatened by foreign states or terrorist attacks using chemical and biological agents. According to these officials, terrorist attacks involving the use of conventional bombs are considered the greatest threat to U.S. overseas missions. [3]
In 1998, at least 12 U.S. abortion clinics received letters that claimed to contain anthrax powder, followed by more than 35 such letters in 1999 and over 30 in 2000. All of these were found to be hoaxes. In addition, DOD committed to a program on December 15, 1997, to vaccinate the entire military because it considered anthrax powder to be a major battlefield
_______________
[2] See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-148 (Washington, D.C.,Apri129, 1999).
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Serious Problems in the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, GAO-01-21 (December 13, 2000).
Limited Official Use Only
Page 2 GAO-03-323T
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threat. [4] Simultaneously, the American public was introduced to biological warfare threats in a series of evening prime-time television addresses, including one by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, showing the relative power of bio-weapons. There was much attendant publicity, both about the importance of the threat and concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. From 1998 to September 2001, more than 400 anthrax powder hoaxes occurred in the United States. While much attention has been paid to the anthrax letters sent in October 2001, more than 750 hoax letters involving anthrax threats were sent worldwide in October and November 2001. According to a non-profit center specializing in issues related to weapons of mass destruction, a single group, called the Army of God, sent more than 550 hoax letters to abortion clinics in the United States.
Ease of Production of Anthrax Spores
As you know, many conflicting statements have been made in public testimony before Congress and in the press concerning the ease or difficulty with which terrorists or a lone scientist could effectively disseminate, on U.S. soil, a chemical or biological agent, specifically anthrax, and cause mass casualties. As to the biological agents, all of the experts we met with agreed that while a laboratory scientist may be able to grow cultures of some bio-agents, the production and use of most biological warfare agents would require a relatively high degree of sophistication in terms of both expertise and equipment.
According to technical experts in the many fields associated with biological agents, including those formerly with state-sponsored offensive biological weapons programs, it would be very difficult for a terrorist to overcome major technical and operational challenges to effectively and successfully weaponize and deliver a biological warfare agent to cause mass casualties. [5] If terrorists could overcome these obstacles, experts believe that those without a prior knowledge of these agents would have to conduct extensive experimentation to perfect their skills, which would
_______________
[4] In July 2000, DOD ordered a temporary slowdown of its program because the U.S. anthrax vaccine manufacturer could not win Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of its manufacturing process and facilities. In January 2002, FDA approved the U.S. manufacturer's facilities and vaccine manufacturing process and DOD announced the resumption of its anthrax vaccination program in June 2002.
[5] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSlAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999).
Limited Official Use Only
Page 3 GAO-03-323T
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result in their increased risk of discovery .Specialized knowledge is needed to acquire the right biological warfare agent, process it, improvise a weapon or device, and effectively deliver it to cause mass casualties.
To make high-quality anthrax powder, a number of challenging steps and specialties are involved:
Acquisition of a virulent strain of anthrax (such as the Ames strain), by (1) locally isolating a strain from a dead animal, (2) purchasing a small sample from an organization that already possessed it, or (3) stealing or by other means obtain it from a laboratory known to possess it.
Culturing or growing the organism to yield a large quantity, which could be done in commercially available fermenters or on agar plates (if fermented, the result is a slurry or liquid concentrate; if on an agar plate, the result is a wet paste). [5]
Harvesting; washing, and concentrating the cultured sample, typically done in a centrifuge, which also removes most of the liquid and results in a wet paste. [6]
Drying and grinding or milling the sample to sufficiently small size [7] including milling the spores to achieve the required particle size, and, possibly, adding appropriate chemicals to prevent aggregation of spores and to reduce static charge. [8]
Testing to confirm dispersion patterns and potency to cause mass casualties, unless the perpetrators are highly confident of their abilities.
Studies Conducted to Test Mail as a Delivery System for Anthrax
Prior to 1998, the military did not envision mail as a delivery system for anthrax powder. In 1998, SAIC, a defense contractor, asked a scientist from the former U.S. offensive biological weapons program, to articulate in a paper several scenarios for delivery of biological warfare agents to support decontamination and containment. One of these scenarios included anthrax powder being sent through the mail. According to this
_______________
[6] Experts told us that anthrax production is not an exact science. The yield and quality of each batch is variable even when produced legitimately in a highly sophisticated facility.
[7] There are several drying and milling methods. Some will greatly increase the static charge, and some will reduce the efficiency of the production. Any anthrax powder of < 5 microns is essentially a vapor.
[8] While it has been suggested that static charge could be reduced without adding chemicals, we have not been provided data to support this assertion. At this point, containment becomes imperative if the perpetrator wants to leave no evidence and protect himself or herself.
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Page 4 GAO-03-323T
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paper, if a letter contained more than 2 to 3 grams of powder, it would be relatively easy to detect by its visible shape. In addition, the author believed, by sending the anthrax in a letter, the area of contamination would be limited, so decontamination procedures could be implemented successfully. In this paper, however, the operational environment of automated mail processing was not considered.
In Canada, the first Canadian anthrax hoax letter incident occurred on January 30, 2001) at the Citizenship and Immigration Office. Since no experimental study on which to base a realistic assessment of the threat posed by these "anthrax letters" could be found, Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES), a Canadian defense research and development organization, undertook a series of experiments to determine the extent of the hazard. This study was an attempt to (1) mimic what might occur in an office or mailroom if an envelope containing anthrax powder was received and opened and (2) estimate the aerosol release of the anthrax powder from the letters. This study also did not consider the operational environment of automated mail processing. Although this study was not published until October 1, 2001, DRES officials provided a schedule of briefings that were conducted through the spring and summer of 2001, when the results of the study were discussed.
The results indicated that dispersion of spores in an office setting would be far more effective than had initially been suspected. Significant numbers of aerosolized particles (>99% in the 2.5 to 10 micron size range) were released when envelopes, containing 0.1 or 1.0 grams of anthrax powder, were opened. A lethal dose could be inhaled within seconds of opening such an envelope. In addition, the powder quickly spread throughout the room so that if other workers were present, depending on their location and the airflow within the office, they would also be likely to inhale a lethal dose. The results also indicated that envelopes with corners not totally sealed could pose a threat to individuals in the mail-handling system. However, it is important to note that the scientists were only evaluating, the anthrax threat that could result from opening an anthrax- contaminated letter. They did not evaluate whether the mail going through the pinch rollers in a postal sorting machine could also result in secondary contamination. Although these results are significant with respect to local area contamination, overall, the mail as a means of producing mass casualties remains an inefficient method of dissemination as compared with the various military technologies. Nonetheless, in terms of public concerns and economic damage, anthrax powder in the mail represents a potentially significant problem.
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Page 5 GAO-03-323T
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USPS Efforts to Detect Anthrax in the Mail
USPS has been pursuing several approaches, including procedural changes and a number of currently available technologies, to reduce risk through early detection of biohazards, primarily anthrax. U8PS has identified several key areas of focus, including (1) redesign of mail collection boxes for both risk reduction and detection, (2) development of technology and procedures to reduce the volume of "anonymous" mail, (3) deployment of vacuum/filtration technology on automated sorting equipment, (4) use of mass spectrometry for detection, and (5) pursuit of a variety of technologies to aid investigators in finding whoever was responsible for earlier anthrax attacks through the mail and deterring future attempts at placing biohazards in the mail.
To date, USPS has focused on systemwide detection technology -- centered mainly on Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) detection -- placed on the initial operation in processing facilities for mail with the greatest risk, which is picked up at collection boxes, residences, and small businesses. [9] USPS continues to face challenges in developing this technology for its operational environment. USPS continues to work with the manufacturers of several different technologies and is conducting additional testing and prototyping to fully determine the viability of these technologies in a mail processing environment. We are continuing to monitor USPS efforts to procure and deploy these technologies.
The USPS efforts to defend against biological agents illustrate a key aspect of homeland defense -- namely, the distinction between reactive and proactive operational environments. Prior to the October 2001 letters containing anthrax powder, the vast majority of technologies and techniques for defending against biological agent attacks were based on a post-release reaction approach. This post-release approach assumed that the delivery of the biological warfare agent would be via a known weapon system; that the target would be an active military site; that the soldiers at the site would be protected by adequate training, clothing; and prophylaxis; and that a high number of false positive detections would not hinder the site's operations in any significant way.
The USPS efforts illustrate a completely new proactive environment and concept of operations for these techniques and technologies. The USPS
_______________
[9] PCR technology is able to detect small quantities of DNA with a particular genetic sequence (e.g. anthrax) and is the nucleus of the biohazard detection system (BDS) specifically designed for USPS.
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environment is a civilian one, in which the. assumptions are that affected people would not have the full protection and training that would be available in a battlefield setting; that the biological warfare agent would have to be intercepted prior to its release, to minimize the impact on both humans and operations; that the delivery mechanism may not be obvious; and that the rate of false positive detection must be minimal in order to avoid unnecessary interruption to normal mail processing activities. As we stated earlier, overcoming the lack of data on the threat, in this domestic civilian environment will be critical to USPS success in establishing a biological agent defense.
Overview of Law Enforcement's Initial Response to the Anthrax Attack
The FBI as lead investigative agency is currently investigating a series of bioterrorism incidents using anthrax spores that were sent through the mail and which resulted in 22 anthrax cases, including five deaths, since October 3, 2001. This is the first time the FBI has conducted this kind of investigation. The FBI's investigative team includes criminal investigators with scientific knowledge. In addition, the FBI has reached out to the scientific community to gain additional scientific knowledge about anthrax. Further, the FBI's HAZMAT Response Team was used to gather evidence at various crime scenes contaminated by anthrax utilizing Personal Protection Equipment. [10] The FBI also utilized the expertise of (1) EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training (OCEFT) to assist in gathering evidence at one of the crime scenes, the Senate Hart Building; (2) USPS's Postal Inspector in collecting evidence involving the contamination of the mail system; (3) CDC and the Florida health unit that initially reported the first anthrax case; and (4) Department of Defense laboratories.
The FBI had previously been made aware of numerous anthrax incidents throughout the United States, which were random in nature and determined to be hoaxes. [AB-1] Because this was the first time the FBI responded to an actual anthrax attack, there was some confusion about the investigative roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies. As a result, the FBI recognized the need for increased coordination with public health officials, including CDC, and other investigative agencies. The CDC particularly is a key agency in any biological terrorist threat because it is
_______________
10. The FBI has 17 Field Offices that have HAZMAT Response Teams that are fully trained and equipped to respond to a hazardous material incident. These teams work in conjunction with the state and local first responders, to assess and evaluate the incident and provide direction to obtain evidence that could be used in subsequent prosecutions.
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able to identify biological agents and has the tools to investigate and respond quickly.
Current Efforts to Prepare for Future Bioterrorist Attacks
The anthrax investigation has prompted the FBI and other investigative agencies to focus additional attention on the chemical and biological threat. Some of these efforts include (1) agreements among the FBI, other federal agencies, and state and local governments delineating each organization's role; (2) increasing liaison efforts with public health officials; (3) preparation by the FBI and CDC of a handbook for conducting investigations involving biological agents; and (4) identification of key state and local officials needing security clearances to allow access to classified information.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving us the opportunity to submit this statement If you have any questions on the statement or follow-up questions, we will be happy to respond.
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GAO
Testimony
Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives
Tuesday, December 10, 2002
DIFFUSE SECURITY THREATS
Information on U.S. Domestic Anthrax Attacks
Statement for the Record by Keith Rhodes,
Chief Technologist,
Center for Technology and Engineering
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This statement has been designated "Limited Official Use Only" because of the sensitive nature of the information it contains. Release to the public could be detrimental to the government. Recipients should not discuss or release this statement to anyone whose official duties do not require access to the information it contains. This statement should be safeguarded when not being used and destroyed when no longer needed.
Released by GAO 6/12/03
GAO
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability
GAO-O3-323T
Limited Official Use Only
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Joint Committee:
As you requested in your letter of October 31, 2002, we are pleased to submit our statement for the record on the anthrax threat. We collected this information as part of several ongoing and completed projects dealing with the anthrax threat, the anthrax vaccine, and technologies to detect and identify anthrax spores, [1] that is, anthrax in a powder form. As you requested, my testimony will focus on the following questions: (1) How easy is it to produce and weaponize anthrax? (2) What studies were conducted to test mail as a weapon delivery system? And (3) what is the status of the United States Postal Service's (USPS) efforts to detect anthrax in the mail? You also requested that we provide an overview of federal law enforcement agencies' initial investigation in response to the October 2001 anthrax attack and how these agencies are preparing for similar incidents in the future.
In conducting our work on anthrax production processes, we identified and consulted with a "Wide range of current and retired experts in anthrax and biological weapons production processes from the U.S. Army's Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, a principal site of biological weapons testing; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, Maryland; the Institute of Genomic Research, Bethesda, Maryland; the University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona; and the United Kingdom.
In conducting our work on lJSPS's efforts to detect anthrax in the mail, we reviewed documents associated with USPS efforts to procure anthrax detection devices, met with USPS officials, and also met with industry experts and vendors representing the technologies USPS is considering. We also met with officials of the Canadian Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) and observed the results of their tests of anthrax in mail in an office setting.
Finally, in conducting our work on how law enforcement agencies responded to the October 2001 anthrax attack, we contacted representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Criminal
_______________
[1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but Challenges Remain, GA,0-02-365 (Washington, D.C., April 23, 2002) and Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing and Cost Benefit Analysis before Implementation, GAO-O2-838 (Washington, D.C. August 22, 2002).
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Enforcement, Forensics and Training (OCEFT); the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit and Washington Field Office; USPS's Manager for Environmental Management, Incident Commander for the Brentwood facility, and Postal Inspector; and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Public Health Preparedness and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
The work on which this statement is based began m November 2001 and has continued through November 2002, and it was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Background
As of October 2002, intelligence assessments have not changed since 1990 for chemical and biological warfare threats on the battlefield or by terrorists. This is especially true, intelligence analysts told us, in terms of the numbers of countries suspected of developing anthrax spores, the types of biological agents these countries are known to possess, and their ability to weaponize and deliver such agents. [2] Unfortunately, for assessing a similar nonbattlefield threat, there are no current data on which to base an estimate apart from data on the October 2001 attack.
As to the-terrorist threat, according to officials at the State Department's Diplomatic Security and at the Central Intelligence Agency, no clear evidence exists at this time that U.S. missions or interests overseas are threatened by foreign states or terrorist attacks using chemical and biological agents. According to these officials, terrorist attacks involving the use of conventional bombs are considered the greatest threat to U.S. overseas missions. [3]
In 1998, at least 12 U.S. abortion clinics received letters that claimed to contain anthrax powder, followed by more than 35 such letters in 1999 and over 30 in 2000. All of these were found to be hoaxes. In addition, DOD committed to a program on December 15, 1997, to vaccinate the entire military because it considered anthrax powder to be a major battlefield
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[2] See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-148 (Washington, D.C.,Apri129, 1999).
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Serious Problems in the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, GAO-01-21 (December 13, 2000).
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threat. [4] Simultaneously, the American public was introduced to biological warfare threats in a series of evening prime-time television addresses, including one by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, showing the relative power of bio-weapons. There was much attendant publicity, both about the importance of the threat and concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. From 1998 to September 2001, more than 400 anthrax powder hoaxes occurred in the United States. While much attention has been paid to the anthrax letters sent in October 2001, more than 750 hoax letters involving anthrax threats were sent worldwide in October and November 2001. According to a non-profit center specializing in issues related to weapons of mass destruction, a single group, called the Army of God, sent more than 550 hoax letters to abortion clinics in the United States.
Ease of Production of Anthrax Spores
As you know, many conflicting statements have been made in public testimony before Congress and in the press concerning the ease or difficulty with which terrorists or a lone scientist could effectively disseminate, on U.S. soil, a chemical or biological agent, specifically anthrax, and cause mass casualties. As to the biological agents, all of the experts we met with agreed that while a laboratory scientist may be able to grow cultures of some bio-agents, the production and use of most biological warfare agents would require a relatively high degree of sophistication in terms of both expertise and equipment.
According to technical experts in the many fields associated with biological agents, including those formerly with state-sponsored offensive biological weapons programs, it would be very difficult for a terrorist to overcome major technical and operational challenges to effectively and successfully weaponize and deliver a biological warfare agent to cause mass casualties. [5] If terrorists could overcome these obstacles, experts believe that those without a prior knowledge of these agents would have to conduct extensive experimentation to perfect their skills, which would
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[4] In July 2000, DOD ordered a temporary slowdown of its program because the U.S. anthrax vaccine manufacturer could not win Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of its manufacturing process and facilities. In January 2002, FDA approved the U.S. manufacturer's facilities and vaccine manufacturing process and DOD announced the resumption of its anthrax vaccination program in June 2002.
[5] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSlAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999).
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result in their increased risk of discovery .Specialized knowledge is needed to acquire the right biological warfare agent, process it, improvise a weapon or device, and effectively deliver it to cause mass casualties.
To make high-quality anthrax powder, a number of challenging steps and specialties are involved:
Acquisition of a virulent strain of anthrax (such as the Ames strain), by (1) locally isolating a strain from a dead animal, (2) purchasing a small sample from an organization that already possessed it, or (3) stealing or by other means obtain it from a laboratory known to possess it.
Culturing or growing the organism to yield a large quantity, which could be done in commercially available fermenters or on agar plates (if fermented, the result is a slurry or liquid concentrate; if on an agar plate, the result is a wet paste). [5]
Harvesting; washing, and concentrating the cultured sample, typically done in a centrifuge, which also removes most of the liquid and results in a wet paste. [6]
Drying and grinding or milling the sample to sufficiently small size [7] including milling the spores to achieve the required particle size, and, possibly, adding appropriate chemicals to prevent aggregation of spores and to reduce static charge. [8]
Testing to confirm dispersion patterns and potency to cause mass casualties, unless the perpetrators are highly confident of their abilities.
Studies Conducted to Test Mail as a Delivery System for Anthrax
Prior to 1998, the military did not envision mail as a delivery system for anthrax powder. In 1998, SAIC, a defense contractor, asked a scientist from the former U.S. offensive biological weapons program, to articulate in a paper several scenarios for delivery of biological warfare agents to support decontamination and containment. One of these scenarios included anthrax powder being sent through the mail. According to this
_______________
[6] Experts told us that anthrax production is not an exact science. The yield and quality of each batch is variable even when produced legitimately in a highly sophisticated facility.
[7] There are several drying and milling methods. Some will greatly increase the static charge, and some will reduce the efficiency of the production. Any anthrax powder of < 5 microns is essentially a vapor.
[8] While it has been suggested that static charge could be reduced without adding chemicals, we have not been provided data to support this assertion. At this point, containment becomes imperative if the perpetrator wants to leave no evidence and protect himself or herself.
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paper, if a letter contained more than 2 to 3 grams of powder, it would be relatively easy to detect by its visible shape. In addition, the author believed, by sending the anthrax in a letter, the area of contamination would be limited, so decontamination procedures could be implemented successfully. In this paper, however, the operational environment of automated mail processing was not considered.
In Canada, the first Canadian anthrax hoax letter incident occurred on January 30, 2001) at the Citizenship and Immigration Office. Since no experimental study on which to base a realistic assessment of the threat posed by these "anthrax letters" could be found, Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES), a Canadian defense research and development organization, undertook a series of experiments to determine the extent of the hazard. This study was an attempt to (1) mimic what might occur in an office or mailroom if an envelope containing anthrax powder was received and opened and (2) estimate the aerosol release of the anthrax powder from the letters. This study also did not consider the operational environment of automated mail processing. Although this study was not published until October 1, 2001, DRES officials provided a schedule of briefings that were conducted through the spring and summer of 2001, when the results of the study were discussed.
The results indicated that dispersion of spores in an office setting would be far more effective than had initially been suspected. Significant numbers of aerosolized particles (>99% in the 2.5 to 10 micron size range) were released when envelopes, containing 0.1 or 1.0 grams of anthrax powder, were opened. A lethal dose could be inhaled within seconds of opening such an envelope. In addition, the powder quickly spread throughout the room so that if other workers were present, depending on their location and the airflow within the office, they would also be likely to inhale a lethal dose. The results also indicated that envelopes with corners not totally sealed could pose a threat to individuals in the mail-handling system. However, it is important to note that the scientists were only evaluating, the anthrax threat that could result from opening an anthrax- contaminated letter. They did not evaluate whether the mail going through the pinch rollers in a postal sorting machine could also result in secondary contamination. Although these results are significant with respect to local area contamination, overall, the mail as a means of producing mass casualties remains an inefficient method of dissemination as compared with the various military technologies. Nonetheless, in terms of public concerns and economic damage, anthrax powder in the mail represents a potentially significant problem.
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USPS Efforts to Detect Anthrax in the Mail
USPS has been pursuing several approaches, including procedural changes and a number of currently available technologies, to reduce risk through early detection of biohazards, primarily anthrax. U8PS has identified several key areas of focus, including (1) redesign of mail collection boxes for both risk reduction and detection, (2) development of technology and procedures to reduce the volume of "anonymous" mail, (3) deployment of vacuum/filtration technology on automated sorting equipment, (4) use of mass spectrometry for detection, and (5) pursuit of a variety of technologies to aid investigators in finding whoever was responsible for earlier anthrax attacks through the mail and deterring future attempts at placing biohazards in the mail.
To date, USPS has focused on systemwide detection technology -- centered mainly on Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) detection -- placed on the initial operation in processing facilities for mail with the greatest risk, which is picked up at collection boxes, residences, and small businesses. [9] USPS continues to face challenges in developing this technology for its operational environment. USPS continues to work with the manufacturers of several different technologies and is conducting additional testing and prototyping to fully determine the viability of these technologies in a mail processing environment. We are continuing to monitor USPS efforts to procure and deploy these technologies.
The USPS efforts to defend against biological agents illustrate a key aspect of homeland defense -- namely, the distinction between reactive and proactive operational environments. Prior to the October 2001 letters containing anthrax powder, the vast majority of technologies and techniques for defending against biological agent attacks were based on a post-release reaction approach. This post-release approach assumed that the delivery of the biological warfare agent would be via a known weapon system; that the target would be an active military site; that the soldiers at the site would be protected by adequate training, clothing; and prophylaxis; and that a high number of false positive detections would not hinder the site's operations in any significant way.
The USPS efforts illustrate a completely new proactive environment and concept of operations for these techniques and technologies. The USPS
_______________
[9] PCR technology is able to detect small quantities of DNA with a particular genetic sequence (e.g. anthrax) and is the nucleus of the biohazard detection system (BDS) specifically designed for USPS.
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environment is a civilian one, in which the. assumptions are that affected people would not have the full protection and training that would be available in a battlefield setting; that the biological warfare agent would have to be intercepted prior to its release, to minimize the impact on both humans and operations; that the delivery mechanism may not be obvious; and that the rate of false positive detection must be minimal in order to avoid unnecessary interruption to normal mail processing activities. As we stated earlier, overcoming the lack of data on the threat, in this domestic civilian environment will be critical to USPS success in establishing a biological agent defense.
Overview of Law Enforcement's Initial Response to the Anthrax Attack
The FBI as lead investigative agency is currently investigating a series of bioterrorism incidents using anthrax spores that were sent through the mail and which resulted in 22 anthrax cases, including five deaths, since October 3, 2001. This is the first time the FBI has conducted this kind of investigation. The FBI's investigative team includes criminal investigators with scientific knowledge. In addition, the FBI has reached out to the scientific community to gain additional scientific knowledge about anthrax. Further, the FBI's HAZMAT Response Team was used to gather evidence at various crime scenes contaminated by anthrax utilizing Personal Protection Equipment. [10] The FBI also utilized the expertise of (1) EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training (OCEFT) to assist in gathering evidence at one of the crime scenes, the Senate Hart Building; (2) USPS's Postal Inspector in collecting evidence involving the contamination of the mail system; (3) CDC and the Florida health unit that initially reported the first anthrax case; and (4) Department of Defense laboratories.
The FBI had previously been made aware of numerous anthrax incidents throughout the United States, which were random in nature and determined to be hoaxes. [AB-1] Because this was the first time the FBI responded to an actual anthrax attack, there was some confusion about the investigative roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies. As a result, the FBI recognized the need for increased coordination with public health officials, including CDC, and other investigative agencies. The CDC particularly is a key agency in any biological terrorist threat because it is
_______________
10. The FBI has 17 Field Offices that have HAZMAT Response Teams that are fully trained and equipped to respond to a hazardous material incident. These teams work in conjunction with the state and local first responders, to assess and evaluate the incident and provide direction to obtain evidence that could be used in subsequent prosecutions.
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able to identify biological agents and has the tools to investigate and respond quickly.
Current Efforts to Prepare for Future Bioterrorist Attacks
The anthrax investigation has prompted the FBI and other investigative agencies to focus additional attention on the chemical and biological threat. Some of these efforts include (1) agreements among the FBI, other federal agencies, and state and local governments delineating each organization's role; (2) increasing liaison efforts with public health officials; (3) preparation by the FBI and CDC of a handbook for conducting investigations involving biological agents; and (4) identification of key state and local officials needing security clearances to allow access to classified information.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving us the opportunity to submit this statement If you have any questions on the statement or follow-up questions, we will be happy to respond.
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(460539)
Page 8 GAO-03-323T
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:45 pm
APPENDIX
CTC WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE
December 1999
Questions raised by Senator Shelby and his staff in December 2002 prompted the Joint Inquiry to inquire further regarding whether CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had any established guidance concerning the watchlisting program. The Joint Inquiry had asked CTC about such watchlisting guidance in April 2002, and had been told in a written CIA response that no such guidance existed.
As a result of this renewed request, the Joint Inquiry was able to determine that CTC had sent a cable in December 1999 to all Directorate of Operations (DO) stations and bases, the subject of which was "Terrorism Guidance." The cable was designated as "Read and Retain," and its purpose was to remind DO personnel of pre-existing, periodically republished guidance regarding several important subjects of relevance to their counterterrorism efforts. The Joint Inquiry also determined that the unit in CTC that was responsible for matters relating to Usama Bin ladin and al-Qa'ida received a copy of the cable.
One paragraph of the nine paragraph "Terrorism Guidance" cable (see attached copy) reminded recipients of the procedures for watchlisting "potential," "possible," "known," or "suspected" terrorists. The guidance stated, in part, that:
...It is important to flag terrorist personality information in DO intelligence reporting for [the State Department watchlist program] so that potential terrorists may be watchlisted. Information for inclusion in [the State Department watchlist program] must raise a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a possible terrorist. ... Information for [the State Department watchlist] program should be based on the following priorities:
-- known or suspected terrorists who pose or may pose a present threat to U.S. interests in the United States or abroad:
...
Thus, CTC personnel and CIA station and base personnel abroad were reminded in December 1999 of the existence, importance and thresholds of the watchlisting program shortly before CTC learned in January 2000 that a known al-Qa'ida associate -- al-Mihdhar - -possessed a multiple entry U.S. visa; one month before the Malaysia meeting; and three months before CTC received information from the field indicating that at least one known al-Qa'ida associate -- Nawaf al-Hazmi -- had traveled to the United States.
2
CTC WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE
December 1999
Questions raised by Senator Shelby and his staff in December 2002 prompted the Joint Inquiry to inquire further regarding whether CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had any established guidance concerning the watchlisting program. The Joint Inquiry had asked CTC about such watchlisting guidance in April 2002, and had been told in a written CIA response that no such guidance existed.
As a result of this renewed request, the Joint Inquiry was able to determine that CTC had sent a cable in December 1999 to all Directorate of Operations (DO) stations and bases, the subject of which was "Terrorism Guidance." The cable was designated as "Read and Retain," and its purpose was to remind DO personnel of pre-existing, periodically republished guidance regarding several important subjects of relevance to their counterterrorism efforts. The Joint Inquiry also determined that the unit in CTC that was responsible for matters relating to Usama Bin ladin and al-Qa'ida received a copy of the cable.
One paragraph of the nine paragraph "Terrorism Guidance" cable (see attached copy) reminded recipients of the procedures for watchlisting "potential," "possible," "known," or "suspected" terrorists. The guidance stated, in part, that:
...It is important to flag terrorist personality information in DO intelligence reporting for [the State Department watchlist program] so that potential terrorists may be watchlisted. Information for inclusion in [the State Department watchlist program] must raise a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a possible terrorist. ... Information for [the State Department watchlist] program should be based on the following priorities:
-- known or suspected terrorists who pose or may pose a present threat to U.S. interests in the United States or abroad:
...
Thus, CTC personnel and CIA station and base personnel abroad were reminded in December 1999 of the existence, importance and thresholds of the watchlisting program shortly before CTC learned in January 2000 that a known al-Qa'ida associate -- al-Mihdhar - -possessed a multiple entry U.S. visa; one month before the Malaysia meeting; and three months before CTC received information from the field indicating that at least one known al-Qa'ida associate -- Nawaf al-Hazmi -- had traveled to the United States.
2
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Re: Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks o
by admin » Sat Mar 26, 2016 11:45 pm
DEC.17.2002
4:58PM
INTELLIGENCE COMM
NO.208 P.2
SECRET
DOSE
DIRECTION 67309
11 DECEMBER 1999
5. VISAVIPER PROGRAM:
THE VISAVIPER PROGRAM PROVIDES A CONSULAR CHANNEL FOR WATCHLISTING POTENTIAL TERRORISTS BY CONTRIBUTING TERRORIST PERSONALITIY INFORMATION FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S UNCLASSIFIED CLASS AND CLASSIFIED TIPOFF DATABASES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO FLAG TERRORIST PERSONALITY INFORMATION IN DO INTELLIGENCE REPORTING FOR VISAVIPER SO THAT POTENTIAL TERRORISTS MAY BE WATCHLISTED. INFORMATION FOR INCLUSION IN VISAVIPER MUST RAISE A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS A POSSIBLE TERRORIST, AND BIOGRAPHIC DATA MUST BE SUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES OR STATE DEPARTMENT WILL NOT MAKE A VISAVIPER ENTRY. INFORMATION FOR THE VISAVIPER PROGRAM SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES:
-- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WHO POSE OR MAY POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD;
-- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS NOT NOW KNOWN TO BE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS BUT WHO WERE SO ENGAGED WITHIN THE PAST 15 YEARS;
-- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST NON-U.S. INTERESTS, OR WHO WERE SO ENGAGED WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS
SECRET
4:58PM
INTELLIGENCE COMM
NO.208 P.2
SECRET
DOSE
DIRECTION 67309
11 DECEMBER 1999
5. VISAVIPER PROGRAM:
THE VISAVIPER PROGRAM PROVIDES A CONSULAR CHANNEL FOR WATCHLISTING POTENTIAL TERRORISTS BY CONTRIBUTING TERRORIST PERSONALITIY INFORMATION FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S UNCLASSIFIED CLASS AND CLASSIFIED TIPOFF DATABASES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO FLAG TERRORIST PERSONALITY INFORMATION IN DO INTELLIGENCE REPORTING FOR VISAVIPER SO THAT POTENTIAL TERRORISTS MAY BE WATCHLISTED. INFORMATION FOR INCLUSION IN VISAVIPER MUST RAISE A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS A POSSIBLE TERRORIST, AND BIOGRAPHIC DATA MUST BE SUFFICIENT FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES OR STATE DEPARTMENT WILL NOT MAKE A VISAVIPER ENTRY. INFORMATION FOR THE VISAVIPER PROGRAM SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES:
-- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WHO POSE OR MAY POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD;
-- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS NOT NOW KNOWN TO BE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS BUT WHO WERE SO ENGAGED WITHIN THE PAST 15 YEARS;
-- KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST NON-U.S. INTERESTS, OR WHO WERE SO ENGAGED WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS
SECRET
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