TOP SECRET
[1] UNITED STATE FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
3 Nov. 1944.
FF/A17-25.
Serial: 003191.
TOP SECRET.
From: The Commander In Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry—Review of.
Reference: (a) SecNav ltr of 21 October 1944.
Annex: (A) List of Parts of Record that Contain Information of super-secret nature.
1. In compliance with Reference (a) the following comment is submitted as to how much of the record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
2. There are only two general classifications of information which, if made public, would be detrimental to the conduct of current and future operations. These are:
(a) Information which directly or by inference would lead the Japanese to suspect that we have been able to break their codes.
(b) Verbatim plain language reproductions of messages sent in United States Codes. The Japanese presumably have the enciphered versions of these messages and if they are given the word for word plain language version it would help them to work on our codes. This is a matter of less importance than the possible compromise of what we know about Japanese encryption but it should be guarded against.
[2] 3. The really vital point is to preserve absolute secrecy as to our success in breaking Japanese codes. It is essential to keep this information to ourselves. I say this for the following reasons:
(a) All Japanese intercepts considered by the Court were in diplomatic codes. Most of these are still in effect with only minor changes. They are still the sources of information of incalculable value. Furthermore, all Japanese codes, Army and Navy, as well as diplomatic, are of the same general structure. The Japanese codes of today are not basically different from those they used in 1941. Breaking one code makes it easy to break the others. The Japanese presumably are well aware of this. If they were told that we broke their diplomatic codes in 1941 there is a reasonable assumption that they will change the whole basic code structure. If they were to do this the damage would be irreparable. The information we get relates not only to the current and prospective movements of Japanese naval vessels upon which we base our operating plans but also include data as to troop strength and prospective troop movements which are vital to the Army. It also relates to the disposition of Japanese Army and Navy air forces. It is impossible to overstate the disadvantages we would suffer if there were to be a leakage direct or indirect that an alert enemy might interpret as indicating that we can and do break his codes. It is no exaggeration to state that Midway might have been a Japanese victory had it not been for the information which we obtained by intercepting his coded despatches. The risks we have
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taken in advancing into the Marshall Islands and the Philippines would have been far greater than they actually were had we not been able to obtain information of Japanese dispositions and movements from Japanese sources.
(b) In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that there be no public release of any information which would alert the Japanese as to the possibility that we were breaking their codes.
[3] (c) It is a pertinent question as to just what part, if any, of the record of proceedings can be made public, without resulting in a leak of vital information.
(c) I can say unequivocally that Volume 5 (the Top Secret volume of proceedings) must not be made public. With regard to the other volumes of the record I find there are certain paragraphs which do point quite clearly to the fact that we have information which could only be obtained by reading Japanese coded messages. I have listed these in Annex (A) of the report, which also includes certain references which might be damaging to the security of our own codes.
(e) I am not any too certain of the effectiveness of the deletions recommended in Annex (A). There are statements of a border-line nature concerning which it is difficult to tell whether or not an alert enemy might find a clue as to what our knowledge of his codes really is. However, if the record is also abridged by deletion of the matter enumerated in Annex (A), it would be devoid of any direct reference to information which we must keep from becoming public.
(f) The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that I am in favor of making public the parts of the record not referred to in the Annex. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that publication of a weeded record or of abridged Findings would have the following undesirable results:
(1) The picture presented would be disjointed and full of unexplained gaps. I think this would lead to a demand of Congress and by the Press for more information, on the ground that the part made public was incomplete, and that withholding of any information is indicative of a desire on the part of the Navy to whitewash high naval officers. A situation such as this might well lead to discussions that would inadvertently disclose just the information that we feel is vital to keep secret.
[4] (2) Admiral Kimmel's principal contention is that he was kept in the dark as to certain information which the Navy Department had obtained from various sources, including the breaking of Japanese codes. This is a matter which cannot be made public without irreparable damage to the conduct of the war. It is not unlikely that if there is a public release of some of the Facts and Opinions, but no release concerning matters in which Admiral Kimmel is particularly concerned, he may take further action to protect his own reputation. The potentialities are particularly dangerous, because Admiral Kimmel's civilian lawyers have now been informed, so I understand, of the existence and content of the many Japanese messages in question. I know of no means of keeping these lawyers from talking in public, except such ethical views as they may have concerning their responsibility for not doing anything that would jeopardize war operations. It is a question just how far they could be restrained by ethical considerations, if the Navy Department were to make public the part of the record which is unfavorable to Admiral Kimmel, while suppressing that part which he regards as a main element of his defense.
(3) I also invite attention to the fact that the Findings include certain Facts and Opinions critical of Army efficiency, ascertained by proceedings to which the Army was not a party. The publication of this part of the record might well result in an inter-service dispute, which would tend to bring out the very information which it is essential to conceal.
4. In regard to the requirements of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, I note that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. This law does [15] not obligate the Secretary of the Navy to make any public statement of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained. Furthermore, as I understand it, the President has definitely expressed himself as opposed to any act which might interfere with the war effort. I, therefore, conclude that there is no necessity for making anything public, except on the ground that something should be done to suppress the rumors and irresponsible accusations that are now current. I do not believe that such considerations in any way warrant jeopardizing the war effort by publicising all or any part of the record.
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5. With regard as to whether or not there should be any public statement, I offer the opinion that no steps should be taken without consulting the Secretary of War, and arranging for parallel action. The two Departments should not issue conflicting statements, nor should one keep silent while the other one makes a statement. Assuming that the War Department would take parallel action I recommend that there be no public release whatsoever. However, if the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War decide that there must be some report to the public, I recommend a statement to the Press in substance as follows:
"The Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed which warrant court martial proceedings against any person or persons in the naval service. The Secretary of the Navy approves the Findings. The record of the Court will not be made public while the war is in progress."
6. If you should find it advisable, at a later time, to issue a further statement it seems to me that it would also be desirable to make public in some manner the fact (see page 1160 of the record) that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends, that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect, and that they [6] invariably conferred on matters bearing on the development of the Japanese situation and their several plans in preparing for war. This would refute the statements and rumors that have been prevalent to the effect that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were at odds with one another. Of course, no such statement could be made unless the Secretary of War concurs. If the Secretary of War does concur you might find occasion to make informal comment on the matter at a press conference.
/S/ E. J. King,
E. J. King.
TOP SECRET
ANNEX "A" To COMINCH SERIAL 003191
1. The following portions of the Record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry should not be made public, because they convey information which the enemy could use to the detriment of United States war operations.
(a) Volume 5 (the "Top Secret" volume).
(b) The following paragraphs of Volumes 1, 2,3, and 4:
(1) Volume 1
Page Paragraph Page Paragraph
166 683 255 174
172 739 256 179
213 Entire Page 266 180
214 116 266 260
214 117 266 261
214 127 297 81
(2) Volume 2
Page Paragraph Page Paragraph
315 25 470 3
315 26 470 4
326 145 471 5
328 153 471 6
344 226 471 7
396 54 471 8
427 43 471 9
430 54 472 15
432 63 473 18
432 64 473 19
463 18 473 20
463 19 473 21
463 20 473 22
465 24 483 51
466 25 534 40
466 26 563 168
466 27 567 187
468 38
Page 335
(3) Volume 3
Page Paragraph Page Paragraph
805 176 889 16
817 7 889 17
818 8 911 38
850 149
(4) Volume 4
Page Paragraph
938 34
939 35
(c) Also the following parts of the "Findings" in Volume 4: Page 1191. Third paragraph (beginning with words "on 24 November") and the despatch quoted therein.
Page 1192. Entire page.
Page 1193. Entire page.
Page 1194. First 3 lines
Page 1198. Last paragraph.
Page 1199. Entire page.
Page 1200. Entire page.
Page 1201. First 2 lines
Page 1206. Last paragraph.
Page 1207. Entire page.
Page 1208. First 7 lines.
Statement of Admiral Stark:
Paragraph 7.
Paragraph 8.
Statement of Admiral Kimmel:
Page 21. Last paragraph.
Page 22. First paragraph.
(d) All "Top Secret" exhibits, and the following exhibits listed in the index to Volume 1: 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 40, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 76, 76, 77.
NOTE
The Top Secret Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 6 Nov. 1944 by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, was not published, however a paraphrased copy of this endorsement was published.
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[1] TOP SECRET
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
FF1/A17-25.
Serial: 003224
TOP SECRET.
6 Nov 1944.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor. Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
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1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the first endorsement and to the following remarks.
2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two- thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Kimmel) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which bad any bearing on the development of the United States- Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions.
My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base were necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment
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is that this principle is sound enough but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should* have been strong enough for self defense. The [4] fact that it *was not* strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance and the maintenance of augmented Condition 3 on board vessels in port. Condition of readiness No. 3 provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in Alert No. 1 which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that condition of readiness No. 3 is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises: 50% were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also points out that there were no longer range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defence."
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This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.
(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
[7] Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).
(l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor-both Army and Navy. It there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV (1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install baffles appears to
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have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain in, formation, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days: [101] [sic] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to all end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
[11] (1) A number of messages were received from informers during and prior to this period in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The test of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatehes, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to main as to the ability of the Navy Department to obtain them. This contention as some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the sources of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give
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Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatehes he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the [12] countries, and leave no doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was received. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation. This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.
(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p. m. message" was received in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p. m. in Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. 13 the significance of the "1:00 p. m. time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the formation just received pointed to the possibility—even to the probability-of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this mess came to his attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii would be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the [13] need for sending this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 p.m., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to destroy their codes immediately and that while the War Department does not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would have been of great value in a planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.
(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings: it is stated Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was [14] informed that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication
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of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency". (Exhibit 22.)
(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was received in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message meant that Japanese relations with Russia were [15] in danger. These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on which was written a different version of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Department or the Navy Department There is considerable testimony in the record as to what was done with the "Winds message." Various officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that none of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
[16] (s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy.
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It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion:
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
[17] (b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pear I Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.
(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX (page 1203), the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in [18] concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that
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no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
[19] (h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (1207), the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been [20] received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the message in question nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this message, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.
4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 120S) the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor [21] incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in at the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.
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(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.
[22] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the senseof intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December [23] concerning destruction of United States Secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessel in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.
6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in questions they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
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[24] 7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King.
E. J. KING.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File: This is Admiral King's Second Endorsement, as paraphrased, by the deletion of the magic. This is the paraphrase that was made public because the public interest required that the magic not be made public.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
FF1/A17-25.
Serial:
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Correspondence re Court of Inquiry Investigating Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Subject correspondence.
1. The attached file copy and rough draft (which was published) is the paraphrased version of my second endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating Pearl Harbor.
/S/ E. J. KING,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.
[1] COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
FF1/A17-25.
Serial: 003224
TOP SECRET.
6 Nov 1944.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor. Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
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1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the first endorsement and to the following remarks.
2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two- thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Kimmel) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which bad any bearing on the development of the United States- Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions.
My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base were necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment
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is that this principle is sound enough but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should* have been strong enough for self defense. The [4] fact that it *was not* strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance and the maintenance of augmented Condition 3 on board vessels in port. Condition of readiness No. 3 provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in Alert No. 1 which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that condition of readiness No. 3 is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises: 50% were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also points out that there were no longer range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defence."
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This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.
(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
[7] Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).
(l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor-both Army and Navy. It there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV (1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install baffles appears to
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have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain in, formation, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days: [101] [sic] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to all end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
[11] (1) A number of messages were received from informers during and prior to this period in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The test of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatehes, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to main as to the ability of the Navy Department to obtain them. This contention as some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the sources of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give
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Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatehes he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the [12] countries, and leave no doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was received. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation. This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.
(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p. m. message" was received in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p. m. in Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. 13 the significance of the "1:00 p. m. time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the formation just received pointed to the possibility—even to the probability-of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this mess came to his attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii would be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the [13] need for sending this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 p.m., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to destroy their codes immediately and that while the War Department does not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would have been of great value in a planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.
(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings: it is stated Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was [14] informed that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication
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of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency". (Exhibit 22.)
(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was received in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message meant that Japanese relations with Russia were [15] in danger. These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on which was written a different version of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Department or the Navy Department There is considerable testimony in the record as to what was done with the "Winds message." Various officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that none of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
[16] (s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy.
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It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion:
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
[17] (b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pear I Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.
(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX (page 1203), the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in [18] concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that
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no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
[19] (h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (1207), the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been [20] received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the message in question nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this message, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.
4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 120S) the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor [21] incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in at the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.
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(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.
[22] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the senseof intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December [23] concerning destruction of United States Secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessel in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.
6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in questions they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
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[24] 7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King.
E. J. KING.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File: This is Admiral King's Second Endorsement, as paraphrased, by the deletion of the magic. This is the paraphrase that was made public because the public interest required that the magic not be made public.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
FF1/A17-25.
Serial:
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Correspondence re Court of Inquiry Investigating Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Subject correspondence.
1. The attached file copy and rough draft (which was published) is the paraphrased version of my second endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating Pearl Harbor.
/S/ E. J. KING,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.
[1] COMINCH FILE
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Re: Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee
by admin » Sun Mar 27, 2016 3:48 am
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
SECOND ENDORSEMENT
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.
2. (A) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from
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going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact VI sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect, that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principles this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless,
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he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that th basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti- ubmarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3" provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No 3" is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50% were on 4 hours notice. This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.
(J) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that
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no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941 The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
[7] (k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the are between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
(1) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject The more important items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet,
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that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(o) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which as known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather an elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
[11] (1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which was to sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire in some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from which it was obtained. This intention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information which he was receiving. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the handling certain information which was received in the Navy Department on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United States proposals for solving matters under dispute between the countries, and leaves no doubt that the United States' proposals were [12] unacceptable to Japan, but do
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not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At, or about, 0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was received which indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at State Department.
(3) At about 10:30 A. M. on 7 December, further reliable information was received in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 P.M. on that day. Information was of significance because 1:00 P. M. in Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and immediately thereafter, to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility—even probability—of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states this information came to his attention about 11:00 A. M. and that he immediately telephone [sic] to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General [13] Short that a break with Japan was imminent and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the need for sending this message, but after brief consideration, asked General Marshall to include in his proposed dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 P. M. Washington time on 7 December; and that while the War Department did not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, he, General Short, was to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dispatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.
[14] (4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says that "the significance of this dispatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the destruction of Secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy Secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency."
(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 25 November reliable information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short-wave news broadcast. When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This inform was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had
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it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. Various officers testified that the implementing broadcasts were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but [15] Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts [1] were never sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII) that 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would [16] seem essential thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; [2] however, it appears to that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
[17] 3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view that presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary. And that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bear upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of and material at the time and that available means were spread thin through the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the indications of that information which was given to him.
[1] Later investigations indicate that the vital implementing broadcasts were not, in fact, received by the Navy Department.
[2] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change any of the opinions or facts established.
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[18] (c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, the plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
[19] (f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
[20] (i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XV II, the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
[21] (j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the court presses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he received regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this
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Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this information as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the views of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the information, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident, that though Admiral Stark did have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.
[22] 4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God," beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people are unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. Attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early accurate information [23] as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the best and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information able in Washington, particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.
(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(3) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the information which he received indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. [24] It appears that had this information been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it *might* have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last
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minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" of 27 November; the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter in outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facts of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be must given consideration. After weighing those considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
[25] (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been full [sic] operational.
6. The derelictions of the part of Admiral stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to position in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King
E. J. KING
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
SECOND ENDORSEMENT
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.
2. (A) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from
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going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact VI sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect, that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principles this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless,
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he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that th basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti- ubmarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3" provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No 3" is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50% were on 4 hours notice. This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads:
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.
(J) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that
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no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941 The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
[7] (k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the are between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
(1) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject The more important items are as follows:
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet,
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that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(o) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which as known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather an elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:
[11] (1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which was to sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire in some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from which it was obtained. This intention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information which he was receiving. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the handling certain information which was received in the Navy Department on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United States proposals for solving matters under dispute between the countries, and leaves no doubt that the United States' proposals were [12] unacceptable to Japan, but do
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not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At, or about, 0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was received which indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at State Department.
(3) At about 10:30 A. M. on 7 December, further reliable information was received in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 P.M. on that day. Information was of significance because 1:00 P. M. in Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and immediately thereafter, to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility—even probability—of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states this information came to his attention about 11:00 A. M. and that he immediately telephone [sic] to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General [13] Short that a break with Japan was imminent and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the need for sending this message, but after brief consideration, asked General Marshall to include in his proposed dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 P. M. Washington time on 7 December; and that while the War Department did not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, he, General Short, was to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dispatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.
[14] (4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says that "the significance of this dispatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the destruction of Secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy Secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency."
(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 25 November reliable information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short-wave news broadcast. When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This inform was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had
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it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. Various officers testified that the implementing broadcasts were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but [15] Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts [1] were never sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII) that 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would [16] seem essential thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; [2] however, it appears to that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
[17] 3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view that presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary. And that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bear upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of and material at the time and that available means were spread thin through the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the indications of that information which was given to him.
[1] Later investigations indicate that the vital implementing broadcasts were not, in fact, received by the Navy Department.
[2] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change any of the opinions or facts established.
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[18] (c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, the plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
[19] (f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
[20] (i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XV II, the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
[21] (j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the court presses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he received regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this
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Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this information as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the views of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the information, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident, that though Admiral Stark did have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.
[22] 4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God," beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people are unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. Attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early accurate information [23] as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the best and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information able in Washington, particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.
(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(3) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the information which he received indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. [24] It appears that had this information been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it *might* have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last
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minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" of 27 November; the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter in outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facts of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be must given consideration. After weighing those considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
[25] (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been full [sic] operational.
6. The derelictions of the part of Admiral stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to position in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King
E. J. KING
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Re: Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee
by admin » Sun Mar 27, 2016 3:49 am
THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
[Stamped:] 1 Dec. 1944
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, a Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.
2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
[Stamped:] 1 Dec. 1944
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, a Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.
2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
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Re: Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee
by admin » Sun Mar 27, 2016 3:52 am
Part 1 of 2
Page 355
TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File:
This is the Sec'ys 4th End that was not used because it contained magic; instead the Secy signed the one of Aug 13, that the President made public Aug 29, from which the magic was deleted in the public interest.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR
Special Assistant to the Secretary
[1] TOP SECRET
Fourth Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry and Fourth Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report to the Secretary of the Navy Dated 12 July 1945
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U.S.N., (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U.S.N., (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U.S.N., (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, U.S.N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."
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6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., as investigating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation directed by my precept of [3] 2 May 1945 was completed on 12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded to the Judge Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.
9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of further investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised, among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to Naval law; that the evidence indicated that the officers in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty of culpable inefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate General further advised in his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the Naval service." Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for any alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December 1941.
10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 August 1945, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurred generally in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy; that with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet was still of the opinion that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties, and that appropriate action, consisting of the relegation of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment might not result in future errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, and stated that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement, that in any event he considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark or Admiral Kimmel to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to [4] national security measures. He
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concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated that this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the Judge Advocate General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to national security.
11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements to the report by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following remarks:
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II.—This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III.—This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate causal relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long [5] distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV.—This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:
"75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V.—The court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved:
"1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local com-
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manders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.
"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange."
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was not working effectively—it failed. In this connection the following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:
"War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of command."
However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or [7] more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports the following conclusion by him, which is approved:
"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack on Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced."
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI.—This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
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The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.—The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.
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attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral Hewitt's report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that those four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer [10] in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:
"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now" or words to that effect....
"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or a jocular one?
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said "Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.
"Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt's report, the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb," and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as [11] to Japanese carriers.
In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief,
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U.S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.—It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not permit an all- round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distance reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.
[12] The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the question of air reconnaissance are approved:
"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 120 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.
"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.
"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu."
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.—This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least
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an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:
"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during [13] certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft."
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV.—This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of [14] the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI.—The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility . . ."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
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TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Memo for File:
This is the Sec'ys 4th End that was not used because it contained magic; instead the Secy signed the one of Aug 13, that the President made public Aug 29, from which the magic was deleted in the public interest.
JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR
Special Assistant to the Secretary
[1] TOP SECRET
Fourth Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry and Fourth Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report to the Secretary of the Navy Dated 12 July 1945
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U.S.N., (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U.S.N., (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U.S.N., (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, U.S.N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."
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6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., as investigating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation directed by my precept of [3] 2 May 1945 was completed on 12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded to the Judge Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.
9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of further investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised, among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to Naval law; that the evidence indicated that the officers in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty of culpable inefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate General further advised in his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the Naval service." Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for any alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December 1941.
10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 August 1945, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurred generally in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy; that with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet was still of the opinion that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties, and that appropriate action, consisting of the relegation of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment might not result in future errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, and stated that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement, that in any event he considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark or Admiral Kimmel to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to [4] national security measures. He
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concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated that this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the Judge Advocate General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to national security.
11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements to the report by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following remarks:
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II.—This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III.—This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate causal relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long [5] distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV.—This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:
"75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V.—The court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved:
"1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local com-
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manders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.
"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange."
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was not working effectively—it failed. In this connection the following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:
"War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of command."
However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or [7] more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports the following conclusion by him, which is approved:
"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack on Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced."
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI.—This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
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The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.—The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.
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attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral Hewitt's report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that those four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer [10] in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:
"Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?
"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now" or words to that effect....
"Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or a jocular one?
"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said "Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.
"Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?
"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt's report, the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb," and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as [11] to Japanese carriers.
In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief,
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U.S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.—It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not permit an all- round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distance reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.
[12] The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the question of air reconnaissance are approved:
"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 120 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.
"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.
"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu."
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.—This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least
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an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:
"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during [13] certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft."
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV.—This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of [14] the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI.—The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility . . ."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
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Re: Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee
by admin » Sun Mar 27, 2016 3:53 am
Part 2 of 2
The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
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I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal [15] with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.—The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was not available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this connection is approved:
"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs, that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack...."
[16] (r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.—These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages, and summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts, constitutes a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy
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Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved:
"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.
[17] "6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready....
"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.
"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.
"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages."
[18] 12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese Consulate General are approved.
"Conclusion 12: Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was
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obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.
"Conclusion 13: Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work."
13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that the disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation [19] of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.
14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the
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responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
[20] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;
(2) The intercepted Japanese message inquiring as to the disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) The implementation of the "winds" message;
(4) In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message" it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available. [sic]
(5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.
I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt is approved:
"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States."
Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures against sabotage."
[21] Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.
The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26 November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum that it wa known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1 December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department's note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State Department's note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time.
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On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.
[22] In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long- range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.
Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:
"The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable pre-
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cautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:
"(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
[23] "(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
"(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
"(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.
"(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.
"(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations."
I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which Admiral Kimmel could and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his following conclusion, which is hereby approved.
"Conclusion 14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu."
During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.
In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was of course always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
[24] 15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."
16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Fleet, states in part:
"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that
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the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.
"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.
"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court [25] martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures."
17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:
"1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.
"2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.
"3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principle been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.
[26] "4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
"(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.
"(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.—This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX.—The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could, that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.—Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X.—This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI.—The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.
In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concur.
(l) Court of Inquiry Finding XII.—The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to
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by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court- martial.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service."
18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, thereto; the record, findings, and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.
(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
19. Accordingly, I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.
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NOTE
This endorsement released by President Truman 29 August 1945-thereby changing classification.
[1]
The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
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I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal [15] with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.—The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was not available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this connection is approved:
"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs, that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack...."
[16] (r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.—These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages, and summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts, constitutes a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy
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Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved:
"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.
[17] "6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready....
"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.
"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.
"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages."
[18] 12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese Consulate General are approved.
"Conclusion 12: Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was
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obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.
"Conclusion 13: Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work."
13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that the disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation [19] of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.
14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the
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responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
[20] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;
(2) The intercepted Japanese message inquiring as to the disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) The implementation of the "winds" message;
(4) In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message" it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available. [sic]
(5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.
I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt is approved:
"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States."
Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures against sabotage."
[21] Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.
The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26 November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum that it wa known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1 December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department's note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State Department's note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time.
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On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.
[22] In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long- range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.
Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:
"The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable pre-
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cautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:
"(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
[23] "(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
"(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
"(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.
"(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.
"(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations."
I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which Admiral Kimmel could and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his following conclusion, which is hereby approved.
"Conclusion 14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu."
During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.
In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was of course always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
[24] 15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."
16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Fleet, states in part:
"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that
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the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.
"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.
"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court [25] martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures."
17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:
"1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.
"2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.
"3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principle been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.
[26] "4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
"(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.
"(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.—This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX.—The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could, that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.—Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X.—This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI.—The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.
In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, I concur.
(l) Court of Inquiry Finding XII.—The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to
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by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court- martial.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service."
18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, thereto; the record, findings, and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.
(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
19. Accordingly, I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.
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NOTE
This endorsement released by President Truman 29 August 1945-thereby changing classification.
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Re: Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee
by admin » Sun Mar 27, 2016 3:55 am
13 AUGUST 1945.
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for Joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944 Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET" in the interest of national security, and the balance "SECRET."
The material which was classified "TOP SECRET" was so classified by the Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations because of the extreme care which has been necessary to safeguard information in the hands of the Navy Department and especially the sources of that information. These sources were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now informs me that it is still in the public interest that the sources of this infor-
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mation be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the report of the Court of Inquiry be made public except that part, publication of which in the opinion of the Commander in Chef, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations would necessarily disclose the sources of secret information. To the same end in the discussion of the report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before the Court and the additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt's investigation herein I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of secret information.
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending [3] the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, as investigating officer, to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop and clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945.
9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the following remarks:
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II.—This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court Of Inquiry Finding III.—This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . . " make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. Though, in contrast with our Constitutional principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was but a repetition of the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaugurating hostilities and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was any proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it [4] appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV.—This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
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Upon the basis of all the evidence including Admiral Hewitt's investigation, it appears that:
(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V. The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection upon all the evidence it appears:
(1) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet with the available means various types of attack including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the ease prior to the attack.
(2) The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
[5] (3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates however that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know which degree of alert the Army had in effect and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation of joint command was of working effectively—it failed.
War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is there must be unity of command. However it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations but all
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acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
[6] I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer.
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI.—This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.—The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.—This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the ships of the Fleet in port had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
[7] (h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX.—The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal; that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could; that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.—Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X.—This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI.—The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.
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In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.
(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII.—The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. N., described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:
"Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?
"A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are [9] in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." . . .
"Q. Your testimony Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?
"A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.
"Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?
"A This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to
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point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb" and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese carriers.
[10] In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.—It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not permit an all- ound daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, the following points may be noted:
(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
[11] (3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning " as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.
(6) The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
(7) If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.
(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.
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(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.—This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least all hour's warning of the attack.
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV.—This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions [12] of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallows as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which [13] he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(P) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI.—The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "*A surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part personal letter sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark
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stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However. We are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.
[14] (q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.—The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, not all of which vas available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates.
The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence. Through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.
(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.—These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1911 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information [15] in his possession constitutes a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
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With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also available as a witness to the Court. I ascertaine that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
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to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation [18] of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and the Navy, in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and materiel programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.
12. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
[19] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was a definite step toward breaking relations.
(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the disposition of the ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which he received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available;
(4) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of mounting intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.
I concur generally with these.
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Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941. Although it was not known on 6 December precisely when or where the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the morning of December 7 by 10:30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring bout some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
[20] (b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5 (b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully formed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should be been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941 and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation. The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.
[21] The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them. Under radio
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silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probably approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port particularly, during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.
The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel's most serious omission was his failure to conduct long range air and/or sea reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt.
The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
During the critical period after November 27th, the limitations of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air and/or sea reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.
[22] In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral King taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."
The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states his conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence produced.
14. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, thereto, and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E Kimmel and Admiral Harold B Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December, 1941, failed
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to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.
[23] (d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made to the extent that such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
15. Accordingly I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made to the extent that such action can be take without injuring current military operations or the national security.
(Signed) JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
[1] SECRET
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for Joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944 Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
[2] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET" in the interest of national security, and the balance "SECRET."
The material which was classified "TOP SECRET" was so classified by the Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations because of the extreme care which has been necessary to safeguard information in the hands of the Navy Department and especially the sources of that information. These sources were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now informs me that it is still in the public interest that the sources of this infor-
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mation be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the report of the Court of Inquiry be made public except that part, publication of which in the opinion of the Commander in Chef, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations would necessarily disclose the sources of secret information. To the same end in the discussion of the report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before the Court and the additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt's investigation herein I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of secret information.
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending [3] the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, as investigating officer, to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop and clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945.
9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the following remarks:
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II.—This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court Of Inquiry Finding III.—This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . . " make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. Though, in contrast with our Constitutional principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was but a repetition of the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaugurating hostilities and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was any proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it [4] appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV.—This states that Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
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Upon the basis of all the evidence including Admiral Hewitt's investigation, it appears that:
(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V. The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection upon all the evidence it appears:
(1) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet with the available means various types of attack including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the ease prior to the attack.
(2) The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
[5] (3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates however that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reinforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know which degree of alert the Army had in effect and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation of joint command was of working effectively—it failed.
War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is there must be unity of command. However it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations but all
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acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
[6] I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer.
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI.—This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.—The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII.—This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the ships of the Fleet in port had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
[7] (h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX.—The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes, that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal; that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could; that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX.—Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X.—This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI.—The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.
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In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.
(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII.—The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. N., described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:
"Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?
"A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are [9] in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." . . .
"Q. Your testimony Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?
"A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.
"Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?
"A This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to
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point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb" and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese carriers.
[10] In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII.—It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not permit an all- ound daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, the following points may be noted:
(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
[11] (3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning " as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.
(6) The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
(7) If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.
(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.
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(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV.—This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least all hour's warning of the attack.
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV.—This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions [12] of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its finding is the further finding that it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallows as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which [13] he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(P) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI.—The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "*A surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part personal letter sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark
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stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However. We are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.
[14] (q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII.—The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, not all of which vas available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates.
The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence. Through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.
(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX.—These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1911 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information [15] in his possession constitutes a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
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With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also available as a witness to the Court. I ascertaine that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
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to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation [18] of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and the Navy, in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and materiel programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.
12. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.
[19] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was a definite step toward breaking relations.
(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the disposition of the ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which he received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available;
(4) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of mounting intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.
I concur generally with these.
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Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941. Although it was not known on 6 December precisely when or where the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the morning of December 7 by 10:30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring bout some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
[20] (b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5 (b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully formed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should be been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941 and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment," he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation. The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz.:
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers;
(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port;
(3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.
[21] The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them. Under radio
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silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probably approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port particularly, during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.
The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel's most serious omission was his failure to conduct long range air and/or sea reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt.
The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
During the critical period after November 27th, the limitations of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air and/or sea reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.
[22] In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral King taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:
"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."
The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states his conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence produced.
14. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, thereto, and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E Kimmel and Admiral Harold B Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December, 1941, failed
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to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.
[23] (d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made to the extent that such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
15. Accordingly I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made to the extent that such action can be take without injuring current military operations or the national security.
(Signed) JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
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Re: Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee
by admin » Sun Mar 27, 2016 3:55 am
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
3 Dec. 1944.
FF1/A17.
Serial: 003489.
SECRET.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board-Comments concerning.
1. The following comments on the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board are submitted.
2. The Army findings as to the basic cause of the surprise are not at variance with the findings of the Navy Court. In brief, they are that no one in authority appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was exposed and consequently the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii were preoccupied with training activities to the exclusion of adequate alertness against attack.
3. There was general agreement between the Army Board and the Navy Court the following particulars as to lack of awareness of danger:
a. It was impossible for United States agents to get information in Japan while Japanese agents were given free rein in Hawaii and encountered little difficulty in transmitting intelligence by cable.
b. The information that did reach Washington was not correctly evaluated, and vital parts of it either never were sent to Hawaii or else got there too late.
c. Estimates of Japanese intentions were based predominately on what the Japanese were likely to do, rather than upon what they could do. All basic plans contain the assumption that hostilities might be opened by an air attack on Oahu, but this assumption was generally ignored during the period preceding the attack. Is of interest to note in this connection that AA batteries of ships in port were ready to open fire when the Japanese planes came in. This is evidence that Admiral Kimmel was less blind to the potential danger than was the Army command. [2] The Army forces had no ammunition at mobile guns and
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it was a matter of hours before it could be distributed from the magazines to the anti-aircraft batteries.
d. The Army was in readiness against sabotage. The Navy condition of readiness, though far from fully effective, was designed to meet air attack. In this connection, the Army Board (Page 229 of the Record) observes that there was conflict in the nature of the information sent to Hawaii, in that Navy Department messages were predominate with warning of conflict while War Department messages were predominate with the idea of avoiding conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and espionage.
e. The Army air warning system was usable, but was being used for training—not for warning-when the Jap planes came in.
4. The Army Board finds that General Short established cordial relations with the Navy, but did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his full information in the performance of his mission. For example, the Board points out that General Short was under the impression that distant reconnaissance was being adequately provided by naval task forces in connection with exercises (he apparently knew that no such exercises were in progress on 7 December), that Admiral Kimmel failed to acquaint him with certain messages he received from the Navy Department (there is conflict of testimony as to some of these), that General Short hesitated to inquire as to the details of naval arrangements, and that he was not informed of the fact that a Japanese submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor in the early morning of 7 December (the Naval Court explains that Admirals Kimmel and Bloch withheld report of this attack until the contact could be verified, in view of many false contacts that had occurred; the air attack began before verification was obtained). This finding of the Army Board is in conflict with the Navy finding that relations—official as well as personal—were not only cordial but adequate. I am inclined to agree with the Army Board for reasons discussed in the next paragraph.
[3] 5. The Army Board criticizes the command arrangements in Hawaii. There was no unity of command, and no integrated staff to evaluate information and to attend to the details of coordinating defense measures. Certain joint plans had been prepared which were sound in concept, but defective in that neither Service had the means to carry them out. Furthermore, for the most part, these plans did not become effective until an emergency arose, and the emergency came too suddenly to permit effective implementation. Unity of Command could have been put into effect (but was not put into effect before the 7th of December) by the President, or by agreement between the Departments or by local arrangement. My comment on this is as follows:
a. Coordination by mutual cooperation, which was the system in effect in Hawaii until after the attack, is a well recognized system of Command. Personally, I consider it inferior to unity of Command in circumstances such as existed in Hawaii, but it is a fact that this system has worked effectively elsewhere during the current war. I think Kimmel and Short were at fault in not making the system work better than it did.
b. The lack of coordination in Hawaii was not in itself a disease, but a symptom of the deeper ill—lack of awareness of danger. As stated by the Army Board, local Commanders were unwilling to put war measures into effect because they would interfere with training.
6. The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment "The Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility." My comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relation ships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. [4] However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
7. The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation.
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There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, and did, do.
8. The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investigated by the Navy. These are:
a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.
b. The Army Board is of the Opinion that Japanese midget submarines operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of December, for the [5] purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F. B. I. By Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation.
c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.
9. The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further Finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General Short's report on 28 November that he had established "Alert No. 1"; and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command.
10. The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to place his Command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach an agreement with local naval officials for implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient staff officers.
11. I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the [6] Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation between these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal, contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, this fault was part and parcel of the general blindness to Japanese potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers in the high commands concerned—Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel—failed to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analyzing and making use of the information that became available to them.
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12. I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to be made in the matters referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged radio contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the substance of information obtained by naval and F.B.I. telephone and cable intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose. The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry.
13. I find no reason to modify the recommendations I made in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
/S/ E. J. King
E. J. KING.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this evidence the following conclusions appear:
(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war.
[16] (2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.
(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means certain information indicating the imminence of an attack by the Japanese that was available at Washington on the morning of December 7th, were unfortunate.
(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.
[17] 10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu but no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.
11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
3 Dec. 1944.
FF1/A17.
Serial: 003489.
SECRET.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board-Comments concerning.
1. The following comments on the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board are submitted.
2. The Army findings as to the basic cause of the surprise are not at variance with the findings of the Navy Court. In brief, they are that no one in authority appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was exposed and consequently the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii were preoccupied with training activities to the exclusion of adequate alertness against attack.
3. There was general agreement between the Army Board and the Navy Court the following particulars as to lack of awareness of danger:
a. It was impossible for United States agents to get information in Japan while Japanese agents were given free rein in Hawaii and encountered little difficulty in transmitting intelligence by cable.
b. The information that did reach Washington was not correctly evaluated, and vital parts of it either never were sent to Hawaii or else got there too late.
c. Estimates of Japanese intentions were based predominately on what the Japanese were likely to do, rather than upon what they could do. All basic plans contain the assumption that hostilities might be opened by an air attack on Oahu, but this assumption was generally ignored during the period preceding the attack. Is of interest to note in this connection that AA batteries of ships in port were ready to open fire when the Japanese planes came in. This is evidence that Admiral Kimmel was less blind to the potential danger than was the Army command. [2] The Army forces had no ammunition at mobile guns and
Page 384
it was a matter of hours before it could be distributed from the magazines to the anti-aircraft batteries.
d. The Army was in readiness against sabotage. The Navy condition of readiness, though far from fully effective, was designed to meet air attack. In this connection, the Army Board (Page 229 of the Record) observes that there was conflict in the nature of the information sent to Hawaii, in that Navy Department messages were predominate with warning of conflict while War Department messages were predominate with the idea of avoiding conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and espionage.
e. The Army air warning system was usable, but was being used for training—not for warning-when the Jap planes came in.
4. The Army Board finds that General Short established cordial relations with the Navy, but did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his full information in the performance of his mission. For example, the Board points out that General Short was under the impression that distant reconnaissance was being adequately provided by naval task forces in connection with exercises (he apparently knew that no such exercises were in progress on 7 December), that Admiral Kimmel failed to acquaint him with certain messages he received from the Navy Department (there is conflict of testimony as to some of these), that General Short hesitated to inquire as to the details of naval arrangements, and that he was not informed of the fact that a Japanese submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor in the early morning of 7 December (the Naval Court explains that Admirals Kimmel and Bloch withheld report of this attack until the contact could be verified, in view of many false contacts that had occurred; the air attack began before verification was obtained). This finding of the Army Board is in conflict with the Navy finding that relations—official as well as personal—were not only cordial but adequate. I am inclined to agree with the Army Board for reasons discussed in the next paragraph.
[3] 5. The Army Board criticizes the command arrangements in Hawaii. There was no unity of command, and no integrated staff to evaluate information and to attend to the details of coordinating defense measures. Certain joint plans had been prepared which were sound in concept, but defective in that neither Service had the means to carry them out. Furthermore, for the most part, these plans did not become effective until an emergency arose, and the emergency came too suddenly to permit effective implementation. Unity of Command could have been put into effect (but was not put into effect before the 7th of December) by the President, or by agreement between the Departments or by local arrangement. My comment on this is as follows:
a. Coordination by mutual cooperation, which was the system in effect in Hawaii until after the attack, is a well recognized system of Command. Personally, I consider it inferior to unity of Command in circumstances such as existed in Hawaii, but it is a fact that this system has worked effectively elsewhere during the current war. I think Kimmel and Short were at fault in not making the system work better than it did.
b. The lack of coordination in Hawaii was not in itself a disease, but a symptom of the deeper ill—lack of awareness of danger. As stated by the Army Board, local Commanders were unwilling to put war measures into effect because they would interfere with training.
6. The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment "The Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility." My comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relation ships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. [4] However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
7. The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation.
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There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, and did, do.
8. The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investigated by the Navy. These are:
a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.
b. The Army Board is of the Opinion that Japanese midget submarines operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of December, for the [5] purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F. B. I. By Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation.
c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.
9. The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further Finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General Short's report on 28 November that he had established "Alert No. 1"; and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command.
10. The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to place his Command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach an agreement with local naval officials for implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient staff officers.
11. I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the [6] Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation between these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal, contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, this fault was part and parcel of the general blindness to Japanese potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers in the high commands concerned—Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel—failed to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analyzing and making use of the information that became available to them.
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12. I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to be made in the matters referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged radio contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the substance of information obtained by naval and F.B.I. telephone and cable intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose. The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry.
13. I find no reason to modify the recommendations I made in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
/S/ E. J. King
E. J. KING.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this evidence the following conclusions appear:
(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war.
[16] (2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.
(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means certain information indicating the imminence of an attack by the Japanese that was available at Washington on the morning of December 7th, were unfortunate.
(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.
[17] 10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu but no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.
11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power
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