Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intellige

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Re: Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intel

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V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM

A. Background


(U) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) provided the most comprehensive Intelligence Community (IC) assessment of Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) programs since United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors departed Iraq in 1998. Prior to the departure of inspectors, IC assessments focused largely on UNSCOM's findings in Iraq, outstanding compliance issues, and the IC's assessment of the difficulties UNSCOM would face as it attempted to gain full Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions requiring its disarmament.

(U) For example, The National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced a NIC memorandum, Iraq: Outstanding WMD and Missile Issues in September 1998 and produced a follow-on memorandum of the same title in November 1998 which comprehensively addressed UNSCOM's assessments of Iraq's outstanding compliance issues. The papers noted that the Intelligence Community generally agrees with the assessments made by UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Iraq's remaining WMD efforts and capabilities. Regarding CW, the IC assessed that:

• Gaps and inconsistencies in Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM strongly suggest that Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical munitions and agents.

• Iraq also had the residual technical expertise, facilities, and production equipment to quickly restart production at declared sites ifUNSCOM is again barred from conducting inspections and on-site monitoring.

(U) In February 1999, soon after UNSCOM inspectors departed Iraq, several intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), [25] the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the U.S. Central Command produced a joint intelligence report, Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox. This assessment focused on the effectiveness of air strikes during Operation Desert Fox in destroying Iraq's WMD facilities and programs, but was not a comprehensive assessment of Iraq's WMD capabilities. The report noted:

• During Operation Desert Fox, few of Iraq's chemical warfare facilities were targeted or damaged and the operation probably had very little impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its chemical warfare programs.

• We believe that Iraq possesses chemical agent stockpiles that can be, or already are, weaponized and ready for use. The size, location, nature and condition of those stockpiles is unknown.

• We assess Iraq's production of chemical weapons to be largely dormant: however, Baghdad has the infrastructure necessary to support offensive programs. Without an effective monitoring presence, Iraq could probably resume its CW program immediately, if it has not already done so.

([DELETE]) In December 2000, the IC published an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities (ICA 2000-007HCX). The ICA was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery system programs, as well as a review of what remained of the WMD arsenal and of outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of UNSCOM. This assessment was the first comprehensive IC product on all aspects of Iraq's WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors departed Iraq. Regarding Iraq's CW programs the assessment stated:

• We judge that Iraq's expansion of its chemical industry is intended to support CW production.

• We have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that small-scale production has occurred.

• Iraq has increased procurement of sensitive equipment and chemicals, some of which we believe will be used to reconstitute a CW production capability.

• We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and filled munitions that are still militarily useful.

• We assess the size of the CW agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent and condition of Iraq's stockpile, although we believe mustard agent -- and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX -- and related munitions probably are key components.

• [DELETE] a range of intelligence reports, suggests that a small portion of Iraq's prewar stockpile of filled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical agents.

• The issue of shelf life is critical to assessments of the current stockpile of Iraqi chemical agents. Mustard is the only agent that would have survived for a significant period after the Gulf War.

• Our main judgments about what remains of Iraq's original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical agents and munitions.

(U) In December 2001, the IC produced an NIE on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. A section of the estimate on Iraq's missile payload options noted that Iraq had, "tested chemical warheads for Scud-variant missiles before the Gulf war," and assessed that "Iraq is rebuilding a CW production capability, probably focusing on mustard, sarin, GF, and VX." The NIE added, "We estimate Iraq holds up to 100 metric tons of chemical agent, although the nature and condition of the agent is unknown. Reporting suggests Iraq might retain at least six Scud-variant missiles equipped with chemical warheads." These assessments were generally consistent with previous IC assessments of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities.

(U) The IC next addressed the issue of Iraq's WMD in the October 2002 NIE, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The judgments in the estimate pertaining to Iraq's CW program were consistent with the 2000 ICA in assessing that:

• Iraq's expansion of its civilian chemical infrastructure was intended to support CW production.

• Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

• Iraq had experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles.

• Iraq probably had a chemical weapons stockpile and CW bulk fills.

(U) In the 2002 NIE, however, the IC made new statements about Iraq's CW program, shifting some judgments in significant respects and eliminating some of the uncertainties regarding Iraq's chemical programs that had been expressed in previous assessments. The 2002 NIE said that, "Baghdad has chemical ... weapons" and "we assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and Vx." As in previous assessments, the IC continued to note that there was little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, but it increased its assessment of its size, noting that, "Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons ofCW agents - much of it added in the last year."

(U) Because the 2002 NIE encompassed all of the intelligence in the previous assessments and because of the notable shifts in assessment between that estimate and all previous assessments of Iraq's CW programs, the Committee focused its review on the intelligence supporting the NIE and the assessments that led the IC to conclude that Iraq had chemical weapons. The Committee examined all of the intelligence provided by the IC underlying each of the assessments made in the NIE and focused particular attention on those assessments which changed between the 2000 ICA and 2002 NIE. Committee staff interviewed analysts from each all-source analysis agency involved in the chemical section of the NIE including CIA, DIA, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to hear each agency's views of Iraq's chemical program and to understand how and why each analyst'S assessments of the intelligence evolved over time.

(U) All intelligence agencies agreed with the assessments in the CW section of the NIE and there were no dissents or footnotes in this section. The discussion below outlines the intelligence supporting the assessments in the CW section of the NIE. Those assessments included:

• Baghdad has chemical weapons.

• We judge that Iraq is expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production.

• We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyc1osarin), and VX.

• Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical warfare agents -- much of it added in the last year.

• The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing chemical bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles.

• Baghdad probably is hiding small-scale agent production within legitimate research laboratories.

• Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons

(U) The statement that, "Baghdad has chemical ... weapons," was made only in the key judgments of the NIE and not in the main text of the document. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Conventional Military Issues who was responsible for the chemical weapons section of the NIE, told Committee staff that the statement was intended to be a summation of assessments in the main text. The statement is broader than previous IC assessments provided to the Committee which used less definitive language in describing Iraq's CW capabilities. For example, the 2000 ICA said, "We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and filled munitions that are still militarily useful." The elimination of "we believe" from the 2002 NIE key judgments removed the indication that this was an assessment rather than a fact. Analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that in retrospect they believe that the statement, "We judge that Baghdad has chemical weapons," would have been a more accurate reflection of their views in the 2002 NIE.

(U) Because the judgment that Iraq had CW was not specifically described in the body of the NIE, no intelligence reporting was provided by the IC directly in support of that assessment. IC analysts told Committee staff, however, that the assessment was based in part on Iraq's inability to fully account for the destruction of pre-Gulf War CW and precursors, suggesting that Iraq may have retained some of those chemicals. Information from UNSCOM reports provided to the Committee shows that Iraq's total production and holdings of CW agents could not be verified, and that Iraq could not account for over 1,500 metric tons of chemical precursors and over 550 artillery shells that had been filled with mustard CW agent. According to UNSCOM, in 1998, the mustard agent was still of the highest quality and was still militarily viable. The CIA estimated in 1998, based on UN reports of precursor chemicals for which Iraq had not been able to account, that Iraq could have had up to 200 metric tons of mustard agent.

([DELETE]) The assessment was also based on [DELETE] reporting from the spring and summer of 2002 which suggested that Iraq was possibly moving chemical munitions. The IC provided several [DELETE] reports to the Committee to support their assessment that Iraq had transported chemical munitions in 2002. The first report showed that a tanker truck, identified as a [DELETE] decontamination vehicle was present at a small, secured ammunition storage area at the al Musayyib Barracks, a Republican Guard facility. According to the [DELETE] report, this vehicle had been associated with CW storage and transshipment prior to the Gulf War. The report also noted that during UN inspections at the al Musayyib Barracks in 1997, Iraqi officials attempted to stall the inspectors, which raised the IC's suspicions that sensitive materials were being stored at the facility. According to the [DELETE] report, in [DELETE] 2002, cargo trucks arrived at the al Musayyib barracks' main depot and small storage area where the [DELETE] decontamination vehicle was located and appeared to come and go [DELETE]. Additional [DELETE] showed that the activity ceased by mid-[DELETE] 2002 and the ground in and around the storage facility had been graded. The report noted that grading is a common fire abatement measure at ammunition depots, but also could hide evidence of CW [DELETE]. A final [DELETE] report provided on this facility showed that the [DELETE] vehicle had departed the facility by [DELETE] 2002.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE]) [DELETE] of a second facility from [DELETE] 2002 also showed that possible transshipment activity had occurred at the [DELETE] Ammunition Depot. This activity was also assessed to be possible CW transshipment because a tanker truck, which could have served as a decontamination vehicle, was present at the facility while a [DELETE] truck was engaged in probable transshipment activities.

([DELETE]) Additional [DELETE] showed that Iraq had conducted munitions transshipment activity at [DELETE] ammunition depots and storage sites around Iraq in the spring and summer of 2002. Most of this activity was assessed to be related to conventional munitions.

(DELETE]) While the presence of the [DELETE] decontamination vehicle was assessed to be an indicator of the of CW, a July [DELETE], 2002 NIMA assessment noted that because of the similarities of the [DELETE] decontamination vehicles to a [DELETE]. The report concluded that the [DELETE] vehicle could not be discounted "as a tipoff when assessing possible CW activity," suggesting that it may be present during non-CW activity as well.

([DELETE]) Intelligence analysts also told Committee staff that the tanker trucks and [DELETE] vehicles were an indication of possible CW transshipment activity, but could also have been associated with other activities. An analyst from the DIA told Committee staff that, "Today, we don't know whether this vehicle is still associated with the CW program, but it is a specific vehicle that the chemical program used in its former program before 1991." An analyst from INR said, "The [DELETE] decon vehicle is used for multiple purposes, and [DELETE], it can also be used as for fire safety as a water truck." [DELETE]. Some of the same hazards exist with conventional munitions as they do for CW munitions, so you need a fire safety truck."

([DELETE]) The Committee was not provided with any corroborating intelligence reporting prior to publication of the NIE that indicated the transshipment activity at any of the facilities mentioned in [DELETE] reports was related to movement of CW.

C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production

(U) The judgment in the NIE that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support CW production was based on intelligence reports which showed construction and other activity at suspect Iraqi CW facilities, particularly the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants. Iraq's Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants were designed and built as dedicated CW precursor production plants in the 1980s, but were heavily damaged during the first Gulf War. Iraq told inspectors in the 1990s that it was rebuilding the plants for civilian chlorine and phenol production. Both chlorine and phenol have CW applications, but also have legitimate civilian uses such as water treatment or pesticide and resin production. The IC judged that Iraq's civilian needs for chlorine were already adequately met through UN-authorized imports and three other chlorine plants in the country. The IC also noted in the NIE that Iraq modified the phenol plant after the departure of UN inspectors in 1998, which they assessed suggested that it was modified for illicit use.

([DELETE]) At least [DELETE] imagery reports provided to the Committee did show that the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants had been operational since March 2000 and that both had been modified after the of UN inspectors. [DELETE] showed [DELETE] support elements at both facilities.

([DELETE]) To show how the IC determined that Iraq's chlorine needs were adequately met without the Fallujah II chlorine plant, the IC provided the Committee with a [DELETE] chlorine stockpiles at Iraq's water treatment plants. [DELETE]. The IC also said that Iraq had three other chlorine production plants in the country that were continuing to produce chlorine. At the end of 2000, just one of the plants was producing 25 tons of chlorine per day. According to the CIA analysts, this was [DELETE] more than the [DELETE] Iraq needed for water treatment each day.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE]) The NIE also noted that personnel at the facility had engage in [DELETE] burial of equipment, [DELETE]. In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the CIA said that [DELETE] burial indicates that Iraq was, "hiding equipment so that it could be dug up easily later," and said that even if the equipment was damaged, other reporting showed that Iraq had repaired such equipment in the past for use at this facility. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) The NIE also said that Iraq was using its procurement network to try to acquire precursors for chemical agents it had made in the past. The IC provided at least thirty [DELETE]intelligence [DELETE] reports to the Committee which indicated that Iraq was trying to procure chemicals and equipment with both CW and legitimate civilian applications. Some of the reports noted specifically that the chemicals were probably for legitimate purposes. [DELETE]. None of the remaining reports showed that Iraq had ultimately obtained any of these chemicals or that the chemicals were intended for a weapons program. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) Finally, the NIE noted that the management of the facility included individuals identified as personnel from Iraq's pre-Gulf War CW program. [DELETE] reports provided to the Committee indicated that in 2000 and 2001 several individuals who worked in Iraq's CW program were working at the Fallujah II facility. One of the reports noted, however, that there was no indication that these individuals were conducting chemical warfare research at the facility.

(U) None of the intelligence reporting provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was expanding its chemical infrastructure "primarily" to support CW production. Although the word "primarily" was in the draft NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate, IC analysts told Committee staff during interviews that they do not believe the assessment that the expansion was "primarily" intended to support a CW program accurately represented their views. When asked whether in retrospect there was anything analysts regretted including in the NIE, a CIA analyst told Committee staff "There's a line in there about how Iraq's chemical industry was rebuilt primarily to support the CW program, and we don't think it was 'primarily.' We think that the program was benefitting from it, but we don't think that's why they were rebuilding the industry." In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the DIA said that it had proposed deleting the word "primarily" from the NIE text at the NIE coordination meeting because "It was difficult to distinguish how much of the chemical industry was supporting CW programs versus various non-chemical warfare programs." Non-chemical warfare programs include both civilian chemical programs and conventional weapons programs. The DIA told the Committee that the disagreement on whether to exclude the word "primarily" was not of sufficient importance to warrant a footnote to the NIE. An INR analyst told Committee staff that he had "no specific recollection" from the NIE coordination meeting about this specific passage, but noted that "In general, INR judged that Iraq could use elements of its dual-use infrastructure to support a CW capability, but that we had little specific intelligence to judge that Iraq was producing chemical warfare agents in 2002."

D. We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX

([DELETE]) The IC provided the Committee with seven intelligence reports which said Iraq had renewed production of chemical agents. [DELETE] according to an IC response to a question from Committee staff "Analysts in 2002 evaluating these reports did not consider them highly reliable." There were no [DELETE] reports to corroborate the [DELETE] reporting that CW production had begun. Intelligence analysts told Committee staff that their assessment that Iraq, "had begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF and VX," was not based on this reporting, but was an analytical judgment based largely on [DELETE] reports of transshipment activity at al Musayyib [DELETE], discussed previously in this report. A CIA analyst told Committee staff that prior to [DELETE] reports, the IC assessed that Iraq was capable of producing CW, but could not determine whether Iraq had produced such weapons. The analyst said that the IC assessed that if Iraq had been moving chemical munitions, it must have produced the agents with which to fill those munitions. The specific references to the chemical agents mustard, sarin, GF and VX were based on information about which agents Iraq had produced in the past and an analytical judgment about which agents Iraq was still capable of producing.

E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CW Stockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents -Much of it Added in the Last Year

(U) The NIE assessment of Iraq's stocks of CW was outlined in a footnote in the report. It said,

Conservative estimates of Iraqi CW precursor stocks and production capacity, combined with Iraqi motivations and military requirements, suggest the stockpile is composed of at least 100 tons. We believe the Iraqis are capable of producing significantly larger quantities of CW agent in some scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds, such as Iraq's limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq's stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm.

([DELETE]) The IC did not provide the Committee with any intelligence documentation which showed that Iraq had stockpiled between 100 and 500 metric tons of chemical agents, other than [DELETE] reports which showed that Iraq did not adequately account for its pre-Gulf War stocks of chemical precursors and stocks. Previous intelligence assessments said that Iraq had a probable stockpile of 100 metric tons or less, based on estimates of CW and precursors for which Iraq had not been able to adequately account.

([DELETE]) An intelligence analyst from the CIA told Committee staff that CIA analysts had estimated 500 metric tons as the upper end of the range for the CW stockpile [DELETE]. The IC increased the stockpile estimate and assessed that much of that 500 metric ton stockpile had been "added in the last year" largely because of the discovery of the suspected CW transshipment activity at al Musayyib [DELETE] in the spring of 2002 discussed previously in this report. The IC assessed that if Iraq had been moving chemical weapons in the spring of 2002, it must have recently produced those weapons, causing the Community to raise the stockpile estimate. There was no direct intelligence reporting of an increase in weapons stocks that caused the IC to raise the stockpile estimate.

(U) An INR CW analyst told Committee staff that he believed the 500 metric tons upper assessment was calculated "very poorly." He said he was dubious of the stockpile estimates, but said he did not footnote the NIE because the 100 metric tons lower estimate was a reasonable and longstanding IC assessment based on Iraq's accounting discrepancies and because the 500 metric tons upper limit was discussed in the NIE as "up to" 500 tons which he believed was plausible. The DIA concurred with the language in the NIE regarding the size of Iraq's CW stockpile because it believed the language, "was sufficiently caveated to indicate DIA's uncertainty in the size of the stockpile."

(U) The fact that the IC lacked specific information about Iraq's CW stockpile was noted in the body of the NIE, and the IC explained in a footnote how it arrived at the assessment that Iraq had stocked "possibly as much as 500 MT ofCW agent." The key judgments of the NIE did not alert the reader to these explanatory notes.

F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles

([DELETE]) The IC provided the Committee with [DELETE] which noted that Iraq had produced CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles prior to the Gulf War. [DELETE]. The report noted that Iraq had produced over [DELETE] 500-guage aerial bombs, [DELETE] 250-gauge aerial bombs, [DELETE] 130-mm artillery shells, almost [DELETE] DB2 aerial bombs, [DELETE] al-Hussein (Scud-variant) warheads, [DELETE] R-400 aerial bombs and [DELETE] warheads for 122-mm artillery rockets. In addition, Iraq declared that it expended thousands of these munitions in the 1980s.

G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate Research Laboratories

([DELETE]) The IC noted in the NIE that its knowledge of Iraq's small-scale agent production hidden within legitimate research laboratories rested on "limited intelligence reporting on suspicious activity at only a few research centers." The NIE said one of the facilities, the al-Basel Research Center which Iraq had declared as part of its pre-Gulf War CW program, "may be collaborating on CW-related tasks" with a suspected chemical facility, Habbaniyah II (another name for Fallujah II).

([DELETE]) Intelligence reporting provided to the Committee did show that these facilities "may" have been collaborating on a sensitive project to produce nerve agent. [DELETE]. A separate [DELETE]report showed that the deputy director of the Tareq State Establishment, which operates Habbaniyah II, was planning to purchase [DELETE] equipment through the UN's Oil For Food Program in May 2002, but there was [DELETE].

H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq's Legitimate Chemical Industry

([DELETE]) The IC assessed in the NIE that Iraq's procurement of CW precursors, technology, and specialized equipment cannot be definitely linked to Iraq's CW program, but "Iraq's procurements have contributed to the rebuilding of dual-use facilities that probably are adding to Iraq's overall CW agent capability." The IC provided at least seven [DELETE] reports to the Committee which showed that Iraq had attempted to procure various chemicals that had potential applications in CW production. These chemicals, however, all had legitimate civilian uses. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) [DELETE] one of the reports, a HUMINT report [DELETE] indicated that Iraq had actually "procured" a chemical substance as noted in the NIE. The other reports showed only that Iraq had attempted to procure the chemicals. Although the original draft language of the NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate said "procured," analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that, in retrospect, "Iraq sought various chemicals ... " or "Iraq tried to obtain various chemicals ... " would have been more accurate statements.

I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements

([DELETE]) The NIE also included a discussion of Iraq's attempts to procure nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive equipment, including NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical detection tubes, a decontamination shower, Geiger counters, and atropine auto-injectors - a nerve agent antidote. The NIE noted that, "Iraqi troops could use NBC equipment defensively against a WMD attack or as a preventative measure during an offensive attack. If Iraq used a nonpersistent agent such as sarin, its troops would need protection in case the agent blew back on them ... " The reports provided to the Committee did not reference whether the equipment was intended to be used defensively for an anticipated WMD attack on Iraq or during an offensive Iraqi attack using WMD. One of the reports did indicate that Iraq had obtained some of the defensive gear [DELETE]

J. Explaining Uncertainties

(U) The NIE provided a "text box" that listed the IC's "confidence levels for selected key judgements in this estimate." The NIE's key judgements were broken down into three categories of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq's CW capabilities listed under the "High Confidence" heading were:

• "Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions."

• "We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs."

• "Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles."

(U) There were no assessments of Iraq's CW capabilities listed under the "Moderate Confidence" or "Low Confidence" headings.

K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE

(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq's CW program was consistent among agencies and largely consistent with the NIE and other IC products discussed earlier in this report. The following are examples of assessments from the DIA, CIA and INR.

(U) In October 1997, the DIA published a defense intelligence assessment, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: Progress, Problems, and Potential Vulnerabilities which stated that, "UNSCOM has had limited success in locating proscribed items and Iraq is assessed to have retained a broad range of CW-related items, including a residual agent and precursor stockpile estimated at 10 to 100 tons." The DIA assessed that Iraq could restart limited agent production quickly, probably within a few weeks of a decision to do so and said "mustard, sarin, and VX are likely to be the focus of the renewed production efforts, although sarin and especially VX will require longer to start up significant production quantities."

(U) On December 14, 2001, the DIA published another document, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, which stated that, "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions. The nature and condition of this remaining stockpile are unknown. Mustard agent is the most likely component of the stockpile. We believe that Iraq also holds production equipment and chemical precursors." The assessment noted that the DIA, "cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish a large-scale CW production capability," but noted that, "We cannot dismiss the possibility that small-scale production has taken place. The agents mustard, sarin, cyclosarin (GF) and VX will most likely be the focus of Iraq's reconstitution efforts."

(U) In September 2002, the DIA published a defense contingency product, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study which said, "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. Unusual munitions transfer activity in mid-2002 suggests that Iraq is distributing CW munitions in preparation for an anticipated US attack." The assessment said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq's effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) effort." The assessment added, "Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX."

(U) As early as August 1996, the CIA published a report which noted that Iraq retained chemical agents and munitions. The CIA intelligence report, Iraq's Remaining WMD Capabilities, said that "Iraq is continuing to conceal a small stockpile of chemical agents, munitions, precursors, production material and equipment."

(U) In August 1998, the CIA published an intelligence report, Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: Status and Prospects (NPC 98-10005C), which noted that "Baghdad retains a clandestine stockpile of chemical munitions and agents. Although UNSCOM initiatives have significantly reduced Iraq's CW stockpiles and infrastructure, Iraq will be poised to restart limited CW production after the departure of UNSCOM." The CIA assessed that, "Iraq could begin limited CW agent production within weeks after UN sanctions are lifted and intrusive inspections cease: Baghdad retains key elements of its CW program including personnel, production data, and hidden stocks of production equipment and precursor chemicals."

(U) On January 3, 2002, the CIA produced a Publish When Ready (PWROI0302-06) which said, "Baghdad retains the ability to strike opponents in the region with chemical and biological agents, including delivery by missiles."

([DELETE]) On April 18, 2002, the CIA published an assessment, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, which stated, "Over the past three years, Iraq may have obtained chemicals that would allow it to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents -- most likely the blister agent sulfur mustard, and the nerve agents sarin and cyclosarin -- quickly on a small scale, according to our analysis of [DELETE] intelligence [DELETE]. Iraq is seeking the equipment and chemicals needed to produce covertly CW precursors and agents within its chemical industry, despite the sanctions and control regimes that are aimed at preventing such transfers. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) INR published an intelligence brief on November 5, 2001, which said that Iraq appeared to have resumed operations at a production building suspected by the IC of supporting CW precursor production. INR also said in an [DELETE] 2002, assessment that Iraq may have conducted CW-filling activity at the al Musayyib site, a suspect CW storage site. [DELETE] INR said, nonetheless, it believed that the activity may have involved suspect CBW-related munitions transshipment.

(U) None of the pre-NIE assessments provided to the Committee by any of the intelligence agencies said that Iraq "has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyc1osarin), and VX." Most of the assessments were published prior to the IC obtaining the intelligence on the spring and summer 2002 transshipment activity that the IC assessed was related to chemical weapons and was a major factor in their judgment that Iraq had chemical weapons.

L. Chemical Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has ... chemical weapons" overstated both what was known about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

(U) Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE])

([DELETE]) Conclusion 60. It was not clearly explained in the National Intelligence Estimate that the basis for several of the Intelligence Community's assessments about Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities and activities were not based directly on intelligence reporting of those capabilities and activities, but were based on layers of analysis regarding [DELETE] intelligence reporting.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

(U) Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community's assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents -- much of it added in the last year," was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

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(U) Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

(U) Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that "Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry" was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

(U) Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq's procurement of defensive equipment.

([DELETE]) [DELETE] 
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Re: Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intel

Postby admin » Sat May 21, 2016 4:36 am

VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S DELIVERY SYSTEMS

A. Background


(U) In addition to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Intelligence Community (IC) produced several intelligence assessments which addressed Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and, more specifically, Iraq's delivery systems, including missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In December 2000, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced an Intelligence Community Assessment (lCA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities. The assessment was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery programs in the absence of weapons inspectors, as well as a review of what remained of the WMD arsenal and outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). In July 1998, the NIC produced an ICA, The Foreign Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat to the United States, which discussed Iraq's development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UA V) for possible biological weapons (BW) delivery.

(U) In March 1998, September 1999, July 2000, and December 2001, the NIC produced NIEs on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. [26] These annual reports were requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to provide Congress with the latest intelligence on worldwide ballistic missile developments and threats. All of these NIEs provided an assessment of Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities.

(U) These IC products regarding Iraq's delivery programs were consistent in assessing that:

• Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for destruction of prohibited missiles, suggest that Iraq retained a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles.

• Technical analysis indicated that Iraq's short-range al Samoud missile was capable of exceeding the ISO-Ian range limit imposed by United Nations (UN) sanctions.

• Baghdad is using the development of shorter-range missiles, allowed under sanctions, to prepare to reconstitute a longer-range missile effort.

(U) In its 2000, 2001, and 2002 intelligence products, the IC updated its assessments and asserted that Iraq had made steady progress in developing its missile programs and was continuing to develop UAVs. The IC assessed that:

• Iraq was in the final stages of development of the al Samoud missile (2000), may be preparing to deploy the al Samoud (2001), and was deploying the al Samoud and Ababil- 100 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), both which exceed the ISO-Ian UN range limit (2002).

• Construction and testing activity showed a clear intent to resume longer-range missile production (2000), Iraq was in the early stages of developing longer range ballistic missiles (2001), and Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities (2002).

• Baghdad was continuing to develop UA V s which probably were intended as delivery platforms for biological weapons (BW). The UAVs posed a threat to Iraq's neighbors and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf (2000, 2002).

(U) In the 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction the key judgments noted that Iraq was developing a UAV, probably intended as a biological weapons (BW) delivery platform. The body of the NIE made it clear that this developmental program was for small and medium UAVs. Previous intelligence assessments had focused on Iraq's development of larger UAVs for possible BW delivery, which Iraq had crafted from modified jet aircraft. The 2002 NIE also raised the possibility, for the first time, that Iraq's UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland, if they were brought in or close to, the U.S. The NIE added that Iraq was attempting to procure mapping software of the U.S. for its UAVs which "strongly suggested that Iraq was investigating the use of these UA V s for missions targeting the U.S."

(U) The Committee examined each of the assessments of Iraq's delivery capabilities outlined above, and all of the available intelligence provided by the IC in support of these assessments. Committee staff also interviewed analysts from each all-source intelligence agency with a role in drafting or coordinating on the delivery section of the NIE including analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the U.S. Air Force's (USAF), National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC,) [27] to hear each agency's reasons for their assessments.

(U) All intelligence agencies agreed with the IC's assessments in the 2002 NIE regarding Iraq's missiles, and there were no footnotes or dissents in this section. USAF intelligence, however, disagreed on several aspects of the NIE regarding Iraq's UAV programs, including the assessment that Iraq's UAVs were probably intended to deliver BW. The USAF assessed that the UAVs were intended primarily for reconnaissance and not BW delivery. The discussion below outlines the intelligence supporting the IC's assessments and discusses any disagreement or alternate judgments about those assessments.

B. Scud-Type Missiles

(U) The IC assessed that gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for destruction of prohibited missiles strongly suggested that Iraq retained a small force of Scudtype ballistic missiles. The NIE said that the covert force may contain "up to a few dozen" Scud-variant short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). UNSCOM data and reports provided to the Committee showed that the UN had been unable to account for two of 819 Scud missiles Iraq acquired from the Soviet Union, seven indigenously produced al Husayn Scud-type missiles, 50 conventional Scud warheads and over 500 tons of proscribed Scud propellants Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally.

([DELETE]) In addition to these accounting discrepancies, more than twenty intelligence reports from at least ten different human intelligence (HUMINT) sources of varying reliability provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq retained prohibited Scud missiles, [DELETE] trucks to carry and conceal them and hid the missiles, launchers, and missile components at various sites in Iraq. Some of these reports indicated that the information [DELETE] who "may have provided it to influence as well as inform," but others were provided by independent sources. For example, in 1998 a source with indirect access, reported that components of Iraqi Scud missiles had been kept in Iraqi military installations and that other missile parts were hidden on trucks that moved continuously in Iraq. [DELETE] A report [DELETE] said that an Iraqi general who defected wrote [DELETE] that Iraq retained prohibited Scud-type missiles, and a report [DELETE] said that Iraq was hiding about five to eight Scud missiles [DELETE].

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

[DELETE] Other information provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq destroyed its Scud missiles in the years after the Gulf War. Intelligence reports describing [DELETE] debriefs of Hussein Kamel (Saddam Hussein's son in law who defected from Iraq in 1995) show that Kamel told interviewers that Iraq had destroyed all of its Scud missiles. This information was not mentioned in the NIE.

(U) Finally, it is unclear exactly how the IC established the estimate that Iraq may have retained "up to a few dozen" Scuds. Analysts told Committee staff that the number was estimated based on Scud missiles and components for which the UN could not adequately account, but the IC had no estimate of the number of components that may have been withheld from inspectors.

C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000), May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002)

(U) The IC's assessments about Iraq's al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles changed progressively in 2000, 2001, and 2002 as intelligence reporting showed that Iraq was continuing to advance in its development of these missile systems.

(U) Since at least 1998, the IC had assessed that the al Samoud had a range greater than the 150-km allowed by the UN. This assessment was based on information extrapolated from Iraq's UN declarations in which Iraq provided details of the missile and engine parameters. The system had been flight tested nine times, with five failures, at the time of the 2000 NIE, leading the IC to assess that the system was in the final stages of development.

([DELETE]) Intelligence provided to the Committee showed that by 2001, Iraq was progressing with development of the al Samoud, but still had not deployed the missiles. By 2002, however, [DELETE]. Iraq had extracted the engines for 30 to 50 al Samoud missiles between mid-2000 and late 2001. Intelligence also showed that Iraq had conducted at least 25 al Samoud flight tests since 2000, the majority of which had been successful. A report from [DELETE] provided to the Committee assessed that in August 2002 two al Samoud missiles flew to ranges [DELETE] above the UN permitted range. Additional [DELETE] an indication that the missile had been deployed. The deployment was confirmed by Iraq's declaration to the UN in December 2002 that it had fielded the al Samoud II.

([DELETE]) The NIE also judged that Iraq was developing an extended-range variant of the al Samoud missile with an assessed range of up to 300 km, and said that on [DELETE] 2002, the missile was flight tested beyond the 150-km range limit "perhaps as far as 300 km." [DELETE]. The IC assessed that [DELETE] was probably the result of an Iraqi effort to enlarge the al Samoud airframe to accommodate more propellant, which could extend its range to 300 km.

([DELETE]) When Iraq provided its Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure to the UN in December 2002, Iraq admitted to developing an al Samoud II variant, but said the range of this variant was also 150 km. Iraq admitted that the missile had flown beyond 150 km during 13 of23 flight tests, but only by at most 33 km. The data provided by Iraq in the declaration caused the IC to change its assessment of the possible range of the al Samoud II, which it corrected in a February 2003 NIE, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The NIE said that Iraq's declaration indicated that the al Samoud II has a larger diameter, which was the cause of [DELETE] noted by the IC during the January 2002 flight test. The NIE said, "The al Samoud data provides an alternate explanation for the [DELETE] the [DELETE] flight test last year." Iraq reported that the missile flew 171 km, and the new NIE judged, based on modeling of the new al Samoud II data, that 171 km was near the expected range.

([DELETE]) [DELETE] provided to the Committee from [DELETE] 2002 also indicated that the Ababil- 100 had been flight tested 18 to 20 times since [DELETE] 2000, and [DELETE] that in [DELETE] 2002 a probable Ababil-100 [DELETE] had arrived at a tactical surface to surface missile facility. In late May 2002, Ababil-100 launch boxes were [DELETE] at a tactical missile and support facility and Ababil-100 missile launchers were [DELETE] at a barracks and training facility, [DELETE]. The deployment was not assessed to be complete, however.

D. Development of Medium-Range Missile Capabilities

(U) In addition to the assessment that both the al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles had ranges which exceeded the UN permitted limit of 150-km, the IC assessed in the 2002 NIE that Iraq was developing medium-range missile capabilities.

([DELETE]) [DELETE] intelligence provided to the Committee [DELETE] that Iraq was nearing completion of an engine test stand that could support testing of larger liquid engines than the al Samoud. [DELETE].

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE]) Finally, [DELETE] intelligence [DELETE] indicated that Iraq had been trying to purchase North Korea's Nodong MRBM. The report said that an Iraqi delegation had visited North Korea in [DELETE]2001 where they discussed and reached agreement to purchase the Nodong missile. [DELETE]. There is no way to determine the reliability of the [DELETE] however, separate [DELETE] provided to the Committee showed that an Iraqi delegation, [DELETE] did visit North Korea in [DELETE] 2001, lending credibility to the [DELETE]. In addition, a May 2002 CIA HUMINT report of a foreign government service [DELETE] also indicated that while meeting at a North Korean [DELETE] discuss missile cooperation, a Syrian missile development team met three unidentified Iraqi military officers there. [DELETE]

E. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

(U) The IC assessed since at least 2000 that Baghdad was developing UAVs which were probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents, and that the UAVs posed a threat to Iraq's neighbors and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. In the 2002 NIE, the IC assessed that Iraq was developing a UAV, "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents," which could threaten the U.S. homeland if brought close to or into the U.S. The statement that the UAV was probably intended to deliver biological agents was made in the key judgments, and not in the main body of the delivery section of the NIE. The USAF disagreed with this assessment and added a footnote to the NIE which noted that it "does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability." Of note, the text of the biological warfare section of the NIE was similar to the USAF footnote in stating that "although we have no information linking the current UA V development with BW delivery, this new airframe may represent another future method ofBW delivery."

 ([DELETE]) The NIE assessment that Iraq was developing UAVs probably intended for BW delivery was based in part on information from UN inspections and Iraqi declarations. [DELETE] showed that in 1995 Iraq declared that it had a pre-Gulf War project to convert MIG-21 aircraft to pilotless aircraft with a drop tank that would deliver biological agent. Iraq conducted one experiment with this aircraft in 1991, but Iraq said it dropped the project because of the war. [DELETE] prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had been working on a program to modify drop tanks for use on an F-1 Mirage fighter for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) dispersal, and had tested the aircraft using an anthrax simulant. Although this was a manned aircraft, IC analysts assessed that the drop tank work could have had applications for use with UAVs. [DELETE] also noted that Iraq had modified commercial crop sprayers for BW delivery at the Salman Pak facility that were assessed to be suitable for the dissemination of BW agents from helicopters or slow moving fixed wing aircraft. Iraq tested this aerosol generator on a helicopter with an anthrax simulant in 1988. [DELETE] Finally, IC analysts pointed to [DELETE] that in 1991 inspectors discovered eleven drones at the Salman Pak BW research, production, and storage facility. Iraqi declarations said that these drones were intended to be used as aerial targets for anti -aircraft artillery training and reconnaissance, not for BW delivery.

(U) IC analysts told Committee staff that when Iraq began to convert 1960s Czech-built L-29 jet trainers into UAVs in 1995, they assessed that Iraq may have intended to use the L-29s for CBW delivery instead of the MIG-21s they had worked on prior to the Gulf War. The IC provided the Committee with the five reports to support the assessment that the L-29s were intended for CBW delivery, only one of which said explicitly that the L-29 UAVs were intended to deliver unconventional weapons.

 ([DELETE]) The IC provided the Committee with [DELETE] HUMINT [DELETE] which said that in February 1999, Iraq was working to increase the L-29s' payload and arm them with "special bombs." The report said the L-29s would be flown at low altitudes to targets outside Iraq, but provided no additional information.

([DELETE]) The IC also provided the Committee with three CIA HUMINT reports, all from the same source, [DELETE]. [28] The three reports all describe an L-29 deployment to Tallil, Iraq airbase in November 1997. When the L-29 unit arrived at the base, the commander of the air defense command informed the unit that their mission was to lure U.S. aircraft into a surface-to-air missile (SAM) trap. The unit's detachment commander later told the team that their "real" mission was to penetrate Kuwait and use the L-29s to "hit and scare" the Kuwaitis and Saudi Arabians. [DELETE]. The mission never took place. [DELETE]

 ([DELETE]) A final report, [DELETE] said the L-29s were being developed as CBW delivery vehicles to attack Kuwait as revenge if the U.S. attacked Iraq. The method of attack was unspecified. [DELETE].

(U) The NIE also pointed to the involvement of the organization managing the L-29 program as being heavily involved in aerial spray technology and other technologies which could easily be applied to BW dissemination. A Department of Defense (DoD) HUMINT report provided to the Committee said the organization managing the UAV program was the Iraqi Air Force's main engineering and procurement entity and was involved in many aerial activities, including an agricultural spraying program. While spray technology has potential CBW dispersal applications, it also has civilian agricultural applications. It is unclear from the information provided to the Committee whether the spray technology program was linked to the UA V program or whether the engineering company was simply engaged in several aerial research and development programs.

 ([DELETE]) At the time of the NIE, the IC assessed that the status of the L-29 program was unknown because, after an L-29 crash in October 2000, no flight tests had been observed by intelligence. The IC then began to focus on Iraq's development of small UAVs, assessing that Iraq may have shifted its work to the small UAVs as a replacement for the L-29s. The IC provided the Committee with more than twenty intelligence reports from a variety of sources which showed that Iraq was developing small UAVs, [DELETE]. None of these reports, however, suggested that the small UAVs were probably intended for biological agent delivery as assessed in the 2002 NIE key judgments.

([DELETE]) The main body of the NIE text said that the IC was concerned about Iraq's development of small UAVs because "Iraq in the past has configured small UAVs to deliver BW agent, according to [DELETE] reporting, and UNSCOM discovered eleven small UAVs at the Iraqi BW research and development (R&D), production, and storage facility at Salman Pak." The IC provided the Committee with one CIA HUMINT report in which [DELETE] that during the Gulf War Iraq had stored about ten drones, designed and produced to deliver biological agents, at the Nasir State Establishment. An _ report provided to the Committee showed that inspectors discovered eleven drones at a separate facility in 1991, but the report did not note the intended purpose of the drones. Iraq's 1996 Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure said the drones were intended for reconnaissance and aerial not for BW delivery. Additional information from Iraq's declaration [DELETE].

([DELETE]) Because only one of these reports suggested that Iraq had developed small UAVs to deliver BW and because the reports all discussed Iraq's pre-Gulf War UAVs, the Committee requested that the IC provide any additional intelligence reports that demonstrated a direct link between the new small UAVs and a BW delivery role. In a written response to the Committee, the CIA said, "a large volume of reporting from multiple [DELETE] strongly suggested BW delivery as one of the goals for Iraq's small UAV program." The intelligence provided to the Committee with that response, however, did not provide any reports, dated prior to publication of the NIE, that suggested Iraq's post-Gulf War small UAV program was being developed to deliver BW. The IC provided three additional reports dated after the publication of the NIE from a foreign government service. The first report, dated October 26,2002, said that an Iraqi Ministry of Defense official [DELETE] that some of Iraq's UAVs were loaded with "chemical materials." The second report [DELETE], dated February 27, 2003, said that Iraq intended to use UAVs to monitor, and, if necessary, attack U.S. forces and said the UAVs could be fitted with conventional or CBW warheads. [DELETE]. The third report indicated [DELETE] Iraq's UAVs were designed to be fitted with CBW, "if necessary." [DELETE]

F. Other Possible Missions for the UAVs

(U) The majority IC position in the NIE did not discuss any possible missions for Iraq's UAVs, other than CBW delivery. The United States Air Force (USAF), however, assessed that the UA V s were not being developed to deliver BW and their footnote outlined another possible purpose. The USAF said,

Iraq is developing UAVs primarily for reconnaissance rather than delivery platforms for CBW agents. The capabilities and missions of Iraq's new UAV remains undetermined, but in this view its small size strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance. CBW delivery is an inherent capability ofUAVs but probably is not the impetus for Iraq's recent UAV programs.


 ([DELETE]) The USAF based this assessment on technical analysis that the small UAVs were too small to be effective CBW delivery vehicles, [DELETE] USAF and the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) analysts also told Committee staff that they did not believe the intelligence reporting demonstrated any link between the small UA V s and a BW delivery mission, but did show other possible missions for the UAVs.

(U) At least eleven HUMINT reports provided to the Committee suggested that both the L-29s and the small UAVs had missions that were unrelated to BW delivery. Three reports suggested that the UAVs were intended to attack U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf, but did not mention how attacks would have been conducted. Four reports suggested the UAVs were intended to be used as cruise missiles to replace Iraq's prohibited surface to surface missiles and two reports indicated that the purpose of the UAVs was reconnaissance. One report suggested that UAVs were being produced for air defense training and another report suggested that the U A V s were being used for both surveillance and air defense training.

 ([DELETE]) The IC also provided at least eight reports which showed that Iraq was trying to procure [DELETE]and technical equipment. One HUMINT report mentioned that Iraq had not decided on a supplier for [DELETE] for the UAV, and [DELETE] reports discussed Iraqi attempts to procure several items including equipment that could be used in an airborne surveillance system. The USAF told Committee staff that Iraq's interest in acquiring this equipment suggested that the UAVs were intended to be used for reconnaissance, but the CIA told Committee staff that technical equipment could also be used for targeting purposes in UAVs intended for BW delivery.

(U) While the USAF was the only agency to discuss a potential mission for the UAVs other than CBW delivery, analysts from other agencies told Committee staff that they also believed Iraq's UAVs were being developed for missions other than CBW. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Iraq UAV analyst told Committee staff that he agreed with the USAF's footnote that the small UAVs could be used for BW delivery, but were primarily intended for other missions. When asked why he did not join the footnote, the analyst said, "its probably an example of the speed of the [NIE] process ... And [the Air Force] had footnoted it. So it was out there."

(U) DIA analysts told Committee staff that they believed Iraq's UAVs had missions other than CBW delivery and agreed with the USAF that the small UAVs were primarily being developed for reconnaissance. The DIA, however, told Committee staff that they did not join the USAF footnote in the NIE because the body of the NIE never said that the small UAVs were intended primarily to deliver BW. The body of the NIE said only that the IC was concerned about Iraq's development of UAVs because Iraq had "configured small UAVs" in the past for biological agent delivery. The DIA agreed with the statements in the body of the NIE and, therefore, believed a footnote would have been unnecessary.

(U) CIA analysts told Committee staff they also believed that the UAVs had missions other than CBW delivery. One CIA UAV analyst told Committee staff that, "some of Iraq's UAVs were in fact developed for reconnaissance and as aerial targets," and another analyst said, "our position was not that every single UAV the Iraqis were producing was for CBW delivery." In line with this position, a 2001 intelligence assessment from the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) titled Iraq's L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces did include discussion of other possible missions for the L-29 to include conventional weapons delivery, operation as an electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform, and reconnaissance missions. CIA analysts told Committee staff that "in retrospect" they did not believe that CIA's assessments about the UAVs were accurately represented because the NIE did not address the reconnaissance mission.

(U) In a written response to a question from the Committee about the IC's analysis of Iraq's UAVs, the CIA told the Committee that, "the role of UAVs as CBW delivery systems was emphasized over their role as reconnaissance vehicles and aerial targets in the NIE assessment, as the focus of the NIE was WMD delivery systems and not the Iraqi UAV program as a whole. We assessed that most Iraqi UAVs were designed as aerial targets and for reconnaissance missions, but those roles fell outside the scope of the Iraq WMD NIE."

([DELETE]) Of note, in November 2002, the NIC produced an NIE on Nontraditional Threats to the U.S. Homeland Through 2007, which did discuss other possible missions for the UAVs, although Iraqi UAVs also were not the primary focus of this intelligence assessment. The NIE said that Iraq may be modifying UAVs to deliver CBW agents, but said "[technical equipment] and other equipment being sought for this program will enable the UAVs to be employed for reconnaissance and, if the UAV is to be used as a CBW delivery vehicle, for targeting." The USAF also included a footnote in this NIE, and this time was joined by the DIA, because the body of this NIE assessed that the UAVs may be being modified for CBW delivery. The footnote said the DIA, the USAF and the Army agreed that

"BW delivery is an inherent capability of most UAVs and that Iraq may choose to exploit this capability, but they note that the evidence is unconfirmed and is not sufficiently compelling to indicate the Iraqis have done so. There is information, however, on procurements that indicate a reconnaissance mission for the UAV program is more likely."


G. Using UAVs to Target the U.S.

 ([DELETE]) The assessment that Iraq's UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland if brought close to, or into, the U.S., was an analytical judgment, [DELETE] that Iraq's small UAV had a capability to fly more than 500 km, and could be launched from the back of a truck, which made bringing a small UAV into or close to the U.S. homeland possible. Another intelligence report indicated that Iraq might launch small UAV s from [DELETE] boats, raising the IC's concern that Iraq could bring a small UAV close to the U.S. homeland. The only intelligence reporting that demonstrated any possibility that Iraq may have intended to use the UAV's to attack targets within the U.S. was reporting that Iraq was trying to procure U.S. mapping software for its small UAVs. The NIE said the procurement effort, "strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."

([DELETE]) The IC first learned that Iraq was interested in procuring the mapping software [DELETE] in the summer of 2001. [DELETE] Iraq was seeking information on various UAV components [DELETE] including for [DELETE] Mapping software. The software provides the user with a route planning capability overlaid on a geographic database, but is only usable for route planning in the U.S. Iraq's interest in the software did not garner.. attention from the IC until May 2002, when [DELETE] additional information that [DELETE] attempting to purchase the UAV components and the mapping software. [DELETE] considered this information to be very sensitive, it did not disseminate an intelligence report to the IC on the procurement attempt, but it did notify CIA analysts about the information. CIA analysts told Committee staff that analysts from other intelligence agencies were not notified.

 ([DELETE]) [DELETE]. A CIA analyst told Committee staff that in the July to August 2002 time frame, [DELETE]. The CIA conveyed the information to the other agency analysts on the telephone. The analysts told Committee staff that they had been unaware of the information until they received the CIA's telephone call.

([DELETE]) NAIC and USAF analysts told Committee staff that at the time [DELETE] they knew enough about the mapping software to know that it is readily available with route planning software. They said they were not very concerned that Iraq was trying to procure the mapping software to target the U.S., because they did not believe that the UAVs were intended for CBW delivery use and, therefore, Iraq would have no need to use the UAVs in the U.S.

 ([DELETE]) In August 2002, the CIA began to obtain additional information through a foreign government service about the Iraqi [DELETE] had been attempting to procure autopilots for Iraq's UAVs [DELETE] that the mapping software was offered [DELETE] with the autopilots [DELETE]

 ([DELETE]) [DELETE] This information was conveyed to CIA analysts at the time the NIE was being coordinated, but DO did not disseminate the information to other intelligence agencies outlining these issues about the mapping software in an intelligence report until November 18, 2002, almost two months after coordinating the NIE. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) The CIA analysts told Committee staff that when the NIE was being coordinated, they were confronted with two possible explanations for Iraq's attempt to procure mapping software: 1) that Iraq was attempting to obtain a mapping capability of the U.S., or 2) that it was a mistake [DELETE] who did not know what he was buying. Committee staff asked the CIA analysts why they assessed in the NIE that the mapping software procurement attempt "strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAV's for missions targeting the United States," when they knew that this was only one of two possibilities. CIA analysts told Committee staff that on the day of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) meeting, one of their analysts suggested to [DELETE] supervisor that the word "strongly" be removed from the NIE based on the new information that had come from a foreign government service. The analyst's supervisor passed her comments on to the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, but the NIO did not receive the comments until he returned from the NFIB meeting where the NIE language had been approved. The NIO told Committee staff that he did raise the issue with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) after the meeting, but they decided to keep the language that had been approved believing that a bullet which said, "We are attempting to collect additional information regarding the intent of this procurement effort" addressed the analyst's concerns.

([DELETE]) The DCI told Committee staff that the context of this issue had been the subject of his personal attention. [DELETE] UAVs recently-produced by the Iraqis could either be used for reconnaissance or to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and [DELETE] that Saddam could use UAVs for BW delivery against targets [DELETE]. The DCI said "[DELETE]. Not good enough for me after the NFIB is closed and the state of my knowledge and all the things we'd been following with this case." The DCI also noted that [DELETE] the NIE text was modified from "at least some of these UAVs are destined for missions targeted against America" to "Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE]) In January 2003, the NIC disseminated an NIE on Nontraditional Threats to the U.S. Homeland Through 2007. The majority IC position was modified in this NIE to say that the software "could support programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States." By this time, agencies other than CIA had access to the intelligence report which said the Iraqi [DELETE] may have ordered the U.S. mapping software unintentionally. Based on the new information, the DIA, the USAF, and the Army all chose to include a footnote noting that they interpreted "recent reporting to mean that the purpose of the Iraqi request for route planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic mapping capability - a goal that is not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. Homeland."

([DELETE]) H. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

([DELETE]) [DELETE]

I. Explaining Uncertainties

(U) The NIE provided a "text box" that listed the IC's "confidence levels for selected key judgements in this estimate." The NIE's key judgements were broken down into three categories of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq's delivery capabilities listed under the "High Confidence" heading were:

• "Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions."

• "We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs."

• "Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles."

(U) There were no assessments of Iraq's delivery capabilities listed under the "Moderate Confidence" or "Low Confidence" headings.

J. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE

(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq's missile programs was consistent between agencies and consistent with the Community products discussed earlier in this report. Committee staff, therefore, focused the discussion of individual agencies' analysis on UAVs.

( [DELETE]) As early as 1998, the CIA began reporting on a possible CBW delivery mission for Iraq's UAVs and the possibility that Iraq was developing some UAVs, specifically the L-29, primarily for the BW delivery mission. In January 1998, the CIA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) [29] wrote a joint intelligence report, Possible Iraqi Development of UA V for CBW Delivery, in which the agencies discussed the possibility of delivery of BW agent from an Iraqi modified L-29 UAV. This report stated, "according to [DELETE], Iraq had developed UAVs specifically for the delivery of chemical and biological agents." The report also mentions that Iraq had acquired or developed UAVs since the early to mid-1980s for air defense training, reconnaissance, or decoy missions.

(U) In March 1999, a second joint CIA and NIMA intelligence report, Iraq: Final Development of Al Bai 'aa L-29 UAV as Possible CBW Delivery System, stated, "intelligence reporting suggests that the (L-29) system may be intended for chemical or biological warfare agent delivery against U.S. military forces." The report did not mention other possible missions for the UAVs. In June 2001, WINPAC published an intelligence assessment, Iraq's L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces, which also discussed the possible threat posed by L-29s capable of delivering BW. As with the 1998 report, this assessment mentioned other possible missions for the L-29 including reconnaissance, communications monitoring, and conventional weapons delivery, although it judged that those missions were secondary to a CBW delivery role.

(U) Prior to 2002, the DIA's finished intelligence products also discussed possible unconventional missions for Iraq's UAVs. In May 2000, the defense intelligence assessment, Iraq's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities, noted that Iraq had made great progress in converting the L-29s into UAVs "possibly for biological agent delivery." The assessment cautioned that "a definitive link between the L-29 and the Iraqi biological warfare program has yet to be established, but L-29 aircraft could serve as line-source aerial delivery platforms to disseminate biological agents." The report did not discuss other possible missions for the UAVs.

(U) In a February 2000 Military Intelligence Digest (MID) article, Iraq: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, the DIA assessed that "the L-29 program-probably a test bed for more advanced UAVs- has been indirectly associated with Iraq's biological warfare program and could pose a threat to allied forces in the Persian Gulf." The MID also noted that "Baghdad reportedly is considering several other missions for the L-29: electronic countermeasures (using the L-29 to fly electronic jammers or decoys); photographic or signals reconnaissance; communications relay to distant nodes; air defense (using the L-29 to draw Western fighters into areas covered by Iraqi air defense systems.)"

([DELETE]) The NAIC's analysts assessed that the L-29 UAV would have been well-suited by range and payload to carry CBW agents; however, they did not believe the Iraqis had successfully completed development of the L-29 for this mission. In a March 1999 Defense Intelligence Reference Document, Iraq L-29 UAV Conversion, NAIC wrote, "possible mission applications for the L-29 UAV could include use as an aerial target, reconnaissance UAV, airborne jammer or electronic intelligence (ELINT) collector, conventional explosive delivery vehicle, test bed for development of other UAV flight systems, or as a possible delivery system for chemical or biological agents." In this report, NAIC stated that the immediate objective of Iraq's L-29 program was to develop the technology necessary to produce UAVs that could be used as a threat vehicle.

(U) The NAIC also briefed a slide presentation to DoD officials from August through October 2002. The presentation outlined NAIC's view that Iraq's L-29 UAVs were not operational and that the small UA V s were designed to carry cameras, jammers, and other equipment that suggested the UAVs were intended for battlefield reconnaissance.

(U) INR told the Committee they did not publish any intelligence products specifically on Iraq's UAVs prior to publication of the NIE.

(U) None of the finished intelligence assessments provided to the Committee from any of the intelligence agencies discussed the reporting about Iraq's attempts to acquire mapping software for its UAV program.

K. Delivery Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 65. The Intelligence Community assessment that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles was reasonable based on the information provided to the Committee. The estimate that Iraq retained "up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles," was clearly explained in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate to be an assessment based "on no direct evidence" and was explained in the key judgments to be based on "gaps in Iraqi accounting to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)."

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(U) Conclusion 66. The assessments that Iraq was in the final stages of development of the al Samoud missile, may be preparing to deploy the al Samoud and was deploying the al Samoud and Ababil-l00 short-range ballistic missile, both which exceed the IS0-km United Nations range limit, evolved in a logical progression over time, had a clear foundation in the intelligence reporting, and were reasonable judgments based on the intelligence available to the Committee.

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(U) Conclusion 67. The assessment that Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities was a reasonable judgment based on the intelligence provided to the Committee.

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(U) Conclusion 68. The Intelligence Community assessment in the key judgments section of the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents" overstated both what was known about the mission of Iraq's small UAVs and what intelligence analysts judged about the likely mission of Iraq's small UAVs. The Air Force footnote which indicated that biological weapons (BW) delivery was a possible, though unlikely, mission more accurately reflected the body of intelligence reporting.

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(U) Conclusion 69. Other than the Air Force's dissenting footnote, the Intelligence Community failed to discuss possible conventional missions for Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) which were clearly noted in the intelligence reporting and which most analysts believed were the UAV's primary missions.

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(U) Conclusion 70. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Iraq's procurement of United States specific mapping software for its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) "strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States" was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

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(U) Conclusion 71. The Central Intelligence Agency's failure to share all of the intelligence reporting regarding Iraq's attempts to acquire United States mapping software with other Intelligence Community agencies left those analysts with an incomplete understanding of the issue. This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported.

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Re: Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intel

Postby admin » Sat May 21, 2016 5:18 am

VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN SECRETARY POWELL'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH

(U) On February 5, 2003, Secretary Powell delivered a speech before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which outlined Iraq's noncompliance with UNSC Resolutions and provided a detailed presentation of intelligence in each of the areas of Iraq' s suspected weapons of mass destruction programs. Secretary Powell told the United Nations (UN) that,

... every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.


(U) The speech originated in early December 2002, according to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts and Intelligence Community (IC) officials, when the National Security Council (NSC) tasked the CIA to prepare a presentation in response to Iraq's declaration to the UN. At the time, it was not clear exactly how the information would be used, but the CIA was aware that they were preparing the NSC to respond to the declaration in some public manner. An Iraq analyst from the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) prepared an initial presentation on Iraq's noncompliance with UN resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to the analyst, CIA analysts and officials worked on this draft for the next several weeks.

(U) On December 28, 2002, the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) and the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs presented the information to the NSC. The CIA told Committee staff that the NSC believed that the draft did not provide the same level of detail or evidence of Iraq's WMD programs as had been in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD programs and asked the DDCI to take the presentation and rework it to include information from the NIE and new intelligence that had been collected since the NIE. That day, the NIO took the CIA input and combined it with additional information. At this point, it had become clear that the NSC intended the information to be presented in a public speech, but it was not clear in what format or by whom the speech would be presented. The NIO wrote the draft as a speech, rather than as an intelligence report. This new draft was circulated for comment within the CIA. Near the end of January, the DDCI provided the revised input back to the NSC. The NIO told Committee staff that the DDCI had advised the NSC that the IC had done all it could do with the presentation and that the NSC speech writers would have to take the input and work it into a policy speech.

([DELETE]) In some cases, information in the CIA draft provided information that had not been reported in previously coordinated IC assessments. For example, the draft said that imports of "highly specialized aluminum tubes are costing Iraq between $20 and $35 a piece, whereas steel tubes sufficient for the expendable rockets cost as little as $.50 a piece." As previously discussed in the nuclear section of this report, Iraq had not agreed to pay such high prices and had negotiated prices as low as [DELETE] per tube. As also noted previously, U.S. Department of Defense rocket experts said that aluminum is one of the cheapest materials from which to make rocket motor cases and said, "everything else is higher cost to manufacture, like steels." The draft also said that the "Iraqi specifications on roundness of these high-strength aluminum tubes is such that the tubes would be rejected as defective if I rolled one under my hand on this table - because the mere pressure of my hand would deform it." Department of Energy (DOE) engineers have told Committee staff that this statement is incorrect. The tubes, made of high-strength aluminum and 3.3 mm thick, will not defect or deform from the specified tolerances from the pressure of one's hand. Neither of these statements about the cost or specifications of the tubes were included in Secretary Powell's final speech.

(U) On January 24,2003, the NSC requested additional information from the IC. The NIO told Committee staff that the NSC believed the nuclear case was weak and asked for additional information on what Iraq would need for a nuclear weapons program and also asked for additional on Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programs. The same day, the NIO faxed additional information on Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs to the NSC.

(U) The material included a short history of Iraq's nuclear program and a section on what Iraq would need to make a nuclear weapon. This section contained text drawn from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which noted that Iraq would need a cadre of scientists, a weapon design, and fissile material. It included the NIE text that Iraq began" ... vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake," and outlined possible uranium acquisition attempts in Niger, Somalia, and possibly the Congo. The NIE text that the IC did not know the status of the Niger arrangement was included. The material also included information on "Iraq's plans to use WMD in a conflict" noting that "Saddam has established redlines for using weapons of mass destruction in a conflict. Why would Saddam establish these redlines if he did not have such a weapon?," and included information on Iraq's biological weapons program, mainly sources on Iraq's mobile biological weapons facilities and information on biological weapons accounting discrepancies documented by the UN.

(U) On January 28, 2003, the NIO learned that a decision had been made at the White House that the speech would be delivered by Secretary of State Powell at the UN. Secretary Powell and State Department officials met with IC officials and CIA and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) [30] analysts at CIA headquarters for several days in late January and early February to work on the draft version of the speech that had been modified by NSC speech writers. In the meetings at the CIA and a meeting in New York the day before the Secretary's UN presentation, the NIO said that they worked with Secretary Powell to develop speech language with which the Secretary and the IC were comfortable.

(U) According to a State Department foreign affairs officer in the Bureau of Nonproliferation and the NIO, the general operating principle set by Secretary Powell in preparing his presentation was that any intelligence that was included had to be corroborated. The foreign affairs officer told Committee staff that "single source information did not go in the speech." CIA analysts who participated in these meetings told Committee staff that the Secretary only wanted to use solid intelligence in the speech and wanted the language carefully reviewed by the analysts. One CIA analyst and one official told the Committee they were not aware of any guidance that single source information should not be used in the speech. The NIO for Science and Technology, who also worked on Secretary Powell's speech, told Committee staff that DCI Tenet specifically told him to check the speech for classification issues and to "back [] up the material and mak[e] sure we had good solid stuff to support everything."

(U) The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared comments on the speech draft on January 31,2003 that were forwarded to the Secretary of State. The comments outlined specific ideas for the Secretary to include in the speech and presented a "scorecard" on the draft to address the analytic merits of the arguments in the speech. Of the thirty eight items that INR considered "weak" or "unsubstantiated," twenty eight were either removed from the draft or changed to eliminate the problem INR had with the draft. (See appendix A for INR 's full comments.) CIA analysts told Committee staff that during the coordination meetings on the speech, information was removed in some instances because Secretary Powell was not comfortable with it and because some information was based on single source raw reporting which the CIA could not corroborate.

(U) On Monday, February 3, 2003, INR prepared more comments on the latest draft of the speech. INR noted that the draft was "vastly improved over Friday's draft, and many or most of the incorrect or dubious claims have been removed." INR's comments described seven of the "most problematic" issues from the previous draft of the speech. Of the seven, the Committee believes three were either removed or modified. INR's remaining concerns were 1) the numerous references to human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting as fact, including use of the phrase "we know that ... ",2) the report that key files were being driven around in cars to avoid inspectors, which INR said was highly questionable, 3) the report that an Iraqi missile brigade was dispersing rocket launchers and biological weapons warheads, which INR also said was highly questionable, and 4) the claim that the aluminum tubes Iraq was seeking "far exceed US requirements for comparable rockets." The INR comments said that the tube tolerances were similar to those of a U.S. rocket system. (See appendix B for INR 's full comments.)

(U) The NIO told Committee staff that the CIA concurred with all of the intelligence information that was included in the final draft of the speech and could not think of any intelligence that was used in the speech that the CIA had wanted removed.

(U) Because of the CIA's central role in preparing input for and checking the accuracy of Secretary Powell's speech and because the speech was intended as an explanation of the intelligence the IC had on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, the Committee reviewed the language in the speech and the intelligence that supported the assessments and statements made in the speech.

(U) Almost all of the information in the speech was from intelligence that had previously been described in IC finished intelligence assessments, in particular from the 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. As described previously in this report, Committee staff found that several of the IC judgments in the NIE were not substantiated by intelligence source reporting. Many of those judgments that were included in Secretary Powell's speech, therefore, are also not substantiated by the intelligence source reporting. Those issues are outlined in detail in the sections of this report on Iraq's suspected nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and delivery systems. Rather than reexamine those issues, this section of the report focuses on identifying the statements in Secretary Powell's speech which were new or differed from previous intelligence analysis.

A. Nuclear Program

(U) Secretary Powell's speech included information about Iraq's attempts to procure a magnet production plant for magnets weighing 20-30 grams. He said the magnets were, " ... the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War," and that "This incident along with [Iraq's attempts to procure high-strength aluminum tubes] is another indicator of Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program." Previous IC products discussed Iraq's attempts to acquire a magnet procurement plant, but did not say that the magnets were the same as those used in Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge program.

(U) According to the Department of Energy (DOE), Iraq used four magnets in different designs for the upper dampers on its pre-Gulf War carbon fiber centrifuge program. Two of the magnets weighed approximately 24 grams, one weighed 60 grams and the other 90 grams. The Intelligence Community does not know which damper design Iraq used in the two centrifuges it operated prior to the Gulf War. The 24 gram magnets used in two of the damper designs were made of samarium cobalt (SmCo), however. The magnets for which Iraq was seeking a production capability were between 20-30 grams, but were made of aluminum-nickel-cobalt (Alnico), which have a lower strength to weight ratio than SmCo magnets. The Alnico magnets used in Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge damper designs were 60 grams, not 20-30 grams as referenced in Secretary Powell's speech. The DOE told Committee staff that there is no known centrifuge damper design with an Alnico magnet weighing less than 60 grams.

(U) Furthermore, Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge, which used 146 mm carbon fiber tubes, is not a design Iraq could have pursued using the 81 mm aluminum tubes Iraq was trying to procure. Therefore, the weight of the magnets Iraq used in its pre-Gulf War program is irrelevant. Engineers from the DOE judged that an acceptable magnet and damper design for use with the 81 mm aluminum tubes Iraq was trying to procure would have to be made from SmCo, because it has greater magnet strength for its weight than Alnico, and "would weigh much more than 30 grams."

B. Biological Weapons

(U) Secretary Powell's speech referenced intelligence on Iraq's biological weapons program, some of which had been obtained after the IC published the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD programs.

([DELETE]) Secretary Powell said, " ... we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were moved every one to four weeks to escape detection." While the speech text referenced "sources," the IC provided the Committee with only one CIA HUMINT report, dated January 11, 2003, to support this statement. [DELETE] the report, [DELETE] said that an Iraqi missile brigade commander supervised the dispersal of his brigade's al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to hide them from UN inspectors. The report said that some of the missiles had warheads containing an "unknown biological agent." The report said the missiles were hidden in large palm groves and were generally kept in the same location for one to four weeks. No other sources were provided to the Committee.

(U) Secretary Powell also described an example of an Iraqi effort to conceal prohibited activity from UN inspectors. Showing a satellite image of vehicle activity at Iraq's Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, he noted that at a "biological weapons related facility, on November 25, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared, something we almost never see at this facility, and we monitor it carefully and regularly."

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([DELETE]) The analyst told Committee staff that he informally raised his concerns about the imagery analysis to his supervisors, but said "when this first came up, it seemed to be one little difference of opinion or potential misinterpretation within a much larger context .... " The analyst said, however, that he was surprised when he heard Secretary Powell's speech and that "a NIMA product had gone forward to the policymakers with incorrect information and had in fact escalated up to where it was being used in the speech." After the speech, the analyst raised the issue within NIMA and discussed his [DELETE] analysis with one of the other three analysts responsible for covering Amiriyah. After looking at the [DELETE] work, the NIMA analyst responsible for covering Amiriyah performed his own historical review of the imagery and remained convinced that the November 2002 activity was unusual [DELETE]. The analyst who performed the original [DELETE] imagery review told Committee staff that he and several other analysts in his branch of NIMA believed that the activity was routine, but said when analysts cannot resolve an issue at the analytical level " ... we don't have a mechanism to have an independent review." NIMA's official assessment remains that the activity was unusual and no other position was presented outside of the agency.

(U) Secretary Powell's speech also discussed intelligence regarding the suspected Iraqi mobile biological weapons (BW) production program and provided detail on the four HUMINT sources which were said to have provided the information on the program. The Committee's findings regarding this intelligence are discussed in detail in the biological weapons section of this report. In short, Committee staff found that details of the reporting and the reliability of some of the sources were not accurately described in Intelligence Community (IC) products on Iraq's suspected BW mobile labs. Because information provided to the Committee shows that some of these problems were discovered by a Department of Defense (DOD) detailee to CIA prior to Secretary Powell delivering his UN speech, the Committee provides the following additional discussion of this issue.

(U) Secretary Powell described the primary mobile BW source and three supporting sources in his speech. He said the first was "an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He was actually present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents."

([DELETE]) This source is known to the IC by the code name CURVE BALL. CURVE BALL is an Iraqi defector who was debriefed [DELETE]. The IC provided the Committee with 95 intelligence reports from the [DELETE] debriefings which describe CURVE BALL as a project engineer involved [DELETE] of biological production facilities in Iraq.

([DELETE]) The second source, Secretary Powell said, was "an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program, [who] confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers." This source was also an Iraqi asylum seeker [DELETE]. A June 2001 report from this source stated that there were transportable facilities for the production of biological weapons mounted on trailers [DELETE] and that there were other Iraqi sites where biological weapons were produced.

([DELETE]) The third source in the speech was said to have been in a position to know that "Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars." The IC provided the Committee with HUMINT reports from this source [DELETE], which described Iraqi mobile [DELETE] units mounted on road-trailer units and rail cars. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) The fourth source was an Iraqi Major who defected and "confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities." This source was an Iraqi [DELETE] defected from Iraq in late 2001, and was brought to the attention of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in February 2002. The IC provided the Committee with one intelligence report from this source which described mobile biological research laboratories.

([DELETE]) Concerns about this source had been raised in a DIA "fabrication notice" issued in May 2002. (See the BW section of this report for an extensive discussion of this notice.) Although a Defense Humint Service (DHS) [DELETE] who was aware of the fabrication notice, attended two of the Powell speech coordination meetings on February 2 and 3, 2003, he told Committee staff that he was unaware that the source mentioned in the speech was the same source about whom the fabrication notice had been issued and, therefore, he did not raise any concerns about the source. He told Committee staff that he had not seen the speech until he arrived at the meeting, that the source was not specifically discussed, and that the speech did not indicate that the source was a DHS source. [DELETE]

([DELETE]) Before Secretary Powell delivered his speech to the UN, a DoD employee detailed to CIA raised concerns within the CIA about each of the BW trailers sources cited in the speech. The detailee, who provides technical advice to the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) on BW matters, met CURVE BALL in May 2000 in order to conduct [DELETE] and is the only American intelligence official to have met CURVE BALL before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

([DELETE]) The chief of the DO's Counterproliferation Division (CPD) reports office had provided the detailee with a draft of the BW section of Secretary Powell's UN speech on February 2 or 3, 2003, according to the CIA. After reading the speech, the detailee wrote an electronic mail (e-mail) to the Deputy Chief of the [DELETE] Iraqi Task Force to express his concerns about the use of the four HUMINT sources cited in the speech. Regarding the source CURVE BALL the detailee said, "I believe I am still the only United States Government (USG) person to have had direct access to him. There are a few issues associated with that contact that warrant further explanation, in my opinion, before using him as the backbone for the Iraqi mobile program." The detailee explained,

I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on "CURVE BALL" having a terrible hangover the morning [DELETE] I agree, it was only a one time interaction, however, he knew he was to have [DELETE] on that particular morning but tied one on anyway. What underlying issues could this be a problem with and how in depth has he been vetted [DELETE]?


The detailee also expressed concern that,

[DELETE] were having major handling issues with him and were attempting to determine, if in fact, CURVE BALL was who he said he was. These issues, in my opinion, warrant further inquiry, before we use the information as the backbone of one of our major findings of the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW program!


([DELETE]) The detailee also expressed concern about the second HUMINT source cited in the Powell speech, [DELETE]. He noted that the source was [DELETE] and said the reporting had inconsistencies that needed further checking. The detailee added, "we sure didn't give much credence to this report when it came out. Why now?"

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He sure didn't corroborate "curve ball's" information. [DELETE]


([DELETE]) On the fourth source, the Iraqi Major, the detailee noted that "This is the Vanity Fair source -- who was deemed a fabricator. Need I say more?"

([DELETE]) The detailee's email was sent to the Deputy Chief of the CIA's Iraqi Task Force on February 4, 2003, one day before Secretary Powell delivered his speech. The detailee told Committee staff that prior to receiving a draft copy of Secretary Powell's speech he had "had many discussions with the analysts about my concerns with CURVE BALL as this whole thing was building up and taking on a life of its own. I was becoming frustrated, and when asked to go over Colin Powell's speech ... and I went through the speech, and I thought, my gosh, we have got -- I have got to go on record and make my concerns known .... "

([DELETE]) The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that he did not believe that the detailee's e-mail contained any new information that had not already been raised previously by the detailee many times, but said he sent the detailee an e-mail inviting him to discuss his concerns. The email, which was provided to the Committee, said,

Greetings. Come on over (or I'll come over there) and we can hash this out. As I said last night, let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say, and that the Powers That Be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about. However, in the interest of Truth, we owe somebody a sentence of two of warning, if you honestly have reservations.


(U) In describing the intent of his e-mail, the Deputy Chief told Committee staff that he had the sense that war was inevitable from reading the newspaper and that he had not had any interactions with government officials in the CIA or with any policymakers that led him to this conclusion. He said,

I was reading the same newspapers you were. It was inevitable, it seemed to me at the time, and to most of us, that war was coming. I was not privy to any particular information indicating war plans or anything. My level was too low for that. ... My source of information was the Washington Post.


([DELETE]) The Deputy Chief added,

Keep in mind [detailee's name redacted] is a personal friend of mine, and what I was probably trying to do was to calm him down a little bit, say, look [detailee's name redacted,] again we all know your objections to this. The war is not going to hinge on what [detailee's name redacted] thinks about CURVE BALL. That probably would have been my intent.


(U) When asked by Committee staff if he was aware of any pressure on IC personnel to change their assessments on Iraq, the Deputy Chief responded "No, absolutely not. Again, I can't speak for the analytical community. I can only speak for the collectors. We were never pressured, no. Quite the opposite, we were given as free a rein as we possibly wanted, as much money as we needed, as much resources as we could bring to bear to find out was there a WMD program and, if so, where are the facilities." The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that there was pressure to answer questions such as "Is there a WMD program or isn't there? Where are the facilities?" And that "underlying it all was what kinds of weapons might the Iraqis bring to bear against our troops, and there was a lot of pressure for that - a lot of it, frankly, self-imposed pressure."

([DELETE]) According to both the detailee and the Deputy Chief, the two met later that evening to discuss the detailee's e-mail. The detailee told Committee staff that the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Task Force told him that he understood the detailee's concerns but said the speech was too far along to bring them up at that time.

([DELETE]) The Deputy Chief said that after meeting with the detailee and hearing his concerns, he believes he did not take any further action because he thought the CIA BW analysts and his superiors were already well aware of the detailee's concerns. He said he may have passed the detailee's concerns on to the Chief of the Iraqi Task Force, but he could not recall doing so and did not have any e-mail or other records to indicate that he did. The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that the Chief of the Iraq WMD Task Force said he was broadly aware at the time of the detailee's concerns about the BW HUMINT sources, but he did not recall the Deputy Chief raising the detailee's specific concerns about the use of the BW sources in Secretary Powell's speech.

([DELETE]) The Deputy Chief said that he may have told the detailee that "it was too far along" to raise concerns about the use of the BW sources in Secretary Powell's speech, but could not remember whether he did. He stated, however, that if he did make this comment, it was with the intention of not hurting the detailee's feelings by telling him there was nothing new to his concerns. He said that he believed that the detailee's warning in the e-mail that the fourth source, the Iraqi Major, "was deemed a fabricator" was hyperbole and did not believe that this indicated that a fabrication notice had actually been issued. He said if a fabrication notice had been issued "WINPAC must have been aware" of it. The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that he believed that the CIA's BW analysts would not have gone forward with the information concerning Iraq's mobile BW program in the Powell speech if they had not already resolved the detailee's concerns.

([DELETE]) Committee staff asked the Deputy Chief if he was aware of any evidence or had any reason to believe that IC management would not have been interested in listening to the detailee's concerns if the Deputy Chief had judged them to be valid. The Deputy Chief said, "they would listen to valid concerns. They had heard [the detailee's] concerns, was our contention, and they had heard it and heard it and heard it and were not interested in hearing it again."

([DELETE]) The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that despite not acting on his concerns, he regarded the detailee as a "useful skeptic" in that he was an independent thinker whose point of view was often different from the CIA's BW analysts. He also told Committee staff that, in retrospect, in light of the controversy over the BW HUMINT sources, he wishes that he had taken action on the detailee's concerns, for "reasons of bureaucratic self-preservation. Even today, looking at [the detailee's] e-mail, there is simply nothing new in it that would have been worth bringing to WINPAC's attention."

([DELETE]) In an interview with the DCI, when asked by Committee staff whether Secretary Powell should have been made aware of the detailee's concerns, the DCI said, "If there were issues and concerns, they should have been raised through our process so that it could be presented to the Secretary, certainly. I don't know how they would have been adjudicated at the time, but it should have been up on the table. There could have been a healthy debate about it. But it did not come to the table."

C. Chemical Weapons

([DELETE]) Secretary Powell's speech referenced intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons which had been obtained after the IC published the 2002 NIB on Iraq's WMD programs. Secretary Powell noted in his speech that" ... we have sources who tell us that [Saddam Hussein] recently has authorized his field commanders to use [chemical weapons]." The IC provided three HUMINT reports which substantiated this statement. The first, dated January [DELETE] 2003, from a CIA [DELETE] said [DELETE] the Iraqi government had informed [DELETE] that it would launch missiles armed with chemical and biological agents against northern Iraq, Kuwait and Israel within the first two hours of the initiation of air strikes U.S. and coalition forces. The [DELETE] reported [DELETE] that the entire Army I Corps had begun to issue atropine injectors and protective masks to soldiers and informed them were intended to protect them against a U.S. chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attack. [DELETE].

([DELETE]) A second CIA HUMINT report [DELETE] said that Saddam Hussein had authorized four field commanders to use "prohibited" weapons if U.S. forces crossed the "red line," a box around Baghdad. Another report, dated September 2002, from a foreign government service, did not say that commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons, but noted that Saddam had ordered that all resources, including chemical and biological weapons, be used to defend the regime from attack. The foreign government service report said that the SSO, under the direction of Qusay Hussein, was in charge of all ofIraq's CBW and that it took an average of 20 minutes to move CBW munitions into place for attack and that the maximum response time was 45 minutes. Both of the reports that noted Saddam Hussein had authorized field commanders to use CBW were obtained by the IC after publication of the NIE on Iraq's WMD programs.

([DELETE]) Secretary Powell's discussion of the intelligence reporting also differed in some respects from previous IC assessments of Iraq's chemical weapons capability in several respects. First, Secretary Powell said that the al-Musayyib site, a suspect chemical munitions storage site, had been used for "at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field." The CIA told Committee staff that State Department speech writers crafted this statement from CIA input that "evidence of movement activity at this site went back as early as 1999." Intelligence provided to the Committee showed only that possible chemical transshipment had occurred at the facility and only in the spring of 2002. There were indicators - a [DELETE] vehicle in 1998 and construction of [DELETE] in late 2000 -- which suggested that the facility may have been involved in suspicious activity, but imagery did not show transshipment or movement activity [DELETE] the spring of 2002.

([DELETE]) Second, Secretary Powell said that a HUMINT source corroborated the movement of chemical weapons at al-Musayyib at the same time that imagery had shown the suspicious activity. Referring to the imagery of the transshipment activity, Secretary Powell said, "What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time." The Committee was provided with a single report from a CIA HUMINT [DELETE] which said that in early August to early November 2002, Iraq had moved possible chemical weapons materials between the al Musayyib site and another site. The report showed that a HUMINT source confirmed the movement of possible chemical munitions at al-Musayyib, as Secretary Powell said, but the report did not show that the movement took place at the same time as shown in the imagery reporting.

([DELETE]) Finally, Secretary Powell discussed an imagery report, which said that the ground in and around the al Musayyib storage area had been graded after the transshipment activity had been completed. Secretary Powell said the grading "literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity." The imagery report provided to the Committee said that this type of grading is "a common fire abatement measure in ammunition deports, but could also hide evidence of [DELETE] CW [DELETE]," noting only the possibility that the purpose of the grading was to conceal chemical weapons activity.

D. Delivery Systems

(U) The information in Secretary Powell's UN speech regarding Iraq's delivery systems was largely consistent with intelligence that had previously been described in other classified and unclassified Intelligence Community products, in particular the classified October 2002 NIE and the unclassified White Paper.

E. WMD Powell Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 72. Much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.

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(U) Conclusion 73. Some of the information supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but not used in Secretary Powell's speech, was incorrect. This information should never have been provided for use in a public speech.

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(U) Conclusion 74. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should have alerted Secretary Powell to the problems with the biological weapons-related sources cited in the speech concerning Iraq's alleged mobile biological weapons program.

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([DELETE]) Conclusion 75. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) [31] should have alerted Secretary Powell to the fact that there was an analytical disagreement within the NIMA concerning the meaning of [DELETE] activity observed at Iraq's Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute in November 2002. Moreover, agencies like the NIMA should have mechanisms in place for evaluating such analytical disagreements.

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(U) Conclusion 76. Human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered after the production of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), did indicate that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons as noted in Secretary Powell's speech.

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