Part 2 of 2
How Much Longer?The "How Much Longer?" campaign was the first major black propaganda leaflet campaign. The campaign produced sixteen different leaflets. Each of these featured a cartoon depicting a burdensome situation and asked how much longer German citizens would tolerate it.[2] These leaflets were "distributed throughout Italy, southern France, and the Balkans."[1]
Skorpion WestSkorpion West was another successful leaflet campaign. After the German defeat at Normandy, a German propaganda team located in France created optimistic leaflets in an effort to boost morale. Germany then airdropped these leaflets over their lines to bolster the spirits of the German soldiers.
The Morale Operations branch obtained copies of these leaflets and immediately produced their own facsimiles. The Germans believed these false documents were genuine and began distributing them. The first of these leaflets indicated that the German high command did not believe their soldiers would be able to hold the line and "encouraged soldiers to scorch the earth before dying in a last stand for Nationalist Socialism."[2] The second ordered all soldiers to shoot any officers who attempted to surrender or retreat.[2] A third pamphlet ordered soldiers to carry out the evacuation of civilian populations by force (Morale Operations hoped that this would create traffic congestion and clog supply lines).[2]
Ultimately the Germans denounced all Skorpion West pamphlets, including the ones that the German propaganda team had created, as enemy propaganda and ordered all troops to ignore their messages.[2]
Poison-pen letters
Operation HemlockOperation Hemlock was a poison-pen letter campaign consisting of anonymous letters sent to Gestapo officers that implicated various German soldiers and officials in pro-Allied behavior.[2] One such letter implied that the Gestapo had killed German Major General Franz Krech after plotting to defect to the Allies.[16] In actuality, Greek guerillas had ambushed and killed Krech.[16]
Death noticesThe Morale Operations Branch also sent letters to the families of German soldiers. These letters indicated that the recently deceased was a victim of a mercy killing at the hands of a German doctor.[2] Other letters claimed that Nazi Party officials had stolen valuable possessions while he lay on his deathbed.[2]
Lichtenau LetterOne Morale Operations letter appeared to be a Christmas greeting from the mayor of Lichtenau. At first glance it appeared as a morale booster for Nazi soldiers, but it also contained several indications of hardships resulting from the war. The letter included claims that government had drafted civilians into the military, that young teenagers were becoming pilots after only a few weeks of training, and that loved ones back home were sacrificing their health to promote the Nazi cause.[2]
Newspapers
Das Neue DeutschlandThe Morale Operations branch created the Das Neue Deutschland newspaper to appear as if a fictional clandestine peace party in Germany had written it.[2] The goal of the newspaper was to promote an anti-Nazi revolution and the re-establishment of a liberal democracy.[2] Morale Operations sent thousands of peace party membership applications to enemy soldiers and civilians in Europe, leading Himmler to denounce the paper and threaten soldiers with execution if they read it.[2]
The Harvard ProjectThe Harvard Project created a four-page weekly business publication, Handel and Wandel, which appeared to analyze world economic news. The leaflet suggested that if Germany expelled the Nazi regime, Allied and German businessmen could work together to defend capitalism from an impending wave of Bolshevism.[2]
Operation CornflakesDuring Operation Cornflakes, Morale Operations agents interviewed German POWs who had worked as mail clerks to discover how the German postal service functioned.[16] Morale Operations then created replicas of German mailbags and stuffed them with various forms of printed propaganda.[2] They placed these bags near trains after an Allied air raid in hopes that the Germans would believe the bags were genuine and thus unwittingly distribute the propaganda.[2] The German postal service delivered a total 320 bags of Morale Operations propaganda.[2] Postwar interrogations of German prisoners revealed that many soldiers received Das Neue Deutschland as a result of this operation.[2]
Radio
SoldatensenderSoldatensender was a Morale Operations grey radio station that broadcast anti-Nazi propaganda hidden in news, music, and entertainment.[1] It quickly became the most popular station in Western Europe.[1] Morale Operations also used it to report news on German military failures, which eroded Nazi morale.[16] After the 1944 coup against Hitler during Operation Valkyrie, Soldatensender broadcast the names of hundreds of Germans in an attempt to cast suspicion on as many Germans as possible.[16] As a result of this the Gestapo arrested and executed roughly 2,500 Germans.[1]
Joker CampaignGerman General Ludwig Beck, the former German Army Chief of Staff, died after the attempt on Hitler's life during Operation Valkyrie, although the Nazi regime never acknowledged his death. During the Joker Campaign a Morale Operations agent, pretending to be Beck, broadcast several messages from London to German soldiers and civilians.[16] These messages blamed German losses on Nazi incompetence and urged the German people to overthrow Hitler and sue for peace in hopes that this would stop the Allies from annihilating their country.[2]
Volkssender DreiThe Volkssender Drei campaign created the first Morale Operations radio station on the European continent. An agent claiming to be Hoffman, a German commander and the son of the general who signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, broadcast messages on a nightly basis. These messages stated that Hoffman had liberated a small town in the mountainous region of Germany and encouraged other German commanders to do the same.[2] The program ended in October 1944 when the Allies purportedly liberated the fictional city.[2]
Operation Anne / Radio 1212Operation Anne, also known as Radio 1212, was one of the most successful radio operations of the war. It reportedly came from an anti-Nazi Rhineland group and initially provided accurate information, prompting Wehrmacht commanders to trust its information. After the Allies had broken through the Moselle region however, Radio 1212 issued false reports, evacuation and mobilization orders, and rumors in order to create maximum confusion and hysteria.[2] The station even created a fictional resistance group and encouraged listeners to join.[2]
RumorSECRET
DECLASSIFIED BY MC NARA Date: 7-15-09
P.G. 28
June 2, 1943
COPY NO. 16
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
PLANNING GROUP
DOCTRINE RE RUMORS
Mr. Taylor has submitted the attached memorandum from the MO Branch, together with a second memorandum from the Psychological Warfare Staff, for consideration of the Planning Group. In his memorandum of transmittal he stated:
“I am submitting to the Planning Group a short doctrinal paper on rumors from Mr. Knapp and a somewhat more comprehensive one worked up by members of my staff together with Mr. Knapp. I would have preferred to submit a single paper and suggested to Mr. Knapp that we turn over our material to him for final shaping but he did not feel he had enough time for this and we therefore agreed with him to submit both papers, it being felt that his short “Criteria of a Successful Rumor” might be useful to the Planning Group for hand reference in connection with rumors submitted while the longer paper, which he approves in all details, is intended rather for operators in the rumor field.
“In addition to discussing the contents of the Planning Staff paper I think it might be useful to have some discussion as to the distribution and general purpose of doctrinal papers of this type as we have several others in mind.”
A.H. Onthank
Colonel, M.I.,
Secretary.
THE CRITERIA OF A SUCCESSFUL RUMOR
The creation of a successful propaganda rumor is more an accomplishment of art than of science. Despite this concession to the intangible character of the good rumor, the following rules are submitted as tentative criteria of the successful story. These rules are neither mutually exclusive, nor are they all of equal importance. They are intended merely as necessarily rough guide posts to be used in appraising the merit of a particular example.
The successful propaganda rumor, as we define it, is self-propelling in a high degree, retains its original content with a minimum of distortion, and conforms to strategic requirements. The following are the characteristics of the successful rumor as defined above:
1. The successful rumor is easy to remember.
a. It is sufficiently brief and simple to survive in memory of successive narrators.
b. It concerns familiar persons, places and circumstances, and incorporates suitable “local color.”
c. It contains striking concrete detail.
d. It often incorporates stereotype phrase or slogan.
e. It contains a humorous twist when possible.
2. The successful rumor follows a stereotyped plot.
a. Its plot recapitulates precedents and traditions in the history and folklore of the group.
b. It observes the peculiar national dispositions of the group.
c. “It is the oldest story in the newest clothes.”
3. The successful rumor is a function of the momentary interests and circumstances of the group.
a. It is provoked by and provides an interpretation or elaboration of some isolated current happening or event.
b. It serves to supply information which is needed to fill a knowledge gap.
c. It stands upon the shoulders and derives support from other rumors or events.
d. It contains some accepted or verifiable detail.
4. The successful rumor exploits the emotions and sentiments of the group.
a. It expresses a widespread emotional disposition shared by members of the group.
b. It provides justification for suppressed fears, hatreds, or desires.
c. It serves to articulate a sentiment common to the group.
5. The successful rumor is challenging because:
a. It purports or appears to come from inside sources and usually has the character of “forbidden” information.
b. It is usually incapable of direct verification.
c. It is neither too plausible nor too implausible.
DEFINITION
The successful rumor is a simple, brief, concrete and vivid story, purporting to come from inside sources and concerning persons and events familiar to all members of the group. Its plot is usually drawn from established traditions or precedents, but it is occasioned by the immediate interests and preoccupations of the group. It mirrors and provides justification for emotions shared by the group and at the same time serves to fill a knowledge gap. It is neither too plausible nor too implausible, and it cannot be readily verified.
SUMMARY OF SOME PRINCIPLES FOR RUMOR WORK
WHAT RUMORS CAN DO:
Rumors can promote subversion and deception of enemy people and governments. The first, by creating and increasing fear, anxiety, confusion, over-confidence, distrust, and panic. The second, by forcing the release of enemy information and encouraging impotent enemy action. (P. 1)
KIND OF INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIAL TO RUMOR WORK:
Effective rumor design requires special kinds of intelligence on Rumor Targets. (q.v.) (P. 3)
RUMOR TARGETS:
A successful rumor must take advantage of the state of mind of the people for whom it is intended. The general principles are:
1. Those people who are most eager for information about events which effect them are the best targets for rumors supplying such information. (Pp. 3-4)
2. People with fears, hopes, and hostilities stemming from their involvement in the war are affected most by rumors that feed on those feelings. (Pp. 3-4)
PROPERTIES OF A RUMOR THAT MAKE IT SPREAD:
In addition to the above principles a successful rumor will embody one or more of the following characteristics:
1. Plausibility. Plausibility may be obtained by one or more of the following: Concreteness, unverifiability, authoritativeness, and credibility. (P. 6)
2. Simplicity. A good rumor characteristically presents one central, uncomplex idea. (P. 7)
3. Suitability to Task. “Slogan” rumors which summarize already accepted opinions, can be short and uncomplicated by qualifications and complexities of plot. Rumors suggesting new attitudes should be embedded in an interesting narrative allowing room for development of details and some complexity of plot. (P. 7)
4. Vividness. Rumors which make clear-cut mental pictures with strong emotional content are likely to be most effective. (P. 8)
5. Suggestiveness. Frequently rumors which merely hint or suggest something instead of stating it are particularly adapted to spreading fear and doubt. (P. 8)
MAKING THE RUMOR FIT THE CHANNEL:
Different channels of rumor initiation and dissemination frequently require different forms and contents for the rumor. Thus the channel which it is planned to use (undercover agents, black radio, enemy mail, diplomatic media, etc.) should always be kept in mind when designing the rumor. (P. 9)
PLANNING RUMOR WORK:
Planned lines of action against the enemy should include strategic themes for rumors.
To implement rumor suggestions stemming directly from these themes one or more of the following techniques can be used: Different rumors revealing the same “information”; planting the same rumor in different places; designing them so as to appear of independent origin; integrating them with black and white media. (P. 10)
PRINCIPLES FOR RUMOR WORK WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
WHAT RUMORS CAN DO
SUBVERSION
1. Exploit and increase fear and anxiety among those who have begun to lose confidence in military success.
EXAMPLE: In this class fall rumors such as those dealing with fearsome secret weapons which the Germans spread so effectively throughout France just prior to the Battle of Flanders. Similarly, we might spread stories in Germany describing the horrible psychic and physical effects which the Allied blitz had on the Afrika Korps in Tunisia.
2. To exploit temporary over-confidence which will lead to disillusionment.
EXAMPLE: In the early hours of the Polish invasion, Germans captured the Polish radio stations. Posing as Polish announcers, they spread enthusiastic and highly optimistic reports of successful Polish resistance to German forces. When the truth became known later, the shock to Polish morale was terrific.
3. Foster suspicion and hostility between persons or groups who might otherwise cooperate.
EXAMPLE: In late 1939 and 1940, one of the most potent rumors current in France was to the effect that England will fight to the last Frenchman; similarly, we spread rumors among Bulgarian troops that instead of being used for Balkan defense, they are to be sacrificed at the spearhead of a new Nazi drive into Russia.
4. Create distrust in news sources.
EXAMPLE: The successful manipulation of this type of rumor by the enemy is illustrated by the Bahnhof bombing incident early in the war. The Germans spread the rumor that the British, in a raid on Berlin, had severely damaged the Bahnhof. Eagerly, the BBC picked this story up and broadcast it. The Germans were then able to discredit British reportage by demonstrating that the Bahnhof was completely undamaged.
5. Lead civilian populations to precipitate financial, food and other crises through their own panicky reactions to rumors.
EXAMPLE: In 1917 the rumor was successfully spread in Germany that the German government was going to confiscate all livestock. Farmers slaughtered tremendous numbers of cows and sheep. As a result, in 1918 the German Army ran short of meat. Similarly, we might cause Italians to refuse to deal in paper money by spreading the rumor that local Fascist officials are operating a counterfeit lire ring; or precipitate runs on banks with a story that the gold backing for deposits has been removed to Germany.
6. Create confusion and nervous bewilderment as to our intentions and plans by the dissemination of a welter of contradictory reports.
EXAMPLE: In this category fall all the “war of nerves” rumors now circulating in Europe which suggest that our invasion will come in Norway, or perhaps Brittany, or Greece, or Italy, etc.
DECEPTION:
N.B. The accomplishment of these objectives requires close collaboration with military planning.
1. Cause enemy people to raise questions which will require actions by their governments (information services) that will reveal enemy plans or conditions.
EXAMPLE: As an extreme case, assume that we wish to know whether the 31st Division is on the Russian front. We spread the story throughout Bavaria that the 31st Division has been annihilated at Novorossisk. The 31st, we know from the German Order of Battle, was recruited largely in Bavaria. This rumor achieves wide-enough currency in Bavaria so that hundreds of civilians with men in the 31st Division demand from the government confirmation or denial. To satisfy the clamor, the government states that the 31st is not even fighting on that front.
2. Timed with military action, reveal false information about our plans which will result in diversionary or impotent action by the enemy.
EXAMPLE: Let the story “lead” out that, the 95th Brigade in northern England is being fitted with cold-weather clothing, ostensibly for a large-scale stab at objectives in Norway. The enemy moves troops from Denmark to cover this stab. The 203rd Brigade then strikes at Jutland.
COUNTER-RUMOR:
1. To nullify effective rumors initiated by the enemy.
EXAMPLE: German atrocity stories tress the brutal treatment which Germans may expect at Russian hands. We spread the rumor that large numbers of the Germans taken at Stalingrad are so well-treated that they have begged the Russians not to send them back to Germany in prisoner-of-war exchanges.
N.B. By and large, unless most subtly handled, counter-rumors may emphasize and increase the effectiveness of the rumor to be countered.
KIND OF INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIAL TO RUMOR WORK
1. From the principle that effective rumors supply “information” eagerly sought for by vulnerable groups or classes of people, the following kinds of intelligence are essential to good rumor design:
a. Intelligence on what kinds of information they are eager for.
b. With respect to (a), intelligence on what they actually know and what they lack.
2. From the principle that effective rumors capitalize on the fears, hopes, and hostilities of people, the following kinds of intelligence are essential to good rumor design:
a. Intelligence on their current fears, hopes, and hostilities relating to their war effort.
b. Research revealing their customary and traditional ways of expressing their anxieties, hopes, and aggressions, especially in conditions of national crisis.
RUMOR TARGETS
AND THE TAILORING OF RUMORS FOR THEM
1. Groups or classes of people that have become fearful and anxious about their personal well-being. Focus on “information” that confirms the pessimistic expectations of the group involved. Extreme rumors designed to produce open panic should be timed with military action.
EXAMPLE: The people of southern Italy and Sicily are extremely jittery at the moment about the possibility of our invasion force crossing the Mediterranean from Tunisia. Thus in this area we spread a rumor that large numbers of invasion barges are being concentrated at a point opposite Trapani.
Note on “Magic” rumors: In the special circumstances when a group or class of enemy people begin to show signs of seeing no course but disaster, focus on alleged events in which personages or “signs” from their religion or folklore present forebodings or prophesies of defeat, or of hope after defeat.
EXAMPLE: In southern Italy, Sardinia and Corsica, the “Evil Eye” superstition has long been strong among the largely illiterate, primitive people. Thus we spread the story that all the woes of the southern Mediterranean peoples date from the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in 1934, at which time Hitler fixed the Duce with his Evil Eye. The result of this curse, we continue, was the Ethiopian failure, reverses in Spain, the current bombing of Italian cities, etc.
2. Groups or classes of people that have become unrealistically over-confident or hopeful. Focus on “information” which supports their hopes, which is consistent with information available to them, but which will ultimately produce disillusionment.
EXAMPLE: We know that the Italian people are thoroughly sick of the poor-quality food substitutes they have had to accept for the past four or five years. They might be kindly disposed toward us if they had grounds for believing we were coming with food as well as guns and planes. They are also generally aware that a Food Conference is in progress in the U.S. Thus we spread the rumor that the delegates at the Food Conference are unanimously in favor of feeding Italy abundantly in return for a quick capitulation. When this story has achieved fairly wide currency and hopes have been raised, we follow with the story that although the Italian King and Cabinet favor our generous food proposition, Mussolini and two or three top Fascists have blocked it. Thus we create hopes for the purpose of dashing them.
3. Groups of classes of people that are suspicious of or hate other groups of leaders. Focus on “information” that justifies and increases hostility.
EXAMPLE: The animosity between the Rumanians and Hungarians is a matter of record. Most Russians and Hungarians know that Antonescu has recently conferred with Hitler. Thus we tailor a rumor for the Hungarian Army that Antonescu’s consultation resulted in an agreement whereby Rumanian troops will be reserved for defense of the Balkans, while Hungarian divisions will be sent to the Russian front.
4. Groups or classes of people that lead monotonous lives which favor the use of fantasy.
EXAMPLE: In this class fall the inmates of prisons, concentration camps and army garrisons, factory workers compelled to work at dull tasks 14-16 hours daily, armies of occupation, etc. These groups, whose humdrum existences make it difficult for them to weigh and evaluate “news” searchingly, are especially susceptible to fantastic rumors of all sorts. They will believe and transmit stories that better-balanced persons will reject as implausible.
Thus among Rumanian factory workers compelled to do an intensely monotonous job we might spread a story that Hitler has decided that this factory is no longer needed and that the workers will shortly be permitted to return to their homes. Although on the face of it absurd, this story might well gain acceptance in the appropriate group. When it becomes clear later on that the story was unfounded, the workers would suffer a severe letdown in morale and efficiency, which was our original intention.
5. Special groups that lack information either as a result of especially vigorous censorship or discredited propaganda or illiteracy.
EXAMPLE: Germany and Italy, all reports indicate, are extremely receptive to well-formulated rumors because of the reputation their Propaganda Ministries have gained for suppressing, or sugar-coating bad news or news unfavorable to the regime. Likewise, populations in lands which for many years were kept well-informed by their own free press and radio, and then were abruptly blacked out from authentic news by Occupation, are dependent on rumor to fill the gaps in their understanding of happenings within their own country and outside. Sardinia is an example of a field where rumor has become an important media of news transmission because of the population’s high degree of illiteracy and because of their relatively isolated position.
Over-all general principle:
a. Those people who are most eager for information about events which affect them are the best targets for rumors which supply the desired “information.
b. People with fears, hopes, and hostilities stemming from their involvement in the war are affected most by rumors that feed on these feelings.
PROPERTIES OF A RUMOR THAT MAKE IT SPREAD
A good rumor is one which will spread widely in a form close to the original containing the basic message. The qualities of a rumor which give it this mobility appear to defy complete analysis at the moment. Probably the main factor determining success or failure is the degree to which a rumor is “tailored” to the state of mind of the audience. In addition, successful rumors seem to embody most of the following qualities:
1. Plausibility. Plausibility may be obtained by one or more of the following:
a. Making the rumor concrete and, so far as possible, specific in terms of familiar persons, places, and round numbers.
EXAMPLE: Poor Technique: People in areas that may be invaded are sewing American flags inside their coats.
Better Technique: 36 arrests were made in Sicily by Fascist authorities when they discovered that Sicilians were sewing crude American flags inside their coats.
b. Tying the rumor to known factor expectations.
EXAMPLE: Poor Technique: Among Near Eastern Moslems, who are familiar with Hitler’s anti-Semitism, spread the story that Hitler is going to seek Allied sympathy by resettling all European Jews in Palestine.
Better Technique: Tunisian Arabs know that some of their numbers were blown up by crossing German minefields. Among Arab populations we spread the following story: Not knowing the exact location of their own minefields, German panzer troops retreating from Bizerte drove scores of Arabs ahead of them to touch off the explosive charges.
c. Designing the rumor so that it consists in part of familiar, accepted information, and in part of “new information” which, though false, is unverifiable.
EXAMPLE: It is now widely known in Germany that the big RAF raid of May 24 did terrific damage to Dortmung. It is further known that Dortmund is an industrial center. We spread a story in Germany that the Dortmund raid knocked out completely one of only two plans in all Germany which manufacture electrodes indispensable to processing artillery steel. The vital part of this rumor is unverifiable, because even if it were true German authorities would suppress it. But it fits in with what Germans in, say, Bavaria know about industrial Dortmund and the recent raid.
It is known to German troops that there are now millions of foreign workers in Germany. They also know that pregnancy is a ground for exemption from labor service at home. So we spread the false story that their wives are dodging labor mobilization by bedding down with good-looking Belgians and Dutchmen and becoming pregnant. Troops far-removed from home, perhaps at the front, are in no position to check the unconfirmed portion of the story. And the elements of it which they know to be true (labor mobilization, foreign workers, pregnancy as a basis for exemption) tend to support the false element.
d.When relevant, making the rumor appear as an “inside story” which has leaked from an authoritative source.
EXAMPLE: Let us assume we wish to spread the idea that Hitler and von Rundstedt have quarreled.
Poor Technique: von Rundstedt and Hitler recently had a bitter quarrel when Rundstedt told the Fuhrer that German divisions for the defense of France are second-rate.
Better Technique: The wife of an officer on General von Rundstedt’s Staff reports that Hitler and von Rundstedt recently had a bitter quarrel when Rundstedt charged that German divisions for the defense of France are second-rate.
e. Not exaggerating the facts in terms of contrasts or magnitudes beyond the bounds of credibility.
EXAMPLE: Poor Technique: One American soldier using a bazooka destroyed 12 enemy tanks in Tunisia with one shot.
Better Technique: One American soldier using a bazooka knocked out one Mark VI tank completely and crippled another with a single shot.
2. SIMPLICITY. This means using only one central idea or core and keeping it uncomplex and thus memorable, regardless of the embellishments added for the sake of authenticity, plausibility or other reasons.
EXAMPLE: Poor Technique: The chief Germany Army medical officer in Italy is carrying on an affair with Ciano’s wife, and yet he has the nerve to issue an order stating that all Italian women in towns where German troops are garrisoned must be examined for venereal disease once a month in order to associate with members of the Wehrmacht.
Better Technique: The chief medical officer of the German Army has ordered that all Italian women must be examined once a month for venereal disease.
3. SUITABILITY TO TASK. The design of a rumor is largely determined by the job it has to do. For example, the slogan-type rumor (“England will fight to the last Frenchman”) is especially adapted to summarizing opinions or attitudes which are already widely accepted.
Narrative-type rumors, on the other hand, aim at introducing “information which will create or shape new attitudes.” In this category are the elaborately detailed and embellished stories such as the one which “proves” that Hitler was mortally ill. Slogan-type rumors will gain acceptance only when the ground has been prepared for them by narrative-type rumors or by other forms of propaganda.
4. VIVIDNESS. Regardless of length or type, rumors which make clearcut mental pictures with strong emotional content are likely to be most effective.
EXAMPLE: Poor Technique: We spread rumor among German troops at the front that their wives at home are complaining because they are lonesome. (The German soldier may regret this, but it will not disturb him inordinately._
Better Technique: We spread the rumor among German troops that because their wives are lonesome they are bedding down with foreign workmen. (To a German soldier who relies on fidelity and moral support from the home front, this is emotionally a strong, upsetting blow.)
SUGGESTIVENESS. Whereas extreme concreteness helps to give a rumor plausibility the very opposite quality sometimes gives great effectiveness to rumors. The type of rumor which merely hints or suggests something instead of stating it seems particularly adapted to spreading fear and doubt.
EXAMPLE: Hitler has had periodic visits recently from Dr. Hans Gluck. Dr. Gluck was decorated last year by the Munich Academy of Science for distinguished research in psychiatry.
German authorities in eastern Slovakia have requisitioned from Berlin 500 3-foot coffins.
MAKING THE RUMOR FIT THE CHANNEL
The form and content of a rumor, when possible, should be tailor-made for the channel through which it is to be initiated. These channels include:
1. Undercover agents.
2. Black radio or press, including false documents.
3. Enemy mail.
4. Compromised enemy communication media.
5. The media of international business, religious, professional, and other such organizations.
6. Diplomatic media.
7. Plants in neutral open propaganda media.
8. Plants in allied open propaganda media.
The importance of designing rumors for dissemination through outlets peculiarly adapted to them may be illustrated in the following way. Assume that our only channel for rumor-spreading in a particular area is through diplomatic representatives of various countries stationed there. Considering the outlet, it would obviously be futile to attempt to spread the rumor that a child of an Italian woman who had been seduced by a German officer was marked with a swastika stigmata at birth. The rumor would be written off as fantastic drivel at once by the first diplomat to whom it was told. It becomes clear then that for dissemination through diplomatic circles we must plan and design rumors of a high order of plausibility in terms of the group’s background, education, information, degree of sophistication, etc. It is likely, for example, that the sort of rumor that would spread most widely through such circles would be clever epigrams or witticisms dealing with current personalities or events.
RUMORS SHOULD BE PLANNED
1. Rumors should be expressly designed to implement planned lines of action against the enemy.
a. Lines of action in plans should include strategic themes for rumors.
b. Rumor suggestions should stem directly from these.
2. To implement effectively a given planned line of action, one or more of the following techniques may be used.
a. Design different rumors that reveal the same “information.”
b. Plant such rumors in different suitable places.
c. Design them so as to appear as of independent origin.
d. Integrate them with black and white media.
Doctrine Regarding Rumors
In coordination with the British PWE, MO Branch made significant use of carefully formulated rumors in order to cause confusion, sow distrust and ultimately incite revolt or assassination attempts in Axis occupied territory. MO Branch and PWE collaborated regularly on lists of 'sibs' (rumors) to be injected into mass media by recruited agents or to be used as themes in Allied-controlled propaganda outlets.[17]
Targeted rumors were also designed to create the notion in Axis occupied areas that attempts had been made by their fellow countrymen on Axis leaders, and thereby motivate disenfranchised populations under Axis control to make such attempts themselves. The purpose of such tactics was twofold: at once to provoke violent action against Axis leadership in order to cause the attention of Axis intelligence and operations units to focus on the source of the rumor or actual attempt, and at the same time provide populations in occupied areas with a cause (or at least an idea) to rally around in support and hope for liberation.[18]
December 12, 1942
DECLASSIFIED Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act PL105-246
MEMORANDUM to Dr. Rogers
From: R.H. Knapp
Subject: Rumor as a device for instigating assassinations.
It is a well established fact in psychology and sociology that crimes of violence, i.e., rape and assassinations, come in strings. This is particularly true if wide publicity or notoriety is given the first crime. It would seem that the publicizing of a single crime of this sort captivates the imagination of certain types of near psychotic personalities, and serves as a suggestion and pattern for their own crazed actions.
With this in view, would it not be possible to circulate persistent rumors to the effect that attempts had been made to assassinate Mussolini. These stories might well be accompanied by stories to the effect that a secret terroristic organization had been founded in Italy, with the purpose of killing the Italian leader. An appropriate name could be devised for this organization. Once these rumors are current, they could be reinforced by open propaganda and by clandestine propaganda in Italy. For example, it might be very effective, immediately after the first rumor of attempted assassination, to have the words “next time” scrawled on side-walks and buildings. The populace, seeking the meaning of these cryptic words, would by this process become acquainted with the fable of the secret vengeance society.
The prime hope of such a program would be that by repeatedly suggesting the assassination of Mussolini, someone might actually undertake to carry it out. Lacking such an outcome, the program would still have merit in focusing hatred against the Italian leader and probably give encouragement to those already disaffected toward the regime. Finally, it might lead to further security measures to protect the leader which would be a nuisance to the regime and perhaps tend to separate him still further from direct contact with the public.
On the other hand, it might well be that rumors of this sort would foster sympathy for the Italian leader or lead to additional security regulations which would prove an impediment to our subversive operations already in action. My judgment is that on the whole the plan is feasible, although I grant there is room for disagreement.
These rumors would probably find a ready reception among the Italian people. First of all, assassination is a venerated political institution among the Italians. Secondly, reports of attempted assassination lend credence by the fact that repeated attempts have been made in the past. Third, the tradition of the “vengeance society” has precedent in the history and folklore of the people. Finally, such rumors directly exploit the deep hostilitiy which many Italians feel for Mussolini and his regime.
Rumor as a device to instigate assassinations
Dec. 4, 1942
DECLASSIFIED Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act PL105-246
EXEMPT from automatic declassification per E.O. 11652, Sec 5(E)(2): BUSH, CIA 22 Dec. ‘76
Reason: C76-8 p. 33 Re-Review
Memorandum to Dr. Rogers
From: R.H. Knapp
Subject: Rumor as an Instrument of Psychological Warfare.
Although rumor is already a recognized instrument of enemy propaganda, its use by American Psychological Warfare Agencies has not apparently been fully exploited. There are many reasons why this neglect should be remedied, perhaps the most important being the peculiar susceptibility of the enemy to attack by this weapon. Below, under five headings, are considered several aspects of the problem of employing rumor against the enemy.
1. The Advantages of Rumor as an Instrument of Psychological Warfare.
Rumor as a device for disseminating ideas or sentiments has several unique merits which other devices do not enjoy. The following are several of its unique merits:
a. Of all methods of communication, rumor is the most difficult to control. While the press may be muzzled, and radio stations jammed, the dissemination of rumors is peculiarly unsusceptible to authoritarian restraint. (As a matter of fact, efforts to curtain rumor-mongering.
b. Unlike most other devices for disseminating propaganda, rumor employs the enemy’s communications system against himself, for rumors once started must be checked and taken note of. In this process, they are often even more widely disseminated.
c. Rumors are rarely detectable as enemy propaganda. If skillfully designed, they are disseminated in enemy territory with nothing about them to indicate their true source. For this reason they are most adaptable to the operations of “black propaganda.”
d. If rumors are skillfully designed, they serve to divert the enemies psychological forces against himself. Thus, his fears, hopes, and aggression which if properly controlled, make for high morale, may be redirected in such a manner as to precipitate unwarranted optimism, panic, defeatism, or internal dissensions.
2. The Vulnerability of the Enemy to Attack by Rumor
All existing evidence indicates that the enemy is most susceptible to attack by rumor. Within the last six weeks both Goering and Mussolini have spoken specifically against rumor-mongering at considerable length. Reports emanating from occupied territories as well as from both Italy and Germany indicate that the “grapevine” is well developed in these areas. This is to be expected, in view of conditions prevailing in these territories. Several of these are noted below.
a. In all occupied territories as well as in enemy territories there prevails acute social unrest, shifting of populations, and disorganization of the normal social life of the community. This leads, among other things, to a disruption of the normal communication system and the consequent increased reliance upon rumor.
b. The peoples of these areas are subject to great emotional duress. They share in common wishes, fears, hostilities and suspicions. This commonality of emotional needs is the father of rumors which arise to express and justify these underlying emotions.
c. The people of these areas share intense interests in common, but lack access to information which will satisfy their interests. This is because official enemy information is either lacking or distrusted. In the absence of reliable sources of information, the peoples of these territories are compelled to develop and rely upon the grapevine – to grasp at straws in an effort ot understand their circumstances.
d. Monotony, enforced inactivity, and personal disorganization is the fate of many individuals in these territories.
This leads to increased credulity and the impulse to share emotional feelings with others, one aspect of which is the impulse to spread and attend to rumors.
e. The fabric of enemy society, resting as it does upon intense personal rivalries and admitted irrationalism, makes a peculiarly fertile field for rumor mongering.
f. The avowed policy of enemy propaganda to their own people, and their history of broken promises, false claims, estc., have thoroughly disillusioned most of their populace; thus they are in a poor position to discredit rumors. The result is that they will probably be unable to control rumors except by force. As already noted, the use of force to control rumor may well increase rather than decrease rumor-mongering.
3. The Designing of Rumors for Enemy Propaganda.
If rumors are to be appealing to enemy or conquered populations, they must be “tailor made” to suit their interests, motives, and situation. It is of the utmost importance that care and skill be taken to frame the propaganda rumor, for lacking proper precautions the rumor may back-fire or may fail to take root. The following are a number of criteria which should be kept in mind in designing a rumor for enemy consumption.
a. It should be brief, preferably concrete, and a “good story.” If possible, it should incorporate a slogan, stereotyped phrase, or witticism.
b. It should concern contemporary happenings or situations.
c. It should be made to appear as “inside information” which has leaked.
d. It should meet the conscious and unconscious emotional needs of the enemy populace. It should justify their more undisciplined fears, confirm latent suspicions, etc.
e. It should be neither too plausible nor too implausible. If too plausible, it might seem trite; if too implausible, it might appear ridiculous.
f. It should be incapable of direct verification.
g. It should exploit stereotyped plots, precedents, and traditions in the history and folklore of the group.
4. The Strategies to which Rumor is Adapted.
Rumor as a weapon of propaganda is adaptable to a number of strategies.
a. To affect enemy morale.
1. Rumors playing upon the wishes and hopes of the enemy population may be employed (a) to encourage complaisance (b) to magnify the impact of subsequent defeats.
2. Rumors exploiting the fears and anxieties of the enemy populace may engender pessimism, defeatism and panic.
3. Rumors playing upon the internal hatreds, rivalries, and suspicions may be employed to divide the enemy within himself.
4. Rumors of atrocities committed by the enemy may be planted among the enemy populace to foster feelings of guilt.
b. Rumor may be used as a device for misleading the intelligence of the enemy. By planting false reports, permitting apparently unwitting leaks to occur, the enemy may be mislead as to our plans.
c. Cleverly designed rumors may force the enemy to release publicly, information desired by our intelligence. In the process of discrediting rumors, facts must be released, and these facts may be to our advantage.
5. Methods of Planting Rumors.
The Germans have used almost all devices, open and clandestine, for planting rumors. Among the most promising are the following:
a. Black Radio disseminating rumors allegedly already current in enemy or occupied territory.
b. Neutral Press, i.e. Sweden, Turkey, Spain, Switzerland, etc.
c. Agents in neutral, occupied or enemy territory.
d. Leaflets and pamphlets. These may be employed very effectively to disseminate poems, witticisms, or factual information with a propagandic purpose.
Rumor as an Instrument of PW
Much of the work done in relation to rumor was directed by Robert H. Knapp (fr), a notable academic with significant history of researching the anatomy and effectiveness of rumors. In addition to his wartime service to the OSS, he contributed readily to the body of academic knowledge on the psychology of suggestion, rumors and lies in many scholarly publications.
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http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWdonovanW.htm. Archived from the original on 2013-03-03. External link in |publisher= (help)
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External links• The Office of Strategic Services: Morale Operations Branch — Central Intelligence Agency CIA page on OSS Morale Operations
• OSS Society WikiMedia Commons Page
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