Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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Operation Paperclip
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 9/30/19

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Image
Kurt H. Debus, a former Nazi scientist turned NASA director, sitting between President of the United States John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson during a briefing at Blockhouse 34, Cape Canaveral Missile Test Annex.

Operation Paperclip was a secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army CIC, in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party.[1][2]

The primary purpose for Operation Paperclip was U.S. military advantage in the Soviet–American Cold War, and the Space Race. The Soviet Union was more aggressive in forcibly recruiting more than 2,200 German specialists—a total of more than 6,000 people including family members—with Operation Osoaviakhim during one night on October 22, 1946.[3]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the first secret recruitment program, called Operation Overcast, on July 20, 1945, initially "to assist in shortening the Japanese war and to aid our postwar military research".[4] The term "Overcast" was the name first given by the German scientists' family members for the housing camp where they were held in Bavaria.[5] In late summer 1945, the JCS established the JIOA, a subcommittee of the Joint Intelligence Community, to directly oversee Operation Overcast and later Operation Paperclip.[6] The JIOA representatives included the army's director of intelligence, the chief of naval intelligence, the assistant chief of Air Staff-2 (air force intelligence), and a representative from the State Department.[7] In November 1945, Operation Overcast was renamed Operation Paperclip by Ordnance Corps (United States Army) officers, who would attach a paperclip to the folders of those rocket experts whom they wished to employ in America.[5]

In a secret directive circulated on September 3, 1946, President Truman officially approved Operation Paperclip and expanded it to include one thousand German scientists under "temporary, limited military custody".[8][9][10]

Osenberg List

In the later part of World War II, Nazi Germany found itself at a logistical disadvantage, having failed to conquer the USSR with Operation Barbarossa (June–December 1941), the Siege of Leningrad (September 1941 – January 1944), Operation Nordlicht ("Northern Light", August–October 1942), and the Battle of Stalingrad (July 1942 – February 1943). The failed conquest had depleted German resources, and its military-industrial complex was unprepared to defend the Großdeutsches Reich (Greater German Reich) against the Red Army's westward counterattack. By early 1943, the German government began recalling from combat a number of scientists, engineers, and technicians; they returned to work in research and development to bolster German defense for a protracted war with the USSR. The recall from frontline combat included 4,000 rocketeers returned to Peenemünde, in northeast coastal Germany.[11][12]

Overnight, Ph.D.s were liberated from KP duty, masters of science were recalled from orderly service, mathematicians were hauled out of bakeries, and precision mechanics ceased to be truck drivers.

— Dieter K. Huzel, Peenemünde to Canaveral


The Nazi government's recall of their now-useful intellectuals for scientific work first required identifying and locating the scientists, engineers, and technicians, then ascertaining their political and ideological reliability. Werner Osenberg, the engineer-scientist heading the Wehrforschungsgemeinschaft (Defense Research Association), recorded the names of the politically cleared men to the Osenberg List, thus reinstating them to scientific work.[13]

In March 1945, at Bonn University, a Polish laboratory technician found pieces of the Osenberg List stuffed in a toilet; the list subsequently reached MI6, who transmitted it to U.S. Intelligence.[14][15] Then U.S. Army Major Robert B. Staver, Chief of the Jet Propulsion Section of the Research and Intelligence Branch of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, used the Osenberg List to compile his list of German scientists to be captured and interrogated; Wernher von Braun, Germany's premier rocket scientist, headed Major Staver's list.[16]

Identification

Image
V-2 rocket launching, Peenemünde, on the north-east Baltic German coast. (1943)

In Operation Overcast, Major Staver's original intent was only to interview the scientists, but what he learned changed the operation's purpose. On May 22, 1945, he transmitted to the U.S. Pentagon headquarters Colonel Joel Holmes's telegram urging the evacuation of German scientists and their families, as most "important for [the] Pacific war" effort.[15] Most of the Osenberg List engineers worked at the Baltic coast German Army Research Center Peenemünde, developing the V-2 rocket. After capturing them, the Allies initially housed them and their families in Landshut, Bavaria, in southern Germany.

Beginning on July 19, 1945, the U.S. JCS managed the captured ARC rocketeers under Operation Overcast. However, when the "Camp Overcast" name of the scientists' quarters became locally known, the program was renamed Operation Paperclip in November 1945.[17] Despite these attempts at secrecy, later that year the press interviewed several of the scientists.[15][16][18]

Capture and detention

Image
The Allied zones of occupation in post-war Germany, highlighting the Soviet zone (red), the inner German border (heavy black line) and the zone from which British and American troops withdrew in July 1945 (purple). The provincial boundaries are those of Nazi Germany, before the present Länder (federal states) were established.

Early on, the United States created the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS). This provided the information on targets for the T-Forces that went in and targeted scientific, military and industrial installations (and their employees) for their know-how. Initial priorities were advanced technology, such as infrared, that could be used in the war against Japan; finding out what technology had been passed on to Japan; and finally to halt the research.

A project to halt the research was codenamed "Project Safehaven", and it was not initially targeted against the Soviet Union; rather the concern was that German scientists might emigrate and continue their research in countries such as Spain, Argentina or Egypt, all of which had sympathized with Nazi Germany.[citation needed] In order to avoid the complications involved with the emigration of German scientists, the CIOS was responsible for scouting and kidnapping high-profile individuals for the deprivation of technological advancements in nations outside of the US.

Much U.S. effort was focused on Saxony and Thuringia, which by July 1, 1945, would become part of the Soviet Occupation zone. Many German research facilities and personnel had been evacuated to these states, particularly from the Berlin area. Fearing that the Soviet takeover would limit U.S. ability to exploit German scientific and technical expertise, and not wanting the Soviet Union to benefit from said expertise, the United States instigated an "evacuation operation" of scientific personnel from Saxony and Thuringia, issuing orders such as:

On orders of Military Government you are to report with your family and baggage as much as you can carry tomorrow noon at 1300 hours (Friday, 22 June 1945) at the town square in Bitterfeld. There is no need to bring winter clothing. Easily carried possessions, such as family documents, jewelry, and the like should be taken along. You will be transported by motor vehicle to the nearest railway station. From there you will travel on to the West. Please tell the bearer of this letter how large your family is.


By 1947 this evacuation operation had netted an estimated 1,800 technicians and scientists, along with 3,700 family members. Those with special skills or knowledge were taken to detention and interrogation centers, such as one code-named DUSTBIN,[19] to be held and interrogated, in some cases for months.[citation needed]

A few of the scientists were gathered up in Operation Overcast, but most were transported to villages in the countryside where there were neither research facilities nor work; they were provided stipends and forced to report twice weekly to police headquarters to prevent them from leaving. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive on research and teaching stated that technicians and scientists should be released "only after all interested agencies were satisfied that all desired intelligence information had been obtained from them".[citation needed]

On November 5, 1947, the Office of Military Government of the United States (OMGUS), which had jurisdiction over the western part of occupied Germany, held a conference to consider the status of the evacuees, the monetary claims that the evacuees had filed against the United States, and the "possible violation by the US of laws of war or Rules of Land Warfare". The OMGUS director of Intelligence R. L. Walsh initiated a program to resettle the evacuees in the Third World, which the Germans referred to as General Walsh's "Urwald-Programm" (jungle program); however, this program never matured. In 1948, the evacuees received settlements of 69.5 million Reichsmarks from the U.S., a settlement that soon became severely devalued during the currency reform that introduced the Deutsche Mark as the official currency of western Germany.[citation needed]

John Gimbel concludes that the United States held some of Germany's best minds for three years, therefore depriving the German recovery of their expertise.[20]

Arrivals

Image
A group of 104 rocket scientists (aerospace engineers) at Fort Bliss, Texas

In May 1945, the U.S. Navy "received in custody" Herbert A. Wagner, the inventor of the Hs 293 missile; for two years, he first worked at the Special Devices Center, at Castle Gould and at Hempstead House, Long Island, New York; in 1947, he moved to the Naval Air Station Point Mugu.[21]

In August 1945, Colonel Holger Toftoy, head of the Rocket Branch of the Research and Development Division of the U.S. Army's Ordnance Corps, offered initial one-year contracts to the rocket scientists; 127 of them accepted. In September 1945, the first group of seven rocket scientists (aerospace engineers) arrived at Fort Strong, located on Long Island in Boston harbor: Wernher von Braun, Erich W. Neubert, Theodor A. Poppel, August Schulze, Eberhard Rees, Wilhelm Jungert, and Walter Schwidetzky.[15]

Beginning in late 1945, three rocket-scientist groups arrived in the United States for duty at Fort Bliss, Texas, and at White Sands Proving Grounds, New Mexico, as "War Department Special Employees".[11]:27[17]

In 1946, the United States Bureau of Mines employed seven German synthetic fuel scientists at a Fischer-Tropsch chemical plant in Louisiana, Missouri.[22]

On June 1, 1949, the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army designated Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, as the Ordnance Rocket Center, its facility for rocket research and development. On April 1, 1950, the Fort Bliss missile development operation—including von Braun and his team of over 130 Paperclip members—was transferred to Redstone Arsenal.

In early 1950, legal U.S. residency for some of the Project Paperclip specialists was effected through the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico; thus, German scientists legally entered the United States from Latin America.[11]:226[16]

Between 1945 and 1952, the United States Air Force sponsored the largest number of Paperclip scientists, importing 260 men, of whom 36 returned to Germany and one (Walter Schreiber) reemigrated to Argentina.[23]

Eighty-six aeronautical engineers were transferred to Wright Field, Ohio, where the United States had Luftwaffe aircraft and equipment captured under Operation Lusty (Luftwaffe Secret Technology).[24]

The United States Army Signal Corps employed 24 specialists – including the physicists Georg Goubau, Gunter Guttwein, Georg Hass, Horst Kedesdy, and Kurt Lehovec; the physical chemists Rudolf Brill, Ernst Baars, and Eberhard Both; the geophysicist Helmut Weickmann; the optician Gerhard Schwesinger; and the engineers Eduard Gerber, Richard Guenther, and Hans Ziegler.[25]

In 1959, 94 Operation Paperclip men went to the United States, including Friedwardt Winterberg and Friedrich Wigand.[21]

Overall, through its operations to 1990, Operation Paperclip imported 1,600 men, as part of the intellectual reparations owed to the US and the UK, valued at $10 billion in patents and industrial processes.[21][26]

Major awards (in the United States)

The NASA Distinguished Service Medal is the highest award which may be bestowed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). After more than two decades of service and leadership in NASA, four Operation Paperclip members were awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal in 1969: Kurt Debus, Eberhard Rees, Arthur Rudolph, and Wernher von Braun. Ernst Geissler was awarded the medal in 1973.

The Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award is the highest civilian award given by the United States Department of Defense. After two decades of service, Operation Paperclip member Siegfried Knemeyer was awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 1966.

The Goddard Astronautics Award is the highest honor bestowed for notable achievements in the field of astronautics by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA).[27] For their service, three Operation Paperclip members were awarded the Goddard Astronautics Award: Wernher von Braun (1961), Hans von Ohain (1967), and Krafft Arnold Ehricke (1984).

The U.S. Space & Rocket Center in Huntsville, Alabama, owns and operates the U.S. Space Camp. Several Operation Paperclip members are members of the Space Camp Hall of Fame (which began in 2007): Wernher von Braun (2007), Georg von Tiesenhausen (2007), and Oscar Holderer (2008).

The New Mexico Museum of Space History includes the International Space Hall of Fame. Two Operation Paperclip members are members of the International Space Hall of Fame: Wernher von Braun (1976)[28] and Ernst Steinhoff (1979).[29] Hubertus Strughold was inducted in 1978 but removed as a member in 2006. Other closely related members include Willy Ley (1976),[30] a German-American science writer, and Hermann Oberth (1976),[31] a German scientist who advised von Braun's rocket team in the U.S. from 1955 to 1958.

Two lunar craters are named after Paperclip scientists: Debus after Kurt Debus, the first director of NASA's Kennedy Space Center, and von Braun.

Scientific accomplishments

Wernher von Braun was chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the key instrument in getting man to the moon.[32]

Adolf Busemann was the mind behind the swept wing, which improved aircraft performance at high speeds.[33][34]

Controversy and investigations

Before his official approval of the program, President Truman, for sixteen months, was indecisive on the program.[10] Years later in 1963, Truman recalled that he was not in the least reluctant to approve Paperclip; that because of relations with Russia "this had to be done and was done".[35]

Several of the Paperclip scientists were later investigated because of their links with the Nazi Party during the war. Only one Paperclip scientist, Georg Rickhey, was formally tried for any crime, and no Paperclip scientist was found guilty of any crime, in America or Germany. Rickhey was returned to Germany in 1947 to stand trial at the Dora Trial, where he was acquitted.[36]

In 1951, weeks after his U.S. arrival, Walter Schreiber was linked by the Boston Globe to human experiments conducted by Kurt Blome at Ravensbrück, and he emigrated to Argentina with the aid of the U.S. military.

In 1984, Arthur Rudolph, under perceived threat of prosecution relating to his connection—as operations director for V-2 missile production—to the use of forced labor from Mittelbau-Dora at the Mittelwerk, renounced his U.S. citizenship and moved to West Germany, which granted him citizenship.[37]

For fifty years, from 1963 to 2013, the Strughold Award—named after Hubertus Strughold, The Father of Space Medicine, for his central role in developing innovations like the space suit and space life support systems—was the most prestigious award from the Space Medicine Association, a member organization of the Aerospace Medical Association.[38] On October 1, 2013, in the aftermath of a Wall Street Journal article published on December 1, 2012, which highlighted his connection to human experiments during WW2, the Space Medicine Association's Executive Committee announced that the Space Medicine Association Strughold Award had been retired.[38][39]

Key recruits

Advisors brought into the United States

Hermann Oberth

Aeronautics and rocketry

Hans Amtmann,[40] Herbert Axster, Anton Flettner, Erich Ball,[41] Oscar Bauschinger,[42] Hermann Beduerftig,[43] Rudi Beichel,[44] Anton Beier,[45] Herbert Bergeler,[46] Magnus von Braun, Wernher von Braun, Theodor Buchhold, Walter Burose,[47] Adolf Busemann, GN Constan,[48] Werner Dahm, Konrad Dannenberg, Kurt H. Debus, Gerd De Beek,[49] Walter Dornberger, Gerhard Drawe,[50] Friedrich Duerr,[51] Ernst R. G. Eckert, Otto Eisenhardt,[52] Krafft Arnold Ehricke, Alfred Finzel,[53] Edward Fischel,[54] Karl Fleischer,[55] Anselm Franz, Herbert Fuhrmann,[56] Ernst Geissler, Werner Gengelbach,[57] Dieter Grau, Hans Gruene,[58] Herbert Guendel,[59] Fritz Haber,[60] Heinz Haber, Karl Hager,[61] Guenther Haukohl,[62] Karl Heimburg,[63] Emil Hellebrand,[64] Gerhard Heller,[65] Bruno Helm,[66] Rudolf Hermann,[67] Bruno Heusinger,[68] Hans Heuter,[69] Guenther Hintze,[70] Sighard F. Hoerner, Kurt Hohenemser, Oscar Holderer, Hans Henning Hosenthien, Walter Jacobi, Erich Kaschig,[71] Ernst Klaus,[72] Theodore Knacke,[73] Siegfried Knemeyer, Heinz-Hermann Koelle, Gustav Kroll,[74] Werner Kuers,[75] Hermann Kurzweg,[76] Hermann Lange,[77] Hans Lindenberg,[78] Hans Lindenmayer,[79] Alexander Martin Lippisch, Robert Lusser, Hans Maus,[80] Helmut Merk,[81] Joseph Michel,[82] Hans Milde,[83] Heinz Millinger,[84] Rudolf Minning,[85] Willi Mrazek,[86] Hans Multhopp, Erich Neubert,[87] Gerhard Neumann, Hans von Ohain (designer of German jet engines), Robert Paetz,[88] Hans Palaoro,[89] Kurt Patt,[90] Hans Paul,[91] Arnold Peter,[92] Theodor Poppel,[93] Werner Rosinski,[94] Heinrich Rothe,[95] Ludwig Roth, Arthur Rudolph, Friedrich von Saurma, Edgar Schaeffer, Martin Schilling,[96] Helmut Schlitt,[97] Albert Schuler,[98] August Schulze,[99] Walter Schwidetzky,[100] Ernst Steinhoff, Wolfgang Steurer,[101] Ernst Stuhlinger, Kurt Tank, Bernhard Tessmann, Adolf Thiel, Georg von Tiesenhausen, Werner Tiller,[102] JG Tschinkel,[103] Arthur Urbanski,[104] Fritz Vandersee,[105] Richard Vogt, Woldemar Voigt (designer of Messerschmitt P.1101), Werner Voss,[106] Theodor Vowe,[107] Herbert A. Wagner, Hermann Weidner,[108] Günter Wendt and Walter Fritz Wiesemann.[109]

(see List of German rocket scientists in the US).

Architecture

Heinz Hilten [110] and Hannes Luehrsen.[111]

Electronics - including guidance systems, radar and satellites

Wilhelm Angele,[112] Ernst Baars, Josef Boehm,[113] Hans Fichtner, Hans Friedrich,[114] Eduard Gerber,[115] Georg Goubau, Walter Haeussermann, Otto Heinrich Hirschler,[116] Otto Hoberg,[117] Rudolf Hoelker,[118] Hans Hollmann, Helmut Hölzer, Horst Kedesdy,[119] Kurt Lehovec, Kurt Lindner,[120] JW Muehlner,[121] Fritz Mueller, Johannes Plendl, Fritz Karl Preikschat, Eberhard Rees, Gerhard Reisig,[122] Harry Ruppe,[123] Heinz Schlicke, Werner Sieber,[124] Othmar Stuetzer,[125] Albin Wittmann,[126] Hugo Woerdemann,[127] Albert Zeiler,[128] and Hans K. Ziegler.

Material Science (high temperature)

Claus Scheufelen [129] and Rudolf Schlidt.[130]

Medicine – including biological weapons, chemical weapons, and space medicine

Theodor Benzinger, Rudolf Brill, Konrad Johannes Karl Büttner, Richard Lindenberg, Walter Schreiber, Hubertus Strughold, Hans Georg Clamann, and Erich Traub.

Physics

Gunter Guttein, Gerhard Schwesinger,[131] Gottfried Wehner, Helmut Weickmann,[132] and Friedwardt Winterberg.

Chemistry and Chemical engineering

Helmut Pichler, Leonard Alberts; Ernst Donath, Hans Schappert, Max Josenhaus, Kurt Bretschneider, Erich Frese

Similar operations

• APPLEPIE: Project to capture and interrogate key Wehrmacht, RSHA AMT VI, and General Staff officers knowledgeable of the industry and economy of the USSR.[133]
• DUSTBIN (counterpart of ASHCAN): An Anglo-American military intelligence operation established first in Paris, then in Kransberg Castle, at Frankfurt.[134][135]:314
• ECLIPSE (1944): An unimplemented Air Disarmament Wing plan for post-war operations in Europe for destroying V-1 and V-2 missiles.[135][136]:44
o Safehaven: US project within ECLIPSE meant to prevent the escape of Nazi scientists from Allied-occupied Germany.[16]
• Field Information Agency; Technical (FIAT): US Army agency for securing the "major, and perhaps only, material reward of victory, namely, the advancement of science and the improvement of production and standards of living in the United Nations, by proper exploitation of German methods in these fields"; FIAT ended in 1947, when Operation Paperclip began functioning.[135]:316
• On April 26, 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued JCS Directive 1067/14 to General Eisenhower instructing that he "preserve from destruction and take under your control records, plans, books, documents, papers, files and scientific, industrial and other information and data belonging to ... German organizations engaged in military research";[15]:185 and that, excepting war-criminals, German scientists be detained for intelligence purposes as required.[137]
• National Interest/Project 63: Job placement assistance for Nazi engineers at Lockheed, Martin Marietta, North American Aviation, and other aeroplane companies, whilst American aerospace engineers were being laid off work.[21]
• Operation Alsos, Operation Big, Operation Epsilon, Russian Alsos: Soviet, American and British efforts to capture German nuclear secrets, equipment, and personnel.
• Operation Backfire: A British effort at recovering rocket and aerospace technology, followed by assembling and testing rockets at Cuxhaven.
• Fedden Mission: British mission to gain technical intelligence concerning advanced German aircraft and their propulsion systems.
• Operation Lusty: US efforts to capture German aeronautical equipment, technology, and personnel.
• Operation Osoaviakhim (sometimes transliterated as "Operation Ossavakim"), a Soviet counterpart of Operation Paperclip, involving German technicians, managers, skilled workers and their respective families who were relocated to the USSR in October 1946.[138]
• Operation Surgeon: British operation for denying German aeronautical expertise to the USSR, and for exploiting German scientists in furthering British research.[139]
• Special Mission V-2: April–May 1945 US operation, by Maj. William Bromley, that recovered parts and equipment for 100 V-2 missiles from a Mittelwerk underground factory in Kohnstein within the Soviet zone. Major James P. Hamill co-ordinated the transport of the equipment on 341 railroad cars with the 144th Motor Vehicle Assembly Company, from Nordhausen to Erfurt, just before the Soviets arrived.[140] (See also Operation Blossom, Broomstick Scientists, Hermes project, Operations Sandy and Pushover)
• Target Intelligence Committee: US project to exploit German cryptographers.

See also

• Spaceflight portal
• Germany portal
• Fascism portal
• Science portal
• United States portal
• War portal
• Nuclear technology portal
• Brain drain
• Operation Osoaviakhim
• Carmel Offie
• Fort Bliss
• List of Axis personnel indicted for war crimes
• Operation Bloodstone
• Operation Lusty — targeting advanced aircraft of the defeated Luftwaffe
• Ratlines (World War II)
• Unit 731 — Japanese human experimenters recruited for their biological weapons technology.
• Upper Atmosphere Research Panel
• Project MKNAOMI

Notes

1. Jacobsen, Annie (2014). Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America. New York: Little, Brown and Company. p. Prologue, ix. ISBN 978-0-316-22105-4.
2. "Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency". U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved October 9,2008.
3. "Operation "Osoaviakhim"". Russian space historian Anatoly Zak. Retrieved May 4, 2018.
4. Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War, 1971, Clarence G. Lasby, et al. p. 79
5. Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War, 1971, Clarence G. Lasby, et al. p. 155
6. Jacobsen, pp. 191.
7. Jacobsen, pp. 193.
8. The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists, 1987, Tom Bower, et al. p. 178
9. Jacobsen, pp. 229.
10. Lasby, pp. 177.
11. Huzel, Dieter K (1960). Peenemünde to Canaveral. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall. pp. 27, 226.
12. Braun, Wernher von; Ordway III; Frederick I (1985) [1975]. Space Travel: A History. & David Dooling Jr. New York: Harper & Row. p. 218. ISBN 978-0-06-181898-1.
13. Forman, Paul; Sánchez-Ron, José Manuel (1996). National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 308. ISBN 9780792335412.
14. MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service (2000), by Steven Dorril, p. 138.
15. McGovern, James (1964). Crossbow and Overcast. New York: W. Morrow. pp. 100, 104, 173, 207, 210, 242.
16. Ordway, Frederick I, III; Sharpe, Mitchell R (1979). The Rocket Team. Apogee Books Space Series 36. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. pp. 310, 313, 314, 316, 325, 330, 406. ISBN 978-1-894959-00-1.
17. Laney, Monique (2015). German Rocketeers in the Heart of Dixie: Making Sense of the Nazi Past During the Civil Rights Era. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. p. 26. ISBN 978-0-300-19803-4.
18. Boyne, Walter J. (June 2007). "Project Paperclip". Air Force. Air Force Association. Retrieved October 17, 2008.
19. Note: Located first in Paris and then moved to Kransberg Castle outside Frankfurt.
20. "U.S. Policy and German Scientists: The Early Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 3, (1986), pp. 433–451
21. Hunt, Linda (1991). Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990. New York: St.Martin's Press. pp. 6, 21, 31, 176, 204, 259. ISBN 978-0-312-05510-3.
22. "Fischer-Tropsch.org". Fischer-Tropsch.org. Archived from the original on September 24, 2015. Retrieved December 22, 2011.
23. Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War, 1975, Clarence G. Lasby, et al. p. 257
24. "The End of World War II". (television show, Original Air Date: 2-17-05). A&E. Archived from the original on September 27, 2007. Retrieved June 4, 2007.
25. Fred Carl. "Operation Paperclip and Camp Evans". Campevans.org. Archived from the original on March 9, 2012. Retrieved December 22, 2011.
26. Naimark. 206 (Naimark cites Gimbel, John Science Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany) The $10 billion compare to the 1948 US GDP $258 billion, and to the total Marshall plan (1948–52) expenditure of $13 billion, of which Germany received $1.4 billion (partly as loans).
27. "Goddard Astronautics Award". AAIA: Shaping the Future of Aerospace. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Retrieved August 22, 2017.
28. "International Space Hall of Fame – Wernher von Braun". New Mexico Museum of Space History. New Mexico Department of Cultural Affairs. Retrieved August 22, 2017.
29. "International Space Hall of Fame – Ernst A. Steinhoff". New Mexico Museum of Space History. New Mexico Department of Cultural Affairs. Retrieved August 22, 2017.
30. "International Space Hall of Fame – Willy Ley". New Mexico Museum of Space History. New Mexico Department of Cultural Affairs. Retrieved August 22, 2017.
31. "International Space Hall of Fame – Hermann J. Oberth". New Mexico Museum of Space History. New Mexico Department of Cultural Affairs. Retrieved August 22, 2017.
32. Harbaugh, Jennifer (February 18, 2016). "Biography of Wernher Von Braun". NASA. Retrieved May 1, 2018.
33. AP. "Adolf Busemann, 85, Dead; Designer of the Swept Wing". Retrieved May 1, 2018.
34. "Operation Paperclip | Defense Media Network". Defense Media Network. Retrieved May 1, 2018.
35. Lasby, pp. 177, citing Personal Interview, President Harry S. Truman, Independence, Missouri, June 3, 1963.
36. Michael J. Neufeld (2008). Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War Vintage Series. Random House, Inc. p. 235. ISBN 978-0-307-38937-4.
37. Hunt, Linda (May 23, 1987). "NASA's Nazis". Literature of the Holocaust.
38. "Strughold Award".
39. Lagnado, Lucette (December 1, 2012). "A Scientist's Nazi-Era Past Haunts Prestigious Space Prize" – via Wall Street Journal.
40. https://www.amazon.com/Hans-H.-Amtmann/e/B001KMFDZ4
41. "Ball, Erich". http://www.astronautix.com.
42. "Bauschinger". http://www.astronautix.com.
43. "Beduerftig". http://www.astronautix.com.
44. "Beichel". http://www.astronautix.com.
45. "Beier". http://www.astronautix.com.
46. "Bergeler". http://www.astronautix.com.
47. "Burose". http://www.astronautix.com.
48. "Constan". http://www.astronautix.com.
49. "De Beek". http://www.astronautix.com.
50. "Drawe". http://www.astronautix.com.
51. "Duerr". http://www.astronautix.com.
52. "Eisenhardt". http://www.astronautix.com.
53. "Finzel". http://www.astronautix.com.
54. "Fischel". http://www.astronautix.com.
55. "Fleischer". http://www.astronautix.com.
56. "Fuhrmann". http://www.astronautix.com.
57. "Werner K. Gengelbach". National Air and Space Museum. January 16, 2016.
58. "Gruene". http://www.astronautix.com.
59. "Guendel". http://www.astronautix.com.
60. Burkhart, Ford (August 29, 1998). "Fritz Haber, 86, Dies; Simulated Weightlessness of Space" – via NYTimes.com.
61. "Hager". http://www.astronautix.com.
62. "Haukohl". http://www.astronautix.com.
63. "Heimburg". http://www.astronautix.com.
64. Ap (December 19, 1981). "Emil Hellebrand Dead; Rocket Expert Was 67" – via NYTimes.com.
65. "Heller". http://www.astronautix.com.
66. "Helm". http://www.astronautix.com.
67. "Hermann, Rudolf". http://www.astronautix.com.
68. "Heusinger". http://www.astronautix.com.
69. "Hueter". http://www.astronautix.com.
70. "Hintze". http://www.astronautix.com.
71. "Kaschig". http://www.astronautix.com.
72. "Klaus". http://www.astronautix.com.
73. "Theodore W. Knacke, USA". National Air and Space Museum. January 16, 2016.
74. "Kroll". http://www.astronautix.com.
75. "Kuers". http://www.astronautix.com.
76. Darling, David. "Kurzweg, Hermann H. (1908-2000)". http://www.daviddarling.info.
77. "Lange". http://www.astronautix.com.
78. "Lindenberg". http://www.astronautix.com.
79. "Lindenmayer". http://www.astronautix.com.
80. "Maus". http://www.astronautix.com.
81. "Merk". http://www.astronautix.com.
82. "Michel, Josef". http://www.astronautix.com.
83. "Milde". http://www.astronautix.com.
84. "Millinger". http://www.astronautix.com.
85. "Minning". http://www.astronautix.com.
86. "Mrazek". http://www.astronautix.com.
87. "Neubert". http://www.astronautix.com.
88. "Paetz". http://www.astronautix.com.
89. "Palaoro". http://www.astronautix.com.
90. "Patt". http://www.astronautix.com.
91. "Paul". http://www.astronautix.com.
92. Trotter, Megan. "Cookevillian recalls secret Operation Paperclip". Herald Citizen.
93. "Poppel". http://www.astronautix.com.
94. "Rosinski". web.archive.org. September 12, 2010.
95. "Rothe". http://www.astronautix.com.
96. "Schilling". http://www.astronautix.com.
97. "Schlitt". http://www.astronautix.com.
98. "Schuler". http://www.astronautix.com.
99. "Schulze". http://www.astronautix.com.
100. "Schwidetzky". http://www.astronautix.com.
101. "Steurer". http://www.astronautix.com.
102. "Tiller". http://www.astronautix.com.
103. "Tschinkel". http://www.astronautix.com.
104. "Urbanski". http://www.astronautix.com.
105. "Vandersee". http://www.astronautix.com.
106. "Voss, Werner". http://www.astronautix.com.
107. "Vowe". http://www.astronautix.com.
108. "Weidner". http://www.astronautix.com.
109. "Wiesemann". http://www.astronautix.com.
110. Roop, Lee (January 26, 2016). "Rare architect's drawings show Huntsville's change from cotton town to Rocket City". al.com.
111. "Luehrsen". http://www.astronautix.com.
112. Saxon, Wolfgang (September 1, 1996). "Wilhelm Angele, 91, Engineer in Space Program" – via NYTimes.com.
113. "Boehm". http://www.astronautix.com.
114. "Friedrich". http://www.astronautix.com.
115. Ballato, A. (January 1, 1987). "In Memoriam Eduard A. Gerber". IEEE Transactions on Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics, and Frequency Control. 34 (1): 2. doi:10.1109/T-UFFC.1987.26903.
116. Saxon, Wolfgang (February 9, 2001). "H. Otto Hirschler, 87, Aided Space Program" – via NYTimes.com.
117. "Hoberg". http://www.astronautix.com.
118. Saxon, Wolfgang (June 20, 2003). "Rudolf F. Hoelker, 91, Space Flight Scientist" – via NYTimes.com.
119. ""OPERATION PAPERCLIP" - ARCHIVE OF DR. HORST KEDESDY on LiveAuctioneers". LiveAuctioneers.
120. "Lindner". http://www.astronautix.com.
121. "Muehlner". http://www.astronautix.com.
122. "Reisig". http://www.astronautix.com.
123. "Ruppe". http://www.astronautix.com.
124. "Sieber". http://www.astronautix.com.
125. "Albuquerque Journal Obituaries". obits.abqjournal.com.
126. "Wittmann". http://www.astronautix.com.
127. "Woerdemann". http://www.astronautix.com.
128. "Albert Zeiler". October 18, 1975 – via NYTimes.com.
129. "Scheufelen". http://www.astronautix.com.
130. "Schlidt". http://www.astronautix.com.
131. "Variable focal length focusing lens system and device therefor". google.com.
132. "Historical Overview of NSSL: We build on the foundations established by our predecessors". http://www.nssl.noaa.gov.
133. "List Of Terms, Code Names, Operations, and Other Search Terminology To Assist Review and Identification Activities Required by the Act". U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved December 19, 2008.
134. Buchholz, Dr. Annemarie (2003). "The New Form of Government: Bombocracy". Current Concerns. Switzerland. Archived from the original on September 28, 2007. Retrieved October 18, 2008.
135. Ziemke, Earl F (1990) [1975]. "Chapter XI:Getting Ready for "The Day"". The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History. p. 163. CMH Pub 30-6.
136. Cooksley, Peter G (1979). Flying Bomb. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. p. 44.
137. Beyerchen, Alan (1982). "German Scientists and Research Institutions in Allied Occupation Policy". History of Education Quarterly. 22 (3): 289–299. doi:10.2307/367770. JSTOR 367770. Much of the FIAT information was adapted commercially, to the degree that the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas requested that the peace treaty with Germany be redacted to protect US industry from lawsuits.
138. Pennacchio, Charles F. (Fall 1995). "The East German Communists and the Origins of the Berlin Blockade Crisis"(DOC). East European Quarterly. 29 (3). Retrieved June 29, 2010. October 21, 1946, marked the initiation of "Operation Ossavakim", which forcibly transferred to Soviet soil thousands of German technicians, managers and skilled personnel, along with their family members and the industrial tools they would operate.
139. "UK 'fears' over German scientists", BBC News, March 31, 2006
140. Breuer, William B. (2000). Top Secret Tales of World War II. Wiley. pp. 220–224. ISBN 978-0-471-35382-9.

References

• Yves Beon, Planet Dora. Westview Press, 1997. ISBN 0-8133-3272-9.
• Giuseppe Ciampaglia: "Come ebbe effettivo inizio a Roma l'Operazione Paperclip". Roma 2005. In: Strenna dei Romanisti 2005. Edit. Roma Amor
• Henry Stevens, Hitler's Suppressed and Still-Secret Weapons, Science and Technology. Adventures Unlimited Press, 2007. ISBN 1-931882-73-8
• John Gimbel, "Science Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany" Stanford University Press, 1990 ISBN 0-8047-1761-3
• Linda Hunt, Arthur Rudolph of Dora and NASA, Moment 4, 1987 (Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)
• Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda:The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990. St Martin's Press – Thomas Dunne Books, 1991. ISBN 0-312-05510-2
• Linda Hunt, U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 1985.
• Matthias Judt; Burghard Ciesla, Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945 Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996. ISBN 3-7186-5822-4
• Michael C. Carroll, Lab 257: The Disturbing Story of the Government's Secret Germ Laboratory. Harper Paperbacks, 2005. ISBN 0-06-078184-X
• John Gimbel "U.S. Policy and German Scientists: The Early Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 3 (1986), pp. 433–51
• Clarence G., Lasby Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War Scribner (February 1975) ISBN 0-689-70524-7
• Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988)
• Wolfgang W. E. Samuel American Raiders: The Race to Capture the Luftwaffe's Secrets (University Press of Mississippi, 2004)
• Koerner, Steven T. "Technology Transfer from Germany to Canada after 1945: A Study in Failure?". Comparative Technology Transfer and Society, Volume 2, Number 1, April 2004, pp. 99–124
• John Farquharson "Governed or Exploited? The British Acquisition of German Technology, 1945–48" Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 23–42
• 1995 Human Radiation Experiments Memorandum: Post-World War II Reccruitment of German Scientists – Project Paperclip
• Employment of German scientists and technicians: denial policy UK National archives releases March 2006.
• "Objective List of German and Austrian Scientists" (Microsoft Word). Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency. Retrieved April 10, 2007.
• Dr. Wernher von Braun First Center Director, July 1, 1960 - Jan. 27, 1970. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center History Office. Retrieved December 31, 2017.

Further reading

• Annie Jacobsen (2014). Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program that Brought Nazi Scientists to America. New York: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 978-0-316-22104-7. OCLC 827257574.
• Brian E. Crim. 2018. Our Germans: project paperclip and the national security state. Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Eric Lichtblau (2014). The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler's Men. Mariner Books. ISBN 0-544-57788-4
• Simpson, Christopher (1988). Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-1-55584-106-5.

External links

• In Cold War, U.S. Spy Agencies Used 1,000 Nazis. Eric Lichtblau for The New York Times. October 26, 2014.
• The Nazis Next Door: Eric Lichtblau on how the CIA & FBI Secretly Sheltered Nazi War Criminals – video report by Democracy Now!, October 31, 2014
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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House Un-American Activities Committee
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Chairman Dies of HUAC proofs his letter replying to President Roosevelt's attack on the committee, October 26, 1938.

The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) or House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), from 1969 House Committee on Internal Security, was an investigative committee of the United States House of Representatives. The HUAC was created in 1938 to investigate alleged disloyalty and subversive activities on the part of private citizens, public employees, and those organizations suspected of having Communist ties. When the House abolished the committee in 1975,[1] its functions were transferred to the House Judiciary Committee.

The committee's anti-communist investigations are often compared with those of Joseph McCarthy[2] who, as a U.S. Senator, had no direct involvement with this House committee.[3] McCarthy was the chairman of the Government Operations Committee and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate, not the House.

History

Precursors to the committee

Overman Committee (1918)


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Lee Slater Overman headed the first congressional investigation of American communism in 1919.

The Overman Committee was a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary chaired by North Carolina Democratic Senator Lee Slater Overman that operated from September 1918 to June 1919. The subcommittee investigated German as well as Bolshevik elements in the United States.[4]

This committee was originally concerned with investigating pro-German sentiments in the American liquor industry. After World War I ended in November 1918, and the German threat lessened, the committee began investigating Bolshevism, which had appeared as a threat during the First Red Scare after the Russian Revolution in 1917. The committee's hearing into Bolshevik propaganda, conducted February 11 to March 10, 1919, had a decisive role in constructing an image of a radical threat to the United States during the first Red Scare.[5]

Fish Committee (1930)

Congressman Hamilton Fish III (R-NY), who was a fervent anti-communist, introduced, on May 5, 1930, House Resolution 180, which proposed to establish a committee to investigate communist activities in the United States. The resulting committee, commonly known as the Fish Committee, undertook extensive investigations of people and organizations suspected of being involved with or supporting communist activities in the United States.[6] Among the committee's targets were the American Civil Liberties Union and communist presidential candidate William Z. Foster.[7] The committee recommended granting the United States Department of Justice more authority to investigate communists, and strengthening of immigration and deportation laws to keep communists out of the United States.[8]

McCormack–Dickstein Committee (1934–1937)

From 1934 to 1937, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities Authorized to Investigate Nazi Propaganda and Certain Other Propaganda Activities, chaired by John William McCormack (D-MA) and Samuel Dickstein (D-NY), held public and private hearings and collected testimony filling 4,300 pages. The committee was widely known as the McCormack–Dickstein committee. Its mandate was to get "information on how foreign subversive propaganda entered the U.S. and the organizations that were spreading it", and it was replaced with a similar committee that focused on pursuing communists. Its records are held by the National Archives and Records Administration as records related to HUAC.

The committee investigated allegations of a fascist plot to seize the White House, known as the "business plot". Although the plot was widely reported as a hoax, the committee confirmed some details of the accusations.[citation needed]

It has been reported that while Dickstein served on this committee and the subsequent Special investigation Committee, he was paid $1,250 a month by the Soviet NKVD, which hoped to get secret congressional information on anti-communists and pro-fascists. It is unclear whether he actually passed on any information.[9]

Dies Committee (1938–1944)

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Conservative Texas Democrat Martin Dies served as chair of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, predecessor to the permanent committee, for its entire seven-year duration.

On May 26, 1938, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was established as a special investigating committee, reorganized from its previous incarnations as the Fish Committee and the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, to investigate alleged disloyalty and subversive activities on the part of private citizens, public employees, and those organizations suspected of having communist or fascist ties; however, it concentrated its efforts on communists.[10][11] It was chaired by Martin Dies Jr. (D-Tex.), and therefore known as the Dies Committee. Its records are held by the National Archives and Records Administration as records related to HUAC.

In 1938, Hallie Flanagan, the head of the Federal Theatre Project, was subpoenaed to appear before the committee to answer the charge the project was overrun with communists. Flanagan was called to testify for only a part of one day, while a clerk from the project was called in for two entire days. It was during this investigation that one of the committee members, Joe Starnes (D-Ala.), famously asked Flanagan whether the Elizabethan era playwright Christopher Marlowe was a member of the Communist Party, and mused "Mr. Euripides" preached class warfare.[12]

In 1939, the committee investigated leaders of the American Youth Congress, a Communist International affiliate organization.[citation needed]

The committee also put together an argument for the internment of Japanese Americans known as the "Yellow Report".[13] Organized in response to rumors of Japanese Americans being coddled by the War Relocation Authority (WRA) and news that some former inmates would be allowed to leave camp and Nisei soldiers to return to the West Coast, the committee investigated charges of fifth column activity in the camps. A number of anti-WRA arguments were presented in subsequent hearings, but Director Dillon Myer debunked the more inflammatory claims.[14] The investigation was presented to the 77th Congress, and alleged that certain cultural traits – Japanese loyalty to the Emperor, the number of Japanese fishermen in the US, and the Buddhist faith – were evidence for Japanese espionage. With the exception of Rep. Herman Eberharter (D-Pa.), the members of the committee seemed to support internment, and its recommendations to expedite the impending segregation of "troublemakers", establish a system to investigate applicants for leave clearance, and step up Americanization and assimilation efforts largely coincided with WRA goals.[13][14]

In 1946, the committee considered opening investigations into the Ku Klux Klan, but decided against doing so, prompting white supremacist committee member John E. Rankin (D-Miss.) to remark, "After all, the KKK is an old American institution."[15] Instead of the Klan, HUAC concentrated on investigating the possibility that the American Communist Party had infiltrated the Works Progress Administration, including the Federal Theatre Project and the Federal Writers' Project. Twenty years later, in 1965–1966, however, the committee did conduct an investigation into Klan activities under chairman Edwin Willis (D-La.).[16]

Standing Committee (1945–1975)

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Democrat Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania was chair of HUAC from 1955 until his death in 1963.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities became a standing (permanent) committee in 1945. Democratic Representative Edward J. Hart of New Jersey became the committee's first chairman.[17] Under the mandate of Public Law 601, passed by the 79th Congress, the committee of nine representatives investigated suspected threats of subversion or propaganda that attacked "the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution".[18]

Under this mandate, the committee focused its investigations on real and suspected communists in positions of actual or supposed influence in the United States society. A significant step for HUAC was its investigation of the charges of espionage brought against Alger Hiss in 1948. This investigation ultimately resulted in Hiss's trial and conviction for perjury, and convinced many of the usefulness of congressional committees for uncovering communist subversion.[19]

Hollywood blacklist

Main article: Hollywood blacklist

In 1947, the committee held nine days of hearings into alleged communist propaganda and influence in the Hollywood motion picture industry. After conviction on contempt of Congress charges for refusal to answer some questions posed by committee members, "The Hollywood Ten" were blacklisted by the industry. Eventually, more than 300 artists – including directors, radio commentators, actors, and particularly screenwriters – were boycotted by the studios. Some, like Charlie Chaplin, Orson Welles, Alan Lomax, Paul Robeson, and Yip Harburg, left the U.S or went underground to find work. Others like Dalton Trumbo wrote under pseudonyms or the names of colleagues. Only about ten percent succeeded in rebuilding careers within the entertainment industry.[citation needed]

In 1947, studio executives told the committee that wartime films – such as Mission to Moscow, The North Star, and Song of Russia – could be considered pro-Soviet propaganda, but claimed that the films were valuable in the context of the Allied war effort, and that they were made (in the case of Mission to Moscow) at the request of White House officials. In response to the House investigations, most studios produced a number of anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda films such as The Red Menace (August 1949), The Red Danube (October 1949), The Woman on Pier 13 (October 1949), Guilty of Treason (May 1950, about the ordeal and trial of Cardinal József Mindszenty), I Was a Communist for the FBI (May 1951, Academy Award nominated for best documentary 1951, also serialized for radio), Red Planet Mars (May 1952), and John Wayne's Big Jim McLain (August 1952).[20] Universal-International Pictures was the only major studio that did not produce such a film.

Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss

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Whittaker Chambers (1948)

On July 31, 1948, the committee heard testimony from Elizabeth Bentley, an American who had been working as a Soviet agent in New York. Among those whom she named as communists was Harry Dexter White. The committee subpoenaed Whittaker Chambers for August 3, 1948. Chambers, too, was a former Soviet spy, by then a senior editor of Time magazine.[citation needed]

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Alger Hiss (1950)

Chambers named more than a half-dozen government officials including White as well as Alger Hiss (and Hiss' brother Donald). Most of these former officials refused to answer committee questions, citing the Fifth Amendment. White denied the allegations, and died of a heart attack a few days later. Hiss also denied all charges; doubts about his testimony though, especially those expressed by freshman Congressman Richard Nixon, led to further investigation that strongly suggested Hiss had made a number of false statements. Hiss challenged Chambers to repeat his charges outside a Congressional committee, which Chambers did. Hiss sued for libel, leading Chambers to produce copies of State Department documents which he claimed Hiss had given him in 1938. Hiss denied this before a grand jury, was indicted for perjury, and subsequently convicted and imprisoned.[21][22] The present-day House of Representatives website on HUAC states, "In the 1990s, relying on Soviet archives and records from the Venona project – a secret U.S. program that decrypted Soviet intelligence messages – some scholars argued that Hiss had indeed been a spy on the Kremlin's payroll."[23]

Decline

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Democrat Richard Howard Ichord Jr. of Missouri was chair of the renamed House Internal Security Committee from 1969 until its termination in January 1975.

In the wake of the downfall of McCarthy (who never served in the House, nor on HUAC), the prestige of HUAC began a gradual decline in the late 1950s. By 1959, the committee was being denounced by former President Harry S. Truman as the "most un-American thing in the country today".[24]

In May 1960, the committee held hearings in San Francisco City Hall which led to the infamous riot on May 13, when city police officers fire-hosed protesting students from the UC Berkeley, Stanford, and other local colleges, and dragged them down the marble steps beneath the rotunda, leaving some seriously injured.[25][26] Soviet affairs expert William Mandel, who had been subpoenaed to testify, angrily denounced the committee and the police in a blistering statement which was aired repeatedly for years thereafter on Pacifica Radio station KPFA in Berkeley. An anti-communist propaganda film, Operation Abolition,[27][28][29][30] was produced by the committee from subpoenaed local news reports, and shown around the country during 1960 and 1961. In response, the Northern California ACLU produced a film called Operation Correction, which discussed falsehoods in the first film. Scenes from the hearings and protest were later featured in the Academy Award-nominated 1990 documentary Berkeley in the Sixties.

The committee lost considerable prestige as the 1960s progressed, increasingly becoming the target of political satirists and the defiance of a new generation of political activists. HUAC subpoenaed Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman of the Yippies in 1967, and again in the aftermath of the 1968 Democratic National Convention. The Yippies used the media attention to make a mockery of the proceedings. Rubin came to one session dressed as a Revolutionary War soldier and passed out copies of the United States Declaration of Independence to those in attendance. Rubin then "blew giant gum bubbles, while his co-witnesses taunted the committee with Nazi salutes".[31] Rubin attended another session dressed as Santa Claus. On another occasion, police stopped Hoffman at the building entrance and arrested him for wearing the United States flag. Hoffman quipped to the press, "I regret that I have but one shirt to give for my country", paraphrasing the last words of revolutionary patriot Nathan Hale; Rubin, who was wearing a matching Viet Cong flag, shouted that the police were communists for not arresting him as well.[32]

Hearings in August 1966 called to investigate anti-Vietnam War activities were disrupted by hundreds of protesters, many from the Progressive Labor Party. The committee faced witnesses who were openly defiant.[33][34]

According to The Harvard Crimson:

In the fifties, the most effective sanction was terror. Almost any publicity from HUAC meant the 'blacklist'. Without a chance to clear his name, a witness would suddenly find himself without friends and without a job. But it is not easy to see how in 1969, a HUAC blacklist could terrorize an SDS activist. Witnesses like Jerry Rubin have openly boasted of their contempt for American institutions. A subpoena from HUAC would be unlikely to scandalize Abbie Hoffman or his friends.[35]


In an attempt to reinvent itself, the committee was renamed as the Internal Security Committee in 1969.[36]

Termination

The House Committee on Internal Security was formally terminated on January 14, 1975, the day of the opening of the 94th Congress.[37] The Committee's files and staff were transferred on that day to the House Judiciary Committee.[37]

Chairmen

Source:[38]

• Martin Dies Jr., (D-Tex.), 1938–1944
• Edward J. Hart (D-N.J.), 1945–1946
• J. Parnell Thomas (R-N.J.), 1947–1948
• John Stephens Wood (D-Ga.), 1949–1953
• Harold H. Velde (R-Ill.), 1953–1955
• Francis E. Walter (D-Pa.), 1955–1963
• Edwin E. Willis (D-La.), 1963–1969
• Richard Howard Ichord Jr. (D-Mo.), 1969–1975

Notable members

For a complete list of members, see List of members of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

• Felix Edward Hébert
• Donald L. Jackson
• Noah M. Mason
• Karl E. Mundt
• Richard Nixon
• John E. Rankin
• Gordon H. Scherer
• Richard B. Vail
• Jerry Voorhis

See also

• California Senate Factfinding Subcommittee on Un-American Activities
• Defending Dissent Foundation
• J. Edgar Hoover
• Loyalty oath
• Manning Johnson
• McCarran Internal Security Act
• Mundt–Ferguson Communist Registration Bill
• Mundt–Nixon Bill
• Red-baiting
• Subversive Activities Control Board
• United States Senate Homeland Security Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
• Wilkinson v. United States

References

1. Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York: Basic Books. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-465-04195-4.
2. For example, see Brown, Sarah (February 5, 2002). "Pleading the Fifth". BBC News. McCarthy's House Un-American Activities Committee
3. Patrick Doherty, Thomas. Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture. 2003, pp. 15–16.
4. Schmidt, p. 136
5. Schmidt, p. 144
6. "Complete Digitized Testimonies: The U.S. Congress Special Committee on Communist Activities in Washington State Hearings (1930)". Communism in Washington State History and Memory Project. Retrieved August 21, 2012.
7. Memoirs, pp. 41–42
8. To Added Law for Curb on Reds The New York Times, November 18, 1930 p. 21
9. Weinstein, Allen; Vassiliev, Alexander (March 14, 2000). The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – The Stalin Era. New York: Modern Library. pp. 140–150. ISBN 978-0-375-75536-1.
10. Finkelman, Paul (October 10, 2006). Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties. CRC Press. p. 780. ISBN 978-0-415-94342-0. Retrieved May 25, 2011.
11. "House Un-American Activities Committee". Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site. National Park Service. Archived from the original on May 29, 2010. Retrieved May 25, 2011.
12. Nightingale, Benedict (September 18, 1988). "Mr. Euripides Goes To Washington". The New York Times. Retrieved May 4, 2010.
13. Myer, Dillon S. Uprooted Americans. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971. p. 19.
14. Niiya, Brian. "Dies Committee". Densho Encyclopedia. Retrieved August 21, 2014.
15. Newton, Michael. The Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi A History. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2010, p. 102.
16. Newton, p. 162.
17. Walter Goodman, The Committee, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968
18. "University of Kentucky archive" (PDF).
19. Doug Linder, The Alger Hiss Trials – 1949–50 Archived August 30, 2006, at the Wayback Machine, 2003.
20. Dan Georgakas, "Hollywood Blacklist", in: Encyclopedia Of The American Left, 1992.
21. Chambers, Whittaker (1952). Witness. Random House. ISBN 978-0-89526-571-5.
22. Weinstein, Allen (2013). Perjury. Hoover Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8179-1225-3.
23. "Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives". Archived from the original on September 16, 2012. Retrieved July 15, 2012.
24. Stephen J. Whitfield. The Culture of the Cold War. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996
25. "The Sixties: House Un-American Activities Committee" at PBS.org
26. Carl Nolte (May 13, 2010). "'Black Friday', birth of U.S. protest movement". San Francisco Chronicle.
27. "Operation Abolition", 1960 on YouTube
28. "Operation Abolition", Time magazine, 1961.
29. Operation Abolition (1960) on YouTube
30. "Operation Abolition", video.google.com and Time magazine, Friday, March 17, 1961.
31. Youth International Party, 1992.
32. Jerry Rubin, A Yippie Manifesto.
33. John Herbers (August 17, 1966). "War Foes Clash With House Panel in Stormy Session After Judges Lift Hearing Ban". The New York Times. Retrieved December 11, 2016.
34. Jim Dann and Hari Dillon. "The Five Retreats: A History of the Failure of the Progressive Labor Party CHAPTER 1: PLP AT ITS PRIME 1963–1966". Marxists.org. Marxists.org. Retrieved December 11, 2016. PLP brought 800 people for 3 days of the sharpest struggle that Capital Hill had seen in 30 years. PL members shocked the inquisitors when they openly proclaimed their communist beliefs and then went on into long sharp detailed explanations, which didn't spare the HUAC Congressmen being called every name in the book.
35. The Harvard Crimson: Thomas Geogheghan, "By Any Other Name. Brass Tacks", February 24, 1969, accessed May 25, 2018
36. Staples 2006, p. 284.
37. Charles E. Schamel, Records of the US House of Representatives, Record Group 233: Records of the House Un-American Activities Committee, 1945–1969 (Renamed the) House Internal Security Committee, 1969–1976.Washington, DC: Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives and Records, July 1995; p. 4.
38. Eric Bentley, Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938–1968. New York: The Viking Press 1971; pp. 955–957.
Works cited[edit]
• Staples, William G. (2006). Encyclopedia of Privacy. Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-313-08670-0.

Further reading

• Works by or about House Un-American Activities Committee in libraries (WorldCat catalog)

Archives

• Investigation of un-American propaganda activities in the United States. Hearings before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives (1938–1944), Volumes 1–17 with Appendices. University of Pennsylvania online gateway to Internet Archive and Hathi Trust.
• United States House Committee on Internal Security University of Pennsylvania online gateway to Internet Archive and Hathi Trust.
• Schamel, Gharles E. Inventory of records of the Special Committee on Un-American activities, 1938–1944 (the Dies committee). Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives and Records Administration. Washington, D.C., July 1995.
• Schamel, Gharles E. Records of the House Un-American Activities committee, 1945–1969, renamed the House Internal Security committee, 1969–1976. Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives and Records Administration. Washington, D.C., July 1995.
• Ship, Reuben (2000). "From the Archives: The Investigator (1954): A Radio Play by Reuben Ship". The Journal for MultiMedia History. 3.

Books

• Bentley, Eric, ed. (2002) [1971, Viking Press]. Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938–1968. Nation Books. ISBN 978-1-56025-368-6.
• Buckley, William F. (1962). The Committee and Its Critics; a Calm Review of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Putnam Books.
• Caballero, Raymond. McCarthyism vs. Clinton Jencks. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2019.
• Chambers, Whittaker (1952). Witness. Random House. ISBN 978-0-89526-571-5.
• Donner, Frank J. (1967). The Un-Americans. Ballantine Books.
• Gladchuk, John Joseph (2006). Hollywood and Anticommunism: HUAC and the Evolution of the Red Menace, 1935–1950. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-95568-3.
• Goodman, Walter (1968). The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Farrar Straus & Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-12688-9.
• Newton, Michael (2010). The Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi: a history. McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-4653-7.
• O'Reilly, Kenneth (1983). Hoover and the Unamericans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace. Temple University Press. ISBN 978-0-87722-301-6.
• Schmidt, Regin (2000). Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919–1943. Museum Tusculanum Press. ISBN 9788772895819.
• U.S. 86th Congress – House Committee on Un-American Activities (December 1959), "Facts on Communism – Volume I, The Communist Ideology", 75 Stat. 965, House Document No. 336, p. 166, OCLC 630998985, retrieved October 6, 2013 External link in |work= (help)
• U.S. 87th Congress – House Committee on Un-American Activities (December 1960), "Facts on Communism – Volume II, The Soviet Union, from Lenin to Khrushchev", 75 Stat. 961, House Document No. 139, p. 408, OCLC 80262328, retrieved October 6, 2013 External link in |work= (help)

Articles

• Bogart, Humphrey (March 1948). "I am no communist". Photoplay. Retrieved August 28, 2013.
• "Operation Abolition", Time Magazine, March 17, 1961
• Seidel, Robert W. (2001). "The National Laboratories and the Atomic Energy Commission in the Early Cold War". Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences. 32 (1): 145–162. doi:10.1525/hsps.2001.32.1.145. JSTOR 3739864.

External links

• Works by House Un-American Activities Committee at Project Gutenberg
• History.House.gov HUAC – permanent standing House Committee on Un-American Activities
• History.House.gov HUAC – 1948 Alger Hiss-Whittaker Chambers hearing before HUAC
• Un-American Activities Committee The Spartacus Educational website, UK
• House Unamerican Activities Committee (HUAC) Collection: Pamphlets collected by HUAC, many of which the committee deemed "un-American". (4,000 pamphlets). From the Rare Book and Special Collections Division at the Library of Congress
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Cold War
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Cold War
(1947–1991)

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Germans watching Western supply planes at Berlin Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift, 1948

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East German construction workers building the Berlin Wall, 1961

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A U.S. Navy aircraft shadowing a Soviet freighter during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

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American astronaut Thomas P. Stafford and Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov shake hands in outer space, 1975

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Soviet frigate Bezzavetny bumping USS Yorktown, 1988

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Mushroom cloud of the Ivy Mike nuclear test, 1952; one of more than a thousand such tests conducted by the US between 1945 and 1992

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The fall of the Berlin Wall, 1989

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Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders signing the Belavezha Accords, officially dissolving the Soviet Union, 1991

The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union with its satellite states (the Eastern Bloc), and the United States with its allies (the Western Bloc) after World War II. The historiography of the conflict began between 1946 (the year U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow cemented a U.S. foreign policy of containment of Soviet expansionism) and 1947 (the introduction of the Truman Doctrine). The Cold War began to de-escalate after the Revolutions of 1989. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 (when the proto-state Republics of the Soviet Union declared independence) was the end of the Cold War. The term "cold" is used because there was no large-scale fighting directly between the two sides, but they each supported major regional conflicts known as proxy wars. The conflict split the temporary wartime alliance against Nazi Germany and its allies, leaving the USSR and the US as two superpowers with profound economic and political differences.

The capitalist West was led by the United States, a federal republic with a two-party presidential system, as well as the other First World nations of the Western Bloc that were generally liberal democratic with a free press and independent organizations, but were economically and politically entwined with a network of banana republics and other authoritarian regimes, most of which were the Western Bloc's former colonies.[1][2] Some major Cold War frontlines such as Indochina, Indonesia, and the Congo were still Western colonies in 1947. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was a self-proclaimed Marxist–Leninist state that imposed a totalitarian regime that was led by a small committee, the Politburo. The Party had full control of the state, the press, the military, the economy, and local organizations throughout the Second World, including the Warsaw Pact and other satellites. The Kremlin funded communist parties around the world but was challenged for control by Mao's People's Republic of China following the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. As nearly all the colonial states achieved independence 1945-1960, they became Third World battlefields in the Cold War.

India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia took the lead in promoting neutrality with the Non-Aligned Movement, but it never had much power in its own right. The Soviet Union and the United States never engaged directly in full-scale armed combat. However, both were heavily armed in preparation for a possible all-out nuclear world war. China and the United States fought an undeclared high-casualty war in Korea 1950-53 that resulted in a stalemate. Each side had a nuclear strategy that discouraged an attack by the other side, on the basis that such an attack would lead to the total destruction of the attacker—the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Aside from the development of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, and their deployment of conventional military forces, the struggle for dominance was expressed via proxy wars around the globe, psychological warfare, massive propaganda campaigns and espionage, far-reaching embargoes, rivalry at sports events, and technological competitions such as the Space Race.

The first phase of the Cold War began in the first two years after the end of the Second World War in 1945. The Soviet Union consolidated its control over the states of the Eastern Bloc, while the United States began a strategy of global containment to challenge Soviet power, extending military and financial aid to the countries of Western Europe (for example, supporting the anti-communist side in the Greek Civil War) and creating the NATO alliance. The Berlin Blockade (1948–49) was the first major crisis of the Cold War. With the victory of the Communist side in the Chinese Civil War and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953), the conflict expanded. The USSR and the US competed for influence in Latin America and the decolonizing states of Africa and Asia. The Soviets suppressed the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The expansion and escalation sparked more crises, such as the Suez Crisis (1956), the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which was perhaps the closest the two sides came to nuclear war. Meanwhile, an international peace movement took root and grew among citizens around the world, first in Japan from 1954, when people became concerned about nuclear weapons testing, but soon also in Europe and the US. The peace movement, and in particular the anti-nuclear movement, gained pace and popularity from the late 1950s and early 1960s, and continued to grow through the '70s and '80s with large protest marches, demonstrations, and various non-parliamentary activism opposing war and calling for global nuclear disarmament. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, a new phase began that saw the Sino-Soviet split complicate relations within the Communist sphere, while US allies, particularly France, demonstrated greater independence of action. The USSR crushed the 1968 Prague Spring liberalization program in Czechoslovakia, while the US experienced internal turmoil from the civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam War (1955–75), which ended with the defeat of the US-backed South Vietnam, prompting further adjustments.

By the 1970s, both sides had become interested in making allowances in order to create a more stable and predictable international system, ushering in a period of détente that saw the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the US opening relations with the PRC as a strategic counterweight to the USSR. Détente collapsed at the end of the decade with the beginning of the Soviet–Afghan War in 1979. The early 1980s were another period of elevated tension, with the Soviet downing of KAL Flight 007 and the "Able Archer" NATO military exercises, both in 1983. The United States increased diplomatic, military, and economic pressures on the Soviet Union, at a time when the communist state was already suffering from economic stagnation. On 12 June 1982, a million protesters gathered in Central Park, New York to call for an end to the Cold War arms race and nuclear weapons in particular. In the mid-1980s, the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the liberalizing reforms of perestroika ("reorganization", 1987) and glasnost ("openness", c. 1985) and ended Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Pressures for national sovereignty grew stronger in Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Gorbachev meanwhile refused to use Soviet troops to bolster the faltering Warsaw Pact regimes as had occurred in the past. The result in 1989 was a wave of revolutions that peacefully (with the exception of the Romanian Revolution) overthrew all of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself lost control and was banned following an abortive coup attempt in August 1991. This in turn led to the formal dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 and the collapse of communist regimes in other countries such as Mongolia, Cambodia, and South Yemen. The United States remained as the world's only superpower.

The Cold War and its events have left a significant legacy. It is often referred to in popular culture, especially in media featuring themes of espionage (notably the internationally successful James Bond book and film franchise) and the threat of nuclear warfare. Meanwhile, a renewed state of tension between the Soviet Union's successor state, Russia, and the United States in the 2010s (including its Western allies) and growing tension between an increasingly powerful China and the U.S. and its Western Allies have each been referred to as the Second Cold War.[3]

Origins of the term

Main article: Cold war (general term)

At the end of World War II, English writer George Orwell used cold war, as a general term, in his essay "You and the Atomic Bomb", published 19 October 1945 in the British newspaper Tribune. Contemplating a world living in the shadow of the threat of nuclear warfare, Orwell looked at James Burnham's predictions of a polarized world, writing:

Looking at the world as a whole, the drift for many decades has been not towards anarchy but towards the reimposition of slavery... James Burnham's theory has been much discussed, but few people have yet considered its ideological implications—that is, the kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of "cold war" with its neighbours.[4]


In The Observer of 10 March 1946, Orwell wrote, "after the Moscow conference last December, Russia began to make a 'cold war' on Britain and the British Empire."[5]

The first use of the term to describe the specific post-war geopolitical confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States came in a speech by Bernard Baruch, an influential advisor to Democratic presidents,[6] on 16 April 1947. The speech, written by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope,[7] proclaimed, "Let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a cold war."[8] Newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann gave the term wide currency with his book The Cold War. When asked in 1947 about the source of the term, Lippmann traced it to a French term from the 1930s, la guerre froide.[9]

Background

Main article: Origins of the Cold War

Russian Revolution

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Allied troops in Vladivostok, August 1918, during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War

While most historians trace the origins of the Cold War to the period immediately following World War II, others argue that it began with the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 when the Bolsheviks took power.[10] In 1919 Vladimir Lenin stated that his new state was surrounded by a "hostile capitalist encirclement", and he viewed diplomacy as a weapon that should be used to keep the Soviet Union's enemies divided, beginning with the establishment of the Communist International, which called for revolutionary upheavals abroad.[11] Historian Max Beloff argued that the Soviets saw "no prospect of permanent peace", with the 1922 Soviet Constitution proclaiming:

Since the time of the formation of the soviet republics, the states of the world have divided into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. There—in the camp of capitalism—national enmity and inequality, colonial slavery, and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars. Here—in the camp of socialism—mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, a dwelling together in peace and the brotherly collaboration of peoples.[12]


According to British historian Christopher Sutton:

In what some have called the First Cold War, from Britain's intervention in the Russian Civil War in 1918 to its uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union against the Axis powers in 1941, British distrust of the revolutionary and regicidal Bolsheviks resulted in domestic, foreign, and colonial policies aimed at resisting the spread of communism. This conflict after 1945 took on new battlefields, new weapons, new players, and a greater intensity, but it was still fundamentally a conflict against Soviet imperialism (real and imagined).[13]

The idea of long-term continuity is a minority scholarly view that has been challenged. Frank Ninkovich wrote:

As for the two cold wars thesis, the chief problem is that the two periods are incommensurable. To be sure, they were joined together by enduring ideological hostility, but in the post-World War I years Bolshevism was not a geopolitical menace. After World War II, in contrast, the Soviet Union was a superpower that combined ideological antagonism with the kind of geopolitical threat posed by Germany and Japan in the Second World War. Even with more amicable relations in the 1920s, it is conceivable that post-1945 relations would have turned out much the same.[14]


By 1933, old fears of Communist threats had faded, and the American business community, as well as newspaper editors, were calling for diplomatic recognition. President Franklin D. Roosevelt used presidential authority to normalize relations in November 1933.[15] There were few complaints about the move.[16] However, there was no progress on the debt issue and little additional trade. Historians Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler note that, "Both nations were soon disillusioned by the accord."[17] Many American businessmen expected a bonus in terms of large-scale trade, but it never materialized.[18]

Roosevelt named William Bullitt as ambassador from 1933 to 1936. Bullitt arrived in Moscow with high hopes for Soviet–American relations, but his view of the Soviet leadership soured on closer inspection. By the end of his tenure, Bullitt was openly hostile to the Soviet government, and he remained an outspoken anti-communist for the rest of his life.[19]

Beginnings of World War II

In the late 1930s, Stalin had worked with Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to promote popular fronts with capitalist parties and governments to oppose fascism. The Soviets were embittered when Western governments chose to practice appeasement with Nazi Germany instead. In March 1939 Britain and France—without consulting the USSR—granted Hitler control of much of Czechoslovakia at the Munich Agreement. Facing an aggressive Japan at Russia's borders as well, Stalin changed directions and replaced Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov, who negotiated closer relations with Germany.[20]

After signing the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and German–Soviet Frontier Treaty, the Soviet Union forced the Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—to allow it to station Soviet troops in their countries.[21] Finland rejected territorial demands, prompting a Soviet invasion in November 1939. The resulting Winter War ended in March 1940 with Finnish concessions.[22] Britain and France, treating the Soviet attack on Finland as tantamount to its entering the war on the side of the Germans, responded to the Soviet invasion by supporting the USSR's expulsion from the League of Nations.[23]

In June 1940, the Soviet Union forcibly annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.[24] It also seized the disputed Romanian regions of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and Hertza. But after the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 and declared war on the United States in December 1941, the Soviet Union and the Allied powers worked together to fight Germany. Britain signed a formal alliance and the United States made an informal agreement. In wartime, the United States supplied Britain, the Soviet Union and other Allied nations through its Lend-Lease Program.[25] However, Stalin remained highly suspicious, and he believed that the British and the Americans had conspired to ensure that the Soviets bore the brunt of the fighting against Germany. According to this view, the Western Allies had deliberately delayed opening a second anti-German front in order to step in at the last minute and shape the peace settlement. Thus, Soviet perceptions of the West left a strong undercurrent of tension and hostility between the Allied powers.[26]

End of World War II (1945–1947)

Wartime conferences regarding post-war Europe


Further information: Tehran Conference, Yalta Conference, and List of Allied World War II conferences

The Allies disagreed about how the European map should look, and how borders would be drawn, following the war.[27] Each side held dissimilar ideas regarding the establishment and maintenance of post-war security.[27] Some scholars contend that all the Western Allies desired a security system in which democratic governments were established as widely as possible, permitting countries to peacefully resolve differences through international organizations.[28] Others note that the Atlantic powers were divided in their vision of the new post-war world. Roosevelt's goals—military victory in both Europe and Asia, the achievement of global American economic supremacy over the British Empire, and the creation of a world peace organization—were more global than Churchill's, which were mainly centered on securing control over the Mediterranean, ensuring the survival of the British Empire, and the independence of Central and Eastern European countries as a buffer between the Soviets and the United Kingdom.[29]

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The "Big Three" at the Yalta Conference: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, 1945

The Soviet Union sought to dominate the internal affairs of countries in its border regions.[27][30] During the war, Stalin had created special training centers for communists from different countries so that they could set up secret police forces loyal to Moscow as soon as the Red Army took control. Soviet agents took control of the media, especially radio; they quickly harassed and then banned all independent civic institutions, from youth groups to schools, churches and rival political parties.[31] Stalin also sought continued peace with Britain and the United States, hoping to focus on internal reconstruction and economic growth.[32]

In the American view, Stalin seemed a potential ally in accomplishing their goals, whereas in the British approach Stalin appeared as the greatest threat to the fulfillment of their agenda. With the Soviets already occupying most of Central and Eastern Europe, Stalin was at an advantage, and the two western leaders vied for his favors.

The differences between Roosevelt and Churchill led to several separate deals with the Soviets. In October 1944, Churchill traveled to Moscow and proposed the "percentages agreement" to divide the Balkans into respective spheres of influence, including giving Stalin predominance over Romania and Bulgaria and Churchill carte blanche over Greece. At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Roosevelt signed a separate deal with Stalin in regard of Asia and refused to support Churchill on the issues of Poland and Reparations.[29] Roosevelt ultimately approved the percentage agreement,[33][34] but there was still apparently no firm consensus on the framework for a post-war settlement in Europe.[35]

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Post-war Allied occupation zones in Germany

At the Second Quebec Conference, a high-level military conference held in Quebec City, 12–16 September 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt reached agreement on a number of matters, including a plan for Germany based on Henry Morgenthau Jr.'s original proposal. The memorandum drafted by Churchill provided for "eliminating the warmaking industries in the Ruhr and the Saar ... looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character." However, it no longer included a plan to partition the country into several independent states.[36] On 10 May 1945, President Truman signed the U.S. occupation directive JCS 1067, which was in effect for over two years, and was enthusiastically supported by Stalin. It directed the U.S. forces of occupation to "...take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany".[37]

Some historians have argued that the Cold War began when the US negotiated a separate peace with Nazi SS General Karl Wolff in northern Italy. The Soviet Union was not allowed to participate and the dispute led to heated correspondence between Franklin Roosevelt and Stalin. General Wolff, a war criminal, appears to have been guaranteed immunity at the Nuremberg trials by Office of Strategic Services (OSS) commander (and later CIA director) Allen Dulles when they met in March 1945. Wolff and his forces were being considered to help implement Operation Unthinkable, a secret plan to invade the Soviet Union which Winston Churchill advocated during this period.[38][39][40]

In April 1945, President Roosevelt died and was succeeded by Harry S. Truman, who distrusted Stalin and turned for advice to an elite group of foreign policy intellectuals. Both Churchill and Truman opposed, among other things, the Soviets' decision to prop up the Lublin government, the Soviet-controlled rival to the Polish government-in-exile in London, whose relations with the Soviets had been severed.[41]

Following the Allies' May 1945 victory, the Soviets effectively occupied Central and Eastern Europe,[35] while strong US and Western allied forces remained in Western Europe. In Germany and Austria, France, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States established zones of occupation and a loose framework for parceled four-power control.[42]

The 1945 Allied conference in San Francisco established the multi-national United Nations (UN) for the maintenance of world peace, but the enforcement capacity of its Security Council was effectively paralyzed by the ability of individual members to exercise veto power.[43] Accordingly, the UN was essentially converted into an inactive forum for exchanging polemical rhetoric, and the Soviets regarded it almost exclusively as a propaganda tribune.[44]

Potsdam Conference and surrender of Japan

Main articles: Potsdam Conference and Surrender of Japan

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Clement Attlee, Harry S. Truman and Joseph Stalin at the Potsdam Conference, 1945

At the Potsdam Conference, which started in late July after Germany's surrender, serious differences emerged over the future development of Germany and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.[45] Moreover, the participants' mounting antipathy and bellicose language served to confirm their suspicions about each other's hostile intentions, and to entrench their positions.[46] At this conference Truman informed Stalin that the United States possessed a powerful new weapon.[47]

The US had invited Britain into its atomic bomb project but kept it secret from the Soviet Union. Stalin was aware that the Americans were working on the atomic bomb, and he reacted to the news calmly.[47] One week after the end of the Potsdam Conference, the US bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after the attacks, Stalin protested to US officials when Truman offered the Soviets little real influence in occupied Japan.[48] Stalin was also outraged by the actual dropping of the bombs, calling them a "superbarbarity" and claiming that "the balance has been destroyed...That cannot be." The Truman administration intended to use its ongoing nuclear weapons program to pressure the Soviet Union in international relations.[47]

Beginnings of the Eastern Bloc

Main article: Eastern Bloc

Further information: Post–World War II economic expansion

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Post-war territorial changes in Europe and the formation of the Eastern Bloc, the so-called 'Iron Curtain'

During the opening stages of World War II, the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the Eastern Bloc by invading and then annexing several countries as Soviet Socialist Republics, by agreement with Germany in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. These included eastern Poland (incorporated into the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR),[49] Latvia (which became the Latvian SSR),[50][51] Estonia (which became the Estonian SSR),[50][51] Lithuania (which became the Lithuanian SSR),[50][51] part of eastern Finland (which became the Karelo-Finnish SSR) and eastern Romania (which became the Moldavian SSR).[52][53]

The Central and Eastern European territories liberated from Germany and occupied by the Soviet armed forces were added to the Eastern Bloc by converting them into satellite states,[54] such as:

• People's Republic of Albania (11 January 1946)[55]
• People's Republic of Bulgaria (15 September 1946)
• Polish People's Republic (19 January 1947)
• People's Republic of Romania (13 April 1948)
• Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (9 May 1948)[56]
• Hungarian People's Republic (20 August 1949)[57]
• German Democratic Republic (7 October 1949)[58]

The Soviet-style regimes that arose in the Bloc not only reproduced Soviet command economy, but also adopted the brutal methods employed by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet secret police in order to suppress both real and potential opposition.[59] In Asia, the Red Army had overrun Manchuria in the last month of the war, and it went on to occupy the large swathe of Korean territory located north of the 38th parallel.[60]

As part of consolidating Stalin's control over the Eastern Bloc, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), led by Lavrentiy Beria, supervised the establishment of Soviet-style secret police systems in the Bloc that were supposed to crush anti-communist resistance.[61] When the slightest stirrings of independence emerged in the Bloc, Stalin's strategy matched that of dealing with domestic pre-war rivals: they were removed from power, put on trial, imprisoned, and in several instances, executed.[62]

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was concerned that, given the enormous size of Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end of the war, and the perception that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was unreliable, there existed a Soviet threat to Western Europe.[63] After World War II, US officials guided Western European leaders in establishing their own secret security force to prevent subversion in the Western bloc, which evolved into Operation Gladio.[64]

Containment and the Truman Doctrine (1947–1953)

Main articles: Cold War (1947–1953), Containment, and Truman Doctrine

Iron Curtain, Iran, Turkey, and Greece

Further information: X Article § The Long Telegram, Iron Curtain, Iran crisis of 1946, and Restatement of Policy on Germany

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Remains of the "iron curtain" in the Czech Republic

In late February 1946, George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow to Washington helped to articulate the US government's increasingly hard line against the Soviets, which would become the basis for US strategy toward the Soviet Union for the duration of the Cold War. The Truman Administration was receptive to the telegram due to broken promises by Stalin concerning Europe and Iran.[65] Following the WWII Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the country was occupied by the Red Army in the far north and the British in the south.[66] Iran was used by the United States and British to supply the Soviet Union, and the Allies agreed to withdraw from Iran within six months after the cessation of hostilities.[66] However, when this deadline came, the Soviets remained in Iran under the guise of the People's Republic of Azerbaijan and Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.[67] Shortly thereafter, on 5 March, former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri.[68] The speech called for an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviets, whom he accused of establishing an "iron curtain" dividing Europe from "Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic".[54][69]

A week later, on 13 March, Stalin responded vigorously to the speech, saying that Churchill could be compared to Hitler insofar as he advocated the racial superiority of English-speaking nations so that they could satisfy their hunger for world domination, and that such a declaration was "a call for war on the U.S.S.R." The Soviet leader also dismissed the accusation that the USSR was exerting increasing control over the countries lying in its sphere. He argued that there was nothing surprising in "the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, [was] trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries".[70][71]

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European military alliances

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European economic alliances

In September, the Soviet side produced the Novikov telegram, sent by the Soviet ambassador to the US but commissioned and "co-authored" by Vyacheslav Molotov; it portrayed the US as being in the grip of monopoly capitalists who were building up military capability "to prepare the conditions for winning world supremacy in a new war".[72] On 6 September 1946, James F. Byrnes delivered a speech in Germany repudiating the Morgenthau Plan (a proposal to partition and de-industrialize post-war Germany) and warning the Soviets that the US intended to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely.[73] As Byrnes admitted a month later, "The nub of our program was to win the German people ... it was a battle between us and Russia over minds ..."[74] In December, the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Iran after persistent US pressure, an early success of containment policy.

By 1947, US president Harry S. Truman was outraged by perceived resistance of the Soviet Union to American demands in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, as well as Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan on nuclear weapons.[75] In February 1947, the British government announced that it could no longer afford to finance the Kingdom of Greece in its civil war against Communist-led insurgents.[76] The US government responded to this announcement by adopting a policy of containment,[77] with the goal of stopping the spread of Communism. Truman delivered a speech calling for the allocation of $400 million to intervene in the war and unveiled the Truman Doctrine, which framed the conflict as a contest between free peoples and totalitarian regimes.[77] American policymakers accused the Soviet Union of conspiring against the Greek royalists in an effort to expand Soviet influence even though Stalin had told the Communist Party to cooperate with the British-backed government.[78] (The insurgents were helped by Josip Broz Tito's Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Stalin's wishes.)[79][80]

Enunciation of the Truman Doctrine marked the beginning of a US bipartisan defense and foreign policy consensus between Republicans and Democrats focused on containment and deterrence that weakened during and after the Vietnam War, but ultimately persisted thereafter.[81][82] Moderate and conservative parties in Europe, as well as social democrats, gave virtually unconditional support to the Western alliance,[83] while European and American Communists, financed by the KGB and involved in its intelligence operations,[84] adhered to Moscow's line, although dissent began to appear after 1956. Other critiques of the consensus policy came from anti-Vietnam War activists, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the anti-nuclear movement.[85]

Marshall Plan and Czechoslovak coup d'état

Main articles: Marshall Plan, Western Bloc, and 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état

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The labeling used on Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe

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Map of Cold War-era Europe and the Near East showing countries that received Marshall Plan aid. The red columns show the relative amount of total aid received per nation.

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Construction in West Berlin under Marshall Plan aid

In early 1947, France, Britain and the United States unsuccessfully attempted to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union for a plan envisioning an economically self-sufficient Germany, including a detailed accounting of the industrial plants, goods and infrastructure already removed by the Soviets.[86] In June 1947, in accordance with the Truman Doctrine, the United States enacted the Marshall Plan, a pledge of economic assistance for all European countries willing to participate, including the Soviet Union.[86] Under the plan, which President Harry S. Truman signed on 3 April 1948, the US government gave to Western European countries over $13 billion (equivalent to $189.39 billion in 2016) to rebuild the economy of Europe. Later, the program led to the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.

The plan's aim was to rebuild the democratic and economic systems of Europe and to counter perceived threats to Europe's balance of power, such as communist parties seizing control through revolutions or elections.[87] The plan also stated that European prosperity was contingent upon German economic recovery.[88] One month later, Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, creating a unified Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC). These would become the main bureaucracies for US defense policy in the Cold War.[89]

Stalin believed that economic integration with the West would allow Eastern Bloc countries to escape Soviet control, and that the US was trying to buy a pro-US re-alignment of Europe.[90] Stalin therefore prevented Eastern Bloc nations from receiving Marshall Plan aid.[90] The Soviet Union's alternative to the Marshall Plan, which was purported to involve Soviet subsidies and trade with central and eastern Europe, became known as the Molotov Plan (later institutionalized in January 1949 as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).[79] Stalin was also fearful of a reconstituted Germany; his vision of a post-war Germany did not include the ability to rearm or pose any kind of threat to the Soviet Union.[91]

In early 1948, following reports of strengthening "reactionary elements", Soviet operatives executed a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, the only Eastern Bloc state that the Soviets had permitted to retain democratic structures.[92][93] The public brutality of the coup shocked Western powers more than any event up to that point, set in a motion a brief scare that war would occur and swept away the last vestiges of opposition to the Marshall Plan in the United States Congress.[94]

The twin policies of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan led to billions in economic and military aid for Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey. With the US assistance, the Greek military won its civil war.[89] Under the leadership of Alcide De Gasperi the Italian Christian Democrats defeated the powerful Communist–Socialist alliance in the elections of 1948.[95]

Espionage

Main articles: Cold War espionage, American espionage in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation, and Soviet espionage in the United States

All major powers engaged in espionage, using a great variety of spies, double agents, and new technologies such as the tapping of telephone cables.[96] The most famous and active organizations were the American CIA,[97] the Soviet KGB,[98] and the British MI6.[99] The East German Stasi, unlike the others, was primarily concerned with internal security, but its Main Directorate for Reconnaissance operated espionage activities around the world.[100] The CIA secretly subsidized and promoted anti-communist cultural activities and organizations.[101] The CIA was also involved in European politics, especially in Italy.[102] Espionage took place all over the world, but Berlin was the most important battleground for spying activity.[103]

So much top secret archival information has been released so that historian Raymond L. Garthoff concludes there probably was parity in the quantity and quality of secret information obtained by each side. However, the Soviets probably had an advantage in terms of HUMINT (espionage) and "sometimes in its reach into high policy circles." In terms of decisive impact, however, he concludes:[104]

We also can now have high confidence in the judgment that there were no successful “moles” at the political decision-making level on either side. Similarly, there is no evidence, on either side, of any major political or military decision that was prematurely discovered through espionage and thwarted by the other side. There also is no evidence of any major political or military decision that was crucially influenced (much less generated) by an agent of the other side.


In addition to usual espionage, the Western agencies paid special attention to debriefing Eastern Bloc defectors.[105]

Cominform and the Tito–Stalin Split

Main articles: Cominform and Tito–Stalin Split

In September 1947, the Soviets created Cominform, the purpose of which was to enforce orthodoxy within the international communist movement and tighten political control over Soviet satellites through coordination of communist parties in the Eastern Bloc.[90] Cominform faced an embarrassing setback the following June, when the Tito–Stalin Split obliged its members to expel Yugoslavia, which remained communist but adopted a non-aligned position.[106]
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

Postby admin » Mon Sep 30, 2019 9:39 am

Part 2 of 4

Berlin Blockade and Airlift

Main article: Berlin Blockade

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C-47s unloading at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin during the Berlin Blockade

The United States and Britain merged their western German occupation zones into "Bizonia" (1 January 1947, later "Trizonia" with the addition of France's zone, April 1949).[107] As part of the economic rebuilding of Germany, in early 1948, representatives of a number of Western European governments and the United States announced an agreement for a merger of western German areas into a federal governmental system.[108] In addition, in accordance with the Marshall Plan, they began to re-industrialize and rebuild the west German economy, including the introduction of a new Deutsche Mark currency to replace the old Reichsmark currency that the Soviets had debased.[109] The US had secretly decided that a unified and neutral Germany was undesirable, with Walter Bedell Smith telling General Eisenhower "in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification on any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seem to meet most of our requirements."[110]

Shortly thereafter, Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949), one of the first major crises of the Cold War, preventing food, materials and supplies from arriving in West Berlin.[111] The United States, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and several other countries began the massive "Berlin airlift", supplying West Berlin with food and other provisions.[112]

The Soviets mounted a public relations campaign against the policy change. Once again the East Berlin communists attempted to disrupt the Berlin municipal elections (as they had done in the 1946 elections),[107] which were held on 5 December 1948 and produced a turnout of 86.3% and an overwhelming victory for the non-communist parties.[113] The results effectively divided the city into East and West versions of its former self. 300,000 Berliners demonstrated and urged the international airlift to continue,[114] and US Air Force pilot Gail Halvorsen created "Operation Vittles", which supplied candy to German children.[115] In May 1949, Stalin backed down and lifted the blockade.[61][116]

In 1952, Stalin repeatedly proposed a plan to unify East and West Germany under a single government chosen in elections supervised by the United Nations, if the new Germany were to stay out of Western military alliances, but this proposal was turned down by the Western powers. Some sources dispute the sincerity of the proposal.[117]

Beginnings of NATO and Radio Free Europe

Main articles: NATO, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Eastern Bloc media and propaganda

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President Truman signs the North Atlantic Treaty with guests in the Oval Office.

Britain, France, the United States, Canada and other eight western European countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[61] That August, the first Soviet atomic device was detonated in Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR.[79] Following Soviet refusals to participate in a German rebuilding effort set forth by western European countries in 1948,[108][118] the US, Britain and France spearheaded the establishment of West Germany from the three Western zones of occupation in April 1949.[119] The Soviet Union proclaimed its zone of occupation in Germany the German Democratic Republic that October.[45]

Media in the Eastern Bloc was an organ of the state, completely reliant on and subservient to the communist party. Radio and television organizations were state-owned, while print media was usually owned by political organizations, mostly by the local communist party.[120] Soviet radio broadcasts used Marxist rhetoric to attack capitalism, emphasizing themes of labor exploitation, imperialism and war-mongering.[121]

Along with the broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America to Central and Eastern Europe,[122] a major propaganda effort begun in 1949 was Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, dedicated to bringing about the peaceful demise of the communist system in the Eastern Bloc.[123] Radio Free Europe attempted to achieve these goals by serving as a surrogate home radio station, an alternative to the controlled and party-dominated domestic press.[123] Radio Free Europe was a product of some of the most prominent architects of America's early Cold War strategy, especially those who believed that the Cold War would eventually be fought by political rather than military means, such as George F. Kennan.[124]

American policymakers, including Kennan and John Foster Dulles, acknowledged that the Cold War was in its essence a war of ideas.[124] The United States, acting through the CIA, funded a long list of projects to counter the communist appeal among intellectuals in Europe and the developing world.[125] The CIA also covertly sponsored a domestic propaganda campaign called Crusade for Freedom.[126]

In the early 1950s, the US worked for the rearmament of West Germany and, in 1955, secured its full membership of NATO.[45] In May 1953, Beria, by then in a government post, had made an unsuccessful proposal to allow the reunification of a neutral Germany to prevent West Germany's incorporation into NATO.[127]

Chinese Civil War, SEATO, and NSC-68

Main articles: Chinese Civil War, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and NSC 68

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Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin in Moscow, December 1949

In 1949, Mao Zedong's People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-shek's United States-backed Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Government in China, and the Soviet Union promptly created an alliance with the newly formed People's Republic of China.[128] According to Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad, the communists won the Civil War because they made fewer military mistakes than Chiang Kai-Shek made, and because in his search for a powerful centralized government, Chiang antagonized too many interest groups in China. Moreover, his party was weakened during the war against Japan. Meanwhile, the communists told different groups, such as the peasants, exactly what they wanted to hear, and they cloaked themselves under the cover of Chinese nationalism.[129] Chiang and his KMT government retreated to the island of Taiwan.

Confronted with the communist revolution in China and the end of the American atomic monopoly in 1949, the Truman administration quickly moved to escalate and expand its containment doctrine.[79] In NSC 68, a secret 1950 document, the National Security Council instituted a Machiavellian policy [130] while proposing to reinforce pro-Western alliance systems and quadruple spending on defense.[79] Truman, under the influence of advisor Paul Nitze, saw containment as implying complete rollback of Soviet influence in all its forms.[131]

United States officials moved to expand this version of containment into Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in order to counter revolutionary nationalist movements, often led by communist parties financed by the USSR, fighting against the restoration of Europe's colonial empires in South-East Asia and elsewhere. [132] In this way, this US would exercise "preponderant power," oppose neutrality, and establish global hegemony.[133] In the early 1950s (a period sometimes known as the "Pactomania"), the US formalized a series of alliances with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines (notably ANZUS in 1951 and SEATO in 1954), thereby guaranteeing the United States a number of long-term military bases.[45]

Korean War

Main articles: Division of Korea, Korean War, and Rollback

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General Douglas MacArthur, UN Command CiC (seated), observes the naval shelling of Incheon from USS Mt. McKinley, 15 September 1950

One of the more significant examples of the implementation of containment was US intervention in the Korean War. In June 1950, after years of mutual hostilities,[134][135][136] Kim Il-sung's North Korean People's Army invaded South Korea at the 38th parallel. Stalin had been reluctant to support the invasion[137] but ultimately sent advisers.[138] To Stalin's surprise,[79] the UN Security Council backed the defense of South Korea, though the Soviets were then boycotting meetings in protest that Taiwan and not Communist China held a permanent seat on the Council.[139] A UN force of sixteen countries faced North Korea,[140] although 40 percent of troops were South Korean, and about 50 percent were from the United States.[141]

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U.S. Marines engaged in street fighting during the liberation of Seoul, September 1950

The U.S. initially seemed to follow containment when it first entered the war. This directed the action of the US to only push back North Korea across the 38th Parallel and restore South Korea's sovereignty, allowing North Korea's survival as a state. However, the success of the Inchon landing inspired the U.S. and the United Nations to adopt a rollback strategy instead and to overthrow communist North Korea, thus allowing nationwide elections under U.N. auspices.[142] General Douglas MacArthur then advanced across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. The Chinese, fearful of a possible US presence on their border or even an invasion by them, then sent in a large army and defeated the U.N. forces, pushing them back below the 38th parallel. Truman publicly hinted that he might use his "ace in the hole" of the atomic bomb, but Mao was unmoved.[143] The episode was used to support the wisdom of the containment doctrine as opposed to rollback. The Communists were later pushed to roughly around the original border, with minimal changes. Among other effects, the Korean War galvanised NATO to develop a military structure.[144] Public opinion in countries involved, such as Great Britain, was divided for and against the war.[145]

After the Armistice was approved in July 1953, Korean leader Kim Il Sung created a highly centralized, totalitarian dictatorship according his family unlimited power and generating a formidable cult of personality.[146][147] In the South, the American-backed dictator Syngman Rhee ran a deeply violent anticommunist regime.[148] While Rhee was overthrown in 1960, South Korea continued to be ruled by a military government of former Japanese collaborators until the re-establishment of a multi-party system in the late 1980s.[149]

Crisis and escalation (1953–1962)

Main article: Cold War (1953–1962)

Khrushchev, Eisenhower and de-Stalinization

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NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strengths in Europe in 1959

In 1953, changes in political leadership on both sides shifted the dynamic of the Cold War.[89] Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated president that January. During the last 18 months of the Truman administration, the American defense budget had quadrupled, and Eisenhower moved to reduce military spending by a third while continuing to fight the Cold War effectively.[79]

After the death of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev became the Soviet leader following the deposition and execution of Lavrentiy Beria and the pushing aside of rivals Georgy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov. On 25 February 1956, Khrushchev shocked delegates to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party by cataloguing and denouncing Stalin's crimes.[150] As part of a campaign of de-Stalinization, he declared that the only way to reform and move away from Stalin's policies would be to acknowledge errors made in the past.[89]

On 18 November 1956, while addressing Western ambassadors at a reception at the Polish embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev used his famous "Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you" expression, shocking everyone present.[151] He later said that he had not been talking about nuclear war, but rather about the historically determined victory of communism over capitalism.[152] In 1961, Khrushchev declared that even if the USSR was behind the West, within a decade its housing shortage would disappear, consumer goods would be abundant, and within two decades, the "construction of a communist society" in the USSR would be completed "in the main".[153]

Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, initiated a "New Look" for the containment strategy, calling for a greater reliance on nuclear weapons against US enemies in wartime.[89] Dulles also enunciated the doctrine of "massive retaliation", threatening a severe US response to any Soviet aggression. Possessing nuclear superiority, for example, allowed Eisenhower to face down Soviet threats to intervene in the Middle East during the 1956 Suez Crisis.[79] US plans for nuclear war in the late 1950s included the "systematic destruction" of 1,200 major urban centers in the Eastern Bloc and China, including Moscow, East Berlin and Beijing, with their civilian populations among the primary targets.[154]

In spite of these threats, there were substantial hopes for detente when an upswing in diplomacy took place in 1959, including a two-week visit by Khrushchev to the US, and plans for a two-power summit for May 1960. The latter was disturbed by the U-2 spy plane scandal, however, in which Eisenhower was caught lying to the world about the intrusion of American surveillance aircraft into Soviet territory.[155][156]

Warsaw Pact and Hungarian Revolution

Main articles: Warsaw Pact and Hungarian Revolution of 1956

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956

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March of protesters in Budapest, on 25 October

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A destroyed Soviet T-34-85 tank in Budapest

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The maximum territorial extent the Soviet influence, after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and before the official Sino-Soviet split of 1961

While Stalin's death in 1953 slightly relaxed tensions, the situation in Europe remained an uneasy armed truce.[157] The Soviets, who had already created a network of mutual assistance treaties in the Eastern Bloc by 1949, established a formal alliance therein, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955. It stood opposed to NATO.[45]

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 occurred shortly after Khrushchev arranged the removal of Hungary's Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi.[158] In response to a popular uprising,[159] the new regime formally disbanded the secret police, declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and pledged to re-establish free elections. The Soviet Army invaded.[160] Thousands of Hungarians were arrested, imprisoned and deported to the Soviet Union,[161] and approximately 200,000 Hungarians fled Hungary in the chaos.[162] Hungarian leader Imre Nagy and others were executed following secret trials.[163]

From 1957 through 1961, Khrushchev openly and repeatedly threatened the West with nuclear annihilation. He claimed that Soviet missile capabilities were far superior to those of the United States, capable of wiping out any American or European city. According to John Lewis Gaddis, Khrushchev rejected Stalin's "belief in the inevitability of war," however. The new leader declared his ultimate goal was "peaceful coexistence".[164] In Krushchev's formulation, peace would allow capitalism to collapse on its own,[165] as well as giving the Soviets time to boost their military capabilities,[166] which remained for decades until Gorbachev's later "new thinking" envisioning peaceful coexistence as an end in itself rather than a form of class struggle.[167]

The events in Hungary produced ideological fractures within the communist parties of the world, particularly in Western Europe, with great decline in membership as many in both western and communist countries felt disillusioned by the brutal Soviet response.[168] The communist parties in the West would never recover from the effect the Hungarian Revolution had on their membership, a fact that was immediately recognized by some, such as the Yugoslavian politician Milovan Đilas who shortly after the revolution was crushed said that "The wound which the Hungarian Revolution inflicted on communism can never be completely healed".[168]

Berlin ultimatum

Main articles: Berlin Crisis of 1961 § Berlin ultimatum, and European integration

During November 1958, Khrushchev made an unsuccessful attempt to turn all of Berlin into an independent, demilitarized "free city". He gave the United States, Great Britain, and France a six-month ultimatum to withdraw their troops from the sectors they still occupied in West Berlin, or he would transfer control of Western access rights to the East Germans. Khrushchev earlier explained to Mao Zedong that "Berlin is the testicles of the West. Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin."[169] NATO formally rejected the ultimatum in mid-December and Khrushchev withdrew it in return for a Geneva conference on the German question.[170][171]

American military buildup

Main article: Flexible response

Kennedy's foreign policy was dominated by American confrontations with the Soviet Union, manifested by proxy contests. Like Truman and Eisenhower, Kennedy supported containment to stop the spread of Communism. President Eisenhower's New Look policy had emphasized the use of less expensive nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression by threatening massive nuclear attacks all of the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons were much cheaper than maintaining a large standing army, so Eisenhower cut conventional forces to save money. Kennedy implemented a new strategy known as flexible response. This strategy relied on conventional arms to achieve limited goals. As part of this policy, Kennedy expanded the United States special operations forces, elite military units that could fight unconventionally in various conflicts. Kennedy hoped that the flexible response strategy would allow the U.S. to counter Soviet influence without resorting to nuclear war.[172]

To support his new strategy Kennedy ordered a massive increase in defense spending. He sought, and Congress provided, a rapid build-up of the nuclear arsenal to restore the lost superiority over the Soviet Union—he claimed in 1960 that Eisenhower had lost it because of excessive concern with budget deficits. In his inaugural address Kennedy promised “to bear any burden” in the defense of liberty, and he repeatedly asked for increases in military spending and authorization of new weapon systems. From 1961 to 1964 the number of nuclear weapons increased by 50 percent, as did the number of B-52 bombers to deliver them. The new ICBM force grew from 63 intercontinental ballistic missiles to 424. He authorized 23 new Polaris submarines, each of which carried 16 nuclear missiles. He called on cities to prepare fallout shelters for nuclear war. In contrast to Eisenhower's warning about the perils of the military-industrial complex, Kennedy focused on rearmament.[173]

Competition in the Third World

Main articles: Decolonization § After 1945, Wars of national liberation, 1953 Iranian coup d'état, 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Congo Crisis, and Partition of Vietnam

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Western colonial empires in Asia and Africa all collapsed in the years after 1945.

Nationalist movements in some countries and regions, notably Guatemala, Indonesia and Indochina, were often allied with communist groups or otherwise perceived to be unfriendly to Western interests .[89] In this context, the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly competed for influence by proxy in the Third World as decolonization gained momentum in the 1950s and early 1960s.[174] Both sides were selling armaments to gain influence.[175] The Kremlin saw continuing territorial losses by imperial powers as presaging the eventual victory of their ideology.[176]

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1961 Soviet postage stamp demanding freedom for African nations

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1961 Soviet stamp commemorating Patrice Lumumba, prime minister of the Republic of the Congo

The United States used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to undermine neutral or hostile Third World governments and to support allied ones.[177] In 1953, President Eisenhower implemented Operation Ajax, a covert coup operation to overthrow the Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The popularly elected Mosaddegh had been a Middle Eastern nemesis of Britain since nationalizing the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Winston Churchill told the United States that Mosaddegh was "increasingly turning towards Communist influence."[178][179][180][181] The pro-Western shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, assumed control as an autocratic monarch.[182] The shah's policies included banning the communist Tudeh Party of Iran, and general suppression of political dissent by SAVAK, the shah's domestic security and intelligence agency.

In Guatemala, a banana republic, the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état ousted the left-wing President Jacobo Árbenz with material CIA support.[183] The post-Arbenz government—a military junta headed by Carlos Castillo Armas—repealed a progressive land reform law, returned nationalized property belonging to the United Fruit Company, set up a National Committee of Defense Against Communism, and decreed a Preventive Penal Law Against Communism at the request of the United States.[184]

The non-aligned Indonesian government of Sukarno was faced with a major threat to its legitimacy beginning in 1956, when several regional commanders began to demand autonomy from Jakarta. After mediation failed, Sukarno took action to remove the dissident commanders. In February 1958, dissident military commanders in Central Sumatera (Colonel Ahmad Hussein) and North Sulawesi (Colonel Ventje Sumual) declared the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Permesta Movement aimed at overthrowing the Sukarno regime. They were joined by many civilian politicians from the Masyumi Party, such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who were opposed to the growing influence of the communist Partai Komunis Indonesia party. Due to their anti-communist rhetoric, the rebels received arms, funding, and other covert aid from the CIA until Allen Lawrence Pope, an American pilot, was shot down after a bombing raid on government-held Ambon in April 1958. The central government responded by launching airborne and seaborne military invasions of rebel strongholds Padang and Manado. By the end of 1958, the rebels were militarily defeated, and the last remaining rebel guerilla bands surrendered by August 1961.[185]

In the Republic of the Congo, newly independent from Belgium since June 1960, the CIA-cultivated President Joseph Kasa-Vubu ordered the dismissal of the democratically elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the Lumumba cabinet in September; Lumumba called for Kasa-Vubu's dismissal instead.[186] In the ensuing Congo Crisis, the CIA-backed Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko quickly mobilized his forces to seize power through a military coup d'état.[186]

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An animated map shows the order of independence of the African nations (1950–2011)

In British Guiana, the leftist People's Progressive Party (PPP) candidate Cheddi Jagan won the position of chief minister in a colonially administered election in 1953, but was quickly forced to resign from power after Britain's suspension of the still-dependent nation's constitution.[187] Embarrassed by the landslide electoral victory of Jagan's allegedly Marxist party, the British imprisoned the PPP's leadership and maneuvered the organization into a divisive rupture in 1955, engineering a split between Jagan and his PPP colleagues.[188] Jagan again won the colonial elections in 1957 and 1961; despite Britain's shift to a reconsideration of its view of the left-wing Jagan as a Soviet-style communist at this time, the United States pressured the British to withhold Guyana's independence until an alternative to Jagan could be identified, supported, and brought into office.[189]

Worn down by the communist guerrilla war for Vietnamese independence and handed a watershed defeat by communist Viet Minh rebels at the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the French accepted a negotiated abandonment of their colonial stake in Vietnam. In the Geneva Conference, peace accords were signed, leaving Vietnam divided between a pro-Soviet administration in North Vietnam and a pro-Western administration in South Vietnam at the 17th parallel north. Between 1954 and 1961, Eisenhower's United States sent economic aid and military advisers to strengthen South Vietnam's pro-Western regime against communist efforts to destabilize it.[79]

Many emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America rejected the pressure to choose sides in the East-West competition. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, dozens of Third World governments resolved to stay out of the Cold War.[190] The consensus reached at Bandung culminated with the creation of the Belgrade-headquartered Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.[89] Meanwhile, Khrushchev broadened Moscow's policy to establish ties with India and other key neutral states. Independence movements in the Third World transformed the post-war order into a more pluralistic world of decolonized African and Middle Eastern nations and of rising nationalism in Asia and Latin America.[79]

Sino-Soviet split

Main article: Sino-Soviet split

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A map showing the relations of the communist states after the Sino-Soviet split as of 1980

The period after 1956 was marked by serious setbacks for the Soviet Union, most notably the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, beginning the Sino-Soviet split. Mao had defended Stalin when Khrushchev criticized him in 1956, and treated the new Soviet leader as a superficial upstart, accusing him of having lost his revolutionary edge.[191] For his part, Khrushchev, disturbed by Mao's glib attitude toward nuclear war, referred to the Chinese leader as a "lunatic on a throne".[192]

After this, Khrushchev made many desperate attempts to reconstitute the Sino-Soviet alliance, but Mao considered it useless and denied any proposal.[191] The Chinese-Soviet animosity spilled out in an intra-communist propaganda war.[193] Further on, the Soviets focused on a bitter rivalry with Mao's China for leadership of the global communist movement.[194] Historian Lorenz M. Lüthi argues:

The Sino-Soviet split was one of the key events of the Cold War, equal in importance to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Second Vietnam War, and Sino-American rapprochement. The split helped to determine the framework of the Second Cold War in general, and influenced the course of the Second Vietnam War in particular.[195]


Space Race

Main article: Space Race

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The United States reached the Moon in 1969.

On the nuclear weapons front, the United States and the USSR pursued nuclear rearmament and developed long-range weapons with which they could strike the territory of the other.[45] In August 1957, the Soviets successfully launched the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),[196][citation not found] and in October they launched the first Earth satellite, Sputnik 1.[197] The launch of Sputnik inaugurated the Space Race. This culminated in the Apollo Moon landings, which astronaut Frank Borman later described as "just a battle in the Cold War."[198]

Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs Invasion

Main articles: Cuban Revolution and Bay of Pigs Invasion

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Che Guevara (left) and Fidel Castro (right) in 1961

In Cuba, the 26th of July Movement, led by young revolutionaries Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, seized power in the Cuban Revolution on 1 January 1959, toppling President Fulgencio Batista, whose unpopular regime had been denied arms by the Eisenhower administration.[199]

Diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States continued for some time after Batista's fall, but President Eisenhower deliberately left the capital to avoid meeting Castro during the latter's trip to Washington, DC in April, leaving Vice President Richard Nixon to conduct the meeting in his place.[200] Cuba began negotiating for arms purchases from the Eastern Bloc in March 1960.[201]

In January 1961, just prior to leaving office, Eisenhower formally severed relations with the Cuban government. In April 1961, the administration of newly elected American President John F. Kennedy mounted an unsuccessful CIA-organized ship-borne invasion of the island at Playa Girón and Playa Larga in Santa Clara Province—a failure that publicly humiliated the United States.[202] Castro responded by publicly embracing Marxism–Leninism, and the Soviet Union pledged to provide further support.[202]

Berlin Crisis of 1961

Main article: Berlin Crisis of 1961

Further information: Berlin Wall and Eastern Bloc emigration and defection

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Soviet and American tanks face each other at Checkpoint Charlie during the Berlin Crisis of 1961.

The Berlin Crisis of 1961 was the last major incident in the Cold War regarding the status of Berlin and post–World War II Germany. By the early 1950s, the Soviet approach to restricting emigration movement was emulated by most of the rest of the Eastern Bloc.[203][citation not found] However, hundreds of thousands of East Germans annually emigrated to West Germany through a "loophole" in the system that existed between East Berlin and West Berlin, where the four occupying World War II powers governed movement.[204]

The emigration resulted in a massive "brain drain" from East Germany to West Germany of younger educated professionals, such that nearly 20% of East Germany's population had migrated to West Germany by 1961.[205][citation not found] That June, the Soviet Union issued a new ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Allied forces from West Berlin.[206] The request was rebuffed, and on 13 August, East Germany erected a barbed-wire barrier that would eventually be expanded through construction into the Berlin Wall, effectively closing the loophole.[207]

Cuban Missile Crisis and Khrushchev's ouster

Main articles: Cuban Project and Cuban Missile Crisis

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Aerial photograph of a Soviet missile site in Cuba, taken by a US spy aircraft, 1 November 1962

The Kennedy administration continued seeking ways to oust Castro following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, experimenting with various ways of covertly facilitating the overthrow of the Cuban government. Significant hopes were pinned on a covert program named the Cuban Project, devised under the Kennedy administration in 1961. Khrushchev learned of the project in February 1962,[208] and preparations to install Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were undertaken in response.[208]

Alarmed, Kennedy considered various reactions. He ultimately responded to the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba with a naval blockade, and he presented an ultimatum to the Soviets. Khrushchev backed down from a confrontation, and the Soviet Union removed the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba again.[209] Castro later admitted that "I would have agreed to the use of nuclear weapons. ... we took it for granted that it would become a nuclear war anyway, and that we were going to disappear."[210]

The Cuban Missile Crisis (October–November 1962) brought the world closer to nuclear war than ever before.[211] The aftermath of the crisis led to the first efforts in the nuclear arms race at nuclear disarmament and improving relations,[212][citation not found] although the Cold War's first arms control agreement, the Antarctic Treaty, had come into force in 1961.[213]

In 1964, Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues managed to oust him, but allowed him a peaceful retirement.[214] Accused of rudeness and incompetence, he was also credited with ruining Soviet agriculture and bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war.[215] Khrushchev had become an international embarrassment when he authorized construction of the Berlin Wall, a public humiliation for Marxism–Leninism.[215]

From confrontation to détente (1962–1979)

Main article: Cold War (1962–1979)

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NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strengths in Europe in 1973

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United States Navy F-4 Phantom II intercepts a Soviet Tupolev Tu-95 D aircraft in the early 1970s.

In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Cold War participants struggled to adjust to a new, more complicated pattern of international relations in which the world was no longer divided into two clearly opposed blocs.[89] From the beginning of the post-war period, Western Europe and Japan rapidly recovered from the destruction of World War II and sustained strong economic growth through the 1950s and 1960s, with per capita GDPs approaching those of the United States, while Eastern Bloc economies stagnated.[89][216][citation not found]

The Vietnam War descended into a quagmire for the United States, leading to a decline in international prestige and economic stability, derailing arms agreements, and provoking domestic unrest. America's withdrawal from the war led it to embrace a policy of detente with both China and the Soviet Union.[217]

In the 1973 oil crisis, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut their petroleum output. This raised oil prices and hurt Western economies, but helped Russia by generating a huge flow of money from its oil sales.[218]

As a result of the oil crisis, combined with the growing influence of Third World alignments such as OPEC and the Non-Aligned Movement, less powerful countries had more room to assert their independence and often showed themselves resistant to pressure from either superpower.[132] Meanwhile, Moscow was forced to turn its attention inward to deal with the Soviet Union's deep-seated domestic economic problems.[89] During this period, Soviet leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin embraced the notion of détente.[89]
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Part 3 of 4

Vietnam War

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U.S. combat operations during the Battle of Ia Drang, South Vietnam, November 1965

Main articles: Vietnam War and Opposition to the Vietnam War

Under President John F. Kennedy, US troop levels in Vietnam grew under the Military Assistance Advisory Group program from just under a thousand in 1959 to 16,000 in 1963.[219][220] South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's heavy-handed crackdown on Buddhist monks in 1963 led the US to endorse a deadly military coup against Diem.[221] The war escalated further in 1964 following the controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which a U.S. destroyer was alleged to have clashed with North Vietnamese fast attack craft. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave President Lyndon B. Johnson broad authorization to increase U.S. military presence, deploying ground combat units for the first time and increasing troop levels to 184,000.[222] Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev responded by reversing Khrushchev's policy of disengagement and increasing aid to the North Vietnamese, hoping to entice the North from its pro-Chinese position. The USSR discouraged further escalation of the war, however, providing just enough military assistance to tie up American forces.[223] From this point, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), also known as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) engaged in more conventional warfare with US and South Vietnamese forces.[224]

The Tet Offensive of 1968 proved to be the turning point of the war. Despite years of American tutelage and aid the South Vietnamese forces were unable to withstand the communist offensive and the task fell to US forces instead. Tet showed that the end of US involvement was not in sight, increasing domestic skepticism of the war and giving rise to what was referred to as the Vietnam Syndrome, a public aversion to American overseas military involvements. Nonetheless operations continued to cross international boundaries: bordering areas of Laos and Cambodia were used by North Vietnam as supply routes, and were heavily bombed by U.S. forces.[225]

French withdrawal from NATO military structures

Main article: Foreign policy of Charles de Gaulle § Partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966

The unity of NATO was breached early in its history, with a crisis occurring during Charles de Gaulle's presidency of France. De Gaulle protested at the strong role of the United States in the organization and what he perceived as a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. In a memorandum sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 17 September 1958, he argued for the creation of a tripartite directorate that would put France on an equal footing with the United States and the United Kingdom, and also for the expansion of NATO's coverage to include geographical areas of interest to France, most notably French Algeria, where France was waging a counter-insurgency and sought NATO assistance.[226] De Gaulle considered the response he received to be unsatisfactory, and began the development of an independent French nuclear deterrent. In 1966 he withdrew France from NATO's military structures and expelled NATO troops from French soil.[227]

Invasion of Czechoslovakia

Main articles: Prague Spring and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia

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The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968 was one of the biggest military operations on European soil since World War II.

In 1968, a period of political liberalization took place in Czechoslovakia called the Prague Spring. An "Action Program" of reforms included increasing freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of movement, along with an economic emphasis on consumer goods, the possibility of a multiparty government, limitations on the power of the secret police,[228][229] and potential withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.[230]

In answer to the Prague Spring, on 20 August 1968, the Soviet Army, together with most of their Warsaw Pact allies, invaded Czechoslovakia.[231] The invasion was followed by a wave of emigration, including an estimated 70,000 Czechs and Slovaks initially fleeing, with the total eventually reaching 300,000.[232] The invasion sparked intense protests from Yugoslavia, Romania, China, and from Western European communist parties.[233]

Brezhnev Doctrine

Main article: Brezhnev Doctrine

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Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon at the Washington Summit, 1973; this was a high-water mark in détente between the USSR and the US.

In September 1968, during a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party one month after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev outlined the Brezhnev Doctrine, in which he claimed the right to violate the sovereignty of any country attempting to replace Marxism–Leninism with capitalism. During the speech, Brezhnev stated:[230]

When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.


The doctrine found its origins in the failures of Marxism–Leninism in states like Poland, Hungary and East Germany, which were facing a declining standard of living contrasting with the prosperity of West Germany and the rest of Western Europe.[234]

Third World escalations

See also: 1964 Brazilian coup d'état, Dominican Civil War, Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, Vietnam War, 1973 Chilean coup d'état, 1973 Uruguayan coup d'état, 1976 Argentine coup d'état, Operation Condor, Six-Day War, Task Force 74, War of Attrition, Yom Kippur War, Ogaden War, Angolan Civil War, South African Border War, Indonesian invasion of East Timor, Re-education camp (Vietnam), Vietnamese boat people, and Stability–instability paradox

[x]
Speech on the Vietnam War given by President Lyndon B. Johnson on 29 September 1967

Under the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration, which gained power after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the U.S. took a more hardline stance on Latin America—sometimes called the "Mann Doctrine".[235] In 1964, the Brazilian military overthrew the government of president João Goulart with U.S. backing.[235] In late April 1965, the U.S. sent some 22,000 troops to the Dominican Republic for a one-year occupation in an invasion codenamed Operation Power Pack, citing the threat of the emergence of a Cuban-style revolution in Latin America.[79] Héctor García-Godoy acted as provisional president, until conservative former president Joaquín Balaguer won the 1966 presidential election against non-campaigning former President Juan Bosch.[236] Activists for Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party were violently harassed by the Dominican police and armed forces.[236]

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General Suharto of Indonesia attending funeral of five generals slain in 30 September movement, October 2, 1965

In Indonesia, the hardline anti-communist General Suharto wrested control of the state from his predecessor Sukarno in an attempt to establish a "New Order". From 1965 to 1966, with the aid of the United States and other Western governments,[237][238][239][240][241] the military led the mass killing of more than 500,000 members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party and other leftist organizations, and detained hundreds of thousands more in prison camps around the country under extremely inhumane conditions.[242][243] A top-secret CIA report stated that the massacres "rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s."[244] These killings served U.S. strategic interests and constitute a major turning point in the Cold War as the balance of power shifted in Southeast Asia.[241][245]

Escalating the scale of American intervention in the ongoing conflict between Ngô Đình Diệm's South Vietnamese government and the communist National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) insurgents opposing it, Johnson deployed some 575,000 troops in Southeast Asia to defeat the NLF and their North Vietnamese allies in the Vietnam War, but his costly policy weakened the US economy and, by 1975, it ultimately culminated in what most of the world saw as a humiliating defeat of the world's most powerful superpower at the hands of one of the world's poorest nations.[79]

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Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet shaking hands with Henry Kissinger in 1976

In Chile, the Socialist Party candidate Salvador Allende won the presidential election of 1970, becoming the first democratically elected Marxist to become president of a country in the Americas.[246] The CIA targeted Allende for removal and operated to undermine his support domestically, which contributed to a period of unrest culminating in General Augusto Pinochet's coup d'état on 11 September 1973. Pinochet consolidated power as a military dictator, Allende's reforms of the economy were rolled back, and leftist opponents were killed or detained in internment camps under the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA). The Pinochet regime would go on to be one of the leading participants in Operation Condor, an international campaign of political assassination and state terrorism organized by right-wing military dictatorships in the Southern Cone of South America that was covertly supported by the US government.[247][248][249]

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Henry Kissinger, who was US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, was a central figure in the Cold War while in office (1969–1977).

The Middle East remained a source of contention. Egypt, which received the bulk of its arms and economic assistance from the USSR, was a troublesome client, with a reluctant Soviet Union feeling obliged to assist in both the 1967 Six-Day War (with advisers and technicians) and the War of Attrition (with pilots and aircraft) against pro-Western Israel.[250] Despite the beginning of an Egyptian shift from a pro-Soviet to a pro-American orientation in 1972 (under Egypt's new leader Anwar Sadat),[251] rumors of imminent Soviet intervention on the Egyptians' behalf during the 1973 Yom Kippur War brought about a massive American mobilization that threatened to wreck détente.[252][citation not found] Although pre-Sadat Egypt had been the largest recipient of Soviet aid in the Middle East, the Soviets were also successful in establishing close relations with communist South Yemen, as well as the nationalist governments of Algeria and Iraq.[251] Iraq signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1972. According to historian Charles R.H. Tripp, the treaty upset "the U.S.-sponsored security system established as part of the Cold War in the Middle East. It appeared that any enemy of the Baghdad regime was a potential ally of the United States."[253] In response, the U.S. covertly financed Kurdish rebels led by Mustafa Barzani during the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War; the Kurds were defeated in 1975, leading to the forcible relocation of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish civilians.[253] Indirect Soviet assistance to the Palestinian side of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict included support for Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[254]

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Suharto with Gerald Ford and Kissinger in Jakarta on 6 December 1975, one day before the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

In East Africa, a territorial dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region resulted in the Ogaden War. Around June 1977, Somali troops occupied the Ogaden and began advancing inland towards Ethiopian positions in the Ahmar Mountains. Both countries were client states of the Soviet Union; Somalia was led by self-proclaimed Marxist military leader Siad Barre, and Ethiopia was controlled by the Derg, a cabal of military generals loyal to the pro-Soviet Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had declared the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia in 1975.[255] The Soviets initially attempted to exert a moderating influence on both states, but in November 1977 Barre broke off relations with Moscow and expelled his Soviet military advisers.[256] He then turned to the Safari Club—a group of pro-American intelligence agencies including those of Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—for support and weapons.[257][258] While declining to take a direct part in hostilities, the Soviet Union did provide the impetus for a successful Ethiopian counteroffensive to expel Somalia from the Ogaden. The counteroffensive was planned at the command level by Soviet advisers attached to the Ethiopian general staff, and bolstered by the delivery of millions of dollars' of sophisticated Soviet arms.[256] About 11,000 Cuban troops spearheaded the primary effort, after receiving a hasty training on some of the newly delivered Soviet weapons systems by East German instructors.[256]

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Cuban tank in the streets of Luanda, Angola, 1976

On 24 April 1974, the Carnation Revolution ousted Marcelo Caetano and Portugal's right-wing Estado Novo government, sounding the death knell for the Portuguese Empire.[259] Independence was hastily granted to a number of Portuguese colonies, including Angola, where the disintegration of colonial rule was followed by a violent civil war.[260] There were three rival militant factions competing for power in Angola, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA).[261] While all three possessed vaguely socialist leanings, the MPLA was the only party which enjoyed close ties to the Soviet Union and was openly committed to Marxist policies.[261] Its adherence to the concept of a one-party state alienated it from the FNLA and UNITA, which began portraying themselves as anti-communist and pro-Western in orientation.[261] When the Soviets began supplying the MPLA with arms, the CIA offered substantial covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA.[262] The MPLA eventually requested direct military support from Moscow in the form of ground troops, but the Soviets declined, offering to send advisers but no combat personnel.[262] Cuba was more forthcoming and began amassing troops in Angola to assist the MPLA.[262] By November 1975 there were over a thousand Cuban soldiers in the country.[262] The persistent buildup of Cuban troops and Soviet weapons allowed the MPLA to secure victory and blunt an abortive intervention by Zairean and South African troops, which had deployed in a belated attempt to assist the FNLA and UNITA.[263]

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During the Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot, 1.5 to 2 million people died due to the policies of his four-year premiership.

During the Vietnam War, North Vietnam used border areas of Cambodia as military bases, which Cambodian head of state Norodom Sihanouk tolerated in an attempt to preserve Cambodia's neutrality. Following Sihanouk's March 1970 deposition by pro-American general Lon Nol, who ordered the North Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, North Vietnam attempted to overrun all of Cambodia following negotiations with Nuon Chea, the second-in-command of the Cambodian communists (dubbed the Khmer Rouge) fighting to overthrow the Cambodian government.[264] American and South Vietnamese forces responded to these actions with a bombing campaign and a brief ground incursion, which contributed to the violence of the civil war that soon enveloped all of Cambodia.[265] US carpet bombing lasted until 1973, and while it prevented the Khmer Rouge from seizing the capital, it also accelerated the collapse of rural society, increased social polarization,[266] and killed tens of thousands of civilians.[267]

After taking power and distancing himself from the Vietnamese,[268] Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot killed 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians in the killing fields, roughly a quarter of the Cambodian population (an event commonly labelled the Cambodian genocide).[269][270][271] Martin Shaw described these atrocities as "the purest genocide of the Cold War era."[272] Backed by the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, an organization of Khmer pro-Soviet Communists and Khmer Rouge defectors led by Heng Samrin, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on 22 December 1978. The invasion succeeded in deposing Pol Pot, but the new state would struggle to gain international recognition beyond the Soviet Bloc sphere, despite the previous international outcry at the Pol Pot regime's gross human rights violations, and it would become bogged down in a guerrilla war led from refugee camps located on the border with Thailand. Following the destruction of Khmer Rouge, the national reconstruction of Cambodia would be severely hampered, and Vietnam would suffer a punitive Chinese attack.[273][274]

Sino-American rapprochement

Main article: 1972 Nixon visit to China

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Mao Zedong and US President Richard Nixon, during his visit in China

As a result of the Sino-Soviet split, tensions along the Chinese–Soviet border reached their peak in 1969, and United States President Richard Nixon decided to use the conflict to shift the balance of power towards the West in the Cold War.[275][citation not found] The Chinese had sought improved relations with the Americans in order to gain advantage over the Soviets as well.

In February 1972, Nixon achieved a stunning rapprochement with China,[276] traveling to Beijing and meeting with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. At this time, the USSR achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States; meanwhile, the Vietnam War both weakened America's influence in the Third World and cooled relations with Western Europe.[277][citation not found]

Although indirect conflict between Cold War powers continued through the late 1960s and early 1970s, tensions were beginning to ease.[212][citation not found]

Nixon, Brezhnev, and détente

Main articles: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Vladivostok Summit Meeting on Arms Control, Helsinki Accords, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

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Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter sign the SALT II treaty, 18 June 1979, in Vienna

Following his visit to China, Nixon met with Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev in Moscow.[278] These Strategic Arms Limitation Talks resulted in two landmark arms control treaties: SALT I, the first comprehensive limitation pact signed by the two superpowers, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which banned the development of systems designed to intercept incoming missiles. These aimed to limit the development of costly anti-ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles.[89]

Nixon and Brezhnev proclaimed a new era of "peaceful coexistence" and established the groundbreaking new policy of détente (or cooperation) between the two superpowers. Meanwhile, Brezhnev attempted to revive the Soviet economy, which was declining in part because of heavy military expenditures. Between 1972 and 1974, the two sides also agreed to strengthen their economic ties,[79] including agreements for increased trade. As a result of their meetings, détente would replace the hostility of the Cold War and the two countries would live mutually.[279]

These developments coincided with the "Ostpolitik" policy of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,[233] an effort to normalize relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe. Other agreements were concluded to stabilize the situation in Europe, culminating in the Helsinki Accords signed at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975.[280]

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Iranian people protesting against the Pahlavi dynasty, during the Iranian Revolution

Kissinger and Nixon were "realists" who deemphasized idealistic goals like anti-communism or promotion of democracy worldwide, because those goals were too expensive in terms of America's economic capabilities.[281] Instead of a Cold War they wanted peace, trade and cultural exchanges. They realized that Americans were no longer willing to tax themselves for idealistic foreign policy goals, especially for containment policies that never seemed to produce positive results. Instead Nixon and Kissinger sought to downsize America's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. They rejected "idealism" as impractical and too expensive, and neither man showed much sensitivity to the plight of people living under Communism. Kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to American foreign policy with Carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and Reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying Communism.[282]

Late 1970s deterioration of relations

In the 1970s, the KGB, led by Yuri Andropov, continued to persecute distinguished Soviet personalities such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who were criticising the Soviet leadership in harsh terms.[283] Indirect conflict between the superpowers continued through this period of détente in the Third World, particularly during political crises in the Middle East, Chile, Ethiopia, and Angola.[284]

Although President Jimmy Carter tried to place another limit on the arms race with a SALT II agreement in 1979,[285] his efforts were undermined by the other events that year, including the Iranian Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution, which both ousted pro-US regimes, and his retaliation against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December.[79]

"Second Cold War" (1979–1985)

Main article: Cold War (1979–1985)

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Protest in Amsterdam against the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, 1981

The term second Cold War refers to the period of intensive reawakening of Cold War tensions and conflicts in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Tensions greatly increased between the major powers with both sides becoming more militaristic.[286] Diggins says, "Reagan went all out to fight the second cold war, by supporting counterinsurgencies in the third world."[287] Cox says, "The intensity of this 'second' Cold War was as great as its duration was short."[288]

Soviet War in Afghanistan

Main articles: War in Afghanistan (1978–present) and Soviet–Afghan War

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President Reagan publicizes his support by meeting with Afghan Mujahideen leaders in the White House, 1983.

In April 1978, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in the Saur Revolution. Within months, opponents of the communist government launched an uprising in eastern Afghanistan that quickly expanded into a civil war waged by guerrilla mujahideen against government forces countrywide.[289] The Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen insurgents received military training and weapons in neighboring Pakistan and China,[290][291] while the Soviet Union sent thousands of military advisers to support the PDPA government.[289] Meanwhile, increasing friction between the competing factions of the PDPA—the dominant Khalq and the more moderate Parcham—resulted in the dismissal of Parchami cabinet members and the arrest of Parchami military officers under the pretext of a Parchami coup. By mid-1979, the United States had started a covert program to assist the mujahideen.[292]

In September 1979, Khalqist President Nur Muhammad Taraki was assassinated in a coup within the PDPA orchestrated by fellow Khalq member Hafizullah Amin, who assumed the presidency. Distrusted by the Soviets, Amin was assassinated by Soviet special forces in December 1979. A Soviet-organized government, led by Parcham's Babrak Karmal but inclusive of both factions, filled the vacuum. Soviet troops were deployed to stabilize Afghanistan under Karmal in more substantial numbers, although the Soviet government did not expect to do most of the fighting in Afghanistan. As a result, however, the Soviets were now directly involved in what had been a domestic war in Afghanistan.[293]

Carter responded to the Soviet intervention by withdrawing the SALT II treaty from the Senate, imposing embargoes on grain and technology shipments to the USSR, and demanding a significant increase in military spending, and further announced that the United States would boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. He described the Soviet incursion as "the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War".[294]

Reagan and Thatcher

Further information: Reagan Doctrine and Thatcherism

Thatcher is the only woman in a room, where a dozen men in suits sit around an oval table. Regan and Thatcher sit opposite each other in the middle of the long axis of the table. The room is which is decorated in white, with drapes, a gold chandelier and a portrait of Lincoln.

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Thatcher's Ministry meets with Reagan's Cabinet at the White House, 1981.

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The world map of military alliances in 1980

In January 1977, four years prior to becoming president, Ronald Reagan bluntly stated, in a conversation with Richard V. Allen, his basic expectation in relation to the Cold War. "My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic," he said. "It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?"[295] In 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election, vowing to increase military spending and confront the Soviets everywhere.[296] Both Reagan and new British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher denounced the Soviet Union and its ideology. Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and predicted that Communism would be left on the "ash heap of history," while Thatcher inculpated the Soviets as "bent on world dominance."[297][298] In 1982, Reagan tried to cut off Moscow's access to hard currency by impeding its proposed gas line to Western Europe. It hurt the Soviet economy, but it also caused ill will among American allies in Europe who counted on that revenue. Reagan retreated on this issue.[299][300]

By early 1985, Reagan's anti-communist position had developed into a stance known as the new Reagan Doctrine—which, in addition to containment, formulated an additional right to subvert existing communist governments.[301] Besides continuing Carter's policy of supporting the Islamic opponents of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-backed PDPA government in Afghanistan, the CIA also sought to weaken the Soviet Union itself by promoting Islamism in the majority-Muslim Central Asian Soviet Union.[302] Additionally, the CIA encouraged anti-communist Pakistan's ISI to train Muslims from around the world to participate in the jihad against the Soviet Union.[302]

Polish Solidarity movement and martial law

Main articles: Solidarity (Polish trade union) and Martial law in Poland

Further information: Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–81

Pope John Paul II provided a moral focus for anti-communism; a visit to his native Poland in 1979 stimulated a religious and nationalist resurgence centered on the Solidarity movement that galvanized opposition and may have led to his attempted assassination two years later.[303] In December 1981, Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski reacted to the crisis by imposing a period of martial law. Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Poland in response.[304] Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's top ideologist, advised Soviet leaders not to intervene if Poland fell under the control of Solidarity, for fear it might lead to heavy economic sanctions, resulting in a catastrophe for the Soviet economy.[304]

Soviet and US military and economic issues

Further information: Era of Stagnation, Strategic Defense Initiative, SS-20 Saber, and MGM-31 Pershing

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US and USSR/Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, 1945–2006

Moscow had built up a military that consumed as much as 25 percent of the Soviet Union's gross national product at the expense of consumer goods and investment in civilian sectors.[305] Soviet spending on the arms race and other Cold War commitments both caused and exacerbated deep-seated structural problems in the Soviet system,[306] which experienced at least a decade of economic stagnation during the late Brezhnev years.

Soviet investment in the defense sector was not driven by military necessity, but in large part by the interests of massive party and state bureaucracies dependent on the sector for their own power and privileges.[307] The Soviet Armed Forces became the largest in the world in terms of the numbers and types of weapons they possessed, in the number of troops in their ranks, and in the sheer size of their military–industrial base.[308] However, the quantitative advantages held by the Soviet military often concealed areas where the Eastern Bloc dramatically lagged behind the West.[309] For example, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated how the armor, fire control systems and firing range of the Soviet Union's most common main battle tank, the T-72, were drastically inferior to the American M1 Abrams, yet the USSR fielded almost three times as many T-72s as the US deployed M1s.[310]

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Delta 183 launch vehicle lifts off, carrying the Strategic Defense Initiative sensor experiment "Delta Star".

By the early 1980s, the USSR had built up a military arsenal and army surpassing that of the United States. Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, president Carter began massively building up the United States military. This buildup was accelerated by the Reagan administration, which increased the military spending from 5.3 percent of GNP in 1981 to 6.5 percent in 1986,[311] the largest peacetime defense buildup in United States history.[312]

Tensions continued to intensify as Reagan revived the B-1 Lancer program, which had been canceled by the Carter administration, produced LGM-118 Peacekeeper missiles,[313] installed US cruise missiles in Europe, and announced the experimental Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, a defense program to shoot down missiles in mid-flight.[314] The Soviets deployed RSD-10 Pioneer ballistic missiles targeting Western Europe, and NATO decided, under the impetus of the Carter presidency, to deploy MGM-31 Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, primarily West Germany.[315] This deployment placed missiles just 10 minutes' striking distance from Moscow.[316][incomplete short citation]

After Reagan's military buildup, the Soviet Union did not respond by further building its military,[317] because the enormous military expenses, along with inefficient planned manufacturing and collectivized agriculture, were already a heavy burden for the Soviet economy.[318][citation not found] At the same time, Saudi Arabia increased oil production,[319] even as other non-OPEC nations were increasing production.[320] These developments contributed to the 1980s oil glut, which affected the Soviet Union as oil was the main source of Soviet export revenues.[305][318][citation not found] Issues with command economics,[321][citation not found] oil price decreases and large military expenditures gradually brought the Soviet economy to stagnation.[318][citation not found]

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After ten-year-old American Samantha Smith wrote a letter to Yuri Andropov expressing her fear of nuclear war, Andropov invited Smith to the Soviet Union.

On 1 September 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing 747 with 269 people aboard, including sitting Congressman Larry McDonald, an action which Reagan characterized as a "massacre". The airliner had violated Soviet airspace just past the west coast of Sakhalin Island near Moneron Island, and the Soviets treated the unidentified aircraft as an intruding U.S. spy plane. The incident increased support for military deployment, overseen by Reagan, which stood in place until the later accords between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.[322] The Able Archer 83 exercise in November 1983, a realistic simulation of a coordinated NATO nuclear release, was perhaps the most dangerous moment since the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the Soviet leadership feared that a nuclear attack might be imminent.[323]

American domestic public concerns about intervening in foreign conflicts persisted from the end of the Vietnam War.[324] The Reagan administration emphasized the use of quick, low-cost counter-insurgency tactics to intervene in foreign conflicts.[324] In 1983, the Reagan administration intervened in the multisided Lebanese Civil War, invaded Grenada, bombed Libya and backed the Central American Contras, anti-communist paramilitaries seeking to overthrow the Soviet-aligned Sandinista government in Nicaragua.[132] While Reagan's interventions against Grenada and Libya were popular in the United States, his backing of the Contra rebels was mired in controversy.[325] The Reagan administration's backing of the military government of Guatemala during the Guatemalan Civil War, in particular the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt, was also controversial.[326]

Meanwhile, the Soviets incurred high costs for their own foreign interventions. Although Brezhnev was convinced in 1979 that the Soviet war in Afghanistan would be brief, Muslim guerrillas, aided by the U.S., China, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,[291] waged a fierce resistance against the invasion.[327] The Kremlin sent nearly 100,000 troops to support its puppet regime in Afghanistan, leading many outside observers to dub the war "the Soviets' Vietnam".[327] However, Moscow's quagmire in Afghanistan was far more disastrous for the Soviets than Vietnam had been for the Americans because the conflict coincided with a period of internal decay and domestic crisis in the Soviet system.

A senior U.S. State Department official predicted such an outcome as early as 1980, positing that the invasion resulted in part from a "domestic crisis within the Soviet system. ... It may be that the thermodynamic law of entropy has ... caught up with the Soviet system, which now seems to expend more energy on simply maintaining its equilibrium than on improving itself. We could be seeing a period of foreign movement at a time of internal decay".[328][329][citation not found]

Final years (1985–1991)

Main article: Cold War (1985–1991)

Gorbachev's reforms

Further information: Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, and Glasnost

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Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign the INF Treaty at the White House, 1987.

By the time the comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985,[297] the Soviet economy was stagnant and faced a sharp fall in foreign currency earnings as a result of the downward slide in oil prices in the 1980s.[330] These issues prompted Gorbachev to investigate measures to revive the ailing state.[330]

An ineffectual start led to the conclusion that deeper structural changes were necessary, and in June 1987 Gorbachev announced an agenda of economic reform called perestroika, or restructuring.[331] Perestroika relaxed the production quota system, allowed private ownership of businesses and paved the way for foreign investment. These measures were intended to redirect the country's resources from costly Cold War military commitments to more productive areas in the civilian sector.[331]

Despite initial skepticism in the West, the new Soviet leader proved to be committed to reversing the Soviet Union's deteriorating economic condition instead of continuing the arms race with the West.[212][citation not found][332] Partly as a way to fight off internal opposition from party cliques to his reforms, Gorbachev simultaneously introduced glasnost, or openness, which increased freedom of the press and the transparency of state institutions.[333][citation not found] Glasnost was intended to reduce the corruption at the top of the Communist Party and moderate the abuse of power in the Central Committee.[334][citation not found] Glasnost also enabled increased contact between Soviet citizens and the western world, particularly with the United States, contributing to the accelerating détente between the two nations.[335][citation not found]

Thaw in relations

Further information: Reykjavík Summit, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, START I, and Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany

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The beginning of the 1990s brought a thaw in relations between the superpowers.

In response to the Kremlin's military and political concessions, Reagan agreed to renew talks on economic issues and the scaling-back of the arms race.[336] The first summit was held in November 1985 in Geneva, Switzerland.[336] At one stage the two men, accompanied only by an interpreter, agreed in principle to reduce each country's nuclear arsenal by 50 percent.[337] A second summit was held in October 1986 in Reykjavík, Iceland. Talks went well until the focus shifted to Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative, which Gorbachev wanted eliminated. Reagan refused.[338] The negotiations failed, but the third summit in 1987 led to a breakthrough with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The INF treaty eliminated all nuclear-armed, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 to 3,400 miles) and their infrastructure.[339]

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"Tear down this wall!" speech: Reagan speaking in front of the Brandenburg Gate, 12 June 1987

East–West tensions rapidly subsided through the mid-to-late 1980s, culminating with the final summit in Moscow in 1989, when Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush signed the START I arms control treaty.[340] During the following year it became apparent to the Soviets that oil and gas subsidies, along with the cost of maintaining massive troops levels, represented a substantial economic drain.[341][citation not found] In addition, the security advantage of a buffer zone was recognised as irrelevant and the Soviets officially declared that they would no longer intervene in the affairs of allied states in Central and Eastern Europe.[342]

In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan,[343] and by 1990 Gorbachev consented to German reunification,[341][citation not found] as the only alternative was a Tiananmen Square scenario.[344][citation not found] When the Berlin Wall came down, Gorbachev's "Common European Home" concept began to take shape.[345]

On 3 December 1989, Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush declared the Cold War over at the Malta Summit.[346] A year later, the two former rivals were partners in the Gulf War against Iraq (August 1990 – February 1991).[347][citation not found]

Eastern Europe breaks away

Main article: Revolutions of 1989

By 1989, the Soviet alliance system was on the brink of collapse, and, deprived of Soviet military support, the communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were losing power.[348] Grassroots organizations, such as Poland's Solidarity movement, rapidly gained ground with strong popular bases. In 1989, the communist governments in Poland and Hungary became the first to negotiate the organization of competitive elections. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, mass protests unseated entrenched communist leaders. The communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania also crumbled, in the latter case as the result of a violent uprising. Attitudes had changed enough that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker suggested that the American government would not be opposed to Soviet intervention in Romania, on behalf of the opposition, to prevent bloodshed.[349] The tidal wave of change culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which symbolized the collapse of European communist governments and graphically ended the Iron Curtain divide of Europe. The 1989 revolutionary wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe and peacefully overthrew all of the Soviet-style communist states: East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria;[350][citation not found] Romania was the only Eastern-bloc country to topple its communist regime violently and execute its head of state.[351]

Soviet dissolution

Main article: Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Further information: History of the Soviet Union (1982–91), The Barricades, 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt, Commonwealth of Independent States, Economy of the Soviet Union, and Baltic Way

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August Coup in Moscow, 1991

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The human chain in Lithuania during the Baltic Way, 23 August 1989

In the USSR itself, glasnost weakened the bonds that held the Soviet Union together,[342] and by February 1990, with the dissolution of the USSR looming, the Communist Party was forced to surrender its 73-year-old monopoly on state power.[352] At the same time freedom of press and dissent allowed by glasnost and the festering "nationalities question" increasingly led the union's component republics to declare their autonomy from Moscow, with the Baltic states withdrawing from the union entirely.[353]

Gorbachev's permissive attitude toward Central and Eastern Europe did not initially extend to Soviet territory; even Bush, who strove to maintain friendly relations, condemned the January 1991 killings in Latvia and Lithuania, privately warning that economic ties would be frozen if the violence continued.[354][citation not found] The USSR was fatally weakened by a failed coup in August 1991, and a growing number of Soviet republics, particularly Russia, threatened to secede from the USSR. The Commonwealth of Independent States, created on 21 December 1991, is viewed as a successor entity to the Soviet Union, but, according to Russia's leaders, its purpose was to "allow a civilized divorce" between the Soviet Republics and is comparable to a loose confederation.[355] The USSR was declared officially dissolved on 26 December 1991.[356]

U.S. President George H.W. Bush expressed his emotions: "The biggest thing that has happened in the world in my life, in our lives, is this: By the grace of God, America won the Cold War."[357]

Aftermath

Main articles: Effects of the Cold War, Frozen conflict, Post-Soviet states, Post-Soviet conflicts, Yugoslav Wars, and Cold War II

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Changes in national boundaries after the end of the Cold War

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia drastically cut military spending, and restructuring the economy left millions unemployed.[358] The capitalist reforms culminated in a recession in the early 1990s more severe than the Great Depression as experienced by the United States and Germany.[359] In the 25 years following the end of the Cold War, only five or six of the post-communist states are on a path to joining the rich and capitalist world while most are falling behind, some to such an extent that it will take several decades to catch up to where they were before the collapse of communism.[360][361]

The Cold War continues to influence world affairs. The post-Cold War world is considered to be unipolar, with the United States the sole remaining superpower.[362][363][citation not found][364][citation not found] The Cold War defined the political role of the United States after World War II—by 1989 the United States had military alliances with 50 countries, with 526,000 troops stationed abroad,[365] with 326,000 in Europe (two-thirds of which were in west Germany)[366] and 130,000 in Asia (mainly Japan and South Korea).[365] The Cold War also marked the zenith of peacetime military–industrial complexes, especially in the United States, and large-scale military funding of science.[367] These complexes, though their origins may be found as early as the 19th century, snowballed considerably during the Cold War.[368] Experts believe that up to 50 nuclear weapons were lost during the Cold War.[369]

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Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has expanded eastwards into the former Warsaw Pact and parts of the former Soviet Union.

Cumulative U.S. military expenditures throughout the entire Cold War amounted to an estimated $8 trillion. Further nearly 100,000 Americans lost their lives in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.[370] Although Soviet casualties are difficult to estimate, as a share of their gross national product the financial cost for the Soviet Union was much higher than that incurred by the United States.[371]

In addition to the loss of life by uniformed soldiers, millions died in the superpowers' proxy wars around the globe, most notably in Southeast Asia.[372] Most of the proxy wars and subsidies for local conflicts ended along with the Cold War; interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, as well as refugee and displaced persons crises have declined sharply in the post-Cold War years.[373]

However, the aftermath of the Cold War is not considered to be concluded. Many of the economic and social tensions that were exploited to fuel Cold War competition in parts of the Third World remain acute. The breakdown of state control in a number of areas formerly ruled by communist governments produced new civil and ethnic conflicts, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. In Central and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War has ushered in an era of economic growth and an increase in the number of liberal democracies, while in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, independence was accompanied by state failure.[286]

In popular culture

See also: Culture during the Cold War

During the Cold War itself, with the United States and the Soviet Union invested heavily in propaganda designed to influence the hearts and minds of people around the world, especially using motion pictures.[374][page needed]

The Cold War endures as a popular topic reflected extensively in entertainment media, and continuing to the present with numerous post-1991 Cold War-themed feature films, novels, television, and other media.[citation needed] In 2013, a KGB-sleeper-agents-living-next-door action drama series, The Americans, set in the early 1980s, was ranked #6 on the Metacritic annual Best New TV Shows list; its six-season run concluded in May 2018.[375][376] At the same time, movies like Crimson Tide (1995) are shown in their entirety to educate college students about the Cold War.[377]

Historiography

Main article: Historiography of the Cold War

As soon as the term "Cold War" was popularized to refer to post-war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, interpreting the course and origins of the conflict has been a source of heated controversy among historians, political scientists, and journalists.[378] In particular, historians have sharply disagreed as to who was responsible for the breakdown of Soviet–US relations after the Second World War; and whether the conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable, or could have been avoided.[379] Historians have also disagreed on what exactly the Cold War was, what the sources of the conflict were, and how to disentangle patterns of action and reaction between the two sides.[286]

Although explanations of the origins of the conflict in academic discussions are complex and diverse, several general schools of thought on the subject can be identified. Historians commonly speak of three differing approaches to the study of the Cold War: "orthodox" accounts, "revisionism", and "post-revisionism".[367]

"Orthodox" accounts place responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansion further into Europe.[367] "Revisionist" writers place more responsibility for the breakdown of post-war peace on the United States, citing a range of US efforts to isolate and confront the Soviet Union well before the end of World War II.[367] "Post-revisionists" see the events of the Cold War as more nuanced, and attempt to be more balanced in determining what occurred during the Cold War.[367] Much of the historiography on the Cold War weaves together two or even all three of these broad categories.[45]
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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Part 4 of 4

See also

Main article: Outline of the Cold War

• American espionage in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation
• American imperialism
• Canada in the Cold War
• Cold War (TV series)
• Cold War II
• List of Americans in the Venona papers
• List of Eastern Bloc agents in the United States
• McCarthyism
• Red Scare
• Soviet Empire
• Soviet espionage in the United States
• Timeline of events in the Cold War
• War on Terror
• World War III
• Venona project
• Category:Cold War by period

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Bibliography and further reading

Main article: List of primary and secondary sources on the Cold War

• Adelman, Jonathan R.; Palmieri, Deborah Anne (1989). The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy. Harpercollins College Div. ISBN 978-0-060-40167-2.
• Applebaum, Anne (2012). Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956. Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-51569-6.
• Bilinsky, Yaroslav (1990). Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine. Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-275-96363-7.
• Bronson, Rachel. Thicker than Oil: Oil:America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN 978-0-19-516743-6
• Brazinsky, Gregg A. Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War (U of North Carolina Press, 2017); four online reviews & author response
• The Cambridge History of the Cold War (3 vol. 2010) online
• Christenson, Ron (1991). Political trials in history: from antiquity to the present. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-0-88738-406-6.
• Davis, Simon, and Joseph Smith. The A to Z of the Cold War (Scarecrow, 2005), encyclopedia focused on military aspects
• Dominguez, Jorge I. (1989). To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-89325-2.
• Fedorov, Alexander (2011). Russian Image on the Western Screen: Trends, Stereotypes, Myths, Illusions. Lambert Academic Publishing. ISBN 978-3-8433-9330-0.
• Franco, Jean (2002). The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City: Latin America in the Cold War. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-03717-5.
• Frankel, Benjamin. The Cold War 1945–1991. Vol. 2, Leaders and other important figures in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and the Third World (1992), 379pp of biographies.
• Friedman, Norman (2007). The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-287-4.
• Gaddis, John Lewis (1990). Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States. An Interpretative History. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-557258-9.
• Gaddis, John Lewis (1997). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-878070-0.
• Gaddis, John Lewis (2005). The Cold War: A New History. Penguin Press. ISBN 978-1-59420-062-5.
• Garthoff, Raymond (1994). Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-3041-5.
• Gilbert, Martin (2007). Routledge Atlas of Russian History. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-39483-3.
• Ghodsee, Kristen (2019). Second World, Second Sex: Socialist Women's Activism and Global Solidarity during the Cold War. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-1-4780-0139-3.
• Halliday, Fred. The Making of the Second Cold War (1983, Verso, London).
• Halliday, Fred (2001). "Cold War". The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World. Oxford University Press Inc.
• Harrison, Hope Millard (2003). Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691096783.
• Haslam, Jonathan. Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (Yale University Press; 2011) 512 pages
• Heller, Henry (2006). The Cold War and the New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945–2005. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 1-58367-139-0
• Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (2010)
• House, Jonathan. A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962 (2012)
• Immerman, Richard H. and Petra Goedde, eds. The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (2013) excerpt
• Judge, Edward H. The Cold War: A Global History With Documents (2012)
• Kalinovsky, Artemy M. (2011). A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-05866-8.
• Kinsella, Warren (1992). Unholy Alliances. Lester Publishing. ISBN 978-1-895555-24-0.
• LaFeber, Walter (1993). America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-035853-9.
• LaFeber, Walter (2002). America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2002. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-284903-5.
• Leffler, Melvyn (1992). A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-2218-6.
• Leffler, Melvyn P. and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History of the Cold War (3 vol, 2010) 2000 pp; new essays by leading scholars
• Leffler, Melvyn P. (September 2008). For The Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. ISBN 9780374531423.
• Lewkowicz, Nicolas (2010). The German Question and the International Order, 1943–48. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-24812-0.
• Lundestad, Geir (2005). East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-1-4129-0748-4.
• Lüthi, Lorenz M (2008). The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-13590-8.
• Malkasian, Carter (2001). The Korean War: Essential Histories. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-282-1.
• Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (1996) online edition
• McMahon, Robert (2003). The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280178-4.
• Meher, Jagmohan (2004). America's Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed. Gyan Books. ISBN 978-81-7835-262-6.
• Miglietta, John P. American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945–1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. ISBN 978-0-7391-0304-3
• Miller, Roger Gene (2000). To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-0-89096-967-0.
• Njølstad, Olav (2004). The Last Decade of the Cold War. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-8371-3.
• Nolan, Peter (1995). China's Rise, Russia's Fall. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0-312-12714-5.
• Pearson, Raymond (1998). The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire. Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-312-17407-1.
• Porter, Bruce; Karsh, Efraim (1984). The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-31064-2.
• Puddington, Arch (2003). Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-9045-7.
• Roberts, Geoffrey (2006). Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-11204-7.
• Rupprecht, Tobias, Soviet internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
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• Stone, Norman (2010). The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War. Basic Books Press. ISBN 978-0-465-02043-0.
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• Tucker, Spencer, ed. Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History (5 vol. 2008), world coverage
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• Weathersby, Kathryn (1993), Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–50: New Evidence From the Russian Archives, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 8
• Westad, Odd Arne (2017). The Cold War: A World History. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-05493-0. online review
• Westad, Odd Arne (2012). Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-02936-5.
• Wettig, Gerhard (2008). Stalin and the Cold War in Europe. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-7425-5542-6.
• Wilson, James Graham (2014). The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5229-1.
• Zubok, Vladislav; Pleshakov, Constantine (1996). Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-45531-3.
• Zubok, Vladislav M. (2008) A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev

Historiography and memory

• Hopkins, Michael F. "Continuing Debate and New Approaches in Cold War History," Historical Journal, December 2007, Vol. 50 Issue 4, pp. 913–34,
• Isaac, Joel, and Duncan Bell, eds. Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War (2012)
• Johnston, Gordon. "Revisiting the cultural Cold War," Social History, Aug 2010, Vol. 35 Issue 3, pp. 290–307
• Kirkendall, Andrew J. "Cold War Latin America: The State of the Field", H-Diplo Essay No. 119: An H-Diplo State of the Field Essay (November 2014)
• Nuti, Leopoldo, et al., eds. Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal (2012)
• Roberts, Priscilla. "New Perspectives on Cold War History from China," Diplomatic History 41:2 (April 2017) online
• Wiener, Jon. How We Forgot the Cold War: A Historical Journey across America (2012)

Primary sources

• Andrew, Christopher; Mitrokhin, Vasili (2000). The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-585-41828-5.
• Cardona, Luis (2007). Cold War KFA. Routledge.
• Dobrynin, Anatoly (2001). In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents. University of Washington Press. ISBN 978-0-295-98081-2.
• Hanhimäki, Jussi and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford University Press, 2003). ISBN 0-19-927280-8.
• Sakwa, Richard (1999). The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917–1991. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-12290-0.
• "Presidency in the Nuclear Age", conference and forum at the JFK Library, Boston, 12 October 2009. Four panels: "The Race to Build the Bomb and the Decision to Use It", "Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", "The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race", and "Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and the Presidency". (transcript of "The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race")

External links

Archives


• An archive of UK civil defence material
• Post-Cold War World Economy from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• CONELRAD Cold War Pop Culture Site
• CBC Digital Archives – Cold War Culture: The Nuclear Fear of the 1950s and 1960s
• The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP)
• The Cold War Files
• Documents available online regarding aerial intelligence during the Cold War, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
• Select "Communism & Cold War" value to browse Maps from 1933–1982 at the Persuasive Cartography, The PJ Mode Collection, Cornell University Library

Bibliographies

• Annotated bibliography for the arms race from the Alsos Digital Library

Educational resources

• Minuteman Missile National Historic Site: Protecting a Legacy of the Cold War, a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan
• Electronic Briefing Books at the National Security Archive, George Washington University

News

• "Cold War". BBC. Video and audio news reports from during the cold war.
• Votel, Joseph L. & Cleveland, Charles T. & Connett, Charles T. & Irwin, Will (January 2016). "Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone". Joint Force Quarterly. 80 (1st Quarter).
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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Orville L. Hubbard
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 9/30/19

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Orville Liscum Hubbard (April 2, 1903 – December 16, 1982) was the mayor of Dearborn, Michigan for 36 years, from 1942 to 1978. Sometimes referred to as the "Dictator of Dearborn", Hubbard was the most outspoken segregationist north of the Mason-Dixon line. During his administration, non-whites were aggressively discouraged from residing in Dearborn, and Hubbard's longstanding campaign to "Keep Dearborn Clean" was widely understood to mean "Keep Dearborn White." Hubbard is also remembered as a political boss who delivered a wide range of city services to his constituents, including the construction of a 626-acre (253 ha) rustic camp outside the city and the purchase of an eight-story senior citizen tower in Florida, all for use by Dearborn residents.

Early years

Hubbard was born April 2, 1903, and raised on a farm near Union City, Michigan. Before being elected mayor of Dearborn, Hubbard ran for office unsuccessfully on nine occasions, including three unsuccessful campaigns for mayor of Dearborn, three campaigns for the Michigan State Senate and one each for Congress, Dearborn City Council and township justice of the peace.[1]

Biographer David Good described Hubbard as a "one-time high school athlete, ex-Marine, nonpracticing attorney, self-acknowledged expert on matters from the milking of cows to the history of the American Revolution, and personal symbol of suburban America's resistance to racial integration."[2][3]

Mayor of Dearborn: 1942–1978

Hubbard was elected mayor 15 times, his last term in office began in 1973. Sometimes referred to as the "Dictator of Dearborn",[4] he regularly won re-election with more than 70% of the vote and once recruited a candidate "to avoid the unseemly appearance of an unopposed election." Hubbard's "opponent" was reportedly seen on more than one occasion wearing a Hubbard button on his jacket.[5] Hubbard suffered a serious stroke on November 3, 1974, and the City Council president served as mayor pro tem, running the city on a day-to-day basis, for the rest of Hubbard's final term.

Segregationist policies

Dearborn in the Orville Hubbard years became known nationally as a symbol of racial segregation. Hubbard's longstanding campaign to "Keep Dearborn Clean" was widely understood as a thinly veiled campaign to keep Dearborn white. Hubbard became the most famous segregationist north of the Mason-Dixon line, and when he left office in 1978, only 20 African-Americans lived in Dearborn—a city with a population of 90,000.

In 1948, Hubbard led a campaign to defeat a referendum to build a low-income housing project in Dearborn on the ground it could turn into a "black slum." Cards opposing the referendum urged Dearborn residents to "keep the Negroes out of Dearborn."[2]

In 1956, Hubbard received national publicity after telling an Alabama newspaper that he favored "complete segregation" of the races.[2]

During the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the federal government put Hubbard on trial for conspiracy to violate human rights in an incident involving mob vandalism to the home of a man rumored to have sold the home to an African-American. Hubbard was acquitted of the charges.[2]

For many years, Hubbard was unabashed in his comments about segregation. He once told a reporter from the Montgomery Advertiser: "They can't get in here. We watch it. Every time we hear of a Negro moving—for instance, we had one last year—in a response quicker than to a fire. That's generally known. It's known among our own people and it's known among the Negroes here."[6] He also boasted that one of his tactics to discourage blacks who had just moved into Dearborn was by providing police and fire protection that was "a little too good"—wake-up visits every hour or so through the night in response to trouble calls.

Hubbard's other statements on race include the following:

• He once examined the bullet-riddled body of a black man and called it an open-and-shut case of suicide.[2]
• Hubbard was once quoted as saying, "I'm not a racist, but I just hate those black bastards."[2]
• During the 1967 Detroit riots, Hubbard ordered Dearborn police to "shoot looters on sight."[2]
• "I favor segregation", he told The New York Times in 1968. With integration, Hubbard said, "you wind up with a mongrel race."[7]

Hubbard's racial views were not limited to African-Americans. He was known to complain that "the Jews own this country", that the Irish "are even more corrupt than the Dagos", and as Middle Easterners began moving into Dearborn that "the Syrians are even worse than the niggers."[2]

However, after the civil rights prosecution by the federal government, and investigations by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, Hubbard was more cautious in his public comments. In an interview with The Detroit News in the early 1970s, Hubbard claimed: "I don't keep the niggers out of Dearborn. I don't keep anybody out of Dearborn. I haven't done anything to encourage 'em. I don't do anything to discourage 'em." In that interview, Hubbard also contended that his "Keep Dearborn Clean" slogan had nothing to do with racial segregation and was based on his efforts to keep Dearborn city politics free of corruption. He asserted: "Our first slogan said, 'Keep Dearborn Clean from Vice, Graft and Corruption. That's exactly what it means."[2] Even then, however, he noted his alarm that Dearborn was "a little postage-stamp community" that was "surrounded now", and that "eventually they'll overrun the place."[2]

Dearborn Towers

In 1967, Hubbard led an effort to purchase an eight-story, 88-unit apartment building with canal views in Clearwater, Florida. Though similar proposals had been rejected by Dearborn voters, Hubbard won City Council approval for acquisition of the project, which was renamed "Dearborn Towers." The City paid $1.1 million for the property, which was made available for rental at reduced rates to Dearborn's senior citizens.[8][9] The complex, a one-mile (1.6 km) walk from the beach, included a heated pool, organized poker nights and other activities. The project was billed in the 1960s as the first attempt by a U.S. city to own property outside the state. However, in 2007, Dearborn voters authorized selling the property (then valued at over $8 million) to help overcome a city budget deficit.[8][9]

Camp Dearborn

During the Hubbard administration, the City of Dearborn also built Camp Dearborn on 626 acres (2.53 km2) in Milford Township, Michigan. Opened on July 4, 1948, Camp Dearborn was Hubbard's pet project, and he was involved in its design. Hubbard dubbed the camp "the citizen's country club."[10] Dearborn had a substantial tax base as the headquarters of Ford Motor Company, which allowed Hubbard to provide his constituents with services unheard of in other cities of its size.[10][11]

Unsuccessful proposals

During his tenure as Dearborn mayor, Hubbard made several unsuccessful proposals, including a proposal to incorporate several other Wayne County suburbs into a super-suburb of Dearborn and a proposal for the City of Dearborn to purchase and operate Detroit's Ambassador Bridge and Detroit-Windsor Tunnel.[12]

Legacy

Hubbard remains a controversial figure in Michigan politics. In his book Detroit Divided, University of Michigan researcher Reynolds Farley found in 2002 that African-Americans in Metro Detroit view Dearborn as harboring racial hostility.[13] Dearborn's African-American population is up from fewer than 100 in 1980 to more than 1,200 in 2000. Still, that represents less than 1.3 percent of the population in a city that borders the predominantly African-American City of Detroit.[13] Dearborn is not by any means unusual in that respect, however, as such stark racial differences between Detroit and its suburbs are typical. For example, in Livonia, Michigan, another West-side suburb of Detroit, less than 1% of the population is African-American.

Controversy over the Orville Hubbard statue

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A statue of Orville Hubbard

A statue of Hubbard erected in front of City Hall remains a subject of controversy. A Michigan Historical marker near the statue refers to Hubbard as "an effective administrator" who "made Dearborn known for punctual trash collection", but omits any discussion of his segregationist policies.[14] Some groups have urged the City to remove the statue.[15][16] In his book, Lies Across America: What Our Historic Sites Get Wrong, James W. Loewen listed the Hubbard statue as one of the Top 20 historical monuments ripe for "toppling", along with the obelisk celebrating the White League in New Orleans and "The Good Darky" statue at the Rural Life Museum in Baton Rouge.[17] The City removed the statue September 29, 2015 and stored it at the Dearborn Historical Museum.[18]

Carl Levin's comments at Rosa Parks' funeral

In 2005, Senator Carl Levin spoke at the funeral of Rosa Parks, making the following comments about Hubbard: "The South had Orval Faubus; Michigan had Orville Hubbard. Orville Hubbard vowed to keep Dearborn clean, which some like to interpret as keep Dearborn white, despite Hubbard's dedication to a well kept city and strict City Ordinances in regards to property maintenance and the Dearborn Public Schools annual 'Clean Up, Paint Up, Fix Up Parade'."[19] Levin's comments drew an angry response from Hubbard's family. A letter published in the Detroit Free Press from Hubbard's granddaughter, Susan L. Hubbard, referred to Levin's comments as "mean-spirited ramblings of an arrogant, Washington politician", and attributed the following quotation to former Detroit Mayor Coleman A. Young: "Orville Hubbard was quite a man. Believe it or not, he was a person I admired. He and I disagreed on some things, but he was a hell of a mayor. I regarded him as one of the best mayors in the United States. ... He took care of business. He knew how to meet the needs of his people."[20]

The musical: "Orvie!"

In 2006, Hubbard was the subject of a musical play, Orvie! The musical was written by David L. Good, a former Detroit News reporter and editor, who is the author of a biography of Hubbard, and the composer Bob Milne.[5][21] Hubbard's daughter, Nancy Hubbard, then the president pro tem of the Dearborn City Council, described the play as "a put-down, like a joke", that distorted her father's contributions.[22] She said her father was a popular mayor who shoveled snow, picked up trash and sent constituents birthday cards and post cards from his travels. "He did everything for this community – the libraries, civic center, the pools. He put Dearborn on the map."[22]

References

1. "Famous People". Dearborn Area Living. Archived from the original on 2007-11-02. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
2. "Detroit News: Orville Hubbard – the ghost who still haunts Dearborn". The Detroit News. July 17, 2000. Retrieved 2018-09-24. excerpted from Good, David L (1989). Orvie: The Dictator of Dearborn. Wayne State University Press. ISBN 0-8143-2289-1.
3. "Mayor Orville Hubbard Statue". Retrieved 2007-12-04.
4. Good, David L. (1989). Orvie: The Dictator of Dearborn: The Rise and Reigh of Orville L. Hubbard. Wayne State University Press. ISBN 0-8143-2289-1.
5. Rubin, Neal (2004-03-28). "Orville Hubbard now a song-and-dance man". Detroit News.
6. Reynolds Farley; Sheldon Danziger; Harry J. Holzer (September 5, 2002). Detroit Divided. Russell Sage Foundation.
7. "Ask local express: Was Orville Hubbard really that bad?". Detroit Free Press. 2004-08-09.
8. Nichols, Darren A. (2007-06-11). "Dearborn seniors may lose Fla. perk; City considers selling beach-view apartment tower to fill budget hole". Detroit News.
9. Nichols, Darren A. (2007-10-15). "Residents oppose vote to sell senior Towers in Fla.". Detroit News.
10. Warikoo, Niraj (2007-09-09). "Suburb revamps citizens' escape: Visitors attracted to tradition, idyllic feel". Detroit Free Press.
11. "The Ordeals of Orville". Time. 1950-08-21. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
12. Marsh, Richard (1998-12-10). "Ideas of Hubbard's that didn't thrive". Press & Guide Newspapers. Archived from the original on 2007-07-01. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
13. Trowbridge, Gordon. "A policy of exclusion: Invisible boundaries created dividing line between black, white suburbs". Detroit News.
14. "L1152". Michigan Markers web site. Retrieved 2008-01-16.
15. "Down with Orville Hubbard". Archived from the original on June 13, 2006. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
16. "Dearborn, Michigan - Statue of Dearborn's Jaunty Racist Mayor". RoadsideAmerica.com.
17. "Down with Orville Hubbard". Metro Times. 2000-01-19.
18. "Dearborn removes Hubbard's statue from former city hall". http://www.arabamericannews.com. Retrieved 2015-10-01.
19. "U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) delivers remarks at the funeral of Rosa Parks". Political Transcript Wire. 2005-11-02.
20. Hubbard, Susan L. (2005-11-11). "From our readers: Sen. Levin wrong about Dearborn, Hubbard". Detroit Free Press.
21. Maynard, Micheline (2006-07-21). "Dearborn Mayor's Posthumous Musical". The New York Times. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
22. Bello, Marisol (2004-01-12). "Dearborn's racist ex-mayor inspires a musical comedy; Flamboyant leader's warts, goodness shown". Detroit Free Press.
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

Postby admin » Tue Oct 01, 2019 5:59 am

Orville Hubbard -- the ghost who still haunts Dearborn
by David L. Good
The Detroit News
Copyright 1989 Wayne State University Press; reprinted with permission.

NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

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Dearborn Mayor Orville Hubbard stands defiantly in the center of Michigan Ave. outside the Dearborn City Hall.

For most of his 36 years as mayor of the Detroit suburb of Dearborn, the late Orville L. Hubbard (1903-82) was known as the most outspoken segregationist north of the Mason-Dixon line.

A few years after taking office in 1942, Hubbard started attracting national publicity as a controversial administrator with a strange sense of humor. Eventually he gained a reputation as a political boss who worked to keep his town predominantly white.

The following chapter on Hubbard's peculiar brand of racism was excerpted from the 1989 biography Orvie: The Dictator of Dearborn (Wayne State University Press) by David L. Good. Good, an editor in the features department of The Detroit News, lives in Dearborn and once covered city hall under Hubbard.


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Through the half-drawn blinds in his mayoral suite at Dearborn City Hall, Orville Hubbard could see mainstream America. He could see the storefronts along historic Michigan Avenue, once the main Detroit-to-Chicago auto route, known during Indian days as the Sauk Trail. He could see the housewives at the neighborhood shops, the businessmen at the lunch spots, the auto workers at the bank, the retirees on the benches and the youngsters on the municipal playground equipment. He could see it all. And he could see that it was white.

In a sense, Orville Hubbard's view was no different from that in any of a dozen or more other segregated suburbs that ringed the city of Detroit -- or in hundreds of other such communities scattered across the country. But Orville Hubbard saw the cityscape and knew it was more than just a view. He knew it was a level for self-perpetuation. And while the racism of Orville Hubbard was not the racism of the Ku Klux Klan, of the cross burners and the lynch mobs, it was just as insidious in its way, representing as it did the stranglehold of the white power structure on the political machinery of the suburbs of northern America.

In Dearborn the political machinery was housed in a three-story, brick, colonial-style city hall built in 1922 and distinguished chiefly by a cupola inspired by the one at Philadelphia's Independence Hall. Inside, lettered above the front entryway, was an immediate reminder of the influence of Henry Ford: his inspirational saying, "People get ahead during the time that others waste." To the right, down the hall from a spiral stairway, lay the mayor's office. Past a paneled wooden door stenciled with an invitation to "Walk In," a pair of industrious-looking secretaries awaited to intercept visitors.

The dingy green walls of the office were decorated with a mix of clippings and slogans, including the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution and a quotation on human kindness. There was also a map of Southeast Asia for quick reference on the Vietnam War, a Marine insignia arrangement and a large color photo of three young woman waterskiing in 1950's-style tank suits. For good measure, there was a time clock with a card exhorting, "You asked for work. You have a job. Dig in or dig out. -- Mayor Hubbard." And, as insurance against confusion on busy days, there was a "Please Take a Number" standard and a "Now Serving" numerical display. Beyond a swinging gateway, past the long table in the conference room, was the mayor's inner sanctum.

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The door to Hubbard's city hall office.

There, behind a neatly ordered desk near the windows that looked out on the erstwhile Indian trail, next to a pair of large wall mirrors and a couple of old maps of the United States and Florida, sat Orville L. Hubbard, one-time high school athlete, ex-Marine, nonpracticing attorney, self-acknowledged expert on matters from the milking of cows to the history of the American Revolution, and personal symbol of suburban America's resistance to racial integration. This sunny fall morning in 1972 was no different from most. The mayor had a visitor, and, as always, he was ready to impart his peculiar wisdom to whoever was within earshot.

Most of Hubbard's conversations soon turned into rambling, disjointed discourses, often profane or scatalogical, but nearly always compelling. Although his voice was flat and adenoidal, he was a master storyteller, even when he mumbled or skipped words, as he sometimes did in his declining years. He was witty, apt of phrase, insightful in his analysis of human nature, unequivocal in his opinions. His musings were invariably an intriguing melange of folksy epigrams, barnyard humor, historical references and character assassination.

When Hubbard talked, he didn't just talk. He regularly worked himself into a desk-pounding fury, spewing out a machine-gun barrage of cuss words as he recalled past transgressions, real or imagined, by opponents or subordinates. Then he would regain his composure and meander off into childhood reminiscences, anecdotes about historical figures or general philosophizing, often pausing along the way to check a date or a spelling with an aide. An interview with Orville Hubbard wasn't so much a question-and-answer session as it was an occasional effort to nudge a monologue back toward a topic that may have seemed all but abandoned hours before.

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The mayor checks his weight on scales in the hallway outside his office.

In one-on-one conversations, Hubbard often appeared obsessed with the race issue. At least that was how he struck me during a two-year series of interviews we set up to talk about his life, and this morning was typical. As usual, he had found something that set him off. This time it was a story about Detroit Mayor Roman S. Gribbs declaring the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. a city holiday. With a touch of incredulity in his voice, Hubbard began reading aloud Gribb's description of the slain civil rights leader: " 'A man of our times. ... A man for all times. He advocated and lived nonviolence.' "

Hubbard's squinty, gray-blue eyes peered out from behind his reading glasses, his swivel chair squeaking loudly as he shifted around to face me directly. "That son of a bitch," he said in measured tones. "Truman said that Martin Luther King was just a troublemaker. He certainly stirred up violence everywhere." Then he read more of Gribbs' commentary: " 'He struggled for and he gained equality. He resisted and he overcame hatred. ' " Again, Hubbard looked up. "He did like hell," he snapped. Finally, adding his own practical reflection on the folly of Gribbs' gesture: "That's a lot of holidays. And they're broke? I wouldn't vote to give 'em the time of day. That ... mess in Detroit can never be straightened out. Never, never, never, never. "

Orville Hubbard was rolling now. Spotting a story about 65 Haitian refugees being blown ashore on the coast of Florida, he immediately clicked back to his own days as a Marine in the Caribbean. He had served a year and a half in the Virgin Islands, "where it's 99 and 44/100ths percent black," and where he recalled with some chagrin having to step deferentially off the street to make way for the locals to pass. He also drew some lasting impressions from a couple of days stationed on duty in Haiti, which he still mispronounced as "Hay-tie."

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Hubbard had few contacts with blacks growing up in rural Union City, Mich., but by the time he got into politics, his feelings on the subject had been hardened by a streak of shameless opportunism.

"Boy, that's some country," he said enthusiastically as he launched into an impromptu history lesson about "Hay-tie." "It was settled by the French, you know, and then the n-----s all overthrew 'em one night -- masscred 'em. For years they lived down there by themselves. They started eating each other. Cannibalism. The Marines went down there in 1914, and they ate a few Marines. There was a General Russell that was in charge 'em at that time. Gave the order to go through those hills and shoot every ---damn thing that moved. That brought 'em under complete control then, settled 'em down."

A few minutes later, the mayor came to a story about a 26-year-old Detroit woman who was awarded $740,000 after a bungled operation turned her into a mental patient. "Jesus Chris Almighty," he thundered. "Society can't stay in business. Because the n-----s are revolting, we just give it away." This was vintage Orville Hubbard, all right. If he was trying to cement his reputation as the nation's most outspoken segregationist outside the Deep South, he certainly was succeeding. It was exactly the kind of performance you might expect of a man who supposedly once had examined the bullet-riddled body of a black man and called it an open-and-shut case of suicide. Or a man who, during the Detroit race rioting of 1967, had ordered Dearborn police to "shoot looters on sight." Or a man who, the stories go, sometimes used to discourage blacks who had just moved into Dearborn by providing police and fire protection that was a little too good -- wake-up visits every hour or so through the night in response to trouble calls.

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Sculptor Janice Trimpe works on a bust of Mayor Hubbard

Despite his record, Hubbard, intriguingly, saw himself as almost a moderate on the race issue, even while giving in to racist invective of the worst sort. "I'm not a racist," he once protested to his assembled department heads, "but I just hate those black bastards." Once, in an apparent effort to show a group of appoinees and a reporter how broadminded he was, he approached a black parking attendant at one of his favorite luncheon spots and, with a flourish, kissed the man on both cheeks. "See," the mayor told his entourage, "I don't hate n-----s."

In his later years, Hubbard seemed to take genuine umbrage at the label with which he was inevitably tagged. When Roy Wilkins pinned the "meanest man in race relations" tag on him in 1969, Hubbard declined public comment. But when I asked him about it later, he was palpably irked. "He's full of s---," he said, adding somewhat extravagantly, "I'm probably the kindest human being that ever dealt with people anywhere in the world." And while Hubbard never did become completely reconciled to the civil rights movement, he was willing to make accommodations to it in his later years. If he looked at Dr. King as an agitator, he also once extended a cordial greeting to the Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy, Dr. King's successor as head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

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Hubbard could relate well with individual blacks. Although he dismissed Dr. Martin Luther King, right, as an agitator, he once told Dr. Ralph Abernathy, left, "We'd like to have you living here."

When Abernathy arrived one afternoon in 1969 to speak at the Dearborn Inn, Hubbard told him, "We'd like to have you living here." Hypocritical, perhaps, but it also was another indication that the ogre of Dearborn could ---and often did ---- relate well with individual blacks. Hubbard had few contacts with blacks when he was growing up. One of his most vivid childhood recollections in the rural Michigan community of Union City, he told me, was a huge sign depicting "a n----r kid eating a watermelon." But by the time he got into politics, his feeling on the subject had been hardened by a streak of shameless opportunism. Although he took no public position on the racial issue until he'd been in office for a few years, he soon became willing to seize on it as one more political advantage in a homogeneous community where many voters undoubtedly felt threatened by the presence of thousands of black auto workers at the Ford Rouge plant.

While the anti-Semitic sentiments of old Henry Ford all but evaporated from the public mind after Dearborn's most famous citizen made a brief and unsuccessful foray as a U.S. Senate candidate, the white-only rhetoric of Orville Hubbard tinged the mayor's entire career. Even his first successful run for the mayor's job in 1941 was marred by rumors --- unfounded, he always said --- that he was a member of the Klan and the even more notorious vigilante group the Black Legion. Shortly after that, he began using a campaign slogan originally intended to refer to illegal activities in town before the Ferguson grand juries came in. "Our first slogan said, 'Keep Dearborn Clean from Vice, Graft and Corruption,'" Hubbard explained to me. "That's exactly what it means." But a few years later, the slogan had evolved -- in its familiar short form, "Keep Dearborn Clean" -- into something that most observers took to mean "Keep Dearborn White." Probably the most charitable interpretation of that evolution is that the mayor never worked very hard at dispelling the impression.

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Hubbard and his Public Works Director Frank Swapka liked to keep the city neat, but the slogan "Keep Dearborn Clean" came to be a catchphrase for "Keep the city white."

Hubbard's years in office were marred by a long list of racist pronouncements. In what was arguably the low point, he opposed construction of a low-income housing development in 1948 on the grounds that it was a "racial gamble" that could turn into a black slum. He went so far as to have his aides pass out leaflets urging citizens to "keep the Negroes out of Dearborn" by voting against a referendum on the project. One of his favorite stories, in fact, concerned a former council member who, he said, worked at a polling place while wearing a hat with the same exhortation on it. But there were no other politicos in town who could even think of outbigoting Orville Hubbard.

Hubbard became a national figure of sorts on the race issue in 1956, when he told an Alabama newspaperman that he was "for complete segregation, one million percent." In 1965, the federal government tried him -- unsuccessfully -- on charges of conspiring to violate the civil rights of a Dearborn man whose house was vandalized during a mob scene stirred up by rumors that he had sold to blacks. A bit later, Hubbard became the first target of the fledgling Michigan Civil Rights Commission after he refused to remove race-related news clippings he had posted on city bulletin boards.

Despite all that, however, Dearborn's history of outright discrimination or harassment against blacks --- by either Hubbard, his underlings or his constituents --- fell well short of the city's national image as a bastion of northern racism. A much-repeated story throughout Hubbard's tenure in office dealt with routine mistreatment of blacks traveling in Dearborn or trying to live or shop in the city. In fact, however, the public record contained little to back up the story.

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Hubbard shows his contempt for his critics by stomping on a subpeona at a city council meeting in 1959.

The mayor had a way of explaining his position on the basis of justice and equity without realizing his words were loaded with irony. "God------," he once was quoted in the NewYork Times. "I don't hate n-----s. Christ, I don't even dislike them. But if whites don't want to live with n-----s, they sure as hell don't have to. D------t, this is a free country. This is America."

Usually, though, when quoted for print, Hubbard spoke temperately, if patronizingly, on the subject. "I just don't believe in integration," he told The Detroit News in 1967. "When that happens, along comes socializing with the whites, intermarriage and then mongrelization." But, he added, "the Negroes who work here are well treated. The're welcome in our restaurants and motels. One Negro told me that he never recieved more polite treatment that when he was stopped by one of our policemen. And go talk to the Negro family who was slipped into the city by some civil rights group. We treat them well."

In spite of his frequent segregationist declarations, Hubbard was not, strictly speaking, a white supremacist. He never said blacks were inferior -- just that they should be kept apart from whites. As for assessing his role in keeping Dearborn white, he occasionally claimed "credit" for the feat in his earlier years as mayor. But he became more modest about the "accomplishment" later in life.

"I don't keep the n-----s out of Dearborn," he told me. "I don't keep anybody out of Dearborn. I haven't done anything to encourage 'em. I don't do anything to discourage 'em."

"I would think eventually they'll overrun the place -- in another 20 years, I wouldn't be surprised. We're surrounded now. Christ, we're just a little postage-stamp community here. I would say the attitude of Dearborn is no different than that of any other community. This town has probably got the greatest diversity of nationalities in the country -- 45, according to the 1970 census report. That's as many as the United Nations.

"I believe in freedom of choice. Most people want to be accepted, and the only way to be accepted is to fit the pattern. I'm not against any human being in the world. I've never taken a stand against a person because he was red, white or yellow, whatever his color is. I've taken this stand; I've never changed it: I don't believe in one group of people forcing themselves upon another. The average fellow with good sense doesn't go where he's not welcome and not wanted. I don't care who he is, where he lives, you or me. People upon this world have lived among their own people. That's the pattern. That's the whole history of the world.

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Hubbard gets a warm welcome at a rally protesting HUD housing. Hubbard was not, strictly speaking, a white supremacist. He never said blacks were inferior -- just that they should be kept apart from whites.

"What the hell's a racist? You're a racist because you don't believe in forced segregation? If you are, I guess I'd be a racist. Do I think the black man is inferior? No, I don't. I think any normal-born human being that has an equal opportunity would develop as much as anybody else regardless of who they are. I think environment's the whole story in life. Human beings -- I don't care what color they are , but they must be accepted on their own merits. If you're going to be a bum, be a bum. If you're going to try to do something, you're recognized for doing something. Be proud of who you are and how you live, and people will be proud of you."

That's the kind of stuff many of the folks in Dearborn loved to hear _ the blue-collar conservative groups in the heavily ethnic east-side precints as well as at least a share of the WASP-ish white-collar and professional types on the west side. It was a formula for racial separation without all the guilt feelings engendered by outright vituperation. And it well may have helped pull Hubbard through an election or two in the early years of his career.

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Hubbard visits precinct workers in 1977.

To those who knew Orvill Hubbard well, the irony of this strong ethnic support was inescapable. Of several long-standing secrets he kept from his constituents, the best kept was that he harbored a wide-ranging personal contempt that extended far beyond the black race. He looked down on a variety of ethnic and religious groups, including many that turned out heavily for him at the polls. If he had not remained on the guard to mask his considerable prejudices about all kinds of white groups, he would never have seemed so easy to pigeonhole as a white bigot.

Indeed, during our interviews, Hubbard frequently let slip asides of anecdotes that revealed his deep-seated dislike of many non-WASP groups. Sometimes he caught himself, and sometimes he did not.

"They say the Jews own this country, the Irish run it and the n-----s have all the fun," he once observed. Then he added, "There's more truth to that. And if there's ever any corruption -- it's not a good thing to say, make a lot of people mad, but it's true -- the Irish are all involved. I've noticed that over the years. In the police department, they seem to be more corrupt even than the Dagos." He also built up an active dislike for the city's burgeoning Arab enclave in the east end, allowing once that "some people, the Syrians, are even worse than the n-----s."

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Hubbard was confined to a wheelchair in his later years following a stroke. He spent his last years in this home owned by Maureen Keane on Wellesley in Dearborn.

Observed Judy Cord, an office secretary for Hubbard from 1959 to 1970: "I don't think he liked anybody. I mean you were either a Polack or a Dago or a Jew or a potato digger, or you were cheap or you were a son of a bitch. Whatever you were, that was the excuse. So I don't think you could say specifically he disliked blacks, because he expanded to everybody."

As an aside, however, let it not be said that Orville Hubbard remained totally blind to the evils of prejudice. At one point, he remarked with totally unitentional irony, "Those Irish Catholics are the worst of them all. They're so damn prejudiced. They talk about the Irish Mafia, about what's going on in Ireland. They never settle that stuff because of the narrowmindedness."

But a question remains: Was Hubbard's own racial stand really just calculated for political effect? There can be no doubt that he believed what he was saying publicly , and yet, in light of his privately expressed revulsion toward other ethnic groups, there's equally little question but that he would have been saying it differently had circumstances been different.

One clue comes from the mayor's own musing about his dealing with blacks on a personal and political level. "Christ," he sputtered, "when I ran for office back in the early days (as a township justice of the peace in 1936), the Negroes all voted for me. I knew 'em all. I get along with everybody. I say if Negroes lived here, they'd be all voting for Hubbard."

Blacks voting for Hubbard?

Perhaps. In another town, under different circumstances, why not? But left unanswered is the question of what sort of community would elect such a man on such a racist platform as Orville Hubbard implicitly ran on -- and keep on electing him.
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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America First Committee
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 10/2/19

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America First Committee
Abbreviation AFC
Formation September 4, 1940
Founder Robert D. Stuart Jr.
Founded at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.
Extinction December 10, 1941
Type Non-partisan pressure group
Purpose Non-interventionism
Headquarters Chicago, Illinois, U.S.
Membership (1941)
800,000
Chairman
Robert E. Wood
Spokesperson
Charles Lindbergh
Key people
William H. RegneryRobert E. WoodCharles A. LindberghLillian GishRobert R. McCormickSargent ShriverPotter StewartRuth Sarles Benedict
Subsidiaries 450 chapters
Revenue (1940)
$370,000

The America First Committee (AFC) was the foremost United States non-interventionist pressure group against the American entry into World War II. Started on September 4, 1940, it put out mixed messaging with antisemitic and pro-fascist rhetoric from leading members,[1][2][3] and it was dissolved on December 10, 1941, three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor had brought the war to the United States. Membership peaked at 800,000 paying members in 450 chapters. It was one of the largest anti-war organizations in the history of the United States.[4][5]

Membership

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Students at the University of California (Berkeley) participate in a one-day peace strike opposing U.S. entrance into World War II, April 19, 1940

The AFC was established on September 4, 1940, by Yale Law School student R. Douglas Stuart, Jr. (son of R. Douglas Stuart, co-founder of Quaker Oats), along with other students, including future President Gerald Ford, future Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver, and future U.S. Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart.[6] At its peak, America First claimed 800,000 dues-paying members in 450 chapters, located mostly in a 300-mile radius of Chicago.[4]

It claimed 135,000 members in 60 chapters in Illinois, its strongest state.[7] Fundraising drives produced about $370,000 from some 25,000 contributors. Nearly half came from a few millionaires such as William H. Regnery, H. Smith Richardson of the Vick Chemical Company, General Robert E. Wood of Sears-Roebuck, publisher Joseph M. Patterson (New York Daily News) and his cousin, publisher Robert R. McCormick (Chicago Tribune).[8]

The AFC was never able to get funding for its own public opinion poll. The New York chapter received slightly more than $190,000, most of it from its 47,000 contributors. Since it never had a national membership form or national dues, and local chapters were quite autonomous, historians point out that the organization's leaders had no idea how many "members" it had.[9]

Serious organizing of the America First Committee took place in Chicago not long after the September 1940 establishment. Chicago was to remain the national headquarters of the committee. To preside over their committee, America First chose General Robert E. Wood, the 61-year-old chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Co. Wood remained at the head of the committee until it was disbanded in the days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.[citation needed]

The America First Committee had its share of prominent businessmen as well as the sympathies of political figures including Democratic Senators Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, Republican Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, with its most prominent spokesman being aviator Charles A. Lindbergh. Other celebrities supporting America First were actress Lillian Gish and architect Frank Lloyd Wright.[10]

Two men who would later become presidents, John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford, supported and contributed to the organization. When he donated $100 to the AFC, Kennedy attached a note which read simply: "What you are doing is vital."[11] Ford was one of the first members of the AFC when a chapter formed at Yale University.[12] Additionally, Potter Stewart, a future Supreme Court justice, served on the original committee of the AFC.[13]

Issues

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Flyer for an America First Committee rally in St. Louis, Missouri in April 1941

When the war began in September 1939, most Americans, including politicians, demanded neutrality regarding Europe.[14] Although most Americans supported strong measures against Japan, Europe was the focus of the America First Committee. The public mood was changing, however, especially after the fall of France in the spring of 1940.[15]

The America First Committee launched a petition aimed at enforcing the 1939 Neutrality Act and forcing President Franklin D. Roosevelt to keep his pledge to keep America out of the war. They profoundly distrusted Roosevelt and argued that he was lying to the American people.

On the day after Roosevelt's lend-lease bill was submitted to the United States Congress, Wood promised AFC opposition "with all the vigor it can exert". America First staunchly opposed the convoying of ships, the Atlantic Charter, and the placing of economic pressure on Japan. In order to achieve the defeat of lend-lease and the perpetuation of American neutrality, the AFC advocated four basic principles:

• The United States must build an impregnable defense for America.
• No foreign power, nor group of powers, can successfully attack a prepared America.
• American democracy can be preserved only by keeping out of the European war.
• "Aid short of war" weakens national defense at home and threatens to involve America in war abroad.

Charles Lindbergh was admired in Germany and allowed to see the buildup of the German air force, the Luftwaffe, in 1937. He was impressed by its strength and secretly reported his findings to the General Staff of the United States Army, warning them that the U.S. had fallen behind and that it must urgently build up its aviation.[16] He had feuded with the Roosevelt administration for years. His first radio speech was broadcast on September 15, 1939, on all three of the major radio networks. He urged listeners to look beyond the speeches and propaganda that they were being fed and instead look at who was writing the speeches and reports, who owned the papers and who influenced the speakers.

On June 20, 1941, Lindbergh spoke to 30,000 people in Los Angeles and billed it as a "Peace and Preparedness Mass Meeting", Lindbergh criticized those movements which he perceived were leading America into the war. He proclaimed that the United States was in a position that made it virtually impregnable. He claimed that the interventionists and the British who called for "the defense of England" really meant "the defeat of Germany".[17][18]

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Charles Lindbergh speaking at an America First Committee rally in Fort Wayne, Indiana in early October 1941

Nothing did more to escalate the tensions than the speech which Lindbergh delivered to a rally in Des Moines, Iowa on September 11, 1941. In that speech, he identified the forces pulling America into the war as the British, the Roosevelt administration, and American Jews. While he expressed sympathy for the plight of the Jews in Germany, he argued that America's entry into the war would serve them little better. He said, in part, the following:

It is not difficult to understand why Jewish people desire the overthrow of Nazi Germany. The persecution they suffered in Germany would be sufficient to make bitter enemies of any race. No person with a sense of the dignity of mankind can condone the persecution the Jewish race suffered in Germany. But no person of honesty and vision can look on their pro-war policy here today without seeing the dangers involved in such a policy, both for us and for them.

Instead of agitating for war the Jewish groups in this country should be opposing it in every possible way, for they will be among the first to feel its consequences. Tolerance is a virtue that depends upon peace and strength. History shows that it cannot survive war and devastation. A few farsighted Jewish people realize this and stand opposed to intervention. But the majority still do not. Their greatest danger to this country lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, our radio, and our government.[19]


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A Dr. Seuss editorial cartoon from early October 1941 criticizing America First

Communists were antiwar until June 1941, and they tried to infiltrate or take over America First.[20] After Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, they reversed positions and denounced the AFC as a Nazi front (a group infiltrated by German agents).[21] Nazis also tried to use the committee: at the trial of the aviator and orator Laura Ingalls,[22] the prosecution revealed that her handler, Ulrich Freiherr von Gienanth, a German diplomat, had encouraged her to participate in committee activities.

After Pearl Harbor

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, AFC canceled a rally with Lindbergh at Boston Garden "in view of recent critical developments,"[23] and the organization's leaders announced their support of the war effort. Lindbergh gave the rationale:[24]

We have been stepping closer to war for many months. Now it has come and we must meet it as united Americans regardless of our attitude in the past toward the policy our government has followed.

Whether or not that policy has been wise, our country has been attacked by force of arms and by force of arms we must retaliate. Our own defenses and our own military position have already been neglected too long. We must now turn every effort to building the greatest and most efficient Army, Navy and Air Force in the world. When American soldiers go to war it must be with the best equipment that modern skill can design and that modern industry can build.


With the formal declaration of war against Japan, the organization chose to disband. On December 11, the committee leaders met and voted for dissolution. In the statement which they released to the press was the following:

Our principles were right. Had they been followed, war could have been avoided. No good purpose can now be served by considering what might have been, had our objectives been attained.

We are at war. Today, though there may be many important subsidiary considerations, the primary objective is not difficult to state. It can be completely defined in one word: Victory.[25]


Conservative commentator Pat Buchanan has praised America First and used its name as a slogan. "The achievements of that organization are monumental," writes Buchanan. "By keeping America out of World War II until Hitler attacked Stalin in June 1941, Soviet Russia, not America, bore the brunt of the fighting, bleeding and dying to defeat Nazi Germany."[26]

See also

• America First (policy)
• America First Party (1943)
• Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies

References

Notes


1. Bennett, Brian. "'America First,' a phrase with a loaded anti-Semitic and isolationist history". latimes.com. Retrieved 2018-11-23.
2. Calamur, Krishnadev (2017-01-21). "A Short History of 'America First'". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2018-11-23.
3. Dunn, Susan (201
3-06-04). 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler-the Election amid the Storm. Yale University Press. p. 66. ISBN 0300195133.
4. Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-41 (1953)
5. Bill Kauffman, Ain't My America: The Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American Anti-Imperialism (2008)
6. Kauffman, Bill; Sarles, Ruth (2003). A story of America First: the men and women who opposed U. S. intervention in World War II. New York: Praeger. p. xvii. ISBN 0-275-97512-6.
7. Schneider p 198
8. Cole, Wayne S. (1953). America First: The Battle Against Intervention. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. p. 15.
9. Cole 1953, 25-33; Schneider 201-2
10. Kevin Starr (2003). Embattled Dreams: California in War and Peace, 1940-1950. Oxford UP. p. 6. ISBN 9780195168976.
11. "Still America First".
12. "In defense of America First". 2 May 2016.
13. Letters (5 March 2017). "America First was not a pro-Nazi organisation - Letters". the Guardian.
14. Leroy N. Rieselbach (1966). The Roots of Isolationism: congressional voting and presidential leadership in foreign policy. Bobbs-Merrill. p. 13.
15. James Gilbert Ryan; Leonard C. Schlup (2006). Historical Dictionary of the 1940s. M.E. Sharpe. p. 415. ISBN 9780765621078.
16. James Duffy (2010). Lindbergh vs. Roosevelt: The Rivalry That Divided America. Regnery. pp. 76–77. ISBN 9781596981676.
17. Louis Pizzitola (2002). Hearst Over Hollywood: Power, Passion, and Propaganda in the Movies. Columbia UP. p. 401. ISBN 9780231116466.
18. Wayne S. Cole (1974). Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. p. 9. ISBN 9780151181681.
19. Cole 1953, p. 144
20. Selig Adler (1957). The isolationist impulse: its twentieth-century reaction. pp. 269–70, 274. ISBN 9780837178226.
21. Kahn, A. E., and M. Sayers. The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia Archived 2009-04-12 at the Wayback Machine. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1946, chap. XXIII (American Anti-Comintern), part 5: Lone Eagle, pp. 365-378. Kahn, A.E., and M. Sayers. The Plot against the Peace: A Warning to the Nation!. 1st ed. New York: Dial Press, 1945, chap. X (In the Name of Peace), pp. 187-209.
22. New York Times, December 18, 1941, "Laura Ingalls Held as Reich Agent: Flier Says She Was Anti-Nazi Spy".
23. "No America First Rally". The New York Times. Associated Press. 1941-12-09. p. 40.
24. "Isolationist Groups Back Roosevelt". The New York Times. 1941-12-09. p. 44.
25. "America First Group to Quit". The Telegraph-Herald. Dubuque, Iowa. United Press International. 1941-12-12. p. 13. Retrieved November 16, 2011.
26. Pat Buchanan (October 13, 2004). "The Resurrection of 'America First!'". The American Cause. Retrieved 2008-02-03

Bibliography

• Berg, A. Scott (1999) Lindbergh pp .84–432
• Cole, Wayne S. (1974) Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle against American Intervention in World War II
• Cole, Wayne S. (1953) America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-41
• Doenecke, Justus D. ed. (1990) In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee
• Doenecke, Justus D. (2000) Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941
• Doenecke, Justus D. (Summer/Fall 1982) "American Isolationism, 1939-1941" Journal of Libertarian Studies 6(3), pp.201–216
• Doenecke, Justus D. (Summer 1987) "Anti-Interventionism of Herbert Hoover" Journal of Libertarian Studies 8(2), pp.311–340.
• Gleason, S. Everett and Langer, William L. (1953) The Undeclared War, 1940-1941
o semi-official government history
• Goodman, David (2007) "Loving and Hating Britain: Rereading the Isolationist Debate in the USA" in Darian-Smith, Kate; Grimshaw, Patricia; and Macintyre, Stuart eds. Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures, Carlton: Melbourne University Press. pp187–204. ISBN 978-0-522-85392-6
• Gordon, David (2003) America First: the Anti-War Movement, Charles Lindbergh and the Second World War, 1940-1941
o presentation to the New York Military Affairs Symposium
• Jonas, Manfred (1966) Isolationism in America, 1935-1941
• Kauffman, Bill (1995) America First!: Its History, Culture, and Politics ISBN 0-87975-956-9
• Parmet, Herbert S. and Hechy, Marie B. (1968) Never Again: A President Runs for a Third Term
• Schneider, James C. (1989) Should America Go to War? The Debate over Foreign Policy in Chicago, 1939-1941

Primary sources

• America First Committee (1990). In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 As Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee. Hoover Press. ISBN 9780817988418.
• Doenecke, Justus D. (1997) The Battle Against Intervention, 1939-1941
o includes short narrative and primary documents

Historiography

• Doenecke, Justus D. (Spring 1983) "Literature of Isolationism, 1972–1983: A Bibliographic Guide" Journal of Libertarian Studies 7(1), pp.157–184
• Doenecke, Justus D. (Winter 1986) "Explaining the Antiwar Movement, 1939–1941: The Next Assignment" Journal of Libertarian Studies 8(1), pp.139–162.
• Hogan, Michael J., ed. (2000). Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941. Cambridge University Press. p. 258. ISBN 9780521664134.

External links

• America First Committee Records, 1940-1942 at the Hoover Institution Archives
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Re: Neuschwanstein: A fairy tale darling's dark Nazi past

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Führerprinzip [Fuhrer-Fuehrer Principle]
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Accessed: 10/2/19

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The Führerprinzip [ˈfyːʀɐpʀɪnˌtsiːp] (About this soundlisten) (German for "leader principle") prescribed the fundamental basis of political authority in the governmental structures of the Third Reich. This principle can be most succinctly understood to mean that "the Führer's word is above all written law" and that governmental policies, decisions, and offices ought to work toward the realization of this end.[1] In actual political usage, it refers mainly to the practice of dictatorship within the ranks of a political party itself, and as such, it has become an earmark of political fascism.

Ideology

The Führerprinzip was not invented by the Nazis. Hermann von Keyserling, an ethnically German philosopher from Estonia, was the first to use the term. One of Keyserling's central claims was that certain "gifted individuals" were "born to rule" on the basis of Social Darwinism.

The ideology of the Führerprinzip sees each organization as a hierarchy of leaders, where every leader (Führer, in German) has absolute responsibility in his own area, demands absolute obedience from those below him and answers only to his superiors.[2] This required obedience and loyalty even over concerns of right and wrong.[2] The supreme leader, Adolf Hitler, answered to God and the German people. Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has argued[citation needed] that Hitler saw himself as an incarnation of auctoritas, and as the living law or highest law itself, effectively combining in his persona executive power, judicial power and legislative power. After the campaign against the alleged Röhm Putsch, Hitler declared: "in this hour, I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and was therefore the supreme judge of the German people!"[3]

The Führerprinzip paralleled the functionality of military organizations, which continue to use a similar authority structure today, although in democratic countries members are supposed to be restrained by codes of conduct. The Freikorps – German paramilitary organizations made up of men who had fought in World War I and been mustered out after Germany's defeat, but who found it impossible to return to civilian life – were run on the Führer principle. Many of the same men had, earlier in life, been part of various German youth groups in the period from 1904-1913.[4] These groups had also accepted the idea of blind obedience to a leader.[5] The justification for the civil use of the Führerprinzip was that unquestioning obedience to superiors supposedly produced order and prosperity in which those deemed 'worthy' would share.

In the case of the Nazis, the Führerprinzip became integral to the Nazi Party in July 1921, when Adolf Hitler forced a showdown with the original leaders of the party after he learned that they were attempting to merge it with the somewhat larger German Socialist Party. Learning of this, and knowing that any merger would dilute his influence over the group, Hitler quit the Nazis. Realizing that the party would be completely ineffective without Hitler as their front man, the founder of the party, Anton Drexler, opened negotiations with Hitler, who delivered an ultimatum: he must be recognized as the sole leader (Führer) of the party, with dictatorial powers. The executive committee gave in to his demands, and Hitler rejoined the party a few days later to become its permanent ruler, with Drexler kicked upstairs to be honorary chairman for life.[6]

In time, as the party expanded, it fragmented somewhat, with the northern faction led by the Strasser brothers, Otto and Gregor, and including Joseph Goebbels, holding more socialist views then the southern faction controlled by Hitler in Munich. They differed in other ways as well, including on the party's acceptance of the Fuehrer Principle. In another confrontation engineered by Hitler, a party conference was called on February 14, 1926 in Bamberg. At this conference, Hitler won over the leaders of the northern faction with his oratorical skills, and the question of whether the NSDAP would follow the Führerprinzip was put to rest for good.[7]

When Hitler finally came to absolute power, after being appointed Chancellor and assuming the powers of the President when Paul von Hindenburg died, he changed his title to "Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor", and the Führerprinzip became an integral part of German society. Appointed mayors replaced elected local governments. Schools lost elected parents' councils and faculty advisory boards, with all authority being put in the headmaster's hands.[8] The Nazis suppressed associations and unions with elected leaders, putting in their place mandatory associations with appointed leaders. The authorities allowed private corporations to keep their internal organization, but with a simple renaming from hierarchy to Führerprinzip. Conflicting associations, e.g. sports associations responsible for the same sport, were coordinated into a single one under the leadership of a single Führer, who appointed the Führer of a regional association, who appointed the sports club Führer, often appointing the person whom the club had previously elected.[9] Shop stewards had their authority carefully circumscribed to prevent their infringing on that of the plant leader.[10] Eventually, virtually no activity or organization in Germany could exist that was completely independent of party and/or state leadership.

Hermann Göring told Nevile Henderson that "When a decision has to be taken, none of us counts more than the stones on which we are standing. It is the Führer alone who decides".[11] In practice, the selection of unsuitable candidates often led to micromanagement and commonly to an inability to formulate coherent policy. Albert Speer noted that many Nazi officials dreaded making decisions in Hitler's absence. Rules tended to become oral rather than written; leaders with initiative who flouted regulations and carved out their own spheres of influence might receive praise and promotion rather than censure.

Image
The architects of the Night of the Long Knives: Hitler, Göring, Goebbels, and Hess. Only Himmler and Heydrich are missing.

Propaganda

Many propaganda films developed the importance of the Führerprinzip. Flüchtlinge depicted Volga German refugees saved from Communist persecution by a leader demanding unquestioning obedience.[12] Der Herrscher altered its source material to depict its hero, Clausen, as the unwavering leader of his munitions firm, who, faced with his children's machinations, disowns them and bestows the firm on the state, confident that a worker will arise capable of continuing his work and, as a true leader, needing no instruction.[13] Carl Peters shows the title character in firm, decisive action to hold and win African colonies, but brought down by a parliament that does not realize the necessity of Führerprinzip.[14]

In the schools, adolescent boys were presented with Nordic sagas as the illustration of Führerprinzip, which was developed with such heroes as Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck.[15]

This combined with the glorification of the one, central Führer. During the Night of Long Knives, it was claimed that his decisive action saved Germany,[16] though it meant (in Goebbels's description) suffering "tragic loneliness" from being a Siegfried forced to shed blood to preserve Germany.[17] In one speech Robert Ley explicitly proclaimed "The Führer is always right."[18] Booklets given out for the Winter Relief donations included The Führer Makes History,[19][20] a collection of Hitler photographs,[21] and The Führer’s Battle in the East[22] Films such as Der Marsch zum Führer and Triumph of the Will glorified him.

Carl Schmitt – drawn to the Nazi party by his admiration for a decisive leader[23] praised him in his pamphlet State, Volk and Movement because only the ruthless will of such a leader could save Germany and its people from the "asphalt culture" of modernity, to bring about unity and authenticity.[24]

Image
Adolf Eichmann on trial in 1961

Application

During the post-war Nuremberg Trials, Nazi war criminals—and, later, Adolf Eichmann during the trial in Israel—used the Führerprinzip concept to argue that they were not guilty of war crimes by claiming that they were only following orders. Eichmann may have declared his conscience was inconvenienced by war events in order to "do his job" as best he could.

In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt concluded that, aside from a desire for improving his career, Eichmann showed no trace of anti-Semitism or psychological abnormalities whatsoever. She called him the embodiment of the "banality of evil", as he appeared at his trial to have an ordinary and common personality, displaying neither guilt nor hatred, denying any form of responsibility. Eichmann argued he was simply "doing his job" and maintained he had always tried to act in accordance with Kant's categorical imperative. Arendt suggested that these statements most strikingly discredit the idea that Nazi criminals were manifestly psychopathic and different from common people, that even the most ordinary of people can commit horrendous crimes if placed in the catalyzing situation, and given the correct incentives. However, Arendt disagreed with this interpretation, as Eichmann justified himself with the Führerprinzip. Arendt argued that children obey, whereas adults adhere to an ideology.

See also

• Adolf Hitler
• Autocracy
• Charisma
• Cult of personality
• Führer
• Functionalism versus intentionalism
• Gleichschaltung
• Meine Ehre heißt Treue
• Milgram experiment
• Nuremberg Defense
• State of exception
• Superior orders
• Unrechtsstaat

References

Notes


1. "Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression Volume I Chapter VII: Means Used by the Nazi Conspiractors in Gaining Control of the German State" A Teacher's Guide to the Holocaust
2. "Befehlsnotstand & the Führerprinzip" Shoah Education
3. Sager, Alexander & Winkler, Heinrich August (2007). Germany: The Long Road West. 1933-1990. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-926598-4.|page=37
4. Savage, Jon (2007) Teenage: The Creation of Youth Culture New York: Viking. pp.101-12. ISBN 978-0-670-03837-4
5. Mitcham (1996), p.21
6. Mitcham (1996), pp.78-79
7. Mitcham (1996), pp.120-121
8. Nicholas (2006), p.74
9. Kurger, Arns (1985) "'Heute gehört uns Deutschland und morgen …?' Das Ringen um den Sinn der Gleichschaltung im Sport in der ersten Jahreshälfte 1933." in Buss, Wolfgang and Krüger, Arnd (eds.) (1985) Sportgeschichte: Traditionspflege und Wertewandel. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Henze Duderstad: Mecke. pp.175–196.
10. Grunberger, Richard (1971) The 12-Year Reich New York: Henry Holt. p 193, ISBN 0-03-076435-1
11. Gunther, John (1940). Inside Europe. New York: Harper & Brothers. p. 19.
12. Leiser (1975), pp.29-30
13. Leiser (1975), p.49
14. Leiser (1975), pp.104-5
15. Nicholas (2006), p.78
16. Koonz (2003), p.96
17. Rhodes, Anthony (1976) Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II New York: Chelsea House. p.16 ISBN 0877540292
18. Ley, Robert ((3 November 1937) "Fate - I Believe!" German Propaganda Archive Calvin College website
19. "Winterhilfswerk Booklet for 1933" German Propaganda Archive Calvin College website
20. ""Winterhilfswerk Booklet for 1938" German Propaganda Archive Calvin College website
21. "Hitler in the Mountains" German Propaganda Archive Calvin College website
22. "Hitler in the East" German Propaganda Archive Calvin College website
23. Koonz (2003), p.56
24. Koonz (2003), p.59

Bibliography

• Koonz, Claudia (2003) The Nazi Conscience Belknap. ISBN 0-674-01172-4
• Leiser, Erwin (1975) Nazi Cinema New York: Macmillan. ISBN 0-02-570230-0
• Mitcham, Samuel W. (1996) Why Hitler? The Genesis of the Nazi Reich Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 0-275-95485-4
• Nicholas, Lynn H. (2006) Cruel World: The Children of Europe in the Nazi Web New York: Vintage. ISBN 0-679-77663-X

External links

• BBC historical article
• Bearers of a Common Fate?
• The Political System of the Third Reich
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