Freda Bedi Cont'd (#2)

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Part 1 of 3

Gandhi vs. Lenin
by S.A. [Shripad Amrit] Dange
1921
Printed by S. V. Lalit at Loksevak Press, Govardhan Building, Bombay No. 4,
Published by the Liberty Literature Co., 434, Thakurdwar, Bombay No. 2.

We shall not give the Govt. assistance to collect revenue. We shall not assist them in carrying on the administration of justice. We shall have our own courts, and if time comes, we shall not pay taxes."

-- Lok. B.G. Tilak. in 1906


CONTENTS.

• My own Foreword
• Chapter I: Introductory
• Chapter II: Society of Today: The Class War
• Chapter III: Gandhi vs. Lenin
• Chapter IV: "The Armed Blow"
• Chapter V: The Indian Revolution
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C

MY OWN FOREWORD.

Every book must have a preface or a foreword; and that preface must be from a well-known writer or a ‘leader’ standing high in public-favour. These are the first principles of publishing a book in our days. If we analyse prefaces to publications of our times, they fall into the following classes: The preface (1) containing a eulogy of the writer’s abilities to write on the particular subject in hand and pleading the necessity of such a book on that particular subject, (2) containing a summary of the subject-matter of the publication and one or two paltry suggestions, (3) containing an impartial judgement on the book by a man, who knows the subject very well and showing the descrepancies, if any. A good book with the 3rd kind of preface is a rarity now-a-days. Hack-writers, wishing to sell cheap, far and wide meet us at every book-stall with glaring placards, mentioning with great care the name of the preface or foreword-writer, who in ninety cases out of hundred is some demagogue assuming the airs of a patriot-leader in the politics of the day. The public seldom knows the troubles the poor writer has to undergo, to procure for their benefit, a foreword from some 'great leader,' with the key or stamp of whose name, he wishes to enter the regions of public favour. He has to introduce himself through several other less great leaders, satellites of the centre planet. ‘The Big Boy’ sometimes does not even know that his person is so well guarded by his faithful ‘crooks’. After introduction the poor preface-procurer, has to flatter the ‘great leader,' saying in the usual line, that he is the only one capable of giving any opinion on the subject and that the public would like to hear his views and that etc., etc. Then the ‘great leader,’ all smiles, condescends to go through the book once. For some days, the poor writer waits dreaming that the book is being gone through. He returns to hear that on account of pressure of work, (of course public work because a ‘leader’ has no time to visit the race-courses and the speculation bazaars, at least openly,) he could not find time.* [I know of a well-known professor, a Marathi scholar, who could not find time to write a preface, until he or rather the time was paid for it!] But he would be glad to do it very soon. If the writer relying upon the words of that honest man has advertised the time, when the work was to be out, he has to express his regret that on account of ‘unforeseen circumstances the publication was delayed.’ After all these troubles of coming and going to the 'great leader’s’ house, sending in visiting cards, (for even in a leader’s house, men must not enter without sending in their names, like a Hindoo! Lok. Tilak was not a ‘well-bred leader’ for peasants could go and speak to him without 'announcing’ themselves!) the public gets some lessons in patriotism, the new spirit in the nation, their birthrights and fighting the battle of liberty to death and so on. [Now-a-days every writer must mention at least once the Khilafat and the Punjab wrongs!] The readers, dazzled by the strong wording and high notions, never dream that the whole thing, over the signature of the great man that they are reading, has been written, not by himself, but by his learned private secretary, specially paid and maintained for this purpose!1 [Many capitalists and money-leaders of Bombay have their speeches, written by their private secretaries, who are sometimes bar-at-laws, and deliver them in currency committees and industrial conferences!] By this I do not mean that all publications are such. What 1 mean is simply this, that if a foreword is to be a mere eulogy of the author or a summary of the subject-matter to follow, it is better that the book should be without any foreword, because the reader can very well know both the writer and the summary, after reading the book himself. However a novice in the line of writing has to suffer these hardships. Let us remember that Johnson suffered much more before he became Dr. Johnson!

Now I will begin my own true foreword. I thought of writing this booklet, when at the beginning of the N.C.O. movement our opponents began to discredit it, by pretending to find signs of Bolshevik activity in the movement and thus kill it. The public knew very little of the Bolsheviks beyond some fables, created by news-paper booming. Seeing this I thought of writing this booklet, to show the extreme contrast between the methods of N.C.O. activity and the Bolshevik plan, to accomplish their ideals. There is not much literature, available for such a work, on the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks; because our Government takes great care to guard the gates of India against the entry of authentic literature on the subject. What has been allowed to enter, is written by men who hate the Bolsheviks and are of imperialistic tendencies. In such a situation, it is difficult to write with confidence on the subject. However my purpose will be served, if the booklet gives at least an idea of the elementary principles of the great movement in Russia and of the hypocrisy of those who would class N.C.O. with Bolshevism, if my countrymen come to recognize the magnitude of extremism to which we will have to go in our struggle for emancipation and to expect and be ready for Government Terrorism, a veritable greater Ireland on the Indian soil!

My foreword is finished. I am sorry, at the end 1 cannot add the author’s script to mention and thank some kind friend for having read and corrected the proofs of my book, as is the custom; for I myself had to do the work!!

Bombay,
April 1921.
S. A. DANGE.

Chapter I: Introductory.

"The Earth is of God and it cannot be accursed.”

-- Mazzini.


Acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry and love of power! When the great massive genius of the Macedonian Conqueror lay silent in Babylon, perhaps Aristotle in his philosophic mood might have murmured, “Acquisitiveness vanity, rivalry and love of power, what wert thou, but a mixture of these, that now thou dost thus lie there in dust!” When the dormant fire in the huts on the Arab sands blazed into flames, what else but these moved them to put the unbelievers to sabres. The Golden Rule of Haroun-al-Rashjid or the days of devastation by the nomadic hordes of flying Zenghiz Khan were ruled by these and these only. Nothing but the volcanic irruptions of these seething elements in the human mind fill the most interesting and busy periods of History. Discord in the harmonious rule of the world is the headline of History. Peoples of the world possessed no written history so long as there was harmony. The day when they did the first thing that could be written as history, was the day of the irruption of these elements, a clay of discord in the House of God!

Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy arc the symbolic measurements that read to you the gradual extension of the Kingdom of these Imperial Majesties, acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry and love of power. When then kingdom extended only over one mastermind in a nation, there was Monarchy. When many, many such master-minds became participators in the rule of tyranny and came under the sway of these fascinating, skin-beautiful hydra-heads of the disfigured sides of human mind, there was Aristocracy. And last of all, when a sufficiently large number became bondsmen to these governing instruments of crime, a number sufficient to drown the voice of God within man, by its cheers of joy for the attainment of what they thought to be the heavenly form of life, under the sun and beyond the sun, it was called the advent of Democracy. So,

Monarchy: All not-freemen except one.

Aristocracy: Most not-freemen except a few.

Democracy: Majority not-freemen except a powerful minority. Such was and such is the position of the contending masses in their struggle towards the realization of the ideal of mutual association and unhampered life of individuals. As long as oppression was centred in one head and one hand— as long as there was Monarchy — the struggle for emancipation was not a hard one, which is clearly exemplified by the comparative ease, with which even mighty monarchies were overthrown in the ancient past. But as soon as the ranks of oppression began to be recruited from the proud intellectuals and the so-called chosen of the people, as monarchy became seconded actively by aristocracy, the struggle for emancipation became still more hard. The common citizen, looking with hatred and awe to the palacial manors of the chosen grinders of the people and ground down under the systems of forced labour1 [In France and Veth in India.] and taxation2 [The Aristocrats were exempted from taxation in France and the Ministry of Turgot and Necker failed because they advocated taxation for all without exception. It was one of the causes that led to the Rev. in 1789.] for the benefit of the upper or heavenly, head-born3 [The Brahmanical class.] classes, whether in India or in Europe, lost all faith in himself and came to consider himself to be born for nothing but labour, fruitless for himself, fruitful for his chosen grinders. The individual was reduced to the state even below that of a hunting-beast, so much so that once in France there existed a law authorizing a Seigneur, as he returned from hunting, to kill not more than two Serfs and refresh his feet in their warm blood and bowels1. [Carlyle’s Fr. Rev.] From slaves of the monarchs to serfs of the seigneurs or the chosen higher, in the icy zones of Europe, men’s faith in the higher law and higher ideals, became chilled, while the hot imaginative mind of the Indian under the sun, losing all hope in the present matter-of-fact life, became resigned and pessimistic and sat, with eyes turned towards heaven, considering salvation in death or in the rejection of worldly life2. [Especially the school of Sanyasism in Hindu Philosophy and the school of Hinayanas in Buddhism.] Until at last it took the whole life of Luther, Rousseau and Voltaire, to teach man to consider himself as man, to reveal to the famished individual that he was the sovereign of his destiny and of his life. “They recovered to humanity its lost little-deeds.” This was a revelation of good as well as evil. The individual was sovereign! Ah! Then why shall he not conquer and be free! Monarchies with their guilded thrones, and Aristocracies with their chateaus built of the hunger and curses of the poor, tumbled down. The individual was free and was sovereign! But it was the beginning of evil too. Possessing no ideal but the negation of a lie, negation of subjection to the chosen few, and not being given side by side, the ideal of subjection to the Higher Law of God, to life of common good and association, the individual strove only to suppress the lie! But when it was suppressed, what remained? The whole daemonic nature of man remained,— hurled forth to rage blindly without rule or rein; savage itself, yet with all the tools and weapons of civilization: a spectacle new in History3 [Carlyle’s Fr. Rev.]. The individual thinking only of his rights and never of duties, substituted himself in the place of those whom he had overthrown, with the difference that where there were the chosen few, there came the many from the common file, but still participators in the continuation of the same criminal rule of oppression. As the ranks of oppression began to be filled from the oppressed themselves, the struggle became still more hard and bitter. Under Democracy people found that they themselves being participators, were oppressors of themselves. The nobles, Sirdars and aristocrats of the old order, were followed in the new one by capitalists and entrepreneurs. Liberty for the individual was recognized a little but liberty for other nations was denied. Whole nationalities began to subject others to slavery.

The initiation of the second stage of emancipation of the individual from the rule of the privileged or the rise of individualism in Europe began with the French Revolution. The very heart and centre of the rights of man suffered from ebb and flow, on account of the vile plotters of authority, who read their doom in the new age. Metternich and his associates stemmed the tide of the consciousness of the individual, for some time, until at last came the year 1848, the year of revolutions and constitutions, after which people saw many from amongst themselves in the high throne of democracy. It seemed as if the days of tyranny were over, thanks to the French Revolution and the all-leveling campaigns of the Corsican conqueror. The peoples dined over the constitutions and democracy waved the banners. They thought themselves happy and free and forgot the pains that slavery inflicts on man and newly thought of conquests, of putting others in slavery. They had been taught ‘‘everyone for himself,” “here on earth and nowhere else.” With such doctrines, digested and turned into flesh and blood of their life, their ideal of life became “acquisitiveness, vanity rivalry and love of power.” History had begun with these Crooked Four. And after centuries of toil and blood-flow of martyrs, what was the result, what change? The result and change was that the executive power in the dominion of these Crooked Four was transferred from monarchs and aristocrat-slave-owners into the hands of many of the slaves themselves, who exulting in the change of hands, became sergeants of these devilish elements in their turn.

As such in their zeal they turned for conquests and conquered India, Africa, Persia and other principalities of the East. But we are chiefly concerned with India and its evolution under these newly emancipated slaves and slaveowners of the civilized order.

India with her water-tight compartments of the divisions of her peoples into classes, had evolved a philosophy and an Indian mind, which had fully realized and imbibed the principles of that philosophy. And this philosophy was specially and thoroughly efficient to maintain and promote the spirit of that particular form of social division. It was nothing but the Hindu philosophy and view of life that had maintained the class divisions of India, in their origin designed to maintain and facilitate a division of social labour1 [Mr. B. G. Tilak on caste system in India.], but in later stages becoming obsolete and oppressive.

The doctrine in Hindu philosophy, that the whole development of the human race, and course of events, was pre-arranged by God, and the individual was nothing but an instrument in the fulfilment, in the practical realization of this pre-arranged plan of the universe, made the individual a firm believer in the doctrine of fatalism. This led Indians to find the cause of every calamity, of every good as well as evil, of every injustice, in their preordained destiny, before which they thought their potent energies to be powerless to achieve anything which apparently seemed to be against the mysterious settled course of events. And they judged of this opposition of events, or their favourableness, not from any plausible causes, but from omens, from predictions of astrologers, mahants and fakirs. Such methods abound in societies where individuals, having lost faith in their subjective energies, seek revelation of the predestined course in objective signs and utterances. Another principle, a necessary corollary to the first, was that of contentment. Since the individual was unable to change or undo anything, as everything that was was there according to an already settled plan, what was the use of struggle? In contentment they must live, in submission to the lot that had fallen to them according to their destiny. The natural result was that men became inactive, less struggling, and less persevering1 [The Sanskrit proverb that the Dakshinatyas are enthusiastic at the beginning well illustrates this view.]. And moreover, this habit of mind was helped by the comparative easiness with which Nature yielded to the Indians the necessaries of life. The Indians formed a character of accepting the existing order of the day without demur, and of submitting to the miseries that arose from the obsolete and oppressive forms of the social order in which they found themselves born. In full accordance with the principle of contentment, and the pessimistic view of life, they were never interested in the pursuits of gaining mastership over the forces of Nature, to add to the ease of life by inventions, or explorations, or exploitations, unless it became absolutely necessary for a decent upkeep of life. For all these virtues (!) the Europeans naturally compliment us, since it is to their advantage, and necessary for their existence in India, for these virtues of living on few necessaries of life, of law-abiding nature, of aversion to rapid and radical changes or revolutions. Perhaps these very virtues have become at this stage in Indian politics very much detrimental to our own interests!

In spite of all this, what saved the Indians from the deteriorating and pernicious effects of such doctrines was their extreme faith in God and Religion. Only that marvellous faith, the most distinguishing feature of the Indian character, saved them from the complete extinction of their race, or decay from within due to immobility.

And Indian History shows that if ever there have been great struggles, they have been for that faith and that Religion which the Indians cherish. If ever true Hindu States of the people have been built by the people, and not by ambitious monarchs, they have been built for the protection, preservation, and promulgation of that faith and Religion. The Buddhist Empires, and the Maratba Revolution, clearly testify to that.

Such principles made the Indians indifferent to the miseries of the social order, which sometimes became so oppressive that great minds had to overthrow or modify them, as in the days of Jnaneshwar or Tukaram. However, the character of divinity created behind these divisions,1 [Geeta.] and often misunderstood in the real sense, supported them, and the serfdom or the bondage to the higher classes continued to grow in India, while the same was being destroyed in the European world. So it was that when the aggressive spirit of Europe began to extend its activities, it found easy matter for subjugation in India. The struggle for conquests was between the acquisitive spirit of the Whites, and the governing powers of the Indian principalities. The masses in India were immersed in themselves, and never thought of the foreigner. They had seen many such coming and going, guests for a while.

But the new guest showed no signs of ceasing to be a guest with the dinner of spoils he had received, as others had done. But when the economic drain, the grinding of the new master began to pinch the stomachs of the masses, they began to search for the cause. But instead of finding and striking at the root of the evil, they retired into themselves and still more cut down their necessities, murmuring that it was God’s will, and that it was their fate that was to be blamed!


But it was now time for the masses of India to awaken to the new spirit that was coming from the Whites of Europe, and either to assimilate it, or reject it and give it a death-blow. But the Indians, with their want of faith in their power, without subjective consciousness, were unable to do anything of this kind. And as Rousseau and Voltaire were required to spend a whole life in teaching the individual his rights to freedom and sovereignty to make the individual conscious of his latent powers, so the whole life of the great genius of Tilak was required to make the Indians feel that they had a right to individual freedom as everybody else had, and that it was their sacred right and duty to fight for the accomplishment of that freedom.

With the advent of the European conquerors in the land, and the subsequent permanence of their rule, the system of jurisprudence introduced by the new rulers possessed much of the spirit of the European systems, though through thoughtfulness, and as a measure of policy, much of the necessary character of the old systems of law prevalent in the customs of the people was retained by the new rulers. Yet the vast change was that the divisions of the social whole into classes, possessed no credit with the rulers, who naturally disregarded them in the promulgation of law. The principle of these immemorial divisions lost its sanction and support of the temporal power, though they continued to exist on the support of the so-called religious sanction, and the habitual obedience of the people.

The new foreigners could not claim to be more civilized than their conquered subjects, if civilization meant refined virtues, and character, and mental qualities of high order. The only thing in which they could claim superiority was their mastery over the forces of Nature, their artful and ingenious science of mechanism: Evidently the people showed no love or loyalty of that nature, which the Marathas of the type of Jadhaves showed towards the Moghuls. These white foreigners had come to exploit the country for the aggrandisement of the personal interests of the members of their race, and the collective interests of their nationalities. Naturally they fostered a system of education designed to turn out, generation after generation, men with a spirit that considered itself always subservient to that of the foreigners, men who found themselves vastly separated from the masses of their countrymen in sentiments and in character. This cleavage between the intellectuals and the masses was to the advantage of the rulers, who found in the intellectuals obedient servants to them, helping and supporting their tyrannical, life-sucking system of government. This was the greatest danger that India had to face at the end of the 18th century. A peasantry that numbered 80% of the population, wringing its hands on account of scarcity, due to the wealth-drain caused by an ingenious system of taxation, and a class of intellectuals who only, in any country, can lead the masses, and show them the roots of evil, estranged from the masses, a class of intellectuals unable to understand their sentiments and character; thus was the dangerous situation of India when the Genius of Tilak began to work to stem the tide of the increasing evil.

With an all-comprehensive genius, a true hero in the Carlylian sense, he started the campaign of speaking boldly and vigourously, of criticizing the iron rule of tyranny, and of claiming it as his right to speak out what he thought, and to speak it direct. He suffered the consequences of this. But his suffering was necessary to shake the masses from their somnambulism; and he was successful. It set them thinking, which revealed to them the source of all their trouble. They followed their saviour implicitly. He became a joining link between the intellectuals and the masses. Through him the intellectuals came to realize their duty, and to lead the masses, and love them. The yawning cleavage was filled up. He taught the masses their individual rights to freedom, to free speech, to be left alone in their land, and not to be exploited for the sake of foreigners. His efforts made India conscious of the outside world, and brought her in level with the ideas that were governing the forces in the new world. But India’s faith in the higher Law and Religion was not corrupted by the new ideas of individual rights, as was the case with the nations of Europe. This very fundamental characteristic raised the fighting Genius of Tilak to the high pedestal of divinity itself.


Thus the Tilak period was one of consciousness of rights. And History shows that such consciousness walks hand in hand with a simple and sincere demand of constitutions. France demanded constitution of Louis XVI, who gave it but it “would not walk”. Italy demanded it of Prince Albert, Russia demanded it of the Czar and got the worthless Duma. Hungary did the same and got the blow of Metternich. So almost everywhere in the earlier stages of assertion of rights, constitution — fighting has been the first step. And History also shows that at the appearance of this step, repression has been the resort of tyrants. Such typical scenes as happened in France can be met with in the history of every people fighting for liberty. “Dreary, languid do these (masses) struggle in their obscure remoteness, their health cheerless, their diet thin. For them in this world rises no era of hope; hardly now in the other,— if it be not hope in the gloomy rest of Death, for their faith too is failing. Untaught, uncomforted, unfed! A dumb generation; their voice only an inarticulate cry; spokesman in the King’s Council, in the world's forum, they have none that finds credence. At rare intervals they will fling down their hoes and hammers, and to the astonishment of thinking mankind, flock hither and thither, dangerous, aimless, get the length even of Versailles, Turgot is altering the corn-trades, abrogating the absurdest corn laws; there is dearth real, or were it even "fictitious,” an indubitable scarcity of bread. And so on the 2nd of May, 1775, these waste multitudes do here at Versailles Chateau, in widespread wretchedness, in sallow faces, squalor, winged raggedness, present, as in legible hieroglyphic writing, their Petition of Grievances. The Chateau gates must be shut, but the King will appear on the balcony and speak to them, they have seen the King’s face; their Petition of Grievances has been if not read, looked at. For answer, two of them are hanged on a new gallows forty feet high, and the rest are driven back to their dens for a time!”

The people going to the bureaucrat's palace in the capital Delhi in the April days of 1917, and the answer of guns to them— certainly a better and speedy remedy than a new gallows forty feet high — and the exploits of Dyrisim in the Punjab are the best reproductions of the French scenes, and the necessary accompaniment to constitution-fighting. Without such scenes, excitement and subsequent progress are impossible.

Besides this, the Tilak-period had produced another great thing. The leader of the peoples had also his treasure of independent philosophy. By his life and his masterly treatise on the Geeta, he put before the people, with an authority which he alone possessed, a new conception of man's actions. He saw the dangers arising from the pessimistic philosophy, and he changed the vision. The people of India are always in a mood to accept anything that came from a religious source. Geeta was the only source through which anybody could speak to the people. With forty years of study, and experience of action according to the Geeta, he revealed to the world, and to India in particular, the underlying principle of continuous Karma, without egoistic covetousness for the fruits of it, continuous Karma for the realization of divinity in man. By his living example, he taught to the Indians their duty of dedicating life to the service of Humanity without egoism. The people, who had been fed over doctrines of inaction, or Sadhuism, gradually changed their vision, and believed him. Most important of all was this conquest, of destroying the people's pessimism, and making them hopeful about the future, in struggle while serving humanity. The "Tilak-Period of Rights” taught the Indians, “The Earth is Of God, and it cannot be accursed.”

India is modernized. That is what we Indians are today. Upon modern India of Tilak, a Mahatma is making his experiments of new methods of winning liberty. The modern systems of fight initiated by Tilak are suspended, and the quite new methods of Tolstoyan school are being tried to win freedom. History is repeating itself. Struggle is followed by repression, repression is mostly followed by success of the people. Now martyrdom is weltering in blood. But in this land of the Buddhas, the tree of Liberty shall not be watered by the blood of despots. How long, Oh! Lord!


CHAPTER II: Society of To-day: The Class War.

We have seen that the peoples of many nations left behind them the stage of individual bondage to the higher and privileged classes and the rise of Individualism was the product of the struggle. We saw India modernised in the Tilak period in the first twenty years, of the twentieth century and we now find ourselves struggling to overthrow the foreign Yoke, as the first result of the appearance of Individualism amongst us.

We said India is modernized. And we further say that in it lies her life as well as her death. How?

The modernization of India is being carried directly on the European lines of progress. Naturally if the progress of events in Europe results in the happiness and well being of that people, the same type of progress perhaps may result in the happiness and well-being of our people too. And if it causes misery and death to them, it will do so in our land also. We say perhaps because the civilization of one people, may not cause the well-being of another too, as it happened to the original natives of America and Australia, to whom the coming of the civilization of the Whites was a signal for the destruction of their races, though in some cases the destruction was brought about by a well-planned scheme of extermination, and not by the introduction of the new civilization. But what causes misery and death to a number of human beings in one place causes misery and death to another set of human beings in another place, if exceptional circumstances are left aside. A race of Eskimos from the polar regions would not flourish happily in the Indian climate as one of Negroes or Chinese would; but a number of human beings made to live in dense-packed cities and filthy houses, would certainly suffer from their pernicious effect, whether they be Eskimos, Indians or Chinese. The simple reason for all this seems to be that the forces of destruction and death work more uniformly than the forces of development and culture. So we will try to see what this new progress means to Europe and to us, whether it means life or death to Europe and life or death to us also.

Side by side with the work of emancipation of the common people from oppression, an industrial revolution took place in Europe, with which every student of history is quite familiar. This industrial revolution introduced the age of mechanism of our days. The whole course and standard of life of all communities, in which this revolution appeared, underwent vast radical changes. The old science of economics— though practically there was no such complicated science as now exists, — would not serve the purposes of the new social order that was ushered in by the revolution. Machinery-inventions made large scale production an easy possibility. But this large scale production, of course, necessitated huge investments in machinery plantations, which brought into existence a class of men who could make such investments, the class of capitalists. Mechanical production and output far superseded that of the home industries and village or guild-industries of the Medieval Ages. The ruin of these industries threw the old independent guild-labour-hands out of employment and thus brought them to the feet of the capitalists, who could propose their own terms to the labourers. The labourers could do nothing but offer themselves to these new masters on their conditions. This age of mechanism brought two changes in the life of the people. Machinery plantations could employ at one and the same time and place large numbers of labourers. The seats of such plantations became overflooded with population, chiefly composed of the labouring masses. The worsted condition of these masses on account of want of education as well as want of money and facilities for development made such city-life still worse. Labour hands that before lived in their villages, lost all their independence, the healthy condition of surroundings and the moral environments of open village life. On the other hand, the possibility to carry on unlimited production through machinery in a very short time, gave to the capitalists means of making vast profits, which intensified the feelings of acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry and love of power. This made them disregard the condition of the labourers that they employed, and whom in course of time they began to consider as another piece of machinery. The old lords, serfs and slaves were abolished; but new kinds of lords and Slaves came into existence, without those obnoxious titles, under the name of capitalists and wage-earners. Monarchs waging wars for personal interests and whims, in the name of patriotism, ceased to exist. But a new monarchical class, that of capitalists, with their various titles of ‘Silver-Kings’ and ‘Copper Kings,’ with their executives of speculators, commission agents, exporters and importers, began to drag nations into wars, wars for their capitalistic interests, for capturing markets and countries to sell their goods. They worked out the labourers for hours like lifeless machines, produced vast quantities for the people of other nations, and in order that this surplus product be sold, they made wars. But why all this trouble? Why should the Manchester capitalist try to clothe the whole of India who can, and who could, if left alone, do without this philanthropy of these new slave-owners? Why could they not be content with clothing their own men abundantly and cheaply [produced]? And after all this competition and wars, who were to be benefited and happy? The labourers, who had toiled and suffered hardships? No! Not at all! The whole wealth, thus obtained by starving the labourers at home and ruining labourers abroad, through competition, went to satisfy the lust of the capitalists. The labourers were men as much as the capital-owners were, but these monsters had their lusts to be satisfied, had vain ambitions of being called men of millions. These monster-heads began to corner the wealth and land of the world, while the labouring masses suffered of want and hunger. Political parties and state mechanisms with their sham of democratic representations were dominated by their purses. Thus becoming masters of the political wheel, which alone is competent to effect reform in society, they could suppress the cry of lessening the miseries of the working-class.

Thus society of our times has come to be divided into three classes; “The capitalists that is the possessors of the means and implements of labour, namely lands, factories, ready money and raw material; contractors that is the heads and initiators of labour, commercial men, who represent or ought to represent intellect and the working men, who represent manual labour.” The capitalists have become the masters of the new slaves, who are not given the rights of human beings even. “Time for education, intellectual development, for the fulfilling of social functions and for social intercourse, for the free play of his bodily and mental activity— moonshine! But in its blind unrestrainable passion, its werewolf hunger for surplus labour, Capital oversteps not only the moral but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working day. It usurps the time for growth, development and healthy maintenance of the body. It higgles over a meal-time, incorporating it, where possible, with the process of production itself, so that food is given to the labourer as to a mere means of production as coal is supplied to the boiler, grease and oil to the machinery. It reduces the sound sleep needed for the restoration, reparation, refreshment of bodily power to just so many hours of torpor, as the revival of an organism, absolutely exhausted renders essential. It is not the normal maintenance of the labour, which is to determine the limit of working day; it is the greatest possible daily expenditure of labour power, no matter how diseased, compulsory and painful it may be, which is to determine the labourer's period of repose. Capital cares nothing for the length of life of labour power. All that concerns it is simply and solely the maximum of labour power that can be rendered fluent in a working day. It attains this end by shortening the extent of the labourer’s life as a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility. Capital extends the labourer’s time of production during a given period by shortening his actual life time."1 [Karl Marx: Capital I, p. 249.]

Such intensity of the evil of the new system has generated a bitter hatred of the working classes towards the capitalists. To wrest from them more wages, shorter hours of work, strikes have become the order of the day. But such puissant methods do not move the capitalists, since in days of dearth of work, they being well-to-do and well-fed can afford to wait, while the poor labourer, living in a hand-to-mouth condition, has to yield and submit to worse conditions.

Such is the course of events in Europe, where society is daily faced with the problem of capital and labour, and the thoughtful of that community are scratching their heads to solve the problem.

We have seen India modernised and her industrialization is vehemently urged and carried on. Naturally her industrialization will be accomplished and is being accomplished on the lines of European systems. When this is done, surely, all the evils of European industrialism, all the methods of class-war between capitalism and labour, will rear their breeding here in our Society too.

Our country at present is suffering from the greatest danger of being impoverished to the last farthing and the last grain of corn by the avidity of European capitalists, assisted from within by our own men, and helped in their devilish designs by an oppressive foreign government. The impoverishment is being carried on quite methodically and constitutionally, which in the case of private persons would have amounted to ingenious robbery and homicide, not amounting to murder, by processes of slow starvation. The 200 millions of our peasantry are reduced to a level of want and suffering by heavy taxes, which are squandered in paying foreign military contingents,1 [In the budget for 1921-22, Rs. 66 croros i.e. 51 p. c. of the total receipts are appropriated for military and in this it must be remembered that the European Jack-boot is paid 4 times more than the Indian Sepoy. Perhaps the Luxurious Moghul soldiers of Aurangzeb’s camp required much less!] maintained for the so-called defence of the country from the frontier tribes, who perhaps never think of India, but really maintained to shoot down patriotism2 [Sir William Vincent's speech in L. A, clearly reveals this motive.] and in pensioning monstrous crops of European civilians, who are the worst possible lot in the whole governing system, and who turn traitorous to the interests of India, after grazing abundantly with their kith and kin on her golden-pasture-lands, as soon as they leave her shores.3 [Lord Curzon and Lord Sydenham are the best examples to illustrate this.] Another method of impoverishing is the continuous export of Indian corn to feed European countries, for which they pay us back by prohibiting our emigrant settlers from lands where our men had suffered hardships to clear the land of marshes and cultivate it.4 [As in South and East Africa.] Government declares scarcity in one part of India, and from another part exports corn to other nations,5 [When scarcity was declared in Kaira district, 1.5 million tons of wheat, 1.9 millions tons of rice were exported from India. Govt, complained for want of transport tonnage while 40,000 waggons wore engaged in simply transporting coal. Foreign machinery must be first fed before starving Indian human beings!] the whole profiteering business being carried by European contractors and capitalists. Our peasantry sells the corn for the high prices offered in order to satisfy the lashing tax-collector, and turns to extract from the land more produce, which in course of time will deprive our cultivated areas of fertility, and cause still greater scarcity. This system of causing dearth finds a somewhat similar parallel1 [Such parallelisms between the Fr. peasantry before the Revolution and ours are not of our own making. Vaughan Nash says in his "The Great Famine," referring to the rigorous collection of land revenue, "cold comfort this for people, who are brought as low as the peasants of France before the revolution, who have ruin and hunger as their daily portion, while plague and cholera stand over them ready to strike. To them appears the Govt. of the British Empire in the likeness of the Broker’s man."] in French history before the Great Revolution. We will quote a few lines. "In the meantime, in contrast with this life in high places, poverty and misery had increased among the people, and most markedly among the cultivators of the soil, to a degree that would appear incredible if we had not at hand the testimonies of men of all class, men who were more than moderate in their views. (Perhaps those very men are born amongst us to-day in our Moderate camp!) Speculators, seconded by Government, and the more covetous courtiers, traded on this misery, and had organized what was termed by contemporaries the Pact of Hunger. By a series of market operations, the whole corn of the country was exported, and when the premium paid on exportations had been received, the whole stock was accumulated in Jersey and Guernsey and other depots and sold again, when the needs of the people had reached their greatest extremity, at very high prices, as though it had arrived from America.”2 [Fr. Revolution. Mazzini p. 278.] If the hunger-stricken peasantry of France answered this by the Reign of Terror, were they to be blamed? And yet William Pitt and his liberty-loving (!) England bribed other nations to kill this France!!

The fourth method of impoverishment is the industrial development of India, which instead of benefiting us, intensifies our poverty, a phenomena quite peculiar to India. Indians clamour for the development of their resources. The Government, with paternal love, condescends to do that. Industries that yield vast profits are undertaken, not by Government, but by European capitalists. And the whole profits from them thus are poured into the pockets of White capitalism. Indian labour, and India’s resources, are exploited, not for her people, but for foreigners. The railway companies, tea, jute and other plantations, mining concerns, shipping companies, and such others, yearly drain from India her wealth in the shape of dividends to the share-holders, 99% of whom are European capitalists. Where these are not benefited, industries are neglected, and to add to the misery, the people are blamed for not advancing capital for the construction of their own industries. Someone has said in London, “You may have either flourishing industries, or a flourishing bureaucracy; but never both.” We certainly want the first; necessarily we must destroy the other? The two are mutually exclusive!

And the fifth method is Government’s systematic gambling with regard to the currency. Indian merchants are prohibited to import Gold from foreign countries, where they have exported their goods, but they have to pay in gold for their imports. Gold flows out of India, and instead we are given pieces of paper, and nothing but paper; consider them worth a farthing, or a thousand; after all the peasant cries in despair, “I have sold my life, my corn; and what have I got? Printed paper!” Our gold reserves lie locked in Ireland for White capitalism to grow fat over it, and we are fed on printed paper. What wonder if one day we rise to find India bankrupt?

Besides this impending danger of national impoverishment and bankruptcy, we have to face another one, that of the evils of industrialization appearing in our society, and becoming our inherent scourge, as it has become of the Europeans. Political emancipation is the remedy for the first danger, and we are struggling for it with methods which we will notice in the next chapter. But even when we become politically free, how are we to avert the dangers of modernization, the dangers of the class war, between capital and labour? Because even the class war is showing its head amongst us. The introduction of factory industries is drawing off more and more of our harassed peasantry to the factory plants in large numbers, and to take to the life of slavish wage-earners. Large populated areas in industrial towns well exhibit to what level of life our wage-earners are being reduced. Our society has already begun to breed the class of capitalists, which is the source of so much evil in Europe. When the cost of living rose extraordinarily high in times of war, the Indian capitalists showed as much implacableness towards the demands of starving Indian labour as the European capitalists did. White capitalists can at least be excused on the ground that it is in their very nature and breeding to behave so towards the Indians. And who are the Indian capitalists? Most of our trade, foreign and inland, is centred in the hands of the Shethias of the Gujrathi community, the Marwaris, the Parsis, and the Bohras. Allied as their interests are with the foreign Government, and foreign capitalism, these capitalist communities of our Society are naturally opposed to our attempts at emancipation. And they in their turn exhibit all the greediness, idleness, cruelty, luxurious and demoralized life, consequent upon capitalism in every form and in every country. The capitalist landholders ruin the middleclass-man by cornering large land-areas, and then charging exorbitant rentals for the tenants1. [Charging high rentals had reached to such a high pitch of madness that in Bombay, a special Rent Act had to be enforced. But it has not proved very much effective.] Some of them make a sham of starting industries for public benefit, and under that pretext oust the peasantry from their holdings with the help of a despotic partial government.2 [The ambitious capitalists, the Tatas, have proposed to supply electricity to Bombay Mills, for which they want to acquire lands by ousting the peasantry of Mulshi Peta lands in Poona Distr. The profits of mills go to millowners and profits of these works will go to the Tatas because 90 p. c. of the shares are held by their own circle! A fine public interest!]

Thus the Indian Capitalists are doing three sins. They support the foreign despotism over us. They demoralize and ruin the peasantry, and the wage-earning classes of our Society. Doing this, they support and feed the capitalists of Europe, and thus help the cause of misery of the workers of that continent also.

So we have to think of two things. How to throw off the foreign Yoke? With what methods? And then how to destroy [the] evil of capitalism amongst us, which is making fast progress, and will double its speed when we are politically free. Mahatma Gandhi has put forth his methods of working out the destruction of these two monster diseases. Gandhism aims to cure Society of modern industrialization and modern civilization. At the same time, Bolshevism is working with the same view in Russia and in European Society. Since both the systems are working with a view to find a solution for a common evil, common to all nations, and since both, fortunately or unfortunately, are born practically in the same era, we propose to compare and contrast these two systems of philosophy and action, and try to see their efficiency to arrive at the desired results.
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Part 2 of 3

CHAPTER III: Gandhi vs. Lenin.

On 15th March 1917 the success of the first Russian Revolution was announced to the world by the abdication of the Czar, the “Autocrat of all the Russias.” The English statesmen and all the world hailed it as one step towards the realization of democracy in this world. But when Kerensky’s Government was overthrown by the Second Russian Revolution of Nov. 7th and the Russian policy, directed by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Govt. was changed by the peace with the central powers, and when Russia withdrew from the war, then as if by magic the British statesmen began to see the hideous monster of despotism and danger to the whole world in the place in which, not long ago, they were disposed to find the very heaven of democracy. They began to cry down the Bolsheviks and Russia as ‘‘Treacherous”; then refused to have any connection with her Government, and began to spread news of alleged devilish atrocities on the part of the Bolsheviks in other nations. To attribute atrocities to one whom we wish to put down and prejudice in the eyes of the world that he may not get a hearing, has always been a political dodge. And this was nothing but a repetition of what the British statesmen had done about Napoleon, in Ireland, so that Ireland might not sympathise and help the Emperor against England. However, the storm cooled down. As a political necessity, commercial relations with Russia were renewed, and Krasin, representative of the Bolshevik Govt. to England, sat in London in conference with British statesmen about the new relations between Russia and England. At least for a time the Red Flag of the Bolshevik waved in the Imperialistic atmosphere of scoffing London, though only over the flat that Krasin had rented for a time! A labour deputation went to Russia to see matters on the spot. Bolshevism that was never studied before the war, until it became the master of Russia, Bolshevism that was howled down by the capitalistic states of Europe from all quarters, began to receive thoughtful consideration and even serious attention! Let us do the same.

Bolshevism, is not, like other sciences, simply a science of politics and economics, submitting itself to changes due to criticism. A true Marxian or a Bolshevik will admit of no change in the body of the theories of his faith. Karl Marx’s Book the "Capita" is to the Bolshevik what the Geeta is to the Hindoo, or the Bible to the Christian. Day by day the very inspirer, Karl Marx, is passing into a Mythical Being. Bolshevism has come to acquire a force of religion, and all that inspired unflinching belief that a religion demands.

The Bolshevik, or rather the extremist Marxian, sees the misery in the world, the poorer classes exploited by the rich and powerful, and sets to investigate the causes of it, and arrives at three conclusions, stored in these three words: Economic Materialism, Surplus Value, and the Class War.

The doctrine of economic materialism underlying all the extremist communist philosophy simply means that almost all human activity is directed with the motive of economic aggrandisenient, that “all the mass-phenomena of history are determined by economic motives.” And if we examine great movements in history, most of them justify this view. The great so called religious movement in Europe, the Reformation, owed much of its success to the expected economic freedom of the states and of the people promised by the Reformation, which absolved them from paying any tithes and taxes to the clergy and the Pope. Had it not been for this expectation of freedom of the masses from the oppressive taxes of the clergy and the Pope, it is doubtful whether all the printing inventions and philosophy of the scholars dispossessed and turned out from Constantinople would have been sufficiently powerful to move the masses to accept the new creed and deny obedience to the papal authority. The whole of the French Revolution and its subsequent offshoots in other nations, became possible when the masses became utterly destitute and the Government bankrupt and unable to produce money by taxation. The expansion of the nations of Europe into the outside world would not have taken place but for the sight of the Spanish galleys, coming loaded with gold and silver from the Peruvian mines. It was the drain of their wealth into the coffers of England that moved the Americans to fight for liberty, to begin that war of American Independence. So most of the greatest events of European history were inspired by economic motives.

Even in daily life man’s whole struggle is primarily dominated by the desire to obtain money, money for existence, for luxury, and then follow other motives of love, of friendship, of religion and morality.

After all this, what is the result of this dominating factor? The doctrine of economic materialism says that consequently all this leads to inequality of wealth, from which proceeds all the misery of the masses of the people, leads to the intolerable situation of some possessing crores and the many begging for bread or starving. Capitalism is the one end of this inequality and poverty of the masses, the other end.

Naturally the next question is, how have the rich or the capitalists come by so much wealth, how in modern society they continue to be so and daily increase in numbers? What is it that allows and facilitates the accumulation of unlimited wealth into the hands of a limited few, of wealth which is the product of the combined labour of the whole of Society? And at this stage, the doctrine of surplus value makes its appearance in the Marxian theory.

If a capitalist possesses capital in vast land-areas, (like the zamindars of Bihar, Orrissa and Bengal,) how has he come to possess so much land? Did he labour and sweat for it? If he has inherited it from his ancestors, did his ancestors labour for it? Land cannot be a product of human labour, and consequently no human being can lay claim to any land-property through the right of labour. History shows that, “the appropriation of land by individuals has in most countries — probably in all where it approaches completeness -- been originally effected not by the expenditure of labour, or the results of labour on the land, but by force. The original landlords have been conquerors1.” [T. H. Green. "Principles of political obligation.”] If the original possessors came by it by force, then their inheritors can show no reason why they should be allowed to retain it to the exclusion of others. One may say that they hold it for the common good of the whole community; but experience shows that landowners, most of them if not all, have never shown themselves conscious of this idea of common good, but have rather worked against it by converting lands into parks and hunting grounds as in England, or by harassing the temporary peasant tenant who works more for the common good by his production than the landholders do by their idle unproductive act of possession. And even if admitted that they do hold it for the common good, Society is doubly justified in relieving this ‘servant of common good’ by directly administering the land i.e., nationalizing it.

Then one may say that the property in land may have been bought by the capitalist owners from other possessors. But we have seen that property in land, in its very nature, cannot be a product of human labour, but is an appropriation by force, and as such it cannot be possessed, bought or sold by any individual to any other individual; because it is a possession of the social whole, and cannot be disposed of in any form except through the consent of the social whole.

Then comes forth the question of capitalism in movable property, easily convertible in money, and of capitalism in wealth as acquired profits of industry. Examine the working of all industries, and we will find that physical labour, the backbone of all industries, remains ‘under-rewarded,’ while intellectual labour, through speculation, through trade, or through ‘middle-manship’, reaps the benefits of the activities of physical labour. Capitalists are brought into existence by the very laws governing modern systems of industrialization, by laws which allow the intellectual few, masters of opportunities, to become possessors of the ‘unearned income’ of the surplus value derived from the production through physical labour of the many. Because always in society workers with hand are in a majority. Take the case of capitalist England. ‘Ninety out of every hundred adults in England are workers with their hands. Most of these are living in districts and in houses, which make their free and healthy development impossible. Twenty-three out of every hundred live below the poverty line— that is to say, they are so ill-clothed, so badly housed, and so underfed, that they die or are racked with premature pains before they are fifty years of age. Yet these men and women are producing and distributing food, clothing, and the luxuries, which they cannot afford to obtain for themselves.” And the surplus value, or profits from the labour of these, becomes the private property of the capitalists, to which they are not at all entitled more than the hand-labourers. This is the main contention of Marx’s doctrine of surplus value.

Having arrived at this, the Marxian proceeds to argue, and tries to find the method, with which to remove this condition of the slavery of the proletariat to capitalism. Capitalists are able to be masters of the proletariat, or the wage-earners, because they can control the means of production, and through this control become owners of vast unearned wealth. What if the state, the society which is mostly composed of workers with hand, were to assume the direct control of these means of production, if production and distribution were so arranged that everybody would get what is his necessity, and the surplus value of production be utilized for the common good of the state, if none were allowed to accumulate wealth and have private property in land or money, which is the root of so much evil? To accomplish this, the workers and peasants must be the masters of the state-mechanism; they must wrest the authority of Government from the capitalists, who everywhere control the state mechanism in their own interests. And this can be done only through a class-war, through an ‘Armed Revolution’ of the workers and peasants.


The extremist Marxian firmly and religiously believes in this method of class-war, and an armed revolution of the proletariat. A peaceful revolution to take over the control of the state and the means of production is impossible. It sounds absurd to tell a man who is habituated to control not to control, and to expect that he would do it for the mere asking, unless he is forced to do so. Neither is the method of accomplishing this through the gradual growth of representative Governments, like the parliamentary democracy of England, possible. Because the Governments of today are dominated by the capitalists or the bourgeoisie class; they control the army, the press, the education, and everything. Through educational institutions, they manufacture and spread what is called the “Bourgeoisie Ideology”, impose it upon the world, and get it ingrained in the ideas and morality of the world. This ideology manufactures a set of laws by which any quantity of land may belong to private people, and may pass from one to another by inheritance, by will, or by sale; another set by which every one must pay taxes demanded of them unquestioningly, and a third set, to the effect that any quantity of articles, by whatever means acquired, may become the absolute property of the people who hold them. It is this teaching which makes the workers and peasants instinctively obey despotic Governments, and paralyzes their strength to seize the capitalists and accomplish their freedom. The capitalists teach that the poor shall always be in society, but even so they had argued when slavery existed that slavery and serfdom were necessary to maintain society, until they were abolished forcibly. Peaceful methods will do nothing. Because capitalist despotism is a thing that will stoop to anything to maintain its hold of injustice. An armed revolution of the workers and peasants, with all the fanaticism of a religious belief, is the only remedy; and such a revolution must be ready to fight the confederacy of all the capitalist states of the world, and expect help from no one. A well known author, though against the Marxians or Bolsheviks, says, "It seems evident from the attitude of the capitalist world to Soviet Russia, of the entete to the central powers, and of England to Ireland and India, that there is no depth of perfidy, cruelty, and brutality from which the present holders of power will shrink when they feel themselves threatened. If in order to oust them, nothing short of fanaticism will serve, it is they who are the prime sources of the resultant evil. And it is permissible to hope that when they have been dispossessed, fanaticism will fade, as other fanaticisms have faded in the past.”1 [Bertrand Russell.]

After this third item of an armed revolution, the necessary form of Government, in absence of capitalism, will be the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which is not to be a permanent factor of the state. For as soon as all shall be labourers, and no one a capitalist, as soon as the whole state will be identical with the proletariat, the Dictatorship will vanish of itself.


The Bolsheviks are the people in those icy zones of Russia, the white land of the Autocrat of all the Russias, who have been the ardent believers in these dogmas, and methods of working them out, who have practically worked out this philosophy and are now ruling Russia. The Bolsheviks are the advance guard of all communists, as they call themselves, Part of this communist philosophy finds expression in the programme of English labour party too, its aims being laid down in these four propositions, (a) The universal enforcement of the national minimum, (b) Democratic control of industry, (c) Revolution in national finance, and (d) the surplus wealth for common good1. [Adopted at the Conference of June 1918.] The difference between the Bolsheviks and the British Labour party consist in this, that the former advocate zealously a military blow against armed capitalism, while the latter believe in the method of attaining their end through the Parliament.

So far we have tried to understand the fundamental conceptions of Bolshevism, or extremist communism, in which many thinkers have great faith. We will now turn to the underlying conceptions of Gandhism, and its methods of work, to realize the end of the social evils of our day.

Gandhism admits all the vices from which Society of our day is suffering, all the vices emanating from the rule of capitalism. It also concedes that Capitalism will stoop to anything to preserve its authority, and a revolution, or a radical charge alone, can redeem Society. But the point where Bolshevism and Gandhism are deadly opposed, is that of methods to work out the revolution in Society. Gandhism attacks the very foundations of modern social arrangements, and divisions introduced by modern industrialization. If Capitalism possesses all the cruelty and perfidy of ancient despotisms, what is it that brought into existence capitalism, and gave it such unbounded iron authority? If a majority of the wage-earning class is ill-housed, ill-fed, lives below the poverty line, what made these men the slaves of capitalism? The sure and certain answer is the modern system of industrialization. Mechanism, the Age of Machinery, drove the independent workers out of their healthy surroundings in villages and guild-unions, made them flock to the plantations to work in large units at the bidding of a capitalist. Mechanism made possible large scale productions. It spurned much of the human factor in industries, and thus made a vain, acquisitive few with wealth, masters of millions of men. The Gandhian argues with Tolstoy, from whom Gandhism directly takes its inspiration, “The cause of the miserable position of the workers cannot be found in the seizure of the means of production by capitalists, the cause must lie in that which drives them from the villages. The labourer’s misery alike on the Railway, in the silk factory, and every other factory or workshop— consists not in the longer or shorter hours of work (for agriculturists work sometimes eighteen hours a day, and as much as thirty-six hours on end, and consider their lives happy), nor does it consist in the low rate of wages, nor in the fact that the railway, or factory, is not theirs; but it consists in the fact that they are obliged to work in harmful, unnatural conditions, often dangerous and destructive to life, and to live a barrack life in town— a life full of temptations and immorality, and to do compulsory labour at another’s bidding.” And the thing that does this, the Gandhian says, is modern mechanism; in fact, the whole of modern civilization. Logic pushed forward in this way naturally concludes that to remove the evils of our day, then modern age of mechanism must be destroyed. Mechanism has made luxuries easily accessible at low cost, and this is breeding idleness in Society, has bred a class living on the labour of others. To destroy this, the necessaries of man must be cut down, and at the same time everybody must be working to provide for himself by his own labour. None must be idle, for an “idler is a thief."1 [Rousseau.]

For this as a remedy, Gandhism proposes a return to the old methods of spinning and weaving on handlooms, which would naturally dissolve the labour mass into smaller units. Today, one nation produces so much of luxuries of cloth, and other things, that the production aims to provide for all the markets of the world, which results in the unemployment and privations of the labour of other nations. Hand-spinning and weaving will make this ambition impossible; it will not drive the worker from his independent village environments, and make him submit to the slavery of capitalism. But this is simply one branch of the programme of Gandhism, to dissolve modern civilization. Monstrous mechanism that support despotism, factories, railways, and everything that now raises the problem of human misery, and problem of the class-war, must go that humanity may be saved.
But how will men leave ideas and habits that they have come to acquire by custom and by education? So the root of the whole thing lies in the minds of men. And the solution cannot be anywhere else but in the minds of men. It lies in “Purification". Gandhism will say to workmen, “The workmen must cleanse themselves in order that the Governments and wealthy shall cease to devour their lives. Impurity breeds in dirt, and it feeds on strange bodies, only while they are unclean. And therefore, for the deliverance of the workers from their calamities, there is only one means— that of purifying themselves. And to purify themselves, liberation from theological, state, and scientific superstitions is necessary, and necessary also is faith in God and His Law."1 [Tolstoy. '"Social Evils and their Remedy", p. 58.] To free oneself from despotism, Gandhism proposes a method which is directly opposed to that of Bolshevism. There is no use finding the remedy outside man. It lies in the mind. If the whole mode of thinking be changed, then alone there can be any change in the external actions of man, for action is practical embodiment of thought. Those motives that lead to all this struggle of class-war, motives of aggrandisement, vanity, rivalry, and love of power, if these are cast out of the “possessed”, then man will be free. Go on multiplying invention after invention, conquer the whole of Nature external to man, and what will be the result? There is that immutable law, applicable to all such methods of finding happiness, the law “That a man is subject to a law of his being, in virtue of which he at once seeks self-satisfaction, and is prevented from finding it in the objects in which he actually desires, and in which he ordinarily seeks it.”1 [T. H. Green. “Principles of Political Obligation.” pp. 19.]

And the way to reform it? The Bolsheviks demand power, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, as they say, to reform human mind, to dispossess capital, and to teach everyone in Society to work for the common good. The Gandhians say that men must be convinced of their duty of working for the common good. And this convincing can be done only through Religion. "Your work must be a work of regeneration, of moral reform— for without this, any political organization is barren, and you delude yourselves with the expectation of success while you banish from your work the religious idea."2 [Mazzini pp. 168.] The cry of the Revolution must be “God wills it; God wills it." For “Without God, you can command, not persuade; you can be tyrants in your turn, never educators and apostles.”3 [Mazzini pp. 29.] An ‘armed revolution,’ or violence, will be followed by nothing but a new kind of tyranny and violence.

So Gandhism requires first a change in human nature, or purification, which in due course will destroy the necessity of the present systems of life. Destroy vanity, love of show, and there will be no necessity to engage wage-earning slaves to produce silks and luxuries. Destroy fear, and love of power, wars will stop, and militarisms and Governments will melt. Destroy the devil within man, and the outside nature of incongruities will die out. Lenin might as well answer to this, “Destroy the universe, and God himself, who is the cause of all this, and everything will stop; a madman’s reasoning; an impossibility!”


Many in India are under the impression that the principles of non-violence, and religious transformation in Gandhism, are due to the peculiar circumstances of India; that Gandhism advocates non-violence because violence is not possible here against the Government. Armed revolution being an impossibility, non-violence has become the order of the day. But it is a gross mistake to suppose that. Even if Gandhi were just now to be transferred to the throne of Lenin, he would dissolve the Red Guards, and the Proletarian Dictatorship; he would stop the industrialization of Russia, and give in her hands the spinning wheel and the handloom.

Gandhism has two aspects. One relates to the general evils, common to all human Society, and treats of the solution of problems affecting all. Another aspect treats of the special evil of despotism, and proposes means to do away with it. We have treated of the first aspect. We will treat a little of the second.

If any country is subjected to despotism, whether foreign or native, in what way shall it subvert this despotism? Surely not by a military war, whether possible or not. Gandhism has put forward its plan of ‘non-violent non-cooperation.’ This plan is directly inspired by Tolstoy's plan of ‘non violent non-participation’ for the Russians. Tolstoy’s plan was abandoned by Russia. India has adopted Gandhi’s plan. Instead of giving the plan of Gandhism, we will give that of Tolstoy. On pursuance of it, we will find that it was Tolstoy who ruled the Congress of Calcutta, where the first principles of it were outlined, and Gandhi was his representative! Tolstoy, cast out of Russia, has been born amongst us.

The underlying conception of the plan is simply this, that tyrants tyrannize because the tyrannized slaves participate in the act. Tolstoy gives three comprehensive commandments to a non-violent non-cooperator.

“He should first of all, neither willingly nor under compulsion, take any part in Government activity, and should therefore be neither a soldier, nor a field-marshal, nor a minister of State, nor a tax-collector, nor a witness, nor an elderman, nor a jurymen, nor a governor, nor a member of Parliament, nor in fact hold any office connected with violence. That is one thing.

“Secondly, such a man should not voluntarily pay taxes to Govt., either directly or indirectly, nor should he accept money collected by taxes, either as salary, or as pension, or as a reward, nor should he make use of Government institutions supported by taxes collected by violence from the people.

“Thirdly, a man who desires to promote not his own well-being alone, but to better the position of people in general, should not appeal to Govt. violence for the protection of his possessions in land, or in other things, nor to defend him and his near ones, but should possess land, and all products of his own or other people’s toil, in so far as others do not claim them from him.”

Tolstoy anticipated our moderates, and continuing says, “People will say, ‘But such an activity is impossible; to refuse all participation in Governmental affairs means to refuse to live.' A man who does not pay taxes will be punished, and the tax will be collected from his property; a man, who having no other means of livelihood, refuses Govt. service, will perish of hunger with his family; the same will befall a man who rejects Govt. protection for his property and his person; not to make use of things that are taxed, or of Govt. institutions, is quite impossible, as the most necessary articles are often taxed, and just the same way it is impossible to do without Govt. institutions, such as the posts, roads, etc.”

But there is the cool and deliberate answer of his to this. “Not everyone will be able to do this at once, but as men will begin to feel the consciousness of these things, they will begin to act.1” [Tolstoy: “The slavery of our Times.”]

From the foregoing discussion, it will be clear that Gandhism relies on individual purification, individual consciousness and conviction, and individual action. Gandhism always lays stress upon the necessity of allowing everyone to act according to his conscience. It has unbounded faith in the inherent goodness of human nature, and believes that man, left to himself to act according to his conscience, will work out nothing but the good of himself and of his community. Complete absence of coercion of any kind, and complete freedom of action, find high credence in the elaborate system of Gandhism. (This nearly verges upon the English idea of liberty, that minimum of government control, or coercion, is maximum of individual liberty1.[Seely, “Introduction to Political Science.” Hegel, ‘Philosophy of History.’]) Bolshevism does not believe in the inherent goodness of human nature, but advocates rather maximum of coercion or control (though as a passing phase) to teach man his duty towards the common good of the whole. Gandhism wishes to make a gift to the world of an Indian Empire, a Nationality founded on the basis of Universal Peace (Ahimsa,) peace between man and man, and between man and every sentient creature. It is a fair dream, an earnest ideal. Practical Lenin, with the vision before him of a world-confederacy of the wolfish capitalist militarisms, always ready to shatter the peace of the poor man and of nations, ready to butcher liberty in its very infancy in any form, slowly murmurs, “In the hoary past, the mighty Asoka had set up an Empire, and had tried to rule it according to his principles of Ahimsa, of non-violence2 [See edicts of Asoka.]. Where is that fabric of Ahimsa now? Alas! ruthlessly shattered by the shock and collision of historic forces. Perhaps the Prime Maker of history has ordained that the world should pass through the process of a painful historic development, from the brute to the man. Call upon the mighty nations of the earth to lay down their pride and hate, their sceptres and swords, and with redemptive humility, love and sacrifice, to fight in union the forces of rebarbarization, and they will laugh at you. Return their laugh with a thrash of the sword, with the very implements they have forged, and you will be at peace, or ye shall be captive of their passions! A painful mysterious future, indeed, before us! But once more the land of Buddha has determined to follow Buddhism or Gandhism; may the fabric be not shattered again!!

To recapitulate

Gandhi and Lenin.

Common aim; — To destroy social evils of the day, especially the misery of the poor and to subvert despotism.

Gandhi.

Cause.—Modern Civilization, specially modern industrialization and the consequent vices of humanity.

Remedy.  

Remedy: — Destroy the spirit of modern civilization and mechanism.

Steps.

1. Despotism of capital and of every kind must go.

2. Despotism rests on force.

3. The force is made possible and maintained by those who are tyrannized over, by their participation or cooperation with the work of the Army, Taxation, and Law of the despots.

4. Let all non-cooperate, and the edifice will fall.

5. Religion and non-violence alone can do this. For religion will teach the emptiness of modern acquisitions. Violence is usurped by violence: Non-violence will be followed by non-violence, and chaos will be prevented, which is imminent upon the subversion of despotic power as is shown by revolutions in history.

6. When despotism falls at the hand of religion and non-violence, a religious order of Society will be the outcome. Spirit of Religion, conscious of the emptiness of modernization, will necessarily destroy it for the sake of common good. The Law will be the Law of conscience of man and Humanity. Conscience will by its nature work for social good. And evils of capital, labour, and the class war will disappear in such Society. So Purify men.

7. The end is a Society of worshippers of God and Religion, and living according to the dictates of conscience.


Source.

Tolstoy →[to] Gandhism

Sphere of Work

India.

Lenin

Cause: -- Seizure of the means of production, land, etc., by the capitalists, the inequality of wealth, and consequent impoverishment of the proletariat, who form the majority of humanity.

Remedy.

Remedy: -- Keep modern acquisitions, but make them work for the common good, i.e., utilize the surplus value, which now goes to the rich, by nationalizing the means of production.

Steps.

1. Despotism of capital and of every kind must go.

2. Despotism rests on force.

3. The participation is not willingly given, but is exacted by force, not necessarily supplied from the ranks of the tyrannized.

4. The all will never do so, because the interests of the majority are allied with that of the existing tyranny. The minority alone will work out the downfall, and the majority will follow.

5. Tyranny will not be moved by religion, non-violence, and such other humane motives. Despotism will go so far as to exterminate the whole race of liberators. So it must be undermined and suppressed by its own means and ways. The chaos after the fall is temporary, and men tired of the chaos soon evolve order, as shown by history.

6. The dictates of conscience are vitiated by many external forces, unless it is highly enlightened. It is not found in average men, and requires generations to evolve. So men must be compulsorily made to work for social good, which the capitalists being unwilling to do, the proletariat must do by establishing their Dictatorship. Compulsion will generate a habit to work for common good, and to hold everything for common good. Habit will be turned into an acquired instinct. When the instinct is acquired, the Dictatorship will naturally vanish, being a mere passing phase and instrument.

7. The end is a Society of workers and no idlers, working instinctively for the common good of the whole.

Source. Karl Marx →[to] Bolshevism or Leninism.

Sphere of Work

Russia.
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Part 3 of 3

CHAPTER IV. “The Armed Blow.”

So far we have discussed the broad underlying principles of Gandhism and Bolshevism. Anybody can see that the complete realization of the theories of both the systems in practical life is an impossibility. Gandhism suffers from too much unwarranted faith in the natural goodness of human nature, while Bolshevism suffers from too much neglect of human interests and sentiments. And so is it that absolute theories, in the process of application to practical life, suffer from modification according to circumstances. The blame does not lie with those who conceive them, but rather with those who receive them. Gandhism advocated, and still advocates, the strictest observation of the law of conscience, everyone to be allowed to act according to the dictates of it. This naturally means that no law passed by a majority can be binding over the minority.1 [Gandhi; Indian Homerule.] If so, then every act of legislation will have to obtain the full consent of every member of the state, failing which there can be no legislation, in fact no government; and the state will have to drift into a philosophical anarchy or Kingdom of God! Absolute theories pushed to the end arrive at such queer results, and yet no one with common sense can say that the advocates of liberty of conscience mean seriously to bring about in practice the latter stage of reasoning. And because such extreme reasoning cannot be brought into practice, Gandhism admits to be bound and guided by congress resolutions and votes of the majority! Even the Bolsheviks, the most uncompromising of political—nay, religious— parties, has to make concessions to the pressing needs of the time. Bolshevism, that would recognize no private property of any kind, has been brought to admit the right of the peasants over their soil and its produce, and thus to recognize the class of peasant proprietors owning private property in land. To be allowed to say, “This is mine,” even of a farthing, or a piece of sod, is a comfort and solace to the human heart, and as long as this great ‘my’, ‘mine’, are not destroyed, no Dictatorship can avail to make man hold anything of his in common for common good1 [As a preparation for the service of common good, or ‘Lokasangraha,’ man must first destroy his ‘Mamatva’, ‘Ahankara,’ or sense of egoism: Geeta.]. However, Bolshevism is a noble and heroic attempt to achieve the ideal. It may fail. But today, at least, it has given to Russia a strong Government, peace and bread, and it is expected that Russia before long will be happy. Bolshevism has subverted the old Czarist despotism, and it will be much profitable if we trace a little the course of events that led the Bolsheviks to power. The study of Revolutions yields very interesting results!

The Czar became an ally of England, France, and the petty quarrelsome states of Southern Europe, and began the Great War of 1914. In truth, the war was not for any high principle or for the professed protection of the liberty of any nation; but it was for the interests of the moneyed high classes, for the protection of their industries and markets, and for the destruction of unfavourable competition. As usual, those for whose interests the war was fought gave it a colour of patriotism, of a struggle for preservation of civilization, and thus duped the people into support of it. The Russians for long were striving for liberty in their own land. Their constitutional agitation had failed. Their terrorist movement had failed. The war gave them the opportunity. The old peasantry, which in times of peace was crushed with repression by Czarist despotism, when it agitated for rights was now turned into a military organization, and it was just the thing that was needed. The long-standing grievance of the peasantry was that they should be allowed to own the lands they cultivated in place of the nobles who never looked to them except for the ruinous taxes and forced labour. The peasantry was denied this right. The war converted this self-same peasantry into a military class, and with it Czardom was doomed.

The intellectuals realized the change, and they set to work. They taught the people that the war was not for them, and if won, it would not benefit them but the high lords, their oppressors. They moved the peasantry to overthrow despotism, and created in them the confidence to do so. To this were added the horrors of scarcity of bread in Russia, and the disastrous defeats at the Front. The cry of the Bolsheviks, the most ardent agitators, became, “Land, Bread and Peace.” With this cry, the Revolution began. And when the command of Czarist despotism to shoot the patriots failed to evoke any answer from the military, on whose strength it had ruled for centuries, the success of the Revolution was assured. “The war assigned the decisive role in the Revolution to the army, and the old army was the peasantry."1 [L. Trotsky. ' History of the Russian Revolution.’]

“Had the Revolution developed more normally that is in conditions of peace-time, such as prevailed in 1912 when it really began, the proletariat would have taken the leading role throughout whilst the peasant masses would have been gradually towed along by the proletariat into the Revolutionary whirlpool. But the war imparted an entirely different logic to the course of events. The army had organised the peasantry not on a political but on a military basis. Immediately the Revolution broke out, the advanced sections of the proletariat revived the traditions of 1905 by calling upon the popular masses to organize in representative bodies viz the “councils’’ of delegates (Soviets.)

The army thus had to send representatives to revolutionary bodies before its political consciousness in any way corresponded to the level of the rapidly developing revolutionary events. Whom could the soldiers send as their representatives? Naturally, only those intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who were to be found in their midst and who possessed at least a minimum amount of political knowledge, and who were capable of giving utterance to it. In this way, by the will of the awakening army, the lower middle-class intellectuals found themselves suddenly raised to a position of enormous influence. Doctors, engineers, lawyers journalists, who in pre-war days led a humdrum private life, and laid no claim of any sort to political influence, became overnight, representatives of whole crops and armies, and discovered that they were the “leaders” of the Revolution. The haziness of their political ideas fully corresponded to the formless state of the revolutionary consciousness of the masses themselves. This half-hearted revolutionary party, raised to power, looked down upon the Bolsheviks contemptuously, and also upon the social demands of the workers and peasants. For a time the new party in power enjoyed respect of the electorates. Immediately the question of the war came before the new Government party, claiming to be representative of the people. But as the party belonged to the middle-class bourgeoisie, they did not possess that hatred for the war as the masses had. And so the party decided upon the continuation of the war. And that was the fatal mistake. The whole army i.e., the peasantry and the workers, were disgusted with the Government of the hazy politicians of the type of Kerensky, who was gradually becoming anti-revolutionary, and other leaders. The Bolsheviks, who so long were in a minority, and were confidently biding their time, and whom the Government of Kerensky was trying to sternly repress, came to the forefront, with their resolute principles and their war-cry,“Land, bread and peace!” This was exactly what the masses wanted, and the new Government, failing to give that, was easily overthrown. Kerensky’s Government failed to satisfy the peasants, and his fall was inevitable.  

To avert the calamity of his fall, Kerensky and his Government ordered the Petrograd Garrison to cantonements on the Front, since that Garrison was the most revolutionary, and opposed to Kerensky and his half-hearted policy. The Congress of the Soviets was to meet on November 7th, and that day was fixed for the Armed Blow of the Bolsheviks which was to have for its object the conquest of the supreme Government authority by the Soviets. The anti-Bolsheviks tried hard to suppress the rising. But the Bolsheviks were supported by the army. “The masses flocked to us irresistibly, and their spirit rose higher and higher. Delegates would arrive from the trenches and ask us, at the sittings of the Petrograd Soviet, 'How long will this unbearable situation last? The soldiers have authorised us to tell you that if by the 15th of November no decisive steps are taken towards the peace, the trenches will be evacuated, and the whole army will march back to the rear!’”

The Bolsheviks decided upon fulfilling their promise of the publication of all secret treaties. The soldiers would exclaim, “you say that full authority should pass into the hands of the Soviet? Then take it. Are you afraid that the front may not support you? Cast aside all doubt; the over-whelming mass of the soldiers are entirely on your side.”

The Bolshevik party appointed a Military Revolutionary Committee which appointed Commissioners to all railway stations. They kept all in-coming and out-going trains under close supervision. A continuous telephonic and motor connection was set up with all the neighbouring towns. The lower ranks of the railway servants at the stations and railway workers gave ready recognition to their Commissioners.

But at the Telephone Exchange on November 6th, the telephone girls came out in opposition to the Soviet. The M. R. Committee sent a detachment and two small guns. So began the seizure of the administrative offices. Sailors and Red Guards were stationed in small detachments at the Telegraph Office, at the Post Office, and other public offices, and measures were taken to gain possession of the State Bank. The Smolny Institute became the Soviet centre, where the M.R.C. sat in permanent session. The moment was drawing near.

On November 7th the Government in Winter Palace seized a Bolshevik paper. The Bolsheviks surrounded the Palace, and thus began the fight. News of the fight was brought to the M.R.C. at the Smolny Institute, and of the first victims on the Bolshevik side. “Everyone rose as though moved by some invisible signal, and with a unanimity, which is only provoked by a deep moral intensity of feeling, sung a Funeral March. He, who lived through this moment, will never forget it. The meeting came to an abrupt end. It was impossible to sit there, calmly discussing the theoretical question as to the method of constructing the Government, with the echo reaching our ears of the fighting and firing at the walls of the Winter Palace.” But the news of the fall and flight of Kerensky arrived. The Bolsheviks had won.

Kerensky tried to storm Petrograd with the help of the ignorant Cossacks, whom he led to believe that the Petrograd garrison was expecting them and longing for their help. But the truth came out, and the Cossacks dispersed.

The Bolsheviks at once followed up their success, resolutely organized the Govt. machinery, and established the Dictatorship of the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers. They concluded peace with Germany, and delivered Russia from destruction. This peace brought upon them the wrath of the English and the French. The invasions of General Denikin and General Wrangel were repelled, for no one could withstand the vigour of the new life of the nation; and Russian Revolution and Liberty once more escaped from falling into the bondage of the capitalist states of Europe. In the earlier campaigns the Red Army, the mainstay of the Bolsheviks, was worsted for want of veteran generals to lead, and skilled hands in the army to help the military manoeuvres, for these were formerly supplied by the old nobility who of course disdained to follow the new masters, their inveterate enemies. But soon the rank and file of the masses produced best generals and best soldiers. The Revolution had produced a new feeling of ardour, a new sense of health and power, which found expression in the enthusiasm of the soldiers. The soldiers did not care to see whether the new Government was a Dictatorship or a Democracy. It was sufficient for them to know that the Government was theirs and that it was threatened. They fought with all the zeal of a religious war. The danger was averted and peace restored.

Since Bolshevism became master of Russia, governments of all countries have been trying to discredit it in the minds of their people by painting it as devilish, atrocious, and despotic. Every move bearing the least resemblance to communist activity is being repressed, and the Bolsheviks are cut off from communicating with the people of any nation. Why is it so? What is the secret reason for this hatred? The reason lies in the avowed international policy of the Bolsheviks. In the Theses presented to the Second Congress of the Third International (of July 1920), there is an article by Lenin called, ‘First Sketch of the theses on National and Colonial Questions.” A passage in it runs thus:—

‘The present world— situation in politics, places on the order of the day, the dictatorship of the proletariat1 [i.e. the working class.]; and all the events of world politics are inevitably concentrated round one centre of gravity! The struggle of the international bourgeoisie2 [i.e. the middle-class capitalists.] against the Soviet Republic,3 [i.e. Republican councils of the working people and peasants.] which inevitably groups round it on the one hand the Sovietist movements of the advanced working men of all countries, on the other hand all the national movements of emancipation of colonies and oppressed nations which have been convinced by a bitter experience that there is no salvation for them except in the victory of the Soviet Government over world-imperialism.

It is henceforth necessary to pursue the realization of the strictest union of all the national and colonial movements of emancipation with Soviet Russia, by giving to this union forms corresponding to the degree of evolution of the proletarian movement1 [Viz. to assist the labour movement of England.] among the proletariat of each country, or of the democratic bourgeois2 [Viz. to assist the movement of emancipation of countries like Ireland, Egypt and India.] movement of emancipation among the workers and peasants of backward countries or backward nationalities.”


Such avowed aggressive international policy, of helping and instigating the labour and peasantry of every country to dispossess capital, has naturally aroused the hatred of the capitalist states of the world towards Soviet Russia. In accordance with this policy, and in conformity with his promise ‘to answer the guns of Germany with his leaflets,’ Lenin succeeded in overthrowing much of capitalism in Germany, and helping the socialist labour in that country. The same danger (!) threatened all the other capitalist states of Europe. America and Japan were too far away to seriously think of the Russian Soviet programme. So England, France and other states hastened to avert the danger to their capitalist classes, and the speedy and best method they thought of was to make war upon Russia on her own soil, and put an end to the Soviet Government with all the fruits of the Revolution. Had Karl Marx been alive, he would have called it a war for the preservation and protection of a class of murderers! Napoleon had failed to carry war to the heart of Russia, with all his powers of a great general. So also Germany with her best generals and army could not do it. What these had attempted vainly, England and France hoped to achieve through the dwarf-intellects of General Wrangel and General Denikin.

England had never shown her readiness to learn lessons from History. Otherwise the ghost of distracted Napoleon, with the flower of his army buried in the snows of the heart of Russia, would have foreshadowed the result of the campaigns of the two generals. But it was not to be; and the expected happened. Armies of exhausted [in] England and France were no match for the Reds of Lenin, fired with all the enthusiasm of a Revolution, and of a feeling that the Govt. was theirs, and that it was in danger. The war ended with disgrace for both the countries. Just so England had tried to kill the French Revolution in 1793, and had succeeded after a struggle of twenty-two years in 1815. But in 1918, a century later the same move failed. And why? A century means much to the bravery and spirit of a nation, embarked on the mad policy of acquisition. A century from 1815 to 1918 meant that England could not kill the Russian Revolution!!

However, the confederacy was dissolved and peace concluded. The Bolsheviks have fulfilled their promises. “Land, Bread and Peace,” they have given to Russia. According to the prophesy of their Guru, Karl Marx, they had expected a confederacy. But they succeeded in destroying it. They have given a strong and capable Government to Russia, which is just the need of any country that has passed through a Revolution. Dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, or rather of Lenin, is now the Government of Russia. A little picture of the Dictator will not be out of place here. We will quote the words of one who had seen him and spoken with him. “Soon after my arrival in Moscow, I had an hour's conversation with Lenin in English, which he speaks fairly well. An interpreter was present, but his services were scarcely required. Lenin’s room is very bare; it contains a big desk, some maps on the walls, two book cases, and one comfortable chair for visitors, in addition to two or three hard chairs. It is obvious that he has no love of luxury or even comfort. He is very friendly, and apparently simple, entirely without a trace of hauteur. If one met him without knowing who he he was, one would not guess that he is possessed of great power, or even that he is in any way eminent. I have never met a personage so destitute of self-importance. (Seems to be a Gandhian in this respect!) He looks at his visitors very closely, and screws up one eye, which seems to increase alarmingly the penetrating power of the other. He laughs a great deal; at first his laugh seems merely friendly and jolly, but gradually I came to feel it rather grim. He is dictatorial, calm, incapable of fear, extraordinarily devoid of self seeking, an embodied theory ... His strength comes, I imagine, from his honesty, courage, and unwavering faith — religious faith in the Marxian gospel, which takes the place of the Christian martyr's hopes of Paradise."1 [Bertrand Russell had been to Russia on behalf of the Labour Deputation and had an interview with Lenin. Russell is not a whole-hearted communist. (The italics are ours.) ] Dictatorial, calm, incapable of fear, extraordinarily devoid of self-seeking, an embodied theory! There is no wonder if such a man, ere long hunted from place to place and compelled to live an underground life, should become the Sovereign, the Dictator of Russia!

Has the Russian Revolution any significance in the History of Mankind? Or is it simply a spectacle of mean scrambling for political power on the part of ambitious parties wending their way to the throne through bloodshed of man? Wars and Revolutions there have been, but many of them would not have been there but for the comprice of vain monarchs, or for the interests of a class of power-hunters. Does the Russian Revolution belong to the same category, or has it something new to announce to the world, as the French Revolution had? Let us see.

There are two institutions on the common platform of which men unite with a common purpose. And the two institutions are Religion and the State. The first is designed to promote the moral development of the human soul, and we may term this institution as an invisible, non-material plan, in which men unite subjectively. The State is designed to promote the interests of man external to himself, of his interests in things, which cannot identify themselves with or assimilate in his personality or Idea. And this second institution is a material, visible plan, in which men unite objectively. Yet each in itself contributes to the development of the other, and sometimes Religion has completely dominated the State, and sometimes the State has dominated Religion. The two are interdependent, but we are speaking only of the State mechanism and revolutions in its construction. The idea of this instrument or institution for the objective unity of interests in men has gone through many stages of evolution, and one of the most despotic, poisonous, hard-dying stage was that completed by the French Revolution. That Revolution completed one phase of the idea about the State Mechanism as to who should be the director of it. The idea that the possession of authority should be in the hands of one man, assisted by high grandees, was destroyed, and in 1793, the new idea of the possession being transferred to the people, the ordinary citizen, was heralded, and the work of destruction was begun. To complete the work begun by 1793, Europe required [one] hundred and twenty five years, i.e., the year 1918 had to dawn until History saw the work of destruction begun by 1793 perfectly accomplished, at least in Europe. The Russian Revolution is at once an end and a beginning. It is an end of the work of destroying absolutism in the high state-lords. But it also heralds a new period. The Fr. Revolution stage tried to give the authority in the State in the hands of the ordinary citizen, but in course of events it went into the hands of the middle-class intellectuals, or the bourgeoisie, and the overwhelming mass of ordinary citizens remained just as it was before the period. The Russian Revolution is a beginning of the destruction of this 'bourgeois period,' and heralds a new day of the 'labour period.' This is the significance of the Bolshevik Revolution. So from Serfdom to Bourgeois-slavery, and from Bourgeois-slavery to the Soviet or Labour period; such are the stages of evolution in the Idea of the State Mechanism, the symbol of the objective unity of human interests.

CHAPTER V: The Indian Revolution.

We have remained too much in the foreign land of Russia, and perhaps talked too much over it. But we hope to be excused on the ground that not only we, but the wisest heads in all nations, are being irresistibly drawn towards that country by its latest noble and heroic success, and the new stage in History that it announces. Another reason is that a forbidden fruit is the most tempting. Our high master-grinders try to discredit every move of ours by calling it a “Bolshevik move.” If the people of India wish to retain their Paradise, they must be kept away from this forbidden fruit, 'Bolshevism'. But while our high masters pose to act as angels to keep us away from it, secretly they act the Satan, driving us towards the forbidden fruit! Simply, the Satan of the old story did it more gently by simply whispering. These of today lash us on the way!

What is the prospect before us? We are embarked on the struggle for independence, and how do we hope to win it? Our constitutional agitation has accomplished almost nothing beyond arousing the nation. We now want a Revolution, surely not with an “Armed Blow,” a Revolution that is the most radical and sweeping change. The theoretical plan of accomplishing it we have noticed in the third chapter. Let us try to see in what position we will drift when we put it into practice.

First, with regard to the movement of spinning and weaving on the charka, which in the hyperbolical language is styled as our ‘munitions' for battle. What will this move bring about? One thing. It will irritate the English capitalists and English labour. Food and Clothing are the two thirds that eat up the greatest part of man’s income, or require the greatest expenditure of the wealth of a nation for their production. As for food, India is self-sufficient, at least to the extent that it does not drain our wealth. But for clothing we have to depend upon England. It drains sixty crores of rupees yearly from our country. If the movement of spinning and weaving succeeds, it will make India richer by sixty crores yearly, and England poorer by the same amount. By it the English capitalists will lose their profits, and the English labour will lose employment worth that much amount. Then how is it that British labour professes hearty support to our movement? The reason is simple. The labour of that country is at present employed in a death-struggle with the capitalists. The meaning of the struggle will be clear if we will see in whose hands the greatest part of the wealth of England is locked: --

Mr. Pathick Lawrence has distributed the private wealth of the United Kingdom in 1913-14 among the rich, comfortable and poor classes in the following proportions.

Rich (owners of more than £ 10,000): 64 p.c. of the aggregate wealth.

Comfortable (owners of between £ 1,000 and £ 10,000): 24 p.c. of the aggregate wealth.

Poor (owners of less than £ 1,000): 12 p.c. of the aggregate wealth.

But by how many persons is this 64% of the aggregate wealth held?

Percentage of population: -- Rich: 2 per cent.

Comfortable: 10 per cent.

Poor: 88 per cent.


So we see that 64% of the whole wealth is enjoyed by only 2% of the population, 24% by 10% of the population and only 12% by 88% of the population. The labour of England means this 88% and its struggle means to get a share in the enormous volume of 64% held by the capitalists. As long as the British labour is not given a share in this enormous volume, it will help the Indian movement, because by our struggle we are harassing the British capitalists also, and thus helping the Labour movement of England. So it will be clear that the Labour party of England is professing sympathy for us not from any philanthropic motives, or from an inherent liking for liberty of other nations. It is a sympathy generating from quite selfish motives. The Indian labour interests, and the British labour interests, are mutually opposed. Independent India would mean full development of our industries in all branches and an efficient, organized labour. That in turn would mean a stop to the vast mass of the expenditure of British labour that is now employed for the needs of India. So sooner or later we will have to struggle with the Labour party also if it comes into power in Parliament, by ousting the present capitalist powers. This much is the meaning of the spinning and weaving movement in the programme of Non-co-operation. Suppose it fails to create a political crisis in the movement of labour vs. capital in England, what is our next weapon? Because we are quite conscious of the limitations of this move. At the most it will feed the poor by giving them work, and make India richer by sixty crores.

But what shall be our next step? The great power of England cannot be shaken by such a feeble blow. Have we then no future? We have. We have this before us. “A race which is suffering from the oppression of an alien conqueror could win its freedom without any resort to force or armed violence. First, the people must become convinced of the necessity of freedom, and that accomplished, they must decline any longer to co-operate in the administration of the foreign power. Instead, they must build up their own State within the State of those who have arrogated the role of rulers. Before long, if the people are united, the external state must crumble to pieces as the inner State grows in fullness. The alien Government may have enormous armies, machine-guns, tanks, poison-gas, aeroplanes, and bombs, but even by the most remorseless use of them it could never defeat resistance of this character. It may kill, but the very dead will work for its overthrow.” We are convinced of the necessity for freedom. That accomplished, we are trying to build an inner State. How? The alien State creates a moral prestige through its Educational and Legal Institutions. If the feelings of awe and obedience created through them are destroyed, the alien Government becomes morally extinct. This we have accomplished by the movement of the boycott of schools, and colleges, and Law Courts. We know that the boycott is not complete, but even the partial success has created the necessary feeling of considering the institutions as worthless and has destroyed the feeling of awe towards Government authority. The moral ground destroyed, on what then does it rest now? Essentially, on its military basis. The British Government in India is morally extinct; now only the military Government is existing by which we are coerced into submission to it. This militarism is maintained by us with our men and money. The army of the Indian Government is roughly three lacs of men, out of which two lacs are supplied by our native races. In our struggle, will these two lacs hold themselves aloof from the Government and refuse action? If we refuse taxes to the Government, and if the Government decides upon terrorism as they are doing in Ireland, will the native army work or refuse? The ranks of the natives are filled in by men from United Provinces, the Punjab, Nepal, and Bhutan, and by some Pathan tribes. As Prof. Seely expects, if the nationality movement gains the native army, the British Empire in India will be at an end. “For we are not really conquerors of India, and we cannot rule her as conquerors; if we undertook to do so, it is not necessary to enquire whether we could succeed, for we should assuredly be ruined financially by the mere attempt.” Even Mahatma Gandhi believes that the native army will refuse work, and says, “One lac of Europeans without our help can only hold less than one-seventh of our villages each, and it would be difficult for one man, even when physically present, to impose his will on say, four-hundred men and women -- the average population of an Indian village.”1 [Young India, March 30, 1921.] The last item of Gandhian programme is this. “We shall continue patiently to educate them (masses) politically till they are ready for safe action. As soon as we feel reasonably confident of non violence continuing among them, in spite of provoking executions, we shall certainly call upon the sepoy to lay down his arms, and the peasantry to suspend payment of taxes. We are hoping that that time may never have to be reached. We shall have no stone unturned to avoid such a serious step. But we will not flinch when the moment has come and the need has arisen.”2 [Young India, March 9, 1921.]

We are quite sure that the final step cannot be avoided. But we are diffident about the native army. The greater part of it is supplied by the Gurkhas, the Punjabis, and the Pathans. Except the Punchabees, there is not the slightest chance of the nationality movement reaching these races, and affecting them to an extent that they would lay down their arms at our orders. So our work of building the inner State must proceed without caring for the army. It can be done by the National Congress only. By the new constitution, even the smallest units of the country, the villages, will be directly affected by the Congress activity. The one crore members of the Congress must be men who will not flinch when the moment comes. The Congress must evolve its own ministries of Education, Law, and Order. The Congress must become the sovereign power of the nation. Then the final command for suspension of payment of taxes will go forth; and the true, earnest struggle shall begin. Men of real worth will be tested in that final phase. The Government will not shrink from terrorism, as it has not shrunk from it in Ireland. All the atrocities committed in Ireland will be related here. Large town-areas like Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, will be coerced into submission by a very simple act, that of stopping the water-supply. As for the peasantry and village-areas, they will be hunted down with all the instruments of war easily available, since the Govt. is a strong military power. And moreover the peasantry is always scattered over a large area, and therefore unable to do any concerted action. Village by village will be lashed to submission and obeyance to the oppressors. Then, where is our hope? We cannot expect that every man will have the courage single-handed to bear everything mutely and still be faithful to the Congress mandate, to the nation’s command, when his house, his wife, his children shall be insulted, flogged, and persecuted before his very eyes! After all we are human beings. Then? There is one remedy. The terrorism will be paralised by only one thing. And it lies in the hands of Indian labour. The army-movements in terrorism, and their success, will depend mainly upon the speedy transport of the soldiers from one centre to another, and of transport of foodstuffs and ammunition for the army. All this is done by Indian labour. If at the extreme moment the Indian labour refuses to work in a solid mass, if the railwayman, telegraph men, coolies, and all sorts of labourers refuse to cooperate with the govt. i.e,, arrange, what is called a sabotage, our success will be assured. The whole movement of govt. terrorism will be paralyzed, and it will have to yield. The sepoy may not lay down his arms, terrorism of the govt. may become financially possible contrary to the expectations of Seely, schools and colleges may not be emptied, and merchants may not stop the foreign trade; but when the final command to suspend paying taxes shall go forth, if the Indian labour will not flinch and do its duty, we will succeed. So side by side with the education of the peasantry must be done the work of organizing our labour and educating it. The labour organization and education is a more hopeful task, because the labourers always are found in large town-areas and in enormous units; a fermenting political atmosphere prevails in such large cities, which makes them susceptible to rapid changes, while the nature of their work makes them habituated to concerted action. This characteristic makes us confident to say that an organized Indian labour will not fail us at the time of action; it is our dire necessity. If we win, we will win only by the help of the proletariat, i.e., the labourers and peasantry. They are our main support. We care neither for the middle-class, nor for the corrupt intellectuals.

No one requires to be told that all this sabotage of the workers, our defence from terrorism by satyagraha, our building the inner State until the outer crumbles down automatically, is to proceed without any violence or disorder. Of course, when the huge mass of population of the Indian continent is to move for action, there is bound to be some violence and some disorder. But that would be nothing compared to those scenes with which mankind has become familiar in history. We are sure this our so-called violence will be nothing when considered by the side of Cromwell’s execution of Charles I, or the guillotine-rumbling of the Fr. Revolution. History cries out hoarsely to all these words. ‘It is the nature of the Devil of tyranny to tear and rend the body, which he leaves ... If it were possible that a people brought under an intolerant and arbitrary system could subvert that system without acts of cruelty and folly, half the objections against despotic power would be removed ....We deplore the outrages that accompany revolutions. But the more violent the outrages, the more assured we feel that a revolution was necessary. The violence of those outrages will always be proportioned to the ferocity, and ignorance of the people will be proportioned to the oppression and degradation under which they have been accustomed to live... If our rulers suffered from popular ignorance, it was because they themselves had taken away the key of knowledge. If they were assailed with blind fury, it was because they had exacted an equally blind submission.”1 [Macaulay 'Milton’, p. 40.] But after this was written, the methods of warfare have made much progress, and the method of non-violent opposition has come in vogue. We are sure our later historians will not have an occasion to write in this strain about us!

Some of our readers may charge us of being in a dream, and writing of a dream, that we may have seen of the future of India. Some may say, “No use talking of the future. Do the work near at hand.” To the former we will say that every ideal and every plan is a dream until it becomes a realized fact. Every plan of action to be done at the moment, next to the one that is actually passing, is speculation, dreaming. Thus every moment man is dreaming. We have only added together, end to end, many such moments, forming days and months at a stretch, and are dreaming about the plan for that much length of time. The greatest dreaming of a fabulous length of time and action is Idealism. To the latter we will say, “we must start work with a clear idea of what we will have to suffer, and to what length and sphere our activities may extend. It is no use starting the work nearest at hand, and turn back half-way, when the terrors of the future are revealed with all their hideousness. We must calculate upon the worst first, and with a clear idea of it start on, which gives greater courage and greater enduring power.”

Only one point now and we finish. In Swaraj (really a dream to some) we will be faced with the problem of labour vs. capital, and the agricultural problem. We must give preference of consideration to these problems first. For we shall win only with the help of the peasantry and labour, who will naturally expect an end of their miseries after emancipation. The spinning wheel alone will not solve the labour problem of modern civilization. We cannot accept the communist plan, in all details, because it is too much fraught with coercion and violence. It must be accepted to this extent, that great concerns like railways, mines, and vast factory plants, may be nationalized or controlled by the State, as even today they are being done in some countries. But how to prevent accumulation of capital in the the hands of a few through speculation and such other means? We may try the following remedy for this. We may fix upon a maximum amount of wealth that an individual may be allowed to possess. Let us take an example of a family man of our day: A man, with a family of say at least four members requires a hundred and fifty rupees to live an honourable decent and happy life without any cares. Of course he is expected to have ambition, to provide something for his children, to have more luxuries of a happier life. The State must allow his powers of working out his ambition free play. But this ambition must be curtailed at some point. The State must stop him at a point where he may be judged to have become “very luxurious” according to the standard of average life of luxuriousness. The standard will vary according to the notions of each man. But we think, in India, we may as well stop a man accumulating beyond one lac of rupees. When this maximum amount has been earned, the man may either stop his activity of earning, or should devote the surplus to the State to be utilized for common good. This is only a suggestion. We have much time to think over its application and efficacy to solve the problem; because we must only think until we get Swaraj!

The Second problem. It is well-known that the agricultural land of India in most parts is accumulated in the hands of great landlords or zamindars, who impoverish the peasants by high taxation, and that the fruits of the peasant’s honest toil goes to the idle, unproductive land-owners. The following figures will explain how the greatest part of agricultural land is divided into a few estates owned by capitalistic zamindars: —  

Acres of land. / No. of estates in which the land is divided.

25 million acres / 90 estates (of course one estate is an ownership of one zemindar.)
73 million acres / 2000 estates (of course one estate is an ownership of one zemindar.)
187 million acres / 1/2 million estates (of course one estate is an ownership of one zemindar.)
30 million acres / 19 million estates (of course one estate is an ownership of one zemindar.)


So we can see that there are only 19 million peasants, who are independent peasant-proprietors, and to their poor lot falls the bit of 30 million acres, a little more than one and a half acre for one peasant-proprietor. The remaining acreage is cultivated by farmers who cannot be proprietors, but are temporary tenants or lease-holders, whose real profit is swallowed by the zamindars, and who can be turned out at their sweet will. The misery of the farmers can be solved only be breaking up the large estates into small holdings and turning them into peasant-proprietorships. Even in Europe the same policy is being followed. “The accepted policy in all the agricultural and thickly populated countries of Europe, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, is the break up of large estates, and the promotion of small holding schemes by the State. It is by the break-up of large estates, and conversion of a landless, oppressed, indebted, and impoverished tenantry into a thrifty, free, and flourishing class of peasant-proprietors, owning land in small and medium sized farms, in conjunction with the organization of rural credit" that we can hold and keep agricultural India in peace and prosperity. Surely by these reforms we shall displease the zemindars and capitalists. But for some years to come, we must face every unjust displeasure. In the end we will triumph, we will be free, we will make the oppressed people free, for ours is a cause of justice, of rights, and of Religion. With this we defy all.

APPENDIX A: How Capitalism robs!

Two examples cited by Mr. C. F. Andrews.

One is that of a modern capitalist, who is said to have bought up all the bricks in the neighbourhood of one of the greatest cities in India, and then, having obtained the monopoly, to have raised immediately the price of building material by 200 per cent.

Let us look a transaction like that squarely in the face. We know how during the present housing crisis in Bombay and elsewhere, the one immediately necessary step to be taken is to create room for expansion in order to relieve the congested slum districts. Most vital moral issues depend on this being done quickly; for immorality breeds in slums. Yet, in the very face of this urgent social demand, here is one individual who can hinder the whole of that necessary building expansion, and hold it up indefinitely by clever manipulation of the money market. Such a man is considered supremely lucky by his neighbours if he succeeds in effecting his object. There appears to be nothing disgraceful in it. On the contrary, his new wealth brings him a thousand fresh admirers. But if we read the parable of Christ aright, God is saying to him, all the while —  

“Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required of thee.”


Second; It has been recently reported to me that a certain firm in Calcutta started business before the war, and was only moderately successful. The shares had slowly risen from 100 to 145, and the rate of interest had slowly risen also. The price paid for the jute to the cultivator had also risen side by side with the prosperity of the jute business. At the outbreak of war, the cultivator could obtain 13 rupees 8 annas per maund for the jute. So far nothing abnormal had happened. But during the war, and after the war, the expenses of the jute cultivator had rapidly increased, and therefore, in justice, he should have demanded more money in return for his labour. Indeed, in order to live at the same rate as before the war, he would need to spend at least twice as much money. He ought, therefore, to be getting not much less than thirty rupees per maund for his jute. But as a matter of fact the opposite of this has taken place. In the years 1914-1920, the jute shares in this company went up from 145 to 1160. The interest paid on the capital invested in the company went up from 15 per cent before the war to 160 per cent. But the price paid to the jute cultivator went down, from 13 rupees 8 annas before the war to six rupees in the year 1920!

We have to understand that here in India itself, and all over the world, the destructive powers which can be wrought under the capitalistic system, when unrestricted, are so great that in their cumulative effects they have far exceeded the violence of revolutionary mobs and predatory powers at open war with one another. The problem of the modern age is to curb these wild excesses of unrestricted capital without destroying or weakening those forces of enterprise and initiative which are vitally necessary for progress.

APPENDIX B: Some interesting figures.

Prices of Foodstuffs (in seers per rupee)

Name of Food / 1857 / 1890 / 1918

Wheat / 39 / 25 / 5.5
Gram / 51.5 / 28 / 7
Rice / 18.5 / 12 / 4
Milk / 160 / 64 / 4


APPENDIX C. Export of living Animals from India.

Year
1901 / 1906 / 1911 / 1912 / 1916

Number
3,20,835 / 3,16,996 / 5,27,706 / 5,44,588 / 3,34,310

Value in £
1,42,634 / 1,50,877 / 1,82,787 / 2,22,200 / 1,59,287


[“In our life’s struggle, our cattle form our primary mainstay. Their milk constitutes our principal food from the day that we are born to the day that we die. It also forms our chief source of nutrition. The cattle forms practically our only beast of burden. It carries us from place to place, and carries our merchandise too. Agriculture is wholly dependent on our cattle.” Yet the Government pursues the policy of exporting them, and of sending them to slaughter-houses. Advantages of British Government in India!!]  
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Ethical movement [Ethical Culture Movement] [Ethical Humanism] [Ethical Culture] [Ethical Church Movement]
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 4/18/20

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Ethical Movement
The Ethical Human logo of the Ethical Culture/Ethical Humanist movement, its most widely used symbol
Scripture None
Headquarters: New York City
Founder: Felix Adler
Origin: 1877
Congregations: about 30
Number of followers: Less than 10,000 (2014)[1]
Official website http://www.aeu.org

The Ethical movement, also referred to as the Ethical Culture movement, Ethical Humanism or simply Ethical Culture, is an ethical, educational, and religious movement that is usually traced back to Felix Adler (1851–1933).[2] Individual chapter organizations are generically referred to as "Ethical Societies", though their names may include "Ethical Society", "Ethical Culture Society", "Society for Ethical Culture", "Ethical Humanist Society", or other variations on the theme of "Ethical".

The Ethical movement is an outgrowth of secular moral traditions in the 19th century, principally in Europe and the United States. While some in this movement went on to organise for a non-congregational secular humanist movement, others attempted to build a secular moral movement that was emphatically "religious" in its approach to developing humanist ethical codes, in the sense of encouraging congregational structures and religious rites and practices. While in the United States, these movements formed as separate education organisations (the American Humanist Association and the American Ethical Union), the American Ethical Union's British equivalents, the South Place Ethical Society and the British Ethical Union consciously moved away from a congregational model to become Conway Hall and Humanists UK respectively. Subsequent "godless" congregational movements include the Sunday Assembly, whose London chapter has used Conway Hall as a venue since 2013.

At the international level, Ethical Culture and secular humanist groups have always organised jointly; the American Ethical Union and British Ethical Union were founding members of Humanists International, whose original name "International Humanist and Ethical Union" reflected the movement's unity.

Ethical Culture is premised on the idea that honoring and living in accordance with ethical principles is central to what it takes to live meaningful and fulfilling lives, and to creating a world that is good for all. Practitioners of Ethical Culture focus on supporting one another in becoming better people, and on doing good in the world.[3][4]

History

Background


The Ethical movement was an outgrowth of the general loss of faith among the intellectuals of the Victorian era. A precursor to the doctrines of the ethical movement can be found in the South Place Ethical Society, founded in 1793 as the South Place Chapel on Finsbury Square, on the edge of the City of London.[5]

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The Fabian Society was an outgrowth from the Fellowship of the New Life.

In the early nineteenth century, the chapel became known as "a radical gathering-place".[6] At that point it was a Unitarian chapel, and that movement, like Quakers, supported female equality.[7] Under the leadership of Reverend William Johnson Fox,[8] it lent its pulpit to activists such as Anna Wheeler, one of the first women to campaign for feminism at public meetings in England, who spoke in 1829 on "Rights of Women." In later decades, the chapel moved away from Unitarianism, changing its name first to the South Place Religious Society, then the South Place Ethical Society (a name it held formally, though it was better known as Conway Hall from 1929) and is now Conway Hall Ethical Society.

The Fellowship of the New Life was established in 1883 by the Scottish intellectual Thomas Davidson.[9] Fellowship members included poets Edward Carpenter and John Davidson, animal rights activist Henry Stephens Salt,[10] sexologist Havelock Ellis, feminist Edith Lees (who later married Ellis), novelist Olive Schreiner[11] and Edward R. Pease.

Its objective was "The cultivation of a perfect character in each and all." They wanted to transform society by setting an example of clean simplified living for others to follow. Davidson was a major proponent of a structured philosophy about religion, ethics, and social reform.[12]

At a meeting on 16 November 1883, a summary of the society’s goals was drawn up by Maurice Adams:

We, recognizing the evils and wrongs that must beset men so long as our social life is based upon selfishness, rivalry, and ignorance, and desiring above all things to supplant it by a life based upon unselfishness, love, and wisdom, unite, for the purpose of realizing the higher life among ourselves, and of inducing and enabling others to do the same. And we now form ourselves into a Society, to be called the Guild [Fellowship] of the New Life, to carry out this purpose.[13]


Although the Fellowship was a short-lived organization, it spawned the Fabian Society, which split in 1884 from the Fellowship of the New Life.[14][15]

Ethical movement

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Felix Adler, founder of the ethical movement.

In his youth, Felix Adler was being trained to be a rabbi like his father, Samuel Adler, the rabbi of the Reform Jewish Temple Emanu-El in New York. As part of his education, he enrolled at the University of Heidelberg, where he was influenced by neo-Kantian philosophy. He was especially drawn to the Kantian ideas that one could not prove the existence or non-existence of deities or immortality and that morality could be established independently of theology.[16]

During this time he was also exposed to the moral problems caused by the exploitation of women and labor. These experiences laid the intellectual groundwork for the ethical movement. Upon his return from Germany, in 1873, he shared his ethical vision with his father's congregation in the form of a sermon. Due to the negative reaction he elicited it became his first and last sermon as a rabbi in training.[17] Instead he took up a professorship at Cornell University and in 1876 gave a follow up sermon that led to the 1877 founding of the New York Society for Ethical Culture, which was the first of its kind.[16] By 1886, similar societies had sprouted up in Philadelphia, Chicago and St. Louis.[17]

These societies all adopted the same statement of principles:

• The belief that morality is independent of theology;
• The affirmation that new moral problems have arisen in modern industrial society which have not been adequately dealt with by the world's religions;
• The duty to engage in philanthropy in the advancement of morality;
• The belief that self-reform should go in lock step with social reform;
• The establishment of republican rather than monarchical governance of Ethical societies
• The agreement that educating the young is the most important aim.

In effect, the movement responded to the religious crisis of the time by replacing theology with unadulterated morality. It aimed to "disentangle moral ideas from religious doctrines, metaphysical systems, and ethical theories, and to make them an independent force in personal life and social relations."[17] Adler was also particularly critical of the religious emphasis on creed, believing it to be the source of sectarian bigotry. He therefore attempted to provide a universal fellowship devoid of ritual and ceremony, for those who would otherwise be divided by creeds. For the same reasons the movement also adopted a neutral position on religious beliefs, advocating neither atheism nor theism, agnosticism nor deism.[17]

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Ethical Culture School (red) and Ethical Culture Society (white) buildings.

The Adlerian emphasis on "deed not creed" translated into several public service projects. The year after it was founded, the New York society started a kindergarten, a district nursing service and a tenement-house building company. Later they opened the Ethical Culture School, then called the "Workingman's School," a Sunday school and a summer home for children, and other Ethical societies soon followed suit with similar projects. Unlike the philanthropic efforts of the established religious institutions of the time, the Ethical societies did not attempt to proselytize those they helped. In fact, they rarely attempted to convert anyone. New members had to be sponsored by existing members, and women were not allowed to join at all until 1893. They also resisted formalization, though nevertheless slowly adopted certain traditional practices, like Sunday meetings and life cycle ceremonies, yet did so in a modern humanistic context. In 1893, the four existing societies unified under the umbrella organization, the American Ethical Union.[17]

After some initial success the movement stagnated until after World War II. In 1946 efforts were made to revitalize and societies were created in New Jersey and Washington D.C., along with the inauguration of the Encampment for Citizenship. By 1968 there were thirty societies with a total national membership of over 5,500. However, the resuscitated movement differed from its predecessor in a few ways. The newer groups were being created in suburban locales and often to provide alternative Sunday schools for children, with adult activities as an afterthought.

There was also a greater focus on organization and bureaucracy, along with an inward turn emphasizing the needs of the group members over the more general social issues that had originally concerned Adler. The result was a transformation of American ethical societies into something much more akin to small Christian congregations in which the minister's most pressing concern is to tend to his or her flock.[17]

In the 21st century, the movement continued to revitalize itself through social media and involvement with other Humanist organizations, with mixed success. As of 2014, there were fewer than 10,000 official members of the Ethical movement.[18]

In Britain

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Stanton Coit led the ethical movement in Britain.

In 1885 the ten-year-old American Ethical Culture movement helped to stimulate similar social activity in Great Britain, when American sociologist John Graham Brooks distributed pamphlets by Chicago ethical society leader William Salter to a group of British philosophers, including Bernard Bosanquet, John Henry Muirhead, and John Stuart MacKenzie.

One of Felix Adler's colleagues, Stanton Coit, visited them in London to discuss the "aims and principles" of their American counterparts. In 1886 the first British ethical society was founded. Coit took over the leadership of South Place for a few years. Ethical societies flourished in Britain. By 1896 the four London societies formed the Union of Ethical Societies, and between 1905 and 1910 there were over fifty societies in Great Britain, seventeen of which were affiliated with the Union. Part of this rapid growth was due to Coit, who left his role as leader of South Place in 1892 after being denied the power and authority he was vying for.

Because he was firmly entrenched in British ethicism, Coit remained in London and formed the West London Ethical Society, which was almost completely under his control. Coit worked quickly to shape the West London society not only around Ethical Culture but also the trappings of religious practice, renaming the society in 1914 to the Ethical Church. He transformed his meetings into services, and their space into something akin to a church. In a series of books Coit also began to argue for the transformation of the Anglican Church into an Ethical Church, while holding up the virtue of ethical ritual. He felt that the Anglican Church was in the unique position to harness the natural moral impulse that stemmed from society itself, as long as the Church replaced theology with science, abandoned supernatural beliefs, expanded its bible to include a cross-cultural selection of ethical literature and reinterpreted its creeds and liturgy in light of modern ethics and psychology. His attempt to reform the Anglican church failed, and ten years after his death in 1944, the Ethical Church building was sold to the Roman Catholic Church.[17]

During Stanton Coit's lifetime, the Ethical Church never officially affiliated with the Union of Ethical Societies, nor did South Place. In 1920 the Union of Ethical Societies changed its name to the Ethical Union.[19] Harold Blackham, who had taken over leadership of the London Ethical Church, consciously sought to remove the church-like trappings of the Ethical movement, and advocated a simple creed of humanism that was not akin to a religion. He promoted the merger of the Ethical Union with the Rationalist Press Association and the South Place Ethical Society, and, in 1957, a Humanist Council was set up to explore amalgamation. Although issues over charitable status prevented a full amalgamation, the Ethical Union under Blackham changed its name in 1967 to become the British Humanist Association – establishing humanism as the principle organising force for non-religious morals and secularist advocacy in Britain. The BHA was the legal successor body to the Union of Ethical Societies.[20]

Between 1886 and 1927 seventy-four ethical societies were started in Great Britain, although this rapid growth did not last long. The numbers declined steadily throughout the 1920s and early 30s, until there were only ten societies left in 1934. By 1954 there were only four. The situation became such that in 1971, sociologist Colin Campbell even suggested that one could say, "that when the South Place Ethical Society discussed changing its name to the South Place Humanist society in 1969, the English ethical movement ceased to exist."[17]

The organisations spawned by the 19th century Ethical movement would later live on as the British humanist movement. The South Place Ethical Society eventually changed its name Conway Hall Ethical Society, after Moncure D. Conway, and is typically known as simply "Conway Hall". In 2017, the British Humanist Association again changed its name, becoming Humanists UK. Both organisations are part of Humanists International, which had been founded by Harold Blackham in 1952 as the International Humanist and Ethical Union.

Ethical perspective

Image
Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture building on Prospect Park West, originally designed by architect William Tubby as a home for William H. Childs (inventor of Bon Ami Cleaning Powder)

While Ethical Culturists generally share common beliefs about what constitutes ethical behavior and the good, individuals are encouraged to develop their own personal understanding of these ideas. This does not mean that Ethical Culturists condone moral relativism, which would relegate ethics to mere preferences or social conventions. Ethical principles are viewed as being related to deep truths about the way the world works, and hence not arbitrary. However, it is recognized that complexities render the understanding of ethical nuances subject to continued dialogue, exploration, and learning.

While the founder of Ethical Culture, Felix Adler, was a transcendentalist, Ethical Culturists may have a variety of understandings as to the theoretical origins of ethics. Key to the founding of Ethical Culture was the observation that too often disputes over religious or philosophical doctrines have distracted people from actually living ethically and doing good. Consequently, "Deed before creed" has long been a motto of the movement.[4][21]

Religious aspect

Image
Pews and stained glass

Functionally, Ethical Societies are similar to churches or synagogues and are headed by "leaders" as clergy. Ethical Societies typically have Sunday morning meetings, offer moral instruction for children and teens, and do charitable work and social action. They may offer a variety of educational and other programs. They conduct weddings, commitment ceremonies, baby namings, and memorial services.

Individual Ethical Society members may or may not believe in a deity or regard Ethical Culture as their religion. Felix Adler said "Ethical Culture is religious to those who are religiously minded, and merely ethical to those who are not so minded." The movement does consider itself a religion in the sense that

Religion is that set of beliefs and/or institutions, behaviors and emotions which bind human beings to something beyond their individual selves and foster in its adherents a sense of humility and gratitude that, in turn, sets the tone of one’s world-view and requires certain behavioral dispositions relative to that which transcends personal interests.[22]


The Ethical Culture 2003 ethical identity statement states:

It is a chief belief of Ethical religion that if we relate to others in a way that brings out their best, we will at the same time elicit the best in ourselves. By the "best" in each person, we refer to his or her unique talents and abilities that affirm and nurture life. We use the term "spirit" to refer to a person’s unique personality and to the love, hope, and empathy that exists in human beings. When we act to elicit the best in others, we encourage the growing edge of their ethical development, their perhaps as-yet untapped but inexhaustible worth.


Since around 1950 the Ethical Culture movement has been increasingly identified as part of the modern Humanist movement. Specifically, in 1952, the American Ethical Union, the national umbrella organization for Ethical Culture societies in the United States, became one of the founding member organizations of the International Humanist and Ethical Union.

Key ideas

While Ethical Culture does not regard its founder's views as necessarily the final word, Adler identified focal ideas that remain important within Ethical Culture. These ideas include:

• Human Worth and Uniqueness – All people are taken to have inherent worth, not dependent on the value of what they do. They are deserving of respect and dignity, and their unique gifts are to be encouraged and celebrated.[3]
• Eliciting the Best – "Always act so as to Elicit the best in others, and thereby yourself" is as close as Ethical Culture comes to having a Golden Rule.[3]
• Interrelatedness – Adler used the term The Ethical Manifold to refer to his conception of the universe as made up of myriad unique and indispensable moral agents (individual human beings), each of whom has an inestimable influence on all the others. In other words, we are all interrelated, with each person playing a role in the whole and the whole affecting each person. Our interrelatedness is at the heart of ethics.

Many Ethical Societies prominently display a sign that says "The Place Where People Meet to Seek the Highest is Holy Ground".[23]

Locations

The largest concentration of Ethical Societies is in the New York metropolitan area, including Societies in New York, Manhattan, the Bronx,[24] Brooklyn, Queens, Westchester and Nassau County; and New Jersey, such as Bergen and Essex Counties, New Jersey.[25][26]

Ethical Societies exist in several U.S. cities and counties, including Austin, Texas; Baltimore; Chapel Hill; Asheville, North Carolina; Chicago; San Jose, California; Philadelphia; St. Louis; St. Peters, Missouri; Washington, D.C.; Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and Vienna, Virginia.

Ethical Societies also exist outside the U.S. Conway Hall in London is home to the South Place Ethical Society, which was founded in 1787.[27]

Structure and events

Ethical societies are typically led by "Leaders." Leaders are trained and certified (the equivalent of ordination) by the American Ethical Union. Societies engage Leaders, in much the same way that Protestant congregations "call" a minister. Not all Ethical societies have a professional Leader. (In typical usage, the Ethical Movement uses upper case to distinguish certified professional Leaders from other leaders.)[28] A board of executives handles day-to-day affairs, and committees of members focus on specific activities and involvements of the society.

Ethical societies usually hold weekly meetings on Sundays, with the main event of each meeting being the "Platform", which involves a half-hour speech by the Leader of the Ethical Society, a member of the society or by guests. Sunday school for minors is also held at most ethical societies concurrent with the Platform.

The American Ethical Union holds an annual AEU Assembly bringing together Ethical societies from across the US.

Legal challenges

The tax status of Ethical Societies as religious organizations has been upheld in court cases in Washington, D.C. (1957), and in Austin, Texas (2003). In challenge to a denial of tax-exempt status, the Texas State Appeals Court decided that "the Comptroller's test was unconstitutionally underinclusive and that the Ethical Society should have qualified for the requested tax exemptions... Because the Comptroller's test fails to include the whole range of belief systems that may, in our diverse and pluralistic society, merit the First Amendment's protection..." [29]

Advocates

British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald was a strong supporter of the British Ethical movement, having been a Christian earlier in his life. He was a member of the Ethical Church and the Union of Ethical Societies (now Humanists UK), a regular attender at South Place Ethical Society. During his time involved with the Ethical movement, he chaired the annual meeting of the Ethical Union on multiple occasions and wrote for Stanton Coit's Ethical World journal.[30][31][32][33]

Albert Einstein was a supporter of Ethical Culture. On the seventy-fifth anniversary of the New York Society for Ethical Culture, in 1951, he noted that the idea of Ethical Culture embodied his personal conception of what is most valuable and enduring in religious idealism. Humanity requires such a belief to survive, Einstein argued. He observed, "Without 'ethical culture' there is no salvation for humanity."[34]

First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt was a regular attendee at the New York Society for Ethical Culture at a time when humanism was beginning to coalesce in its modern day form, and it was there that she developed friendships with the leading humanists and Ethical Culturists of her day. She collaborated with Al Black, Ethical Society leader, in the creation of her nationwide Encampment of Citizenship. She maintained her involvement with the movement as figures on both sides of the Atlantic began to advocate for organising under the banner of secular humanism. She provided a cover endorsement for the first edition of Humanism as the Next Step (1954) by Lloyd and Mary Morain, saying simply that it was "A significant book."

See also

• Arthur E. Briggs, Los Angeles City Council member, 1939–41, Ethical Society leader
• British Humanist Association, which inherited many British ethical societies
• Religious humanism
• Unitarian Universalism
• Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia

References

1. "The original 'atheist church': Why don't more atheists know about Ethical Culture?". Retrieved 25 June 2018.
2. From Reform Judaism to ethical culture: the religious evolution of Felix Adler Benny Kraut, Hebrew Union College Press, 1979
3. Brown, Stuart C; Collinson, Diané (1996), "Adler", Biographical dictionary of twentieth-century philosophers, Books, p. 7, ISBN 9780415060431
4. The conservator, Volumes 3-4, Horace Traubel, Volume 3, page 31
5. City of London page on Finsbury Circus Conservation Area Character Summary Archived 8 October 2006 at the Wayback Machine
6. The Sexual Contract, by Carole Patema. P160
7. ""Women's Politics in Britain 1780-1870: Claiming Citizenship" by Jane Rendall, esp. "72. The religious backgrounds of feminist activists"". Archived from the original on 11 March 2012. Retrieved 17 March 2012.
8. "Ethical Society history page". Ethicalsoc.org.uk. Archived from the original on 18 January 2000. Retrieved 29 September2013.
9. Good, James A. "The Development of Thomas Davidson's Religious and Social Thought".
10. George Hendrick, Henry Salt: Humanitarian Reformer and Man of Letters, University of Illinois Press, pg. 47 (1977).
11. Jeffrey Weeks, Making Sexual History, Wiley-Blackwell, pg. 20, (2000).
12. Knight, William. Memorials of Thomas Davidson.(Boston: Ginn & Company, 1907), 18
13. Knight, William. Memorials of Thomas Davidson.(Boston: Ginn & Company, 1907), 19
14. William A. Knight, Memorials of Thomas Davidson: The Wandering Scholar (Boston and London: Ginn and Co, 1907). p. 16, 19, 46.
15. Pease, Edward R. (1916). The History of the Fabian Society. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co.
16. Howard B. Radest. 1969. Toward Common Ground: The Story of the Ethical Societies in the United States. New York: Fredrick Unger Publishing Co.
17. Colin Campbell. 1971. Towards a Sociology of Irreligion. London: MacMillan Press.
18. Stedman, Chris (2014, October 1). "The original ‘atheist church’: Why don’t more atheists know about Ethical Culture?" Religion World News. Retrieved from https://religionnews.com/2014/10/01/ori ... l-culture/
19. I.D. MacKillop. 1986. The British Ethical Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20. British Humanist Association: Our History since 1896 Archived 9 August 2013 at WebCite
21. Ethics as a Religion, David Saville Muzzey, 273 pages, 1951, 1967, 1986
22. Arthur Dobrin, quoted in "Ethical Culture as Religion" Archived 12 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Jone Johnson Lewis, 2003, American Ethical Union Library
23. Goldberger, Paul (12 August 2010), Architecture, Sacred Space, and the Challenge of the Modern, Chautauqua Institution, archived from the original on 15 July 2011, retrieved 3 March 2011
24. "Riverdale Yonkers Society for Ethical Culture". Rysec.org. 24 August 2012. Retrieved 29 September 2013.
25. Ethical Societies.
26. Bergen, NJ Society
27. South Place Ethical Society, About the Society Archived 29 November 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
28. American Ethical Union. American Ethical Union https://aeu.org/meet-our-leaders/. Retrieved 3 January 2018. Missing or empty |title= (help)
29. Carole Keeton Strayhorn, in her Official Capacity as Comptroller of Public Accounts, Appellant v. Ethical Society of Austin, f/k/a Ethical Culture Fellowship of Austin, Appellee, justia.com, 2003
30. Lord Godfrey Elton (1939). The Life of James Ramsay Macdonald (1866-1919). Collins. p. 94.
31. Turner, Jacqueline (2018). The Labour Church: Religion and Politics in Britain 1890-1914. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
32. Hunt, James D. (2005). An American Looks at Gandhi: Essays in Satyagraha, Civil Rights, and Peace. Promilla & Co Publishers Ltd.
33. Marquand, David; Ramsay MacDonald; London, 1977; p. 24
34. Ericson, Edward L (1988). The Humanist Way: An Introduction to Ethical Humanist Religion. The American Ethical Union. ISBN 9780804421768. Retrieved 23 July 2008.
This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Edward William Bennett (1901–1906). "Ethical Culture, Society for". In Singer, Isidore; et al. (eds.). The Jewish Encyclopedia. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.

Further reading

• Ericson, Edward L. The Humanist Way: An Introduction to Ethical Humanist Religion. A Frederick Ungar book, The Continuum Publishing Company. 205 pages, 1988.
• Radest, Howard. Toward Common Ground: The Story of the Ethical Societies in the United States. Ungar, 1969
• Muzzey, David Saville. Ethics as a Religion, 273 pages, 1951, 1967, 1986.

External links

• Official website
• Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Ethical Society of Austin
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Re: Freda Bedi Cont'd (#2)

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Aristotelian Society
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 4/19/20

The Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, more generally known as the Aristotelian Society, was founded at a meeting on 19 April 1880, at 17 Bloomsbury Square, London.[1]

The Aristotelian Society resolved "to constitute a society of about twenty and to include ladies; the society to meet fortnightly, on Mondays at 8 o'clock, at the rooms of the Spelling Reform Association…"[2] The rules of the society stipulated:

The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of philosophy; 1st, as to its historical development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.


According to H. Wildon Carr, in choosing a name for the society, it was:

essential to find a name which would definitely prescribe the speculative character of the study which was to be the Society's ideal, and it seemed that this could best be secured by adopting the name of a philosopher eminently representative. There is only one such name in the history of philosophy and so we became the Aristotelian Society, not for the special study of Aristotle, or of Aristotelianism, but for the systematic study of Philosophy."[3]


The society's first president was Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson. He was president for fourteen years from 1880 until 1894, when he proposed Dr. Bernard Bosanquet as his replacement.

Bernard Bosanquet FBA (/ˈboʊzənˌkɛt, -kɪt/; 14 June[1] 1848 – 8 February 1923) was an English philosopher and political theorist, and an influential figure on matters of political and social policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. His work influenced but was later subject to criticism by many thinkers, notably Bertrand Russell, John Dewey and William James. Bernard was the husband of Charity Organisation Society leader Helen Bosanquet.

Born at Rock Hall near Alnwick, Bosanquet was the son of Robert William Bosanquet, a Church of England clergyman. He was educated at Harrow School and Balliol College, Oxford. After graduation, he was elected to a Fellowship at University College, Oxford, but, after receiving a substantial inheritance, resigned it in order to devote himself to philosophical research. He moved to London in 1881, where he became an active member of the London Ethical Society and the Charity Organisation Society. Both were positive demonstrations of Bosanquet's ethical philosophy.

The Charity Organization Societies were founded in England in 1869 following the 'Goschen Minute' (Poor Law Board; 22nd Annual Report (1869–70), Appendix A No.4. Relief to the Poor in the Metropolis. PP XXXI, 1871) that sought to severely restrict outdoor relief distributed by the Poor Law Guardians. In the early 1870s a handful of local societies were formed with the intention of restricting the distribution of outdoor relief to the elderly.

Also called the Associated Charities was a private charity that existed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a clearing house for information on the poor. The society was mainly concerned with distinction between the deserving poor and undeserving poor. The society believed that giving out charity without investigating the problems behind poverty created a class of citizens that would always be dependent on alms giving.

The society originated in Elberfeld, Germany and spread to Buffalo, New York around 1877. The conviction that relief promoted dependency was the basis for forming the Societies. Instead of offering direct relief, the societies addressed the cycle of poverty. Neighborhood charity visitors taught the values of hard work and thrift to individuals and families. The COS set up centralized records and administrative services and emphasized objective investigations and professional training.

-- Charity Organization Society, by Wikipedia


Bosanquet published on a wide range of topics, such as logic, metaphysics, aesthetics and politics. In his metaphysics, he is regarded as a key representative (with F. H. Bradley) of absolute idealism, although it is a term that he abandoned in favour of "speculative philosophy".

He was one of the leaders of the so-called neo-Hegelian philosophical movement in Great Britain. He was strongly influenced by the ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, but also by the German philosophers Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Among his best-known works are The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899), his Gifford lectures, The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912) and The Value and Destiny of the Individual (1913).

Bosanquet was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1894 to 1898.

In his Encyclopedia, Section 95, Hegel had written about "the ideality of the finite." This obscure, seemingly meaningless, phrase was interpreted as implying that "what is finite is not real" because the ideal is understood as being the opposite of the real. Bosanquet was a follower of Hegel and the "central theme of Bosanquet's idealism was that every finite existence necessarily transcends itself and points toward other existences and finally to the whole. Thus, he advocated a system very close to that in which Hegel had argued for the ideality of the finite."

The relation of the finite individual to the whole state in which he or she lives was investigated in Bosanquet's Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1899). In this book, he "argued that the state is the real individual and that individual persons are unreal by comparison with it." But Bosanquet did not think that the state has a right to impose social control over its individual citizens. "On the contrary, he believed that if society is organic and individual, then its elements can cooperate apart from a centralised organ of control, the need for which presupposes that harmony has to be imposed upon something that is naturally unharmonious."

The relationship between the individual and society was summarised in Bosanquet's preface to The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art (1886):

Man's Freedom, in the sense thus contemplated, lies in the spiritual or supra-sensuous world by which his humanity is realized, and in which his will finds fulfilment. The family, for example, property, and law are the first steps of man's freedom. In them the individual's will obtains and bestows recognition as an agent in a society whose bond of union is ideal — i.e. existing only in consciousness; and this recognition develops into duties and rights. It is in these that man finds something to live for, something in which and for the sake of which to assert himself. As society develops he lives on the whole more in the civilized or spiritual world, and less in the savage or purely natural world. His will, which is himself, expands with the institutions and ideas that form its purpose, and the history of this expansion is the history of human freedom. Nothing is more shallow,more barbarously irrational, than to regard the progress of civilization as the accumulation of restrictions. Laws and rules are a necessary aspect of extended capacities. (p. xxvii)

-- Bernard Bosanquet (philosopher), by Wikipedia


Professor Alan Willard Brown [1] noted in 1947 that '[The Society]'s members were not all men of established intellectual position. It welcomed young minds just out of university as well as older amateur philosophers with serious interests and purposes. But many distinguished men were faithful members, and not the least virtue of the society has remained, even to the present day, the opportunity it affords for different intellectual generations to meet in an atmosphere of reasoned and responsible discussion.'."[4]

The society continues to meet fortnightly at the University of London's Senate House to hear and discuss philosophical papers from all philosophical traditions. The current President (2016–2017) is Tim Crane, a Professor of Philosophy at University of Cambridge.[5] Its other work includes giving grants to support the organisation of academic conferences in philosophy, and, with Oxford University Press, the production of the 'Lines of Thought' series of philosophical monographs.

The society's annual conference, organised since 1918 in conjunction with the Mind Association, (publishers of the philosophical journal Mind), is known as the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, and is hosted by different university departments in July each year.

The Mind Association is a philosophical society whose purpose is to promote the study of philosophy. The association publishes the journal Mind quarterly.

Mind is a quarterly peer-reviewed academic journal published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association....

Early on, the journal was dedicated to the question of whether psychology could be a legitimate natural science. In the first issue, Robertson wrote:

Now, if there were a journal that set itself to record all advances in psychology, and gave encouragement to special researches by its readiness to publish them, the uncertainty hanging over the subject could hardly fail to be dispelled. Either psychology would in time pass with general consent into the company of the sciences, or the hollowness of its pretensions would be plainly revealed. Nothing less, in fact, is aimed at in the publication of Mind than to procure a decision of this question as to the scientific standing of psychology.

-- Mind (journal), by Wikipedia


It was established in 1900 on the death of Henry Sidgwick [one of the founders and first president of the Society for Psychical Research; a member of the Metaphysical Society, and the Cambridge Apostles, a lifelong homosexual, married to Eleanor Mildred Balfour, sister to Arthur Balfour], who had supported Mind financially since 1891 and had suggested that after his death the society should be formed to oversee the journal.

-- Mind Association, by Wikipedia


Publications

The first edition of the society's proceedings, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, now the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, was issued in 1888.

Papers from invited speakers at the Joint Session conference are published in June each year (i.e., before the joint conference) in The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume.

The Proceedings and the Supplementary Volume are published by the society and distributed by Oxford University Press. The back run of both journals has been digitised by JSTOR.

List of current and past presidents

Many significant philosophers have served the society as its president:

• Shadworth H. Hodgson (1880–1894)
• Bernard Bosanquet (1894–1898)
• D. G. Ritchie (1898–1899)
• G. F. Stout (1899–1904)
• Hastings Rashdall (1904–1907)
Lord Haldane of Cloan (1907–1908)
• Samuel Alexander (1908–1911)
Bertrand Russell (1911–1913)
• G. Dawes Hicks (1913–1914)
Arthur Balfour (1914–1915)
• H. Wildon Carr (1915–1918)
• G. E. Moore (1918–1919)
• James Ward (1919–1920)
• W. R. Inge (1920–1921)
F. C. S. Schiller (1921–1922)
• A. N. Whitehead (1922–1923)
• Percy Nunn (1923–1924)
• Lord Lindsay of Birker (1924–1925)
• J. A. Smith (1925–1926)
• C. Lloyd Morgan (1926–1927)
• C. D. Broad (1927–1928)
• A. E. Taylor (1928–1929)
• J. Laird (1929–1930)
• Beatrice Edgell (1930–1931)
• W. G. de Burgh (1931–1932)
• Leonard J. Russell (1932–1933)
• L. Susan Stebbing (1933–1934)
• G. C. Field (1934–1935)
• J. L. Stocks (1935–1936)
• Samuel Alexander (1936–1937)
Bertrand Russell (1937–1938)
• G. F. Stout (1938–1939)
• Sir William David Ross (1939–1940)
• Hilda D. Oakeley (1940–1941)
• A. C. Ewing (1941–1942)
• Morris Ginsberg (1942–1943)
• H. H. Price (1943–1944)
• H. J. Paton (1944–1945)
• Gilbert Ryle (1945–1946)
• R. B. Braithwaite (1946–1947)
• Norman Kemp Smith (1947–1948)
• C. A. Mace (1948–1949)
• William Kneale (1949–1950)
• John Wisdom (1950–1951)
• A. J. Ayer (1951–1952)
• H. B. Acton (1952–1953)
• Dorothy Emmet (1953–1954)
• C. D. Broad (1954–1955)
• J. N. Findlay (1955–1956)
• J. L. Austin (1956–1957)
• R. I. Aaron (1957–1958)
• Karl Popper (1958–1959)
• H. L. A. Hart (1959–1960)
• A. E. Duncan–Jones (1960–1961)
• A. M. MacIver (1961–1962)
• H. D. Lewis (1962–1963)
• Sir Isaiah Berlin (1963–1964)
• W. H. Walsh (1964–1965)
• Ruth L. Saw (1965–1966)
• Stephan Körner (1966–1967)
• Richard Wollheim (1967–1968)
• D. J. O'Connor (1968–1969)
• P. F. Strawson (1969–1970)
• W. B. Gallie (1970–1971)
• Martha Kneale (1971–1972)
• R. M. Hare (1972–1973)
• Charles H. Whiteley (1973–1974)
• David Daiches Raphael (1974–1975)
• A. M. Quinton (1975–1976)
• D. M. Mackinnon (1976–1977)
• D. W. Hamlyn (1977–1978)
• G. E. L. Owen (1978–1979)
• A. R. White (1979–1980)
• P. G. Winch (1980–1981)
• R. F. Holland (1981–1982)
• Timothy Smiley (1982–1983)
• A. R. Manser (1983–1984)
• Peter Alexander (1984–1985)
• Richard Sorabji (1985–1986)
• Martin Hollis (1986–1987)
• G. E. M. Anscombe (1987–1988)
• Onora O'Neill (1988–1989)
• Renford Bambrough (1989–1990)
• John Skorupski (1990–1991)
• Timothy Sprigge (1991–1992)
• Hugh Mellor (1992–1993)
• David E. Cooper (1993–1994)
• Jonathan Dancy (1994–1995)
• Christopher Hookway (1995–1996)
• Jennifer Hornsby (1996–1997)
• John Cottingham (1997–1998)
• Adam Morton (1998–1999)
• David Wiggins (1999–2000)
• James Griffin (2000–2001)
• Jane Heal (2001–2002)
• Bob Hale (2002–2003)
• Paul Snowdon (2003–2004)
• Timothy Williamson (2004–2005)
• Myles Burnyeat (2005–2006)
• Thomas Baldwin (2006–2007)
• Dorothy Edgington (2007–2008)
• M G F Martin (2008–2009)
• Simon Blackburn (2009–2010)
• Quassim Cassam (2010–2011)
• Marie McGinn (2011–2012)
• Sarah Broadie (2012–2013)
• David Papineau (2013–2014)
• A. W. Moore (2014–2015)
• Susan James (2015–2016)
• Tim Crane (2016–2017)
• Helen Beebee (2017–2018)
• Jo Wolff (2018–2019)

Notes

1. Five individuals attended this meeting: F. G. Fleay, Alfred Senier (1853–1918) (later Professor of Chemistry in the University of Galway), Herbert Burrows, Edward Clarkson, and Alfred Lowe (Carr, 1928–1929, pp.360).
2. Carr (1928–1929), 360.
3. Carr (1928–1929), 361.
4. Brown (1947), p.249.
5. "The Council", Aristotelian Society.

References

• Philosophy portal
• Brown, A.W., "The Metaphysical Society: Victorian Minds in Crisis, 1869–1880" New York: Columbia University Press (1947)
• Carr, H.W., "The Fiftieth Session: A Retrospect", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.29, (1928–1929), pp. 359–386.

External links

• The Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy
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Re: Freda Bedi Cont'd (#2)

Postby admin » Mon Apr 20, 2020 2:27 am

F. C. S. [Ferdinand Canning Scott] Schiller
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 4/19/20

Image
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller
Born: 16 August 1864, Ottensen near Altona, Holstein, German Confederation
Died: 6 August 1937 (aged 72), Los Angeles
Education: Rugby School[1]; Balliol College, Oxford (B.A., 1887)
Era: 19th/20th-century philosophy
Region: Western philosophy
School: British pragmatism
Institutions: Corpus Christi, Oxford[1]
Main interestsL Pragmatism, logic, Ordinary language philosophy, epistemology, eugenics, meaning, personalism
Notable ideas: Criticism of formal logic, justification of axioms as hypotheses (a form of pragmatism), intelligent design, eugenics
Influences: William James, Protagoras
Influenced: William James, Victoria, Lady Welby

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (16 August 1864 – 6 August 1937), usually cited as F. C. S. Schiller, was a German-British philosopher. Born in Altona, Holstein (at that time member of the German Confederation, but under Danish administration), Schiller studied at the University of Oxford, later was a professor there, after being invited back after a brief time at Cornell University. Later in his life he taught at the University of Southern California. In his lifetime he was well known as a philosopher; after his death his work was largely forgotten.

Schiller's philosophy was very similar to and often aligned with the pragmatism of William James, although Schiller referred to it as "humanism". He argued vigorously against both logical positivism and associated philosophers (for example, Bertrand Russell) as well as absolute idealism (such as F. H. Bradley).

Schiller was an early supporter of evolution and a founding member of the English Eugenics Society.

Life

Born in 1864, one of three brothers and the son of Ferdinand Schiller (a Calcutta merchant), Schiller's family home was in Switzerland. Schiller grew up in Rugby. He was educated at Rugby School and Balliol College, and graduated in the first class of Literae Humaniores, winning later the Taylorian scholarship for German in 1887. Schiller's first book, Riddles of the Sphinx (1891), was an immediate success despite his use of a pseudonym because of his fears concerning how the book would be received.

Where is the cultivated reader to go for a positive statement of the philosophic view of the world, for an exposition of modern metaphysics, and for an explanation of their bearing on the problem of life in its modern shape?...

[T]he anti-metaphysical surface current is still sufficiently violent, both in religion and in science, to render discretion the duty of all who do not covet the barren honours of a useless martyrdom. Hence it would be needless to assign any further reason for the last point it is necessary to allude to, viz., the anonymity of the Riddles of the Sphinx, even if the professional position of its author were such that he could afford to disregard men's intolerance of real or seeming innovation. For the splendid satire of Plato is unfortunately still too true to the spirit of men's treatment of those whose souls have risen by rough paths of speculation to the supernal spheres of metaphysics, and who return to tell them that the shadows on the walls of their Cave are not the whole truth, nor precisely what their nurses have taught them, and such as they have learnt from their grandmothers. In their wrath ''they would, if perchance they could lay their hands upon them, verily put them to death;" for their first impulse is still to stone the prophets, whose spirit their bootless reverence will afterwards oppress beneath the burden of memorial sepulchres. Who then will take it upon him to blame a philosopher if he wraps his mantle closely around his face?


-- Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution, by A TROGLODYTE


Between the years 1893 and 1897 he was an instructor in philosophy at Cornell University. In 1897 he returned to Oxford and became fellow and tutor of Corpus Christi for more than thirty years. Schiller was president of the Aristotelian Society in 1921, and was for many years treasurer of the Mind Association. In 1926 he was elected a fellow of the British Academy. In 1929 he was appointed visiting professor in the University of Southern California, and spent half of each year in the United States and half in England. Schiller died in Los Angeles either 6, 7 or 9 August 1937 after a long and lingering illness.[2][3]

Schiller was a founding member of the English Eugenics Society and published three books on the subject; Tantalus or the Future of Man (1924), Eugenics and Politics (1926), and Social Decay and Eugenic Reform (1932).[4]

Philosophy

In 1891, F.C.S. Schiller made his first contribution to philosophy anonymously. Schiller feared that in his time of high naturalism, the metaphysical speculations of his Riddles of the Sphinx were likely to hurt his professional prospects (p. xi, Riddles). However, Schiller's fear of reprisal from his anti-metaphysical colleagues should not suggest that Schiller was a friend of metaphysics. Like his fellow pragmatists across the ocean, Schiller was attempting to stake out an intermediate position between both the spartan landscape of naturalism and the speculative excesses of the metaphysics of his time. In Riddles Schiller both,

(1) accuses naturalism (which he also sometimes calls "pseudometaphysics" or "positivism") of ignoring the fact that metaphysics is required to justify our natural description of the world, and

(2) accuses "abstract metaphysics" of losing sight of the world we actually live in and constructing grand, disconnected imaginary worlds.


The result, Schiller contends, is that naturalism cannot make sense of the "higher" aspects of our world (freewill, consciousness, God, purpose, universals), while abstract metaphysics cannot make sense of the "lower" aspects of our world (the imperfect, change, physicality). In each case we are unable to guide our moral and epistemological "lower" lives to the achievement of life's "higher" ends, ultimately leading to scepticism on both fronts. For knowledge and morality to be possible, both the world's lower and higher elements must be real; e.g. we need universals (a higher) to make knowledge of particulars (a lower) possible. This would lead Schiller to argue for what he at the time called a "concrete metaphysics", but would later call "humanism".

Shortly after publishing Riddles of the Sphinx, Schiller became acquainted with the work of pragmatist philosopher William James and this changed the course of his career. For a time, Schiller's work became focused on extending and developing James' pragmatism (under Schiller's preferred title, "humanism"). Schiller even revised his earlier work Riddles of the Sphinx to make the nascent pragmatism implicit in that work more explicit. In one of Schiller's most prominent works during this phase of his career, "Axioms as Postulates" (1903), Schiller extended James' will to believe doctrine to show how it could be used to justify not only an acceptance of God, but also our acceptance of causality, of the uniformity of nature, of our concept of identity, of contradiction, of the law of excluded middle, of space and time, of the goodness of God, and more.

Towards the end of his career, Schiller's pragmatism began to take on a character more distinct from the pragmatism of William James. Schiller's focus became his opposition to formal logic. To understand Schiller's opposition to formal logic, consider the following inference:

(1) All salt is soluble in water;
(2) Cerebos is not soluble in water;
(3) Therefore, Cerebos is not a salt.


From the formal characteristics of this inference alone (All As are Bs; c is not a B; Therefore, c is not an A), formal logic would judge this to be a valid inference. Schiller, however, refused to evaluate the validity of this inference merely on its formal characteristics. Schiller argued that unless we look to the contextual fact regarding what specific problem first prompted this inference to actually occur, we can not determine whether the inference was successful (i.e. pragmatically successful). In the case of this inference, since "Cerebos is 'salt' for culinary, but not for chemical purposes",[5] without knowing whether the purpose for this piece of reasoning was culinary or chemical we cannot determine whether this is valid or not. In another example, Schiller discusses the truth of formal mathematics "1+1=2" and points out that this equation does not hold if one is discussing drops of water. Schiller's attack on formal logic and formal mathematics never gained much attention from philosophers, however it does share some weak similarities to the contextualist view in contemporary epistemology as well as the views of ordinary language philosophers.

Opposition to naturalism and metaphysics

In Riddles, Schiller gives historical examples of the dangers of abstract metaphysics in the philosophies of Plato, Zeno, and Hegel, portraying Hegel as the worst offender: "Hegelianism never anywhere gets within sight of a fact, or within touch of reality. And the reason is simple: you cannot, without paying the penalty, substitute abstractions for realities; the thought-symbol cannot do duty for the thing symbolized".[6]

Schiller argued that the flaw in Hegel's system, as with all systems of abstract metaphysics, is that the world it constructs always proves to be unhelpful in guiding our imperfect, changing, particular, and physical lives to the achievement of the "higher" universal Ideals and Ends. For example, Schiller argues that the reality of time and change is intrinsically opposed to the very modus operandi of all systems of abstract metaphysics. He says that the possibility to change is a precondition of any moral action (or action generally), and so any system of abstract metaphysics is bound to lead us into a moral scepticism. The problem lies in the aim of abstract metaphysics for "interpreting the world in terms of conceptions, which should be true not here and now, but "eternally" and independently of Time and Change." The result is that metaphysics must use conceptions that have the "time-aspect of Reality" abstracted away. Of course, "[o]nce abstracted from,"

the reference to Time could not, of course, be recovered, any more than the individuality of Reality can be deduced, when once ignored. The assumption is made that, to express the 'truth' about Reality, its 'thisness,' individuality, change and its immersion in a certain temporal and spatial environment may be neglected, and the timeless validity of a conception is thus substituted for the living, changing and perishing existence we contemplate. ... What I wish here to point out is merely that it is unreasonable to expect from such premises to arrive at a deductive justification of the very characteristics of Reality that have been excluded. The true reason, then, why Hegelism can give no reason for the Time-process, i.e. for the fact that the world is 'in time,' and changes continuously, is that it was constructed to give an account of the world irrespective of time and change. If you insist on having a system of eternal and immutable 'truth,' you can get it only by abstracting from those characteristics of reality, which we try to express by the terms individuality, time, and change. But you must pay the price for a formula that will enable you to make assertions that hold good far beyond the limits of your experience. And it is part of the price that you will in the end be unable to give a rational explanation of those very characteristics, which you dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to a rational explanation.[7]


While abstract metaphysics provides us with a world of beauty and purpose and various other "highers", it condemns other key aspects of the world we live in as imaginary. The world of abstract metaphysics has no place for imperfect moral agents who (1) strive to learn about the world and then (2) act upon the world to change it for the better. Consequently, abstract metaphysics condemns us as illusionary, and declares our place in the world as unimportant and purposeless. Where abstractions take priority, our concrete lives collapse into scepticism and pessimism.

He also makes a case against the alternative naturalist method, saying that this too results in an epistemological and moral scepticism. Schiller looks to show this method's inadequacy at moving from the cold, lifeless lower world of atoms to the higher world of ethics, meanings, and minds. As with abstract metaphysics, Schiller attacks naturalism on many fronts: (1) the naturalist method is unable to reduce universals to particulars, (2) the naturalist method is unable to reduce freewill to determinist movements, (3) the naturalist method is unable to reduce emergent properties like consciousness to brain activity, (4) the naturalist method is unable to reduce God into a pantheism, and so on. Just as the abstract method cannot find a place for the lower elements of our world inside the higher, the naturalist method cannot find a place for the higher elements of our world inside the lower. In a reversal of abstract metaphysics, naturalism denies the reality of the higher elements to save the lower. Schiller uses the term "pseudo-metaphysical" here instead of naturalism—as he sometimes does—because he is accusing these naturalist philosophers of trying to solve metaphysical problems while sticking to the non-metaphysical "lower" aspects of the world (i.e. without engaging in real metaphysics):

The pseudo-metaphysical method puts forward the method of science as the method of philosophy. But it is doomed to perpetual failure. ... [T]he data supplied by the physical sciences are intractable, because they are data of a lower sort than the facts they are to explain.

The objects of the physical sciences form the lower orders in the hierarchy of existence, more extensive but less significant. Thus the atoms of the physicist may indeed be found in the organisation of conscious beings, but they are subordinate: a living organism exhibits actions which cannot be formulated by the laws of physics alone; man is material, but he is also a great deal more.[8]


To show that the world's higher elements do not reduce to the lower is not yet to show that naturalism must condemn the world's higher elements as illusionary. A second component to Schiller's attack is showing that naturalism cannot escape its inability to reduce the higher to the lower by asserting that these higher elements evolve from the lower. However, Schiller does not see naturalism as any more capable of explaining the evolution of the higher from the lower than it is capable of reducing the higher to the lower. While evolution does begin with something lower that in turn evolves into something higher, the problem for naturalism is that whatever the starting point for evolution is, it must first be something with the potential to evolve into a higher. For example, the world cannot come into existence from nothing because the potential or "germ" of the world is not "in" nothing (nothing has no potential, it has nothing; after all, it is nothing). Likewise, biological evolution cannot begin from inanimate matter, because the potential for life is not "in" inanimate matter. The following passage shows Schiller applying the same sort of reasoning to the evolution of consciousness:

Taken as the type of the pseudo-metaphysical method, which explains the higher by the lower ... it does not explain the genesis of consciousness out of unconscious matter, because we cannot, or do not, attribute potential consciousness to matter. ... the theory of Evolution derives the [end result] from its germ, i.e., from that which was, what it became, potentially.


Unable to either reduce or explain the evolution of the higher elements of our world, naturalism is left to explain away the higher elements as mere illusions. In doing this, naturalism condemns us to a scepticism in the both epistemology and ethics. It is worth noting, that while Schiller's work has been largely neglected since his death, Schiller's arguments against a naturalistic account of evolution have been recently cited by advocates of intelligent design to establish the existence of a longer history for the view due to legal concerns in the United States (See: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District).

Humanist alternative to metaphysics and naturalism

Schiller argued that both abstract metaphysics and naturalism portray man as holding an intolerable position in the world. He proposed a method that not only recognises the lower world we interact with, but takes into account the higher world of purposes, ideals and abstractions. Schiller:

We require, then, a method which combines the excellencies of both the pseudo-metaphysical and the abstract metaphysical, if philosophy is to be possible at all.[9]


Schiller was demanding a course correction in field of metaphysics, putting it at the service of science. For example, to explain the creation of the world out of nothing, or to explain the emergence or evolution of the "higher" parts of the world, Schiller introduces a divine being who might generate the end (i.e. Final Cause) which gives nothingness, lifelessness, and unconscious matter the purpose (and thus potential) of evolving into higher forms:

And thus, so far from dispensing with the need for a Divine First Cause, the theory of evolution, if only we have the faith in science to carry it to its conclusion, and the courage to interpret it, proves irrefragably that no evolution was possible without a pre-existent Deity, and a Deity, moreover, transcendent, non-material and non-phenomenal. ... [T]he world process is the working out of an anterior purpose or idea in the divine consciousness.[10]


This re-introduction of teleology (which Schiller sometimes calls a re-anthropomorphizing of the world) is what Schiller says the naturalist has become afraid to do. Schiller's method of concrete metaphysics (i.e. his humanism) allows for an appeal to metaphysics when science demands it. However:

[T]he new teleology would not be capricious or random in its application, but firmly rooted in the conclusions of the sciences ... The process which the theory of Evolution divined the history of the world to be, must have content and meaning determined from the basis of the scientific data; it is only by a careful study of the history of a thing that we can determine the direction of its development, [and only then] that we can be said to have made the first approximation to the knowledge of the End of the world process.[11] [This] is teleology of a totally different kind to that which is so vehemently, and on the whole so justly dreaded by the modern exponents of natural science. It does not attempt to explain things anthropocentrically, or regard all creation as existing for the use and benefit of man; it is as far as the scientist from supposing that cork-trees grow to supply us with champagne corks. The end to which it supposes all things to subserve is ... the universal End of the world-process, to which all things tend[.][12]


Schiller finally reveals what this "End" is which "all things tend":

If our speculations have not entirely missed their mark, the world-process will come to an end when all the spirits whom it is designed to harmonise [by its Divine Creator] have been united in a perfect society.[13]


Now, while by today's philosophic standards Schiller's speculations would be considered wildly metaphysical and disconnected from the sciences, compared with the metaphysicians of his day (Hegel, McTaggart, etc.), Schiller saw himself as radically scientific. Schiller gave his philosophy a number of labels during his career. Early on he used the names "Concrete Metaphysics" and "Anthropomorphism", while later in life tending towards "Pragmatism" and particularly "Humanism".

The Will to Believe

Schiller also developed a method of philosophy intended to mix elements of both naturalism and abstract metaphysics in a way that allows us to avoid the twin scepticisms each method collapses into when followed on its own. However, Schiller does not assume that this is enough to justify his humanism over the other two methods. He accepts the possibility that both scepticism and pessimism are true.

To justify his attempt to occupy the middle ground between naturalism and abstract metaphysics, Schiller makes a move that anticipates James' The Will to Believe:

And in action especially we are often forced to act upon slight possibilities. Hence, if it can be shown that our solution is a possible answer, and the only possible alternative to pessimism, to a complete despair of life, it would deserve acceptance, even though it were but a bare possibility.[14]


Schiller contends that in light of the other methods' failure to provide humans with a role and place in the universe, we ought avoid the adoption of these methods. By the end of Riddles, Schiller offers his method of humanism as the only possible method that results in a world where we can navigate our lower existence to the achievement of our higher purpose. He asserts that it is the method we ought to adopt regardless of the evidence against it ("even though it were but a bare possibility").

While Schiller's will to believe is a central theme of Riddle of the Sphinx (appearing mainly in the introduction and conclusion of his text), in 1891 the doctrine held a limited role in Schiller's philosophy. In Riddles, Schiller only employs his version of the will to believe doctrine when he is faced with overcoming sceptic and pessimistic methods of philosophy. In 1897, William James published his essay "The Will to Believe" and this influenced Schiller to drastically expanded his application of the doctrine. For a 1903 volume titled Personal Idealism, Schiller contributed a widely read essay titled "Axioms as Postulates" in which he sets out to justify the "axioms of logic" as postulates adopted on the basis of the will to believe doctrine. In this essay Schiller extends the will to believe doctrine to be the basis of our acceptance of causality, of the uniformity of nature, of our concept of identity, of contradiction, of the law of excluded middle, of space and time, of the goodness of God, and more. He notes that we postulate that nature is uniform because we need nature to be uniform:

[O]ut of the hurly-burly of events in time and space [we] extract[ ] changeless formulas whose chaste abstraction soars above all reference to any 'where' or 'when,' and thereby renders them blank cheques to be filled up at our pleasure with any figures of the sort. The only question is—Will Nature honour the cheque? Audentes Natura juvat—let us take our life in our hands and try! If we fail, our blood will be on our own hands (or, more probably, in some one else's stomach), but though we fail, we are in no worse case than those who dared not postulate ... Our assumption, therefore, is at least a methodological necessity; it may turn out to be (or be near) a fundamental fact in nature [an axiom].[15]


Schiller stresses that doctrines like the uniformity of nature must first be postulated on the basis of need (not evidence) and only then "justified by the evidence of their practical working." He attacks both empiricists like John Stuart Mill, who try to conclude that nature is uniform from previous experience, as well as Kantians who conclude that nature is uniform from the preconditions on our understanding. Schiller argues that preconditions are not conclusions, but demands made on our experience that may or may not work. On this success hinges our continued acceptance of the postulate and its eventual promotion to axiom status.

In "Axioms and Postulates" Schiller vindicates the postulation by its success in practice, marking an important shift from Riddles of a Sphinx. In Riddles, Schiller is concerned with the vague aim of connecting the "higher" to the "lower" so he can avoid scepticism, but by 1903 he has clarified the connection he sees between these two elements. The "higher" abstract elements are connected to the lower because they are our inventions for dealing with the lower; their truth depends on their success as tools. Schiller dates the entry of this element into his thinking in his 1892 essay "Reality and 'Idealism'" (a mere year after his 1891 Riddles).

The plain man's 'things,' the physicist's 'atoms,' and Mr. Ritchie's 'Absolute,' are all of them more or less preserving and well-considered schemes to interpret the primary reality of phenomena, and in this sense Mr. Ritchie is entitled to call the 'sunrise' a theory. But the chaos of presentations, out of which we have (by criteria ultimately practical) isolated the phenomena we subsequently call sunrise, is not a theory, but the fact which has called all theories into being. In addition to generating hypothetical objects to explain phenomena, the interpretation of reality by our thought also bestows a derivative reality on the abstractions with which thought works. If they are the instruments wherewith thought accomplishes such effects upon reality, they must surely be themselves real.[16]


The shift in Schiller's thinking continues in his next published work, The Metaphysics of the Time-Process (1895): The abstractions of metaphysics, then, exist as explanations of the concrete facts of life, and not the latter as illustrations of the former ... Science [along with humanism] does not refuse to interpret the symbols with which it operates; on the contrary, it is only their applicability to the concrete facts originally abstracted from that is held to justify their use and to establish their 'truth.'[17]

Schiller's accusations against the metaphysician in Riddles now appear in a more pragmatic light. His objection is similar to one we might make against a worker who constructs a flat-head screwdriver to help him build a home, and who then accuses a screw of unreality when he comes upon a Phillips-screw that his flat-head screwdriver won't fit. In his works after Riddles, Schiller's attack takes the form of reminding the abstract metaphysician that abstractions are meant as tools for dealing with the "lower" world of particulars and physicality, and that after constructing abstractions we cannot simply drop the un-abstracted world out of our account. The un-abstracted world is the entire reason for making abstractions in the first place. We did not abstract to reach the unchanging and eternal truths; we abstract to construct an imperfect and rough tool for dealing with life in our particular and concrete world. It is the working of the higher in "making predictions about the future behavior of things for the purpose of shaping the future behavior of things for the purpose of shaping our own conduct accordingly" that justifies the higher.[18]

To assert this methodological character of eternal truths is not, of course, to deny their validity ... To say that we assume the truth of abstraction because we wish to attain certain ends, is to subordinate theoretic 'truth' to a teleological implication; to say that, the assumption once made, its truth is 'proved' by its practical working ... For the question of the 'practical' working of a truth will always ultimately be found to resolve itself into the question whether we can live by it.[19]


A few lines down from this passage Schiller adds the following footnote in a 1903 reprint of the essay: "All this seems a very fairly definite anticipation of modern pragmatism." Indeed, it resembles the pragmatist theory of truth. However, Schiller's pragmatism was still very different from both that of William James and that of Charles Sanders Peirce.

Opposition to logic

As early as 1891 Schiller had independently reached a doctrine very similar to William James' Will to Believe. As early as 1892 Schiller had independently developed his own pragmatist theory of truth. However, Schiller's concern with meaning was one he entirely imports from the pragmatisms of James and Peirce. Later in life Schiller musters all of these elements of his pragmatism to make a concerted attack on formal logic. Concerned with bringing down the timeless, perfect worlds of abstract metaphysics early in life, the central target of Schiller's developed pragmatism is the abstract rules of formal logic. Statements, Schiller contends, cannot possess meaning or truth abstracted away from their actual use. Therefore, examining their formal features instead of their function in an actual situation is to make the same mistake the abstract metaphysician makes. Symbols are meaningless scratches on paper unless they are given a life in a situation, and meant by someone to accomplish some task. They are tools for dealing with concrete situations, and not the proper subjects of study themselves.

Both Schiller's theory of truth and meaning (i.e. Schiller's pragmatism) derive their justification from an examination of thought from what he calls his humanist viewpoint (his new name for concrete metaphysics). He informs us that to answer "what precisely is meant by having a meaning" will require us to "raise the prior question of why we think at all.".[20] A question Schiller of course looks to evolution to provide.

Schiller provides a detailed defence of his pragmatist theories of truth and meaning in a chapter titled "The Biologic of Judgment" in Logic for Use (1929). The account Schiller lays out in many ways resembles some of what Peirce asserts in his "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) essay:

Our account of the function of Judgment in our mental life will, however, have to start a long way back. For there is much thinking before there is any judging, and much living before there is any thinking. Even in highly developed minds judging is a relatively rare incident in thinking, and thinking in living, an exception rather than the rule, and a relatively recent acquisition.

...

For the most part the living organism adapts itself to it conditions of life by earlier, easier, and quicker expedients. Its actions or reactions are mostly 'reflex actions' determined by inherited habits which largely function automatically ... It follows from this elaborate and admirable organisation of adaptive responses to stimulation that organic life might proceed without thinking altogether. ... This is, in fact, the way in which most living being carry on their life, and the plane on which man also lives most of the time.

Thought, therefore, is an abnormality which springs from a disturbance. Its genesis is connected with a peculiar deficiency in the life of habit. ... Whenever ... it becomes biologically important to notice differences in roughly similar situations, and to adjust action more closely to the peculiarities of a particular case, the guidance of life by habit, instinct, and impulse breaks down. A new expedient has somehow to be devised for effecting such exact and delicate adjustments. This is the raison d'etre of what is variously denominated 'thought,' 'reason,' 'reflection,' 'reasoning,' and 'judgment[.]'

...

Thinking, however, is not so much a substitute for the earlier processes as a subsidiary addition to them. It only pays in certain cases, and intelligence may be shown also by discerning what they are and when it is wiser to act without thinking. ... Philosophers, however, have very mistaken ideas about rational action. They tend to think that men ought to think all the time, and about all things. But if they did this they would get nothing done, and shorten their lives without enhancing their merriment. Also they utterly misconceive the nature of rational action. They represent it as consisting in the perpetual use of universal rules, whereas it consists rather in perceiving when a general rule must be set aside in order that conduct may be adapted to a particular case.[21]


This passage of Schiller was worth quoting at length because of the insight this chapter offers into Schiller's philosophy. In the passage, Schiller makes the claim that thought only occurs when our unthinking habits prove themselves inadequate for handling a particular situation. Schiller's stressing of the genesis of limited occurrences of thought sets Schiller up for his account of meaning and truth.

Schiller asserts that when a person utters a statement in a situation they are doing so for a specific purpose: to solve the problem that habit could not handle alone. The meaning of such a statement is whatever contribution it makes to accomplishing the purpose of this particular occurrence of thought. The truth of the statement will be if it helps accomplishes that purpose. No utterance or thought can be given a meaning or a truth valuation outside the context of one of these particular occurrences of thought. This account of Schiller's is a much more extreme view than even James took.

At first glance, Schiller appears very similar to James. However, Schiller's more stringent requirement that meaningful statements have consequences "to some one for some purpose" makes Schiller's position more extreme than James'. For Schiller, it is not a sufficient condition for meaningfulness that a statement entail experiential consequences (as it is for both Peirce and James). Schiller requires that the consequences of a statement make the statement relevant to some particular person's goals at a specific moment in time if it is to be meaningful. Therefore, it is not simply enough that the statement "diamonds are hard" and the statement "diamonds are soft" entail different experiential consequences, it is also required that the experiential difference makes a difference to someone's purposes. Only then, and only to that person, do the two statements state something different. If the experiential difference between hard and soft diamonds did not connect up with my purpose for entering into thought, the two statements would possess the same meaning. For example, if I were to randomly blurt out "diamonds are hard" and then "diamonds are soft" to everyone in a coffee shop one day, my words would mean nothing. Words can only mean something if they are stated with a specific purpose.

Consequently, Schiller rejects the idea that statements can have meaning or truth when they are looked upon in the abstract, away from a particular context. "Diamonds are hard" only possesses meaning when stated (or believed) at some specific situation, by some specific person, uttered (or believed) for some specific aim. It is the consequences the statement holds for that person's purposes which constitute its meaning, and its usefulness in accomplishing that person's purposes that constitutes the statement's truth or falsity. After all, when we look at the sentence "diamonds are hard" in a particular situation we may find it actually has nothing to say about diamonds. A speaker may very well be using the sentence as a joke, as a codephrase, or even simply as an example of a sentence with 15 letters. Which the sentence really means cannot be determined without the specific purpose a person might be using the statement for in a specific context.

In an article titled "Pragmatism and Pseudo-pragmatism" Schiller defends his pragmatism against a particular counterexample in a way that sheds considerable light on his pragmatism:

The impossibility of answering truly the question whether the 100th (or 10,000th) decimal in the evaluation of Pi is or is not a 9, splendidly illustrates how impossible it is to predicate truth in abstraction from actual knowing and actual purpose. For the question cannot be answered until the decimal is calculated. Until then no one knows what it is, or rather will turn out to be. And no one will calculate it, until it serves some purpose to do so, and some one therefore interests himself in the calculation. And so until then the truth remains uncertain: there is no 'true' answer, because there is no actual context in which the question has really been raised. We have merely a number of conflicting possibilities, not even claims to truth, and there is no decision. Yet a decision is possible if an experiment is performed. But his experiment presupposes a desire to know. It will only be made if the point becomes one which it is practically important to decide. Normally no doubt it does not become such, because for the actual purposes of the sciences it makes no difference whether we suppose the figure to be 9 or something else. I.e. the truth to, say, the 99th decimal, is ' true enough ' for our purposes, and the 100th is a matter of indifference. But let that indifference cease, and the question become important, and the ' truth ' will at once become ' useful '. Prof. Taylor's illustration therefore conclusively proves that in an actual context and as an actual question there is no true answer to be got until the truth has become useful. This point is illustrated also by the context Prof. Taylor has himself suggested. For he has made the question about the 100th decimal important by making the refutation of the whole pragmatist theory of knowledge depend on it. And what nobler use could the 100th decimal have in his eyes? If in consequence of this interest he will set himself to work it out, he will discover this once useless, but now most useful, truth, and—triumphantly refute his own contention![22]


We might recognise this claim as the sort of absurdity many philosophers try to read into the pragmatism of William James. James, however, would not agree that the meaning of "the 100th decimal of Pi is 9" and "the 100th decimal of Pi is 6" mean the same thing until someone has a reason to care about any possible difference. Schiller, in constast, does mean to say this. James and Schiller both treat truth as something that happens to a statement, and so James would agree that it only becomes true that the 100th decimal of Pi is 9 when someone in fact believes that statement and it leads them to their goals, but nowhere does James imply that meaning is something that happens to a statement. That is a unique element of Schiller's pragmatism.

Humanist theory of meaning and truth

While Schiller felt greatly indebted to the pragmatism of William James, Schiller was outright hostile to the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce. Both Schiller and James struggled with what Peirce intended with his pragmatism, and both were often baffled by Peirce's insistent rebuffing of what they both saw as the natural elaboration of the pragmatist cornerstone he himself first laid down. On the basis of his misunderstandings, Schiller complains that for Peirce to merely say "'truths should have practical consequences'" is to be "very vague, and hints at no reason for the curious connexion it asserts." Schiller goes on to denigrate Peirce's principle as nothing more than a simple truism "which hardly deserves a permanent place and name in philosophic usage". After all, Schiller points out, "[i]t is hard ... to see why even the extremest intellectualism should deny that the difference between the truth and the falsehood of an assertion must show itself in some visible way."[23]

With Peirce's attempts to restrict the use of pragmatism set aside, Schiller unpacks the term "consequences" to provide what he considers as a more substantial restatement of Peirce's pragmatism:

For to say that a [statement] has consequences and that what has none is meaningless, must surely mean that it has a bearing upon some human interest; they must be consequences to some one for some purpose.[23]


Schiller believes his pragmatism to be more developed because of its attention to the fact that the "consequences" which make up the meaning and truth of a statement, must always be consequences for someone's particular purposes at some particular time. Continuing his condemnation of the abstract, Schiller contends that the meaning of a concept is not the consequences of some abstract proposition, but what consequences an actual thinker hopes its use will bring about in an actual situation. The meaning of a thought is what consequences one means to bring about when they employ the thought. To Schiller, this is what a more sophisticated pragmatist understands by the term meaning.

If we are to understand the pragmatic theory of meaning in Schiller's way, he is right to claim that James' theory of truth is a mere corollary of the pragmatist theory of meaning:

But now, we may ask, how are these 'consequences' to test the 'truth' claimed by the assertion? Only by satisfying or thwarting that purpose, by forwarding or baffling that interest. If they do the one, the assertion is 'good' and pro tanto 'true' ; if they do the other, 'bad' and 'false'. Its 'consequences,' therefore, when investigated, always turn out to involve the 'practical' predicates 'good ' or 'bad,' and to contain a reference to ' practice' in the sense in which we have used that term. So soon as therefore we go beyond an abstract statement of the narrower pragmatism, and ask what in the concrete, and in actual knowing, 'having consequences ' may mean, we develop inevitably the fullblown pragmatism in the wider sense.[24]


Given Schiller's view that the meaning of a thought amounts to the consequences one means to bring about by the thought, Schiller further concluded that the truth of a thought depends on whether it actually brings about the consequences one intended. For example, if while following a cooking recipe that called for salt I were to think to myself, "Cerebos is salt", my thought will be true if it consequently leads me to add Cerebos and produce a dish with the intended taste. However, if while working in a chemistry lab to produce a certain mixture I were to think to myself, "Cerebos is salt", my thought would both have a different meaning than before (since my intent now differs) and be false (since Cerebos is only equivalent to salt for culinary purposes). According to Schiller, the question of what a thought like "Cerebos is salt" means or whether it is true can only be answered if the specific circumstances with which the thought arose are taken into consideration. While there is some similarity here between Schiller's view of meaning and the later ordinary language philosophers, Schiller's account ties meaning and truth more closely to individuals and their intent with a specific use rather than whole linguistic communities.

Selected works

• Riddles of the Sphinx (1891)
• "Axioms as Postulates" (published in the collection Personal Idealism, 1902)
• "Useless 'Knowledge': A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism", January 1902)
• Humanism (1903)
• "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics" (July 1903)
• "The Definition of 'Pragmatism' and 'Humanism'" (January 1905)
• Studies in Humanism (1907)
• Plato or Protagoras? (1908)
• Riddles of the Sphinx (1910, revised edition)
• Humanism (1912, second edition)
• Formal Logic (1912)
• Problems of Belief (1924, second edition)
• Logic for Use (1929)
• Our Human Truths (1939, published posthumously)

Notes and references

1. John R. Shook, Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism, John Wiley & Sons, Apr 15, 2008 , p. 44.
2. "Obituary: Prof. F.C.S. Schiller" Nature 140, 454–455 (11 September 1937), link.
3. "Notes: Dr. F.C.S. Schiller (1864–1937)" Mind, Vol. 47, No. 185, Jan 1938.
4. "F.C.S. Schiller" in American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia, 2008, edited by John Lachs and Robert Talisse.
5. Schiller, F.C.S. (1930) page 276
6. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) Riddles of the Sphinx, p. 160
7. Schiller, F.C.S. (1894) "The Metaphysics of the Time-Process"; republished on pages 98–99 of Humanism (1903)
8. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 152
9. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 164
10. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 198
11. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 205
12. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 203
13. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 436
14. Schiller, F.C.S. (1891) p. 5
15. Schiller, F.C.S. (1903) "Axioms as Postulates", p. 111
16. Schiller, F.C.S. (1892) "Reality and 'Idealism'"; reprinted on p. 120 of Humanism (1903)
17. Schiller, F.C.S. (1895) "The Metaphysics of the Time-Process"; also reprinted on pages 102–103 of Humanism (1903)
18. Schiller, F.C.S. (1903) Humanism p. 104
19. Schiller, F.C.S. (1903) Humanism p. 105
20. Schiller, F.C.S. (1930) p.51
21. Schiller, F.C.S. (1929) Logic For Use, pages 197–198
22. Schiller, F.C.S. (1906) "Pragmatism and Pseudo-pragmatism", p. 384
23. Schiller, F.C.S. (1905) p. 236
24. Schiller, F.C.S. (1905) pages 236–237

Further reading

• Pragmatic Humanism of F.C.S. Schiller by Rueben Abel (1955)
• Humanistic Pragmatism: The Philosophy of F.C.S. Schiller edited by Rueben Abel (1966)
• "The Pragmatic Humanism of F.C.S. Schiller" in Cornelis De Waal's On Pragmatism (2005)

External links

• Works written by or about Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller at Wikisource
• Works by F. C. S. Schiller at Project Gutenberg
• Works by or about F. C. S. Schiller at Internet Archive
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Bertrand Russell
by Wikipedia
Accessed: 4/19/20

Physiology and psychology afford fields for scientific technique which still await development. Two great men, Pavlov and Freud, have laid the foundation. I do not accept the view that they are in any essential conflict, but what structure will be built on their foundations is still in doubt.

I think the subject which will be of most importance politically is mass psychology. Mass psychology is, scientifically speaking, not a very advanced study, and so far its professors have not been in universities: they have been advertisers, politicians, and, above all, dictators. This study is immensely useful to practical men, whether they wish to become rich or to acquire the government. It is, of course, as a science, founded upon individual psychology, but hitherto it has employed rule-of-thumb methods which were based upon a kind of intuitive common sense. Its importance has been enormously increased by the growth of modern methods of propaganda. Of these the most influential is what is called "education." Religion plays a part, though a diminishing one; the press, the cinema, and the radio play an increasing part.

What is essential in mass psychology is the art of persuasion. If you compare a speech of Hitler's with a speech of (say) Edmund Burke, you will see what strides have been made in the art since the eighteenth century. What went wrong formerly was that people had read in books that man is a rational animal, and framed their arguments on this hypothesis. We now know that limelight and a brass band do more to persuade than can be done by the most elegant train of syllogisms. It may be hoped that in time anybody will be able to persuade anybody of anything if he can catch the patient young and is provided by the State with money and equipment.

This subject will make great strides when it is taken up by scientists under a scientific dictatorship. Anaxagoras maintained that snow is black, but no one believed him. The social psychologists of the future will have a number of classes of school children on whom they will try different methods of producing an unshakable conviction that snow is black. Various results will soon be arrived at. First, that the influence of home is obstructive. Second, that not much can be done unless indoctrination begins before the age of ten. Third, that verses set to music and repeatedly intoned are very effective. Fourth, that the opinion that snow is white must be held to show a morbid taste for eccentricity.


"Relative political pacifism"/"Non-absolute pacifism" [i.e., "SNOW IS BLACK"]: "War is always a great evil, but in some particularly extreme circumstances, it may be the lesser of two evils." -- Bertrand Russell


But I anticipate. It is for future scientists to make these maxims precise and discover exactly how much it costs per head to make children believe that snow is black, and how much less it would cost to make them believe it is dark gray.

Although this science will be diligently studied, it will be rigidly confined to the governing class. The populace will not be allowed to know how its convictions were generated. When the technique has been perfected, every government that has been in charge of education for a generation will be able to control its subjects securely without the need of armies or policemen. As yet there is only one country which has succeeded in creating this politician's paradise.

-- The Impact of Science on Society, by Bertrand Russell


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Bertrand Russell, OM FRS
Born: Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 18 May 1872, Trellech, Monmouthshire, United Kingdom[note 1]
Died: 2 February 1970 (aged 97), Penrhyndeudraeth, Caernarfonshire, Wales, United Kingdom
Nationality: British
Education: Trinity College, Cambridge (B.A., 1893)
Spouse(s): Alys Pearsall Smith (m. 1894; div. 1921); Dora Black (m. 1921; div. 1935); Patricia Spence (m. 1936; div. 1952)[1]; Edith Finch (m. 1952)
Awards: De Morgan Medal (1932); Sylvester Medal (1934); Nobel Prize in Literature (1950); Kalinga Prize (1957); Jerusalem Prize (1963)
Era: 20th-century philosophy
Region: Western philosophy
School: Analytic philosophy; Aristotelianism; Empiricism; Linguistic turn; Foundationalism[2]; Logicism; Predicativism; Indirect realism[3]; Correspondence theory of truth[4]; Utilitarianism
Institutions: Trinity College, Cambridge, London School of Economics, University of Chicago, UCLA
Academic advisors: James Ward[5]; A. N. Whitehead
Doctoral students: Ludwig Wittgenstein
Main interests: Epistemology ethics logic mathematics metaphysics history of philosophy philosophy of culture philosophy of language philosophy of logic philosophy of mathematics philosophy of mind philosophy of perception philosophy of religion philosophy of science philosophy of social science
Notable ideas [show]
Influences: Euclid Mill Peano Boole[9]De Morgan[10] Frege Cantor Santayana Kant[11] Meinong Spinoza James Mach[12] Hume[13] Leibniz Wittgenstein Whitehead Moore Stout Ward[14] Sidgwick[15] Shelley
Influenced: Ludwig Wittgenstein A. J. Ayer Rudolf Carnap[16] John von Neumann[17] Kurt Gödel[18] Karl Popper[19] W. V. Quine[20] Noam Chomsky[21] Hilary Putnam[22] Saul Kripke[23] Moritz Schlick[24] Vienna Circle[25] J. L. Austin G. H. Hardy[26] Alfred Tarski[27] Norbert Wiener[28] Robert Oppenheimer[29] Leon Chwistek[30] Alan Turing[31] Jacob Bronowski[32] Frank P. Ramsey[33] Jawaharlal Nehru[34] Tariq Ali[35] Michael Albert[36] Che Guevara[37] Bernard Williams Donald Davidson[38] Thomas Kuhn[39] Nathan Salmon[40] Christopher Hitchens[41] Richard Dawkins[42] Carl Sagan[43] Isaiah Berlin[44] Albert Ellis[45] Martin Gardner[46] Daniel Dennett[47] Buckminster Fuller[48] Pervez Hoodbhoy[49] John Maynard Keynes[50] Isaac Asimov[51] Paul Kurtz[52] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn James Joyce[53] Kurt Vonnegut[54] Ray Kurzweil[55] Marvin Minsky[56] Herbert A. Simon[57] B. F. Skinner[58] John Searle[59] Andrei Sakharov[60] Stephen Hawking[61] Joseph Rotblat[62] Edward Said[63] Sidney Hook Frank Wilczek[64] A. C. Grayling Colin McGinn Txillardegi[65]

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM FRS[66] (18 May 1872 – 2 February 1970) was a British philosopher, logician, mathematician, historian, writer, essayist, social critic, political activist, and Nobel laureate.[67][68] Throughout his life, Russell considered himself a liberal, a socialist and a pacifist, although he also sometimes suggested that his sceptical nature had led him to feel that he had "never been any of these things, in any profound sense."[69] Russell was born in Monmouthshire into one of the most prominent aristocratic families in the United Kingdom.[70]

In the early 20th century, Russell led the British "revolt against idealism".[71] He is considered one of the founders of analytic philosophy along with his predecessor Gottlob Frege, colleague G. E. Moore and protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein. He is widely held to be one of the 20th century's premier logicians.[68] With A. N. Whitehead he wrote Principia Mathematica, an attempt to create a logical basis for mathematics, the quintessential work of classical logic. His philosophical essay "On Denoting" has been considered a "paradigm of philosophy".[72] His work has had a considerable influence on mathematics, logic, set theory, linguistics, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, computer science (see type theory and type system) and philosophy, especially the philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics.

Russell was a prominent anti-war activist and he championed anti-imperialism.[73][74] Occasionally, he advocated preventive nuclear war, before the opportunity provided by the atomic monopoly had passed and he decided he would "welcome with enthusiasm" world government.[75] He went to prison for his pacifism during World War I.[76] Later, Russell concluded that war against Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany was a necessary "lesser of two evils" and criticised Stalinist totalitarianism, attacked the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War and was an outspoken proponent of nuclear disarmament.[77] In 1950, Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought".[78][79]

Biography

Early life and background


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Russell as a four-year-old

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Childhood home, Pembroke Lodge

Bertrand Arthur William Russell was born on 18 May 1872 at Ravenscroft, Trellech, Monmouthshire, into an influential and liberal family of the British aristocracy.[80] His parents, Viscount and Viscountess Amberley, were radical for their times. Lord Amberley consented to his wife's affair with their children's tutor, the biologist Douglas Spalding. Both were early advocates of birth control at a time when this was considered scandalous.[81] Lord Amberley was an atheist and his atheism was evident when he asked the philosopher John Stuart Mill to act as Russell's secular godfather.[82] Mill died the year after Russell's birth, but his writings had a great effect on Russell's life.

His paternal grandfather, the Earl Russell, had been asked twice by Queen Victoria to form a government, serving her as Prime Minister in the 1840s and 1860s.[83] The Russells had been prominent in England for several centuries before this, coming to power and the peerage with the rise of the Tudor dynasty (see: Duke of Bedford). They established themselves as one of the leading British Whig families, and participated in every great political event from the Dissolution of the Monasteries in 1536–1540 to the Glorious Revolution in 1688–1689 and the Great Reform Act in 1832.[83][84]

Lady Amberley was the daughter of Lord and Lady Stanley of Alderley.[77] Russell often feared the ridicule of his maternal grandmother,[85] one of the campaigners for education of women.[86]

Childhood and adolescence

Russell had two siblings: brother Frank (nearly seven years older than Bertrand), and sister Rachel (four years older). In June 1874 Russell's mother died of diphtheria, followed shortly by Rachel's death. In January 1876, his father died of bronchitis following a long period of depression. Frank and Bertrand were placed in the care of their staunchly Victorian paternal grandparents, who lived at Pembroke Lodge in Richmond Park. His grandfather, former Prime Minister Earl Russell, died in 1878, and was remembered by Russell as a kindly old man in a wheelchair. His grandmother, the Countess Russell (née Lady Frances Elliot), was the dominant family figure for the rest of Russell's childhood and youth.[77][81]

The countess was from a Scottish Presbyterian family, and successfully petitioned the Court of Chancery to set aside a provision in Amberley's will requiring the children to be raised as agnostics. Despite her religious conservatism, she held progressive views in other areas (accepting Darwinism and supporting Irish Home Rule), and her influence on Bertrand Russell's outlook on social justice and standing up for principle remained with him throughout his life. (One could challenge the view that Bertrand stood up for his principles, based on his own well-known quotation: "I would never die for my beliefs because I might be wrong.") Her favourite Bible verse, "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil" (Exodus 23:2), became his motto. The atmosphere at Pembroke Lodge was one of frequent prayer, emotional repression, and formality; Frank reacted to this with open rebellion, but the young Bertrand learned to hide his feelings.

Russell's adolescence was very lonely, and he often contemplated suicide. He remarked in his autobiography that his keenest interests were in "nature and books and (later) mathematics saved me from complete despondency;"[87] only his wish to know more mathematics kept him from suicide.[88] He was educated at home by a series of tutors.[89] When Russell was eleven years old, his brother Frank introduced him to the work of Euclid, which he described in his autobiography as "one of the great events of my life, as dazzling as first love."[90][91]

During these formative years he also discovered the works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. Russell wrote: "I spent all my spare time reading him, and learning him by heart, knowing no one to whom I could speak of what I thought or felt, I used to reflect how wonderful it would have been to know Shelley, and to wonder whether I should meet any live human being with whom I should feel so much sympathy."[92] Russell claimed that beginning at age 15, he spent considerable time thinking about the validity of Christian religious dogma, which he found very unconvincing.[93] At this age, he came to the conclusion that there is no free will and, two years later, that there is no life after death. Finally, at the age of 18, after reading Mill's Autobiography, he abandoned the "First Cause" argument and became an atheist.[94][95]

He traveled to the continent in 1890 with an American friend, Edward FitzGerald, and with FitzGerald's family he visited the Paris Exhibition of 1889 and was able to climb the Eiffel Tower soon after it was completed.[96]

University and first marriage

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Russell at Trinity College in 1893

Russell won a scholarship to read for the Mathematical Tripos at Trinity College, Cambridge, and commenced his studies there in 1890,[97] taking as coach Robert Rumsey Webb. He became acquainted with the younger George Edward Moore and came under the influence of Alfred North Whitehead, who recommended him to the Cambridge Apostles. He quickly distinguished himself in mathematics and philosophy, graduating as seventh Wrangler in the former in 1893 and becoming a Fellow in the latter in 1895.[98][99]

Russell was 17 years old in the summer of 1889 when he met the family of Alys Pearsall Smith, an American Quaker five years older, who was a graduate of Bryn Mawr College near Philadelphia.[100][101] He became a friend of the Pearsall Smith family—they knew him primarily as "Lord John's grandson" and enjoyed showing him off.[102]

He soon fell in love with the puritanical, high-minded Alys, and, contrary to his grandmother's wishes, married her on 13 December 1894. Their marriage began to fall apart in 1901 when it occurred to Russell, while he was cycling, that he no longer loved her.[103] She asked him if he loved her and he replied that he did not. Russell also disliked Alys's mother, finding her controlling and cruel. It was to be a hollow shell of a marriage. A lengthy period of separation began in 1911 with Russell's affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell,[104] and he and Alys finally divorced in 1921 to enable Russell to remarry.[105]

During his years of separation from Alys, Russell had passionate (and often simultaneous) affairs with a number of women, including Morrell and the actress Lady Constance Malleson.[106] Some have suggested that at this point he had an affair with Vivienne Haigh-Wood, the English governess and writer, and first wife of T. S. Eliot.[107]

Early career

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Russell in 1907

Russell began his published work in 1896 with German Social Democracy, a study in politics that was an early indication of a lifelong interest in political and social theory. In 1896 he taught German social democracy at the London School of Economics.[108] He was a member of the Coefficients dining club of social reformers set up in 1902 by the Fabian campaigners Sidney and Beatrice Webb.[109]

He now started an intensive study of the foundations of mathematics at Trinity. In 1898 he wrote An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry which discussed the Cayley–Klein metrics used for non-Euclidean geometry.[110] He attended the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris in 1900 where he met Giuseppe Peano and Alessandro Padoa. The Italians had responded to Georg Cantor, making a science of set theory; they gave Russell their literature including the Formulario mathematico. Russell was impressed by the precision of Peano's arguments at the Congress, read the literature upon returning to England, and came upon Russell's paradox. In 1903 he published The Principles of Mathematics, a work on foundations of mathematics. It advanced a thesis of logicism, that mathematics and logic are one and the same.[111]

At the age of 29, in February 1901, Russell underwent what he called a "sort of mystic illumination", after witnessing Whitehead's wife's acute suffering in an angina attack. "I found myself filled with semi-mystical feelings about beauty ... and with a desire almost as profound as that of the Buddha to find some philosophy which should make human life endurable", Russell would later recall. "At the end of those five minutes, I had become a completely different person."[112]

In 1905 he wrote the essay "On Denoting", which was published in the philosophical journal Mind. Russell was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society (FRS) in 1908.[66][77] The three-volume Principia Mathematica, written with Whitehead, was published between 1910 and 1913. This, along with the earlier The Principles of Mathematics, soon made Russell world-famous in his field.

In 1910 he became a University of Cambridge lecturer at Trinity College, where he had studied. He was considered for a Fellowship, which would give him a vote in the college government and protect him from being fired for his opinions, but was passed over because he was "anti-clerical", essentially because he was agnostic. He was approached by the Austrian engineering student Ludwig Wittgenstein, who became his PhD student. Russell viewed Wittgenstein as a genius and a successor who would continue his work on logic. He spent hours dealing with Wittgenstein's various phobias and his frequent bouts of despair. This was often a drain on Russell's energy, but Russell continued to be fascinated by him and encouraged his academic development, including the publication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1922.[113] Russell delivered his lectures on logical atomism, his version of these ideas, in 1918, before the end of World War I. Wittgenstein was, at that time, serving in the Austrian Army and subsequently spent nine months in an Italian prisoner of war camp at the end of the conflict.

First World War

During World War I, Russell was one of the few people to engage in active pacifist activities. In 1916, because of his lack of a Fellowship, he was dismissed from Trinity College following his conviction under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914.[114] He later described this as an illegitimate means the state used to violate freedom of expression, in Free Thought and Official Propaganda. Russell played a significant part in the Leeds Convention in June 1917, a historic event which saw well over a thousand "anti-war socialists" gather; many being delegates from the Independent Labour Party and the Socialist Party, united in their pacifist beliefs and advocating a peace settlement.[115] The international press reported that Russell appeared with a number of Labour MPs, including Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden, as well as former Liberal MP and anti-conscription campaigner, Professor Arnold Lupton. After the event, Russell told Lady Ottoline Morrell that, "to my surprise, when I got up to speak, I was given the greatest ovation that was possible to give anybody".[116][117]

The Trinity incident resulted in Russell being fined £100 (equivalent to £5,600 in 2019), which he refused to pay in hope that he would be sent to prison, but his books were sold at auction to raise the money. The books were bought by friends; he later treasured his copy of the King James Bible that was stamped "Confiscated by Cambridge Police".

A later conviction for publicly lecturing against inviting the United States to enter the war on the United Kingdom's side resulted in six months' imprisonment in Brixton prison (see Bertrand Russell's political views) in 1918.[118] He later said of his imprisonment:

I found prison in many ways quite agreeable. I had no engagements, no difficult decisions to make, no fear of callers, no interruptions to my work. I read enormously; I wrote a book, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy"... and began the work for "Analysis of Mind"[119]


He found the Brixton period so much agreeable that while he was reading Strachey's Eminent Victorians chapter about Gordon he laughed out loud in his cell prompting the warden to intervene and reminding him that "prison was a place of punishment".[120]

Russell was reinstated to Trinity in 1919, resigned in 1920, was Tarner Lecturer 1926 and became a Fellow again in 1944 until 1949.[121]

In 1924, Bertrand again gained press attention when attending a "banquet" in the House of Commons with well-known campaigners, including Arnold Lupton, who had been a Member of Parliament and had also endured imprisonment for "passive resistance to military or naval service".[122]

G. H. Hardy on the Trinity controversy and Russell's personal life

In 1941, G. H. Hardy wrote a 61-page pamphlet titled Bertrand Russell and Trinity—published later as a book by Cambridge University Press with a foreword by C. D. Broad—in which he gave an authoritative account about Russell's 1916 dismissal from Trinity College, explaining that a reconciliation between the college and Russell had later taken place and gave details about Russell's personal life. Hardy writes that Russell's dismissal had created a scandal since the vast majority of the Fellows of the College opposed the decision. The ensuing pressure from the Fellows induced the Council to reinstate Russell. In January 1920, it was announced that Russell had accepted the reinstatement offer from Trinity and would begin lecturing from October. In July 1920, Russell applied for a one year leave of absence; this was approved. He spent the year giving lectures in China and Japan. In January 1921, it was announced by Trinity that Russell had resigned and his resignation had been accepted. This resignation, Hardy explains, was completely voluntary and was not the result of another altercation.

The reason for the resignation, according to Hardy, was that Russell was going through a tumultuous time in his personal life with a divorce and subsequent remarriage. Russell contemplated asking Trinity for another one-year leave of absence but decided against it, since this would have been an "unusual application" and the situation had the potential to snowball into another controversy. Although Russell did the right thing, in Hardy's opinion, the reputation of the College suffered due to Russell's resignation since the 'world of learning' knew about Russell's altercation with Trinity but not that the rift had healed. In 1925, Russell was asked by the Council of Trinity College to give the Tarner Lectures on the Philosophy of the Sciences; these would later be the basis for one of Russell's best received books according to Hardy: The Analysis of Matter, published in 1927.[123] In the preface to the Trinity pamphlet, Hardy wrote:

I wish to make it plain that Russell himself is not responsible, directly or indirectly, for the writing of the pamphlet ... I wrote it without his knowledge and, when I sent him the typescript and asked for his permission to print it, I suggested that, unless it contained misstatement of fact, he should make no comment on it. He agreed to this ... no word has been changed as the result of any suggestion from him.


Between the wars

In August 1920, Russell travelled to Soviet Russia as part of an official delegation sent by the British government to investigate the effects of the Russian Revolution.[124] He wrote a four-part series of articles, titled "Soviet Russia—1920", for the US magazine The Nation.[125][126] He met Vladimir Lenin and had an hour-long conversation with him. In his autobiography, he mentions that he found Lenin disappointing, sensing an "impish cruelty" in him and comparing him to "an opinionated professor". He cruised down the Volga on a steamship. His experiences destroyed his previous tentative support for the revolution. He subsequently wrote a book, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism,[127] about his experiences on this trip, taken with a group of 24 others from the UK, all of whom came home thinking well of the Soviet regime, despite Russell's attempts to change their minds. For example, he told them that he had heard shots fired in the middle of the night and was sure that these were clandestine executions, but the others maintained that it was only cars backfiring.

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Russell with his children, John and Kate

Russell's lover Dora Black, a British author, feminist and socialist campaigner, visited Soviet Russia independently at the same time; in contrast to his reaction, she was enthusiastic about the Bolshevik revolution.[127]

The following autumn, Russell, accompanied by Dora, visited Peking (as it was then known in the West) to lecture on philosophy for a year.[89] He went with optimism and hope, seeing China as then being on a new path.[128] Other scholars present in China at the time included John Dewey[129] and Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian Nobel-laureate poet.[89] Before leaving China, Russell became gravely ill with pneumonia, and incorrect reports of his death were published in the Japanese press.[129] When the couple visited Japan on their return journey, Dora took on the role of spurning the local press by handing out notices reading "Mr. Bertrand Russell, having died according to the Japanese press, is unable to give interviews to Japanese journalists".[130][131] Apparently they found this harsh and reacted resentfully.

Dora was six months pregnant when the couple returned to England on 26 August 1921. Russell arranged a hasty divorce from Alys, marrying Dora six days after the divorce was finalised, on 27 September 1921. Russell's children with Dora were John Conrad Russell, 4th Earl Russell, born on 16 November 1921, and Katharine Jane Russell (now Lady Katharine Tait), born on 29 December 1923. Russell supported his family during this time by writing popular books explaining matters of physics, ethics, and education to the layman.

From 1922 to 1927 the Russells divided their time between London and Cornwall, spending summers in Porthcurno.[132] In the 1922 and 1923 general elections Russell stood as a Labour Party candidate in the Chelsea constituency, but only on the basis that he knew he was extremely unlikely to be elected in such a safe Conservative seat, and he was unsuccessful on both occasions.

Together with Dora, Russell founded the experimental Beacon Hill School in 1927. The school was run from a succession of different locations, including its original premises at the Russells' residence, Telegraph House, near Harting, West Sussex. On 8 July 1930 Dora gave birth to her third child Harriet Ruth. After he left the school in 1932, Dora continued it until 1943.[133][134]

On a tour through the US in 1927, Russell met Barry Fox (later Barry Stevens), who became a well-known Gestalt therapist and writer in later years.[135] Russell and Fox developed an intensive relationship. In Fox's words: "... for three years we were very close."[136] Fox sent her daughter Judith to Beacon Hill School for some time.[137] From 1927 to 1932 Russell wrote 34 letters to Fox.[138]

Upon the death of his elder brother Frank, in 1931, Russell became the 3rd Earl Russell.

Russell's marriage to Dora grew increasingly tenuous, and it reached a breaking point over her having two children with an American journalist, Griffin Barry.[134] They separated in 1932 and finally divorced. On 18 January 1936, Russell married his third wife, an Oxford undergraduate named Patricia ("Peter") Spence, who had been his children's governess since 1930. Russell and Peter had one son, Conrad Sebastian Robert Russell, 5th Earl Russell, who became a prominent historian and one of the leading figures in the Liberal Democrat party.[77]

Russell returned to the London School of Economics to lecture on the science of power in 1937.[108]

During the 1930s, Russell became a close friend and collaborator of V. K. Krishna Menon, then secretary of the India League, the foremost lobby in the United Kingdom for Indian self-rule.[vague]

Second World War

Russell's political views changed over time, mostly about war. He opposed rearmament against Nazi Germany. In 1937, he wrote in a personal letter: "If the Germans succeed in sending an invading army to England we should do best to treat them as visitors, give them quarters and invite the commander and chief to dine with the prime minister."[139] In 1940, he changed his appeasement view that avoiding a full-scale world war was more important than defeating Hitler. He concluded that Adolf Hitler taking over all of Europe would be a permanent threat to democracy. In 1943, he adopted a stance toward large-scale warfare called "relative political pacifism": "War was always a great evil, but in some particularly extreme circumstances, it may be the lesser of two evils."[140][141]

Before World War II, Russell taught at the University of Chicago, later moving on to Los Angeles to lecture at the UCLA Department of Philosophy.[142] He was appointed professor at the City College of New York (CCNY) in 1940, but after a public outcry the appointment was annulled by a court judgment that pronounced him "morally unfit" to teach at the college due to his opinions, especially those relating to sexual morality, detailed in Marriage and Morals (1929). The matter was however taken to the New York Supreme Court by Jean Kay who was afraid that her daughter would be harmed by the appointment, though her daughter was not a student at CCNY.[142][143] Many intellectuals, led by John Dewey, protested at his treatment.[144] Albert Einstein's oft-quoted aphorism that "great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre minds" originated in his open letter, dated 19 March 1940, to Morris Raphael Cohen, a professor emeritus at CCNY, supporting Russell's appointment.[145] Dewey and Horace M. Kallen edited a collection of articles on the CCNY affair in The Bertrand Russell Case. Russell soon joined the Barnes Foundation, lecturing to a varied audience on the history of philosophy; these lectures formed the basis of A History of Western Philosophy. His relationship with the eccentric Albert C. Barnes soon soured, and he returned to the UK in 1944 to rejoin the faculty of Trinity College.[146]

Later life

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Russell in 1954

Russell participated in many broadcasts over the BBC, particularly The Brains Trust and the Third Programme, on various topical and philosophical subjects. By this time Russell was world-famous outside academic circles, frequently the subject or author of magazine and newspaper articles, and was called upon to offer opinions on a wide variety of subjects, even mundane ones. En route to one of his lectures in Trondheim, Russell was one of 24 survivors (among a total of 43 passengers) of an aeroplane crash in Hommelvik in October 1948. He said he owed his life to smoking since the people who drowned were in the non-smoking part of the plane.[147][148] A History of Western Philosophy (1945) became a best-seller and provided Russell with a steady income for the remainder of his life.

In 1942, Russell argued in favour of a moderate socialism, capable of overcoming its metaphysical principles, in an inquiry on dialectical materialism, launched by the Austrian artist and philosopher Wolfgang Paalen in his journal DYN, saying "I think the metaphysics of both Hegel and Marx plain nonsense—Marx's claim to be 'science' is no more justified than Mary Baker Eddy's. This does not mean that I am opposed to socialism."[149]

In 1943, Russell expressed support for Zionism: "I have come gradually to see that, in a dangerous and largely hostile world, it is essential to Jews to have some country which is theirs, some region where they are not suspected aliens, some state which embodies what is distinctive in their culture".[150]

In a speech in 1948, Russell said that if the USSR's aggression continued, it would be morally worse to go to war after the USSR possessed an atomic bomb than before it possessed one, because if the USSR had no bomb the West's victory would come more swiftly and with fewer casualties than if there were atom bombs on both sides.[151][152] At that time, only the United States possessed an atomic bomb, and the USSR was pursuing an extremely aggressive policy towards the countries in Eastern Europe which were being absorbed into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Many understood Russell's comments to mean that Russell approved of a first strike in a war with the USSR, including Nigel Lawson, who was present when Russell spoke of such matters. Others, including Griffin, who obtained a transcript of the speech, have argued that he was merely explaining the usefulness of America's atomic arsenal in deterring the USSR from continuing its domination of Eastern Europe.[147]

However, just after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Russell wrote letters, and published articles in newspapers from 1945 to 1948, stating clearly that it was morally justified and better to go to war against the USSR using atomic bombs while the United States possessed them and before the USSR did. In September 1949, one week after the USSR tested its first A-bomb, but before this became known, Russell wrote that USSR would be unable to develop nuclear weapons because following Stalin's purges only science based on Marxist principles would be practiced in the Soviet Union.[153] After it became known that the USSR carried out its nuclear bomb tests, Russell declared his position advocating for the total abolition of atomic weapons.[154]

In 1948, Russell was invited by the BBC to deliver the inaugural Reith Lectures[155]—what was to become an annual series of lectures, still broadcast by the BBC. His series of six broadcasts, titled Authority and the Individual,[156] explored themes such as the role of individual initiative in the development of a community and the role of state control in a progressive society. Russell continued to write about philosophy. He wrote a foreword to Words and Things by Ernest Gellner, which was highly critical of the later thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein and of ordinary language philosophy. Gilbert Ryle refused to have the book reviewed in the philosophical journal Mind, which caused Russell to respond via The Times. The result was a month-long correspondence in The Times between the supporters and detractors of ordinary language philosophy, which was only ended when the paper published an editorial critical of both sides but agreeing with the opponents of ordinary language philosophy.[157]

In the King's Birthday Honours of 9 June 1949, Russell was awarded the Order of Merit,[158] and the following year he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature.[77][89] When he was given the Order of Merit, George VI was affable but slightly embarrassed at decorating a former jailbird, saying, "You have sometimes behaved in a manner that would not do if generally adopted".[159] Russell merely smiled, but afterwards claimed that the reply "That's right, just like your brother" immediately came to mind.

In 1950, Russell attended the inaugural conference for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a CIA-funded anti-communist organisation committed to the deployment of culture as a weapon during the Cold War.[160] Russell was one of the best known patrons of the Congress, until he resigned in 1956.[161]

In 1952 Russell was divorced by Spence, with whom he had been very unhappy. Conrad, Russell's son by Spence, did not see his father between the time of the divorce and 1968 (at which time his decision to meet his father caused a permanent breach with his mother). Russell married his fourth wife, Edith Finch, soon after the divorce, on 15 December 1952. They had known each other since 1925, and Edith had taught English at Bryn Mawr College near Philadelphia, sharing a house for 20 years with Russell's old friend Lucy Donnelly. Edith remained with him until his death, and, by all accounts, their marriage was a happy, close, and loving one. Russell's eldest son John suffered from serious mental illness, which was the source of ongoing disputes between Russell and his former wife Dora.

In September 1961, at the age of 89, Russell was jailed for seven days in Brixton Prison for "breach of peace" after taking part in an anti-nuclear demonstration in London. The magistrate offered to exempt him from jail if he pledged himself to "good behaviour", to which Russell replied: "No, I won't."[162][163]

In 1962 Russell played a public role in the Cuban Missile Crisis: in an exchange of telegrams with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev assured him that the Soviet government would not be reckless.[164][165] Russell sent this telegram to President Kennedy:

YOUR ACTION DESPERATE. THREAT TO HUMAN SURVIVAL. NO CONCEIVABLE JUSTIFICATION. CIVILIZED MAN CONDEMNS IT. WE WILL NOT HAVE MASS MURDER. ULTIMATUM MEANS WAR... END THIS MADNESS.[166]


According to historian Peter Knight, after JFK's assassination, Russell, "prompted by the emerging work of the lawyer Mark Lane in the US ... rallied support from other noteworthy and left-leaning compatriots to form a Who Killed Kennedy Committee in June 1964, members of which included Michael Foot MP, Caroline Benn, the publisher Victor Gollancz, the writers John Arden and J. B. Priestley, and the Oxford history professor Hugh Trevor-Roper." Russell published a highly critical article weeks before the Warren Commission Report was published, setting forth 16 Questions on the Assassination and equating the Oswald case with the Dreyfus affair of late 19th-century France, in which the state wrongly convicted an innocent man. Russell also criticised the American press for failing to heed any voices critical of the official version.[167]

Political causes

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Russell (centre) alongside his wife Edith, leading a CND anti-nuclear march in London, 18 February 1961

Bertrand Russell was opposed to war from early on, his opposition to World War I being used as grounds for his dismissal from Trinity College at Cambridge. This incident fused two of his most controversial causes, as he had failed to be granted Fellow status, which would have protected him from firing, because he was not willing to either pretend to be a devout Christian, or at least avoid admitting he was agnostic.

He later described the resolution of these issues as essential to freedom of thought and expression, citing the incident in Free Thought and Official Propaganda, where he explained that the expression of any idea, even the most obviously "bad", must be protected not only from direct State intervention, but also economic leveraging and other means of being silenced:

The opinions which are still persecuted strike the majority as so monstrous and immoral that the general principle of toleration cannot be held to apply to them. But this is exactly the same view as that which made possible the tortures of the Inquisition.[168]


Russell spent the 1950s and 1960s engaged in political causes primarily related to nuclear disarmament and opposing the Vietnam War. The 1955 Russell–Einstein Manifesto was a document calling for nuclear disarmament and was signed by eleven of the most prominent nuclear physicists and intellectuals of the time.[169] In 1966–1967, Russell worked with Jean-Paul Sartre and many other intellectual figures to form the Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal to investigate the conduct of the United States in Vietnam. He wrote a great many letters to world leaders during this period.

In 1956, immediately before and during the Suez Crisis, Russell expressed his opposition to European imperialism in the Middle East. He viewed the crisis as another reminder of the pressing need for a more effective mechanism for international governance, and to restrict national sovereignty to places such as the Suez Canal area "where general interest is involved". At the same time the Suez Crisis was taking place, the world was also captivated by the Hungarian Revolution and the subsequent crushing of the revolt by intervening Soviet forces. Russell attracted criticism for speaking out fervently against the Suez war while ignoring Soviet repression in Hungary, to which he responded that he did not criticise the Soviets "because there was no need. Most of the so-called Western World was fulminating". Although he later feigned a lack of concern, at the time he was disgusted by the brutal Soviet response, and on 16 November 1956, he expressed approval for a declaration of support for Hungarian scholars which Michael Polanyi had cabled to the Soviet embassy in London twelve days previously, shortly after Soviet troops had already entered Budapest.[170]

In November 1957 Russell wrote an article addressing US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, urging a summit to consider "the conditions of co-existence". Khrushchev responded that peace could indeed be served by such a meeting. In January 1958 Russell elaborated his views in The Observer, proposing a cessation of all nuclear-weapons production, with the UK taking the first step by unilaterally suspending its own nuclear-weapons program if necessary, and with Germany "freed from all alien armed forces and pledged to neutrality in any conflict between East and West". US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles replied for Eisenhower. The exchange of letters was published as The Vital Letters of Russell, Khrushchev, and Dulles.[171]

Russell was asked by The New Republic, a liberal American magazine, to elaborate his views on world peace. He urged that all nuclear-weapons testing and constant flights by planes armed with nuclear weapons be halted immediately, and negotiations be opened for the destruction of all hydrogen bombs, with the number of conventional nuclear devices limited to ensure a balance of power. He proposed that Germany be reunified and accept the Oder-Neisse line as its border, and that a neutral zone be established in Central Europe, consisting at the minimum of Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, with each of these countries being free of foreign troops and influence, and prohibited from forming alliances with countries outside the zone. In the Middle East, Russell suggested that the West avoid opposing Arab nationalism, and proposed the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force to guard Israel's frontiers to ensure that Israel was prevented from committing aggression and protected from it. He also suggested Western recognition of the People's Republic of China, and that it be admitted to the UN with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.[171]

He was in contact with Lionel Rogosin while the latter was filming his anti-war film Good Times, Wonderful Times in the 1960s. He became a hero to many of the youthful members of the New Left. In early 1963, in particular, Russell became increasingly vocal in his disapproval of the Vietnam War, and felt that the US government's policies there were near-genocidal. In 1963 he became the inaugural recipient of the Jerusalem Prize, an award for writers concerned with the freedom of the individual in society.[172] In 1964 he was one of eleven world figures who issued an appeal to Israel and the Arab countries to accept an arms embargo and international supervision of nuclear plants and rocket weaponry.[173] In October 1965 he tore up his Labour Party card because he suspected Harold Wilson's Labour government was going to send troops to support the United States in Vietnam.[77]

Final years, death and legacy

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Russell on a 1972 stamp of India

In June 1955 Russell had leased Plas Penrhyn in Penrhyndeudraeth, Merionethshire, Wales and on 5 July of the following year it became his and Edith's principal residence.[174]

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Bust of Russell in Red Lion Square

Russell published his three-volume autobiography in 1967, 1968, and 1969. Russell made a cameo appearance playing himself in the anti-war Hindi film Aman, by Mohan Kumar, which was released in India in 1967. This was Russell's only appearance in a feature film.[175]

On 23 November 1969 he wrote to The Times newspaper saying that the preparation for show trials in Czechoslovakia was "highly alarming". The same month, he appealed to Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations to support an international war crimes commission to investigate alleged torture and genocide by the United States in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The following month, he protested to Alexei Kosygin over the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from the Soviet Union of Writers.

On 31 January 1970 Russell issued a statement condemning "Israel's aggression in the Middle East", and in particular, Israeli bombing raids being carried out deep in Egyptian territory as part of the War of Attrition. He called for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-Six-Day War borders. This was Russell's final political statement or act. It was read out at the International Conference of Parliamentarians in Cairo on 3 February 1970, the day after his death.[176]

Russell died of influenza, just after 8 pm on 2 February 1970 at his home in Penrhyndeudraeth.[177] His body was cremated in Colwyn Bay on 5 February 1970 with five people present.[178] In accordance with his will, there was no religious ceremony but one minute's silence; his ashes were scattered over the Welsh mountains later that year. He left an estate valued at £69,423 (equivalent to £1.1 million in 2019).[179] In 1980 a memorial to Russell was commissioned by a committee including the philosopher A. J. Ayer. It consists of a bust of Russell in Red Lion Square in London sculpted by Marcelle Quinton.[180]

Lady Katharine Jane Tait, Russell's daughter, founded the Bertrand Russell Society in 1974 to preserve and understand his work. It publishes the Bertrand Russell Society Bulletin, holds meetings and awards prizes for scholarship.[181] She also authored several essays about her father; as well as a book, My Father, Bertrand Russell, which was published in 1975.[182] All members receive Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies.

Titles and honours from birth

Russell held throughout his life the following styles and honours:

• from birth until 1908: The Honourable Bertrand Arthur William Russell
• from 1908 until 1931: The Honourable Bertrand Arthur William Russell, FRS
• from 1931 until 1949: The Right Honourable The Earl Russell, FRS
• from 1949 until death: The Right Honourable The Earl Russell, OM, FRS
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Views

Philosophy

Main article: Bertrand Russell's philosophical views

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Russell is generally credited with being one of the founders of analytic philosophy. He was deeply impressed by Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), and wrote on every major area of philosophy except aesthetics. He was particularly prolific in the fields of metaphysics, logic and the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, ethics and epistemology. When Brand Blanshard asked Russell why he did not write on aesthetics, Russell replied that he did not know anything about it, though he hastened to add "but that is not a very good excuse, for my friends tell me it has not deterred me from writing on other subjects".[183]

On ethics, Russell wrote that he was a utilitarian in his youth, yet he later distanced himself from this view.[184]

For the advancement of science and protection of the right to freedom of expression, Russell advocated The Will to Doubt, the recognition that all human knowledge is at most a best guess, that one should always remember:

None of our beliefs are quite true; all have at least a penumbra of vagueness and error. The methods of increasing the degree of truth in our beliefs are well known; they consist in hearing all sides, trying to ascertain all the relevant facts, controlling our own bias by discussion with people who have the opposite bias, and cultivating a readiness to discard any hypothesis which has proved inadequate. These methods are practised in science, and have built up the body of scientific knowledge. Every man of science whose outlook is truly scientific is ready to admit that what passes for scientific knowledge at the moment is sure to require correction with the progress of discovery; nevertheless, it is near enough to the truth to serve for most practical purposes, though not for all. In science, where alone something approximating to genuine knowledge is to be found, men's attitude is tentative and full of doubt.


Religion

Russell described himself in 1947 as an agnostic, saying: "Therefore, in regard to the Olympic gods, speaking to a purely philosophical audience, I would say that I am an Agnostic. But speaking popularly, I think that all of us would say in regard to those gods that we were Atheists. In regard to the Christian God, I should, I think, take exactly the same line."[185] For most of his adult life, Russell maintained religion to be little more than superstition and, despite any positive effects, largely harmful to people. He believed that religion and the religious outlook serve to impede knowledge and foster fear and dependency, and to be responsible for much of our world's wars, oppression, and misery. He was a member of the Advisory Council of the British Humanist Association and President of Cardiff Humanists until his death.[186]

Society

Main article: Bertrand Russell's political views

Political and social activism occupied much of Russell's time for most of his life. Russell remained politically active almost to the end of his life, writing to and exhorting world leaders and lending his name to various causes.

Russell argued for a "scientific society", where war would be abolished, population growth would be limited, and prosperity would be shared.[187] He suggested the establishment of a "single supreme world government" able to enforce peace,[188] claiming that "the only thing that will redeem mankind is co-operation".[189]

Russell was an active supporter of the Homosexual Law Reform Society, being one of the signatories of A. E. Dyson's 1958 letter to The Times calling for a change in the law regarding male homosexual practices, which were partly legalised in 1967, when Russell was still alive.[190]

In "Reflections on My Eightieth Birthday" ("Postscript" in his Autobiography), Russell wrote: "I have lived in the pursuit of a vision, both personal and social. Personal: to care for what is noble, for what is beautiful, for what is gentle; to allow moments of insight to give wisdom at more mundane times. Social: to see in imagination the society that is to be created, where individuals grow freely, and where hate and greed and envy die because there is nothing to nourish them. These things I believe, and the world, for all its horrors, has left me unshaken".[191]

Freedom of opinion and expression

Like George Orwell, Russell was a champion of freedom of opinion and an opponent of both censorship and indoctrination. In 1928 he wrote: "The fundamental argument for freedom of opinion is the doubtfulness of all our belief... when the State intervenes to ensure the indoctrination of some doctrine, it does so because there is no conclusive evidence in favour of that doctrine .. It is clear that thought is not free if the profession of certain opinions make it impossible to make a living.[192] In 1957 he wrote: "'Free thought' means thinking freely ... to be worthy of the name freethinker he must be free of two things: the force of tradition and the tyranny of his own passions."[193]

Selected bibliography

Below is a selected bibliography of Russell's books in English, sorted by year of first publication:

• 1896. German Social Democracy. London: Longmans, Green.
• 1897. An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry.[194] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• 1900. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• 1903. The Principles of Mathematics.[195] Cambridge University Press.
• 1903. A Free man's worship, and other essays.[196]
• 1905. "On Denoting", Mind, Vol. 14. ISSN 0026-4423. Basil Blackwell.
• 1910. Philosophical Essays. London: Longmans, Green.
• 1910–1913. Principia Mathematica[197] (with Alfred North Whitehead). 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• 1912. The Problems of Philosophy.[198] London: Williams and Norgate.
• 1914. Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy.[199] Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing.[200]
• 1916. Principles of Social Reconstruction.[201] London, George Allen and Unwin.
• 1916. Why Men Fight. New York: The Century Co.
• 1916. The Policy of the Entente, 1904–1914 : a reply to Professor Gilbert Murray.[202] Manchester: The National Labour Press
• 1916. Justice in War-time. Chicago: Open Court.
• 1917. Political Ideals.[203] New York: The Century Co.
• 1918. Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1918. Proposed Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism.[204] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1919. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.[205][206] London: George Allen & Unwin. (ISBN 0-415-09604-9 for Routledge paperback)[207]
• 1920. The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism.[208] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1921. The Analysis of Mind.[209] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1922. The Problem of China.[210] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1922. Free Thought and Official Propaganda, delivered at South Place Institute[168]
• 1923. The Prospects of Industrial Civilization, in collaboration with Dora Russell. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1923. The ABC of Atoms, London: Kegan Paul. Trench, Trubner.
• 1923. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1924. Icarus; or, The Future of Science. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
• 1925. The ABC of Relativity. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
• 1925. What I Believe. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
• 1926. On Education, Especially in Early Childhood. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
• 1927. An Outline of Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1927. Why I Am Not a Christian.[211] London: Watts.
• 1927. Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell. New York: Modern Library.
• 1928. Sceptical Essays. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1929. Marriage and Morals. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1930. The Conquest of Happiness. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1931. The Scientific Outlook,[212] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1932. Education and the Social Order,[213] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1934. Freedom and Organization, 1814–1914. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1935. In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays.[214] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1935. Religion and Science. London: Thornton Butterworth.
• 1936. Which Way to Peace?. London: Jonathan Cape.
• 1937. The Amberley Papers: The Letters and Diaries of Lord and Lady Amberley, with Patricia Russell, 2 vols., London: Leonard & Virginia Woolf at the Hogarth Press.
• 1938. Power: A New Social Analysis. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
• 1945. The Bomb and Civilisation. Published in the Glasgow Forward on 18 August 1945.
• 1945. A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day[215] New York: Simon and Schuster.
• 1949. Authority and the Individual.[216] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1950. Unpopular Essays.[217] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1951. New Hopes for a Changing World. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1952. The Impact of Science on Society. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1953. Satan in the Suburbs and Other Stories. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1954. Human Society in Ethics and Politics. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1954. Nightmares of Eminent Persons and Other Stories.[218] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1956. Portraits from Memory and Other Essays.[219] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1956. Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, edited by Robert C. Marsh. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1957. Why I Am Not A Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, edited by Paul Edwards. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1958. Understanding History and Other Essays. New York: Philosophical Library.
• 1959. Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare.[220] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1959. My Philosophical Development.[221] London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1959. Wisdom of the West: A Historical Survey of Western Philosophy in Its Social and Political Setting, edited by Paul Foulkes. London: Macdonald.
• 1960. Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company.
• 1961. The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, edited by R. E. Egner and L. E. Denonn. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1961. Fact and Fiction. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1961. Has Man a Future? London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1963. Essays in Skepticism. New York: Philosophical Library.
• 1963. Unarmed Victory. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1965. Legitimacy Versus Industrialism, 1814–1848. London: George Allen & Unwin (first published as Parts I and II of Freedom and Organization, 1814–1914, 1934).
• 1965. On the Philosophy of Science, edited by Charles A. Fritz, Jr. Indianapolis: The Bobbs–Merrill Company.
• 1966. The ABC of Relativity. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1967. Russell's Peace Appeals, edited by Tsutomu Makino and Kazuteru Hitaka. Japan: Eichosha's New Current Books.
• 1967. War Crimes in Vietnam. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• 1951–1969. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,[222] 3 vols., London: George Allen & Unwin. Vol. 2, 1956[222]
• 1969. Dear Bertrand Russell... A Selection of his Correspondence with the General Public 1950–1968, edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Russell was the author of more than sixty books and over two thousand articles.[223][224] Additionally, he wrote many pamphlets, introductions, and letters to the editor. One pamphlet titled, 'I Appeal unto Caesar': The Case of the Conscientious Objectors, ghostwritten for Margaret Hobhouse, the mother of imprisoned peace activist Stephen Hobhouse, allegedly helped secure the release from prison of hundreds of conscientious objectors.[225]

His works can be found in anthologies and collections, including The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, which McMaster University began publishing in 1983. By March 2017 this collection of his shorter and previously unpublished works included 18 volumes,[226] and several more are in progress. A bibliography in three additional volumes catalogues his publications. The Russell Archives held by McMaster's William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections possess over 40,000 of his letters.[227]

See also

• Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
• Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club
• Criticism of Jesus
• List of peace activists
• List of pioneers in computer science

Notes

1. Monmouthshire's Welsh status was ambiguous at this time, and was considered by some to be part of England. See Monmouthshire (historic)#Ambiguity over status.

References

Citations


1. Irvine, Andrew David (1 January 2015). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Bertrand Russell – The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2. Carlo Cellucci, Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View, Springer, 2017, p. 32.
3. The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy): "Paraphrasing David Hume (1739...; see also Locke 1690, Berkeley 1710, Russell 1912): nothing is ever directly present to the mind in perception except perceptual appearances."
4. David, Marian (28 May 2015). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Correspondence theory of truth – The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 14 May 2019 – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
5. James Ward (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
6. Howard Wettstein, "Frege-Russell Semantics?", Dialectica 44(1–2), 1990, pp. 113–135, esp. 115: "Russell maintains that when one is acquainted with something, say, a present sense datum or oneself, one can refer to it without the mediation of anything like a Fregean sense. One can refer to it, as we might say, directly."
7. "Structural Realism": entry by James Ladyman in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
8. Dowe, Phil (10 September 2007). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Causal Processes – The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
9. Ronald Jager (2002). The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy, Volume 11. Psychology Press. pp. 113–114. ISBN 978-0-415-29545-1.
10. Nicholas Griffin, ed. (2003). The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-521-63634-6.
11. Russell, pp. 352–353.
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131. Bertrand Russell (1998). "10: China". Autobiography. Psychology Press. ISBN 9780415189859. It provided me with the pleasure of reading my obituary notices, which I had always desired without expecting my wishes to be fulfilled... As the Japanese papers had refused to contradict the news of my death, Dora gave each of them a type-written slip saying that as I was dead I could not be interviewed
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153. He wrote: "There is reason to think Stalin will insist on a new orthodoxy in atomic physics, since there is much in quantum theory that runs contrary to Communist dogma. An atomic bomb' made on Marxist principles would probably not explode because, after all, Marxist science was that of a hundred years ago. For those who fear the military power of Russia there is, therefore, some reason to rejoice in the muzzling of Russian science." Russell, Bertrand "Stalin Declares War on Science" Review of Langdon-Davies, Russia Puts Back the Clock, Evening Standard (London), 7 September 1949, p. 9.
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175. "Aman (1967)". IMDb.
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178. The Guardian – Page 7–6 February 1970
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184. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, London: Routledge, 2000 [London: Allen and Unwin, 1969, Vol. 1], p. 39 ("It appeared to me obvious that the happiness of mankind should be the aim of all action, and I discovered to my surprise that there were those who thought otherwise. Belief in happiness, I found, was called Utilitarianism, and was merely one among a number of ethical theories. I adhered to it after this discovery, and was rash enough to tell my grandmother that I was a utilitarian." In a letter from 1902, in which Russell criticized utilitarianism, he wrote: "I may as well begin by confessing that for many years it seemed to me perfectly self-evident that pleasure is the only good and pain the only evil. Now, however, the opposite seems to me self-evident. This change has been brought about by what I may call moral experience." Ibid, p. 161).
185. Russell, Bertrand (1947). "Am I An Atheist or an Agnostic?". Encyclopedia of Things. Archived from the original on 22 June 2005. Retrieved 6 July 2005.: "I never know whether I should say 'Agnostic' or whether I should say 'Atheist'... As a philosopher, if I were speaking to a purely philosophic audience I should say that I ought to describe myself as an Agnostic, because I do not think that there is a conclusive argument by which one prove (sic) that there is not a God. On the other hand, if I am to convey the right impression to the ordinary man in the street I think I ought to say that I am an Atheist."
186. 'Humanist News', March 1970[not specific enough to verify]
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191. Russell, Bertrand (1968). The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1944–1969. Little, Brown. p. 330. Published separately as 'Reflections on My Eightieth Birthday' in Portraits from Memory.
192. Skeptical Essays, 1928, ISBN 978-0415325080
193. Understanding History and other Essays
194. "An essay on the foundations of geometry". Internet Archive. Cambridge, University press. 1897.
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204. Proposed Roads to Freedom. Project Gutenberg.
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206. Pfeiffer, G. A. (1920). "Review: Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy by Bertrand Russell" (PDF). Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society. 27 (2): 81–90. doi:10.1090/s0002-9904-1920-03365-3.
207. "Introduction to mathematical philosophy". Internet Archive. 1920.
208. The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism. Project Gutenberg.
209. The Analysis of Mind. Project Gutenberg.
210. The Problem of China. Project Gutenberg.
211. "Why I Am Not A Christian". positiveatheism.org. Archived from the original on 19 November 2006.
212. "The Scientific Outlook". Internet Archive. George Allen And Unwin Limited. 1954.
213. "Education and the Social Order". Internet Archive.
214. "In Praise of Idleness By Bertrand Russell". zpub.com.
215. "Western Philosophy". Internet Archive.
216. "Authority and the individual". Internet Archive.
217. "Unpopular Essays". Internet Archive. Simon and Schuster. 1950.
218. "Nightmares of Eminent Persons And Other Stories". Internet Archive. The Bodley Head. 1954.
219. "Portraits From Memory And Other Essays". Internet Archive. Simon and Schuster. 1956.
220. "Common Sense And Nuclear Warfare". Internet Archive. Simon and Schuster. 1959.
221. "My Philosophical Development". Internet Archive. Simon and Schuster. 1959.
222. "The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 1872 1914". Internet Archive. Little, Brown and company. 1951.
223. Charles Pigden in Bertrand Russell, Russell on Ethics: Selections from the Writings of Bertrand Russell, Routledge (2013), p. 14
224. James C. Klagge, Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (2001), p. 12
225. Hochschild, Adam (2011). To end all wars: a story of loyalty and rebellion, 1914–1918. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. pp. 270–272. ISBN 978-0-618-75828-9.
226. "McMaster University: The Bertrand Russell Research Centre". Russell.humanities.mcmaster.ca. 6 March 2017. Retrieved 11 October 2019.
227. "Bertrand Russell Archives Catalogue Entry and Research System". McMaster University Library. The William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections. Retrieved 5 February 2016.

Sources

Primary sources


• 1900, Sur la logique des relations avec des applications à la théorie des séries, Rivista di matematica 7: 115–148.
• 1901, On the Notion of Order, Mind (n.s.) 10: 35–51.
• 1902, (with Alfred North Whitehead), On Cardinal Numbers, American Journal of Mathematics 24: 367–384.
• 1948, BBC Reith Lectures: Authority and the Individual A series of six radio lectures broadcast on the BBC Home Service in December 1948.

Secondary sources

• John Newsome Crossley. A Note on Cantor's Theorem and Russell's Paradox, Australian Journal of Philosophy 51, 1973, 70–71.
• Ivor Grattan-Guinness. The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870–1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
• Alan Ryan. Bertrand Russell: A Political Life, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Further reading

Books about Russell's philosophy


• Alfred Julius Ayer. Russell, London: Fontana, 1972. ISBN 0-00-632965-9. A lucid summary exposition of Russell's thought.
• Celia Green. The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford: Oxford Forum, 2003. ISBN 0-9536772-1-4 Contains a sympathetic analysis of Russell's views on causality.
• A. C. Grayling. Russell: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Nicholas Griffin. Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
• A. D. Irvine (ed.). Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments, 4 volumes, London: Routledge, 1999. Consists of essays on Russell's work by many distinguished philosophers.
• Michael K. Potter. Bertrand Russell's Ethics, Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2006. A clear and accessible explanation of Russell's moral philosophy.
• Elizabeth Ramsden Eames. Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969. A clear description of Russell's philosophical development.
• P. A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University, 1944.
• John Slater. Bertrand Russell, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1994.

Biographical books

• A. J. Ayer. Bertrand Russell, New York: Viking Press, 1972, reprint ed. London: University of Chicago Press, 1988: ISBN 0-226-03343-0
• Ronald W. Clark. The Life of Bertrand Russell, London: Jonathan Cape, 1975 ISBN 0-394-49059-2
• Ronald W. Clark. Bertrand Russell and His World, London: Thames & Hudson, 1981 ISBN 0-500-13070-1
• Rupert Crawshay-Williams. Russell Remembered, London: Oxford University Press, 1970. Written by a close friend of Russell's
• John Lewis. Bertrand Russell: Philosopher and Humanist, London: Lawerence & Wishart, 1968
• Ray Monk. Bertrand Russell: Mathematics: Dreams and Nightmares London: Phoenix, 1997 ISBN 0-7538-0190-6
• Ray Monk. Bertrand Russell: 1872–1920 The Spirit of Solitude Vol. I, New York: Routledge, 1997 ISBN 0-09-973131-2
• Ray Monk. Bertrand Russell: 1921–1970 The Ghost of Madness Vol. II, New York: Routledge, 2001 ISBN 0-09-927275-X
• Caroline Moorehead. Bertrand Russell: A Life New York: Viking, 1993 ISBN 0-670-85008-X
• George Santayana. 'Bertrand Russell', in Selected Writings of George Santayana, ed. Norman Henfrey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I, 1968, pp. 326–329
• Katharine Tait. My father Bertrand Russell, New York: Thoemmes Press, 1975
• Alan Wood. Bertrand Russell The Passionate Sceptic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957.
• Peter Stone et al. Bertrand Russell´s Life and Legacy. Wilmington: Vernon Press, 2017.

External links

• Media from Wikimedia Commons
• Quotations from Wikiquote
• Texts from Wikisource
• "Bertrand Russell's Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• "Bertrand Russell's Logic". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• "Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University
• The Bertrand Russell Society at Bertrand Russell Society
• The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
• O'Connor, John J.; Robertson, Edmund F., "Bertrand Russell", MacTutor History of Mathematics archive, University of St Andrews.
• Works by Bertrand Russell at Project Gutenberg
• Works by or about Bertrand Russell at Internet Archive
• Works by Bertrand Russell at Open Library
• Works by Bertrand Russell at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
• BBC Face to Face interview with Bertrand Russell and John Freeman, broadcast 4 March 1959
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Part 1 of 3

Did [Bertrand] Russell Advocate Preventive Atomic War Against the USSR?
by David Blitz
Philosophy and Honors Program / Central Connecticut State U.
New Britain, CT 06050, USA
Blitz@mail.ccsu.edu

The wind-up for that 1945 nuclear bombing of explicitly civilian targets, had been test-run during the last months of the war in Europe. Planned bombing of civilian populations of targeted cities, under so-called Lindemann/"Bomber Harris" doctrine, had, like Montgomery's "Market Garden" hoax, actually prolonged the war—and, thus, also killed more U.S. soldiers—by resuscitating what [had] been Germany's fading willingness to continue to fight. The fire-bombing of Tokyo had been a similar piece of strategic folly. The needless use of the only existing nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, was the beginning of what became known as the Rand Corporation's post-war "utopian" revolution in military affairs. That evil uncle Bertrand Russell whom confused children have adored as a fighter for peace, was the actual inventor of that United States' doctrine of "preventive nuclear war," which was the actual motivation for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What that bombing accomplished, for the long run, was to set the precedent needed to institutionalize that utopian dogma of a U.S. nuclear revolution in military affairs, which is Cheney's doctrine today....

That bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki thus divided the military and related factions of the U.S. chiefly, between the supporters of the U.S. traditional doctrine of strategic defense—as represented by those such as post-war Generals of the Armies MacArthur and Eisenhower—and, their opponents, the utopian followers of "preventive nuclear warrior" Bertrand Russell. Rumsfeld and his crew typify the "military-industrial complex" utopians at their worst, and most stupid today. A misguided President Truman had leaned toward the side of the same utopians who gave us, later, the 1964-72 Indo-China War, and have also pushed that so-called revolution in military affairs, which dumped us, by means of fraudulent pretexts, into both the 1964-1972 Indo-China war and the presently suppurating folly of rising bloody, irregular warfare attrition in Iraq....


Truman's dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an effect, of the terrorist, Nietzschean type prescribed by Professor Leo Strauss's crony, Synarchist Alexander Kojève. It typified the right-wing, pro-Synarchist turn of the post-Roosevelt U.S.A. That expresses the essence of the trouble with Harry.

A dear friend's eyewitness account of OSS chief General Donovan's emerging, deeply saddened, from a visit at the failing President Roosevelt's office, reports Donovan sadly murmuring to the effect: "It's over." Many among the accomplishments of the U.S.A. under FDR's leadership could not be rooted out by the Truman Presidency, but Truman cleared the way for those who would ruin the FDR legacy as early and often as possible, the right-wing which had used the victory in Normandy as the signal to dump, as much as possible, the policies of a Roosevelt they had always disliked, and who they no longer considered indispensable. Truman cleared the way for an attempted, top-down takeover of U.S. strategic domestic and foreign policy by those utopians President Eisenhower later identified as a "military-industrial complex," the followers of the "preventive nuclear war" doctrines of Bertrand Russell. The other name for that crew of utopians was, and is "The Synarchist International."....

Suppose you were, for example, Russia, China, or India. Suppose you knew that your nation was pre-designated for a medium-term nuclear-warfare attack, or for destruction by other means, if you failed to resist the attacker. Suppose that other nations of Asia shared that concern. How might you react?

How did Russia, China, and North Korea react, during the Korean War, to their conviction that they faced similar threats from the U.S. Truman Administration? How did they read a pattern of certain provocative moves from the Truman Administration. What did these nations, which believed themselves targets, read into the publication of the threat from the most evil living person of the world at that time, Bertrand Russell, in Russell's September 1946 publication of his argument for his doctrine of "preventive nuclear warfare" against the Soviet Union?"

Compare that with Cheney's repeated threats, since he was Secretary of Defense in the 1989-1993 Bush Administration, of nuclear warfare against, implicitly, post-Soviet Russia and other targets? Compare that with the impact of Cheney's escalating threats since the evening of Sept. 11, 2001. If you knew that powerful enemy was intent upon crushing your nation, and also others, out existence, and if you were such a targeted nation, which had the potential means to wreak a terrible penalty upon that foe, would you seek to define a defense, even at the risk of losing half of your population? The history of land wars in Asia on this account, including China's role in the Korean War, and the case of U.S. experience with its war in Indo-China, should give the wary a hint of something to think about....

The combination of Truman's order for the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bertrand Russell's publication of his September 1946 declaration of a policy of preventive nuclear warfare targeting the Soviet Union in particular, and President Harry Truman's endorsement of Winston Churchill's widely celebrated "Iron Curtain" address, had defined a situation in which both Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao Tse Tung's China shared the belief that the U.S.A. and Britain were determined to use nuclear weaponry to threaten them with virtual extinction as states. Against that background, the type of U.S. provocations conducted by the Truman Administration in Asia, as identified in the chapter of Barnett which I have referenced, brought matters to a threshold, in a way broadly analogous to the kind of "pre-World War" tension which the continuing antics of Svengali Cheney and the Trilbys of both the Bush Administration and Democratic Party have combined to create today.....

Apart from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the most significantly tell-tale single piece of evidence against Truman, is that Roosevelt had intended to conclude the war with the liberation of the planet from colonialism and related practices. Truman acted to support the British policy of restoration of colonialism by military force, in places where it had been overthrown in the course of the war. Truman's action thus tipped the balance, to restore the institution of imperialism as a established feature of the United Nations Organization.

Not long after Truman's retirement, and the death of Josef Stalin, the most evil man of the world at that time, Bertrand Russell, negotiated an accommodation with the new Soviet leader Khrushchev, through the facility of a London Conference of World Parliamentarians for World Government. Russell's intention was, as usual for him, world government, and his own burning hatred against the existence of, above all, the United States. His often restated intent was to establish the kind of world government which he and H.G. Wells had prescribed in Wells' 1928 The Open Conspiracy. It was on behalf of world government, explicitly, that Russell had explicitly proposed preventive nuclear warfare as the road to utopia and peace, publically and repeatedly, from 1946 on.

-- World Nuclear War When? McAuliffe's Deadly Delusions: or, How Harry Truman Defeated Himself, by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence Review




Russell’s statements in the immediate post-World War II period about war with the Soviet Union have generated considerable controversy. Some commentators interpret his declarations as if he advocated a preventive war against the Soviet Union. To the contrary, Russell advanced a strategy of conditional threat of war with the aim not of provoking war, but of preventing it. However, Russell was unable to satisfy his critics. Despite initial accuracy in his restatements of what he had originally said, Russell erred in later affirmations, lending credence to the erroneous view that he had something to hide.

INTRODUCTION

Whether Russell advocated a preventive atomic war against the USSR in the period 1945-491 remains a matter of controversy. It has been discussed by all biographers of Russell from Alan Wood to Ray Monk, and was the subject of a debate in the pages of Russell between Douglas Lackey and Ray Perkins, Jr. It was recently the object of an exchange of letters between Nicholas Griffin and Lord Lawson in The Economist. The subject is rendered more noteworthy not only because of the perceived inconsistency of a noted pacifist advocating war—and atomic war at that—but also because of the numerous occasions on which Russell denied having advocated such a position, then recognized that, in a way, he had.2

My claims are the following: (a) Russell’s position with respect to the USSR during the period was consistent with the philosophy of non-absolute pacifism which he shared with Einstein, and is best understood in terms of the exception clause which he had previously invoked during World War II; (b) Russell did not advocate preventive war, in the sense of making a call for immediate and unconditional war—rather, he proposed a conditional threat in order to prevent war; (c) Russell’s policy of conditionally threatening war was a strategy for a specific period of time during which he thought pressuring the Soviet Union might induce it to accept international authority and avoid the arms race; (d) Russell assigned varying probabilities to the likelihood of war, from low to high depending on circumstances, but his preference was for a negotiated agreement separating the opposing Communist and anti-Communist forces, despite the low probability he assigned to such an outcome; (e) Russell’s denials of having advocated preventive nuclear war were consistent with his public statements, and not an attempt to cover up his motivation, despite later confusions in his recollections of what he said.

NON-ABSOLUTE PACIFISM AND EXCEPTIONAL WARS

That Russell would argue in favour of threatening the USSR with war— which he did on many occasions during the period under question— would seem to be inconsistent with his position as a pacifist, and therefore startling and even shocking. But Russell on almost as many occasions indicated that he was not a pacifist in the traditional sense of the term: an individual opposed to all wars at all times and places. Russell was a non-absolute pacifist, and it is in this context that his statements need to be situated in order to be properly understood.3 Non-absolute pacifism as a philosophy consists of two related claims: (1) the principle that wars are evil and must be prevented, and (2) the recognition that some, an exceptional few, can be supported as necessary evils. Russell admitted that the Second World War fell under the latter, rather than the former clause, and he believed, at the beginning of the post-war period under consideration, that a similar exceptional situation might still be at hand:

I make, however, one exception to the condemnation of wars in the near future. A powerful group of nations, engaged in establishing an international military government of the world, may be compelled to resort to war if it finds somewhere an opposition which cannot be peacefully overcome, but which can be defeated without a completely exhausting struggle.4 (Italics added)


The salient point is to determine what type of opposition justified invoking the exception clause. The opposition which Russell had in mind was opposition to the strategic objective of world government. Russell, who had been converted to pacifism as a result of his debates with Louis Couturat during the Boer War, had been shocked by the outbreak of the First World War. He came to realize that an abstract appeal to humanity’s best ideals would often be submerged by that same species’ baser instincts. Consequently, he became an advocate of world government as a means of restraining this tendency. The role of a world government, Russell believed, should be limited to questions of international security. But it had to possess an armed force equipped with the most modern weapons, in order to force recalcitrant states to accept the international order. The achievement of world government would not in itself result in world peace, but it would provide the privileged means to progress towards that ultimate goal.

After World War II, Russell identified the Soviet Union as the main threat not only to world peace, but to western civilization. For Russell, Russia—the term which he used in preference to the USSR—had replaced Nazi Germany as an expansionist, totalitarian regime. Russell had not always held such a view. He had initially welcomed news of the Soviet revolution in 1917, mainly because it meant that the Russians withdrew from the world war which he opposed. But in the course of his visit to the Soviet Union in 1920 he was repelled by the doctrinaire Marxist ideology of the Communist Party and the despotic nature of the Bolshevik state. Nonetheless this did not lead him to designate the Soviet Union as an enemy of world peace before World War II. What changed after 1945 was that the Soviet Union emerged from the war with newly acquired territory—including the Baltic republics—and a clearly expressed desire to expand its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe and the Far East. From a sympathetic point of view this might have appeared as a purely defensive policy, aimed at securing a buffer zone for the Soviet Union, which had suffered some 25 million dead in the preceding conflict. But Russell shared the predominant Western view that Soviet actions, either militarily through its expanded Red Army, or politically, through its client Communist Parties, were aimed at increasing the Russian sphere of domination, up to and including Western Europe.

There was certainly evidence for this view. In the immediate post-war period, Russell was alarmed by what he believed to be the systematic mistreatment of German refugees by the Russians and their allies, and publicly denounced this in the House of Lords, comparing the Soviet actions to those of the defeated Nazis: “The Russians, and the Poles with Russian encouragement, have, I regret to say, adopted a policy of vengeance, and have so far as I am able to discover, committed atrocities very much on the same scale and of the same magnitude as those of which the Nazis were guilty.”5 His concern grew as the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy and nuclear weapons (1946-47), and reached a further high point during the Berlin Blockade (1948-49) when the Soviets blocked all ground traffic in and out of the city, forcing an airlift to supply its citizens with food and supplies. All during this period Russell was growing increasingly alarmed at the prospect of a nuclear arms race once the Soviet Union developed the atomic bomb, as it did in 1949.

Russell’s view during this period of the threat posed by the Soviet Union was based on these concerns, and not, as was the case with the official “cold warriors” in the US and Britain, with the anti-capitalist goals of the Communists which were deemed a threat to the Western powers’ wealth and control. To the contrary, Russell was himself a socialist, though of a moderate “guild socialist” orientation. Moreover, unlike the “cold war” strategy of the right, Russell was unwilling to sacrifice civil liberties at home, and progressive governments abroad, to the anti-Soviet crusade. So while his position was strongly anti-Soviet, it was not one focused on overthrowing the Communist regime at all and any cost.

Russell’s view favouring conditionally threatening war was not an isolated comment or expression of personal feeling. Rather, it was part of a plan he had developed to promote global peace. In isolation the statement appears to be in direct contradiction to his pacifism; indeed it might be seen, as Monk sees it, as a sign of bellicism. But as part of an overall policy it was aimed at serving Russell’s ultimate goal of peace. Russell often talked of his “policy” towards the Soviet Union, and in what follows, I argue that this was a strategy aimed at removing the main obstacle to world government.

THREAT AS A STRATEGIC POLICY

Typically, since Clausewitz, strategy has been considered as the coordination of battles to win a war, and tactics as the coordination of forces to win a battle.6 In the political sense, strategy is the focusing of efforts to achieve a national, or in the case of Russell, an international objective, either directly, by a decisive achievement, or indirectly, by removing an obstacle to a goal. For Russell, the ultimate end was world peace; the strategic objective was international government, and the strategic obstacle was the Soviet Union. The problem was not primarily the Soviet social structure, but rather its leaders’ rejection of trans-national authority under the guise of protecting state sovereignty, coupled with their ambition of increasing the Russian sphere of influence, up to and possibly including Western Europe. The strategy which Russell proposed— that of conditionally threatening war should the Soviet Union not accept specific conditions, such as agreeing to the international control of atomic energy—was specific to the international context of the second half of the 1940s.

The relationship between strategy and goals is not straightforward. Edward Luttwak, in his study of strategy as the logic of war and peace, has drawn attention to this complicated relationship, which he terms “paradoxical”.7 Strategy has an inner logic which often violates common- sense intuitions about the relationship between ends pursued and means that are used. As an example, Luttwak notes that it may be better for a military commander to move forces along the poorer of two roads leading to a desired target, since the better road will likely be more heavily defended. A slower advance is, “paradoxically”, the better choice. Similarly, a military defeat, by drawing enemy forces from a more important task, may facilitate ultimate victory. At the strategic level, it may be necessary to use force to restore peace. A recent example was the NATO bombing of Serbian forces, where the use of deadly force was employed to end the more serious genocidal actions against the Albanian minority. Russell’s threat of force was a paradoxical strategy in this sense as well: the threat of war was intended to prevent war, and served the ultimate goal of world peace.8

That Russell’s policy was a strategic one focused on a time-specific obstacle is indicated by his willingness to change it when circumstances changed. Once the arms race was fully engaged, in particular, after both the US and USSR had exploded hydrogen bombs—the US in 1952 and the USSR two years later—Russell shifted to a different strategy. The ultimate aim (world peace) and the strategic goal (international government) remained the same, but the obstacle was now the arms race to which both the US and the USSR had become committed. The strategic policy that Russell adopted was to propose a special mediating role for the neutral countries, which he hoped would make an objective inquiry into the disastrous effects of nuclear war, and then use their influence to persuade the superpowers of the folly of their course of action. But even India, with whose government Russell was quite close, was unable to take up this proposal, and the policy was abandoned by the second half of the 1950s. By then Russell was persuaded that the US was becoming the major obstacle to world peace, indicated in part by his interpretation of the public exchange of letters he undertook with Khrushchev and John Foster Dulles (acting on Eisenhower’s behalf ) in 1958,9 and then further confirmed by his analysis of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where he valued above all Khrushchev’s removal of the missiles as a means of ending the conflict. By the mid-1960s, under the influence of the war in Vietnam, Russell identified the US as the main obstacle to world peace. This led to Russell’s participation in the campaign to denounce the US intervention in Vietnam, the organization of the International War Crimes Tribunal, and Russell’s support for the Vietnamese liberation movement, all of which shocked Russell observers as much as his threat of war against the USSR a quarter century earlier.

In short, Russell passed through at least three phases in his analysis of the strategic obstacles to international government and world peace: (1) the Soviet Union as the main obstacle in the period 1945-49; (2) a period in the 1950s when both superpowers, and their arms race, were identified as the main obstacle; and (3) the period of the 1960s when he identified the United States as the main obstacle. As the strategic obstacles changed, so did Russell’s policy, with the additional feature that each succeeding strategy became less abstract and more personal: from the conditional threat of war, about which Russell had little control beyond distant relations with the British Labour government, to the proposal for mediation by neutrals, for which Russell had contacts at least with the Indian authorities and a number of leaders in developing countries, to the ban-the-bomb protest movements, where he exercised leadership positions. This process culminated in the establishment of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, with Russell as the centre of an informal diplomatic network of relations with foreign heads of state.

PRESSURING THE SOVIET UNION

In order to better understand the character of the policy that Russell favoured for dealing with the Soviet Union during 1945-49—the threat of force, up to and including its use—it is helpful to compare his strategy with that proposed by the one other prominent thinker who shared his non-absolute pacifism: Albert Einstein. Both men agreed on the need to prevent a nuclear arms race in order to avoid omnicidal disaster, and both agreed on the need for international government as guarantor of world peace. But they disagreed on the means to accomplish this strategic objective, and therefore on policy. For Russell, the United States should take the lead in forming an international alliance, which would be the embryo of a future world government. The Soviet Union should be pressured, up to and including the threat of war, to join. Russell went on to affirm that it might only be as the result of yet another war that such an international organization would be set up, using compulsion to bring the defeated power—which he assumed would be the Soviet Union—into the world government:

There might be a period of hesitation followed by acquiescence, but if the USSR did not give way and join the confederation, after there had been time for mature consideration, the conditions for a justifiable war, which I enumerated a moment ago, would all be fulfilled. A casus belli would not be difficult to find.

Either the voluntary adherence of Russia, or its defeat in war, would render the Confederation invincible, since any war that might occur would be quickly ended by a few atomic bombs.
(“Humanity’s Last Chance”, p. 9)


At the strategic level, Russell believed that firmness and leadership were the only alternative to appeasement. His argument was based on reasoning by analogy: Just as appeasement had failed to stop Nazi Germany in the period leading up to World War II, so too would it fail with Soviet Russia. For this analogy to work one has to accept, as Russell did, that Soviet Russia was now playing the same role in the international system as the Third Reich had previously done. A second aspect of Russell’s strategy, the call for American leadership, was also based on the analogy to the pre-war situation. US isolationism, Russell believed, had encouraged Hitler to launch his attacks both to the west and east; while US involvement in the war after Pearl Harbor hastened the German and Japanese collapse. In the current situation, a return to US isolationism would likewise serve to embolden Stalin, while the assumption of international leadership by the US would have the opposite effect, moderating and perhaps ending his ambitions, particularly in Western Europe. Russell’s conclusion was that only a form of confrontation, to be formulated as threats to compel Russian compliance, would be successful:

The policy most likely to lead to peace is not one of unadulterated pacifism. A complete pacifist might say: “Peace with Russia can always be preserved by yielding to every Russian demand.” This is the policy of appeasement, pursued, with disastrous results, by the British and French Governments in the years before the war that is now ended. I myself supported this policy on pacifist grounds, but I now hold that I was mistaken. Such a policy encourages continually greater demands on the part of the Power to be appeased, until at last some demand is made which is felt to be intolerable, and the whole trend is suddenly reversed. It is not by giving the appearance of cowardice or unworthy submission that the peace of the world can be secured.10


Einstein, like Russell, was a non-Marxist socialist who was opposed to the Soviet dictatorship, but his evaluation of the Soviet Union was less negative, and his tactic toward it, though not one of appeasement, was nonetheless rather different from Russell’s:

I am in favour of inviting the Russians to join a world government authorized to provide security, and if they are unwilling to join, to proceed to establish supranational security without them…. Those who create the organization must understand that they are building with the final objective of obtaining Russian adherence.11


The source of the difference was twofold. On the one hand, Russell’s criterion for invoking the exception clause of non-absolute pacifism was weaker than Einstein’s. Whereas for Einstein, the enemy force against which war could be justified had to aim at the destruction of life “as such”, placing the threat at the level of Nazi genocide, for Russell it sufficed to have an opponent determined to destroy modern civilization, through the elimination of its cultural elite, thus placing the threat at the level of the Soviet gulag. Einstein focused on the Soviet people, who had lost so many of their number to the Nazi onslaught, while Russell focused on the Soviet leadership, which aimed at increasing its sphere of influence in Europe.

Whereas Russell’s policy was one which involved a threat of war, Einstein’s was not, and it might be preferred on these grounds alone. However, given Russell’s analysis that the main obstacle to an effective world authority was the Soviet Union, then not dealing with the Soviet problem, and deferring it to later as Einstein proposed, would only lead to failure. International organizations in the twentieth century were developed, and most major states acquiesced to them, only in the aftermath of major wars—the League of Nations after World War I, and the United Nations after World War II. Leaders were willing to forfeit some, though not much, state sovereignty in the hopes of preventing further global conflict. By not dealing with the most pressing problem at hand, Einstein’s proposal was not such as to motivate states to accept the further, more significant limitation on national sovereignty presupposed by their participation in the sort of international authority which he and Russell proposed, and which went far beyond the relatively powerless United Nations Organization, where the major powers had the veto. Einstein held it possible to deal directly with the strategic objective, and bring about real international authority without dealing with the Soviet problem, whereas for Russell this could not be accomplished except first by removing the main obstacle, which was Russian intransigence and expansionism. This was the point of Russell’s refusal to collaborate with Einstein in 1947 (though they were able to work together in the changed circumstances of the mid-1950s).

The question remains: was there an appropriate strategic policy in 1945-49 other than that of threat, which would not involve appeasement, but would be more active and likely to mobilize than Einstein’s? Here a weakness in Russell’s argument appears: although he stated that he was privately in contact with government specialists on military strategy, he did not publicly debate the strategic and policy theorists of the time. In particular, he did not analyze, or even appear to be acquainted with, the writing of authors such as George Kennan who were addressing the same problem. Kennan is best known for his “long telegram” just after World War II, alerting US policy-makers to the threat of Soviet foreign policy in the post-war period, and the “X” article in Foreign Affairs which proposed the policy of containment to deal with that threat.12

Kennan based his analysis on two factors: “the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism” (p. 572), which he took to be the underlying factor, and the Soviets’ belief in their own infallibility, which he took to be an aggravating factor. Nonetheless, he identified one aspect of Marxist ideology that, curiously enough, mitigated the immediate threat: the belief in the inevitability of Communist victory. As a result, the Kremlin was “under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry” (p. 574), and could allow itself the luxury of patience in dealing with long-term ideological questions. Kennan then proposed his policy of containment: “In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” And he continued, in words that should have called for a response from Russell:

It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics; with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness”. While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by common sense.… For these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige. (Pp. 569-70)


Kennan proceeded from a much narrower perspective than Russell: his strategic goal was the defence of the national interests of the United States, whereas Russell saw the need for the US to take the lead in establishing international authority that transcended national interests. Nonetheless, both identified the Soviet Union as the main obstacle to achieving their strategic objectives, and as is evident from Kennan’s other writings, both had a commitment to world peace. It would therefore have been interesting to have Russell’s opinion on Kennan’s analysis of flexibility in Russian foreign policy and his warning on the futility of threats as a means of modifying Soviet behaviour. This remains a weakness in Russell’s project, as he was unable to refine his policy through debate with related, but differing strategic plans. As a result, Russell’s many statements on the question, in newspapers, journals and broadcasts, tended to be more repetitive than amplificative. We are left with a more limited question: whether Russell’s threat of war amounted to an advocacy of preventive war?

CONDITIONAL THREAT OF WAR ("CTW") VS. ADVOCACY OF PREVENTIVE WAR ("APW")

[T]he theory of internal collusion, which asserts that the CIA and the FBI let it happen (sometimes abbreviated as LIHOP, let it happen on purpose);...[and] the more radical approach which is endorsed here, namely that 9/11 was the product of a network of moles inside the US government and intelligence agencies, backed up by covert action teams of expert professionals, seeking to provoke a war of civilizations as a means of shoring up Anglo-American world domination. The acronym for this approach is MIHOP – made it happen on purpose.

-- 9/11 Synthetic Terror Made in USA, by Webster Griffin Tarpley



In what follows I will refer to the policy advanced by Russell as “conditional threat of war”, formulated as follows:

CTW: If Russia does not acquiesce in the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy, then the West should conditionally threaten war.


This occurred in a variant form before the Baruch Plan, and after as well (during the Berlin crisis, for example), where the focus was on directly warlike activities of the Soviet Union: if Russia does not cease its aggressive activities towards European countries, then the West should threaten war conditionally. This implied as well that the West should be militarily prepared to deal with a provocation by the Soviet Union, a point Russell stressed especially after 1949, to the point of supporting the development of hydrogen weapons as a deterrent to the Soviet A-bomb (a position he abandoned after the devastating effects of the hydrogen bomb were revealed in tests during 1952-54).13

I will contrast this position with a different one, “advocacy of preventive war”, a position often attributed to Russell, but one that I will argue he did not defend:

APW: Because Russia did not acquiesce in the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy, the West should wage preventive war.


Similarly, a modified version of APW can be formulated substituting aggression against a European country for rejection of the Baruch Plan as the trigger for war, or “casus belli”: because Russia has fomented a Communist coup in country X (or invaded it), the West should wage immediate, preventive war. APW contradicts the principle of non-absolute pacifism which Russell advocated, according to which the nonabsolute pacifist may acquiesce to armed conflict only as self-defence against a real aggression putting into jeopardy civilisation itself. A preventive war is conventionally defined as “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.”14 To initiate war on the belief or fear that it is inevitable violates Russell’s philosophy in two ways: firstly, in ascribing inevitability to historical events, a position more in line with Hegelianism or Marxism than with Russell’s view of history as contingent; and secondly, in initiating attack rather than responding to one.15

CTW, however, does not contradict non-absolute pacifism, if, as has been argued above, it is a strategy to deal with an obstacle to attaining the necessary mechanism—that of world government—through which perpetual peace alone can be achieved. To advocate preventive war (APW) is to urge the mobilization of military forces for the waging of war; whereas to conditionally threaten war (CTW) is to urge the object of the threat to satisfy the conditions necessary to avoid the war.16


Two days after resigning as the Bush administration's top weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay said Sunday that his group found no evidence Iraq had stockpiled unconventional weapons before the U.S.-led invasion in March.

He said U.S. intelligence services owe President Bush an explanation for having concluded that Iraq had.

"My summary view, based on what I've seen, is we're very unlikely to find large stockpiles of weapons," he said on National Public Radio's "Weekend Edition." "I don't think they exist."

It was the consensus among the intelligence agencies that Iraq had such weapons that led Bush to conclude that it posed an imminent threat that justified the U.S.-led invasion, Kay said.

"I actually think the intelligence community owes the president rather than the president owing the American people," he said....

"It is not a political 'gotcha' issue. It is a serious issue of 'How you can come to a conclusion that is not matched in the future?'"

Other countries' intelligence agencies shared the U.S. conclusion that Iraq had stockpiled such weapons, though most disagreed with the United States about how best to respond....

Secretary of State Colin Powell defended the administration's moves Sunday. "Military action was justified by Iraq's violation of 12 years of U.N. resolutions," he said in an interview with First Channel Russia during a visit to Moscow.

"Iraq had the intent to have weapons of mass destruction and they had previously used weapons of mass destruction. They had programs to develop such weapons," Powell said.

"And what we were trying to find out was what inventory they actually had, and we are still examining that question."

Saddam Hussein was given the opportunity to divulge what his country was doing but chose not to do so, which resulted in the U.S.-led campaign to oust him, Powell said.

"And the world is better off, the Iraqi people are better off, because Saddam Hussein is gone," Powell said. "And we will continue to make sure we find all elements of his weapons of mass destruction programs and whatever weapons there might be."

-- Kay: No Evidence Iraq Stockpiled WMDs: Former chief U.S. inspector faults intelligence agencies, by CNN


Part, but only part, of the distinction between the CTW and APW lies in the use of the terms “advocate” and “threaten”. I suggest that “advocate” designates the intended goal of a policy, while “threaten” indicates a subordinate strategy. Consider the analogy to a prosecutor in court. She has as her goal, for which she is the advocate, proving the guilt of the accused. She will develop a strategy for the prosecution depending on the specific circumstances of the case. Suppose that a defence witness, whose past is shady and who is known to lie, falsely testifies for the accused. The prosecutor may threaten that witness with charges of perjury if he continues to lie on the stand. Now, we readily admit that the prosecutor advocates the guilt of the accused, proposes a strategy for pursuing the case, and conditionally threatens the witness as part of it.

This analogy can be extended as follows. Suppose the prosecutor, once a guilty verdict has been obtained in a capital murder case, demands the death penalty (in the US, where such penalties are still regrettably permitted). Now this is quite different from that of the police officer who, before the trial had begun, made the conditional threat that if the accused did not admit his guilt, he would be subject to prosecution under the death penalty rule. Once the verdict has been rendered and the court has moved to the penalty phase, the prosecutor is an advocate of the death penalty, since this is the only remedy for which she is pleading. Earlier, before the trial, the police officer had made a conditional threat, offering the prisoner a choice. The two are not the same, since for the prosecutor, advocacy of the death penalty is the goal of her penalty phase presentation, while for the police officer, threat of the death penalty is a means to a different goal: that of obtaining a confession from the accused. Russell’s case is more like that of the police officer than that of the prosecutor.

In other words, Russell’s intention was the prevention of war, through a strategy which may appear paradoxical, but which is not inconsistent with that goal. This contrasts with the intention of APW, which is to wage immediate war. It is instructive to distinguish Russell’s conditional threat of war from a real example of the advocacy of preventive war. The mathematician and game theorist John von Neumann, in speaking of the Soviet Union, was reported to have said: “If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 5 o’clock, I say why not at 1 o’clock?”17 Although von Neumann also preceded his statements by “if ”, there are no conditions that could be satisfied to warrant the non-application of the bombing, whereas for Russell there were. The intention depends in part on the theory in which the statement is embedded, and not exclusively on the statement. The problem is not therefore a semantic one of the difference between “advocate” and “threaten”, but a theoretical one related to the role that statements using each verb play in a more general setting.

The Perkins–Lackey debate touched on the problem of conditional threats as well, along with the likelihood of their being carried out.18 Ray Perkins, Jr. proposed an analysis of three types of statements Russell made, based on the core statement-type, “We ought to wage war against the Soviets unless they agree, under threat of war, to international controls.” This core statement is then modified as a type c1 statement by the addition at the end of the sentence of the modifier “and they will probably agree”, and a type c2 statement by the addition of the phrase “and they will probably not agree”. The “c ” stands for conditional, so that for Perkins the condition is the greater or lesser likelihood of Russian acquiescence to the threat. When proposed without either qualifier, Perkins labels the statement as type u (for unconditional). Perkins argued that Russell’s public claims were usually of type c1, which presumed likely Soviet compliance, without the need to carry out the threat, rather than of type c2, where war was probable (though not guaranteed, as in the case PWu, which Perkins holds that Russell never defended). According to Perkins this meant that Russell defended “a policy rather less bellicose than what is usually attributed to him”. On Perkins’ view, the controversy over the 1948 Westminster School talk arose because it was perceived as type c2, even though upon analysis it can be shown to be of type c1. The only exception was contained in a 1948 letter to an American correspondent, Walter Marseille (see below), which was of type c2.

Perkins’ analysis differs from that made in this paper. Perkins admits that Russell did in fact advocate preventive war, while I claim that Russell did not publicly advocate preventive war; rather he proposed the strategic policy of conditionally threatening war. While Perkins’ distinction between the three types of threat (c1, c2 and u) is helpful in analyzing the variations in Russell’s position (once the sentences are reformulated as CTW, not APW), it does not capture Russell’s CTW position adequately. The conditional nature of Russell’s statement has more to do more with the “unless” part of Perkins’ formulation of Russell’s position: “We ought to wage war against the Soviets unless they agree, under threat of war, to international controls”, than the codicil concerning the likelihood or not of Soviet compliance.19

Douglas Lackey, in his rejoinder to Perkins, denied the relevance of the conditional/unconditional distinction, since on his view even unconditional statements have conditions given by the intentions of the maker of the statement. What I will argue in the following sections of the paper, following in spirit though not in detail Perkins’ position, is that there is a real distinction between conditional and unconditional statements about war, corresponding to APW and CTW above; in particular, that conditional statements allow for an enumeration of cases upon which strategic thinking can be based, while unconditional ones lock in one and only one course of action. But, in agreement with Lackey, though for different reasons, the question of the likelihood of the threat being carried out is not decisive for the justification of the statement containing the threat.20

CONDITIONAL THREAT AND THE "MISSING" CASE

The widespread view is that indeed Russell did advocate preventive war against the Soviet Union. This claim is largely based on a talk which Russell gave in November 1948 for the New Commonwealth at Westminster School. It has recently been discussed again, in an exchange of letters between Nigel Lawson (Lord Lawson of Blaby, a former chancellor of the exchequer), a student at the time at Westminster School who attended the talk, and Nicholas Griffin, editor of Russell’s Selected Letters, Volume 2 of which covers this period.21 Lawson remembers the event as follows:

Needless to say, Russell advocated a pre-emptive nuclear strike on strictly humanitarian grounds. In a nutshell, he pointed out that at the time the Soviet Union did not yet possess a nuclear capability but that it would very soon do so, after which all history made it clear that sooner or later there would be a war between the two superpowers that would be infinitely more devastating than either of the two world wars through which he had lived. The only way of preventing this Armageddon, he concluded with remorseless if unpalatable logic, was for America to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union before it acquired the bomb: after that it would be too late.22


Griffin, in his reply (ibid., 11 Aug., p. 14) pointed out that Lawson had not remembered that the three alternatives were prefaced by the conditional “if the present aggressive Russian policy was persisted in” (emphasis in the original), properly pointing out that since the matter was clearly dealt with as a conditional it should not be construed as a direct call to action, or advocacy of preventive atomic war. Lawson retorted that not withstanding the condition, Russell “expected that it [the Russian policy] would be [persisted in]”, making the action of preventive atomic war the only logical conclusion (18 Aug., p. 14). Griffin replied that Russell advocated a continuation of the West’s policy of containment, “backed by a threat of war”; and that this was not the same as advocating pre-emptive nuclear attack (25 Aug., p. 18). But for Lawson, as for many other listeners and subsequent readers of Russell’s statement, the conditionals had been stripped away, leaving bare the terms “aggressive Russian policy”, “war” and “atomic bombs”, which were then concatenated together to form the notion that Russell advocated a preventive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

A closer examination of the talk in printed form23 shows that Russell clearly formulated his proposal as a conditional. But more importantly, the conditional formulation was part of a more general enumeration of cases which, I believe, is essential to the philosophy of non-absolute pacifism. The task for the absolute pacifist is to organize opposition to each and any war. But the non-absolute pacifist has to analyze cases to determine when a war may exceptionally be justified. Once Russell had concluded that the Soviet Union under Stalin represented a sufficient threat to western civilization to fall under the exception clause, he had to consider the various alternatives. In what follows, he uses both disjunction to exhaustively enumerate possible cases, and implication to propose actions appropriate to each:

The question is whether there is to be war or whether there is not; and there is only one course of action open to us. That is to strengthen the Western Alliance morally and physically as much and as quickly as possible, and hope it may become obvious to the Russians that they can’t make war successfully. If there is war, it should be won as quickly as possible. That is the line of policy which the Western Nations are now pursuing. (P. 41, italics added, with “IS” in the second italicized passage being italicized in the original)


Russell believed that in either case (war, or no war), the preferred policy was one of Western strength. In the best case scenario, this would dissuade the Russians from initiating war, while in the worst case scenario, this would make for as brief a war as possible. In what follows, I will refer to the best case scenario as case (d), for reasons to be explained below. The most controversial part of his talk was the following response to the question: “If there is another war, what would be the chances of survival of this country? What would be the economic consequences?” The response, reported in the third person, reformulated the question as considering the alternatives “if the present aggressive Russian policy was persisted in”, and Russell considered three cases (a)–(c). The first two considered war before and after the Russians had the atomic bomb, and the third, laconically termed “submission”, presumed no war, but immediate Western capitulation. What is missing is the fourth possibility: no war, with Russian acquiescence to international controls of atomic energy and a form of world government. This is precisely the alternative I have lettered as (d) above. Neglecting this fourth possibility gives an altogether sinister interpretation to Russell’s reported response:

As he saw it there were three alternatives if the present aggressive Russian policy was persisted in : (a) War with Russia before she has the atomic bombs, ending fairly swiftly and inevitably in a Western victory; (b) war with Russia after she has the atomic bombs, ending again in Western victory, but after frightful carnage, destruction and suffering; (c) Submission. We could say to the Russians “Come in and govern us, establish your concentration camps, do what you like.” This third alternative seemed to him so unutterably unthinkable that it could be dismissed; and as between the other two the choice to him, at least, seemed clear. (P. 43, italics in the original)


It is interesting to note that Russell considered the conditional nature of his response (“if the present aggressive Russian policy was persisted in”) so important, that one of the few corrections to the typescript he made before publication was to specify that those words be italicized. This is because the three cases (a)–(c) presupposed that condition; while a fourth case—labelled (d) above—presupposed the opposite condition: that Russian policy changed. Russell’s full analysis can be summarized in the table below, with indication of his clearly expressed preferences for each scenario:

CASE / SUBCASE / COMMENT / PREFERENCE

(a) War / Before USSR has atom bomb / Ends swiftly with Western victory. / (2) Preferred to atomic war once USSR has the bomb.

(b) War / After USSR has atom bomb / Much more destruction than in immediately preceding case. / (3) Preferred to capitulation.

(c) No war / West submits to the Soviets / Capitulation of West, destruction of Western civilization. / (4) Least preferred of all options.

(d) No war / Soviets agree to atomic energy control and some form of international government / Can only be achieved by Western preparedness to show Soviets they can’t win war. / (1) Preferred to all other options.


A reasonable hypothesis to explain Lawson’s interpretation of the talk is that members of the audience simply retained cases (a)–(c) based on their recollection of the last part of the talk—the question period—without recalling case (d), which was mentioned earlier in the body of the talk. Although Russell had carefully formulated his proposals in the conditional, making explicit the conditions that first had to be realized before the consequent actions were to be undertaken, Lawson appears to have stripped away the terms “if … then …” and remembered the talk as a series of affirmations. Both of these effects have contributed to the continuing myth that Russell advocated preventive atomic war, when in fact what he did was enumerate possible cases and propose conditional responses, including the use of threats of war as a strategic policy in the existing circumstances.
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Re: Freda Bedi Cont'd (#2)

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Part 2 of 3

POSSIBILITY, PROBABILITY AND PREFERENCES

I will term Russell’s methodology for analyzing the international situation as “enumeration of cases”, where he considers three factors in developing his strategy: the logical possibilities or scenarios, the likelihood or probability of each, and their desirability both intrinsically and realistically. In another article the same year as his Westminster School talk, “The Outlook for Mankind” (1948),24 Russell began: “Let us begin by enumerating the logical possibilities, without regard to the question whether they are probable or desirable” (p. 238). He distinguished six possibilities, three of which involved no world war, and three of which did, as follows:

Let us begin by enumerating the logical possibilities, without regard to the question whether they are probable or desirable.

First: Russia may convert the Capitalist world, and a Communist empire extend over the whole earth.

Second: Russia may revert to Capitalism, and take to willing co-operation with the West.

Third: Each side may concede to the other a definite sphere, and the world may be divided as the medieval world was divided, between Christendom and Islam, perhaps with occasional minor conflicts as inconclusive and peripheral as the Crusades.

These three possibilities do not involve a world war. If there is a world war, there are three further possibilities:

Fourth: America may be victorious and establish an American world empire.

Fifth: Russia may be victorious and establish a Communist world empire.

Sixth: The war may end in a draw, after which, presumably, each side will prepare for the next bout; or, possibly, they may belatedly revert to the third possibility, as was done at the Peace of Westphalia after the Thirty Years’ War.


Russell then evaluated the likelihood of each of these possibilities. He considered case 1 (Russia converts the West) and case 2 (Russia reverts to capitalism) highly unlikely, given the tenacity with which both Americans and Russians then asserted their respective systems. Case 3 (modus vivendi and long-term world division) also seemed unlikely, given Russell’s view that the Russians were insincere in their calls for co-existence. Significantly, however, this possibility was deemed less unlikely than the previous two, with the result that Russell was able to value it as a preference. Of the three war options, case 4 (America victorious) was considered the likely outcome by Americans and by Russell, case 5 (Russia victorious) was considered the likely outcome by the Russians only, while case 6 (draw that prepares yet another war) was not rated, though the possibility that it might not lead to another war was considered.

Russell’s crystal ball was not as good as he might have hoped, as case 3 (coexistence of both systems) did come to pass in the period 1949-91, followed by case 2 (collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union). But the probabilities Russell assigned are less important than the preferences he associated with each case, with the one exception that he excluded evaluating scenarios that were deemed highly improbable:

The above review of possibilities has been necessary before considering what we should attempt and what it is permissible to hope. It seems to result from our survey that what would be best would be an agreement to partition the world and not interfere in each other’s zones; next to that, a war soon, ending in an American victory; next, a Russian victory; and, worst of all, a draw. (P. 243)


In summary form, Russell’s analysis looks as follows:

POSSIBILITY / PROBABILITY / PREFERENCE

A: No War


1: USSR converts world to Communism / Highly improbable / Not ranked as the likelihood is so small.

2: USSR reverts to capitalism / Highly improbable / Not ranked as the likelihood is so small.

3: Division of world into stable and separate blocs / Unlikely / (1) First preference, most preferred since it does not involve war.

B. War

4: American victory / Believed likely by Americans and Russell / (2) Desirable, second preference, since it involves victory of liberty, albeit at the price of war.

5: Russian victory / Believed likely only by Russians, not Americans or Russell / (3) Undesirable, but third ranked preference compared to the next, worst outcome.

6: Inconclusive, leading to further (fourth) world war (or possibly, reverting to case 3 situation) / None stated / (4) Most unwelcome outcome, could lead to annihilation of humanity in subsequent war.


And he noted, that while he considered it possible to avoid war, he doubted whether it was likely:

The only possible way, so far as I can see, of avoiding a war between Russia and America, is to make it obvious to the Russian Government that, in a war, America would be victorious. It is obvious that the Marshall Plan, combined with a West-European Union, gives the best hope of this, as well as of bringing victory to the West if there is a war. But for the reasons already given it is very difficult to persuade the Russians that they would not win. I do not myself believe that it is possible to persuade them, and therefore I expect a war. Nevertheless, we should do all in our power to make the Russians afraid of war. Fortunately, the measures necessary to that end are exactly the same as those involved in preparing for war if it should come, namely to build up the economic and military strength of Western Europe in close alliance with the United States.25 (Ibid., p. 243, italics added)


From the above analysis, three conclusions follow: (1) Russell’s conditional threat was not dependent on his analysis of the probability of compliance by Russia, (2) Russell continued to prefer a non-war solution, despite the low probability he assigned it, and (3) he continued to favour a policy of threats as a means of preserving peace.

THREAT AND RISK/BENEFIT

An interesting analysis of this type of problem is made by the ethicist R. M. Hare, who has argued that it is not always the case that “what it would be wrong to do, it would be wrong to threaten to do.”26 The key to his analysis is the point that “it seems to me that there could be, and well may be now, situations in which the expectation of utility, that is, of preference-satisfaction, would be maximized by making threats the carrying out of which would not maximize utility” (ibid., p. 77). Hare does not discuss Russell’s views, but his analysis can be made explicit as follows. There are four cases to be examined, corresponding to the four combinations of threat/no threat and war/no war: (1) no threat and no war, (2) no threat and war, (3) threat and no war, and (4) threat and war. Preponderance of benefits from the pacifist point of view is obtained in the two no-war cases (1) and (3), while preponderance of risks is incurred in the two war cases (2) and (4). Benefit may be considered as positive utility, risk as negative utility.

-- / NO WAR / WAR

No threat / (1) Spontaneous success of coexistence / (2) Failure of appeasement and isolationism

Threat / (3) Success of threat as pressure tactic / (4) Failure of threat to prevent war


Russell’s position was that it was worth taking the risk involved in case (3), of threat made, but war prevented. On Hare’s analysis, this would be justified only if two inequalities hold:

(i) The benefit involved in not making a threat and no war resulting (success of spontaneous coexistence, case 1) is less than the risk that not making a threat will only hasten war (failure of appeasement and/or isolationism, case 2). Russell believed that coexistence without a threat was unlikely, given Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, so that its overall value as an option was low. At the same time, he considered the likelihood of war as great without a threat, based on the analogy to pre-war appeasement by Britain and isolationism by the US. In other words, not threatening produced more risk of war than benefit of peace, and should be avoided. This does not, in itself, justify threatening, which has to be analyzed on its own terms.

(ii) The benefit of threatening war, without having war (threat of war as preventive, case 3) is greater than the risk that threatening war will lead to war (failure of threat to prevent war, case 4). Conditional threat of war might result in the Soviet Union backing down, thereby achieving the aim of the threat and preserving peace. But even if war did result, the outcome was likely to be favourable to the West and the war to be over quickly, so the failure of the threat to obtain its immediate goal—peaceful coexistence—would lead to the success in the next round of the “game”—Western supremacy.

Much depends on how the threat/war box (case 4) is viewed. For Russell, the war outcome was a failure of the paradoxical strategy of threats of war to prevent actual war. But for his critics, this box should be labelled “preventive war”, since on their view the threat of war was simply a ruse behind which lay the intention of waging preventive war. I argue that Russell favoured case (3): threaten war to prevent war; his critics claim that he actually favoured case (4), interpreted as advocacy of preventive war. This misalignment of perceptions also played a role in the problem of Russell’s denials.

RUSSELL'S DENIALS

One final aspect of the controversy remains to be analyzed: Russell’s repeated denials—and worse than that, occasional retractions of his denials—of having advocated preventive atomic war with the Soviet Union. These have seemed to most of his readers and critics as self-serving, and an indication that there was something to hide. Rather than constituting smoke screens behind which he tried to maintain his newfound respectability with the Labour Party as Ray Monk has claimed (see below), they rather show Russell trying, though not very successfully, to set the record right, and then succumbing to some, though not all, of the misunderstandings of his critics.

There are three distinct periods in Russell’s analysis of his own statements: (1) an initial period, roughly from 1948 to 1953, when he was generally correct in stating that he supported CTW and denying that he approved of APW; (2) the period 1954-59 when under continued pressure by critics, he misstated his own views in meta-statements about them; (3) a third period, 1959-59, when Russell then repeated these more or less inaccurate accounts as if they were what he had actually stated in 1945-49.
The problems involved in the second and third periods do not, however, modify the content of what Russell stated as his policy, and admitted with a high degree of accuracy during the first period.

FIRST PERIOD: CORRECT CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO APW AND CTW

The very first of Russell’s denials was made immediately after the Westminster School talk in 1948. Although Russell had made similar statements on the threat of war on many previous occasions, it was this case which attracted the most attention, in part based on a very unfavourable report in Reynolds News.27 One of the first places that Russell attempted to repair the damage was at his alma mater, Cambridge (where he had attended Trinity College and had been teaching since 1944). The 27 November 1948 edition of Varsity, a Cambridge Weekly Newspaper, headlined, “Earl Russell Denies Atom War Reports: Misquoted in London Press, Did Not Say ‘Attack Russia’”. Russell, as he was to do again later, attacked the report as an “intentional misrepresentation”. In particular, Russell rejected the claim that he had ever said: “Either we must have a war against Russia before she has the atom bomb or we will have to lie down and let them govern us.” This is a denial of APW. An examination of the text of Russell’s speech, both in typescript and as printed, shows that Russell did not make the quoted comment, though, curiously, Ray Monk, following Caroline Moorehead, quotes him as if he had.28

To the contrary, Russell continued, stating a version of CTW: “What I really said was that it was infinitely to be hoped that there would be no war, but that the best way to avoid war was to be prepared for it.” He further admitted that at the end of the meeting he declared “that in the event of war our chance would be better while we had a monopoly of the atom bomb.”29 This is not in contradiction to CTW. Rather, it expresses Russell’s preference for a less destructive rather than a more destructive war, if war were to occur. Such a less destructive war, given the evolution of weapons of mass destruction, would also be earlier rather than later.

In a letter to The Observer (28 Nov. 1948), Russell continued his response to the fallout from the Westminster School address, situating the distinction as between urging immediate war, i.e. preventive war, and urging the threat of war. “I did not, as has been reported, urge immediate war with Russia. I did urge that the democracies should be prepared to use force if necessary, and that their readiness to do so should be made perfectly clear to Russia.”30 Again, he admitted CTW and denied APW.

For his Nobel Prize speech of 11 December 1950, Russell chose as his topic “What Desires Are Politically Important”. Noting that a major psychological source of war was the unfulfilled desire for adventure, he proposed, only partly in jest, that large cities should have venues for such thrill seekers that would satisfy their desires without recourse to war, and he suggested two: artificial waterfalls with fragile canoes, and bathing pools filled with mechanical sharks. He continued: “Any person found advocating a preventive war should be condemned to two hours a day with these ingenious monsters.”31 This does not appear as a self-criticism, so certain was Russell that he had not advocated preventive war in the previous period.

In 1951 Russell responded to a criticism made of him the previous year in the New Statesman. In the 18 November 1950 issue, “Critic” had noted: “After the last war, even more deeply troubled by the spread of communism than he was by the power of Rome which he had often denounced, he decided that it would be both good morals and good politics to start dropping nuclear bombs on Moscow.”32 Russell demanded, and was given, a lengthy reply, in the form of a letter printed in the 21 April 1951 issue. Russell reproduced a number of quotes from his writings in favour of peace, and added in conclusion that he had advanced CTW:

I will admit that at one time I had hopes of a shorter road to general peace. At the time of the Baruch proposal for internationalizing atomic energy, I thought it possible that the Russians might be induced by threats to agree to this proposal and thereby to save the world from the atomic armaments race upon which it is now embarked. But this hope proved vain. After the Berlin blockade and the rape of Czechoslovakia I stated emphatically, what I still hold, that the Russians ought to be informed that the West would not tolerate further aggressions of this sort. (P. 450, italics added)


In 1952 Russell was questioned by journalists at the Fleet Street Forum and the transcript was published as How Near Is War? The relevant question he was asked was phrased in terms of an “ultimatum”: “Not long ago you were quoted as demanding that the West should send the Russians an ultimatum that they should either toe the line or have an atom bomb dropped on them. Will you tell us whether you were misreported and, if not, what accounts for the slight difference between that line and the one you now advocate?” (p. 18). Russell responded with a contextualization of his CTW to the Russian refusal to accept the internationalization of atomic energy:

I thought, at the time, there was something to be said for trying to bully the Russians into accepting that Baruch report. Of course that situation has now gone, entirely. First of all the Russians also have the atom bomb; in the second place the Americans are no longer in that mood—you cannot give those terms any longer. (P. 19, italics added)


On 17 October 1953 Russell’s letter to a correspondent who had queried him on this question was reprinted, with Russell’s permission, in the Nation. He once again denied APW, this time citing it as a “Communist invention”. “The story that I supported a preventive atom war against Russia is a Communist invention. I once spoke at a meeting at which only one reporter was present and he was a Communist, though reporting for orthodox newspapers.”33 This is a denial of APW, but it became a problem in 1959 when Russell, in response to a criticism by a correspondent, incorrectly believed that he had denied CTW in this letter (see below).

The clearest exposition of his position was made in an article published in March 1958, “Why I Have Changed My Mind”, and reproduced as an appendix, entitled “Inconsistency?”, in his 1959 book, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. Referring to the period surrounding the Baruch proposal, he admitted CTW: “I thought, at that time, that it would be worth while to bring pressure to bear upon Russia and even, if necessary, to go so far as to threaten war on the sole issue of the internationalizing of atomic energy.”34 He continued: “My aim, then as now, was to prevent a war.” And he concluded: “I do not deny that the policy I have advocated has changed from time to time. It has changed as circumstances have changed” (p. 91). This summary is interesting, both for its emphasis on the obligation Russell felt to change his political views as the world changed, and for his continued insistence that what he had done was propose a policy of threatening Russia.

Biographers of Russell who have paid careful attention to his published words and studied his archival letters, such as Clark and Monk, are nonetheless not satisfied. Speaking of the 1948 Westminster speech, Clark commented:

Nowhere in all this did Russell urge, in so many words, the starting of preventive war, while the qualifying “if ” about Russian intentions added a conditional that many reports ignored; nevertheless, emphasis on the obvious fact that a war before Russia had nuclear weapons would be less disastrous than war afterwards was perilously close to it. (P. 525)


And he later commented with respect to Russell’s statement of his position for the 1952 Fleet Street interview:

The statement—which overlooked Russell’s advocacy of finding a casus belli long before the Baruch proposals—was not formally a plea for preventive war; but complete dissociation from the policy demanded a considerable semantic wiggle. (P. 526)


Whether Russell was indeed “perilously close” to APW and just a “semantic wiggle” away from it, Clark nevertheless admitted that formally, Russell did not advance it. But when Clark, and other commentators, considered a further set of statements by Russell, where confusions between CTW and APW were made by Russell himself, and where he claimed he had forgotten having made statements threatening war, willingness to give Russell the benefit of the doubt failed.

SECOND PERIOD: CONFUSED OR INCORRECT ADMISSIONS

The second period I identify is characterized by two criticisms made of Russell’s inconsistencies, one in 1954 and another in 1959. Whereas in the first period (1948-53) Russell had focused directly on what he had said in 1945-49, he now was forced to defend what he said he had said in his preceding clarifications. In this situation of meta-claims, mistakes began to accumulate. In particular, Russell admitted that (1) he had stated APW when in fact he had stated CPW; (2) believed that he had stated CTW only privately in 1948, when he in fact he had stated it on numerous public occasions; and (3) claimed that he had forgotten ever having formulated CTW, until reminded by readers who published letters from him which contained anti-Soviet statements.

The young ought to be temperate in the use of this great art [lying] until practice and experience shall give them that confidence, elegance, and precision which alone can make the accomplishment graceful and profitable. Patience, diligence, painstaking attention to detail -- these are the requirements; these, in time, will make the student perfect; upon these, and upon these only, may he rely as the sure foundation for future eminence. Think what tedious years of study, thought, practice, experience, went to the equipment of that peerless old master who was able to impose upon the whole world the lofty and sounding maxim that "Truth is mighty and will prevail"-- the most majestic compound fracture of fact which any of woman born has yet achieved. For the history of our race, and each individual's experience, are sewn thick with evidences that a truth is not hard to kill, and that a lie well told is immortal.

-- "Advice to Youth," by Mark Twain 15 April 1882


In “A Prescription for the World”, which appeared in The Saturday Review in August 1954, Russell announced the shift in his strategy to a campaign against the danger of nuclear omnicide. The changed circumstances of the destructive power of hydrogen-bomb war now precluded any form of threat of war: “Organized war, an institution which has existed for some six thousand years, has at last become incompatible with the continued existence of the human race.” 35 Walter Marseille, the Berkeley psychiatrist to whom Russell had written a letter on the danger of the Soviet Union in 1948, forwarded that letter to the Saturday Review, which published it, along with Russell’s reply, as “1948 Russell vs. 1954 Russell”.36 The accompanying editorial note indicated that Russell’s 1954 article “appeared to reject” the “aggressive anti-Soviet policy” which he had expressed in 1948. In the letter to Marseille, Russell had argued that as a result of a war with Russia, Western Europe “will be lost to civilization for centuries”, and went on to say:

Even at such a price, I think war would be worthwhile. Communism must be wiped out, and world government must be established. But if, by waiting, we could defend our present lines in Germany and Italy, it would be an immeasurable boon.

I do not think the Russians will yield without war. I think all (including Stalin) are fatuous and ignorant. But I hope I am wrong about this. (8 May 1948; SLBR, 2: 429)


This strong expression of personal opinion was not unique. Russell’s intense dislike for Stalinist Russia was evident in his personal letters written immediately after the war, particularly those to his close confident Gamel Brenan and her husband, Gerald. Writing from Trinity College to Gamel Brenan just two days after VE day, Russell was gloomy and pessimistic about the future:

This “Victory” is dreadful. Hatred of everybody by everybody, Germans to be homeless and starving, Russia already taking on the role the Nazis were playing, the next war already clearly in prospect. I have not at any time felt more unhappy than now. (10 May 1945, RA Rec. Acq. 705)


Russell’s attitude did not improve in the following months, and his mind appeared quite set on the notion that Russia was going to occupy the role as destroyer of civilization that the Nazis had been forced to vacate. His pessimism was reinforced by the reality of the A-bombs, which had been dropped on Japan just weeks before this note was sent by Russell to Brenan:

I see very little hope for the world. There is no point in agreements not to use the atomic bomb, as they would not be kept. Russia is sure to learn soon how to make it. I think Stalin has inherited Hitler’s ambition for world dictatorship. We must expect a war between USA and USSR, which will begin with the total destruction of London. I think the war will last 30 years, and leave a world without civilized people, from which everything will have to be built afresh—a process taking (say) 500 years. (1 Sept. 1945; SLBR, 2: 410)


In the same letter he expressed himself most clearly about his personal wish, in the depths of his gloom and pessimism, for a swift resolution to the danger of Soviet Russia. Yet the words that follow, though they represent Russell’s feelings or state of mind, do not constitute a policy he would ever “dream of advocating”: a preventive atomic war of the US against the USSR:

There is one thing, and one only, which could save the world, and that is a thing which I should not dream of advocating. It is, that America should make war on Russia during the next two years, and establish a world empire by means of the atomic bomb. This will not be done. (Ibid., italics added)


Here there is no conditional formulation; merely a desire for an action. Expressed in a personal letter this is no more than what one might ordinarily expect from such a form of communication: indicating to a close personal friend a fear for the future.37 Moreover, Russell very early on states that he does not intend to advocate unconditional, or preventive war. But when a similar expression of Russell’s views appeared in the letter to Marseille, it seemed to Marseille, many commentators, and indeed even Russell at times, to be a case of Russell’s advocacy of preventive war with the USSR. Indeed, given Russell’s imperative, “Communism must be wiped out …”, it could easily be seen by a reader as APW, had it been made in a public statement of Russell’s policy, which—significantly—it was not.

The context of the 1948 letter to Marseille may explain its vociferous tone.
8 May 1948, when the letter was sent, was just weeks after the beginning of the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, and about a month before the relief of the city was undertaken through the US-led airlift. Russell was particularly attuned to the plight of the German civilian population after World War II, and had denounced Soviet mistreatment of them in the harshest terms. Consequently, it is not surprising that Russell used such strong language in his letter to Marseille, given the recent action of the Soviet authorities to prevent food and supplies reaching the people of West Berlin.

In his 1954 response to Marseille, Russell admitted having favoured a policy of threats after the Soviet rejection of the Baruch proposal: “I thought at the time that perhaps the Russians could be compelled to accept the offer by the threat of war in the event of their continued refusal.” This is recognition that he did advance CTW. He went on to note that times had changed, with the Russian acquisition of the bomb: “Those who still advocate war seem to me to be living in a fool’s paradise.” Russell continued that he did “not now, any more than at an earlier time, advocate appeasement or a slackening in rearmament, since either might encourage the Communist powers in aggressive designs and would therefore make war more likely.”38 The impression that an unsympathetic reader would take away from this exchange was that Russell had admitted defending APW, reading “advocate war” for “advocate preventive war”. This use of “advocate”, however, is ambiguous as between “advocate conditional threat of war” (CTW) and “advocate the waging of preventive war” (APW).

This ambiguity persisted in his 1959 interview with John Freeman on the BBC.39 Freeman asked Russell if he had defended APW: “Is it true or untrue that in recent years you advocated that a preventive war might be made against communism, against Soviet Russia?” Russell responded: “It’s entirely true, and I don’t repent of it.” This seems to be an admission of APW, but Russell went on to say that despite his disappointment with the Soviet rejection of the Baruch plan, he had proposed CTW, not APW: “… not that I advocated a nuclear war, but I did think that great pressure should be put upon Russia to accept the Baruch proposal, and I did think that if they continued to refuse it might be necessary actually to go to war.” He readily admitted that making a threat presupposes that it may have to be carried out: “I thought then, and hoped, that the Russians would give way, but of course you can’t threaten unless you’re prepared to have your bluff called” (p. 505, italics added).

The problem of what may be called (on analogy to the previous case) 1954 Russell vs. 1953 Russell was noted almost immediately by a reader of The Listener, Winthrop Parkhurst, who returned to the advocate/threaten debate. He began with a quote from Russell’s 17 October 1953 letter to The Nation denying that he had ever supported a preventive war: “The story that I supported a preventive atom war against Russia is a communist invention.” Parkhurst then quoted from Russell’s 1954 letter to The Saturday Review to the effect that “I thought, at that time, that it would be worth while to bring pressure to bear upon Russia, and even, if necessary to threaten war on the sole issue of the internationalizing of atomic weapons.”

Russell in 1953 denied APW, while in 1954 he admitted CTW. But this was not Parkhurst’s reading: “Mr. Russell may not like to explain how, having formerly advocated preventive war, he can charge a reporter with writing a slanderous report of such advocacy” (ibid.). In other words, Parkhurst read Russell as denying APW in 1953 (which he did) and then admitting APW in 1954 (which he did not), and incorrectly concluded that he was inconsistent.

In response, Russell complicated the problem by accepting that there was in fact a contradiction: that his having “at one time favoured a policy of threats against Soviet Russia which might have led to war” did not “accord” with his 1953 letter to The Nation. To further muddle the matter, he affirmed that he had “completely forgotten that I had ever thought a policy of threat involving possible war desirable”, the fact of which was supposedly brought to his attention by Walter Marseille in 1954. Not only did Russell now agree that there was a conflict between what he said in 1954 and what he said in 1953, when in fact there was not, but he added a reason for it—forgetting that he had favoured a policy of CTW—which contradicted his many statements of the threat, as well as his admission on almost as many occasions that he had made the threat. It was at this point that even a sympathetic biographer such as Clark could only express dismay and endorse the view that Russell had stated APW and was trying to hide it. In this context, Clark returned to a comment Russell had made in a 1945 publication, before the Baruch plan, about finding a “casus belli” if the Soviet Union did not desist in its aggressive activities, and combined this with the 1959 statements, to conclude:

His explanation that he had simply forgotten what he had said, given in The Listener after the Freeman interview, and later in his autobiography, would be more acceptable if applied to one speech rather than to a long series of articles and statements, the first made months before the appearance of the Baruch proposals. It might be possible to argue that his disavowal of advocating preventive war was based on the most academic interpretation of the term: that advocating the threat of war unless a potential enemy submitted, even though being prepared to have your bluff called, was not advocacy of a preventive war. But even this questionable escape-route is blocked by Russell’s own statement to Freeman and to his earlier suggestion that “a casus belli would not be difficult to find”.40 (Clark, pp. 529–30)


Clark concluded that the “truth seems simpler”: Russell was trying to “brush under the carpet” his bellicose period, now that, after 1955 and the Einstein–Russell declaration, he was again an advocate of peace. Monk as well loses what little patience he may have had for Russell at this point, and sees the 1959 Freeman interview and letter in response to Parkhurst as the culmination of a long period of Russell’s attempt to cover-up his “war-like pronouncements” (Monk, 2: 303), initiated after the 1948 Westminster speech in order to protect his new-found respectability with the British Labour Party. Typically, Monk segues into a discussion of Russell’s unhappy personal life, and leaves the matter at that.

Of Russell’s major biographers, Clark is by far the more detailed and analytic in his discussion of the period. But for him, as for Monk, the 1959 “muddle” is the reductio ad absurdum of Russell’s position. I disagree, and suggest a different explanation as follows. Russell found himself in an untenable situation. Despite his accurate denials of APW and ready admission of CTW, the matter was continually brought up as if it were discovered anew. His exasperation increased through the later part of the 1950s, to the point where, unwisely, he was willing to admit to APW if that admission would dissipate the hostility and allow him to explain why he had, in fact, favoured CTW.

The use of the term “advocate war” was a further source of confusion, and eventually, even to Russell, came to signify either APW or CTW. In practice, the distinction meant little in the new period of the hydrogen-bomb arms race begun in 1954, and Russell shifted strategy to take into account this new international situation where the threat of war was no longer justified. But theoretically, and for historical purposes, the distinction remains capital. The impression of wrongdoing— ultimately, of advocating preventive war—as evidenced by a perceived effort to hide the past or cover it up was established in the minds of commentators, and passed into Russell scholarship with Clark’s otherwise excellent, archivally based biography.

THIRD PERIOD: 1959-67

Although Russell correctly stated his position as late as 1958, in the article “Why I Have Changed My Mind”, reprinted as “Inconsistency?”, the Freeman–Parkhurst confrontation caused him to present his positions differently thereafter. Three types of errors occur in this period: (1) Russell’s claim that he proposed conditional threat of war only in 1948, (2) that the threat was made only in private letters and conversation, and (3) that he had forgotten about having made the threat until reminded by correspondents.

In August 1960 Russell dictated to his wife, Edith Russell, a document to be sent to Russell’s publisher, Sir Stanley Unwin, entitled “Bertrand Russell’s Work for Peace”. In a portion of the document formulated in the first person, and in Edith Russell’s hand, Russell stated his erroneous claim that he had made CTW only privately, in 1948:

1948-50. While America had a monopoly of atomic weapons, I favoured the Baruch Plan, which would have entailed their abandonment by the United States and an undertaking by Russia to abstain from making them. When Russia refused to adhere to the Baruch Plan, I thought that the United States could compel adherence, if necessary by the threat of war. (I never urged this publicly, but only stated this view in private correspondence—since published— and conversation. (6 Aug. 1960; p. 3 of the dictated manuscript; p. 2 of the typescript in the third person, italics added; RAI 220.024190)


Russell maintained the same position in 1962 when he was queried by a schoolboy who had refused to join the Cadet Corps.41 This was a protest against war for which he was inspired by Russell’s writings and example. The young man, Christopher Perry, stated: “The other day I became involved in an argument with a Commander of the Navy and he advises me not to believe anything Bertrand Russell has to say because soon after the war he advocated war with Russia, then H-bomb-less, which is inconsistent with the present cause” (undated letter of June 1962). Russell responded, pointing out that his views changed as the underlying circumstances that prompted those views themselves changed: “Of course, I have changed my views on things. In ninety years events have changed as well.” He then continued:

I said privately that it should even be said that this issue [the Baruch Plan] was of such importance that we might consider war were an atomic race to be instituted. I did not advocate a war with Russia; I urged that the terrible urgency of the issue be impressed upon Stalin so that he might realise just how seriously the Baruch plan was desired by the West. Since the arms race itself has taken place the very fears which motivated me to urge so strongly the internationalization of atomic power have led me to call for immediate halt before the danger becomes final death for us all. (13 June 1962, first italics added; RAI 630)


A similar exchange occurred with Miriam Dyer-Bennett where Russell stated, in response to her query on his earlier positions:

I advocated that the Soviets should be informed in 1948 of the tremendous importance of the proposal to internationalize atomic energy, and to be warned that the consequences of not coming to agreement on this would be a disastrous arms race. I urged those who supported the internationalization of atomic energy to inform the Soviets that the consequences of failure to agree might be war. I did not propose an attack upon the Soviet Union, but an ultimately serious effort to avert what then seemed to be an inevitable arms race, the consequences of which we are now experiencing. (14 Sept. 1962, italics added; RA Rec. Acq. 236)


When Dyer-Bennett indicated that she would share his letter with others, Russell responded: “I am most pleased that you found my letter of use to you and I should be in your debt if you could contribute towards putting the lie to the fiction that I have advocated war against the Soviet Union” (21 Oct. 1962).

Russell’s final public statement on the matter was in Volume 3 of his Autobiography. Russell remained unrepentant that he had at one time favoured a policy of CTW, claiming that had his “advice to threaten war been taken in 1948”, the “evils” that have developed as a result of the Cold War “might have been avoided” (p. 8). This is a consequentialist argument for CTW, but Russell continued as if CTW had been made only in 1948, and then only privately:

None the less, at the time I gave this advice, I gave it so casually without any real hope that it would be followed, that I soon forgot I had given it. I had mentioned it in a private letter [to Walter Marseille] and again in a speech [at Westminster School] that I did not know was to be subject of dissection by the press.… Unfortunately, in the meantime, before this incontrovertible evidence was set before me [that he had favoured CTW, by Marseille, in 1954], I had hotly denied that I had ever made such a suggestion [denial of APW in 1953]. (Auto., 3: 18; identification of references in square brackets added)


The layers of confusion in this, Russell’s last statement on the matter, were no doubt exasperating to biographers from Clark through Moorehead to Monk. But many a great thinker has been known to be a poor chronicler of the evolution of his own thought, and autobiographies, though valuable, are not the final word. After all, the Darwin industry would soon be put out of work if it were to accept his own view, as stated in his Autobiography, that the idea of natural selection came to him one day while reading Malthus’ On Population. The actual story is a bit more complicated. So too for Russell, and the fact that, after a period of repeatedly correct presentations of his views (1948-53), he caved in under the weight of his critics’ misunderstandings and his own inability to dissuade them from those misunderstandings (1954-59), and partially misrepresented his own views thereafter (1959-67), does not change what his views originally were. Russell summed up most accurately his view as follows, reading “pacifist” in the context below as “absolute pacifist”:

This advice of mine is still brought up against me. It is easy to understand why Communists might object to it. But the usual criticism is that I, a pacifist, once advocated the threat of war. It seems to cut no ice that I have reiterated ad nauseam that I am not a pacifist, that I believe that some wars, a very few, are justified, even necessary. They are usually necessary because matters have been permitted to drag on their obviously evil way till no peaceful means can stop them. (Auto., 3: 18)


The “usual criticism” that Russell was inconsistent because, although a pacifist, he once advocated preventive war needs to be rejected for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Russell was a non-absolute pacifist who admitted, exceptionally, the support of some wars; so he was not a “pacifist” in the usual sense of the term. Secondly, his support for the conditional threat of war was not advocacy of preventive war. Rather, it was the key component in a strategic plan to force the USSR to accept international control of atomic energy, relinquish territorial ambitions in Europe, and participate in an embryonic form of world government. The aim of this strategy was to avert or to prevent world war, not to advocate the waging of a preventive war. Thirdly, Russell’s policy was specific to a period of time, 1945-49, when Russell believed that it would either bring about the desired result—Soviet acquiescence—or better prepare the West for a defence of its basic values in the face of Soviet aggression. Fourthly, Russell in his statements up to 1959 was consistent in admitting that he favoured a policy of conditional threat of war, even if during the period after 1959 he incorrectly stated that he voiced this policy only in 1948 and only in private. Finally, when the international situation changed and the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers risked an atomic holocaust, Russell shifted his strategy to take this new reality into account, not because he regretted or wanted to hide his previous policy, but because changed circumstances demanded a changed policy. All through these shifts in strategy, there remained one constant to which these strategies were subordinate, as means to an end: the goal of international government to advance the cause of world peace.
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