by Chittaranjan Sinha, M.A., B.L. (Patna), Ph.D. (Lond.).
Journal of the Indian Law Institute
Vol. 16, No. 1 (January-March 1974), pp. 98-108 (11 pages)
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The powers exercised by the Governor or President and Council, were, in the first place, those of masters in regard to servants over all the persons who were in the employment of the Company; and as the Company were the sole master, without fellow or competitor, and those under them had adopted their service as the business of their lives, the power of the master, in reality, and in the majority of cases, extended to almost every thing valuable to man. With regard to such of their countrymen, as were not in their service, the Company were armed with powers to seize them, to keep them in confinement, and send them to England, an extent of authority which amounted to confiscation of goods, to imprisonment, and what to a European constitution is the natural effect of any long confinement under an Indian climate, actual death. At an early period of the Company’s history, it had been deemed necessary to intrust them with the powers of martial law, for the government of the troops which they maintained in defence of their factories and presidencies; and by a charter of Charles II., granted them in 1661, the Presidents and Councils in their factories were empowered to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction according to the laws of England. Under this sanction they had exercised judicial powers, during all the changes which their affairs had undergone; but at last it appeared desirable that so important an article of their authority should rest on a better foundation. In the year 1726 a charter was granted, by which the Company were permitted to establish a Mayor’s Court at each of their three presidencies, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta; consisting of a mayor and nine aldermen, empowered to decide in civil cases of all descriptions. From this jurisdiction, the President and Council were erected into a Court of Appeal. They were also vested with the power of holding Courts of Quarter Sessions for the exercise of penal judicature, in all cases, excepting those of high treason. And a Court of Requests, or Court of Conscience, was instituted, for the decision, by summary procedure, of pecuniary questions of inconsiderable amount.
This reform in the judicature of India was not attended with all the beneficial effects which were probably expected from it. Negligence was left to corrupt the business of detail. The charter is said to have been procured by the influence of an individual, for the extension of his own authority; and when his ends were gained, his solicitude expired. The persons appointed to fill the judicial offices were the servants of the Company, bred to commerce, and nursed in its details: while a manuscript book of instructions comprised the whole of the assistance which the wisdom of the King and the Company provided to guide uninstructed men in the administration of justice.
Nor was the obscurity of the English law, and the inexperience of the judges, the only source of the many evils which the new arrangements continued, or produced. Jealousy arose between the Councils, and the Mayor’s Courts. The Councils complained that the Courts encroached upon their authority; and the Courts complained that they were oppressed by the Councils. The most violent dissensions often prevailed; and many of the members of the Mayor’s Courts quitted the service, and went home with their animosities and complaints.
Besides the above-mentioned tribunals established by the Company for the administration of the British laws to the British people in India, they erected, in the capacity of Zemindar of the district around Calcutta, the usual Zemindary Courts, for the administration of the Indian laws to the Indian people. The Phousdary Court for the trial of crimes; and the Cutcherry for civil causes; besides the Collector’s Court for matters of revenue. The judges, in these tribunals, were servants of the Company, appointed by the Governor and Council, and holding their offices during pleasure; the rule of judgment was the supposed usage of the country, and the discretion of the court; and the mode of procedure was summary. Punishments extended to fine; imprisonment; labour upon the roads in chains for a limited time, or for life; and flagellation, either to a limited degree, or death. The ideas of honour, prevalent among the natives, induced the Mogul government to forbid the European mode of capital punishment, by hanging, in the case of a Mussulman. In compensation, however, it had no objection to his being whipped to death; and the flagellants in India are said to be so dexterous, as to kill a man with a few strokes of the chawbuck.
The executive and judicial functions were combined in the Councils, at the Indian presidencies; the powers even of justices of the peace being granted to the Members of Council, and to them alone. If complaints were not wanting of the oppression by these authorities upon their fellow-servants; it is abundantly evident that the Company were judge in their own cause in all cases in which the dispute existed between them and any other party.
-- The History of British India, vol. 3 of 6, by James Mill
ONE OF the many judicial institutions planted into India by the British was the small cause court. Its history dates back to the year 1753 when the East India Company directed the government at Calcutta to set up forthwith a court for the summary disposal of petty claims. [Letter of the Court or Directors to the President-in-Council at Calcutta, 24 Jan. 1753.] The necessary authority for its establishment came from the Charter of 1753, which among other things made provision for setting up a court for the trial and disposal of small causes by a summary process, at the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.
Courts of small causes were accordingly established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta in 1753, under the name of 'court of requests', a title derived from the court of requests at London, [The court of requests was set up at London in 1750, see 23 Geo. II, c. 27 and 47. It was also called the "Court of Conscience'.] which was the model on which the Indian courts were initially constituted.
The purpose behind the establishment of the court of requests was to provide for the expeditious [Letter or the Court or Directors to the Company's government in Bengal, 24 Jan., 1753.] and final settlement [No appeal was to lie from the decisions of this court in order to deny the scope for prolongation of litigation.] of petty demands, omitting most of the formalities that delayed the disposal regular suits.
On a pattern somewhat similar to the London court of requests, [The London court was to be constituted by two hundred and forty commissioners to be nominated for a year by the several parishes within the city of London. Twenty commissioners were to sit each month by rotation. Three commissioners were sufficient to constitute the quorum. The entire set of commissioners had to be elected every year. Only such persons were qualified to be nominated as commissioners who held income or property of the value of £ 20. The authority or the London court extended to claims up to £ 39, 11 d., approximately equal to 20 sicca rupees.] the Calcutta court was initially to be constituted by twenty-four part-time commissioners, who were to be selected from amongst the principal European inhabitants of Calcutta, half of whom were to be changed every year. [W. Bolts, Consideration of India Affairs 78.] Even three commissioners were sufficient to constitute the quorum of the court and conduct its business. The post of commissioner was completely honorary. The power of their appointment and removal vested with the Governor-in-Council al Fort William. After its establishment in 1774, the Calcutta Supreme Court came to exercise supervisory authority over the conduct and proceedings of the court of requests.
According to the royal charter, the Calcutta court of requests was authorised to try causes up to 5 pogodas, i.e., approximately 18 Bengal rupees, in amount or value. The Calcutta court's jurisdiction was to extend to the company's settlement at Calcutta. After 1774, its jurisdiction became coterminous with the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Supreme Court established in that year.
The Calcutta court was not much of a success during the first fifty years of its existence. This is apparent from a discussion on its reform in 1802. [Notes on the defects of the court of requests at Calcutta, by Sir John Austruther, Chief Justice of the Calcutta Supreme Court, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations, 18 March 1802, No. 12.] The fundamental defect of the court as formed in 1753, arose out of its constitution by unpaid commissioners. The court's sittings were extremely laborious and prolonged, often stretching up to five hours a day. It made the commissioners reluctant to undertake this exertion for which no monetary compensation was to be had. As a result, in spite of there being twenty-four commissioners on roll, it was always found difficult even to secure the attendance of three, the minimum required to constitute the quorum. It was only by making personal approaches to some of the younger commissioners of his acquaintance that the clerk of the court was able to procure the minimum attendance necessary to form the court. [Ibid.]
As such, commissioners who were employed otherwise by the company were unable to spare enough time for the court's business, the court gradually came to be constituted by old civilians out of employment or by young Englishmen who never had any. Devotion or responsibility towards the business of the court could be expected from neither.
Out of the irregularity and laxity in the procedure of the court arose enormous abuses which rendered it more an instrument of fraud and exploitation, than that of justice. [Ibid.] The peons, amlas and clerks of the court found it easy to indulge in all sorts of corrupt practices, much to the harassment of the parties trying to seek redress from the court. Among the many malpractices prevailing in the court that Austruther listed, were:
[T]hat many (defendants) complained that actions were brought and decrees passed against them, of which they had no notice, and by plaintiffs of whom they had never heard; others (complained) that they had attended their cause from day to day to no purpose, but the instant they were gone, the decree (was) passed against them: ... still others (complained) that the causes were (actually) decided by the Amlas after the Commissioners had gone; and that nothing was to be done without bribing the peons or their mates; that summons were issued in the names of fictitious plaintiffs, which were left in the hands of the peons for an indefinite time and were used as a means for harassing persons with names similar to that of the supposed defendants, ... and that the summons contained no definite time for appearance, with the result that the party had to keep attending every day ..., till their cause was called out by the native officers of the Court, who in fictitious suits (brought either by themselves or with their connivance), always cared to have the decree passed in the absence of the defendant. [Ibid.]
Coleman, the clerk of the court, informed Austruther, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, that of an average of about 3,000 causes instituted monthly over the preceding four years, at least one third had been entirely fictitious. [Ibid.]
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, complained that the court's decrees were of no avail, because either they were not executed in consequence of the bribe given to the peons by the debtors, or, if they were, the money obtained was fraudulently appropriated by the vakeels and peons of the court. Thus, Austruther observed:
When the amount was paid into the Court, nothing was more common than for the Vakeels to impersonate the real plaintiff and receive the money, and when the real plaintiff came, the amlas were always ready to swear that they were (sic) witness to the receipt (of the decreed amount by the plaintiff) ...... [Ibid.]
As the court of requests had been established by a royal charter (though no confirmatory parliamentary enactment had followed), only Parliament was competent to amend or reform its composition or jurisdiction. In 1797, Parliament extended the jurisdiction of the court of requests from five pagodas to eighty sicca rupees. [See 37 Geo. III, c 142, s. 30. This, incidentally, was the first "legislative" notice or the court of requests taken by Parliament.] Another parliamentary enactment followed soon after. Appreciating the need for reform in the courts of requests at Calcutta and Madras, in 1800 Parliament empowered the Governor-General of Bengal, and the Governor of Madras to "order and appoint in what manner the said Courts (of Requests) in future be formed and to what extent in value, not exceeding Rs. 400/-, the jurisdiction of the same be extended .... " [See 39 &: 40 Geo. III, c. 79, s. 17.]
After making a minute exposition of the evils attending the Calcutta court of requests, [Supra note 7.] Austruther, urged the Bengal government to make drastic changes in the court under the authority conferred upon the Governor-General. [See 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 79.] Wellesley, the then Governor-General, was in full agreement with Austruther's suggestions. [Letter of the Governor-General to G.H. Barlow, 24 June 1801 Civ. Judl. Cons., 18 March 1802. No. 11.] On 13 March 1802, he issued a proclamation, [Civ. Judl. Cons., 18 March 1802, No. 14).]which incorporated, in toto, a plan of reform of the court earlier suggested by Austruther. By it, the old court of requests of Calcutta was abolished, and a new one set up in its place, with three whole-time commissioners, and with a jurisdiction extending to cases up to Rs. 100, in amount or value. The procedure of the court was also suitably amended to plug effectively the loop-holes which gave scope for the numerous bunglings pointed out above. Coleman, the former clerk of the court, was nominated first commissioner of the new court, while Flemming and Mctire were appointed second and third commissioners respectively.
Shortly after the constitution of the new court, Coleman, the first commissioner, had to be continuously absent from the court's business for a long time on account of protracted illness. The fact that, in spite of the continued absence of Coleman, the other two commissioners were able to clear the entire arrears of the court and carry on its business smoothly, led the Bengal government to question the necessity of having a third commissioner at all. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 16 Sept. 1802, No. 16.] After consulting Chief Justice Austruther on the point, the government abolished the office of the third commissioner with effect from 9 October 1802. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 23 Sept. 1802, No. 5.] But, Austruther, who had earlier approved the proposal for the abolition of the third commissioner's office, was persuaded to alter his opinion soon. In 1805, he recommended the revival of the third commissioner's office for the sake of greater efficiency of the court as well as for providing a deciding vote in case of a possible disagreement between two commissioners. [Letter of Austruther to the government, 6 Feb. 1805, Civ. Judl. Cons., 14 Feb. 1805, No. 1. ] The government readily responded to the suggestion. The post of third commissioner was revived and one James Bryce appointed to it. [Minute of the Governor-General-in-Council, 14 Feb. 1805, Civ. Judl. Cons., 14 Feb. 1805, No. 2.]
The court's reorganisation in 1802 proved an immediate success. Chief Justice Austruther observed in 1804 [Letter of the Chief Justice to the Governor-General, 17 June 1804, Civ. Judl. Cons., 12 July 1804, No. 2A.] that after the reforms of 1802, the court of requests had been functioning very efficiently and that the inhabitants of Calcutta were fully satisfied with its working. There were no arrears of pending cases at the time and consequently no delay in the disposal of suits. Cases were being disposed of within a month of their institution. The expense of litigation for the parties was also not very high. Austruther informed further that compared to its counterpart in Madras, both the cost of establishment and the cost of suits were less in the Calcutta court, while the amount of business done in the latter was more than four times as that in the former. [Ibid.] In the eighteen years between 1805 and 1825, a total of 4,18,281 small causes were disposed of by the Calcutta court recording a fantastic average annual disposal of 23,237 suits or an average monthly disposal of 1,936 causes. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 15 Sept. 1825, No. 32.] The above record of disposal by the Calcutta court was achieved to a large extent by a practice adopted by its commissioners ever since 1802, of sitting separately to constitute two or three courts at the same time.
Not only did the new court of requests at Calcutta work efficiently but it also turned out to be a surplus establishment, its income from fees consistently gaining over its expenses on the establishment. This was pointed out first by Austruther in 1805. [Letter of the Chief Justice to the Governor-General, 6 Feb. 1805, Civ. Judl. Cons., 14 Feb. 1805, No. 1.] During 1811, while the total charges on the court, including that on salaries, miscellaneous items and contingency, had amounted to Rs. 75,498 only, its total receipts had been Rs. 1,00,778, leaving thereby an income of Rs. 25,280, to the Bengal government from the court. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 15 Aug. 1812, No. 18.] The explanation for the court's surplus is, perhaps, not far to seek. On account of its summary process and division into several benches functioning simultaneously, the average disposal of cases by it, as noticed above, was very high, and just as in a commercial enterprise profit is related to the inverse ratio between the turnover and establishment, the court of requests too earned a surplus from a consistent lead of output over investment.
After 1802, the Bengal government issued two more proclamations to reform further the working and jurisdiction of the court. This was done under the authority vested in the Governor-General. [See 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 79, s. 17.] The first proclamation, issued on 25 September 1813, redesignated the court as the "Court of Commissioners for the Recovery of Small Debts", and extended its jurisdiction to cases up to Rs 250 in amount or value. Civ. Judl. Cons., 25 Sept. 1813, No. 29.] The second proclamation, issued on 29 October 1819, further extended the court's jurisdiction to the maximum (authorised) limit [See 39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 17. The Governor-General had been authorised to extend the pecuniary limit of the court's jurisdiction up to Rs. 400.] of Rs. 400, added a fourth commissioner to it, and made a substantial reduction in the fees chargeable from the suitors. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 29 Oct. 1819, No. 14.]
The extension of the court's jurisdiction to Rs. 400 was prompted by the motive of admitting more Calcutta residents to the benefit of this "cheaper and quicker mode of settlement", as well as by the government's confidence in its capability to shoulder the extra burden. [Minute of the Governor-General-in-Council, 12 March 1819, Civ. Judl. Cons., 16 April 1819, No. 11.] To illustrate, the cost of prosecuting a claim of Rs. 300 in the Supreme Court (so far the only tribunal competent to decide claims above Rs. 250, of the Calcutta residents) worked out to about Rs. 100, or thirty three per cent, while the cost of prosecuting a claim of the same amount in the Court of requests was only 18 per cent which was further reduced to only twelve per cent by the proclamation of 1819. [Letter of the Bengal government to the court of requests, 16 April 1819, para 788, Civ. Judl. Cons., 16 April 1819, No. 1.] The court's strength was raised to four commissioners in anticipation of an increase in the business before it, on account of the extension of its jurisdiction.
As stated earlier, ever since the reconstitution of the court in 1802, its commissioners had adopted a practice of sitting singly forming, in effect, several courts functioning at the same time. The Bengal government was also convinced of its necessity for assuring a requisite disposal capacity of the court to prevent any accumulation of arrears before it. In 1819, Governor-General Lord Hastings strongly favoured the continuance of this practice stating that:
[A]ll the advantages contemplated by the addition of a 4th Commissioner (under the proposed proclamation) would be completely lost if the Commissioners were to sit in joint benches .... [Minutes of the Governor-General, 12 March 1819, para 7, Civ. Judl. Cons., 16 April 1819, No. 11.]
However, no formal sanction to the above procedure could be incorporated either in the proclamation of 1813 or that of 1819, because of doubts having been felt as to the legality of it. It was argued that since the royal charter had provided for the establishment of one court of requests only at Calcutta and that even the Government of India Act, 1800 [See 39 and 40 Geo. III.] while authorising the Governor-General to modify or reform the existing Calcutta court, had postulated the existence of a single court only, the Governor-General was not competent to sanction its division into several courts. In 1819, Spankie, the Advocate-General of Bengal, held that:
[T]here is no power given to the Governor-General-in-Council by the Statutes 39 and 40 Geo. III., to affect the unity of the Court or divide its functions ... " [Letter of Spankie to the government, 29 Sept. 1819, Civ. Judl. Cons., 8 June 1824, No. 20.]
This opinion was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court by an observation incidentally made in a case before it, [Letter of the court of requests to the government, 1 Nov. 1823, Civ. Judl. Cons., 8 June 1824, No. 17.] as also by the succeeding Advocate-General, Herbert Compton. [Id., No. 20.] Despite the doubts raised as above, the Bengal government ordered the continuance of the practice of splitting the court for the sake of public convenience, until "either the verdict of the authorities in England, to whom the mater had been referred to some time ago, was known, or until the Supreme Court formally pronounced the practice illegal." [Letter of the government to the court of requests, 8 June 1824, Civ. Judl. Cons., 8 June 1824, No. 22.]
The Governor-General's competence to extend the jurisdiction of the court by his proclamations of 1813 and 1819 was also doubted. Advocate-General Herbert Compton interpreted that the Government of India Act, 1800 had authorised only the existing Governor-General (Lord Wellesley) to extend the pecuniary limit of the court's jurisdiction up to Rs 400, and that it granted no standing power to the succeeding Governor-Generals to make such an extension. [Letter of the Advocate-General to the government, 1 Jan. 1824, para 7, Civ. Judl. Cons., 8 Jan. 1824, No. 20. ] This contention, even if technically correct, was contrary to the spirit and purpose of the parliamentary enactment under reference. The authorities in England never objected to the proclamations of 1813 and 1819, nor did the Calcutta Supreme Court ever challenge the validity of the said proclamations extending the jurisdiction of the Calcutta court of requests.
But a power assumed at one time by the court of requests of punishing for prevarication or perjury was pronounced illegal by the Supreme Court in 1823. On being sentenced to a term of imprisonment by C.A. Robinson, one of the commissioners, on the charge of having tendered false evidence on oath, accused Madhavram Sircar appealed to the Supreme Court against the sentence. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 13 Nov. 1823, Nos. 16-18.] The latter not only set Madhavram free but also declared the proceedings of the commissioner illegal. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 8 Jan. 1824, No. 17.] On the strength of the Supreme Court's judgment, Madhavram also instituted a criminal case against Robinson in the Supreme Court for wrongful confinement.
The commissioners of the court of requests protested strongly against the action of the Supreme Court asserting that the power of punishing witnesses for prevarication or perjury, was essential for the efficient functioning of the court. [Letter of the court of requests to the government, 1 Nov. 1823, Civ. Judl. Cons., 8 Jan. 1824, No. 17.] Herbert Compton, the Advocate-General, however, informed the Bengal government that the power assumed by the court of requests had no sanction whatever, either from the Charter of 1753, or from the Acts of Parliament of 1799, or from the subsequent proclamations of 1802, 1813 and 1819. [Id., No. 20.] It was pointed out further by the Advocate-General that even the courts of conscience in England, the model on which the Indian courts of requests had been set up had no power to punish witnesses for contempt or perjury, [Ibid.] such cases being actually required to be referred to the magistrate for suitable punishment. [See 23 Geo. II, c. 47, S. 10.]
In view of the Supreme Court's judgment and the Advocate-General's opinion, the government directed the commissioners to give up forthwith the power assumed by them of punishing witnesses for perjury. [Civ. Judl. Cons., 1 Nov. 1823, No. 22.]
But the practice of the court, splitting into as many benches as the commissioners were, was considered indispensable for the efficient disposal capacity of the court, and the government ordered its continuance until such time as the Supreme Court formally ruled it to be illegal. Meanwhile, the authorities in London were approached for a parliamentary enactment legalising this practice to put an end to the controversy over this issue. [Judl. Letter from the Bengal government to the Court of Directors, 1 Feb. 1820.]
No such parliamentary enactment ever came, nor did the Supreme Court declare the practice of the court dividing itself into several benches illegal. The court of requests, therefore, continued to function in several benches. The Charter Act of 1833, [3 and 4 William IV, c. 85.] for the first time made the Governor-General-in-Council at Calcutta the central legislative authority for the whole of India. Among other things, the latter was authorised to make or repeal laws for "all courts of justice, whether established by His Majesty's Charter, or otherwise, and the jurisdiction thereof." [Id., s. 47.] It, thus, made the Bengal government competent to legislate on any matter concerning the power, jurisdiction, composition or procedure of all the courts in India including the court of requests.
Though in 1833 the Bengal government became fully competent to amend or alter the composition or powers of the court of requests, [By the Charter Act.] they did not make any legislative affirmation of the practice of the court sitting in several benches until 1848.
The Act of 1848 legalised the earlier proclamation of the Governor-General regarding the court of requests and affirmed the practice of the commissioners sitting singly exercising the full authority of the court. [Act XII of 1848, ss. I and II.]
The provision for the appointment of a fourth commissioner to the court had been made in the proclamation of 1819, to prepare the court for the anticipated increase of business on account of the extension of its jurisdiction and the reduction of its fees. A fourth commissioner was accordingly appointed following the proclamation. [Judl. Letter, 1 Feb. 1820, paras 96-98.] The Bengal government informed the Board of Directors that as a result of this addition, "greater expedition and regularity had been obtained in the Court's despatch of business, and the number of prisoners detained in confinement, in connection with the cases before the Court, had also been materially diminished." [Judl. Letter, 7 Dec. 1821, para 43.] But, on account of the existing doubts over the legality of the practice of allowing the commissioners to sit singly, the Board of Directors disapproved the appointment of the fourth commissioner. [Jud. despatch to Bengal, 20 Oct. 1824, para 116.] The fourth commissioner was, nevertheless. retained until 1827, when the post was allowed to lapse following the dismissal of one of the commissioners, C.A. Robinson, for misconduct. [Judl. Letter, 30 Aug. 1827, para 36.]
The court of requests continued to function efficiently [The average monthly disposal of cases by the court in the twenty years ending 1825 was 2087; by 1838 this average had risen still further to a fantastic figure of 2787, see Judl. Letter, 8 Jan. 1838, para 44. without any change in its constitution or jurisdiction until 1850. There was, however, one significant change in its personnel in 1842, when for the first time an Indian, Rashmy Datta, was appointed commissioner of the court. [34 India Office Parliamentary Branch Collections (1848).]
In 1835, the Law Commission was entrusted with the task of framing an Act to consolidate, confirm and, if necessary, to reform the constitution, jurisdiction and procedures of the existing courts of requests in the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The Law Commission submitted a draft Act in this regard in 1842, [Legislative Cons., 11 May 1844, No. 6.] which, with certain modifications, was passed by the Legislative Council in 1850. [Act IX of 1850.] This Act rescinded all previous proclamations and enactments with regard to the court of requests and uniformly reconstituted it on a completely new footing in all three Presidency towns. The court was, henceforth, to be designated the 'Presidency Small Cause Court'. [Id., s. IV.] It was now to be constituted by a maximum of three judges one of whom had to be a barrister or an advocate of one of the Supreme Courts of India or of the court of sessions in Scotland. [Id., s. VIII.] Besides, judges of the Supreme Courts were authorised to act as judges of the small causes court under their jurisdiction, if they elected to do so and if they found time for the extra exertion. [Id., s. IX.] As heretofore, judges of the new small cause courts were allowed to sit separately or with either or both of the other judges. [Id., s. XXIII.]
The pecuniary limit of the court's jurisdiction was raised to Rs. 500, but certain types of suits, like those concerning public revenue, or those arising out of the acts done under the orders of the Governor-General-in-Council or a councillor in public capacity, or out of any act done by any judge in official capacity, or those for libel or slander, etc., were completely exempted from the court's jurisdiction. The idea was to keep the court's activity confined to simple causes for the recovery of small debts and demands, which could be settled quickly without getting involved in the intricacies of the legal processes. The Supreme Court was authorised to remove from the small cause court even suits under the value of Rs. 500, if the former were satisfied that the case involved a question of law or equity or of novelty or of general importance, which merited a more intensive deliberation of a superior judicial authority. [Id., s. LIV.]
Quantitatively, (that is, in respect of its disposal capacity), the court of requests had been a great success ever since 1802. The main intention behind the reform of 1850 had been to raise also the quality of justice available in the court. This was ensured through the nomination of judges of definite legal background and experience, as well as through a clear definition of the class of cases cognizable by it.
In the annual report of the administration of the Bengal presidency for 1859-60, the utility of the new small cause court was highly appreciated. [XIV Annual Report on the Administration of the Bengal Presidency Narrative on the Court of Legislation 351 (Bengal Secretariat Library, 1859-60).] During that year 32,287 cases were disposed of by the court giving an average monthly disposal of 2690 suits. This very nearly equalled the average of disposals by the court before its reform in 1850. A significant change, however, appears to have taken place in the proportion between the decisions for the plaintiffs and defendants. The percentage of decisions for plaintiffs appears to have gone up remarkably in the post-1850 period. To illustrate, during the twenty years ending 1825, of a total of 7,00,850 suits disposed of by the court 1,40,116 or, a little over twenty per cent had been judgments in favour of the plaintiffs, just over eleven per cent had been non-suited and the remainder, i.e., nearly seventy per cent were either lost or compromised. [Data recorded in Bengal Civ. Judl. Cons., 15 Sept. 1825, Nos. 32-33.] The proportion of judgments for plaintiffs having reduced further to about twelve per cent in 1824-25, a joint petition on behalf of one Baidyanath Roy and some others was presented to the court on 29 July 1825, complaining about the bias against plaintiffs reflected in the high percentage of decisions against the latter. [Report of R.B. Lloyd, the fourth commissioner, Bengal Civ. Judl. Cons., 15 Sept. 1825, No. 33.)] During 1859-60, however, of the 15,274 cases decided by the Calcutta small cause court on merits, 13,657 or nearly eighty nine per cent were judgments for the plaintiffs, while only 1,617 or approximately eleven per cent were judgments in favour of the defendants. [Supra note 67.] This trend appears to have continued. During 1869-70 the percentage of decisions for plaintiffs was sixty seven per cent, and during 1873-74, sixty nine per cent. [Id. vol. XVI (1873-74).] A plausible reason for this could be that with the reform and consolidation of the small cause court and the consequent growth of confidence in its efficiency, the number of frivolous and vexatious complaints lodged before it declined sharply.
The Presidency small cause courts received their final shape in 1882, [See Act XV of 1882.] By it, the local governments were authorised to appoint for their respective courts, one chief judge and as many other judges as may be considered necessary, subject to the approval of the Governor-General-in-Council. [Id., s. 7.] Of the judges, no less than one-third (including the chief judge) had to be advocates of one of the High Courts. [The Supreme Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were abolished and replaced by High Courts in accordance with the Indian High Courts Act of 1861.] Besides, those who had worked as civil judges of a civil court for at least five years, were also eligible for appointment.
The pecuniary limit of the court's jurisdiction (subject to the other limitations) was raised to Rs. 2,000. Besides the judges, registrars of these courts were also empowered to try and decide suits up to Rs. 20 in amount or value.
The small cause courts which had worked so successfully in the Presidency towns were also extended to the other district towns. This was done by a series of enactments beginning with Act XLII of 1860, and culminating with the Provincial Small Cause Court Act of 1887, [Act IX of 1887.] which authorised the provincial governments to establish small cause courts at any place within their jurisdiction. These courts are to be constituted by one judge and as many additional judges as many be considered necessary. It has now become a practice to vest one or more civil judges of the district courts, with the powers of the judges of small cause courts. Under Act IX of 1887, the provincial small cause courts are authorised to try suits up to Rs. 500 in amount or value subject to certain specified exceptions. The registrar of the small cause courts is also empowered to decide cases up to Rs. 20 in amount or value.