Harvey Weinstein: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg

Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 4:11 am

Lauren Holly Describes Harvey Weinstein Harassment: ‘I Wanted to Flee’
by Erin Nyren @ecnyren
Variety
October 16, 2017

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“Beautiful Girls” actress Lauren Holly is the latest woman to share her story of harassment at the hands of Harvey Weinstein, describing an encounter she had with him in a hotel room on Canadian talk show “The Social.”

The actress, who has been on “The Social” several times previously, explained her decision to reach out to the show as a platform to share her story. “I realized that I had a responsibility that I needed to come forward and say it,” she said. “I didn’t want to go chasing after some publication, I didn’t want to post it on social media, it seemed like my voice was too quiet if I did that.”

Holly described her initial reaction to the New York Times expose on Weinstein, stating that she was floored when she initially read it because it felt like her story as well. The actress continued: “This happened in the late 1990s; I was in my 30s. I was not a young ingenue, and I was certainly not new to Hollywood; I was a seasoned, Hollywood person.”

She explained that she was already familiar with Weinstein, having worked with him on “Beautiful Girls” and interacted with him socially.

A meeting was set up between her and Weinstein at a hotel to talk about her future with his company, which she didn’t find “abormal at all” because she had routinely met with producers, writers, and directors in hotel suites.

She described the early stages of their meeting as normal: “Everything was absolutely professional from the get-go.” After some small talk, Holly said that Weinstein asked to be excused, and returned to the main part of the suite wearing a hotel bathrobe. “No doubt it was odd,” she said, “however, when he walked in and he was in the bathrobe, he said, ‘Okay, let’s get to it, this is what we’ve got going on at my company, these are the scripts we have in the pipeline, this is what I think might be right for you,’ and he gestured for me to follow him.”

Holly recounted that she followed him into the bedroom part of the suite as he continued talking. After entering the suite, she said that Weinstein dropped his robe, went into the bathroom, and began using the toilet.

“At this point my head was exploding,” she said. “He keeps the conversation going, he finishes, he turns on the shower, he gets in the shower. He’s continually talking to me, he’s in the shower washing himself. Leaning out, asking me for responses.

“My head is going crazy at this point. He’s acting like the situation is normal. He’s acting like we’re having a normal encounter. I’m thinking to myself, ‘Am I just a prude? Am I supposed to be more open minded?’ I didn’t quite know how to handle myself at that moment.”

According to Holly, Weinstein left the shower, dried off, and began approaching her while still naked.

“The adrenaline rush I felt, I wanted to flee, I was scared. He told me that I looked stressed and he thought maybe I could use a massage, maybe I could give him a massage. I began just sort of babbling like I was a child, I think it was just the fear.” She told him she didn’t have a massage license and that maybe they could call the front desk to have a masseuse come up.

Holly said Weinstein began to threaten her, stating that she needed to “keep him as [her] ally” and that it would be a “bad decision” if she left the room. At that point, Holly said, she “pushed him and ran.”

After leaving the hotel, Holly went to a previously planned dinner with other Hollywood notables, who, when she explained why she arrived distraught, said that since Weinstein hadn’t raped or assaulted her, she should “keep [her] mouth shut because it’s Harvey Weinstein.”


The actress continued that although she isn’t certain the encounter had any negative impacts on her career, she did pivot away from film in the intervening years. Holly also recounted a later experience with Weinstein, in which the two were staying at the same hotel and he requested to meet her. She, however, went to great lengths to avoid him.

More than 30 women have come forward since the New York Times published an investigative report on the Hollywood producer, alleging sexual harassment and assault. Fired from The Weinstein Company, Weinstein was also expelled from the Producers Guild and the Motion Picture Academy. His wife Georgina Chapman has also filed for divorce.
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 4:19 am

Russian TV Hostess Alleges "Disgusting" Harvey Weinstein Incident: "I Was Frozen"
by Nick Holdsworth
The Hollywood Reporter
10:00 AM PDT 10/19/2017

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Courtesy of Katya Mtsidouridze
Katya Mtsitouridze


Katya Mtsitouridze, also the head of Russian film body Roskino, recalls numerous encounters with the disgraced mogul, including one in which he told her, "Don't even think about saying anything."


The head of Russia's international film promotion body Roskino claims she was sexually harassed by Harvey Weinstein.

Katya Mtsitouridze, hostess of This Is Cinema (a popular show on Russia's national television station Channel One) and, as head of film promotional body Roskino, a well-known and influential figure in the Russian film industry, says Weinstein repeatedly pressed her for personal meetings for more than a decade. He also, during the Venice Film Festival, greeted her in his hotel room wearing only a bathrobe and suggested she give him a massage.

Mtsitouridze also says the disgraced Hollywood film producer warned her not to speak out about his behavior toward her.

"I first met Mr. Weinstein in the Regent hotel at the Berlin film festival [in 2003], where I was doing a television interview with George Clooney for Channel One," Mtsitouridze tells The Hollywood Reporter. "Harvey was co-producer of Clooney's directorial debut, Confessions of a Dangerous Mind. After the interview, he came up to me saying that he liked my questions and would love to have lunch in his room — that he loved Russian culture, especially Chekhov, and that his grandparents were originally from Russia — and that we could have an interesting conversation. I was surprised and told him, rather ironically, that, of course, it would be an honor, but I was afraid my boyfriend would not be happy about our cultural tete-a-tete, but if he wished to invite him, there would be no problem."

Weinstein was nonplussed by her reply, Mtsitouridze recalls: "He said, 'Don't you understand me?' and wrote his mobile number down, adding he was waiting for my call at any time."


Busy with festival work, Mtsitouridze put the incident out of her mind and soon forgot about it.

"Later, our paths crossed a few times at various events," she says, adding that she tried to avoid Weinstein because he would always "with such passion ask, 'When will you call me?' Or 'Let me fly you to New York.'" Again, Mtsitouridze says she used her wits and humor to sidestep these proposals.

It was in Venice in 2004 that she says the most threatening incident occurred.

"We met at the premiere of Finding Neverland, starring Johnny Depp and Kate Winslet," she recalls. "This was the famous screening which was delayed by an hour — unthinkable for any self-respecting festival — when Harvey, half-joking, threatened the festival director in comments made from the stage, with words to the effect of, 'If this happens again with my movie, I'll drown you in the lagoon.'"

It was immediately following the screening that Weinstein again approached Mtsitouridze.

"He invited me to meet him in his room after the party, saying he had a great idea for working with contemporary Russian writers, reminding me that he was a publisher as well as a filmmaker," she says.

She refused but diplomatically suggested a meeting the following day at the cafe of the Excelsior, the luxurious five-star hotel frequented by top filmmakers on the Lido during the Venice fest.

Knowing that many movie companies and press people stayed at the hotel, she chose a public place for the meeting. When she turned up the next day, she was greeted by an assistant, who said Weinstein was feeling unwell and suggested she join him for lunch in his room upstairs.

"The assistant said that he would be joining us, so I went up," Mtsitouridze says. But when she walked into the room, she noticed the "table was set for two" and that the "assistant instantly disappeared."

The shock of what happened next is still with Mtsitouridze 13 years later: "I was frozen into immobility like a statue, because a well-known producer with whom I've come to discuss modern Russian writers, was in a bathrobe."

What is now a familiar approach unfolded, echoed in the testimonies of dozens of women recently. Weinstein looked at Mtsitouridze and told her: "I waited for the masseuse, but she's late. We can have fun without her. Let's relax."

She says he then referred to his recent abdominal surgery, in what appeared to be an attempt to garner her sympathy. "He tried to show me his stomach," Mtsitouridze says. "I was disgusted."

Frozen to the spot, desperately trying to work out how to extricate herself from the alarming situation, Mtsitouridze recalled that in the corridor outside there was a press junket taking place. She wondered if she screamed loud enough would her cries be heard?

Mtsitouridze heard Weinstein say, "You will love it. I'm a guru in this matter. You never met a man like me." She says it's unclear if he was referring to a massage or something more intimate.

Mtsitouridze says she was saved, "like a scene from a bad movie," when a waiter entered the room without knocking, bringing in an ice bucket for champagne.

"It seems he had set the table and returned to finish everything," she says.

Seizing the moment, she turned and ran.


The incident, she says today, "seemed to go on for so long it felt like forever, but in reality, it was only a few minutes."

Outside in the corridor, she bumped into "some friends from Dutch television, who, seeing my condition, began to ask what happened. I was so nervous and frightened that I preferred to say that I felt bad because of something I had eaten and since then have simply tried to forget this incident like a bad dream."

Mtsitouridze did her best in the following years to avoid Weinstein at the festivals and events they both attended.

"[But] one day, it was the opening of the Cannes film festival, in 2014 or 2015. I was standing in the company of friends, including producer and investor Len Blavatnik, and Harvey walked over to say hello," she remembers. "Len, not knowing that we had met, introduced us, noting that I'm promoting Russian film worldwide, producing movies and know the Russian industry very well, so we could discuss any common projects."

It was, she says, the "usual nice intro," but she was left feeling awkward in Weinstein's presence. "I did not know how to behave. I was so frustrated. But Harvey, acting as if nothing had happened, kissed my hand and said quietly so that only I could hear: 'Don't even think about saying anything. Forget all about it. Be a smart girl.'"


It was, she says, "all so disgusting. I had no idea that it was his usual way of communicating with women."

Mtsitouridze did not plan to go public with her experiences, even as more and more women spoke to the press but, when approached by THR, decided the time was right.

"I'm sure all the victims of violence, regardless of whether they are well known or unknown to the public, deserve sympathy and support," she says.

She emphasizes that she does not intend for her story to become part of a "witch hunt," recalling that "in Soviet times we experienced the public exposure of famous people, writers, directors or state officials [for inappropriate behavior or other criminal charges]. Later it turned out that many of these cases were wrong."

But she adds: "In Harvey's case — and he is certainly one of the most famous producers in Hollywood — we have to understand that this does not give him the right to behave like this and he needs to take responsibility for his actions. In my opinion, as soon as this topic is raised, we should use this to ensure that in the future such stories will not be repeated. And this applies to both traditional and gay relationships. If a director or producer tries to harass a gay actor, it's also unacceptable, as is the situation with women. I think the creative industries around the world draw conclusions from this sad story. Thanks to the internet, the world today has become much more open and many things begin to change."
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 4:33 am

1980s actress Heather Kerr says Harvey Weinstein made her touch his genitals
by Nardine Saad
October 20, 2017, 01:30 PM

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Heather Kerr, left, who alleges Harvey Weinstein sexually assaulted her, attends a news conference with her attorney, Gloria Allred, at Allred's Los Angeles office on Oct. 20. (Mel Melcon / Los Angeles Times)

Former actress Heather Kerr said Friday that she too was a victim of Harvey Weinstein, charging that the now-disgraced film mogul sexually assaulted her during a business meeting in 1989.

Kerr, speaking during a news conference alongside her attorney, Gloria Allred, alleged that Weinstein forced her to touch his genitals and told her that she had to be good in bed, as well as sleep with him and others, if she wanted a career in Hollywood.

"What he wanted to know was whether she could satisfy him sexually in order to obtain roles in their films," Allred said. "He told her that this was 'how things worked in Hollywood and that all actresses made it that way… by sleeping their way into the jobs that they had."

Kerr, 56, is the latest of Allred's clients to accuse the former studio mogul of assault. Allred also represents former actress Louisette Geiss, who came forward earlier this month in a similar news conference.

The high-profile civil rights attorney said Friday that numerous women have come to her with accounts of abuse and that she has retained several of them since the Weinstein scandal broke earlier this month. She also said more would be coming forward in New York next week.

Reading a prepared statement, Kerr said that she was in her 20s when she met Weinstein during a private meeting, and that he proceeded to tell her how things worked in Hollywood.

"He asked me if I was good," she said, repeating the phrase often, assuming he was asking about her professional training.

"I started to tell him about my training and acting experience, and he said, 'No, I need to know if you're good.' He said that if he was going to introduce me around town … he needed to know if I was any good," she said.


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Gloria Allred, left, comforts Heather Kerr at Friday's press conference. (Mel Melcon / Los Angeles Times )

Kerr, who appeared on the TV show "The Facts of Life," described him wearing a "sly, sleazy smile" and sitting close to her on a couch.

"I started to get a sick feeling in my stomach. The next thing I knew, he had unzipped his fly and pulled out his penis," she said. "My heart started pounding. My mind started racing. How do I deal with this? How do I get out of this. Am I going to get out of this?

"He then grabbed my hand and forced my hand onto his penis and then held it there. I was frozen with fear, trying to remain calm," she added, saying there was nobody else in the office.

She said she pulled her hand away "as casually as possible."


"He told me this was how things work in Hollywood and that all the actresses that had made it had made it this way. He said, 'name anyone,'" she recalled. "He told me that first I would have sex with him and then he would take me to parties and show me who I had to sleep with after that. But first he needed to know how good I was."

Weinstein told her that she wasn't that good-looking but that he was willing to help her anyway, she said, and that he was doing her a favor. She said that she got up and backed out of the room, thanked him for his time and rushed to an elevator, calling the experience a "nightmare."


I didn't think anyone would believe me. I was nobody. Why would they?
-- HEATHER KERR


Kerr said she resigned from her job and quit acting not long after that. She said she continued doing theater for a while and told parts of her story to very few people.

"I felt so powerless because he is, after all, very powerful and very well known and very successful. I didn't think anyone would believe me. I was nobody. Why would they?" she said.

At that moment, she began sobbing and hugged Allred, who then took over the news conference.

"While that may be the way it was, that may not be the way it is in the future because, Harvey, you are done," Allred declared. "Women won't take it anymore. We are taking our power back, and we will never allow things to go back to the way they were. You and your kind will someday be in a museum, or worse."


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Heather Kerr, right, and Gloria Allred. (Mel Melcon / Los Angeles Times )

Weinstein is currently being investigated by law enforcement officials in Los Angeles, New York and London, where women have accused the "Shakespeare in Love" producer of rape. His spokesperson has said that he "unequivocally denies allegations of non-consensual sex."

Allred said that Kerr "lost her willingness to act" because "the price she had to pay as an actress was too high." She gave up on her dream, and no woman should have to do that, she said, adding that Weinstein's proposition was a quid pro quo and against the law.

"To all the women placed in this situation, I have the following advice: Go to a sexual harassment lawyer for a consultation," she said.

Allred also declared that "the balance of power has shifted in Hollywood" and said that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts ans Sciences "did the right thing" by expelling the producer from the institution.

"It's a new day. They made a strong statement and sent a message," she said. "It's no longer business as usual."

A representative for Weinstein could not immediately be reached for comment.
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 4:42 am

Harvey Weinstein and the Economics of Consent: The blunt power of the gatekeeper is the ability to enforce not just artistic, but also financial, exile.
by Brit Marling
October 23, 2017

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When the Harvey Weinstein story broke, I thought of something my mother told me when I was a little girl. She said: To be a free woman, you have to be a financially independent woman. She wasn’t wrong. I studied economics in college and went to New York to become an investment banker. To be blunt, I wanted the freedom money can buy.

I had a sudden change of heart while working at Goldman Sachs as a summer analyst. I decided that if the world required me to sell the hours of my life in exchange for access to what had long ago been free—food, water, shelter—I wanted to at least be doing something that stirred my soul. This is, granted, a privileged position. But as a young woman that was the conclusion I came to.

I had discovered acting and filmmaking in college, and the more time I spent immersed in it, the more I liked the person I became. I listened more acutely. I was more empathic and imaginative. These are qualities that seemed to me to be culturally on the decline; our culture likes forward-thinking talkers who can turn a profit without feeling too much about who may suffer the consequences—usually poor people, people of color, and women. Acting felt like a noble pursuit and maybe even a small act of resistance.

Hollywood was, of course, a rude awakening to that kind of idealism. I quickly realized that a large portion of the town functioned inside a soft and sometimes literal trafficking or prostitution of young women (a commodity with an endless supply and an endless demand). The storytellers—the people with economic and artistic power—are, by and large, straight, white men. As of 2017, women make up only 23 percent of the Directors Guild of America and only 11 percent are people of color.

Straight, white men tend to tell stories from their perspective, as one naturally does, which means the women are generally underwritten. They don’t necessarily even need names; “Bikini Babe 2” and “Blonde 4” are parts I auditioned for. If the female characters are lucky enough to have names, they are usually designed only to ask the questions that prompt the lead male monologue, or they are quickly killed in service to advancing the plot.

Once, when I was standing in line for some open-call audition for a horror film, I remember catching my reflection in the mirror and realizing that I was dressed like a sex object. Every woman in line to audition for “Nurse” was, it seemed. We had all internalized on some level the idea that if we were going to be cast we’d better sell what was desired—not our artistry, not our imaginations—but our bodies.

It was around this time that I remember sitting in a casual gathering where a straight, white male activist said, “Our gender and race has all the power. So when you want to have sex with a woman you have to ask and get her verbal consent.” He continued, “If that woman is a person of color, she is oppressed by both her gender and her race and then you should really ask twice.” The literalism of his ratio was ridiculously reductive, and his declarative tone off-putting, but I appreciated that he was trying to articulate how complicated it is to negotiate the invisible forces of privilege and power inside sexual encounters. He was trying to help other young men understand why it can sometimes be hard for any woman to find and voice “no” within a culture that has taught her to mistrust herself, or to value herself through male approval.

I emerged from this period thinking about the power dynamics inside Hollywood. If auditioning for parts was largely about seeking male approval, and the stories themselves were narratives I didn’t always politically or morally agree with, then the only way for me to navigate Hollywood with more agency was to become a storyteller myself.
That is an easy thing to say and a very hard thing to do. I stopped auditioning. I worked a day job and spent nights and weekends at the public library downtown reading screenwriting books. I did this for years. Eventually, I co-wrote and starred in two films and was very fortunate when they were programmed at Sundance in 2011.

I’m taking you through this brief history because I think it’s important to understanding that when Harvey Weinstein requested a meeting with me in 2014—when the industry had deemed I was legitimate fresh meat—I was, in some ways, in a slightly different position from many who had walked this gauntlet before me.

I, too, went to the meeting thinking that perhaps my entire life was about to change for the better. I, too, was asked to meet him in a hotel bar. I, too, met a young, female assistant there who said the meeting had been moved upstairs to his suite because he was a very busy man. I, too, felt my guard go up but was calmed by the presence of another woman my age beside me. I, too, felt terror in the pit of my stomach when that young woman left the room and I was suddenly alone with him. I, too, was asked if I wanted a massage, champagne, strawberries. I, too, sat in that chair paralyzed by mounting fear when he suggested we shower together. What could I do? How not to offend this man, this gatekeeper, who could anoint or destroy me?

It was clear that there was only one direction he wanted this encounter to go in, and that was sex or some version of an erotic exchange. I was able to gather myself together—a bundle of firing nerves, hands trembling, voice lost in my throat—and leave the room.

I later sat in my hotel room alone and wept. I wept because I had gone up the elevator when I knew better. I wept because I had let him touch my shoulders. I wept because at other times in my life, under other circumstances, I had not been able to leave.


Consent is a function of power. You have to have a modicum of power to give it.


At this point many women have come forward to tell their stories about being harassed or abused by Weinstein. All of them are courageous, including the women who could not find a way out. I think for me, I was able to leave Weinstein’s hotel room that day because I had entered as an actor but also as a writer/creator. Of those dual personas in me—actor and writer—it was the writer who stood up and walked out. Because the writer knew that even if this very powerful man never gave her a job in any of his films, even if he blacklisted her from other films, she could make her own work on her own terms and thus keep a roof over her head.

I’m telling this story because in the heat surrounding these brave admissions, it’s important to think about the economics of consent. Weinstein was a gatekeeper who could give actresses a career that would sustain their lives and the livelihood of their families. He could also give them fame, which is one of few ways for women to gain some semblance of power and voice inside a patriarchal world. They knew it. He knew it. Weinstein could also ensure that these women would never work again if they humiliated him. That’s not just artistic or emotional exile—that’s also economic exile.

It’s important, too, to keep in mind where this power imbalance comes from. In the U.S., women were only allowed to have credit cards in their own names as of 43 years ago. Men had a two-decade head start (the credit card was invented in 1950). In the 1960s a woman needed to bring a man along to cosign any credit application. It’s stunning how recently women were afforded no financial autonomy. This is, of course, connected to the fact that women didn’t have bodily autonomy either. A woman’s husband could beat her or have sex with her without her consent in this country with no real legal recourse until the 1970s.

For me, this all distills down to the following: The things that happen in hotel rooms and board rooms all over the world (and in every industry) between women seeking employment or trying to keep employment and men holding the power to grant it or take it away exist in a gray zone where words like “consent” cannot fully capture the complexity of the encounter. Because consent is a function of power. You have to have a modicum of power to give it. In many cases women do not have that power because their livelihood is in jeopardy and because they are the gender that is oppressed by a daily, invisible war waged against all that is feminine—women and humans who behave or dress or think or feel or look feminine.

It’s a powerful moment when courageous people begin speaking about how they have been harmed, which is a deeply difficult thing to do because it means wading through a swamp of shame you’ve been made to feel. I am inspired by them all. We should let their strength guide our way forward, which means beginning a much larger conversation about the role economic inequality often plays in rape culture.

Men hold most of the world’s wealth. In fact, just eight men own the same wealth as 3.6 billion people who make up the poorer half of humanity, the majority of whom, according to Oxfam, are women. As a gender whole, women are poor. This means that, in part, stopping sexual harassment and abuse will involve fighting for wage parity. This also means women and men in power need to turn around and hire more women, especially women of color, especially women who have not grown up with economic privilege.

Another important step forward would be for all of us to start telling and consuming different stories. If you don’t want to be a part of a culture in which sexual abuse and harassment are rampant, don’t buy a ticket to a film that promotes it. I am as guilty of this as anybody else; sometimes it’s nice to zone out to a film that’s a distraction of epic spectacle. But maybe it’s time to imagine more films that don’t use exploitation of female bodies or violence against female bodies as their selling points. Films with a gender balance and racial balance that better reflect the world we all actually live in. These are challenges I myself am trying to meet, as a series creator, and I have by no means closed the gap between what I aspire to and what I have achieved.

Part of what keeps you sitting in that chair in that room enduring harassment or abuse from a man in power is that, as a woman, you have rarely seen another end for yourself. In the novels you’ve read, in the films you’ve seen, in the stories you’ve been told since birth, the women so frequently meet disastrous ends. The real danger inside the present moment, then, would be for us all to separate the alleged deeds of Cosby, Ailes, O’Reilly, or Weinstein from a culture that continues to allow for dramatic imbalances of power. It’s not these bad men. Or that dirty industry. It’s this inhumane economic system of which we are all a part. As producers and as consumers. As storytellers and as listeners. As human beings. That’s a very uncomfortable truth to sit inside. But perhaps discomfort is what’s required to move in the direction of a humane world to which we would all freely give our consent.
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 4:52 am

Actress Accuses Weinstein Company of Sex Abuse Cover-Up
by Gene Maddaus @GeneMaddaus
Variety
October 24, 2017

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An actress sued the Weinstein Company on Tuesday, alleging that Harvey Weinstein forcibly performed oral sex on her and that the company was complicit in his abuse.

Dominique Huett, an actress and model, alleges that Weinstein lured her to his room at the Peninsula hotel in Beverly Hills in November 2010. She says she was there to discuss her career, but that Weinstein quickly insisted that she give him a massage. She initially refused, but he was relentless and she ultimately agreed. Weinstein then suggested that he perform oral sex on her, the lawsuit states.

“Again, Weinstein displayed persistence and would not take ‘no’ for an answer,” according to the suit. “Weinstein initiated and Plaintiff froze as Weinstein removed her clothing and performed oral sex on her. Weinstein performed oral sex on Plaintiff for several minutes. After performing oral sex on Plaintiff, Weinstein masturbated in front of Plaintiff until he reached orgasm.”

The lawsuit is the first to be filed since the Weinstein scandal broke three weeks ago, and could be the first of several. The Weinstein Company is already on the brink of collapse, with Colony Capital exploring a purchase of some or all of its assets in order to avoid bankruptcy. Deals have fallen apart in the wake of the scandal, leaving the company struggling to stay in business.

Ordinarily in California, a complainant in a sexual harassment suit would have to file with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing within a year of the incident.

Huett’s attorney, Jeff Herman, did not sue Weinstein. Instead, he filed against TWC, alleging a single count of negligence. The suit states that Huett only became aware of TWC’s complicity with the recent reports. Those included claims that the company was aware that Weinstein had reached confidential settlements with multiple women, and that the company had done little to nothing to prevent further incidents. Huett’s attorneys contend that she could not have known of the alleged pattern of misconduct until this month, and that therefore her suit should not be barred by the statute of limitations.

“Defendant was aware of multiple claims of sexual misconduct which were settled with the victims prior to the filing of suit. This knowledge was possessed by Defendant’s Board of Directors including, upon information and belief, Bob Weinstein,” the lawsuit states. “Prior to the incident involving Plaintiff, Defendant often aided and abetted Weinstein in the commission of his sexual misconduct. For example, female Weinstein Company employees were often used as ‘honeypots’ to lure his victims into a false sense of security.”

The Weinstein Company did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

“Any allegations of non-consensual sex are unequivocally denied by Mr. Weinstein,” his rep said.

Huett and Herman are expected to appear at a press conference in Los Angeles on Wednesday.
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 5:00 am

Civil Complaint Alleging Damages for Negligence
Dominique Huett vs. The Weinstein Company LLC.

by Daniel Ellis
October 24, 2017

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HERMAN LAW
5200 Town Center Circle, Suite 540
Boca Raton, Florida 33486
Jeff Herman
(pending pro hac vice admission)
Daniel Ellis
California Bar No. 298639
dellis@hermanlaw.com
Arick Fudali
California Bar No. 296364
afudali@hermanlaw.com
Tel: (305) 931-2200
Fax: (305) 931-0877

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Dominique Huett

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DOMINIQUE HUETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE WEINSTEIN COMPANY LLC,
Defendant.

CASE NO: BC680869

CIVIL COMPLAINT ALLEGING DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

1. Plaintiff Dominique Huett is a citizen and resident of New York.

2. Defendant The Weinstein Company LLC (hereinafter referred to as “TWC”) is a Delaware limited liability company whose principle place of business is in New York, New York.

3. Venue properly lies in this county in that Defendant regularly conducts business in this county, and the torts described herein were committed in this county. This Court has jurisdiction in that this is a claim for damages of not less than $5 million, well in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of $25,000.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

4. In or about November 2010, Plaintiff Dominique Huett and Harvey Weinstein arranged to meet each other at The Peninsula Beverly Hills hotel in Beverly Hills, California. Plaintiff was an aspiring actress at the time and the purpose of the meeting was to discuss Weinstein’s offer to assist Plaintiff in procuring future television and/or film roles. The communications to arrange this meeting included e-mails from the e-mail address of Weinstein’s assistant at TWC.

5. Plaintiff and Weinstein initially met at the bar of The Peninsula hotel, where they discussed Weinstein’s interest in assisting Plaintiff with her acting career. During their conversation, Plaintiff noticed Weinstein staring at her breasts. Weinstein asked Plaintiff is she had ever had a “boob job” and asked her to show him her breasts. Plaintiff refused and was made uncomfortable by the question and the request. However, Weinstein informed Plaintiff that the purpose of the questioning was that it would be beneficial for securing future roles if she did not have breast augmentation.

6. At some point during their conversation, Weinstein, who was at the time living at the hotel, invited Plaintiff to his room under the guise of continuing their business meeting. Plaintiff agreed to move the meeting to his hotel room, believing they were to continue their discussion regarding her career.

7. While in Weinstein’s room, the two continued their conversation regarding Plaintiff’s career. At some point, Weinstein excused himself to use the restroom. After several minutes, Weinstein returned from the restroom wearing only a bathrobe.

8. Upon returning, Weinstein asked Plaintiff to perform a massage on him. Plaintiff said, “No,” and that she did not feel comfortable by his request. However, Weinstein persisted and would not take “no” for an answer. Weinstein laid on the bed and demanded that Plaintiff perform a massage on him. Plaintiff ultimately complied with his demands and performed the massage.

9. Subsequently, Weinstein requested to perform oral sex on Plaintiff. Plaintiff was shocked and alarmed by the request and initially refused. Again, Weinstein displayed persistence and would not take “no” for an answer. Weinstein initiated and Plaintiff froze as Weinstein removed her clothing and performed oral sex on her. Weinstein performed oral sex on Plaintiff for several minutes. After performing oral sex on Plaintiff, Weinstein masturbated in front of Plaintiff until he reached orgasm.


10. At some point during their communications, Weinstein gave Plaintiff the contact information for an executive producer with Project Runaway, a television program produced by Defendant, and offered to secure a role for Plaintiff on the program.

11. Prior to the incident involving Plaintiff, Defendant TWC’s executives, officers and employees had actual knowledge of Weinstein’s repeated acts of sexual misconduct with women. In particular, Defendant was aware of Weinstein’s pattern of using his power to coerce and force young actresses to engage in sexual acts with him. This knowledge was possessed by Defendant’s Board of Directors including, upon information and belief, Bob Weinstein.

12. Upon information and belief, Defendant was aware of allegations of sexual misconduct against Weinstein going back to the 1990s. Upon information and belief, prior to the incident involving Plaintiff, Defendant was aware of multiple claims of sexual misconduct which were settled with the victims prior to the filing of suit. This knowledge was possessed by Defendant’s Board of Directors including, upon information and belief, Bob Weinstein.

13. Prior to the incident involving Plaintiff, Defendant often aided and abetted Weinstein in the commission of his sexual misconduct. For example, female Weinstein Company employees were often used as “honeypots” to lure his victims into a false sense of security. The “honeypots” would initially join a meeting along with a woman Weinstein was interested in, but then Weinstein would dismiss them, leaving him alone with the woman.

14. Plaintiff did not discover, and a reasonable and diligent investigation would not have disclosed, that prior to her incident Defendant was aware of numerous allegations of sexual misconduct involving Weinstein. Upon information and belief, the allegations of sexual misconduct involving Weinstein that Defendant was aware of were subject to nondisclosure agreements and/or confidential settlements, and were otherwise only known inside TWC. Upon information and belief, the nondisclosure agreements and/or confidential settlements legally prohibited Defendant TWC, Weinstein, and the victims of the sexual misconduct from discussing the allegations and Defendant’s knowledge thereof.
As such, even if Plaintiff had conducted a timely and reasonable investigation, she could not have discovered Defendant’s prior knowledge of Weinstein’s sexual misconduct. Plaintiff was unable to discover Defendant’s knowledge of Weinstein’s propensity to engage in sexual misconduct until the story of Weinstein’s pattern of sexual misconduct with young actresses broke in October 2017.

COUNT I
(Negligence)

15. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 14 above.

16. At all relevant times, Defendant owed a duty to use reasonable care in the retention and supervision of its employee Harvey Weinstein.

17. This included a duty to control Weinstein in his interactions with women during meetings taking place within the course and scope of his employment in order to prevent foreseeable harm.

18. Prior to the sexual misconduct with Plaintiff, Defendant knew or had reason to believe Weinstein was likely to engage in sexual misconduct with women he came into contact with during the course and scope of his employment. In particular, upon information and belief, Defendant knew or should have known that Weinstein would lure young aspiring actresses into compromising situations under the guise of business meetings. Prior to the incident involving Plaintiff, Defendant’s Board of Directors possessed knowledge of Weinstein’s propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. Knowledge of Weinstein’s propensity to engage in sexual misconduct was additionally possessed by Defendant’s executives, officers and employees. At all relevant times Defendant’s Board of Directors maintained a supervisory position over Weinstein.

19. By possessing knowledge of Weinstein’s prior sexual misconduct, Defendant knew or should have known that Weinstein was unfit and that this unfitness created a particular risk to others.

20. Defendant did not act in a reasonable manner by failing to terminate Weinstein and instead continued to allow him to meet with prospective actresses in private areas with the knowledge that there was a substantial likelihood for sexual misconduct.

21. Weinstein’s meeting with Plaintiff at the Peninsula hotel occurred within the course and scope of his employment. The contact between Plaintiff and Weinstein was generated by the employment relationship between Defendant and Weinstein.

22. Defendant’s negligence in supervising and/or retaining Weinstein was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

23. It was foreseeable that Weinstein would engage in sexual misconduct if Defendant continued to allow Weinstein to have private business meetings with actresses. At all relevant times, Defendant knew Weinstein was using his power and position to coerce women into engaging in sexual contact and knew that this sexual misconduct would cause harm.

24. Defendant failed to institute corrective measures to protect women coming into contact with Weinstein, including Plaintiff, from sexual misconduct despite the Board of Directors possessing actual notice of Weinstein’s sexually inappropriate behavior. Such acts and omissions demonstrate a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The Board of Directors was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of failing to remove or adequately supervise Weinstein. In failing to do so, Defendant acted with actual malice and with conscious disregard to Plaintiff’s safety.

25. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff was a victim of Weinstein’s sexual misconduct. The sexual misconduct has caused Plaintiff to suffer continuing, severe and permanent psychological and emotional issues, and the loss of enjoyment of life.


PRAYER FOR RELIEF

26. General damages in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial.

27. Special damages including medical and psychological care expenses in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial.

28. Punitive and exemplary damages in an amount appropriate to punish or set an example of Defendant.

29. Costs of suit.

30. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial in this action.

Dated: October 24, 2017 HERMAN LAW

By: /s/ Daniel Ellis
Daniel Ellis
California Bar No. 298639
dellis@hermanlaw.com
Arick Fudali
California Bar No. 296364
afudali@hermanlaw.com
Jeff Herman
(pending pro hac vice admission)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 5:21 am

Lysette Anthony: I answered the door. Harvey Weinstein pushed me inside and raped me in my own hallway. The movie mogul stalked the Hollyoaks actress Lysette Anthony for years before she went to the police last week. Here is her account of how the nightmare began
by Charlotte Metcalf
The Sunday Times
October 15 2017, 12:01am

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Image
The British actress Lysette Anthony says she was raped by Weinstein after he turned up at her door one morning
JAMES SHAW/BRITISH SOAP AWARDS


It was about 15 years ago that my close friend Lysette Anthony told me that Harvey Weinstein had raped her. She said she had told only two other people about the assault. It was an ugly secret hidden inside her like a tumour. Last week, summoning up her courage, she reported the Hollywood producer to the Metropolitan police.

The moment I first heard of the ­­alle­gations being made about Weinstein’s preda­tory sexual behaviour, I thought of Lysette. As if telepathically, she rang me from Liverpool where she stars in the popular Channel 4 soap opera Hollyoaks.

She said she felt emotional and ­conflicted about going to the police. A few years ago she had been embroiled in an ugly court case against her son’s father and the case had been thrown out on a procedural hitch because she had ­muddled a key date.

By her own admission, dates are not her strong point and she was afraid of what she might be put through if she had to endure another lengthy and harrowing legal process. Yet the conclusion she came to was this: “I can’t stand by and see all these brave women tell the truth and not stand up alongside them.”

On Thursday I accompanied Lysette to a police station in central London for a preliminary meeting before giving formal video evidence. She was nervous but the officers were sensitive and reassuring. Afterwards I sat down with her and she told me the full story which she has agreed I should now make public.

Lysette met Weinstein in early 1982 after she was chosen for a leading role in Krull, a swashbuckling science fiction fantasy notable for early screen appearances by Liam Neeson and Robbie Coltrane. Columbia Pictures flew her to New York to do publicity for the US release.

“I was so young and fresh out of a ­convent,” she said.

“I was excited to be going to New York first class. I arrived at a smart hotel and the publicist told me I had to go out with a record producer or promoter. I was only about 19 and it never occurred to me not to do what I was told. I was introduced to Harvey Weinstein in the hotel lobby.”

They got into a tourist horse-drawn carriage “to clip-clop along to a restaurant”, but Lysette started succumbing to jetlag and begged to go back to her hotel.

“Apologetically I told him I needed to get some sleep. Out of embarrassment for not having dinner with him, I gave Harvey my phone number and told him to call me in London some time,” she said.

That proved the start of a nightmare.
“I’ve buried this story for so long that dredging it all up feels as if I’m piecing together a jigsaw made up of smashed shards of glass,’’ she told me.

“Everything I tell you is patched together as more memories start to surface — I did say I was rubbish with dates.”

The next thing she remembers is ­Harvey coming to a party in her flat in Hammersmith, west London; then a glitzy do at the Waldorf or the Ritz — she can’t remember which — where she ended up leaving alone and taking the bus home in her evening gown.

Over the next few years she would have lunch with Harvey from time to time when he was in London. At that point she experienced nothing untoward: “The lunches were invariably in hotel suites but I felt comfortable in Harvey’s company. We had become friends.’


Finally I just gave up. At least I was able to stop him kissing me


One night she met Harvey for a drink and ended up at his rented house in Chelsea: “I’m so nosy about other people’s houses and I was having a good snoop round. The next thing I knew he was half undressed and he ­grabbed me. It was the last thing I expected and I fled. I blamed it on myself because I was tired, a bit drunk and ­therefore so completely off my guard. He was a so-called friend I’d known for years and the clumsy fumble was the last thing I saw coming.”

That was when the stalking began. Once she was at home in the evening with a friend when the doorbell rang. It was Harvey, but her friend answered the door and sent him away. Some time later, at about 10 in the morning, there was another ring on the doorbell. “I was in my dressing gown and I answered the door to find Harvey standing there,” Lysette said.

“He pushed me inside and rammed me up against the coat rack in my tiny hall and started fumbling at my gown. He was trying to kiss me and shove inside me. It was disgusting.”

She tried pushing him off but he was too heavy. “Finally I just gave up. At least I was able to stop him kissing me. As he ground himself against me and shoved inside me, I kept my eyes shut tight, held my breath, just let him get on with it. He came over my leg like a dog and then left. It was pathetic, revolting. I remember lying in the bath later and crying.”

Lysette told me it did not occur to her at the time to call the police or even a friend: “There hadn’t been a knife. He wasn’t a stranger. I was disgusted and embarras­sed, but I was at home. I thought I should just forget the whole disgusting incident. I blamed myself. I’d been an idiot to think he and I were just friends.”


She did not see Weinstein again until about a year later, when she was in Milan doing publicity for a 1989 television ­adaptation of Barbara Cartland’s novel The Lady and the Highwayman, in which Lysette had starred with Hugh Grant.

I was just a body, young flesh. It wouldn’t take long and no one knew


Weinstein contacted her and took her out to dinner. She described him as “perfectly charming” and he insisted on buying her a coat on the way home.

“I thought it was his unspoken way of apologising for what had happened,” Lysette said. “I assumed that was that and we went our separate ways.”


She went on to build a film career that reached its peak in Woody Allen’s 1992 comedy ­Husbands and Wives.

By the time she heard from Weinstein again he had become what she described as the “superstar of indie cinema”.

Miramax, the company Weinstein founded with his brother Bob in 1979, was stacking up Oscar and Bafta ­nominations with films such as Sex, Lies and Video­tape, The Crying Game and Pulp Fiction.

“From this point on, if I ignored ­Weinstein’s calls the assistants started ringing and if I ignored them his ­assistants called my agent to set up a meeting,” Lysette said.

“What you have to understand is that no one turned down an opportunity to meet Harvey Weinstein. No one. I’d never told my agent about the rape, so it was impossible to explain why I didn’t want to see him.

“The meetings would start with a chat in a hotel suite. The assistants would disappear and then he’d disappear and return in a robe demanding a massage. By then I’d just given up. I knew I was powerless and at least I wouldn’t have to do much. I was just a body, young flesh. It wouldn’t take long and no one knew.”

She said she never tried to exploit her connection to Weinstein: “That was my line in the sand, but whenever Harvey summoned me how could I refuse? He had the power to end my career. And I had to work to ­survive.”


Lysette was married twice in the 1990s but both marriages ended in divorce. It was not until 2002 that Weinstein “finally let go of me” and she did not see him again until she bumped into him at a film premiere in 2009. “He leant forward and stroked my face. It was the first time he’d ever shown me a hint of affection. As he walked away I thought I heard him say, ‘I don’t do that stuff any more.’”

Lysette joined Hollyoaks last year ­playing the villainous matriarch Marnie Nightingale. She was recently nominated with Nicole Barber-Lane for best partnership in the 2017 Inside Soap awards.

Yet there has been no escape from her memories. “Harvey Weinstein was the career-changing kingmaker,” she told me, beginning to cry.

“Can you imagine what it was like, never knowing when he was going to show up and putting up with that big lumber­ing brute all those years?”

As Lysette was preparing to return to Liverpool she received a text advising of her of her latest award nomination and started crying again. “I’m 54 and a success­ful soap actress, working in a world I’m fiercely proud of and adore. He can’t hurt me any more,” she said. Yet she was “petrified” of the possible consequences of speaking out.

She said she was determined to “stand up for the truth”, not least to protect her “greatest pride and my raison d’être” — her son Jimi. “If I can’t show him that the truth must always out, whatever the ­personal cost, what sort of mother am I?

“The truth,” she sombrely concluded, “is that Harvey Weinstein raped me — not in a hotel suite with ­champagne and ­caviar on tap, but up against a coat rack on a grey morning in my own home.”

The Sunday Times forwarded Lysette’s allegations to Weinstein’s representatives, who said: “Any allegations of non-consensual sex are unequivocally denied by Mr Weinstein.” The producer has previously denied ever having retaliated against women who refused his sexual advances.
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 5:39 am

Part 1 of 2

Michelle Marvin vs. Lee Marvin
by Supreme Court of California
December 27, 1976

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18 Cal.3d 660 (1976)
557 P.2d 106
134 Cal. Rptr. 815

MICHELLE MARVIN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
LEE MARVIN, Defendant and Respondent.

Docket No. L.A. 30520.

Supreme Court of California.

December 27, 1976.

COUNSEL

Marvin M. Mitchelson, Donald N. Woldman, Robert M. Ross, Fleishman, McDaniel, Brown & Weston and David M. Brown for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jettie Pierce Selvig, Ruth Miller and Suzie S. Thorn as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Goldman & Kagon, Mark A. Goldman and William R. Bishin for Defendant and Respondent.

Herma Hill Kay, John Sutter, Doris Brin Walker and Treuhaft, Walker, Nawi & Hendon as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Isabella H. Grant and Livingston, Grant, Stone & Shenk as Amici Curiae.

OPINION

TOBRINER, J.

During the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the number of couples living together without marrying.[1] Such nonmarital relationships lead to legal controversy when one partner dies or the couple separates.[/size][/b] Courts of Appeal, faced with the task of determining property rights in such cases, have arrived at conflicting positions: two cases (In re Marriage of Cary (1973) 34 Cal. App.3d 345 [109 Cal. Rptr. 862]; Estate of Atherley (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 758 [119 Cal. Rptr. 41]) have held that the Family Law Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.) requires division of the property according to community property principles, and one decision (Beckman v. Mayhew (1975) 49 Cal. App.3d 529 [122 Cal. Rptr. 604]) has rejected that holding. We take this opportunity to resolve that controversy and to declare the principles which should govern distribution of property acquired in a nonmarital relationship.

We conclude: (1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. (3) In the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case.

In the instant case plaintiff and defendant lived together for seven years without marrying; all property acquired during this period was taken in defendant's name. When plaintiff sued to enforce a contract under which she was entitled to half the property and to support payments, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendant, thus leaving him with all property accumulated by the couple during their relationship. Since the trial court denied plaintiff a trial on the merits of her claim, its decision conflicts with the principles stated above, and must be reversed.

1. The factual setting of this appeal.

(1) Since the trial court rendered judgment for defendant on the pleadings, we must accept the allegations of plaintiff's complaint as true, determining whether such allegations state, or can be amended to state, a cause of action. (See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 714-715, fn. 3 [117 Cal. Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) pp. 2817-2818.) We turn therefore to the specific allegations of the complaint.

Plaintiff avers that in October of 1964 she and defendant "entered into an oral agreement" that while "the parties lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined." Furthermore, they agreed to "hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife" and that "plaintiff would further render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook to ... defendant."

Shortly thereafter plaintiff agreed to "give up her lucrative career as an entertainer [and] singer" in order to "devote her full time to defendant ... as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook;" in return defendant agreed to "provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life."

Plaintiff alleges that she lived with defendant from October of 1964 through May of 1970 and fulfilled her obligations under the agreement. During this period the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings acquired in defendant's name substantial real and personal property, including motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May of 1970, however, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support plaintiff until November of 1971, but thereafter refused to provide further support.

On the basis of these allegations plaintiff asserts two causes of action. The first, for declaratory relief, asks the court to determine her contract and property rights; the second seeks to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship.

Defendant demurred unsuccessfully, and then answered the complaint. (2) (See fn. 2.) Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial.[2] Defendant renewed his attack on the complaint by a motion to dismiss. Since the parties had stipulated that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967, the trial court treated defendant's motion as one for judgment on the pleadings augmented by the stipulation.

After hearing argument the court granted defendant's motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment and asked leave to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after defendant's divorce was final. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, and she appealed from the judgment.

2. (3a) Plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for breach of an express contract.

In Trutalli v. Meraviglia (1932) 215 Cal. 698 [12 P.2d 430] we established the principle that nonmarital partners may lawfully contract concerning the ownership of property acquired during the relationship. We reaffirmed this principle in Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, 685 [134 P.2d 761], stating that "If a man and woman [who are not married] live together as husband and wife under an agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect the interests of each in such property."

In the case before us plaintiff, basing her cause of action in contract upon these precedents, maintains that the trial court erred in denying her a trial on the merits of her contention. Although that court did not specify the ground for its conclusion that plaintiff's contractual allegations stated no cause of action,[3] defendant offers some four theories to sustain the ruling; we proceed to examine them.

Defendant first and principally relies on the contention that the alleged contract is so closely related to the supposed "immoral" character of the relationship between plaintiff and himself that the enforcement of the contract would violate public policy.[4] He points to cases asserting that a contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable if it is "involved in" an illicit relationship (see Shaw v. Shaw (1964) 227 Cal. App.2d 159, 164 [38 Cal. Rptr. 520] (dictum); Garcia v. Venegas (1951) 106 Cal. App.2d 364, 368 [235 P.2d 89] (dictum), or made in "contemplation" of such a relationship (Hill v. Estate of Westbrook (1950) 95 Cal. App.2d 599, 602 [213 P.2d 727]; see Hill v. Estate of Westbrook (1952) 39 Cal.2d 458, 460 [247 P.2d 19]; Barlow v. Collins (1958) 166 Cal. App.2d 274, 277 [333 P.2d 64] (dictum); Bridges v. Bridges (1954) 125 Cal. App.2d 359, 362 [270 P.2d 69] (dictum)). A review of the numerous California decisions concerning contracts between nonmarital partners, however, reveals that the courts have not employed such broad and uncertain standards to strike down contracts. The decisions instead disclose a narrower and more precise standard: a contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.

In the first case to address this issue, Trutalli v. Meraviglia, supra, 215 Cal. 698, the parties had lived together without marriage for 11 years and had raised two children. The man sued to quiet title to land he had purchased in his own name during this relationship; the woman defended by asserting an agreement to pool earnings and hold all property jointly. Rejecting the assertion of the illegality of the agreement, the court stated that "The fact that the parties to this action at the time they agreed to invest their earnings in property to be held jointly between them were living together in an unlawful relation, did not disqualify them from entering into a lawful agreement with each other, so long as such immoral relation was not made a consideration of their agreement." (Italics added.) (215 Cal. at pp. 701-702.)

In Bridges v. Bridges, supra, 125 Cal. App.2d 359 [270 P.2d 69], both parties were in the process of obtaining divorces from their erstwhile respective spouses. The two parties agreed to live together, to share equally in property acquired, and to marry when their divorces became final. The man worked as a salesman and used his savings to purchase properties. The woman kept house, cared for seven children, three from each former marriage and one from the nonmarital relationship, and helped construct improvements on the properties. When they separated, without marrying, the court awarded the woman one-half the value of the property. Rejecting the man's contention that the contract was illegal, the court stated that: "Nowhere is it expressly testified to by anyone that there was anything in the agreement for the pooling of assets and the sharing of accumulations that contemplated meretricious relations as any part of the consideration or as any object of the agreement." (125 Cal. App.2d at p. 363.)

Croslin v. Scott (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 767 [316 P.2d 755] reiterates the rule established in Trutalli and Bridges. In Croslin the parties separated following a three-year nonmarital relationship. The woman then phoned the man, asked him to return to her, and suggested that he build them a house on a lot she owned. She agreed in return to place the property in joint ownership. The man built the house, and the parties lived there for several more years. When they separated, he sued to establish his interest in the property. Reversing a nonsuit, the Court of Appeal stated that "The mere fact that parties agree to live together in meretricious relationship does not necessarily make an agreement for disposition of property between them invalid. It is only when the property agreement is made in connection with the other agreement, or the illicit relationship is made a consideration of the property agreement, that the latter becomes illegal." (154 Cal. App.2d at p. 771.)

Numerous other cases have upheld enforcement of agreements between nonmarital partners in factual settings essentially indistinguishable from the present case. (In re Marriage of Foster (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 577 [117 Cal. Rptr. 49]; Weak v. Weak, supra, 202 Cal. App.2d 632, 639; Ferguson v. Schuenemann (1959) 167 Cal. App.2d 413 [334 P.2d 668]; Barlow v. Collins, supra, 166 Cal. App.2d 274, 277-278; Ferraro v. Ferraro (1956) 146 Cal. App.2d 849 [304 P.2d 168]; Cline v. Festersen (1954) 128 Cal. App.2d 380 [275 P.2d 149]; Profit v. Profit (1953) 117 Cal. App.2d 126 [255 P.2d 25]; Garcia v. Venegas, supra, 106 Cal. App.2d 364; Padilla v. Padilla (1940) 38 Cal. App.2d 319 [100 P.2d 1093]; Bacon v. Bacon (1937) 21 Cal. App.2d 540 [69 P.2d 884].)[5]

Although the past decisions hover over the issue in the somewhat wispy form of the figures of a Chagall painting, we can abstract from those decisions a clear and simple rule. (4) The fact that a man and woman live together without marriage, and engage in a sexual relationship, does not in itself invalidate agreements between them relating to their earnings, property, or expenses. Neither is such an agreement invalid merely because the parties may have contemplated the creation or continuation of a nonmarital relationship when they entered into it. Agreements between nonmarital partners fail only to the extent that they rest upon a consideration of meretricious sexual services. Thus the rule asserted by defendant, that a contract fails if it is "involved in" or made "in contemplation" of a nonmarital relationship, cannot be reconciled with the decisions.

The three cases cited by defendant which have declined to enforce contracts between nonmarital partners involved consideration that was expressly founded upon an illicit sexual services. In Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, supra, 95 Cal. App.2d 599, the woman promised to keep house for the man, to live with him as man and wife, and to bear his children; the man promised to provide for her in his will, but died without doing so. Reversing a judgment for the woman based on the reasonable value of her services, the Court of Appeal stated that "the action is predicated upon a claim which seeks, among other things, the reasonable value of living with decedent in meretricious relationship and bearing him two children.... The law does not award compensation for living with a man as a concubine and bearing him children.... As the judgment is at least in part, for the value of the claimed services for which recovery cannot be had, it must be reversed." (95 Cal. App.2d at p. 603.) Upon retrial, the trial court found that it could not sever the contract and place an independent value upon the legitimate services performed by claimant. We therefore affirmed a judgment for the estate. (Hill v. Estate of Westbrook (1952) 39 Cal.2d 458 [247 P.2d 19].)

In the only other cited decision refusing to enforce a contract, Updeck v. Samuel (1954) 123 Cal. App.2d 264 [266 P.2d 822], the contract "was based on the consideration that the parties live together as husband and wife." (123 Cal. App.2d at p. 267.) Viewing the contract as calling for adultery, the court held it illegal.[6]

The decisions in the Hill and Updeck cases thus demonstrate that a contract between nonmarital partners, even if expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, is invalid only if sexual acts form an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement. In sum, a court will not enforce a contract for the pooling of property and earnings if it is explicitly and inseparably based upon services as a paramour. The Court of Appeal opinion in Hill, however, indicates that even if sexual services are part of the contractual consideration, any severable portion of the contract supported by independent consideration will still be enforced.

The principle that a contract between nonmarital partners will be enforced unless expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services not only represents the distillation of the decisional law, but also offers a far more precise and workable standard than that advocated by defendant. Our recent decision in In re Marriage of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342 [131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323] offers a close analogy. Rejecting the contention that an antenuptial agreement is invalid if the parties contemplated a marriage of short duration, we pointed out in Dawley that a standard based upon the subjective contemplation of the parties is uncertain and unworkable; such a test, we stated, "might invalidate virtually all antenuptial agreements on the ground that the parties contemplated dissolution ... but it provides no principled basis for determining which antenuptial agreements offend public policy and which do not." (17 Cal.3d 342, 352.)

Similarly, in the present case a standard which inquires whether an agreement is "involved" in or "contemplates" a nonmarital relationship is vague and unworkable. Virtually all agreements between nonmarital partners can be said to be "involved" in some sense in the fact of their mutual sexual relationship, or to "contemplate" the existence of that relationship. Thus defendant's proposed standards, if taken literally, might invalidate all agreements between nonmarital partners, a result no one favors. Moreover, those standards offer no basis to distinguish between valid and invalid agreements. By looking not to such uncertain tests, but only to the consideration underlying the agreement, we provide the parties and the courts with a practical guide to determine when an agreement between nonmarital partners should be enforced.

(5) Defendant secondly relies upon the ground suggested by the trial court: that the 1964 contract violated public policy because it impaired the community property rights of Betty Marvin, defendant's lawful wife. Defendant points out that his earnings while living apart from his wife before rendition of the interlocutory decree were community property under 1964 statutory law (former Civ. Code, §§ 169, 169.2)[7] and that defendant's agreement with plaintiff purported to transfer to her a half interest in that community property. But whether or not defendant's contract with plaintiff exceeded his authority as manager of the community property (see former Civ. Code, § 172), defendant's argument fails for the reason that an improper transfer of community property is not void ab initio, but merely voidable at the instance of the aggrieved spouse. See Ballinger v. Ballinger (1937) 9 Cal.2d 330, 334 [70 P.2d 629; Trimble v. Trimble (1933) 219 Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477].)

In the present case Betty Marvin, the aggrieved spouse, had the opportunity to assert her community property rights in the divorce action. (See Babbitt v. Babbitt (1955) 44 Cal.2d 289, 293 [282 P.2d 1].) The interlocutory and final decrees in that action fix and limit her interest. Enforcement of the contract between plaintiff and defendant against property awarded to defendant by the divorce decree will not impair any right of Betty's, and thus is not on that account violative of public policy.[8]

(6) Defendant's third contention is noteworthy for the lack of authority advanced in its support. He contends that enforcement of the oral agreement between plaintiff and himself is barred by Civil Code section 5134, which provides that "All contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing...." A marriage settlement, however, is an agreement in contemplation of marriage in which each party agrees to release or modify the property rights which would otherwise arise from the marriage. (See Corker v. Corker (1891) 87 Cal. 643, 648 [25 P. 922].) The contract at issue here does not conceivably fall within that definition, and thus is beyond the compass of section 5134.[9]

(7) Defendant finally argues that enforcement of the contract is barred by Civil Code section 43.5, subdivision (d), which provides that "No cause of action arises for ... breach of promise of marriage." This rather strained contention proceeds from the premise that a promise of marriage impliedly includes a promise to support and to pool property acquired after marriage (see Boyd v. Boyd (1964) 228 Cal. App.2d 374 [39 Cal. Rptr. 400]) to the conclusion that pooling and support agreements not part of or accompanied by promise of marriage are barred by the section. We conclude that section 43.5 is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation advanced by defendant, a conclusion demonstrated by the fact that since section 43.5 was enacted in 1939, numerous cases have enforced pooling agreements between nonmarital partners, and in none did court or counsel refer to section 43.5.

(3b) In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights. Of course, they cannot lawfully contract to pay for the performance of sexual services, for such a contract is, in essence, an agreement for prostitution and unlawful for that reason. But they may agree to pool their earnings and to hold all property acquired during the relationship in accord with the law governing community property; conversely they may agree that each partner's earnings and the property acquired from those earnings remains the separate property of the earning partner.[10] So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements.

In the present instance, plaintiff alleges that the parties agreed to pool their earnings, that they contracted to share equally in all property acquired, and that defendant agreed to support plaintiff. The terms of the contract as alleged do not rest upon any unlawful consideration. We therefore conclude that the complaint furnishes a suitable basis upon which the trial court can render declaratory relief. (See 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) pp. 2335-2336.) The trial court consequently erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

3. (8a) Plaintiff's complaint can be amended to state a cause of action founded upon theories of implied contract or equitable relief.

As we have noted, both causes of action in plaintiff's complaint allege an express contract; neither assert any basis for relief independent from the contract. In In re Marriage of Cary, supra, 34 Cal. App.3d 345, however, the Court of Appeal held that, in view of the policy of the Family Law Act, property accumulated by nonmarital partners in an actual family relationship should be divided equally. Upon examining the Cary opinion, the parties to the present case realized that plaintiff's alleged relationship with defendant might arguably support a cause of action independent of any express contract between the parties. The parties have therefore briefed and discussed the issue of the property rights of a nonmarital partner in the absence of an express contract. Although our conclusion that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action based on an express contract alone compels us to reverse the judgment for defendant, resolution of the Cary issue will serve both to guide the parties upon retrial and to resolve a conflict presently manifest in published Court of Appeal decisions.

Both plaintiff and defendant stand in broad agreement that the law should be fashioned to carry out the reasonable expectations of the parties. Plaintiff, however, presents the following contentions: that the decisions prior to Cary rest upon implicit and erroneous notions of punishing a party for his or her guilt in entering into a nonmarital relationship, that such decisions result in an inequitable distribution of property accumulated during the relationship, and that Cary correctly held that the enactment of the Family Law Act in 1970 overturned those prior decisions. Defendant in response maintains that the prior decisions merely applied common law principles of contract and property to persons who have deliberately elected to remain outside the bounds of the community property system.[11] Cary, defendant contends, erred in 676*676 holding that the Family Law Act vitiated the force of the prior precedents.

As we shall see from examination of the pre-Cary decisions, the truth lies somewhere between the positions of plaintiff and defendant. The classic opinion on this subject is Vallera v. Vallera, supra, 21 Cal.2d 681. Speaking for a four-member majority, Justice Traynor posed the question: "whether a woman living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during the period of their relationship." (21 Cal.2d at p. 684.) Citing Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank (1931) 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307], which held that a nonmarital "wife" could not claim that her husband's estate was community property, the majority answered that question "in the negative." (Pp. 684-685.) Vallera explains that "Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith are not present in such a case." (P. 685.) In the absence of express contract, Vallera concluded, the woman is entitled to share in property jointly accumulated only "in the proportion that her funds contributed toward its acquisition." (P. 685.) Justice Curtis, dissenting, argued that the evidence showed an implied contract under which each party owned an equal interest in property acquired during the relationship.

The majority opinion in Vallera did not expressly bar recovery based upon an implied contract, nor preclude resort to equitable remedies. But Vallera's broad assertion that equitable considerations "are not present" in the case of a nonmarital relationship (21 Cal.2d at p. 685) led the Courts of Appeal to interpret the language to preclude recovery based on such theories. (See Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich (1948) 88 Cal. App.2d 708, 677*677 719 [200 P.2d 49]; Oakley v. Oakley (1947) 82 Cal. App.2d 188, 191-192 [185 P.2d 848].)[12]

Consequently, when the issue of the rights of a nonmarital partner reached this court in Keene v. Keene (1962) 57 Cal.2d 657 [21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 371 P.2d 329], the claimant forwent reliance upon theories of contract implied in law or fact. Asserting that she had worked on her partner's ranch and that her labor had enhanced its value, she confined her cause of action to the claim that the court should impress a resulting trust on the property derived from the sale of the ranch. The court limited its opinion accordingly, rejecting her argument on the ground that the rendition of services gives rise to a resulting trust only when the services aid in acquisition of the property, not in its subsequent improvement. (57 Cal.2d at p. 668.) Justice Peters, dissenting, attacked the majority's distinction between the rendition of services and the contribution of funds or property; he maintained that both property and services furnished valuable consideration, and potentially afforded the ground for a resulting trust.

This failure of the courts to recognize an action by a nonmarital partner based upon implied contract, or to grant an equitable remedy, contrasts with the judicial treatment of the putative spouse. Prior to the enactment of the Family Law Act, no statute granted rights to a putative spouse.[13] The courts accordingly fashioned a variety of remedies by judicial decision. Some cases permitted the putative spouse to recover half the property on a theory that the conduct of the parties implied an agreement of partnership or joint venture. (See Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal. App.3d 714, 717-718 [111 Cal. Rptr. 779]; Sousa v. Freitas (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 660, 666 [89 Cal. Rptr. 485].) Others permitted the spouse to recover the reasonable value of rendered services, less the value of support received. (See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti (1937) 9 Cal.2d 95, 100-102 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342].)[14] Finally, decisions affirmed the power of a court to employ equitable principles to achieve a fair division of property acquired during putative marriage. (Coats v. Coats (1911) 160 Cal. 671, 677-678 [118 P. 441]; Caldwell v. Odisio (1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 732, 735 [299 P.2d 14].)[15]

Thus in summary, the cases prior to Cary exhibited a schizophrenic inconsistency. By enforcing an express contract between nonmarital partners unless it rested upon an unlawful consideration, the courts applied a common law principle as to contracts. Yet the courts disregarded the common law principle that holds that implied contracts can arise from the conduct of the parties.[16] Refusing to enforce such contracts, the courts spoke of leaving the parties "in the position in which they had placed themselves" (Oakley v. Oakley, supra, 82 Cal. App.2d 188, 192), just as if they were guilty parties in pari delicto.

Justice Curtis noted this inconsistency in his dissenting opinion in Vallera, pointing out that "if an express agreement will be enforced, there is no legal or just reason why an implied agreement to share the property cannot be enforced." (21 Cal.2d 681, 686; see Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services (1976) 10 Family L.Q. 101, 117-121.) And in Keene v. Keene, supra, 57 Cal.2d 657, Justice Peters observed that if the man and woman "were not illegally living together ... it would be a plain business relationship and a contract would be implied." (Dis. opn. at p. 672.)

Still another inconsistency in the prior cases arises from their treatment of property accumulated through joint effort. To the extent that a partner had contributed funds or property, the cases held that the partner obtains a proportionate share in the acquisition, despite the lack of legal standing of the relationship. (Vallera v. Vallera, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 685; see Weak v. Weak, supra, 202 Cal. App.2d 632, 639.) Yet courts have refused to recognize just such an interest based upon the contribution of services. As Justice Curtis points out "Unless it can be argued that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper, and homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that if, when she contributes money to the purchase of property, her interest will be protected, then when she contributes her services in the home, her interest in property accumulated should be protected." (Vallera v. Vallera, supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 686-687 (dis. opn.); see Bruch, op. cit., supra, 10 Family L.Q. 101, 110-114; Article, Illicit Cohabitation: The Impact of the Vallera and Keene Cases on the Rights of the Meretricious Spouse (1973) 6 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 354, 369-370; Comment (1972) 48 Wash.L.Rev. 635, 641.)

Thus as of 1973, the time of the filing of In re Marriage of Cary, supra, 34 Cal. App.3d 345, the cases apparently held that a nonmarital partner who rendered services in the absence of express contract could assert no right to property acquired during the relationship. The facts of Cary demonstrated the unfairness of that rule.

Janet and Paul Cary had lived together, unmarried, for more than eight years. They held themselves out to friends and family as husband and wife, reared four children, purchased a home and other property, obtained credit, filed joint income tax returns, and otherwise conducted themselves as though they were married. Paul worked outside the home, and Janet generally cared for the house and children.

In 1971 Paul petitioned for "nullity of the marriage."[17] Following a hearing on that petition, the trial court awarded Janet half the property acquired during the relationship, although all such property was traceable to Paul's earnings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the award.

Reviewing the prior decisions which had denied relief to the homemaking partner, the Court of Appeal reasoned that those decisions rested upon a policy of punishing persons guilty of cohabitation without marriage. The Family Law Act, the court observed, aimed to eliminate fault or guilt as a basis for dividing marital property. But once fault or guilt is excluded, the court reasoned, nothing distinguishes the property rights of a nonmarital "spouse" from those of a putative spouse. Since the latter is entitled to half the "`quasi marital property'" (Civ. Code, § 4452), the Court of Appeal concluded that, giving effect to the policy of the Family Law Act, a nonmarital cohabitator should also be entitled to half the property accumulated during an "actual family relationship." (34 Cal. App.3d at p. 353.)[18]

Cary met with a mixed reception in other appellate districts. In Estate of Atherley, supra, 44 Cal. App.3d 758, the Fourth District agreed with Cary that under the Family Law Act a nonmarital partner in an actual family relationship enjoys the same right to an equal division of property as a putative spouse. In Beckman v. Mayhew, supra, 49 Cal. App.3d 529, however, the Third District rejected Cary on the ground that the Family Law Act was not intended to change California law dealing with nonmarital relationships.

(9) If Cary is interpreted as holding that the Family Law Act requires an equal division of property accumulated in nonmarital "actual family relationships," then we agree with Beckman v. Mayhew that Cary distends the act. No language in the Family Law Act addresses the property rights of nonmarital partners, and nothing in the legislative history of the act suggests that the Legislature considered that subject.[19] The delineation of the rights of nonmarital partners before 1970 had been fixed entirely by judicial decision; we see no reason to believe that the Legislature, by enacting the Family Law Act, intended to change that state of affairs.

But although we reject the reasoning of Cary and Atherley, we share the perception of the Cary and Atherley courts that the application of former precedent in the factual setting of those cases would work an unfair distribution of the property accumulated by the couple. Justice Friedman in Beckman v. Mayhew, supra, 49 Cal. App.3d 529, 535, also questioned the continued viability of our decisions in Vallera and Keene; commentators have argued the need to reconsider those precedents.[20] We should not, therefore, reject the authority of Cary and Atherley without also examining the deficiencies in the former law which led to those decisions.

The principal reason why the pre-Cary decisions result in an unfair distribution of property inheres in the court's refusal to permit a nonmarital partner to assert rights based upon accepted principles of implied contract or equity. We have examined the reasons advanced to justify this denial of relief, and find that none have merit.

First, we note that the cases denying relief do not rest their refusal upon any theory of "punishing" a "guilty" partner. Indeed, to the extent that denial of relief "punishes" one partner, it necessarily rewards the other by permitting him to retain a disproportionate amount of the property. Concepts of "guilt" thus cannot justify an unequal division of property between two equally "guilty" persons.[21]

Other reasons advanced in the decisions fare no better. The principal argument seems to be that "[e]quitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of ... benefits attending the status of marriage ... are not present [in a nonmarital relationship]." (Vallera v. Vallera, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 685.) But, although parties to a nonmarital relationship obviously cannot have based any expectations upon the belief that they were married, other expectations and equitable considerations remain. The parties may well expect that property will be divided in accord with the parties' own tacit understanding and that in the absence of such understanding the courts will fairly apportion property accumulated through mutual effort. We need not treat nonmarital partners as putatively married persons in order to apply principles of implied contract, or extend equitable remedies; we need to treat them only as we do any other unmarried persons.[22]

The remaining arguments advanced from time to time to deny remedies to the nonmarital partners are of less moment. There is no more reason to presume that services are contributed as a gift than to presume that funds are contributed as a gift; in any event the better approach is to presume, as Justice Peters suggested, "that the parties intend to deal fairly with each other." (Keene v. Keene, supra, 57 Cal.2d 657, 674 (dissenting opn.); see Bruch, op. cit., supra, 10 Family L.Q. 101, 113.)

The argument that granting remedies to the nonmarital partners would discourage marriage must fail; as Cary pointed out, "with equal or greater force the point might be made that the pre-1970 rule was calculated to cause the income-producing partner to avoid marriage and thus retain the benefit of all of his or her accumulated earnings." (34 Cal. App.3d at p. 353.) Although we recognize the well-established public policy to foster and promote the institution of marriage (see Deyoe v. Superior Court (1903) 140 Cal. 476, 482 [74 P. 28]), perpetuation of judicial rules which result in an inequitable distribution of property accumulated during a nonmarital relationship is neither a just nor an effective way of carrying out that policy.

In summary, we believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship to the instant case. As we have explained, the nonenforceability of agreements expressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that such conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the nonmarital relationship of today to such a subject matter is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different practice.

We are aware that many young couples live together without the solemnization of marriage, in order to make sure that they can successfully later undertake marriage. This trial period,[23] preliminary to marriage, serves as some assurance that the marriage will not subsequently end in dissolution to the harm of both parties. We are aware, as we have stated, of the pervasiveness of nonmarital relationships in other situations.

The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many. Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out that the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution. The joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.

(8b) We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship should be removed. As we have explained, the courts now hold that express agreements will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious consideration. We add that in the absence of an express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of other remedies in order to protect the parties' lawful expectations.[24]

The courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture (see Estate of Thornton (1972) 81 Wn.2d 72 [499 P.2d 864]), or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may, when appropriate, employ principles of constructive trust (see Omer v. Omer (1974) 11 Wash. App. 386 [523 P.2d 957]) or resulting trust (see Hyman v. Hyman (Tex.Civ.App. 1954) 275 S.W.2d 149). Finally, a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable value of support received if he can show that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward. (See Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, supra, 39 Cal.2d 458, 462.)[25]

Since we have determined that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for breach of an express contract, and, as we have explained, can be amended to state a cause of action independent of allegations of express contract,[26] we must conclude that the trial court erred in granting defendant a judgment on the pleadings.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.[27]

Wright, C.J., McComb, J., Mosk, J., Sullivan, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.

CLARK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

The majority opinion properly permit recovery on the basis of either express or implied in fact agreement between the parties. These being the issues presented, their resolution requires reversal of the judgment. Here, the opinion should stop.

This court should not attempt to determine all anticipated rights, duties and remedies within every meretricious relationship — particularly in vague terms. Rather, these complex issues should be determined as each arises in a concrete case.

The majority broadly indicate that a party to a meretricious relationship may recover on the basis of equitable principles and in quantum meruit. However, the majority fail to advise us of the circumstances permitting recovery, limitations on recovery, or whether their numerous remedies are cumulative or exclusive. Conceivably, under the majority opinion a party may recover half of the property acquired during the relationship on the basis of general equitable principles, recover a bonus based on specific equitable considerations, and recover a second bonus in quantum meruit.

The general sweep of the majority opinion raises but fails to answer several questions. First, because the Legislature specifically excluded some parties to a meretricious relationship from the equal division rule of Civil Code section 4452, is this court now free to create an equal division rule? Second, upon termination of the relationship, is it equitable to impose the economic obligations of lawful spouses on meretricious parties when the latter may have rejected matrimony to avoid such obligations? Third, does not application of equitable principles — necessitating examination of the conduct of the parties — violate the spirit of the Family Law Act of 1969, designed to eliminate the bitterness and acrimony resulting from the former fault system in divorce? Fourth, will not application of equitable principles reimpose upon trial courts the unmanageable burden of arbitrating domestic disputes? Fifth, will not a quantum meruit system of compensation for services — discounted by benefits received — place meretricious spouses in a better position than lawful spouses? Sixth, if a quantum meruit system is to be allowed, does fairness not require inclusion of all services and all benefits regardless of how difficult the evaluation?

When the parties to a meretricious relationship show by express or implied in fact agreement they intend to create mutual obligations, the courts should enforce the agreement. However, in the absence of agreement, we should stop and consider the ramifications before creating economic obligations which may violate legislative intent, contravene the intention of the parties, and surely generate undue burdens on our trial courts.

By judicial overreach, the majority perform a nunc pro tunc marriage, dissolve it, and distribute its property on terms never contemplated by the parties, case law or the Legislature.
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Re: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenberg On a Complicate

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Part 2 of 2

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Notes:

[1] "The 1970 census figures indicate that today perhaps eight times as many couples are living together without being married as cohabited ten years ago." (Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation (1974) 25 Hastings L.J. 1226.)

[2] When the case was called for trial, plaintiff asked leave to file an amended complaint. The proposed complaint added two causes of action for breach of contract against Santa Ana Records, a corporation not a party to the action, asserting that Santa Ana was an alter ego of defendant. The court denied leave to amend, and plaintiff claims that the ruling was an abuse of discretion. We disagree; plaintiff's argument was properly rejected by the Court of Appeal in the portion of its opinion quoted below.

No error was committed in denial of plaintiff's motion, made on the opening day set for trial, seeking leave to file a proposed amended complaint which would have added two counts and a new defendant to the action. As stated by plaintiff's counsel at the hearing, "[T]here is no question about it that we seek to amend the Complaint not on the eve of trial but on the day of trial."

In Hayutin v. Weintraub, 207 Cal. App.2d 497 [24 Cal. Rptr. 761], the court said at pages 508-509 in respect to such a motion that had it been granted, it "would have required a long continuance for the purpose of canvassing wholly new factual issues, a redoing of the elaborate discovery procedures previously had, all of which would have imposed upon defendant and his witnesses substantial inconvenience ... and upon defendant needless and substantial additional expense.... The court did not err in denying leave to file the proposed amended complaint." (See also: Nelson v. Specialty Records, Inc., 11 Cal. App.3d 126, 138-139 [89 Cal. Rptr. 540]; Moss Estate Co. v. Adler, 41 Cal.2d 581, 585 [261 P.2d 732]; Vogel v. Thrifty Drug Co., 43 Cal.2d 184, 188 [272 P.2d 1].) "The ruling of the trial judge will not be disturbed upon appeal absent a showing by appellant of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (Nelson v. Specialty Records, Inc., supra, 11 Cal. App.3d at p. 139.) No such showing here appears.

[3] The colloquy between court and counsel at argument on the motion for judgment on the pleadings suggests that the trial court held the 1964 agreement violated public policy because it derogated the community property rights of Betty Marvin, defendant's lawful wife. Plaintiff, however, offered to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their contract after defendant and Betty were divorced. The trial court denied leave to amend, a ruling which suggests that the court's judgment must rest upon some other ground than the assertion that the contract would injure Betty's property rights.

[4] Defendant also contends that the contract was illegal because it contemplated a violation of former Penal Code section 269a, which prohibited living "in a state of cohabitation and adultery." (§ 269a was repealed by Stats. 1975, ch. 71, eff. Jan. 1, 1976.) Defendant's standing to raise the issue is questionable because he alone was married and thus guilty of violating section 269a. Plaintiff, being unmarried could neither be convicted of adulterous cohabitation nor of aiding and abetting defendant's violation. (See In re Cooper (1912) 162 Cal. 81, 85-86 [121 P. 318].)

The numerous cases discussing the contractual rights of unmarried couples have drawn no distinction between illegal relationships and lawful nonmarital relationships. (Cf. Weak v. Weak (1962) 202 Cal. App.2d 632, 639 [21 Cal. Rptr. 9] (bigamous marriage).) Moreover, even if we were to draw such a distinction — a largely academic endeavor in view of the repeal of section 269a — defendant probably would not benefit; his relationship with plaintiff continued long after his divorce became final, and plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to assert that the parties reaffirmed their contract after the divorce.

[5] Defendant urges that all of the cited cases, with the possible exception of In re Marriage of Foster, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d 577 and Bridges v. Bridges, supra, 125 Cal. App.2d 359, can be distinguished on the ground that the partner seeking to enforce the contract contributed either property or services additional to ordinary homemaking services. No case, however, suggests that a pooling agreement in which one partner contributes only homemaking services is invalid, and dictum in Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, supra, 95 Cal. App.2d 599, 603 [213 P.2d 727] states the opposite. A promise to perform homemaking services is, of course, a lawful and adequate consideration for a contract (see Taylor v. Taylor (1954) 66 Cal. App.2d 390, 398 [152 P.2d 480]) — otherwise those engaged in domestic employment could not sue for their wages — and defendant advances no reason why his proposed distinction would justify denial of enforcement to contracts supported by such consideration. (See Tyranski v. Piggins (1973) 44 Mich. App. 570 [205 N.W.2d 595, 597].)

[6] Although not cited by defendant, the only California precedent which supports his position is Heaps v. Toy (1942) 54 Cal. App.2d 178 [128 P.2d 813]. In that case the woman promised to leave her job, to refrain from marriage, to be a companion to the man, and to make a permanent home for him; he agreed to support the woman and her child for life. The Court of Appeal held the agreement invalid as a contract in restraint of marriage (Civ. Code, § 1676) and, alternatively, as "contrary to good morals" (Civ. Code, § 1607). The opinion does not state that sexual relations formed any part of the consideration for the contract, nor explain how — unless the contract called for sexual relations — the woman's employment as a companion and housekeeper could be contrary to good morals.

The alternative holding in Heaps v. Toy, supra, finding the contract in that case contrary to good morals, is inconsistent with the numerous California decisions upholding contracts between nonmarital partners when such contracts are not founded upon an illicit consideration, and is therefore disapproved.

[7] Sections 169 and 169.2 were replaced in 1970 by Civil Code section 5118. In 1972 section 5118 was amended to provide that the earnings and accumulations of both spouses "while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."

[8] Defendant also contends that the contract is invalid as an agreement to promote or encourage divorce. (See 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed.) pp. 390-392 and cases there cited.) The contract between plaintiff and defendant did not, however, by its terms require defendant to divorce Betty, nor reward him for so doing. Moreover, the principle on which defendant relies does not apply when the marriage in question is beyond redemption (Glickman v. Collins (1975) 13 Cal.3d 852, 858-859 [120 Cal. Rptr. 76, 533 P.2d 204]); whether or not defendant's marriage to Betty was beyond redemption when defendant contracted with plaintiff is obviously a question of fact which cannot be resolved by judgment on the pleadings.

[9] Our review of the many cases enforcing agreements between nonmarital partners reveals that the majority of such agreements were oral. In two cases (Ferguson v. Schuenemann, supra, 167 Cal. App.2d 413; Cline v. Festersen, supra, 128 Cal. App.2d 380), the court expressly rejected defenses grounded upon the statute of frauds.

[10] A great variety of other arrangements are possible. The parties might keep their earnings and property separate, but agree to compensate one party for services which benefit the other. They may choose to pool only part of their earnings and property, to form a partnership or joint venture, or to hold property acquired as joint tenants or tenants in common, or agree to any other such arrangement. (See generally Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change (1974) 62 Cal.L.Rev. 1169.)

[11] We note that a deliberate decision to avoid the strictures of the community property system is not the only reason that couples live together without marriage. Some couples may wish to avoid the permanent commitment that marriage implies, yet be willing to share equally any property acquired during the relationship; others may fear the loss of pension, welfare, or tax benefits resulting from marriage (see Beckman v. Mayhew, supra, 49 Cal. App.3d 529). Others may engage in the relationship as a possible prelude to marriage. In lower socio-economic groups the difficulty and expense of dissolving a former marriage often leads couples to choose a nonmarital relationship; many unmarried couples may also incorrectly believe that the doctrine of common law marriage prevails in California, and thus that they are in fact married. Consequently we conclude that the mere fact that a couple have not participated in a valid marriage ceremony cannot serve as a basis for a court's inference that the couple intend to keep their earnings and property separate and independent; the parties' intention can only be ascertained by a more searching inquiry into the nature of their relationship.

[12] The cases did not clearly determine whether a nonmarital partner could recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services rendered. But when we affirmed a trial court ruling denying recovery in Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, supra, 39 Cal.2d 458, we did so in part on the ground that whether the partner "rendered her services because of expectation of monetary reward" (p. 462) was a question of fact resolved against her by the trial court — thus implying that in a proper case the court would allow recovery based on quantum meruit.

[13] The Family Law Act, in Civil Code section 4452, classifies property acquired during a putative marriage as "`quasi-marital property,'" and requires that such property be divided upon dissolution of the marriage in accord with Civil Code section 4800.

[14] The putative spouse need not prove that he rendered services in expectation of monetary reward in order to recover the reasonable value of those services. (Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, supra, 9 Cal.2d 95, 100.)

[15] The contrast between principles governing nonmarital and putative relationships appears most strikingly in Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, supra, 88 Cal. App.2d 708. When Mrs. Lazzarevich sued her husband for divorce in 1945, she discovered to her surprise that she was not lawfully married to him. She nevertheless reconciled with him, and the Lazzareviches lived together for another year before they finally separated. The court awarded her recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered, less the value of support received, until she discovered the invalidity of the marriage, but denied recovery for the same services rendered after that date.

[16] "Contracts may be express or implied. These terms however do not denote different kinds of contracts, but have reference to the evidence by which the agreement between the parties is shown. If the agreement is shown by the direct words of the parties, spoken or written, the contract is said to be an express one. But if such agreement can only be shown by the acts and conduct of the parties, interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances, then the contract is an implied one." (Skelly v. Bristol Sav. Bank (1893) 63 Conn. 83 [26 A. 474], quoted in 1 Corbin, Contracts (1963) p. 41.) Thus, as Justice Schauer observed in Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715 [299 P.2d 257], in a sense all contracts made in fact, as distinguished from quasi-contractual obligations, are express contracts, differing only in the manner in which the assent of the parties is expressed and proved. (See 46 Cal.2d at pp. 735-736.)

[17] The Court of Appeal opinion in In re Marriage of Cary, supra, does not explain why Paul Cary filed his action as a petition for nullity. Briefs filed with this court, however, suggest that Paul may have been seeking to assert rights as a putative spouse. In the present case, on the other hand, neither party claims the status of an actual or putative spouse. Under such circumstances an action to adjudge "the marriage" in the instant case a nullity would be pointless and could not serve as a device to adjudicate contract and property rights arising from the parties' nonmarital relationship. Accordingly, plaintiff here correctly chose to assert her rights by means of an ordinary civil action.

[18] The court in Cary also based its decision upon an analysis of Civil Code section 4452, which specifies the property rights of a putative spouse. Section 4452 states that if the "court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court should declare such party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and,... shall divide, in accordance with Section 4800, that property acquired during the union...." Since section 4800 requires an equal division of community property, Cary interpreted section 4452 to require an equal division of the property of a putative marriage, so long as one spouse believed in good faith that the marriage was valid. Thus under section 4452, Cary concluded, the "guilty spouse" (the spouse who knows the marriage is invalid) has the same right to half the property as does the "innocent" spouse.

Cary then reasoned that if the "guilty" spouse to a putative marriage is entitled to one-half the marital property, the "guilty" partner in a nonmarital relationship should also receive one-half of the property. Otherwise, the court stated, "We should be obliged to presume a legislative intent that a person, who by deceit leads another to believe a valid marriage exists between them, shall be legally guaranteed half of the property they acquire even though most, or all, may have resulted from the earnings of the blameless partner. At the same time we must infer an inconsistent legislative intent that two persons who, candidly with each other, enter upon an unmarried family relationship, shall be denied any judicial aid whatever in the assertion of otherwise valid property rights." (34 Cal. App.3d at p. 352.)

This reasoning in Cary has been criticized by commentators. (See Note, op. cit., supra, 25 Hastings L.J. 1226, 1234-1235; Comment, In re Marriage of Carey [sic]: The End of the Putative-Meretricious Spouse Distinction in California (1975) 12 San Diego L.Rev. 436, 444-446.) The commentators note that Civil Code section 4455 provides that an "innocent" party to a putative marriage can recover spousal support, from which they infer that the Legislature intended to give only the "innocent" spouse a right to one-half of the quasi-marital property under section 4452.

We need not now resolve this dispute concerning the interpretation of section 4452. Even if Cary is correct in holding that a "guilty" putative spouse has a right to one-half of the marital property, it does not necessarily follow that a nonmarital partner has an identical right. In a putative marriage the parties will arrange their economic affairs with the expectation that upon dissolution the property will be divided equally. If a "guilty" putative spouse receives one-half of the property under section 4452, no expectation of the "innocent" spouse has been frustrated. In a nonmarital relationship, on the other hand, the parties may expressly or tacitly determine to order their economic relationship in some other manner, and to impose community property principles regardless of such understanding may frustrate the parties' expectations.

[19] Despite the extensive material available on the legislative history of the Family Law Act neither Cary nor plaintiff cites any reference which suggests that the Legislature ever considered the issue of the property rights of nonmarital partners, and our independent examination has uncovered no such reference.

[20] See Bruch, op. cit., supra, 10 Family L.Q. 101, 113; Article, op. cit., supra, 6 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 354; Comment (1975) 6 Golden Gate L.Rev. 179, 197-201; Comment, op. cit., supra, 12 San Diego L.Rev. 436; Note, op. cit., supra, 25 Hastings L.J. 1226, 1246.

[21] Justice Finley of the Washington Supreme Court explains: "Under such circumstances [the dissolution of a nonmarital relationship], this court and the courts of other jurisdictions have, in effect, sometimes said, `We will wash our hands of such disputes. The parties should and must be left to their own devices, just where they find themselves.' To me, such pronouncements seem overly fastidious and a bit fatuous. They are unrealistic and, among other things, ignore the fact that an unannounced (but nevertheless effective and binding) rule of law is inherent in any such terminal statements by a court of law. The unannounced but inherent rule is simply that the party who has title, or in some instances who is in possession, will enjoy the rights of ownership of the property concerned. The rule often operates to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd, who wind up with possession of the property, or title to it in their names, at the end of a so-called meretricious relationship. So, although the courts proclaim that they will have nothing to do with such matters, the proclamation in itself establishes, as to the parties involved, an effective and binding rule of law which tends to operate purely by accident or perhaps by reason of the cunning, anticipatory designs of just one of the parties." (West v. Knowles (1957) 50 Wn.2d 311 [311 P.2d 689, 692] (conc. opn.).)

[22] In some instances a confidential relationship may arise between nonmarital partners, and economic transactions between them should be governed by the principles applicable to such relationships.

[23] Toffler, Future Shock (Bantam Books, 1971) page 253.

[24] We do not seek to resurrect the doctrine of common law marriage, which was abolished in California by statute in 1895. (See Norman v. Thomson (1898) 121 Cal. 620, 628 [54 P. 143]; Estate of Abate (1958) 166 Cal. App.2d 282, 292 [333 P.2d 200].) Thus we do not hold that plaintiff and defendant were "married," nor do we extend to plaintiff the rights which the Family Law Act grants valid or putative spouses; we hold only that she has the same rights to enforce contracts and to assert her equitable interest in property acquired through her effort as does any other unmarried person.

[25] Our opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate; the suitability of such remedies may be determined in later cases in light of the factual setting in which they arise.

[26] We do not pass upon the question whether, in the absence of an express or implied contractual obligation, a party to a nonmarital relationship is entitled to support payments from the other party after the relationship terminates.

[27] We wish to commend the parties and amici for the exceptional quality of the briefs and argument in this case.
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Re: Harvey Weinstein: 'Beautiful Girls' Scribe Scott Rosenbe

Postby admin » Fri Nov 03, 2017 7:57 pm

Harvey Weinstein wears blond wig and orange makeup while slurping soup in first sighting since rehab as NYPD detective says there is enough evidence to arrest mogul and DA assigns sex crimes prosecutor
by Chris Spargo
Dailymail.com
November 3, 2017

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Harvey Weinstein was spotted for the first time since he claimed to have entered rehab last month in Arizona

The disgraced mogul was seen eating soup at the Phoenix restaurant Chestnut with a friend, wearing a blond wig and orange makeup

Weinstein is reportedly receiving out-patient therapy after claims that he spent a week in rehab last month to treat his sex addiction

The detective leading the Weinstein investigation for the NYPD said that the evidence needed to make an arrest is in place after Paz de la Huerta's report

'I believe based on my interviews with Paz that from the NYPD. standpoint we have enough to make an arrest,' said Detective Nicholas DiGaudio

At the same time, the Manhattan District Attorney's office has assigned a senior sex crimes prosecutor to work on the case


Harvey Weinstein has been spotted for the first time since he claimed to have entered rehab in Arizona last month as he grabbed some food with a male friend on Thursday.

The disgraced mogul, 65, was seen slurping on some soup at Chestnut, a farm-to-table restaurant in Phoenix.

Weinstein managed to keep a low profile throughout the meal despite the fact that over 100 women have now accused him of sexual harassment and/or assault.

That feat was accomplished in large part because of his disguise, with Weinstein wearing a blond wig over his bald head and orange makeup covering his face before heading out in public.

His guest also appeared to be wearing a wig, with the man keeping a hand on the side of his head during their meal.

Weinstein has been in Arizona for close to a month, where he reportedly attended a week of in-patient rehab at an undisclosed location and is now receiving out-patient treatment.

Meanwhile, the New York Police Department has now gathered enough evidence and information to arrest Weinstein according to the detective leading the investigation.


At the same time, the Manhattan District Attorney's office has assigned a senior sex crimes prosecutor to work on the case.

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Table for two: Harvey Weinstein was spotted for the first time since he claimed to have entered rehab last month in Arizona

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Soup for you: Weinstein managed to keep a low profile throughout the meal despite the fact that over 100 women have now accused him of sexual harassment

These sudden developments within the NYPD and district attorney's office come after actress Paz de la Huerta filed a police report alleging that she was raped by Weinstein in 2010 on two occasions.

'I believe based on my interviews with Paz that from the N.Y.P.D. standpoint we have enough to make an arrest,' Detective Nicholas DiGaudio told Vanity Fair.


Detective DiGaudio is leading the investigation for the department, and has received reports from at least three women claiming they were sexually assaulted by Weinstein.

There has been no statute of limitations on rape, criminal sexual act or aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree in the state of New York since 2006, which means that de la Huerta has the strongest claim against Weinstein.

The assaults alleged by the other two women took place before that law was changed, which means that even if the district attorney's office files charges against Weinstein in those cases they could be tossed out of court by a judge.


New York County District Attorney Maxine B. Rosenthal has also been looking into de la Huerta's claims, with her lawyer confirming he turned over information and files to her office earlier this week.

Among the items turned over were notes from her therapist confirming that de la Huerta spoke about the alleged assault at the time.

'I recall you telling me that Harvey Weinstein was seeking sexual contact with you on more than one occasion with the promise of additional roles,' wrote SueAnne Piliero in a letter to the district attorney's office.

'I recall you reporting to me a sexual encounter with Harvey Weinstein involving intercourse in your apartment in 2010 that resulted in you feeling victimized. I recall you telling me that it felt coercive to you and that you didn’t want to have sex with him, but felt that you had to as he was a man of power and rank and you couldn’t say no to his sexual advances.'


On Friday, de la Huerta's lawyer Aaron Filler detailed his client's experience with Weinstein on 'Megyn Kelly Today.'

'She had known him for years because she met him when she was 14 years old when she did Cider House Rules, and she had seen him,' said Filler.

'She lived in the neighborhood in Tribecca, where he lives and right up the street from the Weinstein Company.'

Then, a decade after they met, the two ran into one another at a nightclub in the city, with Weinstein offering the actress a ride home.

De la Huerta was 25 at the time and Weinstein was 58.

When they got to the actress' building, Weinstein tried to make his way into her apartment, despite her pleas that he leave for the night said her lawyer.

'And they argued in front of the doorman. And as we've heard in the tape from the wire and from 2015 in New York [with Ambra Battilana], convinced her to let him in. And then, rape ensued.'


That was just the beginning though according to Filler.

'And following that, he began to call her, repeatedly and saying, "I'm waiting at your home. I'm in your lobby. I'm parked out front. When are you coming home?" And the doorman would warn her. She would stay away,' said Filler.

'She was afraid to come home.'

Another incident followed a short time later in Los Angeles said Filler, who seemed to struggle with his appearance on 'Today.'

'She decided to confront him and tell him you're a stalker. You raped me. You've got to stop. She confronted him in the hotel. She had come to meet him with some other people,' said Filler.

'And when she gave him the message. He exposed himself. And she left.'


'This has been going on for two months. And she decided she was going to confront him. She was very upset. The whole period of stalking and not being able to come home, day after day, really had tremendous impact on her.'

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Development: The detective leading the Weinstein investigation for the NYPD said that the evidence needed to make an arrest is in place after Paz de la Huerta's report (actress above in undated photo)

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In the beginning: De la Huerta first met Weinstein when she was 14 on the set of 'Cider House Rules' (de la Huerta above on set)

De la Huerta said on Thursday that Weinstein first raped her in October 2010, claiming that he joined her for a drink at her apartment after the two ran into one another at the Standard Hotel and then forced himself on her despite her protests.

'He stuck himself inside me,' said de la Huerta, noting that she was 'afraid and 'it all happened very quickly.'

She also stressed that it was non consensual.

'When he was done he said he’d be calling me. I kind of just laid on the bed in shock said the actress.

The second incident happened two months later when Weinstein came to her apartment after she had been drinking claims de la Huerta, who said she was therefore unable to give consent.


Charges were never filed against Weinstein the last time he was investigated for assault in 2015 by the NYPD, despite police sources saying they thought there was enough evidence to indict the mogul after passing off the case to the district attorney's office.

Three days after meeting with Battilana at their office, a spokesperson for Manhattan District Attorney Vance announced that the probe into the incident did not find enough evidence to pursue a case.

'This case was taken seriously from the outset, with a thorough investigation conducted by our sex crimes unit,' said Joan Vollero at the time.

'After analyzing the available evidence, including multiple interviews with both parties, a criminal charge is not supported.'

The New York Times revealed on last month that Weinstein surrounded himself with a very connected team of litigators before learning that charges would not be pursued in the case.

He retained Elkan Abramowitz, a former law partner of Vance, and Daniel S. Connolly, who was also a former prosecutor.

Linda Fairstein came on as a consultant and introduced Weinstein's lawyer Abramowitz to Martha Bashford, the head of the district attorney’s sex crimes bureau.


'Any allegations of non-consensual sex are unequivocally denied by Mr. Weinstein,' said his spokesperson Sallie Hofmeister in a statement shortly after the first exposes were released about his behavior.

'Mr. Weinstein has further confirmed that there were never any acts of retaliation against any women for refusing his advances.'

She went on to state: 'Mr. Weinstein obviously can’t speak to anonymous allegations, but with respect to any women who have made allegations on the record, Mr. Weinstein believes that all of these relationships were consensual.

'Mr. Weinstein has begun counseling, has listened to the community and is pursuing a better path. Mr. Weinstein is hoping that, if he makes enough progress, he will be given a second chance.'

There is still no confirmation that Weinstein ever entered rehab or sought counseling.

Employees at the Weinstein Company broke their silence for the first time since their boss and company founder had been accused of sexual harassment and assault by over 50 women late last month.

'We all knew that we were working for a man with an infamous temper. We did not know we were working for a serial sexual predator,' read an open letter sent to The New Yorker by 'Select Members of the Weinstein Company Staff.'

'We knew that our boss could be manipulative. We did not know that he used his power to systematically assault and silence women.'

The select staffers then stated: 'We had an idea that he was a womanizer who had extra-marital affairs. We did not know he was a violent aggressor and alleged rapist.'

The letter was included in a story detailing Harvey's final day in the office, with the group acknowledging it was written despite the fact that it is an open violation of the NDA in their contracts.
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