United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact

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MEDICAL CUSTOMER SHOPPING GUIDE (ALL SUPPLY CLASSES) AND THEATER ARMY MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (TAMMIS) INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAUDI ARABIA

1. In order to ensure more responsive medical supply support for units participating in Desert Shield, the Army Surgeon General's Office and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) have developed a Customer Shopping Guide for medical supplies. The shopping guide informs customers where current stocks are located and the levels of stockage. With this data, customers will be able to determine where they can obtain supplies in the time frames they need the supplies.

2. The TAMMIS Customer Guide (TAB A).

a. This document is a guide to customers to understand TAMMIS and products that TAMMIS provides to customers.

b. The TAMMIS Customer Reorder List (Page A-3 of the Customer Guide) is the key document for customers to manually communicate their request to the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center Saudi Arabia (USAMMCSA) or to their supporting Medical Supply, Optical and Maintenance Unit (MEDSOM). For items on the reorder list, the customer only needs to write in the quantity needed for an item. The USAMMCSA currently has four Customer Reorder Lists available that can be used by any customer.

(1) Army sick call list

(2) Army trauma treatment list

(3) All stocked drugs (6505)

(4) All stocked bandages and surgical supplies (6510-6515)

These lists are available in either stock number or nomenclature sequence.

c. Customers can receive a tailored Customer Reorder List for items they use.

d. Customers will automatically have items added to their reorder list each month as they order items that were not on their original list.

3. For your convenience the Customer Shopping Guide-Saudi Arabia is published in two sequences:

a. Nomenclature/alphabetical (TAB B) . b. National Stock number (TAB C) .

4. How to read the Customer Shopping Guide:

a. If an item has a quantity in the USAMMCSA column, it is stocked at the USAMMCSA and the delivery time should be seven days or less.

b. If an item has a quantity in the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center, Europe (USAMMCE) column, it is available in Europe and will have a routine delivery time of 14 to 24 days. All items stocked at USAMMCE are medical items frequently used by medical activities In Europe.

c. All items with a quantity in the Defense Personnel Support Center/USAMMA column will have a routine delivery time of between 21 and 32 days for normal requests.

MACK C. HILL
Colonel, MS
Commanding

3 Encls

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U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War
A Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration
United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session
May 25, 1994

Table of Contents

• Introduction
o FINDINGS
o RECOMMENDATIONS
• Chapter 1. Iraqi Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability
 Status of Iraqi Readiness to Use Chemical Weapons Against Coalition Force
 Destruction of Iraq's Chemicals and Chemical Weapons by the United Nations
 Chemical Warfare Doctrine and the Use of Combined Agent Warfare
 Chemical Nerve Agents
 Sarin (GB)
 Soman (GD)
 Tabun (GA)
 VX
 Vesicants and Blood Agents
 Lewisite
 Cyanogen Chloride
 Hydrogen Cyanide
 Blister Agents
 Mustard Gas
 Related Chemical Agent Information
 Biotoxins
 Biological Warfare Capability
 U.S. Exports of Biological Materials to Iran
 UNSCOM Biological Warfare Inspections
 Biological Warfare Defense
 Types of Biological Agents
 Dissemination of Biological Agents
 Defensive Measures
 Iraq's Experience in the Use of Chemical Warfare Agents
 Gulf War Syndrome: The Case for Chemical/Biological Agent Exposure
• Chapter 2. Group I Exposures: Reported Direct Exposure Events
o Reports by Coalition Forces of Iraqi Chemical Mines Located During Breaching Operations,
o Other Combat-Related Reports
o Conclusions
o Map: Approximate Locations of Direct Exposure Events
• Chapter 3. Reports of Exposure of Coalition Forces Resulting from the Fallout of the Bombings of Iraqi Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Facilities (Group II)
 The Czechoslovak Chemical Defense Unit in the Persian Gulf and the Results of the Investigations of the Military Use of Poisonous Gases
 Other Related Information
 U.S. Unofficial Reports of Downwind Exposure Due to CoalitionBombings of Iraqi Chemical and Biological Facilities
 Weather Reports, Climatic Information, and Imagery Smoke Plume Data
o Gulf War Weather
o Conclusions
• Chapter 4. Other Identifiable Exposures
 Chemical/Biological Warfare Pre-Treatment Drug Reaction
 Anthrax and Botulinum Toxoid Vaccines
 Pyridostigmine Bromide (Group III)
 Reported Contact with Iraqi Enemy Prisoners of War
 Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC)
 Depleted Uranium Ammunition
 Environmental Exposures
 Decontamination of Equipment Returned from the Persian Gulf Theater Operations
 Transmission
o Conclusions
 Chemical/Biological Warfare Agent Exposure: Why Wasn't Everyone Affected?
 Chemical/Biological Warfare Agent Exposure: Did the Military Know or Suspect that Individuals Were Exposed to these Hazardous Substances?
 The Need for Immediate Primary Scientific Research and Advanced Medical Research
 Conclusions
• Appendix A - Material Safety Data Sheets
o Chemical Nerve Agents
o Tabun (GA)
o Sarin (GB)
o Somain (GD)
o VX
o Blister Agents
o Sulfur Mustard (HD, THD)
o Sulfur Mustard (HT)

THIS REPORT IS DERIVED ENTIRELY FROM UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASED

UNLIMITED DISTRIBUTION IS AUTHORIZED

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U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

Staff Report on U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War

INTRODUCTION

In October 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which has Senate oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act (EAA), held an inquiry into the U.S. export policy to Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War. During that hearing it was learned that U.N. inspectors identified many U.S. - manufactured items exported pursuant to licenses issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce that were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and missile delivery system development programs.

On June 30, 1993, several veterans testified at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. There, they related details of unexplained events that took place during the Persian Gulf War which they believed to be chemical warfare agent attacks. After these unexplained events, many of the veterans present reported symptoms consistent with exposure to a mixed agent attack. Then, on July 29, 1993, the Czech Minister of Defense announced that a Czechoslovak chemical decontamination unit had detected the chemical warfare agent Sarin in areas of northern Saudi Arabia during the early phases of the Gulf War. They had attributed the detections to fallout from coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical warfare agent production facilities.

In August 1993, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald W. Riegle Jr. began to research the possibility that there may be a connection between the Iraqi chemical, biological, and radiological warfare research and development programs and a mysterious illness which was then being reported by thousands of returning Gulf War veterans. In September 1993, Senator Riegle released a staff report on this issue and introduced an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act that provided preliminary funding for research of the illnesses and investigation of reported exposures.

When this first staff report was released by Senator Riegle, the estimates of the number of veterans suffering from these unexplained illnesses varied from hundreds, according to the Department of Defense, to thousands, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is now believed that tens of thousands of U.S. veterans are suffering from a myriad of symptoms collectively labelled either Gulf War Syndrome, Persian Gulf Syndrome, or Desert War Syndrome. Hundreds and possibly thousands of servicemen and women still on active duty are reluctant to come forward for fear of losing their jobs and medical care. These Gulf War veterans are reporting muscle and joint pain, memory loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, nasal congestion, urinary urgency, diarrhea, twitching, rashes, sores, and a number of other symptoms.

They began experiencing these multiple symptoms during and after -- often many months after -- their tour of duty in the Gulf. A number of the veterans who initially exhibited these symptoms have died since returning from the Gulf. Perhaps most disturbingly, members of veteran's families are now suffering these symptoms to a debilitating degree. The scope and urgency of this crisis demands an appropriate response.

This investigation into Gulf War Syndrome, which was initiated by the Banking Committee under the direction of Chairman Riegle, has uncovered a large body of evidence linking the symptoms of the syndrome to the exposure of Gulf War participants to chemical and biological warfare agents, chemical and biological warfare pre-treatment drugs, and other hazardous materials and substances. Since the release of the first staff report on September 9, 1993, this inquiry has continued. Thousands of government officials, scientists, and veterans have been interviewed or consulted, and additional evidence has been compiled. This report will detail the findings of this ongoing investigation.

Since the Banking Committee began its inquiry, the position of the Department of Defense regarding the possible causes of Gulf War Syndrome has altered only when challenged with evidence that is difficult to dispute. Yet, despite the vast resources of the Department of Defense, several independent and congressional inquiries with limited resources continue to uncover additional evidence of hazardous exposures and suspicious events.

The Department of Defense, when first approached regarding this issue by Committee staff, contended that there was no evidence that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical warfare agents. However, during a telephone interview on September 7, 1993 with Walter Reed Army Medical Center commander Major General Ronald Blanck, Committee staff was informed that the issue of chemical and biological warfare agent exposure had not been explored because it was the position of "military intelligence" that such exposure never occurred.

Then, during a November 10, 1993 press briefing at the Pentagon, the Department of Defense acknowledged that the Czech government did detect chemical agents in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. After analyzing the results of the Czech report, the Department of Defense concluded that the detections were unrelated to the "mysterious health problems that have victimized some of our veterans." According to former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, in some cases the wind was wrong and the distances too great to suggest a link. For instance, Seabees serving to the south and east of the detection site have complained of persistent health problems; but according to the Pentagon, the wind was blowing in the other direction at the time of the detections and the concentrations were too low to do harm over that kind of a distance.

The fact is, no one has ever suggested that there was a link between the Czech detections and what occurred during the early morning hours of January 19, 1991 near the Port of Jubayl. (These two events will be described in detail in Chapter 2.) Former Defense Secretary Aspin said at the briefing that this incident could not have been from the Coalition bombings of the Iraqi chemical weapons facilities because the winds were blowing to the northwest. Yet according to available Soviet documents, the dispersal of chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by other factors in addition to surface wind direction and velocity, such as topography, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient, and atmospheric humidity. These factors all contribute to the size and type of dispersal that will be observed. [1] Unclassified visual and thermal satellite imagery confirms that the fallout from the bombings of Iraqi targets during the air and ground war moved to the southeast, with the weather patterns and upper atmospheric wind currents, towards Coalition force positions. (See Chapter 3.)

According to a knowledgeable source who has requested confidentiality, the Czechs believed that the detections were caused by the weather inversion which occurred that day (January 19, 1991) as the weather front moved southward. The Czechoslovak chemical detection unit reported this information to U.S. command officials immediately, but the responding units were unable to confirm their findings when they arrived, according to the Pentagon. Nonetheless, at the November 10, 1993 briefing, the Department of Defense admitted that the Czech detections were believed to be valid. The Department of Defense failed to disclose that the Czechoslovak chemical detection team also detected yperite (HD) that morning. The presence of both of these agents in such close proximity could only reasonably be the result of one of two possibilities: (1) direct Iraqi mixed agent attack, or (2) fallout from the Coalition bombings of Iraqi weapons facilities and storage bunkers.

Defense Department officials, having had possession of the Czech report for over a month, were at a loss to explain the chemical mustard agent detected by the Czechoslovak chemical detection team in the Saudi desert near King Khalid Military City on January 24, 1991. This despite the fact that both the Czechs and French claim that this detection was reported to U.S. command authorities during the Persian Gulf War. [2] Additionally, during the Gulf War, the Czechs claimed that they detected Chemical nerve agent after a Scud missile attack. These statements, heretofore only reported in the press, have been confirmed by a member of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and by an entire platoon of a U.S. Army chemical detection unit who trained with the Czechoslovak Chemical detection unit near King Khalid Military City. These reports have not been addressed publicly by the Department of Defense and will be addressed in this report in Chapter 3.

The contents of this report supports the conclusion that U.S. forces were exposed to some level of chemical and possibly biological warfare agents during their service in the Gulf War. Any review conducted by the Pentagon must extend far beyond the information being reported by the Czech Ministry of Defense. The Czech information, while important, represents just a small fraction of the evidence currently available, only some of which will be detailed in this report.

It is now the position of the Department of Defense that it has no other evidence that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical agents. Yet this report contains descriptions and direct eyewitness accounts that provide evidence which suggest that gas was detected, along with many other events which may have been actual attacks on U.S. forces.

This report supports the conclusion that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical agents. The assertion that the levels of nerve agents detected by the Czechs and others were not harmful is flawed. In subsequent requirements for chemical detection equipment, the Department of the Army acknowledges that the principal chemical agent detection alarm deployed during the war, the M8A1 was not sufficiently sensitive to detect sustained low levels of chemical agent and to monitor personnel for contamination. [3] Further, U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) indicate that chronic exposures to levels of over .0001 mg/m3 for Sarin (GB) is hazardous and requires the use of protective equipment. (See appendix A.) The minimum level of chemical agent required to activate chemical agent detection alarm M8A1, commonly in use during the war, exceeds this threshold by a factor of 1,000. [4] (See appendix A.) As the chemical agent alarms began to sound during the "air war," French, Czech, and many U.S. commanders confirmed that they were sounding from the fallout from the bombings. Over time, even at these levels, after repeatedly being told that there was no danger, many U.S. forces failed to take precautionary measures. Other report that the alarms were sounding so frequently that they were turned off. M8A1 alarms do not detect blister agents.

The findings of this report prepared at the request of Chairman Riegle detail many other events reported by U.S. servicemen and women that in some cases confirm the detection of chemical agents by U.S. forces. In other cases these reports indicate the need for further detailed investigation. But still the question remains: Is exposure to these and other chemical agents the cause of Gulf War Syndrome? We have received hundreds of reports that many of these symptoms are being experienced by family members. Numerous developments have taken place over the last several months which suggest that, while chemical agents and other environmental hazards may have contributed to the Gulf War illnesses, bacteriological, fungal, and possibly other biological illnesses may be the fundamental cause. This position is supported by the following.

First, Dr. Edward S. Hyman, a New Orleans bacteriologist, has treated a small number of the sick veterans and several of their wives for bacteriological infections, and has developed a protocol of treatment that has resulted in symptom abatement in many of his patients.

Second, during the November 10, 1993 unclassified briefing for Members of the U.S. Senate, in response to direct questioning, then Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch said that the Department of Defense was withholding classified information on the exposure of U.S. forces to biological materials. In a Department of Defense- sponsored conference on counter-proliferation, held at Los Alamos National Laboratory on 6-7 May, 1994, Dr. Deutch admitted that biological agent detection is a priority development area for the Department of Defense, since there currently is no biological agent detection system fielded with any U.S. forces anywhere in the world.

Third, the Department of Defense has named Dr. Joshua Lederberg to head its research team into the causes of Gulf War illnesses. Dr. Lederberg, among his other credits, is a Nobel Laureate and an expert in the fields of bacteriology, genetics, and biological warfare defenses.

Fourth, in detailed informational interviews conducted of 400 Gulf War veterans, it has been learned that over 3/4 of their spouses complain that they have begun to suffer from many of the same debilitating symptoms. (See Chapter 4.)

This report, like the one which preceded it, will discuss the relationship between the high rate of Gulf War illnesses among Group I individuals (those possibly exposed to a direct mixed agent event), and the lower rates among those in Group II (individuals exposed to the indirect fallout from coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear targets) and Group III (individuals who suffered severe adverse reactions to the nerve agent pre-treatment pills). Despite the varying rates of illness between the groups, however, the symptoms are similar. While other possible causes of the Gulf War Syndrome such as petrochemical poisoning, depleted uranium exposures, and regionally prevalent diseases, have been discussed elsewhere and must be pursued, there is a great deal of compelling evidence which indicates that all of these possibilities must now be seriously considered. We believe, however, that no other explanations prove as compelling as the ones which will be presented in this report.

This report includes a great number of first-hand accounts and other documentary evidence in addition to the anecdotal information that appeared in the print and electronic media during the Gulf War. It establishes convincingly that the Department of Defense assertions are inaccurate. We believe there is reliable evidence that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical and possibly biological agents. But regardless of whether U.S. forces were exposed or not, the entire official body of information, including all classified or heretofore unpublished information, available research data sets, case histories, and diagnostic breakdown information must be made available to independent civilian medical researchers in order to further the research into the causes of and treatments for these illnesses. Absent a release of information by the Department of Defense of the science which forms the bases for their theories, the Department of Defense position must be viewed by qualified scientists as anecdotal and unsubstantiated.

Given that there is also a growing body of evidence indicating that spouses and children of Gulf War veterans are vulnerable to similar illnesses, the Department of Defense must now share all of its information with civilian, non-governmental researchers. These family members are civilians who may be at risk. This illness was first reported over three years ago.

On February 9, 1994, Chairman Riegle sent a letter to Secretary of Defense William Perry asking that he release all U.S. military personnel from any oath of secrecy they may have taken regarding classified information specifically pertaining to chemical or biological warfare agent exposure in the Persian Gulf theater. This request was based on a recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences, National Institute of Medicine in their 1993 publication Veterans at Risk: The Health Effects of Mustard Gas and Lewisite. [5] On May 4, 1994, the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs responded to the Chairman's letter stating that there was no classified information on chemical or biological detections or exposures. This directly contradicts the statement of Deputy Secretary Deutch in his November 10, 1993 unclassified briefing to Members and staff.

Why isn't the Department of Defense aggressively pursuing the answers to the questions surrounding of the events which may have caused illnesses being suffered by many Gulf War veterans? One possible explanation lies in a 1982 article. [6] Then Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower wrote, "Chemical training in the United States armed forces is, at best, perfunctory. It is rarely conducted in a simulated contaminated environment and stocks of individual protective equipment are too limited, and therefore too valuable, to risk them in the numbers necessary to allow troops to operate in them for realistic training. As a result, most U.S. personnel are relegated to a minimal and highly artificial exposure to the problems and hardships entailed in performing their respective combat missions should they have to 'button up'." As numerous U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reports have noted, the U.S. was not much better prepared prior to the Gulf War than it was when Senator Tower wrote in his article. [7]

According to Senator Tower, "Our greatest casualties will not be caused by direct exposure to chemical agents, but by the physical and mental disruption their use will cause our tactical planning and deployment. Certainly, physical on-the-ground contamination and casualties will exist, but their most decisive effect will be their mental intimidation and our unwillingness to operate in the chemical environment. This lack of confidence in our ability to operate in such conditions could be rapidly exploited by Soviet units having no such qualms." This lack of confidence could also have been exploited by the Soviet-trained Iraqi forces, who have an extensive history in the use of chemical and biological warfare.

If the Department of Defense intended to conceal these exposures during the Gulf War to avoid the physical and mental disruption their use would have had on our tactical planning and deployment, their actions would have been understandable. Hoping to avoid responsibility for the casualties of this conflict, however, is quite another matter. Our afflicted veterans are sick and suffering, and some have died. Others are now destitute, having spent tens of thousands of dollars, depleting their life savings, in an unsuccessful search for an explanation for their ailments. Our enemies surely know the extent of our vulnerabilities. They would not hesitate to exploit them, nor would they hesitate to reveal them to others. The veterans of the Gulf War have asked us for nothing more than the assistance they have earned. Our refusal to come to their immediate assistance can only lead others to question the integrity of the nation they serve.

The following is a summary of the findings and recommendations of this report:

FINDINGS:

1. Iraq had a highly-developed chemical warfare program with:

• numerous large production facilities;
• binary (precursor chemical/solvent) capabilities;
• stockpiled agents and weapons;
• multiple and varied delivery systems; and,
• a documented history of chemical warfare agent use.

2. Iraq had an offensive biological weapons program with:

• multiple research/production facilities;
• evidence of weaponization experimentation; and,
• a history of reported but unconfirmed use.

3. The United States provided the Government of Iraq with "dual use" licensed materials which assisted in the development of Iraqi chemical, biological, and missile-system programs, including: [8]

• chemical warfare agent precursors;
• chemical warfare agent production facility plans and technical drawings (provided as pesticide production facility plans)
• chemical warhead filling equipment;
• biological warfare related materials;
• missile fabrication equipment; and,
• missile-system guidance equipment

4. The United States military planned for the use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq by:

• discussing the chemical/biological threat in pre-war threat assessments;
• designating chemical/biological production facilities priority bombing targets;
• assigning a very high priority to SCUD missile units; and,
• conferring with the U.S. national laboratories about the hazards associated with the bombings of the chemical, biological, nuclear weapons facilities.

5. The United States military made preparations for the expected use of chemical/biological weapons by Iraq, including:

• acquiring German-made FOX NBC detection surveillance vehicles shortly before the war;
• deploying as part of standard operating procedure, automatic chemical agent alarms, chemical agent detection equipment, chemical decontamination equipment, and chemical agent protection suits, gloves, boots, and masks;
• administering anthrax vaccines, an experimental botulinum toxin vaccine, and pyridostigmine bromide as a nerve agent pretreatment pill; and
• preparing and using personnel medical questionnaires asking soldiers departing the theater about their health and whether or not they believed they were exposed to chemical or germ warfare.

U.S. General Accounting Office reports issued after the war noted deficiencies in U.S. military medical preparations for chemical/biological warfare, including potential shortages of vaccines, NBC equipment, and NBC capability.

6. United States and Coalition Forces did detect chemical warfare agents in conjunction with definable events, including:

• multiple chemical alarms sounding repeatedly with the onset of the air war, and directly attributed by multiple official and unofficial sources to the fallout from the bombings of Iraqi chemical facilities;
• multiple chemical agent alarm soundings and chemical detections after both missile attacks or otherwise unexplained explosions;
• Czechoslovak, French, and British unit detections and reporting of chemical/biological agents in the air, in puddles on the ground, after SCUD attacks, and from artillery or chemical mine explosions;
• U.S. units detected and/or reported chemical agents in the air, as a result of SCUD missile attacks, after artillery or mine explosions, and from Iraqi munitions bunkers;
• multiple eyewitness reporting and corroboration of a number of direct attacks as well as ongoing alarms due to fallout from the Coalition bombings; and,
• news reports during the war confirming that U.S. units made detections of chemical agents which they believed were the result of Coalition bombings.

7. U.S. and Coalition Forces were exposed to fallout from Coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities, as evidenced by:

• pre-war concerns requiring consultations with the U.S. national laboratories regarding the fallout expected from the bombings;
• post-war assessments of the degree of damage to these facilities and the quantities of agents which survived the Coalition attacks;
• official weather documents showing a continual movement from Iraq of weather patterns down across Coalition troop emplacements throughout the air and ground wars;
• chemical alarms that began sounding nearly contemporaneous with the initiation of the air war, and actual chemical detections confirming the reasons for the alarm soundings; and,
• then Secretary of Defense Aspin's December 1993 comments that the U.S. needed to develop bombs that could target chemical and biological warfare facilities without releasing large amounts of agent into the air.

8. Wartime and post-war discoveries support the conclusion that Iraq had chemical and possibly biological weapons deployed with front line units and was prepared to use them, as evidenced by:

• UNSCOM findings of large and well-financed chemical and biological warfare programs, including large stocks of missiles, artillery, aerial bombs, rockets, and mines;
• Y.S. military unit reports of finding chemical munitions in the forward area, including artillery, mines, and bulk agents;
• captured Iraqi documents purportedly containing orders to use chemical weapons (documents currently being independently verified);
• reported British intercepts of Iraqi communications giving orders to use chemical weapons at the onset of the ground war; and,
• UNSCOM reports of the discovery and subsequent destruction of 28 Scuds with chemical agent warheads — obtained from the Soviet Union.

9. Use of biological weapons during the war can only be inferred at this time because:

• no biological agent detectors are available for or fielded with any U.S. or Coalition forces;
• no samples are known to have been collected in situ or from sick military personnel or animals for testing for the presence of biological agents; and,
• current test results from sick veterans and contaminated equipment are not yet publicly available.

10. The symptomology of the Gulf War veterans is consistent with exposure to a chemical/biological exposure explanation, illustrated by:

• large body of common symptoms; and,
• distribution of illness that appear related to source of exposures, whether by proximity to an explosion, fallout, reaction to pills, contact with EPWs, contact with contaminated vehicles and equipment, or prolonged exposure to sick veterans.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All classified information regarding events before, during, and after the war relating to:

• the nature of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare development programs,
• the deployment of these materials, the location of Iraqi chemical/biological forces, equipment and weapons;
• the intentional use of, inadvertent dispersal of, and destruction of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare agents; and,
• the detection or confirmation of chemical or biological agents should be immediately reviewed for declassification and released by the Department of Defense.

2. The massive amounts of testing data already collected by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs relating to the complaints of Persian Gulf War veterans should be made available to medical researchers and physicians treating these veterans and their family members.

3. A thorough and detailed epidemiological study involving all Gulf War veterans should be conducted by the Department of Defense to determine the origins and causes of the illnesses and the reported transmission of the symptoms to family members.

4. Independent testing of samples is needed from:

• ground sites in Iraq and Kuwait;
• sick veterans and affected family members; and,
• contaminated equipment

5. A post-conflict assessment of die impact of administration of cholinesterase inhibitors in a nerve agent pre-treatment program should be conducted. Particular attention should be focused on the potential synergistic or even potentiation effects administration of these drugs might produce when combined with other hazardous exposures.

6. Presumption of service-connection for the purposes of medical treatment and determining disability, compensation and vocational rehabilitation eligibility (until a diagnostic protocol can be established).

7. The Department of Veterans Affairs claims and appeals process must be streamlined.

8. Government financed health care (when no other medical insurance is available) for spouses and children determined to have contracted a service-connected illness from a Gulf War veteran.

9. Development of appropriate diagnostic and treatment protocols both on the battlefield and in identifying post-conflict casualties.

10. Greater efforts to develop NBC detectors, vaccines, personnel protective equipment, and decontamination equipment .

_______________

Notes:

1. United States, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, August 1982), 7-13; Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine, Military and Historical Experience, 1915-1991 (Boulder, Co.; Westview Press, 1992), 142-143.

2. Congressional Record, 103d Congress, Second Session, Vol. 140, No. 30, "Senator Shelby's Conclusions on the Persian Gulf Syndrome (March 17, 1994), S3098-S3106;

3. DAAA15-90-R-0020, Appendix 2, "Revised Joint Service Operational Requirement (JSOR) for an Advanced Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA), 85.

4. According to the manufacturer of the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Detection Alarm "the G-Agent sensitivity requirement is that the alarm must sound within 2 minutes when exposed to 0.1 milligram per cubic meter (mg/m3)." The M8A1 alarm does not detect chemical blister agents.

This information was confirmed by the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Edgewood, Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010. According to the U.S. Army the sensitivity capacity for the M43A1 detector unit (detection component of the M8A1 alarm) is; GA, GB, GD - 0.1 - 0.2 mg/m3 VX - 0.4 mg/m3

The required response time for these levels is 10 minutes, however actual performance is a response time of approximately 2 minutes to detect at these levels The capability and specifications of this unit are not classified.

5/ Constance M. Pechura and David P. Rall, eds., Veterans at Risk: The Health Effects of Mustard Gas and Lewisite, (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993), 8.

6. Senator John G. Tower, "The Politics of Chemical Deterrence," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Spring 1982).

7. For further information see the following General Accounting Office (GAO) reports:

Chemical Warfare: Soldiers Inadequately Equipped and Trained to Conduct Chemical Operations. GAO/NSIAD-91-197 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1991).

Operation Desert Storm: POD Met Need for Chemical Suits and Masks, but Longer Term Action Needed. GAO/NSIAD-92- 116 (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, April 7, 1992)

Operation Desert Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal with Depleted Uranium Contamination. GAO/NSIAD-93-90 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 29, 1993)

Operation Desert Storm: Problems with Air Force Medical Readiness. GAO/NSIAD-94-58, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 30, 1993).

Operation Desert Storm: Army Medical Supply Issues . GAO/NSIAD-93-206, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 11, 1993).

Operation Desert Storm: Improvements Required in the Navy's Wartime Medical Care Program. GAO/NSIAD-93-189 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 28, 1993).

Operation Desert Storm: Full Army Medical Capability not Achieved. GAO/NSIAD-92-175 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 18, 1992,GAO/NSIAD-92-8 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 5, 1992

8. See "United States Export Policy Toward Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait," Senate Report 102-996, Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Congress, Second Session (October 27, 1992)

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Chapter 1. Iraqi Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability (Part 1)

Over the last ten years, Iraq, a signatory to both the Geneva Protocols of 1925 (prohibiting the use of poisoned gas) and the Biological Warfare Convention of 1972 (banning biological weapons), has expended an enormous amount of research and energy in developing these and other prohibited weapons.

Iraq was believed to have been manufacturing mustard gas at a production facility in Samarra since the early 1980s. It also began an extensive program to produce nerve agent precursor chemicals, taking advantage of its own natural resources. Phosphate mines/industries are at Akashat, Al Qaim, and Rutbah. [1]The Iraqi Al Fallujah gas warfare complex was believed to be capable of producing up to 1,000 tons per month of Sarin, as well as the nerve agent VX. [2] In addition, with the assistance of foreign firms, Iraq developed the capability to experiment with hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and lewisite. [3] By the start of the Gulf War, Iraqi forces had developed chemical delivery capabilities for rifle grenades, 81mm mortars, 152mm, 130mm, and 122mm artillery rounds; bombs; 90mm air-to-ground rockets; 216 kilogram FROG and 555 kilogram SCUD warheads; and possibly land mines and cruise missiles. [4]

On July 30, 1991, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, director of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), charged with overseeing the elimination of Iraq's chemical and nuclear arsenals, told the Security Council that the U.N. inspectors had found chemical warheads armed with nerve gas. Mr. Ekeus claimed that some warheads found were already fitted onto the SCUD missiles. [5]

Iraq's chemical warfare capability was known to the U.S. government before the war. A month before the war began, then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Webster estimated that Iraq possessed 1,000 tons of poisonous chemical agents, much of it capable of being loaded into two types of missiles: the FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) and the SCUD B(SS-1). [6] Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems lists warhead capabilities for the FROG-7 as high explosive (HE), chemical, or nuclear, and for the Iraqi versions of the SCUD as probably HE or chemical. [7]

Status of Iraqi Readiness to Use Chemical Weapons Against Coalition Forces

In March 1991, Molly Moore reported from Jubayl, Saudi Arabia that Marine Commanders found no indications of chemical weapons stockpiles on the battlefields of Kuwait. According to a Washington Post report that day, (March 7, 1991), U.S. intelligence analysts claimed that these weapons "never got distributed down to the battlefield" from storage sites north of the Euphrates River. [8] A U.S. military intelligence source stated in March 1991 that "it was a matter of not deploying chemical weapons, rather than not having them, ....my guess .... is they never managed to get it down to division level." [9]

Regarding the presence of chemical weapons and Iraqi readiness to use them against Coalition forces, Committee staff has received the following information:

Dale Glover, of the 1165th Military Police Company, was with the 7th Corps, approximately 75 miles inside Iraq, when they came upon a destroyed artillery site. They entered a bunker that was half uncovered by the bombing. Inside there was a very strong ammonia smell. They discovered leaking chemical munitions inserts packed inside aluminum casings. A test confirmed a blister agent. They went back to their unit and reported what they had found. Mr. Glover recalled that "they didn't get back to us for 2- 3 hours, then told us it was a false positive, nothing to be concerned about." However, he said, within hours they were ordered to move from the location where they were camped, about three miles from the bunker. Mr. Glover recalled that they had been at that position only a couple of weeks and had not expected to move that soon. When questioned if the site they discovered was south of the Euphrates, he confirmed that it was. [10]

Another source who identified himself to the Committee but wishes to remain anonymous has informed Committee staff that he also was with the 7th Corps in southern Iraq. Somewhere between As Salman and Bashra (in a position south of the Euphrates River), his unit came upon bunkers containing crates of substances that "made you choke, made you want to throw up, burned your eyes. It smelled like ammonia, only a lot stronger." He could not approach the crates without experiencing immediate breathing problems. He said these crates were leaking. [11]

Chris Alan Kornkven was a Staff Sergeant with the 340th Combat Support Company during the Persian Gulf War. He reported to Committee staff that a U.S. military doctor at the 312th Evacuation Hospital told him that doctors at the hospital had been speaking with Iraqi officers. According to these doctors, the Iraqi officers said that they had chemical weapons at the front, and had authorization to use them, but that the winds in their area were blowing the wrong way. [12]

Several press sources carried reports of encounters with chemical mines by the 2nd Marine Division during the initial mine field breaching operation early on February 24, 1991. According to the Chicago Tribune, which interviewed officers and enlisted Marines involved in the operation, a FOX vehicle confirmed positive readings for a nerve agent and for a mustard gas. A second detecting device gave the same positive reading. General Keys, the 2nd Division commander, and Colonel Livingston, commander of the 6th Marine Regiment, told reporters they believed it was possible that a chemical mine was blown up or hit. [13] General Schwarzkopf told reporters he considered the reports "bogus." [14]

British troops also discovered Iraqi chemical mines on the Gulf battlefield, according to Gannett News Service. A British official (not further identified) said the incident was reported to Prime Minister John Major's war cabinet; no details were given. [15]

Press reports indicate Iraqi readiness to use these weapons against Coalition forces. The British Sunday Times reported on January 27, 1991, that American intelligence detected greatly increased activity at Iraq's main chemical plant at Samarra in the last week of December, and the British Ministry of Defense said that the Allies believe that Iraq "may have as many as 100,000 artillery shells filled with chemicals and several tons (of bulk agent) stored near the front line." According to the Times report, a British Ministry of Defense official said: "The plant was at peak activity and the chemicals were distributed to the troops in Kuwait and elsewhere in theatre." The Times reported that an unnamed Pentagon source said that Hussein had given front-line commanders permission to use these weapons at their discretion, and that "it was no longer a question of if, but when." [16]

Iraqi soldiers captured by the British units also informed the allies that before the war started, Iraq distributed substantial supplies of chemical weapons along the front lines to be held for the ground war. [17] According to Newsweek, U.S. intelligence sources had reported that Saddam Hussein had ordered his commanders to fire chemical weapons as soon as the allies launched a ground offensive. [18] A British signals officer was reported to have said that "we were tuned into the Iraqi command radio net. We heard them give the release order to their front-line troops to use chemical weapons against Rhino Force if it crossed the border." [19]

Destruction of Iraq's Chemicals and Chemical Weapons by the United Nations

In April 1993, weapons inspectors from the United Nations charged with locating all of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by U.N. Resolution 687, confirmed that in Muthanna, 65 miles northwest of Baghdad, Iraq manufactured a form of mustard gas as well as Sarin and Tabun, both nerve agents. This vast desert complex was the nucleus of Iraq's chemical weapons program. During the allied bombing in the early days of the Gulf War, Muthanna was a priority target. It was repeatedly attacked and production sites were destroyed. As United Nations inspectors attempted to destroy Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal, they discovered bombs, missiles, and chemical weapons of mass destruction spread out across this immense complex. Of particular concern were the chemical warheads of Al-Hussein modified SCUD missiles, each filled with five gallons of Sarin. Twenty-eight of these warheads have been drained and destroyed by the U.S. inspectors. These weapons were not destroyed during the bombings at Muthanna because they had been removed to other locations before the Gulf War started. Their relocation and transfer back to Muthanna was described by U.N. inspectors as a painstaking process. [20] According to Brigadier General Walter Busbee, U.S. Army Chemical and Material Destruction Agency, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, these warheads were exported to Iraq from the former Soviet Union. [21]

Chemical warfare agents which either survived the allied bombing or were inventoried and returned to the Muthanna facility for destruction include: [22]

• 13,000 155-mm artillery shells loaded with mustard gas;
• 6,200 rockets loaded with nerve agent;
• 800 nerve agent aerial bombs;
• 28 SCUD warheads loaded with Sarin;
• 75 tons of the nerve agent Sarin;
• 60-70 tons of the nerve agent tabun; and,
• 250 tons of mustard gas and stocks of thiodiglycol, a precursor chemical for mustard gas.

U.N. inspectors have concluded that the Muthanna plant was capable of producing two tons of Sarin and five tons of mustard gas daily. The plant was also capable of manufacturing VX, a nerve gas and one of the most toxic chemicals ever produced. [23]

In addition to Muthanna, chemical agents were destroyed at two airbases: one located 40 miles west of Baghdad and the other located near An Nassiriyah, where a number of 122mm rockets loaded with Sarin (GB) were blown in place. According to UNSCOM sources, many of these weapons were hastily deployed prior to the air war and later returned for destruction. The U.N. has destroyed hundreds of tons of bulk chemical agents and tens of thousands of chemical munitions. In addition, hundreds of thousands of liters of key chemical precursors which have been identified and destroyed include: 14,600 liters of DF; 121,000 liters of D4 and 153,983 liters of thiodiglycol. According to UNSCOM, the Iraqis were capable of employing both binary and mixed agent weapons. Binary weapons identified used DF. When combined with appropriate chemicals, GB and GF are produced. [24]

UNSCOM also discovered, at various locations, evidence of research into certain biological agents, including botulinus toxin, anthrax, an organism responsible for gas gangrene (clostridium perfringens) and others as identified below. The evidence discovered by the group suggested that this was primarily an offensive biological warfare program. [25]

On February 13, 1994, a clandestine radio service in Iraq, the Voice of the Iraqi People, reported that Saddam Hussein's government was still attempting to hide chemical and biological weapons from international inspectors by repeatedly relocating them. Citing unidentified individuals, the radio reported that the banned weapons were being hidden in the oil pipelines that have been "out of operation because of the international embargo." [26]

Chemical Warfare Doctrine and the Use of Combined Agent Warfare

There is substantial evidence to suggest that in the use of chemical weapons, as in other military areas, the Iraqi military adhered, at least in part, to Soviet military doctrine. Soviet military doctrine suggested that chemical warfare should be conducted with mixed agents. [27] Mixed agents, often referred to as "cocktails," are intended to enhance the capabilities of nerve agents and defeat the precautions taken by the enemy. [28] Use of mixed agents could account for the wide variety of symptoms displayed by the Gulf War veterans. Mixed agents can be made by combining a variety of biotoxins, nerve agents, vesicants, blister agents and some biological agents -- such as bacteria and fungi, and others described briefly below.

According to some sources, Iraq used mixed agent weapons combining cyanogen, mustard gas, and tabun against the Kurds. Saddam Hussein stated on April 2, 1990, that Iraq had "double combined chemical" weapons since the last year of the Iran-Iraq War. [29] It was also believed that in 1984 Iraq may have used mixed agent weapons with biological tricothecenes and mycotoxins against Majnoon Island during the Iran-Iraq War. [30]

The utility of chemical weapons and the possibility of exposing one's own troops to indirect chemical weapons effects is an issue which has been seriously debated by both U.S. and Soviet military planners. Soviet doctrine questions the utility of initiating chemical warfare, since chemical weapons produce secondary effects that could obstruct troop advances. U.S. Military doctrine warns that according to its calculations, the use of a nerve agent against a target area of no more than a dozen hectares (a hectare is about 2.47 acres) can, under certain weather conditions, create a hazard zone downwind of up to 100 kilometers in length. Within this downwind area, friendly military units would have to take protective measures. [31]

According to the official military announcements made in the last half of January 1991 and based on the quantity of chemical agents observed by UN inspectors after the war, the scope of coalition bombing against these facilities involved hundreds -- if not thousands -- of tons of bulk chemical nerve agents, mustard gas, as well as tens of thousands of pieces of chemical munitions. This quantity of chemical warfare agents vastly exceeds the amounts that might be expected to be deployed by a military force in a single chemical attack.

The dispersal of the chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by factors such as topography, wind velocity, direction, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient and atmospheric humidity. These factors all contribute to the size and type of dispersal pattern which will be observed. [32] In addition, as confirmed by unclassified U.S. satellite imagery, debris from the Coalition bombings were upwardly dispersed, rather than downwardly dispersed as would occur in offensive use, causing chemical agents to be carried by upper atmospheric currents and distributed as "traces" of chemical fallout over "down weather" positions. Czech and French officials confirmed the detections of these chemicals during the war. (See Chapter 3.)

In considering the consequences of the placement of troops in areas downwind (where non-lethal exposure to chemical warfare agents might be expected), it must be remembered that chemical nerve agents, such as Sarin and Soman and other agents, have cumulative effects -- often explained as slow rates of detoxification. [33]

Chemical Nerve Agents

Nerve agents kill by disrupting the metabolic processes, causing a buildup of a chemical messenger (acetylcholine) by inhibiting the production of acetylcholine-esterase, a key regulator of neurotransmission. Lethal exposure to chemical nerve agents is generally characterized by drooling, sweating, cramping, vomiting, confusion, irregular heart beat, convulsions, loss of consciousness and coma. [34]

According to a material safety data sheet (MSDS) for Soman (GD), and VX prepared by the U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, "the inhibition of cholinesterase enzymes throughout the body by nerve agents is more or less irreversible so that their effects are prolonged. Until the tissue cholinesterase enzymes are restored to normal activity, probably by very slow regeneration over a period of weeks or 2 to 3 months if damage is severe, there is a period of increased susceptibility to the effects of another exposure to any nerve agent. During this period the effects of repeated exposures are cumulative; after a single exposure, daily exposure to concentrations of nerve agent insufficient to produce symptoms may result in the onset of symptoms after several days. Continued daily exposure may be followed by increasingly severe effects. After symptoms subside, increased susceptibility persists for one to several days. The degree of exposure required to produce recurrence of symptoms, and the severity of these symptoms depend on duration of exposure and time required to produce recurrence of symptoms, and the severity of these symptoms depend on the duration of exposure and the time intervals between exposures. Increased susceptibility is not specific to the particular nerve agent initially absorbed." (See appendix A for MSDS on Soman, Sarin, Tabun, and VX).

Some of the symptoms commonly associated with acute exposure to chemical nerve agents include myosis, frontal headaches, eye pain on focusing, slight dimness of vision, occasional nausea and vomiting, runny nose, tightness in chest, sometimes with prolonged wheezing, expiration suggestive of broncho-constriction or increased secretion and coughing. Following systemic absorption, these symptoms are identified as typical: tightnesss in chest, wheezing, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, epigastric and substernal tightness, heartburn, diarrhea, involuntary defecation, increased sweating, increased salivation, increased tearing, slight bradycardia, myosis, blurring vision, urinary urgency and frequency, fatigue, mild weakness, muscular twitching, cramps, generalized weakness, including muscles of respiraton, with dyspnea and cyanosis, pallor and occasional elevation of blood pressure; giddiness, tension, anxiety, jitteriness, restlessness, emotional lability, excessive dreaming, insomnia, nightmares, headaches, tremors, withdrawal and depression; bursts of slow waves of elevated voltage in EEG (especially on over ventilation), drowsiness, difficulty concentrating, slowness on recall, confusion, slurred speech, ataxia, coma (with absence of reflexes), Cheyne-Stokes respirations, convulsions, depression of the respiratory and circulatory centers, with dyspnea, cyanosis and fall in blood pressure. [35]

The majority of automatic chemical agent detection alarms (M8A1) deployed during the war were not sufficiently sensitive for detecting sustained low levels of chemical agent and monitoring personnel for contamination. [36] U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) indicate that chronic exposure to levels of over .0001 mg/m3 for Sarin (GB) is hazardous and required the use of protective equipment. (See appendix A). The minimum level of chemical agent required to activate the automatic chemical agent detection alarm M8A1, commonly in use during the war, exceeds this threshold by a factor of 1,000. [37] As the chemical agent alarms began to sound during the "air war," French, Czech, and many U.S. commanders confirmed that they were sounding from the fallout from the bombings. Over time, even at these levels, after repeatedly being told that there was no danger, U.S. forces failed to take precautionary measures. Others report that the alarms were sounding so frequently that they were turned off.

This increased susceptibility associated with prolonged exposures to non-lethal dosages of nerve gases, suggests that the synergistic effects of the fallout from the bombings of the chemical warfare agent facilities and the administration of the cholinesterase inhibiting drug, pyridostigmine bromide, should be further researched as factors contributing to the symptoms being described by the Gulf War veterans.

The following is a listing of a number of agents which the Iraqi government could have combined or which could have been combined in the atmosphere as a result of Coalition bombings:

Sarin (GB) - A colorless and practically odorless liquid, Sarin dissolves well in water and organic solvents. The basic military use of Sarin is as a gas and a persistent aerosol. A highly toxic agent with a clearly defined myopic effect, symtoms of intoxication appear quickly without any period of latent effect. Sarin has cumulative efffects -- that is, a slow rate of detoxification independent of its method of entry into the body. According to Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory in Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine: Military and Historical Experience, 1915-1991, the progressive signs of initial Sarin intoxication include myosis (contraction of the pupil), photophobia, difficulty breathing and chest pain. [38]

Soman (GD) - A neuro-paralytic toxic agent. Soman is a transparent, colorless, involatile liquid smelling of camphor. Soluble in water to a limited degree, Soman is absorbed into porous and painted surfaces. Soman is similar to Sarin in its injurious effects, but more toxic. When it acts on the skin in either droplet or vapor form, it causes a general poisoning of the organism. [39]

Tabun (GA) - A neuro-paralytic toxic agent. Tabun is a transparent, colorless liquid. The industrial product is a brown liquid with a weak sweetish smell; in small concentrations, it smells of fruit, but in large concentrations, it smells of fish. Tabun dissolves poorly in water but well in organic solvents; it is easily absorbed into rubber products and painted surfaces. Injury occurs upon skin contact with Tabun vapor and droplets. The symptoms of injury appear almost immediately . Marked myosis occurs. [40]

VX - This colorless, ordorless, liquid has a low volatility and is poorly soluble in water, but dissolves well in organic solvents. The danger of pulmonary VX intoxication is determined by meteorological conditions and the delivery method used. VX is thought to be very effective against respiratory organs when in the form of a thinly dispersed aerosol. The symptoms of VX intoxication are analogous to those of other nerve agents, but their development is markedly slower. As with other nerve agents, VX has a cumulative effect. [41]

_______________

Notes:

1. Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, "Chemical Weapons In The Third World," 2, "Iraq's Expanding Chemical Arsenal," House Republican Research Committee, U.S House of Representatives (May 29, 1990), 9-10, Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), 497-498.

2. Anthony H Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), 498, 546. According to Cordesman, some of these reports may be exaggerated. "There is no question that Falluja had large scale facilities, but some of these facilities seem to produce nothing but the precursor chemicals for sarin, like phosphorous oxychlonde and phosphorous trichloride Falluja had been concentrating on the production of precursors." For additional views, see Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, "Chemical Weapons In The Third World," 2; "Iraq's Expanding Chemical Arsenal," House Republican Research Committee, US House of Representatives (May 29, 1990), 8.

3. Peter Dunn, "The Chemical War: Journey to Iran," NBC Defense and Technology International, pp. 28-37; W. Seth Carus, The Genie Unleashed: Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons Production. (Washington: Washington Institute Policy Papers, No 14) 22-23, Foreign Report (March 31, 1988), 12; Jane's Defence Weekly (January 9, 1998), 3; Jane's Defence Weekly (February 27, 1988), 336; Anthony H Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993) 498, 546.

4. Michael Eisenstadt, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons (Washington: Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 21, September 1990), 7, Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Policy Focus. No. 9. Washington Institute for Near East Policy (December 1988), 4; "Iraq's Scare Tactic," Newsweek (August 2, 1982);"In Mideast, Warfare of a New Nature: Chemical Arms, Ballistic Missiles Mark New Nature of Mideast Warfare," Washington Post (April 5, 1988), A1; Dick Palowski, Changes in Threat Air Combat Doctrine and Force Structure. 24th Edition (Fort Worth: General Dynamics DWIC-91, February 1992), 11-325, 11-334, Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review (June 1989), 256; Foreign Report (March 31, 1988), 1, New York Times (November 12, 1991; as cited in Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), 499. 547;

5. Frank J. Prial, "UN Team Finds Chemical Arms Four Times Greater Than Iraq Claims," New York Times (July 31, 1991). A1.

6. Duncan Lennox. Janes: Strategic Weapons Systems (Surrey, U.K.: Janes Information Group, 1990); George Lardner, Jr., "No Iraq Move Seen Until Attack Near: CIA Expects Saddam to Extend Crisis," Washington Post (December 15, 1990), A1. 7. Ibid.

8. Rick Atkinson, "No Chemical Arms Found on Battlefield: U.S. Says Iraqi Logistics Failed," Washington Post (March 7, 1991), A1.

9. "No Iraqi Chemical Munitions Have Turned Up So Far." United Press International (March 2, 1991), BC Cycle.

10. Staff Interviews.

11. Staff Interviews.

12. Staff interview.

13. Colin Nickerson, "War Diary: From Chaos and Fear, A Victory," The Boston Globe. (March 3. 1991), 1.

14. The Associated Press. (February 24, 1991), Sunday, BC cycle; David Evans, William Neikirk, David Eisner, Linnet Myers, "U.S. Tanks vs. Desert Sand First Priority: Breach Iraqi Minefields," Chicago Tribune (December 15. 1991). A3.

15. USA TODAY. (March 1, 1991), 3A; "War Log," Gannett Company, Inc., International Edition (March 1, 1991), A3.

16. James Adams and Andrew Alderson. Strategic View from the Saddam Bunker. The Times Newspapers, Ltd , (February 2, 1991); "British Paper Says Saddam Hussein Approved the Use of Chemical Weapons," Reuters. (February 2, 1991), A.M. Cycle.

17. Jesse Birabaum, "The Prisoners," Time Magazine, (March 4, 1991).

18. Tom Masland and Douglas Walker, "Are We Ready for Chemical War." Newsweek, (March 4, 1991).

19. John Fullerton, "Britain's Phantom Army Helped Defeat Iraq, Reuters, (March 2, 1991).

20. "New Method Found to Destroy Iraqi Poison Gas Shells," Xinhua News Service. Item No. 0320210. Cairo, Egypt (March 20, 1993); Brent Sadler, "U.N. and Iraqi Teams Work to Destroy Chemical Weapons," Cable News Network Transcript #133-5 (October 8, 1992).

Note: A Scud warhead should be able to hold much more than 5 gallons of agent. Additional information is being sought regarding the configuration of these warheads.
21. B.Gen Walter Busbee, in oral remarks at The Chemical Weapons Convention Seminar Series, hosted by The Henry L Stimson Center (May 12, 1994).

22. "New Method Found to Destroy Iraqi Poison Gas Shells," Xinhua News Agency (March 20, 1993); "United Nations Destroying Iraqi Nerve Gas Stockpiles," Associated Press (September 24, 1992); Judith Perera, "Iraq: Chemical Weapons Program Disabled, Say U.N Inspectors," Inter Press Service (September 29, 1992).

23. Victoria Graham, "Chemical Weapons Destruction Team Resumes Work," Associated Press (January 23, 1993) A.M. Cycle.

24. Staff interview, February 22, 1994.

25. Bill Gertz, "Biological Arms Elude Inspectors," Washington Times (April 21, 1992), A1; Staff interviews, UNSCOM.

26. JPRS-TAC-94-003 (March 7, 1994), Citing the (Clandestine) Voice of the Iraqi People in Arabic, 1400 GMT, 13 Feb 94.

27. Interview with Dr Sanford Leffingwell, Center for Disease Control on September 3, 1993 Dr Leffingwell advised that Soviet Chemical Warfare Doctrine recommends the use of mixed agents in chemical warfare attacks (using several canisters of agents), Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder and San Francisco Westview Press, 1993), 499. 547, Jane's Defence Weekly (January 9, 1988), Jane's Defense Weekly (January 28, 1989), Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, "Chemical Weapons In The Third World," 2; "Iraq's Expanding Chemical Arsenal," House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (May 29, 1990), 10.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. H. Kadivar and S C. Adams, "Treatment of Chemical and Biological Warfare Injuries; Insights Derived From the 1984 Attack on Majnoon Island," Military Medicine. (April 1991), 171-7.

31. United States, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, August 1982), 7-13;Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine: Military and Historical Experience. 1915- 1991. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992), 142-143.

32. Ibid.

33. Joachim Krause and Charles K Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine: Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1992), 208-9, V. V. Miasnikov, Defense Against Weapons of Mass-Destruction: A Guide (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), 78, James Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, N.J : The Telford Press, September 1987), 146, 153.

34. William Booth, "Gas Masks, Antidote Cause Three Deaths and Illness in Israel," Washington Post (January 19, 1991) A20.

35. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Soman (GD), Sarin (GB) and VX, prepared by the US Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland (See appendix A).

36. DAAA15-90-R-0020. Appendix 2, "Revised Joint Service Operational Requirement (JSOR) for an Advanced Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA), 85.

37. According to the manufacturer of the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Detection Alarm "the G-Agent sensitivity requirement is that the alarm must sound within 2 minutes when exposed to 0.1 milligram per cubic meter (mg/m3) " The MSA1 alarm does not detect chemical blister agents.

This information was confirmed by the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Edgewood, Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010. According to the US Army the sensitivity capacity for the M43A1 detector unit (detection component of the M8A1 alarm) is GA, GB. GD - 0.1 - 0.2 mg/m3 VX - 0.4 mg/m3.

The required response time for these levels is 10 minutes, however actual performance is a response time of approximately 2 minutes to detect at these levels. The capability and specifications of this unit are not classified.

38. Joachim Krause and Charles K Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 208), James A F Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, NJ The Telford Press, September 1987), Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Soman (GD), Sarin (GB) and VX, prepared by the US Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland (See appendix A).

39. Joachim Krause and Charles K Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 209.

40. Ibid, 209.

41. Ibid, 210.

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Chapter 1, Part 2

Vesicants and Blood Agents

Lewisite - A vesicant toxic agent, industrial lewisite is a dark brown liquid with a strong smell. Lewisite is a contact poison with practically no period of latent effect. Lewisite vapors cause irritation to the eyes and upper respiratory tract. [42] According to the Center for Disease Control, lewisite would cause stinging and burning. Its smell, generally characterized as the strong smell of geraniums, could be confused with the smell of ammonia (the reaction to which is regulated by pain fibers rather than smell). [43] Iraqi stores of lewisite were not located after the war according to the Department of Defense.

Cyanogen Chloride - The French first suggested the use of cyanogen chloride as a toxic agent. U.S. analysts have reported that it is capable of penetrating gas mask filters. Partially soluble in water, it dissolves well in organic solvents. It is absorbed easily into porous materials; its military state is a gas. Cyanogen chloride is a quick acting toxic agent. Upon contact with the eyes or respiratory organs, it injures immediately. Lethal exposures result in loss of consciousness, convulsions and paralysis. [44]

Hydrogen Cyanide - A colorless liquid smelling of bitter almonds, hydrogen cyanide is a very strong, quick acting poison. Hydrogen cyanide affects unprotected humans through the respiratory organs and during the ingestion of contaminated food and water. It inhibits the enzymes which regulate the intra-cell oxidant-restorative process. As a result, the cells of the nervous system, especially those affecting breathing -- are injured, which in turn leads to quick death. An important feature of hydrogen cyanide is the absence of a period of latent effect. The military state of hydrogen cyanide is a gas. The toxic and physiologic properties of hydrogen cyanide permit it to be used effectively in munitions -- predominantly in rocket launched artillery. Death occurs after intoxication due to paralysis of the heart. Non-lethal doses do not cause intoxication. [45]

Blister Agents

According to the material safety data sheet (MSDS) for sulfur mustard gas (HD) prepared by the U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, "Chronic exposure to HD can cause skin sensitization, chronic lung impairment, cough, shortness of breath, chest pain, and cancer of the mouth, throat, respiratory tract, skin, and leukemia. It may also cause birth defects. (See appendix A for MSDS sheets on sulfur mustard agents HD and T.) The U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command lists the current detector sensitivity threshold for the M256A1 kits, a commonly used piece of chemical agent detection equipment in the Gulf War, as 2.0 mg/m3. [46] According to the Material Data Safety Sheets for sulfur mustard, total weight average exposures of greater than .003mg/m3 over an 8 hr. period requires the use of protective equipment. (See appendix A.) Therefore, the detection kit would not detect the agent until the amount of agent present exceeded the safety threshold by a factor of over 660. The M8A1 automatic alarms do not detect blister agent.

Mustard Gas - This is a colorless, oily liquid which dissolves poorly in water, but relatively well in organic solvents, petroleum, luricant products, and other toxic agents. The injurious effect of mustard gas is associated with its ability to inhibit many enzyme systems of the body. This, in turn, prevents the intra-cell exchange of chemicals and leads to necrosis of the tissue. Death is associated mainly with necrosis of the tissue of the central nervous system. Mustard gas has a period of latent effect (the first signs of injury appear after 2-12 hours), but does not act cumulatively. It does not have any known antidotes. In military use it can come in gas, aerosol, and droplet form. It therefore acts through inhalation, cutaneously, perorally and directly through the blood stream. The toxic and physico-chemical properties of mustard gas allow it to be used in all types of munitions. [47]

Related Chemical Agent Information

Committee staff has learned that Iraq may have acquired any one of a number of the Soviet binary novachok ("newcomer") series of chemical warfare agent compounds or information relevant to the development of those compounds. This series of chemical warfare agents reportedly contains both lethal and debilitating agents. According to a confidential Committee source, if the Iraqis had obtained samples of these compounds they could be easily analyzed and produced with readily available materials. Several of these compounds are described as agents that even in microdoses can have long lasting effects. These agents are described as inducing myosis, vomiting, memory loss, involuntary motions and internal organ dysfunction. Many of these materials are also described as having mutagenic effects. These materials are, according to the source, stored in the lipids (body fats) and have no known antidotes. In addition, according to the Committee source, the Soviets were believed to have conducted research in a number of dioxin-based chemical warfare agents, and on at least one agent that could be used to contaminate drinking water supplies. Committee staff is conducting further inquiries to determine if Iraq may have had access to any of these compounds. [48]

Biotoxins

Biotoxins are natural poisons, chiefly of cellular structure. A distinction is made between exotoxins which are given off by an organism while it is alive, and endotoxins which are given off after a cell's death. The exotoxins cause the injurious effects of biological weapons, but endotoxins guarantee the effects of chemical weapons and do not cause the widespread disease outbreaks associated with biological warfare. Some examples of biotoxins include botulinus toxin and staphylococcic enterotoxin. [49]

Biological Warfare Capability

According to the U.N., the Iraqi biological warfare program was initiated in mid- 1986 at Salman Pak. UNSCOM inspectors discovered evidence of research into certain biological agents including botulinus toxin and anthrax -- as well as organisms responsible for gas gangrene, tetanus and brucellosis, components of a biological weapons program which was not defensive in nature. In four years of work prior to the war, only 10 papers were published. These research programs focused on Iraqi efforts to isolate the most pathogenic spores. They also did research on the aerosolization and on the environmental survivability of some of these biological materials according to the United Nations. [50]

While the Department of Defense maintains that the Iraqi military did not weaponize its biological warfare program, UNSCOM is less certain, reporting that their degree of confidence that weaponization did not occur is low. In fact, readily high performance agricultural aerosol generators could easily be converted to both decontaminate areas in which chemicals are used and to aerosolize biological and chemical warfare agents.

Other ways in which biological materials could have been weaponized include the use of Iraqi 250 and 500lb bombs, aerial rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles, FAW ground-to-ground missiles, helicopters and Iraqi aircraft. The Committee has received several reports of Iraqi helicopters penetrating Saudi airspace during the war by flying at low levels through the wadis and of Iraqi aircraft penetrating the area over the northern Persian Gulf.

According to UNSCOM, indications that suggested that the program was offensive in nature include:

• No declared links between the BW defense program and medical corps research.
• No links between aerosolization research and research on defensive filters.

The United Nations said that the Biological Inspection was initiated on August 8, 1991 at Salman Pak. The inspection was delayed because of the need to extensively immunize the members of the inspection team. The Salman Pak facility was razed one week prior to the arrival of the inspection team. [51]

The United States is aware of the Iraqi potential for using biological weapons. The employment of biological agents in a "cocktail" mix with chemical warfare agents is consistent with Soviet military doctrine. It is clear that biological weapons are much more difficult than chemical weapons to detect and defend against. Some of the symptoms experienced by veterans suffering from Persian Gulf Syndrome are consistent with biological warfare agent use. Verification will require sophisticated medical diagnosis, which to date has not been publicly undertaken.

The question of whether U.S. forces were attacked with a biological agent is problematic. According to Chemical/Biological Program: A Department of Defense Perspective, "it has been recognized that our biological defense program was inadequate. Creditble analysis indicated that optimal employment of biological agents could result in a significantly large hazard area." It further cites a memo from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the SECDEF (Secretary of Defense) noting: "inadequate ability to counter BW (biological warfare) attack/BW defense is a priority requirement. [52]The inadequacy of the current biological defense and detection program was also supported by Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch in an unclassified May 6, 1994 address delivered at a Department of Defense sponsored counterproliferation conference at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. According to Deputy Secretary Deutch, the United States has "no biological detection capability deployed with any forces, anywhere."

Novel BW agents created by altering DNA plasmids and vectors are specifically intended to avoid detection. As noted below, several shipments of biological materials that might have been used to carry out such a program were licensed for export from the United States to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission. In such a program, common intestinal flora such as e. coli could be altered to produce viral, bacterial, or other toxins and would be difficult to treat. If Iraq was successful in developing such agents, diagnosis will continue to elude physicians testing for traditional illnesses. Novel BW agents would certainly elude biological detection devices. There is evidence, based on the nature of the materials imported, that this type of research was being conducted. Since the Iraqi government managed to dismantle much of its biological warfare program prior to the UNSCOM inspections, we can only speculate on how advanced this program might have been. [53]

It has been suggested that if these problems the veterans are experiencing are Gulf War related, then we should be seeing even more serious problems among the Iraqis. Since beginning this investigation we have learned that many Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPW) suffered skin rashes, sores, nausea, vomiting, coughing and other medical problems while they were being detained in Saudi Arabia. Many members of units who had close contact with these individuals are now reporting to the Committee symptoms consistent with those being suffered by other Gulf War veterans. In addition, Iraq has claimed a dramatic rise in reported cases of communicable diseases since the end of the Gulf War including typhoid, brucellosis, hepatitis and cholera. [54]

Further, reports of Gulf War illnesses being reported are no longer limited to veterans of the Gulf War. Others reporting manifestation of these symptoms include:

• Department of Defense civilians who served in the Persian Gulf War.
• Department of Defense civilians working at the Anniston (AL) Army Depot and the Sharpsite (CA) Army Depot decontaminating equipment which was returned from the Persian Gulf.
• Spouses, particularly the spouses of male veterans, are reporting the following symptoms: chronic or recurring vaginal yeast infections, menstrual irregularities (excessive bleeding and severe cramping), rashes, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, and memory loss.
• Children born to veterans prior to the Gulf War. In many cases both male and female children born prior to the war have experienced symptoms similar to those of the veterans and their spouses.
• Children born following the Gulf war. Some reports have been published which suggest a high rate of miscarriages in the families of Gulf War veterans. Further, several reports have surfaced which suggest that there has been a high rate of physical abnormalities in children born to Gulf War veterans since the war.

U.S. Exports of Biological Materials to Iraq

The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act. Pursuant to the Act, Committee staff contacted the U.S. Department of Commerce and requested information on the export of biological materials during the years prior to the Gulf War. After receiving this information, we contacted a principal supplier of these materials to determine what, if any, materials were exported to Iraq which might have contributed to an offensive or defensive biological warfare program. Records available from the supplier for the period from 1985 until the present show that during this time, pathogenic (meaning "disease producing"), toxigenic (meaning "poisonous"), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Records prior to 1985 were not available, according to the supplier. These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction. According to the Department of Defense's own Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992: "By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed biological weapons. It's advanced and aggressive biological warfare program was the most advanced in the Arab world... The program probably began late in the 1970's and concentrated on the development of two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria... Large scale production of these agents began in 1989 at four facilities in Baghdad. Delivery means for biological agents ranged from simple aerial bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface missiles." [55]

Included in the approved sales are the following biological materials (which have been considered by various nations for use in war), with their associated disease symptoms: [56]

Bacillus Anthracis: anthrax is a disease producing bacteria identified by the Department of Defense in The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Contress, as being a major component in the Iraqi biological warfare program.

Anthrax is an often fatal infectious disease due to ingestion of spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing, and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia (blood poisoning), and the mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced, antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins remain, despite the death of the bacteria.

Clostridium Botulinum: A bacterial source of botulinum toxin, which causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache, fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils and paralysis of the muscles involving swallowing. It is often fatal.

Histoplasma Capsulatum: causes a disease superfically resembling tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and spleen, anemia, an influenza like illness and an acute inflammatory skin disease marked by tender red nodules, usually on the shins. Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.

Brucella Melitensis: a bacteria which can cause chronic fatique, loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest, pain in joints and muscles, insomnia, nausea, and damage to major organs.

Clostridium Perfringens: a highly toxic bateria which causes gas gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause a systemic illness.

In addition, several shipments of Escherichia Coli (E. Coli) and genetic materials, as well as human and bacterial DNA, were shipped directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issueance of an export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department: [57]

Date : February 8, 1985
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Agency
Materials Shipped:

Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup

Date : February 22, 1985
Sent To : Ministry of Higher Education
Materials Shipped:

Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136)
Class III pathogen

Date : July 11, 1985
Sent To : Middle and Near East Regional A
Material Shipped:

Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136)
Class III pathogen

Date : May 2, 1986
Sent To : Ministry of Higher Education
Materials Shipped:

1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10)
Batch # 08-20-82 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

2. Bacillus Subtilis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82)
Batch # 06-20-84 (2 each)

3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502)
Batch # 07-07-81 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et al (ATCC 3624)
Batch # 10-85SV (2 each)

5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051)
Batch # 12-06-84 (2 each)

6. Francisella tularensis var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC 6223)
Batch # 05-14-79 (2 each)
Avirulent, suitable for preparations of diagnotic antigens

7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441)
Batch # 03-84 (3 each)
Highly toxigenic

8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564)
Batch # 03-02-79 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779)
Batch # 04-24-84S (3 each)

10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916)
Batch #08-14-80 (2 each)
Agglutinating type 2

11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124)
Batch #07-84SV (3 each)
Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lecithinase C.J. Appl.

12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185)
Batch #01-14-80 (3 each)
G.G. Wright (Fort Detrick)
V770-NP1-R. Bovine Anthrax
Class III pathogen

13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578)
Batch #01-06-78 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581)
Batch #04-18-85 (2 each)

15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945)
Batch #06-21-81 (2 each)

16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855)
Batch # 06-21-71
Class III pathogen

17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213)
Batch #3-84 (2 each)

18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397)
Batch # 08-18-81 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450)
Batch # 08-02-84 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455)
Batch # 02-05-68 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

21. Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456)
Batch # 03-08-78 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458)
Batch # 01-29-68 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

23. Clostribium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763)
Batch # 8-83 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415)
Batch # 02-02-84 (2 each)
Class III pathogen

Date : August 31, 1987
Sent To : State Company for Drug Industries
Materials Shipped:

1. Saccharomyces cerevesiae (ATCC 2601)
Batch # 08-28-08 (1 each)

2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype typhi (ATCC 6539)
Batch # 06-86S (1 each)

3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633)
Batch # 10-85 (2 each)

4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031)
Batch # 08-13-80 (1 each)

5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536)
Batch # 04-09-80 (1 each)

6. Bacillus cereus (11778)
Batch #05-85SV (2 each)

7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228)
Batch # 11-86s (1 each)

8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884)
Batch # 09-08-80 (2 each)

Date : July 11, 1988
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped

1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303)
Batch # 04-875
Phase host

2. Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC 45031)
Batch # 06-14-85
Plant Virus

3. Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC 37349)
(Ti plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in E. Coli)
Batch # 05-28-85

Date : April 26, 1988
Sent To: : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:

1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57236) Phage vector
Suggest host: E coli

2. Hulambda14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57240) Phage vector
Suggested host: E coli

3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57242) Phage vector
Suggested host: E. coli

Date : August 31, 1987
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:

1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846)
Batch # 07-29-83 (1 each)

2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694)
Batch # 05-87 (1 each)

Date : September 29, 1988
Sent To : Ministry of Trade
Materials Shipped:

1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240)
Batch # 05-14-63 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938)
Batch # 1963 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629)
Batch # 10-23-85 (3 each)

4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009)
Batch # 03-30-84 (3 each)

5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705)
Batch # 06-27-62 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

6. Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014)
Batch # 05-11-66 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388)
Batch # 06-01-73 (3 each)

8. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966)
Batch #05-05-70 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

9. Clostridium botulinum Type A
Batch # 07-86 (3 each)
Class III pathogen

10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018)
Batch # 04-83 (3 each)

11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019)
Batch # 03-88 (3 each)

Date : January 31, 1989
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:

1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT)
Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57057)

2. Plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
pseudogene (HPRT) Chromosome(s): 5 p14-p13 (ATCC 57212)

Date : January 17, 1989
Sent To : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
Materials Shipped:

1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosomes(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57237) Phage vector;
Suggested host: E. coli

2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57540), Cloned from human lymphoblast, Phase vector
Suggested host: E. coli

3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase
(HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57241) Phage vector;
Suggested host: E. coli

Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled a listing of biological materials shipped to Iraq prior to the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from October 1, 1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13, 1993. The following materials with biological warfare significance were shipped to Iraq during this period. [58]

Date : November 28, 1989
Sent To : University of Basrah, College of
Science, Department of Biology
Materials Shipped:

1. Enterococcus faecalis

2. Enterococcus faecium

3. Enterococcus avium

4. Enterococcus raffinosus

5. Enteroccus gallinarium

6. Enterococcus durans

7. Enteroccus hirae

8. Streptococcus bovis
(etiologic)

Date : April 21, 1986
Sent To : Officers City Al-Muthanna,
Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69, House 28/I,
Baghdad, Iraq
Materials Shipped:

1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid
(non-infectious)

Date : March 10, 1986
Sent To : Officers City Al-Muthanna,
Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69 House 28/I,
Baghdad, Iraq
Materials Shipped:

1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2
(non-infectious)

Date : June 25, 1985
Sent To : University of Baghdad, College of
Medicine, Department of Microbiology
Materials Shipped:

1. 3 years cultures
(etiologic)
Candida sp.

Date : May 21, 1985
Sent To : Basrah, Iraq
Materials Shipped:

1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed
(etiologic)

2. West Nile Fever Virus

Date : April 26, 1985
Sent To : Minister of Health, Ministry of
Health, Baghdad, Iraq
Materials Shipped:

1. 8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi) to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious)

UNSCOM Biological Warfare Inspections

UNSCOM inspections uncovered evidence that the government of Iraq was conducting research on pathogen enhancement on the following biological warfare related materials: [59]

o bacillus anthracis
o clostridium botulinum
o clostridium perfringens
o brucella abortis
o brucella melentensis
o francisella tularensis
o clostridium tetani

In addition, the UNSCOM inspections revealed that biological warfare related stimulant research was being conducted on the following materials:

o bacillus subtillus
o bacillus ceres
o bacillus megatillus

UNSCOM reported to Committee staff that a biological warfare inspection (BW3) was conducted at the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission in 1993. This suggests that the Iraqi government may have been experimenting with the materials cited above (E. Coli and rDNA) in an effort to create genetically altered microorganisms (novel biological warfare agents).

________________

Notes:

42. Ibid, 205.

43. Interview with Dr. Sanford Leffingwell, Center for Disease Control on September 3, 1993.

44. Joachim Krause and Charles K Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991 . (Boulder, Co : Westview Press, 1992), 202, V. V. Miasnikov, Defense Against Weapons of Mass-Destruction: A Guide (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984, 82-83).

45. Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine: Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 205, V. V. Miasnikov, Defense Against Weapons of Mass-Destruction: A Guide (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984, 82, Vladimir K Pikalov, "Toxic Agents," The Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Volume 6 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978).

46. This information was provided by the US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Edgewood, Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010. According to the U.S. Army the sensitivity capacity for the M256A1 detector kit is:

Mustard / 2.0 / mg/m3
VX / 0.020 / mg/m3
G-Agents / 0.005 / mg/m3

The required response time for these levels is 15 minutes The capability and specifications of this unit are not classified.

47. Vladimir K Pikalov, "Toxic Agents," The Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Volume 6 (Moscow; Voyenizdat, 1978); Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine: Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 206-7.

48. Staff Interviews, April 19, 1994.

49. Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 162, 209.

50. Staff interview, February 22, 1994.

51. Ibid.

52. Bill Richardson, John Carrico, Col. Frank J. Cox, LTC Jeffery Thomas, and Richard Sanders, Chemical/Biological Program: A Department of Defense Perspective. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, presented as a paper to the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Symposium of the American Defense Preparedness Association, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (May 12-14, 1993), 10.

53. Staff Interview, UNSCOM, February 22, 1994.

54. "Iraq Launches Drive to Combat Increasing Communicable Diseases," Xinhua News Agency (June 8, 1993), Item No: 0608002, "Iraq Faces Health Crisis," The Guardian (September 13, 1993), 7.

55. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (April 1992).

56. Terry J. Gander, ed., Jane's NBC Protection Equipment 1991-92. (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1992), 3-12: Dorland's Pocket Medical Dictionary, 24th Edition (Philadelphia W B Saunders Co , 1989), James A. F. Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, NJ The Telford Press, September 1987).

57. American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland (January 21, 1994).

58. Memorandum from Director of the Centers for Disease Control to Chairman Riegle.

59. Staff interview, UNSCOM, February 22, 1994.