Part 3 of 3
BCCI's U.S. Auditors
Given the limited extent of BCCI's official activities in the United States, which were limited to state-licensed local branches and representative offices, and not licensed to accept deposits in the United States, the audit activities of BCCI's United States outside auditors, Price Waterhouse (US), were extremely narrow in scope. As noted above, Price Waterhouse (US) responded to a subpoena by the Committee by providing all requested documents and full cooperation regarding any materials it possessed regarding BCCI in the United States.
These documents demonstrate that over the course of that audit relationship, Price Waterhouse (US) did find that BCCI's U.S. offices maintained inadequate documentation on many of their loans, and engaged in other sloppy banking practices. But the documents provided by Price Waterhouse (US) to the Subcommittee also confirmed that Price Waterhouse (US) handled its auditing of BCCI's U.S. activities professionally and diligently, albeit within the narrow confines of its commission from its UK partnership.
Such a finding might be odd, given BCCI's extensive involvement in this period in laundering funds from Latin America and the Caribbean. But until the spring of 1989, the Price Waterhouse (US) audits were designed to look only at lending practices and overall bookkeeping issues, rather than the issue of whether BCCI might be laundering funds from abroad. Moreover, given Price Waterhouse (US)'s ignorance of BCCI's true relationships with First American, the Independence Bank, and other entities, there would have been any number of improper activities by BCCI in the United States in the aggregate that would fall outside the ordinary purview of auditors.
In early 1989, after BCCI had been indicted on money laundering charges in Tampa, Price Waterhouse (US) was selected by BCCI to create a compliance program under which BCCI would submit to extremely rigorous standards for the handling of transactions from abroad which were designed to trace and stop money laundering. The compliance program was put into place under a June 1989 Memoranda of Understanding with the Federal Reserve, which permitted BCCI to stay open in the United States only if it developed policies to insure its compliance with Bank Security Act and anti-money laundering regulations.
The Price Waterhouse compliance program, designed to be state-of-the-art, for the first time established a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime at BCCI, and forced BCCI's U.S. offices to become ever more careful in handling funds from foreigners. Its implementation was effective, and its results positive in terms of compliance with U.S. law for BCCI's U.S. branches, but very negative in terms of BCCI's U.S. cash-flow. As Price Waterhouse (UK) noted in November, 1989:
We understand there has been a noticeable drop in the funds transferred from other BCCI locations to the US agencies because of this onerous requirement to obtain the necessary details from their customers. Most of their US dollar transactions formerly with the US agencies are being routed to third party banks. Management are investigating this matter to satisfy themselves that there is nothing untoward in such transactions.(43)
By insisting the BCCI's offices in the US document where their funds were coming from, Price Waterhouse had ended the ability of the U.S. offices to engage in profitable activity. BCCI's business dried up, demonstrating the degree to which the US operations had been functioning largely to launder dirty money from other countries in the first place.
However, there were substantial limitations the effectiveness of the compliance effort undertaken by Price Waterhouse, which were built into its design by BCCI. Originally, Price Waterhouse (US) had proposed to BCCI the establishment of a very broad global review of the bank's procedures to insure that the bank was able to stop laundering money world-wide, and turn BCCI into bank that rigorously honored the laws of every country in which it did business. On February 1, 1989, Price Waterhouse (US) wrote Robert Altman to propose to:
Work with BCCI officials on an immediate to medium term plan to regularize the bank's regulatory and supervisory status on a global consolidated basis. This would necessitate visiting key supervisors around the world and learn of their concerns and expectations and provide the framework to enable BCCI to meet these expectations.(44)
The naive approach by Price Waterhouse (US) was of course, incompatible with BCCI's survival. BCCI could tolerate such a program in any case. But by 1989, the UK auditors already knew of dozens of problems that BCCI was supposed to have cleaned up and had failed to rectify. That failure was because the practices were ones which BCCI relied upon for its continued survival. If BCCI had agreed to permit Price Waterhouse (US) to undertake this court, Price Waterhouse (US) would have swiftly learned of these practices, and possibly have been forced to tell U.S. regulators about them. But there was an even more direct problem. The information already contained in Price Waterhouse (UK)'s audits, that there had been massive lending by BCCI on CCAH shares and securing those shares, contained the great secret that BCCI effectively owned controlled First in violation of U.S. laws. Such a confrontation with reality was obviously not in BCCI's interests, or in the interest of Altman himself. The terms of engagement were swiftly narrowed to include only an anti-money laundering compliance program focused on the particular BCCI entities that had been implicated in the C-Chase sting in Tampa. The narrower engagement was signed by Price Waterhouse and sent to Altman, as BCCI's attorney, on March 9, 1989.(45) For this engagement, together with its regular audits of BCCI branches, Price Waterhouse (US) received approximately $4.5 million per year.(46)
Thus, before hiring the Price Waterhouse (US), BCCI and Altman narrowed the framework for their efforts, with the result that they were sufficiently narrow to preclude Price Waterhouse (US) from learning of problems at BCCI in the United States already known to Price Waterhouse (UK), but apparently never communicated to their US affiliated partnership.
Loans, Payments and Favors from BCCI to Accountants
One especially troubling aspect of BCCI's relationship to its accountants was its practice of providing them with loans. While the Subcommittee has not been able to determine the complete extent of this practice, the Subcommittee has received documentation of at least two such instances -- the first involving a 1987 loan of BDS $587,000 to Price Waterhouse's partners in Barbados, the second involving a loan of $17,000 to Price Waterhouse's partners in Panama in 1984, increased to $50,000 a year later.(47)
Even within BCCI, this practice was controversial. When Price Waterhouse applied for the Panama loan, BCCI official A. M. Akbar wrote Amjad Awan, then head of BCCI's Panama branch, to express his concern about the propriety of lending money to one's auditors:
The firm is our auditors and we do not consider it proper to sanction or enhance the limit of USDLR 50,000.00 to our own auditor. However, we shall re-exam the matter on receipt of your justification as well as your confirmation that local laws does not prohibit loans & advances to the company's auditors.(48)
In response, Awan advised Akbar that "there are no restrictions about advances to company auditors [which] may be allowed" and the lending was approved.
Separately, regulatory reviews of the books and records of Capcom Financial Services Ltd., BCCI's commodities trading affiliate, showed payments of $100,000 by Capcom to former Price Waterhouse Grand Caymans partner Richard Fear in the three years since he left Price Waterhouse in 1986. Fear had previously handled audits of the books of BCCI in the Grand Caymans, the location of many of the worst frauds at BCCI.
Both Capcom's head, Ziauddin Akbar, and former Price Waterhouse partner Fear, had been held at fault in connection with BCCI's massive trading losses in 1985, described above, which were discovered in 1986. At the time, Akbar was the head of BCCI's Treasury, and therefore held responsible for the losses, and Fear was the principal person responsible for insuring the propriety of BCCI Grand Cayman's books and records.
In late June, 1992, at the behest of the Serious Fraud Office of the United Kingdom, Royal Cayman Islands police conducted dawn raids of Price Waterhouse officers in the Grand Caymans, as well as the home of Fear and a second Price Waterhouse partner there, as well as the office of Price Waterhouse's local Grand Caymans attorney, conducting searches for records.
In late February, the Subcommittee requested copies of any reports or memoranda created by Price Waterhouse concerning Fear and BCCI, and related documents. Price Waterhouse refused to provide the documents requested, stating that in its view it was "inappropriate to produce the work product of its lawyers for examination by any governmental or private third-party," and that in any case, "Mr. Fear's participation [in PW's investigation] was predicated upon implicit understandings of confidentiality." However, despite the "implicit understandings of confidentiality" Price Waterhouse reached with Fear, Price Waterhouse did advise the Subcommittee that it had concluded Fear was innocent of wrongdoing in accepting funds from BCCI's affiliate, Capcom. According to Price Waterhouse (UK):
Richard Fear left the employment of PW-UK in July, 1986. . . PW-UK first became aware of the payments to Mr. Fear mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article, in September, 1991.
Upon learning of the payments, PW-UK obtained Richard Fear's agreement to cooperate in an inquiry by lawyers acting for PW-UK. Counsel for PW-UK had discussions on the subject with Richard Fear and ascertained from looking at various records which he showed to them that the payments were indeed made in two installments in July and August 1988 by Capcom Financial Services Limited ("Capcom"). The payments, which totalled $100,000, were stated to be for referral to Capcom of potential clients requiring brokerage or investment services.
We understand that the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") has investigated the circumstances in which the payments were made and has interviewed Mr. Fear. We further understand that the SFO has concluded its investigation with respect to Mr. Fear and the matter is not being pursued.
Based on all the above, PW-UK concluded that these payments by Capcom to Richard Fear, which were made two years after he had ceased to be employed by PW-UK, were unconnected with any work that he did on the audit of BCCI or while at PW-UK.(49)
According to press accounts, Fear's alleged receipt of funds from Capcom remains under investigation by the British Serious Fraud Office.
In sworn testimony before the Subcommittee on July 30, 1992, Akbar Bilgrami, formerly head of BCCI's Latin American and Caribbean region and convicted in the Tampa money laundering case, stated that he had been informed by other BCCI officials that Price Waterhouse in the Grand Caymans had been "taken care of." Bilgrami said he did not have details as to how the auditors had been taken care of, other than that it was his understanding that BCCI had provided one or more of them with the use of a villa.(50)
Robert Bench
Robert Bench, a partner in Price Waterhouse (US), had minimal involvement in any BCCI affair while at Price Waterhouse, becoming responsible for some assistance to BCCI in early 1989 in connection with the compliance program instituted by Price Waterhouse for BCCI as part of BCCI's first consent decree with the Federal Reserve following its indictment on money laundering charges in October, 1988.
However, in his previous positions as a senior official of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency during the late 1970's to the mid 1980's, Bench was exposed on two occasions to important information regarding BCCI which, taken together, raise questions as to Bench's handling of BCCI affairs as a partner at Price Waterhouse.
First, in 1978, as Associate Deputy Comptroller for International Banking, Bench was provided with information about a variety of shoddy banking practices at BCCI, including BCCI's use of nominees, by an OCC bank examiner working under him, Joseph Vaez. The memorandum prepared by Vaez and provided to Bench was a clear warning signal to OCC, as well as the Bank of America, which still had an ownership interest in BCCI, that BCCI was a danger to anyone involved with it. As the Vaez memorandum noted, if the Bank of America did not sever its relationship with BCCI, the OCC might well classify its entire investment in BCCI.(51)
Second, in 1985, Bench was provided a report by the CIA concerning BCCI that detailed BCCI's plans for the United States. This memorandum, described in detail in the chapter on BCCI's ties to the intelligence community, contained striking information, including the fact that BCCI secretly owned First American.
Bench testified that he had only a very limited memory of the 1985 report:
I do recall reviewing a classified piece of information that dealt with BCCI. . . it was somewhere in the middle of the '82 to '87 period. I feel comfortable about that. . . I recall receiving a document from the CIA that dealt with BCCI. To the best of my recollection it didn't deal with First American and it didn't deal with anything in the United States. There is an action step that I took within the office on that information . . . which was to look at this information in terms of LCD [Lesser Developed Country] debt.(52)
In staff interviews prior to this testimony, Bench emphasized that he had no memory whatsoever of having ever been advised that BCCI held interests in any financial institution in the United States, let alone First American.(53)
In fact, the memorandum provided Bench by the CIA focused significantly on BCCI's plans in the United States, including its ownership of a Washington, D.C., based, multistate bank holding company that Bench would have surely known was First American.
Obviously, this was information that the Federal Reserve should have had and did not have at the time that Bench was participating in BCCI's compliance program in connection with its consent decree with the Federal Reserve following its money-laundering indictment.
Bench testified that he had no memory of the 1978 memorandum prepared by Joseph Vaez for him at OCC, and that his memory of the 1985 memorandum was almost equally dim.(54) According to Bench, based on his lack of memory of either memorandum, there was no reason for him to have connected any of the information in them to his ongoing work on BCCI compliance years later at Price Waterhouse.
During that compliance work, Bench travelled to London twice to meet with BCCI officials in London, including Abedi and Naqvi, and provided technical assistance to BCCI in the United Kingdom and the U.S. in anti-money laundering matters, "under the direction of Robert Altman."(55) At the time, Altman was not only BCCI's attorney, but the President of First American. Yet according to Bench, it never occurred to him that there might be a relationship between the two institutions that needed to be understood to determine whether BCCI was truly complying with the Federal Reserve's requirements.
According to Bench, the reason for this was that the focus of the compliance effort solely focused on money laundering. As he testified:
Senator, to the best of my recollection, there was no linkage whatsoever, in any of the work we did or any of the discussions we had, with First American . . . I don't recall any First American issues . . . it was very clear that in this exercise Mr. Altman and Mr. Clifford were lawyer for BCCI.(56)
At the time Bench met with BCCI officials and Price Waterhouse (UK) partners in London, both the BCCI officials and the British accountants knew that BCCI has massive loans on First American secured by First American's shares. Bench himself had been told by the CIA that BCCI owned First American back in 1985. Thus, Bench's personal obliviousness to this issue as a partner of Price Waterhouse (US) raises obvious questions. If Bench had remembered, recognized, or understood the information that was available to him from his days at the OCC, or reviewed any of the recent audit reports at Price Waterhouse (UK) to BCCI's directors, Bench would have had the truth in front of him concerning BCCI's secret ownership of First American. Price Waterhouse (US) and BCCI would have been ethically required to tell the Federal Reserve the truth. And the Federal Reserve would have learned about BCCI's ownership of First American as of the spring of 1989 -- almost two years earlier than the time it actually learned of the relationship.
Instead, according to Bench's testimony, he never focused his attention on the BCCI-First American relationship in any respect, and so confined himself to advising BCCI on how to improve its practices to avoid being used to launder drug money. Bench's approach was narrow and incurious at best.
Conclusions Regarding The Auditors' Role
From the beginning, BCCI's fractured system of banking, involving a multiplicity of entities spanning the globe, posed an obvious challenge to auditors responsible for providing a base-line of protection to those relying on its annual certifications of BCCI, which the auditors failed to meet.
The auditors' options in responding to this problem were quite clear. First, they could respond by highlighting problems, and working with BCCI to solve them, an approach applied through the first 15 years of BCCI's existence. Second, when BCCI failed to respond to their recommendations, the auditors could respond by resigning, an option adopted by Ernst & Whinney in 1986. Price Waterhouse, for reasons that are not clear, but which may relate to the $5 million a year being generated by BCCI-related work, remained with BCCI, and signed off on BCCI's books year after year until early 1990. At that time, recognizing that the financial hole inside the bank required emergency action, Price Waterhouse sought to avoid the risk of being destroyed together with BCCI by taking the information it had developed to the British regulators, and seeking further guidance from them.
The auditors' role also created special problems for those investigating BCCI. BCCI's consolidated audits were based on the work product from auditors around the world. Yet those investigating BCCI in the U.S. found that the local partnership of the auditing firm involved possessed none of the information it requires, and contended it had no power to obtain any of the information it requires.
This problem raises squarely the question of whether remedial legislation is necessary to require international accounting firms to include as a condition of their relationship with foreign affiliated partnerships, that these foreign partnerships agree to provide information in response to valid subpoenas in the United States on cases affecting the United States.
Additional institutional issues arose regarding the auditors' role in BCCI's failure in the UK. In the UK, the issue is whether external auditors have responsibilities to depositors, customers, and the general public independent of their duty to a bank's shareholders.
When an external auditor certifies the financial statement of a business, it is simultaneously providing different services to different audiences.
For the shareholders of the institution it is certifying, it is providing what is supposed to be a clear, full, and fair description of the actual performance of the business to assist the shareholder in determining the value of his investment, the performance of the company, and the strength of the company's management, as well as assurances that the company has no untoward risks from violations of law or regulatory compliance.
To anyone else, an annual certification represents what may be the principal means by which an outsider can evaluate the safety of entering into a transaction with a business. An annual report tells a would-be depositor in a bank about the health of the bank and its business, its level of capital, its past returns on investment, its areas of difficulty. In reviewing such a report's audit certification, an outsider is assuming the reputation for expertise of the auditor, and focusing not on the quality of the audit, but on the information the ostensible neutral and complete audit is providing.
Thus, true and accurate financial statements, certified by reputable accounting firms, are at the heart of the self-regulatory process of financial markets throughout the world. In the United States, this seldom has significant implications because first, depositors are insured by the federal government and therefore need not worry about a bank's solvency, so long as they maintain less than $100,000 per account; and second, the United States conducts independent bank examinations by seasoned examiners employed by bank regulators. Outside the United States, however, bank deposits remain largely uninsured, and outside auditors, rather than bank examiners, are relied upon to insure that reliable financial information is provided to the markets.
Unfortunately, the accounting profession generally has regarded its primary responsibilities as being to shareholders of a company, rather than to potential customers, creditors, or others who might have an interest in obtaining accurate information concerning a company. In the case of a bank, this approach is potentially quite dangerous for uninsured depositors, as it leaves them in the position of having to rely on the work of auditors whose principal duties are not to them, but to those who have placed capital in the bank. This result is especially unfortunate as depositors provide the preponderance of funds used by banks -- typically 90 to 95 percent -- while working capital tends to be limited to 10 percent of a bank's assets or less.
In the case of BCCI, the duty Price Waterhouse viewed itself to owe was to BCCI's shareholders -- a small number of Middle Eastern sheikhs most of whom were in fact not real shareholders at all, but nominees, who were not even paying interest to BCCI on its lending to them in their capacity as nominees. Thus, Price Waterhouse in fact wound up owing a duty principally to the people who were deceiving it.
Moreover, even apart from the nominee issue, because BCCI was a bank, the vast preponderance of its funds came not from capital contributions for stock, but from its one million or more depositors, to whom it surely also had a duty. As Professor Richard Dale of the University of Southampton has noted, this problem was inherent in the system of regulation in the United Kingdom:
BCCI's 1989 accounts were not qualified, even though the auditors were aware of serious problems the nature of which had been reported to the bank's majority shareholders. In explaining the decision not to qualify, the auditors have argued that in general terms a bank's accounts cannot be qualified without risking a collapse in confidence and a potentially calamitous withdrawal of deposits. While this approach may be consistent with an auditor's established legal obligation to shareholders, it is not necessarily in the interests of existing depositors, cannot be in the interests of prospective depositors and is difficult to justify on public policy grounds. . . For the banking system as a whole the absence of credible financial information is likely to mean an increased incidence of destablising bank runs.(57)
Thus, under the system as it stood in 1990 and 1991, Price Waterhouse (UK) was in the unenviable position of having to try to keep BCCI open, even as it uncovered ever more information demonstrating that the only fit conclusion to BCCI's existence was its swift termination. Only a few choices presented themselves. Once again, Price Waterhouse could have resigned its commission as BCCI's auditors, a choice available to it from the beginning. Or it could do as it belatedly did, and make use of a provision of British law that enabled it to advise the regulators of its findings of improper banking practices in early 1990, and seek the regulators' advice on how to proceed further. When it chose the latter course, it obtained the comfort of knowing that its every action was being reviewed contemporaneously by regulators at the Bank of England who would share ultimate responsibility for whatever happened.
Possible Changes in International Accounting Practice
The BCCI case raises the issue of whether the current structure for accounting firms as independent partnerships, with authority and liability limited to the nation in which they are licensed, is appropriate and adequate to meet the challenges posed by an international financial marketplace.
One of the great difficulties in uncovering BCCI's fraud for regulators and investigators was the fact that its frauds were carried out through diverse and widespread jurisdictions spanning the globe, while its activities were audited by local accounting partnerships.
Arguably, the current system by which one partnership of an accounting firm sets out audit instructions to all of its global affiliated partnerships in other countries, for them to carry out its instructions, should be adequate to maintain the standards of an audit that would be carried out within the borders of one country. But in cases where something goes wrong, as in BCCI, the structure leaves those injured in countries other than that in which the accounting firm is licensed, in a difficult situation. The firm responsible for the consolidated audit may be located in a jurisdiction with strong financial confidentiality and privacy laws that preclude disclosure of essential information. It may, as Price Waterhouse (UK) did, contend that it does not do business in a jurisdiction in which people have been injured by its handling of audits, and may even refuse, as Price Waterhouse (UK) did, to honor subpoenas issued to it. Such a result is against public policy, and new structures for international accounting firms need to be considered to avoid a recurrence.
One efficient approach that could be adopted unilaterally by the United States, would be to require accounting partnerships, as a condition of being licensed in the United States, or as a condition of being permitted to have their certifications relied upon by any government agency, to reach agreements with its foreign affiliated entities insuring that they will respond to authorized subpoenas in the United States, and provide information as required by U.S. law.
A second approach would rely on the major accounting firms to modify their partnership agreements without being explicitly required by government to do so, as a matter of self-regulation, to insure the availability of documents from their affiliates in accord with the domestic law of the countries in which they are licensed. Thus, a firm such as Price Waterhouse (US) would seek to amend the Memorandum of Association and Bye-Laws of Price Waterhouse World Firm Limited (PWWF) to reach a new binding understanding among it and its affiliates. Under that new binding understanding, if Price Waterhouse (US) received a legal subpoena in the United States concerning documents possessed by any of its affiliates, the affiliates would have to provide that information to U.S. authorities, subject to the requirements of the laws of their jurisdictions. While such a change would not solve all problems in countries which retain strict financial secrecy laws, it would provide a mechanism by which lawful U.S. subpoenas could be cooperatively enforced in many cases.
A third approach would be legislation prohibiting the use or reliance by any federal agency on an audit prepared by any accounting firm not licensed in the United States. This approach would dramatically reduce the risk to the United States from certifications by foreign accounting firms who do not view themselves to be subject to U.S. subpoenas, such as Price Waterhouse (UK). On the other hand, it could well impose some substantial additional costs on firms, especially foreign firms, whose consolidated audits are prepared by non-U.S. auditors, and further hearings and comments on the proposal would be appropriate.
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Notes:
1. Affidavit of John Bartlett, Bank of England, July 5, 1991.
2. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 498 and 500.
3. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 516.
4. Commentary, Massihur Rahman, Price Waterhouse Section 41 Report to the Bank of England, June, 1991.
5. Memorandum submitted by Price Waterhouse in response to questions from the British Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons; provided to the Subcommittee by counsel to Price Waterhouse (UK), February 5, 1992, Answer 1.
6. Section 41 Report, Price Waterhouse, Bank of England, June 1991.
7. Letter, Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., Price Waterhouse, to Jonathan Winer, Subcommittee staff, October 17, 1991.
8. For the record, Price Waterhouse (UK) did offer to provide the Subcommittee with the opportunity to interview Price Waterhouse (UK) partners in London without the provision of the subpoenaed documents, an offer precluded by Subcommittee rules regarding staff travel, and which, in the absence of the provision of the subpoenaed documents would have been of marginal utility in any case.
9. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 496.
10. Price Waterhouse Grand Caymans papers dated December 31, 1983.
11. "Commentary on the Independent Examination of the Accounts of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. for the year ended 31 December 1984," Price Waterhouse Grand Caymans.
12. "Internal Control Report," 28 April 1986, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd., S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4. pp. 152-155.
13. Price Waterhouse report to BCCI, id, S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 pp. 152-155.
14. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 500.
15. Staff interviews, Akbar Bilgrami and Amjad Awan, July 20-30, 1992.
16. Memorandum submitted by Ernst & Young in reply to Questions from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, February 21, 1992, p. 102.
17. Memorandum submitted by Ernst & Young in reply to Questions of House of Commons Committee on Treasury and Civil Service, February 21, 1991, p. 101, Fourth Report, Banking Supervision and BCCI.
18. Id.
19. Memorandum submitted by Ernst & Young in reply to Questions from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons, February 21, 1992.
20. Price Waterhouse Audit Report, "Our Large Exposures," December, 1987, BCCI, Subcommittee document.
21. Id.
22. Id, re "AR Khalil."
23. Id.
24. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt 1 p. 264.
25. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 307.
26. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 pp. 314-316.
27. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 pp. 317-324, 332-343.
28. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 352.
29. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 353.
30. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 pp. 356-358.
31. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 360.
32. Memorandum submitted by Price Waterhouse in reply to Questions from the Committee on Treasury and Civil Service, February 5, 1992.
33. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 518.
34. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 pp. 518-520.
35. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 pp. 450-458.
36. Staff interviews, Nazir Chinoy, Abdur Sakhia, Akbar Bilgrami.
37. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 481.
38. Memorandum submitted by Price Waterhouse in reply to Questions from the House of Commons Committee on Treasury and Civil Service, February 5, 1992.
39. BCCI Annual Report For the Year 1989, dated April 1990.
40. Memorandum submitted by Price Waterhouse in reply to Questions from the House of Commons Committee on Treasury and Civil Service, February 5, 1991.
41. Memorandum submitted by Price Waterhouse in reply to Questions from the House of Commons Committee on Treasury and Civil Service, February 5, 1991.
42. Id. Price Waterhouse's findings of the Section 41 report are reviewed in some detail in the chapter concerning BCCI's criminality.
43. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 1 p. 279.
44. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 p. 50.
45. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 p. 53.
46. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 p. 92.
47. BCCI Loan documents obtained by Subcommittee; some reprinted in S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 2 pp. 624-629.
48. BCCI Documents, Federal Reserve, Miami, obtained pursuant to Committee subpoena.
49. Letter, James E. Tolan to Jonathan Winer, March 4, 1992.
50. Bilgrami testimony, S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 6, July 30, 1992, and staff interviews, July 20-29, 1992.
51. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 pp. 15-23.
52. Testimony Bench, S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 pp. 36-37.
53. Staff interview, Bench, February 14, 1992.
54. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 pp. 36, 85.
55. S. Hrg. 102- 350 Pt. 4 p. 86.
56. S. Hrg. 102-350 Pt. 4 p. 89-91.
57. Professor Richard Dale, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, id, January 15, 1992, p. 4.