PART 11 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)
V. Command Change at Guantanamo as Dispute over Aggressive Techniques Continues (U)
A. Major General Geoffrey Miller Takes Command of JTF-GTMO (U)(U) In November 2002 a new Commander, MG Geoffrey Miller, took command of JTF-GTMO. At the time, MG Miller had no first-hand experience with detainees or interrogations. [540]
(U) MG Miller told the Committee that prior to taking command, he met with SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill and his staff. [541] During those meetings, MG Miller got the impression that MG Dunlavey, the previous Commander, had bypassed the chain of command by raising issues directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense staff. MG Miller told the Committee that GEN Hill authorized him to speak directly with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but that he told SOUTHCOM he would keep SOUTHCOM informed of those communications. [542]
(U) MG Miller said that, while he was in Command at GTMO, he had direct discussions with the DoD General Counsel's office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). [543] MG Miller also testified to the Army IG that he and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz ''talked once a week when I was in Guantanamo." [544] Lt Col Ted Moss, the JTF-GTMO ICE Chief who began his tour of duty at GTMO in December 2002, said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was in phone contact with MG Miller "a lot." [545] However, MG Miller told the Committee that he misspoke when he testified to the Army IG and that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not speak to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz on the phone while he was at GTMO, but only briefed him quarterly, in person, on GTMO operations. [546]
(U) Shortly after MG Miller arrived at GTMO, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) LTC Phifer informed him of the October 11, 2002 request. [547] Although he later approved an interrogation plan that included reference to Category III techniques, MG Miller told the Army IG that he believed that the techniques in Category III and some techniques in Category II were "overly aggressive" and that he had not intended to use them. [548] MG Miller said he had concerns with stress positions, removal of clothing, and use of dogs, among other techniques. Nevertheless, there is evidence that those techniques were used at GTMO while he was in command. MG Miller told the Committee that he thought he discussed his concerns about the techniques with LTC Beaver in early November before the Secretary approved their use, but that he did not raise it with SOUTHCOM because he wanted to see which techniques would be approved. [549]
(U) MG Miller told the Army IG that when he arrived at GTMO, there was significant tension between JTF-GTMO, CITF, and FBI and that he sought to get all three organizations to work in concert. [550] Despite MG Miller's stated intent, his decision to approve an interrogation plan for Mohammed al Khatani that was opposed by the CITF and FBI, drove a deeper wedge between his organization and both CITF and FBI.
B. Khatani Interrogation Plan Fuels Dispute Over Aggressive Techniques (U)(U) After their unsuccessful interrogation of Khatani in October 2002, JTF-GTMO staff spent several weeks drafting an extensive new interrogation plan. The plan was the first "Special Interrogation Plan" at GTMO and it would encounter strong resistance from both CITF and the FBI. One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that he thought Khatani's interrogation would define the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO and therefore they "had to get it right." [551]
[Delete] Several drafts of JTF-GTMO's interrogation plan for Khatani were circulated at GTMO in November 2002. The discussion below focuses primarily on two of those drafts, one circulated on November 12, 2002 and another which was drafted about a week later and appears to have been finalized on November 22, 2002. Both drafts are discussed here because each provides insight on the range of interrogation techniques considered by senior officials at GTMO. In addition, there is evidence that both draft plans were approved by MG Miller. Finally, there is evidence that techniques which were included in the "draft" circulated on November 12, 2002 but removed from the purported "final" plan, were nevertheless used during Khatani's interrogation.
1. JTF-GTMO Staff Circulate Khatani Interrogation Plan (U)[Delete] According to the report completed by Vice Admiral (VADM) Church, "after discussing the matter in early November 2002 with the Secretary of Defense, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill gave verbal approval on November 12, 2002 for use of all Category I and II counter resistance techniques against Khatani." [552] GEN Hill told the Committee that he had no recollection of that. [553] That same day, November 12, 2002, LTC Phifer sent an email and a four page interrogation plan to MG Miller stating "[h]ere is the Interrogation Plan for [Khatani] as approved by you." [554]
[Delete] The next day, GTMO ICE Chief David Becker emailed the plan, which he referred to as the "[l]atest approved by MG Miller," to a GTMO interrogator. [555] According to the plan, the interrogation was scheduled to begin on November 15, 2002. [556] Mr. Becker told the Committee that the plan was developed by his interrogators with input from him and LTC Phifer. [557] In 2005, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that he thought the plan circulated on November 12, 2002 was part of the final version of the plan that he approved. [558] However, in a subsequent investigation, MG Miller identified a later version as the final plan. [559] He told the Committee that he never approved the version of the plan circulated on November 12, 2002. [560] However, contemporaneous documents indicate that others believed the plan circulated on November 12, 2002 had been approved by both MG Miller and SOUTHCOM and expected it to be implemented on November 15, 2002:
[Delete] [delete] The November 12, 2002 email from the Director for Intelligence LTC Phifer to MG Miller stated, "[h]ere is the Interrogation Plan for ISN: 063 as approved by you. Request you fwd to Gen Hill, info J2/J3/COS. We will begin at 0001 15 Nov per your guidance. [561]
[Delete] The November 13, 2002 email from the GTMO ICE Chief David Becker referred to the November 12, 2002 plan, which was attached to his email, as the "[l]atest approved by MG Miller." [562]
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[Delete] A November 14, 2002 email from the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver to CITF lawyer stated, "[c]oncerning 63 [Khatani] my understanding is that NSC has weighed in and stated that intel on this guy is utmost matter of national security... We are driving forward with support of SOUTHCOM. Not sure anything else needs to be said." [564]
[Delete] A November 15, 2002 staff memorandum for the J-2 of the Joint Staff stated that "interrogators were preparing to interrogate [Khatani] beginning at 15 0001 November 2002 ..." [565]
[Delete] According to the November 12, 2002 plan, the purpose of the interrogation was to "break the detainee and establish his role in the attacks of September 11, 2001." [566] The interrogation would be conducted for "20-hour sessions" and at the completion of each session, Khatani would be permitted four hours of rest, and then "another 20 hour interrogation session [would] begin." [567]
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Prior to the first interrogation, we would like to have the detainee's head and beard shaved. This is to be done for both psychological and hygiene purposes. [Big delete] During the interrogations the detainee will at times be placed in stress positions and blindfolded. If necessary the detainee may have his mouth taped shut in order to keep him from talking. Written approval for the tape and for the presence of dogs will be submitted and obtained prior to implementation. [569]
[Delete] The November 12, 2002 plan went on to describe four phases for the interrogation. [570] During Phase I, interrogators would increase the pressure on Khatani while not permitting him to speak, with the expectation that Khatani, when later presented with the opportunity to speak to an interrogator, would "provide his whole story." [571]
[Delete] Phase II of the plan was to place a cooperative detainee or a native linguist at Camp X-Ray in full view of Khatani. [572] [Big delete]
[Delete] Phase III of the plan, which was entitled "Level III techniques," was to utilize techniques based on those used at SERE school. The plan stated:
The third phase of the plan to exploit 063 requires OSD approval for the SERE interrogation technique training and approval of the level three counter interrogation resistance training submitted by JTF-GTMO. Once the approvals are in place, those interrogation techniques will be implemented to encourage 063 to cooperate. [Big delete]
[Delete] The plan's final phase, Phase IV, was entitled "Coalition Exploitation" and stated that:
The fourth phase of the plan to exploit 063 requires that he be sent off island either temporarily or permanently to either [two specified third countries], or another country to allow those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to obtain the requisite information. [574]
2. CITF and FBI Object to Proposed Interrogation Techniques (U)(U) On November 14, 2002, CITF Commander COL Britt Mallow sent an email to MG Miller raising concerns about both the Khatani interrogation and the October 11, 2002 request for authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques. [575] He stated:
I strongly disagree with the use of many of the proposed [Category] 3 and some [Category] 2 techniques. I feel they will be largely ineffective, and that they will have serious negative material and legal effects on our investigations. I also am extremely concerned that the use of many of these techniques will open any military members up for potential criminal charges, and that my agents, as well as other [military personnel] will face both legal and ethical problems if they become aware of their use. [576]
(U) COL Mallow told the Committee that in addition to his email, he raised concerns about the Khatani interrogation in conversations with MG Miller and in "several meetings with the DoD [General Counsel]." [577] COL Mallow said that MG Miller told him in a meeting that "if [CITF] did not want to participate in interrogations with the intelligence community because of our objections to methods, that [CITF] would not have the benefit of information resulting from any of those interrogations." [578]
(U) MG Miller told the Committee that, while he did not recall the CITF Commander's November 14, 2002 email specifically, he did recall communications from COL Mallow to that effect. [579] DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes stated that he did not recall seeing a copy of the Khatani interrogation plan at that time and did not "specifically" recall his staff advising him that CITF and FBI had concerns with interrogation techniques in the Khatani interrogation plan. [580]
[Delete] A CITF Legal Advisor, [delete], also raised objections to JTF-GTMO's interrogation plan for Khatani. In a November 15, 2002 memo for MG Miller, [delete] [delete] said that "the reliability of any information gained from aggressive techniques will be highly questionable" and objected to all "physical stresses intended for use" in Phase III of the interrogation plan. [581] [Delete] also objected to Phase IV of the plan, stating that it implied "that third country nationals with harsher interrogation standards could be used to convey threats to persons of family or inflict harm contrary to the Convention Against Torture." [582]
[Delete] [delete] The Khatani interrogation did not proceed on November 15, 2002 as planned. A November 15, 2002 staff memo to the Joint Staff J-2 indicated that the interrogation was delayed while MG Miller "consider[ed] COL Mallow's objections." [583] MG Miller denied that the Khatani interrogation was delayed because of COL Mallow's concerns, instead telling the Committee that the interrogation was delayed because he had not received SOUTHCOM's approval. [584] However, as noted above, GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver indicated in a November 14, 2002 email that JTF-GTMO planned to move forward "with support of SOUTHCOM." [585]
(U) In his November 14, 2002 email to MG Miller, COL Mallow proposed that JTF-GTMO and CITF develop a mutually acceptable interrogation plan for Khatani. [586] On November 20, 2002, FBI personnel, who were working closely with CITF, met with JTF-GTMO staff to discuss developing such a plan. [587]
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3. JTF-GTMO Briefs DoD General Counsel's Office on Interrogation Plan (U)[Delete] On November 21, 2002, MG Miller, LTC Phifer, and representatives from the FBI, CITF, SOUTHCOM, and the DoD General Counsel's office all participated in a video teleconference (VTC) to discuss the Khatani interrogation. [591]
[Delete] LTC Phifer told the Committee that he and MG Miller briefed the group on the Khatani plan and that during the VTC, DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson stated that the Department was comfortable with what JTF-GTMO had planned. [592] MG Miller told the Committee that he did not recall the VTC. [593] Ms. Davidson said that she recalled participating in VTCs where the Khatani interrogation was discussed, but she did not recall if she had a copy of the interrogation plan itself and did not recall saying that the Department of Defense was comfortable with what JTF-GTMO proposed for the interrogation. [594] [Delete], the psychiatrist with the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team, said that in the context of the Khatani interrogation, ''we were routinely told that the interrogation strategy was approved up to [the Secretary of Defense] level." [595]
(U) Subsequent to the VTC, the FBI sent a memo to MG Miller alerting him to FBI "misgivings about the overall coercive nature and possible illegality" of the Khatani interrogation plan and informing him that the FBI had presented JTF-GTMO staff with "an alternative interrogation approach based on long-term rapport building." [596] A draft of that alternative approach, which was the product of both the FBI and CITF, stated that Khatani's negative interactions with interrogators "only reinforces Al-Qaeda stereotypes about evil Americans and validates their expectation of harsh treatment and potential torture." [597]
(U) On November 22, 2002, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Chief Psychologist Michael Gelles drafted a formal review of a JTF-GTMO draft plan. [598] Dr. Gelles concluded that the interrogation plan "lack[ed] substantive and thoughtful consideration." [599] Among other concerns, Dr. Gelles stated:
Strategies articulated in the later phases reflect techniques used to train US forces in resisting interrogation by foreign enemies... [These techniques] would prove not only to be ineffective but also border on techniques and strategies deemed unacceptable by law enforcement professionals... [600]
(U) Dr. Gelles noted that '"the choice to use force with this adversary in an interrogation may only reinforce his resistance" and stated that if the plan were implemented he would "have trouble not finding myself from a professional perspective, being forced into an adversary position through cross examination in a military tribunal as an expert in interrogation." [601]
(U) Notwithstanding the CITF and FBI concerns, MG Miller authorized interrogators to proceed with the Khatani interrogation beginning November 23, 2002.
4. "Final" Khatani Interrogation Plan (U)[Delete] [delete] MG Miller identified a version of the Khatani plan that had been written on November 22, 2002 as the "final" plan that he authorized to be implemented on November 23, 2002. [602] While similar to the plan circulated on November 12, 2002, the November 22, 2002 plan contained notable differences from the earlier version that contemporaneous documents indicated had also been approved.
[Delete] [delete] Although there is evidence that both stress positions and dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation, the November 22, 2002 plan does not mention either of these two techniques. [603] MG Miller said the stress positions and use of dogs were removed from the plan at his direction. [604]
[Delete] [delete] With respect to dogs, MG Miller said that neither LTC Phifer, nor LTC Beaver objected to the use of dogs and that his ICE Chief, Mr. Becker, actually favored the use of dogs in interrogations. [605] MG Miller said, however, that he only approved the use of dogs for security around the perimeter of Camp X-Ray, where the interrogation was to take place, and that he made that view absolutely clear to Mr. Becker. CAPT Jane Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, however, that she met with MG Miller in early November and discussed the use of dogs for interrogation purposes. [606] She said that the "theory was that certain individuals are afraid of dogs" and that, while MG Miller talked about dogs being outside the interrogation room, they discussed the purpose of the dogs' presence during interrogations was that it "exploits [the detainee's] fear." [607]
[Delete] [delete] Mr. Becker told the Committee that MG Miller told him to remove dogs from the plan. [608] Nevertheless, a document describing interrogation techniques used in the Khatani interrogation and a witness account (both discussed below) suggest that dogs were used during the interrogation to shock and agitate Khatani. [609]
[Delete] [delete] With respect to stress positions, Mr. Becker told the Committee that, notwithstanding the fact that they were included in the earlier plan, there was never an intent to use stress positions with Khatani. [610] A document that appears to have been produced during the Khatani interrogation, however, stated that stress positions would "be employed." [611] In addition, a 2005 memo from the JTF-GTMO Chief of Staff referencing the 2002 interrogation stated that Khatani had "slight abrasions caused by stress positions and shackle restraints." [612]
[Delete] [delete] The November 22, 2002 plan identified by MG Miller as the final plan described five phases to the interrogation. [613] Phase I, which was added after November 12, called for the interrogators to "Induce and exploit Stockholm Syndrome" by establishing "an isolated, austere environment where the detainee becomes completely dependent on the interrogators and the interrogator presents himself as a 'caretaker' of the detainee." [614] Dr. Gelles said that the idea of inducing the Stockholm syndrome implied that "the subject feels that he is to be killed and the information provided may in fact be distorted." [615]
[Delete] [delete] Phase II of the November 22, 2002 plan (which is largely the same as Phase I of the earlier plan) stated that prior to the start of the first Phase II interrogation session, Khatani's head and beard would be shaved for "safety, hygiene and psychological purposes." [616] In addition, the plan stated that MG Miller had approved the use of hospital gauze to restrain the detainee's mouth to prevent him from becoming argumentative and verbally abusive.
[Delete] Phase III of the November 22, 2002 plan was largely the same as Phase II of the earlier plan and proposed having a native linguist translator play the role of a detainee to elicit information from Khatani. [617]
[Delete] Phase IV of the November 22, 2002 plan - which described the use of interrogation techniques based on those used in SERE school to increase U.S. personnel's resistance to illegal enemy interrogations - was virtually identical to the earlier plan and stated:
The fourth phase of the plan to exploit 063 [Khatani] requires [Office of the Secretary of Defense] approval for the SERE interrogation technique training and approval of the level three counter interrogation resistance training submitted by JTF-GTMO. Once the approvals are in place, those interrogation techniques will be implemented to encourage 063 to cooperate. The intent of raising the stakes to this level is to convince 063 that it is futile to resist. Success of Phase III is when his sense of futility is raised to a high enough level that source gives in and provides the necessary information. Phase III ends with success or a standstill, after the exhaustion of all tools JTF GTMO has to offer. [618]
[Delete] Despite having approved the plan, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that he knew "little about SERE" and "wasn't comfortable" with SERE techniques. [619] However, MG Miller acknowledged to the Committee that these techniques were included in the approved plan and that, if the first three phases of the Khatani plan were unsuccessful, that he was willing to consider the use of SERE techniques. [620]
[Delete] The plan's final phase, Phase V, maintained the same title "Coalition Exploitation" as Phase IV of the earlier plan but did not explicitly state an intention to render Khatani to a third country, as did the earlier plan. [621] Instead, under "Coalition Exploitation" the November 22, 2002 plan stated that:
The fifth phase of the plan to exploit 063 will be determined at the national, interagency level where the future disposition of 063 will be determined.[622]
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[Big delete] [624] Nevertheless, the idea of transferring Khatani to a third country was discussed. [625]
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5. FBI and CITF Continue to Object to Khatani Interrogation Plan (U)(U) On November 22, 2002 the FBI sent MG Miller a memo that outlined FBI's continuing concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques. The FBI also requested a meeting with the Commander. [628] The memo stated:
Many of [JTF-GTMO's] methods are considered coercive by Federal Law Enforcement and UCMJ standards. Not only this, but reports from those knowledgeable about the use of these coercive techniques are highly skeptical as to their effectiveness and reliability. [629]
(U) The memo stated further that the "FBI/CITF strongly believes that the continued use of diametrically opposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will only weaken our efforts to obtain valuable information." [630]
(U) In late November, FBI agents at GTMO asked that their concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques be relayed to Marion "Spike" Bowman, a senior attorney in the FBI's Office of General Counsel. [631] Mr. Bowman said that "[a]s soon as I heard from the [the FBI agents] I talked with (now retired) Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro who immediately said we (the FBI) would not be a party to actions of any kind that were contrary to FBI policy and that individuals should distance themselves from any such actions." [632] Mr. Bowman also recommended to FBI General Counsel Kenneth Wainstein that FBI relay the concerns to the DoD General Counsel's office. Mr. Bowman subsequently called the acting DoD Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence and believes he also spoke with the DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel. DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes said that he did not recall being aware that the FBI had contacted his office with concerns. [633]
(U) On December 2, 2002, an FBI Special Agent, who was also an attorney, sent his own legal analysis of the October 11, 2002 GTMO request to another Special Agent for forwarding to Mr. Bowman. [634] The FBI Special Agent referred to several techniques - such as all the Category III techniques and several Category II techniques, including stress positions, hooding, removal of clothing, 20 hour interrogations, and use of individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress - as "coercive interrogation techniques which are not permitted by the U.S. Constitution." [635] The Special Agent's analysis also identified several techniques - including all Category III techniques and two Category II techniques, i.e. hooding and use of phobias - as "examples of coercive interrogation techniques which may violate 18 U.S.C. § 2340, (Torture Statute)" and warned that "it is possible that those who employ these techniques may be indicted, prosecuted, and possibly convicted if the trier of fact determines that the user had the requisite intent." [636]
(U) The following day, Mr. Bowman sent an email to another FBI Special Agent, stating "[i]t is irrelevant whether these detainees are considered prisoners of war, they are still entitled to minimal conditions of treatment - many of the techniques addressed appear to move well beyond the minimal requirements ... I concur that we can't control what the military is doing, but we need to stand well clear of it and get as much information as possible to D'Amuro, Gebhart, and Mueller as soon as possible." [637] Director Mueller said that he was not aware of the FBI's concerns with DoD interrogation techniques at GTMO until May 2004. [638]
[Big delete]
[Big delete]. [641] The DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, Eliana Davidson, said that the FBI's Unit Chief believed that efforts at GTMO were not being productive and that he advocated for Khatani's transfer during the VTC. [642] [Big delete]. [643]
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[Big delete] DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes said he did not remember discussing the possible rendition of Khatani, but that "it may have been considered." [648]
(U) CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon said that FBI proposed to CITF the idea of rendering Khatani to a third country but that CITF "considered it possibly unlawful" and opposed the proposal. [649] He said CITF staff made Mr. Cobb aware of their concerns and that Mr. Cobb supported the CITF position.
(U) The same day the VTC took place, FBI's on-site supervisor and two Special Agents met with MG Miller where they again raised their concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation techniques. [650] One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that MG Miller thanked the FBI personnel for their views, but told them that JTF-GTMO staff knew what they were doing. [651]
(U) On December 9, 2002, another FBI Special Agent who attended the meeting sent an email stating, "when I return to D.C., I will bring a copy of the military's interview plan [for Khatani] ... You won't believe it!" [652] Several months later he characterized the December 5, 2002 meeting with MG Miller:
Although [MG] Miller acknowledged positive aspects of [the FBI's approach to interrogations] it was apparent that he favored [JTF-GTMO's] interrogation methods, despite FBI assertions that such methods could easily result in the elicitation of unreliable and legally inadmissible information. [653]
[Delete] JTF-GTMO ICE Chief David Becker told the Committee that MG Miller asked him at one point why the JTF was not using the FBI's approach, to which Mr. Becker replied that the JTF had already tried the FBI approach, that it did not work, and that he wanted to be more aggressive. [654]
6. Khatani Interrogation Begins, CITF Directed To "Stand Clear" (U)(U) On November 23, 2002, JTF-GTMO personnel took Khatani to Camp X-Ray to begin Phase I of the interrogation. [655] Two days later, CITF attorney [delete] sent the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate, LTC Diane Beaver, an email indicating that "CITF is not on board with aggressive techniques including 20 hour [plus] interrogations. Therefore, according to our policy, we will 'stand clear' and not offer participation, advisements, support or recommendations as to its implementation." [656] CITF later drafted formal guidance for its agents stating that "Detainees will be treated humanely. Physical torture, corporal punishment and mental torture are not acceptable interrogation tactics and are not allowed under any circumstances... CITF personnel will not participate in any interrogation that employs tactics inconsistent with or in direct violation of this policy." [657]
7. Techniques Used During Khatani Interrogation (U)(U) According to [delete] the GTMO BSCT psychiatrist who participated in the interrogation, just before the Khatani interrogation began, Khatani was "made [to] believe he was sent to a hostile country which advocated torture." [658] [Delete] stated that Khatani was also "led to believe he himself might be killed if he did not cooperate with questioning." [659] The actual interrogation took place at GTMO's Camp X-Ray. LTC Phifer told the Committee that Khatani was taken to X-Ray [Big delete]. [660]
[Delete] However, an interrogator who participated in the interrogation told the Committee that part of the reason Khatani was taken to X-Ray was to scare him. [661]
(U) Khatani was interrogated from November 23, 2002 through January 16, 2003. [662] In June 2004, SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill, described the origin of some of the interrogation techniques used in the interrogation:
The staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to our SERE school and developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided and looked at, said were OK. I sent that list of techniques up to the Secretary and said, in order for us to get at some of these very high-profile, high- value targets who are resistant to techniques, I may need greater flexibility. But I want a legal review of it and you to tell me that, policywise, it's the right way to do business. He did that. And he approved additional techniques, which I would not describe as harsh, but additional techniques and gave them to me the first part of December. And we began to use a few of those techniques, a few of those techniques on this individual... [663]
[Delete] [delete] A memo dated January 17, 2003 also described techniques '"used" against Khatani between November 23, 2002 and January 16, 2003, including stripping, forced grooming, invasion of space by a female interrogator, treating Khatani like an animal, using a military working dog, and forcing him to pray to an idol shrine. [664]
[Delete] [delete] These techniques are similar to techniques used in SERE school. In fact, JPRA training slides, identified by a JPRA instructor as those presented to interrogation personnel deploying for GTMO, identified "religious disgrace" and "invasion of personal space by a female" as methods to defeat resistance. [665] Likewise, JPRA materials identified "degradation" as a method to defeat resistance, which was understood to include such methods as stripping the individual, having the guards address the individual as if that person were an "animal" or of "very low status," and controlling use of the latrine. [666]
[Delete] [delete] The January 17, 2003 memo stated that "[s]earch/strip search" was used on Khatani "for security and to assert control." [667] A second document that appears to have been produced while the Khatani interrogation was ongoing stated that "removal of clothing" would "be employed" as part of Khatani's interrogation. [668] Despite the contemporaneous documents suggesting that removal of clothing was used during the interrogation, several senior JTF- JTMO personnel have said they were unaware of its use as an interrogation technique.
• [Delete] [delete] MG Miller told the Committee that he informed his Director for Intelligence, LTC Phifer, that he opposed the forced removal of clothing as an interrogation technique and in a 2004 sworn statement stated that "to the best of my knowledge JTF-GTMO never used [removal of clothing]" during the six week period in late 2002 early 2003 when it was authorized. [669]
• LTC Phifer and his replacement, COL Richard Sanders (who was given the title of Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) Commander) told the Committee that they were not aware that Khatani was strip searched. [670]
• Both Mr. Becker, the ICE Chief present for the development of the Khatani plan, and his successor Lt Col Ted Moss, who assumed the position when the interrogation was already underway, told the Committee that they were unaware of Khatani being stripped at the direction or suggestion of interrogation personnel. [671]
[Delete] [delete] The January 17, 2003 memo stated that Khatani's head and beard were shaved "for hygienic purposes and to assert control over the detainee," that Khatani's hands were shackled to a chair to prevent him from praying, and that prayer was denied in circumstances where prayer was ''used as a resistance technique." [672] The memo stated that up to eight ounces of water was poured over Khatani's head as a "method of asserting control" when Khatani exhibited ''undesired behavior." [673] And it said Khatani was forced to "sit, stand, lay down, walk or other non-stress position activities by guards to enforce the control of the interrogator." [674] MAJ Burney said that Khatani was "made to stand for several hours at a time or sit on a hard chair for several hours at a time. [675] The January 17, 2003 memo also stated that Khatani was ridiculed and berated ''to elicit an adversarial response." [676]
[Delete] The memorandum listed several techniques used to increase Khatani's stress level including using of a female interrogator who "touch[ed] [Khatani] in close proximity," instructing Khatani ''to pray to idol shrine to test religious temperance and incur," [Big delete]. [677]
[Delete] The memo stated that "K-9 units [were] present during interrogation but outside of booth to provide barking in order to agitate the detainee and provide shock value." [678]
[Delete] One interrogator who participated in the Khatani interrogation told the Committee that he understood that dogs could be used in a manner consistent with the description in the January 17, 2003 memo, i.e. they could be present during interrogation but outside the booth in order to agitate Khatani and provide shock value. [679] The interrogator told the Committee that during one of his shifts interrogating Khatani, an MP brought a dog to the outside of the room in which the interrogation was taking place and that the MP got the dog to bark. [680] The interrogator said that he did not ask the MP to do so and told the MP not to do it again.
(U) MAJ Burney, who was present for portions of the interrogation, testified to the Army IG that a dog was brought into the Khatani interrogation during late November or early December an estimated "half dozen times." [681] MAJ Burney testified:
[The] dog was never allowed to bite the detainee but would be ordered to bark loudly close to the detainee, to sort of sniff or muzzle the detainee, to put paws up on the detainee. [682]
(U) MAJ Burney said that interrogators stopped using the dog "not because anybody had necessarily objected to [the use of the dog]," but because ''the initial shock value had worn off" and "it just wasn't felt to be effective anymore." [683] None of the other witnesses interviewed by the Committee stated that they were aware of a dog being brought into the interrogation booth.
[Delete], who was present for portions of the interrogation, stated that at one point during an interrogation, either a guard or an interrogator suggested that a dog be used to scare Khatani. [684] [delete] said that he informed Mr. Becker, who intervened before the dogs were used. [685]
(U) As discussed above, MG Miller told the Committee that dogs were present at Camp X-Ray solely for securing the perimeter and that he was absolutely clear with ICE Chief David Becker that dogs were not to be used in interrogations. [686] He testified to the Army IG that he "rejected [using dogs in interrogations] as an acceptable technique" and that dogs "were not to be used during active interrogation." [687] In written answers to questions posed by Vice Admiral Church, however, the Director for Intelligence, LTC Phifer stated that dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation and that "We would bring the dog around to within 10 feet [of Khatani] and he would be somewhat unnerved by it. We did it to keep him off balance as well as to enhance security." [688] Despite the testimony of the BSCT psychiatrist and LTC Phifer, Mr. Becker stated that the Commander "refused to allow dogs" in interrogations while he was in command of JTF-GTMO and told the Committee that dogs were not at the Khatani interrogation. [689]
_______________
Notes:540. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 5.
541. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
542. Ibid.
543. Ibid.
544. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 28, 2005).
545. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).
546. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
547. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 11.
548. Ibid.
549. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
550. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20, 2005) at 7.
551. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
552. Church Report at 115.
553 General James Hill answers to July 28, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (August 20, 2008).
554. Email from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 12, 2002).
555. Email from David Becker to [Interrogation Control Element Staff Sergeant] (November 13, 2002). Both the plan attached to those emails and the subsequent plan identified by the JTF-GTMO Commander as the "final" plan contained the JTF-GTMO Commander's [Miller] signature block. However, the Committee has not seen any version of the plan that contained the JTF-GTMO Commander's signature.
556. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [Delete] [Khatani] (November 12, 2002).
557. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). One FBI agent who was a member of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit told the Committee that multiple versions of the plan were actually circulated at GTMO during this period. Committee Staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
558. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (October 20,2005) at 7.
559. Inge Report.
560. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
561. Email from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 12, 2002) (emphasis added), attached as exhibit 7 to the Inge Report.
562. Email from David Becker to [Interrogation Control Element Staff Sergeant] (November 13, 2002).
563. Notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans/or Detainee #063, entry at "1111212002" (emphasis added).
564. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to [delete] (November 14, 2002) (emphasis added). Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she was neither briefed on, nor did she review, the Khatani interrogation plan. Similarly, then-NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that, to the best of his recollection, he too was neither briefed on, nor did he review the plan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
565. Memo from [delete] [delete] to [Joint Staff], GTMO Detainee [delete] (November 15, 2002) (emphasis added).
566. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 12, 2002).
567. Ibid.
568. Ibid.
569. Ibid. A third draft of the plan which appears to have been produced after November 12 stated that "written approval for use of gauze and for the presence of dogs have been approved by [MG Miller]" and was sent from an attorney in the DoD General Counsel's office to an attorney at the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in May 2003. January 31, 2008 SASC staff notes on Vaughn declaration documents.
570. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 12, 2002).
571. Ibid.
572. Ibid.
573. Ibid.
574. Ibid.
575. Email from COL Britt Mallow to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 14, 2002).
576. Ibid.
577. Responses of COL (Ret.) Britt Mallow to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006).
578. Ibid.
579. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
580. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 221, 228.
581. Memo from [delete] for Major General Geoffrey Miller, Objection to Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (November 15, 2002).
582. Ibid.
583. Memo from [delete] to J-2, Joint Staff, GTMO Detainee [delete] 063 [delete] (November 15, 2002).
584. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
585. Email from LTC Diane Beaver to [delete] (November 14, 2002) (emphasis added).
586. Email from COL Britt Mallow to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 14, 2002).
587. FBI memo to Major General Miller, VTC 21 November 2002 (undated).
588. Committee staff interview of FBI Special agent (November 8, 2007).
589. Internal FBI Email, Interview Plans (November 21, 2002).
590. Ibid.
591. Notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans for Detainee #063, entry at "11/21/2002."
592. [Delete] Committee staff interview of LTC Jerry Phifer (June 27, 2007). Notes taken by an FBI Special Agent who participated in the VIC indicate that, in briefing the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) plan, LTC Phifer "portray [ed] the DHS Interrogation Plan to SOUTHCOM and the General Counsel at the Pentagon as a unified FBI/DHS Interrogation Plan." The FBI Special Agent's notes state that the LTC Phifer characterization was "in direct contradiction" to what the Special Agent had told Phifer the previous day. See notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans for Detainee #063, entry at "11/21/2002."
593. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
594. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (February 21, 2008).
595. Written statement of [delete] (August 21, 2007) at 8.
596. FBI memo to Major General Miller, VTC 21 November 2002 (undated).
597. FBI and CITF Draft Interrogation Plan (November 22, 2002).
598. Memo from Michael G. Gelles, Psy.D. to Marie Fallon, Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063, (November 22, 2002) (hereinafter "Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002)").
599. Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002).
600. Ibid.
601. Ibid.
601. Inge Report at 9.
603. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 22, 2002) (hereinafter "Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).").
604. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
605. Ibid.
606. Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 84.
607. Ibid.
608. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17,2007).
609. [Delete] Memorandum, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63(S) (January 17, 2003). Army IG, Interview of [delete] (April 28, 2006).
610. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
611. Memo, 063 Plan of Attack: Phase I Bravo (undated).
612. Memo from COL John A. Hadjis to Chief of Staff, USSOUTHCOM, Executive Summary on Information Concerning Detainee ISN: [delete] (U) (March 14, 2005).
613. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).
614. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002). The Stockholm Syndrome refers to a psychological event where hostages begin to identify with and grow sympathetic to their captors. The syndrome draws its name from a bank robbery and hostage situation in Stockholm, Sweden in 1973.
615 Review of JTF-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002).
616. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).
617. Interrogation Plan for ISN: [delete] [Khatani] (November 15, 2002) (hereinafter "Khatani interrogation plan (November 15, 2002)"); Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).
618. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).
619. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (March 26, 2006).
620. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
621. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002).
622, Ibid.
623. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
624. Ibid.
625. See Section VB 5, infra.
626. Khatani interrogation plan (November 22,2002).
627. Ibid.; Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007).
628 FBI Memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Geoffrey Miller (November 22, 2002). Despite the heading on the memorandum, JTF-GTMO had replaced JTF-170 by the time this memo was written.
629. Ibid.
630. Ibid.
631. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
632. Responses of Marion Bowman to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (August 7, 2006).
633. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 236.
634. Email from FBI Special Agent (December 2, 2002).
635. FBI Memo, Legal Issues Re Interrogation Techniques, attached to Email from FBI Special Agent (December 2, 2002).
636. Ibid.
637. Email from Marion Bowman (December 3, 2002).
638. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (February 16, 2005).
639. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
640 Email from FBI Special Agent (May 10, 2004).
641. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
642. Committee staff interview of Eliana Davidson (May 23, 2008).
643. Committee staff interview of FBI Unit Chief (May 17, 2008).
644. Ibid.
645. Ibid.
646. Ibid.
647. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
648. Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 232.
649. Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006).
650. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agents (November 8,2007).
651. Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
652. Email from FBI Special Agent (December 9,2002).
653. Electronic Communication from FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) (May 30, 2003).
654. Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
655. Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation Into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse At Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility, prepared by Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt and Brig. Gen. John Furlow (hereinafter "Schmidt- Furlow Report'').
656. Email from to LTC Diane Beaver (November 25, 2002).
657. DoD CITF Memo for All Personnel Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigation Task Force, ALCITF Memorandum 004-02, Interrogation Procedures (December 16, 2002).
658 Written statement of [delete] August 21, 2007).
659. Ibid.
660. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007).
661. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008).
662. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 17.
663. Transcript of Media Availability with Commander U.S. Southern Command General James Hill (June 3, 2004) (emphasis added). Despite General Hill's acknowledgement in 2004, in comments submitted to the DoD IG's August 25, 2006 report, the DoD General Counsel's office stated that "there is no evidence that SERE techniques were ever adopted at Guantanamo or anywhere else." See DoD Office of General Counsel, Legal Review of DRAFT SECRET/NOFORN DoD IG Report, "Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse (Project No. D2004- DINTOI-0174) (U)" (June 8, 2006) at 8.
664. Memo, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 063 (January 17, 2003). The author of the memo is unknown but a copy of the memo was sent by the JTF-GTMO BSCT psychiatrist, [delete] to LTC Morgan Banks, the Chief of the Psychological Applications Directorate (PAD) at the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC).
665 See Section I D, supra.
666. Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at 22; Level C Peacetime Governmental Detention Survival JPRA Instructor Guide, Exploitation: Threats and Pressures, Module 6.0, Lesson 6.1, para 5.3.3 (Version GO1.1).
667. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).
668. Memo, 063 Plan of Attack: Phase I Bravo (undated).
669. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007); Sworn Statement of MG Geoffrey Miller (June 19, 2004).
670. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of COL Richard Sanders (August 10, 2007).
671. Committee staff interview of Lt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007); Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
672. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).
673. Ibid.
674. Ibid.
675. Written statement from MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007).
676. Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).
677. Ibid.
678. Ibid.
679. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008); Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, 2003).
680. Committee staff interview of JTF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008).
681. Army IG, Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006).
682. Ibid.
683. Ibid.
684. Committee staff interview of [delete] (August 13, 2007).
685. Ibid.
686. Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 5, 2007).
687. Army IG, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (May 2, 2006).
688. LTC Jerry Phifer written answers to Church Report Questionnaire (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those written answers whether the Director for Intelligence [Phifer] was referring to the use of dogs in the interrogation of Khatani that began in November or the interrogation that took place in October 2003. See section B supra. 689 Army IG, Interview of David Becker (September 20, 2005) at 31.