Minority Report Cont'd.
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matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so imminent as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation or that war. Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an overt act by Japan an attack on territory of the United States. Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and dispositions necessary to that end were taken.
During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meetings, discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that attack or overt act. Yet when the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the attack effectively.
In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding conclusions and more of the same kind that could be cited. This failure cannot all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the President of the United States.
This does demonstrate the weakness of dependence on the political head of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the operating activities of the military branches, particularly in the areas of intelligence. The major lesson to be learned is that this coordination should be done in advance of a crisis.
17. *High authorities in, Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities or their failures in this respect*.
The first part of this conclusion calls for no special citations of authority. In reports of the President's Commission, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Navy Court of Inquiry, three points in this respect are accepted as plain facts: (1) The ultimate power to allocate arms, ammunition, implements of war, and other supplies was vested in the President and his aide, Harry Hopkins, subject to the advice of General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (2) General Short and Admiral Kimmel made repeated demands upon their respective Departments or additional material, which they represented as necessary to the effective defense of Pearl Harbor; and (3) Washington authorities, having full discretion in this regard, made decisions against General Short and Admiral Kimmel and allocated to the Atlantic theater, where the United States was at least nominally at peace, materiel, specially bombing and reconnaissance planes, which were known to be absolutely indispensable to efficient defense of Pearl Harbor. (See exhibits 106 and 53, request for materials.)
The decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made by the President in March 1940, over the protest of Admiral Richardson.
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The second part of this conclusion may be arguable from the point of view of some high world strategy, but it is not arguable under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The President it is true had powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941. But his first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was to care for the defense and security of the United States against a Japanese attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the allocations of materiel, especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he made or authorized decisions which deprived the Hawaiian commanders of indispensable materiel they could otherwise have had and thus reduced their defensive forces to a degree known to be dangerous by high officials in Washington and Hawaii.
When this decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made certain definite facts in relation to such base must be presumed to have been fully known and appreciated by the responsible command at Washington.
The base is a shallow-water bass with limited base mobility, with no chance for concealment or camouflage and without enough air beaches to properly park the necessary defensive air equipment. Entrance to the base is by a narrow winding channel requiring sorties at reduced speed, and in single file, and presenting the possibility of a blockade of the base by an air or submarine attack on the entrance.
The base is surrounded by high land immediately adjacent to the city of Honolulu, thereby affording full public familiarity with installations and movements within the base at all times.
The base is located on an island where the population was heavily Japanese, and where, as was well known, Japanese espionage was rampant, and making it probable that any defensive insufficiency of any kind or nature would be open to Japanese information.
All of the fuel for the base must be transported, by tanker, from the mainland more than 2,000 miles away, thus intensifying the necessity for complete defensive equipment and supplies for the base.
The waters about Oahu are of a depth facilitating the concealed movement of submarines, and the near approach of submarines to the shore, thereby favoring such methods of hostile attack.
The approaches to Oahu cover a full circle of 360 , with open sea available on all sides.
The situation thus confronting the Pacific Fleet upon reaching its Pearl Harbor base seems entirely clear. Before the base could be a safe base, it must be supplied with adequate defense facilities, which facilities must be in kind and amount in relation to the physical characteristics of the base above referred to. An absence of adequate defensive facilities directly increased the peril of the fleet. Since the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made at Washington, the responsibility for providing proper base defense for the fleet rested primarily upon Washington. (See Stark letter, November 22, 1940, Tr., Vol. 5, p. 706 ff.) It becomes important, therefore, to consider what defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl Harbor base, whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if not, the reasons for such failure.
The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense of the Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions,
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the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of long-distance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance covering a 360 perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol planes, with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in operation, and a sufficient number of available crews to permit a continuous patrol.
Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any attack which might be considered possible. This would require approximately 175 planes.
The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable number of antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammunition and sufficient experienced crews for ready operation.
The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and baffles. It would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together with ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant recourse to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of the Pearl Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a more or less defenseless situation except for the defense power of their own ship batteries. The British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, Italy, brought the question of torpedo bomber defense to the fore. Admiral Stark wrote on November 22, 1940 expressing fear of a "sudden attack in Hawaiian waters" on the fleet, and asking about torpedo net protection. (Tr., Vol. 5, p. 707.) Admiral Richardson, then in command, expressed no anxiety about the security of the fleet, and thought torpedo nets unnecessary, but thought security to the fleet must be carried out, even at the expense of fleet training and extra discomfort. Approximately four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon the attack was the result of torpedoes fired by torpedo-bombing planes tacking the base at low altitudes. Against such an attack, anti-torpedo baffles and nets would have been of extraordinary value.
The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly discovered device known as radar, which before December 7 had been sufficiently perfected to permit the discovery of approaching planes more than 100 miles away.
It seems to be agreed that it is not the duty of the fleet, ordinarily, to furnish its own base defense. That duty is supposed to be performed by the base defense itself, usually in the hands of the Army. The fleet, however, is always to be expected to furnish every available defensive effort it has, in event of an attack upon a base. The record discloses that with full knowledge of the defense necessities inherent in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the dangers and peril imposed upon the fleet while based at the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the equipment essential to a proper protection of the fleet at such base, it was decided by President Roosevelt to remove the fleet from the mainland bases and base it at Pearl Harbor.
The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl Harbor until the attack on December 7, the high command at Hawaii, both in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military authorities at Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at the Pearl Harbor base (Exhibits 53 and 106). Nowhere in the record
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does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of the requests for defense equipment made by the high command in Hawaii. On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was expressly recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to provide the equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages, the requested defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied.
It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii than for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble with such an explanation is that Hawaii was the only non-mainland base charged with the defense of a major part of our Pacific Fleet, and the equipment supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient. The Philippines received much equipment which might well have gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii could have been defended, whereas no one expected the Philippines to be able to stand a direct Japanese onslaught. General Marshall reported to the President in March 1941 (Exhibit 59) that "Oahu was believed to be the strongest fortress in the world" and practically invulnerable to attack and that sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause great damage.
The Government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and the Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no issue as to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point out that such decision resulted in the failure of the military authorities in Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the defense of the base and the fleet while in the base. As we have said, such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon the Pacific Fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that in view of the obligations assumed by the Government in other military theaters, and to which we have just referred, and the consequent inability of the Government to properly contribute to the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, that the only alternative left which might have relieved the fleet from the resultant peril would have been to have changed the original decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and *thereupon return the fleet to its several mainland bases*. It appears obvious that the safety of the fleet would have been helped by such removal. The perimeter of a defense at a mainland base would only be 180 instead of 360 , thus permitting distant patrol reconnaissance by one-half as many planes. The transportation and supply facilities to the mainland base would be immensely improved, as would all necessary communication facilities. The mobility of the fleet at a mainland base would have been improved and the concentration of the fleet in a single limited base would have been avoided. *We therefore are of the opinion that the fleet should not have been based at Pearl Harbor unless proper base defenses were assured*.
Since no such change in policy was approved, and the fleet remained based at Pearl Harbor without the necessary defense equipment to which we have referred plus the fact that the precise status of the defense weakness must be assumed to have been open to the unusual Japanese espionage operating in Hawaii, and therefore that the Tokyo war office must be assumed to have been cognizant of the status of affairs at Pearl Harbor, we are forced to conclude that the failure to remove the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the mainland must be viewed
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as an important relevant factor necessarily involved in the success of the Japanese attack on December 7.
The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, between February 1 and December 1, 1941, an abundance of long-distance patrol planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit 172 shows that the Army received between February 1 and December 1, 1941, approximately 600 long-distance bombers capable of flying loaded, missions, of 1,200 miles or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii and 35 went to the Philippines. During the same period the Navy received approximately 560 similar long- distance bombers, of which approximately 175 were assigned to carriers in the Pacific. During the same period the Army received approximately 5,500 antiaircraft guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the Philippines. If it be true that it was found necessary to send this equipment elsewhere, as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii instead of having high priority, occupied a subordinate position.
We have referred to the unavoidable vulnerabilities of the Pearl Harbor base, together with the identification of the essential defense equipment necessary for its proper defense. We likewise noted the demands made by the high command at Hawaii for such equipment, the agreement that such equipment was proper and necessary, and the continued and increased peril imposed upon the fleet by the failure to provide such equipment.
It seems proper here to note the extent to which the Pearl Harbor base was deprived of needed and essential equipment.
(1) We have pointed out that the perimeter of Oahu defense covered 360 . Full defense reconnaissance would likewise be required for the full 360 . The evidence discloses that it would take approximately 200 patrol planes to furnish such reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance would require flights of not less than 750 miles from Oahu. The evidence shows that the wear and tear upon patrol planes engaged in such distant operations would be heavy, that a certain proportion of available planes would have to be under repair and adjustment, and that only about one-third of the assigned planes would be available for a particular day's patrol. In a similar way, in connection with the overhaul and repair of planes, a proper store of repair parts would be essential and of even greater importance, spare crews for the operation of the planes would be required, since the same crew could not fly such patrol missions daily.
The record seems to establish that there were available at Pearl Harbor on December 7, approximately 85 patrol planes suitable for distant patrol, of which not to exceed 55 were in operable condition. The supply of spare parts was not ample, nor were there sufficient extra crews for a continuous operation.
With reference to fighter planes, the situation was not so acute. An estimate appears in the record that 185 fighter planes would be necessary to defend the base, and there were, on December 7, 105 available fighter planes, which, if properly alerted, would have been available for base defense.
The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used as a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater.
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We agree that Admiral Kimmel was faced with a sharp dilemma. He was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Under WPL-46 he was given specific duties which required him to have his fleet ready for action promptly upon the breaking out of war. He had available 50 or 60 patrol planes, and he would need these planes in aid of fleet movements if his fleet was to take the offensive against the enemy. If he used these patrol planes for base defense, such heavy duty would reduce their efficiency and ultimately put them up for repair in event the distance patrol duty should cover an extended period. In such an event his fleet could not sail against the enemy as required by WPL-46 because his patrol planes would be out of commission. He had therefore to make a choice between fleet training and preparation and base defense. He says his decision not to carry on distant reconnaissance was based upon his belief, in common with his staff, that Pearl Harbor was not in danger from a Japanese attack. We think in making such a decision Admiral Kimmel was unjustified in concluding, first, that there was no danger of attack at Pearl Harbor, and, second, that such a decision did not violate the fundamental proposition that no disposition should be taken which unnecessarily increased fleet peril. The absence of distant reconnaissance immediately imperiled fleet safety. We therefore think the abandonment of distance reconnaissance was unjustified.
(2) The fuel reserves were insufficient, limiting full use of the fleet at sea, required constant augmentation from the mainland, and the location of such fuel supplies was such as to make them vulnerable to any raiding attack. The fleet was required to come into the base at frequent intervals to refuel. The facilities at the base made such refueling slow. The fleet was without a sufficient supply of fast tankers to permit refueling at sea, and there was ever present the inescapable fact that a destruction of the fuel supply would necessarily immobilize the entire fleet.
(3) It is difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to the sufficiency of the antiaircraft batteries and supplies available at Pearl Harbor on December 7. General Short testified as to the number of guns available on December 7, 1941, as compared with the number available in December 1942. It is apparent that the antiaircraft gun equipment had been much augmented during the year following the Pearl Harbor attack. The difficulty we have with respect to the antiaircraft batteries situation, as with the available force of fighter planes, is that practically none of these guns were alerted on December 7, and ammunition was not readily available, the crews serving them were not in attendance, and the only seeming excuse for such conditions was the common belief that there was no danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore no reason for any battery alert. Even if there had been twice as many batteries (or fighter planes) available, there is no reason to believe the condition of alert would have been different.
The ships in the harbor were not provided with proper torpedo protection. The letter of June 13, 1941, with respect to the use of aerial torpedoes, seems to demonstrate the responsibility of the high command at Washington to provide a torpedo defense. Such a defense was well known and could have been provided and, if provided,
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might have obviated the greatest source of damage suffered by the fleet during the raid, even though Admiral Richardson in 1940 thought such defense unnecessary. But it could not have been provided at Hawaii; it had to come from Washington. Washington's advices on the subject did more harm than good, because they intimated that an attack was possible even in shallow water, but at the same time, negatived the probability of attack. (See letter of June 13, 1941, Ex. No. 116, letter from Chief of Naval Operations (R. E. Ingersoll) to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, among others.)
The installation of the radar in Hawaii was inexcusably delayed. It was a method of defense peculiarly essential in Hawaii. It was known that there were insufficient planes and insufficient guns to protect the base, and this made the availability of radar all the more necessary. It seems we could have priority for radar protection in New York and other mainland points, where no attack was probable; but none in Hawaii, where radar information was essential. The result was that fixed radio installations were not accomplished at all prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and such fixed installations would have furnished the most distant services. The mobile sets available had, by reason of the delay, been operating only on a short experimental basis. There was a scarcity of trained operators. The operators were trying to learn and operate at the same time. The selected hours of operation, which proved of vast importance, were not wisely fixed. Service stopped at 7 a. m., the very time when the danger was acute.
No suitable information center had been established, and it is conceded that such a center was essential to radar information. This was particularly true at Hawaii, because radar had not yet been developed the point where the nationality of approaching planes could be ascertained. The information as to whether approaching planes were, therefore, friendly or enemy, depended upon the constant presence at an information center of representatives of the military services who could instantly advise as to location of friendly planes. No such information center was established, and no assignment of trained operators to such stations was ever made. Thus, there was no one on duty who could have known whether the approaching planes were enemy planes, or, instead, our own B-17's, en route from the mainland.
The lack of material does not appear to be the fault of a failure of appropriations by Congress to the Army and Navy. A table showing these appropriations as requested by the President in his budget estimates and as finally passed by Congress follows: