U.S. Policy: Chile and the National Security Doctrineby Carla Stea*
Winter 1990
NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHTYOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ
THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.
United States Ambassador Harry Barnes had been in Santiago since October 1985, officially and stridently espousing the U.S. government's concern for human rights in Chile. Under these circumstances (and considering the enormity of U.S. involvement with, and influence upon Chile's government), how was it possible, ten months later, in July 1986, for an atrocity such as the murder of Rodrigo Rojas to occur publicly and with such impunity? Who signaled the armed forces to proceed? In which ultimate power source did the authorization for such an act originate?
The escalation of repression, torture, and murder committed by Chilean government forces since Ambassador Barnes's arrival presents a disturbing contradiction with avowed U.S. policy. Atrocities committed by the Chilean military culminated during the days of mass protest in early July 1986, with a most shocking crime: the death of Rodrigo Rojas and near-death of Carmen Gloria Quintana. Chilean soldiers forced two innocent and (according to the original testimony of 14 witnesses) unarmed teenagers to lie on the ground, beat them mercilessly, then drenched their bodies with gasoline and set them on fire.
U.S. citizens must confront the odious truth that their tax dollars are being used directly and indirectly to support, in Chile, a government which routinely utilizes the most brutal torture. [1]
Hector Salazar, the lawyer representing the families of Rojas and Quintana in the trial of the soldiers responsible for the atrocity, discussed the impact which news of that crime had upon the conscience and sensibilities of people worldwide. He noted that the event had been shocking to people outside Chile. "But for us in Chile, this was nothing new. For many years, the poorest people, those who have suffered most under this dictatorship, have protested their situation during days of nationwide mobilization, often by placing burning tires at entrances to their neighborhoods to keep police and military traffic out. The army, in punishment, has often used the people themselves to extinguish the flames. The burning alive of Rodrigo Rojas and Carmen Gloria Quintana was just the culmination of this process. The Army always acted with impunity."
Salazar has received countless death threats to himself, his family, and his children. "That is part of the job," he said, and he perseveres, while fully conscious that the possibility of "winning" the case under the Pinochet dictatorship is virtually nonexistent. Witnesses to the murder have also received death threats. One, imprisoned for several months, and kept in an isolated cell, was granted release after stating, contradicting his original testimony, that Rojas carried a Molotov cocktail.
The government, which had originally denied responsibility for the murder, was forced to admit that the crime had been perpetrated by its own soldiers after a western European journalist, in Santiago the day of the murder, had overheard on his walkie-talkie a conversation between the soldiers detaining Rojas and Quintana, and their superiors. The soldiers stated that they were holding two teenagers and asked military headquarters for orders. They were told, "silence them."
The journalist brought a recording of this conversation to his embassy; it was sent by diplomatic pouch to Europe, the details published in a Spanish newspaper, and the Pinochet government, confronted with the proof of its own military's involvement, was obliged to admit the crime. What has not yet, and will most likely never be revealed, is from how high a level, and by whom, the authorization for such a murder was given. Salazar suggests this is where the ultimate responsibility lies. (See sidebar.)
The Pattern of U.S. Support"In Chile the Americans made a mistake .... They killed the revolution, but, as we can see from recent developments there, they didn't kill the dream. In Nicaragua they're trying to kill the dream." [2]
There is an ugly pattern to official U.S. "interest" in the rights of majorities in its National Security States. There is a consistency in history, motive, and tragic consequences for these majorities when the U.S. government expresses its concern for their "rights." (See sidebar.) The bitter lesson for the dispossessed majorities is evident: Any ostensible gestures of official U.S. or client state concern and support for the welfare of groups outside domestic or U.S. elites must be considered potential Trojan Horses, ploys whose objective is, perhaps inevitably, the detection, repression, and eradication of incipient popular movements.
It is against this background that it is urgent to examine the Reagan and Bush administrations' official concern for human rights in Chile, the more as Washington's ostentatious display of interest in human rights in Chile coincided with the emergence of a formidable popular mobilization against Pinochet, a mobilization which is expanding, encompasses a broad spectrum of socio-economic groups, and whose confidence and militancy is growing. [3]
The murder of Rojas, undoubtedly intended to intimidate the opposition, backfired and became a potent moral bomb in the arsenal of a Chilean opposition predominantly committed to non-violence, and difficult to label "terrorist." Rojas's death sent shock waves throughout the world, became an immense embarrassment for Pinochet, and a rallying cry for the opposition. It therefore became necessary for the regime to attempt to discredit Rojas posthumously. Senator Jesse Helms arrived in Santiago and denounced Rojas as a terrorist. The embarrassed U.S. Embassy officially disclaimed Helms as a "private citizen." Then death threats were made against the witnesses to Rojas's murder, [4] against the Commission lawyers investigating the murder, [5] and inevitably, three months after the murder, it was "discovered" that he had been carrying a firebomb. [6] An apparent assassination attempt, from which Pinochet emerged unscathed, was cynically utilized: The opposition was labelled terrorist and wholesale repression was instituted. [7]
Ambassador Barnes may be sincere in his concern for human rights, but the record of serious contradictions between his official pronouncements and the regular appearance of "private citizens," United States Senators and Generals espousing antithetical policies, is disturbing.8 Considering that the very survival of a National Security State depends on massive and sustained violations of human rights, official U.S. concern must be based on the Prosterman model (See sidebar).
The National Civil AssemblyThe various opposition parties had not generally worked together during the first 13 years of Pinochet's dictatorship, and had posed no serious threat to his control. However, during the months immediately preceding the Rojas murder, a new popular organization had emerged, the National Civil Assembly, a broad coalition of large sectors of the population opposed to the regime, a federation of professional groups-doctors, lawyers, teachers, labor organizations, women's groups, student organizations, and artists.
The Civil Assembly began to create what the political parties had failed to: a coherent, unified organization of formidable mobilized resistance to the dictatorship, and organization devoted to non-violence, but encompassing so great a number of Chileans that for the first time the possibility of a major popular uprising existed. A huge and serious popular alternative and threat to Pinochet's control was rapidly developing. And it was under the auspices of the National Civil Assembly that mass protests occurred in early June 1986, pressuring for a prompt transition to democracy and restoration of civil, economic, and social rights.
The Assassination AttemptThe burnings of Rojas and Quintana added international outrage and pressure for change to mounting and effective internal resistance to the dictatorship. Indeed, by late August, many observers agreed that the killing of Rojas, a permanent resident of the U.S., actually threatened the viability of the regime, and that equal and opposing force was essential to restore any legitimacy to the Pinochet government. Perhaps, then, it was not a coincidence that an assassination attempt against Pinochet occurred on September 7, one week later. Pinochet imposed a state of siege which crushed the exposed and conspicuous opposition. The movement toward democracy was paralyzed. [9]
Several core members of the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez, a small, armed-resistance movement, claimed responsibility for the attempt, and were imprisoned, undergoing unimaginable torture. Other participants escaped arrest, and there are suggestions that members of the CNI, Pinochet's secret police (and an outgrowth of DINA), were also involved. In view of the total failure of the attempt and the devastating effect it had on the opposition, there is a serious question whether the FPMR was infiltrated and used to bolster the regime. [10]
ConclusionProspects for an early return of democracy to Chile remain dim. The visit of the Pope in April 1987 strengthened rightwing elements in the church, resulting in pressure to close the Vicariate of Solidarity which, for more than a decade, provided refuge and support for victims of government persecution. After the Pope's visit, a fierce campaign of harassment against foreign journalists occurred, as government supporters claimed that the foreign press exaggerated human rights violations and popular resistance in Chile. [11] Moreover, the United States continued to refrain from serious criticism of Chile. In December 1986 it voted against a United Nations resolution expressing "grave concern over human rights violations in Chile." In December 1988, it abstained from a similar resolution.
Pinochet lost his plebiscite on October 5, 1988, and elections for the presidency were scheduled for December 1989. Because of the continued repression and the many attacks the opposition has sustained, it is no surprise that Pinochet was simply replaced by a center-right candidate who will not affect the status quo. The armed forces (Pinochet will remain Chief of the Army for the next eight years) continue to be central to the stability of any new government and the fundamental structure of a National Security State remains intact.
_______________
Notes:* Carla Stea is a free-lance writer whose articles have appeared in the major international press.
1. In November 1986, for example, the U.S. government abstained on both World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans to the Pinochet government totaling half a billion dollars, thereby virtually guaranteeing that these human rights violations would continue. Had the U.S. opposed the loans, as the Harkin Amendment (Sec. 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act) would seem to have necessitated (requiring opposition of loans to countries which engage in gross violations of human rights), they could not have been made.
2. Statement by a Jesuit priest who had worked in Chile and then in Nicaragua; quoted by John Saul, Monthly Review, March 1985.
3. Moderate leader Gabriel Valdez was quoted in the New York Times (April 4, 1986): "He argued that the Communist Party and the Marxist-Leninist groups had a right to take part in civic life. 'We don't accept the exclusion of ideas.' "
4. New York Times, August 26, 1986.
5. Ibid., September 11, 1986.
6. Ibid., October 21, 1986.
7. "Chile's Democratic Transition is in Question: Attempt to Kill Pinochet May Signal Stronger Left," was the New York Times headline September 14. On September 19, the Times ran a story of the discovery of an enormous "Soviet and Cuban supplied" arms cache. And on November 11, an Op-Ed article in the Times noted that "The U.S. State Department appropriately condemned the attempt to assassinate General Pinochet that provoked the State of Siege. But for several weeks Washington has had nothing to say about the murders, torture, death threats, and mass arrests that General Pinochet is using to punish the non-violent democratic movement." Op-Ed article by Americas Watch.
8. In November 1985, U.S. General Schweitzer arrived in Santiago offering unconditional support to the Chilean armed forces. The U.S. Embassy disclaimed him as another "private citizen."
9. Major opposition leaders agreed that, had the assassination attempt succeeded, it would have resulted not in a restoration of democracy, but in a seizure of power by the military, a slaughter of the entire opposition leadership, and a bloodbath which they termed "another Jakarta." Sergio Bitar, editor of Fortin Mapocho and former Minister of Mines under Allende, said at least 60 leaders would have been immediately murdered in reprisal, "and a large part of the Chilean people thereafter."
10. Jorge Lavandero, publisher of Fortin Mapocho, noted, ''There are seven secret police organizations in Chile. It is virtually impossible that an organization such as FPMR was not infiltrated by agents provocateurs. "
11. The home of a top UPI official, Anthony E. Boadle, was broken into and his files and papers searched and destroyed. Rumors were fabricated that two European journalists were drug addicts.