Unlike the Gottbergs, siblings or cousins of one who received clemency would not automatically receive their own exemptions. In fact, it could prove difficult to get clemency for all of one's children. For example, Elisabeth Rohr, mother of Heinz and Joachim Rohr, wrote Brauchitsch on 14 January 1940 that now that her sons had received Hitler's Deutschblutigkeitserklarung, maybe Brauchitsch could help her daughter get the Arisierung. She thanked Brauchitsch for his help in taking her sons' cases to Hitler and reported that they were "once again free and happy people because of you." She now felt they were no longer labeled as inferior human beings. Her concerns had now turned toward her daughter, Margot. [116] Not Brauchitsch but someone in OKH answered Frau Rohr on 29 January 1940 to inform her that Brauchitsch deeply regretted that he could not help her. The army was not responsible for this particular kind of Gnadengesuch. She would have to send her request through the Party. [117] However, Engel did step in and assisted her through the difficult process. Eventually, Engel informed Elisabeth Rohr on 26 November 1940 that Margot had received the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung. [118] By the length of time it took to Aryanize her daughter, Hitler showed that he did not believe siblings were created equal and, consequently, each had to be analyzed separately.
The issue about siblings not being racially equal was discussed by the government and Wehrmacht in 1942. Engel wrote Blankenburg on 28 April 1942 that after discussing the issue of siblings with Commander Frey and Schmundt, he had decided that siblings could differ racially, and the proven performance of one did not give his sibling any rights. Consequently, Hitler had to examine every case. [119] Perhaps the sibling dilemma was discussed again because of the Haller family's situation, although similar cases must have been known to the authorities at this time. [120] The three quarter-Jewish Haller sons were being considered for the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung. On 13 May 1942, Schmundt answered a letter from Martha Haller, the mother of the boys. She had tried for years to get the Aryan declaration to free her sons from the feeling of inferiority. [121] Schmundt was surprisingly kind and showed great understanding for the family's situation. He wrote that her children's applications awaited Hitler's decision. Schmundt expressed his regrets that one of her sons was missing in action and probably had died a "hero's death." [122] On 25 May, Frey wrote Schmundt that they had to clarify how one of the brothers had become an officer without Hitler's permission, but Frey added, since he had earned both Iron Crosses, he apparently had proved himself worthy of being an officer. Since the Haller boys had distinguished themselves in battle and the governor of Hamburg had given the family his approval, he believed they would receive exemptions. [123] Hitler eventually gave them Genehmigungen. Schmundt informed Frau Haller that Hitler intended to declare the boys deutschblutig after the war -- if they continued to prove themselves. The one who later turned out to have died was probably declared deutschblutig posthumously because of his soldier's death. Hitler examined each brother separately before he gave them Genehmigungen. The Haller family was lucky. Sometimes within one family, one brother received an exemption, whereas another, because of unpleasant physical characteristics or poor military performance, did not. This policy led to confusion and strife in many families.
Applications sent to OKW and the Reichskanzlei by half-Jews increased dramatically throughout 1940. After the war in France, the government and Wehrmacht realized that the Mischling regulations laid down in April 1940 were not being followed. To limit the number of applications, the government announced on 28 July 1940 that applicants should be soldiers with a distinguished military record. [124] The announcement specified that the Iron Cross alone did not justify an application. [125] This medal was awarded quite frequently, so many received it. Out of the 967 half-Jews in this study, 127 (13.1 percent) received the EKII, and 40 (4.1 percent) also received the EKI. [126] By extrapolation, out of the 60,000 half-Jewish soldiers estimated in this study, at least 7,880 probably received the EKII, and 2,460 should have also received the EKI. All these half-Jews could have applied for exemptions under the original requirements. It seems that if a half-J w was promoted, this also could demonstrate that he had proven himself in battle. [127]
However, even Mischlinge who did not have sufficient proof that they had distinguished themselves in battle applied for exemptions. For example, although he had no military awards, Schiitze Heinrich Levin wrote OKW on 9 November 1940 to protest his discharge. "During my time as a soldier," Levin wrote, "I conducted myself in a correct, soldierly manner and had a perfect record. I volunteered for service in March of 1940. This didn't benefit me at all economically." Levin explained that he had had a good business, but left it to serve as a volunteer when he was thirty-three years old. By law, he did not have to serve. "I'm a half-Jew, but I have a pure German appearance .... Because of all these reasons, I plead with you to let me serve my Fatherland." [128] OKW rejected his application. Although Levin should never have applied, he, like most Mischlinge, felt that his case was special. For example, Kanonier [129] Viktor Mendel, a Jew (officially classified a half-Jew), wrote on 23 February 1941 that it was his wish "once again to be a soldier ... and serve the Fatherland." He sent in his resume, a copy of his military service book, photographs of himself, military reports written by his commander, and a description of his Jewish ancestors. With such a large file, it took several days to cross-check Mendel's information before the rejection was processed. He did not meet the requirements. [130]
Based on the supplementary decrees issued after 8 April 1940 concerning Mischlinge, one can conclude that the Nazis had no idea how many Mischling soldiers existed. Although Hitler had specified that previously discharged quarter-Jewish officers and officers married to quarter-Jews could apply to reenter the Wehrmacht, OKH added on 12 September 1940 that only men who had also performed an outstanding act in World War I or who had served the Party admirably as a member could apply for reinstatement. [131] Criteria probably were made more restrictive to reduce the number of Mischling applications. Once again, only Hitler could give the final word.
Since Hitler sometimes took years to decide on someone's application, a Mischling could feel quite distressed about his uncertain fate and status. For example, General Karl Zukertort, who had been on active army duty since 1909, applied for the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung in 1939. He was allowed to remain at his post at the Army Weapons Development Office until Hitler decided his case. In 1941, he still had not heard anything about his application. His performance reviews markedly changed from 1939 to 1941. On 21 April 1939, General Erich Stud wrote that Zukertort was an excellent officer and "performs his job as department head very well." [132] On 10July 1939, Colonel Adolf von Schell in Goring's Office of the Four-Year Plan wrote that Zukertort had performed" excellent work" and that he was an exceptionally qualified officer for the Army Weapons Department. [133] Nonetheless, on 3 July 1940, it was noted in his review that Hitler would not decide on his case until after the war. [134] In February 194 I, his superior, General Emil Leeb, wrote that although Zukertort ran his headquarters in Paris with skill and caution, he was shy and lacked a common bond with his fellow officers. Most likely, because of the uncertainty and the lack of recognition because he was a half-Jew, Zukertort had probably become apathetic or even angry. He resigned, probably because he was upset that he had not received the Deuschblutigkeitserklarung. [135] General Zukertort is the only high-ranking officer documented in this study who most likely resigned because of the racial nightmare in which he found himself. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch accepted his resignation, and Zukertort was scheduled to leave on 31 July 1941. [136] Eventually, Hitler declared Zukertort and his sons deutschblutig in April 1942, but he did not return to the army. [137] Both his sons, Sold at Kurt Dagobert and Gefreiter Karl Adolf, served in the army at the end of the war. Karl Adolf would die in battle fighting in Poland in 1944. Retired general Karl Zukertort spent the last three and one-half years of the war, according to his son Dagobert, selling jams and jellies in his hometown. [138] Ironically, his brother, General Johannes Zukertort, remained on active duty. Hitler also declared him deutschblutig, and by 1944, he was the highest ranking artillery officer in the commanding area of Commander in Chief "West." [139]
Some half-Jews tried several times for an exemption. A few who had previously been rejected were later granted exemptions. For instance, OKW informed Walter Hamburger on 17 April 1941 that Hitler had allowed him to reenter the army even though he had been discharged on 2 December 1940. His special approval was under the title of Gnadengesuch. Hamburger felt that the only way to protect his father, who almost died in Dachau during his imprisonment there from 1938 to 1939, was to serve. As a result, he sent in an application in December 1940, which had the standard items: profile head shots, his resume, recommendations from his officers, and a report about his father's military career. During that very month, the Reichskanzlei informed Hamburger that his application was sent on to OKW for further review. Although he had not performed any exceptional military acts, OKW sent his petition on to Hitler, which he approved. In May, OKH informed Hamburger that he was to return to his old army unit. The document stipulated that Hitler would consider declaring Hamburger deutschblutig after the war if he proved himself in battle. [140] Perhaps a high-ranking personality who knew Hamburger helped push his case. General Gustav Freiherr von Perfall wrote Hamburger's sister on 31 May 1941 and extended his congratulations on her brother's success. The general believed that Hamburger's reactivation was rare. [141] Why he may have helped the family remains unknown, but since he wrote a young half-Jewish woman about the case, he must have cared about her and her brother.
The army discussed the policy of giving half-Jews exemptions on 4June 1941 at Zossen. [142] Here, General Bodewin Keitel, head of the Army Personnel Office [143] and brother of Wilhelm Keitel, informed field commanders that presently the Arisierung cases for those who had proven themselves in battle were being treated" in a liberal manner." [144] It was reported that Mischling officers who had proven themselves in the face of the "enemy" would be "100 percent approved" for an Arisierung. [145] The notes taken from the minutes of this meeting show that B. Keitel was referring to the possibility of declaring Mischlinge in the army deutschblutig. [146] It is difficult to ascertain what effect this meeting had on overall policy concerning exemptions, but the fact that field commanders were discussing the Mischling exemption issue showed that this subject matter was widely known and debated, and that the army was in favor of allowing worthy Mischlinge to be declared deutschblutig.
On 16 July 1941, Hitler repeated his April 1940 directives through OKH again with a few changes. The directive defined the distinctions between a Jew, half-Jew, and quarter-Jew. It reiterated that soldiers needed to sign "ancestry declarations," and emphasized that half-Jews and those married to half-Jews were to be immediately discharged. However, half-Jews who had exhibited "meritorious war service" and who had medals [147] to prove it could apply. Now it seemed that an EKII was indeed enough to warrant a Mischling sending in an application that contradicted the decree of July 1940. This new decree gave the same guidelines as those set in 1940 for quarter-Jews and stated that only under special circumstances could a soldier marry a quarter-Jew. Although the Nuremberg Laws allowed quarter- Jews to marry Germans, this new directive held soldiers to a higher standard. Again, Hitler stated that only he could approve applications for exemptions. [148]
The criteria by which Hitler judged applications for exemptions had significantly changed since the OKH decree of 20 April 1940. Whereas previously a soldier had to prove meritorious war service, now he was required to have medals. He also had to obtain a recommendation from his commander rather than just a statement from any other officer that the soldier in question had performed valorous acts. Now a half-Jew had to send in a copy of his military service book or an official list of battles in which he had taken part. Hitler also required OKH to ask each Mischling applicant to provide proof of Party affiliations or honors. Previously, Hitler had not required such proof. Finally, OKH wanted to know whether the Mischling's Jewish relatives were still alive and what type of relationship he had with them. Previously, they had simply requested the address of the Jewish parent or grandparent. Hitler probably made the requirements more difficult to reduce the number of applications submitted for his review.
As the war worsened, Hitler became less generous with his exemptions. He told General JodI during an afternoon tea session on 10 May 1942 that he regretted giving exemptions to so many half-Jewish soldiers. "For experience showed," Hitler said, "that from these Jewish offspring four, five or six generations of pure Jews keep Mendeling out." [149] Only when a Mischling was exceptional would Hitler consider him worthy for an exemption. On 1 July 1942, as part of a discussion of the danger of intermarriage, Hitler referred to Herr von Liebig, considered a commendable Nazi, to prove that Jewish "blood" was very dangerous. Hitler was stunned when he met Liebig because he looked Jewish. [150] Many assured Hitler that "there wasn't a drop of non-Aryan blood" in him. However, after some research, racial experts discovered that one of Liebig's ancestors had married a Jewish woman in 1616. Hitler claimed that Liebig's Jewish appearance proved his point. Even if there was a tiny drop of Jewish blood in someone, over several generations, a racially full Jew could still "Mendel out." Hitler believed Jewish blood was simply stronger. [151] This contradicted what he had said in December 1941, when he claimed that after several generations, German blood would eventually weed out the unwanted Jewish portion. Six months later Hitler felt that Jewish blood was tougher and would dominate well into future generations, regardless of whether the progeny married Aryans.
Hitler wanted the Party and KdF to playa larger role in deciding who was worthy to serve. A shift toward emphasizing Party service also reduced the pool of applicants. Beginning in 1942, the Party played a more active role in deciding which applications reached Hitler's office. Oberbereichsleiter Blankenburg wrote Engel on 23 May 1942 that the "hard cases" should go through his boss, Reichsleiter Bouhler, chief of the KdF, with comments from OKW. Normally, Bouhler gave applications to Engel to be reviewed by Hitler, but now with these hard cases, Engel would examine them first and then send them to KdF. If approved, Bouhler would then present these applicants to Hitler personally. These hard cases included illegitimate children, those who never knew their Jewish parent, and those who grew up with Aryan stepparents and step-siblings and were totally oblivious of their Jewish past. [152] These cases had better than average chances of approval because the Party felt that Judaism had not affected them.
Engel wrote in his diary on 28 and 30 May 1942 that the armed forces had received new criteria for processing applications. [153] That probably meant that the Wehrmacht would have to work more closely with the Party to approve an individual before his dossier reached Hitler. The Party's role did not please Engel. Throughout Engel's diary, he complained about Bormann's intrusions and observed how he was always around Hitler, making Engel's own efforts to help Mischlinge more difficult. [154] Engel often argued with Bormann, whom he clearly 10athed. [155] He feared that his ability to help Mischlinge would now decrease. He claimed that he had been able to help "hundreds of 25 percent, 50 percent, and in some cases 75 percent Jews" to remain in the Wehrmacht. [156] However, Party officials in the Gauleitungen [157] and Kreisleitungen [158] had been finding out that some of these Mischlinge Engel had been helping had received exemptions under false pretenses. In other words, Engel probably deleted harmful information about an applicant before Hitler reviewed his case to ensure that the Mischling would receive an exemption (for example, Engel helping one falsify his documents to make it look like he was a Mischling rather than a Jew). [159] When different Party functionaries asked about these cases, Engel and Frey claimed that they were approved because of an oversight or mistake (Versehen). Possibly some people, such as Bormann, knew about Engel's and Frey's generosity (mistakes) toward Mischlinge and thus encouraged Party involvement to make it harder for Mischlinge to get exemptions, [160] which in fact happened. Engel wrote on 30 May 1942 that he now had to get applications approved by the Parteikanzlei. [161] Neither Schmundt nor Engel nor Frey welcomed Party interference. [162] It would now be harder to get Mischling cases reviewed by Hitler because Party members, like Bormann, prevented them from reaching him. [163] The "sinister guttersnipe" (Guderian's words) Bormann was chomping at the bit to get rid of officers surrounding Hitler and "replace them with his creatures." [164] Bormann also knew of Hitler's growing irritation with the Wehrmacht and probably capitalized on this to make Engel's position more precarious.
On 30 May 1942, Engel felt Hitler was in a sour mood about the Mischlinge. Hitler told Engel that he suspected several people of going behind his back (Mogeleiversuchen) [165] in matters regarding Mischlinge. Just as he had told JodI a few days earlier, he believed that the Wehrmacht (i.e., Engel and Frey) were treating the Mischlinge too leniently. He told Engel that he had discussed this matter with Bormann and Keitel. Engel felt helpless. He wrote that he thought about approaching Goring, who had been "generous" to Mischlinge, [166] but knew that Goring could do only so much, now that the Party was involved. With Bormann around, Engel would be restricted in what he could do for Mischlinge. Hitler seemed to welcome such conflicts. Problems with implementing Nazi ideology "intensified personal rivalries and enmities immeasurably," which Hitler encouraged. [167] Bormann was winning such a struggle against Engel. By 1942, Bormann had more contact with and responsibilities from Hitler than Engel, who was slowly being pushed aside regarding the Mischlinge. By July 1942, according to Bouhler's deputy, Viktor Brack, Engel had expressed that he had lost the desire to present half-Jews to Hitler, [168] probably because of the problems he had encountered with Hitler's changed mood about and Bormann's increased involvement with them.
Bormann took over Rudolf Hesss responsibilities and became head of the Parteikanzlei in May 1941 when the dim-witted HeB made his quixotic flight to Scotland in his insane hope to secure peace and to form a German- English alliance against Russia. Then on 12 April 1943, Bormann became Hitler's personal secretary. [169] The pot-bellied, disagreeable, colorless Bormann was called Hitler's "evil genius" and was described at the Nuremberg trials in 1946 as "an evil archangel at the side of the devil Hitler." [170] Hitler valued Bormann tremendously. He once remarked to an aide, "1need him to win the war." [171] By 1942-1943, Bormann held almost complete control of the Party machinery. Bormann was responsible for laying down the guidelines for those who deserved promotions and government positions. Kershaw wrote of Bormann, "His talent lay not in demagoguery and agitation but in organization, where he combined ideological fanaticism with bureaucratic skill, Machiavellian deviousness, indefatigable energy and a remarkable capacity for hard work." [172] By late 1942, deutschblutig declarations that allowed recipients to remain on or return to active duty now had to go through Bormann before reaching Hitler. By 1942, Lammers's access to and influence on Hitler had declined sharply, and he was required to submit the points about which he wished to talk to Hitler through Bormann, who was now the Fuhrer's gatekeeper. [173] During the war, Bormann" controlled in good measure not only which persons were admitted to Hitler's presence, but also what information reached the Fuhrer." [174] As Bormann said, cynically altering Jesus' words, "No one can come to the Fuhrer but through me!" [175] Almost all high-ranking Party, government, and military personalities feared or hated Bormann. When Goring was asked at Nuremberg in 1946 whether Bormann was still alive, Goring replied, "If I had my say in it, I hope he is frying in Hell, but I don't know." [176]
Bormann was a rabid anti-Semite and detested Mischlinge. The Mischlinge lost their most loyal ally when Losener significantly curtailed his activities as RMI's desk officer for racial matters in December 1941. They gained their worst enemy in Bormann, who took more control over policy affecting them in 1942. This danger became more acute when Hitler made Bormann his personal secretary in 1943, permitting him to assert his power in every department. When he was with Hitler almost every day from 1942 to 1945, [177] racial policies affecting Mischlinge became more restrictive.
On I June 1942, Hitler said the Volk would be endangered by the Mischlinge still serving. He felt that it would be bad "if Mischlinge are allowed to serve in the Wehrmacht, because it opens a door for them to be declared deutschblutig." [178] Ironically, Hitler was the one who had allowed them both to serve and to apply for exemptions. On 2 June 1942, Hitler expressed his irritation to Bormann about the lenient handling by KdF of Mischlinge. Hitler felt an exemption was justified only for those who never knew about their ancestry and who had served the Party during the Kampfzeit. [179] One can be sure that Bormann, always armed with his pad and pencil, took copious notes of what the Fuhrer had discussed with him. Bormann then funneled what Hitler had said into "directives for action." [180] Although many bureaucrats followed these new criteria from Hitler, several Mischlinge who did not meet these guidelines were still reviewed.
On 1 July 1942, Hitler decided it would be a shame if the government allowed Mischlinge to serve and thereby allowed them "the possibility of equal treatment with those of German blood." Hitler believed that the number of exemptions should be reduced. [181] To this end, on 1 July 1942, the Parteikanzlei issued another decree signed by Bormann stating that henceforth, before Hitler would consider their applications, all Mischlinge required a recommendation from the Gauleiter where they lived, stating the special reasons why they should receive an exemption. Hitler still favored Mischlinge who had not known about their ancestry and who had served the Party during the Kampfzeit. Bormann wrote that Hitler no longer wanted to consider those who had just fulfilled their duty to the state, were members of some minor Nazi organization, read Nazi literature, were army volunteers, or were sons of World War I veterans. The bar had been raised. [182]
The next day, Bormann wrote Bouhler complaining that Bouhler had continued to send applications to Hitler that did not meet the criteria. Bormann explained that Hitler had expressed his indignation at the handling of Mischling cases. He explained that only men who had performed special service to the Party during the Kampfzeit should be considered. Party membership alone was not enough. Hitler warned that if they were not careful, the Mischlinge would create a new Jewish race. One needed to exercise caution, Hitler had told Bormann, because it had been proven that Mischlinge always "Mendeled" out Jews. Hitler pointed to Cripps [183] and Roosevelt [184] to support his claim. Bormann reminded Bouhler that Hitler had asked the bureaucrats to be careful, because keeping a Mischling in the Wehrmacht with only a Genehmigung was basically the same as declaring him deutschblutig. [185]
On 3 July 1942, Bormann again complained that regional Party offices (Gauleitungen) [186] were being too lenient with Mischlinge, and he warned officials not to take Mischlinge's statements at face value. Many claimed that they had fought for the Party before 1933. Bormann also complained that Mischlinge often lied about the identity of their fathers, claiming their real fathers were not their mothers' Jewish husbands, but rather "gold blond Aryans." Only those who had not known about their Jewish ancestry or suffered injury or imprisonment because they were a Party member would now be considered. Bormann informed everyone through the Reichsverfugungsblatt [187] that from now on, the Fuhrer "will personally and thoroughly look over" every case. [188] It seemed that Bormann was implying that if the civil servants (e.g., Bouhler) wanted to keep their jobs, they should enforce the decrees.
Although Bormann disliked Bouhler and wanted his responsibilities, he also truly believed that Bouhler was not being tough enough with the Mischlinge. Bouhler felt that he had obeyed the laws and that Bormann was unfairly representing his actions to Hitler. On 10 July 1942, he wrote Bormann and complained that approving Mischlinge for the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung who had proven themselves on the battlefield did not result from his support alone, but had been done according to Hitler's instructions. [189] Bouhler complained to Bormann that his office had incessant workloads created by the Nuremberg Laws, the Mischling classifications, and pertinent decrees. Moreover, the infighting between offices and the necessity to keep track of the Mischling decrees made his job difficult. For seven years, an unbelievable number of Mischlinge had come to Bouhler daily in the quest for Hitler's signature. "Nobody else except Lammers knows what I've endured." The number of applications Bouhler (with Blankenburg) had rejected was "legion." He denied the majority without forwarding them to Hitler. [190] Bouhler vigorously defended himself to Bormann to prove that he was not guilty of lenience toward Mischlinge. Bouhler told Bormann in this cantankerous letter that his office (Blankenburg's letter of March 1940) had originally encouraged and ultimately persuaded Hitler to issue the 8 April 1940 decree, since apparently "your office didn't or couldn't (which can be construed from a conversation that took place with Dr. Blome [191] at the end of 1939) do anything about [the Mischling problem]." [192] Because Bouhler felt that Mischlinge would do everything in their power to enter the armed forces so that they could be declared deutschblutig, he supported the discharge of half-Jews from the Wehrmacht. As a result, he had his department write Hitler in March 1940 about this problem. Bouhler argued that the fact that Hitler had given some form of exemption to "quite a number" of half-Jews should not be blamed on him, since most serving in the Wehrmacht in 1940 were not discharged before the campaign against France started. Consequently, they had the opportunity to prove themselves in battle. [193] Even so, Bouhler said that when Blome had visited his office, he was stunned that the number of exemptions was much smaller than he had expected. [194] Bouhler felt that this fact should have been known before Bormann talked with Hitler about his actions. Bouhler reminded Bormann again that he had started the process of discharging the Mischlinge from the Wehrmacht. [195] Until now, it had been his understanding that he only had to verify that a soldier was politically sound and not that he had performed exceptional service for the Party. Bouhler welcomed the Party's new responsibility to approve cases before they reached Hitler. Bouhler ended his letter saying "that any support for Mischlinge is the farthest thing from my mind." If this was the case, Bouhler wrote, then he would not have given Himmler so much support for exterminating the Jews (Losung der Judenfrage [196]). Most likely, Bouhler meant that he had given Himmler the information he had collected while conducting the euthanasia program from 1939 to 1941. [197]
Apparently after not getting a reply, on 13 July Bouhler wrote Bormann's brother, Albert, chief of Hitler's private chancellery (a subdivision of KdF), [198] requesting that he set up a meeting for him with Hitler. Bouhler had sent a copy of the letter he had sent Martin Bormann on 10 July. Bouhler expressed that Hitler needed to hear his side of the story, knowing as he did that Martin Bormann had already briefed Hitler on what he thought Bouhler had been doing. Bouhler felt that if he met with Hitler, Hitler could then tell him personally how he should deal with Mischlinge. And of course, such a meeting with Hitler, Bouhler felt, would clear his name of any wrongdoing. [199] However, such a meeting probably did not take place.
By 10 July 1942, Hitler was becoming tired of Mischlinge. Hitler emphasized again that Party service was more important than military service when granting exemptions. Consequently, although they were at odds with each other, Bouhler and Bormann took over more responsibility from Engel. [200] At the beginning of July, Engel felt that Hitler had become stricter in handling Mischlinge. For example, Engel had brought to Hitler's attention twenty applicants who had already been approved by the KdF but were not yet approved by OKW. After Hitler reviewed the twenty applications, he told Engel that if OKW approved the nine he had selected, then he would grant the men clemency. When Engel returned on 2 July 1942 to get Hitler's decision on the men, Hitler did not approve any of them. Instead, he told Engel that he would have to discuss them with Bormann. [201] The armed forces were being increasingly pushed aside in their handling of Mischlinge. On 16 July 1942, Blankenburg instructed Frey to stop inquiring directly with the Gauleitungen concerning support for Mischling applications. Such inquiries were to be funneled through him. [202]
At this time, Hitler seemed eager to include Bormann more in the discussion of the "Mischling Question." [203] Bormann claimed on 21 August 1942 in a letter to Heydrich that Hitler "was fundamentally in agreement with classifying half-Jews as Jews," [204] which would have immediately terminated pending applications from half-Jews and theoretically revoked those already approved. When Losener heard about the possibility that half- Jews were going to be declared Jews or sterilized, he protested to Himmler on 10 September 1942 using the same arguments he had before and "consoled" Himmler, writing that" one cannot rectify errors and sins committed during the last two hundred years in one day." [205] Losener urged that the matter be submitted to Hitler for a final decision. On 24 October 1942, Bormann passed on an OKW regulation from 25 September 1942 to the Party which stated that Hitler now prohibited half-Jews from applying to stay in the Wehrmacht. If they had been discharged, they could not return to active duty. Applications in process had to be returned, and it was repeated that if the Wehrmacht found a half-Jew illegally in the ranks, he was to be discharged. [206] Several applicants were informed in 1942 that according to the new decrees, they could no longer be considered for exemptions. For example, Frey wrote the father of several half-Jews in September 1942 that he should stop trying to obtain exemptions for his sons because, according to the new laws, they did not have the necessary credentials. Frey firmly asked him to stop sending in more information. [207]
In late March 1943, the Mischlinge lost one of their last lobbyists. Engel left his position as Hitler's army adjutant and went to the battlefield. Hitler had ordered Engel to leave. Engel found this dismissal difficult and was "completely surprised" by it. [208] Now the Party dominated Mischling policy, although it still needed Wehrmacht cooperation. On 13 March 1943, Albert Bormann answered Blankenburg's letter of 17 February 1943 about several Mischlinge who were being considered for clemency. Albert Bormann said out of ten cases under review, he felt positive about five describing their Party service. Three had shown service "above and beyond the call of duty for the movement." The other two had been Party and SA members. Albert Bormann viewed the remaining cases as going either way - "borderline cases" in which Hitler would have to decide personally. Some had shown Party service, but nothing exceptional. Others had not served the Party, but were good soldiers. [209] Although the soldiers were to be used for the armed forces, according to Albert Bormann, Party service was the determining factor as to whether they would receive Hitler's clemency. Blankenburg wanted to receive Albert Bormann's opinion before he submitted these Mischlinge to the Wehrmacht. Interestingly, Blankenburg felt positive about nine of them. [210] Blankenburg's letter to Albert Bormann shows that Blankenburg (probably with Bouhler's approval) did not take Martin Bormann's decree of I July 1942 about how to judge Mischlinge seriously. [211] Blankenburg was not following Bormann's strict criteria when he recommended at least two of the nine on the list. Although Bormann had decreed in October 1942 that Hitler no longer wanted to review half-Jews, Blankenburg and Albert Bormann's discussion of these Mischlinge (most of whom were half-Jews) showed that Bormann's Rundschreiben, [212] which originated from OKW, was not being followed. [213]
It was clear from some Nazi officials' comments that they were confused about how to implement Hitler's measures affecting Mischlinge. On 3 June 1943, Dr. Kurt Blome, deputy to the chief Reich physician in the Parteikanzlei, Dr. Leonardo Conti, [214] answered the KdF (probably Bouhler) that he believed half-Jew Wachtmeister [215] Ernst Liebscher should have been declared deutschblutig back in 1940 because of his bravery. However, Blome said that since Hitler had changed the criteria by which to handle Mischlinge in 1941, Liebscher was rejected from getting a Deutschblutigkeitserklarung, although the Gauleitung and his military superiors had supported his case. Nonetheless, Blome said that Liebscher belonged to the group that Hitler would declare deutschblutig after the war, and as a result, he gave his approval for Liebscher to marry. Because of Hitler's new regulations, Blome also believed that Liebscher could remain in the Wehrmacht. [216]
OKW and KdF also showed in their dealings with each other that they were confused about how to handle exemptions. In August 1943, OKW asked Blankenburg for clearer statements of approval or rejection from Bouhler in order to know how to deal with the Mischlinge being reviewed. This was especially the case, since the Party now played a role in who would be reviewed for clemency. [217]
But the confusion between OKW, KdF, and the Parteikanzlei in how to handle the Mischlinge up for clemency only mirrored the confusion many Mischlinge and their commanding officers felt in how to submit applications for exemptions. For example, Goring issued a Luftwaffe decree in November 1943 that OKW had explained in October 1943 that Deutschblutigkeitserklarung applications had often been sent to the RMI. OKW explained that such applications should come to them and not the RMI. [218] In November, OKH also sent out a decree that RMI had been receiving applications from Mischlinge in the army. OKH instructed its personnel offices that such applications were supposed to come to OKH and not the RMI. [219] Obviously, many Mischlinge and their superiors still did not know where to submit clemency applications.
Even in late 1943, while working in his windowless, air-conditioned bunkers with reinforced concrete walls, Hitler continued to review Mischling cases despite his desire to stop. Bormann wrote Bouhler on 27 September 1943 that on the previous day, Hitler had given him the files of ten Mischlinge. It was reiterated that applications would be accepted only when accompanied by a Party's statement of approval. Bormann requested that Bouhler also send him any other related files with approved applications. [220] On this date, Bouhler's department lost the right to submit applications to Hitler, although in practice it continued to do so. Bormann informed his rival, Bouhler, that Hitler had decided that only Bormann could present Mischling cases to him with a recommendation from the Parteikanzlei. [221] According to Jeremy Noakes, with this action Bormann "usurped the right of submission from his brother, Albert." Bormann was now able to "enforce the hard line towards Mischlinge" that he had long desired. [222]
Party service was the primary criterion in 1943 and 1944 for granting exemptions. As General Guderian wrote about Party interference in Wehrmacht affairs, "[T]he Party was less interested in the military qualifications than in the political fanaticism of the men it appointed to fill the responsible posts." [223] However, some Mischlinge being reviewed were simply too young to have served the Party before they entered the Wehrmacht. On 12 October 1943, Dr. Vogtherr at OKW asked Dietz if they could use alternate criteria to judge Mischlinge who, because of their age, had not served the Party. [224] On 19 October 1943, Dietz drew up a memorandum for Blankenburg which explained that Hitler had decided that in the future, the Parteikanzlei and not KdF should consider the applications because present political considerations were now more important when considering acts of clemency. [225] That was probably the answer to Vogtherr's question.
Schmundt had helped several men between 1938 and 1942, but in 1943, his attitude toward Mischlinge had become more intolerant. On 3 November 1943, his friend Irmgard Bohrne wrote Schmundt again about helping Mischlinge, this time on behalf of the Roper family. Schmundt advised that Dr. Roper should contact him directly and explain his situation. "However," Schmundt finished his letter, "[i]t's a pity that you continue to ask for help in this area. This contradicts my personal view during this time when the pack of Jews (Meute der Juden) is attacking us from everywhere. It is hard for individuals but matters of State take precedence .... Because I care for you so much, I will look into this case." [226] Schmundt's letter demonstrated the growing impatience the government had with Mischlinge. However, during this time, Hitler still reviewed cases of Mischlinge widows and orphans of fallen soldiers once they passed through KdF. [227] If Hitler's goal was to ultimately remove half-Jews from the Yolk, this was a counterproductive move. [228]
In 1944, Germany might be collapsing, but "purity of the blood" was still hotly debated. On 2 January 1944 Hitler ordered Schmundt to put together a list of active army Mischling officers or officers married to Jews or Mischlinge who had received Hitler's Deutschblutigkeitserklarung. Hitler had the list made, according to Schmundt's order, to locate and discharge these officers. Schmundt wrote that the Personnel Office [229] needed to prepare their discharge orders now, especially for the older ones. [230] Personnel PI (General Linnarz) [231] and P2 (Lieutenant Colonel Seegers) [232] Group Offices (Amtsgruppen) put together the list. [233] On its completion on 11 January 1944, Colonel Georg Erdmann, head of Group IV [234] in P2, sent the list to P5 (Colonel Hessemann). [235] Erdmann complained that tabulating the list had been difficult, because in previous years neither OKH, OKW, nor apparently the Reichskanzlei had put together a catalog of such officers. Consequently, Erdmann wrote, this "list cannot be accepted as complete." He was absolutely correct. On this list, Erdmann identified seventy-seven officers. Erdmann documented twelve Mischling generals and twelve generals married to Mischlinge or Jews. He documented thirty-seven other Mischling officers and sixteen officers married to Mischlinge. Most had received the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung by early 1940. [236] Some were put on the list although they had died in battle or had been taken prisoner. Several officers should have been on the list, but were either purposely excluded or simply not found. For example, Captain Klaus von Schmeling- Diringshofen and his brother, Lieutenant Joachim von Schmeling-Diringshofen, [237] along with Major Ernst Prager, were just a few who were not listed. Moreover, Erdmann had difficulties determining the officer's blood percentage, since Hitler's Deutschblutigkeitserklarungen had not stated their degree. [238]
Before Erdmann sent this list to other offices, he showed it to his nephew, Captain Otto Wolters, who worked in his department. When Wolters saw the names of over twenty generals, he told his uncle, "If we discharge these men, it'll cause so many problems in the army. We need every man in the war, especially if they're generals!" His uncle agreed, shook his head, and walked away. [239] Erdmann had to send in the list. However, for months thereafter, nothing happened to these officers. Most remained at their posts, and the army even promoted a few.
Other lists of Mischlinge and Mischehen (mixed marriages) were compiled during 1944. Bormann made a list of high-ranking civil servants under Hitler's direct orders on 7 November 1944. There were eighty-three men on this list: ten half-Jews and twenty-one men married to half-Jews, fifteen quarter-Jews and twenty married to quarter-Jews, and seventeen married to full Jews. [240] However, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine lists have not been found. It is doubtful that such lists were ever drawn up, since the Aryanized officers documented in this study from these military branches remained at their posts until the war's end. Ironically, during this time, Hitler continued to evaluate applications for exemptions. In this study, three cases have been documented that received Hitler's clemency in 1944.
On 18 February 1944, OKW wrote KdF and complained that the Gauleiter political reports necessary to process Mischlinge were taking forever. The Wehrmacht complained that even in regions not being bombed, it took over three months to get the necessary political references. The armed forces would write KdF after four months, and even then they did not receive an answer. The Wehrmacht told KdF that the longer the Party made them wait to complete a Mischling's file, the longer he had to distinguish himself since, by law, he was allowed to remain with his unit until his case was decided. [241] Blankenburg explained to 0KW on I I March 1944 that their office had been bombed, thus delaying the reports. Blankenburg wrote that OKW would soon receive the Gauleiter reports they needed. [242]
On 20 February 1944, Hitler issued a decree that henceforth only he and Bormann would consider Mischling applications. [243] Hitler believed that only Bormann could solve the Mischling problem. [244] According to Goring, toward the end of the Third Reich, only Bormann was admitted to Hitler's tea sessions where important matters were decided. [245] By 1944, Lammers was hardly consulted about the Mischlinge. His influence had apparently peaked by 1941, probably about the time Bormann took over the Parteikanzlei, which gave Bormann unlimited access to Hitler. He now had to receive Hitler's orders through Bormann. [246] Despite Bormann's increased responsibility in dealing with Mischlinge, other offices besides his Parteikanzlei, such as OKW and KdF, surprisingly continued to process cases. However, the chaos continued. On 3 March 1944, OKW wrote KdF returning twenty-five Mischling memoirs from KdF and their request for updates on various applications. OKW expressed its irritation at KdF for implying that OKW had not worked hard enough on the applications. OKW explained that they just could not ask the Fuhrer and his men to work as fast as KdF would like and besides, the memoirs they sent OKW served no purpose. OKW asked KdF to stop sending letters asking for updates because such work wasted time and paper and created more work for OKW. [247]
In June 1944, under pressure from the Parteikanzlei, the Wehrmacht was ordered to discharge all quarter-Jews. [248] Although the Wehrmacht decreed this discharge, only one quarter-Jew, possibly dismissed because of this decree, has been documented. [249]
After the 20 July 1944 bomb plot failed to kill Hitler, he and many of his cronies declared Mischlinge, among many others, the scapegoats. [250] In general, Hitler now no longer deemed Mischlinge worthy of his time or of living in the Reich. They were to be earmarked for extermination. Ironically, Field Marshal Milch sent Hitler a telegram immediately after the bomb blast: "[I cannot express my] heartfelt joy that a merciful Providence has protected you from this cowardly murder attempt and preserved you for the German Volk and its Wehrmacht." [251] Perhaps Milch really believed what he said, or perhaps he was protecting himself, knowing as he did that Hitler knew about his Jewish father and that the events on 20 July made a Mischling's situation, like his, more precarious.
On 26 July 1944, Himmler's office issued a lengthy decree about Mischlinge. [252] This document suggested that the Party use not only the categories Mischlinge first and second degrees, but also those of third, fourth, fifth, and higher. [253] During 1944, Himmler focused on purging the Wehrmacht of Mischlinge. Himmler's staff argued that those Jewish Mischlinge who had distinguished themselves in battle should not expect automatically to receive the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung. [254] Exemptions should be made only for unique cases. [255] Himmler's staff argued that declaring a Jewish Mischling deutschblutig or giving him the Genehmigung enabled him to disappear and camouflage himself. Although such a person may have been proclaimed deutschblutig, he still was Jewish in a biological sense. Consequently, the Party should "be very reluctant to recommend someone for aryanization." [256] Himmler's staff warned that Mischlinge tended to want more privileges. After they received an exemption, they wanted to study, to become officers, to marry, and to enter the Party. [257] They warned that every chance a Mischling had to prove himself in battle gave him a better bargaining position to improve his lot after the war. [258] The document echoed Hitler's earlier decree claiming that Mischlinge who died in action could be declared deutschblutig, but reiterated that clemency would be granted only when they did not have any children. [259] Himmler's staff mentioned that OKW was basically the only organization still processing applications for Ausnahmebehandlungen. [260] The document strongly implied that this should cease. They forbade any marriages between Aryans and Mischlinge except when a half-Jewish veteran was so disabled (Stufe IV) [261] that he could not live without a wife's care. [262]
On 29 July 1944, Himmler ordered the army to replace General Karl Sachs, a quarter-Jew, German-Cross in Gold bearer, and accomplished divisional commander, with General Hoernlein. [263] Sachs's Aryanization would no longer be honored, [264] although he was highly decorated and had fought bravely "protecting Germany," as he phrased it, from the "terror of the Bolsheviks." [265] Sachs was one of the seventy-seven soldiers on the list drawn up by Erdmann. It was just a matter of time before the others would also be discharged, especially since the SS and Party had the list. [266] On 9 September 1944, General Wilhelm Burgdorf dismissed Sachs on Hitler's orders. [267] Burgdorf had replaced Schmundt, who would die in October from wounds he sustained in the explosion on 20 July 1944 in Hitler's headquarters. Sachs was one of the most distinguished officers on the list, and since Hitler decided that he should go, one can assume that Hitler also ordered most of the others on the list to be discharged.
During this purge, Bormann wrote Lammers on 2 November 1944 that the" event of 20 July has shown the necessity to remove all people in positions of authority, who, owing to their ancestry, could be seen as a liability to the National Socialist ideology and its Weltanschauung." Bormann said that these individuals could become a dangerous liability in times of stress, and explained that because of Mischlinge's convictions, they could never be trusted. Although these Mischlinge had been declared deutschblutig, Bormann believed they should not enjoy the rights of Aryans. [268] Hitler ordered the armed forces on 26 October to discharge officers who were half-Jews or married to half-Jews and who had received some form of clemency by 31 December 1944. [269] During the war's final days, Hitler discharged almost two dozen battle-tested generals who had proven their loyalty and been awarded clemency.
Discharging such accomplished officers showed Hitler's detachment from reality. The more Hitler realized that he could not change the war's outcome, the more irrational he became, which had a catastrophic effect on the conduct of government. [270] The release of two dozen generals was counterproductive at a time when Hitler needed every experienced general available. Hitler discharged only active officers who were on Erdmann's list. Mischling officers who had reserve commissions were not on the list. Most of them and Mischling soldiers remained at their posts. [271]
The hopes that Hitler's clemency had given many were now dashed. Half-Jew Werner Maltzahn had been promoted to general one month before Hitler discharged him. His dismissal depressed him. [272] Many discharged Mischlinge felt demoralized and dishonored. Half-Jew Major Friedrich Gebhard wrote Hanover's General Command on 21 October 1944 complaining about his upcoming discharge:
[M]y discharge is especially hard, because the reasons stated are nothing I was responsible for. Considering my service to Germany in two world wars, and that I have to leave the army despite good evaluations as the result of unusual circumstances, I ask you to grant me the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. ... This higher rank will open more doors to me in civilian life, which I'm now forced to enter sooner than anticipated. [273]
Mischlinge like Gebhard still could not understand why their ancestry prevented them from serving. A mixture of anger, bewilderment, and depression possessed them, and they did not know where to turn for help.
The SS also did their part to hunt down Mischlinge on the list. Himmler had already removed Sachs, and he wanted others. On 15 September 1944, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer [274] Suchanek of Himmler's office wrote General Burgdorf, informing him that Himmler requested the dismissal of the half- Jew Colonel Ernst Bloch and asked that he be sent to a forced labor battalion. [275] On 26 September 1944, Burgdorf responded to Himmler's office, confirming that Bloch had been dismissed, but added that in 1943 Bloch had asked to be "sent to the front despite his several World War I wounds." [276] Burgdorf's halfhearted protest did not succeed in easing Bloch's plight. It also did not seem to matter that Bloch was described as a "positive National Socialist." [277] Bloch left his post on 27 October 1944. On 15 February 1945, Hitler signed the official order discharging him because of his Jewish past. Burgdorf officially informed Bloch of his discharge: "The Fuhrer has decided as of 31 January 1945 to discharge you from active duty. It is an honor to thank you on behalf of the Fuhrer for your service rendered during war and peace for our people and fatherland. I wish you all the best for the future. Heil Hitler." [278] Most discharged Mischlinge received the same dismissal letter. Bloch was flabbergasted because he knew Hitler had personally declared him deutschblutig. [279] However, Bloch probably did not know the particularities behind his discharge. He was simply ordered to leave, and he obeyed without questioning. Walther Brockhoff, a close friend of Bloch's, wrote to Bloch's wife, Sabine, on 31 October 1945 to ask why his friend had been discharged. Brockhoff wrote, "One doesn't dismiss a brave and battle-tested officer away from the front during the hour of the greatest danger. There have been and will be few officers of his caliber." [280]
Most Mischling officers dismissed did not know about each other and believed that they were one of a handful of men who had to leave the Wehrmacht. Probably most were not told that they were discharged because of their Jewish heritage, although they probably suspected that that was the reason.
Most returned home and looked for employment. Some were sent to OT camps or to the makeshift Volkssturm units. Burgdorf saw the idiocy of discharging these proven officers. Since he knew he could not prevent their discharge, he informed the authorities that these men should stay at their posts during the three-month period after they were informed of their discharge. It was crucial that Germany use all its resources during the Totaler Krieg (Total War). [281] Burgdorf was able to hold on to a few officers until late 1944 or early 1945, but others were immediately sent home.
With the discharge of high-ranking Mischling officers, and those married to Mischlinge, the process of granting exemptions ended. Although this study has documented one person who supposedly received the Deutschblutigkeitserklarung in 1945 [282] after the July 1944 bomb attack on Hitler, almost no more exemptions were granted. The discharge of these high-ranking officers foretold what would ultimately happen to all Mischlinge had Germany won or continued the war. They were not wanted.