SECTION 1.14: - TRADITION. IMAGE AND HISTORY
David Potter has defined an administrative tradition as having two features; (1) content, consisting of values, norms and structure, and (2) a process of reproduction. If the features continue over three generations it may be defined as a continuing tradition, and Potter has isolated three factors as being necessary for the reproduction of a tradition; (a) obtaining similar successors, (b) shaping them to the tradition, and, (c) support from the political leadership.[134]
The traditions of the Tibet cadre, and the process of their reproduction among succeeding generations of officers, are consistent with Potter's definition. Although the British Tibet cadre lasted for less than fifty years, there were at least four generations of officers within that period; (1) the 'Curzon-Younghusband-O'Connor' era in which British control of Tibet was a realistic possibility; (2) the Bell and Macdonald period culminating in their visit to Lhasa; (3) the Bailey-Weir-Williamson era of Lhasa visits; and (4) the era after the establishment of a position at Lhasa, dominated by Gould, Richardson and Hopkinson.
A fifth generation may also be identified, that of their Indian successors. There was 'no substantial change in the ambience' of the Tibet cadre after the departure of the British, although the 'Imperial style’ and the concern with 'preserving their imperial distinctness' were dropped.[135] Certainly key elements of the tradition, such as location, method, readings, and the ideal of their predecessors, were all passed on to the new generation of Indian officers. We may, therefore, define the cadre as maintaining the key elements of an administrative tradition.
Previous studies of administrative traditions within British India have described a 'Punjab style’ (Wurgaft) or a ’service code’ (Ewing), a collective ethos maintained through selection and training, which bear many similarities with the distinctive group identity passed on in the traditions of the Tibet cadre. But these studies have adopted a more critical perspective on their subject groups than I have found necessary. Wurgaft has described the ’Punjab style’ as a briefly successful one which became part of an imperial mythology that isolated the British from the complex realities of their environment. Ewing found ICS officers were ’hard headed realists who looked upon their time in India as a job and not a mission’, a finding consistent with Bradford Spangenberg’s criticism of ICS officers as ’aspiring to succeed in India primarily in order to provide for a comfortable retirement in England’.[136]
But the cadre seem to have had a far more complex motivation, including disinterested elements. The Tibet cadre does not seem to have been dominated by careerists. Certainly there was ambition, but there was also a strong sense of ’mission’ (which Ewing found lacking in the ICS officers whom she interviewed), that emerges clearly throughout the period under consideration. Thus even ambitious officers promoted to other positions, such as O’Connor, continued to work for what they saw as the benefit of the Tibetans. This continued even after the departure of the British from India and Tibet.
Copland's study of the Political Department is most critical. It describes an 'intellectually second-rate' service, poorly trained in administrative skills, 'dominated by upright but slow-thinking and extremely unimaginative officers', their claimed efficiency 'a mere facade’.[137] As noted, Copland’s criticisms of lack of intellect and administrative skills do not, from my analysis, apply to the Tibet cadre.
These critical studies do provide a balance to what Potter has called 'an active myth-making',[138] those works, many by former imperial servants, which promote a romantically positive view of the imperial services and their officers. This may be compared with the promotion of a similar myth in recent times: that American Government policy and will failed in Vietnam, but the men who served there did not. There is however, a strong element of truth in this type of myth as it applies to the cadre. As will be seen, most cadre officers did their best to strengthen Tibet, albeit under British supervision, but the Tibetan cause was of little concern to Whitehall after World War One, and of no concern at all after World War Two. Thus the Tibetans were abandoned to their fate, despite the efforts of the 'men on the spot'.
My concern here is to analyse the cadre through understanding their mentality, taking the perspective from the 'inside', rather than attempting to deconstruct their image from the 'outside'. This 'insider view', enhanced by the use of participant oral sources, does not produce an uncritical image, but one which represents a history recognisable as 'true' by the two main participants closest to events, the Tibetans and the Tibet cadre. Naturally it reflects the Anglo-Tibetan perspective of the sources, but as Edward Shils observes, traditions are defined by the insiders, not the observers.[139]
Judged by their own standards, rather than by the outcome of their policies, (a matter which was in the hands of higher government), the Tibet cadre were a success. While Copland's conclusions of course apply to a different field than my own, his 'outsider' approach may in itself tend to produce more critical findings, which do not necessarily represent history as seen by the participants, and thus do not enable us to understand the mentality of the period.
Therefore, analysing the accuracy of the cadre's image, and the extent to which the officers themselves lived up to this image, does little to assist understanding. The image was one created by the officers themselves; therefore it was largely self-descriptive. Officers who failed to live up to the image were not considered 'in the mould', and were not re-employed in Tibet. Those who remained there were naturally those who lived up to the image. Thus my concern is to describe the qualities of those 'in the mould' in order to understand their actions, rather than to deconstruct the image itself.
SECTION 1.16: - PASSING ON TRADITIONS
We have seen that the cadre's traditions were originally developed within existing imperial, and more specifically, Political Department traditions of frontier service, and the mythology and reality of the "Great Game". The character and exploits of Younghusband. and the support and ideology of Curzon and other 'forward school' figures such as MacGregor and Dane, provided the direction and much of its character. The traditions established by the early agents, direct disciples of Younghusband, were passed on throughout the 1904-47 period. Just as 'the first generation of frontiersmen in the Punjab had become legendary by the end of the 19th century',[140] so too had Younghusband and the founding officers of the Tibet cadre 30 years later, when they were seen as ideal types to emulate.
The cadre officers were aware of their legendary image; it was part of their identity. They played a large part in creating it, and attempted to live up to it. One consequence of this was that their identification with 'forward' policies was an integral part of their sense of cadre identity as much as it was a reasoned analysis of potential means of protecting the security of India.
Although the romantic image of the Politicals has been criticised by scholars such as Copland and Wurgaft,[141] it was an important part of Political officers' own sense of identity and purpose. A certain amount of pride and self-confidence was usually an integral part of the ambition to attain the higher ranks of the Politicals. While the self-effacing Ludlow deplored the ego of some of his Political Department contemporaries,[142] Gould expressed this pride when he recalled that to a jealous outside world "a Political" might be a term of abuse. To us it was a term of glory.'[143]
The early officers such as Bell and Bailey, modest though they were by nature, learned the need for judicious self-promotion, and for obscuring their failures; this was a part of gaining both career advancement, and the advancement of the policies they favoured. Yet a fine line was drawn in the 'gentlemanly codes' they had learned in school, between quiet self-promotion and immodesty. This was defined by Bailey when he wrote of Sven Hedin, 'I think he did a great deal but it is a pity he did not let other people praise it instead of praising it himself.'[144]
To the Tibet cadre, the most important aspect of promoting their image was the maintenance of traditions within the cadre itself. Service traditions were deliberately passed on to newcomers by serving officers. While Younghusband and his proteges, O'Connor and Bailey, were more colourful figures, and hence featured more in the romantic mythology, the greatest influence on succeeding officers in Tibet was Sir Charles Bell. He was 'disposed to let a newcomer see things for himself and form his own conclusions," 145] but Weir, MacDonald, Williamson, Gould and Hopkinson all acknowledged a great debt to him, and their written work contains constant echoes of Bell's influence, both acknowledged and unconscious. These officers followed Bell in deliberately instilling their 'enthusiasm' and 'sense of mission' in their successors.[146]
Traditions were handed on within the cadre through the system whereby serving cadre officers selected promising individuals with an interest in Tibet, supervised their training, and instilled in them the history and traditions of the British presence there. For example, Ludlow describes how Bailey had taken he and another young officer and 'pointed out the old haunts of the mission in 1904-05[sic]'.[147] This was a deliberate policy, and the British sought to hand down these traditions to their Indian successors after 1947. Hopkinson wrote that he wanted
to get some Indians genuinely interested and sympathetic, who would help to continue the ideas on which British officers, in succession, had tried to work...and try to bring the Indians up to the right idea.[148]
Richardson too, hoped that he might encourage his successor to work 'along the right lines’. [149]
Officers naturally took an interest in the careers of those they had promoted; their own judgment would be considered at fault if their proteges failed. As Younghusband told Bailey's father, 'tell him [Bailey] to be sure and do me credit for I am responsible for him and I want any man I recommend to be a credit to me'.[150]
Most officers also solicited their predecessors' advice. For example, Bailey profited from O'Connor and Younghusband's counsel throughout much of his career, and Gould wrote to Bell in 1936, noting he had tried to meet Bailey and ’pick his brains', and now sought his old superior's advice.[151]
The cadre traditions were jealously guarded. In 1934, when the Italian Professor, Giuseppe Tucci, claimed to have been the first European to visit Rabgyeling monastery in western Tibet, H.Calvert ICS, who had been there en route to inspect the Gartok Trade Agency in 1906, was quick to write to The Times and correct the report. Since 1947 officers such as Richardson and Caroe have also been quick to defend their achievements against any criticism or misinterpretation. [152]
CONCLUSIONS
What then were the defining characteristics of the successful members of the Tibet cadre? In common with officials of other Government of India services, they had close family connections with India and shared a middle, or upper-middle class origin. They were educated at British public schools, universities or military colleges, which gave them an almost unquestioning belief in the righteousness of the British Empire.
While made up of officers with very different types of personality, these differences were, at least for public consumption, submerged in a collective identity which incorporated the ideals inculcated in their upbringing and training, ideals which were largely synonymous with those of both 'gentleman' and 'muscular Christian'. Thus while self-confident, and not above subtle self-promotion, they were not immodest, or unsophisticated, and they generally maintained a high standard of ethical conduct. When individuals failed to maintain such standards, this failing was concealed from wider knowledge, in order to maintain the prestige of the cadre.
They were strongly influenced by their reading, in youth, education and service training. The texts they read tended to reinforce their ideals, and their perception of frontier service. Role models such as Sandeman provided precedents for their actions, and an image to emulate. Later officers read books by their predecessors, which further reinforced the cadre image and their identification with it.
There were characteristics which they shared with other frontiersmen. They were 'lean and keen', and they preferred the frontier life to the more comfortable existence of an Indian State; implying that in their character was a 'touch of the recluse'. There was a strong military influence and they were courageous in the military sense, but did not view things exclusively in military terms. An intellect more broad than that often associated with army officers was required.
Like many other frontier officers, the Tibet cadre gained a strong empathy with the local people among whom they served, and the lengthy terms which several officers chose to serve, and their reluctance to retire completely from Tibetan affairs, are indications of this attachment. The pre-existing image of the frontiersman was definitely an aspect of their identity and, as on the North-West Frontier, there was a strong sense of regional cadre tradition.
In common with all Politicals, their selection had been personally approved by the Viceroy, which enhanced their own self-confidence and identification with the ’system’. But nearly half of them were not members of the Politicals when they were first appointed to Tibet. However closely they identified themselves with the Department, this implied a specialisation which contrasts with the ’generalist' ideal of the ICS and the Politicals. This ideal however, had became an increasingly outdated image in the 20th century, as Ewing has noted.[153]
This degree of specialisation within the Tibet cadre is one of their defining characteristics, and emerges most clearly in another integral feature of these men; their scholarship. In the early years officers were not 'a network of scholars',[154] but they developed their increasingly deep knowledge of the country into an expertise which later provided much of the European understanding of Tibet. Along with scholarship, the officers learned the importance of political skills, how to manipulate government opinion to achieve their desired policy aims, as will be examined in more detail in ensuing chapters.
We can see from those who failed to return to service in Tibet, that, given the fitness to live at altitude, the most important aspect of the job was a close identification with the Tibetans. Gaining this was a deliberate policy, and officers who failed in this aspect failed in their duty. Thus officers distracted by family concerns, or unable to endure the mores of Tibetan society, did not succeed.
Despite some circumstantial evidence that the Tibetans were more at ease with married officers (they certainly wondered why officers remained alone), celibacy, a state then considered less unnatural than it is now, was required. It has been argued that sexuality in the British empire was sublimated in duty; this appears to apply to the Tibet cadre. While some of the ’lower ranks’ of supporting staff in Tibet married into the community, or took mistresses there, I have found neither evidence nor rumour that any Political Officer did so.[155] Whether, as Ronald Hyam suggests we should consider, sexual factors played a part in their original decision to serve in the empire, is not revealed in the sources.[156]
Crucial to the Tibet cadre's maintenance of their collective identity and policy was their control of personnel intake. This created a chain of succession in which the influence of an early officer can be seen to emerge in a later period. The Yatung and Gyantse positions were used as training grounds; if the trainees proved suitable they were later returned to the higher ranking positions in Lhasa or Gangtok.
The cadre was, to an extent, a meritocracy. While the Political Department generally was the slowest government service to incorporate local peoples, three of the Tibet cadre were local or Eurasian officers. Acceptance of locals however, came only after long periods in which they had proved their loyalty, and ability to fit in with the ideals and ethos of the cadre, as will be seen in Chapter Three.
There was one other characteristic of the Tibet cadre which was not unique, but which is so often and clearly expressed in the sources that it must be examined in depth. This was the concern with prestige, personal, cadre and national, which we will examine in the next chapter.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Coen (1971, pp.42-43), quoting a farewell speech in Simla on 5 September 1905, by the departing Viceroy, Lord Curzon.
[2] Dewey (1993, p.V11); also see Fieldhouse (1982, p.230).
[3] Officers who served at Yatung during the period when it was of importance (pre 1920), all rose to the higher positions, while only Indian staff chosen from the Provincial Services were posted to Gartok. 19 of the 22 officers we are examining were British; the backgrounds of the three local officers naturally differ in some ways, as will be seen in Chapter Three.
[4] Margaret Ewing has found that 'something of the military mind lingered' and affected the world view of those ICS men who had seen active service in World War One; Ewing (1980, pp.120-121).
[5] While information on the other 13 officers who served in Tibet only briefly, or who acted as Trade Agent Gyantse in the absence of a permanent appointee, is incomplete, their backgrounds appear similar, for example, F.P. Mainprice and Captain J.H. Davis had fathers or grandfathers in the Indian Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Kennedy IMS won a DSO. and an MC. in World War One. The four Escort Commanders who served as Trade Agent Gyantse in 1944-46 may have had somewhat different backgrounds. For example, Captain Allen Robins, who held a war-time commission, entered Sandhurst without attending a public school.
[6] See Beaglehole (1977, pp.237-55); Crawford (1930, pp.650-51); Dewey (1973, pp.283-85); Heathcote (1974, p .140); Potter (1986, pp.57-58); Razzell (1963, pp.248-60); Spangenberg (1976, p.19).
[7] For example, see Madden & Fieldhouse (1982); Symonds (1991).
[8] Symonds ibid (p.47), quoting H. Edgerton, (Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford, c1910.
[9] Heussler (1963, p.82), quoting personal correspondence with Sir Ralph Furse, August 1960.
[10] Moore (1993, p.722).
[11] Potter (1986, p.72); The schools most represented in the Tibet cadre were Marlborough, four officers, and Winchester and Edinburgh Academy, two each.
[12] Potter (1986, pp.58-59, 71-75); Symonds (1991, pp.31-32); Girouard (1981, pp.164-67).
[13] IOLR R/1/4/1035, personal file of B. Gould, Report by H.R. Cobb, 15 January 1910.
[14] Mangan (1986, p.18); McKay (1994, pp.373-74).
[15] Hyam (1990, p.73); McKay ibid\ Potter (1986, pp.73-75).
[16] French (1994, pp.9-10), quoting ’Epistle' by Henry Newbolt.
[17] Dewey (1995).
[18] Symonds (1991, pp.300-301); also see Madden & Fieldhouse (1982).
[19] Symonds ibid (p.36), quoting Lord Curzon, from Lord Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, London (1928, (1) p.49).
[20] IOLR MSS Eur F157-272; various papers of F.M.Bailey.
[21] Mason (1974, pp.365, 386); Shepperd (1980, p.9).
[22] Heathcote (1974, p.168); IOLR MSS Eur F157-214, Lhasa diary of F.M. Bailey, entry of 1 August 1924.
[23] Hilton (1955, p.12).
[24] Ewing (1980, p.206); Symonds (1991, p.116); also see Beaglehole (1977); Ewing (1984); Potter (1973).
[25] Potter (1977, p.875), quoting Maurice Zinkin ICS, Development for Free Asia, London (1963, p.89); also see Potter (1986, p. 112); Simon (1961, p. 15).
[26] Potter ibid.
[27] Mason (1974, pp.363-66); Potter (1977, pp.876-77); Potter (1986, pp.101, 109).
[28] Potter (1977); Potter (1986, p. 108), quoting Hunt Pope ICS, Cambridge archives.
[29] Dewey (1993, p,V11); also see Dewey (1973, p.262); Potter (1977, pp.888-89).
[30] IOLR MSS Eur F157-144, Younghusband to (Bailey's father) Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, 12 March 1905.
[31] Interview with Mrs E. Hopkinson, April 1993.
[32] Spear (1978, p. 179)
[33] Potter (1977, pp.875-89); (1986, pp.72).
[34] Walsh (1945, p. 112); Sykes (1945, p. 134).
[35] Simon (1961, pp.11, 100, 110, 198).
[36] Beaglehole (1977, p.249), quoting A.R,Cornelius ICS, 15 October 1928, in IOLR L/S&G/6/351 Collection 3-16a; Ewing (1980, p.200); Simon ibid (p.100).
[37] IOLR MSS Eur F157-142, Bailey's school and college reports.
[38] IOLR MSS Eur F 203-84, Caroe Papers, draft autobiography (untitled), Chapter Two, pp.4-5.
[39] Interview with Mrs R. Collett, March 1993; Interview with Mrs E. Hopkinson, April 1993.
[40] Interview with H. Richardson, November 1990.
[41] Zinkin (1994, p.297).
[42] Lyall (1973, pp.334-36 & passim).
[43] Edwardes (1851, pp.1 & 722-23).
[44] Thornton (1895, pp.24, 36, 290-91, 294-295, 306, 314-316, 320-21 & passim).
[45] For more detail of these incidents see, McKay (1992a), & McKay (1992b).
[46] French (1994, pp.35-37).
[47] Williamson (1987, p.90); Bell's collection is listed in IOLR MSS Eur F80 5a 27.
[48] 'I stayed at the Residency with Sir Basil Gould, and the first thing he said to me was "You’d better start your education. Here are some books." -- Bell's Tibet Past and Present...Spencer Chapman's Lhasa the Holy City.'; interview with R. Ford, March 1993.
[49] IOLR MSS Eur D998-17, Hopkinson to Mrs Hopkinson, 14 October 1945; In his 'Report on Tibet August 1945 to August 1948', (MSS Eur D998-39), Hopkinson repeats unacknowledged Bell's description of Tibet as the 'cinderella[sic] of the Indian Foreign Service, a phrase I used in the title of my 1992 'South Asia Research' article.
[50] Morgan (1973, p.58); Trench (1987, p.11); Interview with Mrs A. Saker, April 1993; IOLR MSS Eur F157-319, Bailey typescript autobiography (untitled), p.18; also see Swinson (1971, pp.42-43).
[51] IOLR MSS Eur F157-166, Bailey to his parents, 11 January 1906; R/1/4/1236, Personal file of E.W. FIetcher; NAI FD, 1923 Establishment B39(1), Macdonald's Political Department entry application, various correspondence. MacDonald was refused entry into the Political Department as a result of what now appears his peripheral involvement in events involving his son-in-law, Frank Perry, Escort Commander in Gyantse, 1918-20; see IOLR L/P&S/11/235-2906, India to Bailey 12 December 1923.
[52] IOLR R/1/4/1261, Personal file of A.J. Hopkinson, P.S.Lock to Hopkinson, 16 March 1923.
[53] IOLR MSS Eur R/1/4/2003, Persona! file of P.C. Hailey, various correspondence.
[54] NAI FD, 1906 General B, October 14-15, Lieutenant-Colonel P.G. Weir IMS, to Dane, 1 September 1906.
[55] IOLR R/1/4/1297, Personal file of A.A. Russell, Russell to India, 15 February 1924.
[56] Coen (1971, pp.35-36).
[57] Ibid-, Copland (1982, pp.80-81).
[58] NAI FD, 1923 Establishment B39(1), Macdonald's Political Department entry application, file note, 21 December 1922, signature unclear.
[59] NAI FD, 1913 Secret E January 120, file note by Foreign Secretary A.H.McMahon, 3 October 1912.
[60] NAI FD, 1906 General A December 56-59, Morley to India, 6 July 1906.
[61] Trench (1987, p. 13); Fletcher (1975, p.228).
[62] Lamb (1966, fn.22, p.138; Addy (1985, p.192), quoting Morley to Minto, 19 February 1908, IOLR D573-3, Morley Papers.
[63] IOLR MSS Eur F203-84, Caroe papers, draft autobiography of Sir Olaf Caroe, Chapter 8, p.4.
[64] IOLR L/P&S/7/183-168, O’Connor to India, 19 November 1905.
[65] IOLR MSS Eur D998-39, ’Report on Tibet August 1945-August 1948’, by A.J. Hopkinson.
[66] NAI FD, 1913, Secret E January 120, file note by A.H. Grant, 10 September 1912.
[67] These links continued in subsequent years. While Curzon was Foreign Minister at Whitehall, O'Connor and Bailey were posted to control of the British positions in Nepal, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan.
[68] Trench (1987, p.13).
[69] Mainprice papers, various diary entries, May to August 1944; Personal information courtesy of his sister, Mrs L.J. Mainprice.
[70] Gould (1957, p.17); Interview with Mrs A. Saker, April 1993.
[71] IOLR MSS Eur F157-219, Younghusband to Bailey, 4 December 1913.
[72] NAI FD, 1907, Secret E September 238-250, O'Connor to India, 13 May 1907, & India to O’Connor, 4 June 1907, 15 June 1907.
[73] IOLR L/P&S/7/214-652, Gyantse Quarterly Trade Report. This report, for the third quarter of 1907, was not submitted by White until 31 January 1908 as he had 'overlooked' it, while preparing for a trip to Bhutan.
[74] Copland (1982, p.78); IOLR MSS Eur F157-219, Younghusband to Bailey, 4 December 1913.
[75] Gould (1957, pp.21, 192-93).
[76] Copland (1978, pp.280-81); Ewing (1980, p.56).
[77] Isolation was also a factor. Gyantse was always an inhospitable posting, and two year terms were usually the maximum served. Gangtok and Lhasa were more congenial, and longer terms were possible.
[78] O'Connor (1940, pp.99-100).
[79] Interview with Mrs E. Hopkinson, April 1993.
[80] The question was raised in the House of Commons by Colonel Howard-Bury, the former Himalayan climber, who asked why two year terms were favoured in Tibet. In reply, the Minister concerned noted the stagnation factor, but the principal reason he gave was that officers felt their promotion prospects would suffer from long service outside India; IOLR L/P&S/12/2345-3200, copy of Hansard entry of 21 May 1930.
[81] Interview with R. Ford, March 1993.
[82] MacLeod (1973, p.1403); Potter (1986, pp.34, 74-75); Robb (1992, p.38).
[83] Interview with Mrs J.M. Jehu, March 1993; Interview with A.H. Robins, April 1993.
[84] Copland (1978, p.287, also see pp.277 & 289); Dewey (1993, pp.5, 7); Misra (1970, pp. 178-79, 246).
[85] Landon (1905, (2) p. 152)
[86] IOLR MSS Eur F157-241, Ludlow to Bailey, 3 June 1930; MSS Eur D979, Ludlow diary, entry of 8 November 1926; Fletcher (1975, p.233).
[87] For example, see Mariani (1954, pp.221-23). The officer referred to is Arthur Hopkinson.
[88] For example, Ludlow wrote that, 'If they wanted me I would come back from the ends of earth to Tibet; IOLR MSS Eur D979, Ludlow diary entry, 10 November 1926.
[89] Macdonald (1932, p.121).
[90] Interview with A.H. Robins, April 1993; Interview with R.Ford, March 1993; personal correspondence with R. Ford, October 1994; Walter's papers, 'Gyantse to Tibet 1940/1', (unpublished article) p.7.
[91] These files are contained in the NAI Foreign Department Establishment B series, i.e. Gould’s letters are in FD, 1913 Establishment B May 168-173, and FD, 1932 Establishment B180. Williamson's preferences are shown in his personal file; IOLR R/1/4/1319, Williamson to India, 18 August 1923.
[92] Weir was planning for his retirement, and a Second-class Residency would add 100 rupees a month to his pension, while a First-class Residency would add 200 rupees; Weir Papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 9 December 1930.
[93] Hopkinson is the only officer who specified a post he did not want -- Hyderabad. It is illustrative of the different types of personality which were blended into the Politicals that it was the magnificence of the Residency there which inspired Sir Olaf Caroe, later Indian Foreign Secretary, to join the Political Department; IOLR MSS Eur F203-84, Caroe papers, draft autobiography (untitled); Hopkinson’s preferences are in NAI FD, 1928 Establishment B, 47 (14) E/28.
[94] IOLR MSS Eur F157-166, Bailey to his parents, 3 January 1909 [dated 1908 in error]; Bell (1992, p.259); IOLR MSS Eur D998-39, 'Report on Tibet August 1945 - August 1948' by A.J. Hopkinson.
[95] Bell ibid.
[96] NAI FD, 1913 Establishment B May 168-73, File Note, 20 February 1913, signature unclear.
[97] IOLR L/P&S/12-2345, India to Secretary of State, 19 May 1945; Mainprice papers, various correspondence, 1943-44.
[98] IOLR MSS Eur F157-166, Bailey to his parents, 13 January 1908; NAI FD, 1911 Establishment BMarch 10-17, Bell to India, 23 December 1910.
[99] For example, Gould asked for Richardson to be posted to Gyantse, knowing he was interested in Tibet; personal correspondence with H. Richardson, June 1992.
[100] For example, see IOLR MSS Eur F157-236, Laden La to Bailey, 18 September 1930, re a Major Lock's hopes of a Tibet posting.
[101] IOLR MSS Eur F157-236, Laden La to Bailey, 18 September 1930; MSS Eur F157-269, Weir to Bailey, January 1929; Weir Papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 9 December 1930.
[102] NAI FD, 1921 Establishment B Nov 199-223, various correspondence.
[103] Weir papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 24 October 1929; IOLR R/1/4/986, file note by B. Gould, 14 August 1940, file note (unsigned), 27 May 1940 & related correspondence; R/1/4/992, Gould to India, 25 March 1941. The dangers of altitude were real, several deaths occurred among Agency or Escort personnel en route to Gyantse, e.g. Lieutenant Warren, appointed to the Gyantse Escort, died at Yatung in September 1939.
[104] NAI FD, 1910 General BApril 156, file note by Viceroy Minto, 25 March 1910.
[105] Lamb (1960, p.220); McKay (1992a, pp.404-05); NAI FD, 1908 External A April 33-34, various correspondence. For recent laudatory comments on White, see Collister (1987, passim).
[106] Mainprice papers, diary entry, 15-19 October 1943; Weir papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 4 June 1929 & 1 October 1929; NAI FD, 1935 Establishment B32 (54) E, various correspondence.
[107] Weir papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 6 May 1930; IOLR MSS Eur F89 5a 92 & 5a 93 both contain reports on Fletcher sent from Tibet, dated 7 December 1930, apparently by David Macdonald.
[108] Interview with Mrs J.M. Jehu, March 1993.
[109] Mainprice papers, diary entry, 15-19 October 1943; Interview with A.H. Robins, April 1993.
[110] Williamson (1987, pp.186-87).
[111] Interview with A.H. Robins, April 1993; IOLR MSS Eur F80, 5a 92, & 5a 93, various correspondence, 1929-31, Macdonald to Bell.
[112] Re O'Connor, see Weir papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 10 November 1932; re Bailey, see NAI FD, 1930 Establishment B214 E, Bailey to E. Howell, 3 November 1930 & related correspondence; re Perry, Parker, Lee and Martin, see FD, 1910 Secret E Dec. 430-31, Bell to India, 10 November 1910 & related correspondence. It was theoretically possible for British citizens to live at the trade marts if they claimed to be traders, but none were permitted to do so after this loophole had been exploited by an eccentric missionary, Annie Taylor, who lived in Yatung from 1894-C1906.
[113] IOLR MSS Eur F157-269, Mrs Weir to Mrs Bailey, 10 June 1932.
[114] IOLR MSS Eur F157-240, Bailey to Norbhu Dhondup, 29 August 1927; L/P&S/12/3982, various correspondence, 1923-27.
[115] IOLR L/P&S/12/4295-5863, Weir to India, 11 September 1932; L/P&S/12/4295-5238, Caroe to Williamson, 4 July 1935, India to Secretary of State, 10 August 1935, and reply, 21 August 1935.
[116] Interview with R. Ford, March 1993.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid; Interview with A.H.Robins, April 1993; interview with Mrs A. Saker, April 1993.
[119] Interview with Mrs E. Hopkinson, April 1993.
[120] Williamson (1987, pp.39 & 207).
[121] For example, see IOLR MSS Eur F157-241, Ludlow to Bailey, 19 November 1944.
[122] Molloy (1991, p.17).
[123] Williamson (1987, pp.39, 207). Women could also cause disputes, there was a long-running vendetta between two Political Officers' wives, which cannot have helped their husbands' relationship; Weir papers, Weir to Mrs Weir, 7 September 1930.
[124] 'You were your own master'; interview with Mrs E. Hopkinson, April 1993.
[125] Interview with R. Ford, April 1993.
[126] Wurgaft (1983, p. XV11), suggests that the 'heroic mythology' attached to the frontier regions arose from a turning 'away from the complexities of contemporary India to a simpler reality that reflected their ideal of paternal rule'; but this ignores the influence of the indigenous placement of the Himalayas as a realm of myth.
[127] Bishop (1989, p.111).
[128] van den Dungan, (1972, p.31).
[129] Wurgaft (1983, p.35).
[130] Orwell (1957, p. 196). George Orwell's description in this article of the ethos of these magazines has not been bettered.
[131] Re Curzon and Younghusband in the "Great Game", see French (1994), and the popular account by Hopkirk (1990).
[132] Campbell (1988, p.123); Eliade (1955).
[133] Younghusband (1985, pp.434-38). The full extent of Younghusband’s spiritual character and beliefs has recently been brought out by Patrick French, see French (1994).
[134] Potter (1986, pp. 13, 249-50). Potter takes a thirty-year period as representing one administrative generation. Here, however, I rely on Shils, who concludes that definition of how long a generation lasts depends upon the context. Potter (1986, p.6); Shils (1981, p. 15). The problem is discussed in Spitzer (1973, pp. 1353-1385),
[135] Interview with J. Lail, October 1993.
[136] Ewing (1980, pp.181-84, 382, 389 & passim ); Spangenberg (1976, pp.53-54); Wurgaft (1983, pp. XV11, X1X, 83, 170).
[137] Copland (1978, pp.277-299).
[138] Potter (1986, p.248).
[139] Shils (1981, p.14).
[140] Wurgaft (1983, p.37),
[141] Copland (1978, pp.277-78, 289, 299); Wurgaft (1983, pp.XVI I-XIX).
[142] IOLR MSS Eur F157-241, Ludlow to Bailey, 26 November 1934, & 4 December 1945.
[143] Gould (1957, p.3).
[144] IOLR MSS Eur F157-166, Bailey to his parents, 2 May 1909.
[145] Gould (1957, p.19).
[146] Awareness of predecessors was also brought about by enquiries after them from the local Tibetans, or, in Mainprice's case, from browsing through the confidential files in the offices, which went back to 1905. Interview with R. Ford, March 1993; Interview with Mrs E. Hopkinson, April 1993, Interview with A.H. Robins, April 1993; Mainprice papers, diary entry of 24 June 1944; Ford (1990, p. 194).
[147] IOLR MSS Eur D979, Ludlow diary entry, 12 September 1924.
[148] IOLR MSS F157-258, Hopkinson to Bailey, 5 December 1949.
[149] IOLR MSS Eur F157-259, Richardson to Bailey, 25 February 1949.
[150] IOLR MSS Eur F157-144, Younghusband to Bailey senior, 6 February 1906; also see MSS Eur F157-219, Younghusband to (F.M.) Bailey, 10 May 1906.
[151] IOLR MSS Eur F80 5a 127, Gould to Bell, 22 March 1936.
[152] IOLR L/P&S/12/4247-1517, cutting from The Times 9 January 1934; also see Caroe (1974); Richardson (1974).
[153] Ewing (1980, p.376).
[154] McKay (1992a, p.407).
[155] This is in contrast to the history of the Politicals' most remote posting, at Kashgar; see Everest-Phillips (1991, p.21 & passim).
[156] Hyam (1990, pp.211-12).