Ouyang Jingwu’s Critique of the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana, Excerpt from "Differentiating the Pearl From the Fish Eye: Ouyang Jingwu (1871-1943) and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism"
A dissertation presented by Eyal Aviv
to The Committee on the Study of Religion in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of The Study of Religion Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
July, 2008
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Chapter Four: Ouyang Jingwu’s Critique of the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter outlined Ouyang’s sharp yet unsystematic critique of mainstream Chinese Buddhism, especially that of the Chan, Tiantai and Huayan Schools. We saw that his critique attempted to correct the flaws that he identified in Buddhism and that his critique targeted specific elements within each tradition, such as misleading meditation techniques, faulty interpretation of the Buddhist teaching and the rejection of scriptural authority. His critique, however, unsystematic as it is cannot fully account for the harsh language that he used when describing what he saw as these schools’ flaws and poor spiritual achievements. If he indeed considered the Huayan and Tiantai schools as accountable for the decline of Buddhism why was it that he never outlined a systematic critique of their teachings and practices? Why was Ouyang so sketchy when leveling criticism toward these schools?
In this chapter, I would like to suggest that in Ouyang’s critique, the problem of the Chinese schools stemmed from a more fundamental reason, that is, a problematic doctrine that deeply influenced these schools. Scholastic Buddhists, beginning with Ouyang, associated the origin of this “flawed” teaching with a series of texts which were highly regarded in the Chinese tradition such as the *Vajrasamadhi sutra (Ch., Chinese)1 and the *Suramgama sutra (Ch., Chinese, Shou lengyan jing).2 There was one text in particular, however, which was the subject of critique by many scholars in Ouyang’s day, including Ouyang himself. This was the text of the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Chinese, Dasheng qixin lun).3
Indeed, since its appearance in the sixth century, the Awakening of Faith has been a text as influential as it was controversial. During the Tang dynasty, the Awakening of Faith enjoyed growing popularity in Huayan circles, alongside some early skepticism about the provenance of the text. However, after the Song dynasty, its influence spread beyond the Huayan School and its teaching dominated the doctrines of all major schools of Chinese Buddhism, specifically those of the Huayan, Tiantai and Chan which Ouyang later criticized.
In this chapter, I will focus on the place of the Awakening of Faith in the history of modern East Asian Buddhism, putting a special emphasis on the emergence of the debate regarding its authenticity in China and on Ouyang’s role in this debate. This debate was at the heart of the attempt to question mainstream East Asian Buddhism in the modern period. It would be impossible to treat all of the people involved with their different emphases and opinions and also maintain our focus on Ouyang. Instead, I will here deal only with the dimensions of the text and its teaching which were at the center of the debate and the criticism of Ouyang and other important modern critics.
I will begin by giving a brief historical outline of the debate’s emergence in Japan and China. I will then outline Ouyang’s position and his major critique and emphasize its pioneering role in this debate (a debate, in many ways, still going on today). After gaining a better understanding of Ouyang’s criticism of the Awakening of Faith, I will show how his most famous disciple, Lü Cheng, carried this debate forward. I will then concluded with some examples of other voices, most of them apologists who tried to defend the Awakening of Faith and other apocryphal texts against the surging wave of scholastic critiques.
4.2 The problem of authentic or real religion
In his book Shouting Fire Alan Dershowitz says “[O]nce [the state] says religion is to be preferred over nonreligion, [it has] to define what religion means. You then have to define what is true religion and what is real religion.”4 As we will see in this chapter, the question, “What is real religion?” occupied Ouyang and his followers as well. Specifically they asked: What is true Buddhism? Can one distinguish true Buddhism from false?
The history and ramifications of this question are widely discussed among scholars of Religious Studies religious thinkers. For our purpose suffice it is to say that this question is often known in the field of religious studies as the search for the sine qua non or essence of religion.5 One of the candidates for the status of “essence” found most persuasive by modern religious thinkers and scholars offered was religious experience. Beginning with Enlightenment apologists, such as Fredrick Schleiermacher in the late eighteenth century and continuing with influential twentieth century scholars of religions and theologians, such as Rudolf Otto (who was influenced by Schleiermacher), William James and others, religion came to be understood as consisting of a core experience of the noumena, as a distinct and purer experience compared to those which are culturally dependent.6
The view that religious or mystical experience is the essence of a tradition found a strong hold also among scholars of Buddhism and Buddhists alike, such as the prominent Kyoto School thinker Nishida Kitaoo, the Zen apostle to the West, D.T. Suzuki, and scholars like Edward Conze,7 C. A. Rhys Davids etc. As we saw above, Ouyang did not share such a conviction. As Robert Sharf noted: “The authority of exegetes such as Kamalasila, Buddhaghosa, and Chih-i lay, not in their access to exalted spiritual states, but in their mastery of, and rigorous adherence to, sacred scriptures.”8 Sharf’s comment certainly hold true for Ouyang’s criticisms as well, stemming as they did from the Confucian tradition, which criticized the Ming dynasty Confucians for their over-emphasis on “exalted spiritual states”, rather than a close study of scriptures.
For Ouyang, as for other exegetes, real Buddhism is found not in experience, but rather in a careful study of the system of thought as outlined in canonical Buddhist texts. Ouyang said: “The doctrine (Chinese) evolves and is deducted from the teaching (Chinese) and does not part from its source (Chinese). It cannot be based relying on intuition.”9 It is therefore imperative to have a thorough command of these texts in order to get the system right. The problem, as we saw, was that, in Ouyang’s view, Buddhists in China considered inauthentic scriptures to be the perfect Buddhist teaching. When one follows an inauthentic and flawed teaching, one inevitably will follow a wrong path. This was exactly the problem he perceived in the Awakening of Faith.
4.3 The Awakening of Faith and its importance
4.3.1 The text – early reception and early doubts
Traditionally, the Awakening of Faith is attributed to Asvaghosa, the second century Sanskrit poet and supposed exponent of Mahayana, who is most famous for the poetic biography of Buddha Sakyamuni, the Buddhacarita. Asvaghosa’s fame led to the attribution of several other works to him. One of them was the Awakening of Faith, which according to tradition, was translated twice into Chinese: first by Paramartha in 554 CE, and second by Siksananda, during the Tang dynasty in 695- 700 CE. Most scholars today agree that the text is neither an Indian text nor a text translated by Paramartha and Siksananda. However, the identity of the true author of the text, and whether it was a Chinese composition or an edited work parts of which may be of a Sanskritic origin, is still debated.10
Doubts regarding the text began shortly after the text appeared in China. Buddhist texts were not translated in a systematic manner into Chinese. Instead, the translation of particular texts was influenced by the availability of Indic manuscripts, the presence of eminent translators, and a favorable political climate. There were no guidelines to determine which texts to translate and how to prioritize the translation work. The result was an influx of texts without the necessary context to understand them or the means to place them within the Buddhist teaching as a whole. In order to fill this lacuna, Chinese monks started to catalogue the available Buddhist texts throughout the empire in an attempt to see the forest created by the numerous but very scattered trees that were available.
In one of the first of these catalogues, the Zongjing mulu (Chinese) (also known as the Fajinglu (Chinese),11 after his head compiler Fajing), the Awakening of Faith appears in the category of suspicious scriptures (Chinese).12 Another interesting example is from a text called The Essentials Writings on the Three Treatises and Profound Commentaries (Chinese)13 written by Chinkai (Chinese 1091-1152), a Japanese monk. Chinkai quotes from Huijun’s (Chinese) The Profound Meaning of the Four Commentaries (Chinese) in two places, where Huijun raises doubts regarding the attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Asvaghosa. Unfortunately, the rendition that is included in the canon today does not include the two citations and it is unclear on which text Chinkai relied on.14
Despite these early doubts, during the Tang, many influential monks, such as Fazang, Zongmi and others subscribed to the text’s teaching. In the aftermath of emperor Wuzong’s persecution of 845 CE, the decline of the Cien/Faxiang School, and the rise to hegemony of the Chan School (especially among elite circles), the Awakening of Faith’s teaching became so popular that questions regarding its teaching and authenticity were marginalized.
4.3.2 Major commentaries throughout the centuries
It is hard to underestimate the importance of the Awakening of Faith in the history of Chinese Buddhism. It found an attentive audience shortly after its appearance in China, which further developed its teaching. Associated with this text are an impressive sets of commentaries, which number more than 150. These commentaries expounded the sutra’s teaching and turned it into a foundational text, respected by all major Chinese Buddhist schools. The text’s far-reaching status and acceptance as a foundational text became the context for the attack on the text and its teaching by Ouyang and other modern East Asian scholastic Buddhists.
The earliest commentary on the Awakening of Faith was Tanyan’s (Chinese) (516-588) (Dasheng qixin lun yishu) (Chinese).15 Tanyan’s commentary was followed by, among others, three commentaries known as the three great commentaries on the Awakening of Faith, namely, (Chinese) (Dasheng qixinlun yishu) (Chinese);16 Wonhyo’s (Chinese, 617-?) Qixin lun shu (Chinese),17 and Fazang’s (Chinese) Dasheng qixin lun yiji) (Chinese).18 Commentators from throughout East Asia continued to interpret the Awakening of Faith in later periods. Notable were the two commentaries written during the Ming dynasty by two of the most renowned monks of the period. These are Hanshan Deqing’s (Chinese) Qixin lun zhijie (Chinese),19 and Ouyi Zhixu’s (Chinese,1599-1656) Dasheng qixin lun liegangshu (Chinese).20
Two well-known modern commentaries are those of Yinshun (1906-2005), the Dasheng qixin lun jiangji (Chinese) and Yuanying’s (1878–1953) Dasheng qixin lun jiangyi (Chinese). I will further discuss the defenders of the text below after presenting the objections of modern Buddhist scholastics.21
4.4 The Awakening of Faith in the twentieth century
The teaching and the authenticity of the Awakening of Faith stood at the center of one of the most heated Buddhist debates throughout the twentieth century across East Asia and China in particular. Because the Awakening of Faith’s teaching had became so axiomatic among Chinese Buddhists, questioning the text became tantamount to questioning Chinese and East Asian Buddhism in its totality.
It is curious that the Awakening of Faith controversy erupted in China after so many years of consensus regarding its centrality and authenticity. There are several potential answers to this question, all of which are related to developments in twentieth century Buddhism. In China, these developments included: the growing popularity of the Faxiang or Yogacara teaching, which rejected the inherent enlightenment teaching dominant in the Awakening of Faith, the growing impact of lay Buddhists, who were less committed to the monastic party-line, and the globalization of Buddhism which exposed Chinese Buddhists to other forms of Buddhism on an unprecedented scale, and which presented Chinese Buddhism as just one form of Buddhism among other choices.
4.5 The debate over the Awakening of Faith in Japan
A major cause for the debates over the Awakening of Faith in China was the influence of similar debates that took place in Japan. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan exerted a tremendous impact on China in almost every aspect of life, social, political, economic and intellectual. Japan became a Mecca for many Chinese who took the modernization of China to be the country’s highest priority. The younger generation of Chinese intellectuals flocked to Japanese universities to learn how this nation, which until recently they had looked down upon as semi-barbarian, succeeded in such a short time in transforming itself into a modern country while at the same time maintaining its traditional and unique culture. This energetic group of young people was determined to transform their own culture in addition to acquiring new knowledge. The cultural upheavals back home became a powerful force that helped to create and propagate radical ideas and proposed solutions to China’s predicament.
Like other Chinese in Japan, Chinese Buddhists admired the example of their Japanese Buddhist colleagues, for they successfully transformed Buddhism in Japan from a persecuted religion into the hallmark of Japanese culture. For centuries, Confucian scholars attacked Buddhists as heresy. In the Meiji era, Japanese Buddhists also came under attack by other dominant powers, such as Christian missionaries and propagators of Western culture. Buddhism, in other words, became an impediment to Japan’s progress.
As in Japan in the early Meiji period, Buddhists in China, like other religions, was considered an impediment to modernity. The miraculous transformation of Japanese Buddhism was therefore of great interest to Buddhists in China. How was it possible for Japanese Buddhists to have transformed a symbol of spiritual decadence (Japanese: daraku) and anachronistic tradition into the hallmark of modernity and Japanese spirit? In addition, how had they managed to go beyond the boundaries of Asia and promote Buddhism as a global religion, in which Japanese Buddhism was envisioned as the spearhead of a new spirituality for the modern age?22
In his book Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan, James Ketelaar outlines three major areas that Buddhist reformers identified as most damaging to the reputation and cause of Buddhists in Japan, and how these reformers responded to these attacks.23 These are:
1. The perceived socio-economic uselessness of priests and temples;
2. The foreign character of Buddhism, which had negatively influenced Japanese culture, filling it with superstitious and other-worldly traits derived from Indian culture;
3. Its mythological and unscientific presentation of history.
Ketelaar explains that Japanese Buddhist reformers responded by repackaging their traditions as “New Buddhism” (shin bukkyo). In so doing, they attempted to respond to the specific criticisms leveled against them. Against the allegation of uselessness, possibly inspired by Christian missionaries, Buddhist reformers promoted the transformation of their temples into centers of social-action. Hospitals and clinics were established, as well as centers for short-term support in times of need for the general population, schools, hotels etc. In addition, these reformers initiated campaigns addressing a wide range of social and political issues, such as the promotion of public health concerns, and anti-abortion and anti-capital punishment campaigns. Later, they also supported Japanese military campaigns.
These campaigns and social activities fostered a sense of Buddhism as an inseparable dimension of the Japanese social fabric, and by that Buddhists responded to the supposed foreignness of the Buddhist tradition. Ketelaar explains: “So entrenched were Buddhist institutions in every aspect of Japanese ‘civilization’ by the end of the nineteenth century that the earlier critique of an ‘other-worldly’ Buddhism was no longer applicable.24 As for the third dimension, response came in the form of the establishment of Buddhist academies and universities that were, and continue to be, at the forefront of Buddhist Studies research. As we will see in the case of the Awakening of Faith controversy, arguments employed by both sides reflected a new level of sophistication and mastery of philological and historical tools available at that time.
4.5.1 The debate surrounding the Awakening of Faith in Japan
In Japan, both the critics of Buddhism as well as the Buddhist reformers held up the Awakening of Faith in support of their views, precisely because of the text’s importance to the tradition and because the doctrines it espouses had become what many consider the hallmark of East Asian Buddhism.25
The beginning of the modern study of Buddhism is often dated to 1879 when Hara Tanzan, a Buddhist scholar and Zen priest, taught a course called “Lectures on Buddhist Texts” at the Imperial University.26 The key text that he chose for the course was the Awakening of Faith, which he saw as a core text and which allowed a discussion of Buddhism in a modern manner with a focus on psychology and “Experiential (Jikken) Buddhism”. The course became widely known and attracted dignitaries from the university including the president of the university, Kato Hiroyuki.
The choice of text as the key text should not surprise us. One of the strategies the reformers of Buddhism adopted was to adopt what Ketelaar called “trans-sectarian” Buddhist culture. This occurs when reformers identify sectarianism as a weak spot that prevents Buddhists from responding effectively to external attacks. One of the key figures behind this movement was Takada Doken, who was the editor of the newspaper Tzuzoku Bukkyo Shinbun (The Common man’s Buddhist Newspaper) and of Tsu-Bukkyo anshin (The Salvation of United Buddhism). For people like Takada and other advocators of trans-sectarian there was a need for a doctrine and texts which would stand beyond any sectarian boundaries. The texts of Shinran, Honen, Dogen or Nichiren were all too closely associated with particular schools and it was the Awakening of Faith that provided the solution they were looking for. As [b][size=110]Takeda and others argue the “‘fundamental essence’ (kompongi) that penetrates every sect of both Mahayana and Hinayana teaching is most perfectly articulated in the Awakening of Faith.”27
The success of the course and the interest it aroused in the Awakening of Faith soon led to the first criticisms against the text and against Buddhism from adversaries of Buddhism. For example, in his New Discourse on Buddhism (Butsudo shinron), Takahashi Goro, a scholar of Biblical and Christian studies, blamed Buddhism and the Awakening of Faith in particular with being irrational. This critique was soon met with the refutation of Oda Tokuno, a prominent scholar of Buddhism.
The debate above, however, was only the prelude to the first major debate surrounding the text, which followed soon after. The reason for the rise of the controversy was the thesis of Kimura Takataro, who was a Japanese nationalist with a broad Western education. His thesis focused on a critique against the Awakening of Faith as fundamentally different from Western thought and Buddhism in general, and therefore as something that was unnecessary for Japan in the present historical moment. Kimura’s attack was followed by others, who defended Buddhism and the Awakening of Faith. Many of them later rose to be among the pioneers of Buddhist Studies in Japan: Ogiwara Unrai, Sakaino Koyo, Furukawa Rosen, Yoshitani Kakuju and Murakami Sensho.
It was also around this time that the Awakening of Faith was translated into English for the first time by Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki, who chose to translate the Siksananda edition of the text,28 as a part of a Japanese Buddhist effort -- and to a certain extent a Chinese effort by figures such as Yang Wenhui -- to propagate Mahayana Buddhism in the West. Western Buddhist scholars at that time largely viewed the Mahayana as a later corruption of the earlier and ostensibly pure Theravada teachings.29 The Chicago World’s Parliament of Religion held in 1893 presented Japanese participants with a key opportunity to propagate what they saw as the true spirit of Mahayana Buddhism.
However, with the growing professionalisation of Buddhist scholars in Japan, even national pride and the relative success of the text abroad did not stop the outbreak of a second, more rigorous, wave of controversy, which began with Mochizuki Shinko’s (Chinese, 1869-1948) argument that the Awakening of Faith was of Chinese provenance. The results of his research were published later in his famous Mochizuki Shinko (Chinese), Studies of the Awakening of Faith (Daijo kishinron no kenkyo (Chinese) in 1922.
Mochizuki was not the first to argue along these lines in modern Japan. Already in July, 1901 Murakami Sensho (Chinese, 1851-1929) had sparked another, closely related, controversy, when he published his own contribution to the transsectarian movement’s first volume of the Bukkyo toitsu ron (The Treatise of Unifying Buddhism). In this work he argued, among other things, that the Mahayana scriptures are not the Buddha’s words (Skt: buddhavacana, Jap: bussetsu). Whalen Lai plausibly argues that Murakami’s approach, and later also Mochizuki’s, should be understood in the context of the quest for the historical Jesus, which had captured the attention of scholars in Europe at that time.30 Related or not, the two quests, for the true Jesus and for the true words of the Buddha’s, were both very controversial. Mochizuki’s assertion that the Awakening of Faith was not an Indian text sparked considerable discussion.
In 1922, the same year that Ouyang voiced his opposition to the text and when Liang Qichao published his own book on the Awakening of Faith, Mochizuki presented his approach systematically in his Studies in the Awakening of Faith. The controversy erupted into full bloom, with both sides arguing about the validity of the other side’s arguments. As expected, Mochizuki was backed by Murakami, while on the more conservative side stood scholars such as Hadani Ryotai (Chinese, 1883-1974) and Tokiwa Daijo (Chinese, 1870-1945). Scholars from both sides argued about the nature of the earlier doubts: the attribution to Asvaghosa and Paramartha; problems related to the language of the text; and the identities of the translator/s or the author/s, if the author was not Asvaghosa and the translator was not Paramartha.
Despite the fact tha t most scholars in the West accept Mochizuki’s assertion, i.e. that the Awakening of Faith is indeed of Chinese origin, the debate has never ended in Japan, and continues to engage contemporary scholars of Indian and East Asian Buddhism.
4.6 The Chinese debate over the Awakening of Faith
Inspired by their Japanese colleagues, by internal growing tendencies toward a more scholarly study of Buddhism and with a growing understanding of Western methods of inquiry, Chinese Buddhists turned their attention to the authenticity of Buddhist texts as well. However, unlike their Japanese counterparts, Chinese Buddhists, while not ignoring the question of authorship, were more concerned with the philosophical and doctrinal teachings of the Awakening of Faith and their compatibility with what they understood as the authentic Buddhist teaching. Surveying the full scope of the traditional interpretation of the Awakening of Faith and the modern debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, in this section of this chapter, I will focus on Ouyang’s contribution to this debate, as the first to identify and raise these concerns in China. To contextualize the significance of Ouyang’s position and in order to better understand the extent to which it snowballed into something much bigger, I will also mention briefly Zhang Taiyan and Lü Cheng’s contribution to the debate,31 and apologists such as Liang Qichao, Taixu and Tang Dayuan.32 As in the case of the Japanese material just surveyed, this will by comprise means an exhaustive discussion [by no means comprise an exhaustive discussion]. Rather, through it, I hope to provide the background necessary for appreciating this group’s basic argument, and Ouyang's special place within this group.
4.6.1 Zhang Taiyan – the initiator of the debate over the Awakening of Faith in China
In 1915, the famous intellectual and nationalist, Zhang Taiyan, poked the first hole in the wall of certainty surrounding the Awakening of Faith with the publication of his Debating the Awakening of Faith (Chinese). In his very short essay, Zhang treated both historical and doctrinal aspects of the problem. Basically, he argued that while historically it is an authentic Indian text, there remained major doctrinal problems and contradictions that should be taken into account.
With regard to questions of authentication, Zhang Taiyan argued along the same lines as Ouyang would seven years later. Zhang does not say in his essay if he is reacting to doubts he encountered in Japan regarding the text, but from the tone of the essay it seems very plausible, especially taking into account the fact that he returned from five years in Japan right after the 1911 revolution.
For Zhang the text was indeed of Indian provenance and was written by Asvaghosa. He opens his article by acknowledging that the Fajinglu catalogue places the Awakening of Faith among the suspicious scriptures, and that the attribution to Asvaghosa was not mentioned in Yijing’s 691 CE, Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan (Chinese, T54.2125 records from his travels in India and South Asia), nor in Kumarajiva’s Biography of the Bodhisattva Asvaghosa (Ch:, Chinese, T50.2046), nor even in Fazang’s writings. Daoxuan’s Xu gaoseng zhuan (Ch: Chinese, T50.2060) mentioned that there was no Sanskrit manuscript of the text available in the Tang (i.e. in the time of Daoxuan, the biographies’ compiler). It was Fei Changfang in Lidai sanbaoji (Chinese, T49.2034), a contemporary of Fajing, who attributed the translation of the text to Paramartha. For Zhang Taiyan, the fact that the text has two translations clearly indicates the existence of an original work, even if the original is missing. The reason the text was included in the category of suspicious scriptures in the Fajinglu does not refer to the texts’ authenticity, but to suspicions regarding the true identity of translators.33
Doctrinally, the situation is slightly more complicated. Although Zhang was generally sympathetic to the doctrine of the Awakening of Faith and found it to be doctrinally similar to Vasubandhu and Asanga’s point of view, he did acknowledged that they differ in terminology.34 In addition to the difference in vocabulary and terminology, Zhang also points out that there is a fundamental contradiction in the analogy of the ocean that is found in the Awakening of Faith. According to this well-known analogy, mind and ignorance are likened to the ocean its waves. The mind on its own is as quiet like a still ocean. Defiled thoughts, which are likened to the waves, are not the true nature of the mind, as they only arise when the winds of ignorance stir them. According to Zhang, this is a dualism that contradicts the monism that the text is trying to promote.35
Although, historically Zhang was the first to discuss the problematic nature of the Awakening of Faith, his essay did not receive much attention at the time. It took seven more years for the debate to reach a much wider audience in China, a development caused to a large extent by Ouyang Jingwu’s publication of the Expositions and Discussions of Vijnaptyimatra in 1922, in which Ouyang outlined his analysis of and critique against the text.
4.6.2 Ouyang Jingwu and the Awakening of Faith
Ouyang holds a unique place in the history of the debate over the Awakening of Faith in China. Applying evidential research methods, such as historical and philological analysis, Ouyang noticed discrepancies between the teaching of the Awakening of Faith and orthodox Yogacara texts such as the Yogacarabhumi sastra and the Cheng weishi lun. Although Zhang Taiyan was the first who wrote abut the Awakening of Faith in the context of the modern critique, it was Ouyang who turned the Awakening of Faith to the focus of debate over the nature and validity of Buddhism, as it developed in East Asia. This development -- no doubt closely related to critiques against the Awakening of Faith in Japan -– had a far-reaching effect on Chinese Buddhist orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Ouyang’s views in regard to the Awakening of Faith were severely criticized in more conservative circles and among Chinese Buddhists and were celebrated by his students and pushed forward to an even more radical conclusion.
Ouyang’s direct critique against the Awakening of Faith appeared in his Expositions and Discussions of Vijnaptyimatra, in his discussion on the notion of correct knowledge (Skt. samyagjñana Ch., Chinese) as a part of the five dharmas scheme. This scheme played an important role in the solution to the problem that Ouyang outlined, which hinges upon the correct understanding on the nature of those five dharmas.
What does he mean by correct knowledge in the five dharmas scheme? Ouyang opened his discussion with a quotation from the Yogacarabhumi sastra (the formula appears first in the Lankavatara sutra), which explains the meaning of the five. According to the Lankavatara and the Yogacarabhumi, the five dharmas are: (1) signs or Appearances (Skt. nimitta, Ch., Chinese), which the Yogacarabhumi explains as all the things (Skt. vastu Ch., Chinese) that discourses and theories (Chinese) are based on (Chinese);37 (2) names (Skt. nama, Ch., Chinese), which further describe verbalizations and categorizations in addition to that of the nimitta; (3) discriminatory conceptions or ideas (Skt. samkalpa, Ch., Chinese), which includes both the citta and caittas associated with the all phenomenal world,38 or the contaminated (sasrava) cittas; (4) correct knowledge (Skt. samyagjnana, Ch., Chinese), which includes both mundane and supramundane knowledge, and experiential wisdom (Chinese), as well as wisdom of the principles (Chinese); (5) suchness (Skt. tathata, Ch., Chinese), which is the state in which the principle of no-self is revealed, the holy teaching is actualized, and which differs from all the [things] that discourses and theories are based on.39
Ouyang then proceeds to talk about correct knowledge, which he saw as a crucial term that was distorted by the Awakening of Faith. For Ouyang, correct knowledge is that knowledge which perceives the object (Chinese) and can function as a cause (Chinese). Tathata or Suchness, on the other hand, “cannot be seeds, perfumer, or perfumed; it has nothing to do with such matters.”40 Here, Ouyang already breaks away from one of the most influential doctrines in East Asian schools of Buddhism, that which saw the “mind as suchness” (Chinese) and the “mind that arises and ceases” (Chinese) as two manifestations of one and the same mind, such that they are in fact identical, two sides of the same coin.41 For Ouyang, the two realms were irrecoverably isolated from one another. Suchness is beyond language and discursive thought and is called suchness [calling it suchness] is merely a “forced terminology expedient” (Chinese). Ouyang utilizes the formula of substance and function (ti (Chinese) and yong (Chinese)) to further explicate his idea. This language, as we will see below, has a long history in China and Ouyang used it in response to traditions later prevalent among Buddhists commentators in East Asia, who insisted that the two are inseparable. For Ouyang the substance equals suchness and the function equals correct knowledge. Ouyang understood the substance to be completely separated from function; the unattainable substance is manifested by the function (correct knowledge). In Ouyang’s words, the correct knowledge reveals (Chinese) the substance, but it is impossible to “see” (Chinese) suchness directly, since its meaning is concealed (Chinese).42
The second problem is that Buddhist thinkers, who followed the wrong interpretation of the Awakening of Faith, saw suchness as giving rise to the myriad dharmas. This is, according to Ouyang, a pitiful mistake that stems directly from the teachings of the Awakening of Faith.43 The position that suchness gives rise to dharmas met with resistance from most scholastic Buddhists from Ouyang’s milieu, and was subject to elaborate refutations by Ouyang’s successors.
As a scholastic, who was aware of the “Westernized” scholarly method popular in Japan and was trained in evidential research methods, Ouyang then turned to the history of the text to seek the historical context for such a flaw. Historically speaking Ouyang’s position is less radical than some. It was in line with Zhang Taiyan’s position and was soon rejected even by his own students such as Liang Qichao and Lü Cheng. Ouyang accepted the Indic origin of the text and its attribution to Asvaghosa. But he qualified this acceptance with the observation that Asvaghosa was originally a follower of the Hinayana, and he understood the Awakening of Faith as a product of Asvaghosa’s earlier Hinayana thinking. Ouyang then analyzed the history of sectarian Buddhism and reached the conclusion that “Asvaghosas’s position is similar to that of the Vibhajyavadins.44 According to Ouyang, “the Vibhajyavadins (Chinese) did not establish the notion of inherent seeds (Chinese). [They claim that] the mind is originally pure. When the mind is separated from defilements, its substance (Chinese) is pure and serves as the cause for the undefiled (Chinese), just as milk can become ghee because there is [already] the nature of ghee in milk. Thus, they (i.e. the Vibhajyavadins) take the substance [of the mind] as the function [of the mind]. [If] substance is mixed [with the nature of its function], then the function is lost.”45
Ouyang went on, in this same essay to attack the terminology used by the Awakening of Faith. The text, according to Ouyang, does not establish its argument based on the notion of seeds,46 either defiled or pure. Instead it relies on an unfounded (Chinese) notion of function that arises from permeation (Chinese). Here, Ouyang specified two problems with the Awakening of Faith. The first, as we will see below, is the author’s understanding (or lack thereof) of the notion of permeation and the second is his disregard of the theory of seeds.
Ouyang’s contention in regard to the notion of permeation is that if we take the Awakening of Faith’s understanding of the term, then the metaphor of the seeds –- and it is important to keep in mind that it is a metaphor only -- loses its meaning. We should therefore define our terms clearly. What, then, is permeation? He says:
“Permeation” (Skt. vasana Ch., Chinese) [takes its] meaning [from an] analogy to a garment in the ordinary world, which in fact has no fragrance [of its own], but which takes on the perfume of an incense when it is “smoked” [“perfumes”=”permeated”, xun] with the incense. In the case of garment and incense in the ordinary world, we can only speak of “perfumation” [“permeation”] [when they are present] at the same time and in the same place; [thus, similarly,] purity and defilement cannot mutually infuse one another, and in fact, ignorance and correct wisdom cannot be established at the same time. (…) If one is talking about inconceivable permeation that is different from the above [example of the garment]: then the permeation of the perfume of a worldly [garment] cannot serve as a [proper] example (Skt. drstanta Ch., Chinese). [Only if] the two (i.e. the garment and the perfume) are [originally] separated and later are connected, can the meaning of permeation [be established.] 47
The other problem Ouyang identifies in the Awakening of Faith is that it does not address the seeds theory. He discusses this problem as follows:
The mistake of the Awakening of Faith does not stop with the fallacy of not establishing the notion of permeation but also concerns not establishing the notions of correct knowledge and uncontaminated seeds. As a result, in terms of principle, the sense of function is lost; it is mistaken concerning the notion of function (Ù). In terms of [the Buddha’s] teaching, it contradicts the teachings of the Lankavatara sutra. It (i.e. the Awakening of Faith) also talks about the three subtle and six coarse marks as strung together (sequentially).48 As a result, in terms of principle, it is mistaken concerning the notion of difference [between the subtle and the coarse marks] and violates the teaching of the Samdhinirmocana sutra. The five dharmas in the Lankavatara sutra, which are discussed in terms of suchness and correct knowledge, emerge together. In the Awakening of Faith, there are no uncontaminated seeds, and suchness is able, on its own, to transcend defilements and become pure, which conflates correct knowledge and suchness into the same thing. This is an error [in understanding both] the substance as well as the function. The Samdhinirmocana sutra discusses the eight consciousnesses “horizontally” (i.e. treats them as independent of each other); hence they are able to operate simultaneously, since they [take each other as] simultaneous bases (Skt. sahabahutasraya Ch. (Chinese). Furthermore, each consciousness has [its own] seeds. The seeds give rise to (similar seeds) but do not hinder their mutual flourishing, since both the direct (Skt. hetu pratyaya Ch., Chinese) and auxiliary (Skt. adhipati pratyaya Ch., Chinese) causes operate as simultaneous bases. The Awakening of Faith [by contrast,] discusses the eight consciousnesses “vertically.” The three subtle and six coarse marks arise sequentially [and yet it appears] as if (Chinese) they all belong to the same kind of consciousness, so no differentiation can be established (by this reasoning)”49
Ouyang then concludes,
Investigated from both an historical and a doctrinal perspective, the Awakening of Faith's teaching is generally similar to that of the Vibhajyavadins in the respects [I have discussed]. Examined from the perspective of the correct principle of the highest teaching [i.e., Buddhism], the teaching of the Awakening of Faith is not completely accurate as those [other teachings I have discussed]. Those who carefully seek the Buddhadharma ought to carefully determine the rights and wrongs of the Awakening of Faith. But for more than a thousand years, it has been esteemed as the highest treasure; inferior people keep discussing it and, in doing so, mistake a fish’s eye for a pearl. It has confused people for a long time. Indeed, it is absolutely necessary that the right discernment be made! 50
Several points are worth noting here. Ouyang’s critique is both historical and doctrinal in nature. Going over his text, we can get a glimpse of his method, which includes historical verification, doctrinal analysis and careful attention to terminology.
His style is dialectical and follows the sastric literature that he promoted. He relies on Buddhist logic, and uses traditional arguments based on scriptural proofs (Skt. agama pramana Ch., Chinese) and logic (Skt. yukti Ch., Chinese). Buddhist logic never established a solid foot in China. Its practice almost disappeared completely in post-Tang China and, with the exception of a short attempt to revive it in the Ming.51 It only regained importance among scholastic circles during the twentieth century. Here again, Ouyang had a pioneering role in the promotion of the importance of Buddhist logic for intellectual discourse.
Although Ouyang was very likely aware of the debates regarding the provenance of the text in Japan,52 he was less concerned with the origin of the text than he was with its philosophical and doctrinal problems. As stated above, Ouyang accepted the authorship of Asvaghosa,53 but related the main historical problem to the fact that Asvaghosa was not a Mahayana follower. Ouyang identified Asvaghosa’s views as closer to those expressed by other early Buddhist schools, especially these of the so-called Vibhajyavada School. Rhetorically speaking, accusing the author of the text that was held as the “highest teaching” by Buddhists in China for the last millennium of being an adherent of the “Hinayana” was polemical enough. But Ouyang went further and called into question the doctrinal core of the text as well.
Doctrinally, Ouyang accused the author of the text of blurring the difference between correct knowledge and suchness. While Ouyang saw the two as separate the author of the Awakening of Faith saw them as similar. We have here two markedly different visions of Buddhist enlightenment and the way to attain it. For Ouyang, suchness is beyond grasp but is revealed through its function, which is correct knowledge. The Awakening of Faith, as Ouyang understood it, mixed the substance with the function in a way that turns suchness into a causative factor that gives rise to phenomena.
Ouyang also had a problem with terminology that was uncritically adopted from Yogacara texts. The seeds theory was ignored in the Awakening of Faith, and gave way to a discussion of an abstract version of permeation (function that arises from permeation, Chinese). In the Awakening of Faith, the metaphor of permeation loses its impact, as Ouyang explained the metaphor is contingent on the total separation of the “garment” (the mind) and the “perfume” (external causes and conditions). If there is no real distinction between substance qua suchness and function qua correct knowledge, function has no real role since substance (= suchness) can purify itself.