E.S. HOOFIEN in London did everything possible to assist Landauer in supplanting Sam Cohen. On July 26, he sent a cable to Heinrich Margulies, Tel Aviv manager ofthe Anglo-Palestine Bank, instructing Margulies to convince the German consul to rescind his endorsement of Sam Cohen. [1] Even as Hoofien was cabling Margulies in Jerusalem, however, Consul Wolff was traveling to Tel Aviv to speak with Hanotaiah and others about Sam Cohen's authority, whether Hanotaiah could indeed distribute RM 3 million worth of German goods, and whether Cohen's transfer plan was cashless. The Hanotaiah people answered Wolff as honestly as possible. First, Hanotaiah had no plans to distribute merchandise. Second, they had no plans to reimburse the emigrants with much cash once they arrived in Palestine. Major deductions would be made for construction materials, land, and other charges. [2] When the transaction was complete, the emigrant would possess little more than the land, some equipment, a farmhouse, and probably some sheds. These answers -- which substantiated the criticisms against Cohen -- were going to be hard to handle in the consul's report to Schmidt-Roelke.
Hoofien's July 26 cable to Margulies reached Margulies the next morning. Margulies immediately telephoned Consul Wolff, who agreed to discuss the situation. Margulies left Tel Aviv for the consulate at once. [3]
During the ninety-minute meeting, Wolff said that in March, Berlin expected to lose the boycott battle in Palestine. Sam Cohen changed all that by presenting his anti-boycott plan. Wolff added that Cohen was the first to suggest transfer ideas. After Hanotaiah received its first permission in mid- May, competitors came to the consulate to complain. Wolff said he answered them all the same way: "Why did you come so late? Somebody has outrun you." [4]
Now that Hanotaiah possessed the monopoly, warned Wolff, Palestinian competitors must not interfere. The consul called the crosscurrents against Cohen a dangerous game. Margulies answered that he represented the Anglo- Palestine Bank, not any group for or against Hanotaiah or Sam Cohen. The bank's position was that it did not understand how it had been suddenly dragged into the arrangement since it had no relationship with Cohen or Hanotaiah, and had never authorized Cohen to speak on its behalf. [5]
Wolff assured that Cohen had not spoken in the bank's name, but that Cohen did have a letter from the Zionist Organization stating his transfer deal would be under "national supervision." Also Ussischkin, head of the Jewish National Fund, had endowed Cohen with official authority to transfer JNF monies from Berlin to Palestine. So, asked Wolff, was this sudden declaration about the illegitimacy of Sam Cohen a mere "sting" against Cohen, or was the intent to disrupt the transfer itself? [6]
Margulies denied any negative intentions regarding Cohen or the transfer. He wanted to state only that Cohen had no connection with the bank, and the bank was therefore free to choose whether to join the transfer project or not. At this Consul Wolff asked why might the Anglo-Palestine Bank not participate? Margulies answered that the bank did not want to associate its good name in so vital an enterprise when the partner was a little private company, "which after all is not exactly the Deutsche Bank." Here Margulies sensed that Wolff was trying either to persuade him or at least to discover the real fiscal reasons behind Anglo-Palestine's hesitation. So Margulies allowed himself to be nudged in that direction. [7]
Wolff did as expected, explaining that he had concluded early on that the original RM 1 million permission granted to Cohen was too small: "I said to myself that in comparison to the big sums which are being mobilized for the Jews, one million marks is cat shit, and therefore I urged the sum to be increased." But with the new 3-million-mark ceiling, and unlimited renewals, what was the bank's objection? [8]
Margulies shot the demerits off in quick succession. A: Hanotaiah's financial capability was limited. B: Hanotaiah could not even guarantee proper land purchases. C. A transfer limited to plantation investments was unacceptable, especially since recent immigrants were learning such investments were risky. D. Hanotaiah could never generate enough plantation sales even to approach the RM 3 million figure. [9] Hence, whatever immigrants would be receiving in exchange for their blocked marks would be vastly inflated. [10]
Then Margulies talked plain politics. Whoever was going to traffic in great quantities of German goods, said Margulies, was exposing himself to the worst kind of public criticism before the whole world. The outcry would be too much for anyone private company. If the arrangement were under the aegis of official Zionist bodies, that outcry might be muffled. But even still, the protests might be so strong that official entities might also retreat from the project. [11]
Margulies then carefully shifted to a gentle threat that in view of the obstacles, only Anglo-Palestine could make the transfer work. In so many words, he declared that if the bank did withdraw, leaving only the German Temple Bank and Hanotaiah, the project would indeed be doomed. Wolff's facial expression changed as he comprehended Margulies' ultimatum. The consul became a bit threatening himself and said, "Then the prospects would be very pessimistic .... The Jews would not get out of Germany." [12]
This was a moment not for diplomats but for hard bargainers. Margulies put up a good front. He nonchalantly agreed yes, "prospects really are pessimistic." With that, Margulies said it was now up to the bank's board of directors to approve or disapprove Cohen's project, and in Margulies' personal opinion, the decision would be no. He would of course stay in touch with the consulate. [13]
Margulies hurried back to his office to type a full report to Hoofien. "I am now quite positive," Margulies wrote, "... that the Consul General ... has skillfully profited from circumstances, using Sam Cohen as a 'scab' to create a fait accompli, that is, before the Zionist institutions could decide whether they would tolerate any breach of the boycott." Wolff wanted to show Berlin how fast he could conquer the boycott in Palestine. Now that all sorts of problems had developed with the consul's choices, suggested Margulies, Wolff "does not want to let his men fall and thereby exchange them for the more bothersome and much less sure partnership of the [same] institutions" he sought to avoid in the first place. [14]
"We have made a great mistake in not getting in touch with the Consul earlier," Margulies told Hoofien. But, added Margulies, "I believe I can change the Consul's stand considerably .... He is urgently interested, and in Berlin they understand that such a key situation ... is worth far more than three million marks. If we do not want to let the whole thing fall or to fight it, and if we want instead to really attain a really 'reasonable' arrangement and to participate, then two things are necessary: you [Hoofien] must begin to act on this matter in Berlin; and I must negotiate here. The negotiations here are very important ... because if we show the Consul our readiness to cooperate, he would probably abandon his exclusive pro-Hanotaiah position." [15] Margulies raced to make the airmail bag to London and then cabled a distilled version of his letter to Hoofien just in case. [16] That done, Margulies called for an immediate conference with the Conference of Institutions which had authorized Cohen a month before.
Even as Margulies was typing his letter to Hoofien, Consul Wolff was preparing his report to Berlin. This was going to be complicated. He would have to tell the painful truth, but in such a way as to not make himself look either foolish, incompetent, or worse -- in league with Mr. Sam Cohen.
Wolff's July 27 report turned out to be a confusing review calculated to protect all his prior endorsements of Cohen, while carefully qualifying them to correspond to the newly known facts. The report began: "I have no reason for changing ... what I have said in previous reports." Wolff then admitted that Hanotaiah was indeed not the only settlement firm in Palestine, but added that Cohen was the first to suggest a plan and that the plan had been endorsed in writing by the Jewish Agency and other Zionist institutions. It was not until after Cohen secured his "monopoly-like agreement" that "Hanotaiah's competitors ... realized that they too should conclude an agreement." [17]
The consul then reaffirmed the need to stand by the Hanotaiah monopoly because "it places Sam Cohen in a position of exerting a calming influence upon boycott tendencies .... For instance in London, from where yesterday he sent me a telegram 'My work is progressing satisfactorily in London also.'" [18]
It was easy to paint Hanotaiah's critics as jealous competitors. But explaining away Cohen's intentions on reimbursements and his inability to distribute merchandise would be harder. Wolff's tactic was simply to leave some questions unanswered and confuse the issues with contradictory statements. For example, he readily conceded that emigrants would not receive their money immediately, but then asked why that was even relevant since the whole idea was to convert German Jewish deposits into agricultural wares. He similarly admitted that Hanotaiah was incapable of distributing general merchandise, but then asserted that Hanotaiah never was interested in such merchandise. Wolff then simply reaffirmed unswerving support for the Hanotaiah agreement, "even if it results in a monopoly."
Perhaps Consul Wolff thought he could pretend that the question of cash reimbursements was not really a valid issue. Perhaps he thought that his open acknowledgment of Hanotaiah's inability to deal in general merchandise would imply that Cohen might organize the merchandise distribution on his own outside Hanotaiah proper. The fact that Wolff followed his candid admissions with a staunch reinforcement of the Hanotaiah agreement strongly suggested to Berlin that the problems were no real obstacle to a successful transfer.
As for the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Wolff wrote that he sensed Hoofien was orchestrating the bank's withdrawal, which would obviously "make the transaction for the Jews more difficult." The consul related his warning to Margulies that withdrawal would only result in a total "cancellation of this and similar projects." [19] In other words, Wolff was advising transfer through Hanotaiah, or no transfer at all. Wolff added that if Jewish groups propagandize against Hanotaiah, "We should stifle this by clearly letting the Jewish Agency know that by sabotaging the Hanotaiah project, it will not smooth the way for other agreements." [20] Wolff's report summed up with a warning he expected the Foreign Ministry to pass on to Hartenstein: "By sabotaging the Hanotaiah plan the Jews would only cut offtheir noses to spite their faces by making further agreements impossible." [21]
Consul General Heinrich Wolff was the Third Reich's man in Palestine. He had been handling this question from the outset. He was the closest man to the Zionist political scene. Consul Wolff had openly admitted there were problems with the project, but insisted these problems should not be allowed to impede the agreement. There was no other authority on Palestinian affairs the Foreign Ministry could turn to. Howsoever problematic his advice seemed to be, Consul Wolff was to be relied on. Schmidt-Roelke could make no other decision.
Mr. Sam Cohen and Hanotaiah Ltd. would remain in full control of the transfer.
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1G_small.gif)
The April First anti-Jewish boycott (Courtesy of the National Archives)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1H_small.gif)
Jewish War Veterans picketing a store selling German goods. (Courtesy of Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1I_small.gif)
Colonel Morris Mendelsohn (Courtesy of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1J_small.gif)
Thousands turned out for the Jewish War Veterans' March 23, 1933, anti-Nazi parade, inaugurating the boycott against Hitler. (Courtesy of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1K_small.gif)
Rabbi M.S. Margolies steps to the microphone to chant a prayer for God's intervention during the March 27, 1933, Madison Square Garden protest rally. The chant was broadcast around the world. (Courtesy of the National Archives)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1L_small.gif)
Stephen Wise addressing a protest rally at Battery Park, May 10, 1933. (Courtesy of the American Jewish Congress)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1M_small.gif)
Bishop Francis T. McConnell (left) and Stephen Wise (right) lead interfaith protest at Madison Square Garden rally. (Courtesy of the National Archives)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1N_small.gif)
The May 10, 1933, protest sent a clear message to the Third Reich. (Courtesy of the American Jewish Congress)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1O_small.gif)
Georg Landauer, director of the German Zionist Federation, worked for an emigration agreement between the Third Reich and the Zionist Organization. (Courtesy of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1P_small.gif)
Siegfried Moses, president of the German Zionist Federation, helped Sam Cohen gain entry to negotiate a private agreement with the Reich. (Courtesy of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1Q_small.gif)
Historic King David Hotel luncheon held with Chaim Weizmann, Chaim Arlosorofl (front row, fourth and fifth from left), and Arab leaders, April 8, 1933. (Courtesy of the Central Zionist Archives)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1R_small.gif)
E.S. Hoofien's nervously scribbled notes from the Hotel Steiner lobby while waiting to be questioned about the Transfer Agreement before the Political Committee at the 18th Zionist Congress.
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1S_small.gif)
Note passed to Hoofien during questioning before the Political Committee at the 18th Zionist Congress.
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1T_small.gif)
Arthur Ruppin (middle) and Georg Landauer (right) attend a meeting of a Palestine School for recently transferred German Jewish children, circa 1935. (Courtesy of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1U_small.gif)
Mr. Sam Cohen (Courtesy of Esther Aharony private collection)
![Image](http://www.rapeutation.com/transferagreementcov.1V_small.gif)
Chaim Ariosoroff (Courtesy of the Central Zionist Archives)
Late in the afternoon, July 27, 1933, as Consul Wolff was reinforcing Cohen's credibility, Heinrich Margulies was continuing his campaign to debunk Cohen once and for all. Margulies went to the Conference of Institutions. Although Landauer, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, and Yakhin had renounced Cohen, the Conference's authority was still intact. Since the Conference included all the key commercial associations plus the Organization of German Immigrants, their endorsement was still a mighty one. Its members were interested primarily in trade with Germany. And Hanotaiah and Cohen had promised to bring plenty of it under the most advantageous financial conditions. In fact, since the merchandise was actually being paid for in Germany from blocked emigrant accounts, all sorts of lenient payment forms could be arranged. However, Margulies was able to convince the businessmen that whatever commercial benefits and windfalls they hoped to realize from the transfer would be wholly endangered if the project were controlled by Hanotaiah, a private concern that was truly in competition with all the business entities present. [22]
A member of the Organization of German Immigrants, Mr. Ney, conceded that his group had been rethinking the Hanotaiah plan. A special Organization subcommittee had adopted an alternative plan, which Ney read aloud. It involved founding a tiny corporation of ambiguous purpose that, like Hanotaiah, would transfer assets by merchandise. Ney at first claimed the emigrants would be reimbursed. Not with money, though, but with some sort of nonmarketable investments in new companies. The conferees quickly saw this as just another version of Hanotaiah's plan, but instead of giving emigrants inflated property, they would be given shares in perhaps worthless companies. The undisguised pilferage was so transparent to the businessmen gathered and to Ney himself that Ney actually became embarrassed over the scheme. Ney withdrew the proposals, which Margulies termed "grotesque," just minutes after they were introduced. [23]
Ney's scandalous proposal was strong proof that only a proper trust company, supervised and controlled by the Anglo-Palestine Bank, would deliver the benefits of transfer without abusing the interests of the German Jews. Neither Mr. Sam Cohen, Hanotaiah Ltd., or any other private entity could be trusted -- only the Anglo-Palestine Bank.
Just after Margulies left the conference session, he cabled Hoofien in London: "RESOLUTION CONFERENCE ... BANK SHALL UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES ACCEPT ACTING AS AGENT WITH OR WITHOUT HANOTAIAH TEMPLE BANK STOP SECONDLY ASK YOU INTERVENE BERLIN VIEW CONTINUATION ALL TRANSACTIONS WITH BANK STOP THIRDLY ASKED ME CONTINUE CONCENTRATING WITH CONSUL GENERAL STOP PLEASE INSTRUCT ME INFORM CONSUL ... ONLY CONFERENCE PLUS BANK SHALL BE AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATE." [24]
Hoofien's response was immediate. "INFORM CONFERENCE BANK PREPARED TO ACT STOP YOU MAY INFORM CONSUL ACCORDING YOUR CABLE." [25]
On July 28, Margulies also tried to bring the Jewish Agency to the anti- Cohen team. On July 17, the Conference of Institutions had cautiously approached the Jewish Agency with a copy of the Conference's resolutions on trade with Germany. The object then was to secure the Agency's sanction. But the Jewish Agency had refused at the time, undoubtedly reacting to the Conference's usurping its authority. Now Margulies was asking the Agency -- in the name of the bank that was itself owned by the Zionist Organization -- to specifically authorize the Conference of Institutions as the sole legitimate negotiator of the transfer. Margulies also wanted the Agency to notify Consul Wolff that Sam Cohen was indeed not acting on its behalf. For compelling evidence, Margulies presented copies of Landauer's original July 19 transfer memorandum, and various letters and cables illustrating that the problem almost entirely revolved around Sam Cohen. The Jewish Agency promised a quick answer. [26]
That same day, July 28, Margulies received in the mail a copy of Landauer's July 21 letter to Hoofien describing the shock he received at Hartenstein's office when he learned of Sam Cohen's new deal. The letter quoted the Hartenstein-Landauer dialogue almost verbatim. It was now clearer than ever to Margulies that the day would be won or lost on the word of Consul Wolff. Margulies sent another note to Hoofien, acknowledging receipt of the Landauer letter and indicating he could now see "that the matter is coming to a head." He told Hoofien he would go back to Consul Wolff to "emphasize more strongly the removal of Sam Cohen-Hanotaiah than I did yesterday, when I was forced to restrain myself." Margulies explained that his tactic would focus on Wolff's false or at least misunderstood endorsements of Cohen -- endorsements "he was now obligated to correct, either of his own volition or in reply to a request for confirmation which the Reich Foreign Ministry would send him." [27]
Margulies, at that moment, was unaware that Wolff had already replied to the Foreign Ministry's request for confirmation, retreating not an inch in his support for Cohen. Nonetheless, Margulies dispatched to Wolff a copy of Landauer's July 19 memorandum, with a short cover note identifying it as the "official" memorandum of the ZVtD. [28]
Then, in a longer letter to Wolff written that day, Margulies suggested that Wolff's exaggerated endorsements of Cohen were about to be unpleasantly exposed. Margulies explained how he had just received a report about the actual conversation between Hartenstein and Landauer, including Hartenstein's request that the Foreign Ministry obtain a "confirmation from the German Consul ... about the authorization of Mr. Sam Cohen." [29]
Margulies was letting Wolff know that he was aware that Berlin was doubting Wolff's original words. Margulies' July 28 letter went right to that issue: "On the basis of our talk yesterday, I was pleased to notice that Mr. Sam Cohen had not declared to you at all that he was the representative ... of our bank, or any other central national institution. It seems to me, then, that the gentlemen at the Reich Economics Ministry have misunderstood your recommendation of Mr. Sam Cohen, and after the explanations which I have received from you, and vice versa, I suppose that you yourself will initiate the correction of this misunderstanding." [30]
Margulies' July 28 letter repeatedly reminded that without the Anglo- Palestine Bank, no goods would be sold, the project would not be trusted by the people, and the entire transfer "would have such minimal chances of succeeding" that German emigrants would have to be advised not to work through Hanotaiah. [31]
Margulies hoped to be sufficiently threatening to compel-Consul Wolff to rescind his recommendation of Sam Cohen lest he endanger Germany's interest and his own credibility. But the suggestion of embarrassment to Consul Wolff, and the promise of a foreign policy and trade fiasco for Germany were all conveyed with cordial language and roundabout phrasing. No threats are taken so seriously as those spoken with a smile. Margulies was smiling in every sentence.
He ended his polite missive: "And you, my very esteemed Consul General ... understand that in this case the unexpectabilities can play a very great role. And these unexpectabilities lay not so much in the hands of those who deposit their money in Germany, but are in the hands of those who must sell the merchandise here.'" Margulies then put Wolff on notice that the Conference of Institutions would soon present a plan for a unified transfer scheme. After presentment they expected the consul to renounce the Hanotaiah plan and endorse the new group. [32]
On July 28, while Margulies was keeping up the pressure on Consul Wolff in Jerusalem, E. S. Hoofien of the Anglo-Palestine Bank in London was planning his strategy for intervening in Berlin. Hoofien was studying the problem when he received a visit from two men: Moshe Mechnes and Mr. Sam Cohen. The Hanotaiah co-owners wanted to discuss details of their transfer, which was to be funneled through an account at the Anglo-Palestine Bank. Hoofien asked them to sit down, and the conversation went right to the conflict. [33]
Wasting no words, Hoofien told them he harbored the greatest apprehensions about Hanotaiah's recent arrangement with the Reich Economics Ministry. [34]
It would have to be reversed. If Hanotaiah would not reverse it of their own accord, the Palestinian community and the Anglo-Palestine Bank would reverse it for them. The logic was simple. If Landauer's ZVtD specifically recommended against the Hanotaiah method of transfer, German Jews would never participate. German Jews wanted a safe and reliable transfer. The least hint of instability would scare them off. Of course, many Jews would prefer the financial risk of transfer via Hanotiah to the physical risk of remaining in Germany. But even these assets would not be usable by Hanotaiah. In order to extract the value of blocked assets, Hanotaiah and/or Sam Cohen would have to sell the merchandise in Palestine. This would never happen. With the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Yakhin, and the Conference of Institutions abstaining from the whole operation, Cohen's transfer would become untouchable. The goods would be boycotted either because they were of German origin or because they represented an outlawed commercial treaty. The Germans would drop the unworkable project and surely rule out any future dealings with Hanotaiah or Sam Cohen, and for that matter with Zionists altogether.
Hoofien, in essence, told Hanotaiah on July 28 that they were the proud possessors of a worthless, exclusive deal, but that there could be a compromise. He conceded that Hanotaiah had every right to conduct its plantation business, but no right to acquire a monopoly. Furthermore, Hanotaiah should not sell merchandise, nor should it be the controlling factor in the transfer with reimbursement to emigrants at its own discretion. Hoofien's compromise was this: First, the Anglo-Palestine Bank would establish a transfer account for Hanotaiah Ltd., but it would be an ordinary account, with the bank assuming no responsibility and stating so openly. Second, the funds processed through the account could pay only for land and agricultural wares -- no general merchandise. Third, Hanotaiah would get no monopoly; the bank would grant identical privileges to competitive plantation companies. Fourth, Hanotaiah must "stick to its role as a plantation company." [35]
Cohen was hearing an ultimatum and it was coming from a bank that embodied the authority of the Zionist Organization. This was a moment of hard choices. All of nothing, or part of something.
Cohen chose something. Mechnes approved. They then handed Hoofien the July 18 transfer decree and asked him to propose any amendments he felt proper. They would return to Berlin and ask the Economics Ministry to ratify the changes. [36]
Mr. Sam Cohen had finally agreed to withdraw. There was no need for recriminations, no need for explanations about all the previous reversals and intrigues. That was all past. Call it bad communications. What was important now was Cohen's pledge to withdraw -- spoken before his partner Mechnes and the head of the Anglo-Palestine Bank with no further possibilities for misunderstandings.
All that remained was for Consul Wolff to switch his recommendation to the new trust company of the Anglo-Palestine Bank and the Conference of Institutions. Margulies was doing everything possible with the consul himself. Hoofien would work on Schmidt-Roelke.
An interagency correspondence was dictated by Hoofien from Anglo- Palestine Bank's London office to Landauer at the ZVfD. This rendered the impression that the two entities regularly coordinated on projects and communicated informally. While the note was addressed to the ZVtD, it was wholly intended for the eyes of Schmidt-Roelke. [37]
Hoofien's correspondence stated, "During the last few days I have heard from you as well as from Mr. Sam Cohen that ... the Reich Economics Ministry will approve certain procedures for transfer of Jewish capital to Palestine ... in such a manner that our bank is to open an account with the Reichsbank into which funds for the credit of Hanotaiah are to be deposited. I have thereupon immediately expressed my surprise to you over ... a linkage between our bank and Hanotaiah without our bank having been consulted." [38]
The note admitted that Hoofien had asked his mangers in Palestine to check on Sam Cohen's activities, authorizations, and any accreditation he enjoyed with the German consul. "Today, I received a reply," Hoofien declared, "which stated -- similarly to the very information I received from Mr. Cohen -- that we had in no way authorized this, that furthermore, the official Jewish authorities had never authorized Mr. Cohen's actions, and that Mr. Cohen had never informed the Consulate General of either. However, the Consulate General has informed our office that it is firmly in favor of a monopoly for Hanotaiah." [39]
Rejecting Consul Wolff's warnings, the correspondence first cited Wolff's words: ''As the Consul General puts it, if we opt out, the matter will proceed without us, with only Hanotaiah and the Temple Bank participating." Hoofien then did just that -- he opted out. He explained, "Hanotaiah is a plantation company and nothing else. Nor is it the only one .... To appoint Hanotaiah as a central point for Palestinian imports from Germany ... would be ... giving it an impossible task. If we were to state that funds are deposited in our account with the Reichsbank and we were therefore participants in the transfer operation, we assume a moral obligation to the German public which we are not prepared to undertake. Will you therefore be good enough to inform the Reich Economics Ministry that we regret to be unable to participate in the arrangement described in the letter of July 18." [40]
After opting out, Hoofien pointed out, "The possibility appears to remain open that the operation be implemented without our participation, as the Consul General in Jerusalem has indicated ... but I doubt very much that it would amount to very much if the German and the Palestinian public finds out that we had seen fit to decline." [41]
As he did with Mechnes and Cohen, Hoofien gave the Reich a respectable way out. He related the entire conversation with Cohen and Mechnes that day, including his offer of working with Hanotaiah so long as they limited their involvement to plantation activities, garnered no monopoly and subordinated to the bank's trust company. Hoofien asserted that both Cohen and Mechnes "told me they are prepared to comply with our wishes in every respect" and willing to ask the Reich to adopt whatever amendments Hoofien felt correct. [42]
What would be correct? "I am prepared to establish in Palestine an agency for handling exports from Germany and to come to an appropriate agreement with the Reich Economics Ministry, if you [Landauer] tell me that the Economics Ministry desires this. I would be prepared to travel to Berlin for that purpose." Hoofien added that just as he was dictating the correspondence, he received another cable from the Conference of Institutions. The Jewish Agency had joined forces with the Conference, thus unifying Zionist support for the Anglo-Palestine Bank's efforts. [43]
Hoofien explained that the Conference "speaks with authority. It is composed of representatives of all leading Jewish authorities ... [and it] informs me it will ask the Consulate ... to consider the Conference along with our bank as the sole representatives of Jewish authorities in Palestine." [44] Hoofien's point: The Anglo-Palestine Bank, the pivotal financial institution, and the Conference of Institutions representing all the important commercial and political entities, all wanted the Hanotaiah agreement changed. Even Mr. Sam Cohen and Hanotaiah now wanted the agreement changed.
Only one man now stood in the way of doing the correct thing. That man was Consul General Heinrich Wolff. Hoofien put the burden on the consul, stating that once the Jewish delegation presented its bona fide authority, "it will of course be up to the Consulate General whether it will comply with this request." He added that if Consul Wolff truly understood the powers represented by the Conference of Institutions, "he will hardly fail to do so." [45]
Hoofien's correspondence to Landauer intended for Schmidt-Roelke was received at the ZVfD's Berlin office on July 31, 1933. Landauer promptly delivered it to Schmidt-Roelke's office with a note attached: "Herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me from London by the Director of the Anglo- Palestine Bank, Mr. S. Hoofien .... While this letter is written in the style of an interagency correspondence, it contains some important information which I do not wish to fail to bring to your attention." Landauer promised to telephone later. [46]
Schmidt-Roelke was confronted that day, July 31, with a thicket of reports, memoranda, and cables about whether Sam Cohen was the man the Third Reich thought he was. But Consul Wolff, the Reich's man on the scene, had investigated all the charges. Wolff reported simple business jealousy as the basis for the sudden criticisms. He recommended in the strongest terms that the Reich honor the Hanotaiah agreement and ignore the criticism. Whatever shortcomings were implicit in the plan would in time be overcome.
But now the head of the Anglo-Palestine Bank himself had written that Wolff had misstated the facts about Cohen. If Cohen himself agreed that the consul had misunderstood Cohen's authority, that would surely settle the matter. Without Cohen's clarification, there was virtually no way to decipher who was correct.
Clearly, the only solution was to bring Cohen and Landauer together with other interested parties to discuss the issue face to face. Schmidt-Roelke instructed one of his key subordinates, Dr. Eberl, to contact Cohen in London, apprise him of the conflicting information and Hoofien's statement that Cohen had voluntarily withdrawn from the transfer. [47] Dr. Eberl's July 31 communication to Cohen, including the full text of the July 28 Hoofien letter, arrived in London the next day.
Late on August I, Sam Cohen wrote back to clarify all questions. "My Esteemed Dr. Eberl: I am addressing this letter to you because you have conducted all negotiations with me and are fully familiar with the subject matter. I have for more than 3-1/2 months spent my entire energies, my capabilities, my intentions, and my influence preparing the groundwork for my project in Palestine. I have worked with equal intensity on the implementation of this project in Prague, Amsterdam, and London. All the influence and connections that I was able to muster and which were accessible to me have made it possible for me to bring this project to fruition despite great obstacles. [ 48]
"Without the Hanotaiah group in Palestine," he continued, "including the farmers, the cooperative societies, industrialists, and merchants, it would never have been possible to find interest for the project. All appropriate authorities in Palestine and London have approved of my project. This purely personal success is begrudged me by dirty competitors and their henchmen. The competition has used every means at its command to destroy the project. Anything they could not accomplish by countervailing arguments and objective proof they tried to do by slander." [49]
If there was any doubt in the Foreign Ministry's mind about Cohen withdrawing from the transfer, or admitting Hanotaiah's inability to execute the merchandise sales, or his willingness to subordinate to the Anglo-Palestine Bank, the next sentences settled the question. Cohen's words: "No objective arguments are possible against my project and against Hanotaiah; it is the only company in the country which can, with my help and collaboration, implement this contract. No bank is necessary for its implementation. Hanotaiah has sufficient capital to do so.... Success is absolutely guaranteed." [50]
Cohen added: "Mr. Hoofien has told me in so many words that he had no intention whatever to destroy this agreement and that he had no objection to it whatsoever. The only reason for his writing that letter [of July 28] to Dr. Landauer was the latter's statement that he could obtain a better agreement. Mr. Hoofien told me that he would assume no responsibility for a possible cancellation of this agreement and that he would charge Dr. Landauer with that responsibility." [51] These were potentially deadly words against Georg Landauer, a German Jew, a man who had stood before the Reich and promised to frustrate-in fact, defy -- economic decrees designed to stimulate employment, break the boycott, and achieve Nazi goals.
At that moment nothing was easier in Nazi Germany than denouncing a Jew for economic sabotage. Such a denunciation -- justified or not -- usually resulted in immediate detention in Dachau without trial. Many such detainees were never heard from again. It was Landauer's good fortune that Schmidt-Roelke was an old-school statesman from the Weimar days. Had Cohen's words been read by an NSDAP kommissar, they would not have been glossed over.
Cohen reminded the Reich of his transfer's central usefulness to them -- the sabotage of the anti-Nazi boycott that was threatening to crack Germany that winter. Cohen's words: "Personally, I wish to emphasize that without the Hanotaiah group and without my intensive efforts and work, it would be impossible to sell any significant amount of merchandise in Palestine during the next six months. I have made my services in their entirety available to you and to the Reich Economics Ministry for the next six months." [52]
Cohen could have hardly been more explicit. Hanotaiah's transfer bore no time limits, no financial ceilings, and indeed was structured to accommodate emigrants for years to come. But both sides knew there would not be years of fruitful transactions if the Reich could not survive the coming winter-"the next six months." As usual, Mr. Sam Cohen selected his words carefully, and emphasized them only with good reason.
Defenses, denials, and derogations recorded, Cohen, however, declined Eberl's invitation to meet with Landauer. [53] It is unclear whether Sam Cohen was actually afraid to return to Germany. He had continually assured the Foreign Ministry he would be available to come to Berlin from London during this period if questions arose. Now at this pressing moment, however, he refused to sit down with Landauer, and claimed to be preoccupied, presumably with transfer and anti-boycott business. "If it were not for the fact that I am presently engaged in negotiations in London in that matter which cannot be postponed," Cohen wrote Dr. Eberl, "I would have come to Berlin for further personal discussions." [54]
Cohen amplified slightly on these pressing London meetings. He claimed they involved Pinchas Rutenberg, who after "long and difficult negotiations" was won over "for my project .... He is the single most influential industrialist and could become one of the largest consumers [of German machinery]. Tomorrow I am to negotiate with Tel Aviv's deputy mayor and hope to enlist him in my plans also." [55] Cohen's correspondence rarely lacked the power of important names and pending breakthroughs. This correspondence was no different.
There is no way to know why Cohen refused to meet with Landauer, but Cohen did write that Moshe Mechnes would be in Berlin and could be called upon for any further meetings. [56] Hence, the decisive confrontation Schmidt- Roelke had hoped for would not materialize. Nonetheless, one more final negotiating session in Hartenstein's office would be needed to resolve somehow the question of who should take possession of the transfer and on what terms. A date was set: August 7, 1933.