A/79/384: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese - Genocide as colonial erasure
by Francesca Albanese
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967
01 October 2024
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/ffa62 ... 427968.pdf
Summary
In the present report, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, examines the unfolding horrors in the occupied Palestinian territory. While the wholesale destruction of Gaza continues unabated, other parts of the land have not been spared. The violence that Israel has unleashed against the Palestinians post-7 October is not happening in a vacuum, but is part of a long-term intentional, systematic, State- organized forced displacement and replacement of the Palestinians. This trajectory risks causing irreparable prejudice to the very existence of the Palestinian people in Palestine. Member States must intervene now to prevent new atrocities that will further scar human history.
U.N. Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese Report
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A/79/384
United Nations
General Assembly
Distr.: General
1 October 2024
Original: English
Seventy-ninth session
Item 71 (c) of the provisional agenda*
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967**
Note by the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 5/1.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese
Genocide as colonial erasure
I. Introduction
1. In March 2024, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Israel had committed acts of genocide in Gaza.1 In the present report, the Special Rapporteur expands the analysis of the post-7 October 2023 violence against Gaza, which has spread to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. She focuses on genocidal intent, contextualising the situation within a decades-long process of territorial expansion and ethnic cleansing aimed at liquidating the Palestinian presence in Palestine. She suggests that genocide should be seen as integral and instrumental to the aim of full Israeli colonization of Palestinian land while removing as many Palestinians as possible.
2. The present report is based on legal research and analysis, interviews with victims and witnesses, including in Jordan and Egypt, open-source information and input from experts and civil-society organizations. The Special Rapporteur, still refused access to the occupied Palestinian territory, stresses that Israel has no authority to bar fact-finding mechanisms from the territory that it illegally occupies. The persistent denial of access to United Nations mechanisms and investigators of the International Criminal Court (ICC) may constitute obstruction of justice, in defiance of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) order that Israel allow international investigators to enter Gaza and take measures to ensure the preservation of evidence.2
3. While the scale and nature of the ongoing Israeli assault against the Palestinians vary by area, the totality of the Israeli acts of destruction directed against the totality of the Palestinian people, with the aim of conquering the totality of the land of Palestine, is clearly identifiable. Patterns of violence against the group as a whole warrant the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) in order to cease, prevent and punish genocide in the whole of the occupied Palestinian territory.
II. Legal framework and developments
4. In the present report, the Special Rapporteur relies on the legal framework considered in previous reports,3 including international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law and customary international law, in particular the Genocide Convention and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, together with relevant legal developments and jurisprudence.
5. Two important legal developments informed the present report. First, in its Advisory Opinion of July 2024, ICJ declared the prolonged presence of Israel in the whole of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including its colony regime,4 as unlawful5 and aimed at annexation.6 It stated that Israeli annexation was designed to be permanent, creating “irreversible effects on the ground”,7 “undermin[ing] the integrity of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”8 and seeking to “acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory”.9
6. The Court recognized the violation of non-derogable norms prohibiting territorial acquisition by force,10 racial segregation and apartheid,11 and protecting the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people,12 concluding that the occupation constitutes an act of aggression, in all but name, deriving in part from its settler-colonial nature.13 It stressed the obligation to rapidly end the occupation, dismantle and evacuate the colonies, provide full reparation to Palestinian victims and allow the return of Palestinians displaced since 1967.14
7. Expanding on the Wall opinion,15 the Court rejected arguments that Israeli “security concerns” justify the occupation.16 The declared unlawfulness of the occupation vitiates claims of purported self-defence; the only lawful recourse available to Israel is its unconditional withdrawal from the whole of that territory.
8. Second, in South Africa v. Israel, the Court ordered provisional measures to prevent and/or stop acts of genocide.17 After recognizing, in January 2024, the existence of a “real and imminent risk [of] irreparable prejudice” to the rights of the Palestinians in Gaza under the Genocide Convention, the Court instructed Israel to “prevent the commission of all acts” outlined in the Convention.18 In March, the Court took notice of the worsening humanitarian crisis,19 and in May, recognizing an “exceptionally grave” risk in Rafah, it ordered Israel to “immediately halt its military offensive”.20 Despite this, Israel, and most other States, continue to disregard such orders,21 with arms continuing to flow to Israel.22
III. The unfolding genocide as a “means to an end”
9. On 14 October 2023, after Israel ordered 1.1 million Palestinians to move south from northern Gaza in 24 hours – “one of the fastest mass displacements in history”23 – the Special Rapporteur warned of the risk of deliberate mass ethnic cleansing.24 This proved prescient. At least 90 per cent of Palestinians in Gaza have now been forcibly displaced – many more than 10 times25 – amid calls from Israeli officials and others for Palestinians to leave and Israelis to “return to Gaza” and rebuild the colonies dismantled in 2005.26
10. Meanwhile, violence has spread beyond Gaza, with Israeli forces and violent settlers having escalated patterns of ethnic cleansing and apartheid in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.27
11. High-ranking Israeli officials, ministers and religious leaders continue to encourage erasure and dispossession of Palestinians, setting new thresholds for acceptable violence against civilians. The Nakba, which has been ongoing since 1948, has been deliberately accelerated.28
12. In the following sections, the Special Rapporteur examines critical developments on the ground, highlighting patterns of conduct that evidence an intent to employ genocidal acts as a means to ethnically cleanse all or parts of the occupied Palestinian territory.
A. Failure to cease and punish genocide in Gaza
13. Since the previous report of the Special Rapporteur (A/78/545), and despite the ICJ interventions, genocidal acts have proliferated. Nearly a year of scorched-earth assault has led to the calculated destruction of Gaza: the human, material and environmental cost is unquantifiable.29
14. Since March 2024, Israel has killed 10,037 Palestinians and injured 21,767, with more than 93 massacres, bringing the reported totals to nearly 42,000 and 96,000 respectively, although figures from reliable sources are incomplete and may understate the magnitude of the casualties.30 Aid distribution sites,31 tents,32 hospitals,33 schools34 and markets35 have been repeatedly attacked through the indiscriminate use of aerial and sniper fire. At least 13,000 children, including more than 700 babies,36 have been killed, many shot in the head and chest.37 Approximately 22,500 Palestinians have sustained life-changing injuries.38 By May, a further 10,000 people were estimated to be buried under the rubble,39 including 4,000 children;40 the voices of those trapped and dying are often audible. An uncertain number are forcibly disappeared by Israeli forces.41
15. The magnitude of destruction in Gaza has prompted allegations of domicide,42 urbicide,43 scholasticide,44 medicide,45 cultural genocide46 and ecocide.47 Nearly 40 million tons of debris, including unexploded ordnance and human remains,48 contaminate the ecosystem.49 More than 140 temporary waste sites50 and 340,000 tons of waste,51 untreated wastewater and sewage overflow52 contribute to the spread of diseases such as hepatitis A,53 respiratory infections,54 diarrhoea and skin diseases.55 As Israeli leaders promised, Gaza has been made unfit for human life.56
16. Continued bombardment of evacuees in purportedly designated “safe zones”57 has continued to create hardship, terror and death.58 Displaced people have been systematically chased down and targeted in shelters, including in United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools, 70 per cent of which Israel has repeatedly attacked.59 The Rafah offensive in May caused more than 3,500 direct deaths60 and new displacement of almost 1 million Palestinians to uninhabitable wastelands of rubble, sewage and decomposing bodies.61
17. According to satellite imagery and other sources, Israeli soldiers have built roads and military bases in more than 26 per cent of Gaza, suggesting the aim of a permanent presence.62 The Israeli military expanded the “buffer zone” along the Gaza perimeter to 16 per cent of the territory, flattening homes, apartment blocks and agricultural farms.63 By August 2024, repeated evacuation orders over approximately 84 per cent of Gaza64 had corralled the majority of the population into a shrinking, unsafe “humanitarian zone” covering 12.6 per cent65 of a territory now reconfigured in preparation for annexation.66 In early September, two ministers of the Government of Israel openly called for the conquest and annexation of significant areas of Gaza.67
18. Israel has continued to use “medical shielding” arguments to target healthcare facilities.68 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 300 days, 32 out of 36 hospitals were damaged, with 20 hospitals and 70 out of 119 primary healthcare centres incapacitated.69 By 20 August, Israel had attacked healthcare facilities 492 times.70 From 18 March to 1 April, Israeli forces again laid siege to Al-Shifa Hospital, killing more than 400 and detaining 300 people, including doctors, patients, displaced persons and civil servants.71 On 26 August, following mass expulsion orders in Deir al-Balah, where 1 million Palestinians were sheltering, Israeli forces compelled the evacuation of all but 100 of 650 patients in Al-Aqsa hospital.72 On 30 August, Israeli forces bombed a humanitarian truck bound for the Emirati hospital in Rafah, killing several aid workers.73
19. On 16 July 2024, WHO detected the first presence of poliovirus in 25 years – a direct consequence of the destruction of water and sewage systems, obstruction of aid and shelter overcrowding.74 By late August, a 10-month-old baby was partially paralysed by the disease.75 Despite the looming outbreak, Israel delayed vaccinations76 and attacked vaccination areas77 and a United Nations vaccination convoy.78 While humanitarian organizations called for a ceasefire, Israel issued the highest number of evacuation orders since 13 October 2023, targeting areas with the highest concentration of displaced Palestinians,79 forcing the United Nations to suspend humanitarian operations.80
20. Systematic attacks on Gaza food sovereignty indicate an intent to destroy its population through starvation.81 Israel has destroyed agricultural land82 and reservoirs83 and attacked distribution centres, coordination teams and aid convoys.84 Hungry crowds waiting for food have been massacred.85 Following constant evacuation orders and the Israeli takeover of the Rafah crossing,86 distribution of daily meals fell by 35 per cent from July to August 2024.87 In August, entry permits for humanitarian organizations nearly halved.88 Access to water has been restricted to a quarter of pre-7 October levels.89 Approximately 93 per cent of the agricultural, forestry and fishing economies has been destroyed;90 95 per cent of Palestinians face high levels of acute food insecurity,91 and deprivation for decades to come.92
21. In August 2024, the Finance Minister of Israel, Bezalel Smotrich, stated that starving the entire Gaza population was “justified and moral”, even if 2 million people consequently died.93 In recent months, 83 per cent of food aid was prevented from entering Gaza,94 and the civilian police in Rafah were repeatedly targeted, impairing distribution.95 At least 34 deaths from malnutrition were recorded by 14 September 2024.96 At the time of writing, the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was evaluating a plan to block all food supplies to northern Gaza97 proposed by adviser Giora Eiland,98 who previously endorsed introducing epidemics as a military tactic.99 The killing of civilian police and clan leadership providing security for food distribution further compounded the crisis across Gaza.100 Starvation and deprivation tactics in the north have been particularly egregious.101
22. Palestinians have been systematically abused in a network of Israeli torture camps.102 Thousands have disappeared, many after being detained in appalling conditions, often bound to beds, blindfolded and in diapers, deprived of medical treatment and subjected to unsanitary conditions, starvation, torturous cuffing, severe beatings, electrocution and sexual assault by both humans and animals.103 At least 48 detainees have died in custody.104
23. Even when conservatively considered, these multiple torments constitute precisely the irreparable harm that ICJ has warned against since January 2024, and which Israel has intentionally inflicted on the Palestinians as a group.
B. Risk of genocide in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
24. The devastation inflicted on Gaza is now metastasizing to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In December 2023, the Defence Minister of Israel, Yoav Gallant, predicted that “when what the IDF did in Gaza becomes clear, that will also be projected on Judea and Samaria [West Bank]”.105
25. From 7 October 2023 to the end of September 2024, Israeli forces carried out more than 5,505 raids.106 Violent settlers, supported by Israeli forces and officials,107 conducted 1,084 attacks,108 killing more than 692 Palestinians – 10 times the previous 14 years’ annual average of 69 fatalities – and injuring 5,199.109
26. The pattern of targeting children is shocking. Since 7 October, 169 Palestinian children have been killed,110 nearly 80 per cent of whom were shot in the head or torso.111 This represents a 250 per cent increase on the previous nine months,112 totalling more than 20 per cent of children killed in the West Bank since 2000.113
27. Echoing the brutality that swept Gaza, Palestinians in the West Bank have been subjected to appalling detention practices,114 following orders by the National Security Minister of Israel, Itamar Ben-Gvir.115 A mass arrest campaign116 led to the detention of tens of thousands, with 9,400 currently detained.117 As in Gaza, many are academics, students, lawyers, journalists and human rights defenders,118 designated as “terrorists” or “national security threats”.119 Leaked videos and interviews with prison officials revealed intentional and systemic abuse and brutality, degradation, torture and even rape.120 At least 12 detainees from the West Bank died as a result of torture and denial of medical care.121
28. In November 2023, Bezalel Smotrich, “Governor of Judea and Samaria” and staunch advocate of colonization and mass expulsion,122 claimed that there are “2 million Nazis” in the West Bank.123 He then promised to turn several areas of the West Bank into a “pile of rubble like … [Gaza]”.124 On 18 August, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Israel Katz, called for the West Bank to receive the same treatment as Gaza.125
29. The northern West Bank has been the subject of particularly severe military violence.126 Protracted sieges,127 relentless raids128 and a major escalation since August 2024, including aerial bombardment,129 have wrought devastation.130 Forty-six drone and air strike operations131 killed 77 Palestinians, including 14 children.132 In Jenin camp approximately 180 homes were levelled and 3,800 structures damaged,133 destroying or damaging power supplies, public services and amenities,134 displacing thousands of families and causing widespread disruption.135 More than 181,000 Palestinians have been affected, many multiple times.136
30. On 27 August 2024, Israeli forces launched operation “Summer Camps” against Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tubas and Tulkarem, fulfilling the promise to treat the West Bank like Gaza.137 For days on end, thousands were placed under curfew, without food or water.138 Israeli forces targeted ambulances, blocked entrances to hospitals and laid siege to Jenin Hospital.139 Bulldozers destroyed streets and electricity and public health infrastructure.140 Hundreds lost their homes and property;141 more than 1,000 families in Jenin were displaced. 142 Thirty-six were killed, including eight children.143
31. Targeted attacks on the health sector have been replicated in the West Bank. Medical workers and infrastructure were attacked 538 times, killing 23 people and injuring 100 and damaging 54 medical facilities, 20 mobile clinics and 374 ambulances,144 while critical medical care was impeded.145 Permits for Palestinians to access medical care outside the West Bank sharply declined.146
32. On 29 May 2024, governance of the West Bank was officially transferred from military to civilian authorities – furthering de jure annexation – and placed under Bezalel Smotrich, a committed Eretz Yisrael politician.147 The largest single land appropriation in 30 years was then approved.148 Since 7 October, Israel has demolished, confiscated or ordered the demolition of more than 1,416 Palestinian structures, displacing more than 3,200 Palestinians, including approximately 1,400 children.149 At least 18 communities were depopulated under the threat of lethal force,150 effectively enabling the colonization of large tracts of Area C.151 This constitutes an escalation of unlawful conduct already found to be “aimed at dispersing the [Palestinian] population and undermining its integrity as a people”.152
33. The crippling of the economy is another existential threat. Amid extreme insecurity and fear, the suspension of financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority,153 the revocation of 148,000 work permits154 and severe movement restrictions, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the West Bank contracted by 22.7 per cent,155 nearly 30 per cent of businesses have closed, and 292,000 jobs have been lost.156
34. Genocidal conduct in Gaza set an ominous precedent for the West Bank. The deliberate strategy of Israel to render Palestinian life unsustainable has markedly intensified everywhere in the occupied Palestinian territory, with devastating consequences for Palestinian survival.
IV. Understanding the legal complexity and scope of genocidal intent
35. Following the harrowing experience of recent genocides in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and, plausibly, Myanmar,157 what constitutes genocide in law – the destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part, as such – has become better established.158 However, preventing and punishing genocide in practice, in particular proving genocidal intent, is still developing.159
36. The stigma attached to and the consequences of the crime of genocide often deter perpetrators from recording policies, plans and other indications of intent to carry it out (e.g. in writing).160 When direct evidence of intent is unavailable, inferring intent requires a complex assessment of facts, statements and circumstances.161 These factors should be borne in mind:
(a) While recognizing the possible composite nature of genocide is critical to its identification and prevention, the compartmentalization of the conduct into its disparate acts without recourse to broader context can obscure the requisite genocidal intent;
(b) Aside from the five acts that may constitute genocidal conduct, other acts can be indicative of genocidal intent;162
(c) The existing jurisprudence has arisen primarily from the criminal prosecution of individuals;163 this can limit the early recognition of broader State responsibility for genocide, which is crucial to its prevention.
37. Understanding how the intent to destroy manifests – its relationship to the prescribed genocidal acts and the nature and scale of atrocities – is key when identifying conduct that could constitute evidence of genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference.
38. In the following sections, the Special Rapporteur briefly outlines how relevant jurisprudence, analysed in abstracto, is fully capable of capturing genocidal intent in State conduct when a comprehensive interpretative approach is adopted.
A. Considering the plurality of facts, circumstances and conduct
39. The magnitude and complexity of the crime of genocide require close analysis of the genocidal conduct as a whole,164 properly situated in its broader context.165 Due consideration should be given to:
• The destruction caused by the nature and scale of atrocities166
• The fog of war167
• Claims to retribution or alternative motives168
• The opportunity to commit genocide169
40. In international practice, the same facts can form the basis of multiple charges (and constitute a war crime or crime against humanity and an act of genocide).170 When determining genocidal intent, it is critical to assess “whether all of the evidence, taken together, demonstrate[s] a genocidal mental state”.171
41. As observed by Judge Trindade in Croatia v. Serbia, an “onslaught of civilians” is not merely a “plurality of common crimes”, but rather a “plurality of atrocities, which, in itself, by its extreme violence and devastation, can disclose the intent to destroy”.172 The focus should be on whether all the acts – e.g. starvation, torture, killing, forced displacement, extermination – considered together in their totality form a pattern of conduct indicative of genocidal intent.173
B. Singularity of intent: destroying “a group” “as such”
42. In proving intent to destroy the group, all relevant factors must be examined holistically. Jurisprudence on genocidal intent is typically focused on “physical or biological destruction” of the group.174 The fact that the Genocide Convention was drafted when colonialism still played a significant role in international relations, and the vivid horror of the Holocaust’s industrial-scale extermination, may account for the focus on physical and biological destruction over social and cultural factors.175 However, genocide is not a crime only of mass killing, as specified in the Convention itself.176 The genocidal act of “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”, for example, entails no killing at all.177
43. Genocide is more structurally complex and insidious, and therefore more difficult to ascertain than crimes such as mass killing or extermination. A wider lens is required to identify the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part as such. International jurisprudence provides that acts other than the five listed in the Convention may be relevant evidence of genocidal intent.178 Accordingly, the historical and sociopolitical context in which genocide occurs is key to identifying how intent forms, and then materializes also through these other acts.
44. Jurisprudence has been broadly focused on determining intent through acts targeting “the very foundation of the group”,179 including the imposition of living conditions leading to “slow death”180 and “the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself”.181 In other words, intent to destroy is assessed holistically and in totality.
45. Jurisprudence has also recognized that a group is “comprised of its individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relationship between its members, the relationship with other groups, the relationship with the land”.182 Violent destruction of any of these components has a profound impact on the group and its ability to survive.183 Trauma, poverty, food scarcity, forced displacement, loss of homes, land and cultural heritage – and settler-colonialism as an “enduring structure”184 – are widely recognized determinants of individual and societal health.185
46. In settler-colonial contexts, land and its resources are particularly relevant. Land is intrinsic to both a people’s right to self-determination and the settler-colonial project. An inherent conflict exists between the colonizers, who seek to acquire and control the land, and the Indigenous population, for whom the land is integral to their identity: “where they are is who they are”.186 Disconnection from land and cultural roots contributes to the erosion of identity and community resilience, resulting in physically destructive outcomes: poorer health, lower life expectancy and abnormally high suicide rates.187 The issue of land is therefore indicative of how the settler-colonial project destroys – in order to replace – the Indigenous population.188
47. Consequently, components of conduct, such as repeated forced displacement, that result in the disconnection from the land, as well as the destruction of the cultural, educational and economic structures that tie a people to the land, must be considered “significant as indicative of the presence of a specific intent … inspiring [other genocidal] acts”.189 Forced displacement itself, together with aggravating factors – e.g. displacement into dangerous, squalid or toxic conditions – can constitute an underlying genocidal act.190 The particular vulnerability of the group must also be considered.191
48. In short, intent to destroy has become established as the targeting of a group’s existence such that “the group can no longer reconstitute itself”.192
C. Genocidal intent in the context of State responsibility
49. Early identification of genocide is crucial to prevent genocide, ensuring that a central tenet of the post-Second World War international legal system is not a dead letter.
50. In assessing State responsibility for genocide – i.e. genocidal intent attributable to the State – ICJ has drawn heavily on the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals.193 While acknowledging that State responsibility can be established “without an individual being convicted of the crime”,194 in Bosnia v. Serbia in 2007, the Court found State genocidal intent only where individual perpetrators had been held criminally responsible. The Court established that, in the absence of direct evidence of State intent, the pattern of conduct must be such that it “could only point to the existence of such intent”.195 This approach was tempered in 2015, in Croatia v. Serbia, where the Court determined that “reasonableness” must be considered when inferring genocidal intent from patterns of conduct.196
51. However, further clarity is needed regarding genocidal intent in the context of State responsibility. State intent can be derived from the aggregate of individual perpetrators’ genocidal intents, but States should not be exonerated simply because there are no individual criminal convictions, which, if they do occur, may come too late to prevent or stop genocide. While ICJ acknowledged that State obligations concerning genocide are “not of a criminal nature”,197 the standard of proof required to ground the responsibility of a State is a quasi-criminal standard. Among other things, this would delay or frustrate justice for victims.
52. Intervening in The Gambia v. Myanmar, currently before ICJ, six Western States argued that the “reasonableness criterion” requires a “balanced approach” so as not to make it “impossible” to determine genocidal intent “by way of inference”198 in other words, urging the Court not to miss the forest for the trees. Otherwise, this risks protecting the State over the victims that the Convention is designed to protect.199
53. Three factors help achieve this balance:
(a) Applying the “only reasonable inference” test involves first filtering out other possible intents that could be inferred but are not reasonably supported by the evidence.200 A balanced consideration of the interplay between motives and intent should determine whether motives “preclude such a specific intent” to destroy a people,201 or whether they are consistent with, or even confirm, genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference;
(b) International law treats the State as a unit, not as separate organs.202 This means that conduct and intent of the State must be considered holistically. A rule of law-regulated State must be viewed as a whole, including its Government, parliament and judiciary and their regulatory functions;
(c) Given the high threshold set for establishing genocidal intent, the failure to illuminate the totality of conduct invites the possibility of invisibilizing the crime itself behind the claimed strategies, policies and actions that are advanced by the wrongdoing State in order to obscure it.203 Failure to recognize genocide in its totality may help create the camouflage that a State could employ to commit it.
V. “Totality triple lens”: Israeli intent towards the Palestinians as a group as such
54. The current intent to destroy the people as such could not be more evident from Israeli conduct when viewed in its totality. In this section, the Special Rapporteur applies the framework set out above to the totality of conduct targeting the totality of Palestinians, in the totality of the occupied Palestinian territory (“totality triple lens”). She then analyses specific components of Israeli conduct: the broader context of the political project of Israel in the region; the nature of the destruction inflicted on the Palestinian people; and the motives obscuring the specific intent itself.
A. Totality of the land: “Greater Israel”
55. The ambition for a “Greater Israel” (Eretz Yisrael), consolidating Jewish sovereignty over the territory now comprising both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory, has been a long-standing goal since the very inception of the Zionist project and before Israel existed.204 The legally recognized right to self-determination of Palestinians being tied to that land,205 together with their large presence, have represented both legal and demographic impediments to the realization of “Greater Israel”.
56. Successive Governments have pursued this goal, predicated on the erasure of the Indigenous Palestinian people.206 Even after the Oslo Accords, which marked international support for a two-State solution, the plan was advanced.207 Since then, Israeli colonies have increased from 128 to 358,208 and settler numbers have grown from 256,400209 to 714,600.210 The 2018 Nation State Law asserted exclusive Jewish sovereignty over “Eretz Yisrael” and “Jewish settlement” in that area as a national priority.211 On 28 December 2022, the current Government of Israel announced its plan to expand the colonies in the West Bank212 and aggressively advanced substantial land confiscation and settlement expansion. In September 2023, before the General Assembly, Prime Minister Netanyahu exhibited a map of Israel erasing the occupied Palestinian territory and superimposing Israel.213
57. The cultivation of a political doctrine214 that frames Palestinian assertions of self-determination as a security threat to Israel has served to legitimize permanent occupation.215 The deliberate dehumanization of the Palestinians has accompanied systematic ethnic purges from the period 1947–1949 to today.216 Ideological hatred of Palestinians as such has pervaded segments of society and the Israeli State apparatus.217
58. Meanwhile, despite the oppression, Palestinians refuse to leave the land, and in fact the population has grown. The increasing risk of a majority-Jewish State becoming unachievable has progressively made destruction an unavoidable part of the process.218
59. The events of 7 October provided the impetus to advance towards the goal of a “Greater Israel”. Calls for the displacement of Palestinians into the Arab world, amid conquest, colonization and annexation, grew.219 The leaked Ministry of Intelligence of Israel “concept paper” from October 2023 outlining the expulsion of the entire Gaza population to Egypt,220 alongside widespread and explicit support within the governing coalition,221 identifies an opportunity to recolonize Gaza,222 which the Government seized, taking advantage of the fog of war. In parallel in the West Bank, following 7 October, annexation and colony construction intensified.223
60. The State’s intent to destroy, expressed in various statements and plans, and inferable from conduct considered in context, has gradually become more recognizable. This conduct had already, prior to 7 October, had the effect of “a cumulative, multilayered and intergenerational impact on the Palestinian society, economy and environment and [had caused] the deterioration of the living conditions of the Palestinians”.224
61. The violence and trauma suffered by the Israelis on 7 October deepened collective animosity, and calls for annihilation grew.225 In a manner reminiscent of other genocides, the ensuing vengeful atmosphere prepared the soldiers to become “willing executioners” of the heinous tasks required of them.226 An opportunity presented itself to sever Palestinian connection to the land, with foreseeable consequences for their Palestinian existence,227 as outlined below.
B. Totality of the group: destruction of the Palestinian people
62. Since 7 October 2023, the decimation of Palestinian human life has been swift and extensive. Amid mass killings, eradication of family lines, large-scale targeting of children and torture, the occupied Palestinian territory is being intentionally rendered unliveable – one home, school, church, mosque, hospital, neighbourhood, community, at a time. Spreading from Gaza to the West Bank, calculated destruction reveals a deliberate campaign of connected incidents, which must be considered cumulatively.
63. Israel has pursued a pattern of conduct “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction”,228 as evidenced by the systematic destruction of already precarious life-sustaining healthcare, food security and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All (WASH) infrastructure. Although varying in intensity across the occupied territory, in Gaza this destructive violence has already led to starvation, epidemics and forced displacement with no possibility of safe return – as expressly intended. The destruction of infrastructure across the occupied Palestinian territory imperils the long-term survival of the group. The deliberate degradation of public health is a technique of genocide “by attrition”.229 More than 500,000 children with no schooling and 88,000 students without universities230 are doomed to dire outcomes.
64. For Palestinians, further layers of agony and forced displacement aggravate their inherited trauma and psychological vulnerability as Nakba survivors.231 Months of relentless shunting of weakened humans from one unsafe area to another – fleeing bombs and bullets, with minimal chances of escape, amid loss, fear and grief, and with little access to shelter, clean water, food and healthcare – have inflicted incalculable harm, especially on children.232 The movement of displaced Palestinians resembles the death marches of past genocides, and the Nakba. Forced displacement severs connection with the land, undermining food sovereignty and cultural belonging, and triggering further displacement.233 Communal bonds are broken, the social fabric shredded and reserves of resilience depleted. Systematic forced displacement contributes to “the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself”.234
65. As was foreseeable, the overall conduct of Israel post-7 October has inflicted severe psychological harm on all Palestinians, both direct victims and those witnessing in exile. The overall aim is to humiliate and degrade Palestinians as a whole. Prisoners stripped and sadistically tortured en masse; bodies of adults and children piled up and decomposing in the street; survivors forced to eat animal food and grass and drink seawater or even sewage; the maiming of thousands, including young children left limbless before they could even crawl; the destruction of homes and violation of intimate life; having absolutely nothing to return to. Mass graves and the exhumation and relocation of bodies are specific acts of desecration, which themselves can suggest genocidal intent.235 Combined, these acts go far beyond what international jurisprudence recognizes as “step[s] in the process of destruction of the … group”.236 The pain and loss will impact generations to come.237
66. Genocide could manifest in the targeting of members of the same group in different parts of their territory, through acts of varying intensity.238 In the background, Palestinians inside Israel (“the enemies within”) have also experienced suppression.239 The relentless attacks against the United Nations, and, in particular, UNRWA, threaten the socioeconomic lifelines of millions of Palestinian refugees across the broader region, and cannot be ignored.
67. The destructive consequences of Israeli conduct reverberate well beyond the Gaza epicentre, as the same patterns of genocidal conduct have begun to appear in the West Bank. The only inference to be reasonably drawn from all this is of a clear intention to attack “the group’s capacity to renew itself, and hence to ensure its long‑term survival”.240
United Nations
General Assembly
Distr.: General
1 October 2024
Original: English
Seventy-ninth session
Item 71 (c) of the provisional agenda*
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967**
Note by the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 5/1.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese
Genocide as colonial erasure
Summary
In the present report, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, examines the unfolding horrors in the occupied Palestinian territory. While the wholesale destruction of Gaza continues unabated, other parts of the land have not been spared. The violence that Israel has unleashed against the Palestinians post-7 October is not happening in a vacuum, but is part of a long-term intentional, systematic, State-organized forced displacement and replacement of the Palestinians. This trajectory risks causing irreparable prejudice to the very existence of the Palestinian people in Palestine. Member States must intervene now to prevent new atrocities that will further scar human history.
I. Introduction
1. In March 2024, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Israel had committed acts of genocide in Gaza.1 In the present report, the Special Rapporteur expands the analysis of the post-7 October 2023 violence against Gaza, which has spread to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. She focuses on genocidal intent, contextualising the situation within a decades-long process of territorial expansion and ethnic cleansing aimed at liquidating the Palestinian presence in Palestine. She suggests that genocide should be seen as integral and instrumental to the aim of full Israeli colonization of Palestinian land while removing as many Palestinians as possible.
2. The present report is based on legal research and analysis, interviews with victims and witnesses, including in Jordan and Egypt, open-source information and input from experts and civil-society organizations. The Special Rapporteur, still refused access to the occupied Palestinian territory, stresses that Israel has no authority to bar fact-finding mechanisms from the territory that it illegally occupies. The persistent denial of access to United Nations mechanisms and investigators of the International Criminal Court (ICC) may constitute obstruction of justice, in defiance of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) order that Israel allow international investigators to enter Gaza and take measures to ensure the preservation of evidence.2
3. While the scale and nature of the ongoing Israeli assault against the Palestinians vary by area, the totality of the Israeli acts of destruction directed against the totality of the Palestinian people, with the aim of conquering the totality of the land of Palestine, is clearly identifiable. Patterns of violence against the group as a whole warrant the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) in order to cease, prevent and punish genocide in the whole of the occupied Palestinian territory.
II. Legal framework and developments
4. In the present report, the Special Rapporteur relies on the legal framework considered in previous reports,3 including international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law and customary international law, in particular the Genocide Convention and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, together with relevant legal developments and jurisprudence.
5. Two important legal developments informed the present report. First, in its Advisory Opinion of July 2024, ICJ declared the prolonged presence of Israel in the whole of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including its colony regime,4 as unlawful5 and aimed at annexation.6 It stated that Israeli annexation was designed to be permanent, creating “irreversible effects on the ground”,7 “undermin[ing] the integrity of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”8 and seeking to “acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory”.9
6. The Court recognized the violation of non-derogable norms prohibiting territorial acquisition by force,10 racial segregation and apartheid,11 and protecting the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people,12 concluding that the occupation constitutes an act of aggression, in all but name, deriving in part from its settler-colonial nature.13 It stressed the obligation to rapidly end the occupation, dismantle and evacuate the colonies, provide full reparation to Palestinian victims and allow the return of Palestinians displaced since 1967.14
7. Expanding on the Wall opinion,15 the Court rejected arguments that Israeli “security concerns” justify the occupation.16 The declared unlawfulness of the occupation vitiates claims of purported self-defence; the only lawful recourse available to Israel is its unconditional withdrawal from the whole of that territory.
8. Second, in South Africa v. Israel, the Court ordered provisional measures to prevent and/or stop acts of genocide.17 After recognizing, in January 2024, the existence of a “real and imminent risk [of] irreparable prejudice” to the rights of the Palestinians in Gaza under the Genocide Convention, the Court instructed Israel to “prevent the commission of all acts” outlined in the Convention.18 In March, the Court took notice of the worsening humanitarian crisis,19 and in May, recognizing an “exceptionally grave” risk in Rafah, it ordered Israel to “immediately halt its military offensive”.20 Despite this, Israel, and most other States, continue to disregard such orders,21 with arms continuing to flow to Israel.22
III. The unfolding genocide as a “means to an end”
9. On 14 October 2023, after Israel ordered 1.1 million Palestinians to move south from northern Gaza in 24 hours – “one of the fastest mass displacements in history”23 – the Special Rapporteur warned of the risk of deliberate mass ethnic cleansing.24 This proved prescient. At least 90 per cent of Palestinians in Gaza have now been forcibly displaced – many more than 10 times25 – amid calls from Israeli officials and others for Palestinians to leave and Israelis to “return to Gaza” and rebuild the colonies dismantled in 2005.26
10. Meanwhile, violence has spread beyond Gaza, with Israeli forces and violent settlers having escalated patterns of ethnic cleansing and apartheid in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.27
11. High-ranking Israeli officials, ministers and religious leaders continue to encourage erasure and dispossession of Palestinians, setting new thresholds for acceptable violence against civilians. The Nakba, which has been ongoing since 1948, has been deliberately accelerated.28
12. In the following sections, the Special Rapporteur examines critical developments on the ground, highlighting patterns of conduct that evidence an intent to employ genocidal acts as a means to ethnically cleanse all or parts of the occupied Palestinian territory.
A. Failure to cease and punish genocide in Gaza
13. Since the previous report of the Special Rapporteur (A/78/545), and despite the ICJ interventions, genocidal acts have proliferated. Nearly a year of scorched-earth assault has led to the calculated destruction of Gaza: the human, material and environmental cost is unquantifiable.29
14. Since March 2024, Israel has killed 10,037 Palestinians and injured 21,767, with more than 93 massacres, bringing the reported totals to nearly 42,000 and 96,000 respectively, although figures from reliable sources are incomplete and may understate the magnitude of the casualties.30 Aid distribution sites,31 tents,32 hospitals,33 schools34 and markets35 have been repeatedly attacked through the indiscriminate use of aerial and sniper fire. At least 13,000 children, including more than 700 babies,36 have been killed, many shot in the head and chest.37 Approximately 22,500 Palestinians have sustained life-changing injuries.38 By May, a further 10,000 people were estimated to be buried under the rubble,39 including 4,000 children;40 the voices of those trapped and dying are often audible. An uncertain number are forcibly disappeared by Israeli forces.41
15. The magnitude of destruction in Gaza has prompted allegations of domicide,42 urbicide,43 scholasticide,44 medicide,45 cultural genocide46 and ecocide.47 Nearly 40 million tons of debris, including unexploded ordnance and human remains,48 contaminate the ecosystem.49 More than 140 temporary waste sites50 and 340,000 tons of waste,51 untreated wastewater and sewage overflow52 contribute to the spread of diseases such as hepatitis A,53 respiratory infections,54 diarrhoea and skin diseases.55 As Israeli leaders promised, Gaza has been made unfit for human life.56
16. Continued bombardment of evacuees in purportedly designated “safe zones”57 has continued to create hardship, terror and death.58 Displaced people have been systematically chased down and targeted in shelters, including in United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools, 70 per cent of which Israel has repeatedly attacked.59 The Rafah offensive in May caused more than 3,500 direct deaths60 and new displacement of almost 1 million Palestinians to uninhabitable wastelands of rubble, sewage and decomposing bodies.61
17. According to satellite imagery and other sources, Israeli soldiers have built roads and military bases in more than 26 per cent of Gaza, suggesting the aim of a permanent presence.62 The Israeli military expanded the “buffer zone” along the Gaza perimeter to 16 per cent of the territory, flattening homes, apartment blocks and agricultural farms.63 By August 2024, repeated evacuation orders over approximately 84 per cent of Gaza64 had corralled the majority of the population into a shrinking, unsafe “humanitarian zone” covering 12.6 per cent65 of a territory now reconfigured in preparation for annexation.66 In early September, two ministers of the Government of Israel openly called for the conquest and annexation of significant areas of Gaza.67
18. Israel has continued to use “medical shielding” arguments to target healthcare facilities.68 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 300 days, 32 out of 36 hospitals were damaged, with 20 hospitals and 70 out of 119 primary healthcare centres incapacitated.69 By 20 August, Israel had attacked healthcare facilities 492 times.70 From 18 March to 1 April, Israeli forces again laid siege to Al-Shifa Hospital, killing more than 400 and detaining 300 people, including doctors, patients, displaced persons and civil servants.71 On 26 August, following mass expulsion orders in Deir al-Balah, where 1 million Palestinians were sheltering, Israeli forces compelled the evacuation of all but 100 of 650 patients in Al-Aqsa hospital.72 On 30 August, Israeli forces bombed a humanitarian truck bound for the Emirati hospital in Rafah, killing several aid workers.73
19. On 16 July 2024, WHO detected the first presence of poliovirus in 25 years – a direct consequence of the destruction of water and sewage systems, obstruction of aid and shelter overcrowding.74 By late August, a 10-month-old baby was partially paralysed by the disease.75 Despite the looming outbreak, Israel delayed vaccinations76 and attacked vaccination areas77 and a United Nations vaccination convoy.78 While humanitarian organizations called for a ceasefire, Israel issued the highest number of evacuation orders since 13 October 2023, targeting areas with the highest concentration of displaced Palestinians,79 forcing the United Nations to suspend humanitarian operations.80
20. Systematic attacks on Gaza food sovereignty indicate an intent to destroy its population through starvation.81 Israel has destroyed agricultural land82 and reservoirs83 and attacked distribution centres, coordination teams and aid convoys.84 Hungry crowds waiting for food have been massacred.85 Following constant evacuation orders and the Israeli takeover of the Rafah crossing,86 distribution of daily meals fell by 35 per cent from July to August 2024.87 In August, entry permits for humanitarian organizations nearly halved.88 Access to water has been restricted to a quarter of pre-7 October levels.89 Approximately 93 per cent of the agricultural, forestry and fishing economies has been destroyed;90 95 per cent of Palestinians face high levels of acute food insecurity,91 and deprivation for decades to come.92
21. In August 2024, the Finance Minister of Israel, Bezalel Smotrich, stated that starving the entire Gaza population was “justified and moral”, even if 2 million people consequently died.93 In recent months, 83 per cent of food aid was prevented from entering Gaza,94 and the civilian police in Rafah were repeatedly targeted, impairing distribution.95 At least 34 deaths from malnutrition were recorded by 14 September 2024.96 At the time of writing, the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was evaluating a plan to block all food supplies to northern Gaza97 proposed by adviser Giora Eiland,98 who previously endorsed introducing epidemics as a military tactic.99 The killing of civilian police and clan leadership providing security for food distribution further compounded the crisis across Gaza.100 Starvation and deprivation tactics in the north have been particularly egregious.101
22. Palestinians have been systematically abused in a network of Israeli torture camps.102 Thousands have disappeared, many after being detained in appalling conditions, often bound to beds, blindfolded and in diapers, deprived of medical treatment and subjected to unsanitary conditions, starvation, torturous cuffing, severe beatings, electrocution and sexual assault by both humans and animals.103 At least 48 detainees have died in custody.104
23. Even when conservatively considered, these multiple torments constitute precisely the irreparable harm that ICJ has warned against since January 2024, and which Israel has intentionally inflicted on the Palestinians as a group.
B. Risk of genocide in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
24. The devastation inflicted on Gaza is now metastasizing to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In December 2023, the Defence Minister of Israel, Yoav Gallant, predicted that “when what the IDF did in Gaza becomes clear, that will also be projected on Judea and Samaria [West Bank]”.105
25. From 7 October 2023 to the end of September 2024, Israeli forces carried out more than 5,505 raids.106 Violent settlers, supported by Israeli forces and officials,107 conducted 1,084 attacks,108 killing more than 692 Palestinians – 10 times the previous 14 years’ annual average of 69 fatalities – and injuring 5,199.109
26. The pattern of targeting children is shocking. Since 7 October, 169 Palestinian children have been killed,110 nearly 80 per cent of whom were shot in the head or torso.111 This represents a 250 per cent increase on the previous nine months,112 totalling more than 20 per cent of children killed in the West Bank since 2000.113
27. Echoing the brutality that swept Gaza, Palestinians in the West Bank have been subjected to appalling detention practices,114 following orders by the National Security Minister of Israel, Itamar Ben-Gvir.115 A mass arrest campaign116 led to the detention of tens of thousands, with 9,400 currently detained.117 As in Gaza, many are academics, students, lawyers, journalists and human rights defenders,118 designated as “terrorists” or “national security threats”.119 Leaked videos and interviews with prison officials revealed intentional and systemic abuse and brutality, degradation, torture and even rape.120 At least 12 detainees from the West Bank died as a result of torture and denial of medical care.121
28. In November 2023, Bezalel Smotrich, “Governor of Judea and Samaria” and staunch advocate of colonization and mass expulsion,122 claimed that there are “2 million Nazis” in the West Bank.123 He then promised to turn several areas of the West Bank into a “pile of rubble like … [Gaza]”.124 On 18 August, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Israel Katz, called for the West Bank to receive the same treatment as Gaza.125
29. The northern West Bank has been the subject of particularly severe military violence.126 Protracted sieges,127 relentless raids128 and a major escalation since August 2024, including aerial bombardment,129 have wrought devastation.130 Forty-six drone and air strike operations131 killed 77 Palestinians, including 14 children.132 In Jenin camp approximately 180 homes were levelled and 3,800 structures damaged,133 destroying or damaging power supplies, public services and amenities,134 displacing thousands of families and causing widespread disruption.135 More than 181,000 Palestinians have been affected, many multiple times.136
30. On 27 August 2024, Israeli forces launched operation “Summer Camps” against Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tubas and Tulkarem, fulfilling the promise to treat the West Bank like Gaza.137 For days on end, thousands were placed under curfew, without food or water.138 Israeli forces targeted ambulances, blocked entrances to hospitals and laid siege to Jenin Hospital.139 Bulldozers destroyed streets and electricity and public health infrastructure.140 Hundreds lost their homes and property;141 more than 1,000 families in Jenin were displaced. 142 Thirty-six were killed, including eight children.143
31. Targeted attacks on the health sector have been replicated in the West Bank. Medical workers and infrastructure were attacked 538 times, killing 23 people and injuring 100 and damaging 54 medical facilities, 20 mobile clinics and 374 ambulances,144 while critical medical care was impeded.145 Permits for Palestinians to access medical care outside the West Bank sharply declined.146
32. On 29 May 2024, governance of the West Bank was officially transferred from military to civilian authorities – furthering de jure annexation – and placed under Bezalel Smotrich, a committed Eretz Yisrael politician.147 The largest single land appropriation in 30 years was then approved.148 Since 7 October, Israel has demolished, confiscated or ordered the demolition of more than 1,416 Palestinian structures, displacing more than 3,200 Palestinians, including approximately 1,400 children.149 At least 18 communities were depopulated under the threat of lethal force,150 effectively enabling the colonization of large tracts of Area C.151 This constitutes an escalation of unlawful conduct already found to be “aimed at dispersing the [Palestinian] population and undermining its integrity as a people”.152
33. The crippling of the economy is another existential threat. Amid extreme insecurity and fear, the suspension of financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority,153 the revocation of 148,000 work permits154 and severe movement restrictions, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the West Bank contracted by 22.7 per cent,155 nearly 30 per cent of businesses have closed, and 292,000 jobs have been lost.156
34. Genocidal conduct in Gaza set an ominous precedent for the West Bank. The deliberate strategy of Israel to render Palestinian life unsustainable has markedly intensified everywhere in the occupied Palestinian territory, with devastating consequences for Palestinian survival.
IV. Understanding the legal complexity and scope of genocidal intent
35. Following the harrowing experience of recent genocides in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and, plausibly, Myanmar,157 what constitutes genocide in law – the destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part, as such – has become better established.158 However, preventing and punishing genocide in practice, in particular proving genocidal intent, is still developing.159
36. The stigma attached to and the consequences of the crime of genocide often deter perpetrators from recording policies, plans and other indications of intent to carry it out (e.g. in writing).160 When direct evidence of intent is unavailable, inferring intent requires a complex assessment of facts, statements and circumstances.161 These factors should be borne in mind:
(a) While recognizing the possible composite nature of genocide is critical to its identification and prevention, the compartmentalization of the conduct into its disparate acts without recourse to broader context can obscure the requisite genocidal intent;
(b) Aside from the five acts that may constitute genocidal conduct, other acts can be indicative of genocidal intent;162
(c) The existing jurisprudence has arisen primarily from the criminal prosecution of individuals;163 this can limit the early recognition of broader State responsibility for genocide, which is crucial to its prevention.
37. Understanding how the intent to destroy manifests – its relationship to the prescribed genocidal acts and the nature and scale of atrocities – is key when identifying conduct that could constitute evidence of genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference.
38. In the following sections, the Special Rapporteur briefly outlines how relevant jurisprudence, analysed in abstracto, is fully capable of capturing genocidal intent in State conduct when a comprehensive interpretative approach is adopted.
A. Considering the plurality of facts, circumstances and conduct
39. The magnitude and complexity of the crime of genocide require close analysis of the genocidal conduct as a whole,164 properly situated in its broader context.165 Due consideration should be given to:
• The destruction caused by the nature and scale of atrocities166
• The fog of war167
• Claims to retribution or alternative motives168
• The opportunity to commit genocide169
40. In international practice, the same facts can form the basis of multiple charges (and constitute a war crime or crime against humanity and an act of genocide).170 When determining genocidal intent, it is critical to assess “whether all of the evidence, taken together, demonstrate[s] a genocidal mental state”.171
41. As observed by Judge Trindade in Croatia v. Serbia, an “onslaught of civilians” is not merely a “plurality of common crimes”, but rather a “plurality of atrocities, which, in itself, by its extreme violence and devastation, can disclose the intent to destroy”.172 The focus should be on whether all the acts – e.g. starvation, torture, killing, forced displacement, extermination – considered together in their totality form a pattern of conduct indicative of genocidal intent.173
B. Singularity of intent: destroying “a group” “as such”
42. In proving intent to destroy the group, all relevant factors must be examined holistically. Jurisprudence on genocidal intent is typically focused on “physical or biological destruction” of the group.174 The fact that the Genocide Convention was drafted when colonialism still played a significant role in international relations, and the vivid horror of the Holocaust’s industrial-scale extermination, may account for the focus on physical and biological destruction over social and cultural factors.175 However, genocide is not a crime only of mass killing, as specified in the Convention itself.176 The genocidal act of “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”, for example, entails no killing at all.177
43. Genocide is more structurally complex and insidious, and therefore more difficult to ascertain than crimes such as mass killing or extermination. A wider lens is required to identify the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part as such. International jurisprudence provides that acts other than the five listed in the Convention may be relevant evidence of genocidal intent.178 Accordingly, the historical and sociopolitical context in which genocide occurs is key to identifying how intent forms, and then materializes also through these other acts.
44. Jurisprudence has been broadly focused on determining intent through acts targeting “the very foundation of the group”,179 including the imposition of living conditions leading to “slow death”180 and “the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself”.181 In other words, intent to destroy is assessed holistically and in totality.
45. Jurisprudence has also recognized that a group is “comprised of its individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relationship between its members, the relationship with other groups, the relationship with the land”.182 Violent destruction of any of these components has a profound impact on the group and its ability to survive.183 Trauma, poverty, food scarcity, forced displacement, loss of homes, land and cultural heritage – and settler-colonialism as an “enduring structure”184 – are widely recognized determinants of individual and societal health.185
46. In settler-colonial contexts, land and its resources are particularly relevant. Land is intrinsic to both a people’s right to self-determination and the settler-colonial project. An inherent conflict exists between the colonizers, who seek to acquire and control the land, and the Indigenous population, for whom the land is integral to their identity: “where they are is who they are”.186 Disconnection from land and cultural roots contributes to the erosion of identity and community resilience, resulting in physically destructive outcomes: poorer health, lower life expectancy and abnormally high suicide rates.187 The issue of land is therefore indicative of how the settler-colonial project destroys – in order to replace – the Indigenous population.188
47. Consequently, components of conduct, such as repeated forced displacement, that result in the disconnection from the land, as well as the destruction of the cultural, educational and economic structures that tie a people to the land, must be considered “significant as indicative of the presence of a specific intent … inspiring [other genocidal] acts”.189 Forced displacement itself, together with aggravating factors – e.g. displacement into dangerous, squalid or toxic conditions – can constitute an underlying genocidal act.190 The particular vulnerability of the group must also be considered.191
48. In short, intent to destroy has become established as the targeting of a group’s existence such that “the group can no longer reconstitute itself”.192
C. Genocidal intent in the context of State responsibility
49. Early identification of genocide is crucial to prevent genocide, ensuring that a central tenet of the post-Second World War international legal system is not a dead letter.
50. In assessing State responsibility for genocide – i.e. genocidal intent attributable to the State – ICJ has drawn heavily on the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals.193 While acknowledging that State responsibility can be established “without an individual being convicted of the crime”,194 in Bosnia v. Serbia in 2007, the Court found State genocidal intent only where individual perpetrators had been held criminally responsible. The Court established that, in the absence of direct evidence of State intent, the pattern of conduct must be such that it “could only point to the existence of such intent”.195 This approach was tempered in 2015, in Croatia v. Serbia, where the Court determined that “reasonableness” must be considered when inferring genocidal intent from patterns of conduct.196
51. However, further clarity is needed regarding genocidal intent in the context of State responsibility. State intent can be derived from the aggregate of individual perpetrators’ genocidal intents, but States should not be exonerated simply because there are no individual criminal convictions, which, if they do occur, may come too late to prevent or stop genocide. While ICJ acknowledged that State obligations concerning genocide are “not of a criminal nature”,197 the standard of proof required to ground the responsibility of a State is a quasi-criminal standard. Among other things, this would delay or frustrate justice for victims.
52. Intervening in The Gambia v. Myanmar, currently before ICJ, six Western States argued that the “reasonableness criterion” requires a “balanced approach” so as not to make it “impossible” to determine genocidal intent “by way of inference”198 in other words, urging the Court not to miss the forest for the trees. Otherwise, this risks protecting the State over the victims that the Convention is designed to protect.199
53. Three factors help achieve this balance:
(a) Applying the “only reasonable inference” test involves first filtering out other possible intents that could be inferred but are not reasonably supported by the evidence.200 A balanced consideration of the interplay between motives and intent should determine whether motives “preclude such a specific intent” to destroy a people,201 or whether they are consistent with, or even confirm, genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference;
(b) International law treats the State as a unit, not as separate organs.202 This means that conduct and intent of the State must be considered holistically. A rule of law-regulated State must be viewed as a whole, including its Government, parliament and judiciary and their regulatory functions;
(c) Given the high threshold set for establishing genocidal intent, the failure to illuminate the totality of conduct invites the possibility of invisibilizing the crime itself behind the claimed strategies, policies and actions that are advanced by the wrongdoing State in order to obscure it.203 Failure to recognize genocide in its totality may help create the camouflage that a State could employ to commit it.
V. “Totality triple lens”: Israeli intent towards the Palestinians as a group as such
54. The current intent to destroy the people as such could not be more evident from Israeli conduct when viewed in its totality. In this section, the Special Rapporteur applies the framework set out above to the totality of conduct targeting the totality of Palestinians, in the totality of the occupied Palestinian territory (“totality triple lens”). She then analyses specific components of Israeli conduct: the broader context of the political project of Israel in the region; the nature of the destruction inflicted on the Palestinian people; and the motives obscuring the specific intent itself.
A. Totality of the land: “Greater Israel”
55. The ambition for a “Greater Israel” (Eretz Yisrael), consolidating Jewish sovereignty over the territory now comprising both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory, has been a long-standing goal since the very inception of the Zionist project and before Israel existed.204 The legally recognized right to self-determination of Palestinians being tied to that land,205 together with their large presence, have represented both legal and demographic impediments to the realization of “Greater Israel”.
56. Successive Governments have pursued this goal, predicated on the erasure of the Indigenous Palestinian people.206 Even after the Oslo Accords, which marked international support for a two-State solution, the plan was advanced.207 Since then, Israeli colonies have increased from 128 to 358,208 and settler numbers have grown from 256,400209 to 714,600.210 The 2018 Nation State Law asserted exclusive Jewish sovereignty over “Eretz Yisrael” and “Jewish settlement” in that area as a national priority.211 On 28 December 2022, the current Government of Israel announced its plan to expand the colonies in the West Bank212 and aggressively advanced substantial land confiscation and settlement expansion. In September 2023, before the General Assembly, Prime Minister Netanyahu exhibited a map of Israel erasing the occupied Palestinian territory and superimposing Israel.213
57. The cultivation of a political doctrine214 that frames Palestinian assertions of self-determination as a security threat to Israel has served to legitimize permanent occupation.215 The deliberate dehumanization of the Palestinians has accompanied systematic ethnic purges from the period 1947–1949 to today.216 Ideological hatred of Palestinians as such has pervaded segments of society and the Israeli State apparatus.217
58. Meanwhile, despite the oppression, Palestinians refuse to leave the land, and in fact the population has grown. The increasing risk of a majority-Jewish State becoming unachievable has progressively made destruction an unavoidable part of the process.218
59. The events of 7 October provided the impetus to advance towards the goal of a “Greater Israel”. Calls for the displacement of Palestinians into the Arab world, amid conquest, colonization and annexation, grew.219 The leaked Ministry of Intelligence of Israel “concept paper” from October 2023 outlining the expulsion of the entire Gaza population to Egypt,220 alongside widespread and explicit support within the governing coalition,221 identifies an opportunity to recolonize Gaza,222 which the Government seized, taking advantage of the fog of war. In parallel in the West Bank, following 7 October, annexation and colony construction intensified.223
60. The State’s intent to destroy, expressed in various statements and plans, and inferable from conduct considered in context, has gradually become more recognizable. This conduct had already, prior to 7 October, had the effect of “a cumulative, multilayered and intergenerational impact on the Palestinian society, economy and environment and [had caused] the deterioration of the living conditions of the Palestinians”.224
61. The violence and trauma suffered by the Israelis on 7 October deepened collective animosity, and calls for annihilation grew.225 In a manner reminiscent of other genocides, the ensuing vengeful atmosphere prepared the soldiers to become “willing executioners” of the heinous tasks required of them.226 An opportunity presented itself to sever Palestinian connection to the land, with foreseeable consequences for their Palestinian existence,227 as outlined below.
B. Totality of the group: destruction of the Palestinian people
62. Since 7 October 2023, the decimation of Palestinian human life has been swift and extensive. Amid mass killings, eradication of family lines, large-scale targeting of children and torture, the occupied Palestinian territory is being intentionally rendered unliveable – one home, school, church, mosque, hospital, neighbourhood, community, at a time. Spreading from Gaza to the West Bank, calculated destruction reveals a deliberate campaign of connected incidents, which must be considered cumulatively.
63. Israel has pursued a pattern of conduct “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction”,228 as evidenced by the systematic destruction of already precarious life-sustaining healthcare, food security and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All (WASH) infrastructure. Although varying in intensity across the occupied territory, in Gaza this destructive violence has already led to starvation, epidemics and forced displacement with no possibility of safe return – as expressly intended. The destruction of infrastructure across the occupied Palestinian territory imperils the long-term survival of the group. The deliberate degradation of public health is a technique of genocide “by attrition”.229 More than 500,000 children with no schooling and 88,000 students without universities230 are doomed to dire outcomes.
64. For Palestinians, further layers of agony and forced displacement aggravate their inherited trauma and psychological vulnerability as Nakba survivors.231 Months of relentless shunting of weakened humans from one unsafe area to another – fleeing bombs and bullets, with minimal chances of escape, amid loss, fear and grief, and with little access to shelter, clean water, food and healthcare – have inflicted incalculable harm, especially on children.232 The movement of displaced Palestinians resembles the death marches of past genocides, and the Nakba. Forced displacement severs connection with the land, undermining food sovereignty and cultural belonging, and triggering further displacement.233 Communal bonds are broken, the social fabric shredded and reserves of resilience depleted. Systematic forced displacement contributes to “the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself”.234
65. As was foreseeable, the overall conduct of Israel post-7 October has inflicted severe psychological harm on all Palestinians, both direct victims and those witnessing in exile. The overall aim is to humiliate and degrade Palestinians as a whole. Prisoners stripped and sadistically tortured en masse; bodies of adults and children piled up and decomposing in the street; survivors forced to eat animal food and grass and drink seawater or even sewage; the maiming of thousands, including young children left limbless before they could even crawl; the destruction of homes and violation of intimate life; having absolutely nothing to return to. Mass graves and the exhumation and relocation of bodies are specific acts of desecration, which themselves can suggest genocidal intent.235 Combined, these acts go far beyond what international jurisprudence recognizes as “step[s] in the process of destruction of the … group”.236 The pain and loss will impact generations to come.237
66. Genocide could manifest in the targeting of members of the same group in different parts of their territory, through acts of varying intensity.238 In the background, Palestinians inside Israel (“the enemies within”) have also experienced suppression.239 The relentless attacks against the United Nations, and, in particular, UNRWA, threaten the socioeconomic lifelines of millions of Palestinian refugees across the broader region, and cannot be ignored.
67. The destructive consequences of Israeli conduct reverberate well beyond the Gaza epicentre, as the same patterns of genocidal conduct have begun to appear in the West Bank. The only inference to be reasonably drawn from all this is of a clear intention to attack “the group’s capacity to renew itself, and hence to ensure its long‑term survival”.240
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C. Totality of the conduct: genocidal intent rationalized as self-defence
68. In the face of such wholesale destruction, the stated goals of Israel, accepted by some States, remain “to eradicate Hamas”241 and “bring the hostages home”.242 Neither of these goals, or motives, preclude a finding of genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference to be drawn. Instead, both motives, together and disjunctively, substantiate the genocidal intent.
69. History reveals that:
(a) As recognized in the jurisprudence, genocide may occur in the context of armed conflict.243 As Judge Trindade elaborated: “perpetrators of genocide will almost always allege that … their actions were taken ‘pursuant to an ongoing military conflict’; yet, ‘genocide may be a means for achieving military objectives just as readily as military conflict may be a means for instigating a genocidal plan’;”244
(b) Different underlying motives do not displace genocidal intent.245 As observed by Judge Bhandari, “genocidal intent may exist simultaneously with other, ulterior motives”.246 In international criminal jurisprudence, intent (the aim to achieve a criminal result: destruction of the group) is distinguished from motive (the reasons behind an action: hatred,247 revenge/collective punishment,248 personal political agendas,249 alleged threat250 ).251 Although motive is usually irrelevant in criminal law,252 it can reveal intent.253
70. Post-7 October, Israel has framed its military operations in Gaza as a war of self-defence254 and counter-terrorism255 against a terrorist group.256 However, it is well established that Israel cannot legitimately invoke self-defence against the population under its occupation.257 The occupying Power must protect, not target, the occupied people. In the context of Israel ignoring the ICJ directive to end the unlawful occupation, the aim to eradicate resistance contradicts the rights to self-determination and to resist an oppressive regime, protected by customary international law.258 It also portrays the entire population as engaged in resistance and therefore eliminable. By continuing to suppress the right to self-determination,259 Israel is replicating historical instances in which self-defence, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism were used to justify destruction of the group, leading to genocide.260
71. With the dehumanization of Palestinians reaching a peak,261 the world has become inured to the individual and collective toll of their devastation. In Gaza, Israel has targeted both military operatives and ordinary civilians, including from local governance structures and civil servants.262 Expanding full-scale military operations to the West Bank further exposes an aim to target Palestinians beyond Hamas.
72. As the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, announced, Israel has operated on the basis that “it is an entire nation out there that is responsible”.263 The entire population – deemed “non-innocent” and “not uninvolved” by Israel – has been subject to indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.264 Scorched-earth tactics have spread terror among civilians, far exceeding the bounds of legitimate force. Continual, unproven attributions of Hamas affiliation and allegations of “human shielding” in almost every assault help disguise the systematic targeting of civilians, de facto erasing Palestinian civilian-ness altogether.265 The resulting incommensurate losses sustained by Palestinians compared with Israeli losses,266 viewed in the context of the vastly superior Israeli military capabilities, 267 suggest an intent other than that claimed.268
73. The disturbing frequency and callousness of the killing of people known to be civilians are “emblematic of the systematic nature” of a destructive intent.269 Six-year-old Hind Rajab, killed with 355 bullets after pleading for help for hours;270 the fatal mauling by dogs of Muhammed Bhar, who had Down’s Syndrome;271 the execution of Atta Ibrahim Al-Muqaid, an older deaf man, in his home, later bragged about by his killer and other soldiers on social media;272 the premature babies deliberately left to die a slow death and decompose in the intensive care unit at Al-Nasr Hospital;273 the elderly man, Bashir Hajji, killed en route to southern Gaza after appearing in a propaganda photograph of a “safe corridor”;274 Abu al-Ola, the handcuffed hostage shot by a sniper after being sent into Nasser Hospital with evacuation orders.275 When the dust settles on Gaza, the true extent of the horror experienced by Palestinians will become known.
74. The second stated goal of Israel is to rescue Israeli hostages.276 This claim has been undermined by the harm caused by Israel to the hostages themselves: more have been killed by indiscriminate Israeli bombing or friendly fire than rescued.277 Sabotaging the ceasefire negotiations resulted in hostage deaths.278 The words and conduct of Israeli high-ranking officials,279 including Prime Minister Netanyahu, indicate that regaining and retaining control over Gaza’s territory has overridden the release of hostages as a priority.280
VI. Understanding genocidal intent within a State
75. Accountability for genocide cannot be limited to criminal responsibility of individuals, who are to be judged in criminal trials with due process guarantees. It would be a tragic paradox if the rights of victims were subordinated to the guarantees afforded to alleged perpetrators and their Governments.281 Furthermore, the responsibility of the State must be assessed in its own right. The moment one genocidal act occurs and the special intent manifests, this signals that genocide is taking place. This is the moment to intervene – early intervention being the only way to prevent more atrocities that will scar human history.
76. State responsibility entails actions and omissions that lead to genocide.282 Conduct attributable to the State includes executive, legislative, judicial or any other functions or actions carried out by State organs283 and legal persons with government authority284 (even ultra vires actions).285 This includes military personnel and persons acting under instructions or control of a State,286 or conduct acknowledged by the State as its own.287 All such conduct should be assessed in its totality.
77. A State is obliged to prevent, to not commit and to punish genocide. According to ICJ, the State obligation to prevent genocide arises as soon as the State becomes aware, or should reasonably be aware, of a “serious risk of genocide”,288 and specifically on the emergence of a reasonable suspicion that genocidal intent has formed within the State apparatus. The State is obliged to investigate and prosecute those suspected of committing genocide and ancillary offences of direct and public incitement, attempt, aid and assist and conspiracy.289 Knowing the risk of genocide, but failing to act to prevent or to take action to punish these preparatory acts, should be taken as indication of genocidal intent.290
78. In autocratic governance systems, checks and balances to curb genocidal conduct are likely either non-existent or non-functioning. Conversely, in a State that claims to have a rule of law system, the legislature, executive or judiciary should be able to curb excesses (generally crimes in and of themselves) that may escalate into genocide. All State organs understand their function as a check on the excesses of others – primarily the executive’s. The failure of an apparent rule of law State apparatus to fulfil those obligations, knowing what the consequences will be, must be seen as an integral part of the totality of conduct that should be assessed when determining State genocidal intent.
79. Acts or omissions of a State may contribute to “the opportunity to commit genocide”, a circumstantial factor that ICJ has considered when assessing inferences to be drawn.291 Jurisprudence also recognizes that “the prevailing atmosphere of impunity”292 and “the encouragement of the authorities” may increase the possibility of crimes leading to genocide.293
80. A conservative assessment would lead to the conclusion that, at a minimum, the orders of ICJ on 26 January 2024 should have triggered this duty to act. The Court had specifically instructed Israel to:294
• Refrain from further acts that may amount to genocide
• Prevent and punish genocidal incitement
• Allow humanitarian assistance
• Preserve evidence
• Submit a report to the Court detailing steps taken to implement the ruling within one month
81. Instead, genocidal violence continued in Gaza with serious risk of expanding to the West Bank amid increasing genocidal incitement, as demonstrated in section III of the present report. No one has been investigated or prosecuted, let alone punished. Immediately after the Court issued provisional measures, Israel launched an unsubstantiated campaign against UNRWA, which jeopardized the fragile lifelines necessary for humanitarian assistance in Gaza.295 The following examples offer a snapshot of how various arms of the State have participated in forming the State’s intent:
(a) Statements made by the political-military leadership must be adjudicated as evidence of both direct intent and part of the totality of conduct from which intent is inferable. Direct orders at the highest levels of Israeli leadership, as meticulously documented by South Africa,296 are the hallmark of the genocide in Gaza. These genocidal statements and incitements have continued unabated throughout the past year and echoed at all levels of the military structure. Relentless genocidal incitement by Israeli officials hastened the “normalization” of exterminatory violence;
(b) The members of the Security and War Cabinets of Israel, and other ministers, have issued such genocidal statements and used their ministerial responsibilities to implement their words, authorizing the various genocidal acts in Gaza, such as starvation, obstruction of humanitarian assistance and creation of conditions of life that would lead to destruction;297
(c) The Knesset has fully supported the Government and provided a platform for utterly dehumanizing debates concerning Palestinians. The Deputy Speaker declared on 8 October 2023, “Now we all have one common goal – erasing the Gaza Strip from the face of the Earth”.298 The Knesset has passed emergency laws,299 amendments and repeated extensions to the Detention of Unlawful Combatants Law, thereby facilitating the imposition of even more deplorable conditions on Palestinian detainees;300 condoned torture, including rape of Palestinian detainees (derogatively called “Nukhba”),301 and approved budgets for military and colony expansion.302 In July 2024, the Knesset voted against the two-State solution;303
(d) The Attorney General has failed to investigate and prosecute acts preparatory to and associated with genocide, such as war crimes, torture and starvation,304 and to implement the provisional measures against genocidal incitement,305 while pursuing those “inciting” support for Palestinian resistance.306 This draws on and consolidates the long-standing environment of impunity recognized by ICJ;307
(e) The judiciary has failed to impose limitations on criminal conduct and administrative excesses, or enforce any accountability, in almost 12 months, effectively granting impunity to public officials, military personnel and settlers.308 Courts dismissed a petition regarding Palestinian prison conditions309 and rejected an appeal relating to media access to Gaza.310 Following the ICJ provisional measures order, the High Court did agree to hear a petition on humanitarian aid to Gaza in March 2024,311 and others on torture and conditions of detention.312 However, no persons or institutions have been held accountable;
(f) The role of the Israeli media in inciting this genocide, by helping to foster an unchecked genocidal climate, ought to be examined judicially – as has occurred in other contexts.313 Compounding decades of dehumanization of the Palestinians,314 the media have platformed proponents of genocide and debates legitimating their brutalization315, and have withheld the facts from the Israeli public. State actions have exacerbated the situation, including heavy military censorship,316 the killing of 111 Palestinian journalists,317 denial of entry to foreign journalists to Gaza and the forced closure of Al Jazeera’s offices in Israel318 and the West Bank.319 Meanwhile, Israeli regulatory agencies have neither exercised their authority to revoke broadcast licences nor issued financial sanctions against those using or amplifying genocidal statements.320
82. The State of Israel is predicated on the goal of Palestinian erasure; its entire political system is directed towards this goal. State structures have historically architected the oppression of Palestinians;321 now its institutions, failing to function as a bulwark, are together advancing the course of the current catastrophe.
VII. Conclusions
83. The Gaza genocide is a tragedy foretold, and one that risks expanding to other Palestinians under Israeli rule. Since its establishment, Israel has treated the occupied people as a hated encumbrance and threat to be eradicated, subjecting millions of Palestinians, for generations, to everyday indignities, mass killing, mass incarceration, forced displacement, racial segregation and apartheid. Advancing its goal of “Greater Israel” threatens to erase the Indigenous Palestinian population.
84. Obscured by false Israeli narratives of a war waged in “self-defence”, the genocidal conduct of Israel must be viewed within a broader context, as numerous actions (totality of conduct) jointly targeting the Palestinians as such (totality of a people) across the entire territory where they reside (totality of the land), in furtherance of the political ambitions of Israel for sovereignty over the whole of former Mandatory Palestine. Today, the genocide of the Palestinians appears to be the means to an end: the complete removal or eradication of Palestinians from the land so integral to their identity, and which is illegally and openly coveted by Israel.
85. Statements and actions by Israeli leaders reflect a genocidal intent and conduct; they have often used the Biblical story of Amalek to justify the extermination of “the Gazans”, erasing Gaza and violently displacing Palestinians, thereby casting Palestinians as a whole as legitimate targets.
86. Individuals clearly identifiable as perpetrators should be prosecuted. However, it is the entire State apparatus that has engineered, articulated and executed genocidal violence, through acts which in their totality may lead to the destruction of the Palestinian people. This must stop; urgent action is required to ensure the full application of the Genocide Convention and full protection of the Palestinians.
87. This ongoing genocide is doubtlessly the consequence of the exceptional status and protracted impunity that has been afforded to Israel. Israel has systematically and flagrantly violated international law, including Security Council resolutions and ICJ orders. This has emboldened the hubris of Israel and its defiance of international law. As the ICC Prosecutor has warned, “if we do not demonstrate our willingness to apply the law equally, if it is seen as applied selectively, we will be creating the conditions of its complete collapse. This is the true risk we face at this perilous moment.”
88. As the world watches the first live-streamed settler-colonial genocide, only justice can heal the wounds that political expedience has allowed to fester. The devastation of so many lives is an outrage to humanity and all that international law stands for.
[b]VIII. Recommendations
89. The current genocide is part of a century-long project of eliminatory settler-colonialism in Palestine, a stain on the international system and humanity, which must be ended, investigated and prosecuted.
90. The Special Rapporteur reminds all States of their legal obligation to act on their due diligence duties given the clearly serious risk of continuous breach of the Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions, and urges States to consider and reach an urgent public determination as to what levers and tools each State has at its disposal to ameliorate that risk, whether acting alone or with other States, including at the United Nations; and to explain to the public and the international community the steps which it has taken and why.
91. Whether in compliance with the above due diligence duties or otherwise, the Special Rapporteur urges Member States to:
(a) Use all their political leverage – commencing with a full arms embargo and sanctions – so that Israel stops the assault against the Palestinians, accepts a ceasefire and fully withdraws from the occupied Palestinian territory in line with the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024;
(b) Formally recognize Israel as an apartheid State and persistent violator of international law, reactivating the Special Committee Against Apartheid to comprehensively address the situation in Palestine, and warn Israel of possible suspension of its membership under Article 6 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) Support the deployment of an international protective presence throughout the occupied Palestinian territory;
(d) Develop a protective framework for Palestinians displaced outside Gaza, in line with international human rights and refugee law, while fully preserving their right to return;
(e) Support independent and thorough investigation(s) of criminal conduct, including genocide and apartheid, including through the application in national courts of universal jurisdiction over those suspected of such criminal conduct, including all relevant ancillary offences;
(f) Investigate and prosecute corporate entities and dual citizens involved in crimes in the occupied Palestinian territory, including soldiers, mercenaries and settlers;
(g) Ensure unhindered humanitarian assistance to Gaza and full financing and protection of UNRWA, including from attacks on its premises and personnel and from libellous smear campaigns, and ensure the continuity of its mandate in all fields.
92. The Special Rapporteur urges the ICC Prosecutor to investigate the commission of the crimes of genocide and apartheid by Israel, and investigate other prominent individuals mentioned in the present report.
93. The Special Rapporteur urges the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel to investigate the broader context of eliminatory intent and practices of Israel against all Palestinians (triple lens test), including those with Israeli citizenship and the refugees, and recent acts of genocide.
_______________
Notes:
* A/79/150.
** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent information.
1 A/HRC/55/73, para. 7
2 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86 (5); and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024, Order, 24 May 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 57 (2) (c).
3 A/HRC/53/59, paras. 14–25; A/HRC/55/73, paras. 15–20; and A/HRC/49/87, paras. 19–34.
4 The French term “colonies” better reflects the colonization process than the euphemism “settlements” commonly used in English, see Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 111.
5 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 155 and 261–264.
6 Ibid., para. 173, 179 and 252.
7 Ibid., para. 173.
8 Ibid., para. 239.
9 Ibid., para. 179.
10 Ibid., paras. 179, 254 and 261–263; and United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4).
11 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 223–229.
12 Ibid., paras. 237–245, 256–257 and 261–262.
13 Ibid., paras. 155 and 167–169. See also the following under Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, see Declaration of Judge Xue, para. 4; Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, paras. 2–4 and 12; and Separate Opinion of Judge Cleveland, para. 33.
14 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 267–271, and 285 (4)–285 (6).
15 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 139.
16 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 205, 254 and 263.
17 Eight States have formally intervened, see http://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention.
18 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86 (1).
19 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 28 March 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 21–22.
20 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024, Order, 24 May 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 29 and 57 (2) (a).
21 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2024 ... -advisory; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ly-or-risk.
22 Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in Respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), Order, 30 April 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 22–24. Consider also, Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 285 (7).
23 A/HRC/56/CRP.4, para. 94.
24 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ians-calls.
25 See http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... Jerusalem; and http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... -Jerusalem.
26 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/12-ministe ... onference; http://www.economist.com/middle-east-an ... r-in-gaza; http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/right ... cna135863; https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/20/midd ... ndex.html; http://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/isr ... s/3252890; and Nicola Perugini, “Settler colonial inversions: Israel’s ‘disengagement’ and the Gush Katif ‘Museum of Expulsion’ in Jerusalem”, Settler Colonial Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 (February 2019), pp. 44–45.
27 See http://www.lemkininstitute.com/active-g ... -west-bank.
28 Israeli Knesset Member, Ariel Kallner, available at https://x.com/ArielKallner/status/ 1710769363119141268, translated in http://www.newarab.com/analysis/erase-g ... sed-israel.
29 See http://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas ... 24-09-11/; and http://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/pr ... m-recovery.
30 See https://gaza-projections.org/gaza_proje ... eport.pdf; and http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lance ... 40-6736(24)01169-3/fulltext.
31 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-131; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-140; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-144; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-146; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-147; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-159; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... west-bank; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ystem-enar.
32 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-136; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-141; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-148; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-171; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-172; http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/28 ... zas-rafah; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
33 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-131; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-144; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and https://airwars.org/civilian-casualties ... y-12-2024/.
34 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-155; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-152; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-171; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-166; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
35 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
36 See http://www.972mag.com/palestinian-infan ... gaza-2024/.
37 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yA7MeI65IlM; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/a ... srael-war; and http://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2 ... s-00167697.
38 See http://www.who.int/news/item/12-09-2024 ... s-in-gaza/.
39 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149256; and http://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world ... eaths.html.
40 See http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/ ... st-in-gaza.
41 See http://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/up ... lities.pdf, paras. 56–57; and http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/ resources/summary_on_detention_and_alleged_ill-treatmentupdated.pdf.
42 See http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024 ... cide.html; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... -gaza-call.
43 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 60–61; and https://beiruturbanlab.com/en/Details/1977.
44 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... cide-gaza; and https://theintercept.com/2024/02/09/dec ... education/.
45 Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, “‘Medicide’ in Gaza and international law: time for banning the bombing of hospitals”, Institute for Palestine Studies, No. 094, September 2024.
46 See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/14 ... destroyed; and https://jacobin.com/2024/03/israel-gaza ... l-heritage.
47 See https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... e-in-gaza; and http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ ... crimes-aoe.
48 See http://www.unep.org/resources/report/en ... al-impacts, p. 7.
49 Ibid., pp. 32–36.
50 See http://www.undp.org/papp/publications/u ... management, p. 1.
51 See http://www.science.org/content/article/ ... -grim-news.
52 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... -un-expert.
53 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152791.
54 See http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... sue_38.pdf, p. 3; and http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... sue_24.pdf, p. 1.
55 See http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... sue_38.pdf, p. 3.
56 S/2024/419, enclosure I, paras. 6, 10 and 24; and enclosure II, para. 6.
57 See http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... -genocide; and https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... ce-in-gaza.
58 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149951; https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/ 1153406; https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/07/1152601; http://www.nrc.no/news/2024/august/gaza ... -aid-hub/; http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... -genocide; and https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... ce-in-gaza.
59 See http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/file ... attack.pdf.
60 See https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ ... report.pdf.
61 See http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... -Jerusalem.
62 See http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/secu ... fffcbc0000.
63 See http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2 ... stigation/.
64 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... gaza-strip.
65 Ibid.
66 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 85 and 95.
67 See https://x.com/AmichaiChikli/status/1830868859407970703 (Hebrew); and https://x.com/bezalelsm/status/1830140531164237947 (Hebrew).
68 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 87–92; and Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, “Medical lawfare: the Nakba and Israel’s attacks on Palestinian healthcare”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 53, No. 1 (April 2024).
69 See https://healthcluster.who.int/publicati ... -territory.
70 Ibid.
71 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.who.int/news/item/06-04-2024 ... n-reports; and https://mondoweiss.net/2024/04/come-out ... -happened/.
72 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... aza-strip; and http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202 ... -al-balah/.
73 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/articl ... onvoy-gaza.
74 See http://www.emro.who.int/opt/news/varian ... gaza.html; http://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza ... -20aug24/; and http://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/26/gaza ... o-outbreak.
75 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cevjz7zreyxo.
76 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1153761; and https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/29/ middleeast/gaza-who-humanitarian-pause-intl-latam/index.html.
77 See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/ ... e=3154007; and https://x.com/EuroMedHR/status/1833448805238181922.
78 See http://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas ... 024-09-09/.
79 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
80 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSQxAU5p1kc.
81 A/79/171, paras. 42–64 and 112 (d).
82 See https://unosat.org/products/3905.
83 See https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.co ... sequence=1, pp. 6 and 21.
84 See https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israe ... war-gaza/; and https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/un-human-rights-office-opt-attacks-humanitarian-aid-distribution-system-enar.
85 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ation-gaza.
86 See http://www.wfp.org/stories/gaza-updates ... els-hunger.
87 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
88 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
89 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported ... ember-2024.
90 See https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/ce ... H-Only.pdf, p. 6.
91 See http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_u ... rip_Acute_ Food_Insecurity_MaySept2024_Special_Snapshot.pdf.
92 A/79/171, para. 48.
93 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-i ... nt-let-us/.
94 See http://www.nrc.no/news/2024/september/i ... a-reveals/.
95 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... update-11; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-116; http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... 18-enarhe; http://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha ... -08jul24/; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ystem-enar.
96 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... gaza-strip.
97 See https://aje.io/e90yu2?update=3174278; http://www.israelnationalnews.com/en/news/395677; and https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/22/midd ... index.html.
98 See http://www.972mag.com/northern-gaza-liq ... land-rabi/.
99 S/2024/419, pp. 92–93.
100 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-113; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-116; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-118; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-143; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-144; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ystem-enar.
101 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, art. 54; Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, art. 14; International Committee of the Red Cross on customary international humanitarian law, rule 53; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (b) (xxv).
102 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... l_eng.pdf; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... reventable.
103 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf.
104 Ibid., p. 91.
105 See http://www.kikar.co.il/security-news/s5ieil (Hebrew).
106 NGO submissions.
107 A/HRC/55/72, para. 18; https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... west-bank; and http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 7e83330000.
108 See https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ts-council.
109 See http://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.
110 See http://www.unicef.org/press-releases/ch ... ine-months.
C. Totality of the conduct: genocidal intent rationalized as self-defence
68. In the face of such wholesale destruction, the stated goals of Israel, accepted by some States, remain “to eradicate Hamas”241 and “bring the hostages home”.242 Neither of these goals, or motives, preclude a finding of genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference to be drawn. Instead, both motives, together and disjunctively, substantiate the genocidal intent.
69. History reveals that:
(a) As recognized in the jurisprudence, genocide may occur in the context of armed conflict.243 As Judge Trindade elaborated: “perpetrators of genocide will almost always allege that … their actions were taken ‘pursuant to an ongoing military conflict’; yet, ‘genocide may be a means for achieving military objectives just as readily as military conflict may be a means for instigating a genocidal plan’;”244
(b) Different underlying motives do not displace genocidal intent.245 As observed by Judge Bhandari, “genocidal intent may exist simultaneously with other, ulterior motives”.246 In international criminal jurisprudence, intent (the aim to achieve a criminal result: destruction of the group) is distinguished from motive (the reasons behind an action: hatred,247 revenge/collective punishment,248 personal political agendas,249 alleged threat250 ).251 Although motive is usually irrelevant in criminal law,252 it can reveal intent.253
70. Post-7 October, Israel has framed its military operations in Gaza as a war of self-defence254 and counter-terrorism255 against a terrorist group.256 However, it is well established that Israel cannot legitimately invoke self-defence against the population under its occupation.257 The occupying Power must protect, not target, the occupied people. In the context of Israel ignoring the ICJ directive to end the unlawful occupation, the aim to eradicate resistance contradicts the rights to self-determination and to resist an oppressive regime, protected by customary international law.258 It also portrays the entire population as engaged in resistance and therefore eliminable. By continuing to suppress the right to self-determination,259 Israel is replicating historical instances in which self-defence, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism were used to justify destruction of the group, leading to genocide.260
71. With the dehumanization of Palestinians reaching a peak,261 the world has become inured to the individual and collective toll of their devastation. In Gaza, Israel has targeted both military operatives and ordinary civilians, including from local governance structures and civil servants.262 Expanding full-scale military operations to the West Bank further exposes an aim to target Palestinians beyond Hamas.
72. As the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, announced, Israel has operated on the basis that “it is an entire nation out there that is responsible”.263 The entire population – deemed “non-innocent” and “not uninvolved” by Israel – has been subject to indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.264 Scorched-earth tactics have spread terror among civilians, far exceeding the bounds of legitimate force. Continual, unproven attributions of Hamas affiliation and allegations of “human shielding” in almost every assault help disguise the systematic targeting of civilians, de facto erasing Palestinian civilian-ness altogether.265 The resulting incommensurate losses sustained by Palestinians compared with Israeli losses,266 viewed in the context of the vastly superior Israeli military capabilities, 267 suggest an intent other than that claimed.268
73. The disturbing frequency and callousness of the killing of people known to be civilians are “emblematic of the systematic nature” of a destructive intent.269 Six-year-old Hind Rajab, killed with 355 bullets after pleading for help for hours;270 the fatal mauling by dogs of Muhammed Bhar, who had Down’s Syndrome;271 the execution of Atta Ibrahim Al-Muqaid, an older deaf man, in his home, later bragged about by his killer and other soldiers on social media;272 the premature babies deliberately left to die a slow death and decompose in the intensive care unit at Al-Nasr Hospital;273 the elderly man, Bashir Hajji, killed en route to southern Gaza after appearing in a propaganda photograph of a “safe corridor”;274 Abu al-Ola, the handcuffed hostage shot by a sniper after being sent into Nasser Hospital with evacuation orders.275 When the dust settles on Gaza, the true extent of the horror experienced by Palestinians will become known.
74. The second stated goal of Israel is to rescue Israeli hostages.276 This claim has been undermined by the harm caused by Israel to the hostages themselves: more have been killed by indiscriminate Israeli bombing or friendly fire than rescued.277 Sabotaging the ceasefire negotiations resulted in hostage deaths.278 The words and conduct of Israeli high-ranking officials,279 including Prime Minister Netanyahu, indicate that regaining and retaining control over Gaza’s territory has overridden the release of hostages as a priority.280
VI. Understanding genocidal intent within a State
75. Accountability for genocide cannot be limited to criminal responsibility of individuals, who are to be judged in criminal trials with due process guarantees. It would be a tragic paradox if the rights of victims were subordinated to the guarantees afforded to alleged perpetrators and their Governments.281 Furthermore, the responsibility of the State must be assessed in its own right. The moment one genocidal act occurs and the special intent manifests, this signals that genocide is taking place. This is the moment to intervene – early intervention being the only way to prevent more atrocities that will scar human history.
76. State responsibility entails actions and omissions that lead to genocide.282 Conduct attributable to the State includes executive, legislative, judicial or any other functions or actions carried out by State organs283 and legal persons with government authority284 (even ultra vires actions).285 This includes military personnel and persons acting under instructions or control of a State,286 or conduct acknowledged by the State as its own.287 All such conduct should be assessed in its totality.
77. A State is obliged to prevent, to not commit and to punish genocide. According to ICJ, the State obligation to prevent genocide arises as soon as the State becomes aware, or should reasonably be aware, of a “serious risk of genocide”,288 and specifically on the emergence of a reasonable suspicion that genocidal intent has formed within the State apparatus. The State is obliged to investigate and prosecute those suspected of committing genocide and ancillary offences of direct and public incitement, attempt, aid and assist and conspiracy.289 Knowing the risk of genocide, but failing to act to prevent or to take action to punish these preparatory acts, should be taken as indication of genocidal intent.290
78. In autocratic governance systems, checks and balances to curb genocidal conduct are likely either non-existent or non-functioning. Conversely, in a State that claims to have a rule of law system, the legislature, executive or judiciary should be able to curb excesses (generally crimes in and of themselves) that may escalate into genocide. All State organs understand their function as a check on the excesses of others – primarily the executive’s. The failure of an apparent rule of law State apparatus to fulfil those obligations, knowing what the consequences will be, must be seen as an integral part of the totality of conduct that should be assessed when determining State genocidal intent.
79. Acts or omissions of a State may contribute to “the opportunity to commit genocide”, a circumstantial factor that ICJ has considered when assessing inferences to be drawn.291 Jurisprudence also recognizes that “the prevailing atmosphere of impunity”292 and “the encouragement of the authorities” may increase the possibility of crimes leading to genocide.293
80. A conservative assessment would lead to the conclusion that, at a minimum, the orders of ICJ on 26 January 2024 should have triggered this duty to act. The Court had specifically instructed Israel to:294
• Refrain from further acts that may amount to genocide
• Prevent and punish genocidal incitement
• Allow humanitarian assistance
• Preserve evidence
• Submit a report to the Court detailing steps taken to implement the ruling within one month
81. Instead, genocidal violence continued in Gaza with serious risk of expanding to the West Bank amid increasing genocidal incitement, as demonstrated in section III of the present report. No one has been investigated or prosecuted, let alone punished. Immediately after the Court issued provisional measures, Israel launched an unsubstantiated campaign against UNRWA, which jeopardized the fragile lifelines necessary for humanitarian assistance in Gaza.295 The following examples offer a snapshot of how various arms of the State have participated in forming the State’s intent:
(a) Statements made by the political-military leadership must be adjudicated as evidence of both direct intent and part of the totality of conduct from which intent is inferable. Direct orders at the highest levels of Israeli leadership, as meticulously documented by South Africa,296 are the hallmark of the genocide in Gaza. These genocidal statements and incitements have continued unabated throughout the past year and echoed at all levels of the military structure. Relentless genocidal incitement by Israeli officials hastened the “normalization” of exterminatory violence;
(b) The members of the Security and War Cabinets of Israel, and other ministers, have issued such genocidal statements and used their ministerial responsibilities to implement their words, authorizing the various genocidal acts in Gaza, such as starvation, obstruction of humanitarian assistance and creation of conditions of life that would lead to destruction;297
(c) The Knesset has fully supported the Government and provided a platform for utterly dehumanizing debates concerning Palestinians. The Deputy Speaker declared on 8 October 2023, “Now we all have one common goal – erasing the Gaza Strip from the face of the Earth”.298 The Knesset has passed emergency laws,299 amendments and repeated extensions to the Detention of Unlawful Combatants Law, thereby facilitating the imposition of even more deplorable conditions on Palestinian detainees;300 condoned torture, including rape of Palestinian detainees (derogatively called “Nukhba”),301 and approved budgets for military and colony expansion.302 In July 2024, the Knesset voted against the two-State solution;303
(d) The Attorney General has failed to investigate and prosecute acts preparatory to and associated with genocide, such as war crimes, torture and starvation,304 and to implement the provisional measures against genocidal incitement,305 while pursuing those “inciting” support for Palestinian resistance.306 This draws on and consolidates the long-standing environment of impunity recognized by ICJ;307
(e) The judiciary has failed to impose limitations on criminal conduct and administrative excesses, or enforce any accountability, in almost 12 months, effectively granting impunity to public officials, military personnel and settlers.308 Courts dismissed a petition regarding Palestinian prison conditions309 and rejected an appeal relating to media access to Gaza.310 Following the ICJ provisional measures order, the High Court did agree to hear a petition on humanitarian aid to Gaza in March 2024,311 and others on torture and conditions of detention.312 However, no persons or institutions have been held accountable;
(f) The role of the Israeli media in inciting this genocide, by helping to foster an unchecked genocidal climate, ought to be examined judicially – as has occurred in other contexts.313 Compounding decades of dehumanization of the Palestinians,314 the media have platformed proponents of genocide and debates legitimating their brutalization315, and have withheld the facts from the Israeli public. State actions have exacerbated the situation, including heavy military censorship,316 the killing of 111 Palestinian journalists,317 denial of entry to foreign journalists to Gaza and the forced closure of Al Jazeera’s offices in Israel318 and the West Bank.319 Meanwhile, Israeli regulatory agencies have neither exercised their authority to revoke broadcast licences nor issued financial sanctions against those using or amplifying genocidal statements.320
82. The State of Israel is predicated on the goal of Palestinian erasure; its entire political system is directed towards this goal. State structures have historically architected the oppression of Palestinians;321 now its institutions, failing to function as a bulwark, are together advancing the course of the current catastrophe.
VII. Conclusions
83. The Gaza genocide is a tragedy foretold, and one that risks expanding to other Palestinians under Israeli rule. Since its establishment, Israel has treated the occupied people as a hated encumbrance and threat to be eradicated, subjecting millions of Palestinians, for generations, to everyday indignities, mass killing, mass incarceration, forced displacement, racial segregation and apartheid. Advancing its goal of “Greater Israel” threatens to erase the Indigenous Palestinian population.
84. Obscured by false Israeli narratives of a war waged in “self-defence”, the genocidal conduct of Israel must be viewed within a broader context, as numerous actions (totality of conduct) jointly targeting the Palestinians as such (totality of a people) across the entire territory where they reside (totality of the land), in furtherance of the political ambitions of Israel for sovereignty over the whole of former Mandatory Palestine. Today, the genocide of the Palestinians appears to be the means to an end: the complete removal or eradication of Palestinians from the land so integral to their identity, and which is illegally and openly coveted by Israel.
85. Statements and actions by Israeli leaders reflect a genocidal intent and conduct; they have often used the Biblical story of Amalek to justify the extermination of “the Gazans”, erasing Gaza and violently displacing Palestinians, thereby casting Palestinians as a whole as legitimate targets.
86. Individuals clearly identifiable as perpetrators should be prosecuted. However, it is the entire State apparatus that has engineered, articulated and executed genocidal violence, through acts which in their totality may lead to the destruction of the Palestinian people. This must stop; urgent action is required to ensure the full application of the Genocide Convention and full protection of the Palestinians.
87. This ongoing genocide is doubtlessly the consequence of the exceptional status and protracted impunity that has been afforded to Israel. Israel has systematically and flagrantly violated international law, including Security Council resolutions and ICJ orders. This has emboldened the hubris of Israel and its defiance of international law. As the ICC Prosecutor has warned, “if we do not demonstrate our willingness to apply the law equally, if it is seen as applied selectively, we will be creating the conditions of its complete collapse. This is the true risk we face at this perilous moment.”
88. As the world watches the first live-streamed settler-colonial genocide, only justice can heal the wounds that political expedience has allowed to fester. The devastation of so many lives is an outrage to humanity and all that international law stands for.
[b]VIII. Recommendations
89. The current genocide is part of a century-long project of eliminatory settler-colonialism in Palestine, a stain on the international system and humanity, which must be ended, investigated and prosecuted.
90. The Special Rapporteur reminds all States of their legal obligation to act on their due diligence duties given the clearly serious risk of continuous breach of the Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions, and urges States to consider and reach an urgent public determination as to what levers and tools each State has at its disposal to ameliorate that risk, whether acting alone or with other States, including at the United Nations; and to explain to the public and the international community the steps which it has taken and why.
91. Whether in compliance with the above due diligence duties or otherwise, the Special Rapporteur urges Member States to:
(a) Use all their political leverage – commencing with a full arms embargo and sanctions – so that Israel stops the assault against the Palestinians, accepts a ceasefire and fully withdraws from the occupied Palestinian territory in line with the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024;
(b) Formally recognize Israel as an apartheid State and persistent violator of international law, reactivating the Special Committee Against Apartheid to comprehensively address the situation in Palestine, and warn Israel of possible suspension of its membership under Article 6 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) Support the deployment of an international protective presence throughout the occupied Palestinian territory;
(d) Develop a protective framework for Palestinians displaced outside Gaza, in line with international human rights and refugee law, while fully preserving their right to return;
(e) Support independent and thorough investigation(s) of criminal conduct, including genocide and apartheid, including through the application in national courts of universal jurisdiction over those suspected of such criminal conduct, including all relevant ancillary offences;
(f) Investigate and prosecute corporate entities and dual citizens involved in crimes in the occupied Palestinian territory, including soldiers, mercenaries and settlers;
(g) Ensure unhindered humanitarian assistance to Gaza and full financing and protection of UNRWA, including from attacks on its premises and personnel and from libellous smear campaigns, and ensure the continuity of its mandate in all fields.
92. The Special Rapporteur urges the ICC Prosecutor to investigate the commission of the crimes of genocide and apartheid by Israel, and investigate other prominent individuals mentioned in the present report.
93. The Special Rapporteur urges the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel to investigate the broader context of eliminatory intent and practices of Israel against all Palestinians (triple lens test), including those with Israeli citizenship and the refugees, and recent acts of genocide.
_______________
Notes:
* A/79/150.
** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent information.
1 A/HRC/55/73, para. 7
2 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86 (5); and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024, Order, 24 May 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 57 (2) (c).
3 A/HRC/53/59, paras. 14–25; A/HRC/55/73, paras. 15–20; and A/HRC/49/87, paras. 19–34.
4 The French term “colonies” better reflects the colonization process than the euphemism “settlements” commonly used in English, see Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 111.
5 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 155 and 261–264.
6 Ibid., para. 173, 179 and 252.
7 Ibid., para. 173.
8 Ibid., para. 239.
9 Ibid., para. 179.
10 Ibid., paras. 179, 254 and 261–263; and United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4).
11 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 223–229.
12 Ibid., paras. 237–245, 256–257 and 261–262.
13 Ibid., paras. 155 and 167–169. See also the following under Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, see Declaration of Judge Xue, para. 4; Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, paras. 2–4 and 12; and Separate Opinion of Judge Cleveland, para. 33.
14 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 267–271, and 285 (4)–285 (6).
15 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 139.
16 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 205, 254 and 263.
17 Eight States have formally intervened, see http://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention.
18 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86 (1).
19 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 28 March 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 21–22.
20 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024, Order, 24 May 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 29 and 57 (2) (a).
21 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2024 ... -advisory; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ly-or-risk.
22 Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in Respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), Order, 30 April 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 22–24. Consider also, Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 285 (7).
23 A/HRC/56/CRP.4, para. 94.
24 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ians-calls.
25 See http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... Jerusalem; and http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... -Jerusalem.
26 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/12-ministe ... onference; http://www.economist.com/middle-east-an ... r-in-gaza; http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/right ... cna135863; https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/20/midd ... ndex.html; http://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/isr ... s/3252890; and Nicola Perugini, “Settler colonial inversions: Israel’s ‘disengagement’ and the Gush Katif ‘Museum of Expulsion’ in Jerusalem”, Settler Colonial Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 (February 2019), pp. 44–45.
27 See http://www.lemkininstitute.com/active-g ... -west-bank.
28 Israeli Knesset Member, Ariel Kallner, available at https://x.com/ArielKallner/status/ 1710769363119141268, translated in http://www.newarab.com/analysis/erase-g ... sed-israel.
29 See http://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas ... 24-09-11/; and http://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/pr ... m-recovery.
30 See https://gaza-projections.org/gaza_proje ... eport.pdf; and http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lance ... 40-6736(24)01169-3/fulltext.
31 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-131; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-140; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-144; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-146; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-147; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-159; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... west-bank; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ystem-enar.
32 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-136; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-141; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-148; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-171; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-172; http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/28 ... zas-rafah; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
33 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-131; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-144; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and https://airwars.org/civilian-casualties ... y-12-2024/.
34 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-155; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-152; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-171; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-166; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
35 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
36 See http://www.972mag.com/palestinian-infan ... gaza-2024/.
37 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yA7MeI65IlM; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/a ... srael-war; and http://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2 ... s-00167697.
38 See http://www.who.int/news/item/12-09-2024 ... s-in-gaza/.
39 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149256; and http://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world ... eaths.html.
40 See http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/ ... st-in-gaza.
41 See http://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/up ... lities.pdf, paras. 56–57; and http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/ resources/summary_on_detention_and_alleged_ill-treatmentupdated.pdf.
42 See http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024 ... cide.html; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... -gaza-call.
43 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 60–61; and https://beiruturbanlab.com/en/Details/1977.
44 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... cide-gaza; and https://theintercept.com/2024/02/09/dec ... education/.
45 Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, “‘Medicide’ in Gaza and international law: time for banning the bombing of hospitals”, Institute for Palestine Studies, No. 094, September 2024.
46 See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/14 ... destroyed; and https://jacobin.com/2024/03/israel-gaza ... l-heritage.
47 See https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... e-in-gaza; and http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ ... crimes-aoe.
48 See http://www.unep.org/resources/report/en ... al-impacts, p. 7.
49 Ibid., pp. 32–36.
50 See http://www.undp.org/papp/publications/u ... management, p. 1.
51 See http://www.science.org/content/article/ ... -grim-news.
52 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... -un-expert.
53 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152791.
54 See http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... sue_38.pdf, p. 3; and http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... sue_24.pdf, p. 1.
55 See http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... sue_38.pdf, p. 3.
56 S/2024/419, enclosure I, paras. 6, 10 and 24; and enclosure II, para. 6.
57 See http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... -genocide; and https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... ce-in-gaza.
58 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149951; https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/ 1153406; https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/07/1152601; http://www.nrc.no/news/2024/august/gaza ... -aid-hub/; http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... -genocide; and https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... ce-in-gaza.
59 See http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/file ... attack.pdf.
60 See https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ ... report.pdf.
61 See http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... -Jerusalem.
62 See http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/secu ... fffcbc0000.
63 See http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2 ... stigation/.
64 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... gaza-strip.
65 Ibid.
66 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 85 and 95.
67 See https://x.com/AmichaiChikli/status/1830868859407970703 (Hebrew); and https://x.com/bezalelsm/status/1830140531164237947 (Hebrew).
68 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 87–92; and Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, “Medical lawfare: the Nakba and Israel’s attacks on Palestinian healthcare”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 53, No. 1 (April 2024).
69 See https://healthcluster.who.int/publicati ... -territory.
70 Ibid.
71 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.who.int/news/item/06-04-2024 ... n-reports; and https://mondoweiss.net/2024/04/come-out ... -happened/.
72 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... aza-strip; and http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202 ... -al-balah/.
73 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/articl ... onvoy-gaza.
74 See http://www.emro.who.int/opt/news/varian ... gaza.html; http://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza ... -20aug24/; and http://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/26/gaza ... o-outbreak.
75 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cevjz7zreyxo.
76 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1153761; and https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/29/ middleeast/gaza-who-humanitarian-pause-intl-latam/index.html.
77 See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/ ... e=3154007; and https://x.com/EuroMedHR/status/1833448805238181922.
78 See http://www.reuters.com/world/middle-eas ... 024-09-09/.
79 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
80 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSQxAU5p1kc.
81 A/79/171, paras. 42–64 and 112 (d).
82 See https://unosat.org/products/3905.
83 See https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.co ... sequence=1, pp. 6 and 21.
84 See https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israe ... war-gaza/; and https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/un-human-rights-office-opt-attacks-humanitarian-aid-distribution-system-enar.
85 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ation-gaza.
86 See http://www.wfp.org/stories/gaza-updates ... els-hunger.
87 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
88 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... gaza-strip.
89 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported ... ember-2024.
90 See https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/ce ... H-Only.pdf, p. 6.
91 See http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_u ... rip_Acute_ Food_Insecurity_MaySept2024_Special_Snapshot.pdf.
92 A/79/171, para. 48.
93 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-i ... nt-let-us/.
94 See http://www.nrc.no/news/2024/september/i ... a-reveals/.
95 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... update-11; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-116; http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... 18-enarhe; http://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha ... -08jul24/; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ystem-enar.
96 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... gaza-strip.
97 See https://aje.io/e90yu2?update=3174278; http://www.israelnationalnews.com/en/news/395677; and https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/22/midd ... index.html.
98 See http://www.972mag.com/northern-gaza-liq ... land-rabi/.
99 S/2024/419, pp. 92–93.
100 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-113; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-116; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-118; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-143; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-144; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... pdate-149; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... aza-strip; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ystem-enar.
101 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, art. 54; Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, art. 14; International Committee of the Red Cross on customary international humanitarian law, rule 53; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (b) (xxv).
102 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... l_eng.pdf; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... reventable.
103 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf.
104 Ibid., p. 91.
105 See http://www.kikar.co.il/security-news/s5ieil (Hebrew).
106 NGO submissions.
107 A/HRC/55/72, para. 18; https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... west-bank; and http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 7e83330000.
108 See https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ts-council.
109 See http://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.
110 See http://www.unicef.org/press-releases/ch ... ine-months.
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Re: U.N. Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese Report
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Part 3 of 3
111 See https://assets.nationbuilder.com/dcipal ... 725884141/ Targeting_Childhood_report.pdf?1725884141, p. 7.
112 See https://assets.nationbuilder.com/dcipal ... 725884141/ Targeting_Childhood_report.pdf?1725884141, p. 7; and http://www.unicef.org/press-releases/ch ... ine-months.
113 See https://assets.nationbuilder.com/dcipal ... 725884141/ Targeting_Childhood_report.pdf?1725884141.
114 NGO submissions; A/HRC/55/28, paras. 75–80; and https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/ TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28609.
115 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 7–8.
116 See http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-release ... ture-rife; NGO submissions; and A/HRC/56/26, para. 62.
117 See https://hamoked.org/prisoners-charts.php; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... reventable.
118 See http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/file ... lities.pdf.
119 See https://cpj.org/2024/09/arrests-of-pale ... -gaza-war/.
120 See http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2 ... -arrests/; http://mezan.org/uploads/files/2024/4/1 ... Mezan.pdf; and http://www.omct.org/site-resources/file ... 5.2.24.pdf, p. 7.
121 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, p. 9.
122 See https://hashiloach.org.il/israels-decisive-plan/.
123 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/there-are- ... -smotrich/. See also para. 32.
124 See http://www.srugim.co.il/999113-%D7%A1%D ... 7%A8%D7%99% D7%A5-%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%98% D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%9D-%D7%AA%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9A-%D7%9C%D7%A2 (Hebrew).
125 See https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1828654399360586025 (Hebrew).
126 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... k-killings.
127 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... ank-enarhe.
128 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... nk-enarhe; http://www.ochaopt.org/poc/16-29-may-2023; http://www.ochaopt.org/ content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-137; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
129 See https://theintercept.com/2024/06/12/isr ... -children/.
130 See http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... epression/.
131 See https://acleddata.com/2024/08/05/palest ... rics-2024/.
132 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank
133 See http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... epression/.
134 See https://t.me/jenencamb/57875; http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ays-exper; and http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... epression/.
135 See http://www.972mag.com/israel-apartheid-jenin-gaza/; http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... pression/; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ays-expert.
136 See http://www.un.org/unispal/document/huma ... 1-07aug24/.
137 See https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/06/midd ... index.html.
138 See http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... Jerusalem; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ntensifies.
139 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ys-expert; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
140 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... -bank-enar.
141 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
142 See https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ntensifies.
143 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... -bank-enar.
144 See http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... ue_41b.pdf.
145 See http://www.msf.org/west-bank-israeli-fo ... eded-most; http://www.who.int/news/item/14-06-2024 ... -west-bank.
146 See http://www.who.int/news/item/14-06-2024 ... -west-bank.
147 A/79/347, paras. 7–10. See also the concern raised in Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 156.
148 See https://peacenow.org.il/en/state-land-d ... 00-dunams; and http://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/ya ... %D7%AA.pdf (Hebrew).
149 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
150 See http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news ... fd66980000.
151 See http://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east- ... -violence; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
152 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 239.
153 See http://www.crisisgroup.org/united-state ... lifelines; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... d-paralyse.
154 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- ... an-economy.
155 See http://www.ilo.org/resource/news/war-pr ... gaza-strip.
156 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- ... an-economy.
157 A/HRC/39/64, paras. 84–87; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 69, para. 56.
158 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 15–20.
159 Paul Behrens, “Between abstract event and individualized crime: genocidal intent in the case of Croatia”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2015), p. 934.
160 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, 7 July 2006, para. 40.
161 A/HRC/55/73, para. 18.
162 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 162, 390 and 434; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 190 and 344; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 580; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 553.
163 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 512.
164 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Ferdinand Nahimana and Others v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, 28 November 2007, para. 524.
165 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 419–430.
166 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Popović and Others, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeal-Judgment, 30 January 2015, para. 503; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, para. 413; Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), 15 November 2023, para. 53; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1436–1438.
167 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 572.
168 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Aloys Simba v. the Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appeal Judgment, 27 November 2007, paras. 268–269; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and others, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Appeal Judgment, 13 December 2004, paras. 302–304; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 49; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 50.
169 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 431–437; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 13 and 148–149.
170 Patricia M. Wald, “Genocide and crimes against humanity”, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 6, No. 3 (January 2007), pp. 631–632.
171 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 55; (cited in) Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), para. 54; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 550 and 2592; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Appeal Judgment, 8 April 2015, paras. 246–247; Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment (Chea Nuon and Samphan Khieu), Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 16 November 2018, para. 803; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1416.
172 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 237.
173 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, para. 801 (citing S/1994/674, para. 94); International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 745; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 55; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 September 2011, para. 142; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Ildéphonse Hategekimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-A, Appeal Judgment, 8 May 2012, para. 133.
174 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 580; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 344.
175 Tamara Starblanket, Suffer the Little Children: Genocide, Indigenous Nations and the Canadian State (Clarity Press, 2018), pp. 77–78; and Elisa Novic, The Concept of Cultural Genocide: An International Law Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 28.
176 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 666; Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, para. 801; Element of Crimes, art. 6 (PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, see construction of genocide crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). See also, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 32.
177 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II (e).
178 See footnote 162.
179 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgment, 12 March 2008, para. 176; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Siméon Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Judgment and Sentence, 12 November 2008, para. 331; Israel, District Court of Jerusalem, Attorney-General v. Eichmann, Case No. 40/61, Judgment, 1968, para. 183; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61; IT-95-18-R6I, Rule 61 Review of the Indictments, 11 July 1996, paras. 94–95.
180 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 740.
181 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
182 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 666; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1405.
183 See International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, paras. 73–74; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, Series C No. 136, Judgment, 22 November 2005, para. 146.
184 Bram Wispelwey and others, “Because its power remains naturalized: introducing the settler colonial determinants of health”, Frontiers in Public Health, vol. 11 (July 2023), p. 3.
185 E/C.12/2000/4, para. 4; and Kimberly Matheson and others, “Canada’s colonial genocide of indigenous peoples: a review of the psychosocial and neurobiological processes linking trauma and intergenerational outcomes”, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, vol. 19, No. 11 (May 2022), p. 2.
186 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, No. 4 (2006), p. 388.
187 A/HRC/21/53, para. 84; A/HRC/54/31/Add.2, paras. 21 and 26; A/HRC/33/57, paras. 4–5; Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart and others, “Historical trauma among indigenous peoples of the Americas: concepts, research, and clinical considerations”, Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, vol. 43, No. 4 (October 2011), p. 284; and Matheson and others, “Canada’s colonial genocide”.
188 Wolfe, “Settler colonialism”, p. 388.
189 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, paras. 190 and 344. See also, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 33.
190 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 740.
191 Ibid., para. 742.
192 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, paras. 661 and 666, citing International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 31; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1405; and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, para. 801.
193 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, paras. 374–376; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 182, 187, 414, 424–430 and 440.
194 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, paras. 182 and 373–375.
195 Ibid., para. 373.
196 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), para. 148.
197 Ibid., para. 170.
198 Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), para. 52, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, para. 148.
199 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 145.
200 Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), paras. 50–52.
201 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. François Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgment, 7 December 2007, para. 534; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 9 July 2004, para. 53; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 554; and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, paras. 4507–4512.
202 Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, with commentaries (see A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 35).
203 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, As We have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2017), p. 15.
204 Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 66.
205 A/77/356, paras. 25–32.
206 Ibid., paras. 38–40; Fayez Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (Beirut, Research Centre, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965), p. 27; and Nadav G. Shelef, “From ‘Both Banks of the Jordan’ to the ‘Whole Land of Israel:’ ideological change in revisionist Zionism”, Israel Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 (2004), pp. 125–148.
207 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-vo ... -us-trip/; http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu- ... -decades/; and http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68025945.
208 See https://peacenow.org.il/en/30-years-aft ... o-accords; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements- ... population.
209 See https://peacenow.org.il/en/30-years-aft ... lo-accords.
210 See http://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/up ... r-2023.pdf.
211 See http://www.badil.org/cached_uploads/vie ... 905362.pdf, pp. 11–12; and https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/Documents/ BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawNationState.pdf.
212 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 170.
213 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text- ... ael-peace/.
214 See International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61; IT-95-18-R6I, Rule 61 Review of the Indictments, 11 July 1996, paras. 94–95; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 524.
215 A/78/545, para. 13; A/HRC/53/59, paras. 4, 36–37 and 42; Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 47 and 205, see also, Declaration of Judge Charlesworth, para. 16.
216 Idith Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 174 and 196.
217 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Security Theology, Surveillance and the Politics of Fear (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 14.
218 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 372.
219 See http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at ... nian-state.
220 See https://www.mekomit.co.il/%d7%94%d7%9e% ... 4-%d7%95/; and https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza- ... 631fa4da5a.
221 See https://x.com/MiddleEastEye/status/1747967081541255628; https://t.me/bengvir/4294 (translated in https://x.com/KhaledYousry22/status/1798729352412319874); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3XLtt2yXGI; and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/29 ... ts-in-gaza.
222 See http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 7f35e10000.
223 A/79/347, paras. 6 and 15–17.
224 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 242.
225 Martin Shaw, “Palestine in an international historical perspective on genocide”, Holy Land Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 (May 2010), p. 20.
226 William Schabas, “Hate speech in Rwanda: the road to genocide”, in Genocide and Human Rights, Mark Lattimer, ed. (London, Routledge, 2017), p. 261.
227 See paras. 46–48 (above).
228 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II (c).
229 See http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... nocide-in; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 115–116.
230 See https://www.thenation.com/article/world ... s-future/; and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-68023080.
231 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 742.
232 A/78/545, para. 21; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 121; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 742; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 532–533; and Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), paras. 67–71.
233 A/79/171, paras. 80 and 110–111; and http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/file ... ts/issues/ food/2024-08-27-visuals-palestinian-people-food-sovereignty.pdf, pp. 6 and 12.
234 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
235 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 596; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... update-99; http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... pdate-158; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... update-164.
236 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
237 International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, paras. 73–74; International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Reparations Order, 28 February 2024, paras. 410–412.
238 Shaw, “Palestine in an international historical perspective”, pp. 3–6.
239 See https://zeteo.com/p/palestinian-israel- ... -citizens; and http://www.adalah.org/en/ content/view/11158.
240 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, para. 136.
241 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847.
242 Ibid.
243 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 572.
244 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 144.
245 Consider Genocide Convention, Travaux Préparatoires, A/C.6/SR.77, pp. 131–133; and A/C.6/SR.75, p. 117.
246 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 50 (emphasis in original).
247 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 79.
248 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 50; S/2005/60, para. 493; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 161.
249 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 49; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeal Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 102.
250 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 309–310; International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, (First) Warrant of Arrest Judgment, 4 March 2009, see Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, para. 65.
251 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 694; International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Appeal Judgment, 20 March 2019, para. 722; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 45.
252 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 268–269.
253 Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 694; International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case No. IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 153.
254 See https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/f ... -00-bi.pdf, para. 4.
255 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sM7Hc7a0vZY; https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1745501853016523013; and http://www.gov.il/en/pages/opening-stat ... 2-jan-2024.
256 See http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/382632.
257 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 139; and Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, see Declaration of Judge Tladi, para. 48.
258 General Assembly resolution 37/43, para. 2; Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, see Declaration of Judge Charlesworth, paras. 23– 24; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975 p. 12, see Separate Opinion of Vice President Ammoun, para. 100; and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
259 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 257, 261–262, 267, 272 and 274.
260 E.g. Martin Shaw, “Darfur: counter-insurgency, forced displacement and genocide”, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 62, No. 1 (March 2011), p. 59; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 99, 1124 and 1480.
261 Regarding Israel, see http://www.972mag.com/dehumanization-mo ... -israelis/.
262 See https://opiniojuris.org/2024/08/02/refl ... -icj-case/.
263 See http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/i ... a0c004e2a8.
264 See http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/file ... c2023.pdf; and A/HRC/55/73, paras. 58–75.
265 A/HRC/55/73, para. 55; and https://jewishcurrents.org/human-shield ... r-genocide.
266 See http://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-ir ... casualties.
267 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Others, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, 27 September 2007, paras. 470–472.
268 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1435–1436.
269 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Ildéphonse Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-55C-T, Judgment, 19 June 2012, paras. 1521 and 1530; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, paras. 28–31.
270 See https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... hind-rajab.
271 See http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz9drj14e0lo.
272 See http://www.aljazeera.net/news/2024/3/9/ ... 8%B5%D9%8A% D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-50-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2% D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81.
273 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202 ... dead-nasr/.
274 See https://x.com/IsraelArabic/status/1724371929413365779; and http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israe ... e-corridor.
275 See https://theintercept.com/2024/02/14/gaz ... -prisoner/.
276 See http://www.thejc.com/news/israel/netany ... -ovyuol0s; and http://www.brookings.edu/events/analyzi ... y-in-gaza/.
277 See http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ameri ... rcna170170.
278 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/articl ... -proposal; http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 341120000; http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 270f10000; http://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-te ... pressure/; http://www.timesofisrael.com/no-doubt-n ... es-forum/; http://www.timesofisrael.com/stop-sabot ... erusalem/; http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp4wgqypwrxo; and http://www.nbcnews.com/news/netanyahu-a ... rcna166503.
279 See http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/i ... 2eb43c2cf0.
280 See http://www.gov.il/en/pages/event-press040924.
281 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 145–146.
282 Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, art. 2.
283 Ibid., art. 4.
284 Ibid., art. 5.
285 Ibid., art. 7.
286 Ibid., art. 8.
287 Ibid., art. 11.
288 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 431.
289 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, arts. III (b)–III (d).
290 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 3425, 3433, 3514, 3520, 4866–4867, 6047 and 6049.
291 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 431–437.
292 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 1150.
293 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 290. See also International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 13 and 148–149; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 6047.
294 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86.
295 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... g-genocide.
296 See S/2024/419; and A/HRC/55/73, para. 50.
297 E.g., see http://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e ... -to-gaza/; and https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.co ... 724-en.pdf, pp. 15–16.
298 See http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cze5w2wd4x0o.
299 See https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51115; and http://www.knesset.tv/parliament/1307/61096/.
300 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 31– 32.
301 See https://x.com/ireallyhateyou/status/181 ... 462196523; and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2024/7/29/israeli-far-right-politicians-protest-arrest-of-soldiers-suspected-of-abuse.
302 See http://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/se ... 40124.pdf; http://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/se ... 40124.pdf; and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16 ... t-gets-cut.
303 See https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/Pre ... 8724w.aspx.
304 See https://hamoked.org/files/2024/1666540_eng.pdf, p. 29; http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... ar-crimes; http://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east- ... -violence; and http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/11095.
305 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86 (3).
306 See http://www.gov.il/en/pages/news-26-11.
307 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 150–154. See also A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1423.
308 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 115–116; and https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/file ... mechanism/ YeshDin+Mechanism.pdf.
309 Israel, High Court of Justice, Association of Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense and Others Case No. HCJ 7753/23, Judgment, 23 November 2011; and http://www.btselem.org/sites/ default/files/publications/202408_welcome_to_hell_eng.pdf, pp. 115–116.
310 See http://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/de ... enter-gaza.
311 See https://gisha.org/en/aid-access-now/.
312 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 115–116. E.g., see Israel, High Court of Justice, Association of Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense and Others, Case No. HCJ 4268/24; and Israel, High Court of Justice, Association of Civil Rights in Israel v. The Government, Case No. HCJ 1357/24. See https://www.acri.org.il/post/__992 (Hebrew).
313 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana and Others, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement, 3 December 2003.
314 Raz Segal and Luigi Daniele, “Gaza as twilight of Israel Exceptionalism: holocaust and genocide studies from unprecedented crisis to unprecedented change”, Journal of Genocide Research (March 2024), pp. 1–2.
315 S/2024/419, enclosure I, paras. 18–26.
316 See http://www.972mag.com/israeli-military- ... dia-2023/; and https://theintercept.com/2023/ 12/23/israel-military-idf-media-censor/.
317 See https://cpj.org/2024/09/journalist-casu ... -conflict/.
318 See https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/Pre ... 1424t.aspx.
319 See https://cpj.org/2024/09/israeli-forces- ... ournalism/.
320 See http://www.gov.il/en/departments/units/moatsa.
321 See https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/file ... m/YeshDin+ Mechanism.pdf.
111 See https://assets.nationbuilder.com/dcipal ... 725884141/ Targeting_Childhood_report.pdf?1725884141, p. 7.
112 See https://assets.nationbuilder.com/dcipal ... 725884141/ Targeting_Childhood_report.pdf?1725884141, p. 7; and http://www.unicef.org/press-releases/ch ... ine-months.
113 See https://assets.nationbuilder.com/dcipal ... 725884141/ Targeting_Childhood_report.pdf?1725884141.
114 NGO submissions; A/HRC/55/28, paras. 75–80; and https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/ TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28609.
115 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 7–8.
116 See http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-release ... ture-rife; NGO submissions; and A/HRC/56/26, para. 62.
117 See https://hamoked.org/prisoners-charts.php; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... reventable.
118 See http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/file ... lities.pdf.
119 See https://cpj.org/2024/09/arrests-of-pale ... -gaza-war/.
120 See http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2 ... -arrests/; http://mezan.org/uploads/files/2024/4/1 ... Mezan.pdf; and http://www.omct.org/site-resources/file ... 5.2.24.pdf, p. 7.
121 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, p. 9.
122 See https://hashiloach.org.il/israels-decisive-plan/.
123 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/there-are- ... -smotrich/. See also para. 32.
124 See http://www.srugim.co.il/999113-%D7%A1%D ... 7%A8%D7%99% D7%A5-%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%98% D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%9D-%D7%AA%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9A-%D7%9C%D7%A2 (Hebrew).
125 See https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1828654399360586025 (Hebrew).
126 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... k-killings.
127 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... ank-enarhe.
128 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... nk-enarhe; http://www.ochaopt.org/poc/16-29-may-2023; http://www.ochaopt.org/ content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-137; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
129 See https://theintercept.com/2024/06/12/isr ... -children/.
130 See http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... epression/.
131 See https://acleddata.com/2024/08/05/palest ... rics-2024/.
132 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank
133 See http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... epression/.
134 See https://t.me/jenencamb/57875; http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ays-exper; and http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... epression/.
135 See http://www.972mag.com/israel-apartheid-jenin-gaza/; http://www.972mag.com/jenin-tulkarem-ar ... pression/; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ays-expert.
136 See http://www.un.org/unispal/document/huma ... 1-07aug24/.
137 See https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/06/midd ... index.html.
138 See http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/ ... Jerusalem; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ntensifies.
139 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... ys-expert; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
140 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... -bank-enar.
141 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
142 See https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-p ... ntensifies.
143 See http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... -bank-enar.
144 See http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/ ... ue_41b.pdf.
145 See http://www.msf.org/west-bank-israeli-fo ... eded-most; http://www.who.int/news/item/14-06-2024 ... -west-bank.
146 See http://www.who.int/news/item/14-06-2024 ... -west-bank.
147 A/79/347, paras. 7–10. See also the concern raised in Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 156.
148 See https://peacenow.org.il/en/state-land-d ... 00-dunams; and http://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/ya ... %D7%AA.pdf (Hebrew).
149 See http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
150 See http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news ... fd66980000.
151 See http://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east- ... -violence; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanita ... -west-bank.
152 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 239.
153 See http://www.crisisgroup.org/united-state ... lifelines; and http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... d-paralyse.
154 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- ... an-economy.
155 See http://www.ilo.org/resource/news/war-pr ... gaza-strip.
156 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- ... an-economy.
157 A/HRC/39/64, paras. 84–87; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 69, para. 56.
158 A/HRC/55/73, paras. 15–20.
159 Paul Behrens, “Between abstract event and individualized crime: genocidal intent in the case of Croatia”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2015), p. 934.
160 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, 7 July 2006, para. 40.
161 A/HRC/55/73, para. 18.
162 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 162, 390 and 434; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 190 and 344; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 580; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 553.
163 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 512.
164 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Ferdinand Nahimana and Others v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, 28 November 2007, para. 524.
165 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 419–430.
166 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Popović and Others, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeal-Judgment, 30 January 2015, para. 503; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, para. 413; Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), 15 November 2023, para. 53; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1436–1438.
167 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 572.
168 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Aloys Simba v. the Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appeal Judgment, 27 November 2007, paras. 268–269; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and others, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Appeal Judgment, 13 December 2004, paras. 302–304; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 49; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 50.
169 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 431–437; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 13 and 148–149.
170 Patricia M. Wald, “Genocide and crimes against humanity”, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 6, No. 3 (January 2007), pp. 631–632.
171 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 55; (cited in) Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), para. 54; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 550 and 2592; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Appeal Judgment, 8 April 2015, paras. 246–247; Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment (Chea Nuon and Samphan Khieu), Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 16 November 2018, para. 803; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1416.
172 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 237.
173 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, para. 801 (citing S/1994/674, para. 94); International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 745; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 55; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 September 2011, para. 142; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Ildéphonse Hategekimana v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-A, Appeal Judgment, 8 May 2012, para. 133.
174 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 580; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 344.
175 Tamara Starblanket, Suffer the Little Children: Genocide, Indigenous Nations and the Canadian State (Clarity Press, 2018), pp. 77–78; and Elisa Novic, The Concept of Cultural Genocide: An International Law Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 28.
176 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 666; Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, para. 801; Element of Crimes, art. 6 (PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, see construction of genocide crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). See also, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 32.
177 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II (e).
178 See footnote 162.
179 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgment, 12 March 2008, para. 176; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Siméon Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Judgment and Sentence, 12 November 2008, para. 331; Israel, District Court of Jerusalem, Attorney-General v. Eichmann, Case No. 40/61, Judgment, 1968, para. 183; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61; IT-95-18-R6I, Rule 61 Review of the Indictments, 11 July 1996, paras. 94–95.
180 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 740.
181 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
182 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 666; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1405.
183 See International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, paras. 73–74; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, Series C No. 136, Judgment, 22 November 2005, para. 146.
184 Bram Wispelwey and others, “Because its power remains naturalized: introducing the settler colonial determinants of health”, Frontiers in Public Health, vol. 11 (July 2023), p. 3.
185 E/C.12/2000/4, para. 4; and Kimberly Matheson and others, “Canada’s colonial genocide of indigenous peoples: a review of the psychosocial and neurobiological processes linking trauma and intergenerational outcomes”, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, vol. 19, No. 11 (May 2022), p. 2.
186 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, No. 4 (2006), p. 388.
187 A/HRC/21/53, para. 84; A/HRC/54/31/Add.2, paras. 21 and 26; A/HRC/33/57, paras. 4–5; Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart and others, “Historical trauma among indigenous peoples of the Americas: concepts, research, and clinical considerations”, Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, vol. 43, No. 4 (October 2011), p. 284; and Matheson and others, “Canada’s colonial genocide”.
188 Wolfe, “Settler colonialism”, p. 388.
189 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, paras. 190 and 344. See also, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 33.
190 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 740.
191 Ibid., para. 742.
192 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, paras. 661 and 666, citing International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 31; A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1405; and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, para. 801.
193 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, paras. 374–376; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 182, 187, 414, 424–430 and 440.
194 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, paras. 182 and 373–375.
195 Ibid., para. 373.
196 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), para. 148.
197 Ibid., para. 170.
198 Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), para. 52, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, para. 148.
199 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 145.
200 Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), paras. 50–52.
201 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. François Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgment, 7 December 2007, para. 534; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 9 July 2004, para. 53; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 554; and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02 Judgment, paras. 4507–4512.
202 Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, with commentaries (see A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 35).
203 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, As We have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2017), p. 15.
204 Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 66.
205 A/77/356, paras. 25–32.
206 Ibid., paras. 38–40; Fayez Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (Beirut, Research Centre, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965), p. 27; and Nadav G. Shelef, “From ‘Both Banks of the Jordan’ to the ‘Whole Land of Israel:’ ideological change in revisionist Zionism”, Israel Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 (2004), pp. 125–148.
207 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-vo ... -us-trip/; http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu- ... -decades/; and http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68025945.
208 See https://peacenow.org.il/en/30-years-aft ... o-accords; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements- ... population.
209 See https://peacenow.org.il/en/30-years-aft ... lo-accords.
210 See http://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/up ... r-2023.pdf.
211 See http://www.badil.org/cached_uploads/vie ... 905362.pdf, pp. 11–12; and https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/Documents/ BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawNationState.pdf.
212 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 170.
213 See http://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text- ... ael-peace/.
214 See International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61; IT-95-18-R6I, Rule 61 Review of the Indictments, 11 July 1996, paras. 94–95; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 524.
215 A/78/545, para. 13; A/HRC/53/59, paras. 4, 36–37 and 42; Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 47 and 205, see also, Declaration of Judge Charlesworth, para. 16.
216 Idith Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 174 and 196.
217 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Security Theology, Surveillance and the Politics of Fear (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 14.
218 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 372.
219 See http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at ... nian-state.
220 See https://www.mekomit.co.il/%d7%94%d7%9e% ... 4-%d7%95/; and https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza- ... 631fa4da5a.
221 See https://x.com/MiddleEastEye/status/1747967081541255628; https://t.me/bengvir/4294 (translated in https://x.com/KhaledYousry22/status/1798729352412319874); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3XLtt2yXGI; and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/29 ... ts-in-gaza.
222 See http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 7f35e10000.
223 A/79/347, paras. 6 and 15–17.
224 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 242.
225 Martin Shaw, “Palestine in an international historical perspective on genocide”, Holy Land Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 (May 2010), p. 20.
226 William Schabas, “Hate speech in Rwanda: the road to genocide”, in Genocide and Human Rights, Mark Lattimer, ed. (London, Routledge, 2017), p. 261.
227 See paras. 46–48 (above).
228 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II (c).
229 See http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... nocide-in; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 115–116.
230 See https://www.thenation.com/article/world ... s-future/; and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-68023080.
231 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 742.
232 A/78/545, para. 21; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 121; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 742; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 532–533; and Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (to the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar), paras. 67–71.
233 A/79/171, paras. 80 and 110–111; and http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/file ... ts/issues/ food/2024-08-27-visuals-palestinian-people-food-sovereignty.pdf, pp. 6 and 12.
234 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
235 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 596; http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... update-99; http://www.unocha.org/publications/repo ... pdate-158; and http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilit ... update-164.
236 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
237 International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, paras. 73–74; International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Reparations Order, 28 February 2024, paras. 410–412.
238 Shaw, “Palestine in an international historical perspective”, pp. 3–6.
239 See https://zeteo.com/p/palestinian-israel- ... -citizens; and http://www.adalah.org/en/ content/view/11158.
240 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, para. 136.
241 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847.
242 Ibid.
243 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 572.
244 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 144.
245 Consider Genocide Convention, Travaux Préparatoires, A/C.6/SR.77, pp. 131–133; and A/C.6/SR.75, p. 117.
246 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 50 (emphasis in original).
247 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 79.
248 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 50; S/2005/60, para. 493; and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 161.
249 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 49; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeal Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 102.
250 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 309–310; International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, (First) Warrant of Arrest Judgment, 4 March 2009, see Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, para. 65.
251 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 694; International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Appeal Judgment, 20 March 2019, para. 722; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 45.
252 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 268–269.
253 Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 694; International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case No. IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 153.
254 See https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/f ... -00-bi.pdf, para. 4.
255 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sM7Hc7a0vZY; https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1745501853016523013; and http://www.gov.il/en/pages/opening-stat ... 2-jan-2024.
256 See http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/382632.
257 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 139; and Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, see Declaration of Judge Tladi, para. 48.
258 General Assembly resolution 37/43, para. 2; Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, see Declaration of Judge Charlesworth, paras. 23– 24; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975 p. 12, see Separate Opinion of Vice President Ammoun, para. 100; and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
259 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 257, 261–262, 267, 272 and 274.
260 E.g. Martin Shaw, “Darfur: counter-insurgency, forced displacement and genocide”, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 62, No. 1 (March 2011), p. 59; and A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 99, 1124 and 1480.
261 Regarding Israel, see http://www.972mag.com/dehumanization-mo ... -israelis/.
262 See https://opiniojuris.org/2024/08/02/refl ... -icj-case/.
263 See http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/i ... a0c004e2a8.
264 See http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/file ... c2023.pdf; and A/HRC/55/73, paras. 58–75.
265 A/HRC/55/73, para. 55; and https://jewishcurrents.org/human-shield ... r-genocide.
266 See http://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-ir ... casualties.
267 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Others, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, 27 September 2007, paras. 470–472.
268 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1435–1436.
269 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Ildéphonse Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-55C-T, Judgment, 19 June 2012, paras. 1521 and 1530; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, paras. 28–31.
270 See https://forensic-architecture.org/inves ... hind-rajab.
271 See http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz9drj14e0lo.
272 See http://www.aljazeera.net/news/2024/3/9/ ... 8%B5%D9%8A% D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-50-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2% D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81.
273 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202 ... dead-nasr/.
274 See https://x.com/IsraelArabic/status/1724371929413365779; and http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israe ... e-corridor.
275 See https://theintercept.com/2024/02/14/gaz ... -prisoner/.
276 See http://www.thejc.com/news/israel/netany ... -ovyuol0s; and http://www.brookings.edu/events/analyzi ... y-in-gaza/.
277 See http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ameri ... rcna170170.
278 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/articl ... -proposal; http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 341120000; http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024 ... 270f10000; http://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-te ... pressure/; http://www.timesofisrael.com/no-doubt-n ... es-forum/; http://www.timesofisrael.com/stop-sabot ... erusalem/; http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp4wgqypwrxo; and http://www.nbcnews.com/news/netanyahu-a ... rcna166503.
279 See http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/i ... 2eb43c2cf0.
280 See http://www.gov.il/en/pages/event-press040924.
281 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 145–146.
282 Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, art. 2.
283 Ibid., art. 4.
284 Ibid., art. 5.
285 Ibid., art. 7.
286 Ibid., art. 8.
287 Ibid., art. 11.
288 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 431.
289 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, arts. III (b)–III (d).
290 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 3425, 3433, 3514, 3520, 4866–4867, 6047 and 6049.
291 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, paras. 431–437.
292 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 1150.
293 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 290. See also International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 13 and 148–149; and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 6047.
294 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86.
295 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/ ... g-genocide.
296 See S/2024/419; and A/HRC/55/73, para. 50.
297 E.g., see http://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e ... -to-gaza/; and https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.co ... 724-en.pdf, pp. 15–16.
298 See http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cze5w2wd4x0o.
299 See https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51115; and http://www.knesset.tv/parliament/1307/61096/.
300 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 31– 32.
301 See https://x.com/ireallyhateyou/status/181 ... 462196523; and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2024/7/29/israeli-far-right-politicians-protest-arrest-of-soldiers-suspected-of-abuse.
302 See http://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/se ... 40124.pdf; http://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/se ... 40124.pdf; and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16 ... t-gets-cut.
303 See https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/Pre ... 8724w.aspx.
304 See https://hamoked.org/files/2024/1666540_eng.pdf, p. 29; http://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/ ... ar-crimes; http://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east- ... -violence; and http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/11095.
305 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order, 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 86 (3).
306 See http://www.gov.il/en/pages/news-26-11.
307 Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 150–154. See also A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1423.
308 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 115–116; and https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/file ... mechanism/ YeshDin+Mechanism.pdf.
309 Israel, High Court of Justice, Association of Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense and Others Case No. HCJ 7753/23, Judgment, 23 November 2011; and http://www.btselem.org/sites/ default/files/publications/202408_welcome_to_hell_eng.pdf, pp. 115–116.
310 See http://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/de ... enter-gaza.
311 See https://gisha.org/en/aid-access-now/.
312 See http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/fi ... ll_eng.pdf, pp. 115–116. E.g., see Israel, High Court of Justice, Association of Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense and Others, Case No. HCJ 4268/24; and Israel, High Court of Justice, Association of Civil Rights in Israel v. The Government, Case No. HCJ 1357/24. See https://www.acri.org.il/post/__992 (Hebrew).
313 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana and Others, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement, 3 December 2003.
314 Raz Segal and Luigi Daniele, “Gaza as twilight of Israel Exceptionalism: holocaust and genocide studies from unprecedented crisis to unprecedented change”, Journal of Genocide Research (March 2024), pp. 1–2.
315 S/2024/419, enclosure I, paras. 18–26.
316 See http://www.972mag.com/israeli-military- ... dia-2023/; and https://theintercept.com/2023/ 12/23/israel-military-idf-media-censor/.
317 See https://cpj.org/2024/09/journalist-casu ... -conflict/.
318 See https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/Pre ... 1424t.aspx.
319 See https://cpj.org/2024/09/israeli-forces- ... ournalism/.
320 See http://www.gov.il/en/departments/units/moatsa.
321 See https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/file ... m/YeshDin+ Mechanism.pdf.
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Re: U.N. Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese Report
by admin » Sun Nov 03, 2024 5:31 am
Occupied Palestinian Territory: Human rights situation - Special Rapporteur
by Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967.
United Nations
Oct 31, 2024
Press conference by Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967.
Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory said, “the genocidal violence” has expanded and “metastasized in other parts of the oPt.”
Briefing reporters in New York City today (30 Oct) she questioned, “How do you explain the 700, over 700, Palestinians who have been killed in the West Bank, including 170 children?”
Albanese further said, “And how do you explain the fact that the Palestinians from the West Bank have been exposed to the same practices and abuses, often rape, among other forms of torture, than those in Gaza? If there was no Hamas military action or presence in the West Bank? Not that the first justified what Israel has done in Gaza.”
According to Albanese, “Impunity that has been granted to Israel has allowed it to become a serial violator of international law.” She argued that the United States has been “an enabler” in Israel’s actions, suggesting it has “a conflict of interest… in orchestrating attacks against anyone who criticizes Israel.”
Albanese further pointed to what she called a “colonial erasure” in efforts to diminish Palestinian identity in the oPt, noting that “75 percent, for example, of the people in Gaza, they’re not even from Gaza. They’re from modern-day Israel.” She said these actions serve as a “reminder… of its original sin” in the creation of the Israeli state.
Additionally, she condemned attacks on UNRWA, describing it as a “symbol of Palestinianness,” and emphasized that UNRWA’s fate rests solely with the General Assembly, noting that “only the General Assembly can decide the future of UNRWA.”
Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council’s independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent of any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity.
Transcript
hello good afternoon and welcome to yet another press
conference you had a difficult day today but I think this is the last one so um
we have with us uh Miss Franchesca Alban special reporter on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967 uh Miss alanza was appointed uh by
the Human Rights Council as independent expert in May of 2022 so we'll first ask her to
um tell us a little bit about her work in the report and then there'll be time for questions
so over to you uh thank you very much good afternoon everyone um I just presented
my fifth report um third to the general
assembly which has a very uh harrowing title genocide as Colonial Erasure and
as I say in the first lines of the report this is something that were walks
on the heels of my previous report what I presented to the Human Rights Council in March this year where I concluded
that based on my findings over five months of Investigation there were reasonable grounds to believe that
Israel had committed acts of genocide in in
Gaza and I've continued to investigate what has happened in Gaza but also the
rest of the occupied Palestinian territory after presenting that
report I um I can say that for over one year I've
pleaded all concerned to all concerned parties uh particularly those States who
can exert more influence on the state of Israel to take concrete actions to stop
the destruction of Gaza the destruction of the Palestinian people to ensure the
prompt and unconditional release of all hostages both Israelis and Palestinians
and to ensure international law is respected and had international law
being respected at least in the last 12 months this would have stopped it should
have stopped it should have been stopped by the security Council last October it should have been stopped uh after the
first set of provisional measures issued by the international court of justice it
should have stopped when I presented my first report it should have stopped before Rafa was invaded or before the
invasion of Lebanon and instead the silence or Worse the
justification of a small but influential number of states as continue to enable and to to
nurture the ubis that leads Israeli conduct as we as we speak the
developments on the grounds are are gruesome and uh it is
long it has actually since the beginning the the the the the violence the
genocidal violence that they have described in my first report uh has expanded and metastized in
other parts of the occupied Palestinian territory and if you look at the patterns of violence the destruction of
Civilian infrastructure roads energy geds uh water pipelines and Reservoir
homes and if you look at the numbers of extrajudicial
killings in the West Bank as well on top of the 42,000
Palestinians have been killed a certain killed in Gaza including 177,000
children how do we explain the 700 over 700 Palestinians have been killed in um
in the West Bank including 170 children and how do we
explain the uh the fact that the Palestinians from the West Bank have
been exposed to the same practices and abuses
often rape among other forms of torture um than those in Gaza if there
was no Hamas military action or presence in the West Bank not that the the first
Justified what Israel has done in Gaza but again not only we see the past
reproducing itself in the occupied Palestinian territory we see the same indifference the same uh ability to look
away of many member states in International Community and we see a total collapse of the international
order which is premised upon the never again that was promised after the second
world war and particular in particular after the Holocaust and the genocide
mostly Jewish people um I'm
I'm very happy to take your questions I don't know what um what else what else to say other than um it's not been an
easy year because surely it has been reluctantly that I took on the the
functions of chronicler of a genocide and it's extremely disturbing to see
member states pontificating and questioning and um and uh obscuring the
meaning of intern naal law and de humanizing the victims of this um of
this last of this last 12 months but however should you have any questions I'm here
yeah you do okay um we have Abdul
Hamid thank you so much uh my name is Abdul Hamid say am from the Arabic da
Al thank you for coming again to talk to us I have a few questions first you have
been personally attacked as always the case when someone criticizes Israel then
they try to attack that person personally like Graham buul with horaa
lazarini now Karim Khan U many others so how do you uh take this uh personal
attacks on you and the second as you know international law
allows people under occupation and foreign domination to
resist I mean they become Heroes I mean we have a statue of Mandela here and
because he was resisting upper side many of the great leaders of modern time were
at at one stage fighting colonialism why only when the Palestinians fight
occupation they are labeled as terrorist thank you
um to be very clear I don't think that Israel is the only state that attacks
special repur special repur get attacked when they uh scrutinize the human rights
records of member states uh and there are states who are more vorous and virulent than others
what it's striking in the case of Israel is that is that there is a cohort of State
who Echoes and reverberates what Israel says and does
and there and there is um an army of minions at work to um to uh
produce literally Fabrications that have one and only one objective to distract
the attention from where it should stay so I will not entertain any discussion
about how I take this attacks because they're not just against me they' have been against the special reporter on the
occupied Palestinian territory who preceded me uh and this year in particular the Secretary General has
been vilified and even declared Persona nrata welcome to the club and um and so
the general assembly what is more shocking to me is that this year the United Nations have
been under an unprecedented military attack 70% of Anda premises have been
hit by Israeli fire and uh which has also hit peacekeepers in
Lebanon and uh the United Nations humanitarian functions have been
hampered at a at a moment where they were the only B the B work to continue
to provide assistance to to the Palestinians in extreme in an extreme
situation of distress and it's because of that that I do believe that while
Israel is by no means the only state that violate violates international law
and it's not even the only states that violate that violate uh the right of
self-determination of a people but it's surely unique in the determination the
the the the the protracted of uh of this conduct and the
fact that Israel has never faced any consequences and indeed I do believe
that the impunity that has been granted to Israel has allowed it to become a
Serial violator of international law which is the reason why I recommended that this is the time as it has been for
aparte South Africa to consider uh for the general assembly to consider uh the
the suspension I mean recommending the the the revision or the suspension of Israel's credential as credential as a
member of the United Nations until uh it ends uh violating
international law until he withdraws the occupation uh which is clearly unlawful
also by determination of the international court of justice and surely uh until it continues it's an
genocidal attack on the Palestinians um you and then
mik hi my name Isam newspaper good to see you again um
I have two follow-ups first on the issue of suspension uh of Israeli membership
or uh to the UN if you could elaborate on that and uh whether you believe this
is something that will get um a majority in the general assembly um and then
um my other question is regarding a third Pary role in the war that's going
on whether it has to do with delivering weapons I mean there responsibility when
it comes to international law and the lack of um Mo them taking any steps and
in and basically supporting so the accountability for not
only for isra but also for third parties and the last thing in your remarks today
to the comittee you talked about the lack of empathy that you are seeing by some member states H in uh not um um
even expressing um any empathy for the Palestinian victims and uh could you and also the
issue of uh the many states um talking about human rights in academic um
context or theoretical context but when it comes to the issue of Palestinian human rights rights uh they are even
attacking uh students they're not allowing uh or attacking people who
demonstrate against the war if you could also touch on that thank you so much yeah thank you first of all I should uh
briefly respond on the second question sorry I missed it um regarding
resistance and I think I've said it before including in this uh in this venue that there is no question that the
Palestinians have the right to resist under International law like all people who are oppressed and who cannot enjoy
the right of self-determination the right to resist is to a people um what the right to
selfdefense is to EST State and uh in the same way it has
limits so it cannot neither can touch civilian life civilian
life is sicker than should always be protected so um I I think that we should always
remind ourselves and respect respect the fact that October 7 has been an
unspeakable tragedy for the for the Israelis who call who call that event uh
the worst terrorist attack they ever suffered and as I I said before for me
those were surely were crimes to the extent they they targeted that they hit
civilians um and should have been met by
Justice this didn't legitimize the attack on the on the uh on the
Palestinians like um like if they were the nation responsible because they were
not and again ref this should have prompt a reflection on the causes on the
root courses that have led to that horrific day uh which is a horrific day both for
the Israelis and the Palestinians I want to underline although I think that this
is not the day the genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza started and
um um is it is it correct that only the
Palestinians are denied of this this this right no I don't think so I I think
that after um then after 911 there is a
an in an increasing uh intolerance for
for people's claims for self-determination and again we are no
longer in the decolonization era uh where the right of the right to resist
was to an extent even celebrated to an extent we are in an
where resistance is seen is often seen and labeled as terrorism this is the
reality for the Palestinians and others um concerning the the suspension so
there are there are different issues there but um what I what I refer to is
article six of the UN Charter which says that when a member of the United Nations
persistently persistently violates the principles containing contained in the
UN Charter it might be expelled from the organizations and there should be from
the organization and there should be uh a decision of the general ass a general assembly upon recommendation of the
security Council um there have been cases where the impass of the security Council has
been circumvented by by by decision of the general assembly to act for example
uniting for peace and this might be one opportunity to consider in this case as
well but I would like to take this opportunity to stress that again this is not an what prompted me to make that
that recommendation is not the fact that Israel violates international law full
Stope Israel violates international law from its birth and international law
includes un security Council resolution and general assembly resolution Israel
has violated including the UN resolutions that he committed to abide by as a condition to become a member of
the of the general assembly of the United Nations and uh orders or and
decisions of the international court of justice and again this year the
escalation of violence and attacks against the United Nations sets a terrible president that if left
unpunished I also encourage other states to resort to the same kind of venomous
reactions toward the the the United Nations losing all respect all respect
for these organizations and this should not happen this is why I think it should now it's time to take an Exemplar
step um considering considering why did I mention the lack
of empathy because I have I don't know if I'm I have the fortune fortune or Misfortune to always present my reports
to the general assembly after the commission of inquiry um which has a team of investigators and
so carries out a very thorough uh work of uh collection of evidence and again
for the third time I heard the member states criticizing the Mandate of the commission which means they don't even
interact with their counterparts uh in in Geneva who have Tor down their criticism toward the commission and
appreciate the work it does instead of engaging on the substance and I've heard
member states mentioning again October 7 I
understand I mean I it's not that I criticize that but like like if history started on October 7 forgetting the 56
years of Oppression and the and the tens of thousands if no more Palestinians who had been killed let alone the 1 million
people people who had been arbitrarily detained including many children so it's it's a bit Preposterous and and the fact
that 177,000 children have been killed and this was not even mentioned together
with the full destruction of Gaza made me realize that no life is not worth the
same and Palestinian life is less worth this for some member states this is a
fact and I'm and I'm also annoyed by the fact that this issue which is so
sensitive to to to Millions because again the life of the Palestinians first
and foremost but also the life of the Israelis for many of them is hell since
uh since last year and there is this sort of U let's
Pi aide attitude in the general assembly one side and the other that again it
Bears Testament to the to the loss of humanity that that has penetrated this
this institution the comment I made on human rights and is and the fact that there
has been an erosion of the value of human rights in the last 12 months was
prompted by the fact that um member states
who member states who uh praise themselves as Defenders of of Human
Rights and sponsor of Human Rights including in their international relations have not hesitated have
not have have engaged in forms of repression and cracking down fundamental
freedoms of their own citizens in in Europe including of Jewish people who
were standing in solidarity with the Palestinians for what they were going through and this is very uh it's very
telling of the of the bizarre time we live uh we live in but especially when
it comes to students who are in a way the most powerful but also the most the
most powerful they've been the most powerful voice speaking truth to power but also they're still the most the the
most frail part of the society because they are investing a lot in building their future and many of them have have
seen their future uh undermined sacrificed for standing for justice and
what kind what kind of message are liberal universities in the liberal West
sending to the students yes we can teach human rights from our um from our
podiums in universities but then don't dare fighting to have them becoming a
reality for all because this is not your job basically this is the message that is been
sent about third party ah third party responsibility is U there is a clear
obligation uh which is gener a general principle of international law law of
State responsibility when there is an international wrongdoing of any sort violations of international law human
rights law international humanitarian law any state has the every state has
the responsibility not to recognize the legal consequences of the wrongful act
and not to engage not to Aid and assist uh in the commission of the
wrongful Act but rather acting to um to uh lead to the sensation of the same and
the and ensure reparations nothing of this has been done but now we are also
in a context where as the international court of justice has recognized the
plausibility of uh the genocide uh could be committed already in
January this triggered the application of the genocide convention mean the
obligation to prevent genocide for which you don't have to wait to have acts of
genocide fully completed and a people or a group completely destroyed you need to
act so that genocide doesn't take place and so an arms embargo was uh was a
clear obligation the day after the court has passed has issued those provisional
measures instead the International Community has uh has followed isra on its uh attack against Tandra and so has
continue I mean member states continue to trade with Israel and to transfer
weapons Mike then Madam Mike wagenheim with I24 news it's been a while since
we've last spoken um a couple questions for you in your report uh you have a
line in here that says that since its establishment Israel has twe uh treated
the occupied people as a hated encumbrance and threat to be eradicated and you go on uh listing other items um
we'll leave aside the contextual and factual debate about that based on that statement it seems to infer that you
believe that Israel has been an occupier since the day of its birth is that your
position you said since its establishment Israel has treated occupied people Etc are you inferring
that Israel's been an occupier since 194 why do you have to ER instead of sticking to what I said and I'm asking
let me let me elaborate um Israel has taken and we can I can concede that
it has done it with uh with the recognition of the general assembly but from a human rights law point of view
and as I take a people centered approach I cannot uh I cannot forget it the
creation of the state of Israel has meant the dispossession of uh hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians of who have been kicked out of their homes and never allowed to return why
so and um is it does it make an occupier
it makes a state it makes of Israel a state who has forci forcibly
displaced significant part of the native population and this is the past that has never been addressed the Palestinians
with Israeli citizenship who remained in Israel have been kept for two decades
under military rule and this is why when I mhm uh when
I when I say an incumbrance I was not even referring to them but as you ask I
mean this is documented so it's not debatable it's it's history and since
1967 which is what I'm most interested in because of the Mandate I have Israel
has continued as continued this practices has extended the the custodianship system
that had been used to take control of all the properties left behind by the Palestinian
refugees but without time limit so from 1967 I think this is military order
5058 one of one of the early military orders Israel has been able to to sa and
acquire all the all the property left behind by the Palestinians the
350,000 were forcibly displaced outside the occupied Palestinian territory in
1967 and the hundreds of thousand who have been kicked out of their homes and lands ever
since so there's been a continuity so it's not just about what has been happening in the
occupied Palestinian territory for the past 57 years is the fact that
unfortunately there is a continuity with patterns of conduct that had already
been enacted in uh in what in modern day
Israel I'm I'm not sure that answers a question but it will have to suffice one other question for you because I know my
colleagues want to jump in here you know about the controversy surrounding your positions and your statements I'm not
going to repeat them here but you did comment on social media within the past
week and I'm going to read this back to you said I'm profoundly committed to human rights for all people how could I
ever be an anti-semite a few days ago you were supposed to have a briefing with members of Congress uh that
briefing was cancelled uh don't know if the the Jewish Lobby was behind it or not but oh you said Jewish Lobby Jewish
Lobby out because it's very anti-semitic appar it is I I I was I didn't use it you did don't know who you feel was
behind it um in any case uh you appeared and your
appearance there was sponsored by a group called code pink you appeared in a video with the co-founder of code pink
code pink well documented shills for some of the world's worst human rights
violators Maduro Iran where they appeared with Holocaust deniers they deny the genocide going on in China of
the weager population completely deny it how can you say appearing with a group
like that that you stand and are committed for human rights for all people and are not an anti-semite this
group is drawn to you and you happily appear with them while they shill for human rights abusers all over the world
and only focus in on Israel according to this principle I shouldn't be asking question from uh from journalists for
example unless I check their pedigree and I explain to you because I was not at an event hosted by good pink check
your sources because this is not correct I was host correct that you appeared in
a video with the co-founder can I finish sure you can I was speaking at an event
organized by B um at a bz boys and Poets a venue I've always uh where I've always
attended wonderful talks then if they have hosted uh people who have terrible
records I don't know but I wouldn't feel responsible and as I was um as I was on
my way out and looking at a Morales U Meda from code pink approached me and
can I ask you a question and I said of course do you mind being on record of course of course not and that is it now
do you want to add on the on the allegations against me because I gave a I answer a question to Mada Benjamin or
do I have to check to do a background check of any person I talk to you have
no idea who code pink is you have no prior contact with them of course I know who could pink is and I but I don't
apparently I'm not as informed as you are thank you for educating me that's part of my job as a journalist thank
you thank you very much stepan York Press
um I'm sorry because I arrived uh I think you had started
already a few minutes so I don't know if you talked about it but uh I heard about when you were talking about the the
Israeli government accusing you to be anti-semitic but
here of anti-Semitism but uh did you respond uh did you respond to that tweet
that Ambassador Linda Thomas grimfield wrote yesterday uh she wrote that as a un
special reporter Alban Alban visit New York I want to reiterate the US believes she's unfit for a role the United
Nations should not tolerate anti-Semitism from a un Affiliated official hire to promote human rights
this is the ambassador of United States at the United Nation what's your response to I have the same shock that
you have looking at how the United States is behaving in this context in the context
of the genocide that is unfolding in Gaza I'm not I'm not surprised that they
attack any anyone who who speaks to the fact acts that are uh frankly on our
watch in um in Gaza and uh they do that so um so brutally because they they feel
called um called out because it's not that is the United State is simply an
observer the United State is being in a an enabler in uh in what Israel has been
doing so of course they have a conflict of interest in uh in this in let's say
orchestrating attacks against uh against anyone who criticizes
Israel but besides this I really don't feel comfortable at entertaining any
longer discussions concerning the attacks against me because it's not about me and I'm not the story the story
is the fact that there are Palestinians who risk to be erased from their land
the questions that journalists should asked I mean this is what I would expect how do you comment on the fact that
Israel has passed laws that Outlaw un organization because other member states
who have a even a worse record than Israel could do the same human rights record than Israel
could do the same and uh and or how how do I comment the fact that Israel is
there has been a plan to erase Palestinian presence from northern Gaza
and the fact that Israel is freely talking about going going back to Gaza and reoccupy Gaza while the
international court of justice has recognize that the occupation is illegal and must go unequivocally and totally
this is what I want to talk about because if we keep on entertaining discussions on is she an anti-mite don't
I'm I'm sorry think what what you want of me I I will do my job until I have
this mandate and that is it uh just a quick followup um just to say that is about what you have
to cover in the sense you if I understood you're saying basically don't don't focus on me focus on on on what I
denounce in my reports and so on uh but if I understand that a special
reporter is effective or could be effective if it maintains is uh uh if
appears not only his but appears uh neutral or they can you know talk to
both sides so for now we seeing that US ambassador
and it's a personal tweet I mean it's a tweet attacking you so my simple
question and it's not a personal question it's about your work as a reporter in the last let's say one here
could you have done something different do you think you could have done something different to maintain your uh you know to be uh more
effective in in be able to talk talk to both side but it you you seem to be someone
who measures Effectiveness in talking to both sides and I don't even understand who both sides are what so can you be be
more specific on who are the both sides I'm talking as a journalist and
not talking as as a journalist say that we see if we do a research uh you know
we as a journalist have to quote our source and everything and unfortunately
and say unfortunately uh your name now when you we quote in
our article because uh according to the report that um Alban wrote
unfortunately you are considered not by me but by what happened in the situation
that we have also the I don't know I don't remember Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield do some an attack like this
for anybody on on Twitter unfortunately is like it doesn't
make your work your reports and what denouncing any more effective because but this is your opinion how do you
measure Effectiveness like look let's cut it short uh first of all there is a an
inaccuracy and I have to to to be uh clear about that and I don't want to put
the spot on you but because I I and thank you for that it gives me the opportunity to clarify but uh an
independent expert of the United Nations with a human rights monitoring mandate is not requested to be neutral is
requested to be impartial sorry it's different it's different tell me how I am partial
because I am the the only special reporter who has in investigated violations of international law
committed by Hamas in my in my second report and the Palestinian Authority and
I've tried I've tried to visit the prisons of the Run by the Palestinian Authority and I was prevented from doing
so by the uh by Israel and who prevented my Vis it and and if you look if you look
at the terms of reference of my resolution of the resolution creating this mandate my mandate uh obliges me to
look at the violations committed by Israel So when you say talk to both parties but I I
understand where what you're trying to say I should maintain uh a position that
allows me to be listened to by all member states and this is what I've done
until March this year I've had the discussions with everyone in March uh
already 30,000 Palestinians had been killed and it was clear that there were it was not in the in at the in the
Horizon that this would stop and again I speak what do I do I I I I tell the
facts and I point to the responsibilities of member states of course member states are not pleased
with it so I don't particularly take uh I'm not sensitive to the fact that
Ambassador uh I mean any Ambassador criticizes my work look at it seems that
there is also some misinformation about the work of special repor I mean the special repor on Iran receives criticism by Iran the
special reporter on Myanmar receives CRI criticism by Myanmar what is unique here
is that Israel is the only state that it's absolutely protected and cocooned
by the by most of the West what Craig mber calls the setler colonial
block yeah and my mandate is the only one who in fact stands looking straight
in the face at western states so again I take your criticism next time try to be
a special reporter on the op and maybe you will be more effective than me we have
a we have have a question online Don if you're still with
us um sure thank you uh Miss Al Don clany with um IPS news I wanted to ask
you about one of the recommendations that you make in your report um regarding putting some sort of Peace
Force um on the ground in in Gaza but I do think you say throughout the occupied
uh Palestinian territory I wanted to see if you could expand a little bit on what
you think think that would look like and then I also wanted to ask you how would you address the concern that if you put
some sort of Peace operation whether it's a force or whatever you want to call it if you put put that on the ground in occupied Palestinian territory
you leave the and it's and it's something that's mandated by the UN it's it's led by the UN you leave the door
open for some misinterpretation that the UN could be possibly you know fighting
Israel or squaring up to Israel um instead of it you know being a being some sort of Peace effort and I was just
wondering how you how you would respond to that thank you
uh I think that on this question we should really consult uh those who have
uh great greater experience than I do with peacekeeping operations because I'm
I'm sure that these are concerns that have been uh raised in other context as
well Israel has no right to be in the occupied Palestinian territory no right
whatsoever the international court of justice has ordered Israel to
withdraw uh unconditionally and totally as rapidly as possible its military
presence dismantling the colonies stopping the seizing the exploitation of
natural resources on the occupied Palestinian territory and making also reparations now how is it going to
happen so the having a um like what I
call protective presence and I've um uh intentionally been fluid and or
ambiguous if you want on this one I've not been very prescriptive because I don't want that the prescriptiveness of
my ideas on the one hand infringe on the on the will of the parties particularly
the Palestinians because the Palestinians are the one who need to make this request at the stage there is
no say for Israel um but this would also
make sure that there is protection for both Palestinians and Israelis while while the Israelis withdraw the
occupation so that there is like like a buffer this is as a minimum um but also
because there is there is a urgent need a urgent need to um take the Israeli
troops out of Gaza first and for most and um and in Gaza the Civil order has
collapsed because um all possible Hamas The deao Authority
related uh Administration officers have been hit Clan structures and Etc and so
there is a need to have I I think a Transit force a
transitory presence which ensures capacity to restore restablish Law and
Order but with a very limited time because it's time for the Palestinians to determine themselves but it's going
to be very very hard the longer the Israeli um army remains in Gaza and the
rest of the occupied Palestinian territory the worse is going to be both for the Palestinians and the Israelis
can I get one more uh sure Don go ahead sorry I also wanted to ask you
about the um polio campaign um as I'm sure you know there's the
successful first round of the polio campaign this second round has has been
paused because of the fighting or whatever else is happening in the north of Gaza and i' and I've seen a lot on on
social media where you know entities especially like Kat will say how can we
be committing genocide when we are helping um distribute you know polio
vaccines we're saving children and and I and I get that you know a vaccine
against polio isn't going to vaccine a child against a bomb or a bullet or anything else I'm just wondering how
that fits into the context of genocide or what what would you say to that
um I think that this confirms my my my sense that there is a general
misunderstanding of what genocide is and what genocidal intent is I've said in my first report that um Israel was not
necessarily denying to have committed I mean that the facts I was
referring to in the report had occurred like the bombing and the um and the
killing of of Palestinians on the ground it has qualified them differently and
I've said uh this is humanitarian camouflage Israel uses uh categories of
international law like humanitarian Zone and collateral damages or human Shields
to justify and to and to make an excuse that distract from the intent to destroy
the intent to destroy a people is the determination to reduce the capacity of
a group to survive um till leading to Leading to
destruction and intent does means that having the intent means that you don't
even need to have the completion of the design of the genocidal design is what
you do to the people and frankly there has been so much pressure on Israel to
allow humanitarian Aid so according to this reasoning so even the fact that during the starvation campaign that has
led many to die and to and to get sick because of the lack of food the lack of water and I've seen some of them
including children so the fact that every now and then the starvation campaign was interrupted by some tracks
allowed in oh so Israel is not really starving the Palestinians I've seen that
the the the vaccination the PO vaccination campaign when it started it was also attacked it had to be
interrupted how did we get there is it an a small Act of basic Humanity going
to hide obscure and mute what has been done for the past 12 months I believe
it's not I mean it might be considered as a as a as an exception but it doesn't
change the overall course of um the overall course of Israel's assault on
Gaza EDI uh thank you very much Miss Alban and apologies I was listening
upstairs um a follow up on what you've just said about uh getting humanitarian
Aid in um what is your reaction to the
Israeli legislation passed earlier this week that would ban the UN agency that
has been a Lifeline forade in Gaza unra um in 90 days
uh three things the act in itself is appalling and it's a blow for the UN
Charter and all what multilateralism is uh uh is premised upon uh which is the
respect of respect for the United Nations and its programs and agency and
organs organs and officials um this is
this is also it's in two respect it's this is the second element it's part of the colonial
what I call the colonial Erasure the fact that Israel in the pursuit of realizing greater Israel is attempting
to um reduce uh physically or spiritually
meaning as a collective the the presence of the Palestinian identity in the occupied Palestinian territory which
means I mean many of whom are refugees 75% for example of the people in Gaza
they're not even from Gaza they're from Modern Day Israel and and um and and
therefore the their their presence is a continuous reminder for Israel of what I
call its original sin it's fact that its creation doesn't matter the justification behind it I'm not
questioning this from a Jewish people point of view but it the creation of the
state of Israel came at a huge price for the Palestinians and it has never been addressed and as I said as after 1967
has even continue because in the attempt to expand uh Israel's control over the
the land Palestinians have been increasingly segregated increasingly
repressed and now an Anda has remained as the symbol of pales not only of
Palestinian uh capacity to to resist on the on the on the land uh but also
Palestinian refugees and so their claims the historical claims and their
historical demand for justice um this is also part and it has
huge humanitarian implications because destroying anra uh preventing anra from
functioning and anra still has the only is the only Remnant uh of the UN large
capacity to still ensure food distribution or um Aid distribution in
general or medical assistance it's very everything is very difficult I'm not even sure in fact that this is the case
because the destruction has been so massive but still anra has the know how to do that and uh this is the third
element is that this is nothing new Israel has been attacking an for the past 20 years steadily steadily seeing
it as part of the problem telling the Israel Ana was registering Palestinian
against the law for Refugee status and I've written widely about that and then I can tell you there has been a
Relentless attack on anra seen as a symbol of Palestinian and and as a quick
followup um the United States gave Israel 30 days to um get a significant
amount of humanitarian Aid into Gaza uh
several weeks ago well was your reaction to to that these are drops my reaction
is that these are drops in the oan I don't understand why member States
including the United the United States cannot simply follow what the law is I
mean I'm really I'm really worried by the lawlessness that is Advanced here
the in again I insist international law says
that Israel at this point by The Liberation of the decision of the international court of justice Israel
must withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territory there is also a time limit for that it is September next
year what the question is what is the United States doing to comply with that
decision what is the United na States doing to ensure that Israel complies
with the provisional measures of the international court of justice the rest is um again I think think it's a it's SM
in the eyes I'm afraid uh we have another question
online uh and then maybe one or two more here and I think we will have to finish so
Jordan online if you yes good afternoon this is Jordan I uh partially you answered the
my question but I have to ask ask the question in different I Ona is not only
a distributor of food Ana is uh is if you look at the W is work alsoa is the
right of rain to the people what do you think about that um as you mentioned U
75% of the people of Gaza they are not gazans they
are um I mean by international law they are Israelis they have to go back and
become Israeli citizen but they were unable to reain uh how can and um we
solved the Palestinian refugees issue with the occupation
ending because in 1967 Gaza was not occupied but Israel sent
100,000 refugees to it in 2005 Israel partially withraw and then besieged Gaza
but the refugees is there in West Bank and my
other question is do you think the war in Gaza actually war on refugees and on
unwa because Israel as many authors wrote including maybe yourself is trying
to eliminate the presence or the issue of right of rain our refugees thank you so
much um I I I'm U as someone who has devoted
many years of her life if studying Palestinian refugees including anra from an academic point of view a scholarly
point of view I can tell you no anra is not the garer of the right of Return of the Palestinian refugees that right is
enshrined in international law is solid solidly built in international law and
even resolution 194 is not the resolution that create the right of
return the the resolution 194 is the first uh durable solution map for for
Palestinian refugees for refugees in fact because it afforded refugees to choose whether to return return to their
homes or to resettle um so it's it's it's a bit more
I mean more articulated than than that I do um of course I do think I do agree
that anra is not just a provider of humanitarian assistance but this is also
one of the elements of criticism that I've brought to anra the sense that anra has withdrawn itself in humanitarian
Corner in order to avoid political controversies but the UN mandate toward
Palestinian Palestine refugees is much broader than that and it also comprises a political Dimension that is with
another body that was created before Andra it's the uncp the new hand conciliation commission for Palestine
and that's been um put out of function because again of political
reasons um concerning the status of Palestinian refugees no under international law they are not Israelis
under international law they are stateless stateless persons um because under international law yes the state of
Palestine exist but is still un UN in captivity and so cannot ensure um cannot
ensure the protection bond that is typical of uh of the relation State
citizen um but besides this besides these
technicalities what what matters to me is that the general the anra is a is a
subsidiary body of the general assembly it's not just a UN agency whatever or a
un program it's been established by the general assembly and only the general assembly can decide the future of Andra
and at the same time uh I was writing this years ago during the Trump
Administration in fact when there was the first massive attack from a US Administration against anr and it was
probably the first was quite unprecedented and again this is it's it's an attent it's an assault on
multilateralism when member states UT utilize their power uh in order to alter
the the Democratic order that exist or should exist at the international level
so they United States or Israel or others should discuss the future of of
Andra within the United Nations and not trying to attack it from outside because
again besides anra and the situation is very serious I already commented on that the other problem is that this sets an
example to get rid of the United Nations everywhere at any latitude when States
um yeah when the states are unhappy with it with the work of the United Nations
I'm sorry I think that's all the time we have because uh our special repter does have other commitments so I thank you
all for coming and with this the press conference is closed okay thank you
by Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967.
United Nations
Oct 31, 2024
Press conference by Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967.
Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory said, “the genocidal violence” has expanded and “metastasized in other parts of the oPt.”
Briefing reporters in New York City today (30 Oct) she questioned, “How do you explain the 700, over 700, Palestinians who have been killed in the West Bank, including 170 children?”
Albanese further said, “And how do you explain the fact that the Palestinians from the West Bank have been exposed to the same practices and abuses, often rape, among other forms of torture, than those in Gaza? If there was no Hamas military action or presence in the West Bank? Not that the first justified what Israel has done in Gaza.”
According to Albanese, “Impunity that has been granted to Israel has allowed it to become a serial violator of international law.” She argued that the United States has been “an enabler” in Israel’s actions, suggesting it has “a conflict of interest… in orchestrating attacks against anyone who criticizes Israel.”
Albanese further pointed to what she called a “colonial erasure” in efforts to diminish Palestinian identity in the oPt, noting that “75 percent, for example, of the people in Gaza, they’re not even from Gaza. They’re from modern-day Israel.” She said these actions serve as a “reminder… of its original sin” in the creation of the Israeli state.
Additionally, she condemned attacks on UNRWA, describing it as a “symbol of Palestinianness,” and emphasized that UNRWA’s fate rests solely with the General Assembly, noting that “only the General Assembly can decide the future of UNRWA.”
Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council’s independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent of any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity.
Transcript
hello good afternoon and welcome to yet another press
conference you had a difficult day today but I think this is the last one so um
we have with us uh Miss Franchesca Alban special reporter on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967 uh Miss alanza was appointed uh by
the Human Rights Council as independent expert in May of 2022 so we'll first ask her to
um tell us a little bit about her work in the report and then there'll be time for questions
so over to you uh thank you very much good afternoon everyone um I just presented
my fifth report um third to the general
assembly which has a very uh harrowing title genocide as Colonial Erasure and
as I say in the first lines of the report this is something that were walks
on the heels of my previous report what I presented to the Human Rights Council in March this year where I concluded
that based on my findings over five months of Investigation there were reasonable grounds to believe that
Israel had committed acts of genocide in in
Gaza and I've continued to investigate what has happened in Gaza but also the
rest of the occupied Palestinian territory after presenting that
report I um I can say that for over one year I've
pleaded all concerned to all concerned parties uh particularly those States who
can exert more influence on the state of Israel to take concrete actions to stop
the destruction of Gaza the destruction of the Palestinian people to ensure the
prompt and unconditional release of all hostages both Israelis and Palestinians
and to ensure international law is respected and had international law
being respected at least in the last 12 months this would have stopped it should
have stopped it should have been stopped by the security Council last October it should have been stopped uh after the
first set of provisional measures issued by the international court of justice it
should have stopped when I presented my first report it should have stopped before Rafa was invaded or before the
invasion of Lebanon and instead the silence or Worse the
justification of a small but influential number of states as continue to enable and to to
nurture the ubis that leads Israeli conduct as we as we speak the
developments on the grounds are are gruesome and uh it is
long it has actually since the beginning the the the the the violence the
genocidal violence that they have described in my first report uh has expanded and metastized in
other parts of the occupied Palestinian territory and if you look at the patterns of violence the destruction of
Civilian infrastructure roads energy geds uh water pipelines and Reservoir
homes and if you look at the numbers of extrajudicial
killings in the West Bank as well on top of the 42,000
Palestinians have been killed a certain killed in Gaza including 177,000
children how do we explain the 700 over 700 Palestinians have been killed in um
in the West Bank including 170 children and how do we
explain the uh the fact that the Palestinians from the West Bank have
been exposed to the same practices and abuses
often rape among other forms of torture um than those in Gaza if there
was no Hamas military action or presence in the West Bank not that the the first
Justified what Israel has done in Gaza but again not only we see the past
reproducing itself in the occupied Palestinian territory we see the same indifference the same uh ability to look
away of many member states in International Community and we see a total collapse of the international
order which is premised upon the never again that was promised after the second
world war and particular in particular after the Holocaust and the genocide
mostly Jewish people um I'm
I'm very happy to take your questions I don't know what um what else what else to say other than um it's not been an
easy year because surely it has been reluctantly that I took on the the
functions of chronicler of a genocide and it's extremely disturbing to see
member states pontificating and questioning and um and uh obscuring the
meaning of intern naal law and de humanizing the victims of this um of
this last of this last 12 months but however should you have any questions I'm here
yeah you do okay um we have Abdul
Hamid thank you so much uh my name is Abdul Hamid say am from the Arabic da
Al thank you for coming again to talk to us I have a few questions first you have
been personally attacked as always the case when someone criticizes Israel then
they try to attack that person personally like Graham buul with horaa
lazarini now Karim Khan U many others so how do you uh take this uh personal
attacks on you and the second as you know international law
allows people under occupation and foreign domination to
resist I mean they become Heroes I mean we have a statue of Mandela here and
because he was resisting upper side many of the great leaders of modern time were
at at one stage fighting colonialism why only when the Palestinians fight
occupation they are labeled as terrorist thank you
um to be very clear I don't think that Israel is the only state that attacks
special repur special repur get attacked when they uh scrutinize the human rights
records of member states uh and there are states who are more vorous and virulent than others
what it's striking in the case of Israel is that is that there is a cohort of State
who Echoes and reverberates what Israel says and does
and there and there is um an army of minions at work to um to uh
produce literally Fabrications that have one and only one objective to distract
the attention from where it should stay so I will not entertain any discussion
about how I take this attacks because they're not just against me they' have been against the special reporter on the
occupied Palestinian territory who preceded me uh and this year in particular the Secretary General has
been vilified and even declared Persona nrata welcome to the club and um and so
the general assembly what is more shocking to me is that this year the United Nations have
been under an unprecedented military attack 70% of Anda premises have been
hit by Israeli fire and uh which has also hit peacekeepers in
Lebanon and uh the United Nations humanitarian functions have been
hampered at a at a moment where they were the only B the B work to continue
to provide assistance to to the Palestinians in extreme in an extreme
situation of distress and it's because of that that I do believe that while
Israel is by no means the only state that violate violates international law
and it's not even the only states that violate that violate uh the right of
self-determination of a people but it's surely unique in the determination the
the the the the protracted of uh of this conduct and the
fact that Israel has never faced any consequences and indeed I do believe
that the impunity that has been granted to Israel has allowed it to become a
Serial violator of international law which is the reason why I recommended that this is the time as it has been for
aparte South Africa to consider uh for the general assembly to consider uh the
the suspension I mean recommending the the the revision or the suspension of Israel's credential as credential as a
member of the United Nations until uh it ends uh violating
international law until he withdraws the occupation uh which is clearly unlawful
also by determination of the international court of justice and surely uh until it continues it's an
genocidal attack on the Palestinians um you and then
mik hi my name Isam newspaper good to see you again um
I have two follow-ups first on the issue of suspension uh of Israeli membership
or uh to the UN if you could elaborate on that and uh whether you believe this
is something that will get um a majority in the general assembly um and then
um my other question is regarding a third Pary role in the war that's going
on whether it has to do with delivering weapons I mean there responsibility when
it comes to international law and the lack of um Mo them taking any steps and
in and basically supporting so the accountability for not
only for isra but also for third parties and the last thing in your remarks today
to the comittee you talked about the lack of empathy that you are seeing by some member states H in uh not um um
even expressing um any empathy for the Palestinian victims and uh could you and also the
issue of uh the many states um talking about human rights in academic um
context or theoretical context but when it comes to the issue of Palestinian human rights rights uh they are even
attacking uh students they're not allowing uh or attacking people who
demonstrate against the war if you could also touch on that thank you so much yeah thank you first of all I should uh
briefly respond on the second question sorry I missed it um regarding
resistance and I think I've said it before including in this uh in this venue that there is no question that the
Palestinians have the right to resist under International law like all people who are oppressed and who cannot enjoy
the right of self-determination the right to resist is to a people um what the right to
selfdefense is to EST State and uh in the same way it has
limits so it cannot neither can touch civilian life civilian
life is sicker than should always be protected so um I I think that we should always
remind ourselves and respect respect the fact that October 7 has been an
unspeakable tragedy for the for the Israelis who call who call that event uh
the worst terrorist attack they ever suffered and as I I said before for me
those were surely were crimes to the extent they they targeted that they hit
civilians um and should have been met by
Justice this didn't legitimize the attack on the on the uh on the
Palestinians like um like if they were the nation responsible because they were
not and again ref this should have prompt a reflection on the causes on the
root courses that have led to that horrific day uh which is a horrific day both for
the Israelis and the Palestinians I want to underline although I think that this
is not the day the genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza started and
um um is it is it correct that only the
Palestinians are denied of this this this right no I don't think so I I think
that after um then after 911 there is a
an in an increasing uh intolerance for
for people's claims for self-determination and again we are no
longer in the decolonization era uh where the right of the right to resist
was to an extent even celebrated to an extent we are in an
where resistance is seen is often seen and labeled as terrorism this is the
reality for the Palestinians and others um concerning the the suspension so
there are there are different issues there but um what I what I refer to is
article six of the UN Charter which says that when a member of the United Nations
persistently persistently violates the principles containing contained in the
UN Charter it might be expelled from the organizations and there should be from
the organization and there should be uh a decision of the general ass a general assembly upon recommendation of the
security Council um there have been cases where the impass of the security Council has
been circumvented by by by decision of the general assembly to act for example
uniting for peace and this might be one opportunity to consider in this case as
well but I would like to take this opportunity to stress that again this is not an what prompted me to make that
that recommendation is not the fact that Israel violates international law full
Stope Israel violates international law from its birth and international law
includes un security Council resolution and general assembly resolution Israel
has violated including the UN resolutions that he committed to abide by as a condition to become a member of
the of the general assembly of the United Nations and uh orders or and
decisions of the international court of justice and again this year the
escalation of violence and attacks against the United Nations sets a terrible president that if left
unpunished I also encourage other states to resort to the same kind of venomous
reactions toward the the the United Nations losing all respect all respect
for these organizations and this should not happen this is why I think it should now it's time to take an Exemplar
step um considering considering why did I mention the lack
of empathy because I have I don't know if I'm I have the fortune fortune or Misfortune to always present my reports
to the general assembly after the commission of inquiry um which has a team of investigators and
so carries out a very thorough uh work of uh collection of evidence and again
for the third time I heard the member states criticizing the Mandate of the commission which means they don't even
interact with their counterparts uh in in Geneva who have Tor down their criticism toward the commission and
appreciate the work it does instead of engaging on the substance and I've heard
member states mentioning again October 7 I
understand I mean I it's not that I criticize that but like like if history started on October 7 forgetting the 56
years of Oppression and the and the tens of thousands if no more Palestinians who had been killed let alone the 1 million
people people who had been arbitrarily detained including many children so it's it's a bit Preposterous and and the fact
that 177,000 children have been killed and this was not even mentioned together
with the full destruction of Gaza made me realize that no life is not worth the
same and Palestinian life is less worth this for some member states this is a
fact and I'm and I'm also annoyed by the fact that this issue which is so
sensitive to to to Millions because again the life of the Palestinians first
and foremost but also the life of the Israelis for many of them is hell since
uh since last year and there is this sort of U let's
Pi aide attitude in the general assembly one side and the other that again it
Bears Testament to the to the loss of humanity that that has penetrated this
this institution the comment I made on human rights and is and the fact that there
has been an erosion of the value of human rights in the last 12 months was
prompted by the fact that um member states
who member states who uh praise themselves as Defenders of of Human
Rights and sponsor of Human Rights including in their international relations have not hesitated have
not have have engaged in forms of repression and cracking down fundamental
freedoms of their own citizens in in Europe including of Jewish people who
were standing in solidarity with the Palestinians for what they were going through and this is very uh it's very
telling of the of the bizarre time we live uh we live in but especially when
it comes to students who are in a way the most powerful but also the most the
most powerful they've been the most powerful voice speaking truth to power but also they're still the most the the
most frail part of the society because they are investing a lot in building their future and many of them have have
seen their future uh undermined sacrificed for standing for justice and
what kind what kind of message are liberal universities in the liberal West
sending to the students yes we can teach human rights from our um from our
podiums in universities but then don't dare fighting to have them becoming a
reality for all because this is not your job basically this is the message that is been
sent about third party ah third party responsibility is U there is a clear
obligation uh which is gener a general principle of international law law of
State responsibility when there is an international wrongdoing of any sort violations of international law human
rights law international humanitarian law any state has the every state has
the responsibility not to recognize the legal consequences of the wrongful act
and not to engage not to Aid and assist uh in the commission of the
wrongful Act but rather acting to um to uh lead to the sensation of the same and
the and ensure reparations nothing of this has been done but now we are also
in a context where as the international court of justice has recognized the
plausibility of uh the genocide uh could be committed already in
January this triggered the application of the genocide convention mean the
obligation to prevent genocide for which you don't have to wait to have acts of
genocide fully completed and a people or a group completely destroyed you need to
act so that genocide doesn't take place and so an arms embargo was uh was a
clear obligation the day after the court has passed has issued those provisional
measures instead the International Community has uh has followed isra on its uh attack against Tandra and so has
continue I mean member states continue to trade with Israel and to transfer
weapons Mike then Madam Mike wagenheim with I24 news it's been a while since
we've last spoken um a couple questions for you in your report uh you have a
line in here that says that since its establishment Israel has twe uh treated
the occupied people as a hated encumbrance and threat to be eradicated and you go on uh listing other items um
we'll leave aside the contextual and factual debate about that based on that statement it seems to infer that you
believe that Israel has been an occupier since the day of its birth is that your
position you said since its establishment Israel has treated occupied people Etc are you inferring
that Israel's been an occupier since 194 why do you have to ER instead of sticking to what I said and I'm asking
let me let me elaborate um Israel has taken and we can I can concede that
it has done it with uh with the recognition of the general assembly but from a human rights law point of view
and as I take a people centered approach I cannot uh I cannot forget it the
creation of the state of Israel has meant the dispossession of uh hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians of who have been kicked out of their homes and never allowed to return why
so and um is it does it make an occupier
it makes a state it makes of Israel a state who has forci forcibly
displaced significant part of the native population and this is the past that has never been addressed the Palestinians
with Israeli citizenship who remained in Israel have been kept for two decades
under military rule and this is why when I mhm uh when
I when I say an incumbrance I was not even referring to them but as you ask I
mean this is documented so it's not debatable it's it's history and since
1967 which is what I'm most interested in because of the Mandate I have Israel
has continued as continued this practices has extended the the custodianship system
that had been used to take control of all the properties left behind by the Palestinian
refugees but without time limit so from 1967 I think this is military order
5058 one of one of the early military orders Israel has been able to to sa and
acquire all the all the property left behind by the Palestinians the
350,000 were forcibly displaced outside the occupied Palestinian territory in
1967 and the hundreds of thousand who have been kicked out of their homes and lands ever
since so there's been a continuity so it's not just about what has been happening in the
occupied Palestinian territory for the past 57 years is the fact that
unfortunately there is a continuity with patterns of conduct that had already
been enacted in uh in what in modern day
Israel I'm I'm not sure that answers a question but it will have to suffice one other question for you because I know my
colleagues want to jump in here you know about the controversy surrounding your positions and your statements I'm not
going to repeat them here but you did comment on social media within the past
week and I'm going to read this back to you said I'm profoundly committed to human rights for all people how could I
ever be an anti-semite a few days ago you were supposed to have a briefing with members of Congress uh that
briefing was cancelled uh don't know if the the Jewish Lobby was behind it or not but oh you said Jewish Lobby Jewish
Lobby out because it's very anti-semitic appar it is I I I was I didn't use it you did don't know who you feel was
behind it um in any case uh you appeared and your
appearance there was sponsored by a group called code pink you appeared in a video with the co-founder of code pink
code pink well documented shills for some of the world's worst human rights
violators Maduro Iran where they appeared with Holocaust deniers they deny the genocide going on in China of
the weager population completely deny it how can you say appearing with a group
like that that you stand and are committed for human rights for all people and are not an anti-semite this
group is drawn to you and you happily appear with them while they shill for human rights abusers all over the world
and only focus in on Israel according to this principle I shouldn't be asking question from uh from journalists for
example unless I check their pedigree and I explain to you because I was not at an event hosted by good pink check
your sources because this is not correct I was host correct that you appeared in
a video with the co-founder can I finish sure you can I was speaking at an event
organized by B um at a bz boys and Poets a venue I've always uh where I've always
attended wonderful talks then if they have hosted uh people who have terrible
records I don't know but I wouldn't feel responsible and as I was um as I was on
my way out and looking at a Morales U Meda from code pink approached me and
can I ask you a question and I said of course do you mind being on record of course of course not and that is it now
do you want to add on the on the allegations against me because I gave a I answer a question to Mada Benjamin or
do I have to check to do a background check of any person I talk to you have
no idea who code pink is you have no prior contact with them of course I know who could pink is and I but I don't
apparently I'm not as informed as you are thank you for educating me that's part of my job as a journalist thank
you thank you very much stepan York Press
um I'm sorry because I arrived uh I think you had started
already a few minutes so I don't know if you talked about it but uh I heard about when you were talking about the the
Israeli government accusing you to be anti-semitic but
here of anti-Semitism but uh did you respond uh did you respond to that tweet
that Ambassador Linda Thomas grimfield wrote yesterday uh she wrote that as a un
special reporter Alban Alban visit New York I want to reiterate the US believes she's unfit for a role the United
Nations should not tolerate anti-Semitism from a un Affiliated official hire to promote human rights
this is the ambassador of United States at the United Nation what's your response to I have the same shock that
you have looking at how the United States is behaving in this context in the context
of the genocide that is unfolding in Gaza I'm not I'm not surprised that they
attack any anyone who who speaks to the fact acts that are uh frankly on our
watch in um in Gaza and uh they do that so um so brutally because they they feel
called um called out because it's not that is the United State is simply an
observer the United State is being in a an enabler in uh in what Israel has been
doing so of course they have a conflict of interest in uh in this in let's say
orchestrating attacks against uh against anyone who criticizes
Israel but besides this I really don't feel comfortable at entertaining any
longer discussions concerning the attacks against me because it's not about me and I'm not the story the story
is the fact that there are Palestinians who risk to be erased from their land
the questions that journalists should asked I mean this is what I would expect how do you comment on the fact that
Israel has passed laws that Outlaw un organization because other member states
who have a even a worse record than Israel could do the same human rights record than Israel
could do the same and uh and or how how do I comment the fact that Israel is
there has been a plan to erase Palestinian presence from northern Gaza
and the fact that Israel is freely talking about going going back to Gaza and reoccupy Gaza while the
international court of justice has recognize that the occupation is illegal and must go unequivocally and totally
this is what I want to talk about because if we keep on entertaining discussions on is she an anti-mite don't
I'm I'm sorry think what what you want of me I I will do my job until I have
this mandate and that is it uh just a quick followup um just to say that is about what you have
to cover in the sense you if I understood you're saying basically don't don't focus on me focus on on on what I
denounce in my reports and so on uh but if I understand that a special
reporter is effective or could be effective if it maintains is uh uh if
appears not only his but appears uh neutral or they can you know talk to
both sides so for now we seeing that US ambassador
and it's a personal tweet I mean it's a tweet attacking you so my simple
question and it's not a personal question it's about your work as a reporter in the last let's say one here
could you have done something different do you think you could have done something different to maintain your uh you know to be uh more
effective in in be able to talk talk to both side but it you you seem to be someone
who measures Effectiveness in talking to both sides and I don't even understand who both sides are what so can you be be
more specific on who are the both sides I'm talking as a journalist and
not talking as as a journalist say that we see if we do a research uh you know
we as a journalist have to quote our source and everything and unfortunately
and say unfortunately uh your name now when you we quote in
our article because uh according to the report that um Alban wrote
unfortunately you are considered not by me but by what happened in the situation
that we have also the I don't know I don't remember Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield do some an attack like this
for anybody on on Twitter unfortunately is like it doesn't
make your work your reports and what denouncing any more effective because but this is your opinion how do you
measure Effectiveness like look let's cut it short uh first of all there is a an
inaccuracy and I have to to to be uh clear about that and I don't want to put
the spot on you but because I I and thank you for that it gives me the opportunity to clarify but uh an
independent expert of the United Nations with a human rights monitoring mandate is not requested to be neutral is
requested to be impartial sorry it's different it's different tell me how I am partial
because I am the the only special reporter who has in investigated violations of international law
committed by Hamas in my in my second report and the Palestinian Authority and
I've tried I've tried to visit the prisons of the Run by the Palestinian Authority and I was prevented from doing
so by the uh by Israel and who prevented my Vis it and and if you look if you look
at the terms of reference of my resolution of the resolution creating this mandate my mandate uh obliges me to
look at the violations committed by Israel So when you say talk to both parties but I I
understand where what you're trying to say I should maintain uh a position that
allows me to be listened to by all member states and this is what I've done
until March this year I've had the discussions with everyone in March uh
already 30,000 Palestinians had been killed and it was clear that there were it was not in the in at the in the
Horizon that this would stop and again I speak what do I do I I I I tell the
facts and I point to the responsibilities of member states of course member states are not pleased
with it so I don't particularly take uh I'm not sensitive to the fact that
Ambassador uh I mean any Ambassador criticizes my work look at it seems that
there is also some misinformation about the work of special repor I mean the special repor on Iran receives criticism by Iran the
special reporter on Myanmar receives CRI criticism by Myanmar what is unique here
is that Israel is the only state that it's absolutely protected and cocooned
by the by most of the West what Craig mber calls the setler colonial
block yeah and my mandate is the only one who in fact stands looking straight
in the face at western states so again I take your criticism next time try to be
a special reporter on the op and maybe you will be more effective than me we have
a we have have a question online Don if you're still with
us um sure thank you uh Miss Al Don clany with um IPS news I wanted to ask
you about one of the recommendations that you make in your report um regarding putting some sort of Peace
Force um on the ground in in Gaza but I do think you say throughout the occupied
uh Palestinian territory I wanted to see if you could expand a little bit on what
you think think that would look like and then I also wanted to ask you how would you address the concern that if you put
some sort of Peace operation whether it's a force or whatever you want to call it if you put put that on the ground in occupied Palestinian territory
you leave the and it's and it's something that's mandated by the UN it's it's led by the UN you leave the door
open for some misinterpretation that the UN could be possibly you know fighting
Israel or squaring up to Israel um instead of it you know being a being some sort of Peace effort and I was just
wondering how you how you would respond to that thank you
uh I think that on this question we should really consult uh those who have
uh great greater experience than I do with peacekeeping operations because I'm
I'm sure that these are concerns that have been uh raised in other context as
well Israel has no right to be in the occupied Palestinian territory no right
whatsoever the international court of justice has ordered Israel to
withdraw uh unconditionally and totally as rapidly as possible its military
presence dismantling the colonies stopping the seizing the exploitation of
natural resources on the occupied Palestinian territory and making also reparations now how is it going to
happen so the having a um like what I
call protective presence and I've um uh intentionally been fluid and or
ambiguous if you want on this one I've not been very prescriptive because I don't want that the prescriptiveness of
my ideas on the one hand infringe on the on the will of the parties particularly
the Palestinians because the Palestinians are the one who need to make this request at the stage there is
no say for Israel um but this would also
make sure that there is protection for both Palestinians and Israelis while while the Israelis withdraw the
occupation so that there is like like a buffer this is as a minimum um but also
because there is there is a urgent need a urgent need to um take the Israeli
troops out of Gaza first and for most and um and in Gaza the Civil order has
collapsed because um all possible Hamas The deao Authority
related uh Administration officers have been hit Clan structures and Etc and so
there is a need to have I I think a Transit force a
transitory presence which ensures capacity to restore restablish Law and
Order but with a very limited time because it's time for the Palestinians to determine themselves but it's going
to be very very hard the longer the Israeli um army remains in Gaza and the
rest of the occupied Palestinian territory the worse is going to be both for the Palestinians and the Israelis
can I get one more uh sure Don go ahead sorry I also wanted to ask you
about the um polio campaign um as I'm sure you know there's the
successful first round of the polio campaign this second round has has been
paused because of the fighting or whatever else is happening in the north of Gaza and i' and I've seen a lot on on
social media where you know entities especially like Kat will say how can we
be committing genocide when we are helping um distribute you know polio
vaccines we're saving children and and I and I get that you know a vaccine
against polio isn't going to vaccine a child against a bomb or a bullet or anything else I'm just wondering how
that fits into the context of genocide or what what would you say to that
um I think that this confirms my my my sense that there is a general
misunderstanding of what genocide is and what genocidal intent is I've said in my first report that um Israel was not
necessarily denying to have committed I mean that the facts I was
referring to in the report had occurred like the bombing and the um and the
killing of of Palestinians on the ground it has qualified them differently and
I've said uh this is humanitarian camouflage Israel uses uh categories of
international law like humanitarian Zone and collateral damages or human Shields
to justify and to and to make an excuse that distract from the intent to destroy
the intent to destroy a people is the determination to reduce the capacity of
a group to survive um till leading to Leading to
destruction and intent does means that having the intent means that you don't
even need to have the completion of the design of the genocidal design is what
you do to the people and frankly there has been so much pressure on Israel to
allow humanitarian Aid so according to this reasoning so even the fact that during the starvation campaign that has
led many to die and to and to get sick because of the lack of food the lack of water and I've seen some of them
including children so the fact that every now and then the starvation campaign was interrupted by some tracks
allowed in oh so Israel is not really starving the Palestinians I've seen that
the the the vaccination the PO vaccination campaign when it started it was also attacked it had to be
interrupted how did we get there is it an a small Act of basic Humanity going
to hide obscure and mute what has been done for the past 12 months I believe
it's not I mean it might be considered as a as a as an exception but it doesn't
change the overall course of um the overall course of Israel's assault on
Gaza EDI uh thank you very much Miss Alban and apologies I was listening
upstairs um a follow up on what you've just said about uh getting humanitarian
Aid in um what is your reaction to the
Israeli legislation passed earlier this week that would ban the UN agency that
has been a Lifeline forade in Gaza unra um in 90 days
uh three things the act in itself is appalling and it's a blow for the UN
Charter and all what multilateralism is uh uh is premised upon uh which is the
respect of respect for the United Nations and its programs and agency and
organs organs and officials um this is
this is also it's in two respect it's this is the second element it's part of the colonial
what I call the colonial Erasure the fact that Israel in the pursuit of realizing greater Israel is attempting
to um reduce uh physically or spiritually
meaning as a collective the the presence of the Palestinian identity in the occupied Palestinian territory which
means I mean many of whom are refugees 75% for example of the people in Gaza
they're not even from Gaza they're from Modern Day Israel and and um and and
therefore the their their presence is a continuous reminder for Israel of what I
call its original sin it's fact that its creation doesn't matter the justification behind it I'm not
questioning this from a Jewish people point of view but it the creation of the
state of Israel came at a huge price for the Palestinians and it has never been addressed and as I said as after 1967
has even continue because in the attempt to expand uh Israel's control over the
the land Palestinians have been increasingly segregated increasingly
repressed and now an Anda has remained as the symbol of pales not only of
Palestinian uh capacity to to resist on the on the on the land uh but also
Palestinian refugees and so their claims the historical claims and their
historical demand for justice um this is also part and it has
huge humanitarian implications because destroying anra uh preventing anra from
functioning and anra still has the only is the only Remnant uh of the UN large
capacity to still ensure food distribution or um Aid distribution in
general or medical assistance it's very everything is very difficult I'm not even sure in fact that this is the case
because the destruction has been so massive but still anra has the know how to do that and uh this is the third
element is that this is nothing new Israel has been attacking an for the past 20 years steadily steadily seeing
it as part of the problem telling the Israel Ana was registering Palestinian
against the law for Refugee status and I've written widely about that and then I can tell you there has been a
Relentless attack on anra seen as a symbol of Palestinian and and as a quick
followup um the United States gave Israel 30 days to um get a significant
amount of humanitarian Aid into Gaza uh
several weeks ago well was your reaction to to that these are drops my reaction
is that these are drops in the oan I don't understand why member States
including the United the United States cannot simply follow what the law is I
mean I'm really I'm really worried by the lawlessness that is Advanced here
the in again I insist international law says
that Israel at this point by The Liberation of the decision of the international court of justice Israel
must withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territory there is also a time limit for that it is September next
year what the question is what is the United States doing to comply with that
decision what is the United na States doing to ensure that Israel complies
with the provisional measures of the international court of justice the rest is um again I think think it's a it's SM
in the eyes I'm afraid uh we have another question
online uh and then maybe one or two more here and I think we will have to finish so
Jordan online if you yes good afternoon this is Jordan I uh partially you answered the
my question but I have to ask ask the question in different I Ona is not only
a distributor of food Ana is uh is if you look at the W is work alsoa is the
right of rain to the people what do you think about that um as you mentioned U
75% of the people of Gaza they are not gazans they
are um I mean by international law they are Israelis they have to go back and
become Israeli citizen but they were unable to reain uh how can and um we
solved the Palestinian refugees issue with the occupation
ending because in 1967 Gaza was not occupied but Israel sent
100,000 refugees to it in 2005 Israel partially withraw and then besieged Gaza
but the refugees is there in West Bank and my
other question is do you think the war in Gaza actually war on refugees and on
unwa because Israel as many authors wrote including maybe yourself is trying
to eliminate the presence or the issue of right of rain our refugees thank you so
much um I I I'm U as someone who has devoted
many years of her life if studying Palestinian refugees including anra from an academic point of view a scholarly
point of view I can tell you no anra is not the garer of the right of Return of the Palestinian refugees that right is
enshrined in international law is solid solidly built in international law and
even resolution 194 is not the resolution that create the right of
return the the resolution 194 is the first uh durable solution map for for
Palestinian refugees for refugees in fact because it afforded refugees to choose whether to return return to their
homes or to resettle um so it's it's it's a bit more
I mean more articulated than than that I do um of course I do think I do agree
that anra is not just a provider of humanitarian assistance but this is also
one of the elements of criticism that I've brought to anra the sense that anra has withdrawn itself in humanitarian
Corner in order to avoid political controversies but the UN mandate toward
Palestinian Palestine refugees is much broader than that and it also comprises a political Dimension that is with
another body that was created before Andra it's the uncp the new hand conciliation commission for Palestine
and that's been um put out of function because again of political
reasons um concerning the status of Palestinian refugees no under international law they are not Israelis
under international law they are stateless stateless persons um because under international law yes the state of
Palestine exist but is still un UN in captivity and so cannot ensure um cannot
ensure the protection bond that is typical of uh of the relation State
citizen um but besides this besides these
technicalities what what matters to me is that the general the anra is a is a
subsidiary body of the general assembly it's not just a UN agency whatever or a
un program it's been established by the general assembly and only the general assembly can decide the future of Andra
and at the same time uh I was writing this years ago during the Trump
Administration in fact when there was the first massive attack from a US Administration against anr and it was
probably the first was quite unprecedented and again this is it's it's an attent it's an assault on
multilateralism when member states UT utilize their power uh in order to alter
the the Democratic order that exist or should exist at the international level
so they United States or Israel or others should discuss the future of of
Andra within the United Nations and not trying to attack it from outside because
again besides anra and the situation is very serious I already commented on that the other problem is that this sets an
example to get rid of the United Nations everywhere at any latitude when States
um yeah when the states are unhappy with it with the work of the United Nations
I'm sorry I think that's all the time we have because uh our special repter does have other commitments so I thank you
all for coming and with this the press conference is closed okay thank you
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Re: U.N. Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese Report
by admin » Sun Nov 03, 2024 5:35 am
“Genocide as Colonial Erasure”: U.N. Expert Francesca Albanese on Israel’s “Intent to Destroy” Gaza
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow!
October 31, 2024
https://www.democracynow.org/2024/10/31 ... a_albanese
We are joined by U.N. special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, Francesca Albanese, who says Israel is committing genocide on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Facing accusations of antisemitism from Israeli and U.S. officials, Albanese is in New York to present her report, titled “Genocide as colonial erasure,” which finds that Israel’s genocide is founded on “ideological hatred” and “dehumanization” and “enabled through the various organs of the state,” and recommends that Israel be unseated from the United Nations over its conduct. She argues that Israel’s attacks on U.N. employees, including the killings of at least 230 U.N. staff in Gaza, its flagrant violations of U.N. resolutions and international law and the unique status of “the first settler-colonial genocide to be ever litigated before [an international] court” justify this unprecedented measure. Israel’s continued impunity, Albanese warns, “is the nail in the coffin of the U.N. Charter.”
Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Israel’s deadly siege on northern Gaza has entered a 26th day. Earlier this week, the World Health Organization managed to deliver some medical supplies to the Kamal Adwan Hospital, but earlier today, Israeli fighter jets bombed the hospital’s third floor, where the supplies were being stored.
Meanwhile, Al Jazeera reports Israeli forces are continuing to shell Beit Lahia, the scene of multiple massacres this week. On Wednesday, an Israeli attack on a market in Beit Lahia killed at least 10 Palestinians. Earlier in the week, Israel struck a five-story residential building, killing at least 93 people, including 25 children.
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the U.N. special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, Francesca Albanese, has released a major report accusing Israel of committing genocide. Albanese concludes that Israel’s war on Gaza is part of a campaign of, quote, “long-term intentional, systematic, State-organized forced displacement and replacement of the Palestinians,” end-quote. The report is titled “Genocide as colonial erasure.”
AMY GOODMAN: Francesca Albanese is now facing intensifying personal attacks from Israeli and U.S. officials. She was set to brief Congress earlier this week, but the briefing was canceled. On Tuesday, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield wrote on social media, quote, “As UN Special Rapporteur Albanese visits New York, I want to reiterate the U.S. belief she is unfit for her role. The United Nations should not tolerate antisemitism from a UN-affiliated official hired to promote human rights,” unquote. On Wednesday, Francesca Albanese spoke at the United Nations and responded to the U.S. attacks.
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: I have the same shock that you have, looking at how the United States is behaving in this context, in the context of the genocide that is unfolding in Gaza. I’m not — I’m not surprised that they attack anyone who speaks to the facts that are, frankly, on our watch in Gaza. And they do that so brutally because they feel called out, because it’s not that it’s that the United States is simply an observer. The United States is being an enabler in what Israel has been doing.
AMY GOODMAN: That was U.N. special rapporteur Francesca Albanese speaking at the United Nations Wednesday. She joins us here in our studio.
Welcome back to Democracy Now! Thanks so much for joining us.
Well, before we get you to further respond to what the U.S. and Israel is saying, can you lay out the findings of your report?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Absolutely. First of all, thank you for having me.
I have to say that this report is the second I write on — and I present to the United Nations on the topic of genocide. And it has been very reluctantly that I’ve taken on the responsibility to be the chronicler of — the chronicler of an unfolding genocide in Gaza. In March this year, I concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Israel had committed at least the three acts of genocide in Gaza, like killing members of the protected group, Palestinians, and inflicting severe bodily and mental harm, and creating conditions of life that would lead to the destruction of the group. And the reason why I identified these were not just war crimes and crimes against humanity is because I identified an intent to destroy. And I understand that even in this country, people are quite confused about what is genocidal intent, because it’s not a motive. One can have many motives to commit a crime. And I understand genocide is a very insidious one, and it’s difficult to identify what’s a motive. But this is not about the motives. The intent to commit genocide is the determination to destroy, which is fully evident in — especially in the Gaza Strip, as I identified in — as argued in March already.
The reason why I continue to write about genocide — and, in fact, this report walks on the heels of the previous one — is in order to better explain the intent, especially state intent, because there is another misunderstanding that there should be a trial of the alleged perpetrators in order to have — to attribute responsibility to a state. No, because not only you have had acts committed that should have been prevented by the — in a rule of law, in a proclaimed rule of law system like Israel, where there is the government, the parliament, the judiciary, working as checks and balances, genocide has not only been not prevented, has been enabled through the various organs of the state.
And I explain what has happened as of October 7, which has provided the opportunity to escalate violence, to build on the rage and on the fury of many Israelis, turning the soldiers into willful executioners, is that there was already a plan, hatred. I mean, the Palestinians, like Ilan Pappé says, are victims not of war, but of a political ideology that has been unleashed. Palestinians have always been an unwanted encumbrance in the Israeli mindset, because they are an obstacle both as an identity and as legal status to the realization of Greater Israel as a state for Jewish Israelis only.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: So, we’ll go back to — because I do want to ask about the Israeli state institutions that you name and the branches of the Israeli state that have been involved in forming this state’s intent. But if you could elaborate on the point that you make, the difference between intent and motive, and in particular what you say in the report about how it’s critical to determine genocidal intent, quote, “by way of inference”? You know, that’s a different phrasing than one has heard in all of this conversation about genocide so far. If you explain what you mean by that and what such a determination makes possible? So, rather than just looking at genocidal intent in other forms, what it means to infer genocidal intent?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: So, first of all, what constitutes genocide is established by Article II of the Genocide Convention, which creates a twofold obligation for member states, to prevent genocide so genocide doesn’t have to complete itself. When there is a manifestation of intent, even genocidal intent, there is already an obligation to intervene, because a crime is unfolding.
And then there is an obligation to punish. How the jurisprudence, especially after Rwanda and after former Yugoslavia, there have been cases both for criminal proceedings, where individual perpetrators have been investigated and tried, and responsibility of the state, litigated before the International Court of Justice. This is how the jurisprudence on genocide has developed.
And the intent has been further elaborated upon what the Genocide Convention says. And while it might be difficult to have direct intent, meaning to have — it’s difficult but not impossible, in fact, to have a state official say, “Yes, let’s go and destroy everyone” — although I do believe that there is direct intent in this genocide in Gaza. But the court also established that genocide can be inferred from the scale of the attack on the people, the nature of the attack, the general conduct. And what it says is that normally there should be a holistic approach in order to identify intent, which is exactly what I’ve done.
And indeed, this is why I proposed in this report what I called the triple lens approach. We need to look at the conduct, like the totality of the conduct, instead of studying with a microscope each and every crime. We need to look at the whole, against the totality of the people, the Palestinians as such, in the totality of the land, that Israel has slated as its own by divine design.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: No, absolutely. And then, if you could — the other precedent you’ve just spoken about — of course, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia — another case that you cite in the International Court of Justice is The Gambia v. Myanmar. So, how is that comparable to what we see happening in Gaza? Why is that a relevant example and different from both Rwanda and former Yugoslavia?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Let me tell you what I see as the major differences in the case of Israel, because it’s a very complex discussion. But in all four cases, there is a toxic combination of hatred, ideological hatred, which has informed political doctrines. And this is true in all the various contexts we are mentioning. The other common element is that there is combination of crimes. Like, forced displacement is not an act of genocide per se, but the jurisprudence says that it can contribute to corroborate the intent. But the, again, mass killing or mass destruction of property, torture and other crimes against a person, which translate into an infliction of physical and mental harm to the group, not individuals as such, but individuals as part of the group, these are common elements to all genocides.
What I find characteristic in this one is, first of all, this is not — I mean, the state of Israel is not Myanmar and is not Rwanda 30 years ago. This is not war-torn former Yugoslavia. This is a state which has a separation of powers, different organs, as I said, checks and balances. And let me give you a specific example, because you asked me to comment on the state functions. In January this year, the International Court of Justice issued a set of preliminary measures in the context of its identification, before even looking at the merits of the case initiated by South Africa for Israel’s breach, alleged breach, of the Genocide Convention, which identified the plausibility of risk for the rights protected — of the rights of the Palestinians protected under the Genocide Convention, which means plausibility — it’s semantics, but it’s plausibility that genocide might be committed against the Palestinians in Gaza. And the provisional measures included an obligation to investigate and prosecute the various cases of incitement, genocidal incitement, that the court had already identified. And it mentions leaders, senior leaders, of the Israeli state. Has there been any investigation? Has there been any prosecution?
But I’m telling you more. The genocidal statements didn’t resonate as shocking in the Israeli public, not only because there was rage, an enormous rage and animosity, of course. I mean, this is understandable, that the facts of October 7 were brutal and traumatized the people. But at the same time, hatred against the Palestinians and hate speech, it’s not something that started on October 7. I do remember, and I do remember the shock I felt because no one was reacting, and years ago, there were Israeli ministers talking of — freely, of killing, justifying the killing of Palestinians’ mothers and children because they would turn into terrorists.
AMY GOODMAN: Francesca Albanese, talk about the title of your report, “Genocide as colonial erasure.”
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: This is another element which I think — and, in fact, it’s the most important, where we see the difference between this genocide and others, because there is a settler-colonial component. And again, if you look at what the International Court of Justice in July this year concluded, when it decided that the — when it found that Israel’s 57 years of occupation in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem is unlawful and needs to be withdrawn totally and unconditionally, as rapidly as possibly, which the General Assembly says before — by September 2025. The court said that it amounts to — that the colonies amount to — have led to a process of annexation and racial segregation and apartheid. And these are the features of settler colonialism, the taking of the land, the taking of the resources, displacing the local population and replacing it. This has been a feature.
Now, it is in this context that we need to analyze what is happening today. And by the way, don’t believe, don’t listen only to Francesca Albanese. Listen to what these Israeli leaders and ministers are saying — reoccupying Gaza, retaking Gaza, recolonizing Gaza, reconquesting Gaza. This is what they are saying. And there are settlers on expeditions, not only to Gaza but also to Lebanon. So, this is why I say that the main difference, the main feature of this genocide, apart all the horrible aspects of it, is that this is the first settler-colonial genocide to be ever litigated before a court, an international court.
And this is why coming to this country, which is a country birthed from a genocide, when I meet the Native Americans, for example, I feel the pain of these people. And I say if we manage to build on the intersectionality of Indigenous struggle, the cry for justice behind this case for Palestine will resonate even louder, because it will somewhat be an act of atonement from the settler-colonial endeavor, which has sprouted out of Europe, toward Indigenous peoples. So there is a lot of symbolism behind it.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: And, you know, the analogy — first of all, you talked about the case brought by South Africa, so what they share, apart from South Africa and Israel-Palestine, is both the fact that they were colonial-settler states, as well as the fact that apartheid has been established as having occurred in both places. Now, in the case of South Africa, it was a decision that was taken by the United Nations at the time of apartheid, was unseating South Africa from the General Assembly. There have been calls now to do the same with Israel. So, if you could — if you could comment on that? And then, I just want to quote another short sentence from your report, in which you say, “As the world watches the first live-streamed settler-colonial genocide, only justice can heal the wounds that political expedience has allowed to fester.” So, if you could talk about the International Criminal — Court of Justice’s case in that context, what role you think they can play, South Africa’s case, in resolving or addressing — seeing and addressing this wound?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: First of all, let me unpack the question of the unseating Israel, because this is one of the recommendations I made in my report. Under Article 6 of the U.N. Charter, a member state can be suspended of its credentials or its membership by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the U.N. Security Council. And the first criticism I got is that we cannot do that, because every states commit international law violations. Absolutely. Absolutely.
But there are two striking features here. First, Israel is quite unique in maintaining an unlawful occupation, which has deemed such by — in at least one full occasion, but again, there was already a case brought before the ICJ in 2004, so there have been two ICJ advisory opinion. There is a pending case for genocide. There has been the violations of hundreds of resolutions by the — on Israel, over occupied Palestinian territory, by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and steady violation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, the Apartheid Convention, the Genocide Convention. So this is quite unique.
But all the more, this year alone, Israel has conducted an attack, an unprecedented attack, against the United Nations. It has attacked physically, through artillery, weapons, bombs, U.N. premises. Seventy percent of UNRWA offices and UNRWA buildings, clinics, distribution centers have been hit and shelled by the Israeli army. Two hundred thirty U.N. staff members have been killed by Israel in Gaza alone. U.N. peacekeepers in Lebanon have been attacked. And this doesn’t even take into account the smear, the defamation against senior U.N. officials, the declaration of the secretary-general as persona non grata, the referring to the General Assembly as a cloak of antisemites.
Again, this has mounted to a level — the hubris against the United Nations and international law has been unchecked and unbounded forever, but now, especially after the Knesset passed a law outlawing UNRWA, declaring UNRWA a terrorist organization, and therefore disabling it from its capacity to deliver aid and assistance especially in Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, this is the nail in the coffin of the U.N. Charter. And it can also contribute to that sense of colonial erasure, because here it’s not just at stake the function of a U.N. body — and UNRWA is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, so it’s even more serious. But there is the capacity of UNRWA to deliver humanitarian aid in a desperate situation, and also the fact that UNRWA is seen by Israel as the symbol of Palestinian identity, especially the Palestinian refugees. So there is an attempt to erase Palestinianness, including by hitting UNRWA.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to ask you about your trip here, as we begin to wrap up. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield quoted on — tweeted on Tuesday, “As UN Special Rapporteur Albanese visits New York, I want to reiterate the U.S. belief she is unfit for her role. The United Nations should not tolerate antisemitism from a UN-affiliated official hired to promote human rights.” If you can further address their charge of antisemitism against you?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Yeah.
AMY GOODMAN: And talk about what happened. You were supposed to come to Congress and speak and brief them, but that was canceled this week.
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Yes, it was canceled. But let me — first of all, I’m very embarrassed to read this, because a senior U.S. official who writes this, I mean, it shows a little bit of desperation. I’m sorry, but, you know, I’m very candid. And let me unpack my antisemitism for the audience. So, what I’ve been accused — the reason why I’ve been accused of antisemitism is because I’ve allegedly compared the Jews to the Nazis. Never done. Never done. What I’ve said, what I’ve done is saying, and I keep on saying, that history is repeating itself. I’ve never done such a comparison where I draw the parallel. It’s on the behavior of member states who have the legal and moral obligation to prevent atrocities, including an unfolding genocide. In the past, they have done nothing — nothing — until the end of the Second World War, to prevent the genocide of the Jews and the Roma and Sinti. And they’ve done nothing to prevent the genocide of the Bosnians. And they’ve done nothing to prevent the genocide of the Rwandans. And they are doing the same today. This is where I insist that now, compared to when there was the Holocaust, now we have a human rights framework that should prevent this. The Genocide Convention to prevent this. So, this is one of the points.
The second point, because — which leads to portray me as an antisemite, which is really offensive, is that I’ve said that the October 7 was not — I’ve contested, I’ve challenged the argument that October 7 was an antisemitic attack. October 7 was a crime, was heinous. And again, I’ve condemned the acts that were directed against the Israeli civilians, and expressed solidarity with the victims, with the families. I’ve been in contact with the families of the hostages. But I’ve also said the hatred that led that attack, that prompted that attack, to the extent it hit civilians, not the military, but it was prompted not by the fact that the Israelis are Jews, but the fact that the Israelis — I mean, the Israelis are part of that endeavor that has kept the Palestinians in a cage for 17 years and, before, under martial law for 37 years. And Palestinians have tried — it’s true they have used violence, but before violence, they have tried dialogue. They have tried collaboration. They have tried a number of means, access to justice, and they have gone nowhere.
I can — I mean, let me relate just this case, because last year I worked with children. And someone who was 17 before — 17 years old before October 7 last year had never set foot out of Gaza. This is the reality. And I spoke with children while I was writing my report on unchilding, the experience of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. And one of them — I mean, there were these two girls fighting, because one of them had been able to go to Israel and the West Bank because she had cancer and could be treated, and the other was jealous, because, she said, “At least she was sick, and she could go, she could travel. I’ve never seen the mountains.”
And again, this doesn’t justify violence, but, please, please, put things in context. And even Israeli scholars have said claiming that October 7 was prompted by antisemitism is a way to decontextualize history and to deresponsibilize Israel. I condemn Israel not because it’s a Jewish state. It’s not about that, but because it’s in breach of international law through and through. And were the majority of Israelis Buddhists, Christians, atheists, it would be the same. I would be as vocal as I am now.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Francesca, just one last question, and we only have a minute. Your recent book, J’Accuse, you take the title, of course, from the letter Émile Zola wrote during the Dreyfus Affair to the French president. You came under severe criticism for the choice of that title. Could you explain why you chose it and what it means in this context?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Absolutely. I have the sense that whatever I say comes under scrutiny and criticism. But J’Accuse is — first of all, it’s the title that was proposed by the editor, the publisher. And I was against it until October 7. When I saw the narrative, the dehumanization of the Palestinians after October 7, and what it was legitimized, I said, “This is the title. We need to use it,” because I draw the parallel between what is happening to the Palestinians and what has happened to other groups, particularly the Jewish people in Europe. I say the Holocaust was not just about the concentration camps. The Holocaust was a culmination of centuries of discrimination, and the previous decades had led the Jewish people in Europe to be kicked out of jobs, professions, to be treated like subhumans, as animals. And it’s this dehumanization that we need to look at in the face today, in the eyes today, and recognize as leading to atrocity crimes.
AMY GOODMAN: We want to thank you for being with us, Francesca Albanese, U.N. special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory.
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow!
October 31, 2024
https://www.democracynow.org/2024/10/31 ... a_albanese
We are joined by U.N. special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, Francesca Albanese, who says Israel is committing genocide on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Facing accusations of antisemitism from Israeli and U.S. officials, Albanese is in New York to present her report, titled “Genocide as colonial erasure,” which finds that Israel’s genocide is founded on “ideological hatred” and “dehumanization” and “enabled through the various organs of the state,” and recommends that Israel be unseated from the United Nations over its conduct. She argues that Israel’s attacks on U.N. employees, including the killings of at least 230 U.N. staff in Gaza, its flagrant violations of U.N. resolutions and international law and the unique status of “the first settler-colonial genocide to be ever litigated before [an international] court” justify this unprecedented measure. Israel’s continued impunity, Albanese warns, “is the nail in the coffin of the U.N. Charter.”
Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Israel’s deadly siege on northern Gaza has entered a 26th day. Earlier this week, the World Health Organization managed to deliver some medical supplies to the Kamal Adwan Hospital, but earlier today, Israeli fighter jets bombed the hospital’s third floor, where the supplies were being stored.
Meanwhile, Al Jazeera reports Israeli forces are continuing to shell Beit Lahia, the scene of multiple massacres this week. On Wednesday, an Israeli attack on a market in Beit Lahia killed at least 10 Palestinians. Earlier in the week, Israel struck a five-story residential building, killing at least 93 people, including 25 children.
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the U.N. special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, Francesca Albanese, has released a major report accusing Israel of committing genocide. Albanese concludes that Israel’s war on Gaza is part of a campaign of, quote, “long-term intentional, systematic, State-organized forced displacement and replacement of the Palestinians,” end-quote. The report is titled “Genocide as colonial erasure.”
AMY GOODMAN: Francesca Albanese is now facing intensifying personal attacks from Israeli and U.S. officials. She was set to brief Congress earlier this week, but the briefing was canceled. On Tuesday, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield wrote on social media, quote, “As UN Special Rapporteur Albanese visits New York, I want to reiterate the U.S. belief she is unfit for her role. The United Nations should not tolerate antisemitism from a UN-affiliated official hired to promote human rights,” unquote. On Wednesday, Francesca Albanese spoke at the United Nations and responded to the U.S. attacks.
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: I have the same shock that you have, looking at how the United States is behaving in this context, in the context of the genocide that is unfolding in Gaza. I’m not — I’m not surprised that they attack anyone who speaks to the facts that are, frankly, on our watch in Gaza. And they do that so brutally because they feel called out, because it’s not that it’s that the United States is simply an observer. The United States is being an enabler in what Israel has been doing.
AMY GOODMAN: That was U.N. special rapporteur Francesca Albanese speaking at the United Nations Wednesday. She joins us here in our studio.
Welcome back to Democracy Now! Thanks so much for joining us.
Well, before we get you to further respond to what the U.S. and Israel is saying, can you lay out the findings of your report?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Absolutely. First of all, thank you for having me.
I have to say that this report is the second I write on — and I present to the United Nations on the topic of genocide. And it has been very reluctantly that I’ve taken on the responsibility to be the chronicler of — the chronicler of an unfolding genocide in Gaza. In March this year, I concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Israel had committed at least the three acts of genocide in Gaza, like killing members of the protected group, Palestinians, and inflicting severe bodily and mental harm, and creating conditions of life that would lead to the destruction of the group. And the reason why I identified these were not just war crimes and crimes against humanity is because I identified an intent to destroy. And I understand that even in this country, people are quite confused about what is genocidal intent, because it’s not a motive. One can have many motives to commit a crime. And I understand genocide is a very insidious one, and it’s difficult to identify what’s a motive. But this is not about the motives. The intent to commit genocide is the determination to destroy, which is fully evident in — especially in the Gaza Strip, as I identified in — as argued in March already.
The reason why I continue to write about genocide — and, in fact, this report walks on the heels of the previous one — is in order to better explain the intent, especially state intent, because there is another misunderstanding that there should be a trial of the alleged perpetrators in order to have — to attribute responsibility to a state. No, because not only you have had acts committed that should have been prevented by the — in a rule of law, in a proclaimed rule of law system like Israel, where there is the government, the parliament, the judiciary, working as checks and balances, genocide has not only been not prevented, has been enabled through the various organs of the state.
And I explain what has happened as of October 7, which has provided the opportunity to escalate violence, to build on the rage and on the fury of many Israelis, turning the soldiers into willful executioners, is that there was already a plan, hatred. I mean, the Palestinians, like Ilan Pappé says, are victims not of war, but of a political ideology that has been unleashed. Palestinians have always been an unwanted encumbrance in the Israeli mindset, because they are an obstacle both as an identity and as legal status to the realization of Greater Israel as a state for Jewish Israelis only.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: So, we’ll go back to — because I do want to ask about the Israeli state institutions that you name and the branches of the Israeli state that have been involved in forming this state’s intent. But if you could elaborate on the point that you make, the difference between intent and motive, and in particular what you say in the report about how it’s critical to determine genocidal intent, quote, “by way of inference”? You know, that’s a different phrasing than one has heard in all of this conversation about genocide so far. If you explain what you mean by that and what such a determination makes possible? So, rather than just looking at genocidal intent in other forms, what it means to infer genocidal intent?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: So, first of all, what constitutes genocide is established by Article II of the Genocide Convention, which creates a twofold obligation for member states, to prevent genocide so genocide doesn’t have to complete itself. When there is a manifestation of intent, even genocidal intent, there is already an obligation to intervene, because a crime is unfolding.
And then there is an obligation to punish. How the jurisprudence, especially after Rwanda and after former Yugoslavia, there have been cases both for criminal proceedings, where individual perpetrators have been investigated and tried, and responsibility of the state, litigated before the International Court of Justice. This is how the jurisprudence on genocide has developed.
And the intent has been further elaborated upon what the Genocide Convention says. And while it might be difficult to have direct intent, meaning to have — it’s difficult but not impossible, in fact, to have a state official say, “Yes, let’s go and destroy everyone” — although I do believe that there is direct intent in this genocide in Gaza. But the court also established that genocide can be inferred from the scale of the attack on the people, the nature of the attack, the general conduct. And what it says is that normally there should be a holistic approach in order to identify intent, which is exactly what I’ve done.
And indeed, this is why I proposed in this report what I called the triple lens approach. We need to look at the conduct, like the totality of the conduct, instead of studying with a microscope each and every crime. We need to look at the whole, against the totality of the people, the Palestinians as such, in the totality of the land, that Israel has slated as its own by divine design.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: No, absolutely. And then, if you could — the other precedent you’ve just spoken about — of course, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia — another case that you cite in the International Court of Justice is The Gambia v. Myanmar. So, how is that comparable to what we see happening in Gaza? Why is that a relevant example and different from both Rwanda and former Yugoslavia?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Let me tell you what I see as the major differences in the case of Israel, because it’s a very complex discussion. But in all four cases, there is a toxic combination of hatred, ideological hatred, which has informed political doctrines. And this is true in all the various contexts we are mentioning. The other common element is that there is combination of crimes. Like, forced displacement is not an act of genocide per se, but the jurisprudence says that it can contribute to corroborate the intent. But the, again, mass killing or mass destruction of property, torture and other crimes against a person, which translate into an infliction of physical and mental harm to the group, not individuals as such, but individuals as part of the group, these are common elements to all genocides.
What I find characteristic in this one is, first of all, this is not — I mean, the state of Israel is not Myanmar and is not Rwanda 30 years ago. This is not war-torn former Yugoslavia. This is a state which has a separation of powers, different organs, as I said, checks and balances. And let me give you a specific example, because you asked me to comment on the state functions. In January this year, the International Court of Justice issued a set of preliminary measures in the context of its identification, before even looking at the merits of the case initiated by South Africa for Israel’s breach, alleged breach, of the Genocide Convention, which identified the plausibility of risk for the rights protected — of the rights of the Palestinians protected under the Genocide Convention, which means plausibility — it’s semantics, but it’s plausibility that genocide might be committed against the Palestinians in Gaza. And the provisional measures included an obligation to investigate and prosecute the various cases of incitement, genocidal incitement, that the court had already identified. And it mentions leaders, senior leaders, of the Israeli state. Has there been any investigation? Has there been any prosecution?
But I’m telling you more. The genocidal statements didn’t resonate as shocking in the Israeli public, not only because there was rage, an enormous rage and animosity, of course. I mean, this is understandable, that the facts of October 7 were brutal and traumatized the people. But at the same time, hatred against the Palestinians and hate speech, it’s not something that started on October 7. I do remember, and I do remember the shock I felt because no one was reacting, and years ago, there were Israeli ministers talking of — freely, of killing, justifying the killing of Palestinians’ mothers and children because they would turn into terrorists.
AMY GOODMAN: Francesca Albanese, talk about the title of your report, “Genocide as colonial erasure.”
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: This is another element which I think — and, in fact, it’s the most important, where we see the difference between this genocide and others, because there is a settler-colonial component. And again, if you look at what the International Court of Justice in July this year concluded, when it decided that the — when it found that Israel’s 57 years of occupation in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem is unlawful and needs to be withdrawn totally and unconditionally, as rapidly as possibly, which the General Assembly says before — by September 2025. The court said that it amounts to — that the colonies amount to — have led to a process of annexation and racial segregation and apartheid. And these are the features of settler colonialism, the taking of the land, the taking of the resources, displacing the local population and replacing it. This has been a feature.
Now, it is in this context that we need to analyze what is happening today. And by the way, don’t believe, don’t listen only to Francesca Albanese. Listen to what these Israeli leaders and ministers are saying — reoccupying Gaza, retaking Gaza, recolonizing Gaza, reconquesting Gaza. This is what they are saying. And there are settlers on expeditions, not only to Gaza but also to Lebanon. So, this is why I say that the main difference, the main feature of this genocide, apart all the horrible aspects of it, is that this is the first settler-colonial genocide to be ever litigated before a court, an international court.
And this is why coming to this country, which is a country birthed from a genocide, when I meet the Native Americans, for example, I feel the pain of these people. And I say if we manage to build on the intersectionality of Indigenous struggle, the cry for justice behind this case for Palestine will resonate even louder, because it will somewhat be an act of atonement from the settler-colonial endeavor, which has sprouted out of Europe, toward Indigenous peoples. So there is a lot of symbolism behind it.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: And, you know, the analogy — first of all, you talked about the case brought by South Africa, so what they share, apart from South Africa and Israel-Palestine, is both the fact that they were colonial-settler states, as well as the fact that apartheid has been established as having occurred in both places. Now, in the case of South Africa, it was a decision that was taken by the United Nations at the time of apartheid, was unseating South Africa from the General Assembly. There have been calls now to do the same with Israel. So, if you could — if you could comment on that? And then, I just want to quote another short sentence from your report, in which you say, “As the world watches the first live-streamed settler-colonial genocide, only justice can heal the wounds that political expedience has allowed to fester.” So, if you could talk about the International Criminal — Court of Justice’s case in that context, what role you think they can play, South Africa’s case, in resolving or addressing — seeing and addressing this wound?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: First of all, let me unpack the question of the unseating Israel, because this is one of the recommendations I made in my report. Under Article 6 of the U.N. Charter, a member state can be suspended of its credentials or its membership by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the U.N. Security Council. And the first criticism I got is that we cannot do that, because every states commit international law violations. Absolutely. Absolutely.
But there are two striking features here. First, Israel is quite unique in maintaining an unlawful occupation, which has deemed such by — in at least one full occasion, but again, there was already a case brought before the ICJ in 2004, so there have been two ICJ advisory opinion. There is a pending case for genocide. There has been the violations of hundreds of resolutions by the — on Israel, over occupied Palestinian territory, by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and steady violation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, the Apartheid Convention, the Genocide Convention. So this is quite unique.
But all the more, this year alone, Israel has conducted an attack, an unprecedented attack, against the United Nations. It has attacked physically, through artillery, weapons, bombs, U.N. premises. Seventy percent of UNRWA offices and UNRWA buildings, clinics, distribution centers have been hit and shelled by the Israeli army. Two hundred thirty U.N. staff members have been killed by Israel in Gaza alone. U.N. peacekeepers in Lebanon have been attacked. And this doesn’t even take into account the smear, the defamation against senior U.N. officials, the declaration of the secretary-general as persona non grata, the referring to the General Assembly as a cloak of antisemites.
Again, this has mounted to a level — the hubris against the United Nations and international law has been unchecked and unbounded forever, but now, especially after the Knesset passed a law outlawing UNRWA, declaring UNRWA a terrorist organization, and therefore disabling it from its capacity to deliver aid and assistance especially in Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, this is the nail in the coffin of the U.N. Charter. And it can also contribute to that sense of colonial erasure, because here it’s not just at stake the function of a U.N. body — and UNRWA is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, so it’s even more serious. But there is the capacity of UNRWA to deliver humanitarian aid in a desperate situation, and also the fact that UNRWA is seen by Israel as the symbol of Palestinian identity, especially the Palestinian refugees. So there is an attempt to erase Palestinianness, including by hitting UNRWA.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to ask you about your trip here, as we begin to wrap up. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield quoted on — tweeted on Tuesday, “As UN Special Rapporteur Albanese visits New York, I want to reiterate the U.S. belief she is unfit for her role. The United Nations should not tolerate antisemitism from a UN-affiliated official hired to promote human rights.” If you can further address their charge of antisemitism against you?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Yeah.
AMY GOODMAN: And talk about what happened. You were supposed to come to Congress and speak and brief them, but that was canceled this week.
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Yes, it was canceled. But let me — first of all, I’m very embarrassed to read this, because a senior U.S. official who writes this, I mean, it shows a little bit of desperation. I’m sorry, but, you know, I’m very candid. And let me unpack my antisemitism for the audience. So, what I’ve been accused — the reason why I’ve been accused of antisemitism is because I’ve allegedly compared the Jews to the Nazis. Never done. Never done. What I’ve said, what I’ve done is saying, and I keep on saying, that history is repeating itself. I’ve never done such a comparison where I draw the parallel. It’s on the behavior of member states who have the legal and moral obligation to prevent atrocities, including an unfolding genocide. In the past, they have done nothing — nothing — until the end of the Second World War, to prevent the genocide of the Jews and the Roma and Sinti. And they’ve done nothing to prevent the genocide of the Bosnians. And they’ve done nothing to prevent the genocide of the Rwandans. And they are doing the same today. This is where I insist that now, compared to when there was the Holocaust, now we have a human rights framework that should prevent this. The Genocide Convention to prevent this. So, this is one of the points.
The second point, because — which leads to portray me as an antisemite, which is really offensive, is that I’ve said that the October 7 was not — I’ve contested, I’ve challenged the argument that October 7 was an antisemitic attack. October 7 was a crime, was heinous. And again, I’ve condemned the acts that were directed against the Israeli civilians, and expressed solidarity with the victims, with the families. I’ve been in contact with the families of the hostages. But I’ve also said the hatred that led that attack, that prompted that attack, to the extent it hit civilians, not the military, but it was prompted not by the fact that the Israelis are Jews, but the fact that the Israelis — I mean, the Israelis are part of that endeavor that has kept the Palestinians in a cage for 17 years and, before, under martial law for 37 years. And Palestinians have tried — it’s true they have used violence, but before violence, they have tried dialogue. They have tried collaboration. They have tried a number of means, access to justice, and they have gone nowhere.
I can — I mean, let me relate just this case, because last year I worked with children. And someone who was 17 before — 17 years old before October 7 last year had never set foot out of Gaza. This is the reality. And I spoke with children while I was writing my report on unchilding, the experience of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. And one of them — I mean, there were these two girls fighting, because one of them had been able to go to Israel and the West Bank because she had cancer and could be treated, and the other was jealous, because, she said, “At least she was sick, and she could go, she could travel. I’ve never seen the mountains.”
And again, this doesn’t justify violence, but, please, please, put things in context. And even Israeli scholars have said claiming that October 7 was prompted by antisemitism is a way to decontextualize history and to deresponsibilize Israel. I condemn Israel not because it’s a Jewish state. It’s not about that, but because it’s in breach of international law through and through. And were the majority of Israelis Buddhists, Christians, atheists, it would be the same. I would be as vocal as I am now.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Francesca, just one last question, and we only have a minute. Your recent book, J’Accuse, you take the title, of course, from the letter Émile Zola wrote during the Dreyfus Affair to the French president. You came under severe criticism for the choice of that title. Could you explain why you chose it and what it means in this context?
FRANCESCA ALBANESE: Absolutely. I have the sense that whatever I say comes under scrutiny and criticism. But J’Accuse is — first of all, it’s the title that was proposed by the editor, the publisher. And I was against it until October 7. When I saw the narrative, the dehumanization of the Palestinians after October 7, and what it was legitimized, I said, “This is the title. We need to use it,” because I draw the parallel between what is happening to the Palestinians and what has happened to other groups, particularly the Jewish people in Europe. I say the Holocaust was not just about the concentration camps. The Holocaust was a culmination of centuries of discrimination, and the previous decades had led the Jewish people in Europe to be kicked out of jobs, professions, to be treated like subhumans, as animals. And it’s this dehumanization that we need to look at in the face today, in the eyes today, and recognize as leading to atrocity crimes.
AMY GOODMAN: We want to thank you for being with us, Francesca Albanese, U.N. special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory.
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