Nazi Terrorists in Ukraine

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Ultra-nationalist Ukrainian battalion gears up for more fighting
by Gabriela Baczynska
Reuters
March 25, 2015 4:02 AM MDT Updated 10 years ago
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukra ... J20150325/


Ukraine's voluntary militia called the Azov Battalion holds artillery training in east Ukraine's village of Urzuf that sits west of the port city of Mariupol on the Azov Sea, March 19, 2015. REUTERS/Marko Djurica P

URZUF, Ukraine (Reuters) - The far-right Azov battalion, whose symbol resembles a black swastika on a yellow background, is preparing to defend the port city of Mariupol in southeastern Ukraine against a widely expected attack by pro-Russian separatists.

The 1,000 strong ultra-nationalist militia has a reputation as a fierce pro-government fighting
force in the almost year-old conflict with the Russia-backed rebels in east Ukraine, and is disdainful of peace efforts.

But the radical views of the commanders of a group affiliated to Ukraine's national guard which works alongside the army, and the use of symbols echoing Nazi emblems have caused alarm in the West and Russia, and could return to haunt Kiev's pro-Western leadership when fighting eventually ends.

"We don't like the ceasefire at all. As with the previous ones, it'll only lead to another offensive by the enemy," Azov commander Andriy Biletsky told Reuters while watching artillery drills at Urzuf, on the shores of the Sea of Azov, about 40 km south-west of Mariupol.

"Appeasing the aggressor will only lead to more aggression. This war will inevitably continue - either until our complete defeat or until our full victory and return to our land in all east Ukraine and Crimea. We believe in the second scenario," said the 35-year-old from the city of Kharkiv.

As the drills continued, other members of the battalion were in combat with the separatists at the village of Shirokino, some 60 km (38 miles) to the northeast.

Shirokino, where Ukrainian and rebel positions are separated by only a few kilometers of village dwellings, is one of several places along the line of contact where fighting has continued despite a February ceasefire.

Mariupol, which Azov helped recapture from the rebels last year, is a big prize. Its capture would offer the separatists the chance to open a road further south a year after Russia annexed the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea from Ukraine. [ID:nL5N0W30SQ]

Kiev and the West say Russia drives the rebellion in east Ukraine and has sent in troops as well as weapons to help the separatists. Moscow has sided with the rebels but denies direct military involvement.

"PATRIOT OF UKRAINE"

The Azov battalion originated from Biletsky's paramilitary national socialist group called "Patriot of Ukraine", which propagated slogans of white supremacy, racial purity, the need for authoritarian power and a centralized national economy.

"Patriot of Ukraine" opposed giving up Ukraine's sovereignty by joining international blocs, called for rolling back of liberal economy and political democracy, including free media.

In 2008, Biletsky urged "thousands of young fanatic apostles" to advance its ideas. Local media have reported on several violent incidents in which the group was involved.

Since Azov was officially created last May, it has been involved in fighting on the outskirts of the rebel stronghold of Donetsk, a battle for the town of Illovaysk which Ukrainian forces lost last summer and across the coast of the Sea of Azov.

But, since Azov was enrolled as a regiment of Ukraine's National Guard in September and started receiving increased supplies of heavy arms, Biletsky has toned down his rhetoric.

Most of "Patriot of Ukraine" websites are now down or under restricted access. He denied Azov's symbol was a reference to Nazism, saying it was rather a Ukrainian nationalist symbol.

Biletsky said he now has infantry and artillery units and was building a proper tank force. His troops training on the cannons in Urzuf were heavily armed with quality uniforms.

Biletsky said his troops, all volunteers, were "officially" making 6,000 hryvnia ($316) a month but in fact around 10,000 hryvnia. Apart from getting funds from the interior ministry, Azov is believed to be getting support from among Ukrainian super-rich oligarchs.

Biletsky did not say whether and how his views have changed since he wrote the "Patriot of Ukraine" program but said his priority now was extinguishing the pro-Russian rebellion.

"We have only one goal right now - fighting for the homeland until all of it is freed. And then we will try to build a new Ukraine that we could all be proud of. We are patriots. We believe in our nation, nationalism is our ideology," he said.

Biletsky, a historian by education who is married with a son, was detained in 2011 on charges of assaulting a man.

He was released after an amnesty in February 2014 and his aides dismiss the case as an example of political persecution of Ukrainian nationalists under Ukraine's ousted president and Moscow ally Viktor Yanukovich.

He has since been elected to the Ukrainian parliament, riding a wave of an increased nationalist sentiment in Ukraine triggered by the war.

PRESSURE ON KIEV

Some Ukrainian politicians have defended Biletsky and his troops as patriots. There is lingering doubt, however, over what role Azov might play when the military conflict ends and whether its members could challenge President Petro Poroshenko and his government or threaten the wider public security.

Biletsky has criticized Poroshenko for losing out on in an information war against Russia and the rebels, and is dismissive of the chances for a negotiated solution to the conflict.

"How can we settle it peacefully if part of our territory is occupied? Will they give us Crimea back? How can there be a peaceful way to stop an aggression?," he said.

In a sign of persistent tensions between the pro-Ukrainian volunteer battalions and Ukraine's regular army, Biletsky blamed Ukraine's top military commanders for battlefield defeats.

He said he has lost about 60 men in the conflict and wants a revamp of Ukraine's armed forces to promote a new generation of field commanders who have fought on the ground in a conflict that has killed more than 6,000 people.

"We have loads of generals brought up in the Soviet Union who have no idea of combat, who rose as state officials in uniforms rather than commanding officers in the field. These people don't want to and don't know how to fight."

($1 = 19.0000 hryvnia)

Additional reporting by Pavel Polityuk in Kiev; Editing by Timothy Heritage and Anna Willard

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Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016
by Office of the United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights

-- Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, by Office of the United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights

Contents

I. Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 1–21 6
II. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity .............................................. 22–67 10
A. Alleged violations of international humanitarian law ..................................... 22–31 10
B. Casualties ........................................................................................................ 32–37 12
C. Missing persons .............................................................................................. 38–44 14
D. Summary executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful and arbitrary
detention, and torture and ill-treatment ........................................................... 45–66 15
III. Accountability and administration of justice ........................................................... 67–107 21
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east ................. 67–85 21
B. Individual cases .............................................................................................. 86–90 24
C. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances .......... 92–107 26
IV. Fundamental freedoms ............................................................................................ 108–148 30
A. Violations of the right to freedom of movement ............................................. 108–118 30
B. Violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief ................................... 119–126 32
C. Violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ................................ 127–132 33
D. Violations of the right to freedom of association ............................................ 133–139 34
E. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression......................... 140–147 35
V. Economic and social rights ..................................................................................... 148–165 36
A. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health .......... 152–158 38
B. Housing, land and property rights ................................................................... 159–165 39
VI. Legal developments and institutional reforms......................................................... 166–182 40
A. Notification on derogation from the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ......................................................................................... 166–167 40
B. Notification in relation to 16 United Nations treaties ..................................... 168–169 41
C. Constitutional reform ...................................................................................... 170–171 42
D. Implementation of the Human Rights Action Plan ......................................... 172–173 42
E. Adoption of the law on internally displaced persons ...................................... 174–175 42
F. Draft law on temporarily occupied territory ................................................... 176–178 43
G. Amendments to the criminal law .................................................................... 179 43
H. Reform of the civil service .............................................................................. 180 43
I. Civil registration ............................................................................................. 181–182 44
VII. Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea .......................................... 183–200 44
A. Due process and fair trial rights ...................................................................... 188–190 45
B. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ..................................... 191 46
C. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression......................... 192 46
D. Violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief ................................... 193–194 46
E. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health .......... 195 47
F. Discrimination in access to services ............................................................... 196 47
G. The ‘civil blockade’ of Crimea ....................................................................... 197–200 47
VIII. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 201–215 48





I. Executive Summary

1. This is the thirteenth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)1. It covers the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 February 20162.

2. During the reporting period, despite a reduction in hostilities, the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine continued to significantly affect people residing in the conflict zone and all their human rights. The Government of Ukraine continued to not have effective control over considerable parts of the border with the Russian Federation (in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Reportedly, this facilitated an inflow of ammunition, weaponry and fighters from the Russian Federation to the territories controlled by the armed groups.

3. The ceasefire in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine agreed upon during the previous reporting period was further strengthened by the “regime of complete silence” introduced on 23 December 2015. However, in January and February, the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observed systematic violations of the ceasefire. During the same period, clashes and exchanges of fire have escalated in several flashpoints, predominantly near the cities of Donetsk and Horlivka (both controlled by the armed groups), and in small villages and towns located on the contact line, such as Kominternove (controlled by armed groups) and Shyrokyne and Zaitseve (divided between Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups).

4. While small arms and light weapons were most frequently employed during these incidents, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission continued to report the presence of heavy weapons, tanks and artillery systems under 100mm calibre on either side of the contact line. Even if sporadic, the continued occurrences of indiscriminate shelling and the presence of anti-personnel mines and remnants of war exposed civilians to a constant threat of death or injury. During the reporting period, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosive devices (IED) remained the main cause of civilian casualties in the conflict zone.

5. In addition, Ukrainian armed forces continue to position themselves near towns and villages while armed groups have embedded deeper into residential areas, further endangering the local population. The risk of re-escalation of hostilities therefore remained high.

6. The conflict continued to cause civilian casualties. Between 16 November 2015 and 15 February 2016, OHCHR recorded 78 conflict-related civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine: 21 killed (13 men and eight women), and 57 injured (41 men, eight women, six boys and two girls) – compared with 178 civilian casualties recorded (47 killed and 131 injured) during the previous reporting period of 16 August – 15 November 2015. Overall, the average monthly number of civilian casualties during the reporting period was among the lowest since the beginning of the conflict. In total, from the beginning of the conflict in mid-April 2014 to 15 February 2016, OHCHR recorded 30,211 casualties in eastern Ukraine, among civilians, Ukrainian armed forces, and members of armed groups – including 9,167 people killed and 21,044 injured.3

7. In the absence of massive artillery shelling of populated areas, ERW and IEDs remained the main cause of civilian casualties in the conflict zone during the reporting period. Given the threat that is presented by such weapons, there is an urgent need for extensive mine action activities, including the establishment of appropriate coordination mechanisms, mapping, mine risk education and awareness, on either side of the contact line.

8. People living in the conflict-affected area shared with OHCHR that they feel abandoned, particularly in villages located in the ‘grey’ or ‘buffer’ zone (See Map of Ukraine: Civilian casualties along the contact line, 16 November 2015 – 15 February 2016)4. Often trapped between Government and armed group checkpoints, some of these areas, such as Kominternove, have been deprived of any effective administration for prolonged periods of time. Others are divided by opposing armed forces (such as Shyrokyne and Zaitseve), while some towns are located near frontline hotspots (such as Debaltseve and Horlivka). The contact line has physically, politically, socially and economically isolated civilians, impacting all of their human rights and complicating the prospect for peace and reconciliation. Over three million people live in the areas directly affected by the conflict5 and urgent attention must be paid to protect and support them. Their incremental isolation emboldens those who promote enmity and violence, and undermines the prospect for peace.

9. Some assistance to territories under armed group control is being provided by local humanitarian partners, bilateral donors, and reportedly the Russian Federation, which delivers convoys, without the full consent or inspection of Ukraine. However, this aid is insufficient to respond to all the needs of 2.7 million civilians living in territories under the control of armed groups, and particularly those 800,000 living close to the contact line, who are particularly vulnerable.

10. The Government has registered 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), who have fled their homes as a result of the conflict. Between 800,000 and 1 million IDPs are living in territories controlled by the Government, where some continue to face discrimination in accessing public services. OHCHR has observed that some IDPs are returning to their homes, while others are unable to do so due to the destruction or military use of their property. According to government sources in neighbouring and European Union countries, over 1 million Ukrainians are seeking asylum or protection abroad, with the majority going to the Russian Federation and Belarus6.

11. According to the State Border Service, some 8,000 to 15,000 civilians cross the contact line on a daily basis, passing through six checkpoints in each transport corridor: three checkpoints operated by the Government, and three by the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’7, with a stretch of no-man’s land in between. OHCHR has regularly observed up to 300-400 vehicles – cars, minivans and buses – waiting in rows on either side of the road. Passengers spend the night in freezing temperatures and without access to water ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, freedom of movement has been further restricted, aggravating the isolation of those living in the conflict-affected areas. Policy decisions by the Government of Ukraine have further reinforced the existing contact line barrier. Moreover, there remains an almost total absence of information regarding procedures at checkpoints, subjecting civilians to uncertainty and arbitrariness.

12. Residents of territories under the armed groups’ control are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses, which are exacerbated by the absence of the rule of law and any real protection. OHCHR continued to receive and verify allegations of killings, arbitrary and incommunicado detention, torture and ill-treatment in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’8. In these territories, armed groups have established parallel ‘administrative structures’ and have imposed a growing framework of ‘legislation’ which violate international law, as well as the Minsk Agreements.

13. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ continued to deny OHCHR access to places of detention. OHCHR is concerned about the situation of individuals deprived of their liberty in the territories controlled by armed groups, due to the complete absence of due process and redress mechanisms. Of particular concern are those currently held in the former Security Service building in Donetsk and in the buildings currently occupied by the ‘ministries of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.

14. OHCHR is also increasingly concerned about the lack of space for civil society actors to operate and for people to exercise their rights to freedoms of expression, religion, peaceful assembly and association in the territories controlled by armed groups. In January 2016, the ‘ministry of state security’ carried out a wave of arrests and detention of civil society actors in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.

15. OHCHR documented allegations of enforced disappearances, arbitrary and incommunicado detention, and torture and ill-treatment, perpetrated with impunity by Ukrainian law enforcement officials, mainly by elements of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). OHCHR urges the Ukrainian authorities to ensure prompt and impartial investigation into each reported case of human rights violations, as well as the prosecution of perpetrators. Accountability is critical to bring justice for victims, curtail impunity, and foster long-lasting peace.

16. OHCHR was granted access to official pre-trial detention facilities throughout areas under Government control9 and, following some of its interventions, noted some improvements in conditions of detention and access to medical care for some detainees in pre-trial detention in Odesa, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Artemivsk and Zaporizhzhia. In some cases, OHCHR intervention also led to due attention being afforded to allegations of illtreatment and to law enforcement investigations into violations of other human rights in custody. These improvements confirm the importance for OHCHR to enjoy unfettered access to all places of detention.

17. OHCHR is concerned about the lack of action toward clarifying the fate of missing persons and preventing persons from going missing as a result of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. There should be a clear commitment at the highest levels of the Government of Ukraine and by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ to fully cooperate on missing persons cases. Mechanisms to clarify the fate of missing persons need to be effective, impartial and transparent, and the victims and their families should always be at the centre of any action.

18. OHCHR continued to monitor the investigations and proceedings into the killings that occurred during the 2014 Maidan events, the 2 May 2014 Odesa violence, the 9 May 2014 Mariupol incidents and the 31 August 2015 Kyiv violence. The lack of progress in these cases undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. It is essential that they be promptly addressed with absolute impartiality as their mishandling can jeopardize the peaceful resolution of disputes and fuel instability.

19. During the reporting period, the Government of Ukraine took steps towards ensuring greater independence of the judiciary, adopted a plan of action for the implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy, and improved its legislation on internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, some critical measures remain to be adopted, including the much-awaited parliamentary vote on decentralization, which has been postponed and should take place by 22 July 2016. Envisioned as part of the Minsk Process, this vote is to be the precursor to a series of steps toward peace. Decentralization was conceived as part of a package of confidence-building measures. These measures included the immediate and full ceasefire; pull-out of all heavy weaponry by either side of the contact line; dialogue on the modalities of conducting local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation; pardon and amnesty through law; release and exchange of all hostages and illegally-held persons; safe access and delivery of humanitarian aid; modalities for the full restoration of social and economic connections; restoration of control of the state border by the Ukrainian government in the whole conflict zone; pull-out of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries; constitutional reform containing the element of decentralization and approval of the special status of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions10.

20. The Government of Ukraine extended the territorial scope of its intended derogation from certain provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) to territories it does not effectively control, as well as to areas it partially or fully controls in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This may further undermine human rights protection for those affected.

21. Despite being denied access to the peninsula, OHCHR continued to closely follow the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“Crimea”)11, primarily relying on first-hand accounts. OHCHR, guided by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine remains concerned about violations taking place in Crimea, which is under the effective control of the Russian Federation. The imposition of the citizenship and the legislative framework of the Russian Federation, including penal laws, and the resulting administration of justice, has affected human rights in Crimea, especially for ethnic Ukrainians, minority groups, and indigenous peoples, such as Crimean Tatars. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented a continuing trend of criminal prosecution of Crimean Tatar demonstrators as well as arrests of Crimean Tatars for their alleged membership in ‘terrorist’ organizations. In a significant and worrying development, on 15 February, the prosecutor of Crimea filed a request with the supreme court of Crimea to recognize the Mejlis, the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatars, as an extremist organization and to ban its activities. Some decisions by the Government of Ukraine also affected the human rights of Crimeans, including those limiting their access to banking services in mainland Ukraine. The ‘civil blockade’ which Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists imposed as of 20 September 2015 – and which led to some human rights abuses – was lifted on 17 January 2016.

_______________

Notes:

1 HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout Ukraine and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address human rights concerns. For more details, see paragraphs 7–8 of the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).

2 The report also provides an update of recent developments on cases that occurred during previous reporting periods.

3 This is a conservative estimate of OHCHR based on available data.

4 The 2016 UN Humanitarian Response Plan for Ukraine identifies the 0.8 million people living in areas along the contact line (200,000 in areas under Government control and 600,000 in areas under the control of the armed groups) as being in particular need of humanitarian assistance and protection.

5 This comprises 2.7 million in areas under the control of the armed groups and 200,000 near the contact line in areas under government control.

6 UNHCR, Ukraine Operational Update, 20 January – 9 February 2016.

7 Hereinafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.

8 Hereinafter ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.

9 In particular, in December 2015 and January 2016, HRMMU was granted unimpeded access to Mariupol SIZO and Artemivsk Penal Institution No. 6 of the State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine, where it could conduct confidential interviews with detainees. The administration and personnel of SIZO and the Penal Institution were transparent and constructive during these visits. The heads and medical personnel expressed commitment to improve medical care for detainees.

10 Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 12 February 2015.

11 The Autonomous Republic of Crimea technically known as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.  

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With Axes And Hammers, Far-Right Vigilantes Destroy Another Romany Camp In Kyiv
by Christopher Miller
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
June 08, 2018 12:12 GMT
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-far-rig ... 80336.html


Members of the far-right Azov National Druzhyna militia rally in December 2017.

KYIV -- Swinging axes and sledgehammers as a camera rolled, members of the far-right Azov National Druzhyna militia destroyed a Romany camp in Kyiv's Holosiyivskiy Park on June 7.

The attack marks the second such incident by far-right vigilantes in Kyiv and the fourth in Ukraine in the past six weeks.

The National Druzhyna, a militia formed in January by veterans of the far-right Azov Battalion, had visited the camp earlier in the day and spoken threateningly with a woman who lived there, an encounter that was filmed by the group and published on its Facebook page.

The militia also issued an ultimatum in the Facebook post for the Roma to clear out within 24 hours or be forced out by a "mob."

"When the police don't act, the National Druzhyna takes control of the situation," the militia wrote.

But the militia didn't wait. Hours later, what appeared to be around two dozen nationalists returned to destroy the camp and harass the few Romany women still there.

The attack was broadcast live on the militia's Facebook page.

That video, which has since been removed, shows the National Druzhyna members in T-shirts adorned with the group's insignia hacking at the camp's makeshift homes with axes and hammers.

A more complete, 12-minute clip of the nationalists' raid was eventually uploaded to YouTube by EuroMaydan, a political group born from the 2013-14 uprising of the same name.




At one point, the militia members mock a woman and child fleeing with their belongings, asking if they planned to eat a nearby dog. "I heard you eat dogs," one of the men says. Later, another belittles a woman trying to collect belongings from the debris by suggesting her actions might be acceptable "in India, but not here."

Near the end of the video, uniformed Ukrainian police officers appear and casually make conversation as the nationalists wind up their raid.

With police looking on, more than a dozen of the vigilantes pose together to a cry of "Glory to the nation! Death to enemies!"

Kyiv police spokeswoman Oksana Blyshchik told Hromadske TV the Romany group had already fled the camp when militia members arrived, which the video clearly contradicts. She added that no one had been injured and nobody had been detained.

Late on June 7, Ukraine's National Police said in a statement that it had begun criminal proceedings in what it labeled a case of "hooliganism."

"All active participants in this event will be identified and brought to justice," the National Police said.

Right-Wing Immunity?

The Holosiyivskiy camp attack follows three others within the past month and a half.

In May, right-wing thugs attacked a Romany camp in western Ternopil. That followed the burning of one in the nearby village of Rudne in the Lviv region.

In April, members of the right-wing extremist group C14 chased a group of Roma from their camp at Lysa Hora nature reserve in Kyiv. Masked attackers hurled stones and sprayed gas as they chased terrified Romany men, women, and children from the makeshift settlement.


This Roma camp was burned down in Kyiv in April.

Police did nothing until a video of the attack went viral online, forcing them to open an investigation, the results of which remain unclear.

Human rights groups have condemned the attacks and demanded that the authorities investigate them. They say some of the Romany families have been left homeless from the raids.

In its May Nations In Transit report, Freedom House warned of the threat to Ukrainian democracy posed by far-right extremism. "They are a real physical threat to left-wing, feminist, liberal, and LGBT activists, human rights defenders, as well as ethnic and religious minorities," the report said.

Critics accuse Ukraine's current leadership of ignoring the radical and sometimes violent actions of members of nationalist groups with far-right views because of how it might look cracking down on them after many fought to protect the country from Russia-backed forces in the war-torn eastern regions.

Perhaps hinting at a new tack, the National Police statement about the June 7 attack used markedly different language from statements about previous attacks.

"The police will rigorously respond to a violation of the law regardless of which organizations' members are violators," it said. "No one has the right to engage in illegal activities, pseudo ultimatums, or for the sake of PR to conduct demonstrative pogroms against other citizens. In particular, with regard to representatives of ethnic minorities."

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Islamic Battalions, Stocked With Chechens, Aid Ukraine in War With Rebels
by Andrew E. Kramer
New York Times
July 7, 2015
https://web.archive.org/web/20220410045 ... ?referrer=

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Members of a Chechen battalion fighting against Russian-backed rebels in Lysychansk, Ukraine, in February. Credit...Olya Engalycheva/Associated Press

MARIUPOL, Ukraine — Wearing camouflage, with a bushy salt-and-pepper beard flowing over his chest and a bowie knife sheathed prominently in his belt, the man cut a fearsome figure in the nearly empty restaurant. Waiters hovered apprehensively near the kitchen, and try as he might, the man who calls himself “Muslim,” a former Chechen warlord, could not wave them over for more tea.

Even for Ukrainians hardened by more than a year of war here against Russian-backed separatists, the appearance of Islamic combatants, mostly Chechens, in towns near the front lines comes as something of a surprise — and for many of the Ukrainians, a welcome one.

“We like to fight the Russians,” said the Chechen, who refused to give his real name. “We always fight the Russians.”

He commands one of three volunteer Islamic battalions out of about 30 volunteer units in total fighting now in eastern Ukraine. The Islamic battalions are deployed to the hottest zones, which is why the Chechen was here.

Fighting is intensifying around Mariupol, a strategic seaport and industrial hub that the separatists have long coveted. Monitors for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe say they have seen steady nighttime shipments of Russian military equipment on a rail line north of here.

Recently, the Ukrainian authorities released photos — which they said were taken by a drone flying north of the city — that showed a massing of heavy weapons, including tanks and howitzers, on the rebel side.

Anticipating an attack in the coming months, the Ukrainians are happy for all the help they can get.

As the Ukrainians see it, they are at a lopsided disadvantage against the separatists because Western governments have refused to provide the government forces with anything like the military support that the rebels have received from Russia. The army, corrupt and underfunded, has been largely ineffective. So the Ukrainians welcome backing even from Islamic militants from Chechnya.


Isa Munayev and other Muslim fighters in Ukraine in January. Mr. Munayev helped found the Chechen battalions and was killed in February, another leader said. Credit...Tomasz Glowacki

“I am on this path for 24 years now,” since the demise of the Soviet Union, the Chechen said in an interview. “The war for us never ended. We never ran from our war with Russia, and we never will.”

Ukrainian commanders worry that separatist groups plan to capture access roads to Mariupol and lay siege to the city, which had a prewar population of about half a million. To counter that, the city has come to rely on an assortment of right-wing and Islamic militias for its defense.

The Chechen commands the Sheikh Mansur group, named for an 18th-century Chechen resistance figure. It is subordinate to the nationalist Right Sector, a Ukrainian militia.

Neither the Sheikh Mansur group nor Right Sector is incorporated into the formal police or military, and the Ukrainian authorities decline to say how many Chechens are fighting in eastern Ukraine. They are all unpaid.

Apart from an enemy, these groups do not have much in common with Ukrainians — or, for that matter, with Ukraine’s Western allies, including the United States.

Right Sector, for example, formed during last year’s street protests in Kiev from a half-dozen fringe Ukrainian nationalist groups like White Hammer and the Trident of Stepan Bandera. Another, the Azov group, is openly neo-Nazi, using the “Wolf’s Hook” symbol associated with the SS. Without addressing the issue of the Nazi symbol, the Chechen said he got along well with the nationalists because, like him, they love their homeland and hate the Russians.

To try to bolster the abilities of the Ukrainian regular forces and reduce Kiev’s reliance on these quasilegal paramilitaries, the United States Army is training the Ukrainian national guard. The Americans are specifically prohibited from giving instruction to members of the Azov group.

Since the Afghan war of the 1980s, Moscow has accused the United States of encouraging Islamic militants to fight Russia along its vulnerable southern rim, a policy that could deftly solve two problems — containing Russia and distracting militants from the United States. The Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has accused the Western-backed Georgian government of infiltrating Islamic radicals into the North Caucasus, though he has not offered proof.

In Ukraine, the Dzhokhar Dudayev and Sheikh Mansur units are mostly Chechen, but they include Muslims from other former Soviet areas, such as Uzbeks and Balkars. The third unit, Crimea, is predominantly Crimean Tatar. There is no indication of any United States involvement with the groups.

Along the front about seven miles to the east, the battalions career about in civilian cars, AK-47 rifles poking from the windows, while the regular army holds back in a secondary line of defensive trenches.


Russia’s Endgame in Ukraine

How Russia aims to achieve its goal of keeping Ukraine isolated from the West.

The Chechens, by all accounts, are valuable soldiers. Ukrainian commanders lionize their skills as scouts and snipers, saying they slip into no-man’s land to patrol and skirmish.

The Chechens are also renowned for their deft ambushes and raids. In the Chechen wars, insurgents had a policy of killing officers and contract soldiers who were taken prisoner, but conscripted soldiers were spared.

In Ukraine, the Chechens’ calls of “Allahu akbar,” or “God is great,” are said to strike fear in the hearts of the Russians.

In the interview, the Chechen commander said his men liked to fight with little protective gear. “This is the way we look at it,” he said. “We believe in God, so we don’t need armored vests.”

In the interview at the restaurant, a steakhouse and favorite haunt of Right Sector, the Chechen said he was about 45, had fought against Russia in both Chechen wars and had seen a good deal of violence. When he talks about combat, his eyes grow dark and inscrutable.

For the Ukrainians, the decision to quietly open the front to figures like the Chechen — who are making their way here from Europe and Central Asia — has brought some battle-hardened men to their side. The Chechen had been living in France, and he founded the Chechen battalions last fall along with Isa Munayev, an émigré from Chechnya who had been living in Denmark.

Mr. Munayev, the Chechen said, had received approval from senior members of the Ukrainian government, but “there were no documents, nothing was written,” he said, adding that Mr. Munayev was killed in fighting in February.

Though religious, the Chechen groups in eastern Ukraine are believed to adhere to a more nationalist strain of the Chechen separatist movement, according to Ekaterina Sikorianskaia, an expert on Chechnya with the International Crisis Group.

Not everyone is convinced. The French authorities, on edge over Islamic extremism in immigrant communities, detained two members of the Sheikh Mansur battalion this year on accusations of belonging to the extremist group Islamic State, the Chechen said. He denied that the two were members of the group.

“All of Europe is shaking with fear of the Russians,” he said. “It’s beneficial for Europe that we fight here as volunteers. But not everybody understands.”