Nazi Terrorists in Ukraine

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Part 1 of 5

PART III: Documents, 1929-66

1. Resolutions of the First Congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
28 JANUARY - 2 FEBRUARY 1929

I. GENERAL OUTLINE

1. Ukrainian nationalism is a spiritual and political movement arising from the inner nature of the Ukrainian Nation in the period of its fierce struggle for the foundations and goals of creative existence.

2. The Ukrainian Nation is the basis for every activity and the aim of every aspiration of Ukrainian nationalism.

3. The organic tie of nationalism with the nation is a fact of the natural order and upon it is based the entire understanding of the existence of a nation.

4. The nation is the highest type of organic human community which, in addition to its psychological and social diversity, has its own unique internal form, created on the basis of similar natural location, common historical experience, and an unremitting urge to realize itself in the completeness of intense efforts.

5. The internal form of the nation is the basic agent of its dynamic continuity and, at the same time, the principle of its synthetic formation. This principle gives the life of a nation, throughout its historical development, an integral spiritual definition which is marked by its various concrete-individual expressions. In that sense, the internal form is the ideal of the nation which establishes and facilitates its historical rise.

6. Historical rise [sic] - the external expression of the constant relevance of the national idea - reflects the undiluted ideal of the nation. The unseen ideal comprises the nation's urge to sustain itself in the system of global reality, in the role of a directly active subject having the broadest sphere of influence on its surroundings.

7. On the path to its self-realization in the form of the greatest intensity of historical meaning, the nation numerically increases its inventory of biological and physical strength with the simultaneous expansion of its territorial base; in this connection, there takes place within it a process of constant reformulation of various ethnic elements into a synthesis of organic national unity; in view of this, the nation always finds itself in a state of domestic growth.

8. The prominent force-oriented means for the growth of a nation is its spiritual longing, expressed through the production of cultural values which, from one side, consolidates the internal community of a nation and, from the other, exerts a centrifugal influence on the surroundings. Culture is not only the creator of national individuality and external distinctiveness, but it is the first among the directly active agents on the periphery of the spiritual strength of a nation.

9. The condition which protects a nation's lasting active participation in the world structure, and which conforms most closely to the comprehensive interests of national life, is the political organization known as the sovereign state.

10. The state is an external form of the interrelation of all the productive forces of a nation. This external form reflects the fundamental qualities of the state and in that manner permits its normal development in all possible ways; the state which is the ever-present definition of the nation by the form of organizational interaction of forces, locked into an organic entity, or system, outwardly differentiated, as an independent collective unit.

11. Through the state, the nation becomes a full member of world history, for only in the form of a state does the nation possess the internal and external criteria of a historic entity.

12. The state form of life most accurately affirms the concrete expression of the national ideal's creative character. For this reason, the primary natural aspiration of a nation is to delineate the borders of its state activities so as to cover the entire region of its ethnic distribution. By these means, the nation forms its entire physical organism into a state. This is the most important and most elementary foundation of its future.

13. In view of its state of political captivity, the chief aim of the Ukrainian Nation is the creation of a political-legal organization, to be called the Ukrainian Independent United State.

14. The fundamental condition necessary for the creation, consolidation, and development of the Ukrainian state is: that the state be an expression of the national being, combining the greatest creative efforts of all the constituent organs of the nation. Thus, the state would reflect their organized interrelations on the basis of the integralism of social forces with their rights and duties, which are determined in relation to their significance to the entirety of national life.

15. Ukrainian nationalism derives practical tasks for itself from the foremost principles of state organization. These tasks are to prepare for the realization of the national idea through the united efforts of Ukrainians committed to the ideas of a nation-state organized on the principles of active idealism, moral self-discipline, and individual initiative.

16. The first stage and first executor of the tasks of Ukrainian nationalism is the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, created by a Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and constructed on the principles of all-Ukrainian representation, non-partisanship, and monocracy.

II. STATE STRUCTURE

1. The form of the Ukrainian state's government will reflect the progressive stages of the state construction of Ukraine, these being: national liberation, state consolidation, and development.

2. In the period of the liberation struggle, only national dictatorship, created in the process of the national revolution, will be able to preserve the internal strength of the Ukrainian nation and its greatest resistance to external forces.

3. Only after the renewal of statehood will a period of internal reorganization and transformation into a monolithic state body take place. In this transitional stage, it will be the duty of the head of state to prepare the creation of the highest legislative organs. The legislative organs will be created on the principle of representation from all organized social classes, taking into consideration the diversity of individual lands which will constitute the Ukrainian State.

4. At the head of the reorganization of the state will be the head of state (chosen by a representative assembly), who will appoint the executive, which will be responsible to him and to the highest legislative body.

5. The basis of the administrative system of the Ukrainian State will be local self-government; each region will have its own separate representative legislative body, summoned by the organized local social classes and by its own executive.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESOLUTIONS

1. Introductory Theses

1. The Ukrainian State will strive to attain national economic self-sufficiency, increase natural wealth, and protect the material livelihood of the population, through expansion of all branches of the national economy.

2. The economic life of the country will be built upon the basis of the co-operation of the state, co-operatives, and private capital. Individual sectors of the national economy will be distributed among them, and will become the object of their simultaneous and equal labour, to the extent that this will benefit the whole of the national economy and be in the interests of the state.

2. Agricultural Policy

1. The interests of the national economy of Ukraine are served by the existence and development of the village farm.

2. The expropriation of feudal lands without compensation, conducted in the period of the revolution in Eastern Ukraine, will be confirmed by the state authorities through legislation, the force of which will extend to all areas of the Ukrainian State.

3. The state authority will institute correctives in the distribution of land in Eastern Ukraine, necessary in view of the spontaneous, unordered character of the division of the lands expropriated in the revolutionary period.

4. The state will ensure the development of agricultural productivity and the protection of the prosperity of the peasantry through support for the middle peasantry.

5. Village farming will be built upon the right of private ownership of land, limited by the state regulation of free sale and purchase of land, with the aim of precluding the excessive reduction or increase in the size of land holdings.

6. The state authority will by all means promote the efficiency of village farms and their adaptation to markets; support the expansion of agricultural co-operatives; offer the rural economy more inexpensive production credit; care for agricultural and agri-educational matters, as well as for the protection of farmers' production by state insurance.

7. Forest lands will be expropriated without compensation and will be transferred to the state or to municipal governments. Only small lots, unsuitable for nationalization or municipalization, will remain in the hands of private owners.

8. Agricultural migration will be regulated through the accommodation of the surplus rural population into national production and through the proper implementation of colonization.

9. City lands and real estate will remain in the hands of private owners. The state and the municipal government will regulate urban construction and will avoid housing crises and land speculation by way of concentrating, in their own hands, the necessary regulatory land funds.

3. Industrial Policy

1. The state will encourage industrialization of the country in order that the aims of economic independence and development at all levels, dictated by the needs of national defence and employment of the surplus rural population, be achieved.

2. Enterprises in branches of industry essential to the existence and defence of the country will be nationalized. Other enterprises will be left to the private capital of individuals and associations in keeping with the principles of free competition and private initiative. In certain cases, defined by law, the state will have the right of pre-empting private investors in the acquisition of co-ownership of private enterprises.

3. The state will encourage the rationalization of all types of industry, particularly their mechanization, and the preparation of professional cadres and technical workers in order to satisfy the demands of contemporary technology.

4. In order to increase the rural population's prosperity and to prepare skilled workers for industry, the state will assist the development of cottage industries in the form of production co-operatives.

5. The state will ensure the organization of production and retail artisans' co-operatives, supporting artisans within the limits which suit the contemporary character of production and the markets.

4. Trade Policy

1. Trade operations within both internal and external markets will be distributed among the private sector, co-operatives, and the state. The state will control trade in the products of nationalized industry and major types of transportation.

2. In order to secure a normal internal process of trade distribution, the state will also ensure the most favourable conditions in world markets for Ukrainian products and manufactured goods and for the external defence of the national economy, and it will use means of a protectionist and favourable character which will be applied in the form of tariffs and trade agreements.

5. Finance Policy

1. The tax system will be operated on the principle of a single, equitable, progressive, and direct tax, with the exception of a limited number of indirect taxes.

2. The state will undertake the development of banking in all branches of the economy. The National Bank will be an institution independent to the greatest possible extent from purely political activities, and will be accountable to the executive and citizenry.

3. The matter of the payment of state debts which the Ukrainian state acquires as part of the debt of the occupying states will be settled in accordance with the principles of justice within the framework of economic capacity.

6. Social Policy

1. Regulation of interrelations between social groups, particularly the right of binding arbitration in matters of social conflict, will belong to the state, which will ensure co-operation between the productive classes of the Ukrainian Nation.

2. Members of all social groups will have the right of coalition, on the basis of which they will unite into professional organizations, with the right to syndicate in accordance with territorial principles and branches of the economy. These will have their representation in government.

3. Employers and employees will have the right to free personal and collective agreements in all matters which concern their mutual interests, within the framework of legislation, and under the supervision of the state.

4. In private and state industrial enterprises elective councils will be created with representation from entrepreneurs, managers, and workers, with the right to oversee and monitor the technology of production.

5. Workers' councils will be established in agricultural, industrial, and trade enterprises, as representative organs for the settlement of workers, relations with trade unions, employers, and the state. Particularly, they will themselves, or in understanding with the professional organizations, conclude collective agreements. In industrial enterprises they will take part in production councils.

6. Employers and employees will have the right to resolve disagreements between them by way of third-party hearings. In the event that an agreement cannot be reached, there remain the rights to strike and to lockout. Binding settlement of conflicts will belong to the state's arbitration bodies.

7. The standard work day will be eight hours, which the state will attempt to shorten, conditions permitting.

8. Recognizing the basic right to choose one's work, the state will encourage productivity, first by passing legislation establishing conditions for skilled labour and small business and by regulating the internal workings of enterprises, particularly in the disposition of jobs and technical processes; and second, by accomplishing the same with the aid of supervisory bodies and other state institutions.

9. In accordance with state regulation of public and private employment offices, the state will ensure provision of material assistance to the unemployed, which will be distributed indirectly by professional organizations from funds collected from workers and employers. In exceptional cases defined by law, this aid will come from the assistance funds of communities and the state.

10. The state will institute a single organization of general insurance, compulsory for all classes of society, which will simultaneously take upon itself the responsibility of supporting all citizens over sixty years of age who do not have their own means of support.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY

1. The realization of the postulate of Ukrainian statehood requires the activization of the internal political life of the Ukrainian people, to be manifested externally to gain recognition of the Ukrainian cause as a decisive force in Eastern European political affairs.

2. Complete expulsion of occupying forces from our lands in a national revolution, enabling the development of the Ukrainian Nation within its boundaries, can only be assured by an independent military establishment and a purposeful policy of alliances of political action.

3. Ukrainian foreign policy will realize its task by making alliances with those nations that are hostile to Ukraine's occupiers and discard in principle the traditional method of Ukrainian politics of making the liberation struggle dependent on one or another of the historical enemies of the Ukrainian Nation. Ukrainian foreign policy will also realize its tasks by properly utilizing the international forum in order to achieve an active role for Ukraine in international politics.

4. In pursuing its external policy, the Ukrainian state will strive to achieve the greatest defensive borders that will include all Ukrainian ethnic territories and guarantee its economic self-sufficiency.

V. MILITARY POLICY

1. The organization of Ukrainian military power will be gradually developed, and its form will change in response to the three stages of the political condition of the Ukrainian nation: enemy occupation, national revolution, state consolidation.

2. Under enemy occupation, the preparation of the Ukrainian popular masses for armed combat, particularly the preparation of organizers and the education of leaders, will be taken over by a separate military body.

3. Only military power, which relies on an armed nation prepared to fight stubbornly and valiantly for its rights, will be able to free Ukraine from occupation and facilitate the organization of the Ukrainian State.

4. The defence of the organized state will be taken over by a single, regular, classless, national army and navy which, alongside territorial Cossack formations, will be formed on the basis of conscription.

VI. CULTURE AND ART

1. The Ukrainian State will strive to raise the level of culture and civilization in Ukraine by sanctioning a cultural process built on the foundation of free cultural activity, and on the spiritual nature of the Ukrainian nation, its historical traditions and contemporary achievements. The Ukrainian State will also strive to root out the detrimental influences of alien domination in the cultural and psychological life of the nation.

2. Only the development of cultural works and artistic currents that are associated with healthy phenomena in the Ukrainian Nation's art and with the cult of chivalry, as well as those which have a voluntaristically creative approach to life, will be able to awaken the healthy urge of the nation to power and might.

VII. EDUCATION POLICY

1. The administration and maintenance of education as an instrument of raising the national masses in a national-state spirit, and the implementation of a school system which would raise the development of the education of the Ukrainian nation to the necessary level, will reside with the state.

2. At the foundations of national education lies a system of Ukrainian state, compulsory, and free comprehensive schools, which will thoroughly guarantee the harmonious development of the person and include practical, vocational training.

3. Private educational institutions and foreign education will be allowed with state permission in each individual case, and will be under the supervision of state officials.

VIII. RELIGIOUS POLICY

1. Believing the religious question to be a personal matter of the individual, the Ukrainian state will adopt a position of full freedom of religious conscience.

2. Recognizing the fundamental separation of church and state, the government - while preserving the necessary supervision of church organizations - will co-operate with Ukrainian clergymen of various faiths in matters concerning the moral upbringing of the nation.

3. In schools, the teaching of religion of those faiths which do not display denationalizing tendencies will be allowed.

4. The Ukrainian state will assist the development of a Ukrainian national church independent of foreign patriarchs, and the Ukrainianization of religious faiths active in Ukraine.

IX. THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

1. Taking the ideal of a Ukrainian Independent and United State as the basis of its political activity, and not recognizing all those acts, agreements, and institutions which consolidated the dismemberment of the Ukrainian nation, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists places itself in categorical opposition to all those powers, domestic and alien, which oppose actively or passively this stand of the Ukrainian nationalists, and will act against all political endeavours of individuals and collectives which deviate from the above-mentioned principles.

2. Not limiting its activities to anyone territory, but striving for the domination of the Ukrainian national reality on all Ukrainian lands and in foreign territories populated by Ukrainians, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists will pursue a policy of all-Ukrainian statehood without giving it a partisan, class or any kind of socially limited character, and directly opposes this policy to all party and class groupings and their political methods.

3. Supported by the creative elements of the Ukrainian citizenry and uniting them around the Ukrainian nation-state ideal, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists sets out as its task to make healthy the inner relations of the nation, to extract state-creating efforts from the Ukrainian nation, to expand Ukrainian national power to its full proportions and, in this way, act to guarantee the great Ukrainian Nation a fitting place among the world's other nation-states.

Source: DUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 r. (The OUN as Reflected in Resolutions of the Grand Assemblies, Conferences, and Other Documents from the Struggle, 1929-1955) (n.p., 1955), 3-16. Translated by Taras F. Pidzamecky, Roman Waschuk, and Andriy Wynnyckyj.

2. The Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist (Decalogue)
JUNE 1929

1. You will attain a Ukrainian State, or die in battle for it.

2. You will not permit anyone to defame the glory or the honour of Your Nation.

3. Remember the Great Days of our struggles.

4. Be proud of the fact that You are the inheritor of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr's Trident.

5. Avenge the deaths of the Great Knights.

6. Do not speak about matters with whom you can, but only with whom you must.

7. Do not hesitate to carry out the most dangerous deeds, should this be demanded by the good of the Cause.

8. Treat the enemies of Your Nation with hatred and ruthlessness.

9. Neither pleading, nor threats, nor torture, nor death shall compel You to betray a secret.

10. Aspire to expand the power, wealth, and glory of the Ukrainian State.

Source: OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 r. (The OUN as Reflected in Resolutions of the Grand Assemblies, Conferences, and Other Documents from the Struggle, 1929-1955) (n.p., 1955), 16. Translated by Taras F. Pidzamecky, Roman Waschuk, and Andriy Wynnyckyj.

Note:

The Decalogue was the OUN's statement of principles, which every OUN member was expected to memorize. It was written by a leading member, Stepan Lenkavsky (1904-77), and first published as an insert in the underground newspaper Surma in the summer of 1929.

In the original 1929 version of the Decalogue, the published text begins with: "I am the spirit of the eternal natural force which protected you from the Tatar hordes and placed you on the frontier of two worlds to create a new life." Several other sections read differently from the version translated here, and it is not known when the newer version became official. The different sections are: "(7) Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of the Cause demands it"; (8) "Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hate and perfidy"; (10) "Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners." See Petro Mirchuk, Narys istorii Orhanizatsii ukrains1cykh natsionalistiv, vol. 1, 1920-1939 (Munich-London-New York, 1968), 126-7; and Alexander J. Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (Boulder, Colo., 1980), 142-3. (Ed.)

3. Einsatzkommando Order against the Bandera Movement
25 NOVEMBER 1941

Einsatzkommando C/5
der Sicherheitspolizei und SD
-Kdo-Tgb. Nr. 12432/41

O.V., 25 November, 1941
G.R.S.

To the Outposts in: Kiev
Dnipropetrovske
Mykolaiv
Rivne
Zhytomyr
Vinnytsia

Re: OUN (Bandera Movement)

It has been established beyond doubt that the Bandera movement is preparing an uprising in the Reichskommissariat with the final goal of creating an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera movement are to be arrested immediately and, after a thorough investigation, are to be secretly liquidated as looters.

This letter is to be destroyed immediately after being read by the Kommando leader.

[illegible signature]
SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer

Source: Roman Ilnytzkyj, Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945: Ein Vorbericht (Germany and Ukraine, 1934-1945: A Preliminary Report), 2 vols. (Munich: Osteuropa-Institut, 1956), 2:338-9. Translated by Roman Waschuk.  

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Part 2 of 5

4. Letter from Alfred Rosenberg to General Keitel on Nazi Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War
28 FEBRUARY 1942

... The fate of Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is, on the contrary, a tragedy of the greatest dimensions. Of the 3.6 million prisoners of war, today only several hundred thousand are completely fit for work. A large portion of them have starved to death or have died of exposure because of the inclemency of the weather. Thousands have also succumbed to typhus. It is obvious that the feeding of such masses of prisoners of war will encounter difficulties. Nevertheless, had there been a certain amount of understanding for the aims of German policy, death and demoralization on such a scale could have been avoided. For example, according to reports we have received, within [the former boundaries of] the Soviet Union, the civilian population was completely prepared to supply food for the prisoners of war. Several understanding camp commandants followed this route with success. In the majority of cases, however, the camp commandants forbade the civilian population from supplying the prisoners of war with food and preferred to leave them to die of starvation. The civilian population was also not allowed to give food to the prisoners of war during their march to the camps. Indeed, in many cases, when hungry and exhausted prisoners of war could no longer continue with the march, they were shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population and their bodies were left to lie where they fell. In many camps, no shelter at all was provided for the prisoners of war. They lay there, exposed to the rain and snow. They were not even provided with the equipment to dig themselves foxholes or caves. Systematic delousing of prisoners of war in the camps and of the camps themselves has obviously been neglected. Utterances have been heard, such as: lithe more of the prisoners who die, the better it is for us." The result of this approach is that typhus has become widespread through the release or escape of prisoners of war and has claimed victories from among the German Wehrmacht and the civilian population, even in the old Reich. Finally, one must also mention the shootings of prisoners of war which, in part, were carried out on the basis of viewpoints which are devoid of any political sense. [. . .]

The treatment of prisoners of war seems to be founded to a great extent on completely incorrect notions about the peoples of the Soviet Union. One encounters the view that the peoples become increasingly inferior, the further east one goes. If the Poles must be treated harshly then, so the argument goes, the same applies on a much larger scale to the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Russians and, finally, the "Asiatics" ....

Source: International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-9),25: 156-61. Translated by Roman Waschuk.

Note

Alfred Rosenberg joined the Nazi Party in 1919. He was the party's official "philosopher" and a leading proponent of Nazi racial theory and of the Fuhrer mystique. In 1941 he became Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories. At the Nuremberg Trials he was condemned to death as a war criminal and executed in 1946. (Ed.)

5. Memorandum from Alfred Rosenberg to Adolf Hitler on Nazi Policy toward Ukrainians
16 MARCH 1942

A variety of partly mutually contradictory requests from the Wehrmacht High Command which are based on opinions expressed by the Fuhrer have induced me to ask the Fuhrer to make a decision in the following question of principle as well as political tactics.

The aims of German policy, notably in Ukraine, have been set by the Fuhrer: the exploitation and mustering of natural resources; the settlement of Germans in certain regions; no artificial intellectualization of the population, but rather the maintenance of its capacity for work; otherwise, a general lack of interest in the remaining internal developments. As a consequence of this, there arise for the future fixed and, depending on circumstances and the behaviour of the population, harsh governmental measures for the securing of German interests. Certain persons have seized upon this view and come to the conclusion that it should be stated everywhere possible using drastic phraseology, such as: "a colonial people that, like the Negroes, should be handled with the whip," "a Slavic people which must be kept as ignorant as possible," "the establishment of churches and sects so that they may be played off against one another," etc. This talk has continued to circulate despite a directive approved by the Fuhrer to the Reichskommissar of Ukraine, and all those who have visited Ukraine have reported about the consequences of this talk, namely that it is precisely this repeatedly displayed contemptuous attitude that often has worse effects on the willingness to work than all other measures. The representatives of the Wehrmacht have urgently requested that we see to the pacification of the Ukrainian population so as to hinder sabotage and the formation of partisan bands. It seems to me that talk of this sort harms rather than serves the German interest. Having continuously observed things in the Occupied Eastern Territories, I believe that German policy can have a certain, perhaps even contemptuous opinion of the characteristics of the subject peoples, but that it is not the task of the German political representation to proclaim measures and views which will, in the end, drive the subject population to sheer desperation, instead of encouraging the desired productive labour. The frequently-made reference to India seems entirely wrong to me in this respect. England exploited India to a great extent and divided it into power-groups, but it never broadcast this division and exploitation. On the contrary, it has instead emphasized for decades what benefits it has brought to the land and has, by means of some concessions, created a basis for this sort of propaganda.

While we must, as part of our internal policy, openly and aggressively announce to our entire people our antagonistic aspirations towards others, the political leadership in the East should remain silent at times when German policy dictates harshness; it should keep silent about its perhaps disparaging view of the subject peoples. Yes, an intelligent German policy can, under certain circumstances, achieve more for German interests by means of insignificant concessions and a little human kindness than by means of overt, unthinking brutality.

Because the results of the earlier approach have been manifesting themselves everywhere, despite many admonitions, I intend to send the Reichskommissar of Ukraine the attached decree. I ask the Fuhrer to decide about this memorandum and the draft decree.

Source: International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-9), 25: 97-8. Translated by Roman Waschuk.

6. Erich Koch on the Economic Exploitation of Ukraine
26-8 AUGUST 1942

... The Gauleiter came directly from Fuhrer Headquarters and brought with him extraordinarily complimentary words of thanks from the Fuhrer for the work of the La-Fuhrer [agricultural leaders]. He described the political situation and his tasks as Reichskommissar as follows: There is no free Ukraine. The goal of our work must be that the Ukrainians work for Germany and not tha t we ensure the happiness of the people. Ukraine must deliver that which Germany lacks. This task must be carried out without regard for losses. In every country in Europe, the situation is better than it is here. Food supplies in the Reich are based on ration cards. The black market is limited in its extent. Among other peoples, the black market is the basis, and ration cards are issued as a supplement. The food situation in Germany is serious. Production is already falling under the influence of the bad food situation. An increase in the bread ration is a political necessity in order to carry on the war victoriously. The quantities of grain which are lacking must be procured from Ukraine. The Fuhrer has made the Gauleiter personally responsible for ensuring that these quantities will be secured. In view of this task the feeding of the Ukrainian civilian population is of absolutely no concern. Through its black marketeering, it lives better than we think. There can be no discussion about the new levies. The Fuhrer has demanded 3 million tonnes of grain from Ukraine for the Reich, and this must be provided. He does not wish to hear discussions about the lack of transportation facilities. The transport problem must be solved through one's own inventiveness.

Source: International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-9), 25: 317-18. Translated by Roman Waschuk. Koch's speech was included in a secret, unsigned note about a conference held in Rivne on 26-28 August.

7. Memorandum from Erich Koch to Alfred Rosenberg on Harsh Measures Adopted in Ukraine by the German Administration
16 MARCH 1943

The Ukrainian emigres have, meanwhile, also succeeded in gaining influence in the Bandera and Melnyk movements, so that today both of them act in an intentionally anti-German fashion. "Prosvita," to the extent that it exists, is also used as a front organization for Ukrainian chauvinists. For examples of this, please see SD reports. Proof of this has been produced in Rivne, Dunaivtsi I Dunajezy], Kamianets-Podilskyi and Kiev. In Kiev, the Ukrainians, including those who belonged to German social circles, had prepared to assassinate the Generalkommissar by poisoning. Ukrainian teachers from "Prosvita" have Joined resistance groups, as for example in Kamin-Kashirskyi (see SD report for 27 and 31 June 1942). I gather from the most recent SD reports that, under the mild hand of the German leadership of the operational front zone, a sort of Ukrainian national government could be formed at the "Prosvita" in Kharkiv. I point out in connection with this that, apart from the gentlemen in your Main Political Affairs Section, it was always the representatives of the rear area services in the operational front zone who demanded a different treatment of the Ukrainians than that which occurred in my Reichskommissariat. The Ukrainian nationalists from Kharkiv have now been evacuated to Kiev. There they have told [our] reliable Ukrainian informants that very soon a world conference of Ukrainians will take place. They speak of a change in Germany's Ukrainian policy in the coming weeks. They demand independent military units for Ukraine. They insist that the newspapers appearing in my Reichskomissariat should be edited in a Ukrainian national spirit, and declare that, if these demands are met, they are ready to demonstrate a conditional loyalty to the Germans.

The Ukrainian emigres make up a separate chapter of my political work. It must, unfortunately, be stated that here, too, there are differences in political attitude between your ministry and myself. It is not prejudice that has shaped my negative attitude to the Ukrainian emigres but extensive experience during my activities in Ukraine ....

I refer, for example, to the New Year's message of the UNO [19] 42/43, which demonstrates political impudence.! It contains no greetings, but crass political demands: the demand for national freedom and state independence. The demands are simultaneously mixed with threats, in the event that the Ukrainian claims would not be complied with.

I was strengthened in my attitude towards the emigres by a statement made by the Fuhrer, passed on to me through official channels, to the effect that these emigres demoralize the people, and that he would have had them shot at the beginning of the Eastern campaign if he had had a clear idea of their attitude then. I regret that this clarity has not yet made its way into all departments of your ministry ....

Source: International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-9), 25: 270-2. Translated by Roman Waschuk.

Note:

1 The UNO New Year's message refers to the Ukrainske natsionalne obiednannia, a Ukrainian social and cultural organization in Germany under OUN-M influence. (Ed.)

8. Appeal to Ukrainian Citizens and Youth by the Ukrainian Central Committee President on the Formation of the Galician Division
6 MAY 1943

The long-awaited moment has arrived when the Ukrainian people will again have the opportunity to come out with gun in hand to do battle against its most grievous foe - Bolshevism. 1 The Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich has agreed to the formation of a separate Ukrainian volunteer military unit under the name SS Riflemen's Division "Halychyna."

Thus we must take advantage of this historic opportunity; we must take up arms because our national honour, our national interest, demands it.

Veterans of the struggles for independence, officers and men of the Ukrainian Galician Army! Twenty-two years ago you parted with your weapons when all strength to resist had ebbed. The blood of your fellows who fell on the Fields of Glory calls upon you to finish the deed already begun, to fulfill the oath you swore in 1918. You must stand shoulder to shoulder with the invincible German army and destroy, once and for all, the Bolshevik 2 beast, which insatiably gorges itself on the blood of our people and strives with all of its barbarity to arrive at our total ruination.

You must avenge the innocent blood of your brothers tortured to death in the Solovets Islands camps, in Siberia, in Kazakhstan, the millions of brothers starved to extinction on our bountiful fields by the Bolshevik collectivizers.

You, who followed the thorny but heroic path of the Ukrainian Galician Army, understand more than anyone what it is to fight in the face of uneven odds. You realize that one can only face an enemy such as Red Moscow shoulder to shoulder with an army capable of destroying the Red monster.

The failures of the anti-Bolshevik forces of the European Entente in the years 1918 to 1920 testify irrevocably that there is only one nation capable of conquering the USSR - Germany. For twenty-two years you waited with sacred patience for the holy war against the barbarous Red hordes menacing Europe.

It goes without saying that, in this titanic struggle, the fate of the Ukrainian people is also being decided. Thus, we must fully realize the importance of this moment and playa military role in this struggle. Now the battle is not uneven, it is not hopeless. Now, the greatest military power in the world stands opposed to our eternal foe.

Now or never!

Youth of Ukraine!

I turn to you with particular attention and call upon you to join the SS Riflemen's Division "Halychyna." You were born at the dawn of the great age, when the new history of Ukraine began to be written in crimson Blood and golden Glory.

When your fathers and elder brothers, first and alone in all of Europe, took up arms against the most fearful enemy of Ukraine and of all humanity;

When your brothers, inflamed as you are now, first wrote into history the peerless heroic deeds at the Battle of Kruty; 3

When your brothers covered themselves with the glory of the first Winter Campaigns against the Bolshevik monster;

When they, in the midst of a newly "peaceful" Europe, were the first to go forth against the Bolshevik invader in the second Winter Campaign, writing into history the heroic deeds of the Battle of Bazar; 4

It was then that You, our Youth, were born, then that You grew, as across the whole of Ukraine revolts rose up against the Bolshevik invader, who by ruin, famine, exile, torture, and murder strove to wipe our nation from the face of the earth. Then You, our Ukrainian Youth, laid your colossal sacred sacrifices on the altar of your Fatherland. You burned with the sacred fire of love for it, hardened your spirit for it, readied yourself for the right moment of reckoning by arms. With longing in your heart, with glowing embers in Your soul, You waited for this moment.

And now this moment has come.

Dear Youth, I believe that your patriotism, your selflessness, your readiness for armed deeds, are not mere hollow words, that these are your deep-set feelings and convictions. I believe that You suffered deeply and understood the painful experiences of the past struggles for independence, and that You culled from them a clear sense of political realism, a thorough understanding of the national interest and a hardy readiness for the greatest of sacrifices for it. I believe in You, dear Youth, I believe that You will not idle while the Great Moment passes by, that you will prove to the whole world who you are, what you are worth, and what you are capable of.

Ukrainian Citizens!

I call upon you for great vigilance. The enemy does not sleep. In the memorable years of 1917-19, enemy propaganda lulled our people with lofty words about eternal peace, about the brotherhood of nations. Now this propaganda aims to tear weapons from our hands once again, and disseminates among us countless absurd slogans, groundless conjectures, febrile dreams. You know where this propaganda originates. You know its purpose. Counter it decisively, even when it comes forth under a Ukrainian guise, guilefully exploiting the uninformed and confused among the Ukrainian people. You know the value of arms, and thus I believe that, with God's assistance, You will worthily pass the test of political maturity to which history has put you.

Ukrainian Citizens!

The time of waiting, the time of debilitation and suffering has come to an end. Now, the great moment of armed deeds has also come for our people. Side by side with the heroic army of Greater Germany and the volunteers of other European peoples, we too come forth to battle our greatest national foe and threat to all civilization. The cause is sacred and great and therefore it demands of us great efforts and sacrifices.

I believe that these efforts and sacrifices are the hard but certain road to our Glorious Future.

Dr. Volodymyr Kubiiovych
President
Ukrainian Central Committee

Source: Krakivski visti (Cracow News), 16 May 1943. Translated by Andriy Wynnyckyj.

Notes:

In the daily newspaper Lvivski visti (Lviv), 6 May 1943, the words "Muscovite-Jewish Bolshevism" were inserted here, whereas in Kubiiovych's original version, from which this translation is taken, no such wording exists. The original version, with minor grammatical changes, can also be found in the weekly newspaper, Krakivski visti, 16 May 1943. The reasons for the differences between the Lviv and Cracow texts lies in the fact that the Lviv newspaper was under the careful scrutiny of Georg Lehmann, a Nazi official in charge of the press in Galicia. The Lviv newspaper was an official organ of the Press and Journal Publications Branch of the Generaigouvernement, whereas the Cracow newspaper was the organ of Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, an independent commercial publishing concern with very close ties to the Ukrainian Central Committee headed by Kubiiovych. It should also be noted that press censorship was somewhat more lenient in Cracow than it was in Lviv. For more details, see Kost Pankivsky, Roley nimetskoi okupatsii 1941-1944 (New York-Toronto, 1965), 91-92, 116-18,276, 344-5. (Ed.)

2 The words "Jewish-Bolshevik monster" appear in the Lvivski visti version. See note 1. (Ed.)

3 This battle took place on 29 January 1918, when a force of 600 Ukrainian cadets attempted to stop a 4,000-strong Red Army force along the Moscow-Bakhmach-Kiev railway line. Almost all the cadets were killed, and their deaths became a symbol of selfless patriotism and sacrifice. (Ed.)

4 An engagement of the Second Winter Campaign or "November Raid" of 1921. The government and army of the ousted Ukrainian People's Republic, exiled in Poland, decided to initiate a military campaign against the Bolsheviks. On 17 November the Ukrainian army was surrounded by the Red Army at Bazar; 443 soldiers were taken prisoner and 359 were shot. (Ed.)

9. Programmatic and Political Resolutions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists' Third Congress
21-5 AUGUST 1943

I. PROGRAMMATIC RESOLUTIONS

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is fighting for an independent, united Ukrainian state and for the right of every nation to lead a free life in its own independent state. The only way to effect a just solution to the national and social problem in the world is to bring an end to the subjugation and exploitation of one nation by another and to establish a system of free nations existing in their own independent states.

The OUN is fighting against imperialism and against empires, for within empires, one ruling nation culturally and politically subjugates and economically exploits other nations. For this reason, the OUN is fighting against the USSR and against Germany's "New Europe."

The OUN is resolutely fighting against both internationalist and fascist national-socialist programs and political concepts, because they are the tools of imperialist policies of conquest. Thus, we are opposed both to Russian Communist Bolshevism and German National Socialism.

The OUN is opposed to any nation, intent on fulfilling its imperialist goals, "liberating," "taking under its protection," or "into its care" other nations, for these deceptive phrases conceal a repugnant reality: subjugation, coercion and plunder. For this reason, the OUN will struggle against the Russian-Bolshevik and German plunderers until it rids Ukraine of all "protectors" and "liberators," until it attains an independent, united Ukrainian state in which peasants, workers and intellectuals will be able to live and develop in a free, prosperous and cultured manner.

The OUN is for the full liberation of the Ukrainian people from the Russian-Bolshevik and German yoke; it is for the establishment of an independent, united Ukrainian state free of landowners and capitalists, as well as of Bolshevik commissars, NKVD agents and party parasites.

In the Ukrainian state, the governing power will regard serving the interests of the people as its highest duty. Since it will have no plans for conquest, nor any subject countries or oppressed nations within its state, the national government of Ukraine will not waste time, energy or financial resources on establishing an apparatus of oppression. The Ukrainian national regime will direct all economic resources and all human energies toward establishing a new political order and a just social system, toward building up the economy of the country and raising the cultural level of the people.

Within the ranks of the OUN, Ukrainian peasants, workers, and intellectuals are fighting against their oppressors for an independent, united Ukrainian state, for national and social liberation, for a new political and social order:

l.a) For the destruction of the Bolsheviks' and the Germans' exploitative system of serfdom in the organization of the rural economy. Since the land is the property of the people, the Ukrainian national regime will not impose on farmers anyone method of working the land. In the Ukrainian state, both individual and collective work on the land will be permitted; the method will depend upon the will of the farmers.

b) For a free transfer to peasants in western Ukrainian oblasts of all lands held by landowners, monasteries and churches.

2.a) For state ownership of large-scale industry and co-operative ownership of small-scale industry.

b) For the participation of workers in the direction of factories; for directors to be chosen on the basis of expertise, rather than on the commissar-party principle. 1

3.a) For a universal eight-hour work day. Overtime will have to be consented to freely - like all work in general - and will have to bring the worker additional wages.

b) For fair wages for work; for the participation of workers in the profits of commercial enterprises. Every worker will receive a wage sufficient to meet the material and spiritual needs of his entire household. During the period when annual financial reviews of commercial enterprises are carried out, every worker will receive the following: in co-operative enterprises - a dividend (his share of the yearly profits): in state-owned enterprises - a premium.

c) For freedom in work, a free choice of profession, and free choice of the place of work.

d) For free trade unions. For the abolition of the Stakhanov work method, 2 socialist competition, increasing norms and other methods of exploiting workers.

4. For freedom in the trades; for the right of tradesmen to unite voluntarily in workmen's associations; for the right of the tradesman to leave the association in order to pursue his work on an individual basis and to dispose freely of his income.

5. For state ownership of large business; for co-operative and private ownership of small business; for free marketplaces.

6. For full equality of women with men in all the rights and obligations of citizenship; for free access for women to all schools and all professions; for the fundamental right of women to engage in physically lighter work, so that women will not be obliged to ruin their health by seeking employment in mines and other heavy industries. For state protection of motherhood. Fathers will receive, in addition to wages for their work, a supplementary payment for the support of their wives and of children who have not yet reached the age of majority. Only in these conditions will women have the opportunity to carry out their important, honourable and responsible duties as mothers and educators of the younger generation.

7.a) For compulsory secondary education. For raising the educational and cultural level of the population by increasing the numbers of schools, publishers, libraries, museums, cinemas, theatres, and similar institutions.

b) For increased advanced and professional training: for a continual growth of cadres of highly qualified specialists in every field of human endeavour.

c) For free access by young people to all institutions of higher learning. For ensuring students' ability to pursue their studies by providing stipends, food, accommodation, and the equipment necessary for education.

d) For a harmonious, all-round development of the younger generation in the moral, intellectual and physical spheres. For free access to all the scientific and cultural achievements of mankind.

8. For respect for the work of intellectuals. For creating material conditions for intellectual work that will ensure the well-being of the intellectual's family, so that he can be free to devote himself to his cultural and creative work and constantly increase his knowledge and raise his intellectual and cultural level.

9.a) For full protection of all workers in old age and in case of illness or handicap.

b) For the establishment of universal health care; for the expansion of the network of hospitals, sanatoriums, health resorts and rest homes. For expanding the medical cadres. For the right of workers to have access, without payment, to all health institutions.

c) For special state protection of children and youths; for an expansion of the network of nurseries, kindergartens, sanatoria and recreation camps; for the inclusion of all children and youths in the programs of state institutions dedicated to care and education.

10.a) For freedom of the press, speech, thought, convictions, worship and world-view. Against the official imposition on society of any doctrines or dogmas with regard to world-view.

b) For the freedom to profess and practice any religion which does not run counter to the morals of society.

c) For the separation of church organizations from the state.

d) For cultural relations with other nations; for the right of citizens to go abroad for education, medical treatment or in order to learn about the life and cultural achievements of other nations.

11. For the full right of national minorities to cultivate their own national cultures.

12. For equality of all citizens of Ukraine, whatever their nationality, with regard to the rights and obligations of citizenship; for an equal right for all to work, remuneration, and rest.

13. For a free, fully Ukrainian culture; for a spirit of heroism and a high moral standard; for civic solidarity, friendship and discipline.

9. Ukrainian Nationalists' Third Congress, 1943 189

II. POLITICAL RESOLUTIONS

1. The International Situation

1. The present war is a typical war between competing imperialist powers for domination of the world, for a new division of material wealth, for the acquisition of new sources of raw materials and markets and for the exploitation of labour.

2. The warring imperialist powers are not bringing the world any progressive political or social ideas. In particular, Germany's so-called "New Europe" and Moscow's "Soviet Union" are a denial of the right of nations to free political and cultural development within their own states; instead, they bring all nations political and social enslavement. For this reason, a victory for the imperialist powers in the current war and an organization of the world according to imperialist principles would bring only a momentary pause in the war and would soon lead to new collisions between the imperialist powers over the division of war spoils and to new conflicts. At the same time, the liberation movements of the nations subjugated by the imperialist powers would become the seeds of new conflicts and revolutions. Thus, a victory for the imperialist powers in the present war would lead to chaos and to further suffering for millions of people within the captive nations.

3. At this time, the present imperialist war has entered a decisive phase, which is characterized by:

a) the exhaustion of the imperialist powers,

b) an increase in the contradictions between the imperialist powers,

c) a growth in the struggle of the captive nations.

At the same time, the present war is serving as an external auxiliary factor, bringing nearer the time of the outbreak of national and social revolutions inside the captive nations.

4. The reactionary and anti-popular plans of German racist imperialism to enslave other nations, the Germans' terroristic practices on occupied territories and the captive nations' battle against the so-called New Europe have hastened the complete political collapse of German imperialism. Now, as a result of the blows dealt by her imperialist opponents and of the liberation struggle waged by the captive nations, Germany is also nearing an inevitable military defeat.

5. Bolshevik Russia, ideologically and politically compromised and materially weakened, is making use of the Germans' terroristic policy on occupied territories and of the provisions supplied by the Allies for continuing the war.

Only the fear of German occupation and the internal Stalinist terror are compelling the soldiers of the Red Army to continue fighting. The enormous losses of human life and military equipment are deepening the internal crisis of the Russian imperialist regime. The shortage of food in the country, along with the landing of the Allies in Europe, and the threat posed as a result to Soviet plans, are compelling the Bolsheviks to accelerate their own offensive. The aim of the Bolsheviks is to pursue, under the guise of their so-called defence of the fatherland, revived Slavophilism, 3 and pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, the goals of Russian imperialism, that is, to gain dominion over Europe and, eventually, the entire world. The point of departure for the fulfillment of Moscow's imperialist plans is Ukraine, with all her natural wealth. Further bases for fulfilling the plans of Russian imperialism are the Balkans, the Baltic region, and Scandinavia.

6. In spite of the differences that exist among the Allies, they are waging the war for the destruction of their rivals, above all, of German imperialism. The Allies' next task is the destruction of Japanese imperialism. In order to bring about the destruction of these opponents, the Allies are making use of Russian imperialism and will attempt to do so as long as possible. At the same time, the domination of Europe by the Bolsheviks is not in the interest of the Allies and they are attempting in the present war to weaken, and eventually destroy, Russian imperialism. The continuation of the war on the eastern front and the mutual destruction of German and Russian imperialism are in accord with the interests of the Allies. The goal of the Allies - especially Britain - on the European continent is the defeat, or at least the substantial weakening, of all the imperialist states of Europe and the establishment of an order which would guarantee them a decisive voice in Europe and give free rein to Anglo-Saxon political and economic influences. In order to attain these goals, the Allies are gaining control or are attempting to gain control of the most important bases around and inside Europe (Sicily, the Apennine and Balkan peninsulas, Scandinavia and the Caucasus).

7. The captive nations and their struggle for liberation constitute one of the most important elements in the further development of the current political situation. The military superiority of the imperialist powers at the present moment still prevents a full manifestation of the powers of the captive nations. But in measure with the deepening of the war crisis, the strength of the captive nations is increasing and the moment of national and social revolutions is approaching; the captive nations are becoming a new, decisive political factor. Only on a platform of a new political concept with regard to the captive nations, a concept which, in opposition to the imperialist powers, guarantees every nation the right to its own national state and grants it social justice, can a just order be built and a lasting peace maintained among nations.

8. The approaching military collapse of Germany in the East and the complete ideological and political bankruptcy of Soviet imperialism have set the captive nations of the East the task of fighting against imperialist oppressors in order to rebuild the East along the new principles of freedom for nations, autonomy in free, independent states and the liberation of nations and individuals from political oppression and economic exploitation. Only by way of national and social revolutions, waged by the captive nations of the East for the sake of new progressive ideas and struggle against imperialism, can Russian Bolshevik imperialism be destroyed.

9. Ukraine stands at the centre of the present imperialist war. Russian and German imperialists are fighting for the domination and exploitation of Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine, as the bearer of progressive ideas to all the captive nations, is becoming a decisive factor in the preparation of revolutions in the East. Ukraine is the first country in the East to have raised the flag of resolute struggle by captive nations against the imperialists, and she will begin the period of national and social revolutions. Only through a common struggle of the Ukrainian people with those of other captive nations of the East can Bolshevism be defeated. The rebuilding of an independent, united Ukrainian state will guarantee the rebuilding and permanent existence of the national states of other nations of eastern, southeastern and northern Europe and of the captive nations of Asia. Only with the existence of a Ukrainian state can permanent existence be guaranteed for those nations which, in mutual understanding and co-operation based on the principles of the right of every nation to have its own state, a just social order and economic independence, oppose all the covetous plans of hostile imperialist powers. In this way, lasting peace and the peaceful national, social, and cultural development of these nations will be guaranteed.

Source: Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground (forthcoming); reprinted with permission. See also Ideia i chyn 2, no. 5 (1943): 1-10 (partial text). Original copy: archives of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, New York; photocopy: archives of Litopys UPA.

Notes:

1 This is a reference to the nomenklatura system, one of the main instruments of political control in the USSR. Positions in state, economic, and social institutions and organizations are filled exclusively on the recommendation of party organs by persons from special lists compiled for that purpose. (Ed.)

2 The Stakhanov movement was a form of "socialist competition" that attempted to establish high records of productivity. Formally, it was considered a voluntary expression of workers' initiative, but in reality it was organized by directives from above. (Ed.)

3 Slavophiles were the nineteenth-century conservative Russian intelligentsia. (Ed.)

10. What is the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Fighting For?
AUGUST 1943

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is fighting for an independent, united Ukrainian state and for the right of every nation to lead a free life in its own independent state. The only way to effect a just solution to the national and social problem in the world is to bring an end to the subjugation and exploitation of one nation by another and to establish a system of free nations existing in their own independent states.

The UPA is fighting against imperialism and against empires, for within empires, one ruling nation culturally and politically subjugates and economically exploits other nations. For this reason, the UPA is fighting against the USSR and against Germany's "New Europe."

The UPA is resolutely fighting against both internationalist and fascist national-socialist programs and political concepts, because they are the tools of imperialist policies of conquest. Thus, we are opposed both to Russian Communist Bolshevism and German National Socialism.

The UPA is opposed to any nation, intent on fulfilling its imperialistic goals, "liberating," "taking under its protection," or "into its care" other nations, for these deceptive phrases conceal a repugnant reality: subjugation, coercion, and plunder. For this reason, the UPA will struggle against the Russian-Bolshevik and German plunderers until it rids Ukraine of all "protectors" and "liberators," until it attains an independent, united Ukrainian state in which peasants, workers, and intellectuals will be able to live and develop in a free, prosperous, and cultured manner.

The UPA is for the full liberation of the Ukrainian people from the Russian Bolshevik yoke; it is for the establishment of an independent, united Ukrainian state free of landowners and capitalists, as well as of Bolshevik commissars, NKVD agents, and party parasites.

In the Ukrainian state, the governing power will regard serving the interests of the people as its highest duty. Since it will have no plans for conquest, nor any subject countries or oppressed nations within its state, the national government of Ukraine will not waste time, energy, or financial resources on establishing an apparatus of oppression. The Ukrainian national regime will direct all economic resources and all human energies toward establishing a new political order and a just social system, toward building up the economy of the country and raising the cultural level of the people.

Within the ranks of the UPA, Ukrainian peasants, workers and intellectuals are fighting against their oppressors for an independent, united Ukrainian state, for national and social liberation, for a new political and social order:

1. For the destruction of the Bolsheviks' exploitative system of serfdom in the organization of the rural economy. Since the land is the property of the people, the Ukrainian national regime will not impose on farmers any one method of working the land. In the Ukrainian state, both individual and collective work on the land will be permitted; the method will depend upon the will of the farmers.

2.a) For state ownership of large-scale industry and co-operative ownership of small-scale industry.

b) For the participation of workers in the direction of factories; for directors to be chosen on the basis of expertise, rather than on the commissar-party principle. 2

3.a) For a universal eight-hour work day. Overtime will have to be consented to freely - like all work in general - and will have to bring the worker additional wages.

b) For fair wages for work; for the participation of workers in the profits of commercial enterprises. Every worker will receive a wage sufficient to meet the material and spiritual needs of his entire household. During the period when annual financial reviews of commercial enterprises are carried out, every worker will receive the following: in co-operative enterprises - a dividend, in state-owned enterprises - a premium.

c) For freedom in work, a free choice of profession, and a free choice of the place of work.

d) For free trade unions. For the abolition of the Stakhanov work method,3 socialist competition, increasing norms, and other methods of exploiting workers.

4. For freedom in the trades; for the right of tradesmen to unite voluntarily in workmen's associations; for the right of the tradesman to leave the association in order to pursue his work on an individual basis and to dispose freely of his income.

5. For state ownership of large business; for co-operative and private ownership of small business; for free marketplaces.

6. For full equality of women with men in all the rights and obligations of citizenship; for free access for women to all schools and all professions; for the fundamental right of women to engage in physically lighter work, so that women will not be obliged to ruin their health by seeking employment in mines and other heavy industries. For state protection of motherhood. Fathers will receive, in addition to wages for their work, a supplementary payment for the support of their wives and of children who have not yet reached the age of majority. Only in these conditions will women have the opportunity to carry out their important, honourable, and responsible duties as mothers and educators of the younger generation.

7.a) For compulsory secondary education. For raising the educational and cultural level of the population by increasing the numbers of schools, publishers, libraries, museums, cinemas, theatres, and similar institutions.

b) For increased advanced and professional training: for a continual growth of cadres of highly qualified specialists in every field of human endeavour.

c) For free access by young people to all institutions of higher learning. For ensuring students' ability to pursue their studies by providing stipends, food, accommodation, and the equipment necessary for education.

d) For a harmonious, all-round development of the younger generation in the moral, intellectual, and physical spheres. For free access to all the scientific and cultural achievements of mankind.

8. For respect for the work of intellectuals. For creating material conditions for intellectual work that will ensure the well-being of the intellectual's family, so that he can be free to devote himself to his cultural and creative work and constantly increase his knowledge and raise his intellectual and cultural level.

9.a) For full protection of all workers in old age and in case of illness or handicap.

b) For the establishment of universal health care; for the expansion of the network of hospitals, sanatoria, health resorts, and rest homes. For expanding the medical cadres. For the right of workers to have access, without payment, to all health institutions.

c) For special state protection of children and youths; for an expansion of the network of nurseries, kindergartens, sanatoria, and recreation camps; for the inclusion of all children and youths in the programs of state institutions dedicated to care and education.

10.a) For freedom of the press, speech, thought, convictions, worship, and world-view. Against the official imposition on society of any doctrines or dogmas with regard to world-view.

b) For the freedom to profess and practice any religion which does not run counter to the morals of society.

c) For the separation of church organizations from the state.

d) For cultural relations with other nations; for the right of citizens to go abroad for education, medical treatment, or in order to learn about the life and cultural achievements of other nations.

11. For the full right of national minorities to cultivate their own national cultures.

12. For equality of all citizens of Ukraine, whatever their nationality, with regard to the rights and obligations of citizenship; for an equal right for all to remuneration and rest.

13. For a free, fully Ukrainian culture; for a spirit of heroism and a high moral standard; for civic solidarity, friendship, and discipline.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army
August 1943
Republished 1949

Source: Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground (forthcoming); reprinted with permission. Original copy: Folio of Leaflets, archives of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, New York; photocopy: archives of Litopys UPA; reprinted in Litopys UPA (Toronto, 1978), 1: 126-31.

Notes:

1 This is a revised edition of the document "What is the Revolutionary-Liberationist UPA Fighting For?" initially signed by the OUN leadership. (Ed.)

2 The reference is to the nomenklatura system, one of the main instruments of political control in the USSR. Positions in state, economic, and social institutions and organizations are filled exclusively on the recommendation of party organs by persons from special lists compiled for that purpose. (Ed.)

3 See document 9, note 2. (Ed.)

11. Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council
11-15 JULY 1944

1. The Ukrainian national-liberation movement, the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, and the struggle for its consolidation in the years 1917-21 deepened the national consciousness and increased the political activity of the Ukrainian masses.

The collapse of the Ukrainian state as a result of foreign conquest, which was brought about by insufficient internal unity of the Ukrainian national forces, made it easier for foreigners to gain dominion over Ukraine. This foreign domination has been marked by unprecedented oppression, massive plunder of the Ukrainian people, a return of peasants and workers to a state of true serfdom, merciless exploitation, and the extermination of millions of people by means of famine and terror. These terrible and bloody times, twenty-five years in duration, have taught the Ukrainian masses that no foreign political and social system will bring benefit to them, and that only the establishment of their own national sovereign state will guarantee a normal life and development of the nation and its culture and the material and spiritual well-being of the masses.

2. The present war between two enormous imperialist powers, Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, is being waged primarily for domination over Ukraine as a point of departure to dominion over Eastern Europe and even all of Europe. Both these powers have as their policy the total colonial exploitation of Ukraine and her population. Having seized all the material and economic resources of the Ukrainian people, they mercilessly exterminate the leading national forces in Ukraine, destroy the national culture and the national consciousness of the masses, and colonize the country with foreigners, while exterminating great masses of the Ukrainian population or transporting them beyond the borders of Ukraine.

3. Nevertheless, this war is also debilitating our enemies and bringing them to a state of social and political disintegration. As a result, conditions are favourable for liberation struggles on the part of the captive nations and their ultimate victory is facilitated.

4. Under these circumstances, it is essential that:

a) in the vortex of the present total war, the Ukrainian people and their leading cadres be protected from extermination;

b) the Ukrainian people be led to battle for their liberation and for their own sovereign state.

For the fulfillment of these tasks, it is necessary that there be a single, pan-Ukrainian national front, organized by uniting all the active, national Ukrainian forces which are endeavouring to establish a sovereign Ukrainian state, and that there be a single governing centre.

For this reason, on the initiative of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was formed in the process of the Ukrainian people's armed struggle against the plunder and coercion of the peaceable Ukrainian population by the forces of occupation, a pan-Ukrainian governing centre has been established, comprising representatives from all regions of Ukraine and all Ukrainian political circles, under the name Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.

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Part 3 of 5

I. GOALS AND DUTIES OF THE UKRAINIAN SUPREME LIBERATION COUNCIL

1. To unite and co-ordinate the activities of all the pro-independence liberation forces of the Ukrainian people in all the territories of Ukraine and outside these territories in a national-liberation struggle against all the enemies of the Ukrainian people, in particular, against Soviet Russian and Nazi German imperialists, for the establishment of an independent, united Ukrainian state.

2. To determine the ideological program of the Ukrainian people's liberation struggle.

3. To direct the entire Ukrainian national-liberation struggle until sovereignty and the establishment of independent government organs in the Ukrainian state are attained.

4. To represent, in its capacity as the highest pan-Ukrainian governing centre, the current political struggle of the Ukrainian people, both inside the country and abroad.

5. To bring into being the first government of the Ukrainian state and to convene the first nation-wide Ukrainian representative body.

II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAM OF THE UKRAINIAN SUPREME LIBERATION COUNCIL

The preservation of a nation's life, national unity, and culture constitutes the primary and highest goal of any sound national organism. A sovereign national state is the chief guarantee of the preservation of a nation's life, its normal development, and the well-being of its citizens.

For this reason, the Ukrainian nation should, at this time, dedicate all its powers to the establishment and consolidation of its own state.

All politically active Ukrainian agencies should consolidate their forces in the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state, laying aside all disputes of a social and political nature because, until an independent state is attained, these disputes remain in the realm of theory.

The struggle for a national independent state can be successful only if it is carried out independently of the political influences of foreign powers.

Accordingly, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council bases its activity on the following principles:

1. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council aspires to the re-establishment of an independent, united Ukrainian state on all Ukrainian territories by means of a revolutionary struggle against all the enemies of Ukrainian sovereignty, in particular, against the Soviet and German forces of occupation. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council endeavours to work in co-operation with all those who favour such independence.

2. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council is founded on the principle of complete political independence from the influences of foreign powers and agencies.

3. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council unites all the leading political groupings that favour political sovereignty for the Ukrainian state and political autonomy in the Ukrainian struggle for independence, regardless of their ideological world-views or political and social orientation.

4. To achieve the union of Ukrainian national-liberation forces in the battle for an independent, united Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council adopts the following political and social platform:

a) guarantee of a popular, democratic method of determining the political order of the Ukrainian state by means of universal popular representation;

b) guarantee of freedom of thought, world-view, and belief;

c) guarantee of the development of Ukrainian national culture;

d) guarantee of a just social order in the Ukrainian state, free of class exploitation and oppression;

e) guarantee of the genuine rule of law in the Ukrainian state and of the equality of all citizens before the law;

f) guarantee of citizenship rights to all national minorities in Ukraine;

g) guarantee of the right of equal educational opportunity for all citizens;

h) guarantee in the labour sector of the right of all citizens to the free exercise of initiative, regulated by the demands and needs of the totality of the nation;

i) guarantee of freedom in methods of working the land; designation of a minimum and maximum size for individual farms;

j) socialization of the basic natural wealth of the country: the land, forests, water, and underground resources; transfer of arable land to farmers for permanent agricultural use;

k) nationalization of heavy industry and heavy transport; transfer of light industry and the food industry to co-operatives; guarantee of the right to wide-scale, free co-operation on the part of small producers;

l) guarantee of free trade within limits set by legislation;

m) guarantee of the free development of trades and of the right to establish individual workshops and enterprises;

n) guarantee of the right of freedom in work for workers engaged in physical and intellectual occupations and a guarantee of the protection of the interests of workers by social legislation.

5. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council will wage its struggle for an independent, united Ukrainian state in alliance with all the captive nations of Europe and Asia which are fighting for their own liberation and which recognize Ukraine's right to political independence.

6. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council is striving for accommodation and peaceful co-existence with all of Ukraine's neighbours on the basis of mutual recognition of the right of each nation to its own state on its ethnic territories.

Source: Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground (forthcoming); reprinted with permission. Original copy (carbon copy of a typescript): archives of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, New York, no. 7-2; photocopy: archives of Litopys UPA.

Note:

This document was adopted by the First Grand Assembly of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council on 11-15 July 1944. (Ed.)

12. Declaration on the Formation of the Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian National Army
MARCH 1945

The Ukrainian National Committee (UNC) has come into being by the will of Ukrainian citizens who now reside in Germany and in countries allied with it.

The formation of the UNC is a new page in the socio-political life of Ukrainian citizens, who, governed by a pervasive love for the Homeland, desire to see their Fatherland freed of its invader.

The UNC is the spokesman of these hidden sentiments in our citizens and it firmly strides along the path which leads to the formation of a sovereign nation-state.

To this end, the UNC is organizing the Ukrainian National Anny (UNA), whose purpose is to renew the armed struggle for Ukrainian statehood.

The UNA, in Ukrainian uniform, under the national flags sanctified by the battles of the past, under the command of its own Ukrainian officers, will stand under the ideological and political leadership of the UNC. Its ranks will be filled primarily by Ukrainians in the German Anny and in other military and police formations.

The building of a nation-state requires Ukrainians of sound body and mind who are deeply nationally and socially conscious. To further this goal, the UNC will ensure the protection of all Ukrainians in Germany, equalization of rights of Ukrainian workers with those of their counterparts of other nations, and primarily will ensure their widest possible religious, moral, cultural, and material welfare. The UNC will also ensure the release of all political prisoners.

Foreign and ancient borders separating the individual Ukrainian lands have generated differences in thought and deed. These must disappear in a unified march to a common goal. The UNC wishes to speed up this process of unification of the Ukrainian populace, not only through a wide-ranging educational policy but also by a united Ukrainian approach to all matters. The UNC will co-operate with National Committees of other nations enslaved by Muscovite Bolshevism who are fighting, as are the Ukrainian people, for Independence and Freedom.

The UNC will staunchly strive to perform the duties placed upon it by Ukrainian citizens, and it will perform them with confidence, providing that every consciously Ukrainian individual concentrates all of his efforts on the Common Struggle for a Common Victory.

Major-General of the General Staff Pavlo Shandruk, Head, Ukrainian National Committee

Professor Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Oleksander Semenenko, Vice-Presidents, Ukrainian National Committee

Petro Tereshchenko, Acting General Secretary, Ukrainian National Committee

Sources: Ukrainskyi shliakh (Ukrainian Pathway) (Vienna), 30 March 1945; reprinted in Volf-Ditrikh Haike (Wolf-Dietrich Heike), Ukrainska dyviziia "Halychyna": istoriia formuvannia i boiovykh dii u 1943-45 rokakh (The Ukrainian Division "Galicia": A History of Its Formation and Military Actions in 1943-45) (Toronto, 1970),236-7. Translated by Andrij Wynnyckyj.

13. U.S. Army Guidelines on the Repatriation of Soviet Citizens
4 JANUARY 1946

RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER 1

AG 383.7 GEC-AGEd

(Main) APO 757
4 January 1946

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Soviet Citizens Subject to Repatriation Under the Yalta Agreement

TO: Commanding Generals:
Third U.S. Army Area
Seventh U.S. Army Area
Berlin District

It is the policy of the Government of the United States, pursuant to the agreement with the Soviet Union at Yalta, 2 to facilitate the early repatriation of Soviet citizens remaining in the U.S. Zone Germany, 3 to the Soviet Union. In the execution of this policy you will be guided by the instructions which follow:

1. Persons who were both citizens of and actually present within the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939 and who fall into the following categories will be repatriated without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary:

a) Those captured in German uniforms.

b) Those who were members of the Soviet Armed Forces on and after 22 June 1941 and who were not subsequently discharged therefrom.

c) Those charged by the Soviet Union with having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy, provided the Soviet Union satisfied the U.S. Military authorities of the substantiality of the charge by supplying in each case, with reasonable particularity, the time, place, and nature of the offenses and the perpetrator thereof. A person's announced resistance to this repatriation or acceptance of ordinary employment in German industry or agriculture shall not of itself be construed as constituting rendition of aid and comfort to the enemy.

2. Every effort should be made to facilitate repatriation of persons who were both citizens and actually present within the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939, but who do not fall into any of the classes defined in Par 1. In the case of such persons, however, you are not authorized to compel involuntary repatriation. With respect to these persons you will:

a) Permit Soviet authorities, on their own request and responsibility, free access to these persons for the purpose of persuading them to return voluntarily and assisting them to do so.

b) Take such practical steps as you may deem appropriate to minimize the development of organized resistance to repatriation, such as the segregation of known leaders of resistance groups, the separation of existing groups into smaller groups, and such other practical measures you may deem appropriate to prevent continuance or recurrence of organized resistance.

c) Continue vigorous efforts to prevent the dissemination of propaganda of any kind designed to influence these persons against repatriation.

3. You are authorized to permit in your discretion Soviet authorities to have access to persons not specified in Pars. 1 and 2 who are claimed to be Soviet citizens by the Soviet Union, for the purpose of persuading them to return to their homes under practical arrangements which exclude the use of force, threat or coercion.

4. Efforts should be continued to facilitate the transfer to the Soviet Union of all persons who since 1 September 1939 have been given the right to become Soviet Nationals, who affirmatively make this choice, and who indicate that they desire the transfer.

5. The Soviet Authorities will furnish from time to time lists and addresses of Soviet Nationals who are charged with collaboration with the enemy and who are subject to the provisions of Par 1 (c) above and who are not subject to the provisions of Par 1 (a) or 1 (b). Upon receipt of these lists the District Commanders will take measures to collect the individuals listed therein and place them in camps, where they will be held pending screening and examination of charges against them. If addresses given are erroneous Military Authorities will not be required to conduct a search.

6. So much of letter this headquarters, file number AG 383.7 GEC-AGO, subject: "Release of Soviet Citizens subject to Repatriation Under the Yalta Agreement from Employment by Germans in the U.S. Zone", dated 17 November 1945, as provides that "no Soviet citizen subject to repatriation under the Yalta Agreement will be provided for after 1 December 1945 in any displaced persons camp except camps under Soviet administrations" is rescinded.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL McNARNEY:

x/ L.S. OSTRANDER
x/ L.S. OSTRANDER
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

1 Incl: List of names furnished by Russian Mission

DISTRIBUTION

1- Third U.S. Army Area
1- Seventh U.S. Army Area
1- Berlin District (Less incl)
5- O/Mil Gov (U.S. Zone) (Less incl)
1- AG Opns (Less incl)
1- AG Record (Less incl)

Reproduced by Hq, Third U.S. Army 19 January 1946

Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York. PAG-4/3.0. 11.0. 1.4:3, "Repatriations. "

Notes:

1 The U.S. Zone in Germany, as well as the Bremen enclave and the U.s. sector of Berlin, was under the command of the United States Forces European Theater (USFET), with headquarters at Frankfurt. The functions of military government, at first exercised by USFET, were later undertaken by the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), a separate organization with headquarters in Berlin. USFET retained jurisdiction only in matters relating to disarmament and demilitarization, security, displaced persons, and matters unrelated to civil control in Germany. OMGUS exercised a general surveillance over all German internal affairs, operating increasingly through approved German administrative agencies and personnel. (Ed.)

2 The meeting of the "Big Three" (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin) in Yalta in the Crimea was held 4-11 February 1945. Zones of occupation for Germany were agreed upon, the Soviet republics of Belorussia and Ukraine received separate membership in the United Nations, but disagreements over the future of Poland remained unresolved. The allies agreed that all non-German, United Nations nationals in wartime Germany, Austria, and elsewhere were to be repatriated immediately to their homelands.

At the war's end the Soviet authorities claimed that some 5.5 million Soviet citizens were residing in the former Reich. Included in this figure were about one million Soviet prisoners of war and about two million forced labourers. According to the Yalta agreement, Soviet citizens were to be gathered together, housed separately, subjected to Soviet law, and handed over to Soviet officials. Being unclear about the exact meaning of "Soviet citizenship," the Western Allies indiscriminately transferred a total of 2,272,000 people to Soviet authorities by September 1945. Many of these were forcibly repatriated and were not, in fact, Soviet citizens when the war broke out in 1939 but of Polish, Czechoslovak, and other citizenship.

By the end of December 1945 and the beginning of 1946, the Western Allies, especially the Americans, changed their approach and declared that forcible repatriation would be limited to specific categories and would be carried out under the conditions outlined in document 13. It is estimated that out of the 5.5 million, about 500,000 former Soviet citizens remained in the West. (Ed.)

3 At the time of the German defeat, the major Allied powers agreed that Germany and Austria should be completely occupied and that German political, economic, and cultural life should be controlled until the Allied objectives for Germany had been achieved.

The unconditional surrender of the German High Command on 7 and 8 May 1945 was followed on 5 June by the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the governments of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and France. Exclusive of the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line, Germany was divided into four zones to be administered separately by the four powers. The Soviet Union controlled the northeastern provinces between the Oder-Neisse and Elbe rivers, Britain the northwest, and the U.S. the southern areas. France received control of two Rhineland states in the American sector. The commanders of the four sectors formed the Allied Control Council which, by unanimous decision, ruled Germany during the first months of occupation. However, by the end of 1945 the Allied Control Council lost power, and American, French, British, and Soviet commanders assumed supreme authority in their zones. "Greater Berlin" was occupied jointly, with each power occupying a sector of the city. (Ed.)

14. U.S. Army Procedures for the Forcible Repatriation of Soviet Nationals
22 JANUARY 1946

RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

AG 383.6 GNMCY

APO 403
22 January 1946

SUBJECT: Procedure for Repatriation of Russian [Soviet] Nationals

TO: See Distribution

In order to prevent suicides or disturbances among Prisoner of War Russian Nationals who are being forcibly repatriated to Russia the following added precautions will be taken:

1. Precaution prior to shipment date

a) As little publicity as possible will be given to their forced repatriation.

b) Russian Nationals will not be shipped until they have been cleared by both the Russian Liaison Officer and an American Screening Team, under provision of Letter, Headquarters, United States Forces European Theater, dated 4 January 1946, AG 383.7, Subject: "Repatriation of Soviet Citizens subject to Repatriation Under the Yalta Agreement".

c) Guards will be thoroughly oriented that these prisoners are desperate characters.

d) Every effort will be exerted to insure that adequate anti-suicide and escape measures are taken.

e) Russian Nationals will be segregated in groups of 10 or less for ease of handling.

f) A showdown inspection will be held in which all possible weapons, knives, razors, glass, etc., are confiscated. If practicable window glass should be removed from windows or screened in to prevent its use as a weapon.

14. Forcible Repatriation of Soviet Nationals, 1946 207

2. Preparation of train

If rail movement is to be made, train should be prepared as follows:

a) A partition across each end of the car to separate guards from prisoners and make escape of prisoners impossible (see sketch attached).

b) A field telephone system from car to car should be installed. This should be connected to the engine and to the guard reserve car.

c) The minimum train guard requirements should be as follows: 3 officers, so that one officer is on duty at all times. 4 EM (Enlisted Men) in each box car (2 on duty at all times). Reserve equal to 2% of the number of Prisoners of War shipped.

d) Train guard should be equipped with normal weapons except as follows: (1) Rifles or carbines will be substituted for pistols for all EM. (2) At least 25% of weapons will be automatic type, that is, Browning Automatic Rifles or sub-machine guns.

e) Train guard will be thoroughly oriented.

3. Loading of prisoners of war

a) Prisoners will be loaded as quietly as possible. Not more than one hour advance notice should be given prisoners and they will not be told where they are to go. After being alerted for shipment they must be watched constantly.

b) Prisoners must be loaded by American personnel only. Polish Guards may assist in perimeter defense only.

c) Russian Liaison Officer and sufficient interpreters must be present.

d) Fire trucks, Medical Officer and assistants must stand by.

e) Guards should operate as platoons under their normal leaders. It is desirable to have 2/3 of this group armed with night sticks and 1/3 with automatic weapons. A numerical superiority of three to one in the particular sub-group being loaded is necessary. An adequate reserve armed with gas masks, tear gas and smoke must be available. Plans to use tear gas in an emergency should be formulated.

f) The loading operation will be under the command and personal supervision of a competent officer of Field Grade.

4. Precaution during the rail shipment

a) Destination will be notified of nature and expected time of arrival of the shipment in sufficient time to allow reception arrangements at destination.

b) Adequate guard will be posted at all times to prevent suicide and escape.

c) Officer in charge will control the movement from the engine cab. Train will not be halted at places favorable for Prisoners of War to escape.

d) Reserve will be alerted and dismounted at all halts and be prepared to act in case of emergency.

e) Latrine facilities inside the car will be provided. Except in trips of more than 72 hours Prisoners of War will not be unloaded.

f) Every precaution against suicide enroute will be taken.

g) Under no circumstances will Prisoners of War be unloaded at night.

h) Train guard is responsible for Prisoners of War until they are turned over and receipted for by Russian authority or the Prisoners of War have been turned over and receipted for at point of detraining by an adequate United States troop unit which assumes responsibility for turnover to Russian authority.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYES:

s/R.A. KNECHT
t/R.A. KNECHT
1st Lt AGD
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl: Diagram of Railroad Car

DISTRIBUTION

"A" plus
20 copies to 1st Inf. Div.
20 copies to 3rd Inf. Div.
20 copies to 9th Inf. Div.

[i]Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York. PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:3, "Repatriations."

Note:

1 Russian Liaison Officers were Soviet officials in the Main Administration for the Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, established in October 1944, and better known as the Soviet Repatriation Commission. Although headed by General Golikov, the commission was actually under the authority of the secret police - the NKGB (the People's Commissariat for State Security) within the USSR and Soviet-occupied territory, and SMERSH ("Death to Spies") abroad. The commission, based primarily in the West, received its directions and some of its staff from SMERSH's Main Administration of Counterintelligence (GUKR). (Ed.)

15. Why the Displaced Persons Refuse To Go Home
MAY 1946

REPORT OF THE REPATRIATION POLL OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN UNRRA ASSEMBLY CENTERS IN GERMANY FOR THE PERIOD 1-14 MAY 1946: ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE VOTES

GERMANY
MAY 1946

Attachment 8

The following analysis of reasons why approximately 82% of the displaced persons voted not to return home is based solely on their own statements and on summary analyses prepared by the town directors, who, through daily contact with the DPs are best fitted to analyse their present position with regard to repatriation. 1 Observations contained herein should in no way be construed as representing the views of the UNRRA staff in Germany. They are the views of the private individuals in the centers, and are included for the purpose of presenting a comprehensive picture of the group motives, personal motives and repatriation desires of the displaced persons.

Due to the tremendous number of ballots received and the variety of replies in a multitude of languages, it has been impossible to make an accurate numerical calculation of the different reasons. The percentages quoted in this report are therefore based on the most reliable estimates available.

It is interesting to note that nationals of so-called Western countries give both personal and economic reasons for not going home now, while the Eastern Europeans generally fall back on political factors as their primary explanation. The Eastern Europeans seem to show a real fear in their replies, the fear increasing the further east the home of the voter. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that, among many of these people, the political explanation serves merely as a convenient justification and cover for underlying motives which are essentially personal and economic. Camp directors throughout Germany point to a general impression of demoralization and inertia among the Poles particularly, a reluctance to leave a comparatively secure and comfortable existence for a life of toil and hardship in their war-tom country.

Annex "A" contains some typical replies from the principal nationalities.

Germany
May 1946

Attachment 8

ESTONIANS, LATVIANS, AND LITHUANIANS2

The displaced persons from the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania submitted an almost unanimous vote against repatriation. They can be considered as a single group, since their backgrounds are similar and all of their replies express the same unwavering determination not to return to their homelands as long as they are occupied by the Russians.

The principal groups among the BaIts come from the so-called "middle" and "upper-middle" classes. Many are well educated and enjoyed the prosperous, independent life of the average intellectual, professional or businessman before the war. Others were independent farmers, small artisans or craftsmen. They started coming into Germany in large numbers in 1941-42, when the Germans first occupied the Baltic lands. It is difficult to determine how many of them came voluntarily, seeking better jobs, and how many were actually deported to Germany. It is significant, however, that very few of this group were persecuted by the Nazis, and that practically none of them have returned home. The bulk of the "displaced" Balts, however, appear definitely to have entered Germany in late 1944, fleeing, not from the enemy, but from the Russians.

Their primary objection to repatriation is based on political reasons. Approximately 90-95% of them express an outspoken antagonism toward "Communism as a way of life" and especially toward "the Russian occupation of their countries." (It is interesting to note that some of the answers were anti-communistic as opposed to anti-Russian, but the majority made no distinction between the two.) Most of their reasons are not a mere parrot-like repetition of political propaganda which characterizes the Polish vote, but arguments apparently based on personal experience during the Russian occupation of 1940/1 when relatives and friends were "transported to Siberia in sealed cars without food or water, never to be heard of again." They express the fear that the same may happen to them if they return. Some refer to the time the Communist party was voted into power in a "free election," held after all the parties but one were dissolved, in which everyone was forced to vote.

The actual replies on the ballots vary from a guarded "our country is occupied" to ferocious denunciations of "Russian dictatorship." Such words as "sadism," "reign of terror," "bestial," "murderous" etc. appear frequently in the descriptions of Communism. A few quoted Molotov's statement made in 1940 to the effect that the Baltic nations must be destroyed. About 30-40% of the Baltic DPs state that they have lost relatives or friends, either killed or deported by the Russians. There is no way of telling whether or not this figure is accurate, but their reasons for not desiring repatriation seem to be motivated by a real fear of personal persecution, deportation or even death at the hands of the Russian secret police.

Closely linked with the political reasons for not desiring repatriation are the economic ones. These were mentioned by approximately 60% of the BaIts, usually as a secondary factor, in connection with the communistic regime. Only about 10% based their primary reason for not returning on economic factors. A large number of these DPs were accustomed to a fairly high standard of living before the war. "The confiscation of all private property" has reduced many formerly well-to-do Balts to a position where they could not hope to return to their previous way of life. A number of the Baltic farmers, particularly Lithuanians, claim to have had their land taken away from them during the Russian occupation and were forced to join "Kolchozes" [kolkhozy] or farming communities. They now refuse to return. The uncertainty of being able to buy food at normal prices, the shortage of houses, the prospect of unemployment and the unfavorable currency exchange, all vital problems to the Poles, seem to be relatively insignificant factors contributing to the anti-repatriation desires of the BaIts, who for the most part have not considered repatriation seriously enough to think about these problems.

In addition to the fear of economic persecution, the fear of religious persecution is also mentioned as a secondary reason for not wanting to go home. Some mention the days in 1940/1 when they "weren't allowed to go to church"; some fear reprisals for their former membership in religious organizations, while others merely state that "in my country today religion is suppressed and the institution of marriage does not exist."

The majority of the BaIts sincerely want to return, provided they can return to a "free, democratic country." Some of them are optimistic enough to state that they "expect" to go home as soon as a democratic government is established. A group of Latvians and Lithuanians in one camp have reluctantly accepted the present situation in their former countries as final and are hoping to immigrate to either the U.S., Canada or Africa. However, the majority of Balts seem to be waiting in Germany for the "occupation" of their countries to end, for there is very little mention of resettlement as a solution to the Baltic "hard-core" problem.3

POLES

With very few exceptions, the Poles in the U. S. and British Zones gave political reasons for their negative votes in the repatriation poll. The three basic complaints, repeated again and again, were the "presence of Russians in Poland," "the Communistic Warsaw government," and "the lack of personal freedom in Poland." Although most of the Poles claimed the same reasons for not wanting to go home, it is clear from the comments on their ballots that they did not all have the same motivation for their answers. In general, the Poles who quoted political reasons can be broken down into three groups.

The first and smallest of these groups is made up of those so-called leaders and intellectuals who have an ideological conception of Poland as a "free democracy" and refuse to return under present conditions. They claim to abhor the thought of "Communism" in Poland, the "Russian-dominated Warsaw government," the "occupation by Russian troops," the alleged repression of democratic freedom, and feel that they can do more for their fatherland by not returning now. A few described the conditions under which they would return: "When the Atlantic Charter is applied;5 "When the Russians leave;" "When General Anders returns;"6 "When Democracy has been established as in England." Some feel that since they have not returned home before now, they will be suspected and possibly persecuted regardless of their innocence of collaboration. This first group is the only one which mentions terroristic treatment by Russians and fear of reprisals should they return. On the whole the fear of persecution does not play the same important role in the Polish answers as it does in those of the Balts, the Russians and the Polish-Ukrainians.

The second group consists of people who have private political reasons for fearing repatriation. The largest number in this group are those whose homes were located east of the Curzon line in that part of Poland which has been annexed to Russia. 7 The loss of their homes to Russia makes them feel an even stronger nationalistic tie with Poland, so that they invariably refuse to return to their homes and become Soviet citizens. If any of them would agree to go back to Poland they would probably be sent to the newly annexed western provinces which are now being settled by the Poles.8 This cannot properly be called repatriation, but rather "pioneering" in an unfamiliar land, far from friends and relatives. Most of the DPs now being maintained in camps in Germany seem to lack a pioneering spirit to set forth and build a new home and a new life in an area where conditions are reported to be difficult.

The third and by far the largest group of the so-called political refugees (estimated roughly at about 60% of the total negative vote), are those who cannot definitely make up their minds to return. It must be remembered that the majority of these people have had little or no education to speak of, have not suffered political persecution which would shape their ideology, and are incapable of forming mature political opinions for themselves. They are subject to outside influences and as a result, their minds change almost every day, reflecting current slogans circulating in the camps. It is among this group that you find the stereotyped answers, such as "Poland is not free," "the Russians are occupying Poland," and "Poland is Communistic," indicating that the voters have been propagandized, either in the past, or that there was a planned campaign on the part of their leaders to furnish the DPs with the same answers for the poll. The vote of this group should not be taken as a final indication of their desires. Most of them are agricultural workers, small independent farmers and factory hands who have a strong patriotic feeling for Poland, regardless of her political complexion. The team directors who commented on this group felt that most of them would eventually return to Poland if given a little more encouragement and if removed from the political influences hindering their repatriation.

The influences which are affecting the majority of those potentially repatriable Poles seem to be similar in all of the camps, and are centered around the camp leaders, who were elected by a free vote, the members of the Polish guard units and the Catholic c1ergy.9 These political and c1ericalleaders have been successful in persuading a large number of Poles that it is against their interests to return home until their country is "freed from the Russians." The Polish-Ukrainians who are unanimously opposed to repatriation have also had an effect on the other Poles, as well as the demoralized group who have lost all ambition and are content to stay in the camps, leading a comparatively comfortable life, until forced to make a decision. Three other factors which have recently had an unfavorable effect on the Poles' desire to be repatriated are Hoover's speech describing starvation in Poland, Churchill's "iron curtain" speech and the dissension at the foreign ministers' conference at Paris. 10

Over half of the Poles quoted economic factors as a secondary reason for not wanting to go home. These factors are probably more basic than the political ones in determining repatriation desires of the Polish DPs. The Poles in Germany are not entirely cut off from their homeland. They maintain contact through newspapers, letters, radio broadcasts and friends who have returned to Germany after having been repatriated. From these sources they receive a description of destruction in the towns and cities, shortages of food, clothes and housing, unemployment and the general economic insecurity of life in present-day Poland.

These Poles who believe they have lost all of their former possessions naturally hesitate to return to their war-torn country where they fear they cannot earn a living. Their feeling of economic insecurity is expressed in the following typical comment by a Polish farmer:" At my house now, no horse, no cow, no pig - only a picture of Stalin on the wall." The desire to remain in their present condition of comparative security is quite natural on the part of these people, who were suddenly taken from a state of slavery and placed into an artificial society where they are cared for without having to work. Many of them who could not maintain the same standards of living at home will continue to live in the assembly centers as long as they exist.

Many of the Poles have not been content to live idly, however, but have found some measure of real economic security in the form of employment. This is particularly true in the French Zone where a large number of DPs live and work in the German communities. The fact that a large percentage of Polish DPs are employed in the local economy in the French Zone is reflected in the ballot, for only 64% gave political reasons, the rest economic or personal reasons for wanting to stay in Germany.

Very few of the Poles gave only personal reasons for not wanting to go home. Among those who did are the people who have lost their homes, their families and their friends as a result of the war and have nothing to which to return. They don't appear to have the courage to face the future alone in a destroyed country, and many of them want to start life anew in a western land, preferably the U.S. or Canada. They are waiting hopefully for a declaration of emigration opportunities by the governments of these countries. Another group of DPs have family ties which are holding them here. They are engaged or married to Germans, to DPs of another nationality or to members of the Polish Guard Units stationed in Germany and are unwilling to break up their families to return home. Others can't be repatriated now for health reasons. Either they are old or sick or are staying with sick relatives, until they can be moved. Some mothers don't want to expose their infants and small children to the uncertain conditions in Poland, but prefer to remain in Germany until after the harvest. Others will return when their personal affairs are settled. Included in this group are those awaiting news from home or abroad before they set out to join relatives, and some who are still trying to locate lost members of their families who were deported to Germany during the war.

A very small number of Poles, chiefly the elderly people from the eastern provinces, gave fear of religious persecution as their main reason for not going home. This factor was mentioned, however, on a number of ballots in connection with political reasons.

POLISH -UKRAINIANS

Despite repeated instructions from UNRRA directors, this group insists on describing itself as "Polish-Ukrainian" or "Ukrainian Stateless". 11 The constant dissemination of nationalistic propaganda has completely alienated them from the idea of adherence to either Poland or Russia, and thereby has eliminated all chance for a voluntary repatriation of Ukrainian peoples. Like the Poles, they give mainly political reasons for not wanting to return home but they are generally more violent in their attacks on Russia, and express fear of forced labor conditions, even "deportation to Siberia," should they dare to return. Some give supposed first hand accounts of previous persecution, such as "I don't wish to be repatriated to the Ukraine because my father was killed by the communists for his political and religious ideas and I was sent to Siberia, and had to stay for five years in a concentration camp." About 10% of the Ukrainians included in their reasons descriptions of the absence of political, cultural, religious and personal freedom at home, while others compared "Bolshevik totalitarianism" with Nazism.

They claim that their country is occupied and since they do not wish to become citizens of the USSR, they have in effect no fatherland to which to return. Some stated that they want a free, autonomous Ukrainian state, even within the boundaries of the new Poland. An important factor in this separatist movement has been the activity of the Greek-Orthodox clergy, who constantly use their strong influence against repatriation. As a logical consequence of this clerical influence, and the fact that Ukrainians are predominantly orthodox [sic], they seem to be much more concerned over the lack of religious freedom than do the Poles.

A few of the Ukrainian DPs lost large land holdings in the collectivization of estates by the Soviet government, so that they have a bitter personal enmity toward the new economic system. Others merely stated their dislike for a system where there is no private property.

RUSSIANS [SOVIET CITIZENS]

The few Russians who are still left in Germany belong in three distinct categories, two of them comprising political refugees who refuse to return to Soviet Russia. The first group represents those Russians and Russian-Ukrainians who came to Germany during the war as volunteers, deserters, forced laborers or POWs. They express a hatred for Communism and the "dictatorship" in Russia and would rather stay in Germany for the time being. Eventually they hope to emigrate to one of the western countries, when opportunities are available.

The second group is composed of White Russians and other Russian emigrants from 1919-20, displaced persons left over from the last war, who never adopted a new citizenship. A few of them hold Nansen passports, while others claim that theirs were lost or taken away by the German authorities. 12 Their return to Russia is out of the question, as the majority of the older men were active counter-revolutionists, and fear reprisal by the Communists, and the younger ones, the children who were born abroad, have never lived in Russia and have no desire to go to the country from which their parents are exiles.

The third group all gave personal reasons for not going home, such as illness or marriage to Germans, Poles or other DPs.

YUGOSLAVS

The Yugoslavs in UNRRA camps are mostly Royalists and therefore opposed to repatriation for political reasons. 13 Like the Balts and Poles, they claim a passionate love for democracy (which they interpret to be a restoration of the monarchy). On the other hand they represent a different problem from the Poles and Balts who are afraid to go home, since the Yugoslavs are for the most part ex-POWs who still consider themselves as part of King Peter's army. They do not accept their present status as a lasting one but are hoping for the chance to go home and fight Tito. In one center in the U.S. Zone, for instance, the Yugoslav leader began the poll with a spirited declaration that he and his men were soldiers, wished to be soldiers and had no plan to go anywhere, or do anything else. He then suggested that UNRRA send them all home to fight the Tito government.

The following explanation from one of the ballots is typical of the general feeling of the Yugoslav DPs. "We were determined to fight against Hitler's Germany for high principles of democracy and freedom. Now the war is over; instead of democracy and freedom we have a dictatorship in Yugoslavia. We expect nobody's charity or any reward. What we expect and claim is the most elementary right to choose our own form of government. This was proclaimed in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter."

JEWS14

The Jews in UNRRA centers in Germany expressed a unanimous desire to immigrate, the majority of them either to Palestine or to the U.S. By far the largest number of Polish and Ukrainian Jews express a desire to go to Palestine. This desire can easily be understood in the light of strong nationalistic feelings among the eastern Jewry already prevailing before the war, coupled with the racial persecution at the hands of the Nazis, not to mention some of their own countrymen during the war. Tragic personal histories on the ballots present vividly the reasons for not returning. It is now impossible for the Jews from Eastern Europe to return to their large Jewish communities for so many of them have been wiped out, and tales of continued anti-semitism drift in daily with new refugees coming out of Poland, seeking refuge in UNRRA centers in Germany. Although many would perhaps prefer to go to some western country, the emigration quotas to these lands will be so low as to allow only a trickle of immigrants to enter. Palestine appears to be the only solution to their problem. Hundreds of ballots showed just one word as an explanation for not returning home: "Palestine."

The German Jews are also anxious to emigrate, most of them to Palestine but a large number have relatives abroad whom they wish to join in such countries as the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, France, Sweden or South America. Like the Polish and other Eastern European Jews these people feel that they can't settle down again in the country which is a constant reminder of their personal tragedies. Some even stated that they feared history would repeat itself in Europe and that they or their children might have to go through the same sort of persecution should they remain in Germany now.

CZECHS

Although there are only about 2,000 Czechs still in Germany, a large percentage of them are staying for the same political reasons as the Poles, namely fear of Communism and the repression of personal freedom. Some fear a war in the near future and state that Czechoslovakia is too close to Russia for any measure of comfort, should a war break out.

In some cases their homes were in that part of Slovakia annexed to Russia, and they are afraid or unwilling to become Soviet citizens. 15

On the whole the Czechs are not as violent as the Poles in their criticism of their home government, or in their refusal to return home. It is interesting to note that about 25% of them are holding up their decision pending the outcome of the Czech national vote, whereas a much smaller percentage are looking forward to emigration.

The reasons why the remaining Czechs don't want to return are personal. Some are sick, or are staying with sick relatives, some are married to Polish DPs while others are still searching for lost relatives in Germany. In addition, there is a small number who are employed by UNRRA, or the Military and have the permission of their national liaison officers to remain temporarily in the DP centers.

WESTERN EUROPEANS, BRITISH, U.S., AND SMALLER GROUPS

The small number of these nationals are staying in Germany solely for personal or economic reasons. Either they are married to Germans or other DPs whom they are not yet allowed to take home with them, or else they wish to settle in Germany where they have economic interests. The last reason is particularly true in the French Zone where many of the DPs are living privately and can carry on a fairly normal life in the German community. A few individuals are probably collaborators who are trying to hide in Germany, while others have lived in Germany for some time before the war, and do not wish to move. As in the case of the Czechs, many of the Western Europeans are working for UNRRA or the military authorities with the permission of their national liaison officers. These jobs offer more security than they could find at home. Several Frenchmen, Italians and Dutchmen say that they fear to return to the present unstable economic conditions in their countries. They know of the shortages of food, clothing and employment possibilities and prefer to stay in Germany under comparatively favorable conditions until the situation in their homelands improves. In the British Zone there are small numbers of Dutch bargees [bargemen] who will return as soon as the canals and waterways are opened.

Some so-called Armenians (including some "Turks" and "Iranians") fear religious persecution in their homelands.

Germany
May 1946

Attachment 8

Annex A

TYPICAL NEGATIVE REPLIES ON THE BALLOTS OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONALITY GROUPS

1. ESTONIANS, LATVIANS, LITHUANIANS 1. "Under the present circumstances I do not want to return, for I know well enough who is ruling behind the 'iron curtain' and what kind of life the people lead in this 'most liberal country'."

2. "I am not a Communist."

3. "I have already been a political deportee to Siberia for four years."

4. "I am a mother and I want to raise my child myself."

5. "My country has ceased to exist."

6. "In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania there is no democratic government."

7. "I cannot return. My brother, sister, father and mother were deported to Siberia because they did not go to the poll to vote for the Communists."

8. "Russia."

9. "I have never been a Russian citizen and I am not interested to serve in the Russian army. Further I don't recognize the one-party system."

10. "Stalin."

11. "In all countries occupied by the USSR people are physically and morally suppressed."

12. "My country is occupied by the Bolsheviks."

13. "In 1940 my father was arrested and killed because he was a Russian officer under the Czars. My mother was sent to Russia, then I escaped."

II. POLES

1. "Poland is not free."

2. "The Russians are dominating the Polish Government."

3. "Quoting Mr. Churchill's speech: an 'iron curtain' is hanging from Stettin to Trieste. Behind it an ignorant slave state is hidden from the eyes of us all, etc." - "I am a Democrat, not a Communist."

4. "Communist dictatorship. No freedom of personal opinion. Russians annihilate everything that is not Russian and communistic."

5. "Stalin annihilates people as well as Hitler."

6. "I don't trust Stalin and his government in Poland."

7. "Uncertain situation in Poland. The presence of the Soviet Army is dangerous to the freedom of my country."

8. "I don't agree with the policy of the Government and the persecution of the church and the lack of private property and freedom."

9. "I am afraid of Stalin, I am afraid of Siberia. Poland is not free."

10. "After the election of a democratic government, I shall return home."

11. "The Russians occupy that part of Poland where I lived. My home and family are gone."

12. "I can't find my family."

13. "1 am ill and tired after the hard work in Germany."

14. "If I go back I am sure they will kill me or send me to Siberia."

15. "They sent part of my family to Siberia and confiscated our farm."

16. "I have been persecuted by the Communists and condemned for exile to Siberia. I don't want to try to live under the Communists again."

17. "My husband is not going back home and so I don't want to go."

18. "When I get a letter from my family saying that they are alive, then I shall return home."

19. "Because there is starvation in my country."

20. "My family is in America. I shall wait until I can also go there."

III. POLISH-UKRAINIANS

1. "I don't want to live under dictatorship and terror."

2. "I am against violations and terror in the USSR. I am against men who persecute religion, who turn peasants into slaves. I am against the one-party system."

3. "Two of my brothers were killed. My parents died in jail after being there a long time. My brother was sentenced to forced labor."

4. "My homeland is at present occupied by Soviet Russia, which follows the policy of general terror against those who are opposed to the communistic system. They persecute religion (Greek-Orthodox); bishops and priests are sent to Siberia. Catholic churches are closed. Because of these reasons I will not return."

5. "I don't agree with the totalitarian system in the USSR. Galicia belongs now to the USSR. I never was, neither am, nor wish to be a citizen of the USSR. Persecution of the Greek-Orthodox Church."

IV. RUSSIANS [SOVIET CITIZENS]

1. "I don't agree with Stalin-terror and oppression of people. The system has nothing to do with democracy."

2. "I have been persecuted by the NKVD since 1929. Most of the time I have been obliged to live under a false name."

3. "Democracy in the Soviet Union exists only on paper. There is only freedom to vote for the candidates of the Communistic Party and for its resolutions."

4. "The Soviet regime is not a Russian government. The main idea of the Soviet government is a world revolution."

5. "Communism is even worse than Nazism."

6. "In the Soviet Union there is no free work nor any private property. There is only forced, slave-like labor in the ko1choz [sic] (Government farms) and in the factories or businesses, all run by the Government."

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Part 4 of 5

V. JEWS

1. "Palestine is my Fatherland."

2. "Poland is covered with Jewish blood; even now the Poles are persecuting Jews. We can visit the cemeteries, but we cannot live there. Therefore I want to immigrate to the U.S. to join my relatives in the best democracy in the world."

3. "I have nobody left at home."

4. "My husband was murdered by the Germans. I spent three years in the KZ (concentration camp). My relatives are in foreign countries. They will take care of me."

5. "All my relatives were killed in Auschwitz. I can't live among the murderers of my parents."

6. "Because of anti-Semitism in Poland, and I have no family left there."

7. "Because Poles and Ukrainians are killing Jews."

8. "I am the only survivor of a family of eight. I have no relatives in Europe. I am miserable and want to join relatives in America. I have an affidavit."

VI. WESTERN EUROPEANS AND SMALLER GROUPS

1. "At present there is no job, life is too expensive in France and as I am alone, I have nothing to look forward to at home."

2. "I will not be sent back because I have no job and no home." (Dutch)

3. "I don't want to go back to Greece, because I have no job and there is a food shortage."

4. "I am married to a Pole, but the Dutch Government won't allow her to come home with me. I shall wait in Germany."

Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York. PAG-4I3.0.11.0.1.4:2, "Council Resolution 92 etc."

Notes:

1 After following a policy of encouraging outright repatriation of "former Soviet nationals" and others whose homelands came under Soviet control after 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) found that about one million displaced persons (DPs) under its care refused to be repatriated. Approximately fifty-two nationalities were among these DPs, and they were dispersed among 920 camps in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Not fully understanding their reluctance, UNRRA officials in the U. S. Zone of Occupied Germany decided to conduct a secret poll among the DPs, during 1-14 May 1946. Each DP was handed a sheet and asked to answer the following questions: (1) what nationality do you claim?; (2) do you wish to be repatriated now? (yes/no); (3) if your answer to 2 is "no," explain your reasons in the space below.

No exact figures on the total number of respondents were given by UNRRA, but the poll gave UNRRA and the U.S. military authorities their first comprehensive understanding of the difficulties involved in repatriation. Although some facts and analyses in the report are inaccurate and misleading, the document does shed light on why DPs did not want to return home after the war. (Ed.)

2 Granted sovereignty in 1919, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were included in a plan secretly arranged by Nazi Germany and the USSR for dividing these states into spheres of influence. In the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia were ceded to the Soviets. By the Nazi-Soviet friendship treaty, 28 September 1939, Lithuania was similarly brought under Soviet domination. Profiting from the German advance of May-June 1940 on the Western front, Soviet troops overran all the Baltic states, including the Lithuanian border strip reserved for Germany by the friendship treaty. On 15 June 1940 Soviet forces entered Lithuania, and two days later they were in Latvia and Estonia. In August 1940 the USSR officially incorporated these states into the USSR as the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth Soviet republics.

After the German invasion of the USSR, the three countries, together with part of Belorussia, constituted the Reichskommissariat Ostland, under the direction of Gauleiter Heinrich Lohse, and were deprived of their autonomy. With the end of the war, attempts to reconstitute independent governments failed and the Red Army restored the political situation of 1940. By 1946 there were an estimated 190,400 Balts under UNRRA care. (Ed.)

3 These were persons considered to be non-repatriable, either because they were unacceptable to their country of origin or were unwilling to be repatriated. (Ed.)

4 On 1 September 1939 Poland was invaded by Germany and on 17 September by the Soviet Union. Polish army units were soon forced to surrender to the Germans or the Red Army. According to the 28 September 1939 agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov, Poland was divided along the Narva-Bug-San rivers; that is, approximately along the Curzon Line (see note 7). In the German sphere, some territories were incorporated directly into the Reich, and the central part of the country was organized under the General Government of Occupied Poland.

On 7 May 1945, the day the Germans capitulated, Poland was split between a Polish government recognized by the Western Allies and a Polish Committee of National Liberation recognized by the USSR. A solution of sorts was worked out with the creation of the Provisional Government of National Unity in Moscow in June 1945. On 5 July 1945 the major Western powers withdrew recognition of the London-based Polish government-in-exile. (Ed.)

5 The Atlantic Charter was a statement of fundamental principles for the postwar world order, issued jointly by Roosevelt and Churchill after meetings during 9-12 August 1941 in Argentia Bay, Newfoundland. The main terms were: (1) a renunciation of territorial or other aggrandizement by the United Kingdom and the United States; (2) opposition to territorial changes contrary to the wishes of the people immediately concerned; (3) support for the right of peoples to choose their own form of government. On 15 September 1941 it was announced that fifteen nations fighting the Germans and Italians (including the USSR) had endorsed the Atlantic Charter. Stalin, however, added a proviso: "Considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries, the Soviet Government can state that a consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the government and peoples of the Soviet Union." (Ed.)

6 Wladyslaw Anders (1892-1970), a Polish Anny commander, was wounded and captured by the Soviets in September 1939 and released in July 1941. He then formed an army of 75,000 citizens of Poland (including non-Poles) who fought on the British side in the Near East and participated in the capture of Monte Cassino in May 1944 and of Bologna in April 1945. Anders was politically allied to the Polish government-in- exile based in London and headed by General Sikorski. (Ed.)

7 The Curzon Line refers to a proposal to settle the disputed frontier between Poland and Russia, put to the Poles by Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, on 10 July 1920, and then dealt with by Lord George N. Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary. The line or demarcation stretched from Grodno, through Brest-Litovsk and Przemysl, to the Carpathians; it would have excluded from Poland the lands inhabited predominantly by Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians. The Poles rejected the proposal and subsequently secured territory twice as large as that suggested by Lloyd George. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, the Curzon Line (with minor variations) became the boundary between the German and Soviet spheres of occupation. In 1945 it was accepted by the Polish Government as the frontier with the USSR. (Ed.)

8 At the Potsdam conference of 17 July-2 August 1945, the Allies agreed that Poland would occupy the German areas east of a line following the Oder and Neisse rivers, from the Baltic Sea to the Czechoslovak frontier. Former eastern territories of interwar Poland were taken by the USSR, and about 1.4 million Poles left this territory in 1946-7 to settle in regions taken from the Reich. (Ed.)

9 The term Polish guard units refers to displaced persons recruited to guard American supply depots and other installations. (Ed.)

10 On 9 February 1946 Stalin gave a speech in which he argued that, despite the end of hostilities, there was to be continued vigilance; there was to be no peace at home or abroad. Churchill delivered the Western reply at Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946. He argued for close co-operation among the world's English-speaking peoples, because "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent," allowing "police governments" to rule Eastern Europe. The month of March 1946 is seen by many historians as the beginning of the Cold War.

At the Paris conference of Allied foreign ministers in May 1946, the USSR accused the United Kingdom of imperialism for its suppression of the Greek rebellion and criticized the Netherlands for its repressive actions in Indonesia. The British foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, responded by accusing the Soviet Union of imperialism. These disputes prevented any agreement from being reached at the conference. (Ed.)

11 At the end of the war, approximately 2.5-3 million Ukrainians were in the Third Reich. Some were prisoners of war who had served in the Polish or Red Army; most had been forced labourers in Germany. A smaller number were political refugees and concentration camp survivors. An estimated two million Ukrainians found themselves in the occupied zones under Supreme Headquarters, Allied European Forces (SHAEF) in Austria, Germany, and Italy. After voluntary and forcible repatriation about 250,000 remained and they refused to be repatriated. About one-third were former citizens of the Soviet Union before 1939; the remaining two-thirds were from other countries, primarily from Poland.

Official UNRRA and other statistical information on the exact number of Ukrainians is, however, not entirely reliable for several reasons. The Allies used citizenship rather than ethnic origin to classify DPs, but because Ukrainian DPs came from the prewar territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union their citizenship varied accordingly. Also, the fear of repatriation was so great that many, especially those from Soviet Ukraine, did not reveal their true nationality. In time, a change in designation by officials was precipitated by the Polish government because it insisted that Ukrainians from Poland be separated from "true" Poles, arguing that Poland did not want Ukrainians back since their former lands had been ceded to the USSR. Furthermore, they were to be repatriated to the USSR. On 6 July 1946 Poland and the USSR concluded an agreement to exchange Ukrainians in Poland for Poles in the USSR. Moreover, UNRRA and other authorities were not consistent in their use of the term "Ukrainian." Officially, Ukrainians were not designated by UNRRA as a separate nationality until the summer of 1947; however, even before then, local UNRRA officials sometimes did allow refugees to designate themselves as Ukrainians. For these reasons, official UNRRA statistics underestimate the number of Ukrainians (100,000) and Soviet citizens (10,000) while overestimating the number of Poles (275,000). (Ed.)

12 In 1921 Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), Norwegian explorer and later politician, became the first head of the League of Nation's High Commission in Connection with the Problem of Russian Refugees in Europe. After World War I, an estimated 800,000 refugees from tsarist Russia were scattered throughout Europe; most refused to return to Bolshevik-controlled Russia. Mandated to deal with this major problem, Nansen called a conference in Geneva at which sixteen nations were represented. An agreement was reached to issue for Russian refugees a special travel document, to be known as the "Nansen certificate" or "Nansen passport." By 1928 fifty-one governments had agreed to issue and recognize this passport for refugees from Russia and elsewhere. The passport gave the holder League of Nations protection and guarantees that they would not be arbitrarily treated or forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union. (Ed.)

13 The Royalists were supporters of King Peter II, who ascended the Yugoslav throne in 1934. On 27 March 1941 he assumed full royal powers when a coup d'etat in Belgrade overthrew the regency, but he had to flee on 6 April when the Germans attacked Yugoslavia. He established a government-in-exile in London that supported the Serbian officer, Dragoljub (Draza) Mihailovic and his Chetniks. King Peter made an accommodation with the Communist partisans led by Josip Broz (Tito) in August 1944 but was deposed in November 1945.

In 1946 there were about 150,000 Yugoslav refugees, most of whom were dispersed in UNRRA and military camps throughout Italy. Among them were monarchists, Serbian Chetniks, Croatian nationalists (Ustashi), and former partisans united in their opposition to Tito's regime. The Yugoslav government was particularly adamant in demanding their forcible repatriation. (Ed.)

14 In December 1945 UNRRA listed only 18,361 Jews as receiving assistance in various zones in Germany. By June 1946 the number had reached 97,333, and in June 1946, 167,531. The combined total of Jews under UNRRA care in Italy, Germany, and Austria was close to 250,000 in June 1947. (Ed.)

15 Some of these Czechoslovak citizens were no doubt Ukrainians (Lemkos) from the eastern provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia), ceded to the USSR after the war. It was an area of about 8,800 square kilometres with a population of approximately 850,000. Not wishing to take part in the "voluntary" transfer to the USSR, these Ukrainians fled primarily to the U.S. Zone. (Ed.)

***

16. Report on the Screening of UkrainianDisplaced Persons

22 AUGUST 1946

UNRRA LIAISON OFFICE
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, AUGSBURG

Military - 7484 Augsburg

22 August 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Screening of Ukrainian Displaced Persons

TO: General Brown, Deputy Director, German Operations; UNRRA Central Headquarters, Arolsen

Attention: Mr. Edward Reich, Operations

1. In reply to your telephone conversation of several days ago, I wish to make the following report about the screening progress of Ukrainian Displaced Persons in the American Zone.

2. The latest weekly report of screening in 9th Division area, which includes Districts I, 2 and 5, shows more than 88,000 persons screened. It is impossible to obtain an accurate breakdown of the number of Ukrainians in this group because of the uneven method of reporting by screening teams and the general confusion that still exists on the lower military echelons about the classification of Ukrainians by citizenship and nationality. However, I can make a report of the general situation with regard to Ukrainians.

3. Several camps have been screened that contain large Ukrainian groups and a few all-Ukrainian camps have been screened. For example, Cornberg, Team 518, an all-Ukrainian camp with a population of about 2,500, was screened a few weeks ago with no special events. There were evictions but the number was small. The Ukrainians were about evenly classified as Polish and Russian although certainly this figure cannot be judged as particularly accurate. Hindenburg Kaserne, Team 114, had about 700 Ukrainians screened; Kapellenschule, Team 114, had about 160 Ukrainians screened; Muhldorf, Team 154, had about 230 persons classified as Russians, mostly all of whom are Ukrainians; Dillingen, Team 308, had 200 Polish Ukrainians screened; and smaller groups of Ukrainians have been screened in many other camps. Other large Ukrainian camps, like Team 612 in Aschaffenburg, with a population of over 2,000, and Team 517 in Kastel, with over 2,000 Ukrainians, have not yet been screened. In all of these camps reported as being screened there has been only one incident of irregularity reported.

4. This incident occurred in Hindenburg Kaserne where about 230 persons were evicted because they were "Soviet citizens." These persons were in actuality Russian Ukrainians. This eviction was carried out by the Anny screening team under the 9th Division's interpretation of directives to the effect that any person who is a Soviet citizen is not eligible for DP care. This seems to be an interpretation that has long been used in the Bavarian district by both the Military Government and Tactical Troops. I immediately challenged this interpretation of 9th Division's and caused to have USFET bulletin of 4 January on the subject "Repatriation of Soviet Citizens Under The Yalta Agreement" re-interpreted to the 9th Division by 3rd Anny Headquarters. The interpretation was to the effect that Soviet citizens are eligible for DP care excepting those three categories in Para. 2a, b, and c which call for involuntary repatriation by Soviet authorities. This interpretation is now in effect with screening teams and there have been no other incidences of eviction of Soviet citizens. The UNRRA team was instructed to assist those persons unjustly evicted at Hindenburg Kaserne to make appeals to the 9th Division Review Board. This is being carried out insofar as possible, although it is quite difficult, because within two or three days' time many of the evictees were scattered in refugee centers throughout a wide area of the American Zone.

5. In general, the screening of Ukrainians is without event. There is no special consideration being given to them or demanded by them, and there have been no incidences revealing that they are especially guilty of collaboration with the enemy or in other ways are particularly different from any other nationality of DPs as to eligibility for UNRRA care. It still may be seriously questioned whether or not even screening teams are able to make proper classification of Ukrainians as to citizenship although screening teams and UNRRA personnel assigned to the teams are certainly aware of this difficulty.

J .H. WHITING
Zone Director

Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York. PAG - 4/3.0.11.0, 1.4:2, "Eligibility (Screening), Liaison Officers."

***

17. The Condition of Displaced Persons

SEPTEMBER 1946

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION (UNRRA), U.S. ZONE HEADQUARTERS, TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF UNRRA

The purpose of this report and of this action is to bring to the personal attention of the Director General of UNRRA a realistic view of the deplorable and rapidly deteriorating position of the Displaced Persons in the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany. For the reasons which are explained further herein, it is the conclusion of the Executive Staff of UNRRA U.S. Zone Headquarters that immediate action is required by the highest level of authority to initiate steps for the earliest possible removal of non-repatriable Displaced Persons and Refugees from Germany.

It is the conclusion of UNRRA U. S. Zone personnel that the ideology which ineradicably permeates the minds of the German people is successfully exerted with such consistent pressure upon the Military Government and the Army of Occupation as to render them incapable of securing for the DP a safe haven in Germany; that to retain them in Germany for any protracted length of time, under any conditions, would be to perpetuate the crimes of Nazism and the injustices of other circumstances which have caused them to be uprooted from their normal lives, with the loss of relatives, friends and possessions; that to oblige them to continue their present form of existence would be to contribute to the creation of a "barrack race," a demoralized, hopeless mass of stranded humanity. 1

The agencies upon whom it had been expected that the responsibility for resettlement would fall, have proven inadequate to meet the situation. It is known that the Economic and Social Council of UNO [United Nations Organization] have recognized the seriousness and urgency of the problem, but unfortunately the plans of this body do not call for any form of initial action before September 1946.

It therefore remains for UNRRA, who has lived in close human touch with these unfortunate people for many months, to take the initiatives in their behalf. While it may be argued that such action does not come within the scope of UNRRA responsibility as governed by its charter and resolutions, it is the consensus of the UNRRA personnel in the field that, because of the effort which has been put forth, and in order not to shatter the last remaining hope and faith which the DPs are placing in it, there has developed the inescapable moral obligation and responsibility upon UNRRA to see the problem through, either directly or indirectly.

It has therefore been resolved to place before the Director General of UNRRA the urgent request that he take the lead in developing a solution for the Displaced Persons in Germany. Known as a man of direct, forceful action, unfettered by political or diplomatic considerations, but bound rather by strong human instincts to the sufferings of oppressed and downtrodden people, it is hoped that he will use his strength and prestige to awaken world consciousness to the urgency of this need; that he will take direct and energetic action with the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and any other interested nations to hasten the opening of their gates to these people; that he will take steps to spur the Economic and Social Council of UNO into more rapid action on their behalf; and that he will take necessary action with the Government of the United States in order that, pending their final resettlement, the genuine DP and refugees in Germany will be given asylum, hospitality and protection in the true spirit of American tradition.

I. GENERAL SITUATION OF DP, U.S. MILITARY AND GERMAN AUTHORITIES

... In countries other than Germany and not under military occupation, the lot of the DP is not critical. He lives among former Allies with fairly equal economic, educational and general living opportunities. His ultimate settlement can be a plan of the future, without causing him undue suffering and hardships in the meanwhile.

The DP and refugees remaining in Germany, whether in camps or in the community, do not have such an equal chance. They are living in a country hostile to them, which is itself being subjected to a punitive economy under military control with lowered standards of living and restricted occupational and educational opportunities. They are held in the greatest contempt by the Germans, who lose no opportunity to discredit them in the eyes of the American Military Authorities. The effect of this derogatory influence has been strong and widespread to the point where it has seeped up from the operating levels to even the highest military echelons. The DP problem has always been a nuisance to the Army. With redeployment and the introduction of new, untrained and unoriented military personnel, there is now an almost complete lack of knowledge and understanding of the factors which created the DP situation in the first place; and the subjection of the Americans [sic] mind to German influence has been such that there is even less human sympathy and consideration than there is understanding. The DP are generally considered by military personnel as "lousy Poles" and "Goddam DP" who should be sent back where they came from whether they like it or not.

The combat troops who originally liberated the DP, who saw the conditions to which they had been subjected, were human and considerate in their treatment of them. The directives of General Eisenhower, reflecting the policies of the U.S. Government and people, recognized the DP on the level of Allied citizens and decreed that, pending final repatriation or resettlement, they would be cared for on a high standard at the expense of the German community, and that priority was to be given to their requirements over those of the Germans.

Insofar as it has affected and continues to affect the DP situation, we can state authoritatively that the U. S. military establishment has broken down completely. The directives of General Eisenhower have not been and are not being properly implemented in the field. The majority of officials are woefully ignorant of the problem and the few officers remaining who have knowledge of, and sympathy for it are unable to make their influence felt at the troop level. Occasional instances of sympathetic and cooperative treatment by military authorities at the field level are usually the product of the individual intelligence and humanity of a particular officer and of his resistance to German influence.

That the contempt for the DP and forgetfulness of his proper status has also permeated the higher military echelons, is evidenced by recent policies. Most revealing of the loss of regard toward the DP, and of the absence of elemental psychological understanding, is the granting of authority for the use of German police in carrying out raids and searches in DP installations. That the average DP has long been subjected to German brutal force is established fact. That he will resent and resist the intrusion of this, to him, same brutal force into his so-called "liberated" situation, is a foregone conclusion.

This policy has provoked several serious situations, and has culminated in the incident at Stuttgart, where over 200 armed German police, under the supervision of a few MP [military police] troops with no commissioned officer, using a number of dogs on leashes, surrounded and attempted to search a camp of approximately 1,500 Polish-Jewish Displaced Persons. This resulted in the shooting to death by the German police of one Polish-Jew (survivor of a concentration camp and only recently reunited with his wife and two children) and the wounding by gunshot of three other DPs.

Another activity carried out on the basis of military necessity has been the wholesale transferring of DP populations from one camp to another. That this is a policy of subtle coercion toward repatriation has been confirmed by the statements of high officers who did not want the DP to become too "settled" in their living conditions.

Further to this attitude is the evident and proclaimed desire of the military to "liquidate" the DP problem by integrating DPs into the German community. This has taken the form of more or less official announcements in the press relative to the imminent closing of DP camps and various instructions given by U. S. officers at field level that UNRRA DP camps were to be closed as of certain dates, without any indication as to the future fate of the DP.

Another indication is the great emphasis which is being placed on the criminality of DPs. Continuous allegations by German civil authorities of black market activities of DPs, and the general conclusion that DP camps are largely populated by collaborators, by SS, etc., have created the tendency to class all remaining DPs as criminals and collaborators. These allegations and conclusions are founded more on assumptions than on facts. On the allegations of black market activities, and sometimes possession of arms, shake-down raids have been carried out at some time or other in almost every DP camp in the U. S. Zone. These have often been carried out by U.S. troops, untrained, unoriented, and undisciplined, without adequate officer supervision, in the crudest and roughest manner, with deliberate destruction and theft by the troops of DPs' personal possessions. These raids have in general failed to produce the evidence of large-scale black market activities by DPs as would justify such violent action. Likewise, what screening has been accomplished thus far has failed to reveal any large percentage of collaborators or otherwise undeserving persons in DP camps which would factually sustain the general assumption which is being taken.

The deterioration of the Military attitude toward the DPs, and the arbitrary, provoking and often violent actions which are being taken against them, have served to place them again in the position of inferiority and baseness, in the eyes of the Germans, that they occupied under the Nazi regime; this time, however, with the apparent concurrence of the Americans. More and more authority is being delegated to the German Civil Government and the DPs are receiving proportionately less and less protection from the U.S. Military.

Living in an uncertain status, lacking any clearly defined juridical rights and representation, the DP in his contacts with German authorities is again the victim of discriminations and ruthless treatment.

II. PRESENT LIVING CONDITIONS AND MORALE OF DPS IN THE U.S. ZONE

The living conditions of DPs and their material and spiritual lot can be generally estimated as being about ten per cent of the requirements necessary to achieve a minimum acceptable standard.

Most of the DPs live in former troops barracks, often partially destroyed, in primitive conditions of housing and feeding. The directives of General Eisenhower calling for the provision of normal living accommodations, even at the expense of German housing, were intended to restore to the DPs some opportunity for the home life which had been denied them for many years. These directives always met with resistance by Military Government and have been implemented only to an insignificant degree. This fact is self-evident since the DPs have continued to live in the most demoralizing conditions of overcrowding, with large numbers of people in single rooms, often with mixed sexes, mixed families and with children of all ages observers of adult intimacies. Within the compass of one room, without separation or privacy of any kind, are affected by groups of people the daily activities of dressing and undressing, of eating and sleeping, and of conjugal relations. These barracks constructed only for the use of regimented men are totally inadequate in the basic requirements of sanitation. The waste disposal, washing facilities and toilets were intended for a population of men, not women and children. The difficulties in obtaining materials and tools for alterations have prevented any substantial degree of correction of these conditions. Only by virtue of the initiative and persistence of UNRRA team personnel were some of the badly damaged barracks repaired sufficiently to enable the DPs to withstand the past winter. The facilities for food preparation and messing are equally dismal. While sufficient food is provided to retain average health (not, however, for workers) the lack of balance, the monotony of diet, and the method of preparation, dispensation, contribute to the general despondency. The DP diet contains very little, if any, fresh foods of any kind. Military Government regulations forbid the procurement of fresh foods, other than potatoes from indigenous sources for DPs. Any efforts by the DPs to secure such foods independently are immediately attacked by M.G. [Military Government] and German authorities as black marketing activities.

There are few facilities which can be adapted to use as central messes and this idea is generally resisted by the DP; for, although his main meal usually consists of the eternal soup or stew, in which most of the available ingredients are combined, he prefers to carry it in a container of any description to the room where, supplemented by some dry rations, on a box or other flat surface, he goes through the parody of setting the family table.

The DP's clothing is not calculated to restore or sustain this self respect. He has been provided with a covering for his body, generally a second hand, ill fitting garment. The legal issue has been limited to a single item, i.e., one trouser, one jacket, one dress, one pair of shoes, without due allowance for cleaning, mending or replacement, resulting in considerable difficulty in making ends meet. This condition has been particularly demoralizing for the women. Independent efforts by the DP to obtain supplementary clothing are again attacked as black market activities; in fact, items of clothing legitimately possessed by the DP are often confiscated by U.S. troops or German police during shakedown raids. The German civilian is still unusually well dressed and presents a neat respectable appearance. In contrast the DP looks like a bum, and this difference does not fail to make its impression on the U.S. troop. The German looks like a gentleman (or a lady) and the U.S. soldier accepts him as such; the DP man or woman looks like a bum or a tramp and that is the way they are regarded. The medical aspect of the care for DP has been far in advance of any other. Fortunately, UNRRA was able to discharge directly this professional service by having doctors on its teams; but even here, the difficulties of securing medical supplies and instruments for DP use have been a great obstacle to an adequate program. Until recently, UNRRA's medical services were limited to camp infirmaries, to deliveries, inoculations and minor injuries. Patients suffering from major illnesses or requiring surgical treatment We're generally placed in German hospitals, with varying degrees of acceptance by the Germans. At present, however, UNRRA has direct administrative control of hospitals for DP to the extent of nine thousand beds, which is resulting in a great improvement for hospitalized cases.

It is a tribute to the zeal of UNRRA medical personnel that no serious outbreak of disease has occurred among DP. It is also significant that the program has been successful, in the one field of professional work where UNRRA services could be directly applied in the field, without great dependency on the military organization.

The foregoing paragraphs have dealt with the basic physical requirements to sustain life and health among the DP and the shabby manner in which they are met.

Even more serious are the tremendous deficiencies in those aspects of a normal life which develop character and spiritual values, i.e., employment opportunities, work incentives, education, vocational training, religion and recreation; and as long as the DP remain in Germany their possibilities for realizing these activities are non-existent.

Understandably enough the DP refuse to work for Germans or under German supervision, the latter being generally a condition of working for the Army. They have no desire to assist in the reconstruction of Germany, nor to be again subjected to German regimentation and discrimination against foreigners. There is plenty of hard labor to be done in Germany, but the DP who are highly trained professional and technical people (especially the Balts), such as engineers, scientists, architects, lawyers, doctors, teachers and scholars, administrators, etc., have no prospect whatsoever of following their individual pursuits or of establishing themselves once more with any degree of independence.

The maximum employment of DP has been between 12 and 14%. All but a very few of these work in assembly center administration, maintenance and workshops. On the principle that the Germans must bear the cost of DP maintenance, directives provide that the wages of such workers must be paid by the Burgermeisters. This policy is meeting with growing resistance on the part of Burgermeisters and Military Government.

Army directives have always stated that priority in employment be given to DPs, yet consistent discrimination has been practiced against this group by all Army echelons. This, the one possibility for acceptable employment outside of assembly centers, has never been realized. The UNRRA Employment Branch presented to the Displaced Persons Division at USFET a practical operating procedure for DP employment pools in October 1945. This division took no action until 13 March 1946, despite constant urging of this branch. On this date, a directive was again issued stressing the priority to be given DPs in employment by the Army. In view of the delegation of procurement responsibility to German civil authorities and of their recognized antagonistic attitude toward the DP, its effective implementation is not probable.

It is now a year since their liberation, and the majority of DPs have remained in comparative idleness. That they are idle by nature cannot be accepted, since the nationalities they represent are traditionally hard workers; but lacking adequate opportunities, motivation of private family life and responsibility, incentives of remuneration in convertable currencies, supplementary workers' rations and, most important, a future for which to strive, it is inevitable that every passing day adds to the deterioration of character, self-respect and the urge for independence.

Equally discouraging in effect are the extreme limitations in educational and training opportunities. The desire for education is unusually high and UNRRA welfare personnel have exploited existent possibilities to the fullest extent. However, it is estimated that only about five per cent of the children, youth and adults are having their educational and training needs properly fulfilled to desirable standards. The lack of space for school facilities, inability to procure adequate books and school supplies and the dearth of teachers, particularly in the Polish and Jewish groups, have all contributed to this deplorable situation. German high schools, technical schools and universities have been ordered to make available ten per cent of their enrollment to DPs, but here again exists a language barrier, since these schools are conducted in German and [there is] the natural reluctance of the DP to accept German-style education, even under Military Government supervision. In any case, these facilities would meet only about one-tenth of the need.

Opportunities for vocational training are equally limited by lack of machinery and materials, with obvious reluctance on the part of Military Government to make such facilities available for DPs. A case in point was the action considered necessary by Military Government to forbid supplies of leather for DP centers. This leather was being used in cobbler workshops, set up in centers for two purposes: to repair shoes and for apprentice cobblers. DP shoes subsequently had to be sent to German factories for repair.

Religion and recreation have found a measure of native self-expression, despite dire limitations of facilities and materials. Because of its suppression under the Germans, religion assumed greater significance than ever for these people. Psychologically, the DP has had to cope with the effect of years aimed at the degradation of the human spirit, and with the months since liberation spent under conditions which have afforded little opportunities for private family living, little chance for constructive employment, little hope for the future. Serious handicaps have been the absence of a Greek Orthodox Church in Germany, of synagogues, and of facilities for Roman Catholics, notably the Poles, who do not choose to use churches frequented by the Germans. Spiritual leadership is also lacking as well as materials such as bibles, prayerbooks, etc. UNRRA and the voluntary agencies are doing all in their power to facilitate religious services and the observance of major religious holidays, the first such holidays to be observed since the war began.

The recreational activities of the DP instinctively take the forms best calculated to buoy their flagging spirits. National zeal is manifest through their music, dramatics, crafts, legend and lore. The exuberance of children and youth finds expression in sports and games, under any conditions.

This bright spot of cultural recovery, while serving to hide the tragedy and hopelessness which lie in their hearts, is also an indication of their ability to adjust and and of their potential contribution to any community in which they may live and work with equal freedom and opportunity.

At this stage, the morale of the Displaced Persons is at its lowest ebb. The change of attitude and treatment by the U.S. Military leaves them utterly bewildered. The incomprehensible moves of entire population from one camp to another, abruptly destroying whatever meager roots they may have established, fills them with dismay. The increase of German authority over them and the announced prospect of their being dumped into the German community and left to their own resources, is draining their very last hopes. Their faith in UNRRA is dying, for they cannot understand that the U.S. Military are the only responsible and commanding authority as far as the DPs are concerned.

The U.S. Immigration program, at first a light on the horizon, is being recognized in all its inadequacy, and the silence of other nations on the subject of refuge fills them with despair.

On every side, the future is dark and forbidding. The job that started with liberation, in all its glorious, humanitarian brightness, has been left to drift and disintegrate. The world of charity and understanding is breaking faith with a part of humanity.

But the job must be completed. The impoverished "little people," caught like grains of sand between the millstones of power, cannot be left to the "tender mercies" of a German populace, nor to the degrading effects of substandard institutional living. They must be removed from Germany and given the ordinary opportunities of human beings.

Every sincere UNRRA employee feels in his heart, "It is up to UNRRA to take the lead and point the way" - now, urgently, without delay.

Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York. PAG-413.0.11. 3.0-9, "Confidential Report on the General Situation of DPs."

Notes

1 American policy in the U.S. Zone of Occupied Germany stressed the principle that administrative functions should be delegated as rapidly as feasible to politically reliable Germans. By October 1945, three state administrations had been set up in the zone - Bavaria, North Wurttemberg-Baden, and Greater Hesse - in addition to the separate administration for the Bremen enclave. In each Land, or state, appointed officials headed by a Minister-President were assigned full responsibility for internal affairs not involving security. All aspects of German administration were carefully scrutinized and supervised by U.S. military government, which, by January 1946, was separately constituted as the Office of Military Government (OMGUS). Eyen such important tasks as denazification were turned over to the German administration. (Ed.)

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Part 5 of 5

18. Report on the Screening of the First Ukrainian Division

21 FEBRUARY 1947

REFUGEE SCREENING COMMISSION REPORT ON UKRAINIANS IN SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL (SEP) CAMP NO. 374 ITALY

LACAB/18 RSC/RIC
21 February 1947

1. This camp consists entirely of male Ukrainians who were either captured in German uniform or were working in Germany as civilians and attached themselves to the 1st Ukrainian Division shortly before its surrender. The proportion of civilians is small, and doubt exists about exactly how many come into this category and about exactly when they joined up with the Division. I refer to this in more detail in paragraph 7 below. The number of inmates varies from time to time due to escapes, transfers to hospitals, etc., but the figure on which we have been working, and which was confirmed on 16th February by the British camp authorities as accurate, is a total of 8,272, which includes 218 permanently employed outside the camp on working parties. None had been screened previously by any British authority and no British records either on individuals or of a general nature were available to us here.

2. Individual screening by us being impossible, it was decided to question a small cross section chosen in accordance with their Wehrmacht formations. A full nominal roll broken up into these formations was prepared for us by the Ukrainian camp leader, Major Jaskewycz, which gave the following breakdown:

1,203 Offrs and ORs of the 1st Infantry Regt of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
1,058 Offrs and ORs of the 2nd Infantry Regt of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
1,150 Offrs and ORs of the 3rd Infantry Regt of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
938 Offrs and ORs of the Artillery (actually with 4th Regt) of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
320 Oifrs and ORs of the Supply Section of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
305 Offrs and ORs of the Engineer Bn. of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
205 Offrs and ORs of the Signals Unit of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
2,230 Offrs and ORs of the Recruiting Regt of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
76 Offrs and ORs of the Workshop Coy. of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
281 Offrs and ORs of the Fusilier Bn. of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
221 Offrs and ORs of the Sanitary Section of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
156 Offrs and ORs of the Anti Tank Section of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
125 Offrs and ORs of the Divisional Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
4 Offrs and ORs of the Army Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Div.
______ 8,272
______

3. At the same time Major Jaskewycz gave us his version of the history of the 1st Ukrainian Division and the various units that composed it. It should be emphasized that all these nominal rolls and the short history of the Division were supplied entirely by the Ukrainians themselves and that we had no information here of any kind against which they could be checked; and virtually none of the men had any identifying documents of any use, such as German Army pay books, though one or two of them had pre-war Polish civilian identity cards. I feel satisfied, however, that Major Jaskewycz has done his best to provide accurate and complete information, as far as he was able.

4. Our next step was to select a cross section of these people for questioning. We concentrated on the first three regiments and the Artillery Regiment in order to try to build up a Battle Order. Fifty officers and men were chosen at random from the nominal rolls of these four regiments, but in actual practice it proved impossible to question only 47 of the 1st Regiment, 49 of the 2nd Regiment, 46 of the 3rd Regiment and 47 of the Artillery Regiment. A few others were chosen from the Signals Unit, the Supply Section and the Engineer Battalion, and 30 from the Recruiting or Reserve Regiment. Except in the case of Mr. Brown, who was able to question the men in Russian, Ukrainian-speaking interpreters, who were actually inmates of the camp, had to be used.

5. When the questioning had been completed the individual statements of each man were checked against each other and against the information supplied by Major Jaskewycz about the Division and its various units. No serious discrepancies were discovered, nor did any particularly suspicious individual come to light, except in so far as some of them stated that they had volunteered for armed service with the Germans as early as July 1943, whereas the 1st Ukrainian Division does not appear to have been formed until the late summer of 1944. Nineteen men were therefore selected for further questioning, which disclosed that they had been enlisted in the summer of 1943 in the 1st Galician Division or the 14th Galician Grenadier Division. As it was not clear from the interrogations whether this was one and the same Division or two separate ones, I questioned the three senior officers in the Camp on this point, and established that it was called by the Germans the 14th Galician Waffen Grenadier Division and consisted of three Infantry and one Artillery Regiments. I do not see anything suspicious in some of the men not knowing exactly what unit they were in, and they probably referred to it as the 1st Galician Division because it was for them the first Division to be formed out of Ukrainians from Galicia. This Division suffered heavy losses at Brody in July 1944 and ceased to exist. The 1st Ukrainian Division was formed round its remnants. One of the officers of the 14th Galician Waffen Grenadier Division has stated that it was originally called by the Germans a Waffen-SS Division but the SS was dropped from its title, on the Ukrainians protesting, and that it subsequently became an ordinary German Army Division. It seems, however, to have had some SS training, which would account for some of its officers having given their ranks as Untersturmfuehrer, which is a SS rank and not an ordinary German Army rank.

6. As far as the 1st Ukrainian Division is concerned, the short history supplied by Major Jaskewycz was borne out by the individual interrogations and we were able to draw up a nucleus of its Battle Order. The Division appears to have been formed about September 1944 and actually to have fought for only about one month in the late stages of the campaign in Austria (April 1945); the rest of its time was occupied in training and guard duties in Austria and Yugoslavia. It surrendered to us in Austria in May 1945. The men we questioned were nearly all of the simple peasant type, and made a good impression, showing no signs of either prevarication or truculence; a high proportion of them, and, from what we have seen, of the whole camp, are under 30 years of age. I myself questioned the three senior officers in the camp, Lt. Cols. Sylenko and Nikitin, and Major Jaskewycz. The other senior officers, namely two full colonels and one Lt. Col, were not available, but I feel sure that their story is similar to the history of the others. These three officers' stories were much the same. They were all born in the 1890s in Russia, became regular Tsarist army officers and fought in the 1914 war against the Germans. After the revolution of 1917 they fought for the Whites against the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian Army; and when these hostilities came to an end all three settled in Poland as political emigrees [sic] with Nansen passports. None of them has this passport now, but Sylenko produced, as though it were a highly valuable objet d'art, a passport issued in 1918 by the Democratic Government of the Ukraine. He told me with pride that this was now very rare. They kept themselves in Poland from 1922 to 1939 by working in various civil jobs and continued in these jobs during and after the German occupation of Poland in 1939. They claimed that their status as political emigres exempted them from service in the Polish Army and all were insistent that they had never acquired Polish nationality. Some of the men, however, admit to having served in the Polish Army in 1939 and in a few cases were able to produce authentic-looking documents in support of their claim to Polish nationality. No officer or man that we saw admitted to having served in the Red Army, nor do I think it likely that any of these Ukrainians did do so. About 10% are of the Orthodox faith. On the crucial point whether any of them are Soviet citizens by our definition we have no evidence other than that supplied by the men themselves. Many of the places which they have given as their place of birth and/or habitual residence are small villages and hamlets which are not likely to be marked on any but the largest maps; but I think we can safely assume that the great majority of those born after 1919 were born in Poland, and were resident in Poland on 1st September 1939, and that the great majority of those born before Poland existed were not resident in the Soviet Union on ht September 1939. The general impression which we have formed of all the men in the camp is favourable, as they strike us all as being decent, simple-minded sort of people. The national emblem of the Ukraine, in the form of a trident, is freely displayed all over the camp, and the inmates clearly regard themselves as a homogeneous unit, unconnected either with Russia or Poland, and do not seem conscious of having done any wrong.

7. Our attention has been concentrated on trying to build up a Battle Order and a general picture of the division, and we have for this reason paid no attention to any of the miscellaneous units except the Signals Unit, the Supply Section, and the Engineer Battalion. Some of the real villains of the piece, if there are any, may be sheltering behind these innocuous sounding units, but that is a risk which we have to take. We did, however, question thirty of the Recruiting or Reserve Regiment, the largest single unit in the camp. We did not expect these interrogations to throw much light on the Division as a whole, which proved to be the case; but we were anxious to question some men in this regiment, as the camp leader had told us that a fair proportion of them were really civilians such as Todt workers, who had only attached themselves to the regiment shortly before its surrender, as a means of escaping from the Germans. It so happened that of the thirty men we picked, none admitted to having been a Todt worker, although six of them said that they had not been enlisted in the regiment until the early part of 1945, and that before this date they had been working in various factories in Germany. Time prevented us from pursuing the matter further, but this omission is not important, as if any of the men were really civilians that must be considered a point in their favour rather than the reverse.

B. During the course of our enquiries we discovered that nearly all these Ukrainians had already been screened by an official Soviet Mission (they were then in a different camp at Bellaria). The first part of the Soviet Mission arrived on 13 August 1945, with the primary object of weeding out all the Ukrainians who were not Soviet citizens according to the Soviet definition, by which all people who were resident in that part of pre-war Poland bounded on the west by the Curzon line and on the east by the then Polish-Soviet frontier were considered Soviet citizens if they were still resident in that area by the time the Red Army occupied it in late September 1949(?). Three hundred and ninety-seven officers and men who had claimed not to be Soviet citizens, were screened by the Soviet Mission and 127 of them were passed as not being Soviet citizens and were forthwith removed from the Ukrainian camp (most of them are now back in it). The remainder were kept in the camp. On 17th August 1945 Col. Jakovlev arrived in order to discuss administrative matters. He maintained that all those left in the camp after the Soviet screening should be administered on lines laid down by the Soviet Union, and that they were eligible for the scale of rations, clothing and pay to which free Soviet citizens were entitled under the Yalta agreement. This contention was rejected. Colonel Jakovlev thereupon decided to begin a drive in the camp for voluntary repatriation, and to break down the general resistance to such repatriation by having what he called the "stubborn Fascist minority" removed from the camp. A for this purpose, but only succeeded in securing 50 volunteers for repatriation, who were forthwith removed from the camp and reclassified as Free Soviet citizens. They are presumably back in the Soviet Union. The General and his personal staff left the camp on the 25th August, having met with a hostile reception and having apparently abandoned any further attempt to secure more volunteers. The task which General Vasilov had begun of identifying the stubborn Fascist minority was continued by the original members of the mission who had arrived on the 13th August and was not completed until the end of September. Some attempt was made at thoroughness in dealing with the officers, but most of the men appear to have been treated in a remarkably high-handed and abrupt manner. When the mission had finished they stated to the British authorities that a minority in the camp was definitely responsible for terrorising the great majority from volunteering for repatriation, and that once this minority had been removed from the camp most of the remainder would eventually come forward as volunteers. Eleven men were in fact removed at the request of the Soviet Mission, but were subsequently allowed by the British authorities to return. I am satisfied that there are no grounds for the Soviet Mission's complaint of terrorisation. No official report of their activities was supplied by the Soviet Mission to the local British authorities, and the information given in this paragraph was supplied by Major Hills, GSI(b) of this Sub-Area, who was present when the visits took place.

9. The only effect, which the Soviet Mission's visit appears to have had on the Ukrainians, was to convince any waverers there might have been never to return to the Soviet Union, and to cause a great deal of probably justified anxiety to those who still had relatives there. We must, I think, accept as a definite fact, that all those Ukrainians now in Camp 374 who were screened by the Soviet Mission - that is to say the great majority - are now regarded by the Soviet Government as Soviet citizens, and that having failed to secure their voluntary repatriation the Soviet Government will demand their forcible repatriation as War Criminals when the Italian Treaty comes into force.

10. Attached you will find the following results of our activities:

*i [*Note: These are not forwarded with this report.] ) Nominal rolls of all the inmates of the camp broken up into their various Wehrmacht Units.

ii) Information about each unit supplied by Major Jaskewycz.

iii) Names of those chosen for questioning.

iv) Case sheets of the results of this questioning (enclosed in a separate folder).

v) Summary of information taken from cases.

vi) Battle Order for the first three Regiments, the Artillery Regiment and the Recruiting Regiment compiled from the individual questionnaires and from Major Jaskewycz's histories.

11. We have thus obtained a reasonably consistent picture as far as it goes, and as far as it can go within the limits of our time and resources. The men may be all or in part lying, and even their names may be false. No attempt at cross examination was made except where some obscurity or glaring discrepancy was revealed during the course of the interrogation; the work in fact which the screeners have done has largely consisted of taking down through an interpreter the men's answers to a limited number of set questions. If, however, we are to get anywhere we must, and in my opinion, can safely, assume that by and large the men are what they say they are and did what they say they did. It would seem therefore that the only further screening processes that can usefully be applied:

i) To see if any of the men listed in the nominal rolls figure in UNWCC or CROWCASS lists or have been specifically accused by the Russian or other government of War Crimes.

ii) To see if any of the units to which the men belong have particularly bad war records.

iii) To see if the short history of the various units and of the Division as a whole, as ascertained by interrogation, corresponds to the known facts about them. It might be possible to locate some of the German officers of the Division and have them questioned. None are known to be in this area.

If this further screening confirms the history of the units and produces no bad units and no wanted men, then the solution of the problem resolves itself into taking a decision on the following general considerations:

A. It seems likely that the great majority, at least of the men, are not Soviet citizens by our definition. It must, however, be borne in mind that an official Soviet Mission has questioned nearly all of them, and that the Soviet Government merely regards nearly all of them as Soviet citizens; and that there may be among them a number who are Soviet citizens by our definition. We may, therefore, if we get them all accepted as DPs render ourselves liable to a valid charge of sheltering Russian traitors. (It might be worthwhile noting in this connection that on the nationality issue these men are really having the best of both worlds. They do not qualify as Soviet citizens because their place of birth and/or habitual domicile on 1.9.39 were in Poland, and they therefore by our definition escape all punishment by the Russians for their having assisted the enemy; and they are not presumably eligible now for punishment by the Polish authorities because that part of the country from which they came is no longer part of Poland.)

B. The great majority of them voluntarily enlisted in the German Armed Forces and fought against our Allies, Soviet Russia and Jugoslavia. There are some grounds for believing that some of those whom we have questioned have stated that they were volunteers, because if they said that they had been conscripted they would then be told that they would have nothing to fear if they returned to the Ukraine. The number of volunteers may thus be smaller than would at first appear. Nonetheless, also allowing for intimidation, and dislike of forced labour, the majority for our purpose must be regarded as volunteers. There are, therefore, prima facie grounds for classifying them as traitors, i.e., as ineligible for IRO status according to the 1st section of paragraph two of the definition sheet. The term "traitor" is vague and has been defined for our guidance by Professor Royse as embodying, among other things, "civilians who voluntarily offer their services to the enemy and, in general sense, people who gave aid and comfort to the enemy." This definition undoubtedly applies to most, if not all, of these Ukrainians.

C. We must, however, I think take into account their motives for having voluntarily offered their services to the enemy, even though by so doing one might be able, as a reductio absurdum [sic], to prove Quisling himself as eligible for IRO assistance. There seem to be four main reasons for their having taken this step:

a) The hope of securing a genuinely independent Ukraine.

b) Without knowing exactly what they were doing, e.g., because other Ukrainians whom they knew had already volunteered.

c) As a preferable alternative to forced labour, etc., or to living in Soviet-controlled territory.

d) To have a smack at the Russians, whom they always refer to as "Bolsheviks" .

They probably were not, and certainly do not now seem to be at heart pro-German, and the fact that they did give aid and comfort to the Germans can fairly be considered to have been incidental and not fundamental.

D. The desire among their leaders for an independent Ukraine, naive and unreal as it is, is nonetheless genuine.

E. They are obsessed by a terror and hatred, bordering in some cases almost on hysteria, of Soviet Russia. It seems clear that when the Russians occupied Eastern Poland in 1939-40 many of these people's wives and families were ruthlessly taken away from their homes to Siberia and other remote parts of the Soviet Union and have not been seen or heard of since. They also seem to have suffered a good deal at the hands of the Red Army during the Russo-German campaign, and also on occasion at the hands of the Germans.

F. None of them wish to return to the Ukraine, with the exception of one man, who, after securing an interview with one of the Commissioners and stating to him that he did wish to return to the Ukraine, was subsequently found to be suffering from the last stages of consumption and was not expected to live very much longer. He is now in the hospital.

G. No one in the camp has been sentenced by any British military authority to one year's imprisonment or over. Their behaviour indeed since their surrender to us has been exemplary. They have not indulged in any subversive activities, nor do I think they will do so in the future. They seem resigned to the fact that there is now no place in Europe for them and that those of them who have wives and families in the Soviet Union will never see them again. We must not, however, expect most of them ever to become well disposed toward the Soviet Union.

12. I am not competent from here to judge the issue as far as our relations with the Soviet Union (or with Poland) are concerned; nor do I know whether our policy is to interpret strictly or liberally the instructions as to who is eligible for DP status and who not. I can only speak from the experience gained from our actually having seen the men and from humanitarian instincts common to us all; and on this basis and taking into account the long time that has elapsed from the end of the war, I recommend most strongly that all these Ukrainians should be classified as DPs; and I would add, with all the emphasis I can command, that, if this is accepted, immediate action, not high-sounding resolutions, is necessary either to ensure that the IRO or the IGCR can give them effective protection as DPs from being handed over to the Soviet Government by the Italian Government under the Treaty, or to have them removed lock, stock and barrel from Italy before the Treaty comes into force. 1

(signed) D. Haldane Porter
Refugee Screening Commission
In charge S.E.P. Camp 374

Source: Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Citizenship and Immigration Branch, RG 26 vol. 147, file 3-43-1 (copy).

_______________

Note

1 The British feared that Italy, after the withdrawal of British troops, would not be able to resist Soviet pressure to forcibly repatriate division members. It was therefore decided that most of the division members would be removed from Italy and brought to work camps in England, in place of the repatriated German prisoners of war. In May 1947 the men were moved to Britain, where they retained their prisoner of war status until the end of 1948. About 500, however, were allowed to join their families in West Germany and did not go to Britain. For a history of the division during the war, see the article by Myroslav Yurkevich in this volume. (Ed.)

***

19. British Foreign Office Assessment of the First Ukrainian Division

5 SEPTEMBER 1950

Imm. B53802
Our File 232-L-40
Despatch No. 2087
Date 5th September 1950

Ottawa File
No. 232-L-40

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: The High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom

TO: The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

REFERENCE: Your despatch No. C229 dated 14th August 1950

SUBJECT: Admission into Canada of Ukrainian Surrendered Enemy Personnel

The information which you requested on behalf of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in your above-referenced despatch, regarding the past record of Ukrainian refugees now in the United Kingdom and who served in the German armed forces, has to-day been received from the United Kingdom authorities in response to our enquiry on the subject, and I quote below from the Foreign Office letter dated the 4th September:

While in Italy these men were screened by Soviet and British missions and neither then nor subsequently has any evidence been brought to light which would suggest that any of them fought against the Western Allies or engaged in crimes against humanity. The behaviour since they came to this country has been good and they have never indicated in any way that they are infected with any trace of Nazi ideology.

When they surrendered to the Allied forces at the end of the war, they were members of the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Wehrmacht which was formed about September 1944 and which was only in action once (against the Red Army in Austria during April 1945), being employed in training and guard duties in Austria and Yugoslavia during the rest of its existence. Some of its members, however, appear to be survivors of an earlier formation known as the 14th Galician Grenadier Division. This was also a Wehrmacht unit, an attempt made by the Germans to make it into an SS Division having apparently been resisted by the Ukrainians themselves. This unit seems to have been formed about July 1943 and to have been destroyed at the Battle of Brody in June 1944.

From the reports of the special mission set up by the War Office to screen these men, it seems clear that they volunteered to fight against the Red Army from nationalistic motives which were given greater impetus by the behaviour of the Soviet authorities during their earlier occupation of the Western Ukraine after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Although Communist propaganda has constantly attempted to depict these, like so many other refugees, as "quislings" and "war criminals" it is interesting to note that no specific charges of war crimes have been made by the Soviet or any other Government against any member of this group.

No. of Enclosures

Post File
AR. 408/7

Signed: L.D. WILGRESS
High Commissioner

Source: Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Immigration Branch, RG 76, vol. 656, file 13538021-2.

***

20. Address by Ivan Dziuba at Babyn Iar

29 SEPTEMBER 1966

There are events, tragedies, the enormity of which make all words futile and of which silence tells incomparably more - the awesome silence of thousands of people. Perhaps we, too, should keep silent and only meditate. But silence says a lot only when everything that could have been said has already been said. If there is still much to say, or if nothing has yet been said, then silence becomes a partner to falsehood and enslavement. We must, therefore, speak and continue to speak whenever we can, taking advantage of all opportunities, for they come so infrequently.

I want to say a few words - one-thousandth of what I am now thinking and what I would like to say here. I want to address you as men - as my brothers in humanity. I want to address you Jews as a Ukrainian - as a member of the Ukrainian nation to which I proudly belong.

Babyn Iar is a tragedy of all mankind, but it happened on Ukrainian soil. And, therefore, a Ukrainian has no more right to forget it than a Jew has. Babyn lar is our common tragedy, a tragedy for both the Jewish and the Ukrainian nations.

This tragedy was brought on our nations by fascism.

Yet one must not forget that fascism neither begins nor ends in Babyn Iar. Fascism begins in disrespect to man and ends in the destruction of man, in the destruction of nations - though not necessarily in the manner of Babyn Iar.

Let us imagine for a moment that Hitler had won, that German fascism had been victorious. One can be sure that the victors would have created a brilliant and "flourishing" society that would have attained a high level of economic and technical development and made the same scientific and other discoveries that we have made. Probably the mute slaves of fascism would eventually have "tamed" the cosmos and flown to other planets to represent humanity and earthly civilization. Moreover, this regime would have done everything in order to consolidate its own "truth" so that men would forget the price they paid for such "progress," so that history would excuse or forget their enormous crimes, so that their inhuman society would seem normal to people and even the best in the world. And then, not on the ruins of the Bastille but on the desecrated, forgotten sites of national tragedy, thickly choked with sand, there would have been an official sign: "Dancing Here Tonight."

We should therefore judge each society not by its external technical achievements but by the position and meaning it gives to man, by the value it puts on human dignity and human conscience.

Today, in Babyn Iar, we commemorate not only those who died here. We commemorate millions of Soviet warriors - our fathers - who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism. We commemorate the sacrifices and efforts of millions of Soviet citizens of all nationalities who unselfishly contributed to the victory over fascism. We should remember this so that we may be worthy of their memory and of the duty that has been imposed upon us by the countless sacrifices of human lives, hopes, and aspirations that were made.

Are we worthy of this memory? Apparently not, since even now various forms of human hatred are found among us - including one we call by the worn-out, banal, and yet terrible [name], anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is an "international" phenomenon. It has existed and still exists in all societies. Sadly enough, even our own society is not free of it. Perhaps there is nothing strange about this - after all, anti-Semitism is the fruit and companion of age-old barbarism and slavery, the foremost and inevitable result of political despotism. To conquer it - in entire societies - is not an easy task, nor can it be done quickly. But what is strange is the fact that no struggle has been waged here against it during the postwar decades; what is more, it has often been artificially nourished. It seems that Lenin's instructions concerning the struggle against anti-Semitism are forgotten in the same way as his precepts regarding the national development of Ukraine.

In Stalin's day, there were open and flagrant attempts to use prejudices as a means of playing off Ukrainians and Jews against each other - to limit the Jewish national culture on the pretext of Jewish bourgeois nationalism, Zionism, and so on, and to suppress the Ukrainian national culture on the pretext of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. These cunningly prepared campaigns wrought damage on both nationalities and did nothing to further friendship between them. They only added one more sad memory to the harsh history of both nations and to the complex history of their relationship.

We must return to these memories not in order to open old wounds but in order to heal them once and for all.

As a Ukrainian, I am ashamed that there is anti-Semitism here, as in other nations; that those shameful phenomena we call anti-Semitism - and which are unworthy of mankind - exist here.

We Ukrainians must fight against all manifestations in our midst of anti-Semitism or disrespect toward the Jews ....

You Jews must fight against those in your midst who do not respect Ukrainian people, Ukrainian culture, and the Ukrainian language - against those who unjustly see a potential anti-Semite in every Ukrainian.

We must outgrow all forms of human hatred, overcome all misunderstandings, and by our own efforts win true brotherhood.

It would seem that we ought to be the two nations most likely to understand each other, most likely to give mankind an example of brotherly cooperation. The history of our nations is so similar in its tragedies that, in the Biblical motifs of his "Moses," Ivan Franko recreated the story of the Ukrainian nation in terms of the Jewish legend. Lesia Ukrainka began one of her best poems about Ukraine's tragedy with the line: II And you fought once, like Israel. ... "

Great sons of both our nations bequeathed to us mutual understanding and friendship. The lives of the three greatest Jewish writers - Sholom Aleichem, Itskhok Peretz, and Mendele Moykher-Sforim - are bound up with Ukraine .... The brilliant Jewish publicist Vladimir Zhabotinsky fought on the Ukrainian side in Ukraine's struggle against Russian Tsarism and called upon the Jewish intelligentsia to support the Ukrainian national liberation movement and Ukrainian culture.

One of Taras Shevchenko's last civic acts was his well-known protest against the anti-Semitic policies of the tsarist government. Lesia Ukrainka, Ivan Franko, Borys Hrinchenko, Stepan Vasylchenko, and other leading Ukrainian writers well knew and highly valued the greatness of Jewish history and of the Jewish spirit, and they wrote of the suffering of the Jewish poor with sincere sympathy.

Our common past consists not only of blind enmity and bitter misunderstanding - although there was much of this, too. Our past also shows examples of courageous solidarity and co-operation in the fight for our common ideals of freedom and justice, for the well-being of our nations.

We, the present generation, should continue this tradition and not the tradition of distrust and reserve.

But, sadly enough, there are a number of factors which are not conducive to letting this noble tradition of solidarity take firm root.

One of these factors is the lack of openness and publicity given to the nationalities question. As a result, a kind of "conspiracy of silence" surrounds the problem. The attitude in socialist Poland could serve as a good example for us. We know how complicated the relations between Jews and Poles were in the past. Now there are no traces of past ill-feeling. What is the "secret" of this success? In the first place, the Poles and the Jews were brought closer together by the common evil of the Second World War. But we, too, had this evil in common.


Second - and this we do not have - in socialist Poland, relations between nationalities are the subject of scientific sociological study, public discussion, inquiries in the press and literature, and so on. All this creates a proper atmosphere for successful national and international enlightenment.

We, too, should care about and exert ourselves - in deed rather than just in word - on behalf of this kind of enlightenment. We must not ignore anti-Semitism, chauvinism, disrespect toward any nationality, a boorish attitude toward any national culture or national language. There is plenty of boorishness in our midst, and, in many of us, it begins with the rejection of ourselves - of our nationality, culture, history, and language - even though such a rejection is not always voluntary nor is the person involved always to be blamed.

The road to true and honest brotherhood lies not in self-oblivion but in self-awareness, not in rejection of ourselves and adaptation to others but in being ourselves and respecting others. Jews have a right to be Jews and Ukrainians have a right to be Ukrainians in the full and profound, not merely the formal, sense of the word. Let Jews know Jewish history, Jewish culture, and the Yiddish language and be proud of them. Let Ukrainians know Ukrainian history, Ukrainian culture and language and be proud of them. Let them also know each other's history and culture and the history and culture of other nations, and let them know how to value themselves and others -as brothers.

It is difficult to achieve this - but better to strive for it than to shrug one's shoulders and swim with the current of assimilation and adaptation, which will bring about nothing except boorishness, blasphemy, and veiled human hatred.

With our very lives, we should oppose civilized forms of hatred for mankind and social boorishness. There is nothing more important for us at the present time, because, without such opposition, all our social ideals will lose their meaning.

This is our duty to millions of victims of despotism; this is our duty to the better men and women of the Ukrainian and Jewish nations who have urged us to mutual understanding and friendship; this is our duty to our Ukrainian land in which we live together; this is our duty to humanity.

Source: Viacheslav Chornovil, ed., Lykho z rozumu: portrety dvadtsiaty "zlochyntsiv" (The Misfortune ofIntellect: Portraits of Twenty "Criminals") (Paris, 1967),303-8. Translation from Abraham Brumberg, ed., In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today (New York: Praeger, 1970).

_______________

Note:

Ivan Dziuba, literary critic and publicist, lives in Kiev. In the 1960s he was active in the Ukrainian dissident movement and was the author of Internationalism or Russification?, a samizdat (samvydav) work that demonstrated how the Soviet government had departed from Leninist nationality policy. Dziuba was arrested in 1972 and expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine. A year later he signed a public recantation and was released from prison. (Ed.)

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Chronology of Major Events
1914-45


1914

28 July / Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia
6 August / Ukrainski sichovi striltsi (Ukrainian Sich Riflemen) formed as a national legion within the Austrian Army

1917

17 March / Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) formed in Kiev in the wake of the Russian Revolution
20 November / Central Rada proclaims formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) as part of a future Russian federation

1918

22 January / Central Rada proclaims Ukrainian independence
9 February / UNR signs a peace treaty with Germany and the other Central Powers
1 November / Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), encompassing the Ukrainian lands formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary, is proclaimed in Lviv. The Polish-Ukrainian war begins

1919

22 January / The UNR and ZUNR unite
16 July / Polish forces push the Ukrainian Galician Army out of Galicia, after unsuccessful mediation attempts by the Allied Powers
Summer-Autumn / Period of intense civil war and chaos in Eastern Ukraine. UNR forces led by Symon Petliura battle with the Bolsheviks, Russian White Guards, and Nestor Makhno's anarchists; peasant bands nominally allied with the combatants, including Petliura, stage pogroms

1923

15 March / Council of Ambassadors recognizes Poland's claim to Galicia

1926

25 May / Symon Petliura assassinated in Paris by Samuel Schwartzbard, ostensibly to avenge pogroms against Jews

1929

28 January-2 February / First Congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) held in Vienna

1930

9 March / Show trial of forty-five Ukrainian intellectuals begins in Kharkiv; they are charged with forming the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and plotting to overthrow the government. All of them "confess" and are deported to concentration camps in Siberia
16 September / Polish government initiates a pacification campaign against the Galician Ukrainian population in retaliation for OUN activities

1932

25 January USSR-Poland non-aggression pact concluded

1933

30 January / Adolf Hitler appointed Chancellor of Germany
23 March / Hitler granted dictatorial powers
1 April / Persecution of Jews in Germany begins with national boycott of all Jewish businesses and professions
17 November / United States recognizes the Soviet Union. Famine caused by Soviet government actions sweeps Soviet Ukraine, claiming millions of victims

1934

26 January / Germany and Poland sign a non-aggression pact
14 June / OUN assassinates Bronislaw Pieracki, Poland's Minister of the Interior, in Warsaw. In the wake of this attack, a concentration camp is established near Bereza Kartuzka for Ukrainian nationalists and other anti-government activists
14 September / USSR admitted to the League of Nations

1935

15 January / Stalin's Great Purge begins in the USSR with the trial of Zinoviev and other prominent Bolsheviks
16 March / Germany repudiates disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty
15 September / Nuremberg laws outlaw Jews and make the swastika the official symbol of Nazi Germany

1936

7 March / In violation of the Treaty of Versailles, German forces occupy the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland
18 July / Spanish Civil War begins with the army revolt led by General Francisco Franco
24 November / Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany signed

1937

12 June / Stalin purges Soviet generals and much of the Red Army officer corps

1938

11 March / German troops enter Austria, declared part of the Third Reich on 13 March
23 May / Assassination of OUN leader levhen Konovalets in Rotterdam
1-14 / October German troops occupy the Sudetenland
8-14 / November Anti-Jewish pogroms break out in Germany; anti-Semitic legislation introduced in Italy on 10 November

1939

15 March / German troops occupy Bohemia and Moravia; CarpathoUkraine is proclaimed an independent state
March 16 / Carpatho-Ukraine occupied by Hungary with the tacit approval of Germany and Italy
March 28 / Hitler denounces Germany's 1934 non-aggression pact with Poland
22 May / Hitler and Mussolini sign the Pact of Steel, a ten-year political and military alliance
18 August / Soviet-German commercial agreement concluded
23 August / USSR and Germany sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a non-aggression agreement. The Anti-Comintern Pact collapses
27 August / Second OUN congress in Rome confirms Andrii Melnyk as leader
1 September / Germany invades Poland and annexes Danzig
3 September / Britain and France declare war on Germany
7 September / Germany overruns Pomerania and Silesia; by 10 September all of western Poland is under German control
17 September / USSR breaks its non-aggression treaty with Poland, invades it from the east, and annexes lands inhabited by Ukrainians and Belorussians to the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR
20-22 September / Legal Western Ukrainian parties are dissolved under the Soviet occupation. Sovietization begins with the prohibition of Ukrainian political and cultural organizations; arrests and deportations to Siberia follow
28 September / German armies reach Warsaw
30 September / German-Soviet treaty of amity settles the partition of Poland
8 October / Germany incorporates western Poland into the Third Reich
10 October / Deportation of Polish Jews to Lublin begins
12 October / German-occupied Polish territory reconstituted as the Generalgouvernement within the Third Reich
26-28 October / Narodni Zbory Zakhidnoi Ukrainy (People's Assembly of Western Ukraine), elected from a single slate of candidates on 22 October, meets to endorse a request for annexation
1 November / USSR Supreme Soviet approves the annexation of Western Ukraine
29 November / USSR attacks Finland
14 December / USSR is expelled from the League of Nations

1940

10 February / The Revolutionary Leadership of the ~UN, headed by Stepan Bandera, is formed in Cracow. The OUN splits into the Bandera and Melnyk factions, the OUN-B and OUN-M
10-11 February / Mass deportation of pre-war Polish colonists in Western 11 Ukraine to Kazakhstan and Siberia
12 March / Finland signs peace treaty with USSR, ceding the Karelian Isthmus and shores of Lake Ladoga
9 April / Germany invades Norway and Denmark
15 April / Ukrainian Central Committee, headed by Volodymyr Kubiiovych, is formed in Cracow to act as the representative of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement
2 May / Germany invades Holland, Luxemburg, and Belgium
21 May / Massacre of an estimated ten thousand Polish army officers in the Katyn forest, probably by the Soviets
17 June / USSR occupies Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
22 June / France concludes an armistice with Germany
27 June / USSR invades Romania after the refusal of King Carol to cede Bessarabia and Bukovyna. Romania appeals in vain for German aid
9 July / Romania places itself under German protection

1941

5 April / Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty
6 April / German ultimatum to Greece and Yugoslavia
13 April / USSR signs neutrality pact with Japan
May / Germans begin training Nachtigall and Roland military units composed of OUN-B volunteers
9 May / USSR withdraws recognition of Yugoslavia
3 June / USSR withdraws recognition of Greece
22 June / Germany invades the USSR. Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) forms the Einsatzgruppen SS (mobile killing units). Their main targets are Jews, Communists, and later Ukrainian nationalists
23-26 June / Before retreating from Ukraine, the NKVD (Soviet 26 security police) massacres approximately 19,000 prisoners in Lviv and other cities. Outbreaks of violence against Jews and suspected Communists follow discovery of the bodies
28 June / German troops capture Minsk
30 June / OUN-B proclaims Ukrainian statehood in Lviv. Iaroslav Stetsko forms a provisional government
1-6 July / Einsatzgruppen units C and 0 commence operations on Ukrainian territory; on 7 July, 7,000 Jews are shot in Lviv. By the end of the year, these and other German units are responsible for more than 850,000 executions; most victims are Jews
6 July / Soviet troops abandon occupied Poland and the Baltic states, retiring to the Stalin Line on the former frontier with Poland
12 July / OUN-B leaders Stetsko and Roman Ilnytzkyj are detained and deported to Germany to join Bandera, who is under German house arrest. British-Soviet agreement of mutual assistance signed in Moscow
16 July / German troops pierce the Stalin Line and take Smolensk
Romania occupies northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia. Ukrainian territory between the Boh and Dniester rivers is annexed to Romania and renamed Transnistria
29 July / Soviet Army invading Romania withdraws to the Dniester
30 July / Ukrainska natsionalna rada (Ukrainian National Council) formed in Lviv to represent Ukrainian political interests before the German authorities
1 August / Galicia is annexed to the former Polish lands as the fifth district of the Generalgouvernement
20 August / Erich Koch appointed Reichskommissar of Ukraine
September / Members of OUN-B task forces in Eastern Ukraine are systematically eliminated by the Einsatzgruppen
3 September / Germans advance to the outskirts of Leningrad and on 8 September take Schlusselburg, completing the land blockade of Leningrad
19 September / German troops take Kiev
11 September / First issue of the nationalist newspaper Ukrainske slovo, edited by OUN-M member Ivan Rohach, is published in Kiev
15 September / Bandera, Stetsko, and Ilnytzkyj are sent to a concentration camp
29-30 September / Three thousand Jews are murdered in Babyn Iar (Babi Yar) near Kiev; they are the first of 150,000 Jews, Ukrainians, and others to die there
1 October / German forces advance from Smolensk toward Moscow
2 October / German forces take Orel
5 October / Ukrainska natsionalna rada, with Mykola Velychkivsky as president, is formed in Kiev but suppressed after eight weeks
16 October / Germans advance to within sixty miles of Moscow. The Soviet government is transferred to Kuibyshev, but Stalin stays in Moscow
16 October / Odessa falls
24 October / Germans take Kharkiv
25 October / First German offensive against Moscow fails
3 November / German troops take Kursk
16 November / Second German offensive against Moscow begins
27 November / Red Army General Semen Tymoshenko launches a counteroffensive, forcing the Germans to evacuate Rostov, take•n on 23 November
29 November / Soviet counter-offensive in the Moscow sector begins
12 December / Ukrainske slovo, a Kiev newspaper, is suppressed by the Germans. Hitler decides on his "final solution" (Endlosung) to the "Jewish question" in Europe. This plan was agreed upon at the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942

1942

9 February / Ivan Rohach, the poetess Olena Teliha, and other OUN-M activists are shot by the Nazis in Babyn Iar near Kiev
Spring / Polissian Sich partisan group, commanded by Taras Bulba- Borovets, turns against Germans after initially fighting Soviet partisans
8 May / German troops attack Kerch Peninsula in the Crimea
13 May / Soviet forces make gains in the Kharkiv region
20 May / German troops take Kerch Peninsula
26 May / British-Soviet twenty-year alliance signed in London
28 June / German counter-attack launched in the Kharkiv region
Summer / Large-scale manhunts net the first of 2.3 million Ukrainian forced labourers (Ostarbeiter) who are sent to Germany
3 July / German forces take Sevastopol
28 July / German forces take Rostov and overrun the northern Caucasus
26 August / German forces reach Stalingrad
13 September / German all-out attack on Stalingrad begins
19 November / Soviet counter-offensive from Stalingrad surrounds the besieging German Army
1 December / Nachtigall dissolved after its members refuse to re-enlist; its officers are arrested by the Germans

1943

26 January / Soviets are victorious at Voronezh
30 January / Soviet forces destroy the German Army southwest of Stalingrad
31 January / General Paulus surrenders at Stalingrad
8 February / Soviet troops take Kursk
14-16 February / Soviet troops recapture Rostov and Kharkiv
15 March / Soviet troops forced to evacuate Kharkiv
26 March / USSR breaks off diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London
28 April / Proclamation of the formation of the Galician Division
30 June / The District of Galicia's SS Commander, Katzmann, declares the district "free of Jews" (Judenfrei). Up to 27 June, 434,329 Jews were "evacuated" from Galicia.
5 July / German offensive on Soviet front opens with Battle of Kursk
12-15 July / Soviet counter-offensive against Orel
13-17 July / An international medical commission with representation from neutral powers examines the graves of 9,439 victims of NKVD shootings (1937-8) in Vinnytsia
12 August / Soviet troops recapture Kharkiv
21-25 August / Third OUN-B Congress modifies the organization's platform, condemns National Socialism, and calls for democratic rights
24 September / Soviet forces cross the Dnieper River north of Kiev
25 September / Soviet forces take Smolensk
October 1943-June 1944 / Nazis publicly execute 1,541 OUN and UPA members in Galicia
6 / Kuban Peninsula is in Soviet hands
6 November / Soviet forces take Kiev
26 November / Soviet forces take Homel

26 December / Soviet forces succeed in recapturing two-thirds of Soviet territory captured by the Germans
1944
26 January / Andrii Melnyk, under house arrest since 1941, is detained and sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp
22 February / Soviet troops take Kryvyi Rih
2 April / Soviet forces enter Romania
11 April / Soviet forces re-enter the Crimea
May / Germany attempts to co-operate with the UPA against Soviet forces
21 May / Allies break through the Hitler Line in Italy
10 June / Murder of OUN-M deputy leader Oleh Olzhych-Kandyba in Sachsenhausen concentration camp
3 July / Soviet troops take Minsk, capturing 100,000 Germans
11-15 July / Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council formed as the political co-ordinating body of the Ukrainian underground
17-22 July / Galician Division routed at the Battle of Brody; 3,000 22 retreat, and 7,000 are killed, taken prisoner by the Soviets, or join local UPA units
23 July / Soviet troops cross the Curzon Line in Poland
26 July / USSR recognizes the pro-Soviet Lublin Committee of Polish Liberation as the authority for liberated Poland
28 July / Soviet troops take Brest-Litovsk
20 August / Soviet offensive in Bessarabia and Romania
30 August / Soviet troops enter Bucharest
5 September / USSR declares war on Bulgaria
29 September / Soviet forces invade Yugoslavia
September-October / Release of Stepan Bandera, Andrii Melnyk, and other Ukrainian political leaders; Germans attempt to win them back as allies
27 December / Soviet troops surround Budapest

1945

17-23 / January Soviet forces take Warsaw, Cracow, and Tilsit
17 March / Creation of the Ukrainian National Committee and Army Command, headed by General Pavlo Shandruk
29 March / Soviet forces cross the Austrian frontier
30 March / Soviet troops take Danzig
1 April / 30th (2d Ukr.) Regiment of the Galician Division temporarily disarmed by the Germans in Maribor, Slovenia
20 April / Soviet offensive on Berlin begins
26 April / U.S. and Soviet forces take Torgau
27 April / Galician Division transferred to the Ukrainian National Army commanded by General Shandruk and renamed the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army
30 April / Hitler commits suicide in Berlin
1 May / Surrender of the German Army on the Italian front
2 May / Berlin surrenders to Soviets
3 May / Allied forces enter Hamburg
6 May / British command agrees to accept the Ukrainian Division as surrendered enemy personnel
8 May / General Alfred Jodl oversees the capitulation of Germany to General Dwight Eisenhower
9 May / Soviets take Prague
29 June / Czechoslovakia cedes Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathia) to USSR
17 July / Conference attended by Stalin, Truman, and Churchill is held at Potsdam to settle the occupation of Germany
20 November / Trial of Nazi war criminals before the Allied tribunal opens at Nuremberg

APPENDIX B

The Canadian Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals

On 7 February 1985 the Honourable John C. Crosbie, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, announced the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals to be conducted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes of the Superior Court of Quebec.

The Commission, established under Part I of the Inquiries Act, is to conduct an investigation into alleged war criminals in Canada. It is also to attempt to determine whether any such persons are now resident in Canada.

The government has stipulated a reporting date of 31 December 1985 for the Commission's findings and recommendations.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

WHEREAS concern has been expressed about the possibility th;..t Joseph Mengele, an alleged Nazi war criminal, may have entered or attempted to enter Canada;

WHEREAS there is also concern that other persons responsible for war crimes related to the activities of Nazi Germany during World War II (hereinafter referred to as war criminals) are currently resident in Canada;

AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to adopt all appropriate measures necessary to ensure that any such war criminals currently resident in Canada or hereafter found in Canada, are brought to justice;

THEREFORE, the Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, advise that, pursuant to the Inquiries Act, a Commission do issue under the Great Seal of Canada, appointing the Honourable Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes, of the Superior Court of Quebec, to be Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act lito conduct such investigations regarding alleged war criminals in Canada, including whether any such persons are now resident in Canada and when and how they obtained entry to Canada, as in the opinion of the Commissioner are necessary in order to enable him to report to the Governor in Council his recommendations and advice relating to what further action might be taken in Canada to bring to justice such alleged war criminals who might be residing within Canada, including recommendations as to what legal means are now available to bring to justice any such persons in Canada or whether and what legislation might be adopted by the Parliament of Canada to ensure that war criminals are brought to justice and made to answer for their crimes."

The Committee of the Privy Council further advise that:

a) the Commissioner be authorized to adopt such procedures and methods as he may from time to time deem expedient for the proper conduct of the Inquiry and to sit at such times and at such places within or outside of Canada as he may decide from time to time;

b) the Commissioner be authorized to have complete access to personnel and all relevant papers, documents, vouchers, records and books of any kind in the possession of departments and agencies of the Government of Canada and be provided with adequate working accommodation and clerical assistance;

c) the Commissioner be authorized to engage the services of such staff and counsel as he deems necessary or advisable at such rates of remuneration and reimbursement as may be approved by the Treasury Board;

d) the Commissioner be authorized to rent office space and facilities for the Commission's purposes in accordance with Treasury Board policy;

e) the Commissioner be required to submit a report to the Governor in Council embodying his findings and recommendations and advice on or prior to December 31, 1985 and file with the Oerk of the Privy Council his papers and records as soon as reasonably may be after the conclusion of the inquiry;

f) the Commissioner be directed that the proceedings of the inquiry be held in camera in all matters where the Commissioner deems it desirable in the public interest or in the interest of the privacy of individuals involved in specific cases which may be examined;

g) the Commissioner be directed to follow established security procedures with regard to his staff and technical advisers and the handling of classified information at all stages of the inquiry;

h) the Commissioner be directed, in making his report, to consider and take all steps necessary to preserve:

a) the secrecy of sources of security information within Canada; and

b) the security of information provided to Canada in confidence by other nations;

i) the inquiry be known as the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals;

j) the Commissioner be authorized to engage the services of such experts and other persons as are referred to in section 11 of the Inquiries Act who shall receive such remuneration and reimbursement as may be approved by the Treasury Board; and

k) pursuant to section 37 of the Judges Act, the Honourable Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes be authorized to act as Commissioner in the said inquiry.

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ABWEHR (Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr). Intelligence and counterespionage service of the German armed forces high command.

ALLGEMEINE SS. General SS; main body of the prewar SS, composed of volunteers.

BAHNSCHUTZ. Armed, uniformed security police who defended railway lines.

BAUDIENST. Compulsory labour service.

BEKANNTMACHUNG. Official proclamation.

BUND DER DEUTSCHEN OFFIZIEREN. Union of German Officers.

CHEKA (Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia komissiia po borbe 5 kontrrevoliutsiei, spekuliatsiei i sabotazhem). All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Struggle against Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage. Soviet security police established in 1917; renamed GPU in 1922. qc. Canadian Jewish Congress.

CROWCASS. Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects.

OUN (Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv). Brotherhoods (Legions) of Ukrainian Nationalists.

DPs. Displaced Persons.

DYVIZIIA "HALYCHYNA" (GALICIA, GALIZIEN). See GALICIAN DIVISION.

EINSATZGRUPPE, EINSATZGRUPPEN (EG) DER SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI UNO DES SD. Special Operations Group(s) of the Security Police and the Security Service of the SS: SS/5D Special Task Force ("action team") for the liquidation of "undesirable" elements.

EINSATZKOMMANDO (EK) DER SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI UND DES SD. Special Operations Detachment of the Security Police; sub-unit of an EINSATZGRUPPE.

FORCES FRANCAISES DE L'INTERIEUR (French Interior Forces). Group of Resistance units in France during World War II.

GALICIAN (GALIZIEN) DIVISION. Ukrainian volunteer military formation recruited by the Germans largely in the district of Galicia (Halychyna). It was one of many non-German units in the WAFFEN-SS.

GAULEITER. Nazi Party leader responsible for party administration in a province or federal state.

GENERALGOUVERNEMENT (General Government for Occupied Poland). Polish territory conquered by Germany and placed by Hitler under a civilian administration on 25 October 1939. The portions of western Poland incorporated into the Reich were Danzig, East Prussia, the Wartaland, and the administrative district of Zeichenau and Upper Silesia; Galicia was added on 1 August 1941.

GESTAPO (Geheime Staatspolizez). State Secret Police.

GULAG (Glavnoe upravlenie lagerei NKVD). The central administration of prison camps. The term has come to refer to the network of Soviet prison camps and prisons.

HILFSWILLIGE (HIWIS). Volunteer auxiliaries used by German armed forces, chiefly to handle supplies.

HROMADSKI HOSPODARSTVA. Community farms; term applied to collective farms retained under German rule.

IADC. Information and Anti-Defamation Commission of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Montreal Chapter).

IGCR. Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

INS. Immigration and Naturalization Service; the U.S. government agency in charge of prosecuting alleged Nazi war criminals until 1979.

INTEGRAL NATIONALISM. A political doctrine based on the idea of the nation as the supreme value, on mystically conceived ideas of the solidarity of all the individuals making up the nation, and on the subordination of rational and analytical thought to "intuitively correct" emotions. Expression of the "national will" is carried out through a charismatic leader and an elite of nationalists organized in a single party.

IRO. International Refugee Organization.

JUDENRATE. Jewish Elected Councils. Established by decree of the Generalgouvernement, 28 November 1939; responsible for helping enforce Nazi orders affecting Jews, and for administration of all Jewish ghettos.

KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnostz). Committee for State Security; the official name of the Soviet security police since 1954.

KHLIBOROBSKA SPILKA. Agricultural association; the second stage of decollectivization under German rule.

KOLKHOZ (Kollektivnoe khoziaistvo). Soviet collective farm.

KOMSOMOL (Kommunistjcheskii soiuz molodezhi). The Young Communist League.

LANDWIRTSCHAFTSFUHRER or LA-FUHRER. Local German agricultural supervisor in the Reichskommissariat.

LUBIANKA. KGB headquarters, investigation, and isolation prison in Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow.

MP. Member of Parliament.

MVD (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del). Ministry of Internal Affairs; the name of the Soviet security organs, 1946-53.

NASA. National Aeronautics and Space Agency of the United States.

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NKVD (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del). The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs; an arm of the Soviet security organization, 1934-46.

OBLAST. Province.

ODVU (Orlumizatsiia derzhavnoho vidrodzhennia Ukrainy). Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine; an affiliate of the OUN-M in the United States.

OSI. Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Justice Department.

OSS. Office of Strategic Services of the U.S. government; predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency.

OSTARBEITER. Eastern European (forced) labourer during Nazi rule.

OSTMINISTERIUM. Short form of Reichsministerium fUr die besetzten Ostgebiete. Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories; headed by Alfred Rosenberg.

OSTTRUPPEN. Low-level German military units comprised of Eastern Europeans.

OUN (Orhanizatsiia ukrains1cykh natsionalistiv). Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. It split into two factions: the OUN-B, headed by Stepan Bandera, and the OUN-M, headed by Andrii Melnyk.

POKHIDNI HRUPY. OUN expeditionary groups organized by both factions.

POW. Prisoner of war.

PROSVITA. Ukrainian adult-education (enlightenment) society.

RCMP. Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

REICHSKOMMISSAR. Reich Commissioner; title of a Nazi chief of civilian administration in the occupied areas of Europe.

REICHSKOMMISSARIAT UKRAINE. Major territorial unit of German civil administration, in this case, of Ukraine; it included six sub-regions (Generalbezirke): Volhynia-Podillia, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Dnipropetrovske, Mykolaiv, and Crimea.

REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPIAMT (RSHA). Reich Central Security Office: SS department that controlled administration of the SD, the Gestapo, and Kripo (Criminal Police).

ROA (Russkaia osvoboditelnaia armiia). Russian Liberation Army under General Andrei Vlasov.

SAMIZDAT. "Self-published" illegal underground dissident works in the Soviet Union.

SCHUTZMANNSCHAFfEN. Local militia and auxiliary police under German supervision in occupied areas.

SD (Sicherheitsdienst). Security and intelligence service of the SS.

SEP CAMPS. Surrendered Enemy Personnel Camps (British).

SHTETL. Jewish settlements in Eastern Europe.

SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI. Security Police (Sipo); component of the SS.

SONDERKOMMANDO. Special assignment detachment; sub-unit of EINSATZGRUPPE(N).

SS. Abbreviation for Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad). Originally an elite Nazi para-military organization. Under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler it came to control the police and security service and created its own military force, the WAFFEN-SS.

SS DIVISION HALYCHYNA. See GALICIAN DIVISION.

TODT. A German military organization responsible for capital construction projects, named after its founder, a Nazi engineer.

UCC. Ukrainian Canadian Committee.

UHA (Ukrainska halytska armiia). Ukrainian Galician Army.

UHVR (Ukrainska holovna vyzvolna rada). Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.

UNA (Ukrainska natsionalna armiia). Ukrainian National Army.

UNC (Ukrainskyi natsionalnyi komitet). Ukrainian National Committee.

UNDO (Ukrainske natsionalno-demokratychne obiednannia). Ukrainian National Democratic Union.

UNO (Ukrainske natsionalne obiednannia). Ukrainian National Union.

UNR (Ukrainska narodnia respublika). Ukrainian People's Republic.

UNRA (Ukrainska narodnia revoliutsiina armiia). Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army.

UNRRA. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.  
UNTERMENSCHEN. Sub-humans; Nazi term for Slavs, Jews, and other "non-Aryans".

UNWCC. United Nations War Crimes Commission.

UPA (Ukrainska povstanska armiia). Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

USFET. United States Forces, European Theatre.

USS (Ukrainski sichovi striltsi). Ukrainian sich Riflemen.

UVV (Ukrainske vyzvolne viisko). Ukrainian Liberation Army.

VOLKSDEUTSCHE. Ethnic Germans residing outside German territories.

VVN (Viiskovi viddily natsionalistiv). Armed nationalist detachments of the OUN.

WAFFEN-SS. Military branch of the SS, which fought alongside the Wehrmacht.

WAFFEN-SS DIVISION GALICIA. See GALLICIAN DIVISION.

WEHRMACHT. German Armed Forces.

WERKSCHUTZ. Factory police, factory guards.

YAD VASHEM. Israeli Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, Jerusalem; research and documentation centre on the Holocaust.

ZAKORDONNE PREDSTAVNYTSTVO UHVR. The Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.

ZOGLINGE. SS auxiliary anti-aircraft brigades composed of fourteen-to-seventeen- year-olds. In 1944 "non-Aryan" boys and girls were forcibly recruited.

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SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY  

This selected bibliography is divided into four parts:

I. a brief listing of archival and manuscript materials in the Public Archives of Canada;

II. selected published sources that include:

1. bibliographies, guides, and aids to research;

2. documents, memoirs, and other primary sources by language (English, French, German, Polish, and Ukrainian); for Russian-language sources see the Parrish bibliography on p. 270;

3. secondary sources by language;

III. a subject bibliography on Ukrainians in Nazi concentration camps;

IV. a subject bibliography on U.S. cases and materials on denaturalization, deportation, and suspected Nazi war criminals, prepared by David Springer, an attorney with a Chicago law firm.

I. ARCHIVAL AND MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS

Note: Several authors in this volume cited sources in archival and manuscript repositories. Among these are the records of Holocaust survivors in Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, Israel; German government and military records in both the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and in Koblenz, West Germany; and the United Nations (UNRRA) records in New York. For more precise details, see the chapter endnotes and the source locations in the documents section. The following archival materials on the 1st Ukrainian Division's immigration to Canada and other related issues are housed in the Public Archives of Canada (Ottawa).

1. Immigration Branch Records

RG 76 vol. 656, file B53802 (1-2) Ukrainian Refugees, Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) 1946-52.

RG 76 vol. 800, file 547-1 Security examinations - regulations and procedures 1946-53.

RG 76 vol. 854, file 554-12 Cossack refugees - general file 1947-53.

RG 76 vol. 855, file 554-20 Kalmyk refugees - general file 1946-53.

RG 76 vol. 856, file 554-33 Ukrainian refugees - general file 1947-62.

RG 76 vol. 866, file 555-55 Resettlement in Canada of political refugees in co-operation with the United States 1952-53.

RG 76 vol. 866, file 555-57 Admission of 5,000 Displaced Persons (DPs) from Europe 1947-50 (P.C. 2180).

RG 76 vol. 866, file 556-61 Return to Canada of Canadian citizens who served in enemy forces - general file 1946-54.

RG 76 vol. 870, file 556-19-637 Admission and resettlement of Displaced Persons (DPs) in the United States 1946-65.

2. External Affairs - Canada House

RG 25 External Affairs, Special Research Bureau, 1936-1945. Information on war crime matters (restricted).

RG 25 A12 vol. 2087, file AR 22113 Enemy Nationals - Enforced Repatriation to respective countries from United Nations Territories 1946-48.

RG 25 A12 vol. 2109, file AR405/4112 United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) - Canadian War Crimes Investigations Unit 1945-51.

RG 25 F3d vols. 2607-09, War Crimes Documents, 1945-46. List of names and documents (6,000 pages) relating to the Central Registry of War Criminals, distributed by Allied governments. A list of files is available.

RG 28 F2c vols. 952-954, United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1944-1947. A list of files is available.

3. Citizenship and Immigration

RG 26 vol. 122, file 3-32-13 Volksdeutsch Refugees 1947-50.

RG 26 vol. 130, file 3-33-34 Admission to Canada of Ukrainians 1947-57.

RG 26 vol. 147, file 3-43-1 Includes Report on Ukrainians in Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) Camp No. 374 Italy by Refugee Screening Commission, 21 February 1947.

RG 26 vol. 166, file 3-25-11 (parts 1-3) Overseas Security Screening (with much policy material on admissibility of Nazi Party and Waffen-SS members, Nazi collaborators), 1947-58.

MG 28, V120 Canadian Lutheran World Relief, vol. 24, file 17, Waffen-SS, including reports 1949-55.

MG 28, V9 Ukrainian Canadian Committee, vol. 5, file "Galician" Division 1946-51.

Notice to Researchers: Researchers interested in obtaining information about individual applications for immigration to Canada from Europe during the period 1946-56 should write to Employment and Immigration Canada, Place du Portage, Phase N, 140 Promenade du Portage, Ottawa, Ontario KIA OJ9. The Public Archives of Canada in the Immigration Branch Record Collection (RG 76) has policy and general administrative and procedural files. There are some files dealing with individual cases that were perceived to be irregular or exceptional cases in the collection. In some cases these files are restricted.

The Public Archives of Canada does not have files on individual immigrants or applicants who wished to immigrate to Canada from Europe.

II. SELECTED PUBLISHED SOURCES

1. Bibliographies, Guides, and Aids to Research

Baudot, Marcel et al., eds. The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II. New York: Facts on File, 1980.

Bayliss, Gwyn M. Bibliographic Guide to the Two World Wars: An Annotated Survey of English-language Reference Materials. New York-London: Bowker, 1977.

Bienkowski, Wieslaw, ed. Bibliografia Historii Polski. Vol. 3, pt. 1, 1918-1945. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1974.

Bloomberg, Marty, and Hans H. Weber. World War II and Its Origins: A Select Bibliography of Books in English. Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1975.

Boshyk, Yury, and Boris Balan. Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Select Bibliography and Guide to Research, with Special Reference to the Ukrainians. Research Report No. 2. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982.

Boshyk, Yury, and Wlodzimierz Kiebalo, comps. Publications by Ukrainian "Displaced Persons" and Political Refugees: The John Luczkiw Collection, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Forthcoming.

Dallin, Alexander. liThe German Occupation of the U.S.S.R. in World War II: A Bibliography." External Research Paper. Washington, D.C.: Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, 1955.

Davies, Norman. Poland, Past and Present: A Select Bibliography of Works in English. Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1977.

Dekhtiarova, N.A. et aI., comps. "Ukrainska RSR u Velykii Vitchyznianii viini: pokazhchyk literatury za 1975-1985 IT." Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal (Kiev), no. 3 (288) (March 1985): 145-58; no. 5 (290) (May 1985): 153-8.

Enser, A.G.S., ed. A Subject Bibliography of the Second World War: Books in English. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977.

Funk, Arthur L., compo The Second World War: A Select Bibliography of Books in English since 1975. Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1985.

Gilbert, Martin. Atlas of the Holocaust. London: Michael Joseph in association with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1982.

Held, Walter, ed. Verbiinde und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS in Zweiten Weltkrieg: Eine Bibliographie der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsliteratur. Osnabrock: Biblio Verlag, 1978.

Hundert, Gershon David, and Gershon C. Bacon. The Jews in Poland and Russia: Bibliographical Essays. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Kehr, Helen, and Janet Langmaid, comps. The Nazi Era, 1919-1945: A Select Bibliography of Published Works from the Early Roots to 1980. London: Mansell, 1982.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographical Guide. Toronto: University of Toronto Press in association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983.

Parrish, Michael. The U.S.S.R. in World War II: An Annotated Bibliography of Books Published in the Soviet Union, 1945-1975, with an Addenda for the Years 1975-1980. 2 vols. New York-London: Garland, 1981.

Petryshyn, Roman W., and Natalia Chomiak, comps. Political Writings of Post-World War Two Ukrainian Emigres: Annotated Bibliography and Guide to Research. Research Report No.4. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984.

Phillips, Jill M. The Second World War in History, Biography, Diary, Poetry, Literature, and Film: A Bibliography. New York: Gordon, 1983.

Robinson, Jacob, and Henry Sachs, comps. The Holocaust: The Nuremberg Evidence. Part 1: Documents Digest, Index and Chronological Tables. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem and the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, 1976.

Smith, Myron J. The Secret Wars: A Guide to Sources in English. Vol. 1, Intelligence, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Resistance Movements, and Secret Operations, 1939-1945. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1980.

- World War II, The European and Mediterranean Theaters: An Annotated Bibliography. New York: Garland, 1984.

Snyder, Louis L. Encyclopedia of the Third Reich. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. Subject Bibliography of the Second World War: Books in English 1914-1978. London: Gower, 1977.

Tessin, Georg. Verbiinde und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waft en SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945. 13 vols. Osnabrock: Biblio Verlag, 1965-.

Tuider, Othmar, Anton Legler, and Hans-Egon Wittas, eds. Bibliographie zur Geschichteder Felddivisionenderdeutschen Wehrmacht und Waften-SS 1939-1945. Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches Museum (Militarwissenschaftliches Institut Militarwissenschaftl. Abteilung), 1976.

Walker, Malvin. Chronological Encyclopedia of Adolf Hitler and The Third Reich. New York: Carlton Press, 1978.

Wistrich, Robert. Who's Who in Nazi Germany. New York: Macmillan, 1982.

Ziegler, Janet. World War Two: A Bibliography of Books in English, 1945-1965. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971.

2. Documents, Memoirs, and Other Primary Sources

ENGLISH

Anatoli, A. (Kuznetsov, Anatoly). Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel. Translated by David Floyd. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970.

Arad, Yitzhak, Yisrael Gutman, and Abraham Margaliot, eds. Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem in co-operation with the Anti-Defamation League and Ktav Publishing House, 1981.

Bialer, Seweryn, ed. Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II. New York: Pegasus, 1969.

Dawidowicz, Lucy S., ed. A Holocaust Reader. New York: Behram House, 1976.

Detwiler, Donald S., ed. World War II German Military Studies. Vol. 19, pt. 7, The Eastern Theatre. New York-London: Garland, 1979.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Series C and D. 18 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-64. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949-64.

Ehrenburg, Ilya, and Vasily Grossman, eds. The Black Book: The Ruthless Murder of Jews by German-Fascist Invaders Throughout the Temporarily-Occupied Regions of the Soviet Union and in the Death Camps of Poland During the Warof1941-1945. Translated by John Glad and James S. Levine. New York: Holocaust Library, 1980.

Grudzinska-Gross, Irena, and Jan Tomasz Gross, eds. War Through Children's Eyes: The Soviet Occupation of Poland and the Deportations, 1939-1941. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1981.

Hilberg, Raul, compo Documents of Destruction: Germany and Jewry, 1933-1945. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971.

International Military Tribunal. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. 42 vols. Nuremberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, 1947-9.

Kugelmass, Jack, and Jonathan Boyarin, eds. and trans. From a Ruined Garden: The Memorial Books of Polish Jewry. Geographical index and bibliography by Zachary M. Baker. New York: Schocken Books, 1983.

Neumann, Peter. The Black March: The Personal Story of an SS Man. Translated by Constantine FitzGibbon. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1959.

Nomberg-Przytyk, Sara. Auschwitz: True Tales from a Grotesque Land. Edited by Eli Pfefferkorn and David H. Hirsch. Translated by Roslyn Hirsch. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

Panchuk, Gordon R. Bohdan. Heroes of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panch uk. Edited and with an introduction by Lubomyr Y. Luciuk. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1983.

Potichnyj, Peter J., and Yevhen Shtendera, eds. The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Forthcoming.

Ross, Graham, ed. The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Shandruk, Pavlo. Arms of Valor. Translated by Roman Olesnicki. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1959.

Shumuk, Danylo. Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner. Foreword by Nadia Svitlychna. Edited by Ivan Jaworsky. Translated by Ivan Jaworsky and Halya Kowalska. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984.

Strik-Strikfeldt, Wilfried. Against Stalin and Hitler: Memoir of the Russian Liberation Movement, 1941-1945. London: Macmillan, 1970.

Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10. 15 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-54.

United States, Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. 8 vols. and supplements A and B. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946-48.

Wells, Leon W. [eliczker]. The Death Brigade (The Janowska Road). 2d ed. New York: Holocaust Library, 1978.

FRENCH

Petit, Victor. "Journal de Marche 1944." [Commandant du Bataillon Ukrainien]. Lyon: Comite du Souvenir des soldats Ukrainiens morts pour la France, 1985 (mimeographed).

GERMAN

Frank, Hans. Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975.

Ilnytzkyj, Roman. Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945: Ein Vorbericht. 2 vols. Munich: Osteuropa-Institut, 1955.

UKRAINIAN

Bulba-Borovets, Taras. Armiia bez derzhavy: slava i trahediia ukrainskoho povstanskoho rukhu. Spohady. Winnipeg: Tovarystvo Yolyn, 1981.

Hunchak, Taras, ed. UPA v svitli nimetskykh dokumentiv. Vols. 6 and 7 of Litopys Ukrainskoi povstanskoi armii. Edited by Ievhen Shtendera and Petro Potichny. Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1983.

- and Roman So1chanyk, eds. Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: dokumenty i materiialy. 3 vols. New York: Suchasnist, 1983.

Kalba, Myroslav, ed. U lavakh druzhynnykiv: spohady uchasnykiv. Denver: Ukrapress, 1982.

Kary, Lukian. Krakh: dokumentalnyi roman z chasiv Druhoi svitovoi viiny. Baltimore-Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1985.

Kubiiovych, Volodymyr. Meni 70. Paris-Munich: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1970.

- Meni 85. Paris-Munich: Molode Zhyttia, 1985.

OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 r.: zbirka dokumentiv. n.p.: Zakordonni chastyny Orhanizatsii ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, 1955.

Pankivsky, Kost. Vid derzhavy do komitetu: lito 1941 roku u Lvovi. New York: Kliuchi, 1951. 2d ed. New York: Kliuchi, 1970.

- Roky nimetskoi okupatsii. New York: Kliuchi, 1965. 2d ed. New York: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1983.

Rudnytska, Milena, ed. Zakhidnia Ukra ina pid bolshevykamy, IX. 1939 - VI. 1941. New York: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka v Amerytsi, 1958.

Shandruk, Pavlo. "Tse bulo tak." Visti Bratstva kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, no. 3-4 (53-54) (1955): 2-6.

Shtendera, Ievhen, and Petro Potichny (PotichnyD, eds. Litopys Ukrainskoi povstanskoi armii. 10 vols. Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1976-.

3. Secondary Sources

ENGLISH

Abella, Irving, and Harold Troper. None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1982.

Arad, Yitzhak. "Jewish Family Camps in the Forests: An Original Means of Rescue." In Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, 333-53. Edited by Yisrael Gutman and Ephraim Zuroff. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977.

Armstrong, John A. Ukrainian Nationalism. 2d rev. ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Reprint. Littleton, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980.

- ed. Soviet Partisans in World War II. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.

- "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe." Journal of Modern History 40, no. 3 (September 1968): 396-410.

Aster, Howard, and Peter J. Potichnyj. Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes. Oakville, ant.: Mosaic Press, 1983.

- eds. Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Forthcoming.

Bardakjian, Kevork B. Hitler and the Armenians. Cambridge, Mass.: Zoryan Institute, 1985.

Bender, Roger James, and Hugh Page Taylor. Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen-SS. San Jose: R. James Bender, 1975.

Bethell, Nicholas. The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia, 1944-47. London: Andre Deutsch, 1974.

Bilinsky, Yaroslav. The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964.

Budurowycz, Bohdan. "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939." Canadian Slavonic Papers 25, no. 4 (December 1983): 473-500.

Buss, Phillip H., and Andrew Mollo. Hitler's Germanic Legions: An Illustrated History of Western European Legions with the SS [in Russia], 1941-1943. New York: Beekman House, 1978.

Carrell, Paul (Schmidt, Paul K.). Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War, 1943-1944. Translated from the German by Ewald Osers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.

Childs, David. The GDR: Moscow's German Ally. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983.

Ciechanowski, Jan M. The Warsaw Rising of 1944. New York-London: Cam. bridge University Press, 1974.

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45. New York: William Morrow, 1965.

Cooper, Matthew. The Phantom War: The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944. London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1979.

Dallin, Alexander. The Kaminsky Brigade, 1941-1944: A Case Study of German Military Exploitation of Soviet Dissatisfaction. Cambridge, Mass.: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1956.

- Odessa, 1941-1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory Under Foreign Rule. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1957.

- German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies. London: Macmillan, 1957. 2d rev. ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981.

Davies, Norman. God's Playground: A History of Poland. Vol. 2, 1795 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Dawidowicz, Lucy. The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.

De Jong, Louis. The German Fifth Column in the Second World War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

Dinnerstein, Leonard. America and the Survivors of the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Dmytryshyn, Basil. "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division 'Galicia'." American Slavic and East European Review 15, no. 1 (February 1956): 1-10. Elliott, Mark R. Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982.

Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

- The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983.

Ferencz, Benjamin B. Less Than Slaves: Jewish Forced Labor and the Quest for Compensation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Fireside, Harvey. Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Fischer, George. Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Fleming, Gerald. Hitler and the Final Solution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Friedman, Philip. Their Brothers' Keepers. New York: Crown, 1957. 2d ed. New York: Holocaust Library, 1978.

- "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation." YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 12 (1958-59): 259-96. Reprinted in his Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust, 176-208. New York-Philadelphia: Conference on Jewish Social Studies and The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980. Gelwick, Robert A. "Personnel Policies and Procedures of the Waffen SS." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1971.

Gross, Jan Tomasz. Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 1939-1944. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Hamerow, Theodore S. "The Hidden Holocaust." Commentary 79, no. 3 (March 1985): 32-42.

Higgins, Trumbull. Hitler and Stalin: The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 1937-1943. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961. Rev. ed. 3 vols. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985.

Hildebrand, Klaus. The Third Reich. Translated by P.S. Falla. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1985.

Homze, Edward L. Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Isajiw, Wsevolod, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, eds. "Displaced Persons" and Political Refugees: The Ukrainian Experience, 1945-54. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Forthcoming.

Kamenetsky, Ihor. Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956.

- Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961; College and Universities Press, 1964.

- "The National Socialist Policy in Slovenia and Western Ukraine during World War II." Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States 14, no. 37-38 (1978-80): 39-67.

Kochan, Lionel, ed. The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917. Introduction by Leonard Schapiro. London-New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Koehl, Robert L. RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.

- The Black Corps: The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.

Kolasky, John. The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1979.

Kosyk, Wolodymyr. "Ukraine's Losses During the Second World War." The Ukrainian Review 33, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 9-19.

Krawchenko, Bohdan . . Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine. London: Macmillan, 1985.

Levin, Dov. "The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina." Soviet Jewish Affairs 6, no. 2 (1976): 52-70.

Littlejohn, David. The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German Occupied Europe, 1940-1945. London: Heinemann, 1972.

Luduk, Lubomyr Y. "Searching For Place: Ukrainian Refugee Migration to Canada after World War II." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1984.

Lyons, Graham, ed. The Russian Version of the Second World War. New York: Facts on File, 1983.

Mace, James. "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in the Soviet Ukraine." In Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide, 67-83. Edited by I. Charny. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.

Marples, David. "The Ukraine in World War II." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL Supplement 1185. Munich: Radio Liberty, 6 May 1985 (mimeograph).

- "Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia Under Soviet Occupation: The Development of Socialist Farming, 1939-1941." Canadian Slavonic Papers 27, no. 2 Oune 1985): 158-77.

Manus, Michael R. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Mastny, Vojtech. The Czechs Under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939-1942. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

- Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Strategy, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Medvedev, Roy A. Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. New York: Knopf, 1971.

Mendelsohn, Ezra. The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1983.

Motyl, Alexander J. The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929. Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1980.

- "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921-1939." East European Quarterly 19, no. 1 (March 1985): 45-55.

Nekrich, Aleksandr M. The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War. New York: W.W. Norton, 1978. The Onslaught: The German Drive to Stalingrad. New York: W.W. Norton, 1985. Orbach, Wila. "The Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR." Soviet Jewish Affairs 6, no. 2 (1976): 14-51.

Palij, Michael. "The Problem of Displaced Persons in Germany, 1939-1950." In Almanakh Ukrainskoho narodnoho soiuzu na rik 1985, 28-37. Jersey City, N.J.: Svoboda, 1985.

Pearson, Raymond. National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945. London, Macmillan, 1983.

Petryshyn, Roman. "Britain's Ukrainian Community: A Study of the Political Dimension in Ethnic Community Development." Ph. D. dissertation, University of Bristol, 1980.

Piotrowski, Stanislaw. Hans Frank's Diary. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1961.

Polonsky, Antony. Politics in Independent Poland, 1921-1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

- and Boleslaw Drukier. The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland, December 1943-June 1945. London: Routledge and Kegan, 1980.

Prociuk, Stephan G. "Human Losses in the Ukraine in World War I and II." Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States 13, no. 35-36 (1973-77): 23-50.

Prociuk, Oksana, Leonid Heretz, and James E. Mace. Famine in the Soviet Ukraine 1932-1933: A Memorial Exhibition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard College Library, 1986.

Raschhofer, Hermann. Political Assassination: The Legal Background of the Oberlander and Stashinsky Cases. Tubingen: Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1964.

Redlich, Shimon. "The Jews in the Soviet-Annexed Territories, 1933-41." Soviet Jewish Affairs 1, no. 1 (June 1971): 81-90.

- Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia: The Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948. Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1982.

Reitlinger, Gerald. The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945. New York: Viking Press, 1960. Reprint. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975.

- The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945. 2d rev. and augm. edition. London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1968. New York: Beechurst Press, 1953. Reprint. New York: Yoseloff, 1968.

- The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945. New York: Viking Press, 1968.

Rich, Norman. Hitler's War Aims. 2 vols. New York: W.W. Norton, 1973-4.

Ryan, Allan A., Jr. Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984.

Saidel, Rochelle G. The Outraged Conscience: Seekers of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.

Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War, 1941-45. New York: Praeger, 1971.

- The German Army, 1933-45. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Stehle, Hansjacob. Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917-1979. Translated by Sandra Smith. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981.

Stein, George H. The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966.

Stephan, John J. The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.

Syndor, Charles W., Jr. Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Szporluk, Roman. "War By Other Means." Slavic Review 44, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 20-26.

Thorwald, Jurgen. The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Armies. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York-London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.

Tolstoy, Nikolai. Victims of Yalta. Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977. U.S. edition. The Secret Betrayal: 1944-47. New York: Scribner's, 1978.

- Stalin's Secret War. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982.

Trunk, Isaiah. Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

Tys-Krokhmaliuk, Yuriy. UPA Warfare in Ukraine: Strategical, Tactical and Organizational Problems of Ukrainian Resistance in World War II. Translated by Walter Dushnyck. New York: Society of Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army,1972.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Fight for Freedom. New York: United American Ukrainian Organization Committee of New York, 1954.

"Ukrainians in World War II: Views and Points." Nationalities Papers 10, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1-39.

Ukrainian Resistance: The Story of the Ukrainian National Liberation Movement in Modern. Times. New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1949.

United States, General Accounting Office. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States. "Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to Further U. S. Anti-Communist Objectives in Europe - Some Immigrated to the United States." Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 28 June 1985 (GAO/GGD-85-66).

Vago, Bela, and George L. Mosse, eds. Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe, 1918-1945. New York-Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.

Werth, Alexander. Russia at War, 1941-1945. New York: Carroll and Graf, 1984.

Wyman, David S. The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. New York: Pantheon, 1984.

Wynot, Edward. "'A Necessary Cruelty': The Emergence of Official Antisemitism in Poland, 1936-39." American Historical Review 76, no. 4 (October 1971): 1035-58.

Wytwycky, Bohdan. The Other Holocaust: Many Circles of Hell. Washington, D.C.: The Novak Report, 1980.

Zarnowski, Janusz, ed. Dictatorships in East Central Europe 1918-1939. Anthologies. Translated by Janina Dorosz. Wroc1aw: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1983.

FRENCH

De Launay, Jacques. La Grande Debacle, 1944-1945: Sept millions de civils fuient devant l'Armee rouge. Paris: Albin Michel, 1985.

GERMAN

Buchsweiler, Meier. Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs - ein Fall doppelter Loyalitat? Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1984.

Fleischhauer, Ingeborg. Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983.

Heike, Wolf-Dietrich. Sie wollten die Freiheit: Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division 1943-1945. Dorheim: Podzun-Verlag, n.d. [1973].

Hoffmann, Joachim. Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee. Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1984.

Kosyk, Wolodymyr. "Die Opfer der Ukraine wahrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs." Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde 1984, 116-26. Munich: Ukrainische Wissenschafte e.V., 1984.

Krausnick, Helmut. Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, 1938-1942. Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985.

- and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm. Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 1938-1942. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981.

Neufeldt, Hans-Joachim, Jurgen Huck, and Georg Tessin. Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei, 1936-1945. Koblenz: [Bundesarchiv], 1957.

Thorwald, Jurgen. Wen sie verderben wollen: Bericht des grossen Verrats. Stuttgart: Steingriiben-Verlag, 1952.

Weber, Hermann. Die Bukowina im Zweiten Weltkrieg: VOikerrechtliche Aspekte der Lage der Bukowina im Spannugsfeld zwischen Rumiinien, der Sowjetunion und Deutschland. Frankfurt-Main: In Kommission beim A. Metzner, 1972.

POLISH

Szczesniak, Antoni, and Wieslaw Z. Szota. Droga do nikad: dzialalnosc Organizacji Ukrainskich Nacjonalistow i jej likwidacja w Polsce. Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1973.

Torzecki, Ryszard. Kwestia ukraifzska w polityce III Rzeszy, 1933-1945. Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1972.

UKRAINIAN

Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, Instytut istorii. Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR: Ukrainska RSR u Velykii Vitchyznianiiviini Radianskoho Soiuzu, 1941-1945. Vol. 7. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1977.

Boiko, Iurii et al., eds. Ievhen Konovalets ta ioho doba. Munich: Fundatsiia im. Ievhena Konovaltsia, 1974.

Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv u 1941-1942 rokakh. Munich: Nasha knyhozbirnia, 1953.

Haike, Volf-Ditrikh [Heike, Wolf-Dietrich]. Ukrainska dyviziia "Halychyna": istoriia formuvannia i boiovykh dii u 1943-1945 rokakh. Translated by Roman Kolisnyk. Toronto: Bratstvo kol. voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1970.

Hirniak, Kost. Ukrainskyi Iehion samooborony: prychynky do istorii. Toronto: Nakladom starshyn i voiakiv lehionu, 1977.

Horak, Stepan. "Ukraintsi i Druha svitova viina: dosvid u spivpratsi z Nimechchynoiu, 1941-1942." Ukrainskyi istoryk 16, no. 1-4 (1979): 23-40; 17, no. 1-4 (1980): 58-70.

Kalba, Myroslav. "Nakhtigal" (Kurin OUN) u svitii faktiv i dokumentiv. Denver: Ukrapress, 1984.

Kedryn, Ivan. "Velykyi iskhod." In Aimanakh Ukrainskoho narodnoho soiuzu na 1985 rik, 17-27. Jersey City, N.J.: Svoboda, 1985.

Korduba, Feliks. "Der Generalplan Ost: u 40-richchia pokhodu III Raikhu proty SRSR." Ukrainskyi istoryk 18, no. 1-4 (1981): 153-73.

Krokhmaliuk, Roman. Zahrava na skhodi: spohady i dokumenty z pratsi u Viiskovii upravi "Halychyna" v 1943-1945 rokakh. Toronto-New York: Bratstvo kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1978.

Kubiiovych, Volodymyr. "Pochatky Ukrainskoi dyvizii 'Halychyna'." Visti Bratstva kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, no. 3-4 (41-42) (1954): 2-5.

- Ukraintsi v Henerainii hubernii, 1939-1941: istoriia Ukrainskoho tsentrainoho komitetu. Chicago: Mykola Denysiuk, 1975.

Lebed, Mykola. Ukrainska povstanska armiia: ii geneza, rist i dii u vyzvoinii borotbi ukrainskohonarodu. Vol. 1, Nimetska okupatsiia Ukrainy. n.p.: Presove biuro UHVR, 1946.

Levytsky, Myron, ed. Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska. 2d rev. ed. Winnipeg: Ivan Tyktor, 1953.

Lysiak, Oleh, ed. Bii pid Broda my: zbirnyk stattei u trydtsiatlittia. Munich: Bratstv'o kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1951. 2d rev. and augm. ed. New York: Bratstvo kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1974.

Maruniak, Volodymyr. Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini. Vol. 1, Roky 1945-1951. Munich: Akademichne vydavnytstvo Petra Beleia, 1985.

Matla, Zynovii. Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa. Munich: Nasha knyhozbirnia, 1952.

Melnyk, Kost, Oleh Lashchenko, and Wasyl Veryha, eds. Na zov Kyieva. Toronto: Olzhych Institute, 1985.

Nebeliuk, Myroslav. Pid chuzhymy praporamy. Paris-Lyon: Persha ukrainska drukamia u Frantsii, 1951.

Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, 1929-1954. Paris: Persha ukrainska drukamia u Frantsii, 1955.

Ortynsky, Liubomyr. "Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv (OUN)." Visti Bratstva.kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, no. 6-7 (20-21) (1952): 4-7.

OUN u viini 1939-1945. n.p.: Informatsiinyi viddil OUN, 1946 (mimeograph). Rebet, Lev. Svitla i tini OUN. Munich: Ukr.1inskyi samostiinyk, 1964.

Shankovsky, Lev. Pokhidni hrupy OUN: prychynky do istorii pokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentralnykh i skhidnikh zemliakh Ukrainy v 1941-1943 rr. Munich: Ukrainskyi samostiinyk, 1958.

- Ukrainska armiia v borotbi za derzhavnist. Munich: Dniprova khvylia, 1958.

Shuliak, O. (Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych). V imia pravdy: do istorii povstanchoho rukhu v Ukraini. Rotterdam: Provid ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, 1947.

Tytarenko, Petro. "Protypantsyrna bryhada Vilna Ukraina." Visti Bratstva kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, no. 6-7 (20-21) (1952): 3.

Veryha, Vasyl. Dorohamy Druhoi svitovoi viiny: legendy pro uchast ukraintsiv u zdushuvanni Varshavskoho povstannia v 1944 r. ta pro Ukrainsku dyviziiu "Halychyna." 2d rev. ed. Toronto: Bratstvo kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1981.

- Pid sontsem Italii. Toronto: Bratstvo kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1984.

Zelenko, Kostiantyn. "Shche pro dyviziiu 'Halychyna'." Ukrainskyi samostiinyk 23, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1972): 26-32; 24, no. 1 (January 1973): 25-32; 24, no. 2 (February 1973): 30-41.

Zeleny, Zenon. Ukrainske iunatstvo v vyri Druhoi svitovoi viiny. Toronto: Bratstvo kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA, 1965.

Zlochyny komunistychnoi Moskvy v Ukraini vliti 1941 roku. New York: Prolog, 1960.

III. UKRAINIANS IN NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Note: All RB numbers refer to an accession number in the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library catalogue, University of Toronto. These sources can be found in Yury Boshyk and Wlodzimierz Kiebalo, comps., Publications by Ukrainian "Displaced Persons" and Political Refugees: The John Luczkiw Collection, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; forthcoming). The archives of the Liga Ukrainskykh Politychnykh Viazniv (League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners) are now in the possession of Mykhailo H. Marunchak, Winnipeg, Canada.

Bazhansky, Mykhailo. Mozaika kvadriv viaznychnykh. Aschaffenburg: Tovarystvo ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv, 1946. (RB 127206)

Beskyd [Tarnovych1, luliian. Liudy bez prizvyshch. Regensburg: Ukrainske slovo, 1946. (RB 127683)

Dansky, O. Khochu zhyty: obrazky z nimetskykh kontsentratsiinykh taboriv. Munich: Ukrainska vydavnycha spilka, 1946. (RB 127187)

Ianiv, Volodymyr. Nimetskyi kontsentratsiinyi tabir: sproba kharakterystyky. Dopovid na pershu naukovu konferentsiiu NDIUM. Munich: Naukovo-doslidnyi instytut ukrainskoi martyrolohii, 1948. (RB 127789)

Illaw, Mykhailo. German Concentration Camps: Memoirs. New York: Former Ukrainian Political Prisoners, 1983.

Informatsii Holovnoi upravy Tovarystva ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv (Munich), nos. 1-3 (1946). (RB 130233)

Izhyk, Semen. "Christmas in a Nazi Concentration Camp." Ukrainian Echo (Toronto), 16 February 1983.

K.V. and T.A. Chomu svit movchyt? Ukraintsi v kontsentratsiinykh taborakh Nimechchyny 1940-1945 rr. 2d ed. Paris: n.p., 1945-6. (RB 127593)

Kalendarets ukrainskoho politviaznia. Munich: Liga ukrainskykh politviazniv, 1947. (RB 130383)

Kyshenevyi kalendarets ukrainskoho politviaznia (1948). Munich: Vasyl Pasichniak, 1948. (RB 130379)

Litopys politviaznia (Munich), nos. 1-11 (1946-7). (RB 130252)

Maletych, I. Try khresty: opovidannia z zhyttia ostarbaiteriv. Regensburg: Promin, 1948. (RB 127860)

Malashchuk, Roman. "Return from the Dead, Easter 1945." Ukrainian Echo, 9 May 1979.

Martynets, Volodymyr. Bratz - nimetskyi kontsentratsiinyi tabir: spohady viaznia. Stuttgart: Tovarystvo ukrainskykh politviazniv, 1946. (RB 127132)

Marunchak, Mykhailo H. Systema nimetskykh kontstaboriv i polityka vynyshchuvannia v Ukraini. Winnipeg: Zahalna biblioteka "UKT," 1963.

- Za gratamy drotamy natsional-sotsiialistychnoi Nimechchyny. Winnipeg: Committee of Former Ukrainian Political Prisoners, 1985.

Mirchuk, Petro. Unimetskykh mlynakh smerty: spomyny z pobutu v nimetskykh tiurmakh i kontslaherakh, 1941-1945. New York-London: Ukrainskyi soiuz politychnykh viazniv, 1957.

- In the German Mills of Death. New York: Vantage Press, 1976.

Mostovych, Leonidas. "Recollections: Former Prisoner Recalls Life and Death in Nazi Camps." Ukrainian Weekly (Jersey City) 8, no. 36 (8 September 1985): 7.

Obvynuvachuvalnyi vnesok ukrainskoi hromadskosty do mizhnarodnoho sudu nad natsional-sotsiialistychnymy kerivnykamy Nimechchyny. Geneva: Orhanizovana ukrainskahromadskist, 1946. (RB 128581)

Osynka, Paladii. Albom politviaznia. Munich, 1946. (RB127123)

Pershyi kongres ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv. Munich: Liga ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv, 1946. (RB 129855)

Politviazen: biuleten Ligy ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv (Munich) nos. 1-4 (1946): (RB 130287)

Rozdolsky, Roman. "Nevilnyky i smertnyky (Spomyn pro Osventsim i Birkenau)." Oborona (Newark), no. 7 (January 1956). Reprint. Diialoh (Toronto), no. 10 (1984): 84-8.

V pamiat poliahlykh ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv. n.p.: Tovarystvo ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv - Tsentralia, 1946. (RB 128414)

Zavdannia ukrainskoi martyrolohii. Munich: Liga ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv, 1947. (RB 128457)

IV. U.S. CASES AND MATERIALS ON DENATURALIZATION, DEPORTATION, AND SUSPECTED NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

1. Cases

Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944)
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912)
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949)
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946)
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)
Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913)
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)
Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958)
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943)
Simons v. United States, 333 F.Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1971)
Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926)
United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F.Supp. 1362 (N.D.Ohio 1981), aff'd per curiam, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982)
United States v. Dercacz, 530 F.Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F.Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981)
United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917)
United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F.Supp. 72 (E.D.Pa. 1983), rev'd, 744 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1984), panel opinion vacated and rehearing en banc granted
United States v. Koziy, 540 F.Supp. 25 (S.D.Fla 1982), aff'd 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 105 S.Ct. 130 (1984)
United States v. Kungys, 571 F.Supp. 1104 (D.N.].), appeal docketed (3d Cir. 1983)
United States v. Linnas, 527 F.Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd per curiam without opinion, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982)
United States v. Mansour, 170 F. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), aff'd per curiam without opinion, 226 U.S. 604 (1912)
United States v. Minerich, 250 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1957)
United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 (1917)
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963)
United States v. Osidach, 513 F.Supp. 51 (E.D.Pa. 1981)
United States v. Palciauskas, 559 F.supp. 1294 (M.D.Fla. 1983), aff'd, 734F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Profaci, 274 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1960)
United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1964)
United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962)
United States v. Schellong, 717F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -,104 S.Ct. 1002 (1984)
United States ex reI. Leibowitz v. Schlotfeldt, 94 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1938)
United States v. Stromberg, 227 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1955)
United States v. Theodorovich, 102 F.R.D. 587 (D.D.C. 1984)
United States v. Tooma, 187 F.Supp. 928 (E.D.Mich. 1960)
United States v. Trifa, 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2239 (1982).
United States v. Walus, 453 F.Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd, 616F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980)

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Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary. 95th Congress, 2d Session, 1978.

Baltic States Investigation: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R., Part 1, House of Representatives. 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953.

Bittman, Ladislav. The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare. Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972.

Blum, M. Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1977.

Cermack, John F., Jr. "The Effect of Government Knowledge on Denaturalization Proceedings: A Return to Illegal Procurement?" American University Law Review 30, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 519-76.

Cohen, Robert A. "United States Exclusion and Deportation of Nazi War Criminals: The Act of October 30, 1978." International Law and Politics 13 (1980): 101-33.

"Comment, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals: Is There Sufficient Justice for Those Who Would Not Dispense Justice?" Maryland Law Review 40 (1981): 39-89.

Communist Bloc Intelligence Activities in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

Communist Bloc Intelligence Activities in the United States, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1976. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

Communist Forgeries: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, June 2, 1961. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.

Concurrent Resolution with Respect to the Baltic States and Soviet Claims of Citizenship Over Certain Citizens of the United States: Senate Report. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Report Submitted to the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Department of State, February 3, 1978. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Department of State, February 4, 1980. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, for the Department of State, February 2, 1981. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Department of State, February 1981. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

"Denaturalization and the Right to Jury Trial." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 71, no. 1 (1980): 46-50.

Gerson, Allan. "Beyond Nuremberg." Commentary 72, no. 4 (October 1981): 62-6.

Helling, Lisa L. "U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe During the Carter Administration." Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 9, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 85-118.

Human Rights and the Baltic States: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 96th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Security Assistance: Report Submitted to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, by the Department of State, April 25, 1977. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

Immigration and Naturalization Service Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary. 93rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.

Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary. 96th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia: Sixth Interim Report of Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives. 83rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of the Non-Russian Nations of the U.S.S.R.: Eighth Interim Report of Hearings Before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives. 83rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

Lehman, William. "Nazi War Criminals Living in the United States."

Congressional Record - Extensions of Remarks, no. 18 (2 March 1982), E690.

The MacNeil/Lehrer Report: Human Rights. New York: MacNeil/Lehrer Report, 10 February 1981.

Maxey, David W. "Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat?" Albany Law Review 164 (1962): 151.

Quinlan, James. "Due Process and the Deportable Alien: Limitation on State Department Participation in Withholding of Deportation Inquiry." Catholic Lawyer 22 (Autumn 1976): 275-86.

Remeikis, Thomas. Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945-1980. Chicago: Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980.

- ed. The Violations of Human Rights in Soviet Occupied Lithuania: A Report for 1979-80. Glenside, Pa.: The Lithuanian American Community, 1981.

Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and Forced Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R.: Third Interim Report of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives. 83rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

Roche, John P. "Comments: Pre-Statutory Denaturalization." Cornell Law Quarterly 35 (1949): 120-37.

Second Interim Report of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives. 83rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, D.C., 1954.

Solovyov, Vladimir. "Knowing the KGB." Partisan Review, no. 2 (1982).

Soviet "Active Measures": Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, October 1981. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 88. Washington, D.C.

Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives. 96th Congress, 2d Session, 6 and 19 February 1980. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.

Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Reports of Helsinki Accord Monitors in the Soviet Union. 1978.

Taylor, Telford. Courts of Terror: Soviet Criminal Justice and Jewish Immigration. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976.

[admin]

INDEX

A
Abwehr, , 70
Allgemeine SS,75-6
Allied Council of Ambassadors, 68
Anders, Wladyslaw, 55 n.37, 61-2
Auschwitz, 29, 48
Austria-Hungary, 67
Auxiliary police. See Schutzmannschaftt
8
Babyn Iar, 56-7 n. 63, 243-6
Bahnschutz, 64
Bakst, Valentyn, 51
Baltic states, 6, 25, lOS, 109, 146, 149
Bandera, Stepan, IS, 54 n.27, 70, 71, 72,
79. See also Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists, Bandera faction
Baudienst, 64
Bazar, 23
Belgium, 44
Belorussia, 63, 72
Belorussians, 4, 5, 6, 95
Berdychiv, 36 n.141
Berlin, 63, 64
Bessarabia,71
Biletsky, Roman, 48
Bisanz, Alfred, 77
B'nai B'rith, Anti-Defamation League of,
10S-10
B'nai B'rith, League for Human Rights of,
110, 116, 119, 122, 141
Bohoun Battalion, 64
Bormann,~artin,24
Borshchiv, 48
Brody, Battle of, 63, 7S, 95
Brotherhood of Veterans of the 1st Division
of the Ukrainian National Army,
110
Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists,
62-3, 71-2, 77
Buchenwald, 29
Bukovyna, 3,24
Bulba-Borovets, Taras, 64, 72-3
C
Canadian Armed Forces, 62
Canadian Bar Association, 119
Canadian Council of Christians and Jews,
12S
Canadian Criminal Code, 118, 119
Canadian Jewish Congress, 110, 125, 127,
129 n.8
Canadian Jewish News, 126
Canadian War Crimes Act, 119
Canaris, Wilhelm, 69
Carpatho-Ukraine, 18, 33 n.29, 34 n.82,
62,69-70
Cheka, 43, 142
Chortkiv,12
Collective farms, 9,26,31
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals,
121-2, 158
Cossacks,94
288 Index
Cracow, 40, 70, 71, 75
Croatia, 94, 95
Czechoslovakia, 68, 69, 73, 97
D
Dawidowicz, Lucy, 56-7 n.63, 126
Deschenes, Jules, 110, 121. See also
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals
Displaced Persons, 98-9, 103 n.41, 145-8,
157,209-22,225-32
rhtiproperrovske,21,30
Dobki,49
Dobromyl, 12, 43, 53 n.17
Donbas, 19,20,22,30,31,37 n.l56
Dubno,43
E
Einsatzgruppen, 17, 23, 42, 52 n.16
Estonia, 109, 143
Estonians, 5, 134, 145
F
Famine (in Ukraine), 8, 13, 54 n.36, 82,
115, 119, 150
Fascism, 44, 45, 65, 68-9, 81, 155
1st (First) Ukrainian Division. See Galician
Division
France, 44, 45, 64, 146
Frank, Hans, 74, 81
Free Ukraine Brigade, 63
Freitag, Fritz, 77, 80
French Resistance, 62, 64, 78, 150
G
Galicia, 67, 68, 73
Galician Division, 45, 47, 62, 63, 64, 65,
67, 75-82, 95, 113, 123, 124, 129 n.8,
141,183-5,233-42
Gehlen, Reinhard, 91
Generalgouvernement (of Poland), 24, 67,
73,74,75
Geneva Conventions Act, 119
Gestapo, 5, 7, 118, 132, 144, 162
Goebbels, Joseph, 91
Goering, Hermann, 24, 26, 29
Graukopf Battalion, 96
Greenspan, Edward, 127
Gypsies, 47, 55 n.42
H
Helsinki accords, 117
Heu-Aktion, 47
Hilberg, Raul, 56-7 n.63, 149
Hilfswillige (Hiwis), 64, 93-4, 97
Hirnmler, Heinrich, 17,29,49,56 n.53, 76,
90, 91, 95, 96
Hitler, Adolf, 17, 18, 23, 25, 28, 31, 68, 69,
80, 90, 94, 149
Holland,44
Holtzman, Elizabeth, 107
Horodenka, 49
Hungary, 18,24,62,69-70
Immigration and Nationality Act, 107
Institute for the Study of Foreign
Countries (Kiev), 138
J
Japan, 44
Jary, Riko, 71
Jews, 4, 16, 17,23,27,29,36 n.141, 39-57,
75, 90, 96, 98, 99, 110, 114-6, 118, 134,
138,140,142,144,162,215-6,219
Judenrate, 46, 54 n.32
K
Kairys, Liudas, 132
Kaminskii, Bronislav (Brigade), 96
KGB, 131-5, 138
Kharkiv, 15, 27
Khrushchev, Nikita, 139
Khvylovy, Mykola, 21
Khyriv, 26
Kiev, 20, 24, 27, 34 n.82, 72, 89, 128, 138
Koch,Erich,23-4,26,27,28,29,34-5
n.86, 73, 128, 159
Koesrring, Ernst, 91
Kolomyia, 49
Komsomol, 37 n.156, 65
Konovalets, Ievhen, 68, 70
Kouch,48
Krasin, Victor, 132
Krat, Mykhailo, 80
Kremenchuk,41,46
Index 289
Kremianets,43
Krukovsky, Osyp, 64, 78
Kryvyi Rih, 21, 30
Kubiiovych (Kubijovy~), Volodymyr, 74,
76, SO, 81, 8S n.54
Kudrynky, 42
Kungys, Jouzas, 161
L
Laba, Vasyl, 77
Latvia, 109
Latvians,5,145
Linnas, Karl, 143
Lithuania, 109, 110
Lithuanians,S, 118, 134, 145, 162
Littman, Sol, 81, 113, 122, 124
Livytsky, Andrii, SO
Lokot,96
Lutske, 12, 43
Lviv, 12,25,40,43,46,49,53 n.17, 63, 71,
72,77
M
Marko, Reverend, 51
Melnyczuk, Helena, 49
Melnyk, Andrii, 18, 70, 72, SO. See also
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
Mihailovic, DraZa, 62
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 3, 6-7, 62, 70,
132
Moroz, Valentyn, 129
Mykolaiv,,21, 24, 142
N
Nachtigall. See Brotherhoods of Ukrainian
Nationalists
Nationalist Military Detachments, 62-3,
70
NATO, 138, 139
Neuhammer, 78, 95
NKVD, 5, 7, 11-12, 16, 17, 43, 53 n.17
Novychenko, Leonid, 137
Nuremberg Trials, 43, 81, 108, 109, 118,
155
o
Office of Special Investigations (051),
108, 131-5, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150
Odessa, 24
Onatsky, levhen, 69
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine
(ODVU),151
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
(OUN), 9, 18-20,37 n.156, 40-1, 45,
47,48,68-73,81,142,165-74,186-91
Bandera faction, 18,20,23,25,29,30,54
n.27, 63, 65, 67, 71, 73, 77
Expeditionary groups, 18-19, 23, 30, 71
Melnyk faction, 18, 20, 23, 65, 70, on, 73,
77
Ostarbeiter, 15, 28, 47, 89, 99, 149
Ostministerium, 23
Osttruppen, 25, 35 n.101, 62-5, 90-9, 103
n.39
p
Pachybula, M., 48
Palciauskas, Kazys, 162
Pannwitz, Helmut von, 94
Peremyshliany,48
Petain,74
Pobihushchy, levhen, 71
Poland, 3, 4, 8-9, 39, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74,
75, 108
Poliska (Polissian) Sieh, 64, 72-3
POWs. See Soviet POWs
Poltava,20
Poryts,42
Proskurlv, 142
Prosvita, 21, 23
Pozychaniuk, Osyp, 65
Q
Quisling, 74
R
Radio Liberty, 138, 141, 142
Rauca, Helmut, 110, 113, 120 n.1, 154
Ravensbriick,29
Red Cross, 21, 26, 28, 74
Refugees, 73,89,98-9
Reiehskommissariat Ukraine, 23-4, 73
Repatriation, 99,202-8
Rivne, 12,24,27
ROA (Russkaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia). See
V1asov, Andrei
290 Index
Rohatyn,49
Roland. See Brotherhoods of Ukrainian
Nationalists
Romania,3,24,29,62,108
Romansky, 46
Rosenberg, Alfred, 23, 24, 26, SO, 89
Rudenko, Roman, 148, 160
Russia, 68
Ryan, Allan A. Jr., 108, 143, 145-52, 160,
161
Rybak, Danylo, 48
S
Sachsenhausen, 72
Sambir, 12, 43, 48, 53 n.18
Saubersdorf, 70
Schutzmannschaften, 25, 45, 46, 63, 64, 65,
72,78
Screenings, 147, 148, 223-4
Senytsia, 46
Shandruk, Pavlo, 64, SO
Sheptytsky, Andrei, Metropolitan, II,
49-51,72,76-7,139
Sher, Neal, 108
Shevchenko Battalion, 64
Shukhevych,Roman,63,71,72,77,78
Shumuk, Oanylo, 65
Sichovi striltsi, 63, 67, 78
Simes, Dimitri, 86 n.76, 141-2
Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust
Studies (Los Angeles), 151
Siave labour. See Ostarbeiter
Slovakia, 70, 78, 95
Slovenia, SO
Sokoluk,48
Solovy, Franko, 49
Soviet deportations, 10-11
Soviet prisoners of war, 8, 9, IS, 16, 21,
25-6,64,89-99,176-7
Soviet Ukraine, 15, 31, 54-55 n.36
Stalin, Joseph, 16, 21, 22, 30, 31, 44, 69,
82,89,99
Stalingrad, Battle of, 13, 63, 95
Stalino, 41
Stalin's purges, 3, 8, 12, 16,21, 134
Stanyslaviv, 12
Stetsko, Iaroslav, 54 n.27, 71, 72
Stryi,43
Stsiborsky, Mykola, 68
Svoboda, Ludvilk,62
Sumy Division, 63, 95
Sushko, Roman, 62, 70
T
Temopil, 43, 53 n.17
Tito, 62, SO, 94
Tovste,49
Transnistria, 24, 29
Turkish Division, 95
Tyrnoshenko, Semen, 8
U
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church, 21, 77
Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox
Church,21
Ukrainian auxiliary police. See
Schutzmannschaften
Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC),
110, 113, 121, 125
Ukrainian Catholic Church, 10, 48, 49-51,
67, 139
Ukrainian Central Committee, 67, 74-5,
78, SO, 81
Ukrainian Galician Army, 19,67
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UP A), 6,
29-30, 42, 45, 48, 52 n.14, 62, 63, 64, 65,
72, 73, 77, 78, 82, 142, 144, ISO, 192-5
Ukrainian Liberation Anny, 62, 63, 80
Ukrainian Military Organization, 68
Ukrainian National Army, 62, 64, 200-1
Ukrainian National Association, 151
Ukrainian National Committee, 24, 64, 80,
200-1
Ukrainian National Council, 49
Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army,
64
Ukrainian National Union, 74
Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), 65,
67,68,80
Ukrainian Publishing House, 75
Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council
(UHVR),41,65, 73, 196-9
Ukrainians:
in concentration camps, 29, 55 n.38, 72
in Red Army, 30-1
291 Index
in Soviet partisans, 30-1, 61
Untermensch policy, 29, 72, 90-2, 98, 149
United Hetman Organization, 151
United Nations, 116
V
Vinnytsia, 24, 43, 53 n.17
Vlasov, Andrei, 62, 63,78, SO, 95-6, 97,
98,99
Volhynia, 68
Volksdeutsche, 25, 73, 146
Voroshylovhrad, 20
Voskoboinikov,96
Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, 20
w
Wachter, Otto, 76, 78
Waffen-SS, 75-6. See also Galician Division
Walus, Frank, 157
Warsaw Uprising (1944), 80, 96
Wawryniuk,46
Wehrmacht, 19-20, 24, 25, 26, 71, 72, 77,
89,91,92-7
Werkschutz, 64
Wiesenthal, Simon, 113, 118, 122-6, 140,
157
y
Yachenko, Vasyl, 143
Yad Vashem, 48, 55-6 n.50
Yalta agreement, 151
Yugoslavia, 108
Z
Zahajkiewkz, Orest, 49
Zamosc,74
Zavaliv,48
Zhdanov, Andrei, 31
Zhytomyr, 21, 22, 23
Zolf, Larry, 127
Zolochiv, 12,41,43
Zundel, Ernst, 114, 115, 120 n.2