Part 1 of 3
Decision + Order on Motions [for summary judgment]
People of the State of New York, by Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Donald Trump, et al.
Case No. 452564/2022by Judge Arthur F. Engoron, J.S.C.
9/26/23
INDEX NO. 452564/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1531
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/26/2023
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
PRESENT: HON. ARTHUR F. ENGORON
Justice
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY LETITIA JAMES, ATIORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Plaintiff,
-v-
DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP JR, ERIC TRUMP, ALLEN WEISSELBERG, JEFFREY MCCONNEY, THE DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP ORGANIZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER, TRUMP ENDEAVOR 12 LLC, 401 NORTH WABASH VENTURE LLC, TRUMP OLD POST OFFICE LLC, 40 WALL STREET LLC, SEVEN SPRINGS LLC, Defendants.
PART: 37
INDEX NO. 452564/2022
MOTION DATES: 08/30/2023, 08/30/2023, 09/05/2023
MOTION SEQ. NO.: 026, 027, 028
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTIONSThe following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 026) 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148. 1149. 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190. 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1247, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402, 1403,1404, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1408, 1409, 1410, 1411, 1412, 1413, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1428, 1429, 1430, 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1435, 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1447
were read on this motion for PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 027) 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1374
were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 028) 1263, 1264, 1265, 1276, 1448, 1449, 1450, 1451, 1452, 1453, 1454, 1455, 1456, 1457, 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1462, 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466, 1467, 1468, 1469, 1470, 1471, 1472, 1473
were read on this motion for SANCTIONS
Upon the foregoing documents, it is hereby ordered that defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied, plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part, and plaintiff's motion for sanctions is granted in part, all as detailed herein.
This action arises out of a years-long investigation that plaintiff, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York ("OAG"), conducted into certain business practices that defendants engaged in from 2011 through 2021 . OAG alleges that the individual and entity defendants committed repeated and persistent fraud by preparing, certifying, and submitting to lenders and insurers false and misleading financial statements, thus violating New York Executive Law § 63(12),
Procedural BackgroundIn 2020, OAG commenced a special proceeding seeking to enforce a series of subpoenas against various named defendants and other persons and entities. This Court presided over that proceeding and issued several orders compelling compliance with OAG's subpoenas. See People v The Trump Org., Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 54 1685/2020. During that proceeding, OAG and the Trump Organization entered into an agreement, which, broadly speaking, tolled the statute of limitations from November 5, 2020, through May 31, 2022, NYSCEF Doc, No. 1260.
On November 3, 2022, this Court found preliminarily that defendants had a propensity to engage in persistent fraud by submitting false and misleading Statements of Financial Condition ("SFCs") on behalf of defendant Donald j, Trump ("Donald Trump"). NYSCEF Doc, No, 183, Accordingly, the Court granted a preliminary injunction against any further fraud and appointed the Han. Barbara S. Jones (ret.) as an independent monitor to oversee defendants' financial statements and significant asset transfers. NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 193 and 194.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. In a Decision and Order dated January 6, 2023, this Court denied the motion. NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 453. Defendants appealed, resulting in a January 6, 2023 Order wherein the Appellate Division, First Department modified this Court's order to the extent of: (I) declaring that the " continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend [the statute of limitations]"; (2) finding that claims are timely against defendants subject to the tolling agreement if they accrued after July 13, 2014, and timely against defendants not subject to the tolling agreement if they accrued after February 6, 2016; and (3) dismissing the complaint as against defendant Ivanka Trump on statute of limitations grounds, finding that she was not an employee of the Trump Organization at the time at which the parties entered into the tolling agreement. People v Trump, 217 AD3d 609 (1st Dept 2023).
The Appellate Division declined to dismiss any other defendants or any causes of action.
Discovery ended on July 28, 2023, and OAG filed a note of issue shortly thereafter. NYSCEF Doc. No. 644. OAG now moves for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action, for fraud under Executive Law § 63(12). NYSCEF Doc. No. 765. Separately, plaintiff now moves, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, to sanction defendants for frivolous motion practice. NYSCEF Doc. No. 1263. Defendants also move for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. NYSCEF Doc. No. 834.
Executive Law § 63(12)Executive Law § 63(12) provides, as here pertinent, as follows:
Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages and, in an appropriate case, cancelling any certificate filed under and by virtue of the provisions of section four hundred forty of the former penal law or section one hundred thirty of the general business law, and the court may award the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper. The word "fraud" or "fraudulent" as used herein shall include any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false pretense, false promise or unconscionable contractual provisions. The term "persistent fraud" or illegality" as used herein shall include continuance or carrying on of any fraudulent or illegal act or conduct. The term "repeated" as used herein shall include repetition of any separate and distinct fraudulent or illegal act, or conduct which affects more than one person.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
Arguments Defendants Raise Again
Standing and Capacity to SueDefendants' arguments that OAG has neither capacity nor standing to sue under Executive Law § 63(12), and that the disclaimers of non-party accountants Mazars insulate defendants, invoke the time-loop in the film "Groundhog Day." This Court emphatically rejected these arguments in its preliminary injunction decision and in its dismissal decision, and the First Department affirmed both. Defendants' contention that a different procedural posture mandates a reconsideration, or a fortiori, a reversal, is pure sophistry1.
As this Court and others have made abundantly clear, "[it] is not disputed that the Attorney General is empowered to sue for violations of [Executive Law § 63(12)]." People v Greenberg, 21 NY3d 439, 446 (2013) (finding Executive Law § 63(12) to be broadly worded anti-fraud device); People v Ford Motor Co., 74 NY2d 495, 502 (I989) ("Executive Law § 63(12) is the procedural route by which the Attorney-General may apply to Supreme Court for an order enjoining repeated illegal or fraudulent acts" ).
Parens Patriae and Consumer AmbitDefendants repeat the erroneous argument that the complaint must be dismissed because OAG cannot demonstrate the requirements of a parens patriae action, which is one in the public interest. "Parens patriae is a common-law standing doctrine that permits the state to commence an action to protect a public interest, like the safety, health or welfare of its citizens." People v Grasso, 11 NY3d 64, 72 at n 4 (2008). Invocation of such doctrine, or its requirements, is not necessary where, as here, the New York legislature has specifically empowered the Attorney General to bring such an action pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12). People v Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 31 NY3d 622, 633 (2018) (" it is undisputed that Executive Law § 63(12) gives the Attorney General standing to redress liabilities recognized elsewhere in the law, expanding the scope of available remedies" ); People v Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 137 AD3d 409, 417 (1st Dept 2016) ("[E]ven apart from prevailing authority, the language of the statute itself appears to authorize a cause of action; like similar statutes that authorize causes of action, § 63(12) defines the fraudulent conduct that it prohibits, authorizes the Attorney General to commence an action or proceeding to foreclose that conduct, and specifies the relief, including equitable relief, that the Attorney General may seek").
In any event, even if compliance with the requirements of the parens patriae doctrine is necessary, which it is not, OAG has easily satisfied those requirements, as it is well-settled that " [ i]n varying contexts, courts have held that a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the integrity of the marketplace." Grasso at 69 n 4; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 (1st Dept 2008) ("the claim pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12) constituted proper exercises of the State's regulation of businesses within its borders in the interest of securing an honest marketplace" ); People v Amazon.com. Inc., 550 F Supp 3d 122, 130-13 1 (SD NY 202 1) ("[T]he State's statutory interest under § 63(12) encompasses the prevention of either 'fraudulent or illegal ' business activities. Misconduct that is illegal for reasons other than fraud still implicates the government's interests in guaranteeing a marketplace that adheres to standards of fairness ... " ).
Defendants' rehashed argument that OAG's complaint must be dismissed because it is not designed to protect consumers is unavailing. New York v Feldman, 210 F Supp 2d 294, 299-300 (SD NY 2002) ("[D]efendants' claim that section 63(12) is limited to consumer protection actions is simply incorrect. The New York Attorney General has repeatedly used section 63(12) to secure relief for persons who are not consumers in cases that are not consumer protection actions").
Defendants cite to the trial court decision People v Domino's Pizza. Inc., NY Slip Op 300l5(U) (Sup Ct, NY County 2021), which is not binding on this Court, as authority for the proposition that any relief sought here should come in the form of private contract litigation, not "a law enforcement action under a statute designed to address public harm." NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 39. However, Domino's is wholly distinguishable from the instant case. There, the Court found that "OAG did not establish that Domino's representations to franchisees ... were false, deceptive, or misleading. Accordingly, the Court concludes that OAG has not established that Domino's engaged in conduct that ' tends to deceive or creates an atmosphere conducive to fraud.'" Domino's at 262• Here, as discussed infra, OAG demonstrates that defendants repeatedly submitted fraudulent financial documents to obtain financial benefits which otherwise they would not have received.
Defendants glaringly misrepresent the requirements of an Executive Law § 63(12) cause of action. Citing to People v Northern Leasing Sys .. Inc., 70 Misc 3d 256, 267 (Sup Ct, NY County 202 1), defendants assert that OAG must show " the practice is one likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances." NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 42. However, the word "consumer" does not appear anywhere in the referenced decision. and defendants' characterization of its holding is inaccurate3. Northern Leasing confirms that the " test for fraud under Executive Law § 63(12) is whether an act tends to deceive or creates an environment conducive to fraud." Northern Leasing at 267 (further holding " Executive Law § 63(12) expands fraud to encompass new liability, while including non-statutory fraud claims" and finding that "[a] claim under Executive Law § 63(12) is the exercise of 'the State's regulation of businesses within its borders in the interest of securing an honest marketplace" ').
Non-Party DisclaimersDefendants, yet again, argue that OAG's complaint must be dismissed because the SFCs contain language, provided by non-party accountants Mazars, that indicate that they have not audited or reviewed the accompanying financial statements and therefore cannot express an opinion as to whether the financial statements comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). However, as this Court already ruled, these non-party disclaimers do not insulate defendants from liability, as they plainly state that " Donald J. Trump is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statement in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America and for designing, implementing, and maintaining internal control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statement." NYSCEF Doc. No. 183.
As this Court explained in its November 3, 2022 Decision and Order: "[t]he law is abundantly clear that" using a disclaimer as a defense to a justifiable reliance claim requires proof that: " (I) the disclaimer is made sufficiently specific to the particular type of fact misrepresented or undisclosed; and (2) the alleged misrepresentations or omissions did not concern facts peculiarly within the [defendant' s] knowledge." Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v Goldman Sachs Grp .. Inc., 115 AD3d 128, 137 (151 Dept 2014) (" a [plaintiff] may not be precluded from claiming reliance on misrepresentation of facts peculiarly within the [defendant's] knowledge" ); People v Bull Inv. Gm., Inc., 46 AD2d 25, 29 (3d Dept 1974) ("It has been stated that '[t]he rule is clear that where one party to a transaction has superior knowledge, or means of knowledge not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak and his silence constitutes fraud"). As the SFCs did not particularize the type of fact misrepresented or undisclosed and were unquestionably based on information peculiarly within defendants' knowledge, defendants may not rely on such purported disclaimers as a defense.
In sum, the Mazars disclaimers put the onus for accuracy squarely on defendants' shoulders.
Scienter and "Participation" RequirementsDefendants erroneously claim that Fletcher v Dakota. Inc, 99 AD3d 43, 49 (1st Dept 2012), stands for the proposition that the purported "participation element [of a cause of action under Executive Law § 63(12)] is satisfied where the defendant ' directed, controlled, or ratified the decision that led to plaintiffs injury.'" However, Fletcher is not an Executive Law § 63(12) action, it was brought as a corporate tort; accordingly, is not relevant here.4 Executive Law § 63(12) is much more than a mere codification of common law fraud.
Defendants also incorrectly rely on Abrahami v UPC Const. Co., 224 AD2d 23 1, 233 (1st Dept 1996), for the proposition that "[m]erely providing copies of purportedly false financial statements is insufficient." NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 55. However, as Abrahami was not brought pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12), its analysis regarding " intent to deceive" is irrelevant. Unlike the situation in Abrahami. where an action is brought pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12), " good faith or lack of fraudulent intent is not in issue." People v Interstate Tractor Trailer Training. Inc., 66 Misc 2d 678, 682 (Sup Ct, NY County 1971) (holding liability under Executive Law § 63(12) does not require demonstrating an «intent to defraud" ); Trump Entrepreneur Initiative at 417 ("fraud under section 63(12) may be established without proof of scienter or reliance"); Bull Inv. Gro. at 27 (" [ i]t is well-settled that the definition of fraud under subdivision 12 of section 63 of the Executive Law is extremely broad and proof of scienter is not necessary").
Disgorgement of ProfitsIn flagrant disregard of prior orders of this Court and the First Department, defendants repeat the untenable notion that "disgorgement is unavailable as a matter of law" in Executive Law § 63(12) actions. NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 70. This is patently false, as defendants are, or certainly should be, aware that the Appellate Division, First Department made it clear in this very case that " [w]e have already held that the failure to allege losses does not require dismissal of a claim for disgorgement under Executive Law § 63(12)." Trump. 2 17 AD3d at 610.
Defendants nonetheless rely on the trial court decision in People v Direct Revenue. LLC, 19 Misc 3d I I 24(A) (Sup Ct, NY County 2008), for the proposition that Executive Law § 63(12) "do[es] no[t] authorize the general disgorgement of profits received from sources other than the public." NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 71-72. However, defendants' neglect to mention that Direct Revenue was superseded, and essentially overruled, in 2016 by the New York Court of Appeals in People v Greenberg, which unequivocally held that " disgorgement is an available remedy under the Martin Act and the Executive Law." People v Greenberg, 27 NY3d 490, 497 (20 16).
Also fatally flawed is defendants' reliance on People v Frink Am., Inc., 2 AD 3d 1379, 1380 (4th Dept 2003), as it relies on the outdated proposition that Executive Law § 63(12) " does not create any new causes of action" and thus, the remedy of disgorgement is unavailable. NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 73-74. However, in Trump Entrepreneur initiative, in which at least three of the instant defendants were parties, the First Department unambiguously declared that "the Attorney General is, in fact, authorized to bring a cause of action for fraud under Executive Law § 63(12)." Trump Entrepreneur Initiative at 418; see also People v Pharmacia Corp., 27 Mise 3d 368, 373 (Sup Ct, NY County 2010) (holding " Executive Law § 63(12) applies to fraudulent conduct actionable at common law, as well as to conduct for which liability arises solely from the statute" ).
Defendants incorrectly posit that, under People v Ernst & Young, LLP, 114 AD3d 569 (1st Dept 2014), disgorgement is available under the Martin Act but not under Executive Law § 63(12). NYSCEF Doc. No. 836 at 73. This is simply untrue. In Ernst & Young, the First Department specifically held that disgorgement was an available and potentially "crucial" remedy in an Executive Law § 63(12) action. Ernst & Young at 570.
Defendants correctly assert that "the record is devoid of any evidence of default, breach, late payment, or any complaint of harm" and argue that as none of the recipients of the subject SFCs ever lodged a complaint with OAG or otherwise claimed damages, disgorgement of profits would be inappropriate. NYSCEF Doc. No. 835 at 40.
However, that is completely irrelevant. As the Ernst & Young Court noted:
[W]here, as here, there is a claim based on fraudulent activity, disgorgement may be available as an equitable remedy, notwithstanding the absence of loss to individuals or independent claims for restitution. Disgorgement is distinct from the remedy of restitution because it focuses on the gain to the wrongdoer as opposed to the loss to the victim. Thus, disgorgement aims to deter wrongdoing by preventing the wrongdoer from retaining ill-gotten gains from fraudulent conduct. Accordingly, the remedy of disgorgement does not require a showing or allegation of direct losses to consumers or the public; the source of the ill-gotten gains is "immaterial."
Id. (disgorgement is not impermissible penalty "since the wrongdoer who is deprived of an illicit gain is ideally left in the position he would have been had there been no misconduct") (internal citations omitted); see also Amazon.com at 130 ("Executive Law § 63(12) authorizes the Attorney General to seek injunctive and other relief', and finding " the Attorney General can seek disgorgement of profits on the State's behalf" ).
Sanctionable Conduct for Frivolous Motion PracticeIn response to both OAG's request for a preliminary injunction and to defendants' motions to dismiss, this Court rejected every one of the aforementioned arguments. In rejecting such arguments for the second time, this Court cautioned that "sophisticated counsel should have known better." 5 NYSCEF Doc. No. 453 at 5. However, the Court declined to impose sanctions, believing it had " made its point." Id.
Apparently, the point was not received.
One would not know from reading defendants' papers that this Court has already twice ruled against these arguments, called them frivolous, and twice been affirmed by the First Department.
"In its discretion, a court may award costs and financial sanctions against an attorney or party resulting from frivolous conduct." Kamen v Diaz-Karnen, 40 AD3d 937, 937 (2d Dept 2007). See Yan v Klein, 35 AD3d 729, 729- 30 (2d Dept 2006) ("The plaintiff, following two prior actions, has 'continued to press the same patently meritless claims, ' most of which are now barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel " ).
Defendants' conduct in reiterating these frivolous arguments is egregious. We are way beyond the point of "sophisticated counsel should have known better"; we are at the point of intentional and blatant disregard of controlling authority and law of the case. This Court emphatically rejected these arguments, as did the First Department. Defendants' repetition of them here is indefensible.
Pursuant to New York Administrative Code § 130-1.1, "[t]he Court, as appropriate, may make such an award of costs or impose such financial sanctions against either an attorney or a party to the litigation or against both." The provision further states that:
[quote]For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:
(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;
(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or
(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.
22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c). Defendants' inscrutable persistence in re-presenting these arguments clearly satisfies the first of these three possible criteria.
When considering imposing sanctions "[a]mong the factors [the court] is directed to consider is whether the conduct was continued when it became apparent, or should have become apparent, that the conduct was frivolous, or when such was brought to the attention of the parties or to counsel." Levy v Carol Mgmt. Corp., 260 AD2d 27, 34 (1st Dept 1999) (further finding that sanctions both " punish past conduct" and "they are goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct").
In its January 6, 2023 Decision and Order, this Court warned defendants that their "reiteration of [these previously rejected arguments] scattered across five different motions to dismis[s] was frivolous." NYSCEF Doc. No. 453 at 3.
In a last-ditch attempt to stave off sanctions, defendants have submitted an affirmation by the Hon. Leonard B. Austin (ret.), who had a supremely distinguished judicial career, culminating in 12 years on the Appellate Division, Second Department. NYSCEF Doc. No. 1449. Justice Austin presents what is essentially a primer on the interplay between motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, and every point of law is valid.
However, it is wholly invalid as a reason for this Court to deny sanctions. First, legal arguments are for counsel to make, not for experts to submit. "The rule prohibiting experts from providing their legal opinions or conclusions is 'so well-established that it is often deemed a basic premise or assumption of evidence law- a kind of axiomatic principle.'" In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F Supp 2d 61, 64 (SD NY 200 I) (citing Thomas Baker, The Impropriety of Expert Witness Testimony on the Law, 40 U Kan LRev 325, 352 (1992) (precluding " expert affidavits" on the law); accord, Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 Harv LRev 797, 797 (1984) ("it remains black-letter law that expert legal testimony is not permissible"). Neither defendants nor Justice Austin has sought permission to file an amicus brief. In their own submissions, defendants have expounded on the law of capacity, standing, disclaimers, motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and sanctions. The heft and prestige of a legal lion adds nothing.
More importantly, the subject affirmation utterly fails to fit the specific facts of this case into the general principles it enunciates. In many situations, discovery, and a complete record, and the reversal of the burden of proof, will turn the tide, requiring that a valid complaint be dismissed because there is no evidence to support it. But standing and capacity are legal questions, not factual issues. Crucially, while defendants have, by their own account, conducted extensive discovery and have created a complete record, they fail to point to a single fact that discovery has uncovered, let alone a single fact in the record, that changes the calculus of their denied and doomed capacity and standing arguments.
Capacity and standing are not esoteric concepts. Infants, legally declared incompetents, and persons under certain legal disabilities are not allowed to sue. The New York Attorney General is none of the above. If my sibling or neighbor is harmed, I do not have standing to sue for his or her injury. Citizens may not sue to prevent governmental actions unless they may suffer some personal harm. Executive Law § 63(12) was promulgated to give the Attorney General standing to sue on behalf of the people of New York to prevent or deter the precise type of fraud here at issue. Arguments to the contrary are risible.
Defendants' arguments that the factual record developed in discovery changed the landscape under which standing should be viewed is legally preposterous. The best that defendants could muster at oral argument was to contend (incorrectly) that plaintiff cannot sue because the subject transactions were between private entities, and nobody lost money. However, that is purely an argument on the merits, not an argument on standing. Taken to its logical extreme, absolutely any time a defendant denies liability, it could move to dismiss on the ground of lack of standing.
Exacerbating defendants' obstreperous conduct is their continued reliance on bogus arguments, in papers and oral argument. In defendants' world: rent regulated apartments are worth the same as unregulated apartments; restricted land is worth the same as unrestricted land; restrictions can evaporate into thin air; a disclaimer by one party casting responsibility on another party exonerates the other party's lies; the Attorney General of the State of New York does not have capacity to sue or standing to sue (never mind all those cases where the Attorney General has sued success fully) under a statute expressly designed to provide that right; all illegal acts are untimely if they stem from one untimely act; and square footage subjective.
That is a fantasy world, not the real world.
There is also a larger context to the sanctions issue. Several defendants are no strangers to sanctions and why courts are sometimes constrained to issue them. In the investigatory special proceeding this Court found Donald Trump in contempt of Court and sanctioned him $10,000 per day for failing to comply with his discovery obligations. This Court lifted the contempt after 11 days. The First Department affirmed the contempt and the fines. People v Trump, 213 AD3d 503, 504 (1st Dept 2023) ("[T]he financial sanction to compel compliance was a proper exercise of the court's discretionary power and was not excessive or otherwise improper, under the particular circumstances" ).
In Donald J. Trump v Hillary R. Clinton, 22-1 4102-CV-DMM, ("Order on Motion for Indicative Ruling") (filed September 15, 2023) (SD FL), Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks denied what in New York legal parlance would be called " a motion to reargue, " pursuant to which Donald Trump asked Judge Middlebrooks to vacate sanctions imposed on him and his legal team totaling close to one million dollars. Judge Middlebrooks wrote, on the first page thereof, that "Movants acted in bad faith in bringing this lawsuit and that this case exemplifies Mr. Trump's history of abusing the judicial process.6" Id.
Unfortunately, sanctions are the only way to impress upon defendants' attorneys the consequences of engaging in repetitive, frivolous motion practice after this Court, affirmed by the Appellate Division, expressly warned them against doing so. Boye v Rubin & Bailin. LLP, 152 AD3d I, II 1st Dept 20 17) ("sanctions serve to deter future frivolous conduct" and their " goals include preventing the waste of judicial resources, and deterring vexatious litigation and dilatory or malicious litigation tactics" ).
It is of no consequence whether the arguments were made at the direction of the clients or sua sponte by the attorneys; counsel are "ethically obligated to withdraw any baseless and false claims, if not upon [their] own review of the record, certainly by the time [the] Supreme Court advised [them] of this fact." Boye at 11 (upholding sanctions against attorneys because "counsel continued to ... pursue claims which were completely without merit in law or fact."); see also Nachbaur v Am. Transit Ins. Co., 300 AD2d 74, 75 (1st Dept 2002) (motion court properly sanctioned attorneys for "repetitive and meritless motions"); Leventritt v Eckstein, 206 AD2d 313, 314 (1st Dept 1994) (affirming sanctions imposed on attorney for " repeated pattern of frivolous conduct"); William Stockier & Co. v Heller, 189 AD2d 601, 603 (1st Dept 1993) (affirming sanctions against attorney upon finding "there was no factual or legal basis for defendant's original cross motion, or for the reargument motion, that both motions were ' totally frivolous' and were submitted 'just really to delay'''). Counsel should be the first line of defense against frivolous litigation.
Accordingly, this Court grants OAG's motion for sanctions, in part, to the extent of sanctioning each of defendants' attorneys who signed their names to the instant legal briefs7, in the amount of $7,500 each, to be paid to the Lawyer's Fund for Client Protection of the State of New York no later than 30 days from the date of this Order.