Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Gates

Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Mon Aug 04, 2025 8:00 pm

Prof. Jeffrey Sachs : Trump's Dangerous Moves.
Judge Napolitano - Judging Freedom
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Prof. Jeffrey Sachs : Trump's Dangerous Moves.



Transcript

Council Special Report Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China by Ashley J. Tellis and Robert D. Blackwill April 2015 54 Pages


Hi everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Monday, August 4th, 2025. Professor Jeffrey Sachs joins us now. Professor Sachs, always a pleasure, my dear friend.

Great to be with you. Thank you.

I want to spend a little time with you seeking your analysis on some rather dangerous things the president of the United States has done and said lately. But before we get there I have an interest in this and I know you do and I know it's one of your fields of expertise and I know viewers are interested in it. What are the origins of American hostility toward China? Why this hostility rather than compatibility?

Well, we had compatibility up until 10 years ago and then a conscious decision was made to move to hostility. This was actually a contrived move to try to stop China's successful economic development. The origins of it are that from the 1970s to around 2010, China was viewed as both a constructive partner, a trade partner and geopolitically helpful to the United States for quite a while. Remember when Richard Nixon went to China, the idea was a kind of triangulation that there was the US cold war with the Soviet Union by the US warming up with China. This would help to put more pressure, it was thought, on the Soviet Union. So it was an instrumental idea that the US would get closer to China.

Starting in 1978, China undertook remarkable economic reforms, arguably the most successful economic reforms in world history because China went from being an impoverished economy in 1978 to being one of the most successful, dynamic, arguably currently the most successful economy in the world today, during a period of just a bit over 40 years.

Now during that time, US China economic and political relations were good for most of the period. Actually a lot of Americans were making a lot of money by selling things to China, or making investments in China, or integrating Chinese companies into global supply chains. And America on the whole benefited enormously from China's economic growth. Though some places in America faced intense import competition from China and suffered but others boomed. California boomed, no question, as a result of the growing US China trade. Probably places in the industrial Midwest were hit by the increase in competition from China, but net the US China relations were very positive.

Now, starting around 2010, American strategists, -- I think it's a euphemism because I think they're idiots, as as you know. I don't think that they're strategists at all --

But anyway, who's the president in this time period?

That's Obama, but it doesn't matter. This is another point of American foreign policy. All this idea that, oh, we'll see if it's Clinton, or Bush Jr., or Obama, or Trump 1, or Biden, or Trump 2. This is not actually how foreign policy works. It's the Pentagon, the CIA, the deep state, the military-industrial complex. And starting around 2010, these strategists said, "Oh my god, China's too successful. We need to do something."

In 2015, a very interesting article, horrible on one level, because I think it's foolishness to the maximum, but insightful also to the maximum, was written by a former colleague of mine, Ambassador Robert Blackwell, who was a professor at Harvard, then a senior US diplomat, and another leading specialist, Ashley Telus. And the paper in 2015 was written for the Council on Foreign Relations. You could put a link to it because I believe it's openly available. And it declares bluntly that America's goal or its grand strategy is primacy. In other words, the grand strategy of the United States is to be number one. And China's rise, these authors say, is a threat to America being number one. They don't say China's evil. They don't say China's done something terrible. They don't say that China is a threat to US national security or prosperity. They say that China's success is a threat to the American grand strategy of being number one.

Okay. If you're in a high school clique, maybe that's your goal. If you're grown-ups in a in a world where there are dangers of nuclear war, where you need cooperation, where there's mutual gains from trade, the idea that being number one is a meaningful idea when you're 4% of the world population. And the idea that the success of another country is harmful to you because they're successful, not because of what they're doing, but because of their successful is, to my mind so mind-bogglingly wrongheaded. But that became the core of American policy. And in this very interesting paper, which I really would like people to read with their own eyes because it's incredible, says we must stop China. It's no longer in our interest for China to be successful. And they list all the things we should do.

For example, one of the incredibly stupid ideas was we should have a trade arrangement for the US and Asian countries that excludes China. It's like kids taking a map, and putting an X over China, but we trade with all the others. Not noticing that all the others have their main trading partner, China. But Obama really tried to do that. He tried to launch something called the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a trade group that would exclude China. Okay, this was another one of these ideas that belongs in the dust bin of history and it did never materialize. But the list goes on. We should stop exporting technology. We should break relations. We should increase our military bases around China's rimlands. we should do other things restrictions on investments trade barriers. Why? Because America needs to be number one. So we have to do whatever we can to harm China's economy.

Now today I was just reading the typical columnists of the Washington Post and the New York Times and Financial Times and every one of them treats China like an enemy just naturally we have to prepare for war. They're an enemy. we have to be smarter in our trade policy than Trump because China's going to take an advantage. Everything is not about American interests or American well-being or the American people.
It's about this game. Like it's a board game. So you ask me why do we hate China? Because we were told to, starting 10 years ago, because it became the strategy of the United States to harm China.

By the way, how do you think Chinese officials and government and business feel about this? That another country is overtly aiming to harm them. Is that conducive to to peace, to goodwill, to normal behavior, to the security of the United States of America? Of course not. We're provoking and but it's so clear from this article. People should read it.

So this is the the basic point, and I've been visiting China since 1981. So 44 years I've toured all parts of the country. I've studied Chinese history extensively. I've published about China. I've written very extensively about the Chinese reforms. China is not an enemy. China is not doing anything to threaten American security. There is no reason for the United States to view China's well-being as harmful to America's interest. Nor did China's rise hurt the United States. But our political system is so broken that if major parts of the US benefit, but one part, say the industrial Midwest, say in Ohio or Indiana hurts, we don't have a policy to help those people. Our policy is to attack China, even though the overall relationship is mutually beneficial. So, by the way, every day there's a drum beat of war right now. on our side.

I was in China recently, just a couple of weeks ago. They just look on in amazement. "What is going on in your country? What is it? What is this hostility? Why does the president fulminate every day about us?" That's what they ask. "I wish the president would listen to you. I wish the Congress could listen to you, Professor Sachs." Two months ago, the Secretary of Defense, who has his own issues, was in Japan, and was threatening China. They're all threatening every day. And these incredibly awful columnists, Max Boot today, I'll name names in in the Washington Post, it's just pure warmongering. Now, of course, he supported every war we've been in because that's our columnists. They're just warmongers. But the next war they want is with China. Good luck with that.

What is the matter with our country? Can't we just get along with somebody? Is there any reason from an economic perspective, ne of your other fields of expertise, Professor Sachs, that we can't just have an open trading policy with China? They can sell us what they want, and we can buy what we want, and we can sell whatever they want to buy from us. Of course. And when they outcompete us in certain areas, like they are doing right now in electric vehicles, it's because the United States has no policy that Trump just pulled the plug literally on electric vehicles, and on the incentives and so forth.

Okay, we handed China the world market for electric vehicles, and then we say, "Oh, they've got overcapacity in electric vehicles because they're selling electric vehicles all over the world." Then we have to put up tariff barriers because we have no sensible industrial policy whatsoever. And this is not China's fault. China is just diligently following the future, developing new efficient energy sources, 5G technology, open-source AI, fourth generation nuclear power. I toured factories recently, seeing an incredible integration of artificial intelligence systems and robotics in highly sophisticated solar module factories. Incredible what I saw. Yeah. And we complain. They're just doing a good job in manufacturing. What is Trump doing? Trump is attacking the universities, cutting the research budgets, driving scientists from the United States to China, or to other parts of the world, and then whining about all those terrible things the other countries are doing to us. All that unfairness.

Well, Professor Sachs, President Trump shoots the messenger. If you're the director of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the statistics are bad for a month, and he doesn't like what you reveal, even though what you revealed is based on an algorithm, you're fired. That's the mentality we're dealing with. Trump is like a 5-year-old. 'I don't like the news, so I just throw everything into turmoil." But what's amazing is not what we might have expected. What is amazing is the silence in Washington. This is how our country is supposed to be, that you get a month of bad data, and then you fire the person in charge of the Bureau of Labor Statistics? And by the way, there always are revisions to the data. This is a core, and systematic, and scientific part of how to measure a complex $30 trillion economy. But what struck me first was the silence. Where are the Congress people saying, "No, we can't run a country on the the most shoddy whims?" But then the chairman of the council of economic advisers comes out and defends the firing of the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. He is completely destroying our institutions before our eyes. The only word that characterizes Washington, and I'm speaking beyond Trump himself, is pathetic. Nobody speaks the truth. No one says that this completely erratic and dangerous behavior, and it's very damaging to our national security.

We had the president shooting off about nuclear this and nuclear that in the last few days. Just unbelievable. Here's what he said. And this is in response to a tweet based on the highly provocative statements of the former president. Chris, can you put it up? Based on the highly provocative statements of the former president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, who is now the deputy chairman of the security council of the Russian Federation.

[Donald Trump] I have ordered two nuclear submarines to be positioned in the appropriate regions. Just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that. Words are very important and can often lead to unintended consequences. I hope this will not be one of those instances. Thank you for your attention to this matter.


Talk about being foolish with words. Why would you do this, and why would you announce it? And why would you provoke another nuclear power that has three or four times the number of nuclear submarines that we do? And and the reason that this unbelievable posting occurred was in response to a posting by Medvedev, which was in response to an ultimatum delivered by Trump to President Putin that if you don't have a ceasefire in 10 days, I impose the sanctions on all countries in the world that are dealing with you. An ultimatum to Russia rather than actual diplomacy. Good luck with that ultimatum.

Trump has no attention span, maybe no understanding, no knowledge of what he's doing. But the fact of the matter is there's no diplomacy taking place right now, because the war in Ukraine that he promised to end in 24 hours, which by the way could have been ended in 24 hours, not on the basis of an ultimatum or declaring you must have a ceasefire, but on the basis of solving the underlying issue that led us to this war. And this war, as every analyst you talk to says, and as everyone who has looked clearly into this, understands, came because we pushed NATO up to Russia's borders, because we overthrew a government in Ukraine so that that new government would support NATO because the government we overthrew wanted neutrality which is a no no in American eyes, and because the United States resisted every attempt at diplomacy to avoid the war, and then to end the war. We absolutely threw out the agreement at the UN called the Minsk 2 agreement that would have avoided this war, telling the Ukrainians you don't have to abide by the UN security council, and an agreement that Ukraine itself had signed. And then when there was a peace agreement just about to be reached in April 2022, the US government told the Ukrainians, "No, you fight on; we don't want you neutral. We want you on our side. No neutrality."

So Trump now gives an ultimatum that doesn't get to any of the root causes of this conflict.
Of course, the ultimatum is not going to be observed, but he's giving an ultimatum to a nuclear superpower. But more than that, he's telling China, India, Brazil, and all the other countries of the world, that the United States demands that they stop trading with Russia as well. Well, fancy that. You think that's going to work? That the United States, that the president of the United States can just dictate to the whole world what to do? No. That is not how conflicts are resolved. That's not how diplomacy works. That's not, and this is the most important point, that's not how American security is achieved.

Trump is driving America into the greatest insecurity that we have had in decades, certainly since the worst moments of the Cold War, if not worse than that right now. by this obstreporous, vituperative, unstable, non and anti- diplomacy that we're engaged in. Sit and talk and resolve serious issues like grown-ups. Not this shooting off in the most provocative possible ways.

But again, I have to emphasize the fact that Trump does it. It's disgusting and it's shocking. But in Washington, no one says anything else because it's as if the rest of the constitutional order has disappeared in the United States.

Professor Sachs, did the United States government in the past two weeks announce that it had just completed the delivery of nuclear weapons to NATO countries? I can't tell you actually, I don't know authoritatively on such a a crucial question, but I know you have many interlocutors who can give an authoritative answer. I appreciate your candor there.

Tomorrow's New York Times has an article by the New York Times bureau chief in Jerusalem. It's highly critical of Prime Minister Netanyahu, but the opening line is so curious. "When Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, led the country to a military victory over Iran in June," -- what military victory over Iran in June is the New York Times talking about? Every day I decide to cancel my subscription to the New York Times, and every day I pull back, just because I need at least to see the foolishness, so that I understand what others are hearing.

Of course, there was no military victory. We are in a much deeper crisis than we were before the so-called 12-day war. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, was pushed out of Iran. There is no diplomacy. You see, everything, Judge, is coming from the basic point of the American delusion. And it's not just Trump, although he has his particular way. The American delusion, let me just add Lindsay Graham, or Richard Blumenthal, but it's everywhere, that the United States can dictate all terms to all of the rest of the world. And that is true whether it's in Iran, with this 12-day war, and we bomb when we want, we make demands of diplomacy when we want, or true in Ukraine, or true in China, or true in India's trade with Russia, you name it.

You know, the one leader in the world who said it most clearly, just very succinctly, because he's a brilliant leader and communicator, is Brazil's president Lula, who said very matter of factly, "We don't need an emperor." And he was referring, of course, to all the threats that Trump had made against Brazil. Trump telling the independent Brazilian judiciary to stop a a court case, if you can imagine. And Lula said we don't need an emperor, but we have an emperor right now, and we don't have a constitutional order. And we have growing crises all over the world. And the biggest culprit is a supine Congress that does nothing, lets the president impose taxes, looks the other way, doesn't complain about anything.

As you pointed out earlier, the silence from Congress, I just don't get it. We used to know of senators who were personalities, and would speak to the country, and actually advise the nation about the right way forward. We had debates in Washington, sometimes very heated debates, but sometimes very illuminating debates. We have nothing right now. We have executive orders where one person declares emergencies. We have silence from the Congress as if it doesn't exist at all. We have a Supreme Court that basically closes its eyes and turns away, and lets this destruction of the constitutional order proceed. We have spokespeople completely unqualified, knowing nothing, opining on the gravest matters of international relations, because they're in the White House without any responsibility. I don't even want to name names. It's so ugly the things that have been coming out of the White House in the last few days, and the idiocy of people who know nothing about the world except that they're making the world far more dangerous every single day.

Not to raise your blood pressure, but I believe that shortly before we came on air, the Israeli government announced the firing of the attorney general of Israel, who was the principal prosecutor of Netanyahu. Now, this will obviously go before the Israeli Supreme Court, and there'll be another Israeli constitutional crisis.


Yeah, whether Israel survives all of this we don't know, because it is in the process of self-destructing, undermining the most basic legitimacy of the state in an orgy of murder, in an orgy of genocide, where the ministers of the government have left any even slightest compunction about talking about genocide openly. And the United States is completely complicit in this -- completely. And again, Trump's our president, so he's complicit in it. But it goes far beyond Trump. It is the completely compromised American political class. Mike Huckabee, my former colleague at Fox News. every time you turn around, there's somebody that used to work at Fox being given a significant position in the government. He was allowed to visit Gaza, and of course the person he spoke to was healthy, happy, well-dressed, and said all the right things to him, and he came on and repeated that he don't know how any of this ends. Professor Sachs, Trump has only been in office for eight months. I share every one of your criticisms against them, except that people are dying horrible, horrific deaths, and nothing seems to come of it. What will come of Great Britain, France, Canada, a few other countries, I think Spain, maybe Portugal recognizing a Palestinian state? I don't think anything until the UN Security Council does it. Am I right?

Well, we have right now 150 countries that have recognized the state of Palestine. They represent around 90% of the world population. I need to do an update of the arithmetic, but basically 90 plus% of the world population says there needs to be a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel. There was a declaration by the Arab countries saying that Hamas would be disarmed, that there would be a normalization of relations on the basis of a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel. Of course, Israel rejected that. This is what's important for everybody to understand. Israel is not looking for peace. Israel is looking for domination. This government, and much of Israeli society, is absolutely content on mass murder, and on ethnic cleansing, so that Israel retains control over 100% of what was the so-called British mandatory Palestine. In other words, the land that Britain, in its typical imperialistic way, promised to everybody, to the Arabs, to the Jews, to the French, to everybody, and the Zionists said, "We'll take it all." And they don't want peace based on two states. They want everything. And since there just happened to be some millions of Arabs living there, they're just going to have to leave, or starve to death, or be killed, or submit to apartheid rule. That's all that's going on. There is no attempt in the United States and or Israel to actually make peace. But for 90% of the world, what's happening is abhorrent. And for most of American citizens, who of course play no role in our government in foreign policy whatsoever, no voice, no say, no reflection of our attitudes, we are revolted by Israel's extraordinarily cruel. I lose the words, but it is a genocide, and it's two countries now, and you ask will something come of this? Yes, in the end there will be a state of Palestine. How many people die beforehand is the real question. But there absolutely will be a state of Palestine. The question is, will there be a state of Israel, because if Israel is so shockingly, disgustingly brazen in this mass murder, how is Israel going to go on among the community of nations? That's the real question.

Here's Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia who agrees with you, and regrettably, Secretary of State Marco Rubio who does not. Chris, back to back, two and three.

The international community, including the United States, made a promise in 1947 that there would be a state of Israel, and a state for Arabs, Palestine, in this space. One promise has been met. Nearly 80 years later, one promise has not been met. More than a hundred nations have done a recognition. They've said, "Look, we need to meet the promise that the international community made." But it needs to be conditions-based. And I think the most important condition is recognizing Palestine when they are able to peacefully coexist with their neighbors, including Israel. And so as I read what the nations are saying, it's not an immediate recognition, no questions asked, in September. It's establishing conditions that when they are met, Palestine would be recognized. The UK is like, well, if Israel doesn't agree to a ceasefire by September, we're going to recognize the Palestinian state. So if I'm Hamas, I say, you know what, let's not allow there to be a ceasefire. If Hamas refuses to agree to a ceasefire, it guarantees a Palestinian state will be recognized by all these countries in September. So, they're not going to agree to a ceasefire.

I mean, it's so clumsy. It's hard to know whether these people like Rubio are so dense that they don't understand anything, or so vulgar that they obfuscate everything. But Rubio's not working towards a two-state solution. No. What's his complaint? Do your diplomacy. That's your job, Mr. Secretary of State, do your diplomacy. But you're not doing any diplomacy. So, who are you to say what other countries should do? Because you and your administration are not engaged in diplomacy. It's engaged in war. War is not diplomacy. Diplomacy is finding a way to peace. What are you doing, Mr. Rubio, to find a way to peace, and a two-state solution? Nothing. So every word that Rubio utters is either this measure of how dense he might be, or how much he wants to obfuscate the most basic point, that we are complicit in a genocide, and do not find words for diplomacy which 150 other countries have easily recognized. And by the way, that's 150 that have recognized Palestine. More than 180 have repeatedly voted for the Palestinian right to political self-determination at the UN year after year. I know the count because I've done the arithmetic. It's 95% of the world population.

Do you think that the arguments that you've made are even articulated in the White House?

No, I think the military-industrial state which runs our country, lives in a delusion of being all powerful, and thinking that whenever there's resistance, all they have to do is escalate more arms, more military, more war, so that they can dictate. It's been like this for a long time. Again, I don't find anything particular with Trump, except how obnoxious things are put. But Biden was terrible. Trump was the same way. Obama was terrible. Bush was terrible. Bush Jr. was terrible. This is why none of these problems get solved. It's not just that Trump's not solving them. The military-industrial state, as Eisenhower told us, took over our country by the mid 1960s, probably with the coup in which President Kennedy was assassinated. And since then, we don't have public opinion on foreign policy. We don't have American security interests. We just have war. And the war is based on a delusion that we're the most powerful so that we can dictate terms to everyone else. So no, I don't think that these arguments are discussed, or debated, because there is no discussion or debate in Washington. None.

By the way, there's an article today of some senators saying how unhappy they are in the Senate, and they say there's no debate in the Senate anymore.

There isn't. I used to work in the Senate a long time ago, 52 years ago. when I was a kid, and I saw real debate. There's no debate right now. So no, the things we're discussing, they're not discussed at all. They're too arrogant, and too ignorant even to have the discussion.

Professor Sachs, even when you're angry, you are over-the-top articulate, and so informative. Thank you very much for all of this. I didn't mean to raise your blood pressure, but God bless you. Thank you for your understanding, and your ability to explain that understanding to all of us. And we'll look forward to seeing you again soon. See you next week.

Thanks a lot. Byebye.

Fabulous. Coming up tomorrow, Tuesday, at 8 in the morning, Ambassador Charles Freeman at 2 in the afternoon, Aaron Mate at 3 in the afternoon, Colonel Karen Quowski. Judge Napolitano for judging freedom.
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Mon Aug 04, 2025 8:49 pm

Part 1 of 3

Council Special Report No. 72
March 2015
Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China

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Table of Contents

Foreword vii
Acknowledgments xi
Acronyms xiii
Council Special Report 1
Introduction 3
China’s Evolving Grand Strategy 7
U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China and U.S. Vital National Interests 18
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China 23
Conclusion 34
Endnotes 40
About the Authors 45
Study Group Members 47
Mission Statement of the IIGG Program 49
Contents

Foreword

It has become something of a cliché to say that no relationship will
matter more when it comes to defining the twenty-first century than
the one between the United States and China. Like many clichés, this
statement is true but not terribly useful, as it tells us little or nothing
about the nature of the relationship in question.
Some point to history and argue that strategic rivalry is highly likely
if not inevitable between the existing major power of the day and the
principal rising power. Others challenge such a prediction, emphasizing
more the impact of domestic political, economic, and social developments
within the two countries as well as the potential constructive
influence of diplomacy and statecraft.
Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, the authors of this Council
Special Report, reach a conclusion considerably closer to the first
of these two propositions. “China represents and will remain the most
significant competitor to the United States for decades to come,” they
write, judging that “the likelihood of a long-term strategic rivalry
between Beijing and Washington is high.” They also argue that China
has not evolved into the “responsible stakeholder” that many in the
United States hoped it would. To the contrary, Blackwill and Tellis see
China as having adopted a grand strategy for itself that is meant to
increase state control over Chinese society and, beyond its borders, to
pacify its periphery, cement its status in the international system, and
replace the United States as the most important power in Asia.
What flows from this assessment is nothing less than a call on their
part for “a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing
the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.”
The two authors acknowledge that this new policy “cannot be
built on a bedrock of containment”; they also say that policymakers
cannot simply jettison the prevailing policy of integration. But they do
viii
Foreword
advocate what they describe as “crucial changes to the current policy in
order to limit the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion
pose to U.S. interests in Asia and globally.”
Stated somewhat differently, the authors recommend a new U.S.
policy of balancing China that would in effect change the balance of
current U.S. policy, in the process placing less emphasis on support and
cooperation and more on pressure and competition. There would be
less hedging and more active countering.
A number of policy prescriptions follow, including the adoption
of policies designed to produce more robust economic growth in the
United States; new trade arrangements in Asia that exclude China; a
stricter technology-control regime affecting exports to China; a larger,
more capable, and more active U.S. air and naval presence in the Asia-
Pacific region; more intimate U.S. strategic ties with Japan, Australia,
the Republic of Korea, India, the countries of southeast Asia, and
Taiwan; and a considerably tougher set of measures to counter Chinese
behavior in the cyber realm.
Interestingly, the report also argues for an intensification of U.S.-
Chinese diplomatic contacts, recommending a discourse that is “more
candid, high-level, and private than current practice.” The focus of such
talks would be not on the internal political character of China, but on
such issues as Asian security, and would possibly involve experienced
external persons on both sides who would presumably be less constrained
by the sorts of rigidities and conventional thinking normally
associated with bureaucracies.
It is clear, though, that this call for real dialogue is not motivated by
any great optimism of what it can achieve. Indeed, the authors conclude
by noting that “the most that can be hoped for is caution and restrained
predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China strategic competition
becomes the new normal, and even that will be no easy task to
achieve in the period ahead.”
Both authors anticipate that their analysis and recommendations
alike will be controversial and generate substantial criticism, and they
devote their conclusion to addressing what they see as the likely challenges
to what they have written. I expect some readers will, as a result,
be persuaded by what is said here; I equally expect that others will
remain unpersuaded that what is being suggested in these pages is either
desirable or feasible. But whatever the reaction or reactions, Revising
Foreword ix
U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China deserves to become an important
part of the debate about U.S. foreign policy and the pivotal U.S.-China
relationship.
Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations
March 2015

xi
We would like to express our gratitude to the many people who made
this report possible. To begin, we thank CFR President Richard N.
Haass and Director of Studies James M. Lindsay for their support of
this project and insightful feedback throughout the drafting process.
We owe a debt to the members of the CFR study group on U.S. grand
strategy toward China for their comments and critiques, all of which
improved the substance of the report. The report also benefited from
interviews conducted with current and former U.S. government officials,
as well as insights from researchers and journalists immersed in
the U.S.-China relationship.
We are grateful for the valuable assistance of Patricia Dorff, Eli
Dvorkin, and Ashley Bregman in CFR’s Publications Department,
who provided editorial support, and to Melinda Wuellner and Kendra
Davidson in Global Communications and Media Relations for their
marketing efforts. We also appreciate the contributions of the David
Rockefeller Studies Program staff in shepherding the report. Most
important, we thank Research Associate Lauren Dickey, our gifted
CFR sinologist, whose contribution to this report was indispensable.
Special thanks also goes to William Hayes of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace for his editorial and research assistance.
This publication is part of CFR’s International Institutions and
Global Governance program and has been made possible by the generous
support of the Robina Foundation. The statements made and views
expressed herein are solely our own.
Robert D. Blackwill
Ashley J. Tellis
Acknowledgments

xiii
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BMD ballistic missile defense
CCP Chinese Communist Party
IMET International Military Exchange Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP People’s Armed Police
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
ROK Republic of Korea
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WTO World Trade Organization
Acronyms

Council Special Report

3
Introduction
In a classic work published at the height of the Second World War,
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler,
editor Edward Meade Earle defined grand strategy as “the art of controlling
and utilizing the resources of a nation…to the end that its vital
interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies,
actual, potential, or merely presumed.”1 Elaborating on this idea, Earle
argued that this “highest type of strategy” is precisely such because it
“so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort
to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum
chance of victory.”2 With these considerations in mind, Earle
correctly concluded that “[grand] strategy…is not merely a concept of
wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times.”3 Though
many others have subsequently offered variations on this concept, a
wiser or more comprehensive definition of grand strategy has not been
better articulated.
Since its founding, the United States has consistently pursued a
grand strategy focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power
over various rivals, first on the North American continent, then in the
Western hemisphere, and finally globally. During the Cold War, this
strategy was manifested in the form of “containment,” which provided
a unifying vision of how the United States could protect its systemic
primacy as well as its security, ensure the safety of its allies, and eventually
enable the defeat of its adversary, the Soviet Union. As Melvyn P.
Leffler succinctly summarized, “the key goals of containment were to
limit the spread of Soviet power and communist ideology. Yet containment
was never a defensive strategy; it was conceived as an instrument
to achieve victory in the Cold War.”4 A variety of policies—including
deliberately limiting Soviet connectivity with the major global economic
centers of power, sustaining a diverse and sometimes overlapping
set of “mutual security agreements” and formal alliances, pursuing
4 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
worldwide ideological campaigns to delegitimize the Soviet state and
its policies, and preserving the United States’ industrial and technological
supremacy—were successfully implemented to achieve this aim as
Washington entered a new era of geopolitical competition.
In the aftermath of the American victory in the Cold War and the
dissolution of containment, U.S. policymakers have struggled to conceptualize
a grand strategy that would prove adequate to the nation’s
new circumstances beyond the generic desire to protect the liberal
international order underwritten by American power in the postwar
era. Though the Department of Defense during the George H.W. Bush
administration presciently contended that its “strategy must now refocus
on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor”—
thereby consciously pursuing the strategy of primacy that
the United States successfully employed to outlast the Soviet Union—
there was some doubt at the time whether that document reflected
Bush 41 policy.5 In any case, no administration in Washington has either
consciously or consistently pursued such an approach. To the contrary,
a series of administrations have continued to implement policies
that have actually enabled the rise of new competitors, such as China,
despite the fact that the original impulse for these policies—the successful
containment of the Soviet Union—lost their justification with
the demise of Soviet power.
Because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal
international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy
in Asia—and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to
American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy
toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power
rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy. This strategy cannot be
built on a bedrock of containment, as the earlier effort to limit Soviet
power was, because of the current realities of globalization. Nor can it
involve simply jettisoning the prevailing policy of integration. Rather,
it must involve crucial changes to the current policy in order to limit
the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S.
interests in Asia and globally.
These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing
strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving
U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective
of U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Sustaining this
status in the face of rising Chinese power requires, among other things,
Introduction 5
revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations
that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages
over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among
U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments
that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control
regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military
and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict “high-leverage strategic
harm” on the United States and its partners; concertedly building
up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s
periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively
project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese
opposition—all while continuing to work with China in the diverse
ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests.
The necessity for such a balancing strategy that deliberately incorporates
elements that limit China’s capacity to misuse its growing
power, even as the United States and its allies continue to interact with
China diplomatically and economically, is driven by the likelihood that
a long-term strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high.
China’s sustained economic success over the past thirty-odd years has
enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most
capable of dominating the Asian continent and thus undermining
the traditional U.S. geopolitical objective of ensuring that this arena
remains free of hegemonic control. The meteoric growth of the Chinese
economy, even as China’s per capita income remains behind that
of the United States in the near future, has already provided Beijing
with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian
neighbors and Washington’s influence in Asia, with dangerous consequences.
Even as China’s overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth
slows considerably in the future, its relative growth rates are likely to be
higher than those of the United States for the foreseeable future, thus
making the need to balance its rising power important. Only a fundamental
collapse of the Chinese state would free Washington from the
obligation of systematically balancing Beijing, because even the alternative
of a modest Chinese stumble would not eliminate the dangers
presented to the United States in Asia and beyond.
Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is
and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States
for decades to come.6 China’s rise thus far has already bred geopolitical,
military, economic, and ideological challenges to U.S. power, U.S.
6 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
allies, and the U.S.-dominated international order. Its continued, even
if uneven, success in the future would further undermine U.S. national
interests. Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that
values China’s economic and political integration in the liberal international
order at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence
and long-term strategic interests, hardly amounts to a “grand” strategy,
much less an effective one. The need for a more coherent U.S. response
to increasing Chinese power is long overdue.
7
Following the Communist Revolution in 1949, China has pursued the
objective of maximizing its national power in order to recover the geopolitical
primacy it enjoyed in East Asia prior to the Columbian era.
The arrival of modernity proved unkind to China’s regional predominance—
and, in an economic sense, its global standing—embittering
its Maoist founders, who were determined, through their communist
uprising, to retrieve the greatness last witnessed during the mid-Qing
Dynasty, which had been lost due to technological atrophy, domestic
conflict, and external intervention.
Given this painful history, it is not surprising that China’s primary
strategic goal in contemporary times has been the accumulation of
“comprehensive national power.”7 This pursuit of power in all its dimensions—
economic, military, technological, and diplomatic—is driven by
the conviction that China, a great civilization undone by the hostility
of others, could never attain its destiny unless it amassed the power
necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this quest. This
conception, shared by all Chinese leaders since 1949, reflects a vision of
politics that views conflict as intrinsic to the human condition. In this
“parabellum paradigm,” superior power alone creates order. China’s
success as a state requires its leaders to possess greater capabilities than
any other entity inside or outside its borders.8
The failure to create such a hierarchy centered on the conjoint
supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within the country
and China’s primacy within the international system would open
the door to persistent and dangerous threats of the kind witnessed
during China’s “century of national humiliation.”9 Defeating these
dangers requires that the party protect its monopoly over power
within the country while steadily acquiring more power than its
international competitors. As Chinese theorist Ye Zicheng argues in
his treatise on Chinese grand strategy, “There is a close connection
China’s Evolving Grand Strategy
8 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
between the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and China’s becoming
a world power. If China does not become a world power, the
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete. Only when it
becomes a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation has been achieved.”10
This vision of strengthening the Chinese state while recovering
China’s centrality in international politics—both objectives requiring
the accumulation of “comprehensive national power”—suggests
that the aims of Beijing’s grand strategy both implicate and transcend
the United States’ and China’s other Asian rivals. For China, which is
simultaneously an ancient civilization and a modern polity, grand strategic
objectives are not simply about desirable rank orderings in international
politics but rather about fundamental conceptions of order.11
Good order in the Chinese world view is ensured by the creation
of a durable hierarchy: an absolute, virtuous sovereign on the inside
and geopolitical primacy on the outside. However, the “rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation” involves more than its strengthening as a state
and its rise to the pinnacle of the international hierarchy. More fundamentally,
it requires that others accept this order as legitimate, which
the historian Wang Gungwu has described as a “principle of superiority”
underwriting Beijing’s “long-hallowed tradition of treating foreign
countries as all alike but unequal and inferior to China.”12 Consistent
with this principle, Henry Kissinger, describing the traditional sinocentric
system, has correctly noted that China “considered itself, in a sense,
the sole sovereign government of the world,” wherein the emperor’s
purview was not “a sovereign state of ‘China’…but ‘All Under Heaven,’
of which China formed the central, civilized part.”13
Because the acquisition of comprehensive national power is therefore
meant to both increase the Chinese state’s control over its society
and maximize the country’s overall capabilities relative to its foreign
competitors, Beijing has consistently pursued four specific operational
aims since the revolution—though the instruments used to achieve
these ends have varied over time.
Maintain Internal Order
The first and most important aim pursued by China’s leaders since
the founding of the modern Chinese state has been the preservation
of internal order. Though this resolute pursuit of internal order was
9
rooted in the CCP’s self-interest, it also stemmed from a deeper Chinese
phobia “of social chaos and political fragmentation or collapse,
usually seen as ‘just-around-the-corner’ and often closely associated
with [fears of] aggression and intervention from the outside.”14 Because
of the historical memory of domestic divisions providing incentives for
foreign manipulation and even aggression, China’s rulers have sought
to suppress all political disquiet—increasingly by appeals to nationalism,
but by coercion when necessary.
In contemporary times, this fixation on preserving domestic
order has become particularly acute, paradoxically because of China’s
recent economic success. High growth has resulted in desires for
expanded personal liberties, but the regime has responded by restricting
freedom of expression in various realms. Rapid economic growth
has also dramatically accentuated stratification and social inequalities
while increasing social dislocation and corruption nationally. As
a result, the same tool that has accelerated China’s rise in the global
system has also weakened the CCP’s domestic legitimacy, and political
resentment against Beijing has grown, especially in the Han-minority
areas of the country.
Despite China’s meteoric economic success, its leadership does
not possess easy solutions to the current challenges of governance
and legitimacy. Surrendering power in favor of genuine democracy
is unthinkable for the Communist regime, and the palliatives offered
by anticorruption campaigns, the incorporation of rule by law (as
opposed to rule of law), the increased invocation of classical texts in an
effort to seek validation in tradition, the growing ideological emphasis
on promoting “Chinese values,” the promotion of a new “Chinese
Dream” centered on “national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s
livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society, and military
strengthening,” and the stimulation of nationalism have not yet resolved
the crisis of legitimacy that now engulfs the CCP.15
China’s Communist rulers remain threatened by U.S. campaigns in
support of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities,
all of which are viewed in Beijing as thinly veiled attempts at either
fomenting secession or engineering regime change. In an effort to ensure
that American democratic values and policies do not undermine the
CCP’s hold on power, Chinese rulers have prosecuted a multipronged
ideological campaign that includes a strident defense of sovereignty and
a concerted rejection of all foreign interest in the nation’s internal affairs,
intense surveillance of suspect domestic groups and nongovernmental
China’s Evolving Grand Strategy
10 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
organizations operating in China, and focused propaganda efforts to
amplify Chinese nationalism and mobilize public support in defense of
the regime and the state.16
Beneath these ideational efforts, however, lies the iron fist. Given the
CCP’s deep-seated fears for its own survival amid the current economic
and social ferment in China, the party has continually expanded its
capabilities for domestic coercion, to the point where its internal security
budget, exemplified by the People’s Armed Police (PAP), is larger
than that of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) itself. Clearly, internal
security competes with, and could even trump, external security. Further
complicating matters, the party’s army fears finding itself in the
awkward position of having to defend the purported representatives
of the people against the people’s own wrath—a conundrum that may
prove to be explosive if events like Tiananmen Square were to recur in
the future.
Sustain High Economic Growth
Preserving internal control remains the foremost objective of the CCP
today. But the goal of ensuring continued and unchallenged Communist
rule leads to the second operational aspiration: sustaining the high
levels of economic growth necessary to preserve social order. Since the
founding of the Communist state, transforming the Chinese economy
has remained an important political aim. After all, Mao Zedong had no
doubts that political power grew out of not only a monopoly of force,
but, more fundamentally, material foundations.
Unfortunately for China, however, Mao’s collectivist strategies
failed to achieve the high levels of growth chalked up by its neighbors,
and his capricious political actions only further stunted China’s development.
Yet so long as Mao remained alive, his towering personality
and his ruthless politics—especially the extreme and effective brutality
of the PLA and the Red Guards—ensured that the CCP’s hold on
power did not suffer because of economic underperformance.17
Since the beginning of the reform period under Deng Xiaoping,
however, high levels of economic growth have become indispensable.
In the absence of charismatic leaders such as Mao and Deng, economic
growth has become important for sustaining the legitimacy of
the CCP—even for China’s current “imperial president,” Xi Jinping.18
11
With the shift to market reforms beginning in 1978, the imperative for
high growth has only intensified as the distinctiveness of the CCP as
the vanguard of socialism has progressively eroded. There is nothing
particularly unique about the party anymore, except that it remains the
sole holder of political power in China.
Why this should be the case in perpetuity remains difficult to
answer—and the party has sought to deflect this question by, in effect,
promising high levels of sustained economic growth as its newest
justification for continued rule. This strategy of mitigating a fraying
political legitimacy through impressive economic performance
has come to embody the essence of the new social contract in China:
through its economic policies, the party promises rising standards
of living for China’s population and an increase in personal (but not
political) freedoms in exchange for an unchallenged acceptance of
continued Communist rule. For the moment at least, this strategy
appears to be successful. For whatever its discontent may be, the Chinese
population ultimately ends up supporting the regime because it
views order and control as essential for maintaining the high rates of
economic growth that generate the prosperity demanded by the citizenry.
The populace and the party are thus locked into an uncertain
symbiosis that provides the regime with strength and the polity with a
modicum of stability—a relationship that compels China’s leaders to
maintain strong economic ties with the outside world while protecting
the country’s claims and prerogatives internationally as the price
of political success at home.
The aim of sustaining high levels of economic growth, therefore, is
colored by both economic and political imperatives. The former speak
to the development agenda of the Chinese state—the importance of lifting
vast numbers of people out of poverty and enriching the population
at the fastest rate possible—while the latter are advanced by the fact that
rapid economic expansion contributes to the CCP’s political legitimacy,
increases its available resources for domestic and international (including
military) ends, and underwrites its status and material claims in the
international arena. China’s means of producing high economic growth
have also been distinctive. By liberalizing commodity and labor prices
but not the prices of other elements such as land, capital, and energy,
Beijing created limited free markets in China that operated under the
supervision of a strong and controlling state. Because many foreign
firms invested in China under this scheme, manufacturing consumer
China’s Evolving Grand Strategy
12 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
and industrial goods intended primarily for export, China has become
the “new workshop of the world.”19
This economic model of production for overseas markets is slowly
changing: it is now supplemented by increasing attention to domestic
consumers and by the rise of new private enterprises, but it was controlled
capitalism that elevated China’s growth to unprecedented levels,
thus permitting Beijing to portray its older approach—which consisted
of incremental reforms, innovation and experimentation, export-led
growth, state-dominated capitalism, and authoritarian politics—as the
superior alternative to the American framework of free markets overseen
by democratic regimes. The global financial crisis of 2007–2008
raised doubts about the wisdom of Washington’s methods of economic
management, giving new life to China’s critique of liberal democracy
and free markets.
Although the attractiveness, endurance, and exportability of
this so-called Beijing model are suspect on multiple grounds, the fact
remains that it has more or less served China well until now.20 This
model has bequeathed Beijing with huge investible surpluses (in the
form of vast foreign exchange reserves), substantially increased its technological
capabilities (thanks to both legitimate and illegitimate acquisitions
of proprietary knowledge), and—most important—has tied the
wider global economy ever more tightly to China.
Although this last development has generated wealth and welfare
gains globally, it has also produced several unnerving strategic consequences.
It has made many of China’s trading partners, especially its
smaller neighbors, asymmetrically dependent on China and thus reluctant
to voice opposition even when China’s policies leave them disadvantaged.
21 China’s economic integration has also produced higher
relative gains for itself, even with its larger trading partners, such as
the United States—not in the narrow sense pertaining to the bilateral
terms of trade, but in the larger strategic sense that its overall growth
has risen far faster than it might have had China remained locked into
the autarkic policies of the pre-reform period. U.S. support for China’s
entry into the global trading system has thus created the awkward situation
in which Washington has contributed toward hastening Beijing’s
economic growth and, by extension, accelerated its rise as a geopolitical
rival. Furthermore, China’s growing economic ties have nurtured
and encouraged various internal constituencies within China’s trading
China’s Evolving Grand Strategy 13
partners to pursue parochial interests that often diverge from their
countries’ larger national interests with regard to China.22 Finally,
economic integration has shaped the leadership perceptions of many
of China’s trading partners in ways that lead them to worry about
their dependence on and vulnerability to China. Even if such worry is
sometimes exaggerated, it weakens their resistance to both Chinese
blandishments and coercion.23 Given these outcomes, it should not be
surprising that Beijing has consciously sought to use China’s growing
economic power in a choking embrace designed to prevent its Asian
neighbors from challenging its geopolitical interests, including weakening
the U.S. alliance system in Asia.
Beijing’s commitment to sustaining high economic growth
through deepened international interdependence, therefore, provides
it not only with internal gains—a more pliant populace and a
more powerful state—but consequential external benefits as well, in
the form of a growing military and deferential neighbors who fear
the economic losses that might arise from any political opposition
to China. These gains are likely to persist even as China’s economic
growth slows down over time—as it inevitably will—so long as Beijing’s
overall material power and its relative growth rates remain superior
to those of its neighbors.24
Pacify the Periph ery
The external advantages arising from China’s high growth rates thus
far have strengthened its capacity to achieve the third operational aim
deriving from its quest for comprehensive national power: the pacification
of its extended geographic periphery. With the success of economic
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing finally reacquired the means to
pursue as an element of its grand strategy a systematic pacification of
its extended peripheries and entrench Chinese dominance in the Indo-
Pacific for decades to come.
The circumstances surrounding this renewed effort at pacification,
however, were dramatically different from those of previous
imperial eras. For one thing, China was now surrounded by major
power competitors, such as Russia, Japan, and India. Furthermore,
even the smaller states previously deferential to China at some point
14 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
in the past, such as South Korea and Vietnam, were now successful,
self-regarding entities that, despite their weaknesses, demonstrated
no interest in being subservient to China. And, finally, the desire to
sanitize the periphery to benefit Chinese supremacy in Asia now ran
up against the ubiquitous presence of the United States, its forwardbased
and forward-operating military forces, and its formidable alliance
system in Asia.
Facing this new environment, Beijing has advanced a variety of
policies aimed toward pacifying its periphery. First, it has used its deep
economic ties with its Asian neighbors to “reduce regional anxieties”
about the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while “creating
mechanisms for Beijing to increase its influence with these regional
neighbors.”25 Second, it has sought to make common cause with some
states, such as Russia, which, despite their own suspicions of Beijing,
have reasons—the Ukraine crisis and Western economic sanctions
in the case of Moscow—to resist joining the larger balancing against
China now under way in Asia.26 Third, Beijing has embarked on a concerted
modernization of the PLA with the intention to amass military
power capable of both defeating local adversaries and deterring the
United States from coming to their defense in a crisis.27 Fourth, it has
now renewed older efforts to delegitimize the U.S. alliance system in
Asia, acting on its recognition that Washington remains the critical
obstacle in Beijing’s quest for a neutralized periphery. Accordingly,
China has actively promoted “a new security concept” that rejects U.S.
alliances as anachronisms; demands that Asian security be managed by
Asians alone; and privileges China as the regional security provider of
choice in a situation where, as Xi Jinping recently put it, “development
is the greatest form of security.”28

The desire to pacify the periphery thus signifies a modern adaption
of the traditional aim to entrench China’s centrality in Asia. If Beijing
can successfully achieve these aims alongside a backdrop of continued
internal stability, sustained economic growth, and expanding military
capabilities, China’s ambition to dominate Asia would over time recreate
a bipolar system internationally. This achievement, in turn, would
further reinforce the CCP’s central domestic objective: delivering
material benefits to the Chinese population while further increasing
the country’s security and standing, thereby assuring its continued grip
on power.
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Part 2 of 2

China’s Evolving Grand Strategy 15
Cement International Status
The CCP’s desire to preserve domestic control is enhanced by the final
element of the strategic goal of maximizing comprehensive national
power: enhancing China’s status as a central actor in the international
system. Even before the Communist Revolution in 1949, China’s prospects
for becoming a major power were assured, as it was given a permanent,
veto-wielding seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC). After
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engineered
the American rapprochement with Mao’s China in 1971, China’s
role among the global elite—those few countries charged with managing
the international order—was seamlessly transferred to the Communist
regime in Beijing. Although such symbolic primacy seemed
hollow when China underperformed economically, it was still critical
in strategic terms insofar as it ensured that no fundamental decisions
involving the UNSC could be made without China’s consent.
Now that China has become a consequential economic power,
its membership in the Security Council has only taken on additional
significance—a fact highlighted by Beijing’s determination to avoid any
expansion of this body that could dilute its own longstanding privileges.
Even beyond the Security Council, however, China’s growing material
capabilities have ensured that it becomes fundamentally relevant to all
institutions of global order. Unsurprisingly, it has sought increasing
power in these bodies—for example, in the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—to orient their operations toward
serving its own purposes. Whether in the functional institutions or in
regional ones, China has indeed “gone global,” seeking and taking an
active role to ensure that the rules made in these bodies not only do not
undermine its interests, but also actively advance them.29 In so doing,
China’s behaviors are similar to those of other previous rising powers
in international politics.
China’s widespread participation in international institutions
today, nonetheless, has produced a mixed record. In some cases, China’s
activism has been beneficial for global order, but in many other
instances Beijing has displayed an unwillingness to bear the commensurate
costs of contributing toward global governance. Despite possessing
the world’s second-largest economy and military budget, China
has generally adopted a strategy of burden shifting, insisting that the
16 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
United States and others bear the costs of providing global public goods
even as China, citing its challenges as a “developing country,” uses them
to maximize its own national power. When international institutions
are not perceived as advancing Chinese interests, the Chinese government
has attempted to create or strengthen alternatives, especially ones
that exclude the United States. For example, China has sought to integrate
both its Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)
partners and its regional neighbors into economic ventures that rival
those of the liberal international system, including the New Development
Bank (widely perceived as an alternative to the World Bank and the
IMF); the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–initiated free trade
agreement (FTA) that China has ardently championed; an Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (a rival to the Asian Development Bank);
and an Asia-Pacific FTA (that would knit China closer to its neighbors
in Asia). In other regions of the world, Beijing has initiated the Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum,
and a variety of similar bodies that privilege China’s position and
undermine standards of governance set by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and
other international institutions.
The character of Beijing’s international involvement, therefore,
suggests that its commitment to the current order is considerably instrumental.
China is content to operate within that order to the degree that
it receives material or status benefits, but it has no fundamental commitment
to protecting that system beyond the gains incurred. At one
level, this should not be surprising because, as Kissinger astutely noted,
China is still “adjusting [itself] to membership in an international
system designed in its absence on the basis of programs it did not participate
in developing.”30 But, when all is considered, this ambivalence
ultimately undermines American national interests and, most important,
the premise on which the current U.S. strategy of integration is
based: that China’s entry into the liberal order will result over time in
securing its support for that regime, to include the avoidance of threats
levied against its principal guardian, the United States.31
Because these twin expectations have not materialized, China’s
rise as a new great power promises to be a troubling prospect for
the United States for many years to come. China’s economic growth
derives considerably from its participation in the multilateral trading
China’s Evolving Grand Strategy 17
system and the larger liberal international order more generally, but its
resulting military expansion has placed Beijing’s economic strategy at
odds with its political objective of threatening the guarantor of global
interdependence, the United States. At the moment, China displays no
urgency in addressing this conundrum, aware that its trading partners
hesitate to pressure Beijing because of the potential for economic losses
that might ensue. Given this calculation, Chinese leaders conclude that
their country can continue to benefit from international trade without
having to make any fundamental compromises in their existing disputes
with other Asian states or their efforts to weaken U.S. power projection
in Asia.
So long as the United States does not alter the intense “global codependency”
that currently defines U.S.-China economic relations, China
is content to maintain the current arrangement.32 China still seeks to
cooperate with the United States whenever possible, but only when
such collaboration is not unduly burdensome in the face of common
interests, does not undercut its geopolitical ambitions to undermine
U.S. primacy, and does not foreclose future options that might one day
prove advantageous to China. Because China recognizes that its quest
for comprehensive national power is still incomplete, it seeks to avoid
any confrontation with the United States or the international system in
the near term. Rather, Beijing aims to deepen ties with all its global partners—
and especially with Washington—in the hope that its accelerated
rise and centrality to international trade and politics will compel others
to become increasingly deferential to China’s preferences. Should such
obeisance not emerge once China has successfully risen, Beijing would
then be properly equipped to protect its equities by force and at a lower
cost than it could today, given that it is still relatively weak and remains
reliant on the benefits of trade and global interdependence.
The fundamental conclusion for the United States, therefore, is
that China does not see its interests served by becoming just another
“trading state,” no matter how constructive an outcome that might be
for resolving the larger tensions between its economic and geopolitical
strategies. Instead, China will continue along the path to becoming a
conventional great power with the full panoply of political and military
capabilities, all oriented toward realizing the goal of recovering from
the United States the primacy it once enjoyed in Asia as a prelude to
exerting global influence in the future.
18
The principal task that confronts U.S. grand strategy today, therefore,
is adapting to the fundamental challenge posed by China’s continuing
rise. Integration, the prevailing U.S. approach toward China and the
one followed assiduously since the 1970s, has undoubtedly contributed
to China’s rise as a future rival to American power. None of the alternatives
usually discussed in the debates in Washington and elsewhere
about how to respond to China’s growing strength satisfy the objective
of preserving American primacy for yet another “long cycle” in international
politics. These alternatives, which include embracing and participating
with China, accommodating Beijing through some kind of a
Group of Two (G2) arrangement, or containing China à la the Soviet
Union, all have severe limitations from the viewpoint of U.S. national
interests and could in fact undermine the larger goal of strengthening
Washington’s preeminence in the global system.33 Accordingly, the
United States should substantially modify its grand strategy toward
China—one that at its core would replace the goal of concentrating on
integrating Beijing into the international system with that of consciously
balancing its rise—as a means of protecting simultaneously the security
of the United States and its allies, the U.S. position at the apex of
the global hierarchy, and the strength of the liberal international order,
which is owed ultimately to the robustness of American relative power.
There is no better basis for analyzing and formulating U.S. grand
strategy toward China than connecting that strategy directly to U.S. vital
national interests—conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and
enhance Americans’ survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.34
U.S. vital national interests are as follows:
■■ prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of conventional and unconventional
attacks on the continental United States and its extended territorial
possessions;
U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
and U.S. Vital National Interests
U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China and U.S. Vital National Interests 19
■■ maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia that promotes peace
and stability through a continuing U.S. leadership role and U.S.
alliances;
■■ prevent the use and slow the spread of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction, secure nuclear weapons and materials,
and prevent proliferation of intermediate and long-range delivery
systems for nuclear weapons; and
■■ promote the health of the international economy, energy markets,
and the environment.
China’s Challenge to U.S. Vital
National Interests
Although Washington seeks a cooperative relationship with Beijing
regarding nonproliferation, energy security, and the international
economy and environment, the primary U.S. preoccupation regarding
these national interests should be a rising China’s systematic effort
to undermine the second vital national interest mentioned—that is, to
fundamentally alter the balance of power in Asia, diminish the vitality
of the U.S.-Asian alliance system, and ultimately displace the United
States as the Asian leader. Success in attaining these objectives would
open the door to China’s ability to undermine the first and third interests
over time. As noted earlier, Beijing seeks to achieve these goals:
■■ replace the United States as the primary power in Asia;
■■ weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia;35
■■ undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability,
and staying power;
■■ use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to PRC geopolitical
policy preferences;
■■ increase PRC military capability to strengthen deterrence against
U.S. military intervention in the region;
■■ cast doubt on the U.S. economic model;
■■ ensure U.S. democratic values do not diminish the CCP’s hold on
domestic power; and
■■ avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade.
20 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
President Xi signaled China’s aims to undermine the Asian balance
of power at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia in early 2014 when he argued that “Asia’s problems
ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia’s security ultimately
must be protected by Asians.”36 The capacity of the United States to
deal successfully with this systematic geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic
challenge by China to U.S. primacy in Asia will determine the
shape of the international order for decades to come.
The Resp onse of U.S. Grand Strateg y
to Chi na’s Strategic Objecti ves
The long-term U.S. effort to protect its vital national interests by integrating
China into the international system is at serious risk today
because Beijing has acquired the capacity, and increasingly displays the
willingness, to pursue threatening policies against which American
administrations have asserted they were hedging. Nevertheless, these
same U.S. policymakers have continued to interact with China as if
these dangerous Chinese policies were only theoretical and consigned
to the distant future. In short, successive administrations have done
much more cooperating with China than hedging, hoping that Beijing
would gradually come to accept the United States’ leading role in Asia
despite all the evidence to the contrary, not least because cooperation
was so much less costly in the short term than military, geoeconomic,
and diplomatic hedging.
China has indeed become a rapidly growing economy, providing
wealth and welfare gains both for itself and for American citizens, but it
has acquired the wherewithal to challenge the United States, endangering
the security of its allies and others in Asia, and to slowly chip away
at the foundations of the liberal international order globally. In other
words, China has not evolved into a “responsible stakeholder” as then
Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on it to become.37
Instead, in recent decades Beijing has used the benign U.S. approach
to the rise of Chinese power to strengthen its domestic economy, and
thus the CCP’s hold on power, to enhance its military capabilities and
increase its diplomatic and geoeconomic sway in Asia and beyond, all
while free-riding on the international order and public goods provided
by the United States and its allies.
U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China and U.S. Vital National Interests 21
Therefore, the United States should become more strategically proactive
in meeting the Chinese challenge to U.S. interests and less preoccupied
with how this more robust U.S. approach might be evaluated in
Beijing. (The PRC apparently will remain convinced that Washington
is practicing a containment policy no matter what policies the United
States pursues.38) This means reconfiguring U.S. grand strategy toward
China in the following four ways with consequent and systematic policy
implementation:
■■ The United States should vitalize the U.S. economy at home, construct
a new set of trading relationships in Asia that exclude China,
fashion effective policies to deal with China’s pervasive use of geoeconomic
tools in Asia and beyond, and, in partnership with U.S.
allies and like-minded partners, create a new technology-control
mechanism vis-à-vis China.39
■■ The United States should invest in U.S. defense capabilities and
capacity to enable the United States to defeat China’s emerging antiaccess
capabilities and permit successful U.S. power projection even
against concerted opposition from Beijing.
■■ The United States should reinforce a new set of trusted strategic relationships
and partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific region that
include traditional U.S. alliances but go beyond them, pursuing as
an explicit policy the objectives of both strengthening Asian states’
ability to cope with China independently and building new forms of
intra-Asian strategic cooperation that do not always involve, but will
be systematically supported by, the United States.
■■ The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China
to attempt to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two
nations pursue mutually incompatible grand strategies and to reassure
U.S. allies and friends in Asia and beyond that its objective is to
avoid a confrontation with China.
No U.S. grand strategy toward China can succeed without the continuous
involvement and leadership of President Barack Obama and
his successors. Despite turmoil in the Middle East and tensions with
Russia, the president should concentrate on managing the greatest strategic
challenge to the United States in the coming decades—the rise of
Chinese power. His hands should be continually seen to be on the wheel
of U.S. grand strategy toward China, and he should hold face-to-face
22 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
meetings on the subject much more frequently with Asia’s leaders and
European Union heads of government. Occasional forty-five minute
bilateral talks with his Asian counterparts at the margins of international
meetings are insufficient to the task.
The same is true of Congress, which is an indispensable element
in dealing with Chinese power over the long term. Partisan divides and
the press of daily events will not excuse Congress if it largely ignores the
effects of China’s rise on U.S. interests. The congressional role in sustaining
a successful U.S. grand strategy toward China is manifested primarily
in three areas: giving the president trade-promotion authority so
that he may quickly conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) freetrade
agreements now being negotiated in Asia, reforming and providing
the defense budgets necessary to maintain U.S. power projection
and a credible Asian alliance system, and continuously holding U.S.
administrations accountable for the implementation of their response
to the rise of Chinese power.
23
To accomplish this robust U.S. grand strategy toward China, Washington
should implement the following policies.
Vitalize the U.S. Economy
Nothing would better promote the United States’ strategic future
and grand strategy toward China than robust economic growth in the
United States.40 Recent economic data suggests some optimism in that
regard.41 This must be the first priority of the president and the new
Congress.
Expa nd Asian Trade Net works
■■ Deliver on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP until very recently
has been conceived by the Obama administration primarily not as a
geoeconomic answer to growing Chinese economic power and geopolitical
coercion in Asia, but rather as a shot in the arm of a dying
Doha Round at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although,
of course, the TPP will not erase China’s asymmetrical economic
advantages with respect to the nations of Asia, it will be a vivid demonstration
that the United States is determined to compete on the
Asian economic playing field. By the same token, U.S. grand strategy
toward China will be seriously weakened without delivering on the
TPP. A major push by the White House for ratification should therefore
begin immediately in the new Congress and include seeking
trade promotion authority. Many elements of U.S.-China economic
interaction serve U.S. national interests and should be encouraged.42
However, Beijing’s constant challenges to the international trading
Recommendations for U.S. Grand
Strategy Toward China
24 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
system should be resisted and met with a unified response by the
industrial democracies, led by the United States. Washington should
continue to press Beijing to bring China’s currency in line with its
actual market value.
■■ Fashion effective policies to deal with China’s pervasive use of geoeconomic
tools in Asia and beyond. Never in history has one government
so directly controlled so much wealth as does the leadership of China.
It is not surprising, then, that as China’s economic might has grown,
so has its ability and inclination to use this power to advance geopolitical
ends. China is often correctly described as the world’s leading
practitioner of geoeconomics. For the purposes of this report, geoeconomics
is defined as “the use of economic instruments for geopolitical
objectives.”43 This has been reflected in coercive geoeconomic
Chinese policies toward Japan, ASEAN nations, and Australia,
among others, with no serious U.S. policy response. A geoeconomic
foreign policy approach would entail these initiatives:
■■ U.S.-Asian alliances should be rebooted for offensive and defensive
geoeconomic action. This intensified alliance focus should
be as concentrated on geoeconomics as on political-military
instruments.
■■ The administration should construct a geoeconomic policy to deal
with China over the long term, using the strength and positive
power of the U.S. economy, innovation, and networks to attract
Asian nations; and deal with the PRC’s coercive pressure on its
neighbors, in ways that are always consistent with an international
rules-based system that is so obviously in the national interest of
the United States and its friends and allies.
■■ The U.S. energy revolution should be converted into lasting geopolitical
gains in Asia by eliminating constraints on supplying U.S.
allies and friends with gas and oil.
■■ Create, in partnership with U.S. allies and like-minded partners, a new
technology-control regime vis-à-vis Beijing. Washington should pay
increased attention to limiting China’s access to advanced weaponry
and militarily critical technologies. Although the United States
certainly should lead the West in expanding international trade,
this policy ought not to be extended to the point where it actually
undermines American power and erodes Washington’s ability to
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China 25
discharge its fundamental obligation to guarantee Asian and global
security and meet the Chinese challenge. The virtues of enhanced
trade with China “must not obscure the reality that deepening globalization
increases Beijing’s access to sophisticated weaponry and
its associated elements,” including through dual-use technologies.44
Such acquisitions can undermine any American success in balancing
China’s rise with decisive and dangerous consequences.
Today, such capabilities obviously do not reside solely in the United
States—they can be found in many nations, especially Washington’s
European and Asian allies. The United States should encourage these
countries to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s
access to all technologies, including dual use, that can inflict “highleverage
strategic harm.”45 To establish a new technology regime
toward China, Washington should enter into an immediate discussion
with allies and friends with the aim of tightening restrictions on
the sales of militarily critical technologies to China, including dualuse
technologies. This will obviously not be easy to accomplish, but
the effort should get under way immediately.
Strengthen the U.S. Military
The United States should invest in defense capabilities and capacity
specifically to defeat China’s emerging anti-access capabilities and
permit successful U.S. power projection even against concerted opposition
from Beijing.
At present, the Obama administration’s military component to
strengthen U.S. power projection in Asia is small: adding a fourth attack
submarine to Guam; rotating 2,500 marines to Darwin, Australia;
putting a small number of littoral combat ships in Singapore; making
minor improvements in technology, intelligence, and missile defense;
and increasing U.S. naval forces in Asia from 50 percent to 60 percent
over the long term.46
No nation in Asia, least of all China, will take seriously U.S. military
enhancement in Asia unless the United States takes the following
vigorous and comprehensive steps:
■■ Congress should remove sequestration caps and substantially
increase the U.S. defense budget.47
26 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■■ The White House should work with Congress on thoughtful, meaningful
reform of the defense budget and force design. Absent that,
the internal cost drivers (compensation and entitlements) within the
budget will outpace any reasonable increase to the budget.
■■ The existing nuclear balance between the United States and China
should be maintained, as it is crucial to the U.S. posture in Asia.
■■ Washington should accelerate U.S. military capabilities to counter
China’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) programs, especially
in those areas where the United States retains advantage, such as
stealthy long-range unmanned vehicles and undersea warfare.
■■ Washington should reiterate its insistence on freedom of navigation
and overflight, including in exclusive economic zones, for military as
well as civilian ships and planes, and challenge Beijing appropriately
if those norms are violated.
■■ Washington should build military capability and capacity to increase
interoperability with allies and partners in Asia to include aiding the
regional states to develop their own A2/AD capabilities against China.
■■ Washington should accelerate the U.S. ballistic missile defense
posture and network in the Pacific to support allies, among other
objectives.
■■ Washington should enhance efforts to protect its space domain
while developing an aerial alternative to space for high-volume
communications.
■■ Washington should intensify a consistent U.S. naval and air presence
in the South and East China Seas.
■■ Washington should increase the frequency and duration of naval
exercises with South China Sea littoral states.
Imp lement Effective Cyber Policies
For the past decade, the United States has tolerated incessant cyberattacks
by China on the U.S. government, critical infrastructure, and
businesses. Virtually nothing has been done to stop this cyber assault,
and the “name and shame” approach toward China has clearly failed.
(The U.S. indictment of five PLA officers, of course, had no impact on
China’s cyber espionage.) The Department of Defense cyber strategy
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China 27
published in 2011 announced a new doctrine, arguing that harmful
action within the cyber domain can be met with a parallel response
in another domain, known as equivalence.48 No such equivalence has
been exacted on China. Such passivity on the part of the United States
should end, especially since there is no way to reach a verifiable cybersecurity
agreement with China. The United States should implement the
following cyber policies:
■■ Impose costs on China that are in excess of the benefits it receives
from its violations in cyberspace. A good starting point is the recommendation
of the Blair-Huntsman Commission of an across-theboard
tariff on Chinese goods.49
■■ Increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities to dissuade China’s leaders
from using cyberattacks against the United States and its partners in
the region.
■■ Continue to improve U.S. cyber defenses. Securing cyberspace will
require congressional action, including a law regulating information
sharing between intelligence agencies and the corporate world.
■■ Pass relevant legislation in Congress, such as the Cyber Information
Security Protection Act, allowing businesses to rapidly share intelligence
on cyber threats with each other and the government without
fear of lawsuits.
Reinforce Indo-Pacific Partnerships
The United States should reinforce a new web of partnerships throughout
Asia that includes traditional U.S. alliances but goes beyond them,
pursuing as an explicit policy the objectives of both strengthening
Asian states to cope with China independently and building new forms
of intra-Asian strategic cooperation that do not always involve, but will
be systematically supported by, the United States.
The United States cannot defend its national interests in Asia without
sustained support from its allies and friends. In one way or another,
the PRC seeks to undermine each of these crucial bilateral relationships
to test American strength and resilience in defending and promoting
these ties in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. The first step
in combating these corrosive Chinese efforts is to recognize that they
28 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
are occurring; the second is to develop strategies to defeat them. At the
same time, it is essential that Washington constantly reassure its democratic
partners in Asia that it seeks to avoid a confrontation with China
and that the steps delineated below are prudent in order to maintain the
existing balance of power and to protect Western national interests in
the Indo-Pacific.
■■ Japan: No other U.S. relationship approaches that with Japan in
maintaining the current balance in Asia and dealing with the rise
of Chinese power. Indeed, without close and enduring U.S.-Japan
security cooperation, it is difficult to see how the United States could
maintain its present power and influence in Asia. Thus, as Japan continues
to emerge from its post–World War II self-imposed security
constraints, the United States should continually support this crucial
alliance partner by
■■ substantially expanding its security relationship with Japan, encompassing
all of Asia;
■■ helping upgrade the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), including
Japan’s capabilities for joint/combined-arms/amphibious
operations;
■■ aligning concepts such as air-sea battle and dynamic defense
through a dialogue with Japan on roles, missions, and capabilities;50
■■ reinvigorating an extended deterrence dialogue with Japan;
■■ intensifying ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with
Japan;
■■ signaling more often that Japan remains fully and reliably under a
U.S. security umbrella;
■■ supporting Japan’s cooperation with Vietnam, Australia, India, and
other nations concerned with the rise of Chinese power; and
■■ allowing liquefied natural gas exports to Japan.
■■ South Korea: The U.S. strategic relationship with the Republic of
Korea (ROK) is essential to maintaining the balance of power in Asia.
In that context, these bilateral ties should be reinforced by
■■ ensuring adequate military capabilities are present on the Korean
peninsula in the context of provocations from North Korea;
■■ working with the ROK (and Japan) to develop a comprehensive
strategy for regime change in North Korea;
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China 29
■■ formulating with Seoul a shared vision for dealing with Korean
unification;
■■ boosting the credibility of U.S.-extended nuclear guarantees to
South Korea;
■■ increasing support for the ROK’s BMD capabilities; and
■■ encouraging the ROK to eventually join the TPP.
■■ Australia: Australia is the southern anchor of U.S. relationships in
the Pacific and, as a nation facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans, an
essential link in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States and
Australia should cooperate to achieve the following goals:
■■ The United States should use the Stirling naval base near Perth to
support increased U.S. naval force structure in the region.
■■ The United States should immediately accelerate cyber, space, and
undersea cooperation with Australia.
■■ The United States and Australia should jointly deploy surveillance
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles on the Cocos Islands (Australian
territory) in the Indian Ocean.
■■ The two countries should work together to more rapidly identify
potential Australian contributions to ballistic missile defense.
■■ The scope and frequency of Australia’s hosting of rotational
deployments of U.S. military personnel should be increased.51
■■ The U.S.-Australia free trade agreement should be upgraded, particularly
as Australia progresses toward FTAs with Japan, Korea,
and China.52 Similarly, Australia should be included in the TPP.
■■ Washington should support Australia’s efforts to expand its strategic
interaction with like-minded Asian nations.
■■ India: Especially in the face of an increasingly assertive China, the
United States benefits from the presence of a robust democratic
power that is willing to and capable of independently balancing Beijing’s
rising influence in Asia.53 The United States should
■■ substantially loosen its restraints on military technology transfer
to India;
■■ regard Indian nuclear weapons as an asset in maintaining the current
balance of power in Asia;
■■ markedly increase U.S.-India military-to-military cooperation,
especially between the two navies;
30 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■■ systemically assist India in building maritime capabilities in the
Indian Ocean and beyond, including through substantial technology
transfer;
■■ develop a global counterterrorism relationship with India;
■■ further incentivize India to sign defense cooperation agreements,
including the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA), the Communications
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA);
■■ advocate much more actively for India’s long-pending request for
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum and in the global nonproliferation regimes; and
■■ vigorously support India’s “Act East” policy to strengthen its power
projection and influence into Southeast and East Asia.
■■ Southeast Asia: ASEAN nations are a primary target of China’s geoeconomic
coercion, not least regarding issues in the South China
Sea. The United States should
■■ push harder for meaningful defense reform within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to develop a full range of defense capabilities
that would enable the government to deter and prevent intrusions
on or possible invasion of Philippine territory;
■■ boost Indonesia’s role in joint exercises and expand its scope, symbolically
indicative of Jakarta’s growing centrality to security in the
Asia Pacific, and gear military aid, training, and joint exercises with
Indonesia toward air-sea capabilities;54
■■ help Singapore upgrade its current air force capabilities from F-16s
to F-35s;
■■ encourage Malaysia to fully participate in the Proliferation Security
Initiative, which it agreed to join in April 2014, and promote
more active Malaysian involvement in combined exercises, domain
awareness architectures, and the like;
■■ seek to expand the scope of activities during the annual U.S.-
Vietnam naval exercises to include joint humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and/or search and rescue exercises, and make
more frequent stops at the port at Cam Ranh Bay in the short term;55
■■ establish strategic International Military Exchange Training (IMET)
programs with Myanmar, with a focus on professionalizing the
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China 31
military, and continue to integrate the Myanmar military into, and
expand its participation in, joint international military exercises;56
■■ advocate substantial IMET expansion throughout Southeast Asia;
and
■■ help build domestic democratic political capacity throughout the
region.
■■ Taiwan: A comprehensive, durable, and unofficial relationship
between Taiwan and the United States should be a feature of an
invigorated U.S. grand strategy toward China, including through
the legislative framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The
United States should reaffirm its military commitment to Taiwan
by upholding TRA obligations to “provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character.” Possible future arms sales to Taiwan could
include signals intelligence aircraft, transport aircraft, upgraded
engines for F-16s, upgrades to frigates and other ships, and/or landbased
missile defense systems.57
Energize High-Level Diplomacy
With Beijing
The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China to
attempt to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two nations
pursue mutually incompatible grand strategies, and to reassure U.S.
allies and friends in Asia and beyond that Washington is doing everything
it can to avoid a confrontation with Beijing.
Despite the destabilizing objectives of China’s grand strategy in Asia
and in the context of implementing the many policy recommendations
in this report to systemically strengthen the American response to the
rise of Chinese power, the United States bears major responsibilities
to promote international stability, prosperity, and peace—in Asia and
across the globe.
In this context, take into account the negative consequences for each
country’s formidable domestic challenges if the United States and
China seriously mismanage their relationship. Imagine the tumultuous
effects on the global economy. Consider the dramatic increase in tension
throughout Asia and the fact that no country in this vast region
wants to have to choose between China and the United States. Envision
the corrosive impact on U.S.-China collaboration on climate change.
32 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
Picture the fallout over attempts to deal with the nuclear weapons programs
of North Korea and Iran.
With this in mind, the U.S.-China discourse should be more
candid, high level, and private than current practice—no rows of officials
principally trading sermons across the table in Washington or
Beijing. Bureaucracies wish to do today what they did yesterday, and
wish to do tomorrow what they did today. It is, therefore, inevitable
that representatives from Washington and Beijing routinely mount
bills of indictment regarding the other side. All are familiar with these
calcified and endlessly repeated talking points. As the Chinese proverb
puts it, “To talk much and arrive nowhere is the same as climbing
a tree to catch a fish.”
For such an intensified high-level bilateral dialogue between Washington
and Beijing to be fruitful, it should avoid concentrating primarily
on the alleged perfidious behavior of the other side. For instance,
no amount of American condemnation of China’s human rights practices—
private or by megaphone—will consequentially affect Beijing’s
policies, including toward Hong Kong, and no degree of Chinese complaints
will lead the United States to weaken its alliance systems that
are indispensable to the protection of its vital national interests. Nor
is it likely that either side will admit to its actual grand strategy toward
the other. In any case, endemic contention will over time contribute to
a systemic worsening of U.S.-China bilateral relations that results in all
the destructive consequences enumerated earlier.
Instead, after thorough consultations with its Asian allies, the United
States should commit to working with China on two or three issues that
would make a positive contribution to bilateral ties and to international
peace and security. After the November 2014 U.S.-China summit in
Beijing, Asian security would be good subject with which to begin. For
example, subjects for joint exploration could include the possibility of
creating a version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe for Asia, expanding the talks on North Korea to include broader
Asian security issues, or agreeing on enhanced security confidencebuilding
measures between the two sides. To inspire fresh thinking and
creative policy initiatives, it might be best if the senior individuals to
take the lead in these talks were not in the direct national security chain
of command.
Bipartisan candidates for such a U.S. team include Thomas Donilon,
former Obama national security advisor, and Robert Zoellick, former
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China 33
World Bank president and George W. Bush administration policymaker.
The Chinese side would have similar credentials and all these
individuals would, of course, need the confidence of their respective
leaders. Such a channel would simply recognize the reality that the two
countries’ strategic policies are being primarily designed not by foreign
and defense ministries, but by those close to each president and by the
presidents themselves, and that the current means of bilateral interaction
are not adequate for the task.
34
Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed
in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some will
argue that China has no grand strategy. Although there may be those in
Beijing who disagree with China’s current strategic approach, its dominating
elements are not a mystery. Chinese officials insistently argue
that the U.S. alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and
should be dismantled; that the United States’ Asian allies and friends
should loosen their U.S. ties and that failure to do so will inevitably produce
a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current
presence and power in Asia are dimensions of an American attempt
to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that
U.S. military power projection in the region is dangerous and should be
reduced (even as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities
with the clear objective of reducing U.S. military options in the context
of a U.S.-China confrontation); and that the U.S. economic model is
fundamentally exploitative and should have no application in Asia. To
not take seriously official Chinese government statements along these
lines is to not take China seriously. That Beijing does not hope to realize
these policy goals in the short term does not reduce their potential
undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if China were to
achieve the policy objectives contained in these official statements, it
would clearly replace the United States as Asia’s leading power. If that
does not represent a PRC grand strategy, what would?
Second, some may say that the analysis and policy recommendations
in this report are too pessimistic, based on a worst-case appraisal
of Chinese behavior. To the contrary, we draw our conclusions from
China’s current actions regarding its internal and external security, its
neighbors, and U.S. presence in Asia. We project nothing that is not
already apparent in China’s present policies and strategic intentions.
Nevertheless, this hardly represents the worst case if China began to
Conclusion
Conclusion 35
behave like the Soviet Union, necessitating something far more costly
than balancing. The word “containment” comes to mind, and we certainly
do not recommend that vis-à-vis China in current circumstances,
not least because no Asian nation would join in such an endeavor.
Other policymakers might argue that China’s international behavior
is “normal” for a rising power, that China is gradually being socialized
into the international system and it is far too early for Washington
to give up on comprehensive cooperation and strategic reassurance
toward Beijing. The issue here is how long the United States should
pursue a policy toward China that is clearly not sufficiently protecting
U.S. vital national interests. Although Beijing has in general acted
responsibly in the international lending institutions and may be slowly
moving toward progress on difficult issues (such as climate change),
Kurt Campbell, former State Department assistant secretary for
East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration, recently
stressed, “We were always looking for deeper cooperation with China
and attempts to have on-the-ground cooperation—for example, on aid
or humanitarian support operations, we weren’t able to bring about;
in military-to-military relations, on the diplomatic agenda, on aid, we
found it very difficult to get meaningful results.”58
“Meaningful results” have been so difficult to achieve in the U.S.-
China relationship precisely because China seeks to replace the United
States as the leading power in Asia. And although Chinese behavior
may be “normal” for a rising nation, that does not diminish China’s
overall negative impact on the balance of power in the vast Indo-Pacific
region; nor does it reduce the crucial requirement for Washington to
develop policies that meet this challenge of the rise of Chinese power
and thwart Beijing’s objective to systematically undermine American
strategic primacy in Asia.
Fourth, some may assert that China’s integration into the international
system broadly serves important U.S. purposes, binds Beijing to a
rules-based system and increases the costs to the PRC of going against it,
and thus should trump other U.S. concerns about China’s internal and
external behavior. We accept that integrating China into international
institutions will continue and that the United States will accrue some
benefits from that activity. Our argument is that basing U.S. grand strategy
primarily on such Chinese global integration ignores the strategic
reality that China has made far greater relative gains through such processes
than the United States has over the past three decades, that China
36 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
has accordingly increased its national power in ways that potentially
deeply threaten U.S. national interests in the long term, and that therefore
the United States needs to understand and internalize this disturbing
fact and respond to such PRC international assimilation with much
more robust American policies and power projection into Asia.
Fifth, critics may also say that the United States’ Asian allies and
friends will never go along with the grand strategy outlined in this
document. This concern seems to concentrate not on the merits of
our strategic approach, but rather on its reception in the region. In
any case, what the allies want is not to cut ties with China, but rather
increased U.S. capabilities in the region, increased reassurance of
American protection, and increased U.S. support for their own economic
growth and security. The grand strategy outlined in this report
advances all of these objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate
the current anxiety among virtually all Asian nations about the strategic
implications of the rise of Chinese power, recent examples of PRC
aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, and the conviction
that only the United States can successfully deter Beijing’s corrosive
strategic ambitions. Because of PRC behavior, Asian states have
already begun to balance against China through greater intra-Asian
cooperation—actions that are entirely consistent with and only reinforce
our U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, the worry across Asia today is
not that the United States will pursue overly robust policies toward
China; rather, it is that Washington is insufficiently aware of Beijing’s
ultimate disruptive strategic goals in Asia, is periodically attracted to
a G2 formula, and may not be up to the challenge of effectively dealing
with the rise of China over the long term. These deeply worried
views across Asian governments are fertile ground on which to plant a
revised U.S. grand strategy toward China.
Moreover, a close examination of the specific policy prescriptions
in this study reveal few that would not be welcomed by the individual
nations of Asia to which they apply. Although this major course
correction by the United States toward China would not gain allied
endorsement overnight, with sustained and resolute U.S. presidential
leadership and the immense leverage the United States has with its
Asian allies and friends, this is not too steep a strategic hill to climb,
especially given the profound U.S. national interests at stake across
Asia. Finally, nothing in this grand strategy requires the United
States and its allies to diminish their current economic and political
Conclusion 37
cooperation with China. Rather, the emphasis is on developing those
U.S. and allied components that are ultimately necessary to make this
cooperation sustainable. In other words, if the balance of power alters
fundamentally, U.S. and Asian economic cooperation with China
could not be maintained.
Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond
to the U.S. grand strategy recommended here. Are not the risks of
pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a
strong Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relationship,
including fewer meetings among senior officials, little progress
on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American business
in China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in
societal interchange, and perhaps fewer Chinese students in American
universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to
the measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond
holdings because of the consequential reduction in their value.) These
steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital
U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to
reacting rhetorically, the more aggressive Beijing’s policy response and
the more coercive its actions, the more likely that America’s friends and
allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think
that China will find an easy solution to this dilemma.
Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate
with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national
interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change,
counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea,
and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese
leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition—
would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation
around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy
toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing
because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of dominating
Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security
Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international
collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there
are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental
policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that
are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the
rise of Chinese power.
38 Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
In any case, there is no reason why a China that did not seek to overturn
the balance of power in Asia should object to the policy prescriptions
contained in this report. And which of the policy prescriptions
would those who wish to continue the current prevailing U.S. approach
to China—that is, cooperation—reject? In short, these measures do not
“treat China as an enemy” as some American analysts rightfully warn
against; rather, they seek to protect vital U.S. and allied national interests,
a reasonable and responsible objective.
Washington simply cannot have it both ways—to accommodate
Chinese concerns regarding U.S. power projection into Asia through
“strategic reassurance” and at the same time to promote and defend
U.S. vital national interests in this vast region. It is, of course, the
second that must be at the core of a successful U.S. grand strategy
toward China.
In this same sense, there is no real prospect of building fundamental
trust, “peaceful coexistence,” “mutual understanding,” a strategic
partnership, or a “new type of major country relations” between the
United States and China. Rather, the most that can be hoped for is caution
and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China
strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be
no easy task to achieve in the period ahead. The purpose of U.S. diplomacy
in these dangerous circumstances is to mitigate and manage the
severe inherent tensions between these two conflicting strategic paradigms,
but it cannot hope to eliminate them. Former Australian Prime
Minister and distinguished sinologist Kevin Rudd believes the Chinese
may have come to the same conclusion: “There is emerging evidence
to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun
to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and
Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental
change in the relationship.”59

The Obama administration has clearly pursued a policy approach
far different than the one recommended in this report. To be clear,
this involves a more fundamental issue than policy implementation.
All signs suggest that President Obama and his senior colleagues have
a profoundly different and much more benign diagnosis of China’s
strategic objectives in Asia than do we. Like some of its predecessors,
the Obama administration has not appeared to understand and digest
the reality that China’s grand strategy in Asia in this era is designed to
Conclusion 39
undermine U.S. vital national interests and that it has been somewhat
successful in that regard. It is for this overriding reason that the Obama
team has continued the cooperate-but-hedge policy of its predecessors,
but with much greater emphasis on cooperating than on hedging.
Many of these omissions in U.S. policy would seem to stem from
an administration worried that such actions would offend Beijing and
therefore damage the possibility of enduring strategic cooperation
between the two nations, thus the dominating emphasis on cooperation.
That self-defeating preoccupation by the United States based on
a long-term goal of U.S.-China strategic partnership that cannot be
accomplished in the foreseeable future should end.
The profound test that the rise of Chinese power represents for
the United States is likely to last for decades. It is unrealistic to imagine
that China’s grand strategy toward the United States will evolve in a
way—at least in the next ten years—that accepts American power and
influence as linchpins of Asian peace and security, rather than seeks to
systematically diminish them. Thus, the central question concerning
the future of Asia is whether the United States will have the political
will; the geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic capabilities; and, crucially,
the right grand strategy to deal with China to protect vital U.S.
national interests.
40
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Part 3 of 3

Notes

1. Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli
to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. viii.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Melvyn Leffler, “Containment,” in Silvio Pons and Robert Service, eds., A Dictionary
of 20th-Century Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 236.
5. “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,” New
York Times, March 8, 1992.
6. The logic of restricting trade during the Cold War has been carefully analyzed in
Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries and International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994). For a comprehensive list of all the agreements entered into by
the United States, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Collective
Defense Treaties, with Maps, Texts of Treaties, a Chronology, Status of Forces Agreements,
and Comparative Chart (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).
A broader discussion of the network of military bases in the Cold War can be found
in Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York: The Free
Press, 1984), pp. 471–541. The United States’ global campaign against Soviet ideology
is examined in Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency:
American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009). For a discussion of the United States’ policies to maintain scientific
and industrial superiority during the period while guarding against becoming a
garrison state, see Audra J. Wolfe, Science, Technology, and the State in the Cold War
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); and Aaron L. Friedberg, In the
Shadow of the Garrison State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
7. For a further discussion of this concept, see Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Grand Strategy:
The Quest for Comprehensive National Power and Its Consequences,” in Gary
Schmitt, ed., The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition (New York: Encounter
Books, 2009).
8. Alastair Iain Johnson, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Peter J.
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 267.
9. For further analysis on the connection between the “century of humiliation” and
China’s current geopolitical strategy, see Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and
Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House,
2013); and Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese
Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
10. Ye Zicheng, Inside China’s Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People’s Republic
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. 72.
11. For an illuminating discussion, see Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s
History and Modern Foreign Relations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010).
Endnotes
Endnotes 41
12. Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in
John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 61.
13. Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), p. 213.
14. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present,
and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 16.
15. “Full text: China’s new party chief Xi Jinping’s speech,” BBC News China, November
15, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586.
16. See Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere, “A Notice from the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office,” April 22,
2013, http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chi ... ranslation.
17. For a discussion of Mao’s personality and his leadership, see Lucian W. Pye, “Mao Tsetung’s
Leadership Style,” Political Science Quarterly vol. 91, no. 2, summer 1976, pp.
219–35. For an overview of the Red Guard movement, see Juliana P. Heaslet, “The Red
Guards: Instruments of Destruction in the Cultural Revolution,” Asian Survey vol. 12,
no. 12, December 1972, pp. 1032–47.
18. Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s Imperial President,” Foreign Affairs, November/December
2014.
19. “A New Workshop of the World,” Economist, October 10, 2002.
20. John Williamson, “Is the ‘Beijing Consensus’ Now Dominant?,” Asia Policy no. 13,
January 2012, pp. 1–16.
21. For an extended discussion of the tensions between relative and absolute gains that
motivate the geopolitical response to China, see Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing Without
Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2014), pp. 29–32.
22. James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China
(New York: Penguin Books, 2008).
23. See the insightful discussion in Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s
Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security vol. 34, no. 2, fall
2009, pp. 7–45.
24. See Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers on the inevitable dramatic slowing of
the Chinese economy. “Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean,” NBER Working
Paper no. 20573 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October
2014). They may well be right, but who predicted thirty-plus years of China’s doubledigit
growth?
25. Michael R. Chambers, “Rising China: The Search for Power and Plenty,” in Ashley J.
Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, Interdependence, and Security
(Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006), p. 76.
26. The many dimensions of China’s cooptation of Russia are surveyed in James A. Bellacqua,
The Future of China-Russia Relations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
2010).
27. For details and the larger strategic implications of the “decoupling” of the United
States and Asia portended by this modernization, see Ashley J. Tellis and Travis
Tanner, Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military Modernization (Seattle, WA: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2013).
28. David Cohen, “‘Development is the Key to Peace’: Chinese Leaders Discuss Future of
Asia,” in China Brief vol. 14, no. 10, May 23, 2014.
29. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013).
30. Henry Kissinger, “Avoiding a U.S.-China Cold War,” Washington Post, January 14, 2011.
31. Mann, The China Fantasy, pp. 101–12.
42 Endnotes
32. Catherine L. Mann, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Global Co-Dependency, Collective
Action, and the Challenges of Global Adjustment,” CESifo Forum, January 2005,
http://petersoninstitute.org/publicatio ... n0105b.pdf.
33. For an extended discussion of these alternatives, their strengths, and their limitations
from an American perspective, see Ashley J. Tellis, “The Geopolitics of the TTIP and
the TTP: Geo-economic Containment of China?,” in Sanjaya Baru, ed., Power Shifts
and New Blocs in the Global Trading System (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2015); Tellis, Balancing Without Containment, pp. 4–25.
34. See Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser, co-chairs, America’s
National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America’s National Interests,
2000 (Washington, DC: Commission on America’s National Interests, July 2000).
35. Note these Chinese comments on the subject: “US needs to rein in destabilizing Japanese
nationalism: Xinhua,” Want China Times, December 4, 2013, http://www.wantchinatimes.
com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131204000059&cid=1101; Ren Zhongxi,
“Xinhua Focus: Right-leaning Japan becomes Washington’s liability in Asia-Pacific,”
CCTV, April 23, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/04/23/ARTI1398262842351527.
shtml; Chen Jimin, “America’s Rebalance Strategy and Challenges for China,”
Study Times, February 9, 2015, http://www.qstheory.cn/international/2015-
02/09/c_1114300613.htm; Dai Bingguo’s comments to then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton (“Why don’t you just ‘pivot’ out of here?”) in Hard Choices (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2014), p. 79; Zhong Sheng, “Hold mainstream of China-ASEAN relations,”
People’s Daily, April 6, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-04/09/
content_15004996.htm; “A Neutral U.S. helpful to stability in South China Sea,”
China Daily, July 5, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/20 ... 7/content_
15226749.htm; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press
Conference on June 4, 2012,” http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/fyrth/t939675.
htm; “U.S. will not backtrack on rebalance toward Asia: envoy,” Xinhua, July 23, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world ... 564914.htm.
36. Xi Jinping, “New Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation,” remarks
at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia, Shanghai, May 21, 2014.
37. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” remarks by Robert Zoellick
for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21,
2005.
38. As Chinese Minister of Defense General Chang Wanquan noted, “With the latest developments
in China, it can never be contained.” Major General Luo Yuan, known for
his hawkish views, encouraged Chinese “vigilance” as the United States continues to
“bolster its five major military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, adjusts the position
of its five major military base clusters, and seeks more entry rights for military bases
around China.” Other official statements reference perceived U.S. efforts at containing
Beijing in calls for “more cooperation and less containment,” requiring Washington
to “discard its containment fantasy [and] treat China equally and fairly.” Academic
analyses also point to Chinese concerns that the United States is constructing a “super
long line of defense” stretching from the Aleutian Islands to the Persian Gulf with the
sole aim of containing China (Lyle J. Goldstein, “How China Sees America’s Moves in
Asia: Worse Than Containment,” National Interest, October 29, 2014; Zhou Jinghao,
“U.S. Containment Frays China’s Nerves,” Global Times, November 25, 2013; Luo Jun,
“U.S. needs to discard containment fantasy,” Xinhua, June 1, 2014; “Hagel to Meet Xi
as China Vows No Compromising on Sea Disputes,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 9,
2014; “China top military paper warns U.S. aims to contain rise,” Reuters, January 10,
2012; “CPPCC calls for less containment in Sino-US ties,” CCTV, March 3, 2010).
Endnotes 43
39. See, e.g., Dennis Blair and Jon Huntsman, co-chairs, “The IP Commission Report:
The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,” National
Bureau of Asian Research, May 2013, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/
ip_commission_report_052213.pdf.
40. As Richard N. Haass notes, “The United States is fast approaching one of those truly
historic turning points: either it will act to get its fiscal house in order, thereby restoring
the prerequisites of this country’s primacy, or it will fail to and, as a result, suffer both
the domestic and international consequences.” He further highlights five elements
central to restoring America’s strength at home: reducing the federal deficit and ratio
of national debt to GDP; putting into place a comprehensive energy strategy; improving
the quality of education; upgrading domestic physical infrastructure; and modernizing
outdated immigration policy. Richard N. Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home:
The Case for Putting America’s House in Order (New York: Basic Books, 2014), p. 124.
A similar discussion is found in Kim Holmes, Rebound: Getting America Back to Great
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
41. Evidence about American economic power gathered by Goldman Sachs is found in its
January 2015 outlook, “U.S. Preeminence.” “From the peak before the 2008 financial
crisis, the U.S. economy has grown a further 8.1 percent in real terms, compared with
declines of 2.2 percent for the Eurozone and 1.1 percent for Japan. The gap between
GDP growth rates in fast-rising emerging-market economies and the United States
shrank from 6.5 percentage points in 2007 to 2.6 points in 2014, and it’s expected to
narrow further this year to 1.2 points as China slows. The gains are even more striking
when examining business statistics. The debt leverage of listed U.S. companies is
lower than that of firms in any of its trading partners. U.S. labor productivity is substantially
higher than that of the Eurozone, Japan or any emerging-market country. In
terms of average manufacturing costs, the U.S. has an advantage over every one of the
ten largest exporters, except China.” See also David Ignatius, “In foreign policy, play
to American strength,” Washington Post, February 8, 2015; Goldman Sachs Investment
Management Division, “Outlook: US Preeminence,” January 2015.
42. As Walter Lohman, director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center puts
it, “In the end, fostering a global economy growing on liberal principles and institutions
is one of the most potent policies to counter China’s national aims. China cannot
avoid the laws of economics forever. It must resolve the fundamental contradiction
between maintaining high growth and real free-market reform. Time is on our side in
that regard because regional and ultimately global liberalization and the consequent
growth are the most powerful inducements to reform” (interview with the authors,
2014).
43. Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, Geoeconomics and Statecraft, forthcoming.
44. Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing
China (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), p. 52.
45. A 1990 U.S. Department of Defense policy persuasively argued this should be the
benchmark for deciding whether a particular military technology should be considered
destabilizing.
46. Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Pentagon reevaluating pivot to Asia,” Washington Times,
March 5, 2014.
47. The Pentagon should focus its budget on the military pivot to the Pacific, which means
continued investments in high-end weapons, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or
the new Long-Range Strike Bomber. Base realignment and closure authority, as well
as smart reforms targeted at compensation and overhead costs, should also be implemented.
For other sensible recommendations on increasing the U.S. defense budget,
see Diem Nguyen Salmon, “A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget,” Heritage
44 Endnotes
Foundation Backgrounder #2989, January 30, 2015; Ashton B. Carter, “Running the
Pentagon Right,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014; Ron Haskins and Michael
O’Hanlon, “Stop Sequestering Defense,” Defense News, October 13, 2014; Michèle
Flournoy and Eric Edelman, “Cuts to defense spending are hurting national security,”
Washington Post, September 19, 2014; “The Pentagon’s 2016 Budget Will Focus on the
Pacific,” Defense One, December 5, 2014; and Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price, eds.,
The Future of American Defense (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 2014).
48. Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011.
49. See Gordon Chang, “Only Tariffs Will Stop China’s Cyber Attacks,” World Affairs
Journal, October 23, 2014; Blair and Huntsman, “The IP Commission Report.”
50. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability
in Asia,” August 2012, p. 17. Also see Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, eds.,
“Pivot 2.0,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2015; Sheila Smith,
“A Strategy for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, April
2012; Sheila Smith, “Feeling the Heat: Asia’s Shifting Geopolitics and the U.S.-Japan
Alliance,” World Politics Review, July 9, 2013.
51. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop, “U.S.-Australia: The Alliance
in an Emerging Asia,” speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC, January 22, 2014.
52. Original FTA text available from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; also
see Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement negotiations.”
53. Ashley J. Tellis, “Productive but Joyless? Narendra Modi and U.S.-India Relations,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 12, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.
org/2014/05/12/productive-but-joyless-narendra-modi-and-u.s.-india-relations.
54. Murray Hiebert, Ted Osius, and Gregory B. Poling, “A U.S.-Indonesia Partnership for
2020: Recommendations for Forging a 21st Century Relationship,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, September 2013.
55. Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Poling, “A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam
Relations: Deepening Ties Two Decades After Normalization,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, June 2014.
56. “U.S.-Burma Relations: Peace, Stability, and the Transition to Democracy,” Policy
Task Force from the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2013.
57. Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research
Service, August 29, 2014, p. 26.
58. James Massola, “Barack Obama’s China Policy Has Not Been Successful, Says US Official,”
Sydney Morning Herald, November 2, 2014.
59. Kevin Rudd, “East Asia’s Strategic and Economic Future: Chinese Perspectives and
American Responses,” address at the launch of the Zbigniew K. Brzezinski Institute at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, October 1, 2014.
45
Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign
policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he
was senior fellow at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California,
from 2008 to 2010, after serving from 2004 to 2008 as president
of BGR International. As deputy assistant to the president and deputy
national security advisor for strategic planning under President George
W. Bush, Blackwill was responsible for government-wide policy planning
to help develop and coordinate the mid- and long-term direction
of American foreign policy. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq
and was the administration’s coordinator for U.S. policies regarding
Afghanistan and Iran. Blackwill went to the National Security Council
(NSC) after serving as the U.S. ambassador to India from 2001 to 2003,
and he is the recipient of the 2007 Bridge-Builder Award for his role in
transforming U.S.-India relations.
Prior to reentering government in 2001, Blackwill was the Belfer
lecturer in international security at the Harvard Kennedy School.
From 1989 to 1990, Blackwill was special assistant to President George
H.W. Bush for European and Soviet affairs, during which time he was
awarded the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit by the Federal
Republic of Germany for his contribution to German unification.
Earlier in his career, he was the U.S. ambassador to conventional arms
negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, director for European affairs at the
NSC, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for political-military
affairs, and principal deputy assistant secretary of state for European
affairs. Blackwill is author and editor of many articles and books on
transatlantic relations, Russia and the West, the Greater Middle East,
and Asian security. He edited the CFR book Iran: The Nuclear Challenge
(June 2012). His book, a best seller coauthored with Graham Allison
of the Harvard Kennedy School, is titled Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand
Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (MIT Press,
About the Authors
46 About the Authors
February 2013). He is coauthor of a forthcoming book with Jennifer M.
Harris, Geoeconomics and Statecraft. He is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the
Trilateral Commission, and the Aspen Strategy Group, and is on the
board of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs.
Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, specializing in international security, defense,
and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to the U.S. Department
of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary of state for political
affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear
agreement with India. Previously, he was commissioned into the U.S.
Foreign Service and served as senior advisor to the ambassador at the
U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security
Council staff as special assistant to the president and senior director
for strategic planning and Southwest Asia. Prior to his government
service, Tellis was senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and
professor of policy analysis at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate
School. He is the author of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001)
and coauthor of Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and
Future (2000). He is the research director of the strategic Asia program
at the National Bureau of Asian Research and coeditor of the program’s
eleven most recent annual volumes, including this year’s Strategic Asia
2014–15: U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power. His
academic publications, which include numerous Carnegie and RAND
reports, have appeared in many edited volumes and journals, and he is
frequently called to testify before Congress. Tellis is a member of several
professional organizations related to defense and international
studies, including the Council on Foreign Relations, the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, the United States Naval Institute, and
the Navy League of the United States.
47
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

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FBI pulls UNPRECEDENTED stunt against Democrats
Brian Tyler Cohen
Aug 7, 2025 Brian Tyler Cohen



Transcript

You're watching the legal breakdown,
Glenn. We've got some chilling news here
as it relates to the FBI. Can you
explain what just happened at the hands
of John Cornin?
Yeah, Brian. Chilling indeed. As our
viewers undoubtedly know, some Democrat
legislators from Texas left Texas to try
to thwart the Republicans attempt to
basically undermine voting rights in
Texas. They didn't want to be there to
participate in a vote that essentially
would allow Texas legislators to
jerrymand minority votes damn near out
of existence. They didn't want to be
part and parcel of it. So what happened
is Senator Cornin from Texas asked the
FBI to get after these Democrat
legislators who left Texas and asked
Cash Patel, director of the FBI, to
quote arrest them even though they
committed no crime. Indeed, they
certainly committed no federal crime,
but they didn't even commit a state
crime in violation of the laws of Texas.
This is Senator Cornin in a very real
sense urging the FBI to abuse its power,
its authority, its jurisdiction,
and to violate the Constitution by not
only marginalizing voting rights at the
end of this process, but by violating
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against an unlawful arrest. And don't
take my word for it, Brian. Let me just
read a sentence or two from John
Cornin's letter to Cash Patel asking
that the FBI render this assistance. Um,
dear Director Patel, I write to
encourage the FBI to take any
appropriate steps to aid in Texas state
law enforcement efforts to locate or
arrest potential law breakers who have
fled the state. The problem there is
that these Democrat legislators did not
break any law. They've committed no
crime by leaving the state of Texas
rather than being complicit in basically
running roughshot over voters rights in
Texas. But that doesn't matter to
Senator Cornin. You know, there there's
this thing, Brian. It's called a 241
conspiracy. What is a 241 conspiracy?
Well, under 18 United States Code
section 241, there's this thing called a
conspiracy against rights, any
constitutional rights, voting rights,
the Fourth Amendment right prohibiting
an unreasonable seizure, seizure of a
person. In other words, an unlawful
arrest. People may remember that. That
sounds a little familiar. Why? Well,
Brian, because Donald Trump was indicted
for a 241 conspiracy against voting
rights by trying to steal the 2020
presidential election from the American
voters. It really does feel like when I
read this letter, this ask of Senator
Cornin is inviting Cash Patel not only
to abuse the power of the FBI, but to
join him in a 241 conspiracy against
voting rights and against the Fourth
Amendment rights of those Democrat
legislators to be free from an unlawful
arrest, an unreasonable seizure. So, you
know, this is beyond the legal upside
down. This is like an open invitation to
just abuse governmental power and run
roughshot over the constitutional rights
of the people. Now, with that said, I I
guess none of this is actionable until
we actually see what Cash Patel does. I
mean, it's one thing to be able to say,
"Sure, John Cornin, we're at your
disposal. The FBI is going to, you know,
come go in there and scoop up these
Texas Democrats." It's a whole other
thing to do it. And so nothing is really
actionable until we see whether Cash
Patel is actually willing to put his
money where his mouth is, fully
weaponize the government and commit this
illegal act.
Yeah, you're exactly right. because as
of the most recent reporting, there's no
indication that FBI agents have like run
to Illinois, where a lot of these
Democrat uh lawmakers are apparently
staying and tried to take them into
custody, unlawfully arrest them, which
would be a violation of their
constitutional right against an
unreasonable seizure. So, we don't know
what Cash Patel might choose to do. But
what we do know, Brian, is Senator
Cornin announced, "Oh, Cash Patel has
agreed to my request for help." We don't
know what form that help will take. We
can go through the paniply of
possibilities. They could send FBI
agents to do what we call a knock and
talk. They can try to find the u the
Democrat legislators and say, "Hey,
we're encouraging you to go back to
Texas." That's not unlawful. It might be
heavy-handed and it's certainly a waste
of FBI resources if not an abuse of FBI
power. But then they could what? Go
after the credit cards that are being
used by these legislators. They go after
the cell phone information, including
cell site information, which can tell
you where a cell phone is, when a
particular call is being made or
received. But here's the problem, Brian.
There's a legal process that goes along
with law enforcement agents acquiring
that kind of information. The two
different ways you can get different
kinds of information. Um, one is with a
grand jury subpoena. You can get certain
information but not all information. And
the second is with either a judicially
issued search warrant or a judicially
issued court order. So the question
remains, how far will the FBI go in
abusing its authority and power to get
involved in an investigation when no
crime has been committed and certainly
no federal crime has been committed?
You know, I I I know that we look at
this and say, okay, the FBI can't do
this because uh because they don't have
the authority to do so. But we also look
at how ICE has kind of operates in this
nebulous gray zone where all of a sudden
whereas you didn't have the authority to
just scoop people up effectively kidnap
them off the streets before suddenly you
do. And and it's wild how quickly the
American people have have been forced to
become accustomed or or or uh normalized
to this behavior. And so if we see the
FBI do the same thing, what recourse is
there when you have, you know, like Cash
Battel's goons going up to Texas and and
just I guess acting as as the Republican
party's uh political, you know, army
with with uh to to do to do whatever
they need to do to help uh these
politicians reach their political goals.
Yeah, it does seem like violating the
rule of law, violating the
constitutional rights of people in the
United States, not just American
citizens, but all people in the United
States, enjoy constitutional rights, for
example, against an unreasonable search
and seizure, a lawless arrest. But
lawlessness by Donald Trump's, you know,
federal law enforcement agencies has
quickly become the norm. And we see that
most acutely in the way they are, you
know, going after any any folks who
happen to be in a Home Depot parking lot
or, you know, picking produce in a field
or working in the garment district in
California in LA who happen to look what
Hispanic, maybe they're speaking
Spanish. Well, the good news is, Brian,
and there's always good news. There are
points of light out there amidst the
Trump induced darkness. The good news is
a federal judge in California told ICE,
ordered ICE, prohibited ICE from making
these unlawful seizures of people
without specific reasons, specific
constitutional reason to do so with
respect to every single person they
stop. Right? And the appeals court, the
ninth circuit court of appeals recently
affirmed that trial court ruling and
that injunction remains in place. So the
good news is there are federal court
judges protecting the American people
and undocumented workers from the abuses
of Donald Trump's law enforcement
agency. So now let's shift back to the
John Corn and Cash Patel, you know,
arrest lawmakers who committed no crimes
topic. If there is some unconstitutional
or unlawful act perpetrated against one
or more of these Texas lawmakers, I can
pretty much guarantee you that that is
going to get right into court and you're
going to have a federal judge deal with
it on an emergency basis because Brian,
in a very real sense, the federal
judiciary, and I'm talking about the
trial court judges and all of the
circuit courts of appeal, the federal
appeals court judge judges in a very
real sense have been protecting us
against the abuses and the lawlessness
and the unconstitutional acts of a
president of the United States.
And so in this instance, if we're
carrying on with this thought experiment
wherein Cash Patel is able to send the
FBI off to Illinois to scoop these
people up, how quickly would these Texas
officials be able to seek recourse in
the courts? Because I mean if they are
in the midst of being scooped up
extrajudicially by these FBI agents, I
mean like that's something that requires
immediate attention. And obviously, you
know, I think that that I'm probably
correct in saying you can't seek any any
recourse or you you can't seek any
remedy. You can't claim harm if they
haven't done it yet. So there's no way
to prep prepare for this. But what
happens in the event that it's
happening?
Great question. And and here's the
thing, you know, to talk about this
being a thought experiment. You know, it
sounds too crazy to be a Hollywood
script. However, Illinois Governor
Pritsker has said he will not allow
lawlessness in his state, including
lawlessness perpetrated by federal
agents. And Brian, if somebody grabs you
and takes you into custody without
lawful process or basis, we have a word
for that. It's called kidnapping. It's
also an assault. And I'm going to take
Governor Pritsker at his word that he
will not allow lawlessness in his state
to be perpetrated against Texas
legislators or anybody else. Again, this
sounds too insane to even be talking
about using state law enforcement
authorities to thwart unlawful efforts
by the FBI to take Texas legislators
into custody, but you know, this is
Donald Trump's America in which we're
living.
Well, we will of course stay on top of
this. The story is pretty quickly
moving, so I'm sure we'll have updates
quite soon. And for those who are
watching, if you'd like to support our
work and hear more, please make sure to
subscribe. The links to both of our
channels are right here on the screen.
Best way to support us, completely free,
and a great way to show some support for
independent media. I'm Brian Taylor
Cohen.
And I'm Glenn Kersner.
You're watching the Legal Breakdown.
[Music]
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri Aug 08, 2025 6:45 am

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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri Aug 08, 2025 7:07 pm

Krystal ENDS Cory Booker's Career
Breaking Points
Aug 7, 2025 Breaking Points

Krystal and Saagar discuss Cory Booker.

"Cohn was closely associated with numerous celebrities, famous politicians and political operatives. Many of his birthday parties over the years attracted such famous figures such as artist Andy Warhol, fashion designer Calvin Klein, and comedian Joey Adams, as well as notable political figures including former Mayor of New York Abraham Beame and then-Assemblyman from Brooklyn and future Senator Chuck Schumer, among others."

-- Government by Blackmail: Jeffrey Epstein, Trump’s Mentor and the Dark Secrets of the Reagan Era. Appalling for both the villainous abuse of children itself and the chilling implications of government by blackmail, this tangled web of unsavory alliances casts a lurid light on the political history of the U.S. from the Prohibition Era right up through the Age of Trump, by Whitney Webb, July 25, 2019




Transcript

Krystal, what are you taking a look at?
Wow, I haven't said that in a while.
Well, in a Senate that is full of amoral
psychopathic monsters, it can be
difficult to choose among the various
odious figures who should truly reach
the S tier of villain. You've got your
proudly genocidal types like John
Fetterman. You've got your Islamophobic
procry sellouts like Kirstston
Gillibrand. But in terms of the
Democratic caucus, at least in my humble
opinion, Corey Booker is the worst. He
is just the [ __ ] worst. Booker
combines theatrical vacuous pining with
corporate slavishness with moral horrors
for a total package that is thoroughly
and completely repugnant. Please, for
the love of God, someone decent primary
this man. So, the problems with Cy
Booker, of course, they're nothing new.
actually attended a wedding that he
officiated once and I swear to God the
first maybe 20 minutes of the ceremony
he spent describing his own personal
faith journey. Leave it to Corey Booker
to make a wedding about himself instead
of I don't know maybe the bride and
groom. I am also old enough to remember
when Booker went on Meet the Press as a
top Obama surrogate to decry that
campaign's attacks on Mitt Romney's Bane
Capital private equity record. this was
really something
that stuff. I have to just say from a
very personal level, uh I'm not about to
sit here and indict uh private equity.
It's to me it's just this we're getting
to a ridiculous point in America,
especially that I know I live in a state
where pension funds, unions, and other
people are investing in companies like
Bane Capital. If you look at the
totality of Bane Capital's record, uh it
ain't they've done a lot to support uh
uh businesses to grow businesses. And
this to me, I'm I'm very uncomfortable.
This kind of stuff is nauseating to me
on both sides. It's nauseating to the
American public. Enough is enough. Stop
attacking private equity. Stop attacking
Jeremiah Wright. This stuff has got to
stop because what it does is it
undermines to me what this country
should be focused on. It's a distraction
from the real issues. It's either going
to be a small campaign about this crap
or it's going to be a big campaign in my
opinion about the issues that American
public cares about.
Nauseating. Okay. The Obama campaign and
Democratic base backlash against Cy
Booker was swift after those comments. I
remember a sweaty, nervous Rachel Matto
interview he did in the aftermath of
those comments to try to clean it up,
but he never really fully recanted. It
was a very revealing episode because it
broadcasts that he was willing to take
the heat, even against Obama, the most
beloved figure in the Democratic party,
in order to defend the honor of capital.
His mentality is donor first through and
through, but wrapped in a shoddy veneer
of supposed progressivism. Booker's not
stupid, though. Unlike some of his
duller compatriots who thought that
there was political advantage to be
gained from playing footsie with MAGA,
like let's say Gavin Newsome, having
Charlie Kirk and Steve Bannon on his
podcast, or all of the Doge caucus
people. Booker recognized pretty quickly
in Trump 2.0 that the Democratic base
was desperate for figures who would
stand up and fight the Trump
administration. So, what did Cory Booker
do? Well, he strapped on an adult diaper
and took to the floor of the Senate for
an epic filibuster, boldly speaking
truth to power for hour after hour after
hour, excoriating the Trump
administration, promising to fight their
power grab at every turn, eventually
breaking the record for the longest ever
floor speech. Maybe we thought this man
has turned a page. Maybe he's decided to
rise the historical moment to put
grassroots democracy over donor-driven
capitulation.
But even in this speech marathon, the
red flags were pretty clear. First of
all, it wasn't actually a filibuster as
it wasn't blocking any actual action.
Second, he used some of his time to
embrace abundance, the big money back
neoliberal rebrand dedicated to putting
a glossy new sheen on status quo
politics. Finally, he swiftly moved from
declaring allout war on the Trump
administration to voting to confirm
justice involved person and Trump family
relative Charles Kushner as ambassador
to France, demonstrating just how
committed Booker really is to actually
fighting Trump administration nepotism
and thuggery. The Kushner vote was
particularly egregious given that he has
was convicted of some pretty wild crimes
in Booker's own home state of New
Jersey. You guys can go and look that
one up. In fact, only a handful of
Senate Democrats have supported more
Trump nominees than Corey Booker has.
The man who theatrically pledged to
fight the Trump administration
relentlessly. Booker is apparently all
resistance in the streets, but
capitulation in the Sheets. The dude is
also utterly shameless, too. When the
Newark mayor and New Jersey
congressional members were arrested
attempting to examine an ICE detention
facility, Booker, of course, nowhere to
be found. When other members were flying
to El Salvador to demand the release of
innocents from a slave labor camp,
Booker was reported to be planning a
trip but seemingly quashed it when Hakee
Jeff told Democrats that they needed to
back off the case. So, while substantive
action has ranged from non-existent to
outright complicit, theatrics have
certainly continued. Most recently,
Booker got into an intentionally noisy
spat with Senator Amy Clolobashar.
Apparently, Booker was looking to
grandstand over some provisional
policing bill. Clolobashar was pissed
off and disgusted with this little
performance because he actually couldn't
be bothered to show up for the committee
vote when said provision was actually
being discussed and voted on. So here is
a snippet of Booker's outburst.
I was just called out by name and I want
to respond. I don't need somebody
implying in any way that this is not
vital to me and my state that we have
resources for our police officers. But
what I am tired of is when the president
of the United States of America violates
the Constitution, trashes our norms and
traditions,
and what does the Democratic Party do?
Comply?
Allow him? Beg for scraps? No. I demand
justice. It's time for Democrats to have
a backbone. It's time for us to fight.
It's time for us to draw lines. And when
it comes to the safety of my state,
being denied these grants, that's why
I'm standing here. Don't question my
integrity. Don't question my motives.
I'm standing for Jersey. I am standing
for my police officers. I'm standing for
the Constitution. And I'm standing for
what's right.
Standing for what's right, you say?
Well, it will surprise no one to learn
that. Shortly after this tor force of
moral preining, I believe in front of an
empty chamber, by the way, Booker would
once again vote to ship offensive
weapons to Israel so they can continue
their campaign of terror against
starving Palestinian children. What
clarity, what courage, what incredible
moral leadership. And truly, it is with
Israel's genocide in Gaza where Booker
has reached his final most despicable
form. It will not surprise you to learn
that he is a top recipient of Israel
lobby funds and he votes and acts
accordingly in seemingly every instance.
He's been enthusiastic in efforts to
criminalize criticism and boycots of
Israel. He goes that extra mile by
attending Apac policy conferences. He
even gushed in leaked audio about how he
texts back and forth with Apac's
president like they're a couple of
teenagers. Part for the course, I guess,
for someone with an apparent multi-deade
close friendship with the utterly
reprehensible Rabbi Schmoolie. Here they
are together, horsing around at a porum
party at Oxford in 1993.
By all accounts, the two were extremely
close friends for decades, falling out,
according to Booker, over Schmoolie
being so self-promoting that even Cory
Booker couldn't quite take it. I guess
the man does have some limits,
apparently. But Booker's ironclad
commitment to Israel has outlasted his
schmooly bromance. In fact, perhaps
nothing so accurately encapsulates the
putrid essence of Cy Booker as this
photo with wanted war criminal Benjamin
Netanyahu back when he was in town just
a few weeks ago. Cory has the intellect
to know a photo op with BB probably a
bad look while babies are literally
being starved. So, he hides his face,
but he lacks the integrity to actually
buck his donors. So, there Corey is in
the photo lamely trying to hide behind
someone. Now he claims the photographer
positioned him this way. Okay. Now it
goes without saying you'd be hardressed
to identify a more monstrous and
destructive figure in the entire world
than Netanyahu. And yet here is
self-anointed moral warrior Cy Booker
meeting with modern-day Hitler so he can
hear the latest Husbara talking points
about how children with pre-existing
conditions don't really count as
starving or how American Jews voting for
Zoron are actually Hamas. Speaking of
Zoron, guess who refuses to get behind
the Democratic nominee for New York City
in spite of a resounding 12-point
victory? You guessed it, Mr. Courageous
himself, Cory Booker.
About mom and Donnie, are you going to
support him?
I I I have learned a long time ago, let
New York politics be New York politics.
We got enough challenges in Jersey. I
got a governor's race. I'm supporting
Mikey Cheryl. I got legislative races.
That's where my energy is going to go
going into November. New York City, I
love you. You're my neighbor. You're
about 10 miles from where I live. You
guys figure out your elections. I'm
going to f focus on mine.
Would you be surprised if I informed you
that his don't endorse in New York rule
is not some consistent Booker
anti-mettling policy. In fact, for
years, Cy Booker ran a pack that
endorsed Democrats in races across the
country. and he currently sits on the
board of the pack Democrats for
Education Reform, a group founded by
billionaire and former mayoral candidate
Whitney Tilson and which endorses
candidates who are against teachers
unions and generally in favor of charter
schools. He's got no problem endorsing
candidates in New York or in any other
state. By the way, he just doesn't want
to support this particular candidate.
Given Cory's delight at texting like a
teenager with Apac and his close
association with billionaire Zionist
Whitney Tilson, who made his whole
mayoral campaign about Israel, I think
we all know why the supposed progressive
just can't bring himself to support the
progressive Democratic nominee for
mayor. To top off all the self-
congratulation and cash grab and really
wrap it all in a bow, Booker has decided
to turn his 25-hour speech into a book
called Stand. On the publishers's
website, they describe Stand as quote,
"A celebration of the Americans who
chose to get up in the face of
injustice, who championed the uniquely
American values central to making our
nation a more perfect union despite
seemingly insurmountable obstacles. It's
also, they say, a guide for today.
Leadership is not derived from position
or title. It comes from action and
example." Action and example. Really?
Booker's actions have been
grandstanding. His example has been
support for a genocide. co-opting
progressive language to run cover for a
rogue ethnostate. For these reasons and
so many more, I do hereby declare that
Cy Booker is just the [ __ ] worst. Um,
watching him out there still doing his
little
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