The tide has turned: Iran’s strategic control of the Strait of Hormuz crushes American naval supremacy
by Press TV Strategic Analysis Desk
Saturday, 06 June 2026 1:53 PM [ Last Update: Saturday, 06 June 2026 1:57 PM ]
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/06/0 ... -supremacy
For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has been more than a waterway. It has functioned as the world’s most strategic chokepoint, the jugular vein of global energy flows, and the stage upon which American naval supremacy has performed its most visible and intimidating demonstrations of military force.
Through this narrow maritime corridor, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, nearly one-fifth of global oil supply once moved with routine predictability. That predictability itself was the source of strategic power. Whoever could guarantee – or disrupt – that flow effectively held leverage over the global economic bloodstream.
For decades, the United States positioned itself as the ultimate arbiter of that passage. Its naval formations patrolled these waters with the implicit assumption of ownership, dictating the rules of engagement, enforcing “freedom of navigation” on its own strategic terms, and treating Iran’s legitimate maritime interests as little more than a secondary concern.
That era has effectively ended now. Renewed clashes in the Strait of Hormuz in recent days, triggered by repeated US military adventurism, are not routine maritime incidents. They represent the surface tremors of a deeper structural transformation: the steady consolidation of Iran’s sovereignty over this critical waterway.
This is no longer a question of symbolic passage rights or procedural navigation disputes. It is about effective control of one of the most consequential maritime arteries on the planet, where geography, deterrence, and power projection intersect with global energy security.
For the United States, this significant shift does not register as a diplomatic inconvenience or localized friction. It constitutes a direct erosion of its ability to assert uncontested naval dominance in a region that has long been central to its global power projection.
In strategic terms, it represents a serious and irreversible blow to its status as a maritime superpower, which has been dying a slow death since the recent war against Iran.
The unspoken contest: Sovereignty vs. symbolism
At the core of the current standoff lies a simple yet profound struggle. The American war machine persists in symbolically steering its warships through the Strait of Hormuz while refusing to abide by Iran's established rules following the recent war of aggression.
This is not merely about transit rights. It is an act of defiance, a refusal to acknowledge the practical consolidation of Iranian sovereignty over the world's most strategically vital maritime corridor and the shift in maritime dynamics in the past three months.
Washington fully grasps what Tehran has declared: the strait is no longer an open highway for hostile foreign naval forces. Iran has imposed new regulations, new protocols, and new realities. And for a superpower whose identity hinges on projecting force across global oceans, such surrender is unthinkable. Thus, the United States is trying to resist and flout new rules through presence, turning each routine crossing into a symbolic confrontation.
Yet symbolism, however resolute, cannot forever override geography. The Strait of Hormuz rests entirely within Iran's territorial waters and the Iranian leadership has clearly and categorically announced that its sovereignty is non-negotiable.
A heavy blow to American naval supremacy
The legitimate consolidation of Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz delivers far more than financial or security benefits to Tehran. It strikes a devastating blow to the very foundation of American dominance at sea, which remained unquestioned not long ago.
America's military power is inherently maritime. From aircraft carriers to nuclear submarines, from the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain to patrols across the Indian Ocean, the American war machine projects influence through its mastery over the world's strategic waterways.
The Persian Gulf has anchored that strategy for half a century. It is the arena where Washington has repeatedly sought to demonstrate its ability to protect regional allies, intimidate adversaries, and secure energy flows that safeguard its own interests.
Depriving the United States of its ability to freely exploit the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz – to move with impunity, to dictate the rules, to command the waters – marks the beginning of America's decline and fall as a naval superpower.
From that decline flows a cascade of consequences: zero political leverage, shattered military credibility, and a weakened hand against major rivals such as China and Russia.
Beijing and Moscow are watching closely. If the US cannot secure compliance in a narrow strait off Iran's coast, what message does that send about its ability to contest the South China Sea or the Arctic? The blow at Hormuz resonates far beyond the Persian Gulf.
No acceptance, now or ever
Given the immense stakes, it would be naive to expect the American war machine ever to formally approve or accept Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.
Not in the short term, during the current fragile ceasefire. Not in the medium term, between the end of unprovoked aggression and any potential final agreement. And certainly not in the long term – even after some future deal, should one ever materialize.
For Washington, acceptance would mean surrender. It would signal to the world that a regional power has successfully challenged and shattered American maritime dominance. It would embolden other players – from the South China Sea to the Black Sea – to assert their own sovereign controls over strategic waterways. The precedent is simply far too dangerous.
Thus, American stubbornness has already manifested in localized clashes within the strait, along Iran's southern coasts, and in attacks on limited positions in Qeshm, Sirik, and Bandar Abbas. Iranian vessels around the Strait have also been struck.
These are not isolated incidents but the death throes of a superpower that refuses to accept a new geopolitical reality of Iran as a new power and the Strait as its jugular vein.
The red line that cannot be erased
Even if the naval blockade were fully lifted – even if tensions eased elsewhere – American provocative operations and harassment in the Strait of Hormuz are unlikely to cease.
Why? Because the normalization and consolidation of Iran's exercise of sovereignty over the strait has become, and will remain, an official red line for the United States.
This is not just about oil or about Israel. It is about the fundamental architecture of global power. If Iran can close or control the Strait at will, the United States can no longer guarantee global energy security in line with its own interests.
If the United States cannot guarantee global energy security, its allies will lose confidence. If its allies lose confidence, the entire American-led international order begins to collapse.
For Washington, retreat at the Strait of Hormuz is inconceivable and in fact suicidal. Yet continued confrontation with Iran carries its own catastrophic consequences.
Iran’s objective: Victory without instability
For Iran, however, prolonged tension in the Strait of Hormuz remains undesirable in the long term. Victory on the battlefield and at the negotiating table must be sustainable.
If commercial shipping routes stay chronically insecure, shipping companies will inevitably seek or create alternative paths, bypassing the strait entirely through pipelines, overland corridors, or longer sea lanes. Iran's strategic leverage would then erode, not through military defeat, but through economic irrelevance.
Moreover, sustained tension generates pressure from other countries, including Iran's friends and allies. Even sympathetic countries may quietly urge Tehran to compromise, not because they side with Washington, but because their own economies, in one way or another, depend on predictable maritime traffic.
Iran thus faces a delicate dilemma: how to entrench sovereignty without strangling the very waterway that gives sovereignty its strategic meaning.
The logic of asymmetric action
To end tensions and impose new rules under Iranian sovereignty, there is no option but asymmetric action in response to American provocations. Symmetry, which means matching the United States ship for ship, strike for strike, is a losing proposition. Iran cannot out-build the most powerful navy in history, but it can certainly out-think and out-maneuver it.
Asymmetric action raises the cost of harassing Iran in Washington's calculus. Every American provocation must carry a price wildly disproportionate to the act itself.
Not always a military price – at least not exclusively – but a strategic, political, or reputational toll. Over time, as these costs accumulate, Washington will reluctantly conclude that unofficial submission to Iranian sovereignty is the least bad option.
Critically, even if the American war machine someday refrains from disrupting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Sea of Oman, it retains the capacity to do so anywhere in the world's waters.
This global reach grants America coercive bargaining power. It can threaten disruption elsewhere to extract concessions on Iran's control of the strait. Asymmetric responses must therefore be imaginative, persistent, and capable of following the United States far beyond the Persian Gulf region.
Beyond military responses: Expanding the target set
Iran's reactions to American maritime banditry and maritime terrorism are not confined to military responses or the targeting of US military bases across the region. Other domains are equally viable and very much on the table – cyber, diplomatic, economic, and covert.
Importantly, if the enemy continues to use the territory and facilities of southern Persian Gulf states to project its delusional power against Iran, then the infrastructure of those very states becomes a legitimate target as well.
This logic has been repeatedly underscored by Iranian officials. If Iran's use of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf is restricted because the enemy operates from the soil or facilities of Persian Gulf Arab states – and if Iran's territorial integrity and security are not respected – then none of those countries will enjoy security either.
This is not a threat of indiscriminate aggression but a clear and categorical statement of strategic reality. In any prolonged confrontation, proximity becomes vulnerability.
The Persian Gulf Arab states may host American bases, but they also sit within easy reach of Iranian missiles, drones, and unconventional forces. Their prosperity depends on the very waters Iran is and has been defending. They cannot expect to facilitate pressure on Tehran while remaining insulated from the consequences.
The ultimate calculation: War as a boundary
Ultimately, the enemy must reach a single conclusion regarding the Strait of Hormuz: Iran is unwilling to abandon its sovereignty over this strait even at the cost of a full-scale war. That is the red line. That is the point beyond which American threats lose their coercive power.
But before reaching the point of war, many other measures are possible. Gradual escalation, calibrated retaliation, shadow warfare, legal maneuvering, diplomatic offensives, and economic leverage can all be deployed to make the United States understand Iran’s firm determination.
War is not a goal. It is a threshold. And the most effective deterrence is convincing the adversary that crossing that threshold will produce no victory, only unacceptable loss.
Hence, the enemy must come to terms with the new reality that governs the Strait of Hormuz in particular and the West Asia region in general. The American Empire is resisting not because it can reverse this tide, but because accepting it would mean admitting that its naval supremacy no longer exists.
The consolidation of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz is a heavy blow to the United States at sea, one from which American power may never fully recover.
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From manufacturing consent to masking defeat: 'Iran International'in service of US-Israeli war machine
By Sheida Eslami
Saturday, 06 June 2026 10:35 AM [ Last Update: Saturday, 06 June 2026 10:35 AM ]
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/06/0 ... ar-machine
In today’s West Asia, the simultaneous roar of the swords of war, narrative, and imagery grows louder by the day. The military support, intervention, and direct involvement of the United States in the crimes of the Zionist regime through direct military aggression against Iran, as well as its guidance and arms support for the assaults carried out by this usurping regime, have lost their effectiveness in legitimizing the slaughter of children, women, patients, and others across the region.
Now, even turning nations into servants – nations that gain nothing from allowing the United States and Israel access to and use of their territories and facilities – no longer yields results.
America’s hollow hegemony has been shattered, and the sun of truth has emerged from behind the clouds of lies and staged victimhood media spectacles.
Under such conditions, increasing and repairing media budgets to conceal political and even security objectives, enhancing public relations, advertising, and cognitive operations are no longer merely figures in financial statements but signs of anxiety, defeat, and attempts to escape a deep crisis of legitimacy.
On one side, Israel, by approving an unprecedented budget for hasbara and public diplomacy, is effectively admitting that in the battle for public opinion, especially after the Gaza genocidal war and the aggression against Iran, it faces a serious fracture.
On the other side, propaganda networks such as “Iran International,” the symbol of Persian-language propaganda against Iran, gain meaning within a larger constellation of infiltration operations and perception management; a constellation in which media, lobbying, data, capital, and security are intertwined and wrapped in a veil of hollow claims.
What outwardly appears as “advertising” and “media” is in reality a new form of warfare: a war waged not on land, but in minds, social media feeds, and television frames. Yet the more intensely its flames rise, the more they consume their own creators.
Iran International, an ostrich burying its head in the sand
The recent Financial Times report on the financial and ownership structure of the anti-Islamic Republic Persian-language network “Iran International” once again revived a question that has existed since the network’s launch in 2017: a media outlet with such enormous expenditures, such levels of losses, and such opacity in ownership, exactly with what motive and by whom is it being kept alive?
Why does this so-called media outlet, despite all the evident signs and evidence, still attempt to justify itself with grandiose terminology and refuse to pull its head out of the sand and see that everyone can already observe its naked reality? What is the real motive and objective behind sustaining Iran International?
The answer to this question does not merely help understand an overseas Persian-language network. The main issue is that public opinion should know that when a media outlet simultaneously claims editorial independence, records hundreds of millions of pounds in accumulated losses, refuses to disclose the identities of its investors, and transfers parts of its ownership structure to offshore companies, it can no longer be evaluated by the normal standards of a commercial media enterprise.
According to the Financial Times report, the parent company of “Iran International,” Volant Media UK, suffered more than £410 million in losses during the five years ending in December 2024 and owed approximately £482 million to affiliated entities.
Despite such conditions, the network was not only not shut down or downsized, but according to the same report, continued operating internationally with a vast network of personnel and media activities. From an economic perspective, this situation is abnormal, because in a normal commercial model, such a scale of losses would either lead to reduced operations, transparent ownership changes, clear capital injections, or investor withdrawal.
But here something else happened: shareholders converted around £650 million of the company’s debts into equity; a move that reduces liabilities from the balance sheet and strengthens the company’s financial appearance without necessarily clarifying the true source of the capital to the public.
“Iran International” has announced that this operation did not represent fresh money entering the company and was merely a debt-to-equity conversion intended to strengthen the company’s balance sheet. This explanation may be understandable from an accounting perspective, but it does not eliminate the core question regarding the philosophy behind the move. If investors were acting solely according to the logic of media profitability, why would they continue spending and absorbing hundreds of millions of pounds in losses on a project with no obvious economic return?
It is precisely here that the hypothesis of “political and geopolitical returns” becomes more serious. In other words, the issue is not merely what money was spent but it is why such money, with such a level of opacity, has been spent on such a media outlet, especially given the timing coinciding with plans for engineered riots in Iran in January 2026, responsibility for which, during the course of American-Israeli aggression against Iran, was openly acknowledged by American officials, with one of the key objectives described as the partitioning of Iran. Trump himself even complained about the ineffectiveness of funneling weapons to Kurdish separatists.
Likewise, the FT report notes that Reza Moadab, one of “Iran International” presenters, told Agence France-Presse in January regarding protesters: “We are all fighting together to get rid of this brutal regime.” It is as if the network operates along the same line as the military actions against Iran and has moved far beyond the framework of a normal media organization and what it attempts to portray itself as.
The offshore trail, Saudi links, and ownership ambiguity
An important part of the report concerns the registration and ownership changes of Volant Media. According to the report, on December 13, 648 million new shares with a nominal value of £648 million were issued, while simultaneously all 50,000 original company shares were transferred from Adel Abdulkarim Alabdulkarim to a Cayman Islands company named Info-Cast Cayman Limited.
The Cayman Islands are among the most famous offshore corporate jurisdictions; the use of such a structure in a case fundamentally centered on financial transparency and real ownership naturally raises sensitivities and questions.
More importantly, according to the FT narrative, registration documents do not clearly explain to whom the newly issued shares were allocated. This means that at the same time as the company’s largest financial restructuring, a major part of the ownership picture remains obscure.
Meanwhile, the report states that [b][size=110]the only registered director of Info-Cast Cayman is a person named Saleh Hussain Aldowais, and a person with the same name is identified as the chief operating officer of Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG), one of Saudi Arabia’s largest media groups. SRMG itself reportedly did not respond to FT’s request for comment.
These data points create an important chain of circumstantial evidence: massive losses, undisclosed investors, conversion of enormous debt into equity, transfer of ownership to offshore structures, and the nominal connection of an offshore company director to one of Saudi Arabia’s largest media entities.
Alongside this, republished reports citing FT also mention the role of OR Holdings and Investments Limited, a company reportedly linked to Adel Abdulkarim, active in film and television production, producing content for “Iran International,” and maintaining offices or operational ties in Riyadh.
These reports further state that the company produced propaganda works including several anti-Iranian documentaries and productions targeting martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, as well as the documentary ‘The Line: Saudi Arabia’s City of the Future in Neom’, with Abdulkarim listed on IMDb as executive producer of these projects.
Putting these pieces together, the resulting picture resembles not a simple financial relationship, but rather a network of media, production, and investment companies moving between London, Riyadh, and offshore jurisdictions.
This ambiguity has existed since the network’s earliest years. In 2018, The Guardian published a report referencing concerns about “Iran International’s” financial ties to circles close to Mohammed bin Salman. That report, citing anonymous sources, claimed the network’s funding was facilitated through intermediaries close to Saudi power centers and mentioned figures such as Saud al-Qahtani.
The Guardian also referenced an initial support figure of $250 million. These are at the level of source-based journalistic claims, not judicial rulings, but their significance lies in the fact that, together with FT’s new data, they form a recurring pattern: enormous capital, opaque ownership, Saudi connections, and intermediary structures.
Among the newer points raised in recent reports is that ambiguity over the source of funding has not only been a concern for outside critics. According to FT, some individuals familiar with or close to the network’s operations stated that the concealment of financial sources was itself a source of concern among some of the organization’s journalists, and questions about its possible impact on editorial decisions had even been raised privately.
This point is significant because it moves the issue beyond “external accusations” and shows that financial opacity can become a crisis of internal trust and even a source of concern about conflict and possible collapse within the organization itself.
Of course, the official position of “Iran International” and Volant Media is that the network has received no funding from the Saudi government, Israel, or any other entity, and is supported by a consortium of private commercial investors.
But the main problem is that the identities of these investors are not publicly disclosed. Therefore, official denials without clarification of ultimate ownership not only fail to answer all questions, but in the face of a body of financial and registration evidence, themselves become part of the issue.
From editorial line to anti-security function
The financial ambiguity surrounding “Iran International” becomes more important when examined alongside its editorial line and political role. The Guardian’s 2018 report referred to criticisms regarding the network’s extensive coverage of MKO terror cult gatherings and the platforming of a spokesperson linked to the Ahvaz terror attack.
It was also reported that Ofcom was reviewing the matter at the time. One of the newer points highlighted in the recent report is the network’s changed regulatory position in Britain.
According to FT, “Iran International” is no longer fully subject to traditional Ofcom television broadcasting rules because it now operates in Britain as an online streaming and on-demand service. This does not mean the absence of oversight entirely, but it reduces obligations such as strict traditional broadcasting impartiality.
Consequently, a network aiming for significant political influence is deliberately framed within a regulatory structure more flexible and less constrained than conventional television. This is seen as another sign of a mechanism through which the network can move toward broad political influence while avoiding normal media accountability with institutional assistance.
The new FT report also notes that critics regard “Iran International” as promoting pro-war narratives and amplifying the self-proclaimed “prince” Reza Pahlavi. This perception became especially pronounced after the events of 2022 and later during heightened tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States; a period during which “Iran International” devoted significant airtime to opposition, monarchist, separatist, or anti-Iranian narratives, blurring the line between information dissemination and psychological operations.
During the riots or quasi-coup attempt of January 2026 and plans for hybrid warfare and the February 28 war of aggression, attempts aimed at igniting civil war in Iran simultaneously with the American-Israeli military assault – substantial evidence emerged of the network’s deliberate attempts to advance a strategy of division among the Iranian people and justify crimes against civilians, educational centers, medical facilities, and others during the “Ramadan War,” most notably the attack on the school in Minab and the massacre of more than 150 students there.
Viewed from the outside, “Iran International” with such an approach is not a news outlet covering events, but an actor that at political turning points moves toward constructing narratives, empowering specific figures, legitimizing interventionist scenarios, and justifying foreign aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Alongside the Saudi issue, recent reports from Israeli media including Israel Hayom have claimed that Israeli military bodies have used overseas Persian-language media for infiltration operations, character assassination, and influencing Iranian public opinion.
The importance of these narratives lies in elevating the role of media from “transmitting news” to “a tool of cognitive operations,” which means the news itself, its timing, social context, publishing outlet, and the intended public reaction all become components of a multilayered operation. The language used in Israeli media itself demonstrates how regime apparatuses view media, social networks, and psychological operations as complementary tools.
Therefore, when all components are assembled, the final picture is this: “Iran International” claims to operate under the claim of independence, yet its financial structure is muddy; its hundreds of millions of pounds in losses cannot be explained through ordinary economic logic; its ownership restructuring is tied to offshore companies in the Cayman Islands; names within its structure intersect with the Saudi media sphere; and its editorial line has repeatedly been accused by critics of aligning with pressure projects, destabilization campaigns, foreign intervention, and plans such as the January 2026 quasi-coup and attempts to trigger civil war and partition Iran.
Hasbara is no longer advertising but perception engineering
Other reports published in spring 2026 indicate that Israel allocated around $730 million for advertising and “public diplomacy/hasbara” in 2026; a figure approximately five times larger than the previous year’s $150 million budget and approved by the Knesset in March.
This budget is roughly twenty times higher than spending levels before the Gaza genocidal war began in October 2023, and this enormous increase in itself signals an intense crisis of credibility, a deep fracture in belief in the legitimacy of the occupying regime’s actions, and a sense of urgency in trying to repair this vast gap: namely, that hasbara must evolve into perception management; a combination of media, diplomacy, lobbying, digital campaigns, influencers, and data-driven operations aimed not merely at defending Israel’s crimes against the people of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and others, but at reshaping public emotions – at least within the United States – toward the Israeli regime.
This is particularly significant when polling data, especially in the United States, offer a clearer picture of the scale of the crisis. According to a Pew Research Center survey published in April, 60 percent of Americans now hold an unfavorable view of Israel, a significant increase compared to the previous year.
Only 37 percent hold a favorable view, and this divide is clearly visible across various social and religious groups. Even among Republicans under 50 – traditionally part of Israel’s support base – the majority now hold negative views.
Add to this the fact that the Hebrew word “hasbara” itself is increasingly used in a derogatory manner to describe Israeli propaganda efforts; a sign that these campaigns have not only failed to achieve their intended influence, but in some cases have produced the opposite effect. So much so that Gideon Sa’ar himself recognized the strategic necessity of changing the approach, calling the investment “a vital issue” and stating: “It must be treated like investments in fighter jets, bombs, and missile defense systems.”
Under the new framework, the budget has been distributed in a highly targeted manner: establishing a central media operations room to monitor 250 media outlets and produce 10,000 pieces of Israel-related content daily; allocating $50 million for digital advertising across international platforms such as Google, YouTube, X, and Instagram; and dedicating $40 million to hosting 400 foreign delegations including lawmakers, clergy, university presidents, and influencers.
The $1.5 million monthly contract with Brad Parscale falls precisely within this logic. Tel Aviv signed a $1.5 million per month deal with Parscale, Donald Trump’s former campaign strategist, to use artificial intelligence tools to monitor and manage what it describes as “antisemitism.” Funding networks of influencers and targeted campaigns, including among evangelical Christian groups, is also part of the strategy.
According to this plan, crises threatening Israel’s manufactured image and exposing the face of a genocidal state must be identified and contained before they reach public consciousness.
A war for hearts and minds
But why such a budget? Because Israel faces a growing crisis of public alienation. Data showing that Israel’s popularity among young Americans has gone into free fall, hashtags such as #FreePalestine generating tens of billions of views, and the explosive popularity and attention given to content produced by Iranian embassies abroad or anonymous Iranian youths creating Lego-style animations all carry profound meaning.
Especially when Jewish Telegraphic Agency quotes experts in public diplomacy saying: “If you ask those who professionally study public diplomacy whether any of this will work, the dominant answer is skepticism. Their central objection is that no amount of messaging can overcome deep-rooted opposition among target audiences to Israel’s military responses to conflicts with its neighbors.”
Jewish Telegraphic Agency quotes Nicholas Cull, professor of communications at the University of Southern California and one of the founders of public diplomacy studies, saying: “My position is that history shows if the policy is wrong, all the money in the world won’t help. America learned this in Vietnam, when its Cold War public diplomacy budget peaked... I think the Israeli government will not be able to sell its solutions to the world when many of its own people question the credibility of those solutions and when domestic consensus is so disconnected from international perceptions of realities on the ground.”
That is why Sa’ar speaks of a battle for “hearts and minds”; remarks that in reality amount to an admission of severe damage to the regime’s credibility, especially after the Gaza genocidal war. And Israel, to repair this damage, has been forced into colossal investment.
Meanwhile, allocating part of the new budget to platforms that appear public and non-political, and using micro-influencers, shows that the regime’s propaganda strategy is based on concealing the source and making the message appear natural, distributed through lifestyle content, entertainment, seemingly neutral news, and small agile networks, thereby erasing the line between propaganda and content.
In reality, the Zionist regime seeks, through money and enormous hasbara expenditures, to move away even from overt propaganda and toward “perception engineering.”
We pay for actions against Iran, in Israel’s interest
The evidence clearly indicates that networks such as “Iran International” must also be viewed within this same framework, to the point that the network itself is described as part of Mossad’s influence operation chain. References to accumulated losses, heavy debts, offshore structures, ownership transfers to foreign-registered companies, and recent claims from sources close to Iran International stating that after repeated failures to incite unrest in Iran, Mossad threatened to significantly cut the network’s budget, all reinforce the conclusion that this is not an ordinary effort to strengthen public relations, manage public opinion, or run a typical media outlet. Rather, these are projects operating at the intersection of media, anti-security measures, and psychological warfare.
For the peoples of the region and the world, beyond shocking reports such as The Guardian’s and later the recent admission by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid on X that the Zionist regime uses the anti-Iranian network “Iran International” for its media wars, or even Israel Hayom’s recent report exposing the role of anti-Iranian Persian-language media abroad in Mossad-designed operations against Iran, the hidden connections among the puzzle pieces became as clear as the midday sun when it was revealed that during the peak days of the American-Israeli attacks on Iran, beginning on February 28, 2026, the coordinates of locations targeted by missiles and bombs were effectively being communicated through “Iran International’s” propaganda operations, thereby assisting the enemy.
One concrete example exposing “Iran International’s” role as an intelligence hub for sensitive Iranian locations under the guise of amplifying the voice of the “people” was the reporting of the alleged relocation of police personnel from a station to a sports hall and mosque, after which the same location was bombed by Israel just hours later.
More importantly, however, even these multimillion-dollar displays of loyalty and image laundering, disguised as covering losses or improving public diplomacy, have failed. The whirlwind of bloodshed inflicted upon Palestinian, Lebanese, Iranian, and other victims has torn apart the fabric of Zionist policies.
The influence of “Iran International” among Persian speakers has declined, the circulation of its content inside and outside Iran has fallen, and the exposure of its political and security links has generated broader distrust, strengthening the reality that the network’s activities overlap with Tel Aviv’s objectives: the money comes from Arab states, but the output serves the same larger Israeli project whose explosive and astonishing budget has now attracted global attention.
Throughout the war, whose ceasefire foundations remain fragile, the news line of “Iran International” mirrored that of pro-Israeli media, from amplifying attacks and creating panic to attempts aimed at spreading insecurity and psychologically exhausting Iranian society.
The FT report has officially confirmed an old truth: behind the polished studio décor and claims of “free news” lies an operations room tasked with acting against Iran’s security.
A deadly collision with the wall at the end of the dead end
Now that the realities and origins of this network have become clear, tools, methods, and styles such as Shock Journalism, the approach based on crisis manufacturing, sensational headlines, and media shock production that once sufficed to attract attention, no longer possess their former effectiveness in the face of rapid exposure, audience awareness, and platform competition.
If, for this reason, Israel is shifting from large and classical arms to smaller, more agile and invisible networks, from explicit media outlets to algorithms, from lavish studios to micro-influencers, and from direct propaganda to soft infiltration, it remains unclear whether it will achieve significant success.
The key point is this: increasing budgets, attempting to conceal backstage relationships, and similar measures, contrary to appearances, are not signs of strength but signs of pressure. It is enough to roughly add together all the visible and hidden figures and expenditures devoted to media and propaganda by aggressors in West Asia during this short period.
Wherever the cost of narrative construction rises this high, it means the official narrative has failed in relation to reality on the ground. In Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf states, within media scenes emerging even from those same countries, across global public opinion, Western universities, and social networks, the image of Israel and the United States has deteriorated, and traditional whitewashing mechanisms, the expansion of wealthy media empires detached from truth, no longer work.
In reality, these hundreds of millions of dollars in investments, AI contracts, influencer networks, and media operations rooms are less signs of power than documents of anxiety – anxiety that despite all engineering efforts, truth still finds its way into public consciousness; anywhere on earth where an awakened conscience exists and cannot look upon the shocking images of innocent children in Minab, dying infants, mutilated and murdered children in Gaza, and still seek ways to justify the crimes of America and Israel.
Press TV’s website can also be accessed at the following alternate addresses:
http://www.presstv.co.uk
By Sheida Eslami
Saturday, 06 June 2026 10:35 AM [ Last Update: Saturday, 06 June 2026 10:35 AM ]
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/06/0 ... ar-machine
In today’s West Asia, the simultaneous roar of the swords of war, narrative, and imagery grows louder by the day. The military support, intervention, and direct involvement of the United States in the crimes of the Zionist regime through direct military aggression against Iran, as well as its guidance and arms support for the assaults carried out by this usurping regime, have lost their effectiveness in legitimizing the slaughter of children, women, patients, and others across the region.
Now, even turning nations into servants – nations that gain nothing from allowing the United States and Israel access to and use of their territories and facilities – no longer yields results.
America’s hollow hegemony has been shattered, and the sun of truth has emerged from behind the clouds of lies and staged victimhood media spectacles.
Under such conditions, increasing and repairing media budgets to conceal political and even security objectives, enhancing public relations, advertising, and cognitive operations are no longer merely figures in financial statements but signs of anxiety, defeat, and attempts to escape a deep crisis of legitimacy.
On one side, Israel, by approving an unprecedented budget for hasbara and public diplomacy, is effectively admitting that in the battle for public opinion, especially after the Gaza genocidal war and the aggression against Iran, it faces a serious fracture.
On the other side, propaganda networks such as “Iran International,” the symbol of Persian-language propaganda against Iran, gain meaning within a larger constellation of infiltration operations and perception management; a constellation in which media, lobbying, data, capital, and security are intertwined and wrapped in a veil of hollow claims.
What outwardly appears as “advertising” and “media” is in reality a new form of warfare: a war waged not on land, but in minds, social media feeds, and television frames. Yet the more intensely its flames rise, the more they consume their own creators.
Iran International, an ostrich burying its head in the sand
The recent Financial Times report on the financial and ownership structure of the anti-Islamic Republic Persian-language network “Iran International” once again revived a question that has existed since the network’s launch in 2017: a media outlet with such enormous expenditures, such levels of losses, and such opacity in ownership, exactly with what motive and by whom is it being kept alive?
Why does this so-called media outlet, despite all the evident signs and evidence, still attempt to justify itself with grandiose terminology and refuse to pull its head out of the sand and see that everyone can already observe its naked reality? What is the real motive and objective behind sustaining Iran International?
The answer to this question does not merely help understand an overseas Persian-language network. The main issue is that public opinion should know that when a media outlet simultaneously claims editorial independence, records hundreds of millions of pounds in accumulated losses, refuses to disclose the identities of its investors, and transfers parts of its ownership structure to offshore companies, it can no longer be evaluated by the normal standards of a commercial media enterprise.
According to the Financial Times report, the parent company of “Iran International,” Volant Media UK, suffered more than £410 million in losses during the five years ending in December 2024 and owed approximately £482 million to affiliated entities.
Despite such conditions, the network was not only not shut down or downsized, but according to the same report, continued operating internationally with a vast network of personnel and media activities. From an economic perspective, this situation is abnormal, because in a normal commercial model, such a scale of losses would either lead to reduced operations, transparent ownership changes, clear capital injections, or investor withdrawal.
But here something else happened: shareholders converted around £650 million of the company’s debts into equity; a move that reduces liabilities from the balance sheet and strengthens the company’s financial appearance without necessarily clarifying the true source of the capital to the public.
“Iran International” has announced that this operation did not represent fresh money entering the company and was merely a debt-to-equity conversion intended to strengthen the company’s balance sheet. This explanation may be understandable from an accounting perspective, but it does not eliminate the core question regarding the philosophy behind the move. If investors were acting solely according to the logic of media profitability, why would they continue spending and absorbing hundreds of millions of pounds in losses on a project with no obvious economic return?
It is precisely here that the hypothesis of “political and geopolitical returns” becomes more serious. In other words, the issue is not merely what money was spent but it is why such money, with such a level of opacity, has been spent on such a media outlet, especially given the timing coinciding with plans for engineered riots in Iran in January 2026, responsibility for which, during the course of American-Israeli aggression against Iran, was openly acknowledged by American officials, with one of the key objectives described as the partitioning of Iran. Trump himself even complained about the ineffectiveness of funneling weapons to Kurdish separatists.
Likewise, the FT report notes that Reza Moadab, one of “Iran International” presenters, told Agence France-Presse in January regarding protesters: “We are all fighting together to get rid of this brutal regime.” It is as if the network operates along the same line as the military actions against Iran and has moved far beyond the framework of a normal media organization and what it attempts to portray itself as.
Press TV
@PressTV
Analysis - Hybrid warfare after military defeat: Iran and resistance axis poised to thwart all enemy plots – including psyops
https://t.co/OkbdkKc66B
By Press TV Strategic Analysis Desk
From presstv.ir
1:18 PM · Jun 4, 2026
The offshore trail, Saudi links, and ownership ambiguity
An important part of the report concerns the registration and ownership changes of Volant Media. According to the report, on December 13, 648 million new shares with a nominal value of £648 million were issued, while simultaneously all 50,000 original company shares were transferred from Adel Abdulkarim Alabdulkarim to a Cayman Islands company named Info-Cast Cayman Limited.
The Cayman Islands are among the most famous offshore corporate jurisdictions; the use of such a structure in a case fundamentally centered on financial transparency and real ownership naturally raises sensitivities and questions.
More importantly, according to the FT narrative, registration documents do not clearly explain to whom the newly issued shares were allocated. This means that at the same time as the company’s largest financial restructuring, a major part of the ownership picture remains obscure.
Meanwhile, the report states that [b][size=110]the only registered director of Info-Cast Cayman is a person named Saleh Hussain Aldowais, and a person with the same name is identified as the chief operating officer of Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG), one of Saudi Arabia’s largest media groups. SRMG itself reportedly did not respond to FT’s request for comment.
These data points create an important chain of circumstantial evidence: massive losses, undisclosed investors, conversion of enormous debt into equity, transfer of ownership to offshore structures, and the nominal connection of an offshore company director to one of Saudi Arabia’s largest media entities.
Alongside this, republished reports citing FT also mention the role of OR Holdings and Investments Limited, a company reportedly linked to Adel Abdulkarim, active in film and television production, producing content for “Iran International,” and maintaining offices or operational ties in Riyadh.
These reports further state that the company produced propaganda works including several anti-Iranian documentaries and productions targeting martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, as well as the documentary ‘The Line: Saudi Arabia’s City of the Future in Neom’, with Abdulkarim listed on IMDb as executive producer of these projects.
Putting these pieces together, the resulting picture resembles not a simple financial relationship, but rather a network of media, production, and investment companies moving between London, Riyadh, and offshore jurisdictions.
This ambiguity has existed since the network’s earliest years. In 2018, The Guardian published a report referencing concerns about “Iran International’s” financial ties to circles close to Mohammed bin Salman. That report, citing anonymous sources, claimed the network’s funding was facilitated through intermediaries close to Saudi power centers and mentioned figures such as Saud al-Qahtani.
The Guardian also referenced an initial support figure of $250 million. These are at the level of source-based journalistic claims, not judicial rulings, but their significance lies in the fact that, together with FT’s new data, they form a recurring pattern: enormous capital, opaque ownership, Saudi connections, and intermediary structures.
Among the newer points raised in recent reports is that ambiguity over the source of funding has not only been a concern for outside critics. According to FT, some individuals familiar with or close to the network’s operations stated that the concealment of financial sources was itself a source of concern among some of the organization’s journalists, and questions about its possible impact on editorial decisions had even been raised privately.
This point is significant because it moves the issue beyond “external accusations” and shows that financial opacity can become a crisis of internal trust and even a source of concern about conflict and possible collapse within the organization itself.
Of course, the official position of “Iran International” and Volant Media is that the network has received no funding from the Saudi government, Israel, or any other entity, and is supported by a consortium of private commercial investors.
But the main problem is that the identities of these investors are not publicly disclosed. Therefore, official denials without clarification of ultimate ownership not only fail to answer all questions, but in the face of a body of financial and registration evidence, themselves become part of the issue.
From editorial line to anti-security function
The financial ambiguity surrounding “Iran International” becomes more important when examined alongside its editorial line and political role. The Guardian’s 2018 report referred to criticisms regarding the network’s extensive coverage of MKO terror cult gatherings and the platforming of a spokesperson linked to the Ahvaz terror attack.
It was also reported that Ofcom was reviewing the matter at the time. One of the newer points highlighted in the recent report is the network’s changed regulatory position in Britain.
According to FT, “Iran International” is no longer fully subject to traditional Ofcom television broadcasting rules because it now operates in Britain as an online streaming and on-demand service. This does not mean the absence of oversight entirely, but it reduces obligations such as strict traditional broadcasting impartiality.
Consequently, a network aiming for significant political influence is deliberately framed within a regulatory structure more flexible and less constrained than conventional television. This is seen as another sign of a mechanism through which the network can move toward broad political influence while avoiding normal media accountability with institutional assistance.
The new FT report also notes that critics regard “Iran International” as promoting pro-war narratives and amplifying the self-proclaimed “prince” Reza Pahlavi. This perception became especially pronounced after the events of 2022 and later during heightened tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States; a period during which “Iran International” devoted significant airtime to opposition, monarchist, separatist, or anti-Iranian narratives, blurring the line between information dissemination and psychological operations.
During the riots or quasi-coup attempt of January 2026 and plans for hybrid warfare and the February 28 war of aggression, attempts aimed at igniting civil war in Iran simultaneously with the American-Israeli military assault – substantial evidence emerged of the network’s deliberate attempts to advance a strategy of division among the Iranian people and justify crimes against civilians, educational centers, medical facilities, and others during the “Ramadan War,” most notably the attack on the school in Minab and the massacre of more than 150 students there.
Viewed from the outside, “Iran International” with such an approach is not a news outlet covering events, but an actor that at political turning points moves toward constructing narratives, empowering specific figures, legitimizing interventionist scenarios, and justifying foreign aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Alongside the Saudi issue, recent reports from Israeli media including Israel Hayom have claimed that Israeli military bodies have used overseas Persian-language media for infiltration operations, character assassination, and influencing Iranian public opinion.
The importance of these narratives lies in elevating the role of media from “transmitting news” to “a tool of cognitive operations,” which means the news itself, its timing, social context, publishing outlet, and the intended public reaction all become components of a multilayered operation. The language used in Israeli media itself demonstrates how regime apparatuses view media, social networks, and psychological operations as complementary tools.
Therefore, when all components are assembled, the final picture is this: “Iran International” claims to operate under the claim of independence, yet its financial structure is muddy; its hundreds of millions of pounds in losses cannot be explained through ordinary economic logic; its ownership restructuring is tied to offshore companies in the Cayman Islands; names within its structure intersect with the Saudi media sphere; and its editorial line has repeatedly been accused by critics of aligning with pressure projects, destabilization campaigns, foreign intervention, and plans such as the January 2026 quasi-coup and attempts to trigger civil war and partition Iran.
Press TV
@PressTV
Viewpoint - How 'Iran International' fanned flames of war but lost to Iranian people's wisdom and resilience
https://t.co/jiE71DlyHw
By Y. P. Rāzi
From presstv.ir
7:11 AM · May 3, 2026
Hasbara is no longer advertising but perception engineering
Other reports published in spring 2026 indicate that Israel allocated around $730 million for advertising and “public diplomacy/hasbara” in 2026; a figure approximately five times larger than the previous year’s $150 million budget and approved by the Knesset in March.
This budget is roughly twenty times higher than spending levels before the Gaza genocidal war began in October 2023, and this enormous increase in itself signals an intense crisis of credibility, a deep fracture in belief in the legitimacy of the occupying regime’s actions, and a sense of urgency in trying to repair this vast gap: namely, that hasbara must evolve into perception management; a combination of media, diplomacy, lobbying, digital campaigns, influencers, and data-driven operations aimed not merely at defending Israel’s crimes against the people of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and others, but at reshaping public emotions – at least within the United States – toward the Israeli regime.
This is particularly significant when polling data, especially in the United States, offer a clearer picture of the scale of the crisis. According to a Pew Research Center survey published in April, 60 percent of Americans now hold an unfavorable view of Israel, a significant increase compared to the previous year.
Only 37 percent hold a favorable view, and this divide is clearly visible across various social and religious groups. Even among Republicans under 50 – traditionally part of Israel’s support base – the majority now hold negative views.
Add to this the fact that the Hebrew word “hasbara” itself is increasingly used in a derogatory manner to describe Israeli propaganda efforts; a sign that these campaigns have not only failed to achieve their intended influence, but in some cases have produced the opposite effect. So much so that Gideon Sa’ar himself recognized the strategic necessity of changing the approach, calling the investment “a vital issue” and stating: “It must be treated like investments in fighter jets, bombs, and missile defense systems.”
Under the new framework, the budget has been distributed in a highly targeted manner: establishing a central media operations room to monitor 250 media outlets and produce 10,000 pieces of Israel-related content daily; allocating $50 million for digital advertising across international platforms such as Google, YouTube, X, and Instagram; and dedicating $40 million to hosting 400 foreign delegations including lawmakers, clergy, university presidents, and influencers.
The $1.5 million monthly contract with Brad Parscale falls precisely within this logic. Tel Aviv signed a $1.5 million per month deal with Parscale, Donald Trump’s former campaign strategist, to use artificial intelligence tools to monitor and manage what it describes as “antisemitism.” Funding networks of influencers and targeted campaigns, including among evangelical Christian groups, is also part of the strategy.
According to this plan, crises threatening Israel’s manufactured image and exposing the face of a genocidal state must be identified and contained before they reach public consciousness.
A war for hearts and minds
But why such a budget? Because Israel faces a growing crisis of public alienation. Data showing that Israel’s popularity among young Americans has gone into free fall, hashtags such as #FreePalestine generating tens of billions of views, and the explosive popularity and attention given to content produced by Iranian embassies abroad or anonymous Iranian youths creating Lego-style animations all carry profound meaning.
Especially when Jewish Telegraphic Agency quotes experts in public diplomacy saying: “If you ask those who professionally study public diplomacy whether any of this will work, the dominant answer is skepticism. Their central objection is that no amount of messaging can overcome deep-rooted opposition among target audiences to Israel’s military responses to conflicts with its neighbors.”
Jewish Telegraphic Agency quotes Nicholas Cull, professor of communications at the University of Southern California and one of the founders of public diplomacy studies, saying: “My position is that history shows if the policy is wrong, all the money in the world won’t help. America learned this in Vietnam, when its Cold War public diplomacy budget peaked... I think the Israeli government will not be able to sell its solutions to the world when many of its own people question the credibility of those solutions and when domestic consensus is so disconnected from international perceptions of realities on the ground.”
That is why Sa’ar speaks of a battle for “hearts and minds”; remarks that in reality amount to an admission of severe damage to the regime’s credibility, especially after the Gaza genocidal war. And Israel, to repair this damage, has been forced into colossal investment.
Meanwhile, allocating part of the new budget to platforms that appear public and non-political, and using micro-influencers, shows that the regime’s propaganda strategy is based on concealing the source and making the message appear natural, distributed through lifestyle content, entertainment, seemingly neutral news, and small agile networks, thereby erasing the line between propaganda and content.
In reality, the Zionist regime seeks, through money and enormous hasbara expenditures, to move away even from overt propaganda and toward “perception engineering.”
Press TV
@PressTV
Viewpoints - How ‘Iran International’ was weaponized against Iranian people during recent Israeli war
https://t.co/52uwu1uQZ2
By Hussein Yaqubi
From presstv.ir
4:34 AM · Jul 5, 2025
We pay for actions against Iran, in Israel’s interest
The evidence clearly indicates that networks such as “Iran International” must also be viewed within this same framework, to the point that the network itself is described as part of Mossad’s influence operation chain. References to accumulated losses, heavy debts, offshore structures, ownership transfers to foreign-registered companies, and recent claims from sources close to Iran International stating that after repeated failures to incite unrest in Iran, Mossad threatened to significantly cut the network’s budget, all reinforce the conclusion that this is not an ordinary effort to strengthen public relations, manage public opinion, or run a typical media outlet. Rather, these are projects operating at the intersection of media, anti-security measures, and psychological warfare.
For the peoples of the region and the world, beyond shocking reports such as The Guardian’s and later the recent admission by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid on X that the Zionist regime uses the anti-Iranian network “Iran International” for its media wars, or even Israel Hayom’s recent report exposing the role of anti-Iranian Persian-language media abroad in Mossad-designed operations against Iran, the hidden connections among the puzzle pieces became as clear as the midday sun when it was revealed that during the peak days of the American-Israeli attacks on Iran, beginning on February 28, 2026, the coordinates of locations targeted by missiles and bombs were effectively being communicated through “Iran International’s” propaganda operations, thereby assisting the enemy.
One concrete example exposing “Iran International’s” role as an intelligence hub for sensitive Iranian locations under the guise of amplifying the voice of the “people” was the reporting of the alleged relocation of police personnel from a station to a sports hall and mosque, after which the same location was bombed by Israel just hours later.
More importantly, however, even these multimillion-dollar displays of loyalty and image laundering, disguised as covering losses or improving public diplomacy, have failed. The whirlwind of bloodshed inflicted upon Palestinian, Lebanese, Iranian, and other victims has torn apart the fabric of Zionist policies.
The influence of “Iran International” among Persian speakers has declined, the circulation of its content inside and outside Iran has fallen, and the exposure of its political and security links has generated broader distrust, strengthening the reality that the network’s activities overlap with Tel Aviv’s objectives: the money comes from Arab states, but the output serves the same larger Israeli project whose explosive and astonishing budget has now attracted global attention.
Throughout the war, whose ceasefire foundations remain fragile, the news line of “Iran International” mirrored that of pro-Israeli media, from amplifying attacks and creating panic to attempts aimed at spreading insecurity and psychologically exhausting Iranian society.
The FT report has officially confirmed an old truth: behind the polished studio décor and claims of “free news” lies an operations room tasked with acting against Iran’s security.
A deadly collision with the wall at the end of the dead end
Now that the realities and origins of this network have become clear, tools, methods, and styles such as Shock Journalism, the approach based on crisis manufacturing, sensational headlines, and media shock production that once sufficed to attract attention, no longer possess their former effectiveness in the face of rapid exposure, audience awareness, and platform competition.
If, for this reason, Israel is shifting from large and classical arms to smaller, more agile and invisible networks, from explicit media outlets to algorithms, from lavish studios to micro-influencers, and from direct propaganda to soft infiltration, it remains unclear whether it will achieve significant success.
The key point is this: increasing budgets, attempting to conceal backstage relationships, and similar measures, contrary to appearances, are not signs of strength but signs of pressure. It is enough to roughly add together all the visible and hidden figures and expenditures devoted to media and propaganda by aggressors in West Asia during this short period.
Wherever the cost of narrative construction rises this high, it means the official narrative has failed in relation to reality on the ground. In Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf states, within media scenes emerging even from those same countries, across global public opinion, Western universities, and social networks, the image of Israel and the United States has deteriorated, and traditional whitewashing mechanisms, the expansion of wealthy media empires detached from truth, no longer work.
In reality, these hundreds of millions of dollars in investments, AI contracts, influencer networks, and media operations rooms are less signs of power than documents of anxiety – anxiety that despite all engineering efforts, truth still finds its way into public consciousness; anywhere on earth where an awakened conscience exists and cannot look upon the shocking images of innocent children in Minab, dying infants, mutilated and murdered children in Gaza, and still seek ways to justify the crimes of America and Israel.
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