Federal Judge Compares Trump to the Tyrannical Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland by Glenn Kirschner Mar 12, 2025
District of Columbia Federal District Judge Beryl Howell pulled no punches in a new ruling against Trump and his administration.
Trump issued an executive order punishing a law firm he doesn't like, prohibiting the firm's attorneys from interacting with federal agencies and even from entering federal buildings.
In ruling against Trump and in favor of the law firm, Judge Howell said:
"This may be amusing in 'Alice in Wonderland' where the Queen of Hearts yells, 'Off with their heads!' at annoying subjects . . . and announces a sentence before a verdict, but this cannot be the reality we are living under."
Federal courts are not only ruling against Trump's unlawful and unconstitutional executive orders, but they are beginning to call out his obvious autocratic conduct.
Transcript
So friends let's start today with a quote from a federal court judge regarding Donald Trump's retaliation against a law firm that he doesn't like quote this may be amusing in allice in Wonderland where the Queen of Hearts yells Off With Their Heads at annoying subjects and announces a sentence before a verdict judge Howell said but this cannot be the reality we are living under close quote let's talk about that because Justice [Music] matters hey all Glenn Kirschner here so friends because nothing is too Petty or too vindictive for Donald Trump he just tried to punish a law firm that he doesn't like by prohibiting the firm's attorneys from interacting with federal agencies or even entering Federal buildings well DC federal district court judge Beryl Howell just called him out on it here's the new reporting from Politico headline judge blocks key provisions of Trump's bid to punish Democratic linked law firm and that article begins president Donald Trump's retaliation against a prominent Democratic linked Law Firm is likely unconstitutional a federal judge ruled Wednesday US District Judge Beryl Howell blocked the Trump Administration from enforcing Central provisions of an executive order that seeks to punish the law firm Perkins Coi by barring its attorneys from interacting with federal agencies or even entering Federal buildings you know friends I swear Donald Trump is like a a little discount dictator right just pathetically Petty my editorial addition the article continues judge said the retaliatory animus of Trump's order is clear on its face and appears to violate constitutional restrictions on Viewpoint discrimination the executive order which Trump issued last week quote runs head-on into the wall of First Amendment protections close quote the judge concluded Perkins Coi which is based in Seattle has often represented Democratic politicians and causes including Hillary Clinton's 2016 campaign Trump has long targeted the firm as a political and legal adversary for its role in commissioning the anti-trump dossier compiled by former British intelligent agent Christopher Steele in 2016 that dossier whose salacious allegations against Trump were never confirmed by federal investigators helped fuel the long-running probe of his Trump's 2016 campaigns interactions with Russia the executive order if allowed to take effect would hamstring the firm's ability to represent clients who have business with the federal government The Firm claims the Trump's directive has already LED clients to abandon the firm and is likely to prompt Federal officials to cancel or deny meetings on a wide array of pending matters judge Howell noted that the order would harm not only the firm's 1200 lawyers most of whom had nothing to do with the Russia probe but its 2500 non-lawyer employees from IT staff to secretaries the judge said Trump's order was also flawed because it was issued without any notice to the firm or due process to challenge his determination quote this may be amusing in Allison Wonderland where the the Queen of Hearts yells Off With Their Heads at annoying subjects and announces a sentence before a verdict Howell said but this cannot be the reality we are living under judge Howell's got a point and if I can even put it a little less discreetly this is some real dictatorial Trump is pulling you know friends we have a flood of legal opinions coming in from federal courts literally from coast to coast ruling against Donald Trump's executive orders his unlawful terminations his refusal to pay contractors Who provided services and goods to the federal government and deserve to be paid we have legal opinion after legal opinion we have court finding after court finding that Donald Trump's conduct his executive orders are unlawful are unconstitutional and you know to say this is just executive branch overreach does not capture what Trump and Company are doing this is autocracy this is Donald Trump you know as aspiring dictator in the Oval Office and I'll tell you the federal bench the federal Judiciary that co-equal branch of government is acting as a check against an an aspiring autocrat an aspiring dictator in the Oval Office so friends I say let's keep these federal court opinions coming and I suspect they will keep coming because the Judiciary understands it's vital role in protecting our democracy its vital role in addressing executive branch abuse overreach lawlessness and unconstitutionality is all important to the health and I would say to the viability of American democracy so let's keep them coming and I suspect they will keep coming because the court understands that it may be the last firewall the last buwwark standing up against an aspiring dictator in the Oval Office and as we see in court ruling after court ruling after court ruling the federal Judiciary clearly understands that Justice matters friends as always please stay safe please stay tuned and I look forward to talking with you all again tomorrow [Music]
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Judge temporarily blocks parts of Trump’s executive order seeking to punish law firm Perkins Coie by Alanna Durkin Richer Politico Updated 6:23 PM MDT, March 12, 2025 https://apnews.com/article/trump-execut ... bc72be267e
WASHINGTON (AP) — A federal judge blocked President Donald Trump’s administration Wednesday from enforcing portions of an executive order designed to punish a prominent law firm linked to Democratic-funded opposition research during the 2016 presidential campaign into ties between the Republican candidate and Russia.
U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell in Washington granted a temporary restraining order sought by the firm, Perkins Coie, one day after it filed a federal lawsuit alleging it’s being illegally targeted because of its legal work. The judge said the president’s action sends a chilling message that lawyers can be punished for representing clients or advancing views unfavorable to the administration.
“Such a circumstance threatens the very foundation of our legal system,” said Howell, who was nominated to the bench by Democratic President Barack Obama. “Our justice system is based on the fundamental belief that justice works best when all parties have zealous advocates.”
Perkins Coie called the judge’s ruling “an important first step in ensuring this unconstitutional Executive Order is never enforced.”
“We will follow the court’s direction regarding next steps and will continue to challenge the Executive Order, which threatens our firm, our clients, and core constitutional protections important to all Americans,” a firm spokesperson said.
The order came during an extraordinary court hearing in which Attorney General Pam Bondi’s chief of staff, Chad Mizelle, defended the latest in a series of retributive moves targeting the president’s perceived adversaries. It’s highly unusual for such a high-ranking Justice Department official to argue on behalf of the government in the trial court.
Mizelle, who’s also serving as the acting associate attorney general, argued that the president has the clear authority to take action against entities he believes present a threat to national security.
“If that means excluding individuals that are no longer trustworthy with the nation’s secrets, that’s a bedrock principle of our republic,” Mizelle said.
Perkins Coie says it’s already suffering financial consequences of the order, which calls for limiting firm employees’ access to federal buildings and terminating any government contacts of its clients. The judge’s temporary restraining order doesn’t block the administration from enforcing another provision that seeks to strip Perkins Coie attorneys of security clearances.
Perkins Coie says all 15 of its top clients have government contracts, and several clients have already ended their legal arrangements with the firm or threatened to do so. Dane Butswinkas, an attorney representing Perkins Coie, said keeping the order in place will “spell the end of the law firm.”
“This executive order takes a wrecking ball to the rule of law, to the principles that promote democracy,” Butswinkas said.
Perkins Coie represented the 2016 presidential campaign of Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, Trump’s opponent, and also represented Democrats in a variety of voting rights challenges during the 2020 election. The firm made headlines in 2017 when it was revealed to have hired a private investigative research firm during the 2016 campaign to conduct opposition research on Trump. That firm, Fusion GPS, subsequently retained a former British spy, Christopher Steele, who researched whether Trump and Russia had suspicious ties.
Trump had sued the law firm in 2022, along with Clinton, FBI officials and other defendants, as a part of a sprawling complaint alleging a massive conspiracy to concoct the Russia investigation that shadowed much of his administration. The suit was dismissed.
Layoff plans are due Thursday. Feds are terrified. President Donald Trump has ordered “large-scale” cuts to the federal workforce. by Robin Bravender Politico 03/12/2025 07:08 PM EDT https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/1 ... d-00226148
People gather for a "Save the Civil Service" rally hosted by the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) outside the Capitol on Feb. 11. | Kent Nishimura/Getty Images
Agencies across the federal government are facing a Thursday deadline to submit plans for sweeping workforce cuts and reorganizations.
President Donald Trump ordered agencies last month to draft plans for “large-scale reductions in force,” and his administration gave agencies a March 13 deadline to hand over plans for “initial agency cuts and reductions,” with another round due in April.
Workers inside energy and environmental agencies — who have already seen colleagues terminated in the early days of Trump’s term — are anxiously awaiting details of the administration’s next targets.
They’re bracing for steep cuts.
“People are completely terrified,” said one Interior Department employee, who was granted anonymity because they fear reprisal. “There are rumors circulating” about which offices and programs the administration might single out for cuts, that person said, but staffers hadn’t yet heard details from management about the specifics.
“We’re also kind of puzzled,” that person said, because the expected downsizing across agencies is coming as “this administration is putting a lot of work on our plates,” including repealing Biden-era regulations.
The Interior Department has already lost employees through the administration’s “Fork in the Road” resignation offer and the firings of probationary staff, that staffer said. The Trump administration is “gonna need staff” to enact its policy agenda, they added.
The Interior Department did not respond to a request for comment about its downsizing plans. The White House and the Office of Personnel Management did not respond to requests for comment about whether agencies’ plans will be made public or about the scope or timing of layoffs across the government.
The Education Department this week announced plans to slash about half of its workforce.
‘People are so scared’
Following early signals from Trump and his aides, EPA employees are girding for dramatic reductions at their agency.
Trump recently suggested that EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin planned to cut 65 percent of the staff at EPA — a prospect the president appeared to welcome — although the White House later said that Zeldin aimed to cut about 65 percent of the agency’s spending, rather than its workforce.
Zeldin this week pledged to “massively reduce” his agency’s spending and said EPA will, “where necessary, reduce staff.”
Meanwhile, the DOGE operation led by Elon Musk announced that the leases for some EPA offices around the country have been canceled. The locations of some EPA regional offices were also included on a list of buildings the Trump administration slated for “disposal” before that list was taken down.
“Everyone is very conscious of the deadline for EPA to submit a reorganization and [reduction in force] plan,” said Nicole Cantello, the president of a union local that represents EPA regional workers.
“EPA workers continue to be concerned that EPA will close many offices around the country,” Cantello said. “Our scientists and engineers know that all EPA office buildings are essential to protecting human health and the environment.”
Marie Owens Powell, president of a union that represents EPA employees across the country, said employees at that agency fear what’s coming in the Trump plans due this week.
“People are so scared,” she said. “They don’t know if they’re going to fall into a RIF.”
Powell, who recently retired from her position as an EPA staffer after 33 years, said she never experienced a reduction in force, or a RIF, during her career with the agency. “We came close. We prepared for one, but we never fully implemented one,” she said.
Workers are afraid of potentially losing their jobs and their livelihoods, she said. They’re also afraid of the unknown. “They’re frantic at this point for lack of information,” she said.
EPA did not respond to a request for comment about its layoff and reorganization plan due this week.
The Trump administration’s building disposal plan included the Energy Department’s Washington headquarters as well as DOE offices in Germantown, Maryland. Those buildings were among the more than 400 posted online by the General Services Administration before the list was removed the following day, leaving employees who work there uncertain about their futures.
Employees at the National Science Foundation are also concerned about the upcoming layoff plans, but “there’s nothing we can do about it,” said one NSF employee who was granted anonymity because they fear reprisal. Staff at the science funding agency have been celebrating the return of probationary employees who had been terminated but were reinstated, the NSF employee said, “even if it’s only for another month or so.”
An NSF spokesperson declined to comment for this story.
More eliminations to come
The “Phase 1” goals for agency cuts due this week are just one step of the Trump administration’s extensive downsizing vision.
The strategies due Thursday will identify agency offices that provide “direct service to citizens,” explain which parts of agencies are required by law and explain whether “the agency or any of its subcomponents should be eliminated or consolidated,” according to guidance provided to agency bosses.
Agency leaders were also directed to describe the tools they intend to use to “achieve efficiencies,” including through expected staff reductions in coming years.
In the “Phase 2” plans due by April 14, agency bosses were directed to expand on their plans for overhauling their operations. That plan is set to include any proposals to relocate agency offices from Washington to other parts of the country, targets for “subsequent large-scale RIFs,” and agencies’ plans to renegotiate provisions of collective bargaining agreements deemed to “inhibit government efficiency and cost-savings.”
Agencies were told to implement those second-phase plans by Sept. 30.
Musk has previously suggested he’d like to delete most federal agencies.
“Do we really need whatever it is, 428, federal agencies?” Musk said in an interview prior to Trump’s inauguration. “I think we should be able to get away with 99 agencies,” he said.
Thousands of fired federal workers must be rehired immediately, judge rules. U.S. District Judge William Alsup described the mass firings as a “sham” strategy by the government’s central human resources office. by Josh Gerstein and Kyle Cheney Politico 03/13/2025 12:35 PM EDT Updated: 03/13/2025 01:45 PM EDT https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/1 ... g-00228721
Demonstrators chant during a National Treasury Employees Union rally protesting the Trump administration's policies toward federal workers on Capitol Hill, on March 5, 2025. | Francis Chung/POLITICO
A federal judge on Thursday ordered federal agencies to rehire tens of thousands of probationary employees who were fired amid President Donald Trump’s turbulent effort to drastically shrink the federal bureaucracy.
U.S. District Judge William Alsup described the mass firings as a “sham” strategy by the government’s central human resources office to sidestep legal requirements for reducing the federal workforce.
Alsup, a San Francisco-based appointee of President Bill Clinton, ordered the Defense, Treasury, Energy, Interior, Agriculture and Veterans Affairs departments to “immediately” offer all fired probationary employees their jobs back. The Office of Personnel Management, the judge said, had made an “unlawful” decision to terminate them.
And even if it is upheld on appeal, it does not guarantee that all the workers will be able to get their jobs back permanently: Alsup made clear that agencies still have the authority to implement “reductions in force,” as long as they follow the proper procedures for doing so. Federal agencies are currently finalizing “reduction in force” plans.
Alsup issued his ruling in a lawsuit brought by federal employee unions. He lashed out at the Justice Department over its handling of the case, saying he believes that Trump administration lawyers were hiding the facts about who directed the mass firings.
“You will not bring the people in here to be cross-examined. You’re afraid to do so because you know cross examination would reveal the truth,” the judge said to a DOJ attorney during a hearing Thursday. “I tend to doubt that you’re telling me the truth. … I’m tired of seeing you stonewall on trying to get at the truth.”
Alsup also said the administration attempted to circumvent federal laws on reducing the workforce by attributing the firings to “performance” when that was not in fact the case. The judge called the move “a gimmick.”
“It is sad, a sad day when our government would fire some good employee and say it was based on performance when they know good and well that’s a lie,” Alsup said.
More than 5,000 probationary workers for USDA had already won a reprieve last week when the chair of a federal civil service board ordered them reinstated for 45 days. But Alsup is the first federal judge to order the administration to broadly unwind the firing spree that has roiled the federal workforce during Trump’s first two months in office.
Alsup emphasized that he was not ruling that the government is unable to lay off personnel at federal agencies, but that the Trump administration was in such a hurry to do so that it shunted aside federal laws that dictate the procedures for a so-called RIF.
“The words that I give you today should not be taken that some wild-and-crazy judge in San Francisco said that an administration cannot engage in a reduction in force,” Alsup said. “It can be done, if it’s done in accordance with the law.”
Alsup is also seeking answers about the administration’s position that fired federal workers should have to seek relief from two executive branch agencies tasked with supervising federal workplace issues: the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Labor Relations Authority. The judge expressed concern that Trump’s effort to remove members of those boards might render them ineffective.
Alsup had ordered the acting head of OPM, Charles Ezell, to appear at the hearing Thursday so he could be cross-examined about his claims that the personnel office did not direct any firings but simply provided guidance to other agencies about how to carry out the dismissals.
However, Justice Department lawyers told Alsup earlier this week that Ezell would not appear, and the government withdrew a sworn declaration Ezell submitted earlier in the case. At one point Thursday, the judge reprimanded Assistant U.S. Attorney Kelsey Helland for the government’s decision not to make witnesses available.
“You’re not helping me get at the truth. You’re giving me press releases, sham documents,” the frustrated judge said, adding, “I’m getting mad at you and I shouldn’t. You’re trying to do your best, and I apologize.”
Helland, who sat alone at the table for government counsel, argued that the agencies made the firing decisions, and he said the timing was driven by the urgency of Trump’s agenda, not any moves by OPM.
“Everybody knew the new administration was prioritizing this and the political appointments wanted to comply with that administration priority,” the DOJ attorney said. “This was not an order by OPM.”
But the judge noted that some agencies told employees they were instructed by OPM to fire every probationary employee deemed non-essential.
Probationary status is extremely common in the federal workforce. Many newly hired employees are required to begin their tenure as probationary employees, and employees are also often required to spend time on probationary status after being promoted. Probationary employees do not enjoy many of the civil service protections as non-probationary workers.
One of the attorneys challenging the dismissals emphasized Thursday that some newly-promoted employees with lengthy tenure at agencies were caught up in the mass firings.
The suit the judge acted on Thursday was brought by federal employee labor unions along with non-profit groups that said their work would be negatively impacted by the firings in places like national parks and veterans’ hospitals.
115. Mar 13, 2025. Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William Alsup: Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on 3/13/2025. Court granted and extended TRO as stated on the record. Court directed counsel to file briefs by 3/21/2025, 12:00 noon, 10 pages in length as stated on the record. Memorandum Opinion to issue. Initial Case Management Conference not held. Still, discovery open; parties to comply with all rules and standing orders (e.g., Supplemental Order to Order Setting Initial Case Management Conference in Civil Cases Before Judge William Alsup 18, 35 (Revd Aug. 27, 2024)). Court further stated plaintiffs may depose Noah Peters in Washington, D.C.; Government to make him available for 3 hours within two weeks. Total Time in Court: 8:00 - 9:30 = 1 Hour; 30 Minutes. Court Reporter: Kendra Steppler. Plaintiff Attorneys: Danielle Leonard, Stacey Leyton, Eileen Goldsmith, Tera Heintz, Norman Eisen. Defendant Attorney: Kelsey Helland. (This is a text-only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (afm, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 3/13/2025) (Entered: 03/13/2025)
Attorney Generals GANG UP on Trump IN COURT by Michael Popok Legal AF Mar 13, 2025 The Intersection with Popok
The feared Gang of 20 States have banded together for the 6th time to sue the Trump Administration and obtain a temporary restraining order to stop Trump's shrinking the Congressionally- mandated and funded Dept of Education responsible for billions in funding and the welfare of 65 million students, and shrinking it so small that it can be drowned in the bathtup, as Trump pays off his campaign debts to the Heritage Foundation and its Project 2015. Popok reports.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
STATE OF NEW YORK; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSSETTS; STATE OF HAWAIʻI; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL DANA NESSEL FOR THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; and STATE OF WISCONSIN;
Plaintiffs,
v.
LINDA McMAHON, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; and DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Defendants.
Linda, I hope you do a great job and put yourself out of a job I want her to put herself out of a job education department all right and a move that seems to pretend the beginning of the end for the Department that Republicans going back to Reagan pledged to abolish the Department of Education today told staffers to vacate their offices by 6: p.m. because the offices were closing Nationwide the doors are now locked workers aren't going to be allowed back into the buildings until at least Thursday this the first step on the road to a total shutdown uh yes uh actually it is because that was the president's uh mandate as directive to me uh clearly is to shut down the Department of Education which we know we'll have to work with Congress you know to get that accomplished but what we did today was to take the the first step of of eliminating what I think is is bureaucratic bloat and that's not to say that a lot of the folks uh you know it's a humanitarian thing too A lot of the folks that are there you know they're they're out of a job but um we wanted to make sure that we kept all of the right people and the good people to make sure that the outward facing programs the the grants the Appropriations that come from Congress all of that are being met and none of that's going to fall through the crack oh they so blly just want to dismantle the Department of Education impacting millions and millions of children 50 million children at least and billions and billions of dollars with just the BL well we're going to dismiss mantle it oh we're going to put ourselves out of business oh we're going to this is the beginning of chloroforming and taking out in the back and shooting the Department of Education not so fast not so fast you're like it's a James Bond movie and these are the the evil people living in the mountain lair Leticia James and 19 other states she represents New York have banded together once again I call him the gang of 20 and they're banding together time and time again filing injunction suit after injunction suit against the administration and they're winning and they got a new one that they just filed in Massachusetts federal court I'll talk to you a little bit why we're filing these kind of suits in Massachusetts in Maine in New Hampshire in California and in New York New Jersey Maryland and the District of Colombia and were avoiding red States talk about that at the end but let me let me read to you from a quote from Leticia James this is the not on my watch moment letia James is the bane of Donald Trump's existence right she's the one that brought him low prove that his his business operations were a sham a fraud a house of cards uh got a $450 million civil fraud judgment against those companies in New York putting him out of business putting a a monitor former federal judge over the Trump organization to this moment so there's no love loss between Laticia James and Donald Trump I assure you that doesn't stopped Laticia James from being at the Forefront the tip of the spear against the Trump Administration here's her quote upon the filing of the lawsuit that she led this Administration may claim to be stopping waste and fraud but it is clear that their only mission is to take away the necessary Services resources and funding that students and their families need firing half of the Department of education's Workforce will hurt students throughout New York and the nation especially low-income students and those with disabilities who rely on federal funding time out for a minute that's you rural States that's you poor states that's you red States who do you think the Department of Education helps the rich parents on the upper west side or upper east side of Manhattan um but I digress back to Laticia james' statement today along with her lawsuit um this outrageous effort to leave students behind and deprive them of a quality education is reckless and illegal today I am taking action to stop the madness and protect our schools and the students who depend on them let me just give you the the gravity of this there's probably no other department including Social Services Social Security that touches the America America life more in a positive way than the Department of Education formed in 1979 by Congress just here the numbers 50 million students K through 12 are under the opes of a Department of Education and receive billions and billions of dollars of funding through their states and through their local school systems there are 98,000 public schools there are 32,000 private schools there are 18,000 school districts there are another 12 million who are in higher education there's an entire department that's now been completely shuttered and dismantled and chloroformed related to civil rights and discrimination and harassment and abuse in the school systems something Donald Trump doesn't care about I thought his I thought his administration and his wife are all about stopping cyber bullying where do you think that starts that starts with the Department of Education and its civil rights Division and now New York who has been harmed by the complete shuttering of the Department of Education in effect you know it it received more than $6 billion do worth of Aid last year for its school students that's just New York alone now this gang of 20 that I like that I'm proud to talk about have joined together six or seven other times to sue Donald Trump under Birthright citizenship and they won against Elon Musk going through the treasury Department uh servers and websites and they won against um they're trying to dis the National Institute of Health and they won and about Mass firings of federal employees and they won they're batting over 900 against the Trump Administration even better than they did the first time around because Donald Trump is worse than the first time around this lawsuit that's been brought is is simple is is simple in its Elegance about the claims that it's bringing because every lawsuit is the same you have the general allegations you have the the jurisdiction and venue allegations you have the part parties who are the parties allegations and then you get to the meat of the order and that's the claims in federal court here there's only four claims but they're so powerful separation of powers have been violated by Donald Trump by trying through a reduction in force a phony reduction in force we call it a riff to put the Department of Education out of business you just saw the clip that's been his goal because that's project 202's goal it's right there the play we had the Playbook while he was running for office it said the complete dismantling of the Department of Education okay well he's obeying his Masters in the project 2025 Heritage Foundation world who help get elected and he is paying off a campaign debt even if it means by doing so he is completely undermining our public education system and the dignity that goes along with that uh to make sure that everybody has a fair Shake in our society which they don't care about goes along with their desire to get rid of diversity equity and inclusion at every stage to the game so separation of powers that the AR first argument in their claim in this new lawsuit is that there's been a usurpation of the legislative Authority that Congress set up this particular Department of Education for a reason in 1979 and funded it for a reason and Donald Trump can't through executive action or non-action or reductions of force or putting Linda McMahon a meat puppet into that position from her days in the World Wrestling Federation of all things can't put can't do by reduction and force and violate Congressional mandates in other words the law and that leads us to the second claim in the case separation of powers that means that he's violating they've argued that he's violating the take care Clause that the executive branch must take care to Faithfully execute the laws the laws are set by Congress by Congress and they cite in their own complaint um lawsuit dicta and precedent going back in the Supreme Court to the 1800 with the first Supreme Court Justice John Marshall who says it is Congress who sets the law the president may be able to fill in some of the details but the law The Guiding post the the poll star is Congress not not Faithfully not executing the laws in order to cut the legs out from under a congressional statute and the creation of this Department of Education third that his actions are Ultra varies that's a fancy way of saying that it is out outside the norm he's coloring outside the lines of his executive power given to him by the Constitution it is ill not only irregular but illegal Ultra varies and lastly as we've said before almost every one of these cases is has this has the same type of blueprint that Donald Trump has violated the administrative procedures act which deals with administrative agencies and departments like the Department of Education by making having Linda McMahon make an arbitrary and capricious that's the term to decision to cut without regard to impact on the states half of the workforce telling them to go home and lock the door and shut the door you heard it in her interview at the top of this hot take I'm hot at the top of this hot take so I see the lawsuit and I'll tell you why it's been filed in Massachusetts because we know how to take a page out of the Republicans book for years you know to be the bane of Biden's existence and his policies they filed their law lawsuits and where were they filed occasionally in DC but Texas Louisiana and Florida in order to get to favorable and they're most favorable appell Court the fifth Circuit Court of Appeals out of out of New Orleans which sits Over Texas Louisiana and others Mississippi and the like that's where those cases came from our cases are going to come from New Hampshire and Massachusetts and um and um Maine and New Jersey and Maryland and the District of Columbia where about half the cases are and California and New York and even when Laticia James is leading as the New York attorney general banding together with the other 20 States and I'll just shout out see if you can figure out the common denominator of these 20 States leave it in my comments New York Massachusetts uh California Hawaii Arizona Colorado Connecticut Delaware DC the district Illinois Maine Maryland uh Michigan uh Nevada Minnesota New Jersey Oregon Rhode Island Vermont state of Washington state of Wisconsin mainly mainly blue States maybe not at the Electoral time but certainly their attorney general is blue their governor is blue and maybe one or both chambers of their legislator is legisl legislation um body is uh blue and so they're joining together this is the fifth or sixth time that Leticia James has brought a case like this and has been successful you know we talked about it Birthright citizenship stopping federal workers from being fired stopping Elon Musk and Doge from going through the treasury Department servers all because of Leticia james' leadership so what's going to happen next Massachusetts judge federal judge going to hold a hearing on the temporary restraining order to determine whether they have standing um as states which is the fundamental issue that you have to prove to a court in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction you have to show that a federal judge has a live case or controversy that's the term of Art in front of him in order to rule they have standing they've been injured it's called a pocketbook injury and it's what it sounds like their wallets and pocketbooks their budgets the funding has been cut off and therefore they've been specially injured they have standing so even though the Trump Administration will argue no standing they're GNA that they're going to blow by that that threshold requirement pretty pretty quickly then it's going to go to a reparable harm because for an injunction unlike the regular substance of a merit-based lawsuit you got to prove that you have a a harm that is so distinct in character that it can't be compensated later by money because something has to happen now to stop an ongoing issue there has to be an ongoing future harm other words not a completed harm something that's going to happen in the future again the continued dismantling of the Department of Education and try attempts to defund it and then you have to have um the judge make the determination that that qualifies as irreparable harm it's like toothpaste out of the tooth tooth uh tube kind of thing eggs that can't be unscrambled that kind of thing and then you have inadequate remedy at law which is similar to that and then lastly that the parties are likely to Prevail on proving their case at the end of the trial the judge looks at it now kind of Peaks under the hood and says yes you are more likely than not you are likely to Prevail on the merits of your case to prove the Constitutional administrative procedure act violations that alleging I will grant you the temporary restraining order some people think it's easy to get a trro looks like you just it's like pulling a number at your local supermarket at the deli counter boom because there's so many of them against the Trump Administration they're very hard to get in 35 years of my practice I've gotten about five yeah and I've probably been denied double that um doesn't mean your case is terrible doesn't mean you're not going to win ultimately at your case at trial or with a judge or with a jury or a judge or an arbitrator or something it just means at that moment you don't have the unique extraordinary elements necessary to obtain this type of extraordinary relief from a judge and you may not think it's extraordinary because there's been you know about six a week issued against the Trump Administration you know he's averaging about uh 12 to 15 lawsuits a week but it is extraordinary and it is hard but I think they get the temporary restraining order here to stop the future chloroforming and dismantling of the Department of Education where they take him out in the back and try to shoot it or as Leticia James and her lawsuit alleged through a a phony reduction in force act like they're just cutting off fraud and waste when they're not they're they've cut through the fat through the muscle through the bone and into vital organs I guess is the best way to put it trro happens hearing temporary restraining order issued set the case for trial set the case for preliminary injunction which in the food chain of of of stays or or blocks by a federal judge it starts with administrative stay um I need a few more days to even see your briefing I'm not making a decision on the merits at all administrative stay next level up I've seen your papers on temporary restraining order you've made out movement the the states here you've made out your four elements to to obtain a temporary restraining order irreparable harm inadequate remedy at law uh likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of equities or in public interest tips in your favor yes boom done that's that holds the ring for the case and stops the government from doing something or forces them to do something for for the next briefing schedule preliminary injunction maybe a week or two or a month later with the injunction in place preliminary injunction similar factors full more full or complete record case law argument judge either enters the preliminary injunction or not sometimes it's converted into a permanent injunction because the judge finds un summary judgment there's no disputed facts it's just the law and person can issue a ruling without having to go through a full-blown trial or certainly not a jury trial this is all judg made law so that's the hierarchy that we will get to as soon as it gets to a temporary restraining order level it then once that's entered um and certainly at yeah once that's entered and usually at the preliminary injunction level appellant jurisdiction kicks in and then you can go off and try to take an emergency appeal to your various appell courts so I think that's what's going to happen here Donald Trump's not going to like this he's going to get a trro against them there's going to be a preliminary injunction against him he's going to run out and try to get the first circuit which just ruled against him big time on Birthright citizenship a new three judge panel of the first circuit up in up in that area up in Massachusetts is going to issue its ruling he'll take that to the United States Supreme Court through a uh moderate Justice of the Supreme Court because that's who sits over the first and over Massachusetts another good reason to file there and then we'll see if there's any will any any ability to count to four or five at the United States Supreme Court level to hear this case on an emergency application we'll cover it all that's one of the things we do well we WE Post these issues to you we put them on your radar we explain it to them explain it to you in this way and then we follow up and follow through in a way that of course mainstream media and corporate media won't can't and doesn't want to and is afraid to we're not and I'm glad you're here I'm Michael popok you're on the legal AF YouTube channel um take a moment hit the Subscribe button we just rolled the odometer to 500,000 subscribers well on our way to where yes a million before our one-year birthday and that with your help we're going to get there I appreciate all of you I'm Michael popuk reporting in collaboration with the mest touch Network we just launched the legal AF YouTube channel help us build this pro-democracy channel where I'll be curating the top stories the intersection of Law and politics go to YouTube now and free subscribe at legal AF MTN that's at legal aftn [Music]
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Attorney General James Sues Trump Administration To Stop Dismantling of Department of Education and Protect Students. AG James Leads Coalition of 20 Attorneys General in Suing to Stop Trump Administration from Shutting Down the Department of Education by Letitia James New York State Attorney General Press Release March 13, 2025 https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2025/at ... department
NEW YORK – New York Attorney General Letitia James today led a coalition of 20 other attorneys general in suing the Trump administration to stop the dismantling of the Department of Education (ED). On March 11, the Trump administration announced that ED would be firing approximately 50 percent of its workforce as part of its goal of a “total shutdown” of the Department. Attorney General James and the coalition today filed a lawsuit seeking to stop the targeted destruction of this critical federal agency that ensures tens of millions of students receive a quality education and critical resources.
“This administration may claim to be stopping waste and fraud, but it is clear that their only mission is to take away the necessary services, resources, and funding that students and their families need,” said Attorney General James. “Firing half of the Department of Education’s workforce will hurt students throughout New York and the nation, especially low-income students and those with disabilities who rely on federal funding. This outrageous effort to leave students behind and deprive them of a quality education is reckless and illegal. Today I am taking action to stop the madness and protect our schools and the students who depend on them.”
The ED’s programs serve nearly 18,200 school districts and over 50 million K-12 students attending roughly 98,000 public schools and 32,000 private schools throughout the country. Its higher education programs provide services and support to more than 12 million postsecondary students annually. Students with disabilities and students from low-income families are some of the primary beneficiaries of ED services and funding. Federal ED funds for special education include support for assistive technology for students with disabilities, teacher salaries and benefits, transportation to help children receive the services and programming they need, physical therapy and speech therapy services, and social workers to help manage students’ educational experiences. The ED also supports students in rural communities by offering programs designed to help rural school districts that often lack the personnel and resources needed to compete for competitive grants.
As Attorney General James and the coalition assert in the lawsuit, dismantling ED will have devastating effects on states like New York. K-12 schools in New York received $6.17 billion, or $2,438 per student, from the ED in federal fiscal year 2024. Federal funding for public colleges and universities averaged $1,256 per student in New York in federal fiscal year 2024. The administration’s layoff is so massive that ED will be incapacitated and unable to perform essential functions. As the lawsuit asserts, the administration’s actions will deprive students with special needs of critical resources and support. They will gut ED’s Office of Civil Rights, which protects students from discrimination and sexual assault. They would additionally hamstring the processing of financial aid, raising costs for college and university students who will have a harder time accessing loans, Pell Grants, and work-study programs. This would be particularly harmful to New York, where more students receive Pell Grants than almost any other state.
With this lawsuit, Attorney General James and the coalition are seeking a court order to stop the administration’s policies to dismantle ED by drastically cutting its workforce and programs. Attorney General James and the coalition argue that the administration’s actions to dismantle ED are illegal and unconstitutional. The Department is an executive agency authorized by Congress, with numerous different laws creating its various programs and funding streams. The coalition’s lawsuit asserts that the executive branch does not have the legal authority to unilaterally incapacitate or dismantle it without an act of Congress.
Joining Attorney General James in filing the lawsuit are the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.
This is the latest action Attorney General James has taken to protect New Yorkers and the services they rely on from the Trump administration’s illegal attacks. On February 13, Attorney General James and a coalition of attorneys general secured a preliminary injunction stopping the administration’s illegal revocation of birthright citizenship. On February 24, Attorney General James led a coalition of attorneys general in securing a court order preventing Elon Musk and members of DOGE from accessing Americans’ private information through the U.S. Treasury. On March 5, Attorney General James and a coalition of attorneys general secured a court order stopping the Trump administration from withholding vital funding to the National Institutes of Health. On March 6, Attorney General James led a coalition of attorneys general in securing a court order blocking the Trump administration’s freeze of essential federal funds to states. Also on March 6, Attorney General James and a coalition of attorneys general sued the Trump administration for illegal mass firings of federal employees and sued the Trump administration for cutting critical grant programs for teachers through the Department of Education.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SUSAN TSUI GRUNDMANN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-425 (SLS)
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 4, the Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 11, the legal memoranda in support and in opposition, and the entire record herein, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 4, is GRANTED; and the Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 11, is DENIED. It is further
DECLARED that the termination of the Plaintiff Susan Tsui Grundmann was unlawful, in violation of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). Ms. Grundmann remains a Member of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, having been appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate to a five-year term on May 12, 2022, and she may be removed by the President prior to the expiration of her term “only upon notice and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). It is further
ORDERED that the Plaintiff Susan Tsui Grundmann shall continue to serve as a Member of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) until her term expires pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c), unless she is earlier removed “upon notice and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” id. § 7104(b). The Defendant Colleen Duffy Kiko, as well as her subordinates, agents, and employees, are ENJOINED from removing Ms. Grundmann from her office without cause or in any way treating Ms. Grundmann as having been removed, from impeding in any way her ability to fulfill her duties as a Member of the FLRA, and from denying or obstructing her authority or access to any benefits or resources of the office; it is further
ORDERED that the Defendant Colleen Duffy Kiko and her subordinates, agents, and employees provide the Plaintiff Susan Tsui Grundmann with access to the necessary government facilities and equipment so that she may carry out her duties during her term as a Member of the Federal Labor Relations Authority; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court close this case.
This is a final appealable order.
SO ORDERED.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: March 12, 2025
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Trump LOSES case with MAJOR Supreme Court implications by Brian Tyler Cohen and Glenn Kirschner Mar 13, 2025 The Legal Breakdown with Glenn Kirschner
Transcript
you're watching the legal breakdown Glenn we've got a major Court ruling against Donald Trump definitively which you'll talk about in a moment one that is going to eventually find its way up to the US Supreme Court can you explain what just happened yeah Brian very quickly this case just got teed up to be a major case before The Supreme Court in the very near future and here's why you know there have been a series of firings by Donald Trump that have been flat out unlawful and you don't have to take my word for it because just as in the case we're about to discuss Trump's doj lawyers are actually going into court and admitting they are unlawful but they're saying we think the Constitution ought to be changed and not give Congress the authority to pass laws that set fixed terms for executive branch employees and say that those people cannot be fired on a whim by an incoming president they can only be fired for good cause for neglect of Duty for malfeasance in office and they can only be fired after notice and a hearing but lately Brian Donald Trump has been firing people on a whim not for good cause and without giving the them the required opportunity for notice and a hearing on the issue of their proposed determination so in this case it is a case that was brought by a woman who had just been fired by Trump unceremoniously no notice no no hearing no um indication that she had fallen down on her duties now what was she doing well she was appointed as one of three members of a board for the federal labor relations Authority the FL she gets a five-year term and Brian mind you this is under a law that was passed by Congress and signed into law by the president and for nearly a hundred years the Supreme Court has said yes this is within the authority within the Constitutional prerogatives of Congress to put these people in place for five years and and requiring by federal law that they can't be removed except for cause and now Trump one after another is saying I don't care I'm violating the law because I want to get these cases up to the Supreme Court and I want the Supreme Court to revisit the law and say that I have complete and absolute Authority and Congress can't tie my hands by putting these qualifiers on people who are working in the executive branch so um this case was just resolved and something called summary judgment was entered what does that mean it means that the judge the presiding judge judge uh suknanan in DC said okay I've heard enough I've seen the briefs you've made your arguments I don't even need to hold evidentiary hearings because I am ruling that this was an unlawful termination of this member of the flr board and indeed it was easy for the judge to reach that conclusion Brian because even the doj lawyers went into court and conceded this was an unlawful termin but they say we don't like the law and we want to try to get this up to the Supreme Court so they can change the law and give Donald Trump nearly dictatorial power and just give me one more minute because I really want to read a little snippet of Judge Suk nanan's opinion because it is forceful it is direct and it is unflinching the judge says the government meaning the doj lawyers in court the government vigorous defends Miss grundman's Hasty termination Miss grundman is the board member who was unlawfully terminated and the lawyers vigorously defend that termination arguing that the president May remove Federal officers on a whim and in doing so override congress's considered judgment the government the doj's lawyers arguments paint with a broad brush and threaten to upend fundamental protection in our constitution but ours is not an autocracy it is a system of checks and balances and then she puts an exclamation point on that by saying we abide by the Constitutional prerogative of Congress to do this quote to save the people from autocracy close quote it doesn't get any more pointed than that and Brian this case is now headed like a rocket up to the Supreme Court I suspect and Glenn in terms of the Supreme Court being able to see this I mean you you just said this is this is law this is and I believe this is Humphrey's executive is that the the case that this is all based upon is that correct it is it's the Humphrey's executive case kind of a curious name for a Supreme Court case it's 90 years old it was decided in 1935 and what it all boils down to is humph was a an executive branch official he claimed he was wrongfully terminated and he died during the course of the litigation of that wrongful termination suit so his executive stepped in and finished up the case and the Supreme Court said no the Congress has the power and the authority under our constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances they have the authority to do this and Donald Trump doesn't like it one bit I mean he is forever sort of reaching for more and more and more power and this judge called him out and said the reason we have the humph executive Supreme Court ruling and other rulings that have followed along those same lines is to quote protect the people from autocracy and here we are well in that in that you know look I get that this Supreme Court is not sympathetic to settled law right like even though they they went on and on about SAR decisis and how it was the most important thing in the world and they couldn't possibly touch um Row versus Wade only only to do exactly that once they actually get a seat on the bench the difference is that row wasn't wasn't protected by Statute it was a supreme court precedent but but this has been statute for almost a hundred years and so how does the Supreme Court have the ability have the right really to go in and overturned statute without Congress being the ones to change the law you know what Brian's saying that the Supreme Court is not fond of settled law or they don't feel Bound by settled law is probably a pretty dramatic understatement as you just pointed out in how they flip-flopped on Ro v Wade versus Dos when they revoked women's constitutional privacy rights to make their own reproductive Health decisions so you asked the question well what might they do here with something that has been settled for nearly a hundred years you know it's anybody's guess um and I wouldn't you know place my $1 bet on how this case will turn out but here's what I will say and we're always looking for Points of Light the most recent case where the Supreme Court had to decide whether the Trump administration had overstepped its Authority had done something that the law and the Constitution doesn't permit um it was the US aid case where they had stiffed Donald Trump's administration had stiffed a bunch of contractors who had submitted invoices for work already performed or Goods already delivered to the federal government under existing contract that sounds that sounds like a that sounds like a recurring theme in Donald Trump's life yeah who would who would have guessed that Donald Trump would continue stiffing contractors when he transitioned from being a businessman to being president um but what did the Supreme Court do well two justices crossed over and joined the liberal block it was chief justice Roberts and Justice Amy Cony Barrett and they ruled against Trump's expansive view of the executives power and they said no basically pay your damn bills that is a good and and hopefully that's a good sign and hopefully it's some foreshadowing for how this Supreme Court will now begin to assess Donald Trump's determination to Forever expand the power of the the chief executive so I am very guardedly optimistic that they will stick with nearly hundred year old president and say no the Humphrey's executive case the power of congress to protect the people against autocracy In This Very way will continue to survive and hopefully Thrive because we need it now more than ever Glenn I know that this this case specifically was narrowly focused on the plaintiff which is Susan grundman at uh at the federal labor relations Authority but there are other folks in analogous positions who've been fired who who could make the same claim here so does this precedent um count only toward uh this one plaintiff or is there a way to to more broadly have it so that this precedent applies to all folks who are in a similar position yeah great question so let me unpack that a little bit first of all this this is a trial court decision by one federal district court judge judge Suk nanan um so that doesn't serve as precedent now it can be persuasive because the rationale that this judge used could certainly be adopted and used by other judges who as you're saying are literally involved in litigation involving not just analogous but almost identical cases and here's the thing Brian judge suknanan actually acknowledges that in her written opinion she says look Congress has this authority to set terms for executive branch officials to require that they can only be removed for cause not on a whim and only after notice and a hearing and what have we seen in the last couple of months we've seen inspectors General who enjoy those same Congressional protections under the law terminated at will violating federal law there's a special counsel who's actually sort of an overseer of many of the inspectors General who was terminated who enjoys some of those same legal protections for his position so the answer to your question is um in part yes this will be seen as persuasive Authority because it involves identical facts and identical protections put in place by Congress that the Supreme Court has consistently ruled are lawful and constitutional exercises of congress's power so I have a feeling this rationale though it's not technically precedent because president is only set in the appell at courts it will serve as what I like to call atmospheric precedent and it will be an important consideration in all of the lawsuits brought by similarly situated wrongfully terminated executive branch officials which brings me to my next Point shouldn't other folks who've been wrongfully terminated see this decision being handed down and shouldn't this be an impetus to bring suit against him if they haven't already yes but remember lots and lots and lots tens of thousands of the people who are being wrong wrongfully terminated like probationary employees and so some prosecutors who worked on j6 cases um they are not um benefiting from these Congressional statutes that give protections only to very specific right um members of the executive branch like inspectors General like members of certain boards like the flr the board we're discussing here and a handful of others so it's actually a limited Universe of people who um have those protection under the law but all of them who are wrongfully terminated I'm with you should look at this should be emboldened and should be encouraged to bring suits of their own if they haven't already many have for their wrongful termination is there a world in which all of these folks can come together if they are if they are at least protected under under the same general statute that they can come together for a class action lawsuit okay I am not a civil litigator and I've never put a class together in a civil litigation case so with that caveat my sort of informed opinion knowing what I know about class action litigation is probably not because there are different statutes in place that govern different executive branch employees if it's you're An Inspector General you're going to be covered by one federal statute if you're a member of the flr another so you could probably join in with like mini classes but I don't I don't see all wrong ful terminated executive branch officials being collected up in one class action civil suit but I will leave that for the experts look class action suit or or individual suit I think the the point here Remains the Same which is that um clearly there is there is some positive reinforcement for these folks who are looking to take legal action against Trump this case right here with uh with Susan grundman is a testament to exactly that and so I hope that folks who have been wrongfully terminated can see what's happening in the courts right now and can take action so that they aren't wrongfully terminated so that the government isn't staffed with only people who are going to be um uh loyal to Donald Trump and that we have some folks who can serve as bullworks against the worst excesses of this Administration so look we will continue to focus on this as we said in the beginning this is very likely to make its way all the way up to the Supreme Court so we'll stay on top of it uh for those who are watching if you want to follow along and if you want to support our work and Independent Media more broadly please make sure to subscribe the links to both of our channels are right here on this screen Glenn is fast on his way to a million subscribers so if you haven't subscribed to his channel yet please make sure to hit the Subscribe button I'm Brian terer Cohen and I'm Glenn kersner you're watching the legal breakdown [Music]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AIDS VACCINE ADVOCACY COALITION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-00400 (AHA)
_______________________________________
GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-00402 (AHA) [Judge Amir H. Ali, United States District Judge]
Date: March 10, 2025
Memorandum Opinion and Order
The provision and administration of foreign aid has been a joint enterprise between our two political branches. That partnership is built not out of convenience, but of constitutional necessity. It reflects Congress and the Executive’s “firmly established,” shared constitutional responsibilities over foreign policy, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 62 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and it reflects the division of authorities dictated by the Constitution as it relates to the appropriation of funds and executing on those appropriations. Congress, exercising its exclusive Article I power of the purse, appropriates funds to be spent toward specific foreign policy aims. The President, exercising a more general Article II power, decides how to spend those funds in faithful execution of the law. And so foreign aid has proceeded over the years.
[Marc Elias] So let me start with something that I don't understand. So you got Article I of the Constitution, which is the Congress, and lays out Congress's power; and you got Article II, which lays out the Executive Branch's power; and you got Article III that lays out the Judicial branch. And I think the Founders had in mind that the most powerful of these branches would actually be the first, would be Article I, right? It would be Congress. And that it would jealously guard its authority -- particularly its ability to spend money, and its ability to issue taxes -- that it would jealously guard this power from a rapacious Executive. That does not seem to be happening. So what do you make of this? Either put on your Constitutional law hat, or put on your member of Congress hat, but what do you make of this?
[Jamie Raskin] Well, in one sense, this is a decades-long process of erosion of Congressional lawmaking power. But this is a dramatic and sudden jump into the unknown, with the President basically defying Congress in Congressional statutes and Appropriations at every turn. But to go back to the beginning, Marc, look, we had a revolution against a king, against a monarch. The first three words of the Constitution are, "We the people." And then, after you get through our beautiful Preamble, it leads right into the creation of Article I: "All legislative power is vested in the Congress of the United States." The sovereign power of the People to create the Constitution flows right into the Congressional power of lawmaking. And you know, Article I lays out everything, from regulating Commerce domestically and internationally, to the power to declare war, budgets, taxes, you name it. And even in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, all other powers necessary and proper to the execution of the forgoing powers, right?
Then you get to Article II. My colleague, Jim Jordan's, been running around TV saying that Article II says, in the first sentence, "All Executive power is vested in the President." Yeah, that's true, but what is the executive power, right? When you get past commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy in times of actual conflict, or when the militia's been mobilized, what's the core job of the President? "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." That's it. "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Articles of Confederation didn't even have a President, right? And then they thought that that was too inefficient, and there was nobody to keep things going to, you know, move the bureaucracy when Congress wasn't in town. And then the President was created, but very clearly in a secondary position. As Madison put it in the Federalist Papers, "The legislative branch is the predominant branch of government."
So sometimes my colleagues will get up, even Democrats will say, "We're three co-equal branches of government." And I just want to say, first of all, "co-equal" is not even a word, okay? You know, that's like extremely unique, or something like that. Secondly, the claim that we have three equal branches is just ridiculous. I mean, when you get to Article II, you've got four short sections. One section is all about how you impeach a President for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. If we're co-equal, or equal, or equivalent, or whatever, why do we have the power to impeach and try and convict a President, and he doesn't have the power to impeach and try and convict us? The framers were clearly a lot more afraid of a President purporting to be a King, or arrogating the powers of a dictator, than it was afraid of Congress; all of the people, coming from this great huge, vast, diverse country, from different points of views, and working together, and split between the House and the Senate with bicameralism. So, as you know, Washington told Jefferson in that famous anecdote,
There is a tradition that Jefferson coming home from France, called Washington to account at the breakfast-table for having agreed to a second, and, as Jefferson thought, unnecessary legislative Chamber.
"Why," asked Washington, "did you just now pour that coffee into your saucer, before drinking?"
"To cool it," answered Jefferson, "my throat is not made of brass."
"Even so," rejoined Washington, "we pour our legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it."
It's like, you know, pouring your tea from the cup into the saucer so it can cool off a little bit, right? And the Senate is supposed to allow the passions and tempers of the House of Representatives to cool off a little bit. But in any event, Congress is the lawmaking branch. We also have the power of the purse. We've got the power to spend, right? And you know this Marc, an Appropriations Act is just another federal law. It's like a law against assaulting Federal officers. And they should show more respect for both the law against assaulting Federal officers, and for an Appropriations Act. An Appropriations Act is not a budgetary recommendation, or a point of negotiation, or a bargaining chip with the President. It's a law you follow. The law "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." So do your job, yeah?
This case involves a departure from that firmly established constitutional partnership. Here, the Executive has unilaterally deemed that funds Congress appropriated for foreign aid will not be spent. The Executive not only claims his constitutional authority to determine how to spend appropriated funds, but usurps Congress’s exclusive authority to dictate whether the funds should be spent in the first place. In advancing this position, Defendants offer an unbridled view of Executive power that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected—a view that flouts multiple statutes whose constitutionality is not in question, as well as the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Asserting this “vast and generally unreviewable” Executive power and diminution of Congressional power, Defendants do not cite any provision of Article I or Article II of the Constitution. See generally Glob. Health, ECF No. 34.
When courts have confronted Executive overreach of the foreign policy power in the past, they have stood prepared to reaffirm Congress’s role. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952); Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 62 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“For our first 225 years, no President prevailed when contradicting a statute in the field of foreign affairs.”). So too they have stood firm when the Executive treads on Congress’s spending power. See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.) (granting mandamus). Three Justices aptly captured the import to our nation’s founding: “Before this country declared independence, the law of England entrusted the King with the exclusive care of his kingdom’s foreign affairs.” Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., dissenting). But “[t]he People of the United States had other ideas.” Id. The People “considered a sound structure of balanced powers essential to the preservation of just government, and international relations formed no exception to that principle.” Id. They “adopted a Constitution that divides responsibility for the Nation’s foreign concerns between the legislative and executive departments.” Id.
Today, this Court reaffirms these firmly established principles of our Constitution. At the same time, however, the Court is mindful of limitations on its own authority. While Congress has directed courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” certain agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), and the Supreme Court has admonished that the “duty of the judicial department to say what the law is” includes resolving disputes between Congress and the President over foreign policy power, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)), courts remain constrained in the relief they can offer. The Court must be careful that any relief it grants does not itself intrude on the prerogative of a coordinate branch. The Court accordingly denies Plaintiffs’ proposed relief that would unnecessarily entangle the Court in supervision of discrete or ongoing Executive decisions, as well as relief that goes beyond what their claims allow. For the reasons herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction.
I. Background
A. The Political Branches’ Joint Framework For The Provision And Administration Of Foreign Aid
The general framework for foreign aid relevant here began with Congress’s enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”), Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.). In the FAA, Congress sets forth principles to guide U.S. foreign policy as it relates to foreign aid. Congress “reaffirms the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and renews its commitment to assist people in developing countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance.” 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a). The act further declares that “a principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.” Id. Congress also sets forth specific priorities for such foreign assistance: “(1) the alleviation of the worst physical manifestations of poverty among the world’s poor majority; (2) the promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of benefits; (3) the encouragement of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced; (4) the integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system; and (5) the promotion of good governance through combating corruption and improving transparency and accountability.” Id. Congress declares that “pursuit of these goals requires that development concerns be fully reflected in United States foreign policy and that United States development resources be effectively and efficiently utilized.” Id.
In addition to setting forth these principles and priorities, the FAA explicitly recognizes and authorizes the President’s role in administering aid allocated toward those ends. With respect to various areas in which aid is to be targeted, such as health programs, economic development, anticrime efforts, military education, and peacekeeping, Congress authorizes the President “to furnish assistance” “on such terms and conditions as he may determine.” See, e.g., id. §§ 2151b(c)(1), 2291(a)(1)(G)(4), 2346(a), 2347(a), 2348.
The FAA led to the creation of the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), first by executive order, see Exec. Order No. 10973, 26 Fed. Reg. 10469 (Nov. 3, 1961), and more than thirty years later enshrined by legislation in the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, see 22 U.S.C. § 6563. In the years since, Congress has regularly appropriated foreign assistance funds to USAID for specific purposes, including “[f]or necessary expenses to enable the President to carry out the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.” Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138 Stat. 460, 740. For example, the appropriations act provides: “For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of chapters 1 and 10 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for global health activities, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, $3,985,450,000, to remain available until September 30, 2025, and which shall be apportioned directly to the United States Agency for International Development,” and it further specifies the global health issues that amount is to be spent on. Id. The act appropriates other funds “directly to the Department of State” to be spent on specific issues, such as “the prevention, treatment, and control of, and research on, HIV/AIDS.” Id. at 742; see also, e.g., id. at 743 (appropriating funds to the State Department “[f]or necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for the promotion of democracy globally”).
B. The Issuance And Implementation Of Executive Order No. 14169
On January 20, 2025, the President issued an executive order entitled “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid.” Exec. Order No. 14169, 90 Fed. Reg. 8619 (Jan. 20, 2025). The order directed an immediate pause in “United States foreign development assistance.” Id. § 3(a). It also directed responsible department and agency heads to review each foreign assistance program and to determine within ninety days of the order “whether to continue, modify, or cease each foreign assistance program,” in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Id. §§ 3(b), (c). The order directed that the Secretary of State would have authority to waive the pause “for specific programs” and separately allowed for new obligations or the resumption of disbursements during the ninety-day review period, if a review was conducted sooner and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of OMB, approved. Id. §§ 3(d), (e).
In the days that followed, agency officials took actions to institute an immediate suspension of all congressionally appropriated foreign aid. On January 24, the Secretary of State issued a memorandum suspending all new funding obligations, pending a review, for foreign assistance programs funded by or through the State Department and USAID. Glob. Health, ECF No. 43 at 14. USAID officials also issued instructions to immediately pause all new programs, issue stop-work orders, and develop appropriate review standards. Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 58-1 to 58-4. OMB issued a memorandum ordering a temporary pause of all federal financial assistance, including assistance for foreign aid and nongovernmental organizations. Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶ 47. Plaintiffs provide numerous letters terminating or suspending their awards following these actions. See, e.g., Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-4 at 2, 5, 7, 13. The record shows that within a few weeks, the State Department suspended more than 7,000 awards and terminated more than 700. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 25-1 ¶¶ 25–28. USAID proceeded at a similar pace, suspending and terminating 230 awards in a two-day span and, in total, terminating almost 500 awards and suspending thousands of others in just weeks. Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 20, 20-1, 25-1 ¶ 12.
C. The Present Litigation
Plaintiffs, who are all recipients of or have members who receive foreign assistance funding, filed these actions and sought temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) enjoining Defendants from giving effect to Executive Order No. 14169 and the subsequent implementations.1 The Court held a hearing in both cases, and Plaintiffs thereafter submitted revised proposed orders that narrowed the scope of their requested relief. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 16-1; Glob. Health, ECF No. 18. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motions in part and issued a temporary restraining order on still narrower terms. AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-00400, 2025 WL 485324 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2025). The Court found that Plaintiffs had made a strong preliminary showing of irreparable harm. Id. at *2–4. Among other things, Plaintiffs provided evidence that they had been and would continue to be forced to shut down program offices, to furlough or terminate staff, and in some cases to shutter their businesses entirely. Id. They further adduced evidence that Defendants’ actions had and would continue to have a catastrophic effect on the humanitarian missions of several Plaintiffs and their members. Id. The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the challenged agency action was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, particularly given Defendants’ failure to consider enormous reliance interests. Id. at *4–5. Finally, the Court held that the equities and the public interest favored Plaintiffs in light of the existential threats they faced and the lack of any compelling countervailing harms identified by Defendants. Id. at *6.
Although the Court determined that temporary injunctive relief was warranted, it found that Plaintiffs’ requested injunctions were overbroad and narrowed the relief in multiple ways. Id. Specifically, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the President or the Executive Order itself; limited its temporary relief only to the implementation of specific sections of the Executive Order; and rejected language that would have dictated personnel decisions or operational details in complying with the injunction. Id. The Court also declined to enjoin Defendants from taking action to enforce the terms of individual contracts, including expirations, modifications, or terminations pursuant to contractual provisions. Id. With those limitations, the Court temporarily enjoined Defendants (excluding the President) from implementing directives “suspending, pausing, or otherwise preventing the obligation or disbursement of appropriated foreign-assistance funds” or “issuing, implementing, enforcing, or otherwise giving effect to terminations, suspensions, or stop-work orders” in connection with any contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, loans, or other federal foreign assistance awards in existence as of January 19, 2025. Id. at *6–7.
In the two weeks that followed, Plaintiffs moved multiple times to enforce the Court’s TRO and hold Defendants in contempt, providing evidence that Defendants continued their freeze and further evidence of irreparable harm to businesses and organizations across the country. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 26; Glob. Health, ECF No. 29; see Glob. Health, ECF No. 29-1 (discussing February 18 internal email stating that Secretary of State “has implemented a 15-day disbursement pause on all $15.9B worth of grants at the State Department” and directing recipients to “review the President’s executive orders and recommend termination of grants that do not comply with those orders” (emphasis omitted)). The Court declined to hold Defendants in contempt and reaffirmed certain flexibility and authority Defendants reserved, consistent with the TRO. AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-00400, 2025 WL 569381, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2025); AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-00400, 2025 WL 577516, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2025). However, the Court also reiterated: “[T]o the extent Defendants have continued the blanket suspension, they are ordered to immediately cease it and to take all necessary steps to honor the terms of contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, loans, and other federal foreign assistance awards that were in existence as of January 19, 2025, including but not limited to disbursing all funds payable under those terms.” AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 569381, at *3; AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 577516, at *3.
Within a few days, Plaintiffs in both cases had renewed their motions to enforce. Glob. Health, ECF No. 36; Glob. Health, ECF No. 37 at 25. Plaintiffs explained that, despite the Court’s orders, they were still owed millions of dollars on due and overdue invoices and reimbursement requests; they still lacked access to letter of credit facilities and other payment management systems; and their contracts and awards terminated pursuant to the Executive Order remained terminated. Glob. Health, ECF No. 36 at 2. In addition, several plaintiffs were facing “new and mounting irreparable harms that threaten their very existence and which require emergency relief prior to the Court’s hearing on the preliminary injunction motion.” Id.
The Court held a motions hearing on February 25. At the hearing, Defendants’ counsel acknowledged that the TRO foreclosed them from giving effect to suspensions or terminations that were issued before February 13. Glob. Health, ECF No. 37 at 33–34. The Court asked Defendants’ counsel if he was “aware of steps taken to actually release those funds” over the prior two weeks, consistent with the TRO and later orders. Id. at 35. Counsel responded that he was “not in a position to answer that.” Id. For that and other reasons set forth on the record, the Court orally granted Plaintiffs’ second set of motions to enforce the TRO. The Court ordered Defendants to unfreeze funds for work completed prior to the TRO, giving Defendants an additional thirty-six hours to come into compliance. Id. at 57–58.
Defendants appealed and moved to stay the Court’s oral ruling, asserting for the first time that it would not be possible to process payments within that time. Glob. Health, ECF No. 39. Defendants also provided additional details on suspensions and terminations since the issuance of the TRO. Glob. Health, ECF No. 42. In particular, Defendants represented that they had completed an independent, individualized review process for over 13,000 USAID and State Department awards following the Court’s TRO, which resulted in the termination of all but 500 USAID awards and all but 2,700 State Department awards. Id.
Upon remand from the Supreme Court, this Court promptly ordered the parties to address the feasibility of processing payments. Glob. Health, Min. Order (Mar. 5, 2025). The Court also held a lengthy hearing on Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motions and the issue of feasibility. At the hearing, the parties agreed that compliance with the February 25 order required Defendants to make approximately 2,000 USAID payments and to enable drawdowns for awards that proceed on letters of credit. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 131–33; see Glob. Health, ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 4. The Court requested benchmarks to help evaluate the feasibility of processing payments. The parties identified a declaration from Defendants indicating that USAID and State previously had been capable of processing several thousand payments each day. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 133; see Glob. Health, ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 15. As a more recent benchmark, Defendants explained that they had been able to release some payments to Plaintiffs; they have since clarified that they processed approximately 100 payments in an overnight period. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 125; see Glob. Health, ECF No. 54 at 2. The Court ordered Defendants to begin by paying Plaintiffs’ outstanding invoices and letter of credit drawdowns within a four-day period, which would be a small fraction—apparently just 1% to 10%—of the rate at which the agencies previously processed payments and appeared consistent with the rate that Defendants had been able to process payments the night before. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 144–46. The Court asked the parties to come back with any further information that would be helpful in assessing feasibility and setting a clear, administrable benchmark. Id. at 147–49.
II. Discussion
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right” and, to the contrary, “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). In particular, a plaintiff must establish four factors: “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. In granting a TRO, the Court found that Plaintiffs had established these factors. As discussed below, however, the Court finds that the ground has shifted some since that time, both in terms of further actions on the part of the agencies and further development of the parties’ arguments.
The Court begins by addressing Article III standing. Upon concluding that Plaintiffs clearly have standing, the Court turns to the Winter factors. The Court finds that, although Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success under the APA as to the initial agency action they challenged, their challenge to Defendants’ subsequent review of awards is a closer call, and Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, on the other hand, have a substantial likelihood of success, particularly given Defendants’ failure to offer a defensible interpretation of the separation of powers. Because Plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm, which remains largely uncontested, and the remaining factors favor Plaintiffs, the Court grants preliminary injunctive relief in part, tailored to the scope of claims likely to succeed and the relevant harms.2
A. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated Standing
“To establish Article III standing, the plaintiff must have ‘suffered an injury in fact’ that ‘is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant’ and it must be ‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Banner Health v. Price, 867 F.3d 1323, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). As the Court detailed in its TRO opinion, Plaintiffs adduced evidence that Defendants’ actions had caused them immense harm, including by inflicting massive financial injuries, forcing them to significantly reduce core operations and staff, and jeopardizing their missions. AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *2–4. Those injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged agency action in this case: namely, the blanket suspension of funds. And a determination that the blanket suspension was unlawful, and therefore cannot be given effect, would likely redress at least some of the harms Plaintiffs have suffered.3
Defendants did not dispute Plaintiffs’ standing at the TRO stage. In their preliminary injunction briefing, however, they now argue Plaintiffs have failed to show Article III standing, and the Court pauses to address that argument. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs allege “no more than” a “pocketbook injury” from the terminations of their awards and are attempting to challenge “implementing acts that do not affect Plaintiffs directly.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 18 (quoting Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 243 (2021)). Defendants’ argument is difficult to parse and is not supported by the case law they cite. First, when considering injury in fact, financial injury, or “pocketbook injury,” is generally considered the gold standard or “prototypical form of injury in fact.” Collins, 594 U.S. at 243. Indeed, when asked at the preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants conceded that this is “recognized as an Article III injury.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 63. Here, Plaintiffs argue that the injury not only can be traced to, but flows directly from, the Executive Order and its implementations directing the suspension of congressionally appropriated foreign aid. Indeed, the Executive Order and its implementations are what caused the agreements’ review and their suspension or termination. Moreover, Defendants’ argument overlooks Plaintiffs’ injuries that go beyond their “pocketbook.” Plaintiffs have adduced evidence that Defendants’ actions have critically compromised their missions, causing disruption to programs, substantial layoffs, threats to employees’ physical safety, and impending legal action. See, e.g., AIDS Vaccine, ECF Nos. 1-11, 1-12; Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 36-1, 46-2; see also AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *2–4 (summarizing evidence of harm).4
At bottom, the relief Plaintiffs seek, an order invalidating Defendants’ blanket directive to suspend congressionally appropriated foreign aid, would mean the government must honor its aid agreements for a period greater than it did. That includes obligations directly affecting Plaintiffs’ pocketbooks and their ability to fulfill their organizational missions, honor their responsibilities to employees, and meet their commitments to community partners. That is textbook injury, causation, and redress.5
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed On The Merits
Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ blanket suspension of foreign aid under the APA as both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, and they also assert constitutional claims that Defendants’ actions violate the separation of powers. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 45–73; Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 111–31. The Court need only find that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on one of these claims for this factor to weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction. That said, any relief should be tailored to the particular claims likely to succeed.
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims challenge different Executive actions. Plaintiffs’ APA claims challenge the Secretary of State’s January 24 memorandum and other contemporaneous directives implementing Executive Order No. 14169 by suspending congressionally apportioned foreign aid, and they seek relief for the consequences that resulted from those directives. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims challenge Defendants’ authority to unilaterally rescind or defer funds that Congress has appropriated in accordance with its spending power. The Court begins with Plaintiffs’ statutory claims and then turns to their constitutional claims.
1. Plaintiffs Will Likely Prevail, At Least In Part, On Their APA Claims
The APA permits judicial review of “final agency action” and requires a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2)(A). Here, the final agency action Plaintiffs challenge is the Secretary of State’s January 24 memorandum and other contemporaneous directives implementing Executive Order No. 14169 by suspending congressionally apportioned foreign aid. Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶ 113; AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 1 ¶ 61. Plaintiffs claim that these actions were both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.
a. Plaintiffs’ Claims Seeking To Invalidate The Agencies’ Implementing Directives Are Properly Asserted Under The APA
Defendants raise a threshold challenge as to whether the APA is the right home for Plaintiffs’ claims. The APA provides for judicial review of claims “seeking relief other than money damages” and does not apply where another statute “grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also id. § 704 (final agency action is subject to APA review where “there is no other adequate remedy in a court”). According to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims might “ripen into” claims under the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), which applies to government procurement contracts, including for the “procurement of services,” and channels claims to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals after an exhaustion process. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 12; see 41 U.S.C. §§ 7102(a)(2), 7104(b), 7105(e)(1)(B). Alternatively, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs’ claims must proceed under the Tucker Act, which applies to claims for breach of contract against the federal government over $10,000 and channels those claims to the Court of Federal Claims. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 14; see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). On Defendants’ account, Plaintiffs have attempted to package contractual claims for “delayed payments” as ones for injunctive relief under the APA, and therefore they fall under one of these other two acts rather than the APA. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 15.6
Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ APA claims, by their terms, challenge specific agency actions—here, the implementing policy directives—and ask the Court to “hold them unlawful and set them aside.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 112–14, 116–17, 122. That’s precisely the relief that is afforded—indeed, required—by and routinely granted under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing that courts “shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that violates APA’s substantive standards). The complaints do not seek money damages. It is, of course, true that after a court sets aside agency action, a natural consequence may be the release of funds withheld pursuant to that action. The Supreme Court recognized this in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988). There, the Court considered whether the APA provided jurisdiction to order the Secretary of Health and Human Services to undo his refusal to reimburse the plaintiff. The Court explained that its cases “have long recognized” that “[t]he fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’” Id. at 893. The Court concluded: “since the orders are for specific relief (they undo the Secretary’s refusal to reimburse the State) rather than for money damages (they do not provide relief that substitutes for that which ought to have been done) they are within the District Court’s jurisdiction under § 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 910.
Indeed, even to the extent that payments might result from Plaintiffs’ APA claims, they do not resemble a “money damages” claim, for breach of contract or otherwise. Here, as the Supreme Court recognized, Judge Bork’s “explanation of the plain meaning of the critical language” in the APA is instructive. Id. at 894. In Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health & Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Judge Bork considered the APA’s application to “injunctive relief enjoining defendants from reducing funds otherwise due to plaintiffs” and held that this was “not a claim for money damages, although it is a claim that would require the payment of money by the federal government.” Bowen, 487 U.S. at 894 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland, 763 F.2d at 1446). He explained that any funds that would flow to the plaintiff as the result of agency action being held unlawful under the APA were not “money in compensation for the losses, whatever they may be, that [plaintiff] will suffer or has suffered by virtue of the withholding of those funds.” Id. at 895 (quoting Maryland, 763 F.2d at 1446). The same is true here. Plaintiffs are not seeking compensation for their losses due to the failure to pay them, which, as in any contract case, could be far greater than the amount withheld pursuant to the agency policy; Plaintiffs seek only invalidation of the policy, including the withholding of payment that flowed from it. See also Am.’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[M]oney damages represent compensatory relief, an award given to a plaintiff as a substitute for that which has been lost; specific relief in contrast represents an attempt to restore to the plaintiff that to which it was entitled from the beginning.”).
Second, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ APA claims are contract claims that must proceed under the CDA or Tucker Act is unpersuasive. The D.C. Circuit has “explicitly rejected the ‘broad’ notion ‘that any case requiring some reference to or incorporation of a contract is necessarily on the contract and therefore directly within the Tucker Act’ because to do so would ‘deny a court jurisdiction to consider a claim that is validly based on grounds other than a contractual relationship with the government.’” Crowley Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 38 F.4th 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). “Exclusive jurisdiction in Claims Court under the Tucker Act does not lie ‘merely because [a plaintiff] hints at some interest in a monetary reward from the federal government or because success on the merits may obligate the United States to pay the complainant.’” Id. at 1108 (alteration in original) (quoting Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, 56 F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The question under both the CDA and Tucker Act is whether the action “is at its essence a contract claim.” Id. at 1106 (quoting Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 967); see A&S Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1995). That inquiry turns on (1) “the source of the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claims,” and (2) “the type of relief sought (or appropriate).” Crowley, 38 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968).
As set forth above, “the face of the complaint” in both cases makes clear that Plaintiffs are asserting a right “to be free from government action beyond [its] congressional authority.” Id. at 1108 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The sources of Plaintiffs’ claims “are the statutes identified in [their] complaint[s],” id., which include the APA, the Impoundment Control Act, the Anti-Deficiency Act, and the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 45–73; Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 79–110. And, consistent with those sources, the remedy Plaintiffs seek is simply to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 112–14, 116–17, 122; see also N.J. Conservation Found. v. FERC, 111 F.4th 42, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“Vacatur is the normal remedy when we are faced with unsustainable agency action.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Plaintiffs do not seek money damages and, to return to Judge Bork’s apt distinction, do not seek the contractual remedy of “money in compensation for [their] losses, whatever they may be,” in relation to any breach of their agreements. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895 (quoting Maryland, 763 F.2d at 1446). Indeed, it would be quite extraordinary to consider Plaintiffs’ claims to sound in breach of contract when they do not at all depend on whether the terms of particular awards were breached—they instead challenge whether the agency action here was unlawful, irrespective of any breach.7
To be sure, some Plaintiffs or other parties may have individual claims sounding in contract that could be brought against their respective contracting counterparties. The critical point is that here Plaintiffs assert APA claims to invalidate agency policy directives, regardless of any breach of any agreement or the extent of their losses. See Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284 (“Even where a monetary claim may be waiting on the sidelines, as long as the plaintiff’s complaint only requests non-monetary relief that has considerable value independent of any future potential for monetary relief—that is, as long as the sole remedy requested is declaratory or injunctive relief that is not negligible in comparison with the potential monetary recovery—we respect the plaintiff’s choice of remedies and treat the complaint as something more than an artfully drafted effort to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Plaintiffs’ claims are properly asserted under the APA.8
b. Plaintiffs Will Likely Prevail In Showing That Defendants’ Initial Directives To Freeze Foreign Aid Were Arbitrary And Capricious
“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Rather, the court “must confirm that the agency has fulfilled its duty to examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 816 F.3d 119, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). “[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
In granting a TRO, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that Defendants’ implementation of a blanket suspension of congressionally appropriated foreign aid pending review was arbitrary and capricious. The Court explained that there was nothing in the record that provided “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” to impose an immediate and wholesale suspension of foreign aid in order to review programs. Moreover, nothing in the record suggested that Defendants considered and had a rational reason for disregarding the massive reliance interests of businesses and organizations that would have to shutter programs or close their doors altogether. The blanket suspension thus “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *5.
This continues to be true with respect to the original implementing directives. Defendants have yet to offer any explanation, let alone one supported by the record, for why a blanket suspension setting off a shockwave and upending reliance interests for thousands of businesses and organizations around the country was a rational precursor to reviewing programs. Instead, Defendants assert that the Executive Order and January 24 implementing memorandum provided “more than enough explanation” given the Executive’s “vast” powers over foreign affairs. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 37. But the Executive Order simply stated that the purpose of the freeze was to allow the administration to assess programmatic efficiencies and ensure that foreign aid is consistent with U.S. foreign policy. Exec. Order No. 14169 § 3(a). And the implementing memorandum said:
Across the United States government, it is currently impossible to access sufficient information in one place to determine whether the foreign assistance policies and interests supported by appropriations are not duplicated, are effective, and are consistent with President Trump’s foreign policy. The Department needs a centralized repository from which senior Department, USAID officials, Ambassadors, missions and others can draw sufficiently detailed information from which the Secretary can make judgments. Further guidance regarding a new or updated repository and mandatory bureau submissions to it will be forthcoming.
Glob. Health, ECF No. 43 at 14.
The desire to review programs for efficiency or consistency, and to access information in one place, does not have a rational connection to the directives to proceed with a sudden, blanket suspension of congressionally appropriated aid.Nor do any of these articulated goals demonstrate consideration of the immense reliance interests among businesses and other organizations across the country. When an agency suddenly changes course, it must recognize “longstanding policies may have ‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020) (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016)). There is, of course, nothing inherently arbitrary and capricious about agencies conducting a review of aid programs for these purposes or building a centralized repository. But these assertions alone do not provide a rational explanation for why such a review required an immediate and wholesale suspension of all aid—including many longstanding programs taking place pursuant to contractual terms—and do not bear on the failure to consider the reliance interests of small and large businesses that would have to shutter programs or close altogether and furlough or lay off swaths of Americans in the process.9
Defendants also insist that the funding freeze was not “comprehensive or undifferentiated” because the Secretary of State approved certain waivers, including for foreign military financing, emergency food assistance, and legitimate expenses incurred before the pause went into effect. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 37. But none of those waivers involve or demonstrate consideration of the massive reliance interests of U.S. businesses and organizations. And the record belies the assertion that the waivers provided any meaningful relief from the blanket freeze. At the TRO stage, Plaintiffs proffered specific facts that the availability of a waiver did not meaningfully mitigate the harm described, and Defendants acknowledged “hiccups” in the waiver process. Glob. Health, ECF No. 22 at 31; see AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *4. In particular, State Department officials could not provide any information regarding qualification for waivers, while officials in USAID bureaus were unresponsive to similar inquiries. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-3 ¶¶ 11–12, 19–20. Even if an organization received a waiver, moreover, no aid would be disbursed because the government’s payout portals were disabled. Id. ¶ 11. And one plaintiff received limited waivers lasting for only thirty days, which did little to address the harm due to the uncertainty as to whether the company would have to halt operations again at the end of that period. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-6 ¶ 6.
Despite pointing to the possibility of waivers again in their preliminary injunction briefing, Defendants have not proffered any evidence to rebut the showing Plaintiffs made at the TRO stage. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs offer even more evidence that the waiver process has been largely irrelevant. See, e.g., Glob. Health, ECF No. 29-5 ¶ 4 (plaintiff received no payments in week after entry of TRO, including for programs that had received waivers); AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 26-3 ¶¶ 37–38 (programs receiving waivers were not able to restart due to lack of funding); AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 46-1 at 4 (internal USAID memorandum concluding that successful implementation of waiver process “was not possible due to administrative and bureaucratic challenges, including contradictory and shifting guidance regarding approval for required activities and failure of Agency leadership to process disbursement of funds for activities once approved”).
Because the current record does not include “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” and indicates Defendants “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their APA claims as they relate to the original directives implementing a blanket suspension of aid.
c. Although A Close Question, Plaintiffs Will Likely Not Prevail In Showing That Defendants’ Subsequent Terminations Flow From The Original Directives In Violation Of The APA
Although Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing Defendants’ implementing directives violated the APA, the parties disagree on how far that goes—namely, whether the invalidation of the initial implementing directives affects the review of agreements and large-scale terminations that occurred after the Court entered its TRO on February 13, 2025. This is a close question on this record, but the Court finds Plaintiffs have not made an adequate showing that the large-scale terminations resulted from the same agency action they challenge in their complaints. The Court’s conclusion is also informed by Plaintiffs’ failure to offer a clear and administrable standard for determining when terminations would no longer be tainted by the original implementing directives without entangling the Court in supervision of Executive decisions as to individual agreements.
As described above, the APA requires a plaintiff to identify the “agency action” they seek to set aside, 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2), and here Plaintiffs challenge the directives implementing the Executive Order. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 112–14, 116–17, 122. The effect of the implementing directives in their immediate wake is plain—they ordered contracting officers and grant officers to “immediately issue stop-work orders” articulated under “the terms of the relevant award” for all existing foreign assistance awards. Glob. Health, ECF No. 43 at 16. Agency employees accordingly sent out waves of suspension and termination notices with boilerplate language.10
After the Court’s TRO, however, Defendants claim they conducted a new individualized and comprehensive review of awards. In the interest of tailoring its TRO to the reliance interests at stake, the Court did not enjoin Defendants from taking actions based on the particular terms of individual contracts. AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *6–7; see also AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 569381, at *2 (explaining that “nothing in the TRO limits the agencies from conducting an individualized review of agreements and taking action as to a particular agreement where the agency determines that it has lawful authority to do so”). The Court explained that “[w]hile agency determinations based on wholly independent legal authority and justification such as the terms of particular agreements or sets of agreements, rather than deriving from a general directive to suspend aid, may be subject to some other legal challenge, whether it be under the APA, separation of powers, individual breach of contract cases, or otherwise, such determinations do not violate the present TRO.” AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 577516, at *2. It also cautioned that “of course, the TRO does not permit Defendants to simply search for and invoke new legal authorities as a post-hoc rationalization for the enjoined agency action.” Id. at *1 (quoting AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 569381, at *1).
As described above, in the roughly two weeks following the TRO, Defendants issued thousands of terminations, ultimately canceling roughly 9,900 of 13,100 USAID and State Department awards. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 42 at 16. Defendants attest that these terminations were the result of an independent review process based on the terms of the programs and the agencies’ independent legal authority to terminate them. They rely principally on a declaration from USAID Deputy Administrator Pete Marocco, which states: “USAID led a rigorous multi-level review process that began with spreadsheets including each contract, grant, or funding instrument where each line of the spreadsheeting reflected one such agreement and included information about the recipient, the amount of the award, the subject matter, and a description of the project that often included the location of the project.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 5. Marocco further describes a process in which policy staff performed an initial review of whether individual agreements were in line with foreign policy priorities, followed by a senior policy official’s review, followed by Marocco’s review, followed by the Secretary of State’s review. Id. The declaration describes a similar process for State Department awards. Id. ¶ 6. As of February 26, Defendants indicated that the review process had been completed for both USAID and State. Glob. Health, ECF No. 43-1 ¶¶ 1–2. In total, nearly 5,800 USAID awards were terminated, while more than 500 were retained. Id. ¶ 1. At State, approximately 4,100 awards were terminated, while roughly 2,700 were retained. Id. ¶ 2.
Plaintiffs in both cases opted to rely on their initial TRO motions at the preliminary injunction stage. Accordingly, their opening motions do not address the post-TRO landscape, and their arguments were limited to their reply briefs and oral argument. Their principal argument is that the review process was a sham. Glob. Health, ECF No. 46 at 16–17. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “were terminating and suspending hundreds of millions of dollars in awards based on a one-line summary, without actually looking at the award documents themselves, without consulting the personnel who manage the project, and, at least in some cases, without even knowing ‘the location of the project.’” Id. at 17. They highlight, for instance, Marocco’s assertion that the first stage of the review process “often included the location of the project” as a demonstration of how shallow the review was. Id. at 16 (quoting Glob. Health, ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 5). Plaintiffs also say it is “implausible” that the Secretary of State or a group of political appointees could have “engaged in a meaningful individualized review of the hundreds of contracts and awards terminated prior to or after the Court’s TRO.” Id. at 17 n.7. They support these arguments with declarations from contracting officers who dispute that any case-by-case review could have plausibly taken place. Glob. Health, ECF No. 42-1 ¶ 36; AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 26-3 ¶ 49.
The Court does not reach the merits of these arguments because Plaintiffs have not adequately shown that they arise from the same agency action challenged in this case. Even accepting that the review process described by Marocco took place in a cursory manner, that does not make it the same agency action as the implementing memoranda, as opposed to a distinct, flawed agency action that must be challenged as such.11
Plaintiffs come closer in their argument that the subsequent review was pretext to turn the blanket suspension of foreign aid funds into a near-blanket termination of those funds. Relying on Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752 (2019), Plaintiffs argue that “[n]ot a shred of evidence suggests that Defendants had the terms and conditions of award agreements in mind when they initiated blanket suspensions and terminations.” AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 45 at 4–5. In doing so, they cite some evidence that supports their allegation of pretext. For example, Plaintiffs point to terminations following Defendants’ review that make no reference to the terms of agreements or legal authority. See AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 44 at 7–10. They also identify several terminations after the review process that continued to assert the termination was “part of” or “in alignment with” the Executive Order. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 40-4 ¶ 24; Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 55-2 to 55-6. And Plaintiffs provide anonymous declarations, including one showing that a senior official instructed contracting officers to follow earlier terminations with expanded termination notices “tailored to the specific award and implementing partner, referencing the relevant clauses or provisions within the award.” AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 55-1. While Plaintiffs’ showing is sufficient to raise questions, on this record they have not met the high standard of a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Dep’t of Com., 588 U.S. at 781 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ proposed relief highlights further difficulty with their argument. They ask for an order requiring Defendants to revoke all terminations and suspensions issued since January 20—a total of roughly 9,900 awards—and to develop plans to restart those programs within ten days. Glob. Health, ECF No. 46-6 at 2–3. Plaintiffs also propose that Defendants be required to submit status reports to the Court every two weeks providing “an individualized statement of reasons” for any new termination or suspension. Id. at 4. And they do so without articulating a meaningful standard for the Court to distinguish between those terminations that are still affected by the original implementing directives and those that are not. This would devolve into the type of intensive supervision of day-to-day agency activities, as well as inquiry into the terms of individual awards, that the Court has expressly rejected. The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their APA challenge as to the large-scale terminations in the process that followed the Court’s TRO.12
2. Plaintiffs Will Likely Prevail On Their Constitutional Claims
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants are acting in violation of the separation of powers, including Congress’s shared power over foreign policy, its exclusive power over spending, and the expression of those powers through statutes that constrain the Executive’s authority in relation to foreign aid spending and the impoundment of appropriated funds. These claims are distinct in scope from Plaintiffs’ APA claims, in that they are not premised on the initial blanket directive to suspend funds pending review or an alleged policy to mass terminate aid programs. The argument here is that, irrespective of any particular agency action that may be subject to APA review, Defendants are engaging in a unilateral rescission or deferral of congressionally appropriated funds in violation of Congress’s spending power, as expressed in multiple statutes whose constitutionality has not been questioned. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on these claims as well.
In considering claims related to Executive power, including with respect to foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has applied “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite framework.” Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 10 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring)). The first category of this framework recognizes that when “the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). The second category recognizes that “in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” there is a “zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority.” Id. at 637. The third recognizes that when “the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” and “he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are operating in the third category of the tripartite framework, in which they have taken “measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” See AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 45 at 8. Plaintiffs observe that, consistent with the purposes outlined in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Congress has explicitly appropriated foreign aid funds for specified purposes. In March of last year, Congress passed the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138 Stat. 460. That act provides: “For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of chapters 1 and 10 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for global health activities, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, $3,985,450,000, to remain available until September 30, 2025, and which shall be apportioned directly to the United States Agency for International Development.” 138 Stat. at 740. It further specifies various purposes for which this appropriation “shall be made available,” including “training, equipment, and technical assistance” to build public health institutions; specific health programs like child survival, maternal health, and immunization; and programs for the prevention, treatment, and control of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, polio, malaria, and other infectious diseases. Id. The act similarly provides for funds that “shall be apportioned directly to the Department of State” for specified purposes. Id. at 742; see also id. at 743.
Congress has further asserted its spending power in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, which explicitly prohibits the President from impounding appropriated funds without following certain procedures. For permanent impoundments or “rescissions,” Congress specified that if the President “determines that all or part of any budget authority will not be required to carry out the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is provided” or “should be rescinded for fiscal policy or other reasons,” he must “transmit to both Houses of Congress a special message” addressing the amount, reasons, impact, and other information related to the proposed recission of funds. 2 U.S.C. § 683(a). The act requires that the funds in question be made available for obligation unless Congress rescinds the appropriation within forty-five days. Id. § 683(b). The act also imposes procedural requirements, including a special message to Congress, where the President seeks to temporarily impound or “defer” funds. Id. §§ 682(1), 684(a).
Defendants do not object to the constitutionality of any of these statutes. They do not, for instance, contend Congress exceeded its authority by mandating that funds be used for specified foreign aid purposes or by mandating the President follow procedures before permanent or temporary impoundment. At the same time, the record here shows that Defendants are acting to rescind or defer the funds Congress has appropriated and have no intent to spend them. Plaintiffs point to multiple public statements in which the President and other senior officials have said Defendants’ actions are being undertaken to end foreign aid funding. For example, they cite contemporaneous statements from the State Department that these actions “prevented” foreign aid spending for policy reasons and to save taxpayer money; from a presidential advisor stating that it is “[t]ime for [USAID] to die”; and from the President stating “CLOSE IT DOWN” with respect to USAID. See AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 13-1 at 12–13 (alterations in original); Glob. Health, ECF No. 4 at 14. When given the opportunity in these proceedings, Defendants have not disputed this is their intent. See also AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 46-1 at 35 (internal USAID memorandum indicating that more than $2 billion appropriated to USAID for specific health objectives “has been blocked from obligation to partners”).13 Yet it is uncontested that Defendants have not undertaken the procedures required for the impoundment of congressionally appropriated aid, whether permanent or temporary, by the Impoundment Control Act. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 102–03.14
This is accordingly a circumstance in which the Executive’s power is “at its lowest ebb.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). As a result, Defendants’ actions must be “scrutinized with caution,” and they “can rely only upon [the President’s] own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Id. Here, the President’s powers come from his general Article II responsibility to serve as the Executive and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. The powers of Congress involve not only its general shared responsibility over foreign affairs, but its core and “exclusive power over the federal purse.” U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.) (citation omitted); see U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8, 9. It is well established that “whether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law,” and this includes Congress’s core spending power. Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 21; see also id. at 16 (noting that the President “could not build an American Embassy abroad without congressional appropriation of the necessary funds”). Under “settled, bedrock principles of constitutional law,” the President “must follow statutory mandates so long as there is appropriated money available and the President has no constitutional objection to the statute.” Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 259 (emphasis omitted). And if the authority to make law and control spending is to mean anything, it means the President may not disregard a statutory mandate to spend funds “simply because of policy objections.” Id.; see also id. at 261 n.1 (explaining that where a President has policy reasons “for wanting to spend less than the full amount appropriated by Congress for a particular project or program,” it remains the case that “even the President does not have unilateral authority to refuse to spend the funds” and must propose a rescission to Congress for its approval).15
Here, Defendants do not contest that they are declining to spend appropriated funds based on policy objections—indeed, they have explicitly said so. See Exec. Order No. 14169 § 2 (“[N]o further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.”); Glob. Health, ECF No. 43 at 15 (January 24 memorandum directing departments and agencies to ensure that all foreign assistance is aligned with the President’s foreign policy agenda).Their principal argument, repeatedly asserted throughout their brief, is that the President has “vast and generally unreviewable” powers in the realm of foreign affairs. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 2, 10, 24. Defendants do not ground their position in any specific provision of the Constitution or articulate any limits to this expansive authority. Nor do they engage in any analysis of how these asserted powers relate to those vested in Congress under Article I of the Constitution; indeed, Defendants never cite Article I or mention Congress’s spending power. Defendants instead rely on broad language from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), to argue that the President is “the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 25.
This argument falls short for several reasons. First and foremost, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected it. The Court has explained that Curtiss-Wright does not stand for such “unbounded power.” Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 20; see also id. at 66 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that Supreme Court cases “have never accepted such a sweeping understanding of executive power”). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that, notwithstanding the Executive’s important role in foreign affairs, “it is essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.” Id. at 21 (majority opinion). To repeat, “whether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law.” Id. Or, as the Chief Justice aptly summarized, the Constitution “allocates some foreign policy powers to the Executive, grants some to the Legislature, and enjoins the President to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” Id. at 62 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). The Executive is therefore “not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.” Id. at 21 (majority opinion); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It was intimated [in Curtiss-Wright] that the President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.”).
Indeed, the claim to “vast and generally unreviewable” power to impound congressionally appropriated aid is weaker here than in past invocations in the foreign affairs context. In Zivotofsky, for instance, the Executive pointed to a long line of “judicial precedent and historical practice” showing that the power at issue, recognition, was “for the President alone,” and the Court emphasized “the lack of any similar power vested in Congress.” 576 U.S. at 14, 21. Defendants do not claim there is any precedent or history allowing the President to dictate whether to spend foreign aid for the statutory purposes here. And the Constitution explicitly vests in Congress the power to spend, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and appropriate funds, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. This “power over the purse was one of the most important authorities allocated to Congress in the Constitution’s ‘necessary partition of power among the several departments.’” Dep’t of Navy, 665 F.3d at 1346–47 (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). In the third Youngstown category, the President “can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). The constitutional power over whether to spend foreign aid is not the President’s own—and it is Congress’s own.16
Aside from their unbounded view of Executive power in foreign policy, Defendants observe that Congress’s “appropriations acts grant the President significant discretion in how to use these funds.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 33. They also cite City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1987), to argue that a “pause” in funding does not qualify as an impoundment. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 35. These arguments are unavailing. No one does or could doubt that the Executive is afforded significant discretion in administering the funds appropriated or, as Defendants put it, “how to use these funds.” See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(c)(1) (authorizing the President “to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine,” for certain programs). As described, the constitutional partnership between the political branches has always recognized the Executive’s role in determining how appropriated funds are spent. The critical point here, which Defendants do not contest, is that Congress’s appropriations laws set the amount that is to be spent. That is, the appropriations laws reflect an exercise of Congress’s own, core constitutional power to determine whether and how much money is spent. Defendants do not argue that Congress’s appropriations laws delegate that core authority to the Executive.
Moreover, the notion that the Executive has simply “paused” appropriations does not avoid the problem. As an initial matter, the contention is belied by public statements indicating that this action has been taken to save taxpayer money and end USAID for policy reasons, which Defendants have not disputed when given the opportunity. And the case Defendants cite to authorize a pause of appropriated funds stands for just the opposite proposition. In City of New Haven, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the Impoundment Control Act’s legislative history indicated that the President might invite little controversy when it comes to “trivial” impoundments relating to the “normal and orderly operation of the government.” 809 F.2d at 908. But the Court explained that other impoundments, those “designed to negate congressional budgetary policies,” were precisely the kind that Congress “was determined to forestall.” Id. A blanket suspension of billions of dollars appropriated by Congress for specific purposes can hardly be classified as trivial. And, indeed, the record makes clear that Defendants’ impoundment was specifically “designed to negate congressional budgetary policies.”17
The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their separation of powers claims and rejects Defendants’ unbridled understanding of the President’s foreign policy power, which would put the Executive above Congress in an area where it is “firmly established” that the two branches share power, Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 62 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), where Congress is exercising one of its core powers, and where there is no constitutional objection to the laws it has made.18
C. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Preliminary Injunctive Relief
The Court’s order granting in part Plaintiffs’ motions for a TRO described evidence of the immense irreparable harm to businesses and organizations across the country, which has, at least to date, gone unrebutted by Defendants. AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *2–4. As the Court explained, this included immense financial harm to Plaintiffs and, in many cases, forced them to significantly cut down on staff or otherwise reduce core operations. A few examples are illustrative:
• One plaintiff, a large investigative journalism organization, has USAID and State Department grants that constitute 38% of its budget, supporting investigations into corruption, sanction violations, and other wrongdoing. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 13-4 ¶¶ 2, 6–7, 9. Due to the suspension of appropriated funding and stop-work orders received as a result, the organization has been forced to cut 43 of 199 staff members, with most remaining being moved to a shorter work week. Id. ¶ 12. The organization has had to cancel events, cut travel for reporting, and freeze new equipment purchases. Id. The organization attests that the disruption will continue absent relief. Id. ¶ 13.
• A nonprofit plaintiff focused on protecting refugees and asylum seekers has had to lay off 535 staff members since receiving termination and suspension notices for multiple grants. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-3 ¶¶ 3–4, 13. It has been forced to shutter program offices and defer payments to vendors. Id. ¶ 21.
• A plaintiff representing small businesses across all sectors attests that the suspension included USAID failing to pay its members for months of unpaid invoices. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 8. This has forced small businesses to furlough “most U.S. national staff in home offices and on contracts, and terminate foreign national staff or risk keeping them and being uncertain of payments under stop work orders.” Id. ¶ 10.
• Another plaintiff focused on addressing the global HIV/AIDS epidemic has already been forced to lay off seven employees and will lay off ten more over the next month if the suspension of appropriated foreign aid continues. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 12.
In addition, several plaintiffs had attested to how the blanket suspension of funds undermined their core missions and jeopardized vital services to vulnerable populations. For example:
• One plaintiff asserts that the suspension of appropriated foreign aid has disrupted critical health programs, including maternal and child health programs and infectious disease prevention efforts administered by its member organizations. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-1 ¶ 8. One of those member organizations reports that a $20 million project to support the development of hospital accreditation in Cambodia has been suspended. Id. ¶ 8(a). Another reports that a stop-work order has disrupted a total of $4 million in funding for American Schools and Hospitals Abroad grants in Nepal and Vietnam. Id. ¶ 8(c). And another reports that the freeze has delayed several time-sensitive antimalaria campaigns that are expected to benefit millions of people in Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Id. ¶ 8(d). The plaintiff attests that the suspension of appropriated foreign aid funding “is an existential threat to [its] members and their life-saving work.” Id. ¶ 11.
• Another plaintiff reports that it can no longer fund shelters for minors in Central America trying to escape recruitment into criminal gangs. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-7 ¶ 10.
• A different plaintiff explains that it has abruptly stopped providing medical services for hundreds of adolescents and young students in need in Bangladesh. Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-8 ¶ 12(a).
• An additional plaintiff that supports HIV prevention research and the rollout of HIV prevention medication to high-risk communities in various African countries asserts that the funding freeze has disrupted clinical trials and the rollout of life-saving medication. AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 13-2 ¶¶ 3–4, 11.
Based on this evidence, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had made a sufficient preliminary showing that Defendants’ actions “threaten[ed] the very existence of [their] business.” Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). And they had likewise shown that the “obstacles” created by Defendants’ conduct “make it more difficult for the [plaintiffs] to accomplish their primary mission.” League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016).19
Over the weeks that have followed, Plaintiffs have continued to produce more evidence of irreparable harm. A supplemental declaration from one plaintiff, for example, explains that the funding freeze has impacted its ability to meet financial obligations, which has in turn placed staff at risk of harassment, intimidation, and potential physical harm. Glob. Health, ECF No. 46-2 ¶ 2. Personnel have also been stranded in high-risk environments due to insufficient repatriation funding. Id. ¶ 3. And the loss of funding has forced security cutbacks, jeopardizing sensitive equipment and program-related data. Id. ¶ 6. As of February 26, the same plaintiff had furloughed around two-thirds of its U.S.-based workforce because of the funding freeze. Glob. Health, ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 32. Another plaintiff reiterated that, unless it received the funds owed by USAID, it would be forced to make another round of furloughs within about two weeks, reducing a staff of more than 250 to as few as ten. Glob. Health, ECF No. 29-4 ¶ 7.
Several declarations from the Global Health Plaintiffs further illustrate the ongoing irreparable harm:
• One plaintiff attests that if USAID does not pay outstanding invoices forthwith, the plaintiff will be in serious legal jeopardy in both the United States and other countries. Glob. Health, ECF No. 36-1 ¶ 7. The plaintiff will be forced to default on numerous contracts, including for corporate insurance and legal services—all while it is facing threatened legal action from staff members because it does not have funds to pay employees. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. And the risks to the plaintiff “are worsening by the day,” as it faces an increased likelihood of not being able to repatriate staff members, pay local legal counsel, or meet obligations to local communities. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15–17.
• Another plaintiff explains that it has been forced to furlough an additional 124 staff members since the TRO was issued because it still has not received any payments. Glob. Health, ECF No. 36-2 ¶¶ 3, 5. Organizational staff and their families “are suffering ongoing financial hardship that worsens with each passing day of reduced or no compensation.” Id. ¶ 5. The plaintiff is in imminent danger of being forced to suspend thousands of staff members without pay, which could violate labor laws in countries where it operates. Id. ¶ 9.
• Still another declaration explains that without imminent payment, a small business focused on energy and infrastructure will be forced to close its doors due to insolvency and to walk away from active federal contracts. Glob. Health, ECF No. 36-3 ¶¶ 5–6.
• Likewise, another plaintiff planned to lay off “a substantial number of its workforce” due to the lack of funding and will have to shutter its doors in all but five to seven of its twenty-four country offices. Glob. Health, ECF No. 36-4 ¶¶ 4, 6.
Defendants do not rebut these existential threats to the survival and core missions of businesses and organizations around the country. They respond that there is no irreparable harm because there is an ongoing, individualized review process that “could prevent the harm from transpiring at all.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 39. And they insist that any damage to Plaintiffs and other enterprises is recoverable. Id. at 40–42. Defendants’ point is well taken in one respect—the Court has found that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on this record as it relates to terminations resulting from Defendants’ subsequent review process. And, as discussed below, the Court’s relief must be tailored in that respect.
But Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive as it relates to irreparable harm. Defendants have now stated that they have completed their review process and have represented that they will cancel the vast majority of congressionally appropriated foreign aid. While it is true that the relevant Executive action here has the effect of withholding substantial amounts of funds, the harm here goes to the very subsistence of the organizations, many of which are on the brink of shuttering entirely, and poses an existential threat to the viability of their humanitarian missions. In fact, Defendants have not hesitated to cite the threat of insolvency to Plaintiffs as a justification for not making payments. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 25 (“[T]he plaintiffs have claimed that many grant recipients and contractual counterparties are insolvent or nearly so, raising the high likelihood that they will immediately spend any funds they receive—making it impossible for the Government to recover those funds as a practical matter.”). Defendants’ actions are, in effect, the massive disruption of a whole industry or sector, and Plaintiffs have made a strong showing that the harm is “both certain and great,” as well as “actual and not theoretical.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
D. The Balance Of The Equities And The Public Interest Favor Plaintiffs
The final two factors, balancing the equities and the public interest, generally “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009); see Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Here, they also weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 12. “To the contrary, there is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the harms that Plaintiffs have suffered—and will continue to suffer absent preliminary injunctive relief—are stark. Plaintiffs have adduced ample evidence that the funding freeze has had dire humanitarian consequences and has devastated businesses and programs across the country. Defendants still have made no effort to rebut that showing.
Defendants respond that they are undertaking a thorough review of foreign aid programs to determine which ones “make sense for the American people,” and they assert that the public has an interest “in the Executive effectuating foreign affairs.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 44–45 (citation omitted). But the Executive’s ability to review foreign aid programs is not at issue here. The Court’s TRO order explicitly declined to “enjoin any aspect of the Government’s ability to conduct a comprehensive internal review of government programs.” AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *6. Indeed, the Court has concluded above that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in challenging Defendants’ review process on this record. See supra section II.B.1.c. And while the public no doubt has an interest in the Executive carrying out his important role in foreign affairs, it also has an interest in ensuring those duties are carried out in accordance with law, including the APA, and with the role prescribed to Congress, also a democratically elected branch, under the Constitution. To the extent Defendants’ argument seeks more than that, it is merely a repackaging of their unbridled view of Executive foreign affairs power that has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra section II.B.2. In terms of the equities and the public interest, the Executive is equal to, not above, Congress and its laws. However, the scale tips in favor of Plaintiffs on these factors in light of their additional, unrebutted showing of enormous harm.
[Marc Elias] So let me start with something that I don't understand. So you got Article I of the Constitution, which is the Congress, and lays out Congress's power; and you got Article II, which lays out the Executive Branch's power; and you got Article III that lays out the Judicial branch. And I think the Founders had in mind that the most powerful of these branches would actually be the first, would be Article I, right? It would be Congress. And that it would jealously guard its authority -- particularly its ability to spend money, and its ability to issue taxes -- that it would jealously guard this power from a rapacious Executive. That does not seem to be happening. So what do you make of this? Either put on your Constitutional law hat, or put on your member of Congress hat, but what do you make of this?
[Jamie Raskin] Well, in one sense, this is a decades-long process of erosion of Congressional lawmaking power. But this is a dramatic and sudden jump into the unknown, with the President basically defying Congress in Congressional statutes and Appropriations at every turn. But to go back to the beginning, Marc, look, we had a revolution against a king, against a monarch. The first three words of the Constitution are, "We the people." And then, after you get through our beautiful Preamble, it leads right into the creation of Article I: "All legislative power is vested in the Congress of the United States." The sovereign power of the People to create the Constitution flows right into the Congressional power of lawmaking. And you know, Article I lays out everything, from regulating Commerce domestically and internationally, to the power to declare war, budgets, taxes, you name it. And even in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, all other powers necessary and proper to the execution of the forgoing powers, right?
Then you get to Article II. My colleague, Jim Jordan's, been running around TV saying that Article II says, in the first sentence, "All Executive power is vested in the President." Yeah, that's true, but what is the executive power, right? When you get past commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy in times of actual conflict, or when the militia's been mobilized, what's the core job of the President? "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." That's it. "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Articles of Confederation didn't even have a President, right? And then they thought that that was too inefficient, and there was nobody to keep things going to, you know, move the bureaucracy when Congress wasn't in town. And then the President was created, but very clearly in a secondary position. As Madison put it in the Federalist Papers, "The legislative branch is the predominant branch of government."
So sometimes my colleagues will get up, even Democrats will say, "We're three co-equal branches of government." And I just want to say, first of all, "co-equal" is not even a word, okay? You know, that's like extremely unique, or something like that. Secondly, the claim that we have three equal branches is just ridiculous. I mean, when you get to Article II, you've got four short sections. One section is all about how you impeach a President for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. If we're co-equal, or equal, or equivalent, or whatever, why do we have the power to impeach and try and convict a President, and he doesn't have the power to impeach and try and convict us? The framers were clearly a lot more afraid of a President purporting to be a King, or arrogating the powers of a dictator, than it was afraid of Congress; all of the people, coming from this great huge, vast, diverse country, from different points of views, and working together, and split between the House and the Senate with bicameralism. ...
It's like, you know, pouring your tea from the cup into the saucer so it can cool off a little bit, right? And the Senate is supposed to allow the passions and tempers of the House of Representatives to cool off a little bit. But in any event, Congress is the lawmaking branch. We also have the power of the purse. We've got the power to spend, right? And you know this Marc, an Appropriations Act is just another federal law. It's like a law against assaulting Federal officers. And they should show more respect for both the law against assaulting Federal officers, and for an Appropriations Act. An Appropriations Act is not a budgetary recommendation, or a point of negotiation, or a bargaining chip with the President. It's a law you follow. The law "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." So do your job, yeah?
“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 579 (2017). The court “need not grant the total relief sought by the applicant but may mold its decree to meet the exigencies of the particular case.” Id. at 580 (citation omitted). As it did at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court emphasizes that the scope of the injunctive relief should be tailored to the particular claims that are likely to succeed and the particular showings made as to the other factors.
As described above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their APA claims challenging the agency directives that implemented the blanket suspension of congressionally appropriated aid, but they are not likely to succeed as to the review and large-scale terminations that occurred in the process that took place after February 13, 2025. The Court accordingly finds it proper to preliminarily enjoin the parts of those directives, and the actions taken pursuant to them, to implement the freeze between January 20, 2025, and February 13, 2025. However, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request to preliminarily enjoin or invalidate the subsequent review process or the mass terminations that resulted from it. [!]20 The Court also finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their constitutional claims that Defendants’ withholding of congressionally appropriated foreign aid funds violates the separation of powers. Again, however, the relief must be properly tailored.
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ proposed relief is overbroad in two additional respects as to their APA claims and one as to their constitutional claims. First, Plaintiffs propose relief that goes beyond the implementing directives they challenged in their APA claims, such as specifically enjoining Defendants from “terminating, furloughing, or placing personnel on administrative leave” and ordering them to “restore the status quo as it existed before January 20, 2025,” including by “restoring technical systems” and restoring prior processes to approve payments. Glob. Health, ECF No. 46-6 at 2–4. The Court finds that dictating operational decisions would go beyond the proper relief. While the Court has expressed concern about the length of time before Defendants took action to comply with the TRO, Defendants have since represented that they will adjust staffing levels as needed to comply with the Court’s order and have taken at least some steps to do so. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 125–26.
Second, and relatedly, the Court cannot adopt Plaintiffs’ proposal that Defendants achieve “payment processing rates equivalent to those achieved before January 20, 2025.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 46-6 at 3. In denying Defendants’ application to vacate this Court’s order enforcing its TRO, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for “due regard for the feasibility of any compliance timelines.” AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 698083. While that direction was given in the context of the TRO, it applies equally to the preliminary injunction. This Court has since invited both written and oral submissions on the issue of feasibility. During its hearing concerning feasibility, the Court sought the parties’ views on creating a clear and feasible benchmark as it relates specifically to the remaining funds to be disbursed at the TRO phase. Given that the parties frequently articulated their respective arguments in terms of the number of payments processed, the Court proposed that metric and invited the parties’ submissions, including requesting data from the parties on what number of payments processed per day would be feasible (or range of payments processed, to the extent not all payments are created equal).
The parties agree that, as of the time of the appeal, there were roughly 2,000 outstanding payments to be processed by USAID, along with additional payments to be processed by State. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 131–33. They also agree that both USAID and State could previously “process several thousand payments each day.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 15. As a benchmark of the current state, Defendants have submitted that after the Supreme Court lifted its administrative stay, they were able to create the capacity to process about 100 payments over one night. Glob. Health, ECF No. 54 at 2. In light of these benchmarks, the Court found it feasible for Defendants to process roughly 1,200 payments to Plaintiffs over the course of a four-day period, or roughly 300 payments per day. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 53 at 1 (stating that Global Health Plaintiffs have around 1,200 outstanding invoices). Although the Court has invited submissions and discussions related to feasibility, there has not been any specific objection to this rate. The Court accordingly finds it appropriate and feasible to order Defendants to continue to process payments at a rate of approximately 300 per day. Although this is a small fraction of the rate at which payments were processed in a single day before January 20, 2025, it nonetheless allows for Defendants to come into compliance within a relatively short period, at a demonstrated level of current capability. The Court may revisit this benchmark if Defendants make a specific showing of legitimate feasibility concerns.
As to the separation of powers claims, Plaintiffs’ proposed relief is overbroad insofar as it would specifically order Defendants to continue to contract with them. As discussed, the violation here results from the Executive’s decision to unlawfully impound funds appropriated by Congress for specific foreign aid purposes. To be sure, Plaintiffs observe that they occupy a large share of the sector serving the relevant foreign aid purposes, as demonstrated by the severe harm they have faced as a result of the disruption to the sector, and accordingly it may well be that the only or most practical way for Defendants to carry out their duty to spend the funds is to revive existing partnerships, as Plaintiffs suggest. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 47–48. However, the separation of powers dictates only that the Executive follow Congress’s decision to spend funds, and both the Constitution and Congress’s laws have traditionally afforded the Executive discretion on how to spend within the constraints set by Congress. The appropriate remedy is accordingly to order Defendants to “make available for obligation the full amount of funds Congress appropriated” under the relevant laws. See City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449, 1460 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 260 (granting mandamus relief and concluding that agency could not “decline to spend previously appropriated funds” toward specified purpose).21
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction. Consistent with this opinion, it is hereby ORDERED:
• Defendants Marco Rubio, Peter Marocco, Russell Vought, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of Management and Budget (the “Restrained Defendants”) and their agents are enjoined from enforcing or giving effect to sections 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of the January 24 State Department memorandum, and any other directives that implement sections 3(a) and 3(c) of Executive Order No. 14169, by giving effect to any terminations, suspensions, or stop-work orders issued between January 20, 2025, and February 13, 2025, for any grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts for foreign assistance. Accordingly, the Restrained Defendants shall not withhold payments or letter of credit drawdowns for work completed prior to February 13, 2025.
• The Restrained Defendants are enjoined from unlawfully impounding congressionally appropriated foreign aid funds and shall make available for obligation the full amount of funds that Congress appropriated for foreign assistance programs in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024.
It is further ORDERED that the Restrained Defendants shall take all steps necessary to effectuate this order and shall provide written notice of this order to all recipients of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for foreign assistance that were in existence between January 20, 2025, and February 13, 2025. The parties shall file a joint status report by March 14, 2025, that apprises the Court of Defendants’ compliance with this order and proposes a schedule for next steps in this matter. The Court is prepared to hold a prompt hearing at the request of the parties to address any feasibility concerns. The February 13 temporary restraining order issued by the Court is hereby dissolved.
SO ORDERED.
AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge
Date: March 10, 2025
_______________
1 The parties filed notices of related cases that included National Council of Nonprofits v. Office of Management and Budget, No. 25-cv-00239-LLA (D.D.C.), and American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump, No. 25-cv-00352-CJN (D.D.C.). The judges assigned to those cases determined that the present cases were not sufficiently related, and the cases were submitted for random assignment. See AIDS Vaccine, ECF No. 12; Am. Fed’n, ECF No. 32.
2 Some courts have employed a “sliding scale” approach to the preliminary injunction factors, particularly before the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter. See Nat’l Council of Nonprofits v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-239, 2025 WL 368852, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2025) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The Court’s analysis here does not depend on the sliding scale method and arrives at the same place when each prong is evaluated as “an independent, free-standing requirement.” Sherley, 644 F.3d at 393 (citation omitted).
3 In seeking preliminary relief, a plaintiff generally need only show a substantial likelihood of standing. See, e.g., Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 928 F.3d 95, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiffs’ standing is plain.
4 Defendants separately challenge whether two plaintiffs have established associational or organizational standing. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 19–21. The Court “need only find one party with standing.” Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And, in any event, the associations have standing. Their members would likely have standing because they have been harmed by the challenged actions, see Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 7-1, 7-2; the interests that the associations seek to protect are “germane” to their organizational purposes, see Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 7-1 ¶ 3, 7-2 ¶ 2 (describing organizational purposes of “identifying priority world health problems and reporting on them to the U.S. public, legislators, international and domestic government agencies, academic institutions, and the world health community” and “promot[ing] the meaningful utilization of U.S. small businesses at U.S government agencies providing foreign assistance”); and, because the relief sought is “invalidation of agency action,” the claims do not require consideration of individual members’ circumstances. Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 596–97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
5 Defendants have also filed a sur-reply suggesting that the case is moot in light of their subsequent review and decisions to terminate Plaintiffs’ contracts and grants. Glob. Health, ECF No. 48-1 at 3–5. This argument is not persuasive. Plaintiffs ask the Court to vacate or set aside the agency action that led to the blanket suspension of funds. Granting such vacatur would have the effect of remedying, at least in part, the injuries that give Plaintiffs standing to sue in the first place. While this may not make Plaintiffs whole, it is not a circumstance where it is “impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief.” Id. at 3 (quoting Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 411 F.3d 225, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). As discussed below, however, Defendants’ subsequent review and decisions to terminate do constitute distinct agency action, which Plaintiffs have not challenged. See infra section II.B.1.c.
6 As Defendants acknowledged at the preliminary injunction hearing, this argument applies only to Plaintiffs’ APA claims and does not bear on their constitutional claims. Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 87.
7 As Plaintiffs point out, the record also suggests they have subawards and cooperative agreements that do not fall under the CDA or Tucker Act. See, e.g., Glob. Health, ECF Nos. 7-3 ¶ 8, 7-5 ¶¶ 4–5. Defendants seem to concede that not all of Plaintiffs’ awards are contracts subject to those statutes. See Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 14 (accepting that “some Plaintiffs may have award documents that are not procurement contracts” and only “some of the claims may proceed under the Tucker Act” (emphasis omitted)); see also U.S. Enrichment Corp. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 548, 553 (2014) (recognizing that “[s]ubcontractors and other third parties are generally not permitted to raise claims directly against the government”); Am. Near E. Refugee Aid v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 703 F. Supp. 3d 126, 134 (D.D.C. 2023) (rejecting application of Tucker Act to USAID cooperative agreement). Thus, even assuming Plaintiffs have some agreements that qualify as contracts within the CDA or Tucker Act, they also have agreements that would lack those alternative avenues and fall within the APA. Cf. Ams. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 440 (denying jurisdictional challenge where court found that at least one named petitioner had standing).
8 In opposing a TRO, Defendants contended that because the President is not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA, an agency’s actions implementing presidential directives are also free from APA review. The Court rejected that argument, finding that Defendants did not ground their argument in the text of the APA, which specifically defines “agency” to include “each authority of the Government of the United States,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), and that Defendants failed to meaningfully define the bounds of their argument. AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *5. To the extent Defendants renew that argument at the preliminary injunction stage, they do not develop it any further, and the Court rejects it for the same reasons stated in the TRO. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 30–31; see also Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]hat the Secretary’s regulations are based on the President’s Executive Order hardly seems to insulate them from judicial review under the APA, even if the validity of the Order were thereby drawn into question.”).
Defendants also argue in passing that their directives to suspend aid are not sufficiently circumscribed and discrete agency actions to be challenged under the APA, citing cases where plaintiffs sought “wholesale improvement” of an agency’s programs. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 31–32 (citing Ala.-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. United States, 757 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2014)). But the agency directives Plaintiffs challenge are precisely the sort of “agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” that the APA explicitly includes and is routinely applied to. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4); cf. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 893–94 (1990) (noting that while challenges seeking “wholesale correction” of an entire program are not proper under the APA, judicial intervention, where appropriate, still “may ultimately have the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of regulations, or even a whole ‘program’ to be revised by the agency in order to avoid the unlawful result that the court discerns”).
9 Defendants attempt to hollow out arbitrary and capricious review with various arguments. For example, they say that rather than ask whether Defendants considered reliance interests, the Court can merely infer from Defendants’ silence that they “exercised their discretion to determine that it would not be possible to consider the consequences of various approaches in the absence of a temporary pause.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 38. In the alternative, they argue that an agency need not articulate a rationale for its action “beyond simple compliance with the President’s directives.” Id. at 37–38. These arguments conflict with the APA’s mandate and, as already noted, would dramatically and impermissibly cabin judicial review under the APA. See supra n.8.
10 Examples of these notices in the record simply state that programs were suspended “[c]onsistent with the President’s Executive Order” or terminated because the award “no longer effectuates agency priorities and is terminated in accordance with the U.S. Department of State Standard Terms and Conditions and 2 CFR 200.340.” E.g., Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-4 at 2, 5.
11 To be sure, Plaintiffs may be able to formulate some new challenge to Defendants’ process leading to these later terminations, whether in an APA claim premised on the relevant action or a contractual challenge based on the terms of individual awards. The Court expresses no view as to the proper forum for such challenges or whether they might have merit; the point is that they are distinct from the challenge Plaintiffs currently advance.
12 Plaintiffs’ other APA claims, that Defendants acted contrary to law, must also be premised on “agency action,” 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2), and therefore do not afford any relief distinct from Plaintiffs’ arbitrary and capricious claims. The contrary-to-law claims are likely to succeed insofar as they concern Defendants’ initial directives and actions implementing the Executive Order, for the same reasons Plaintiffs’ separation of powers claims (addressed in the next section) are likely to succeed. The contrary-to-law claims are unlikely to succeed as to the review process and terminations after February 13, 2025, for the same reasons just articulated in this section.
13 When asked to identify anything in the record indicating “an intention to spend the amount that’s been sidelined by terminating the large majority of agreements,” Defendants’ counsel stated that he was “not familiar with somewhere in the record that there is.” Glob. Health, ECF No. 58 at 100–01. Although Defendants requested and were granted the opportunity to “send [the Court] a letter after the hearing,” they did not do so. Id. at 101.
14 Defendants also do not respond to Plaintiffs’ argument that they have violated the Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits officials from establishing a “reserve” except in specific circumstances (which Defendants do not claim are present here). See 31 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1).
15 Plaintiffs observe that even before the Impoundment Control Act took effect, the Supreme Court recognized that the Executive was not free to override Congress’s spending power by making the unilateral decision to allot “less than the entire amounts authorized to be appropriated.” Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975).
16 In analyzing the President’s authority to impound in the context of domestic spending, some have noted the possibility that unique problems could arise in conflicts between spending mandates and a foreign policy question “confided by the Constitution to [the President’s] substantive direction and control.” Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally Impacted Schools, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 303, 311 (Dec. 1, 1969); see John G. Roberts, Jr., Memorandum for Fred F. Fielding Re: Impoundment Authority at 2 (Aug. 15, 1985) (“Roberts Memorandum”). But even in the context of foreign affairs, a problem arises only “if spending would conflict with a constitutional obligation vested in the President.” Roberts Memorandum at 2. Defendants have not articulated their argument with remotely sufficient shape to give rise to such a problem—they do not ground the authority to impound here in any particular “constitutional obligation vested in the President”; they do not articulate any bounds to the authority; and they have not raised any challenge to the constitutionality of the governing statutes, as applied or otherwise, including the appropriations act and Impoundment Control Act.
17 Defendants offer some arguments in passing that there is no avenue to relief even if they are in violation of valid statutes expressing Congress’s spending power. First, they say this makes Plaintiffs’ claims “purely statutory” and therefore not cognizable as constitutional claims, citing Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 23. But Dalton “merely stands for the proposition that when a statute entrusts a discrete specific decision to the President and contains no limitations on the President’s exercise of that authority, judicial review of an abuse of discretion claim is not available.” Chamber of Com., 74 F.3d at 1331. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs assert that the Executive has attempted to usurp Congress’s power over the purse in violation of the separation of powers, and there is no asserted or plausible argument that the President is simply exercising discretionary authority conferred by statute. Nor do Defendants explain how this argument can be squared with then-Judge Kavanaugh’s decision issuing mandamus relief in Aiken County. See 725 F.3d at 267.
Defendants also claim that violation of the Impoundment Control Act cannot be a basis for finding action contrary to law under the APA because the Impoundment Control Act allows for enforcement by the Comptroller General. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 35. This argument is limited to Plaintiffs’ contrary-to-law APA claims, see supra n.12, and lacks merit. The APA, by its terms, applies unless another statute “preclude[s] judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). And as the D.C. Circuit has observed, any such preclusion must have “sufficient clarity to overcome the strong presumption in favor of judicial review.” Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv. v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 15, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 590 U.S. 45, 53 (2020)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 594 U.S. 338 (2021).
Finally, Defendants argue that the AIDS Vaccine Plaintiffs’ separate claim under the Take Care Clause cannot be a basis for affirmative relief. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 26. However, the Court need not reach that claim or argument since it concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their separation of powers claims.
18 The Court notes that, for similar reasons, Plaintiffs would be likely to succeed on their claim that Defendants acted ultra vires. Glob. Health, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 129–31. “When an executive acts ultra vires”—meaning beyond the scope of his power—“courts are normally available to reestablish the limits on his authority.” Chamber of Com., 74 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Defendants do not identify any authority, statutory or otherwise, that would authorize this sort of vast cancelation of congressionally appropriated aid. Even if they did, Defendants do not dispute that they would be in the territory of having to show “clear congressional authorization” based on the “vast economic and political significance” of these actions. See West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 716, 723 (2022) (citations omitted). Needless to say, canceling billions of dollars in congressionally appropriated funds is “no everyday exercise of federal power.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
19 The Court also noted that Plaintiffs’ evidence showed severe harm to their “goodwill, reputation, and relationships with employees, partners, subcontractors, foreign governments, and other stakeholders.” AIDS Vaccine, 2025 WL 485324, at *3 n.2 (quoting Glob. Health, ECF No. 4 at 23). This included concrete examples such as having to violate contractual duties by deferring payments to suppliers, vendors, and landlords, Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-6 ¶¶ 10, 15; disruptions to relationships with longstanding partners whose trust had been cultivated over decades, id.; and having to go back on previous assurances made to clients and partners in reliance on the agreements that have now been canceled, Glob. Health, ECF No. 7-9 ¶ 21. See Armour & Co. v. Freeman, 304 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that irreparable harm was apparent where defendant’s conduct “could not fail to damage [plaintiff’s] good name”); Atlas Air, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 280 F. Supp. 3d 59, 103 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Injury to reputation can, at least at times, rise to the level necessary to support the issuance of an injunction.”); Xiaomi Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., No. 21-cv-280, 2021 WL 950144, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021) (collecting cases).
20 The Court notes that Defendants have preserved the government’s frequent argument that relief under the APA should apply only to the particular plaintiffs before the Court. As the Court observed at the preliminary injunction hearing, this argument has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court. Cf. Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 831 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“When a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
21 Defendants request that the Court stay any order issuing a preliminary injunction for a short time while they decide whether to appeal. Glob. Health, ECF No. 34 at 45. That request is denied as premature. If, after reviewing this opinion and order, Defendants decide to pursue an appeal, they may move for a stay pending appeal and the Court will consider it in the ordinary course.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
STATE OF NEW YORK; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSSETTS; STATE OF HAWAIʻI; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL DANA NESSEL FOR THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; and STATE OF WISCONSIN;
Plaintiffs,
v.
LINDA McMAHON, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; and DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States;
Defendants.
Case 1:25-cv-10601
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
1. The Department of Education is essential. Plaintiff States rely on the Department for an extraordinary array of programs. The Department provides funds for low-income children and students with disabilities. It enforces the laws that prohibit discrimination in education. It administers federal student aid programs. These are just some of the key ways the congressional acts governing the existence and responsibilities of the Department are deeply intertwined with the education systems in Plaintiff States. Incredibly, all of these significant and statutorily-mandated functions were covered by a lean staff of only 4,133 people—until March 11, when the Department of Education announced through a press release that it is reducing that staff by 50%. U.S. Department of Education Initiates Reduction in Force, Press Release, Department of Education (Mar. 11, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-rel ... initiates- reduction-force (“March 11 Press Release”). This massive reduction in force (RIF) is equivalent to incapacitating key, statutorily-mandated functions of the Department, causing immense damage to Plaintiff States and their educational systems.
2. Although the Department’s March 11 Press Release says that the Department “will continue to deliver on all statutory programs that fall under the agency’s purview,” id., that assertion is easily belied by the extent and effect of the RIF. So too is the assertion from Secretary McMahon, later on March 11, that the terminations were the “first step” on the road to a “total shutdown” of the Department. Filip Timotija, Education Secretary: Mass layoffs First Step Toward Total Shutdown, The Hill (Mar. 12, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/education/5190161- linda-mcmahon-education-department-mass-layoffs.
3. Far from being just a “first step,” the lay-offs are an effective dismantling of the Department. Based on figures provided in the March 11 Press Release, the announced RIF displaces approximately 1,378 employees, all of whom “will be placed on administrative leave” beginning on March 21. March 11 Press Release. These employees join around 600 others who took earlier buy-out offers. Id. The press release states that “[a]fter today’s actions, the Department’s workforce will total roughly 2,183 workers,” an approximately 50% cut from the 4,133 workers the Department of Education had “[w]hen President Trump was inaugurated.” Id.
4. The RIF is so severe and extreme that it incapacitates components of the Department responsible for performing functions mandated by statute, effectively nullifying those mandates. For example, seven regional offices of the Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR)—including those in New York, Boston, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Chicago—have been closed down entirely. Juan Perez, Jr. & Rebecca Carballo, Education Department Documents Detail Massive Scope of Agency Worker Terminations, Politico (Mar. 12, 2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/1 ... ncyworker- terminations-00226222.
5. This massive RIF is not supported by any actual reasoning or specific determinations about how to eliminate purported waste in the Department—rather, the RIF is part and parcel of President Trump’s and Secretary McMahon’s opposition to the Department of Education’s entire existence. The Administration’s goal of eliminating the Department of Education by any means necessary has been plainly and repeatedly stated: President Trump called the Department “a big con job” and declared that he would “like to close it immediately.” Michael C. Bender, Trump Is Said to Be Preparing Order That Aims to Eliminate Education Dept., The New York Times (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/p ... education- department-executive-order.html. He also stated that he would like Secretary McMahon to put herself “out of a job.” Zachary B. Wolf, Trump and Musk are moving to smother these three pieces of the government, CNN (Feb. 5, 2025). Secretary McMahon has affirmed that “President Trump believes that the bureaucracy in Washington should be abolished so that we can return education to the states, where it belongs,” and that she “wholeheartedly support[s] and agree[s] with this mission.” Lexi Lonas Cochran, McMahon says she ‘wholeheartedly’ agrees with Trump plan to abolish Education Department, The Hill (Feb. 25, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/education/ ... menttrump/. On March 3, 2025, Secretary McMahon asked employees to join her in “perform[ing] one final, unforgettable public service to future generations of students” by dismantling the Department of Education. Secretary McMahon: Our Department’s Final Mission, U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/F7BT-MQ3D. On the evening of March 11, Secretary McMahon stated that “the President’s mandate,” his “directive to me, clearly, is to shut down the Department of Education.” See Timotija, Education Secretary, cited supra ¶ 2.
6. But the Trump Administration cannot dismantle the Department of Education. It cannot override—whether through large-scale RIFs or otherwise—the statutory framework prescribing the Department’s responsibilities. As the Supreme Court put it nearly a century ago, “[t]o Congress under its legislative power is given the establishment of offices [and] the determination of their functions and jurisdiction.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926). And, thus, administrative agencies “are creatures of statute.” Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022).
7. Past attempts to eliminate the Department of Education have reflected these limitations on executive power. President Reagan sought legislation to dismantle the Department of Education, which Congress did not pass. See Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union (Jan. 26, 1982) (“The budget plan I submit to you . . . will realize major savings by dismantling the Departments of Energy and Education.”), available at https://nationalcenter.org/ncppr/2001/1 ... the-union- 1982. Since then, numerous bills have been introduced to shutter the Department of Education. See Mona Vakilifathi, Why Trump is Trying to Reduce the Status of the Department of Education, Brookings Inst. (July 16, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why- ... -toreduce- the-status-of-the-department-of-education. Each of these efforts reflects the uncontroversial understanding that only Congress may abolish an agency it created.
8. And while Congress has granted the Secretary of Education—though not the President—the authority to modestly restructure the Department of Education, she is expressly limited to “allocat[ing] or reallocat[ing] functions among the officers of the Department” or modifying “organizational entities within the Department as may be necessary or appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 3473(a). She is not permitted to eliminate or disrupt functions required by statute, nor can she transfer the Department’s responsibilities to another agency outside of its statutory authorization. Id.
9. Because neither the President nor his agencies can undo the many acts of Congress that authorize the Department, dictate its responsibilities, and appropriate funds for it to administer, the President’s directive to eliminate the Department of Education (“Directive”)—including through the March 11 decimation of the Department’s workforce and any other agency implementation—is an unlawful violation of the separation of powers, and the Executive’s obligation to take care that the law be faithfully executed.
10. The Department’s implementation of the Directive, including through the March 11 RIF, is separately unlawful because it violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It is arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to law.
11. For these reasons, Plaintiff States seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the Directive and any implementation of it by Secretary McMahon and the Department of Education, including the March 11 RIF.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (action arising under the laws of the United States). Jurisdiction is also proper under the judicial review provisions of the APA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. An actual controversy exists between the parties within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and this Court may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and other relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 705, 706.
13. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this district, and Defendants are United States agencies or officers acting in their official capacities.
PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
14. Plaintiff State of New York is a sovereign state of the United States of America. As a body politic and a sovereign entity, it brings this action on behalf of itself and as trustee, guardian, and representative of all residents, and political subdivisions of New York. Attorney General Letitia James is the chief law enforcement officer for New York.
15. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a sovereign commonwealth in the United States of America. Massachusetts is represented by Attorney General Andrea Campbell, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Massachusetts.
16. Plaintiff State of Hawai’i, represented by and through Attorney General Anne E. Lopez, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is Hawai’i’s chief legal officer and chief law enforcement officer and is authorized by Hawaii Revised Statutes § 28-1 to pursue this action.
17. Plaintiff State of California is a sovereign state in the United States of America. California is represented by Attorney General Rob Bonta, who is the chief law enforcement officer of California.
18. Plaintiff State of Arizona, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Arizona is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Kristin K. Mayes. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-192(A). Attorney General Mayes is authorized to pursue this action on behalf of the State of Arizona. Id.
19. Plaintiff State of Colorado is a sovereign state in the United States of America. Colorado is represented by and through its Attorney General Phil Weiser. The Attorney General acts as the chief legal representative of the state and is authorized by Colo Rev. Stat. § 24-31-101 to pursue this action.
20. Plaintiff State of Connecticut is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Connecticut is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General William Tong, who is authorized under General Statutes § 3-125 to pursue this action on behalf of the State of Connecticut.
21. Plaintiff State of Delaware, represented by and through its Attorney General, Kathleen Jennings, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is Delaware’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 2504.
22. Plaintiff District of Columbia is a municipal corporation organized under the Constitution of the United States. It is empowered to sue and be sued, and it is the local government for the territory constituting the permanent seat of the federal government. The District is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General Brian L. Schwalb. The Attorney General has general charge and conduct of all legal business of the District and all suits initiated by and against the District and is responsible for upholding the public interest. D.C. Code. § 1-301.81.
23. Plaintiff State of Illinois is a sovereign state in the United States of America. Illinois is represented by Attorney General Kwame Raoul, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Illinois.
24. Plaintiff State of Maine is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Maine is represented by its Attorney General, who is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to 5 Me. Rev. Stat. § 191.
25. Plaintiff State of Maryland is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Maryland is represented by Attorney General Anthony G. Brown, who is the chief legal officer of Maryland.
26. Plaintiff the People of the State of Michigan is represented by Attorney General Dana Nessel. The Attorney General is Michigan’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized to bring this action on behalf of the People of the State of Michigan pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 14.28.
27. Plaintiff State of Minnesota is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Minnesota is represented by Attorney General Keith Ellison, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Minnesota.
28. Plaintiff State of Nevada is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Nevada is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General Aaron D. Ford. The Attorney General has the authority to file this suit to protect and secure the interests of the State. NRS 228.170.
29. Plaintiff State of New Jersey is a sovereign state in the United States of America. New Jersey is represented by Attorney General Matthew Platkin, who is the chief law enforcement officer of New Jersey.
30. Plaintiff State of Oregon is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Oregon is represented by Attorney General Dan Rayfield, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Oregon.
31. Plaintiff State of Rhode Island is a sovereign state in the United States of America. Rhode Island is represented by Attorney General Peter F. Neronha, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Rhode Island.
32. Plaintiff State of Vermont is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Vermont is represented by its Attorney General, who is the State’s chief legal officer and authorized to pursue this action on behalf of the State. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 159.
33. Plaintiff State of Washington, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is Washington’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized under Wash. Rev. Code § 43.10.030 to pursue this action.
34. Plaintiff State of Wisconsin is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Wisconsin is represented by Attorney General Josh Kaul, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Wisconsin.
B. Defendants
35. Defendant Linda McMahon is the Secretary of the United States Department of Education and that agency’s highest ranking official. She is charged with the supervision and management of all decisions and actions of the agency. She is sued in her official capacity. 20 U.S.C. § 3412.
36. Defendant the United States Department of Education is a cabinet agency within the executive branch of the United States government that has been created by Congress. 20 U.S.C. § 3411. Defendants United States Department of Education and Linda McMahon are jointly referred to as “Agency Defendants.”
37. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the President of the United States. He is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by Plaintiffs in this action and is sued in his official capacity.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Executive Has No Authority to Incapacitate a Congressionally Created Agency.
38. It is a bedrock constitutional principle that the President and his agencies cannot make law. Rather, they can only—and indeed, they must—implement the laws enacted by Congress, including those statutes that create federal agencies and dictate their duties. The Executive thus can neither outright abolish an agency nor incapacitate it by cutting away the personnel required to implement the agency’s statutorily-mandated duties.
39. Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution enumerates that: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in Congress.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1.
40. “The Framers viewed the legislative power as a special threat to individual liberty, so they divided that power to ensure that ‘differences of opinion’ and the ‘jarrings of parties’ would ‘promote deliberation and circumspection’ and ‘check excesses in the majority.’” Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 223 (2020) (quoting The Federalist No. 70, at 475 (A. Hamilton) and No. 51, at 350).
41. “As Chief Justice Marshall put it, this means that ‘important subjects . . . must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,’ even if Congress may leave the Executive ‘to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.’” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 737 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825)).
42. Congress has exclusive authority to abolish executive agencies, and either redistribute their functions to existing or newly created agencies, or to discontinue their functions. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, §§ 471, 441, and 451(b) (abolishing Immigration and Naturalization Service and transferring its functions to the newlycreated Department of Homeland Security); Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, Division G; 112 Stat. 2681 (abolishing several agencies and consolidating their functions within the Department of State, and creating USAID as an independent executive agency).
43. The Constitution vests executive power in the President. U.S. Const., art. II, § 1. The primary function of the President is understood to be cabined in the “Take Care” clause, which requires that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const., art. II, § 3. Nothing in Article II can be construed to authorize the Executive to dismantle a statutorily created agency directly or indirectly.
44. The Executive has no authority to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998). The Executive does not have, under the Constitution or otherwise, an undefined “inherent” power, even in “emergency” circumstances, to unilaterally decide to ignore statutes. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
45. Indeed, the Executive acts at the “lowest ebb” of his constitutional authority and power when he acts contrary to “the express or implied will of Congress.” Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
B. The Statutory Framework Authorizing the Department of Education.
46. In 1979, pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress established the Department of Education, and many of its offices, by statute with the enactment of the Department of Education Organization Act. That Act made express findings about the importance of the Department’s mission. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 669 (1979) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3510); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 3411–3427 (offices); id. §§ 3401–3402 (findings and purpose).
47. “[P]rimary responsibility for establishing policy and providing funding for elementary and secondary education rests with the states and instrumentalities therein,” but the Department of Education “has primary responsibility for administering federal elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education programs.” See Rebecca R. Skinner et al., A Summary of Federal Education Laws Administered by the U.S. Department of Education, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Dec. 12, 2024) (hereinafter, “the Skinner Report”).
48. Over time, Congress has enacted more statutes authorizing additional functions for the Department of Education and appropriating additional funds for it to administer. The major statutes administered by the Department (as detailed in the Skinner Report, see id.) include:
a. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The ESEA (Pub. L. 89-10, as amended) was enacted in 1965 and was last reauthorized in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) (Pub. L. 114-95). Title I-A, the largest ESEA program, provides compensatory grants to local educational agencies (LEAs). Congress appropriates funds for ESEA on an annual basis.
b. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In 1975, Congress enacted Pub. L. 94-142 (now known as the IDEA), which authorizes grant programs that support legally-mandated early intervention and special education services for children with disabilities from birth to age 21. The IDEA was last reauthorized in 2004 (Pub. L. 108-446). Over 90% of IDEA funds are appropriated for Part B (Section 611), which provides funding for special education services for school-aged children. The authorization of appropriations for Part B is permanent. Funds for Part C—which authorizes state grants for infants and toddlers with disabilities—and Part D—which authorizes national activities—have been appropriated on an annual basis.
c. Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The HEA (Pub. L. 89-329, as amended) was enacted in 1965. It was last comprehensively reauthorized by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA) (Pub. L. 110-315) and has since been amended multiple times. Title IV of the HEA authorizes a number of student aid programs that assist students with postsecondary education expenses. These include the Federal Pell Grant program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program, and the Federal Work-Study program. The HEA also authorizes programs providing federal support directly to institutions of higher education through Title III and Title V. HEA programs are funded through a combination of discretionary and mandatory appropriations. Mandatory funding for the Direct Loan program is permanently authorized, and mandatory funding for the Federal Pell Grant program is permanently appropriated. Funding continues to be appropriated for other HEA programs annually.
d. Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Pub. L. 93-112, as amended), the Department provides funds to support vocational rehabilitation services primarily through the State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program, which supports services to help individuals with disabilities. Congress continues to appropriate funding for the program annually.
e. Civil Rights Laws. The Department is also charged with enforcing various civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in all programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance (unless otherwise noted). These include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352, as amended); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Pub. L. 92-318, as amended); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Pub. L. 93-112, as amended); the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-135, as amended); and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-336, as amended).
f. Privacy Rights Laws. The Department also enforces laws that protect student privacy rights: (1) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); and (2) the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA).
49. Congress has granted the Secretary of Education limited discretion to reallocate functions within the Department, but that authority is modest, and in no way includes the power to eliminate statutorily-created functions. The Secretary is authorized to “allocate or reallocate functions among the officers of the Department, and to establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue such organizational entities within the Department as may be necessary or appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 3473(a). “[ b]ut the authority of the Secretary” under these provisions “does not extend to: (1) any office, bureau, unit, or other entity transferred to the Department and established by statute or any function vested by statute in such an entity or officer of such an entity, except as provided in subsection (b); (2) the abolition of organizational entities established by this chapter; or (3) the alteration of the delegation of functions to any specific organizational entity required by this chapter.” Id. By statute, there are fourteen offices and programs that may be “consolidate[d], alter[ed], or discontinue[d],” or have their “functions” “reallocate[d]” by the Secretary. Id. § 3473(b)(1). Even then, however, the Secretary must give the congressional committees of jurisdiction “a full and complete statement of the action proposed to be taken pursuant to this subsection and the facts and circumstances relied upon in support of such proposed action,” and then wait ninety days before acting. Id. § 4373(b)(2).
50. Thousands of employees have administered the many programs the Department is mandated to operate. Nothing in the numerous statutes creating the Department and describing its mandated functions can be construed as authorizing the Executive to gut an agency such that it can no longer meet its statutory obligations.
C. Requirements Governing RIFs.
51. The Department may engage in limited restructuring and downsizing of its workforce through a RIF, “an administrative procedure by which agencies eliminate jobs and reassign or separate employees who occupied the abolished positions.” James v. Von Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But the Department’s authority to administer RIFs does not override Congress’s exclusive authority to abolish executive agencies or to discontinue their functions. And an agency cannot use a RIF to unilaterally cease implementing the agency’s statutorily-mandated duties.
52. Consistent with those limits, any federal agency reducing staff pursuant to a RIF must follow specific statutory and regulatory procedures. These include following required retention preferences for employees. “[I]n any reduction in personnel in any civilian service of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings.” James, 284 F.3d at 1314–15; see also 5 U.S.C. § 3502(a).
53. All civilian employees in the executive branch of the federal government, including employees of the Department of Education, are covered by the Office of Personal Management’s (OPM) regulations regarding RIFs. 5 C.F.R. § 351.202(a). All agencies of the federal government are required to follow the OPM regulations “when the agency determines that a [RIF] is necessary.” 5 C.F.R. § 351.204.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
54. The Department of Education operates programs that touch on nearly every aspect and level of education. The Department’s elementary and secondary programs annually serve nearly 18,200 school districts and over 50 million students attending roughly 98,000 public schools and 32,000 private schools, while the Department’s higher education programs provide services and support to more than 12 million postsecondary students.
A. The Department of Education’s Support Across All Spectrums of Education.
55. The Department of Education is among the smallest federal agencies, yet it is charged with performing an immense breadth of work.
The Department’s Support for Birth-to-Grade 12 Educational Programs.
56. In federal fiscal year 2024, the Department directed 25.4% of its total spending to states and local governments. The federal government provides 13.6% of the funding for public K–12 education.
57. The two largest sources of federal funding for schools are Title I funding and IDEA funding. The Department of Education distributes over $18 billion under the Title I program to help support schools with high-poverty populations, providing benefits like extra staff to supplement reading instruction. The Department disburses over $15 billion in IDEA funding, which helps cover the costs of special education.
58. Public education funding varies significantly across states. K–12 schools in Alaska receive the most federal funding per pupil, followed by North Dakota. Utah and Kansas receive the least federal funding per pupil. New York and Massachusetts are among those that receive the least federal funding per pupil. Nevertheless, every state receives considerable federal funding and services from the Department.
59. The K–12 funding provided by the Department supports a wide variety of educational programs and needs: special education, including paying for assistive technology for students with disabilities; the payment of teacher salaries, and benefits, school counselors, and homeless liaisons; the professional development and salaries for special education teachers, paraprofessionals, and reading specialists; transportation to help children receive the services and programming they need; and physical therapy, speech therapy, and social workers.
60. For instance, Department of Education funding supports education of students with disabilities, both in public and private schools. Funding through IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1409, pays for a broad range of special education services required by individualized education programs (IEPs) for students with disabilities attending public schools. IDEA funding also helps school districts pay for the costs of placing students with disabilities who need out-of-district placements in special education schools and programs that can meet their needs. E.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.145– 300.146. IDEA also provides funding for equitable services for students with disabilities attending regular private schools. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130–300.138. IDEA funding helps support the cost of salaries of special education teachers and other service providers who provide direct instruction and services to students with disabilities, such as speech-language pathologists, reading specialists, physical and occupational therapists, audiologists, psychologists, behavioral therapists, deaf and hard of hearing instructors, and other service providers. IDEA funding also supports the cost of augmentative communication equipment and devices for students with disabilities with speech, language or communication impairments. IDEA also funds the costs of providing Extended School Year programs for students with disabilities who need continuous support outside of the academic year to help students maintain their academic, social, behavioral, and communication skills. IDEA funding also supports professional development activities for special education teachers and other service providers who work with students with disabilities to better meet the students’ needs. IDEA funding supports special education instruction and services to students with disabilities who are in institutional settings.
61. The Department of Education also administers grants for various disaster and emergency-related relief and preparations, through the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and the Department’s Disaster Recovery Unit.
62. Department of Education funding also supports early childhood education for children from birth through kindergarten. For instance, the Preschool Development Grant Birth through Five program is a $250 million competitive federal grant designed to improve states’ early childhood systems by building upon existing federal, state, and local early care and learning investments.
The Department’s Role in Providing Administrative and Substantive Services for Birth-to-Grade 12 Education.
63. The Department of Education’s statutory mission includes promoting “improvements in the quality and usefulness of education through federally supported research, evaluation and sharing of information.” 20 U.S.C. § 3402(4).
64. To that end, the Department of Education gathers data, identifies best practices in pedagogy, and disseminates that research to educators and others. The Department also operates several National Centers housed within the Institute of Education Sciences, all of which conduct research, collect and analyze data, and provide technical assistance to educators, parents, students, policymakers, and the general public on a range of topics aimed at improving academic achievement for all children and ensuring the effectiveness of educational programs. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 3419, 9511(a) (establishing the Institute of Education Sciences); 20 U.S.C. § 9531(a) (establishing a National Center for Educational Research); 20 U.S.C. § 9541(a) (establishing the National Center for Education Statistics); 20 U.S.C. § 9561(a) (establishing the National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance); 20 U.S.C. § 9567(a) (establishing the National Center for Special Education Research). The Department, for example, creates resources to support educators and school districts in meeting academic standards, providing education to children who are English language learners, addressing school safety, bullying, and chronic absenteeism, supporting children with significant behavioral issues, and other important topics.
65. The Department’s Office of English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement and Academic Achievement for Limited English Proficient Students oversees policy for the education needs of linguistically and culturally diverse students. 20 U.S.C. § 3420.
66. The Student Privacy Policy Office implements FERPA and PPRA, both of which specifically mandate the creation of an office and review board to investigate, process, review, and adjudicate violations of the student privacy laws. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(g), 1232h(f).
67. The Department’s Office of Safe and Healthy Schools administers, coordinates and recommends policy for programs such as drug and violence prevention programs, character and civic education, and a variety programs supporting students’ physical and mental health.
68. The Department’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) provides guidance, technical assistance, and oversight of special education requirements under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C § 3417. The Office of Special Education Programs, established within OSERS, administers programs concerning education of children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1402(a).
69. The Department provides guidance relating to the educational rights of students who are homeless under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301– 11481. Similarly, the Department provides guidance regarding protections for students in foster care under the ESSA.
70. The Department collects and publishes data relating to education services across the country. For example, it conducts the Civil Rights Data Collection, through which it compiles and publishes data on a broad range of civil rights related topics that serve as a valuable resource to state educational agencies.
The Department’s Role in Safeguarding Equal Access to Public Education.
71. The Department of Education plays a critical role in safeguarding equal access to public education through transparency and accountability. The Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) was created by Congress and has historically focused on ensuring that schools provide equal access to education across diverse student bodies. 20 U.S.C. § 3413.
72. OCR directs, coordinates, and recommends policy for activities that are designed to, among other things, comply with legislative and regulatory civil rights requirements. For example, in May 2022, OCR announced proposed amendments to the Department of Education’s regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. U.S. Department of Education Announces Intent to Strengthen and Protect Rights for Students with Disabilities by Amending Regulations Implementing Section 504 (May 2022), available at https://www.ed.gov/about/ed-offices/ocr/news-room#2022. As part of that process, OCR sought and considered written suggestions from the public about how best to improve the current regulations. Id. In 2024, OCR also promulgated regulations implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, restoring strong protections against sexual harassment and assault and reinforcing critical protections for LGBTQ+ students. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 89 Fed. Reg. 33,474 (Apr. 29, 2024).
73. OCR is charged with enforcing and investigating alleged violations of various federal civil rights laws that protect students against discrimination, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. OCR has a responsibility to act in a reasonably prompt manner in response to alleged violations of these laws.
74. In FY 2024, OCR reviewed the highest volume of complaints ever, totaling 22,687 complaints. U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, 2024 Fiscal Year Annual Report (2024), available at https://www.ed.gov/media/document/ocr-r ... education- 2024-109012.pdf. That number represented an 18% increase over a previous record high in FY 2023 of 19,201 complaints. Id.
75. In addition to their enforcement and investigative work, OCR has provided trainings and technical assistance to state educational agencies and local educational agencies on civil rights laws. For example, OCR provided training to state and local educational agencies regarding digital accessibility of websites and other electronic documents for individuals who have disabilities, including blindness.
The Department’s Administration of Higher Education Programs and the Federal Student Loan System.
76. The federal student loan programs administered under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, are central components of the financial aid provided to students in Plaintiff States. These programs are designed to provide critical assistance to prospective students and expand access to higher education to students who could not otherwise afford to pursue a degree or certificate.
77. The Department manages the federal student loan system through its Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), which handles loan disbursement, servicing and borrower assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1018.
78. Included in this system is the administration of Pell Grants, work-study programs and subsidized loans. The Department awards more than $120 billion a year in grants, work-study funds, and low-interest loans to approximately 13 million students. Much of this funding is sent directly to colleges and universities, including public colleges and universities in the Plaintiff States. If Program Participation Renewals are not processed in a timely manner, it could impact the ability of institutions to operate and most of their student to attend the institution by functionally eliminating the availability of financial aid.
79. The Office of Federal Student Aid develops the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form and processes, with vendors, more than 17.6 million FAFSA forms each year. The deadline for applicants to submit their FAFSA forms is June 30, 2025, although many students submit their FAFSA forms earlier, as their decision about whether they can afford to attend college and, if so, which college, is necessarily dependent on learning what financial aid they qualify for. If FAFSA forms are not processed on time, this will mean that many students may seek to delay their decisions about which college to attend, and many students will decide to postpone attending college, for a year or indefinitely.
80. While the Department distributes this funding to institutions of higher education, it also ensures that the institutions receiving Title IV funding are financially responsible. The Secretary of Education determines the standard of financial responsibility and enforces it as required under the HEA. When something happens that could affect an institution’s financial responsibility, the institution is required to notify the Department within 21 days. If such notifications are no longer monitored by the Department, institutions that continue to receive Title IV funding could engage in wasteful or unnecessary spending without repercussion.
81. Under the HEA, the Department enforces the requirement that institutions of higher education provide counseling to new students as well as graduating students with information about debt management and repayment. If the Department ceased enforcement of these programs, it would become substantially more difficult to ensure that institutions provide this counseling. Accordingly, students could lose the opportunity to make informed decisions about their student loan debt, or could even become unwitting victims of predatory lending.
82. The Department’s responsibilities are not just financial. The Department manages large-scale data collection and enforcement which would not be possible on a state-by-state basis. Such data are described in various Congressional Acts and often implicate campus safety. Collecting this vital data across states, and therefore monitoring nationwide trends, would be infeasible for individual states to perform and would thereby go unenforced.
83. For instance, the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery Act”) also requires colleges and universities to disclose, via an annual report, certain crimes that occur in certain places if they are reported to certain people. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092; 34 CFR 668.46. If the Department no longer processed the notice and reports made under this and other statutes, colleges and universities would lose a valuable partner in supporting their compliance with these reporting requirements and in interpreting and responding to the information gathered, which in turn would impede the ability of colleges and universities to keep their campus safe.
84. Similarly, the Department enforces reporting and compliance of campus safety with regard to drug and alcohol use under the Drug Free Schools and Communities Act and the HEA. These statutes require institutions of higher education to maintain policies surrounding illegal drug and alcohol use, and to determine the number of drug- and alcohol-related violations and fatalities associated with the institution. The Department collects this information from institutions and ensures compliance. Were the Department to cease enforcement of these Acts, institutions would no longer need to monitor and report this data, impacting campus safety.
85. The Violence Against Women Act requires the Secretary of Education to nationally survey reports of sexual and domestic violence or harassment across institutes of higher education. The Secretary of Education is required to report the data biennially, which institutions receiving federal funding must in turn publish (at a campus level) on their websites. This allows current or prospective students to make informed decisions regarding their place of education. Were the Department to cease collection of this information, not only would campus safety be affected by the lack of enforcement, but the Secretary of Education would be in violation of the Violence Against Women Act.
86. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) is enforced by the Department. It requires that institutions of higher education allow students to inspect their records, and that institutions obtain written request before sharing such records with external personnel. Lack of enforcement of FERPA places students’ data security and private records at risk.
87. The Department’s Office of Postsecondary Education is responsible for formulating federal postsecondary education policy and administering programs to support of increased access to quality postsecondary education. 20 U.S.C. § 3415.
88. The Department is also responsible for vital aspects of higher education accreditation. The accreditation of institutions of higher education is a joint process between the educational institutions, states, the Department, and third-party accreditation authorities. Accreditation ensures that educational institutions meet certain standards for quality and assures students that a degree from that institution has and will continue to have value in the workplace. The Department is responsible for reviewing the accreditation standards of agencies that review programs and institutions of higher education. While some accrediting agencies work without Department of Education recognition, these agencies need not conform to any standards of quality or integrity. Without Department-recognized accreditation, institutions of higher education may engage in profit-seeking behaviors without relating any educational benefits to students. Many unaccredited institutions are profit-hungry “diploma mills,” which lack external quality control or educational standards and whose diplomas are therefore meaningless to the job market and worthless to graduates.
The Department’s Programs Supporting Vocational Education and Rehabilitation.
89. The Department of Education provides both vocational education and vocational rehabilitation services to help individuals gain skills for employment and support those with disabilities in finding and maintaining jobs.
90. The Department’s Office of Vocational and Adult Education oversees programs that assist adults with obtaining a high school diploma or the equivalent and support them in their pursuit of postsecondary, career, or technical education.
91. The Department’s Office of Career, Technical, and Adult Education (OCTAE) administers and coordinates programs related to career and technical education, adult education and literacy, and community colleges for advancing workforce development. 20 U.S.C. § 3416.
92. OCTAE’s Division of Academic and Technical Education (DATE) is responsible for helping adult students acquire academic and technical skills to be prepared for high-skill, highwage, or high-demand occupations.
93. DATE administers formula and discretionary grant programs under the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act (Perkins V), 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2414, which is the primary source of federal funding for career and technical education. DATE also provides assistance to states to improve program quality, implementation, and accountability, and establish national initiatives that help states implement rigorous career and vocational education programs.
94. DATE also administers the Perkins Collaborative Resource Network, which provides resources and tools for state directors and state staff who administer career and technical education programs.
95. OCTAE’s Division of Adult Education and Literacy (DAEL) administers adult education and literacy programs that help adults acquire the basic skills they need including reading, writing, math, English language proficiency, and problem-solving. The Office of Correctional Education, which coordinates efforts to support educational opportunities in correctional settings, is also located in DAEL.
96. DAEL administers formula grant programs to adults under the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) and Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 3271–3333; 29 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3361. These programs provide assistance to states to improve program quality, accountability, and capacity, and establish national leadership activities to enhance the quality of adult education.
97. OCTAE provides national leadership to strengthen the role of community colleges in expanding access to postsecondary education for youth and adults and advancing workforce development.
98. OCTAE’s community college initiatives are designed to build public support for community colleges as centers of innovation and providers of excellent education and training that are affordable and accessible to all Americans, facilitate the dissemination of timely and actionable guidance on community college educations for teachers, administrators, students, parents, and employers, and promote the development of strategies that support students in the completion of their postsecondary certification and degree programs.
99. The Department of Education also provides critical vocational rehabilitation services and funding for individuals with disabilities through its Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA), a component of the Department’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS). 29 U.S.C. § 702. RSA provides leadership and resources to assist state and other agencies in providing vocational rehabilitation and other services to individuals with disabilities to maximize their employment, independence, and integration into the community and the competitive labor market.
100. The Rehabilitation Services Administration funds and administers many programs, including disability employment programs, an independent living program, technical assistance centers, training programs, and disability innovation fund programs.
101. Two disability employment programs—the State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program and the State Supported Employment Services Program—provide formula grants to states to provide employment services for individuals with disabilities.
102. The State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program is authorized by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended by Title IV of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. This program provides grants to assist states in operating statewide vocational rehabilitation programs, each of which is an integral part of a statewide workforce development system.
103. The State Supported Employment Services Program is authorized by Title VI of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended by Title IV of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. This program provides grants to assist states in developing and implementing collaborative programs with appropriate entities to provide supported employment services for individuals with the most significant disabilities, including youth with the most significant disabilities, who require supported employment services following the achievement of a supported employment outcome.
104. Supported employment grant funds are used to supplement funds provided under the State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program to provide supported employment services. Program funds may be used to provide supported employment services, once an individual has been placed in supported employment, for up to 24 months and to supplement other vocational rehabilitation services necessary to help individuals with the most significant disabilities find work in the integrated labor market.
105. The Rehabilitation Services Administration also provides Independent Living Services for Older Individuals Who Are Blind formula grants to states under Title VII, Chapter II of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by Title IV of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, to support services for individuals age 55 or older whose severe visual impairment makes competitive employment difficult to obtain but for whom independent living goals are feasible.
106. The Rehabilitation Services Administration further provides critical technical assistance, training programs, and disability innovation fund programs to states supported through discretionary grants.
107. Certain technical assistance centers provide training and technical assistance to states and state agencies including those that ensure: that transition-age youth with disabilities receive high-quality education services, state agencies are trained to provide adequate vocational rehabilitation services to individuals who are blind, the increase in number and quality of employment outcomes for individuals with disabilities.
108. The Rehabilitation Services Administration also provides training programs and assistance to states. For example, it administers training programs to help fund undergraduate and graduate programs in the field of rehabilitation and training programs for the use of braille for personnel providing vocational rehabilitation services or education services to youth and adults who are blind. They also allow new and innovative training programs to improve methods of training rehabilitation personnel for more effective delivery of rehabilitation services.
109. The Rehabilitation Services Administration also provides funds through Disability Innovation Fund Programs (“Disability Innovation Fund”) to state agencies to conduct innovative activities aimed at improving outcomes for individuals with disabilities. For example, these funds allow evidence-based practices for individuals with disabilities to advance in high-demand and high-quality careers, foster partnerships among agencies, evaluate new or substantially improved model strategies to transition youth and adults with disabilities to competitive integrated employment, and increase the opportunity for Subminimum Wage to Competitive Integrated Employment program participants to obtain competitive integrated employment.
The Department’s Administration of Impact Aid.
110. Because school districts rely heavily on local property taxes for funding, property tax exemptions on federal land create funding shortages for neighboring school districts. The Impact Aid program, signed into law by President Harry Truman in 1950 (Pub. L. 815 and Pub. L. 874), is a critical method of ensuring the financial survival of local school districts whose revenue is decreased due to the presence of non-taxable federal land. School districts that are near, or serve students from, military bases, federal lands, federal low-rent housing facilities, and tribal communities lose local revenue because of the presence of these nontaxable federal activities. While these school districts typically continue to receive funding from their states, Impact Aid funding partially reimburses school districts for this loss of locally-derived revenue.
111. The Department is the primary agency responsible for administering Impact Aid payments to local school districts. See ESEA, Title VII, 20 U.S.C. § 7701–7714, 34 C.F.R. § 222. Every year, each school district seeking Impact Aid must submit an application to the Department. Typically this is January 31, though late application deadlines can extend to April 1 with payment of a penalty. The Department reviews the applications and processes payments based on congressional appropriations each fiscal year and allocates funding in multiple installments until all available funds are distributed.
112. Many school districts within the Plaintiff States are heavily dependent on the Department’s effective funding distribution and administration of Impact Aid due to the large amount of nontaxable federal property within their boundaries, as the amount of Impact Aid received by each school district is based on the number of affected students who live on federal property or whose parents work in federal facilities. School districts within Plaintiff States receive hundreds of millions of dollars annually in Impact Aid funding for construction, special education, maintenance, and operations.
113. The Impact Aid Program is the only K–12 Federal education program that is not forward funded. Any delay in either appropriations or administration has an immediate impact on Impact Aid-recipient school districts’ ability to fund day-today operations, instructional expenditures, utility payments or payroll.
B. The President’s Directive to Dismantle the Department of Education and the Secretary of Education’s Elimination of Nearly Half of the Department’s Workforce.
114. President Trump has publicly described his intention to dismantle the Department of Education. That goal has been plainly and repeatedly stated: President Trump called the Department of Education “a big con job” and declared that he would “like to close it immediately.” See, e.g., Michael C. Bender, Trump Is Said to Be Preparing Order That Aims to Eliminate Education Dept., The New York Times (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/p ... utiveorder. html. He also stated that he would like the newly installed Secretary of Education, Linda McMahon, to put herself “out of a job.” Zachary B. Wolf, Trump and Musk are moving to smother these three pieces of the government, CNN (Feb. 5, 2025) (“I told Linda, ‘Linda, I hope you do a great job in putting yourself out of a job.’ I want her to put herself out of a job – Education Department.”).
115. Secretary McMahon has indicated that she plans to heed this call and break down the Department of Education from within. She affirmed that “President Trump believes that the bureaucracy in Washington should be abolished so that we can return education to the states, where it belongs,” and that she “wholeheartedly support[s] and agree[s] with this mission.” Cochran, McMahon, cited supra ¶ 5. On March 3, 2025, Secretary McMahon asked employees to join her in “perform[ing] one final, unforgettable public service to future generations of students” by dismantling the Department of Education. Secretary McMahon: Our Department’s Final Mission, U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/F7BT-MQ3D.
116. On March 6, 2025, news outlets reported that the White House had drafted an executive order calling on the Secretary of Education to “take all necessary steps to facilitate the closure of the Department of Education (DOE) and return authority over education to the States and local communities, the maximum extent allowed by law.”
117. On March 11, 2025, five days after reports of the draft executive order calling for the Department’s dismantling, the U.S. Department of Education announced that its workforce is being cut virtually in half. The Department described a massive reduction in force (RIF)—as part of its “final mission”—that affects “[a]ll divisions within the Department.” U.S. Department of Education Initiates Reduction in Force, Press Release (Mar. 11, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-rel ... ctionforce.
118. Based on figures provided by the Department, the RIF displaces approximately 1,378 employees, all of whom “will be placed on administrative leave beginning Friday, March 21st.” The total reduction in force to the Department of Education is “roughly” 1,950 people: the approximately 1,378 employees subject to the RIF, the 259 employees that accepted the so-called “Fork in the Road” offer (referred to in the press release as the “Deferred Resignation Program”), and the 313 employees that accepted a “Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment.” The press release states that “[a]fter today’s actions, the Department’s workforce will total roughly 2,183 workers,” an approximately 50% cut from the 4,133 workers the Department of Education had “[w]hen President Trump was inaugurated.”
119. On March 11, 2025, Secretary McMahon stated, during an interview with Laura Ingraham of Fox News, that the workforce reductions were the first steps in dismantling the Department of Education:
Ingraham: Now, is this the first step on the road to a total shutdown?
McMahon: Yes, actually it is, because that was the President’s mandate. His directive to me, clearly, is to shut down the Department of Education, which we know we’ll have to work with Congress, you know, to get that accomplished. But what we did today was to take the first step of eliminating what I think is bureaucratic bloat.
120. On information and belief, the RIF devastated important segments of the Department of Education, rendering the agency unable to perform its core functions.
121. On information and belief, almost the entire staff of the Institute of Education Sciences has been eliminated.
122. On information and belief, the majority of staff in the Office for Civil Rights have been eliminated or otherwise removed. The Office for Civil Rights, created by Congress and codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3413, enforces federal civil rights laws in schools and other recipients of Department of Education funding, and directs, coordinates, and recommends policy for activities that are designed to administer the provisions of legislation and Departmental policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age. Regional offices of the Office for Civil Rights in Boston, San Francisco, Cleveland, New York, Chicago, Dallas, and Philadelphia have been eliminated and closed, with employees terminated in each of those offices.
123. The cuts to the Office for Civil Rights will have deep impacts on the Department of Education’s ability to carry out its vital work. Given that the RIF heavily impacted investigative staff, on information and belief the cuts will force remaining investigators to nearly double their caseloads, severely limiting meaningful investigation of discrimination in schools.
124. On information and belief, the Office of General Counsel has also been gutted, with many divisions eliminated and approximately three-quarters of OGC’s staff terminated. One such eliminated division, the Ethics Division, is responsible for counseling current and past Department employees on ethics matters. On information and belief, the Office of General Counsel advised offices and units across the Department and its effective gutting will negatively impact the Department’s ability to perform statutory functions.
125. On information and belief, all OGC attorneys specializing in K–12 grants, IDEA grants, and equity grants have been terminated. The RIF has also resulted in the termination of most OGC attorneys focused on privacy issues.
126. On information and belief, the RIF has had a material impact on the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services, which serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary on Departmental matters related to special education and rehabilitative services. See 20 U.S.C. § 3417. In particular, the RIF may hamstring OSERS activities related to policy, program and strategic planning, regulations, evaluation, and grant activities.
127. On information and belief, the RIF has also effectively eliminated the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education’s State and Grantee Relations Team, which partners with stakeholders and connects them to the resources and relationships they need to support and educate students nationally.
128. On information and belief, the RIF has also seriously impacted the Department of Education’s FSA. FSA directs, coordinates, and recommends policies for programs that are designed to provide financial assistance to eligible students enrolled in postsecondary educational institutions. This assistance includes grants, loans, and work-study assistance to nearly 12.9 million students through approximately 6,100 postsecondary institutions.
129. Upon information and belief, given the impending challenges of students facing renewed payments following the pandemic, the Department employed contractors to help borrowers weather the resumed payments. Even prior to the RIF, it was reported on March 7, that “the agency hasn’t been able to provide any communication to schools, servicers, or borrowers about how to navigate the changes that are coming.” https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/07/poli ... tion-trump. “And many staffers with institutionalized knowledge about the aid programs have been fired or left.” Id.
130. In a public LinkedIn post, the Executive Director of the newly formed Office of Loan Portfolio Management at Federal Student Aid wrote:
When I accepted the position two months ago, I dove in, putting together a strategy for tackling the challenges that I knew would come with managing a group of 200 dedicated public servants and shepherding 43M borrowers back into our complex repayment environment after a long payment pause and on-ramp. But now, I have lost many of those 200 staff, with more to come. I spend my days justifying our existence, our dignity, and our mission. I try to keep the work going in spite of the impossible environment we find ourselves in. I'm afraid of what the coming days, weeks, months, years will bring not just for me and the Department, but for the borrowers we serve. I've dedicated my career to the work of supporting college affordability and a student aid system that supports our most vulnerable, and it is heartbreaking to see that dissolving before my eyes. I'm not sure what the future will bring, but as always, I’m here to fight, to work for the mission, to do the right thing.
131. On information and belief, within FSA, the RIF has resulted in the termination of many of the Department’s employees in the School Eligibility and Oversight Services Group, which is responsible for administering a program of eligibility, certification, financial analysis, and oversight of schools participating in Federal Student Aid programs. In order to receive Federal Student Aid funds, schools must remain compliant with Title IV requirements and submit to audits which confirm compliance. Department employees responsible for Title IV oversight ensure compliance, process auditing results, and release Title IV funding timely.
132. On information and belief, the RIF has effectively eliminated FSA’s Vendor Oversight Division, which oversees and assists federal student loan servicers. The Vendor Oversight Division is responsible for ensuring that loan servicers fulfill their contracts while meeting Department requirements. When such requirements are not met, it is responsible for enforcing corrective action. For example, when the Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri (MOHELA) failed to comply with its contractual requirements after the return to repayment in August 2023, including mismanaging borrower accounts, the Department imposed a corrective action plan on MOHELA, which the Vendor Oversight Division is responsible for overseeing and defending. The Vendor Oversight Division also plays a key role in verifying compliance with the requirements of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program and the Income-Based Repayment plan before instructing federal loan servicers to discharge a student’s debt under these programs.
133. On information and belief, the RIF has eliminated key staff members in FSA’s Product Management Group, including those responsible for the online income-driven repayment application, Direct Loan Consolidation application, and PSLF Help Tool, which enables borrowers to certify their qualifying employment for the PSLF Program.
134. In sum, on information and belief, the RIF has so severely impaired the Department of Education that it can no longer function, and cannot comply with its statutory requirements.
C. The Incapacitation of the Department of Education Will Cause Grave Harm to the States and Their Residents.
135. The effective gutting of the Department of Education will result in a wide range of devastating harms for Plaintiff States and their residents that could be neither prevented nor mitigated.
136. The Directive and RIF will result in the loss of or delays in Department funding and supports impacting nearly every aspect of K–12 education in the Plaintiff States because there will be such a significant reduction in staff. These impacts will include teacher shortages from the loss in salary funding, which in turn will result in increased class sizes. The impacts will also include a loss of professional development and salaries for special education teachers, paraprofessionals, reading specialists, physical therapists, speech therapists, and social workers, which in turn will result in lost educational opportunities for students that cannot be recovered or remedied. Without Department of Education financial support, states will lose critical services from special education students and students with IEPs. States would lose funding for assistive technology for students with disabilities, and funding for transportation to help children receive the services and programming they need. The dismantling of the Department will also result in the termination of afterschool programs.
137. Regardless of what alternative resources are put in the place of the Department of Education, the process of the Department’s dismantling will create and has created chaos, disruption, uncertainty, delays and confusion for Plaintiff States and their residents. States anticipating federal fund disbursements do not know whether staff will be employed and able to be contacted regarding those disbursements. Students at state universities do not know whether their federal student aid packages will be timely processed and made available before the Fall 2025 semester begins.
138. For instance, on March 12, 2025, the day after the RIF was announced, the Department’s website for administering the distribution of federal funds (referred to as the “G6” system) became unavailable. G6 was the Department system used for managing federal funds, and allowed schools to request payments, adjust drawdowns, and return cash to the Department for many Title IV programs. On March 12, the website for the G6 system stated: “G6.ed.gov will no longer exist, G5.gov will be the correct URL. To access G5, external users should enter their G5 email ID and their G5 email password.”
139. When certain users then attempted to then access the G5.gov system for the distribution of federal funds, the G5 website announced:
ALERT: Due to severe staffing restraints, you can expect delays in connecting to a live help desk agent for assistance with G5. We recommend sending an email to [email protected] with a summary of your issue or question. The next available agent during normal business hours will respond to your email in the order it was received.
140. On March 12, 2025, a user of the G5 system from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education attempted to access the G5 system in order to process a request for anticipated disbursements of federal funds, but was unable to access the G5 system for hours. The user was told that the G5 system was experiencing a “system glitch.”
141. The harms from the dismantling of the Department go beyond systems breakdowns and unresponsive administrators.
142. On information and belief, the dismantling of the Department has more than decimated the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Without a functioning OCR, school districts in Plaintiff States may be emboldened to restrict access to quality education and ignore complaints of discrimination or hate against students based on race, gender identity, disability status, religion, and immigration status. Students with current complaints will likely see no meaningful resolution, with cases backlogged due to the shortage of employees to resolve them. Students facing discrimination, sexual harassment, or sexual assault will lose a critical avenue to report their case.
143. On information and belief, the dismantling of the Department will result in higher costs to attend institutions of higher education. Not only will federal funding for Pell grants, workstudy programs and subsidized loans be at risk, but so too will the Department’s administration of those programs, without which they cannot operate even if they were fully funded. Without these federal programs supporting students of higher education, the cost of pursuing higher education will increase and fewer students will have the opportunity to attend college. For many state university systems, disruption to or loss of Pell grants would be an existential threat, especially to their mission to serve first generation college students.
144. On information and belief, the gutting of the Office of General Counsel that has resulted from the dismantling of the Department will have impacts throughout the Department’s statutory and non-statutory functions. Without the now-eliminated Ethics Division, current Department employees are now deprived of the counseling regarding ethics matters that govern all manner of agency actions affecting Plaintiff States’ participation in Department programs. The termination of all OGC attorneys specializing in K–12 grants, IDEA grants, and equity grants will necessarily impede the Department’s ability to award and administer those grants to Plaintiff States.
145. On information and belief, the RIF’s effective elimination of the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education’s State and Grantee Relations Team signifies the Plaintiff States’ loss of a critical partner in identifying and developing the resources and relationships needed to support and educate students.
146. On information and belief, the RIF’s impacts on the implementation of the Federal Student Aid program will be monumental. By terminating many of the Department’s employees in the School Eligibility and Oversight Services Group, the Department has lost the tool responsible for administering a program of eligibility, certification, financial analysis, and oversight of schools participating in Federal Student Aid programs. Moreover, with the effective elimination of FSA’s Vendor Oversight Division, which oversees and assists federal student loan servicers, Plaintiff States and their students lose tools to help ensure that loan servicers comply with their contractual requirements.
147. On information and belief, in addition to these disruptions of the administration of Federal Student Aid generally is the disruption that will come to the administration of FAFSA applications specifically. With the destruction of these multiple aspects of the FSA program at the Department, the Department is deprived of the administrative systems necessary to administer and process the millions of FAFSA applications the Department receives. Indeed, the dismantling of the Department comes just as the college admissions and decisionmaking process is at its peak, with the FAFSA application deadline merely two and a half months from the RIF. The President’s Directive and the Agency Defendants’ implementation of it has resulted in mass uncertainty regarding whether and how FAFSA applications will be processed, and will result in delays and obstructions in the immediate future.
148. On information and belief, without the Vendor Oversight Division’s verification of compliance with the requirements of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program and the Income-Based Repayment plan, Plaintiff States and their educational institutions are deprived of a system by which loan servicers receive instructions regarding the discharge of student debt under FSA programs.
CAUSES OF ACTION Count I Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine – Usurping Legislative Authority (Against All Defendants)
149. The States reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
150. Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution enumerates that: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in . . . Congress.” U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 1.
151. “The Framers viewed the legislative power as a special threat to individual liberty, so they divided that power to ensure that ‘differences of opinion’ and the ‘jarrings of parties’ would ‘promote deliberation and circumspection’ and ‘check excesses in the majority.’” Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 223 (quoting The Federalist No. 70, at 475 (A. Hamilton) and No. 51, at 350).
152. Thus “‘important subjects . . . must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,’ even if Congress may leave the Executive ‘to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.’” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 737 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825)).
153. The separation of powers doctrine thus represents a central tenet of our Constitution. See, e.g., Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 637–38 (2024); Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 227.
154. Consistent with these principles, the Executive’s powers are limited to those specifically conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes, and do not include any undefined residual or inherent power.
155. Any instance where the President, by Executive Order or otherwise, directs an agency to take an action that runs afoul of a statute or the legislative intent of Congress, violates the Separation of Powers doctrine.
156. Any instance where the President, by Executive Order or otherwise, directs that an agency authorized by Congress to perform statutory duties cease operations, effectively repeals the statutes that authorize that agency and thus violates the Separation of Powers doctrine.
157. Here, where Congress has created the Department of Education, the Executive and his agencies cannot incapacitate it, absent Congressional action that directs them to do so. The Actions challenged herein thus violate Constitutional and statutory mandates, contravene Congressional intent, and are unlawful.
158. This court is authorized to enjoin any action by the Executive and his agencies that “is unauthorized by statute, exceeds the scope of constitutional authority, or is pursuant to unconstitutional enactment.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D.D.C. 1952), aff ’d, 343 U.S. 579.
159. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the States are also entitled to a declaration that the President’s Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation of the Directive violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and impermissibly arrogates to the executive power that is reserved to Congress.
Count II Violation of the Separation of Powers – Take Care Clause (Against All Defendants)
160. The States reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
161. The Take Care Clause provides that the executive must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3; UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014) (“Under our system of government, Congress makes the laws and the President . . . faithfully executes them” (quotation and citation omitted)).
162. The Executive violates the Take Care Clause where it declines to execute or otherwise undermines statutes enacted by Congress and signed into law or duly promulgated regulations implementing such statutes. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“the President is without authority to set aside congressional legislation by executive order”); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838) (rejecting argument that by charging the President with faithful execution of the laws, the Take Care clause “implies a power to forbid their execution”).
163. By issuing the Directive to dismantle an agency authorized by Congress, the President has failed to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress in violation of the Take Care Clause.
164. This court is authorized to enjoin any action by the Executive and his agencies that “is unauthorized by statute, exceeds the scope of constitutional authority, or is pursuant to unconstitutional enactment.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 103 F. Supp. at 576, aff ’d, 343 U.S. 579.
165. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the States are also entitled to a declaration that the Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and impermissibly arrogates to the executive power that is reserved to Congress.
Count III Ultra Vires – Conduct Outside the Scope of Statutory Authority Conferred on the Executive (Against All Defendants)
166. The States reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
167. Neither the President nor an agency can take any action that exceeds the scope of their constitutional and/or statutory authority.
168. Federal courts possess the power in equity to grant injunctive relief “with respect to violations of federal law by federal officials.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2015). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed equitable relief against federal officials who act “beyond th[e] limitations” imposed by federal statute. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).
169. Defendants’ conduct in issuing the Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation of it is contrary to law and outside of Defendants’ authority.
170. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation of it is contrary to law and outside of Defendants’ authority.
171. Plaintiff States are further entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Agency Defendants from implementing the Directive.
Count IV Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act – Contrary to Law (Against Agency Defendants)
172. Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.
173. Agency Defendants are “agenc[ies]” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
174. Under the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)–(C).
175. Congress enacted the APA “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 391 (2024) (quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)). In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court clarified that historical principles of “respect” did not equate to deference, and that “Section 706 makes clear that agency interpretations of statutes—like agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled to deference.” Id. at 392 (emphasis in original). Rather, it “remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the law means what the agency says.” Id. (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
176. An agency may not take any action that exceeds the scope of its constitutional or statutory authority.
177. No constitutional or statutory authority authorizes the Department of Education to refrain from fulfilling its statutory duties, or to violate federal law.
178. An agency likewise may not violate its own regulations. When a federal agency promulgates “[r]egulations with the force and effect of law,” those regulations “supplement the bare bones” of federal statutes. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954). “It is an abecedarian principle of administrative law that agencies must comply with their own regulations.” Manguriu v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). An agency’s action may be set aside pursuant to the APA if the action violates the agency’s own procedures, particularly if that error prejudices the interest of a person before the agency. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Town of Weymouth, Mass. v. Mass. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 961 F.3d 34, 47 (1st Cir. 2020), on reh’g, 973 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[A]n agency action may be set aside as arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to ‘comply with its own regulations.’” (quoting Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
179. The Agency Defendants lack authority to implement the Directive as it calls for actions that are not authorized by statute, and are in direct contravention of statutory authority governing the creation and operation of the Department of Education. The Agency Defendants also lack authority to use a RIF to override the limitations on their own power to dismantle statutorilymandated agency functions. These agency actions are unauthorized, unprecedented, and not entitled to deference by this Court.
180. In enacting the Directive, the Agency Defendants have acted contrary to the applicable regulations governing the administration of Department functions.
181. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the Agency Defendants lack legal authority to implement the Directive, contrary to congressional directive and intent, and have, in so doing, acted contrary to law, outside of statutory authority, and in violation of the APA.
182. Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of the Department of Education’s implementation of the Directive, and a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the Agency Defendants from implementing the Directive.
Count V Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act – Arbitrary & Capricious and an Abuse of Discretion (Against Agency Defendants)
183. Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.
184. Defendants include “agenc[ies]” under the APA 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
185. The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
186. An agency action is arbitrary or capricious where it is not “reasonable and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). An agency must provide “a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. That “reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public.” Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019). Agencies may not rely on explanations that are “contrived” or “incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process.” Id.
188. An action is also arbitrary and capricious if the agency “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem” before it. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 591 U.S. 1, 25 (2020) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43).
189. The Department’s mass RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Department provided no reasoned basis or explanation for its mass RIF.
190. The Department’s RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Agency Defendants failed to consider the consequences of their actions.
191. The Department’s RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Department’s stated reasons for the RIF—to promote “efficiency” and “accountability” —are pretext for the President and Secretary McMahon’s stated goal of dismantling the Department from within.
192. The Department’s RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Agency Defendants’ actions impede their ability to perform the Department’s functions, both those that are required by statute and those that are not.
193. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the Agency Defendants’ actions implementing the Directive violate the APA because they are arbitrary and capricious.
194. Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of the Agency Defendants’ implementation of the Directive pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, and a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Agency Defendants from implementing the Directive.
195. Under the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)–(C).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff States pray that this Court:
i. Issue a judicial declaration that President Trump’s Directive to dismantle the Department of Education, and the Department of Education’s implementation of the Directive are unlawful because they violate the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act;
ii. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, vacate Agency Defendants’ actions implementing President Trump’s Directive to dismantle the Department of Education;
iii. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Agency Defendants from implementing President Trump’s Directive to dismantle the Department of Education, including through ordering a reduction in force;
iv. Award the Plaintiff States their reasonable fees, costs, and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and
v. Grant other such relief as this Court may deem proper.
Dated: March 13, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts By: /s/ Katherine Dirks
Katherine Dirks (BBO No. 673674) Chief State Trial Counsel Yael Shavit (BBO No. 695333) Chief, Consumer Protection Division Elizabeth Carnes-Flynn (BBO No. 687708) Nathaniel Hyman (BBO No. 698506) Assistant Attorneys General 1 Ashburton Pl. Boston, MA 02108 (617) 963-2277 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
LETITIA JAMES Attorney General for the State of New York
By: /s/ Rabia Muqaddam Rabia Muqaddam* Special Counsel for Federal Initiatives Molly Thomas-Jensen* Gina Bull* Special Counsel 28 Liberty St. New York, NY 10005 (929) 638-0447 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
ANNE E. LOPEZ Attorney General for the State of Hawaiʻi
By: /s/ Kalikoʻonālani D. Fernandes David D. Day* Special Assistant to the Attorney General Kalikoʻonālani D. Fernandes* Solicitor General Ewan C. Rayner* Deputy Solicitor General 425 Queen Street Honolulu, HI 96813 (808) 586-1360 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
ROB BONTA Attorney General for the State of California
By: /s/ Lucia Choi Lucia Choi* Deputy Attorney General Michael L. Newman* Senior Assistant Attorney General Srividya Panchalam* James E. Stanley* Supervising Deputy Attorneys General Natasha A. Reyes* Deputy Attorney General California Attorney General’s Office 300 South Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 269-6364 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
PHIL WEISER Attorney General for the State of Colorado
By: /s/ David Moskowitz David Moskowitz* Deputy Solicitor General 1300 Broadway, #10 Denver, CO 80203 (720) 508-6000 [email protected]
KRISTIN K. MAYES Attorney General for the State of Arizona
By: /s/ Hayleigh S. Crawford Hayleigh S. Crawford* Deputy Solicitor General 2005 North Central Avenue Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 542-3333 [email protected] [email protected]
KATHLEEN JENNINGS Attorney General for the State of Delaware By: /s/ Ian R. Liston Ian R. Liston* Director of Impact Litigation Vanessa L. Kassab* Deputy Attorney General Delaware Department of Justice 820 N. French Street Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 683-8899 [email protected]
WILLIAM TONG Attorney General for the State of Connecticut
By: /s/ Patrick Ring Patrick Ring* Assistant Attorney General 165 Capitol Avenue Hartford, CT 06106 (860) 808 5020 [email protected]
BRIAN L. SCHWALB Attorney General for the District of Columbia
By: /s/ Andrew Mendrala Andrew Mendrala* Assistant Attorney General Public Advocacy Division Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia 400 Sixth Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 724-9726 [email protected]
KWAME RAOUL Attorney General for the State of Illinois
By: /s/ Karyn L. Bass Ehler Karyn L. Bass Ehler* Assistant Chief Deputy Attorney General Katharine P. Roberts* Assistant Attorney General Office of the Illinois Attorney General 115 S. LaSalle St. Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 814-4985 [email protected] [email protected]
AARON M. FREY Attorney General for the State of Maine
By: /s/ Sean D. Magenis Sean D. Magenis* Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333-0006 (207) 626-8800 [email protected]
ANTHONY G. BROWN Attorney General for the State of Maryland
By: /s/ Keith M. Jamieson* Keith M. Jamieson* Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 200 Saint Paul Place, 20th Floor Baltimore, MD 21202 (410) 576-6960 [email protected]
DANA NESSEL Attorney General for the People of Michigan
By: /s/ Neil Giovanatti Neil Giovanatti* Kathleen Halloran* Assistant Attorneys General Michigan Department of Attorney General 525 W. Ottawa Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7603 [email protected] [email protected]
KEITH ELLISON Attorney General for the State of Minnesota
By: /s/ Liz Kramer Liz Kramer* Solicitor General 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400 St. Paul, MN, 55101 (651) 757-1010 [email protected]
AARON D. FORD Attorney General for the State of Nevada
By: /s/ Heidi Parry Stern Heidi Parry Stern* Solicitor General Office of the Nevada Attorney General 1 State of Nevada Way, Ste. 100 Las Vegas, NV 89119 [email protected]
MATTHEW J. PLATKIN Attorney General for the State of New Jersey
By: /s/ Jessica L. Palmer Jessica L. Palmer* Deputy Attorney General 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625-0093 (609) 696-4607 [email protected]
DAN RAYFIELD Attorney General for the State of Oregon
By: /s/ Elleanor H. Chin Elleanor H. Chin* Senior Assistant Attorney General 100 SW Market Street Portland, OR 97201 (971) 673-1880 [email protected]
PETER F. NERONHA Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island
By: /s/ Kathryn T. Gradowski Kathryn T. Gradowski* Special Assistant Attorney General 150 South Main Street Providence, RI 02903 (401) 274-4400, Ext. 2810 [email protected]
CHARITY R. CLARK Attorney General for the State of Vermont
By: /s/ Jonathan T. Rose Jonathan T. Rose* Solicitor General 109 State Street Montpelier, VT 05609 (802) 793-1646 [email protected]
JOSHUA L. KAUL Attorney General for the State of Wisconsin
By: /s/ Charlotte Gibson Charlotte Gibson* Assistant Attorney General Wisconsin Department of Justice Post Office Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707-7857 (608) 957-5218 [email protected]
NICHOLAS W. BROWN Attorney General for the State of Washington
By: /s/ Spencer W. Coates Spencer W. Coates* Assistant Attorney General Cristina Sepe* Deputy Solicitor General Office of the Washington State Attorney General 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 464-7744 [email protected] [email protected] *Pro Hac Vice Applications Forthcoming
