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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. STATE OF NEW YORK; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSSETTS; STATE OF HAWAIʻI; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL DANA NESSEL FOR THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; and STATE OF WISCONSIN; Plaintiffs, v. LINDA McMAHON, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; and DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Defendants. COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. Case 1:25-cv-10601.

-- Attorney General James Sues Trump Administration To Stop Dismantling of Department of Education and Protect Students. AG James Leads Coalition of 20 Attorneys General in Suing to Stop Trump Administration from Shutting Down the Department of Education, by Letitia James


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

STATE OF NEW YORK; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSSETTS; STATE OF HAWAIʻI; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL DANA NESSEL FOR THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; and STATE OF WISCONSIN;

Plaintiffs,

v.

LINDA McMAHON, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; and DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States;

Defendants.

Case 1:25-cv-10601

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION


1. The Department of Education is essential. Plaintiff States rely on the Department for an extraordinary array of programs. The Department provides funds for low-income children and students with disabilities. It enforces the laws that prohibit discrimination in education. It administers federal student aid programs. These are just some of the key ways the congressional acts governing the existence and responsibilities of the Department are deeply intertwined with the education systems in Plaintiff States. Incredibly, all of these significant and statutorily-mandated functions were covered by a lean staff of only 4,133 people—until March 11, when the Department of Education announced through a press release that it is reducing that staff by 50%. U.S. Department of Education Initiates Reduction in Force, Press Release, Department of Education (Mar. 11, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-rel ... initiates- reduction-force (“March 11 Press Release”). This massive reduction in force (RIF) is equivalent to incapacitating key, statutorily-mandated functions of the Department, causing immense damage to Plaintiff States and their educational systems.

2. Although the Department’s March 11 Press Release says that the Department “will continue to deliver on all statutory programs that fall under the agency’s purview,” id., that assertion is easily belied by the extent and effect of the RIF. So too is the assertion from Secretary McMahon, later on March 11, that the terminations were the “first step” on the road to a “total shutdown” of the Department. Filip Timotija, Education Secretary: Mass layoffs First Step Toward Total Shutdown, The Hill (Mar. 12, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/education/5190161- linda-mcmahon-education-department-mass-layoffs.

3. Far from being just a “first step,” the lay-offs are an effective dismantling of the Department. Based on figures provided in the March 11 Press Release, the announced RIF displaces approximately 1,378 employees, all of whom “will be placed on administrative leave” beginning on March 21. March 11 Press Release. These employees join around 600 others who took earlier buy-out offers. Id. The press release states that “[a]fter today’s actions, the Department’s workforce will total roughly 2,183 workers,” an approximately 50% cut from the 4,133 workers the Department of Education had “[w]hen President Trump was inaugurated.” Id.

4. The RIF is so severe and extreme that it incapacitates components of the Department responsible for performing functions mandated by statute, effectively nullifying those mandates. For example, seven regional offices of the Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR)—including those in New York, Boston, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Chicago—have been closed down entirely. Juan Perez, Jr. & Rebecca Carballo, Education Department Documents Detail Massive Scope of Agency Worker Terminations, Politico (Mar. 12, 2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/1 ... ncyworker- terminations-00226222.

5. This massive RIF is not supported by any actual reasoning or specific determinations about how to eliminate purported waste in the Department—rather, the RIF is part and parcel of President Trump’s and Secretary McMahon’s opposition to the Department of Education’s entire existence. The Administration’s goal of eliminating the Department of Education by any means necessary has been plainly and repeatedly stated: President Trump called the Department “a big con job” and declared that he would “like to close it immediately.” Michael C. Bender, Trump Is Said to Be Preparing Order That Aims to Eliminate Education Dept., The New York Times (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/p ... education- department-executive-order.html. He also stated that he would like Secretary McMahon to put herself “out of a job.” Zachary B. Wolf, Trump and Musk are moving to smother these three pieces of the government, CNN (Feb. 5, 2025). Secretary McMahon has affirmed that “President Trump believes that the bureaucracy in Washington should be abolished so that we can return education to the states, where it belongs,” and that she “wholeheartedly support[s] and agree[s] with this mission.” Lexi Lonas Cochran, McMahon says she ‘wholeheartedly’ agrees with Trump plan to abolish Education Department, The Hill (Feb. 25, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/education/ ... menttrump/. On March 3, 2025, Secretary McMahon asked employees to join her in “perform[ing] one final, unforgettable public service to future generations of students” by dismantling the Department of Education. Secretary McMahon: Our Department’s Final Mission, U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/F7BT-MQ3D. On the evening of March 11, Secretary McMahon stated that “the President’s mandate,” his “directive to me, clearly, is to shut down the Department of Education.” See Timotija, Education Secretary, cited supra ¶ 2.

6. But the Trump Administration cannot dismantle the Department of Education. It cannot override—whether through large-scale RIFs or otherwise—the statutory framework prescribing the Department’s responsibilities. As the Supreme Court put it nearly a century ago, “[t]o Congress under its legislative power is given the establishment of offices [and] the determination of their functions and jurisdiction.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926). And, thus, administrative agencies “are creatures of statute.” Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022).

7. Past attempts to eliminate the Department of Education have reflected these limitations on executive power. President Reagan sought legislation to dismantle the Department of Education, which Congress did not pass. See Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union (Jan. 26, 1982) (“The budget plan I submit to you . . . will realize major savings by dismantling the Departments of Energy and Education.”), available at https://nationalcenter.org/ncppr/2001/1 ... the-union- 1982. Since then, numerous bills have been introduced to shutter the Department of Education. See Mona Vakilifathi, Why Trump is Trying to Reduce the Status of the Department of Education, Brookings Inst. (July 16, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why- ... -toreduce- the-status-of-the-department-of-education. Each of these efforts reflects the uncontroversial understanding that only Congress may abolish an agency it created.

8. And while Congress has granted the Secretary of Education—though not the President—the authority to modestly restructure the Department of Education, she is expressly limited to “allocat[ing] or reallocat[ing] functions among the officers of the Department” or modifying “organizational entities within the Department as may be necessary or appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 3473(a). She is not permitted to eliminate or disrupt functions required by statute, nor can she transfer the Department’s responsibilities to another agency outside of its statutory authorization. Id.

9. Because neither the President nor his agencies can undo the many acts of Congress that authorize the Department, dictate its responsibilities, and appropriate funds for it to administer, the President’s directive to eliminate the Department of Education (“Directive”)—including through the March 11 decimation of the Department’s workforce and any other agency implementation—is an unlawful violation of the separation of powers, and the Executive’s obligation to take care that the law be faithfully executed.

10. The Department’s implementation of the Directive, including through the March 11 RIF, is separately unlawful because it violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It is arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to law.

11. For these reasons, Plaintiff States seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the Directive and any implementation of it by Secretary McMahon and the Department of Education, including the March 11 RIF.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (action arising under the laws of the United States). Jurisdiction is also proper under the judicial review provisions of the APA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. An actual controversy exists between the parties within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and this Court may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and other relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 705, 706.

13. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this district, and Defendants are United States agencies or officers acting in their official capacities.

PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs


14. Plaintiff State of New York is a sovereign state of the United States of America. As a body politic and a sovereign entity, it brings this action on behalf of itself and as trustee, guardian, and representative of all residents, and political subdivisions of New York. Attorney General Letitia James is the chief law enforcement officer for New York.

15. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a sovereign commonwealth in the United States of America. Massachusetts is represented by Attorney General Andrea Campbell, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Massachusetts.

16. Plaintiff State of Hawai’i, represented by and through Attorney General Anne E. Lopez, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is Hawai’i’s chief legal officer and chief law enforcement officer and is authorized by Hawaii Revised Statutes § 28-1 to pursue this action.

17. Plaintiff State of California is a sovereign state in the United States of America. California is represented by Attorney General Rob Bonta, who is the chief law enforcement officer of California.

18. Plaintiff State of Arizona, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Arizona is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Kristin K. Mayes. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-192(A). Attorney General Mayes is authorized to pursue this action on behalf of the State of Arizona. Id.

19. Plaintiff State of Colorado is a sovereign state in the United States of America. Colorado is represented by and through its Attorney General Phil Weiser. The Attorney General acts as the chief legal representative of the state and is authorized by Colo Rev. Stat. § 24-31-101 to pursue this action.

20. Plaintiff State of Connecticut is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Connecticut is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General William Tong, who is authorized under General Statutes § 3-125 to pursue this action on behalf of the State of Connecticut.

21. Plaintiff State of Delaware, represented by and through its Attorney General, Kathleen Jennings, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is Delaware’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 2504.

22. Plaintiff District of Columbia is a municipal corporation organized under the Constitution of the United States. It is empowered to sue and be sued, and it is the local government for the territory constituting the permanent seat of the federal government. The District is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General Brian L. Schwalb. The Attorney General has general charge and conduct of all legal business of the District and all suits initiated by and against the District and is responsible for upholding the public interest. D.C. Code. § 1-301.81.

23. Plaintiff State of Illinois is a sovereign state in the United States of America. Illinois is represented by Attorney General Kwame Raoul, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Illinois.

24. Plaintiff State of Maine is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Maine is represented by its Attorney General, who is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to 5 Me. Rev. Stat. § 191.

25. Plaintiff State of Maryland is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Maryland is represented by Attorney General Anthony G. Brown, who is the chief legal officer of Maryland.

26. Plaintiff the People of the State of Michigan is represented by Attorney General Dana Nessel. The Attorney General is Michigan’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized to bring this action on behalf of the People of the State of Michigan pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 14.28.

27. Plaintiff State of Minnesota is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Minnesota is represented by Attorney General Keith Ellison, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Minnesota.

28. Plaintiff State of Nevada is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Nevada is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General Aaron D. Ford. The Attorney General has the authority to file this suit to protect and secure the interests of the State. NRS 228.170.

29. Plaintiff State of New Jersey is a sovereign state in the United States of America. New Jersey is represented by Attorney General Matthew Platkin, who is the chief law enforcement officer of New Jersey.

30. Plaintiff State of Oregon is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Oregon is represented by Attorney General Dan Rayfield, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Oregon.

31. Plaintiff State of Rhode Island is a sovereign state in the United States of America. Rhode Island is represented by Attorney General Peter F. Neronha, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Rhode Island.

32. Plaintiff State of Vermont is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Vermont is represented by its Attorney General, who is the State’s chief legal officer and authorized to pursue this action on behalf of the State. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 159.

33. Plaintiff State of Washington, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is Washington’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized under Wash. Rev. Code § 43.10.030 to pursue this action.

34. Plaintiff State of Wisconsin is a sovereign state of the United States of America. Wisconsin is represented by Attorney General Josh Kaul, who is the chief law enforcement officer of Wisconsin.

B. Defendants

35. Defendant Linda McMahon is the Secretary of the United States Department of Education and that agency’s highest ranking official. She is charged with the supervision and management of all decisions and actions of the agency. She is sued in her official capacity. 20 U.S.C. § 3412.

36. Defendant the United States Department of Education is a cabinet agency within the executive branch of the United States government that has been created by Congress. 20 U.S.C. § 3411. Defendants United States Department of Education and Linda McMahon are jointly referred to as “Agency Defendants.”

37. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the President of the United States. He is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by Plaintiffs in this action and is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Executive Has No Authority to Incapacitate a Congressionally Created Agency.


38. It is a bedrock constitutional principle that the President and his agencies cannot make law. Rather, they can only—and indeed, they must—implement the laws enacted by Congress, including those statutes that create federal agencies and dictate their duties. The Executive thus can neither outright abolish an agency nor incapacitate it by cutting away the personnel required to implement the agency’s statutorily-mandated duties.

39. Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution enumerates that: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in Congress.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1.

40. “The Framers viewed the legislative power as a special threat to individual liberty, so they divided that power to ensure that ‘differences of opinion’ and the ‘jarrings of parties’ would ‘promote deliberation and circumspection’ and ‘check excesses in the majority.’” Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 223 (2020) (quoting The Federalist No. 70, at 475 (A. Hamilton) and No. 51, at 350).

41. “As Chief Justice Marshall put it, this means that ‘important subjects . . . must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,’ even if Congress may leave the Executive ‘to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.’” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 737 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825)).

42. Congress has exclusive authority to abolish executive agencies, and either redistribute their functions to existing or newly created agencies, or to discontinue their functions. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, §§ 471, 441, and 451(b) (abolishing Immigration and Naturalization Service and transferring its functions to the newlycreated Department of Homeland Security); Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, Division G; 112 Stat. 2681 (abolishing several agencies and consolidating their functions within the Department of State, and creating USAID as an independent executive agency).

43. The Constitution vests executive power in the President. U.S. Const., art. II, § 1. The primary function of the President is understood to be cabined in the “Take Care” clause, which requires that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const., art. II, § 3. Nothing in Article II can be construed to authorize the Executive to dismantle a statutorily created agency directly or indirectly.

44. The Executive has no authority to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998). The Executive does not have, under the Constitution or otherwise, an undefined “inherent” power, even in “emergency” circumstances, to unilaterally decide to ignore statutes. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

45. Indeed, the Executive acts at the “lowest ebb” of his constitutional authority and power when he acts contrary to “the express or implied will of Congress.” Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).

B. The Statutory Framework Authorizing the Department of Education.

46. In 1979, pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress established the Department of Education, and many of its offices, by statute with the enactment of the Department of Education Organization Act. That Act made express findings about the importance of the Department’s mission. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 669 (1979) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3510); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 3411–3427 (offices); id. §§ 3401–3402 (findings and purpose).

47. “[P]rimary responsibility for establishing policy and providing funding for elementary and secondary education rests with the states and instrumentalities therein,” but the Department of Education “has primary responsibility for administering federal elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education programs.” See Rebecca R. Skinner et al., A Summary of Federal Education Laws Administered by the U.S. Department of Education, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Dec. 12, 2024) (hereinafter, “the Skinner Report”).

48. Over time, Congress has enacted more statutes authorizing additional functions for the Department of Education and appropriating additional funds for it to administer. The major statutes administered by the Department (as detailed in the Skinner Report, see id.) include:

a. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The ESEA (Pub. L. 89-10, as amended) was enacted in 1965 and was last reauthorized in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) (Pub. L. 114-95). Title I-A, the largest ESEA program, provides compensatory grants to local educational agencies (LEAs). Congress appropriates funds for ESEA on an annual basis.

b. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In 1975, Congress enacted Pub. L. 94-142 (now known as the IDEA), which authorizes grant programs that support legally-mandated early intervention and special education services for children with disabilities from birth to age 21. The IDEA was last reauthorized in 2004 (Pub. L. 108-446). Over 90% of IDEA funds are appropriated for Part B (Section 611), which provides funding for special education services for school-aged children. The authorization of appropriations for Part B is permanent. Funds for Part C—which authorizes state grants for infants and toddlers with disabilities—and Part D—which authorizes national activities—have been appropriated on an annual basis.

c. Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The HEA (Pub. L. 89-329, as amended) was enacted in 1965. It was last comprehensively reauthorized by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA) (Pub. L. 110-315) and has since been amended multiple times. Title IV of the HEA authorizes a number of student aid programs that assist students with postsecondary education expenses. These include the Federal Pell Grant program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program, and the Federal Work-Study program. The HEA also authorizes programs providing federal support directly to institutions of higher education through Title III and Title V. HEA programs are funded through a combination of discretionary and mandatory appropriations. Mandatory funding for the Direct Loan program is permanently authorized, and mandatory funding for the Federal Pell Grant program is permanently appropriated. Funding continues to be appropriated for other HEA programs annually.

d. Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Pub. L. 93-112, as amended), the Department provides funds to support vocational rehabilitation services primarily through the State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program, which supports services to help individuals with disabilities. Congress continues to appropriate funding for the program annually.

e. Civil Rights Laws. The Department is also charged with enforcing various civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in all programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance (unless otherwise noted). These include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352, as amended); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Pub. L. 92-318, as amended); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Pub. L. 93-112, as amended); the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-135, as amended); and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-336, as amended).

f. Privacy Rights Laws. The Department also enforces laws that protect student privacy rights: (1) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); and (2) the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA).

49. Congress has granted the Secretary of Education limited discretion to reallocate functions within the Department, but that authority is modest, and in no way includes the power to eliminate statutorily-created functions. The Secretary is authorized to “allocate or reallocate functions among the officers of the Department, and to establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue such organizational entities within the Department as may be necessary or appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 3473(a). “[ b]ut the authority of the Secretary” under these provisions “does not extend to: (1) any office, bureau, unit, or other entity transferred to the Department and established by statute or any function vested by statute in such an entity or officer of such an entity, except as provided in subsection (b); (2) the abolition of organizational entities established by this chapter; or (3) the alteration of the delegation of functions to any specific organizational entity required by this chapter.” Id. By statute, there are fourteen offices and programs that may be “consolidate[d], alter[ed], or discontinue[d],” or have their “functions” “reallocate[d]” by the Secretary. Id. § 3473(b)(1). Even then, however, the Secretary must give the congressional committees of jurisdiction “a full and complete statement of the action proposed to be taken pursuant to this subsection and the facts and circumstances relied upon in support of such proposed action,” and then wait ninety days before acting. Id. § 4373(b)(2).

50. Thousands of employees have administered the many programs the Department is mandated to operate. Nothing in the numerous statutes creating the Department and describing its mandated functions can be construed as authorizing the Executive to gut an agency such that it can no longer meet its statutory obligations.

C. Requirements Governing RIFs.

51. The Department may engage in limited restructuring and downsizing of its workforce through a RIF, “an administrative procedure by which agencies eliminate jobs and reassign or separate employees who occupied the abolished positions.” James v. Von Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But the Department’s authority to administer RIFs does not override Congress’s exclusive authority to abolish executive agencies or to discontinue their functions. And an agency cannot use a RIF to unilaterally cease implementing the agency’s statutorily-mandated duties.

52. Consistent with those limits, any federal agency reducing staff pursuant to a RIF must follow specific statutory and regulatory procedures. These include following required retention preferences for employees. “[I]n any reduction in personnel in any civilian service of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings.” James, 284 F.3d at 1314–15; see also 5 U.S.C. § 3502(a).

53. All civilian employees in the executive branch of the federal government, including employees of the Department of Education, are covered by the Office of Personal Management’s (OPM) regulations regarding RIFs. 5 C.F.R. § 351.202(a). All agencies of the federal government are required to follow the OPM regulations “when the agency determines that a [RIF] is necessary.” 5 C.F.R. § 351.204.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

54. The Department of Education operates programs that touch on nearly every aspect and level of education. The Department’s elementary and secondary programs annually serve nearly 18,200 school districts and over 50 million students attending roughly 98,000 public schools and 32,000 private schools, while the Department’s higher education programs provide services and support to more than 12 million postsecondary students.

A. The Department of Education’s Support Across All Spectrums of Education.

55. The Department of Education is among the smallest federal agencies, yet it is charged with performing an immense breadth of work.

The Department’s Support for Birth-to-Grade 12 Educational Programs.

56. In federal fiscal year 2024, the Department directed 25.4% of its total spending to states and local governments. The federal government provides 13.6% of the funding for public K–12 education.

57. The two largest sources of federal funding for schools are Title I funding and IDEA funding. The Department of Education distributes over $18 billion under the Title I program to help support schools with high-poverty populations, providing benefits like extra staff to supplement reading instruction. The Department disburses over $15 billion in IDEA funding, which helps cover the costs of special education.

58. Public education funding varies significantly across states. K–12 schools in Alaska receive the most federal funding per pupil, followed by North Dakota. Utah and Kansas receive the least federal funding per pupil. New York and Massachusetts are among those that receive the least federal funding per pupil. Nevertheless, every state receives considerable federal funding and services from the Department.

59. The K–12 funding provided by the Department supports a wide variety of educational programs and needs: special education, including paying for assistive technology for students with disabilities; the payment of teacher salaries, and benefits, school counselors, and homeless liaisons; the professional development and salaries for special education teachers, paraprofessionals, and reading specialists; transportation to help children receive the services and programming they need; and physical therapy, speech therapy, and social workers.

60. For instance, Department of Education funding supports education of students with disabilities, both in public and private schools. Funding through IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1409, pays for a broad range of special education services required by individualized education programs (IEPs) for students with disabilities attending public schools. IDEA funding also helps school districts pay for the costs of placing students with disabilities who need out-of-district placements in special education schools and programs that can meet their needs. E.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.145– 300.146. IDEA also provides funding for equitable services for students with disabilities attending regular private schools. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130–300.138. IDEA funding helps support the cost of salaries of special education teachers and other service providers who provide direct instruction and services to students with disabilities, such as speech-language pathologists, reading specialists, physical and occupational therapists, audiologists, psychologists, behavioral therapists, deaf and hard of hearing instructors, and other service providers. IDEA funding also supports the cost of augmentative communication equipment and devices for students with disabilities with speech, language or communication impairments. IDEA also funds the costs of providing Extended School Year programs for students with disabilities who need continuous support outside of the academic year to help students maintain their academic, social, behavioral, and communication skills. IDEA funding also supports professional development activities for special education teachers and other service providers who work with students with disabilities to better meet the students’ needs. IDEA funding supports special education instruction and services to students with disabilities who are in institutional settings.

61. The Department of Education also administers grants for various disaster and emergency-related relief and preparations, through the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and the Department’s Disaster Recovery Unit.

62. Department of Education funding also supports early childhood education for children from birth through kindergarten. For instance, the Preschool Development Grant Birth through Five program is a $250 million competitive federal grant designed to improve states’ early childhood systems by building upon existing federal, state, and local early care and learning investments.

The Department’s Role in Providing Administrative and Substantive Services for Birth-to-Grade 12 Education.

63. The Department of Education’s statutory mission includes promoting “improvements in the quality and usefulness of education through federally supported research, evaluation and sharing of information.” 20 U.S.C. § 3402(4).

64. To that end, the Department of Education gathers data, identifies best practices in pedagogy, and disseminates that research to educators and others. The Department also operates several National Centers housed within the Institute of Education Sciences, all of which conduct research, collect and analyze data, and provide technical assistance to educators, parents, students, policymakers, and the general public on a range of topics aimed at improving academic achievement for all children and ensuring the effectiveness of educational programs. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 3419, 9511(a) (establishing the Institute of Education Sciences); 20 U.S.C. § 9531(a) (establishing a National Center for Educational Research); 20 U.S.C. § 9541(a) (establishing the National Center for Education Statistics); 20 U.S.C. § 9561(a) (establishing the National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance); 20 U.S.C. § 9567(a) (establishing the National Center for Special Education Research). The Department, for example, creates resources to support educators and school districts in meeting academic standards, providing education to children who are English language learners, addressing school safety, bullying, and chronic absenteeism, supporting children with significant behavioral issues, and other important topics.

65. The Department’s Office of English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement and Academic Achievement for Limited English Proficient Students oversees policy for the education needs of linguistically and culturally diverse students. 20 U.S.C. § 3420.

66. The Student Privacy Policy Office implements FERPA and PPRA, both of which specifically mandate the creation of an office and review board to investigate, process, review, and adjudicate violations of the student privacy laws. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(g), 1232h(f).

67. The Department’s Office of Safe and Healthy Schools administers, coordinates and recommends policy for programs such as drug and violence prevention programs, character and civic education, and a variety programs supporting students’ physical and mental health.

68. The Department’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) provides guidance, technical assistance, and oversight of special education requirements under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C § 3417. The Office of Special Education Programs, established within OSERS, administers programs concerning education of children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1402(a).

69. The Department provides guidance relating to the educational rights of students who are homeless under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301– 11481. Similarly, the Department provides guidance regarding protections for students in foster care under the ESSA.

70. The Department collects and publishes data relating to education services across the country. For example, it conducts the Civil Rights Data Collection, through which it compiles and publishes data on a broad range of civil rights related topics that serve as a valuable resource to state educational agencies.

The Department’s Role in Safeguarding Equal Access to Public Education.

71. The Department of Education plays a critical role in safeguarding equal access to public education through transparency and accountability. The Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) was created by Congress and has historically focused on ensuring that schools provide equal access to education across diverse student bodies. 20 U.S.C. § 3413.

72. OCR directs, coordinates, and recommends policy for activities that are designed to, among other things, comply with legislative and regulatory civil rights requirements. For example, in May 2022, OCR announced proposed amendments to the Department of Education’s regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. U.S. Department of Education Announces Intent to Strengthen and Protect Rights for Students with Disabilities by Amending Regulations Implementing Section 504 (May 2022), available at https://www.ed.gov/about/ed-offices/ocr/news-room#2022. As part of that process, OCR sought and considered written suggestions from the public about how best to improve the current regulations. Id. In 2024, OCR also promulgated regulations implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, restoring strong protections against sexual harassment and assault and reinforcing critical protections for LGBTQ+ students. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 89 Fed. Reg. 33,474 (Apr. 29, 2024).

73. OCR is charged with enforcing and investigating alleged violations of various federal civil rights laws that protect students against discrimination, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. OCR has a responsibility to act in a reasonably prompt manner in response to alleged violations of these laws.

74. In FY 2024, OCR reviewed the highest volume of complaints ever, totaling 22,687 complaints. U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, 2024 Fiscal Year Annual Report (2024), available at https://www.ed.gov/media/document/ocr-r ... education- 2024-109012.pdf. That number represented an 18% increase over a previous record high in FY 2023 of 19,201 complaints. Id.

75. In addition to their enforcement and investigative work, OCR has provided trainings and technical assistance to state educational agencies and local educational agencies on civil rights laws. For example, OCR provided training to state and local educational agencies regarding digital accessibility of websites and other electronic documents for individuals who have disabilities, including blindness.

The Department’s Administration of Higher Education Programs and the Federal Student Loan System.

76. The federal student loan programs administered under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, are central components of the financial aid provided to students in Plaintiff States. These programs are designed to provide critical assistance to prospective students and expand access to higher education to students who could not otherwise afford to pursue a degree or certificate.

77. The Department manages the federal student loan system through its Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), which handles loan disbursement, servicing and borrower assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1018.

78. Included in this system is the administration of Pell Grants, work-study programs and subsidized loans. The Department awards more than $120 billion a year in grants, work-study funds, and low-interest loans to approximately 13 million students. Much of this funding is sent directly to colleges and universities, including public colleges and universities in the Plaintiff States. If Program Participation Renewals are not processed in a timely manner, it could impact the ability of institutions to operate and most of their student to attend the institution by functionally eliminating the availability of financial aid.

79. The Office of Federal Student Aid develops the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form and processes, with vendors, more than 17.6 million FAFSA forms each year. The deadline for applicants to submit their FAFSA forms is June 30, 2025, although many students submit their FAFSA forms earlier, as their decision about whether they can afford to attend college and, if so, which college, is necessarily dependent on learning what financial aid they qualify for. If FAFSA forms are not processed on time, this will mean that many students may seek to delay their decisions about which college to attend, and many students will decide to postpone attending college, for a year or indefinitely.

80. While the Department distributes this funding to institutions of higher education, it also ensures that the institutions receiving Title IV funding are financially responsible. The Secretary of Education determines the standard of financial responsibility and enforces it as required under the HEA. When something happens that could affect an institution’s financial responsibility, the institution is required to notify the Department within 21 days. If such notifications are no longer monitored by the Department, institutions that continue to receive Title IV funding could engage in wasteful or unnecessary spending without repercussion.

81. Under the HEA, the Department enforces the requirement that institutions of higher education provide counseling to new students as well as graduating students with information about debt management and repayment. If the Department ceased enforcement of these programs, it would become substantially more difficult to ensure that institutions provide this counseling. Accordingly, students could lose the opportunity to make informed decisions about their student loan debt, or could even become unwitting victims of predatory lending.

82. The Department’s responsibilities are not just financial. The Department manages large-scale data collection and enforcement which would not be possible on a state-by-state basis. Such data are described in various Congressional Acts and often implicate campus safety. Collecting this vital data across states, and therefore monitoring nationwide trends, would be infeasible for individual states to perform and would thereby go unenforced.

83. For instance, the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery Act”) also requires colleges and universities to disclose, via an annual report, certain crimes that occur in certain places if they are reported to certain people. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092; 34 CFR 668.46. If the Department no longer processed the notice and reports made under this and other statutes, colleges and universities would lose a valuable partner in supporting their compliance with these reporting requirements and in interpreting and responding to the information gathered, which in turn would impede the ability of colleges and universities to keep their campus safe.

84. Similarly, the Department enforces reporting and compliance of campus safety with regard to drug and alcohol use under the Drug Free Schools and Communities Act and the HEA. These statutes require institutions of higher education to maintain policies surrounding illegal drug and alcohol use, and to determine the number of drug- and alcohol-related violations and fatalities associated with the institution. The Department collects this information from institutions and ensures compliance. Were the Department to cease enforcement of these Acts, institutions would no longer need to monitor and report this data, impacting campus safety.

85. The Violence Against Women Act requires the Secretary of Education to nationally survey reports of sexual and domestic violence or harassment across institutes of higher education. The Secretary of Education is required to report the data biennially, which institutions receiving federal funding must in turn publish (at a campus level) on their websites. This allows current or prospective students to make informed decisions regarding their place of education. Were the Department to cease collection of this information, not only would campus safety be affected by the lack of enforcement, but the Secretary of Education would be in violation of the Violence Against Women Act.

86. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) is enforced by the Department. It requires that institutions of higher education allow students to inspect their records, and that institutions obtain written request before sharing such records with external personnel. Lack of enforcement of FERPA places students’ data security and private records at risk.

87. The Department’s Office of Postsecondary Education is responsible for formulating federal postsecondary education policy and administering programs to support of increased access to quality postsecondary education. 20 U.S.C. § 3415.

88. The Department is also responsible for vital aspects of higher education accreditation. The accreditation of institutions of higher education is a joint process between the educational institutions, states, the Department, and third-party accreditation authorities. Accreditation ensures that educational institutions meet certain standards for quality and assures students that a degree from that institution has and will continue to have value in the workplace. The Department is responsible for reviewing the accreditation standards of agencies that review programs and institutions of higher education. While some accrediting agencies work without Department of Education recognition, these agencies need not conform to any standards of quality or integrity. Without Department-recognized accreditation, institutions of higher education may engage in profit-seeking behaviors without relating any educational benefits to students. Many unaccredited institutions are profit-hungry “diploma mills,” which lack external quality control or educational standards and whose diplomas are therefore meaningless to the job market and worthless to graduates.

The Department’s Programs Supporting Vocational Education and Rehabilitation.

89. The Department of Education provides both vocational education and vocational rehabilitation services to help individuals gain skills for employment and support those with disabilities in finding and maintaining jobs.

90. The Department’s Office of Vocational and Adult Education oversees programs that assist adults with obtaining a high school diploma or the equivalent and support them in their pursuit of postsecondary, career, or technical education.

91. The Department’s Office of Career, Technical, and Adult Education (OCTAE) administers and coordinates programs related to career and technical education, adult education and literacy, and community colleges for advancing workforce development. 20 U.S.C. § 3416.

92. OCTAE’s Division of Academic and Technical Education (DATE) is responsible for helping adult students acquire academic and technical skills to be prepared for high-skill, highwage, or high-demand occupations.

93. DATE administers formula and discretionary grant programs under the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act (Perkins V), 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2414, which is the primary source of federal funding for career and technical education. DATE also provides assistance to states to improve program quality, implementation, and accountability, and establish national initiatives that help states implement rigorous career and vocational education programs.

94. DATE also administers the Perkins Collaborative Resource Network, which provides resources and tools for state directors and state staff who administer career and technical education programs.

95. OCTAE’s Division of Adult Education and Literacy (DAEL) administers adult education and literacy programs that help adults acquire the basic skills they need including reading, writing, math, English language proficiency, and problem-solving. The Office of Correctional Education, which coordinates efforts to support educational opportunities in correctional settings, is also located in DAEL.

96. DAEL administers formula grant programs to adults under the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) and Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 3271–3333; 29 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3361. These programs provide assistance to states to improve program quality, accountability, and capacity, and establish national leadership activities to enhance the quality of adult education.

97. OCTAE provides national leadership to strengthen the role of community colleges in expanding access to postsecondary education for youth and adults and advancing workforce development.

98. OCTAE’s community college initiatives are designed to build public support for community colleges as centers of innovation and providers of excellent education and training that are affordable and accessible to all Americans, facilitate the dissemination of timely and actionable guidance on community college educations for teachers, administrators, students, parents, and employers, and promote the development of strategies that support students in the completion of their postsecondary certification and degree programs.

99. The Department of Education also provides critical vocational rehabilitation services and funding for individuals with disabilities through its Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA), a component of the Department’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS). 29 U.S.C. § 702. RSA provides leadership and resources to assist state and other agencies in providing vocational rehabilitation and other services to individuals with disabilities to maximize their employment, independence, and integration into the community and the competitive labor market.

100. The Rehabilitation Services Administration funds and administers many programs, including disability employment programs, an independent living program, technical assistance centers, training programs, and disability innovation fund programs.

101. Two disability employment programs—the State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program and the State Supported Employment Services Program—provide formula grants to states to provide employment services for individuals with disabilities.

102. The State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program is authorized by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended by Title IV of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. This program provides grants to assist states in operating statewide vocational rehabilitation programs, each of which is an integral part of a statewide workforce development system.

103. The State Supported Employment Services Program is authorized by Title VI of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended by Title IV of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. This program provides grants to assist states in developing and implementing collaborative programs with appropriate entities to provide supported employment services for individuals with the most significant disabilities, including youth with the most significant disabilities, who require supported employment services following the achievement of a supported employment outcome.

104. Supported employment grant funds are used to supplement funds provided under the State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program to provide supported employment services. Program funds may be used to provide supported employment services, once an individual has been placed in supported employment, for up to 24 months and to supplement other vocational rehabilitation services necessary to help individuals with the most significant disabilities find work in the integrated labor market.

105. The Rehabilitation Services Administration also provides Independent Living Services for Older Individuals Who Are Blind formula grants to states under Title VII, Chapter II of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by Title IV of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, to support services for individuals age 55 or older whose severe visual impairment makes competitive employment difficult to obtain but for whom independent living goals are feasible.

106. The Rehabilitation Services Administration further provides critical technical assistance, training programs, and disability innovation fund programs to states supported through discretionary grants.

107. Certain technical assistance centers provide training and technical assistance to states and state agencies including those that ensure: that transition-age youth with disabilities receive high-quality education services, state agencies are trained to provide adequate vocational rehabilitation services to individuals who are blind, the increase in number and quality of employment outcomes for individuals with disabilities.

108. The Rehabilitation Services Administration also provides training programs and assistance to states. For example, it administers training programs to help fund undergraduate and graduate programs in the field of rehabilitation and training programs for the use of braille for personnel providing vocational rehabilitation services or education services to youth and adults who are blind. They also allow new and innovative training programs to improve methods of training rehabilitation personnel for more effective delivery of rehabilitation services.

109. The Rehabilitation Services Administration also provides funds through Disability Innovation Fund Programs (“Disability Innovation Fund”) to state agencies to conduct innovative activities aimed at improving outcomes for individuals with disabilities. For example, these funds allow evidence-based practices for individuals with disabilities to advance in high-demand and high-quality careers, foster partnerships among agencies, evaluate new or substantially improved model strategies to transition youth and adults with disabilities to competitive integrated employment, and increase the opportunity for Subminimum Wage to Competitive Integrated Employment program participants to obtain competitive integrated employment.

The Department’s Administration of Impact Aid.

110. Because school districts rely heavily on local property taxes for funding, property tax exemptions on federal land create funding shortages for neighboring school districts. The Impact Aid program, signed into law by President Harry Truman in 1950 (Pub. L. 815 and Pub. L. 874), is a critical method of ensuring the financial survival of local school districts whose revenue is decreased due to the presence of non-taxable federal land. School districts that are near, or serve students from, military bases, federal lands, federal low-rent housing facilities, and tribal communities lose local revenue because of the presence of these nontaxable federal activities. While these school districts typically continue to receive funding from their states, Impact Aid funding partially reimburses school districts for this loss of locally-derived revenue.

111. The Department is the primary agency responsible for administering Impact Aid payments to local school districts. See ESEA, Title VII, 20 U.S.C. § 7701–7714, 34 C.F.R. § 222. Every year, each school district seeking Impact Aid must submit an application to the Department. Typically this is January 31, though late application deadlines can extend to April 1 with payment of a penalty. The Department reviews the applications and processes payments based on congressional appropriations each fiscal year and allocates funding in multiple installments until all available funds are distributed.

112. Many school districts within the Plaintiff States are heavily dependent on the Department’s effective funding distribution and administration of Impact Aid due to the large amount of nontaxable federal property within their boundaries, as the amount of Impact Aid received by each school district is based on the number of affected students who live on federal property or whose parents work in federal facilities. School districts within Plaintiff States receive hundreds of millions of dollars annually in Impact Aid funding for construction, special education, maintenance, and operations.

113. The Impact Aid Program is the only K–12 Federal education program that is not forward funded. Any delay in either appropriations or administration has an immediate impact on Impact Aid-recipient school districts’ ability to fund day-today operations, instructional expenditures, utility payments or payroll.
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Part 2 of 2

B. The President’s Directive to Dismantle the Department of Education and the Secretary of Education’s Elimination of Nearly Half of the Department’s Workforce.

114. President Trump has publicly described his intention to dismantle the Department of Education. That goal has been plainly and repeatedly stated: President Trump called the Department of Education “a big con job” and declared that he would “like to close it immediately.” See, e.g., Michael C. Bender, Trump Is Said to Be Preparing Order That Aims to Eliminate Education Dept., The New York Times (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/p ... utiveorder. html. He also stated that he would like the newly installed Secretary of Education, Linda McMahon, to put herself “out of a job.” Zachary B. Wolf, Trump and Musk are moving to smother these three pieces of the government, CNN (Feb. 5, 2025) (“I told Linda, ‘Linda, I hope you do a great job in putting yourself out of a job.’ I want her to put herself out of a job – Education Department.”).

115. Secretary McMahon has indicated that she plans to heed this call and break down the Department of Education from within. She affirmed that “President Trump believes that the bureaucracy in Washington should be abolished so that we can return education to the states, where it belongs,” and that she “wholeheartedly support[s] and agree[s] with this mission.” Cochran, McMahon, cited supra ¶ 5. On March 3, 2025, Secretary McMahon asked employees to join her in “perform[ing] one final, unforgettable public service to future generations of students” by dismantling the Department of Education. Secretary McMahon: Our Department’s Final Mission, U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/F7BT-MQ3D.

116. On March 6, 2025, news outlets reported that the White House had drafted an executive order calling on the Secretary of Education to “take all necessary steps to facilitate the closure of the Department of Education (DOE) and return authority over education to the States and local communities, the maximum extent allowed by law.”

117. On March 11, 2025, five days after reports of the draft executive order calling for the Department’s dismantling, the U.S. Department of Education announced that its workforce is being cut virtually in half. The Department described a massive reduction in force (RIF)—as part of its “final mission”—that affects “[a]ll divisions within the Department.” U.S. Department of Education Initiates Reduction in Force, Press Release (Mar. 11, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-rel ... ctionforce.

118. Based on figures provided by the Department, the RIF displaces approximately 1,378 employees, all of whom “will be placed on administrative leave beginning Friday, March 21st.” The total reduction in force to the Department of Education is “roughly” 1,950 people: the approximately 1,378 employees subject to the RIF, the 259 employees that accepted the so-called “Fork in the Road” offer (referred to in the press release as the “Deferred Resignation Program”), and the 313 employees that accepted a “Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment.” The press release states that “[a]fter today’s actions, the Department’s workforce will total roughly 2,183 workers,” an approximately 50% cut from the 4,133 workers the Department of Education had “[w]hen President Trump was inaugurated.”

119. On March 11, 2025, Secretary McMahon stated, during an interview with Laura Ingraham of Fox News, that the workforce reductions were the first steps in dismantling the Department of Education:

Ingraham: Now, is this the first step on the road to a total shutdown?

McMahon: Yes, actually it is, because that was the President’s mandate. His directive to me, clearly, is to shut down the Department of Education, which we know we’ll have to work with Congress, you know, to get that accomplished. But what we did today was to take the first step of eliminating what I think is bureaucratic bloat.


See Fox News Channel, https://www.foxnews.com/video/6369901522112 (televised interview).

120. On information and belief, the RIF devastated important segments of the Department of Education, rendering the agency unable to perform its core functions.

121. On information and belief, almost the entire staff of the Institute of Education Sciences has been eliminated.

122. On information and belief, the majority of staff in the Office for Civil Rights have been eliminated or otherwise removed. The Office for Civil Rights, created by Congress and codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3413, enforces federal civil rights laws in schools and other recipients of Department of Education funding, and directs, coordinates, and recommends policy for activities that are designed to administer the provisions of legislation and Departmental policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age. Regional offices of the Office for Civil Rights in Boston, San Francisco, Cleveland, New York, Chicago, Dallas, and Philadelphia have been eliminated and closed, with employees terminated in each of those offices.

123. The cuts to the Office for Civil Rights will have deep impacts on the Department of Education’s ability to carry out its vital work. Given that the RIF heavily impacted investigative staff, on information and belief the cuts will force remaining investigators to nearly double their caseloads, severely limiting meaningful investigation of discrimination in schools.

124. On information and belief, the Office of General Counsel has also been gutted, with many divisions eliminated and approximately three-quarters of OGC’s staff terminated. One such eliminated division, the Ethics Division, is responsible for counseling current and past Department employees on ethics matters. On information and belief, the Office of General Counsel advised offices and units across the Department and its effective gutting will negatively impact the Department’s ability to perform statutory functions.

125. On information and belief, all OGC attorneys specializing in K–12 grants, IDEA grants, and equity grants have been terminated. The RIF has also resulted in the termination of most OGC attorneys focused on privacy issues.

126. On information and belief, the RIF has had a material impact on the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services, which serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary on Departmental matters related to special education and rehabilitative services. See 20 U.S.C. § 3417. In particular, the RIF may hamstring OSERS activities related to policy, program and strategic planning, regulations, evaluation, and grant activities.

127. On information and belief, the RIF has also effectively eliminated the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education’s State and Grantee Relations Team, which partners with stakeholders and connects them to the resources and relationships they need to support and educate students nationally.

128. On information and belief, the RIF has also seriously impacted the Department of Education’s FSA. FSA directs, coordinates, and recommends policies for programs that are designed to provide financial assistance to eligible students enrolled in postsecondary educational institutions. This assistance includes grants, loans, and work-study assistance to nearly 12.9 million students through approximately 6,100 postsecondary institutions.

129. Upon information and belief, given the impending challenges of students facing renewed payments following the pandemic, the Department employed contractors to help borrowers weather the resumed payments. Even prior to the RIF, it was reported on March 7, that “the agency hasn’t been able to provide any communication to schools, servicers, or borrowers about how to navigate the changes that are coming.” https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/07/poli ... tion-trump. “And many staffers with institutionalized knowledge about the aid programs have been fired or left.” Id.

130. In a public LinkedIn post, the Executive Director of the newly formed Office of Loan Portfolio Management at Federal Student Aid wrote:

When I accepted the position two months ago, I dove in, putting together a strategy for tackling the challenges that I knew would come with managing a group of 200 dedicated public servants and shepherding 43M borrowers back into our complex repayment environment after a long payment pause and on-ramp. But now, I have lost many of those 200 staff, with more to come. I spend my days justifying our existence, our dignity, and our mission. I try to keep the work going in spite of the impossible environment we find ourselves in. I'm afraid of what the coming days, weeks, months, years will bring not just for me and the Department, but for the borrowers we serve. I've dedicated my career to the work of supporting college affordability and a student aid system that supports our most vulnerable, and it is heartbreaking to see that dissolving before my eyes. I'm not sure what the future will bring, but as always, I’m here to fight, to work for the mission, to do the right thing.


https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/ur ... 3838350337.

131. On information and belief, within FSA, the RIF has resulted in the termination of many of the Department’s employees in the School Eligibility and Oversight Services Group, which is responsible for administering a program of eligibility, certification, financial analysis, and oversight of schools participating in Federal Student Aid programs. In order to receive Federal Student Aid funds, schools must remain compliant with Title IV requirements and submit to audits which confirm compliance. Department employees responsible for Title IV oversight ensure compliance, process auditing results, and release Title IV funding timely.

132. On information and belief, the RIF has effectively eliminated FSA’s Vendor Oversight Division, which oversees and assists federal student loan servicers. The Vendor Oversight Division is responsible for ensuring that loan servicers fulfill their contracts while meeting Department requirements. When such requirements are not met, it is responsible for enforcing corrective action. For example, when the Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri (MOHELA) failed to comply with its contractual requirements after the return to repayment in August 2023, including mismanaging borrower accounts, the Department imposed a corrective action plan on MOHELA, which the Vendor Oversight Division is responsible for overseeing and defending. The Vendor Oversight Division also plays a key role in verifying compliance with the requirements of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program and the Income-Based Repayment plan before instructing federal loan servicers to discharge a student’s debt under these programs.

133. On information and belief, the RIF has eliminated key staff members in FSA’s Product Management Group, including those responsible for the online income-driven repayment application, Direct Loan Consolidation application, and PSLF Help Tool, which enables borrowers to certify their qualifying employment for the PSLF Program.

134. In sum, on information and belief, the RIF has so severely impaired the Department of Education that it can no longer function, and cannot comply with its statutory requirements.

C. The Incapacitation of the Department of Education Will Cause Grave Harm to the States and Their Residents.

135. The effective gutting of the Department of Education will result in a wide range of devastating harms for Plaintiff States and their residents that could be neither prevented nor mitigated.

136. The Directive and RIF will result in the loss of or delays in Department funding and supports impacting nearly every aspect of K–12 education in the Plaintiff States because there will be such a significant reduction in staff. These impacts will include teacher shortages from the loss in salary funding, which in turn will result in increased class sizes. The impacts will also include a loss of professional development and salaries for special education teachers, paraprofessionals, reading specialists, physical therapists, speech therapists, and social workers, which in turn will result in lost educational opportunities for students that cannot be recovered or remedied. Without Department of Education financial support, states will lose critical services from special education students and students with IEPs. States would lose funding for assistive technology for students with disabilities, and funding for transportation to help children receive the services and programming they need. The dismantling of the Department will also result in the termination of afterschool programs.

137. Regardless of what alternative resources are put in the place of the Department of Education, the process of the Department’s dismantling will create and has created chaos, disruption, uncertainty, delays and confusion for Plaintiff States and their residents. States anticipating federal fund disbursements do not know whether staff will be employed and able to be contacted regarding those disbursements. Students at state universities do not know whether their federal student aid packages will be timely processed and made available before the Fall 2025 semester begins.

138. For instance, on March 12, 2025, the day after the RIF was announced, the Department’s website for administering the distribution of federal funds (referred to as the “G6” system) became unavailable. G6 was the Department system used for managing federal funds, and allowed schools to request payments, adjust drawdowns, and return cash to the Department for many Title IV programs. On March 12, the website for the G6 system stated: “G6.ed.gov will no longer exist, G5.gov will be the correct URL. To access G5, external users should enter their G5 email ID and their G5 email password.”

139. When certain users then attempted to then access the G5.gov system for the distribution of federal funds, the G5 website announced:

ALERT: Due to severe staffing restraints, you can expect delays in connecting to a live help desk agent for assistance with G5. We recommend sending an email to [email protected] with a summary of your issue or question. The next available agent during normal business hours will respond to your email in the order it was received.


140. On March 12, 2025, a user of the G5 system from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education attempted to access the G5 system in order to process a request for anticipated disbursements of federal funds, but was unable to access the G5 system for hours. The user was told that the G5 system was experiencing a “system glitch.”

141. The harms from the dismantling of the Department go beyond systems breakdowns and unresponsive administrators.

142. On information and belief, the dismantling of the Department has more than decimated the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Without a functioning OCR, school districts in Plaintiff States may be emboldened to restrict access to quality education and ignore complaints of discrimination or hate against students based on race, gender identity, disability status, religion, and immigration status. Students with current complaints will likely see no meaningful resolution, with cases backlogged due to the shortage of employees to resolve them. Students facing discrimination, sexual harassment, or sexual assault will lose a critical avenue to report their case.

143. On information and belief, the dismantling of the Department will result in higher costs to attend institutions of higher education. Not only will federal funding for Pell grants, workstudy programs and subsidized loans be at risk, but so too will the Department’s administration of those programs, without which they cannot operate even if they were fully funded. Without these federal programs supporting students of higher education, the cost of pursuing higher education will increase and fewer students will have the opportunity to attend college. For many state university systems, disruption to or loss of Pell grants would be an existential threat, especially to their mission to serve first generation college students.

144. On information and belief, the gutting of the Office of General Counsel that has resulted from the dismantling of the Department will have impacts throughout the Department’s statutory and non-statutory functions. Without the now-eliminated Ethics Division, current Department employees are now deprived of the counseling regarding ethics matters that govern all manner of agency actions affecting Plaintiff States’ participation in Department programs. The termination of all OGC attorneys specializing in K–12 grants, IDEA grants, and equity grants will necessarily impede the Department’s ability to award and administer those grants to Plaintiff States.

145. On information and belief, the RIF’s effective elimination of the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education’s State and Grantee Relations Team signifies the Plaintiff States’ loss of a critical partner in identifying and developing the resources and relationships needed to support and educate students.

146. On information and belief, the RIF’s impacts on the implementation of the Federal Student Aid program will be monumental. By terminating many of the Department’s employees in the School Eligibility and Oversight Services Group, the Department has lost the tool responsible for administering a program of eligibility, certification, financial analysis, and oversight of schools participating in Federal Student Aid programs. Moreover, with the effective elimination of FSA’s Vendor Oversight Division, which oversees and assists federal student loan servicers, Plaintiff States and their students lose tools to help ensure that loan servicers comply with their contractual requirements.

147. On information and belief, in addition to these disruptions of the administration of Federal Student Aid generally is the disruption that will come to the administration of FAFSA applications specifically. With the destruction of these multiple aspects of the FSA program at the Department, the Department is deprived of the administrative systems necessary to administer and process the millions of FAFSA applications the Department receives. Indeed, the dismantling of the Department comes just as the college admissions and decisionmaking process is at its peak, with the FAFSA application deadline merely two and a half months from the RIF. The President’s Directive and the Agency Defendants’ implementation of it has resulted in mass uncertainty regarding whether and how FAFSA applications will be processed, and will result in delays and obstructions in the immediate future.

148. On information and belief, without the Vendor Oversight Division’s verification of compliance with the requirements of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program and the Income-Based Repayment plan, Plaintiff States and their educational institutions are deprived of a system by which loan servicers receive instructions regarding the discharge of student debt under FSA programs.

CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I
Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine – Usurping Legislative Authority
(Against All Defendants)


149. The States reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

150. Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution enumerates that: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in . . . Congress.” U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 1.

151. “The Framers viewed the legislative power as a special threat to individual liberty, so they divided that power to ensure that ‘differences of opinion’ and the ‘jarrings of parties’ would ‘promote deliberation and circumspection’ and ‘check excesses in the majority.’” Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 223 (quoting The Federalist No. 70, at 475 (A. Hamilton) and No. 51, at 350).

152. Thus “‘important subjects . . . must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,’ even if Congress may leave the Executive ‘to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.’” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 737 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825)).

153. The separation of powers doctrine thus represents a central tenet of our Constitution. See, e.g., Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 637–38 (2024); Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 227.

154. Consistent with these principles, the Executive’s powers are limited to those specifically conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes, and do not include any undefined residual or inherent power.

155. Any instance where the President, by Executive Order or otherwise, directs an agency to take an action that runs afoul of a statute or the legislative intent of Congress, violates the Separation of Powers doctrine.

156. Any instance where the President, by Executive Order or otherwise, directs that an agency authorized by Congress to perform statutory duties cease operations, effectively repeals the statutes that authorize that agency and thus violates the Separation of Powers doctrine.

157. Here, where Congress has created the Department of Education, the Executive and his agencies cannot incapacitate it, absent Congressional action that directs them to do so. The Actions challenged herein thus violate Constitutional and statutory mandates, contravene Congressional intent, and are unlawful.

158. This court is authorized to enjoin any action by the Executive and his agencies that “is unauthorized by statute, exceeds the scope of constitutional authority, or is pursuant to unconstitutional enactment.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D.D.C. 1952), aff ’d, 343 U.S. 579.

159. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the States are also entitled to a declaration that the President’s Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation of the Directive violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and impermissibly arrogates to the executive power that is reserved to Congress.

Count II
Violation of the Separation of Powers – Take Care Clause
(Against All Defendants)


160. The States reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

161. The Take Care Clause provides that the executive must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3; UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014) (“Under our system of government, Congress makes the laws and the President . . . faithfully executes them” (quotation and citation omitted)).

162. The Executive violates the Take Care Clause where it declines to execute or otherwise undermines statutes enacted by Congress and signed into law or duly promulgated regulations implementing such statutes. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“the President is without authority to set aside congressional legislation by executive order”); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838) (rejecting argument that by charging the President with faithful execution of the laws, the Take Care clause “implies a power to forbid their execution”).

163. By issuing the Directive to dismantle an agency authorized by Congress, the President has failed to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress in violation of the Take Care Clause.

164. This court is authorized to enjoin any action by the Executive and his agencies that “is unauthorized by statute, exceeds the scope of constitutional authority, or is pursuant to unconstitutional enactment.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 103 F. Supp. at 576, aff ’d, 343 U.S. 579.

165. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the States are also entitled to a declaration that the Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and impermissibly arrogates to the executive power that is reserved to Congress.

Count III
Ultra Vires – Conduct Outside the Scope of
Statutory Authority Conferred on the Executive
(Against All Defendants)


166. The States reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

167. Neither the President nor an agency can take any action that exceeds the scope of their constitutional and/or statutory authority.

168. Federal courts possess the power in equity to grant injunctive relief “with respect to violations of federal law by federal officials.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2015). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed equitable relief against federal officials who act “beyond th[e] limitations” imposed by federal statute. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).

169. Defendants’ conduct in issuing the Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation of it is contrary to law and outside of Defendants’ authority.

170. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the Directive and the Department of Education’s implementation of it is contrary to law and outside of Defendants’ authority.

171. Plaintiff States are further entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Agency Defendants from implementing the Directive.

Count IV
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act – Contrary to Law
(Against Agency Defendants)


172. Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

173. Agency Defendants are “agenc[ies]” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

174. Under the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)–(C).

175. Congress enacted the APA “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 391 (2024) (quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)). In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court clarified that historical principles of “respect” did not equate to deference, and that “Section 706 makes clear that agency interpretations of statutes—like agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled to deference.” Id. at 392 (emphasis in original). Rather, it “remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the law means what the agency says.” Id. (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).

176. An agency may not take any action that exceeds the scope of its constitutional or statutory authority.

177. No constitutional or statutory authority authorizes the Department of Education to refrain from fulfilling its statutory duties, or to violate federal law.

178. An agency likewise may not violate its own regulations. When a federal agency promulgates “[r]egulations with the force and effect of law,” those regulations “supplement the bare bones” of federal statutes. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954). “It is an abecedarian principle of administrative law that agencies must comply with their own regulations.” Manguriu v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). An agency’s action may be set aside pursuant to the APA if the action violates the agency’s own procedures, particularly if that error prejudices the interest of a person before the agency. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Town of Weymouth, Mass. v. Mass. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 961 F.3d 34, 47 (1st Cir. 2020), on reh’g, 973 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[A]n agency action may be set aside as arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to ‘comply with its own regulations.’” (quoting Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

179. The Agency Defendants lack authority to implement the Directive as it calls for actions that are not authorized by statute, and are in direct contravention of statutory authority governing the creation and operation of the Department of Education. The Agency Defendants also lack authority to use a RIF to override the limitations on their own power to dismantle statutorilymandated agency functions. These agency actions are unauthorized, unprecedented, and not entitled to deference by this Court.

180. In enacting the Directive, the Agency Defendants have acted contrary to the applicable regulations governing the administration of Department functions.

181. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the Agency Defendants lack legal authority to implement the Directive, contrary to congressional directive and intent, and have, in so doing, acted contrary to law, outside of statutory authority, and in violation of the APA.

182. Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of the Department of Education’s implementation of the Directive, and a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the Agency Defendants from implementing the Directive.

Count V
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act –
Arbitrary & Capricious and an Abuse of Discretion
(Against Agency Defendants)


183. Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

184. Defendants include “agenc[ies]” under the APA 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

185. The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

186. An agency action is arbitrary or capricious where it is not “reasonable and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). An agency must provide “a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

187. That “reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public.” Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019). Agencies may not rely on explanations that are “contrived” or “incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process.” Id.

188. An action is also arbitrary and capricious if the agency “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem” before it. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 591 U.S. 1, 25 (2020) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43).

189. The Department’s mass RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Department provided no reasoned basis or explanation for its mass RIF.

190. The Department’s RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Agency Defendants failed to consider the consequences of their actions.

191. The Department’s RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Department’s stated reasons for the RIF—to promote “efficiency” and “accountability” —are pretext for the President and Secretary McMahon’s stated goal of dismantling the Department from within.

192. The Department’s RIF is arbitrary and capricious because the Agency Defendants’ actions impede their ability to perform the Department’s functions, both those that are required by statute and those that are not.

193. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the Agency Defendants’ actions implementing the Directive violate the APA because they are arbitrary and capricious.

194. Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of the Agency Defendants’ implementation of the Directive pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, and a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Agency Defendants from implementing the Directive.

195. Under the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)–(C).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff States pray that this Court:

i. Issue a judicial declaration that President Trump’s Directive to dismantle the Department of Education, and the Department of Education’s implementation of the Directive are unlawful because they violate the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act;

ii. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, vacate Agency Defendants’ actions implementing President Trump’s Directive to dismantle the Department of Education;

iii. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Agency Defendants from implementing President Trump’s Directive to dismantle the Department of Education, including through ordering a reduction in force;

iv. Award the Plaintiff States their reasonable fees, costs, and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and

v. Grant other such relief as this Court may deem proper.

Dated: March 13, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL
Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
By: /s/ Katherine Dirks

Katherine Dirks (BBO No. 673674)
Chief State Trial Counsel
Yael Shavit (BBO No. 695333)
Chief, Consumer Protection Division
Elizabeth Carnes-Flynn (BBO No. 687708)
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Assistant Attorneys General
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Boston, MA 02108
(617) 963-2277
[email protected]
[email protected]
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LETITIA JAMES
Attorney General for the State of New York

By: /s/ Rabia Muqaddam
Rabia Muqaddam*
Special Counsel for Federal Initiatives
Molly Thomas-Jensen*
Gina Bull*
Special Counsel
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Attorney General for the State of Hawaiʻi

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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Thu Mar 13, 2025 10:32 pm

What Every American Can Do To Fight DOGE
by Marc Elias and Jamie Raskin
Democracy Docket
Mar 13, 2025 Defending Democracy — Complete Podcast

[Marc Elias] So let me start with something that I don't understand. So you got Article I of the Constitution, which is the Congress, and lays out Congress's power; and you got Article II, which lays out the Executive Branch's power; and you got Article III that lays out the Judicial branch. And I think the Founders had in mind that the most powerful of these branches would actually be the first, would be Article I, right? It would be Congress. And that it would jealously guard its authority -- particularly its ability to spend money, and its ability to issue taxes -- that it would jealously guard this power from a rapacious Executive. That does not seem to be happening. So what do you make of this? Either put on your Constitutional law hat, or put on your member of Congress hat, but what do you make of this?

[Jamie Raskin] Well, in one sense, this is a decades-long process of erosion of Congressional lawmaking power. But this is a dramatic and sudden jump into the unknown, with the President basically defying Congress in Congressional statutes and Appropriations at every turn. But to go back to the beginning, Marc, look, we had a revolution against a king, against a monarch. The first three words of the Constitution are, "We the people." And then, after you get through our beautiful Preamble, it leads right into the creation of Article I: "All legislative power is vested in the Congress of the United States." The sovereign power of the People to create the Constitution flows right into the Congressional power of lawmaking. And you know, Article I lays out everything, from regulating Commerce domestically and internationally, to the power to declare war, budgets, taxes, you name it. And even in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, all other powers necessary and proper to the execution of the forgoing powers, right?

Then you get to Article II. My colleague, Jim Jordan's, been running around TV saying that Article II says, in the first sentence, "All Executive power is vested in the President." Yeah, that's true, but what is the executive power, right? When you get past commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy in times of actual conflict, or when the militia's been mobilized, what's the core job of the President? "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." That's it. "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Articles of Confederation didn't even have a President, right? And then they thought that that was too inefficient, and there was nobody to keep things going to, you know, move the bureaucracy when Congress wasn't in town. And then the President was created, but very clearly in a secondary position. As Madison put it in the Federalist Papers, "The legislative branch is the predominant branch of government."

So sometimes my colleagues will get up, even Democrats will say, "We're three co-equal branches of government." And I just want to say, first of all, "co-equal" is not even a word, okay? You know, that's like extremely unique, or something like that. Secondly, the claim that we have three equal branches is just ridiculous. I mean, when you get to Article II, you've got four short sections. One section is all about how you impeach a President for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. If we're co-equal, or equal, or equivalent, or whatever, why do we have the power to impeach and try and convict a president, and he doesn't have the power to impeach and try and convict us? The framers were clearly a lot more afraid of a President purporting to be a King, or arrogating the powers of a dictator, than it was afraid of Congress; all of the people, coming from this great huge, vast, diverse country, from different points of views, and working together, and split between the House and the Senate with bicameralism. So, as you know, Washington told Jefferson in that famous anecdote,

There is a tradition that Jefferson coming home from France, called Washington to account at the breakfast-table for having agreed to a second, and, as Jefferson thought, unnecessary legislative Chamber.

"Why," asked Washington, "did you just now pour that coffee into your saucer, before drinking?"

"To cool it," answered Jefferson, "my throat is not made of brass."

"Even so," rejoined Washington, "we pour our legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it."


It's like, you know, pouring your tea from the cup into the saucer so it can cool off a little bit, right? And the Senate is supposed to allow the passions and tempers of the House of Representatives to cool off a little bit. But in any event, Congress is the lawmaking branch. We also have the power of the purse. We've got the power to spend, right? And you know this Marc, an Appropriations Act is just another federal law. It's like a law against assaulting Federal officers. And they should show more respect for both the law against assaulting Federal officers, and for an Appropriations Act. An Appropriations Act is not a budgetary recommendation, or a point of negotiation, or a bargaining chip with the President. It's a law you follow. The law "To take care that the laws are faithfully executed." So do your job, yeah?  

-- What Every American Can Do To Fight DOGE, by Marc Elias and Jamie Raskin, Democracy Docket, Mar 13, 2025

Maryland Congressman Jamie Raskin joins Defending Democracy to discuss the state of democracy, how Republicans are ceding their constitutional powers and the one action every American should do to protest DOGE.



Transcript

Donald Trump has seized congress's
constitutional power but Republican
leaders are giving it to him
representative Jamie Rasin is here to
discuss welcome back to defending
democracy I'm Mark Elias let's get
started Congressman Rasin welcome back
to defending democracy uh thank you for
having me Mark delighted to be with you
of course all right so I need everyone
to hear from you because you are both
the foremost uh scholar in the Congress
about congressional power the
Constitution executive branch power and
also you're just a super smart member of
Congress who understands how the body
works.

So let me start with something
that I don't understand. So you got
Article I of the Constitution, which
is the Congress, and lays out Congress's
power; and you got Article II, which lays out
the Executive Branch's power; and you got
Article III that lays out the
Judicial branch. And I think the Founders
had in mind that the most powerful of
these branches would actually be the
first, would be Article I, right? It would
be Congress. And that it would jealously
guard its authority -- particularly its ability to
spend money, and its ability to
issue taxes -- that it would jealously
guard this power from a rapacious
Executive. That does not seem to be
happening. So what do you make of this?
Either put on your Constitutional law
hat, or put on your member of Congress
hat, but what do you make of this?

[Jamie Raskin] Well, in
one sense, this is a decades-long process
of erosion of Congressional lawmaking
power. But this is a dramatic and
sudden jump into the unknown, with the
President basically defying Congress in
Congressional statutes and
Appropriations at every turn. But to go
back to the beginning, Marc, look, we had
a revolution against a king, against a
monarch. The first three words of the
Constitution are, "We the people." And then,
after you get through our beautiful
Preamble, it leads right into the
creation of Article I: all legislative
power is vested in the Congress of the
United States. The sovereign power of the
People to create the Constitution flows
right into the Congressional power of
lawmaking. And you know, Article I lays
out everything, from regulating Commerce
domestically and internationally, to the
power to declare war, budgets, taxes,
you name it. And even in Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 18, all other powers
necessary and proper to the execution of
the forgoing powers right?

Then you get
to Article II. My colleague, Jim
Jordan's, been running around TV saying
that Article II says, in the first
sentence, "All executive power is vested
in the president." Yeah, that's true, but
what is the executive power, right? When
you get past commander-in-chief of the
Army and Navy in times of actual
conflict, or when the militia's been
mobilized, what's the core job of the
President? "To take care that the laws are
Faithfully executed." That's it. "To take care that the
laws are Faithfully executed." The
Articles of Confederation didn't even
have a President, right? And then they
thought that that was too inefficient, and
there was nobody to keep things going
and to, you know, move the bureaucracy
when Congress wasn't in town. And then
the President was created. But very
clearly in a secondary position. As
Madison put it in the Federalist Papers,
the legislative branch is the
predominant branch of government.
So
sometimes my colleagues will get up, even
Democrats will say, "We're three co-equal
branches of government." And I just want
to say, first of all, "co-equal" is not even
a word, okay? You know, that's like
extremely unique, or something like that.
Secondly, the claim that we have three equal
branches is just ridiculous. I mean, when
you get to Article II, you've got four
short sections. One section is all about
how you impeach a President for treason,
bribery, and other high crimes and
misdemeanors. If we're co-equal, or
equal, or equivalent, or whatever, why do
we have the power to impeach and try and
convict a president, and he doesn't have
the power to impeach and try and convict
us? The framers were clearly a lot more
afraid of a President
purporting to be a King, or arrogating
the powers of a dictator, than it was
afraid of Congress; all of the people,
coming from this great huge, vast, diverse
country, from different points of views,
and working together, and split
between the House and the Senate with
bicameralism. So, as you know, Washington
told Jefferson in that famous anecdote,
It's like, you know, pouring your tea
from the saucer into the cup so it can
cool off a little bit right. And the
Senate is supposed to allow the
passions and tempers of the House of
Representatives to cool off a little bit.
But in any event, Congress is the
lawmaking Branch. We also have the power
of the purse. We've got the power to
spend, right? And you know this Marc, an
Appropriations Act is just another
federal law. It's like a law against
assaulting Federal
officers. And they should show more
respect for both the law against
assaulting Federal officers, and for an
Appropriations act. Appropriations Act is
not a budgetary
recommendation, or a point of negotiation,
or a bargaining chip with the president.
It's a law you follow. The law to take care
that the laws are Faithfully executed; do
your job, yeah?


[Marc Elias] And I want to emphasize
one thing you said uh and and add a
little bit to it you know you point out
that the impeachment power both for
article one and article three the
Judiciary rests solely with Congress and
there is no parallel. The
president cannot remove members of
Congress. The Judiciary can't actually
remove members of Congress. People always
ask me you know why is it that you know
so and so can be convicted of a crime and
they can still run for Congress; so they
can still be in Congress. And the answer
is because only Congress can decide who
in more specifically each chamber decide
its members and there is an opinion that
is according to the Constitution that's
the qualifications Clause correct the
qualifications clause and I was about to
say there's actually very um uh
insightful uh opinion by then circuit
court judge Scalia later Justice Scalia
in which he basically says that this is
a power that is rest that the power to
remove members of Congress rest solely
with their B their members under the
qualifications clause and that it has to
be that way and he explains why it has
to be that way because you could not
have member you could not have the
ability to destroy Congress uh rest any
place else uh by through its
qualifications and that that is uniquely
because of Congress that's uniquely
because of the place Congress plays in
the in the Constitutional scheme so I
agree with all of that but answer me
this that is all true as a matter of
constitutional law why is that not a
matter of political will right now I
mean if you are the speaker of the house
you are the third to in line to the
presiden of United States I mean it was
you know I I am you know old enough to
remember all the way back to Nancy
Pelosi being the speaker and speakers
before and you know she was as tough as
they come um and you know could be uh
could be a partisan but she jealously
guarded Congressional prerogatives even
against democratic presidents and that
was true with tip O'Neal it was true you
know I'd say even with the new ginges of
the world uh you know why has why has
that changed like why is Speaker Johnson
just not willing to assert house
prerogatives because it really is even
within Congress the house has certain
prerogatives that the Senate doesn't
have and why is he so willing to just
say well whatever Donald Trump wants
like that's just the way it is part of
the answer to that is the ethical
collapse of the Republican Party um we
saw what happened to anyone who
dissented were
opposed Donald Trump's autocratic
Ambitions we saw what happened to Liz
jany we saw what happened to Adam k ger
Mitt Romney you name it I mean there
were 10 Republican house members uh who
voted to impeach there were seven
Republican Senators who voted to convict
and the vast majority of them are gone
um and that's almost Donald Trump's uh
prominant uh motivation I mean probably
after making whatever money he can make
in office it is making sure that
everybody follows him that's more
important to him than even being in the
majority he wants to have absolute
control control over their party so part
of that you know does demonstrate the
the complete
deterioration of GOP ethics and support
for uh Congress as a branch I mean
Madison really thought that members of
Congress would identify with legislative
interests and the Judiciary would defend
zealously the judicial interest and the
executive the executive interest but
what we have now is people who are loyal
to
uh the institution of the political
party before the formal constitutional
institutions in some sense um this has
been a dynamic and a problem since the
very beginning of the Republic I mean
our constitution was written famously
against political parties political
parties aren't mentioned in the
Constitution much less a two-party
system um their existence is implied or
Allowed by the First Amendment to the
Constitution with Association and
assembly and speech and so on um but
from the very beginning political
parties began to form in the country you
know the Federalists and the Democratic
Republicans and so there's always been
that partisan or factional Spirit as the
FR Founders described it but it's really
gone off the deep end uh at this point
where you've got one party that would uh
Elevate its own interests and its own
agenda above the Constitution itself
and uh you know that's why people like
Liz Cheney and Adam Kinser and Mitt
Romney in my book continue to be heroes
because they were willing to stand in
the breach when that was happening and
there are precious few Republicans left
certainly in public office who were
willing to do that now yeah we'll be
right back with more of my conversation
with Congressman Rasin in a moment but I
want to take a second to ask you to
subscribe to democracy duckets free
daily and weekly newsletters you'll get
the most important news and updates you
need to know about the fight for
democracy in court it's short
informative and I promise you the best
thing you'll read in your inbox sign up
now for free at the link above or in the
description below yeah so I want to talk
about the other uh folks who should be
in the breach protecting democracy um it
is interesting to me uh distressing uh
that Donald Trump seems to have targeted
um the independent agencies uh uh uh and
in particular he started with Watchdog
officials so he started with uh the nlrb
the Merit systems protection board the
office of special counsel which is the
Hampton which Hampton Dinger uh people
may know he litigated uh to protect his
job the inspector's General were fired
um and so what do you do you think it is
uh no coincidence as I do that that he
seems to have taken a particular
interest in getting internal Watchdogs
off the
beat well yeah I mean that was um agenda
item number one when they got in office
of course they sacked immediately 17 and
later 18 inspectors General I mean these
are the real corruption Fighters as you
know these are the real people fiing out
waste fraud abuse corruption
self-dealing Kickbacks and so on in
federal departments and agencies and
that's very difficult
painstaking comprehensive work that
takes huge staffs of people and when you
do it you bring in forensic Auditors and
accountants you don't bring in computer
hackers who go and get everybody's data
um and so they sacked the real
corruption fighters in the government
they cleared them out of the way they
dismantled uh enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act they disbanded
numerous uh task forces in the
Department of Justice like the anti
kleptocracy uh task force which were uh
designed to stop foreign Corruption of
American politics and business um and
then um they basically unleashed the
Doge people on all of our data in all of
the Departments and uh all of the
agencies um and so um you know the Elon
Musk and his the band of uh uh computer
hacker juvenile night Raiders these
people uh are not opponents of
corruption they're instruments of
corruption and lawlessness against the
rights of the people um so I have y two
questions about that the first is as a
law professor how do they fit into or
don't fit into the Constitutional
structure and number two what can people
do about it because people like are
people are worried that their data has
been compromised like people are like I
mean average Americans I don't mean like
just like you know members of Congress I
mean like you know average Americans are
petrified that their information I'm
sure you heard from your constituent so
how does how does Doge like fit into
what you described at the beginning of
an AR start with and then what could
people do I'm very glad you raised it
because yesterday the United States
district court for the District of
Columbia uh rendered yet another victory
for the forces of democracy and freedom
they found that doge is in fact a
federal agency some something that uh
Doge was resisting uh and yet uh the
federal district court and judge
Cooper's courtroom found that DOI is a
federal agency and it's subject to
federal laws specifically the Freedom of
Information Act so um the last thing I
did before I got on this call with you
Mark was I um completed filling out a
form the whole thing took me less than
five minutes maybe six minutes to do um
a form demanding
of Doge the department of government
efficiency which in my neighborhood we
call it the dissing our government
employees statute but I was demanding of
Doge and Elon Musk that they turn over
to me all the data they have on me from
the Social Security uh Department from
the Department of Education college
student loans anything they would have
from any federal department that they've
assembled I want to see it and guess
what I've got a right to see it and I
want to know whether they've made it any
changes to it I have a right to
determine whether everything in there is
accurate or if there are inaccuracies to
tell them to change it and I also want
to know whether it's been diverted and
leaked out to any thirdparty Source
whether it is uh Elon musk's artificial
intelligence program grock or any other
business I have a right to know that
that's my data and guess who else has
that right 340 million Americans and for
the cost of a stamp you can write in to
the Department of government efficiency
fill out their form and say give me all
this information now I don't know if
doge is set up to answer foyer requests
I don't think they were thinking a lot
about the public interest but hey uh
this is the magic um and the Paradox of
being part of government there are
people who want to go into government
because they can get as much as they can
out of it that's Elon Musk right but
there are benefits that go there burdens
that go along with the benefits and one
burden is you take control over our data
you tell us what data you've got and you
show us exactly uh what you have this is
our government that's our data uh and we
have a right to know well that's uh
great actual information for everybody
to to hear what the congressman is
saying is not just him because he's a
member of Congress who's entitled to
this but everyone is entitled to this
information so it's something that
anyone can do well everywhere I go
marker saying what can we do what can we
do and you know uh people go to rallies
and then the next minute they're saying
what can we do here's something every
American can do and ought to do get your
foyer request in under the Privacy Act
for your private information that may
have been seized by Elon musk's
Department of government uh efficiency
Doge and then uh we can take it from
there and if they don't respond well
we'll have to deal with that at that
point the other thing that people are
asking about and I don't want this to
turn too wonky but you are con tion law
professor um people are worried that he
seems to be able to fire people who are
not supposed to be fired like on the one
hand they hear that like there are
people who are protected from arbitrary
firing um they hear that you know that
there are these independent agencies and
boards and yet he seems to be firing
these people and they want to know isn't
there some Court like isn't isn't there
some court case or something that says
he can't do this all right so I I want
to answer both about the boards and
agencies and that involves a case called
Humphrey's executive but I want to
answer just about all of the federal
workers the tens of thousands or
hundreds of thousands now of federal
workers who've been sacked okay first on
the members of federal agencies and
Boards like the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Federal Trade Commission
the Federal elction Federal Election
Commission that's a critical one um on
of these things um basically since the
New Deal um there has been a Doctrine
which has said that while the president
gets to absolutely nominate his own uh
cabinet secretaries and his political
subordinates with under his budget his
executive budget he does not have the
right to hire and fire the members of
these bipartisan boards and agencies
those exist under Congressional statute
and they have some quasi legislative
powers by which the court is meant Ru
making Powers um they have some quasi
executive powers they can enforce rules
um whether it's you know the SEC
enforcing rules against insider trading
or the Federal Election Commission uh
enforcing rules against um illegal
campaign expenditures okay um but also
they have quazite Jud judicial powers in
that they can rule on particular cases
that come before them okay so um this is
this has been identified with the rise
of the administrative state which has a
very you know nefarious Sinister sound
in the uh Steve Bannon era but the
administrative State basically makes it
possible to govern a country of hundreds
of millions of people and make sure that
people's rights are Vindicated Within
These agencies within the bureaucracies
if they have a problem they're able to
go to it and um and the agencies in turn
are able to enforce the public interest
well now um Donald Trump is advancing a
federalist Society Dogma um called the
unitary executive which is that uh all
of these agencies all of these boards
are directly under the control of the
president and the president can uh hire
and fire everybody so one of the first
things he did got in office this time
was he sacked all of the Democrats who
sered for example uh on the Federal
Election Commission uh or the Federal
Trade Commission and so on he sacked all
of them saying that was under his
unilateral control they seem like
they're chomping at the bit to get this
question before The Supreme Court where
they believe they have a sympathetic
majority um the rationale for allowing
this before was that um that the
president's job is to take care that the
laws are Faithfully executed there are
laws setting up these boards and
agencies and none of those boards or
agencies in any way interfered with the
essential powers of the president and
the executive um but now they want to
say no basically they're under the
vertical control of the president so
we'll see if that happens it will it
will be uh a
landslide uh reversal and turnabout in
terms of administrative law and public
law in America to say I mean imagine if
uh president Trump actually controlled
the Federal Election Commission he would
obviously use it to attack all of the
Democrats the way he's using the
Department of Justice right now and to
go after his political opponents and if
uh if F found anything done wrong by one
of his uh supporters one of his allies
he would immediately force them to drop
the charges the way he's doing with
mayor Adams in New York who's decided to
cut a deal with Donald Trump and you
know he was willing to lose six or seven
top Conservative Republican
prosecutors um rather than just follow
the law no the president cannot make a
trade for someone in order to uh destroy
a grand jury indictment you can't engage
in that kind of political negotiating so
um but we're watching this and you know
I know that the members of the boards
and agencies will be defending and the
Democrats will be defending the laws as
they've existed of course Trump has more
broadly been trying to sack tens of
thousands of federal workers with the
idea of basically destroying the
functions of the federal government I
mean the Consumer Financial production
Bureau has saved American consumers more
than $21 billion in uh credit card late
charges in Bank overdraft fees all of
these rapacious or ripoff charges that
large corporations pasted on people in
addition to more uh elaborate schemes
against the consuming public uh but they
want to dismantle it I mean in fact
there are hundreds of millions of
dollars right now Mark that are
frozen because the cfpb workers were
told they can't do any work they
literally can't sign a letter turning
this money over to Consumers who have a
lawful right to it so we're going to try
to unlock all of that but the bottom
line is that all of this is an assault
in the Civil Service the core meaning of
the Civil Service is that people can
only be fired for poor professional
performance or professional misconduct
you know for stealing money or for not
doing their job but the people who are
being sacked have been doing a fantastic
job they have Superior evaluations my
guess to the to the Joint session of
Congress where Trump came and spoke was
a a doctor from NIH who's a uh a
pediatric cancer biologist and she'd
been there for several years as a
postgraduate student she did so well and
had such excellent performance rating
she was promoted to the job of top
biologist there and by virtue of being
promoted she was a a probationary
employee which sounds like there's
something wrong all it means is you've
been promoted but the Doge people used
that as a reason to um sack her as part
of the Valentine's Day Massacre and
they're people like that strewn
throughout the federal government I mean
we're talking air tra air traffic
controllers Food and Drug safety uh
inspectors um you know Forest Service
firefighters um all these people have
just been randomly sacked as they try to
hack away at the federal Workforce and
the last point I'll make about this is
you know people really ask why why is
this happening to us I mean if Vladimir
Putin came here and took over the US
government he would be doing nothing
different than what these people are
doing to us right now well if you really
read into Elon Musk and um his friend
Peter teal and their intellectual Guru
named Curtis yarvin these people believe
that democracy's defunct they believe
we're living in a post-constitutional
America the US Constitution they think
is Obsolete and we're in the middle of a
regime change where we're going to move
into some kind kind of monarchical
autocratic
technate and uh guess who's there to be
in charge of it none other than Elon
Musk who could never run for president
because he wasn't born in the United
States he was born in apartheid South
Africa and grew up there and shows
because those are the kinds of attitudes
that now permeate not just Doge but
large parts of uh of the new
Administration but check out the
interview with Curtis yarvin that was in
the New York Times about a month ago
where he said the American people have
got to get over their fear of the word
dictator a dictator he assured us is
just what uh president CEO of a company
is and just as we have dictators in
private corporations we need a dictator
in the corporation that is the US
government and that government serves
primarily the presidents and CEOs of all
these corporations it's a dictator
serving dictators Congressman Jamie
Rasin one of my personal Heroes the
smartest most
astute Observer of the Constitution
Congress and uh uh and politics thank
you for joining me today dear mark thank
you for everything you're doing for us
every day man really all right thanks
for tuning in to this episode of
Defending democracy make sure you're
subscribed to democracy dockets free
daily and weekly newsletters to stay
informed on the latest voting rights and
democracy news we'll see you next time
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Thu Mar 13, 2025 11:15 pm

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https://ia904503.us.archive.org/16/item ... 4.22.0.pdf

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SUSAN TSUI GRUNDMANN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 25 - 425 (SLS)

Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Constitution vests Congress with broad authority to organize the Executive Branch. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8. From its earliest days, Congress exercised this power by creating institutions to structure the government. And for almost a century and a half, Congress has created independent federal agencies with specific expertise and limited the President’s power to remove principal officers leading those agencies. The Supreme Court first blessed that approach in 1935 when it rejected the President’s claim of “illimitable power of removal” over all federal officers, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), instead holding that our Constitution gives Congress the power to “create expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the President only for good cause.” Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 204 (2020) (emphasis omitted) (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602). And the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed statutory removal protections for multimember and bipartisan expert agencies since then.

Congress created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to impartially manage and resolve disputes surrounding labor organization in the federal workforce. The independence of the FLRA was central to its creation, as Congress wanted to ensure a fair, consistent, and unbiased process for managing federal labor relations that would not shift with political whims. To achieve this goal, Congress decided to give the three Members of the FLRA a limited statutory protection from removal by the President. They could be removed only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office during their staggered five-year terms, and only after notice and a hearing.

In the nearly fifty years since the FLRA’s creation, no President has ever removed a Member. Until now. On February 10, 2025, the Plaintiff, Susan Tsui Grundmann, received a two-sentence email on behalf of President Donald J. Trump informing her that her position on the FLRA had been terminated. Ms. Grundmann received no explanation whatsoever for her termination. And she did not receive notice or a hearing. Ms. Grundmann is not alone. This is one of a series of cases filed in this District challenging the President’s unprecedented removal of officers across the federal government without cause, including Members of the Merit Systems Protection Board and the National Labor Relations Board, as well as the Special Counsel.

The Government vigorously defends Ms. Grundmann’s hasty termination on the basis that the Constitution vests the entirety of the “executive Power” in the President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. It argues that the President may remove federal officials on a whim, and in doing so, override Congress’s considered judgment. The Government’s arguments paint with a broad brush and threaten to upend fundamental protections in our Constitution. But ours is not an autocracy; it is a system of checks and balances. Our Founders recognized that the concentration of power in one branch of government would spell disaster. “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

The removal in this case was unlawful. The Government concedes that Ms. Grundmann’s removal violated the FLRA’s founding statute—a statute that Congress enacted and the President signed into law to revamp federal labor relations in the federal government. The Government’s argument that the statutory removal provision is unconstitutional cannot be reconciled with longstanding Supreme Court precedent that is binding on this Court. And it would encroach on Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.1

As for remedies, the Government takes the position that this Court lacks the authority to provide meaningful relief in these circumstances. It argues that where a President removes a Senate-confirmed federal officer in violation of a duly enacted and constitutional statute, the only recourse is an award of backpay to that officer. Why? According to the Government, any order from this Court that results in the officer continuing her role against the President’s will would raise grave separation-of-powers concerns. In other words, where a President exceeds his power under Article II of the Constitution and intrudes on Congress’s Article I authority, the Government’s position is that an Article III court may not interpret the law and redress the resulting injury. It is the Government’s own argument that raises grave separation-of-powers concerns. There can be no doubt that “the President is bound to abide by the requirements of duly enacted and otherwise constitutional statutes.” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d. 973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And it is precisely the role of an Article III court to step in when that does not happen. Ms. Grundmann is entitled to relief that would redress her injury and allow her to continue her work on the FLRA.

For those reasons and the reasons that follow, the Court grants Ms. Grundmann’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background


Nearly fifty years ago, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7135, as part of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). These statutes “comprehensively reorganized the structure of labor-management relations in the federal government.” Library of Cong. v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1983). “Congress intended the new statutory system to serve the twin goals of protecting the right of public employees to organize and bargain collectively, while simultaneously strengthening the authority of federal management to hire and fire employees in the interest of a more effective public service.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7101).

Congress created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to “carry[] out the purpose” of the FSLMRS. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1). It tasked the FLRA with “conduct[ing] hearings and resolv[ing] complaints of unfair labor practices,” “resolv[ing] issues relating to the duty to bargain in good faith,” and “resolv[ing] exceptions to arbitrator’s awards.” Id. § 7105(a)(2). Congress also empowered the FLRA to supervise elections for the selection of labor organizations by employees and to prescribe certain criteria related to labor bargaining in the federal workforce. Id.

The FLRA is composed of three Members, all appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 7104. No more than two of the three Members are permitted to “be adherents of the same political party.” Id. § 7104(a). And each Member is to serve a staggered five-year term. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (establishing five-year terms); CSRA, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7104(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1196 (1978) (staggering terms). The Members can be removed by the President “only upon notice and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). But the President has the authority to designate one of the Members as the “Chairman of the Authority.” Id.

The structure of the FLRA was meant to ensure “the resolution of disputes by the intervention of neutral, independent, third parties[.]” 124 Cong. Rec. 25,720 (1978). Congress sought to “eliminate what [was] perceived by Federal employee unions and others as conflict of interest in the existing council,” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 159 (1978), and to create a body that was “impartial by independence from any direct responsibility to the incumbent administration,” S Rep. No. 95-969, at 7 (1978). As one sponsor stated:

One of the central elements of a fair labor relations program is effective, impartial administration. Title VII provides for the creation of an independent and neutral Federal labor relations authority to administer the Federal labor management program . . . . Currently the Federal labor-management program is administered by the Federal Labor Relations Council which is composed of three administration officials, . . . none of whom can be considered neutral.


124 Cong. Rec. 25,721 (1978). The belief was that “[i]mpartiality [was] guaranteed by protecting authority members from unwarranted ‘Saturday night’ removals.” Id. at 25,721–25,722.

B. Factual Background

The facts are drawn from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and Statement of Material Facts, which the Defendants do not dispute. Joint Status Report at 3, ECF No. 8.

The Plaintiff, Susan Tsui Grundmann, became a Member of the FLRA on May 12, 2022. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. She was appointed by President Joseph R. Biden and confirmed by the Senate to a term set to expire on July 1, 2025. Id. But that expiration date was not set in stone. Under the FSLMRS, she was permitted to continue serving until either her successor took office or the last day of the Congress beginning after the original expiration date, 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c), which in her case would fall in January 2029, Compl. ¶ 3. On January 3, 2023, President Biden designated her as Chairman of the Authority. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 4; Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 12.

The Government does not allege that Ms. Grundmann has been an ineffective Member of the FLRA. Yet on February 10, 2025, at 10:46 PM, Ms. Grundmann received a two-sentence email from Trent Morse, the Deputy Director of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel: “On behalf of President Donald J. Trump, I am writing to inform you that your position on the Federal Labor Relations Authority is terminated, effective immediately. Thank you for your service.” Pl.’s Decl. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 4-2. She did not receive notice or a hearing, nor was any “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” identified. Compl. ¶ 17. And she has since been unable to perform her duties as a Member of the FLRA. Id. ¶ 20. To the best of Ms. Grundmann’s knowledge, this is the first time a President has ever removed a Member of the FLRA without cause. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 12.

On February 11, 2025, President Trump named Colleen Duffy Kiko as Chairman, Compl. ¶ 19, leaving the FLRA with only two Members, see id. ¶ 20. Although the FLRA maintains a quorum, without Ms. Grundmann’s tiebreaking vote, certain cases may deadlock and go into abeyance. See Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7. This is exactly what happened when Ms. Grundmann served as one of only two Members of the FLRA for eighteen months, resulting in about one-third of the cases being deadlocked. Id.

C. Procedural Background

On February 13, 2025, Ms. Grundmann filed a Complaint alleging that her removal without cause violated the FSLMRS. See Compl. ¶¶ 22–25. She named President Trump and Ms. Kiko as Defendants, id. ¶¶ 4–5, and she requested both declaratory and injunctive relief, Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 1–3. The next day, on February 14, 2025, she filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”). On February 25, 2025, the Defendants filed their Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, see Defs.’ Opp’n, and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, see Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Cross-Mot.”), ECF No. 11. The Plaintiff responded to both on February 28, 2025. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 16. And the Defendants filed their Reply in support of their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 5, 2025. See Defs. Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply), ECF No. 18. The Court held a hearing on March 7, 2025. Both motions are now ripe for decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2006). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). When “both parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each must carry its own burden under the applicable legal standard.” Ehrman, 429 F. Supp. 2d. at 67.

DISCUSSION

The President violated the law when he removed Ms. Grundmann. The removal was in clear contravention of the FSLMRS. And under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, that statute was a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.

A. Statutory Violation

The Government concedes that Ms. Grundmann’s removal violated the FSLMRS. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 24:10–14. The statute provides that “Members of the Authority . . . may be removed by the President only upon notice and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). But Ms. Grundmann received no notice or hearing. See Compl. ¶ 17. And the two-sentence email on behalf of the President informing her of the removal did not allege any inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. See id. The Government instead argues that the removal protection in the FSLMRS is unconstitutional. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 6–12.

B. Constitutionality of the Statute

“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010). This includes the power to provide removal protections to “multimember bodies with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ functions.” Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 217. This power to “create a traditional independent agency headed by a multimember board or commission,” id. at 207, “cannot well be doubted,” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629. The Court has repeatedly endorsed such removal protections throughout the last century. See, e.g., id.; Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).

But this power is not without limits. “Article II provides that ‘[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id., § 3). This establishes a “general rule that the President possesses ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties.’” Id. at 215 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010)). The scope of Congress’s power therefore turns on whether this general rule applies. See id. at 218.

The Supreme Court has identified “two exceptions” that “represent what up to now have been the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the President’s removal power.” Id. (quoting PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). The first comes from Humphrey’s Executor, and it extends to “multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. The second comes from Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and it applies to “inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Congress may provide removal restrictions to an executive officer who fits within either of these two exceptions. See id.

1. The Humphrey’s Executor Exception

Seila Law is best read as teaching that the Humphrey’s Executor exception applies in two steps. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218–19. First, courts must ask whether an agency’s structure resembles that of the “New Deal-era FTC” described in Humphrey’s Executor. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Second, courts must ensure that the agency does not exercise substantial executive power. Id. at 218–19. If both conditions are met, then Congress has the authority to provide removal restrictions. Id. at 218.

The Government quibbles with step two. Even though Seila Law squarely states that the exception extends to “multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power,” id. (emphasis added), it argues that the exception is limited to agencies “that exercise no executive power,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 8 (emphasis added). Although some language in Seila Law could be read that way, a careful reading of each passage reveals that the opinion is more restrained.

First, Seila Law outlines its general rule in very broad terms. The Supreme Court says that “the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 203 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id., § 3). Then it says that the President has the “power to remove . . . those who wield executive power on his behalf.” Id. at 204. The combination of these two statements initially suggests that all executive power is wielded on behalf of the President, so anyone exercising any executive power must be removable at will. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 7. But the Court immediately acknowledges that there are “two exceptions” to this removal power. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 204. And it would make little sense to call them “exceptions” if they did not involve the exercise of any executive power at all. Id.

Second, Seila Law highlights that in Humphrey’s Executor, “[r]ightly or wrongly, the Court viewed the FTC (as it existed in 1935) as exercising ‘no part of the executive power.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 215 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628)). This makes it into the summary of the holding: “In short, Humphrey’s Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause removal protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.” Id. at 216 (emphasis added). But we should not read into this because Seila Law cites Wiener as falling within the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216. This could not be the case if the exception applied only to agencies that were “said not to exercise any executive power.” Id. (emphasis added). Neither Wiener nor Seila Law ever said such a thing about the War Claims Commission. See generally Wiener, 357 U.S. 349; Seila Law, 591 U.S. 197. The Court’s summary of the Humphrey’s Executor holding should therefore not be conflated with its description of the bounds of the Humphrey’s Executor exception.

Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021), does not change this reading of Seila Law. The Government points to broad language from the opinion: “Courts are not well-suited to weigh the relative importance of the regulatory and enforcement authority of disparate agencies, and we do not think that the constitutionality of removal restrictions hinges on such an inquiry.” Collins, 594 U.S. at 253. But Collins was a case about single agency heads, not multimember agencies, so the Humphrey’s Executor exception was not at issue. See id. at 251. The Court in Collins merely declined to create a new exception—beyond the two recognized in Seila Law—for single agency heads that exercise minimal executive power. Id. at 250. Collins even included a footnote right after the broad language that limited its reach to single agency heads. See id. at 253 n.19. That footnote distinguished two historical examples of removal restrictions by saying that “those agencies are materially different because neither of them operated beyond the President’s control, and one of them was led by a multi-member Commission.” Id. (emphasis added). So the language the Government identifies was not meant to apply to multimember agencies. And the Court expressly warned against reading Collins to apply to agencies not before the Court. See id. at 256 n.21. This would make little sense if Collins were meant to change Seila Law.2

2. The Structure of the FLRA

The first question is whether the FLRA’s structure resembles how Humphrey’s Executor described the “New Deal-era FTC.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Humphrey’s Executor “identified several organizational features that helped explain its characterization of the FTC as non-executive.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216. First, the Board was “[c]omposed of five members” with “no more than three from the same political party,” signaling that it was “designed to be ‘non-partisan’ and to ‘act with entire impartiality.’” Id. at 216 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624). Second, “[t]he FTC’s duties were ‘neither political nor executive,’ but instead called for ‘the trained judgment of a body of experts’ ‘informed by experience.’” Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624). And third, “the Commissioners’ staggered, seven-year terms enabled the agency to accumulate technical expertise and avoid a ‘complete change’ in leadership ‘at any one time.’” Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624).

All three features are present in the FLRA. First, the Authority has three Members, and no more than two of them may be “adherents of the same political party,” which ensures bipartisanship. 5 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Second, “the FLRA was intended to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the [Civil Service Reform Act].” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983). And third, each Member serves a staggered five-year term, allowing the agency to gain technical expertise. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (establishing five-year terms); CSRA, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7104(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1196 (1978) (staggering terms). The FLRA’s structure therefore triggers the Humphrey’s Executor exception.

3. The Powers of the FLRA

The next step is to ensure that the FLRA does not exercise substantial executive power. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218–19. Whether an agency exercises substantial executive power is a fact-bound inquiry. Humphrey’s Executor “acknowledged that between purely executive officers on the one hand, and officers that closely resembled the FTC Commissioners on the other, there existed ‘a field of doubt’ that the Court left ‘for future consideration.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 217 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632). This is because “[t]he versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural desire for definitiveness.” Wiener, 357 U.S. at 252. In other words, bright-line rules are not always possible. But by all indications, none of the FRLA’s powers identified by the Government qualifies as a substantial executive power.

First, the Government points to the fact that the FLRA “conduct[s] hearings and resolve[s] complaints of unfair labor practices.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(G)). They argue that this puts the FLRA in the same camp as the CFPB in Seila Law, which could “unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in administrative adjudications.” Id. (quoting 591 U.S. at 219). And it is true that the FLRA’s power to conduct hearings and resolve complaints is greater than was described in Humphrey’s Executor, where the FTC merely “submit[ed] recommended dispositions to an Article III court.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218–19. But the ability to issue final judgments is not a death knell for removal protections. Just look at Wiener. There, the War Claims Commission “was established as an adjudicating body with all the paraphernalia by which legal claims are put to the test of proof, with finality of determination not subject to review by any other official of the United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise.” 357 U.S. at 354–55 (cleaned up). Yet the Commission still counts as an example of an agency that fits within the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216.

Second, the Government points out that the FLRA “has the authority to litigate and enforce its orders in federal court.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9. It highlights three facts. See id.

1. The FLRA can “require an agency or a labor organization to cease and desist” from statutory violations and “require [the agency or labor organization] to take any remedial action it considers appropriate to carry out the policies” of the FSLMRS. Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7105(g)(3)). But Humphrey’s Executor was unbothered by the FTC’s ability to “issue and cause to be served a cease and desist order.” 295 U.S. at 620. And the FLRA’s other tools do not resemble the wide range of remedies available to the CFPB in Seila Law, which included restitution, disgorgement, and “civil penalties of up to $1,000,000 (inflation adjusted) for each day that a violation occurs.” 591 U.S. at 206.

2. The FLRA “may petition to enforce such an order in federal court[.]” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7123(b)). It is true that Seila Law said that “the power to seek daunting monetary penalties against private parties in federal court” is “a quintessentially executive power[.]” 591 U.S. at 199. But it is not clear that the object of an FLRA order—an agency or labor union—should be considered a private party for this analysis. And either way, this is not a substantial exercise of executive power. In Humphrey’s Executor, if an FTC “order [was] disobeyed, the commission [could] apply to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals for its enforcement.” 295 U.S. at 620–21. This posed no problem. Id. at 629.

3. The FLRA “has independent litigation authority to send its own attorneys (not Department of Justice attorneys) to litigate civil actions outside the Supreme Court in connection with any of its functions.” Opp’n at 9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7105(h)). But again, it is not clear why this would make the power more substantial. When Seila Law described the CFPB’s enforcement powers, it did not even mention whether the attorneys belonged to the CFPB. See 591 U.S. at 206. It was much more concerned about the scale of relief. See id. (“Since its inception, the CFPB has obtained over $11 billion in relief for over 25 million consumers, including a $1 billion penalty against a single bank in 2018.”).

Third, the Government notes that the FLRA has the power to “prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the [FSLMRS] applicable to [it].” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7134). This includes (1) specifying the criteria for determining when a labor organization represents “a substantial number of the employees of the agency,” which allows the labor organization to be granted consultation rights by the agency, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(C), 7113(a); (2) determining whether an agency has a “compelling need” for an agency-wide regulation, which would allow the agency to avoid having to bargain in good faith with a proposal by a labor organization, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(D), 7117(b); see also Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., The Negotiability Guide (June 17, 2013); and (3) determining “who is eligible to vote” for labor organization recognition and establishing the “rules governing such an election,” subject to certain statutory limitations, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(B), 7111(d).

These narrow, largely administrative regulatory assignments pale in comparison to what was feared in Seila Law, where “the [CFPB] Director possess[ed] the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19 federal statutes, including a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in a major segment of the U.S. economy.” 591 U.S. at 218. The FLRA promulgates regulations under fewer statutes, Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 31: 16–17; those statutes provide more guidance than the broad prohibition of “unfair and deceptive practices,” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218; and the federal workforce is a smaller segment of the economy than was covered by the CFPB statutes, which included “everything from credit cards and car payments to mortgages and student loans,” id. at 219.

4. Other Seila Law Factors

Seila Law mentions other factors as well, although it is unclear how they should fit into the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Consumers’ Rsch. v. CPSC, 91 F.4th 342, 355– 56 (5th Cir. 2024). The Court need not solve this puzzle, however, because none of these factors apply.

First, the FLRA’s structure is not “almost wholly unprecedented.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 220. To the contrary, agencies like the FLRA are part of the fabric of our federal government. Congress has created independent multimember agencies for nearly a century and a half. See Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1116 (2000). The “structure, role, and functions of the [FLRA] were closely patterned after those of the NLRB.” Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And the powers of the NLRB were modeled after those of the FTC, Dish Network Corp. v. NLRB, 953 F.3d 370, 375 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020), only one month after Humphrey’s Executor approved of the FTC’s removal protections, Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The FLRA is “a traditional independent agency, run by a multimember board with a diverse set of viewpoints and experiences.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 205–06 (cleaned up).

Second, the FLRA has levers of Presidential accountability. The CFPB Director served a five-year term, leaving some Presidents without “any opportunity to shape its leadership and thereby influence its activities.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 225. But the FLRA Members serve staggered five-year terms, allowing every President to wield influence over the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (establishing five-year terms); CSRA, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7104(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1196 (1978) (staggering terms). If the President follows the ordinary course and nominates someone to replace Ms. Grundmann, her term would end on July 1, 2025. Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Defs.’ SUMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 11-2. The CFPB also received funds “outside the appropriations process,” which “further aggravate[ed] the agency’s threat to Presidential control.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 226. But the FLRA receives its funding through the appropriations process, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 118–47, 138 Stat. 461 (2023), allowing the President “to recommend or veto spending bills that affect the operation of [the agency],” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 226.

And that is not all. The General Counsel of the FLRA, who may investigate labor practices and prosecute complaints, “may be removed at any time by the President.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(f). With the selection of the General Counsel, the President can immediately influence the FLRA’s investigative and prosecutorial power. The President may also “designate one member [of the FLRA] to serve as Chairman of the Authority,” who serves as “the chief executive and administrative officer. Id. § 7104(b). And this title that may be revoked at will. Pl.’s Reply at 10; see, e.g., Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., Press Release, Patrick Pizzella Designated Acting FLRA Chairman (Sept. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/ED2R-HVKG. There are therefore no additional features of the FLRA that render its Members’ removal protections “even more problematic.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 225.

***

A straightforward reading of Supreme Court precedent thus resolves the merits of this case. The FLRA triggers and satisfies the Humphrey’s Executor exception, making the FSLMRS removal provision a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority. Although the Government claims fidelity to Humphrey’s Executor and the cases that follow, its arguments seem to contemplate absolute presidential authority over the removal of federal officers and would leave Humphrey’s Executor toothless. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a federal agency that would fit within the Humphrey’s Executor exception as the Government reads it. But it has been clear for almost a century that Article II does not give the President an “illimitable power of removal” over all federal officers. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.

When pressed at oral argument to identify existing federal agencies that would satisfy the Humphrey’s Executor exception, the Government identified only a single agency: the Federal Reserve. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 36:19–20. But the Government declined to explain why the Federal Reserve would fit within the exception under the broad arguments it advances in this case. Id. at 36:21–37:5. The Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate, 12 U.S.C. §§ 225, 263, which permeates every corner of the American economy. If control over that does not rise to an exercise of substantial executive power, then neither does laying down the administrative rules for labor organizing within the federal workforce.

REMEDIES

The Court now turns to the question of remedies. Ms. Grundmann requests both declaratory and injunctive relief. See Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 1–2. The Government broadly argues that the Court lacks the authority to award either and is instead limited to an award of backpay to Ms. Grundmann. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 45:1–19. According to the Government, because prior removed officials chose to seek backpay only, the Court may not award more than that. The Government held this line at oral argument, insisting that an Article III court is without authority to award relief to redress the injury caused by a President exceeding his Article II authority and intruding on Congress’s Article I authority. Id. at 46:11. The Court disagrees. Ms. Grundmann is entitled to a declaratory judgment saying that her removal was unlawful. And she has also met her burden to receive the permanent injunction that she seeks.
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Part 2 of 2

A. Declaratory Relief

The Plaintiff requests that the Court “[d]eclare that Ms. Grundmann was unlawfully removed as a member of the [FLRA].” Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶ 1. The Court has the authority to issue such a declaratory judgment, and it exercises its discretion to do so.

The Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) provides that, “in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). The DJA “alone does not provide a court with jurisdiction,” California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 672 (2021), but it does “enlarge[] the range of remedies available in the federal courts” that have established jurisdiction, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). This Court has jurisdiction over this federal-question case because, at minimum, it could provide backpay to establish redressability. See Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶ 3 (asking for “all other appropriate relief”); Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 45:1–46:12 (conceding backpay is available). So the DJA allows for declaratory relief.

In its reply brief, the Government appears to take the position that the Court may not award “declaratory relief stating that the President’s removal of Plaintiff was unlawful.” See Defs.’ Reply at 15. In support, they cite a single quote from a concurring opinion that is inapposite and not binding on this Court. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 827 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment) (“I think we cannot issue a declaratory judgment against the President.”). When pressed at oral argument, the Government walked this back and agreed that the Court could issue a declaratory judgment saying that Ms. Grundmann’s removal was unlawful. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 42:19-20 (“A declaratory judgment saying that the removal was unlawful I think would be an acceptable outcome.”). To be sure, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). That applies even when the person violating the law is the President. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (affirming a declaratory judgment invalidating the President’s power to wield a line-item veto pen as unconstitutional).

The Government also makes a more modest argument that declaratory relief is generally unavailable whenever injunctive relief is unavailable. See Defs.’ Reply at 15. They cite Samuels v. Mackell for support. 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (“[W]here an injunction would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well.”). But Samuels merely extended Younger abstention to relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act from ongoing state criminal prosecutions, explaining that a declaratory judgment could have a res judicata effect on the state court proceedings that is not meaningfully different from an injunction. See id. at 68, 73 (“[T]he basic policy against federal interference with pending state criminal prosecutions will be frustrated as much by a declaratory judgment as it would be by an injunction.”). The Court “express[ed] no views on the propriety of declaratory relief when no state proceedings is pending at the time the federal suit is begun.” Id. at 73. So Samuels does not apply.

“[ I]t is well settled that a declaratory judgment always rests within the sound discretion of the court.” President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 364 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1980). A declaratory judgment will “ordinarily be granted only when it will either ‘serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue’ or ‘terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.’” Id. (quoting E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 299 (2d ed. 1941)). The case before the Court involves legal relations that clearly need to be clarified. Ms. Grundmann has challenged her removal by the President as unlawful and needs to know if she can resume her work on the Authority. On the other side, the Government argues that Congress overstepped when it enacted a provision limiting the President’s ability to remove Members of the FLRA without cause. The Court therefore exercises its discretion and provides the requested declaratory relief.

B. Injunctive Relief

The question of injunctive relief is more difficult. An injunction ordering the President to reinstate Ms. Grundmann would raise complicated questions about the separation of powers. And the availability of such an order may turn on technical differences between equitable remedies and legal remedies. These questions can largely be avoided, however, because Ms. Grundmann has never sought reinstatement from the President and ultimately requests a type of injunction that has been blessed by the D.C. Circuit. The Court therefore has the authority to issue the requested injunctive relief, and it finds that such relief is warranted.

1. Availability of Injunctive Relief

Ms. Grundmann has requested various types of injunctive relief throughout these proceedings. She originally asked the Court to enter an injunction ordering Ms. Kiko to reinstate her as a Member of the Authority. But Ms. Kiko lacks the authority to formally reinstate Ms. Grundmann, and it is not clear how such an injunction could be squared with Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), given the plausible evidence that wrongfully removed executive officers were historically reinstated by courts of law instead of courts of equity. Fortunately for Ms. Grundmann, the D.C. Circuit has twice recognized a more modest equitable remedy when an officer has been removed by the President. See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Severino v. Biden, 71 F.4th 1038 (D.C. 2023). These cases teach that courts may order the members of an agency—or even just the Chair—to recognize the unlawfully removed member as a member and to halt any efforts to hinder her work in that capacity. While this relief may be less complete than formal reinstatement, the D.C. Circuit has said that it strikes the right balance between respecting the rule of law and avoiding conflicts between the branches of government. The Plaintiff now requests this more modest relief, and the Court has the authority to grant it.

a. Formal Reinstatement

In her Complaint, Ms. Grundmann asked the Court to “[e]nter an injunction against Defendant Kiko, ordering her to reinstate Ms. Grundmann as a member of the Board and to refrain from taking any further action to obstruct Ms. Grundmann’s ability to carry out her duties.” Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶ 2. There are two problems with this request.

First, Ms. Kiko lacks the authority to reinstate Ms. Grundmann. “Members of the Authority shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). The Plaintiff conceded this at oral argument. See Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 18:12–16.

Second, it is not clear how such an injunction can be squared with Grupo. The Supreme Court in Grupo taught that “the general availability of injunctive relief . . . depend[s] on traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.” 527 U.S. at 318–19 (internal citations omitted). This means that “unless Congress expressly provides otherwise, equitable remedies must track remedies traditionally afforded by the equity courts.” Goodluck v. Biden, 104 F.4th 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing Grupo, 527 U.S. at 318–19). But a preliminary review of the historical record suggests that, at least by the late nineteenth century, wrongfully removed executive officers sought relief in courts of law, not courts of equity. See White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). Whether this was already true at the Founding is less clear.

It is easy to find evidence from the turn of the last century. In 1888, the Supreme Court said it was “well settled that a court of equity has no jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of public officers.” In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 212. And it repeated that statement ten years later. White, 171 U.S. at 377; see also Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 165 (1898). According to the Court, “[t]he jurisdiction to determine the title to a public office belong[ed] exclusively to the courts of law, and [was] exercised either by certiorari, error, or appeal, or by mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, or information in the nature of the writ of quo warranto.” In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 212; see also White, 171 U.S. at 377. This is consistent with treatises from the time. See, e.g., 2 James L. High, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions § 1312 (2d ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1880) (“No principle of the law of injunctions, and perhaps no doctrine of equity jurisprudence, is more definitely fixed or more clearly established than that courts of equity will not interfere by injunction to determine questions concerning the appointment of public officers or their title to office.”); Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 496 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1890) (saying quo warranto allows courts “not only to oust the respondent [officer] but also to install the relator [officer]”). And the Supreme Court reiterated this view shortly before the merger of law and equity. See Walton v. House of Representatives of Okla., 265 U.S. 487, 490 (1924) (“A court of equity has no jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of public officers”). So it was not a stretch for the Court to say that these cases “reflect . . . a traditional limit upon equity jurisdiction.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 231 (1962).

But evidence from the 1880s might not settle the Grupo debate. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 318 (discussing equitable principles “at the time of the separation of the two countries” (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939))); id. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing equitable principles “at the time of the founding”); Bessent v. Dellinger, 145 S. Ct. 515, 517 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing equitable remedies “at the time of the Nation’s founding”). And the earlier evidence is sparse.

The Court looks in vain to In re Sawyer for help. 124 U.S. 200. The Court there said that “[n]o English case has been found of a bill for an injunction to restrain the appointment or removal of a municipal officer.” Id. at 212. But this argument from silence is far from determinative. And the only English cases cited dealt with corporate officers. See Att’y Gen. v. Earl of Clarendon, 17 Ves. Jr. 490, 498, 34 Eng. Rep. 190, 193 (Ch. 1810); Queen v. Saddlers’ Co., 10 H.L. Cas. 404 (1863); Osgood v. Nelson, L. R. 5 H. L. 636 (1872). The Court also cited many “well-considered” state court cases denying “the power of a court of equity to restrain by injunction the removal of a municipal officer.” In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 212. But all of those cases were decided at least a half century after the Founding. See Tappan v. Gray, 7 Hill 259 (N.Y. 1843); Hagner v. Heyberger, 3 Pa. L.J. 370 (1844); Updegraff v. Crans, 47 Pa. 103 (1864); Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa 75 (1867); Delahanty v. Warner, 75 Ill. 185 (1874); Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237 (1875); Dickey v. Reed, 78 Ill. 261 (1875); Harris v. Schryock, 82 Ill. 119 (1876); Beebe v. Robinson, 52 Ala. 66 (1875); Moulton v. Reid, 54 Ala. 320 (1875); cf. State v. Sheldon, 6 N.W. 757 (Neb. 1880); State v. Oleson, 18 N.W. 45 (Neb. 1883); State v. Meeker, 27 N.W. 427 (Neb. 1886).

The vintage of these cases matters. In re Sawyer itself recognized that the Supreme Court of Alabama had only recently decided that reinstatement was not available in equity, “overruling its own prior decisions to the contrary.” 124 U.S. at 214 (citing Beebe, 52 Ala. 66; Moulton, 54 Ala. 320). Those prior decisions had allowed courts of equity to enjoin an unlawfully appointed sheriff where the incumbent sheriff could not proceed by quo warranto, Bruner v. Bryan, 50 Ala. 522, 529 (1874), and to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute about the identity of the true mayor because a quo warranto “would not be a complete remedy,” Reid v. Moulton, 51 Ala. 255, 266 (1874). This flip-flopping could be read as evidence that the consensus view recognized in In re Sawyer was not as well-established at the Founding. But the Court need not come to a firm conclusion on this point since the Plaintiff now seeks different relief.

b. De Facto Reinstatement

This brings us to the relief that is really at issue. In her later briefing and at oral argument, Ms. Grundmann clarified that she seeks only the relief discussed in Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Severino v. Biden, 71 F.4th 1038 (D.C. 2023). That is, she “seeks injunctive relief from Defendant Kiko, a subordinate official, to treat her as a de facto member of the FLRA.” Pl.’s Reply at 14. While resuming her work on the Authority “in this de facto fashion might not be as complete a remedy for [the Plaintiff] as an official reinstatement by the President,” Swan, 100 F.3d at 980, the D.C. Circuit has twice recognized that this relief is available and advisable. See id. at 979–81; Severino, 71 F.4th at 1042–43.

The D.C. Circuit is no stranger to removal challenges. In Swan, a Senate-confirmed Board member of an independent agency was removed by President Clinton after being appointed by President Bush. See 100 F.3d at 975–76. He sued President Clinton and some staff who had implemented the firing, “seeking to have his removal . . . declared unlawful and to obtain injunctive relief ordering his reinstatement as a member of the Board.” Id. at 975. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 976. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit assessed the plaintiff’s standing, focusing on the redressability prong. See id. at 976. It questioned “whether a federal court has the power to grant injunctive relief against the President of the United States in the exercise of his official duties.” Id. at 976.

Resolving this question required balancing two important values. On the one hand, the Court recognized the “bedrock principle that our system of government is founded on the rule of law, and it is sometimes a necessary function of the judiciary to determine if the executive branch is abiding by the terms of legislative enactments.” Id. at 978. On the other hand, ordering the President “to perform particular executive [acts] . . . at best creates an unseemly appearance of constitutional tension and at worst risks a violation of the constitutional separation of powers.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court struggled to resolve this tension the usual way, by enjoining a subordinate official, “because only the President has the power to remove or reinstate [the] Board members.” Id. at 979.

The Court then concluded that certain subordinate officials had enough authority to “substantially redress” the injury without formal reinstatement. See id. at 979. The Executive Director of the agency “could direct the staff to treat [the plaintiff] as a Board member.” Id. at 979. And although they were not initially named in the complaint, the “Chairman, other NCUA Board members[, and] the Board Secretary” could accomplish reinstatement “de facto by treating Swan as a member of the NCUA Board and allowing him to exercise the privileges of that office.” Id. at 979–80. The Court decided that such “partial relief [was] sufficient for standing purposes when determining whether [it could] order more complete relief would require [it] to delve into the complicated and exceptionally difficult questions regarding the constitutional relationship between the judiciary and the executive branch.” Id. at 981.

The D.C. Circuit recited this same analysis just two years ago. In Severino, a member of the Administrative Conference of the United States Council was removed by President Biden after being appointed by President Trump. See 71 F.4th at 1041. He sued President Biden and others, “request[ing] that the court issue an injunction requiring that the President restore him to his position on the Council.” Id. at 1041 (cleaned up). The Court again assessed redressability, looking to Swan for guidance. Severino, 71 F.4th at 1042–43. It declined to answer whether such an injunction could run against the President because it could “enjoin ‘subordinate executive officials’ to reinstate a wrongly terminated official ‘de facto,’ even without a formal presidential reappointment.” Id. at 1042–43 (quoting Swan, 100 F.3d at 980). It explained that the Conference’s Chairperson could include the plaintiff in Board meetings and give him access to his former office, among other things, thereby providing partial relief. Id. at 1043.

The Government argues that Swan and Severino are inapposite because they are standing cases. See Defs.’ Reply at 11–12. The Court disagrees. The redressability analysis asks whether it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Swan, 100 F.3d at 976 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). So a remedy cannot establish redressability if it is beyond the authority of the court. See, e.g., Ege v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 784 F.3d 791, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“And because we have no jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 to issue an order binding the TSC, we ipso facto cannot redress Ege’s injury even if we were inclined to agree with him.”); Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (identifying a redressability problem because “[i]t is impossible for this court to grant such relief”); Love v. Vilsack, 908 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144– 45 (D.D.C. 2012) (“To satisfy [redressability], a plaintiff must show in the first instance that the court is capable of granting the relief sought.”). Swan itself assessed redressability only because “[a] question exists . . . as to whether a federal court has the power to grant injunctive relief against the President.” 100 F.3d at 976. It therefore makes little sense to hermetically seal the question of redressability from that of remedial availability.

And this Court is in good company reading Swan and Severino as standing for the proposition that such de facto reinstatement is an available remedy. See, e.g., Harris v. Bessent, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 25-cv-412, 2025 WL 521027 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2025) (Contreras, J.); Dellinger v. Bessent, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 25-cv-385, 2025 WL 665041 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2025) (Berman Jackson, J.); Wilcox v. Trump, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 25-cv-334, 2025 WL 720914 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025) (Howell, J.); Spicer v. Biden, 575 F. Supp. 3d 93, 97 (D.D.C. 2021) (Friedrich, J.) (“Following Swan, the Court could grant effective relief in this case by ordering Ruppersberger and Thalakottur, in their capacities as the Board’s Chairman and DFO, to treat the plaintiffs are full members of the Board.”).

The Government’s other arguments seem to ignore the existence of Swan and Severino altogether. First, it argues that “[w]hen executive officers have challenged their removal by the President, they have traditionally sought back pay, not reinstatement.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 12 (citing Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 326 (1897); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 318 (1903); Myers, 272 U.S. at 106; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 612; Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350). But reinstatement was not an issue in Humphrey’s Executor or Myers because those plaintiffs were both deceased. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–19; Myers, 272 U.S. at 106. Nor did it make sense in Wiener since the Commission had been abolished. See 357 U.S. at 350–51. And any argument from past practice should account for the cases where the plaintiffs did seek reinstatement. See Swan, 100 F.3d at 361; Severino, 71 F.4th at 1041.

Second, the Government argues that “members of the First Congress argued against requiring the Senate’s advice and consent for removals precisely because of the risk that such a procedure would require the President to retain someone he had sought to remove.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 13. It points to three Representatives in particular. See id. (citing Myers, 272 U.S. at 124 (saying that Rep. Benson worried that “the President would then have a man forced on him whom he considered as unfaithful”); id. at 131–32 (saying that Rep. Boudinot bemoaned a situation where the President would be “surrounded by officers . . . in whom he can have no confidence”); id. at 132 (saying that Rep. Sedwick asked whether such “a man under these circumstances” should “be saddled upon the President”)). But this paints with too broad a brush. Those very same Representatives highlighted the special danger of removal protections for the office at issue—the Secretary of Foreign Affairs—on the ground that “the direction of our foreign relations” was an “unquestioned field of executive prerogative.” Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 353, 364–66 (1927) (collecting quotations). So their concerns may well have been limited to the character of the office. See id. at 366 And in any case, three individuals cannot speak for the entire First Congress, especially considering the wide spectrum of opinion it expressed on removal protections. See id. at 361–62. The “implications of the debate, properly understood, were highly ambiguous and prone to overreading.” John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1965 n.135 (2011). The Court declines to enter this historical fray.

Third, the Government argues that Grupo forecloses reinstatement, “[w]hether the order is expressly directed at the President or not.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 15. But this argument fails to appreciate the nuance of the remedy recognized in Swan and Severino. The Court has already acknowledged the strong—albeit imperfect—evidence that reinstatement was not traditionally available in a court of equity. See supra at 23–25. But that evidence does not clearly extend to de facto reinstatement; nor does the Government offer a theory for how it could. The Court is particularly hesitant to second-guess its authority to order de facto reinstatement now that the D.C. Circuit has reaffirmed the remedy’s availability even after Grupo. See Severino, 71 F.4th at 1042–43.

Finally, the Government invites the Court to consider afresh the values already weighed by the D.C. Circuit in Swan and Severino. It argues that the “Plaintiff’s injunction necessarily targets the President.” Defs.’ Reply at 11 (cleaned up). But issuing no relief at all would undermine “the bedrock principle that our system of government is founded on the rule of law.” Swan, 100 F.3d at 978. The Court therefore defers to the careful balance struck by the D.C. Circuit in Swan and Severino, which are binding on this Court.

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that it has the authority to order injunctive relief as to Ms. Kiko.3

2. Permanent Injunction

Having established its authority to grant injunctive relief, the Court now addresses whether an injunction is appropriate in this case. “[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). “A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Id. Ms. Grundmann has satisfied all four factors. The Court therefore grants a permanent injunction.4

a. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedy at Law

The first two factors “are often considered together.” Wilcox, 2025 WL 720914, at *15 n.20 (citing Ridgley v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89, 98 (D.D.C. 2014)). And Ms. Grundmann has satisfied both. Her “unlawful removal from office by the President” was an irreparable harm. Berry v. Reagan, No. 83-cv-3182, 1983 WL 538, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1983), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (Mem.) (D.C. Cir. 1983). And as the Government conceded at oral argument, there is no available remedy at law that would effectuate her reinstatement. See Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 45:18–46:12.

Ms. Grundmann claims that “[h]er removal has deprived her of her statutory right to function in her office.” Pl.’s Reply at 16. And courts in this District have recognized that this harm can be irreparable. See, e.g., Berry, 1983 WL 538, at *5 (recognizing as irreparable the plaintiffs’ “deprivation of their statutory right to function as Commissioners”); Wilcox, 2025 WL 720914, at *15 (recognizing as irreparable the plaintiff’s deprivation “of a presidentially appointed and congressionally confirmed position of high importance”). The Government argues that loss of employment does not amount to an irreparable harm because backpay is available. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 17–18 (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92 n.68 (1974)). But Sampson expressly contemplates “that cases may arise in which the circumstances surrounding an employee’s discharge . . . may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable injury might be found.” 415 U.S. at 92 n.68. This is such a “genuinely extraordinary situation.” Id. Far from a mere claim of lost employment, this is a case of constitutional significance. Backpay does not get Ms. Grundmann back into her role as a Member of the FLRA—a role that the President appointed her to, that the Senate confirmed her for, in an agency that both Congress and the President in their considered judgment created to be independent and free from political meddling. See Harris, 2025 WL 679303, at *13. A check in the mail does not address the gravamen of this lawsuit. Perhaps that is why Ms. Grundmann has not even asked for one.

According to the Government, several cases “reject[] the notion that the deprivation of a unique, singular, or high-level position is any more of an irreparable injury.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 17– 18. But the Government’s cases cannot support such a broad rule. See id. (cases involving corporate managers, subordinate local and state officials, lower-level federal employees, and a credit union board member). Ms. Grundmann is a Senate-confirmed principal officer of a congressionally-created independent agency. She accepted the President’s nomination and earned Senate confirmation in order to serve her country at the highest possible level in her field. This represented the capstone of her long career in public service, see Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7, and her unlawful termination deprived her of the opportunity to make her mark in this statutorily protected role.

b. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest

The final two injunction factors merge when the Government is a party. Wilcox, 2025 WL 720914, at *17 (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). And Ms. Grundmann has satisfied both. The Authority needs all three voters to avoid deadlock, especially at a time when there have been mass firings across the federal government. And the Government’s arguments about the separation of powers actually weigh in favor of an injunction.

Without this relief, the Authority has only two of its three Members. This runs the risk of letting cases deadlock with no tiebreaker, which would cause those cases to go into abeyance. Pl.’s Mot. at 14; see also Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7. This is not mere speculation either. “[D]uring the eighteen-month period that Plaintiff Grundmann served as part of a two-member Authority, approximately one-third of the Authority’s cases deadlocked, leading to duplicative disputes and resource waste.” Pl.’s Mot. at 14. Abeyance “results in increased costs and confusion to the parties” and adds “to the bottom line of the agencies, the cost of which is ultimately borne by taxpayers.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 10. “It also creates legal uncertainty and likely inconsistency in labor practices the longer key labor issues remain unsolved.” Pl.’s Reply at 20. And this would be a particularly bad time for deadlock considering the widespread firings across the federal workforce in recent months. See Pl.’s Mot. at 15; Pl.’s Reply at 20. In fact, only weeks ago, a court in this District told fired federal workers to pursue their claims before the FLRA before seeking judicial relief. See Nat’l Treasury Emps.’ Union v. Trump, No. 25-cv-420, 2025 WL 561080, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2025). Leaving the Authority with only two voters would make that instruction hollow.

The Government argues that providing this relief raises grave separation-of-powers concerns. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 19. They say that “[s]uch a remedy would undermine the accountability of the Executive Branch enshrined in the Constitution” and that “[t]he Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’” Id. at 20 (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974)). But the Government ignores the separation-of-powers risks posed by non-intervention. If the Government had its way, it would place unchecked power in the hands of the President, which is antithetical to our system of government. Again, nearly fifty years ago, Congress and the President worked together to create the FLRA as an independent agency. The President appointed Ms. Grundmann to her position, and the Senate confirmed her. The two political branches decided to give her removal protections—protections that have now been ruled constitutional by a federal court. Providing no injunctive relief would allow the President to flout not only Congress’s Article I power to create independent multimember agencies, but also the Court’s Article III power to maintain the rule of law, see Swan, 100 F.3d at 978.5

Congress has already balanced the equities at stake in this case. The FLRA “safeguards the public interest” and “contributes to the effective conduct of public business.” 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1). “[L]abor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest,” and “the public interest demands . . . the efficient accomplishment of the operations of the Government.” Id. § 7101(a)(2). The public interest therefore favors Ms. Grundmann, and a permanent injunction is warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court has issued a separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge

Date: March 12, 2025

_______________

1 The Government has hinted that it intends to ask the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent, invalidating statutory provisions that have been in place for nearly a century and a half and leaving the President free to fire whomever he wants in the Executive Branch. See Letter from Sarah Harris, Acting Solicitor General, to Sen. Richard Durbin on Restrictions on the Removal of Certain Principal Officers of the United States (Feb. 12, 2025), https://perma.cc/D67G-FKK4.

2 A Fifth Circuit panel recently offered its own distillation of the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Consumers’ Rsch. v. CPSC, 91 F.4th 342 (5th Cir. 2024). And it did not deal with this broad language from Collins at all, see id., suggesting that it did not read the language as bearing on the exception.

There is also a more ambitious way to square Collins. As the Fifth Circuit noted, id. at 352 n.53, in Seila Law, the Chief Justice and two other Justices said that there “may be means of remedying the defect in the CFPB’s structure,” including, “for example, converting the CFPB into a multimember agency,” 591 U.S. at 237 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). This matters because the CFPB exercises “significant executive power,” id. at 220 (majority opinion), suggesting the Court might be open to recognizing an exception for “traditional independent agenc[ies], run by a multimember board with a diverse set of viewpoints and experiences,” id. at 205–06, regardless of the amount of executive power exercised. Cf. Consumers’ Rsch., 91 F.4th at 353–54 (arguing that a multimember agency is not removed from the Humphrey’s Executor exception just because it exercises substantial executive power). After all, the Court said that the two definite exceptions “represent what up to now have been the outermost constitutional limits.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). If the Court were to take this step, then it would be true that “the constitutionality of removal restrictions” would not “hinge[]” on “the relative importance of the regulatory and enforcement authority of disparate agencies.” Collins, 594 U.S. at 253.

3 In a Notice of Supplemental Authority and at oral argument, the Plaintiff asks the Court to consider a writ of mandamus as an alternative remedy. See ECF No. 17 at 1. Given the lack of briefing on mandamus as a remedy, the Court leaves it for another day. But as other courts in this District have found, a writ of mandamus may well be an available remedy were injunctive relief unavailable in this case. See, e.g., Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-cv-412, 2025 WL 679303, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 4 2025); Wilcox v. Trump, No. 25-cv-334, 2025 WL 720914, at *16 n.22 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025).

4 The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. In her Reply, she sought only a permanent injunction. See Pl.’s Reply at 11–21. The Government has argued that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction or permanent injunction. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 16 n.5. Because this Court grants the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it awards a permanent injunction.

5 The Government also argues that the President “cannot be compelled to retain the services of a principal officer whom the President no longer believes should be entrusted with the exercise of executive power.” See Defs.’ Opp’n at 20. But Congress set forth permissible limits on the President’s ability to remove Ms. Grundmann. And the Government has made no attempt to establish inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office on Ms. Grundmann’s part. Absent cause to remove Ms. Grundmann, the President may of course nominate someone to replace her when her term expires in less than four months. Curiously, although the FLRA’s General Counsel may be removed at will, the President has taken no steps to remove that officer.
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri Mar 14, 2025 1:08 am

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum addresses Trump: "You want a wall, you get a wall."
The Indian Investor
9:59 AM · Feb 9, 2025
https://x.com/Anvith_/status/1888633802706293035

Image

Well, dear Americans, even if you don’t understand much about geography, since for you America is your country and not a continent, it is important for you to know, before the first brick is laid, that there are 7 billion people beyond that wall.

But since you don’t really know the term “people,” we will call them “consumers.” There are 7 billion consumers ready to replace their iPhones with Samsung or Huawei devices in less than 42 hours.

They can also replace Levi’s with Zara or Massimo Duti.

In less than six months, we can easily stop buying Ford or Chevrolet cars and replace them with Toyota, KIA, Mazda, Honda, Hyundai, Volvo, Subaru, Renault or BMW, which are technically better than the cars they produce. These 7 billion people can also stop subscribing to Direct TV, and we don't want to do that, but we can stop watching Hollywood movies and start watching more Latin American or European productions that have better quality, message, cinematic techniques and content.

Although it may sound incredible, we can skip Disney and go to the Xcaret resort in Cancun, Mexico, Canada or Europe: there are other great destinations in South America, East America and Europe.

And even if you don't believe it, even in Mexico there are better hamburgers than McDonald's and they have better nutritional content.

Has anyone seen pyramids in the United States? In Egypt, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, Sudan and other countries there are pyramids with incredible civilizations.

Find out where to find the wonders of the ancient and modern world. None of them in the US. Shame on Trump, he would have bought them and sold them!

We know that Adidas exists, not just Nike, and we can start wearing Mexican sneakers like Panam
. We know more than you think.

We know, for example, that if these 7 billion consumers don't buy their products, there will be unemployment and their economy will collapse (within the racist wall) to such an extent that they will beg us to tear down this ugly wall.

We didn't want to, but....

You want a wall, you get a wall. Sincerely yours."

-- Claudia Sheinbaum
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri Mar 14, 2025 10:32 pm

“Never Again for Anyone”: 100 Jewish Activists Arrested at Trump Tower Protesting Mahmoud Khalil Arrest
by Amy Goodman & Jewish Voice for Peace
March 14, 2025
https://www.democracynow.org/2025/3/14/ ... transcript



Over 300 protesters with the group Jewish Voice for Peace flooded the lobby of Trump Tower in New York on Thursday wearing red shirts saying “Not in Our Name.” They demanded the immediate release of Mahmoud Khalil and held banners reading “opposing fascism is a Jewish tradition.” About 100 protesters were arrested and face charges of trespassing, obstruction and resisting arrest. Democracy Now! was at the protest. “I refuse to allow this administration to speak in my name, to use our names as Jews, to carry out a fascist agenda,” protester Josh Dubnau said. “The Trump administration is a government that has far-right white supremacists, people that do the Nazi salute, and [Trump’s] fine with that.”

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: Mahmoud Khalil, the Columbia University graduate and protest leader being held in ICE detention, felt like he was being kidnapped when he was arrested last week and flown to Louisiana, shackled and in handcuffs by agents who never identified themselves. That’s according to an updated lawsuit filed by Khalil’s legal team late Thursday. They say his treatment by federal authorities reminded Khalil, who’s Palestinian and grew up in Syria, of the time he left Syria in 2013 when his friends were being forcibly disappeared by the Assad regime.

Less than a week after immigration authorities detained Khalil, Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, agents were back on Columbia University’s campus late Thursday to serve two search warrants. Columbia’s interim president said no one was arrested or detained and that the university was obligated to comply with the warrants.

Earlier on Thursday, the Trump administration sent a letter to Columbia with a list of required policy changes it must meet by March 20th in order to begin negotiations to reinstate the $400 million in federal funding the federal government canceled last week over alleged inaction in addressing what they called antisemitism. The letter outlines nine preconditions the university must comply with. These include disciplining students involved in Gaza solidarity protests last spring with expulsion or more severe suspension, turning campus safety officers into police, adopting a definition of “antisemitism” that could limit criticism of Israel, and taking over the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies. In a post on social media, the retired Columbia Law professor Katherine Franke described the letter as a “ransom note.”

Before news of the letter was revealed, Columbia’s administration announced a range of punishments affecting at least 22 students involved in the occupation of a campus building last spring. The students were expelled, suspended for several years or had their degrees temporarily revoked.

Meanwhile, opposition to the Trump administration’s attempt to deport Mahmoud Khalil is only growing. Here in New York, Jewish Voice for Peace organized a nonviolent civil disobedience Thursday in the lobby of the Trump Tower right by the golden escalator where Donald Trump famously descended as he first announced his decision to run for president back in 2015. Some 300 protesters flooded the Trump Tower lobby, demanding the immediate release of Mahmoud Khalil. Nearly a hundred protesters were arrested and face charges of trespassing, obstruction and resisting arrest. Democracy Now! was at the protest.

AMY GOODMAN: We’re here at Trump Tower, where hundreds of protesters have gathered, unfurling banners that say “Jews say do not comply,” “You can’t deported a movement,” calling for Mahmoud Khalil to be freed, banners that say “Never again for anyone,” “No Muslim ban ever.” People are protesting, saying, “We’ve got your back, students. We’ve got your back, Mahmoud. We’ve got your back, Gaza. We’ve got your back, trans people,” and more. The police are beginning to move in. Those who don’t want to be arrested have gone up the escalator. We’ll see what happens. We’re in the middle of Trump Tower, here in Midtown Manhattan.

ELENA STEIN: My name’s Elena Stein. I’m with Jewish Voice for Peace. We’re here today with 300 Jewish people and friends, all of whom are taking the day off work to occupy, to take over Trump Tower, because we know that Mahmoud’s case is a pressure test. The Trump administration wants to know if they can crush dissent altogether. So, it’s Mahmoud’s case. He’s been abducted. But they’re coming for so many more people. They’re starting with noncitizen students. They’ll move to the whole movement for Palestinian liberation. And they’ll do that as a gateway to get to the whole — all of our movements. And so, the time is now. We need everybody to stand up as loudly as possible and ensure that this case cannot go through for all of our movements.

PROTESTERS: No more deportations! End the occupation!

JAY SAPER: I’m Jay Saper with Jewish Voice for Peace, and I’m here to raise my voice to free Mahmoud Khalil. We see that the president is taking action in our name, and we refuse. We see this is a chilling of dissent. And we understand, when you come for one, you must face us all. As Jews, we have an experience with fascism, and our tradition teaches us that we must fight against fascism. So that is why we are rising up right now at Trump Tower to challenge the president’s disappearing, kidnapping, abduction of Mahmoud Khalil.

I have members of my family who were killed at Auschwitz in the Holocaust, and so I am deeply compelled by my family’s story to do everything I can to take action for all of our communities that are under attack right now. This has absolutely nothing to do about Jewish safety, and we will continue to raise our voices. When they are talking about taking action against antisemitism, that is not the case. What they are doing is stifling the movement for Palestinian liberation. And as Jews, we are calling for the U.S. to stop arming Israel, because we believe we can — our liberation is intertwined with one another, and none of us can be safe until all of us are safe.

PROTESTERS: “Never again” for anyone! “Never again” is now!

JANE HIRSCHMANN: I’m Jane Hirschmann with Jewish Voice for Peace. And we’re here to say to President Trump: He’s got to
stop this authoritarianism, this fascism. I personally know about it. My parents were Holocaust survivors. My grandfather and uncle were abducted late at night, just like Mahmoud, just the same, and they were taken to jail. And my mother had to find them and take them out. Once they come for one of us, they’re going to come for all of us. And we are here to say to Trump, “No!” And we are Jewish. We’re here strong. There are over 216 of us. And this is a message we want to send to the president.

PROTESTERS: From Palestine to Mexico, all the walls have got to go!

JOSH DUBNAU: My name is Josh Dubnau. I’m here — I’m here as a Jew, because I refuse to allow this administration to speak in my name, to use our names as Jews to carry out a fascist agenda. There is a long history of Jews fighting fascism. And we are here today, as Jews and allies, to say no to fascism. The Trump administration is a government that has far-right white supremacists, people that do the Nazi salute, and he’s fine with that. He’s fine with supporting the AfD in Germany and other neo-Nazi and far-right groups. He’s not a friend to Jewish people.

POLICE LIAISON: The NYPD would like me to communicate that this has been your final warning, and they will begin arrests now.

PROTESTERS: When Palestine is under attack, what do we do? Stand up! Fight back! When Palestine is under attack, what do we do? Stand up! Fight back!

PROTESTER: I’m a militant anti-Zionist Jew. I’m ashamed —

POLICE OFFICER: You guys press?

AMY GOODMAN: Yes.

POLICE OFFICER: You guys have to leave here. They have the press downstairs.

PROTESTER: — of what — I’m ashamed of what my country is doing.

POLICE OFFICER: You guys have to leave. Come on. Let’s go.

JAMAAL BOWMAN: Jamaal Bowman, former congressman from New York’s 16th District, I love showing up here to support people who are putting their bodies on the line to save our democracy. Honestly, I didn’t even know this was happening. I happened to be in the neighborhood, and someone told me there’s a protest happening at Trump Tower. So I walked over here to just offer my support.

I’m here fighting for democracy, fighting for justice, fighting for humanity, fighting for brother Mahmoud Khalil, who was unlawfully detained in our country that’s supposed to be a country that exercises First Amendment rights. Brother Khalil was a peaceful protester fighting against a genocide in Gaza, like millions across the country and millions around the world. We have to stand up and fight for him, and we have to stand up and fight for everything this democracy is supposed to stand for. We have a fascist, right-wing dictator in the White House. His henchman, Elon Musk, is a Nazi. And we need the people of our country to push back and fight back and stand up against all of the injustices and the inhumanity that’s taking place in our country.

PROTESTERS: From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!

AMY GOODMAN: Former New York Congressmember Jamaal Bowman standing outside the protest, where, inside, Jewish Voice for Peace, hundreds of people gathered at the Trump Tower, where it all began in 2015 when Donald Trump came down the same escalators and first announced he was running for president. About a hundred people were arrested.
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri Mar 14, 2025 11:25 pm

Speech: [Department of Education] Secretary McMahon: Our Department's Final Mission
by Secretary Linda McMahon
March 3, 2025
https://perma.cc/F7BT-MQ3D

When I took the oath of office as Secretary of Education, I accepted responsibility for overseeing the U.S. Department of Education and those who work here. But more importantly, I took responsibility for supporting over 100 million American children and college students who are counting on their education to create opportunity and prepare them for a rewarding career.

I want to do right by both.

As you are all aware, President Trump nominated me to take the lead on one of his most momentous campaign promises to families. My vision is aligned with the President’s: to send education back to the states and empower all parents to choose an excellent education for their children. As a mother and grandmother, I know there is nobody more qualified than a parent to make educational decisions for their children. I also started my career studying to be a teacher, and as a Connecticut Board of Education member and college trustee, I have long held that teaching is the most noble of professions. As a businesswoman, I know the power of education to prepare workers for fulfilling careers.

American education can be the greatest in the world. It ought not to be corrupted by political ideologies, special interests, and unjust discrimination. [!] Parents, teachers, and students alike deserve better.

After President Trump’s inauguration last month, he steadily signed a slate of executive orders to keep his promises: combatting critical race theory, DEI, gender ideology, discrimination in admissions, promoting school choice for every child, and restoring patriotic education and civics. He has also been focused on eliminating waste, red tape, and harmful programs in the federal government. The Department of Education’s role in this new era of accountability is to restore the rightful role of state oversight in education and to end the overreach from Washington. [!]

This restoration will profoundly impact staff, budgets, and agency operations here at the Department. In coming months, we will partner with Congress and other federal agencies to determine the best path forward to fulfill the expectations of the President and the American people. We will eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy so that our colleges, K-12 schools, students, and teachers can innovate and thrive.

This review of our programs is long overdue. The Department of Education is not working as intended. Since its establishment in 1980, taxpayers have entrusted the department with over $1 trillion, yet student outcomes have consistently languished. Millions of young Americans are trapped in failing schools, subjected to radical anti-American ideology, or saddled with college debt for a degree that has not provided a meaningful return on their investment. Teachers are leaving the profession in droves after just a few years—and citing red tape as one of their primary reasons.

The reality of our education system is stark, and the American people have elected President Trump to make significant changes in Washington. Our job is to respect the will of the American people and the President they elected, who has tasked us with accomplishing the elimination of bureaucratic bloat here at the Department of Education—a momentous final mission—quickly and responsibly.

While the public no doubt has an interest in the Executive carrying out his important role in foreign affairs, it also has an interest in ensuring those duties are carried out in accordance with law, including the APA, and with the role prescribed to Congress, also a democratically elected branch, under the Constitution.... the Executive is equal to, not above, Congress and its laws.

-- Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction: Memorandum Opinion and Order by Judge Amir H. Ali, USDC Judge, March 10, 2025. USDC, District of Columbia, AIDS VACCINE ADVOCACY COALITION, et al. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al., Civil Action No. 25-00400 (AHA) GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, et al. v. DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Civil Action No. 25-00402 (AHA) [Judge Amir H. Ali, United States District Judge], March 10, 2025


As I’ve learned many times throughout my career, disruption leads to innovation and gets results. We must start thinking about our final mission at the department as an overhaul—a last chance to restore the culture of liberty and excellence that made American education great. Changing the status quo can be daunting. But every staff member of this Department should be enthusiastic about any change that will benefit students.

True change does not happen overnight—especially the historic overhaul of a federal agency.
Over the coming months, as we work hard to carry out the President’s directives, we will focus on a positive vision for what American education can be.

These are our convictions:

1. Parents are the primary decision makers in their children’s education.
2. Taxpayer-funded education should refocus on meaningful learning in math, reading, science, and history—not divisive DEI programs and gender ideology.
3. Postsecondary education should be a path to a well-paying career aligned with workforce needs.

Removing red tape and bureaucratic barriers will empower parents to make the best educational choices for their children. An effective transfer of educational oversight to the states will mean more autonomy for local communities. Teachers, too, will benefit from less micromanagement in the classroom—enabling them to get back to basics.

I hope each of you will embrace this vision going forward and use these convictions as a guide for conscientious and pragmatic action. The elimination of bureaucracy should free us, not limit us, in our pursuit of these goals. I want to invite all employees to join us in this historic final mission on behalf of all students, with the same dedication and excellence that you have brought to your careers as public servants.

This is our opportunity to perform one final, unforgettable public service to future generations of students. I hope you will join me in ensuring that when our final mission is complete, we will all be able to say that we left American education freer, stronger, and with more hope for the future.

Sincerely,

Linda McMahon
Secretary of Education
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri Mar 14, 2025 11:58 pm

If Successful, I Would Call It a Coup: A Retired Judge’s Warning About Elon Musk’s Abuse of Power
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow!
March 14, 2025
https://www.democracynow.org/2025/3/14/ ... transcript



A pair of federal judges have ordered the Trump administration to reinstate thousands of fired federal workers at the departments of Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Interior and Treasury. The White House vowed to fight what it called an “absurd and unconstitutional order.” This comes as the White House and its allies have increasingly targeted judges who rule against the administration. Elon Musk has posted dozens of messages on his social platform X calling for the impeachment of judges who rule against the administration. We speak with retired federal Judge Nancy Gertner, who served as a federal district judge in Massachusetts for 17 years, from 1994 to 2011. “The distance between what they are trying to do and what is lawful is so enormous that anyone would rule as these judges are doing,” says Gertner.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org. I’m Amy Goodman.

Two federal judges — one in Maryland, one in California — have ordered the Trump administration to reinstate tens of thousands of fired federal workers. In one of the rulings, District Judge William Alsup said, “It is a sad day when our government would fire some good employee and say it was based on performance when they know good and well that’s a lie,” unquote. The White House responded by saying, quote, “The Trump Administration will immediately fight back against this absurd and unconstitutional order,” unquote.

This comes as the White House and its allies have increasingly targeted judges who rule against the administration. Reuters recently reported U.S. marshals have warned federal judges of unusually high threat levels due to a series of comments from Elon Musk, Donald Trump and others targeting judges. Musk has posted dozens of messages on his social platform X calling for the impeachment of judges who rule against the administration. He has also called judges “corrupt,” “radical” and “evil.” Vice President JD Vance has questioned whether judges even have the authority to rule on Trump’s order. Vance went to Yale Law School. Vance wrote last month on X, “judges aren’t allowed to control the executive’s legitimate power,” unquote. President Trump has indicated he believes he’s above the law, recently writing, quote, “He who saves his Country does not violate any law,” unquote.

Trump has also gone after law firms. Last week, he levied unprecedented penalties against the firm Perkins Coie, that has ties to the Democratic Party. On Wednesday, a federal judge partially blocked the order, saying the order, quote, “casts a chilling harm of blizzard proportions across the legal profession,” unquote. The American Bar Association has also criticized efforts to undermine the courts. In a statement, the ABA said, quote, “We will not stay silent in the face of efforts to remake the legal profession into something that rewards those who agree with the government and punishes those who do not.”

We’re joined right now by retired federal Judge Nancy Gertner. She served as a federal district judge in Massachusetts for 17 years, from 1994 to 2011, now a professor at Harvard Law School. She’s also the author of the book, In Defense of Women: Memoirs of an Unrepentant Advocate.

Judge, welcome to Democracy Now! It’s great to have you with us. If you can respond, overall, to the attack on judges, and judges pushing back around the country?

NANCY GERTNER: You have to put it in context here. What the judges are doing in cases across the country are dealing with executive orders that are so, so far from lawful, constitutional, consistent with the statute, that, frankly, if they didn’t respond, there would be something wrong. In other words, there have been, what, over 111 lawsuits filed, and, for the most part, every time someone asks for a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, that has been allowed. It does not matter who appointed the judge. It doesn’t matter where this is happening in the country. As I said, the distance between what they are trying to do and what is lawful is so enormous that anyone would rule as these judges are doing.

The case in California, for example, is a classic example. The judge there yesterday said, you know, “Give me an explanation as to why the probationary employees have been resoundingly fired.” And the Trump administration refused to provide anyone from the Office of Personnel Management. It was as if they were saying, “We don’t have to explain. We don’t have to give an explanation.” And the judge was absolutely furious, because, of course, there has to be an explanation. These people were fired, completely not following any of the rules. And worse, in order to sort of come up with a lame justification, people who had great performance reviews only, you know, a few months ago were suddenly described as inadequate employees. I mean, it was a contrivance. It was a lie. And it violated numbers and numbers of laws and statutes. So, judges are doing what they are put on the bench to do, which is to call it as they see it.

AMY GOODMAN: Let me ask you your thoughts on Vice President Vance, who notoriously stated, “judges aren’t allowed to control the executive’s legitimate power.”

NANCY GERTNER: Well, I think the word “legitimate” carries weight in that sentence. The question is: What’s legitimate? And courts are supposed to say what the law is. That was settled, you know, in the last century. Courts are supposed to say what is constitutional and what the law is, and the executive is to follow. So, they are doing what is completely within their legitimate scope of authority. And he knows that. He knows that. I’m a Yale Law graduate, as well, and his statements, frankly, are chilling, really extraordinary.

AMY GOODMAN: Judge Gertner —

NANCY GERTNER: So, yeah, he knows that. But the — yeah.

AMY GOODMAN: I want to move on quickly, because we don’t have much time, and there’s a lot to talk about. I wanted to get your response to efforts by some House Republicans who have introduced a bill aimed at limiting the power of judges, in response to the mounting challenges against Trump’s measures, and the role of the Supreme Court.

NANCY GERTNER: Well, that was to be expected, which is to try to restrict the authority of judges. But the authority of judges to announce what the law is is in the Constitution, or it’s an interpretation of the Constitution, which they cannot undo without undoing much more than just the issue of this judge or that judge. Judges are supposed to interpret the law, and particularly interpret constitutional law. And this is power, it seems to me, that is baked into the Constitution and cannot be taken away. So, this is an empty gesture. But even worse, it is a troubling, outrageous gesture.

AMY GOODMAN: And can you respond to lawyers for Trump asking the Supreme Court this week to lift a nationwide pause imposed on the president’s order ending birthright citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants, marking the first time the legal wrangling over the president’s order to end birthright citizenship has reached the Supreme Court?

NANCY GERTNER: Well, this is — again, this was a move that, in my view, is so far from constitutional that no judge worthy of their name would ever rule in a different direction. Birthright citizenship is in the Constitution. Birthright citizenship was affirmed — what is it? — a hundred years ago. So, this is just pushing back on the judiciary, and then, when the judiciary does what they don’t want them to do, and the judiciary says this is wrong, trying to delegitimize that decision. I can’t tell you how fundamentally dangerous all of this is, because the judiciary is one of the institutions that deal with checks and balances. And if you take them out of the picture, you’re going the way of Hungary, you’re going the way of Russia. And it’s extraordinarily troubling.

AMY GOODMAN: And can you talk about President Trump simply not obeying the courts? I mean, U.S. marshals are the kind of army for the courts, but they’re under the Justice Department, Trump’s Justice Department, the heads of that calling themselves Trump’s lawyers.

NANCY GERTNER: The marshals are supposed to be the enforcer of judgments. And as you say, they are under the supervision of the Department of Justice. Their authorizing legislation, however, says that the marshals shall enforce the law. And so there’s a division here. On the one hand, the authorizing statute says they shall enforce the law. And even if Pam Bondi says, you know, “I’m sorry, that law doesn’t matter. We’re going to skip over that law,” they still have an obligation to enforce the law. If they did not, then we would have a constitutional crisis.

Saying that doesn’t describe what that would mean. A constitutional crisis, what does that mean for all of us? I mean, then, it would mean, really, a marching on Washington, deluging all of our congressmen and representatives. It could mean mass demonstrations. I mean, it’s almost the end of law. And at that point, people have to make it clear, as the population in Israel did, as populations in Poland did, that this is beyond the pale. This is not what our Constitution was meant to accomplish.

AMY GOODMAN: Judge, would you call DOGE’s taking over of federal agencies, you know, run by, as President Trump keeps saying, Elon Musk, the richest man in the world, who gave the most money to the president to be reelected — would you call what’s happened, as judges push back across the country and say tens of thousands of workers have to be reinstated — would you call what has happened a coup?

NANCY GERTNER: What has happened with Elon Musk, well, I have called it a coup. If it succeeds, it will have been a coup. In other words, if the definition of a “coup” is a small group of people who are not elected — and there was Musk — who are taking over the power of the government, yes, I would call it a coup. I mean, he — there are challenges around the country to his authority, to Musk’s authority — Musk, who is not confirmed by Congress, who was selected by means that no one exactly knows, who was given powers that no one knows about, who is getting access to information that only government officials who have been appropriately selected can get. And if he’s successful in that — there are challenges to that. If he is successful, yes, I would call that a coup.

AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to leave it there. I want to thank you so much for being with us, retired Judge Nancy Gertner, professor at Harvard Law School, served as a federal judge in the District Court of Massachusetts for 17 years, speaking to us from Massachusetts.
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Sat Mar 15, 2025 12:28 am

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/ ... 031025.pdf

Image

-- Mahmoud Khalil v. William P. Joyce (1:25-cv-01935), District Court, S.D. New York. Assigned To: Jesse Matthew Furman

29. Mar 12, 2025. ORDER As stated on the record during the conference held earlier today: With the consent of both parties, the Court orders that the limitations on remote access to electronic files otherwise applicable in this case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c), are lifted. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to lift all viewing restrictions on the docket - i.e., to make all prior filings electronically available to the public - and to update the docket to conform with the caption of this Order. All future filings shall be publicly available unless the Court grants leave to file something under seal or in redacted form. Any application to file a document in such a manner shall be made in accordance with the Court's Individual Rules and Practices for Civil Cases, available at https://nysd.uscourts.gov/hon-jesse-m-furman. The Government shall file its Motion to Transfer or Dismiss for Improper Venue by 11:59 p.m. tonight. Briefing on that motion and Petitioner's Motion to Compel Respondents to Return Petitioner to this District, see ECF No. 11, shall then proceed as follows: The parties shall file their oppositions by March 14, 2025, at 11:59 p.m.; and the parties shall file their replies by March 17, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. Petitioner shall file an Amended Petition no later than March 13, 2025, at 9:00 p.m. After the Amended Petition is filed, the parties shall confer and then file a joint letter, no later than March 14, 2025, at 12:00 p.m., proposing next steps, including an expedited schedule for any additional motion practice. With the consent of the Government, Petitioner shall be granted at least one privileged attorney-client call (of at least one hour) today and at least one such call (also of at least one hour) tomorrow. The Government raised no objection to the temporary relief that the Court granted in its Notice of Conference entered on March 10, 2025. See ECF No. 9, at 1 ("To preserve the Courts jurisdiction pending a ruling on the petition, Petitioner shall not be removed from the United States unless and until the Court orders otherwise." (citing cases)). Accordingly, that order remains in effect. SO ORDERED. (Amended Pleadings due by 3/13/2025., Motions due by 3/12/2025., Replies due by 3/17/2025., Responses due by 3/14/2025) (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 3/12/2025) (jca) (Entered: 03/12/2025)


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M.K. [Mahmoud Khalil],

Petitioner,

-v-

WILLIAM P. JOYCE et al.,

Respondents.

CASE NO.: 25-CV-1935 (JMF)

NOTICE OF CONFERENCE

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:

It is hereby ORDERED that counsel for all parties appear for a conference with the Court on March 12, 2025 at 11:30 a.m. in Courtroom 1105 of the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, New York. Counsel must confer in advance of the conference and submit a joint letter, no later than March 11, 2025, at 5:00 p.m., indicating whether the conference is necessary and addressing how the Court should handle the present Petition. If counsel do not believe a conference is required, and that briefing is appropriate, counsel should propose a briefing schedule (expedited or otherwise) in the joint letter.

To preserve the Court’s jurisdiction pending a ruling on the petition, Petitioner shall not be removed from the United States unless and until the Court orders otherwise. See, e.g., Local 1814, Intern. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass’n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1237 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Once the district court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and the parties to, the litigation, the All Writs Act [28 U.S.C. § 1651] authorizes a federal court to protect that jurisdiction” (cleaned up)); Garcia-Izquierdo v. Gartner, No. 04-CV-7377 (RCC), 2004 WL 2093515, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2004) (observing that, under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, a district court “may order that a petitioner’s deportation be stayed . . . when a stay is necessary to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction of the case”); cf. Michael v. I.N.S., 48 F.3d 657, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the All Writs Act provides a federal court of appeals reviewing a final removal order with a basis to stay removal).

All counsel are required to register promptly as filing users on ECF. All counsel must familiarize themselves with the Court’s Individual Rules, which are available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Furman. Absent leave of Court obtained by letter-motion filed before the conference, all pretrial conferences must be attended by the attorney who will serve as principal trial counsel.

If this case has been settled or otherwise terminated, counsel are not required to appear, provided that a stipulation of discontinuance, voluntary dismissal, or other proof of termination is filed on the docket prior to the date of the conference, using the appropriate ECF Filing Event. See SDNY ECF Rules & Instructions §§ 13.17-13.19 & App’x A, available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf_filing.php.

In accordance with the Court’s Individual Rules and Practices, requests for an extension or adjournment may be made only by letter-motion filed on ECF and must be received at least 48 hours before the deadline or conference. The written submission must state (1) the original date(s); (2) the number of previous requests for adjournment or extension; (3) whether these previous requests were granted or denied; (4) whether the adversary consents and, if not, the reasons given by the adversary for refusing to consent; and (5) the date of the parties’ next scheduled appearance before the Court. Unless counsel are notified that the conference has been adjourned, it will be held as scheduled.

No later than today, March 10, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel is directed (1) to serve Respondents with a copy of the petition and accompanying papers, along with a copy of this Order, by e-mail to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and by overnight mail, and (2) to promptly file proof of such service on the docket. Counsel for Respondents shall promptly enter notices of appearance.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2025
New York, New York

JESSE M. FURMAN
United States District Judge

**********************

“This Is All Retaliatory”: Judge Blocks Mahmoud Khalil’s Deportation as Trump Vows More Arrests
by Amy Goodman
DemocracyNow!
March 11, 2025
https://www.democracynow.org/2025/3/11/ ... _palestine



A federal judge has blocked the deportation of recent Columbia University graduate Mahmoud Khalil, a permanent legal resident of the U.S. who was arrested by immigration authorities for helping organize campus solidarity protests with Gaza. He had been receiving daily threats stemming from an online smear campaign launched by pro-Israel activists before his arrest and repeatedly appealed to university administrators for protection. Khalil, who is a Palestinian green card holder, is married to a U.S. citizen. Upon his arrest, he was separated from his pregnant wife and transported to a detention facility in Louisiana, where legal experts say he is more likely to appear before Trump-friendly judges if his case moves forward. “Her husband was abducted before her very eyes [and] disappeared,” says Ramzi Kassem.

Kassem is the founder of the legal clinic CLEAR, which is contesting Khalil’s “baseless” detention and Louisiana transfer in New York court.
Khalil’s unprecedented arrest makes good on President Trump’s promise to punish antiwar student activists, bringing together his administration’s attacks on free speech, education and immigrant rights. It is “part and parcel” of “Trump’s racist and fascist agenda,” says immigrant rights activist Murad Awawdeh, who adds that the Columbia University administration’s lack of response to Khalil’s high-profile case has been “incredibly shameful.”

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: A federal judge has blocked the deportation of Mahmoud Khalil, the recent Columbia University graduate who was arrested over the weekend by immigration agents for helping organize campus solidarity protests with Gaza last year. Khalil is a permanent legal resident; he has a green card. His wife is a U.S. citizen who’s eight months pregnant. Khalil was arrested Saturday at his university-owned apartment. He’s now being held in a federal jail for immigrants in Louisiana.

President Trump boasted of Khalil’s arrest, posting on social media, quote, “This is the first arrest of many to come,” unquote.


On Monday, faculty at Columbia University and Barnard College held an emergency press conference, where they were joined by rabbis and immigrant rights advocates. This is Nadia Abu El-Haj, co-director of the Center for Palestine Studies at Columbia.

NADIA ABU EL-HAJ: Mahmoud Khalil has been a public face of the student movement at Columbia-Barnard since last spring. During the encampment, he served as the lead negotiator with the Columbia administration. A mature and gentle human being and a politically sophisticated thinker, Mahmoud tried his best to bring a peaceful end to that encampment. In the same spirit, Mahmoud tried to negotiate a resolution between students and the Barnard administration last week during a sit-in at Milstein Hall.

AMY GOODMAN: Yinon Cohen is a professor of Israel and Jewish studies at Columbia University.

YINON COHEN: Rescinding visas, canceling green card and intimidating students and staff have become the tool of choice for stifling free speech and undermining the First Amendment. Columbia University includes Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and atheists, and none of us will be safe unless we’re all safe.


AMY GOODMAN: Over a thousand protesters also gathered at Federal Plaza in New York Monday to demand Mahmoud Khalil’s release. These are some of the voices from the protest.

PROTESTERS: Hands off Mahmoud Khalil! Hands off Mahmoud Khalil! ICE off our campus now! ICE off our campus now!

LAYAN FULEIHAN: My name is Layan Fuleihan. I’m with the People’s Forum. The larger context from even before this weekend, I think, is important. The DOJ has been threatening to deport students who have stood up for the Palestinian people over the past 18 months. They have been calling them pro-Hamas. They have been saying they are antisemitic. They have been trying to demonize the students in the face of the American public. They said to Israeli media that they intend on putting these students in jail, not for 24 hours, but for years.

The Columbia administration has been cracking down on the students without even provocation from the federal government. I mean, they only lasted one day before they brought the NYPD onto campus to suppress the encampment. Columbia has absolutely been part and parcel of this crackdown on the students.

PROTESTERS: No fascist U.S.A.! No ICE!

MURAD AWAWDEH: My name is Murad Awawdeh. I am the president and CEO of the New York Immigration Coalition. It is incredibly shameful that our communities have to continue to endure under this fascist regime simply to deliver on a publicity stunt of a campaign called mass deportation. The message that they are trying to send, which is a deplorable one, is that no one is protected under free speech in this country anymore.

PROTESTERS: Hands off our students now! Hands off our students now!

ANNOUNCER: I’m going to call up now an experienced leader in the immigrant rights movement, Ravi from the New Sanctuary Coalition.

RAVI RAGBIR: They want to terrorize us. They want to intimidate us. This is my home. I was born in Trinidad, but this is my home. This is Khalil’s home. This is Mahmoud’s home. Right? We have been here. We are making this our community. You all are part of our community. We are going to stand up. We are going to fight. We are not going to allow this agency, this administration to instill fear. So we are not fearful. We are strong. We are unafraid. And we are going to stand up and fight. Free Mahmoud!

PROTESTERS: Release Mahmoud Khalil now! Release Mahmoud Khalil now!

ALEXA AVILÉS: My name is Alexa Avilés. I am a councilmember representing District 38 in South Brooklyn. We are standing here in support of a free Palestine. We are standing demanding the freedom of Khalil. If they cannot hear us, we must be louder. We must organize. They are coming for all of us, and it is us who will protect each other. ICE — ICE and the Trump band of bigots have no place here in New York City.

AMY GOODMAN: On Monday, the news outlet Zeteo reported Mahmoud Khalil had emailed Columbia’s interim President Katrina Armstrong one day before ICE detained him, to ask her to protect him after he was targeted in a doxxing and smear campaign. Khalil wrote, quote, “I haven’t been able to sleep, fearing that ICE or a dangerous individual might come to my home. I urge you to intervene and provide the necessary protections to prevent further harm,” he said.

Emails Show Mahmoud Khalil Asked Columbia for Protection a Day Before He Was Detained: "I haven’t been able to sleep, fearing that ICE or a dangerous individual might come to my home. I urge you to intervene and provide the necessary protections to prevent further harm."
by Prem Thakker
zeteo
Mar 10, 2025
https://zeteo.com/p/scoop-emails-show-m ... ection-ice

Image
Mahmoud Khalil speaks to members of the media about the Revolt for Rafah encampment at Columbia University on June 1, 2024. Photo by Jeenah Moon/Reuters

Mahmoud Khalil, a Palestinian who helped lead negotiations between Columbia University and student protesters, had appealed to the school for protection from harassment and possibly Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents one day before the Trump administration detained him on Saturday, emails obtained by Zeteo show.

The most recent among the leaked messages was an email Khalil, a green card holder, sent to Columbia interim president Katrina Armstrong on March 7. “Since yesterday, I have been subjected to a vicious, coordinated, and dehumanizing doxxing campaign led by Columbia affiliates Shai Davidai and David Lederer who, among others, have labeled me a security threat and called for my deportation,” he began.

“Their attacks have incited a wave of hate, including calls for my deportation and death threats. I have outlined the wider context below, yet Columbia has not provided any meaningful support or resources in response to this escalating threat,” he added.

“I haven’t been able to sleep, fearing that ICE or a dangerous individual might come to my home. I urgently need legal support, and I urge you to intervene and provide the necessary protections to prevent further harm.”


The message was especially notable given several reports of ICE being spotted on campus throughout the week and Columbia’s own guidance published this weekend about “potential visits to campus” by ICE. In the memo, the school said faculty and staff “should not interfere” in “exigent circumstances” where ICE agents seek access to university buildings or people without a warrant.

Columbia University and Lederer did not immediately respond to Zeteo’s requests for comment.

Davidai [Shai Davidai, a Columbia professor banned from campus for harassing pro-Palestinian students], who had been suspended from campus last year over allegations he had harassed university staff, denied collaborating with the Trump administration to get Khalil deported. “Let me be absolutely clear: I have never had a direct line to the administration. Even if I did, I would never use such influence to target an individual. This is not who I am or what I stand for,” Davidai told Zeteo. “Like many, I’ve called out Khalil’s repeated legal violations and demanded accountability. But as I always remind my students, just because one event follows another doesn’t mean it caused it.

In online posts, Davidai had called Khalil a “terrorist supporter” and suggested he should be deported, tagging Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

They're negotiating with them AGAIN.
What did you think will happen when you negotiated with them last time?
By the way - the terrorist supporter holding the megaphone is Mahmoud Khalil - a @Columbia (not @BarnardCollege) student.
Time for arrests and expulsions.


Israel War Room
@IsraelWarRoom
Mar 5, 2025
Why is @BarnardCollege’s administration negotiating with the pro-Hamas mob AGAIN?!


Dear @SecRubio,
Thank you for your strong statements.
Now we want to see strong action.
Illegally taking over a college in which you are not even enrolled and distributing terrorist propaganda should be a deportable offense, no?
Because that’s what Mahmoud Khalil from @ColumbiaSJP did
yesterday at @BarnardCollege


[x]
David lederer @Davidlederer6
Mar 6, 2025
Meet Mahmoud Khalil, a Columbia student known to have been on a foreign visa last year. He recently helped illegally take over a library building and distribute Hamas propaganda.
https://x.com/canarymission/status/1897 ... 62/video/1
4:39 PM · Mar 6, 2025


Khalil’s March 7 email came after an earlier Jan. 31 email he sent, in which he urged the school “to take immediate action to protect international students at Columbia facing severe and pervasive doxing, discriminatory harassment, and very possibly deportation in retaliation for the lawful exercising of their rights to freedom of speech, expression, and association…”

Khalil cited a threatening post by the pro-Israel organization Betar in January. In the post, the group wrote that he said, “Zionists don’t deserve to live” – a statement Khalil “unequivocally” denied making in his email to university officials. Betar also wrote that ICE⁩ “is aware of his home address and whereabouts” and that they “have provided all his information to multiple contacts.”


[x]
Mohammad khalil says Zionists don’t deserve to live while he’s on a visa ⁦@Columbia⁩. It’s 10 pm and ⁦@ICEgov⁩ is aware of his home address and whereabouts. We have provided all his information to multiple contacts. He’s on our deport list!
7:52 PM · Jan 29, 2025


“He’s on our deport list!“ Betar added.

Citing the Betar post, Khalil asked Armstrong in his email: “With the stakes being so high, I ask you, as representatives of Columbia University’s administration – how will you protect international students from doxing and from deportation? How will you protect these students’ rights to free speech, expression, and association – rights provided for in the U.S. Constitution and Columbia’s Code of Conduct – and stop the suppression and now potential criminalization of that speech and expression? Students’ futures, their livelihoods, and now, without exaggerating, their lives are at risk.”

Targeted Removal Before Arrest

On Thursday, March 6, Khalil emailed Gerald Lewis, the vice president of Columbia Public Safety, and cc’d Armstrong regarding the deactivation of his university ID. Khalil wrote that during a campus protest, he was approached by public safety staff who informed him his ID had been deactivated due to not being registered for classes this semester.

“I am a recent alumnus, having graduated in December 2024, with my degree set to be conferred in May. By now, I believe you’ve confirmed that I entered the campus like any other Columbia affiliate, swiping my ID and showing it to security,” Khalil wrote.

“I questioned why I was being singled out, as I am aware of other Columbia affiliates who were in similar situations and were not approached, despite being in close proximity to me at the time,” noting that the staff who approached were “well aware that I am a Palestinian national, as we have previously communicated and worked together to ensure safe campus protests.”

“However, when I asked for clarification on how I was identified and why I was the only individual approached, they refused to provide any explanation,” Khalil wrote
, questioning why he was the only individual targeted and who issued the instructions for the staff to approach and remove him from campus. Khalil wrote that the lack of a clear justification raised concerns for targeted discrimination.

“For over a year, I have been collaborative with your office and other university offices to ensure all students are safe and that the university operates smoothly so I was really shocked to be treated this way. If I’m unwelcome on Columbia campus, please let me know through the right channels.”

Trump: More Arrests to Come

For more than 24 hours after his detainment, Khalil’s whereabouts were unclear. Per the ICE detainee tracker, he is now held in an ICE detention facility in Louisiana (just months ago, rights groups published a report on facilities in Louisiana entitled "Inside the Black Hole: Systemic Human Rights Abuses Against Immigrants Detained & Disappeared in Louisiana”).

On Monday, a federal judge temporarily blocked the deportation of Khalil until at least Wednesday while he reviewed a petition that challenges the legality of Khalil's detention.

The Trump administration has scrambled to justify Khalil’s detention – but has yet to say explicitly what, if anything, Khalil has been charged with. First, the Department of Homeland Security referred Zeteo to the White House, which did not respond to a request for comment. Later, DHS spokesperson Tricia McLaughlin confirmed in a statement that ICE detained Khalil “in support of President Trump’s executive orders prohibiting anti-Semitism.” Without providing evidence, McLaughlin claimed Khalil “led activities aligned to Hamas.”[/i]

A State Department spokesperson initially told Zeteo they cannot comment on individual visa cases, but "in general, the department has broad authority to revoke visas … under the Immigration and Nationality Act,” and that the department “exercise[s] that authority when information comes to light at any time indicating that a visa holder may be inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible for a visa.”

But then, Rubio issued a curt statement that appeared to be trying to reconcile the confusion of how the State Department could even go after someone’s green card – especially after the arresting agents didn’t even know Khalil had one. “We will be revoking the visas and/or green cards of Hamas supporters in America so they can be deported,” Rubio wrote.

Finally, on Monday, President Donald Trump celebrated the arrest of Mahmoud Khalil, calling him, without providing evidence, "a Radical Foreign Pro-Hamas Student.”

"This is the first arrest of many to come,” Trump added.


Prem Thakker is Zeteo’s political reporter. Send tips via email or Signal (premthakker.35).


Meanwhile, Drop Site News reports the ICE agent who detained Khalil was Elvin Hernandez, who was honored by Trump during his State of the Union address in 2019, when Trump was first president.

We’re joined now by two guests. Murad Awawdeh is president of the New York Immigration Coalition, longtime Palestinian American activist. We just saw him in that clip speaking to the crowd yesterday. And Ramzi Kassem is a professor of law at CUNY, the City University of New York, where he founded the legal clinic CLEAR — the acronym stands for Creating Law Enforcement Accountability and Responsibility. Its mandate is to support Muslims and all other communities “targeted by local, state, or federal government agencies under the guise of national security and counterterrorism,” unquote. On Monday, CLEAR and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a federal habeas petition in the Southern District of New York challenging Mahmoud Khalil’s detention.

Ramzi Kassem, let’s begin with you. If you can explain what has taken place in the last days, from Mahmoud Khalil’s arrest in Columbia housing after directly appealing to Columbia’s president to protect him, right through to the judge yesterday enjoining his deportation and your emergency submission?

RAMZI KASSEM: Thank you, Amy.

I can start with what happened to Mahmoud and his wife. On Saturday night, they were walking home. As you mentioned earlier, Mahmoud is a U.S. permanent resident. His wife is a U.S. citizen who is eight months pregnant. This is a family. They were expecting their first child next month. They had every reason to look forward to that momentous event.

And they’re coming home on Saturday night around 8 p.m. As they’re about to enter their building is when they’re approached by men in plainclothes who subsequently identify themselves as DHS agents. And what they say is that they’re going to take Mahmoud away because his student visa has been revoked. His wife protested and said that he doesn’t have a student visa. He’s a permanent resident. He has a green card. She goes upstairs to their apartment, gets the green card, shows it to the agent. The agent seems confused, calls his superiors, who apparently ordered him to take Mahmoud anyway.

And so, from her perspective, understandably, her husband was abducted before her very eyes, disappeared to a location in downtown Manhattan. And later that evening, our colleagues and co-counsel Amy Greer and Kyle Barron filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court in Manhattan on his behalf, asking for him to be released
. And what the government did, within hours of that, is to move him a thousand miles away from that courthouse down to Louisiana to complicate, interfere with his access to the court, with his access to his legal team, with his access to his wife and to his family and to his support network.

So, what we ended up having to do yesterday, unfortunately, is filing a motion with that same court, asking, basically, for the court to order the government to return Mahmoud to New York so that he can have access to his legal team, so that he can have access to the court, and so that the court can vindicate his constitutional rights. The court has already issued an order yesterday scheduling a hearing for Wednesday and also barring the government from deporting Mahmoud until the court orders otherwise.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: But, Ramzi, if he is a permanent resident, and he’s not — hasn’t been accused of any lawful violation, what basis do they have, if any, to actually try to revoke his green card?

RAMZI KASSEM: That is the key question, Juan. Our contention is that this is all retaliatory. The reason he was arrested and detained and targeted for arrest and detention was his constitutionally protected, First Amendment-protected speech and activism in support of Palestinian lives and rights in Gaza and beyond, and the fact that he played, as your segment highlighted, a key mediation role between the university administration and student protesters — which, if anything, is laudable. It’s commendable. It’s what you would want any student to do.

So, none of that is criminal. The government hasn’t even contended, really, seriously, that there is any kind of criminal activity. There’s never been an arrest or a conviction that they could point to. As far as we could tell, the government is invoking — and this is a somewhat novel approach — they’re invoking the foreign policy grounds, where the secretary of state is basically saying that this person, who is a noncitizen, who is a permanent resident, by his mere presence or activities in the United States, poses a threat to U.S. foreign policy interests. Now, none of that has been detailed or specified. And frankly, we don’t believe it will fly in court, because that provision of law may exist, but it does not exist to punish constitutionally protected speech. In other words, it doesn’t trump Mr. Khalil’s First Amendment rights.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And when you hear, for instance, that President Trump on Truth Social said, quote, “We know there are more students at Columbia and other Universities across the Country who have engaged in pro-terrorist, anti-Semitic, anti-American activity, and the Trump Administration will not tolerate it,” what does this tell you about where we’re heading?

RAMZI KASSEM: Well, look, I mean, we’ve all, sadly, become accustomed to the sort of inflammatory and, frankly, racist rhetoric that emanates from the Trump administration. This is no different. When it comes to Mahmoud, it’s all entirely baseless. And both Mahmoud and we on his legal team and all of his supporters, including the thousand-plus people who showed up yesterday, intend to fight to bring him back to New York and to vindicate not just his right to free speech, but everyone’s rights to free speech. You know, it can’t be the case that saying something that the government disagrees with becomes cause for a night arrest. No one should accept that. And so, you know, we’ll fight that tooth and nail.

And we don’t believe that this case will set the precedent that the government believes it’s going to set. It’s already backfired. You know, if the intent was to silent speech and to dissuade people from coming out in support of Palestinian human rights, well, we all saw what happened yesterday in Manhattan. Over a thousand people came out, not just in solidarity with Mahmoud, but also in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza and beyond. And we don’t believe that people are going to be deterred, nor is the movement that is critical of the ongoing genocide in Gaza and U.S. foreign policy and its support for Israel. Nor is that movement carried mainly by noncitizens. I mean, that’s also a falsehood. Americans are the ones who are driving the movement. And, of course, there are many noncitizen activists among them, but it’s primarily Americans. And so, they’re not going to be able to deport their way out of this movement.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you explain what’s going to happen in court tomorrow, Ramzi Kassem? And also, sending him to Louisiana, was that just outright punitive?

RAMZI KASSEM: Absolutely, Amy. I mean, our view is that his detention itself was punitive and retaliatory for his First Amendment-protected speech in support of Palestinian lives and rights. And then, subsequently, moving him to Louisiana was retaliatory and punitive, because he filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court contesting the legality and constitutionality of his detention. And so, the government’s response was to try to interfere with the court’s jurisdiction, to try to interfere with his access to counsel and to his family and to his support network by moving him a thousand miles away to Louisiana, where it believes it will have access to, you know, friendlier immigration courts and whatnot.

So, you know, we hope, even though we don’t expect the government to do the reasonable thing and voluntarily bring him back to New York — and if they don’t tell us today that they’re going to do that, then we’ll be in court tomorrow asking the court to order them to do that. And we will litigate the rest of the issues, including the free speech issues, from there.

AMY GOODMAN: And what about the Columbia University —Mahmoud lives in Columbia University housing. This direct appeal to the president of Columbia saying he was living in fear, that he couldn’t sleep. How could Columbia have protected him? Did ICE enter private Columbia housing illegally?

RAMZI KASSEM: There have been numerous reports of ICE in various Columbia housing facilities in the last couple of weeks, some substantiated, some not. That certainly raises a question about Columbia’s role.

Bigger picture, though, Columbia’s silence — well, I should say the Columbia administration’s silence has been noteworthy and shameful. For a university that has so often professed its concern for students, it is remarkably silent now that students are literally being abducted off of the streets surrounding Columbia’s campus. And I stress that this is the administration that I’m pointing a finger towards, because, you know, as your segment showed, other segments, other parts of the Columbia community, whether it’s the faculty or the students, have come out. And that’s commendable. They’ve come out in support of Mahmoud and of his family, and that’s great to see. But the university itself and its role in all of this has been, sadly, shameful to date.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: I’d like to bring in Murad Awawdeh, president of the New York Immigration Coalition, into the conversation. Murad, your response to what has been happening now with Mahmoud Khalil?

MURAD AWAWDEH: You know, this is, unfortunately, part and parcel to the Trump immigration agenda that we’re seeing play out, from his family separation agenda to his mass deportation plans. Mahmoud Khalil also falls under the category of this Trump administration trying to do everything it can to stymie people’s rights. You know, we’ve seen Tom Homan go out across Fox News, CNN and other networks talking about how individuals who are immigrants don’t have any rights. And this is sort of the rhetoric that they continue to hammer down on.

But fortunately, for everyone who calls his country home, they have constitutional rights, and Mahmoud Khalil is entitled to those rights, as well. And what we’re seeing right now with the Department of Homeland Security, and thankful for the CUNY CLEAR, as well as Center on Constitutional Rights, for stepping in and supporting Mahmoud in this moment, is that he has a right to due process, and that in this moment, he has done nothing wrong. He’s not been charged nor convicted with any crimes.

And it’s incredibly shameful that we continue to see Columbia spiral downward. This university used to be something that was considered the cream of the crop of universities, one of the top Ivy Leagues. There was a report from The Forward yesterday indicating that it may have been some board members of the university who actually called authorities on Mahmoud, which is incredibly disingenuous for an institution that continues to parade itself as an institution that wants to champion its students and build new leaders that we need for this world. What message is this sending to not just to their immigrant students, but all their students and families, that this is something that they would be participating in?

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And you mentioned the possibility of a connection directly to the university about his arrest. What about — has the university issued any statement, given the fact that they’ve been talking so much in recent months about free speech and protection of free speech?

MURAD AWAWDEH: It does not seem that they have yet. They did send out an email to students shortly after the incident, indicating that they were, you know, aware of situations occurring — which only begs the question: If, you know, Mahmoud is living in university-owned property, and Columbia has policies on the books that says that they will not cooperate or allow ICE onto their properties without a judicial warrant, why was ICE allowed onto that property? This only even more so begs the question: What is Columbia’s role in this moment?

AMY GOODMAN: Let me ask you about a New York Times piece that came out right before Mahmoud was taken by ICE, saying, “The Trump administration is finalizing a new ban on travel to the United States for citizens of certain countries that would be broader than the versions President Trump issued in [his] first term. … A draft recommendation circulating inside the executive branch proposes a 'red' list of countries whose citizens Mr. Trump could bar from entering the United States,” referring essentially to a new Muslim ban.

MURAD AWAWDEH: Yeah, and this is part and parcel to, again, Trump’s racist and fascist agenda that he campaigned on and, now that he is in office, is trying to deliver on. We saw this happen in part one of Trump when he was in office, and he’s looking to revive that policy and actually put another ban in place. We believe that it’s imminent, any day now. So, folks who are intending to travel outside of the country should reconsider their travels. And people who are outside of the country who have visas or are LPRs, green card holders, should be considering to travel back as soon as possible.

AMY GOODMAN: I want to thank you for being with us. We’ve been speaking with Murad Awawdeh, president of the New York Immigration Coalition, and with, as well, one of the attorneys for Mahmoud. He is Ramzi Kassem, professor of law at CUNY, the City University of New York, where he founded the legal clinic CLEAR. CLEAR and Center for Constitutional Rights have filed a federal habeas petition in the Southern District of New York challenging Mahmoud Khalil’s detention.

****************************

Mahmoud Khalil Was Detained by ICE Agent Honored by Trump at State of the Union. A federal judge has since blocked his potential deportation—for now
by Jason Paladino
Drop Site News
Mar 10, 2025
https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/mahmoud- ... ored-trump

The Trump administration's attempt to deport Mahmoud Khalil, a lawful permanent resident who hasn't been charged with any crime, represents a frightening erosion of First Amendment protections that threatens all Americans. This extraordinary action—detaining and attempting to remove someone for protected political speech—establishes a dangerous precedent where government can bypass due process and criminalize dissent. On Monday evening, a federal judge temporarily blocked the attempted deportation. Sign and share our petition to stand with millions of Americans who believe in protecting constitutional rights. Scroll to the bottom to participate in a letter-writing campaign.

Demand the Release of Mahmoud Khalil

—Ryan Grim

Image
Homeland Security agent Elvin Hernandez during the State of the Union address on February 5, 2019. Photo: SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images.

In 2019, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Elvin Hernandez sat in the gallery watching the State of the Union address with First Lady Melania Trump. President Donald Trump celebrated Hernandez as a hero, praising the story of a boy from the Dominican Republic who went on to become an ICE agent and work on human trafficking cases. Hernandez stood and saluted as the president sang his praises.

“We are joined tonight by one of those law enforcement heroes: ICE Special Agent Elvin Hernandez. When Elvin was a boy, he and his family legally immigrated to the United States from the Dominican Republic. At the age of eight, Elvin told his dad he wanted to become a Special Agent. Today, he leads investigations into the scourge of international sex trafficking.”

Image
The White House45 Archived @WhiteHouse45
February 9, 2019
Legal immigration gave a young Elvin Hernandez the chance to become an American hero.
Today, he fights international sex trafficking as an ICE Special Agent -- part of a team that secured justice for more than 1,500 perpetrators just last year.


That same special agent was present when plainclothes officers raided a Columbia University-owned residential building and detained Mahmoud Khalil, a recent graduate of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs and a lead negotiator for the Gaza Solidarity Encampment in April 2024.

Hernandez’s involvement was made public in a declaration filed in a habeas corpus case filed by Khalil’s attorney, Amy Greer. In response, Judge Jesse E. Furman of the Southern District of New York ordered the government to halt Khalil’s potential deportation until a Wednesday hearing in Manhattan, which his lawyer told Drop Site is “the right decision.” "We are grateful the Court has taken immediate action to protect Mahmoud's rights," she said.

At 8:26 p.m. on Saturday, Khalil called Greer to make her aware of the unfolding situation. ICE’s Hernandez then took the phone and spoke to Greer directly, before eventually hanging up on her.

When Greer asked Hernandez why they were making the arrest and if they had a warrant, he replied that they had an administrative warrant and that the basis of the arrest was the Department of State revoking Khalil’s student visa. Greer then told the agent that Khalil does not have a student visa—he is a legal permanent resident with a green card. Hernandez responded that DHS had “revoked that too.”

No charges have been filed against Mahmoud Khalil. DHS Spokesperson Tricia McLaughlin released a statement claiming that Khalil’s activism was “aligned to Hamas, a designated terrorist organization.”

On Monday, the president released a statement directly taking credit for the raid and promising more to come. “Following my previously signed Executive Orders, ICE proudly apprehended and detained Mahmoud Khalil, a Radical Foreign Pro-Hamas Student on the campus of Columbia University,” the post begins. A DHS official initially told Drop Site to contact the White House for information about the arrest.

According to the filing, Greer explained to Hernandez that they can’t simply revoke his green card without due process. Hernandez replied that he would have a chance to go before an immigration judge. When Greer then pushed back and asked what grounds the agents had to start immigration proceedings, Hernandez did not seem thrilled.

“When I began to ask more questions about what grounds they would have to put Mahmoud in immigration proceedings, Agent Hernandez started to grumble at me. I asked him to show me, Mahmoud, or his wife the warrant and he hung up on me,” Greer wrote in the legal filing.

His legal team and wife were unable to locate him for over 24 hours after his detention. According to the ICE database, Khalil was sent from New Jersey to the Central Louisiana ICE Processing Center. His legal team is attempting to petition the court to return him to New York.

According to LinkedIn, Hernandez works for Homeland Security Investigations, a directorate of the Department of Homeland Security’s ICE. Created in 2010, HSI describes its role as to “shield our nation from global threats to ensure Americans are safe and secure.” It has offices in 235 U.S. cities and 90 offices in over 50 countries and boasts a budget of just under $2.5 billion for Fiscal Year 2025. According to its budget documents, HSI “combats transnational criminal enterprises that seek to exploit America’s legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems.”

A 2022 Department of Justice press release thanks supervisory special agent Elvin Hernandez for his work on the R. Kelly case.

ICE did not respond to a request for comment. An online letter-sending campaign calling for the immediate release of Khalil now has over 1.8 million letters sent.

Meghnad Bose contributed reporting. If you have information about Khalil’s ICE detention, contact Jason Paladino securely on Signal at jpal.01.
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