https://ia904503.us.archive.org/16/item ... 4.22.0.pdf
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SUSAN TSUI GRUNDMANN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25 - 425 (SLS)
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Constitution vests Congress with broad authority to organize the Executive Branch. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8. From its earliest days, Congress exercised this power by creating institutions to structure the government. And for almost a century and a half, Congress has created independent federal agencies with specific expertise and limited the President’s power to remove principal officers leading those agencies. The Supreme Court first blessed that approach in 1935 when it rejected the President’s claim of “illimitable power of removal” over all federal officers, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), instead holding that our Constitution gives Congress the power to “create expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the President only for good cause.” Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 204 (2020) (emphasis omitted) (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602). And the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed statutory removal protections for multimember and bipartisan expert agencies since then.
Congress created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to impartially manage and resolve disputes surrounding labor organization in the federal workforce. The independence of the FLRA was central to its creation, as Congress wanted to ensure a fair, consistent, and unbiased process for managing federal labor relations that would not shift with political whims. To achieve this goal, Congress decided to give the three Members of the FLRA a limited statutory protection from removal by the President. They could be removed only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office during their staggered five-year terms, and only after notice and a hearing.
In the nearly fifty years since the FLRA’s creation, no President has ever removed a Member. Until now. On February 10, 2025, the Plaintiff, Susan Tsui Grundmann, received a two-sentence email on behalf of President Donald J. Trump informing her that her position on the FLRA had been terminated. Ms. Grundmann received no explanation whatsoever for her termination. And she did not receive notice or a hearing. Ms. Grundmann is not alone. This is one of a series of cases filed in this District challenging the President’s unprecedented removal of officers across the federal government without cause, including Members of the Merit Systems Protection Board and the National Labor Relations Board, as well as the Special Counsel.
The Government vigorously defends Ms. Grundmann’s hasty termination on the basis that the Constitution vests the entirety of the “executive Power” in the President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. It argues that the President may remove federal officials on a whim, and in doing so, override Congress’s considered judgment. The Government’s arguments paint with a broad brush and threaten to upend fundamental protections in our Constitution. But ours is not an autocracy; it is a system of checks and balances. Our Founders recognized that the concentration of power in one branch of government would spell disaster. “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The removal in this case was unlawful. The Government concedes that Ms. Grundmann’s removal violated the FLRA’s founding statute—a statute that Congress enacted and the President signed into law to revamp federal labor relations in the federal government. The Government’s argument that the statutory removal provision is unconstitutional cannot be reconciled with longstanding Supreme Court precedent that is binding on this Court. And it would encroach on Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.1
As for remedies, the Government takes the position that this Court lacks the authority to provide meaningful relief in these circumstances. It argues that where a President removes a Senate-confirmed federal officer in violation of a duly enacted and constitutional statute, the only recourse is an award of backpay to that officer. Why? According to the Government, any order from this Court that results in the officer continuing her role against the President’s will would raise grave separation-of-powers concerns. In other words, where a President exceeds his power under Article II of the Constitution and intrudes on Congress’s Article I authority, the Government’s position is that an Article III court may not interpret the law and redress the resulting injury. It is the Government’s own argument that raises grave separation-of-powers concerns. There can be no doubt that “the President is bound to abide by the requirements of duly enacted and otherwise constitutional statutes.” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d. 973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And it is precisely the role of an Article III court to step in when that does not happen. Ms. Grundmann is entitled to relief that would redress her injury and allow her to continue her work on the FLRA.
For those reasons and the reasons that follow, the Court grants Ms. Grundmann’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
Nearly fifty years ago, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7135, as part of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). These statutes “comprehensively reorganized the structure of labor-management relations in the federal government.” Library of Cong. v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1983). “Congress intended the new statutory system to serve the twin goals of protecting the right of public employees to organize and bargain collectively, while simultaneously strengthening the authority of federal management to hire and fire employees in the interest of a more effective public service.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7101).
Congress created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to “carry[] out the purpose” of the FSLMRS. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1). It tasked the FLRA with “conduct[ing] hearings and resolv[ing] complaints of unfair labor practices,” “resolv[ing] issues relating to the duty to bargain in good faith,” and “resolv[ing] exceptions to arbitrator’s awards.” Id. § 7105(a)(2). Congress also empowered the FLRA to supervise elections for the selection of labor organizations by employees and to prescribe certain criteria related to labor bargaining in the federal workforce. Id.
The FLRA is composed of three Members, all appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 7104. No more than two of the three Members are permitted to “be adherents of the same political party.” Id. § 7104(a). And each Member is to serve a staggered five-year term. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (establishing five-year terms); CSRA, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7104(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1196 (1978) (staggering terms). The Members can be removed by the President “only upon notice and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). But the President has the authority to designate one of the Members as the “Chairman of the Authority.” Id.
The structure of the FLRA was meant to ensure “the resolution of disputes by the intervention of neutral, independent, third parties[.]” 124 Cong. Rec. 25,720 (1978). Congress sought to “eliminate what [was] perceived by Federal employee unions and others as conflict of interest in the existing council,” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 159 (1978), and to create a body that was “impartial by independence from any direct responsibility to the incumbent administration,” S Rep. No. 95-969, at 7 (1978). As one sponsor stated:
One of the central elements of a fair labor relations program is effective, impartial administration. Title VII provides for the creation of an independent and neutral Federal labor relations authority to administer the Federal labor management program . . . . Currently the Federal labor-management program is administered by the Federal Labor Relations Council which is composed of three administration officials, . . . none of whom can be considered neutral.
124 Cong. Rec. 25,721 (1978). The belief was that “[i]mpartiality [was] guaranteed by protecting authority members from unwarranted ‘Saturday night’ removals.” Id. at 25,721–25,722.
B. Factual Background
The facts are drawn from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and Statement of Material Facts, which the Defendants do not dispute. Joint Status Report at 3, ECF No. 8.
The Plaintiff, Susan Tsui Grundmann, became a Member of the FLRA on May 12, 2022. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. She was appointed by President Joseph R. Biden and confirmed by the Senate to a term set to expire on July 1, 2025. Id. But that expiration date was not set in stone. Under the FSLMRS, she was permitted to continue serving until either her successor took office or the last day of the Congress beginning after the original expiration date, 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c), which in her case would fall in January 2029, Compl. ¶ 3. On January 3, 2023, President Biden designated her as Chairman of the Authority. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 4; Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 12.
The Government does not allege that Ms. Grundmann has been an ineffective Member of the FLRA. Yet on February 10, 2025, at 10:46 PM, Ms. Grundmann received a two-sentence email from Trent Morse, the Deputy Director of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel: “On behalf of President Donald J. Trump, I am writing to inform you that your position on the Federal Labor Relations Authority is terminated, effective immediately. Thank you for your service.” Pl.’s Decl. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 4-2. She did not receive notice or a hearing, nor was any “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” identified. Compl. ¶ 17. And she has since been unable to perform her duties as a Member of the FLRA. Id. ¶ 20. To the best of Ms. Grundmann’s knowledge, this is the first time a President has ever removed a Member of the FLRA without cause. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 12.
On February 11, 2025, President Trump named Colleen Duffy Kiko as Chairman, Compl. ¶ 19, leaving the FLRA with only two Members, see id. ¶ 20. Although the FLRA maintains a quorum, without Ms. Grundmann’s tiebreaking vote, certain cases may deadlock and go into abeyance. See Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7. This is exactly what happened when Ms. Grundmann served as one of only two Members of the FLRA for eighteen months, resulting in about one-third of the cases being deadlocked. Id.
C. Procedural Background
On February 13, 2025, Ms. Grundmann filed a Complaint alleging that her removal without cause violated the FSLMRS. See Compl. ¶¶ 22–25. She named President Trump and Ms. Kiko as Defendants, id. ¶¶ 4–5, and she requested both declaratory and injunctive relief, Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 1–3. The next day, on February 14, 2025, she filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”). On February 25, 2025, the Defendants filed their Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, see Defs.’ Opp’n, and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, see Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Cross-Mot.”), ECF No. 11. The Plaintiff responded to both on February 28, 2025. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 16. And the Defendants filed their Reply in support of their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 5, 2025. See Defs. Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply), ECF No. 18. The Court held a hearing on March 7, 2025. Both motions are now ripe for decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2006). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). When “both parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each must carry its own burden under the applicable legal standard.” Ehrman, 429 F. Supp. 2d. at 67.
DISCUSSION
The President violated the law when he removed Ms. Grundmann. The removal was in clear contravention of the FSLMRS. And under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, that statute was a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.
A. Statutory Violation
The Government concedes that Ms. Grundmann’s removal violated the FSLMRS. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 24:10–14. The statute provides that “Members of the Authority . . . may be removed by the President only upon notice and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b). But Ms. Grundmann received no notice or hearing. See Compl. ¶ 17. And the two-sentence email on behalf of the President informing her of the removal did not allege any inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. See id. The Government instead argues that the removal protection in the FSLMRS is unconstitutional. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 6–12.
B. Constitutionality of the Statute
“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010). This includes the power to provide removal protections to “multimember bodies with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ functions.” Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 217. This power to “create a traditional independent agency headed by a multimember board or commission,” id. at 207, “cannot well be doubted,” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629. The Court has repeatedly endorsed such removal protections throughout the last century. See, e.g., id.; Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
But this power is not without limits. “Article II provides that ‘[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id., § 3). This establishes a “general rule that the President possesses ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties.’” Id. at 215 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010)). The scope of Congress’s power therefore turns on whether this general rule applies. See id. at 218.
The Supreme Court has identified “two exceptions” that “represent what up to now have been the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the President’s removal power.” Id. (quoting PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). The first comes from Humphrey’s Executor, and it extends to “multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. The second comes from Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and it applies to “inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Congress may provide removal restrictions to an executive officer who fits within either of these two exceptions. See id.
1. The Humphrey’s Executor Exception
Seila Law is best read as teaching that the Humphrey’s Executor exception applies in two steps. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218–19. First, courts must ask whether an agency’s structure resembles that of the “New Deal-era FTC” described in Humphrey’s Executor. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Second, courts must ensure that the agency does not exercise substantial executive power. Id. at 218–19. If both conditions are met, then Congress has the authority to provide removal restrictions. Id. at 218.
The Government quibbles with step two. Even though Seila Law squarely states that the exception extends to “multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power,” id. (emphasis added), it argues that the exception is limited to agencies “that exercise no executive power,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 8 (emphasis added). Although some language in Seila Law could be read that way, a careful reading of each passage reveals that the opinion is more restrained.
First, Seila Law outlines its general rule in very broad terms. The Supreme Court says that “the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 203 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id., § 3). Then it says that the President has the “power to remove . . . those who wield executive power on his behalf.” Id. at 204. The combination of these two statements initially suggests that all executive power is wielded on behalf of the President, so anyone exercising any executive power must be removable at will. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 7. But the Court immediately acknowledges that there are “two exceptions” to this removal power. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 204. And it would make little sense to call them “exceptions” if they did not involve the exercise of any executive power at all. Id.
Second, Seila Law highlights that in Humphrey’s Executor, “[r]ightly or wrongly, the Court viewed the FTC (as it existed in 1935) as exercising ‘no part of the executive power.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 215 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628)). This makes it into the summary of the holding: “In short, Humphrey’s Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause removal protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.” Id. at 216 (emphasis added). But we should not read into this because Seila Law cites Wiener as falling within the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216. This could not be the case if the exception applied only to agencies that were “said not to exercise any executive power.” Id. (emphasis added). Neither Wiener nor Seila Law ever said such a thing about the War Claims Commission. See generally Wiener, 357 U.S. 349; Seila Law, 591 U.S. 197. The Court’s summary of the Humphrey’s Executor holding should therefore not be conflated with its description of the bounds of the Humphrey’s Executor exception.
Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021), does not change this reading of Seila Law. The Government points to broad language from the opinion: “Courts are not well-suited to weigh the relative importance of the regulatory and enforcement authority of disparate agencies, and we do not think that the constitutionality of removal restrictions hinges on such an inquiry.” Collins, 594 U.S. at 253. But Collins was a case about single agency heads, not multimember agencies, so the Humphrey’s Executor exception was not at issue. See id. at 251. The Court in Collins merely declined to create a new exception—beyond the two recognized in Seila Law—for single agency heads that exercise minimal executive power. Id. at 250. Collins even included a footnote right after the broad language that limited its reach to single agency heads. See id. at 253 n.19. That footnote distinguished two historical examples of removal restrictions by saying that “those agencies are materially different because neither of them operated beyond the President’s control, and one of them was led by a multi-member Commission.” Id. (emphasis added). So the language the Government identifies was not meant to apply to multimember agencies. And the Court expressly warned against reading Collins to apply to agencies not before the Court. See id. at 256 n.21. This would make little sense if Collins were meant to change Seila Law.2
2. The Structure of the FLRA
The first question is whether the FLRA’s structure resembles how Humphrey’s Executor described the “New Deal-era FTC.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Humphrey’s Executor “identified several organizational features that helped explain its characterization of the FTC as non-executive.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216. First, the Board was “[c]omposed of five members” with “no more than three from the same political party,” signaling that it was “designed to be ‘non-partisan’ and to ‘act with entire impartiality.’” Id. at 216 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624). Second, “[t]he FTC’s duties were ‘neither political nor executive,’ but instead called for ‘the trained judgment of a body of experts’ ‘informed by experience.’” Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624). And third, “the Commissioners’ staggered, seven-year terms enabled the agency to accumulate technical expertise and avoid a ‘complete change’ in leadership ‘at any one time.’” Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624).
All three features are present in the FLRA. First, the Authority has three Members, and no more than two of them may be “adherents of the same political party,” which ensures bipartisanship. 5 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Second, “the FLRA was intended to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the [Civil Service Reform Act].” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983). And third, each Member serves a staggered five-year term, allowing the agency to gain technical expertise. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (establishing five-year terms); CSRA, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7104(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1196 (1978) (staggering terms). The FLRA’s structure therefore triggers the Humphrey’s Executor exception.
3. The Powers of the FLRA
The next step is to ensure that the FLRA does not exercise substantial executive power. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218–19. Whether an agency exercises substantial executive power is a fact-bound inquiry. Humphrey’s Executor “acknowledged that between purely executive officers on the one hand, and officers that closely resembled the FTC Commissioners on the other, there existed ‘a field of doubt’ that the Court left ‘for future consideration.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 217 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632). This is because “[t]he versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural desire for definitiveness.” Wiener, 357 U.S. at 252. In other words, bright-line rules are not always possible. But by all indications, none of the FRLA’s powers identified by the Government qualifies as a substantial executive power.
First, the Government points to the fact that the FLRA “conduct[s] hearings and resolve[s] complaints of unfair labor practices.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(G)). They argue that this puts the FLRA in the same camp as the CFPB in Seila Law, which could “unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in administrative adjudications.” Id. (quoting 591 U.S. at 219). And it is true that the FLRA’s power to conduct hearings and resolve complaints is greater than was described in Humphrey’s Executor, where the FTC merely “submit[ed] recommended dispositions to an Article III court.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218–19. But the ability to issue final judgments is not a death knell for removal protections. Just look at Wiener. There, the War Claims Commission “was established as an adjudicating body with all the paraphernalia by which legal claims are put to the test of proof, with finality of determination not subject to review by any other official of the United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise.” 357 U.S. at 354–55 (cleaned up). Yet the Commission still counts as an example of an agency that fits within the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216.
Second, the Government points out that the FLRA “has the authority to litigate and enforce its orders in federal court.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9. It highlights three facts. See id.
1. The FLRA can “require an agency or a labor organization to cease and desist” from statutory violations and “require [the agency or labor organization] to take any remedial action it considers appropriate to carry out the policies” of the FSLMRS. Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7105(g)(3)). But Humphrey’s Executor was unbothered by the FTC’s ability to “issue and cause to be served a cease and desist order.” 295 U.S. at 620. And the FLRA’s other tools do not resemble the wide range of remedies available to the CFPB in Seila Law, which included restitution, disgorgement, and “civil penalties of up to $1,000,000 (inflation adjusted) for each day that a violation occurs.” 591 U.S. at 206.
2. The FLRA “may petition to enforce such an order in federal court[.]” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7123(b)). It is true that Seila Law said that “the power to seek daunting monetary penalties against private parties in federal court” is “a quintessentially executive power[.]” 591 U.S. at 199. But it is not clear that the object of an FLRA order—an agency or labor union—should be considered a private party for this analysis. And either way, this is not a substantial exercise of executive power. In Humphrey’s Executor, if an FTC “order [was] disobeyed, the commission [could] apply to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals for its enforcement.” 295 U.S. at 620–21. This posed no problem. Id. at 629.
3. The FLRA “has independent litigation authority to send its own attorneys (not Department of Justice attorneys) to litigate civil actions outside the Supreme Court in connection with any of its functions.” Opp’n at 9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7105(h)). But again, it is not clear why this would make the power more substantial. When Seila Law described the CFPB’s enforcement powers, it did not even mention whether the attorneys belonged to the CFPB. See 591 U.S. at 206. It was much more concerned about the scale of relief. See id. (“Since its inception, the CFPB has obtained over $11 billion in relief for over 25 million consumers, including a $1 billion penalty against a single bank in 2018.”).
Third, the Government notes that the FLRA has the power to “prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the [FSLMRS] applicable to [it].” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7134). This includes (1) specifying the criteria for determining when a labor organization represents “a substantial number of the employees of the agency,” which allows the labor organization to be granted consultation rights by the agency, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(C), 7113(a); (2) determining whether an agency has a “compelling need” for an agency-wide regulation, which would allow the agency to avoid having to bargain in good faith with a proposal by a labor organization, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(D), 7117(b); see also Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., The Negotiability Guide (June 17, 2013); and (3) determining “who is eligible to vote” for labor organization recognition and establishing the “rules governing such an election,” subject to certain statutory limitations, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(B), 7111(d).
These narrow, largely administrative regulatory assignments pale in comparison to what was feared in Seila Law, where “the [CFPB] Director possess[ed] the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19 federal statutes, including a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in a major segment of the U.S. economy.” 591 U.S. at 218. The FLRA promulgates regulations under fewer statutes, Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 31: 16–17; those statutes provide more guidance than the broad prohibition of “unfair and deceptive practices,” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218; and the federal workforce is a smaller segment of the economy than was covered by the CFPB statutes, which included “everything from credit cards and car payments to mortgages and student loans,” id. at 219.
4. Other Seila Law Factors
Seila Law mentions other factors as well, although it is unclear how they should fit into the Humphrey’s Executor exception. See Consumers’ Rsch. v. CPSC, 91 F.4th 342, 355– 56 (5th Cir. 2024). The Court need not solve this puzzle, however, because none of these factors apply.
First, the FLRA’s structure is not “almost wholly unprecedented.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 220. To the contrary, agencies like the FLRA are part of the fabric of our federal government. Congress has created independent multimember agencies for nearly a century and a half. See Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1116 (2000). The “structure, role, and functions of the [FLRA] were closely patterned after those of the NLRB.” Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And the powers of the NLRB were modeled after those of the FTC, Dish Network Corp. v. NLRB, 953 F.3d 370, 375 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020), only one month after Humphrey’s Executor approved of the FTC’s removal protections, Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The FLRA is “a traditional independent agency, run by a multimember board with a diverse set of viewpoints and experiences.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 205–06 (cleaned up).
Second, the FLRA has levers of Presidential accountability. The CFPB Director served a five-year term, leaving some Presidents without “any opportunity to shape its leadership and thereby influence its activities.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 225. But the FLRA Members serve staggered five-year terms, allowing every President to wield influence over the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (establishing five-year terms); CSRA, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7104(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1196 (1978) (staggering terms). If the President follows the ordinary course and nominates someone to replace Ms. Grundmann, her term would end on July 1, 2025. Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Defs.’ SUMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 11-2. The CFPB also received funds “outside the appropriations process,” which “further aggravate[ed] the agency’s threat to Presidential control.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 226. But the FLRA receives its funding through the appropriations process, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 118–47, 138 Stat. 461 (2023), allowing the President “to recommend or veto spending bills that affect the operation of [the agency],” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 226.
And that is not all. The General Counsel of the FLRA, who may investigate labor practices and prosecute complaints, “may be removed at any time by the President.” 5 U.S.C. § 7104(f). With the selection of the General Counsel, the President can immediately influence the FLRA’s investigative and prosecutorial power. The President may also “designate one member [of the FLRA] to serve as Chairman of the Authority,” who serves as “the chief executive and administrative officer. Id. § 7104(b). And this title that may be revoked at will. Pl.’s Reply at 10; see, e.g., Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., Press Release, Patrick Pizzella Designated Acting FLRA Chairman (Sept. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/ED2R-HVKG. There are therefore no additional features of the FLRA that render its Members’ removal protections “even more problematic.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 225.
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A straightforward reading of Supreme Court precedent thus resolves the merits of this case. The FLRA triggers and satisfies the Humphrey’s Executor exception, making the FSLMRS removal provision a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority. Although the Government claims fidelity to Humphrey’s Executor and the cases that follow, its arguments seem to contemplate absolute presidential authority over the removal of federal officers and would leave Humphrey’s Executor toothless. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a federal agency that would fit within the Humphrey’s Executor exception as the Government reads it. But it has been clear for almost a century that Article II does not give the President an “illimitable power of removal” over all federal officers. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.
When pressed at oral argument to identify existing federal agencies that would satisfy the Humphrey’s Executor exception, the Government identified only a single agency: the Federal Reserve. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 36:19–20. But the Government declined to explain why the Federal Reserve would fit within the exception under the broad arguments it advances in this case. Id. at 36:21–37:5. The Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate, 12 U.S.C. §§ 225, 263, which permeates every corner of the American economy. If control over that does not rise to an exercise of substantial executive power, then neither does laying down the administrative rules for labor organizing within the federal workforce.
REMEDIES
The Court now turns to the question of remedies. Ms. Grundmann requests both declaratory and injunctive relief. See Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 1–2. The Government broadly argues that the Court lacks the authority to award either and is instead limited to an award of backpay to Ms. Grundmann. Motions H’rg (Mar. 7, 2025), Draft Tr. at 45:1–19. According to the Government, because prior removed officials chose to seek backpay only, the Court may not award more than that. The Government held this line at oral argument, insisting that an Article III court is without authority to award relief to redress the injury caused by a President exceeding his Article II authority and intruding on Congress’s Article I authority. Id. at 46:11. The Court disagrees. Ms. Grundmann is entitled to a declaratory judgment saying that her removal was unlawful. And she has also met her burden to receive the permanent injunction that she seeks.