Part 3 of 3
Implementation of the Proclamation and Subsequent Litigation
65. Upon information and belief, prior to the public issuance of the Proclamation, Respondents developed a memorandum for federal law enforcement officers with guidance on implementation of the Proclamation.
66. Prior to the public issuance of the Proclamation, ICE had moved Venezuelan detainees into position such that, when the Proclamation was made public, the detainees were already being transported to the airport and loaded onto planes.
67. Those flights took off quickly and, despite this Court’s order to return individuals on the flights who were being removed pursuant to the AEA, the planes continued to El Salvador where the individuals were promptly detained in that country’s notorious Terrorism Confinement Center (“CECOT”).
68. The government also sent eight Venezuelan women to CECOT, presumably pursuant to the Proclamation. However, upon landing, Salvadoran officials informed U.S. officials that CECOT does not imprison women. The government returned the eight Venezuelan women to the United States, along with a Nicaraguan man whom they also attempted to send to CECOT.
69. Petitioners received no advance notice of the basis for their removal. Neither Petitioners nor their attorneys were told that they had been designated “alien enemies.” They were not told that they could challenge that designation. Nor were they given an opportunity to do so. They were not even told where the plane was going when they boarded.
70. It later emerged that Respondents had a notice form asserting that an individual is an “alien enemy” and stating that they are “not entitled to a hearing, appeal, or judicial review of this notice and warrant of apprehension and removal.” But the CECOT Subclass received no such notice. Nor did their lawyers.
71. It also emerged that Respondents used a checklist to identify alleged TdA members. The checklist gave points for certain characteristics. Eight points meant the individual was “verified” as TdA. The checklist included characteristics such as “subject has tattoos denoting membership/loyalty to TDA” and “subject possesses written rules, constitution, membership certificates, bylaws, etc. indicating . . . membership of or allegiance to TDA.”
72. Whether most (or perhaps all) of the class members lack ties to TdA remains to be seen, because the government secretly rushed the men out of the country and has provided Petitioners with no information about the class. But evidence since the flights on March 15 increasingly shows that many members of the CECOT Subclass removed to El Salvador are not “members” of TdA as is required to fall within the Proclamation; many have no ties to TdA at all.
73. Respondents’ errors are unsurprising because the methods they employ in the checklist are flawed. For example, the checklist relies on indicators like tattoos or other iconography, despite the fact that TdA does not have common tattoos or symbols. It also relies on possessing an official “indicia” of the organization, like membership certificate or written rules—but the government’s own declarants have conceded that TdA is “decentralized” and “loosely organized.”
74. These mistakes are devastating. Individuals who are wrongly designated are deported to El Salvador’s notorious CECOT prison, as has already occurred to a number of class members. Respondents have repeatedly taken the position that they cannot or will not take any meaningful steps to facilitate the return of individuals from CECOT.
75. Since March 15, Respondent DOD has operated at least one flight transporting individuals from the United States to CECOT in El Salvador. Several of those individuals were alleged to be affiliated with TdA.
76. Respondents have custody or constructive custody over the individuals designated under the AEA, including those detained at CECOT. Respondents are responsible for the restraints on the liberty of these individuals.
77. Individuals detained at CECOT are detained at the behest of Respondents, and Respondents are paying El Salvador millions of dollars to detain them, as Respondent Secretary Rubio has publicly explained.
78. Respondents are outsourcing part of the United States’ prison system to El Salvador. Respondent Secretary Noem has publicly described the transfer of U.S. residents to CECOT as “one of the tools” in the United States’ “toolkit” “that we will use if you commit crimes against the American people.”
79. Upon information and belief, Respondents are aware that the Salvadoran government mistreats and tortures individuals detained in CECOT.
80. Respondents are attempting to deliberately prevent individuals designated under the AEA, including individuals detained at CECOT, from seeking judicial review.
81. Respondents have also taken the position that noncitizens subject to the Proclamation are not be afforded credible fear interviews, nor will claims for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) be recognized.
82. Petitioners obtained a TRO against Respondents’ unlawful action from this Court on March 15. Respondents sought a stay of the TRO in the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit denied the motions for stay in a per curiam opinion. J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025). Judge Henderson, concurring, found that the orders were appealable but that Respondents had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits because, in her preliminary view, that the AEA’s statutory predicates of “invasion” and “predatory incursion” were not met. Id. at *1–13 (Henderson, J., concurring). Judge Millett, also concurring, wrote that the order was not appealable and that if the court were to reach the merits, Respondents were unlikely to prevail on their jurisdictional arguments and that the balance of equities weighed against Respondents. Id. at *13–31 (Millett, J., concurring). Judge Walker dissented, acknowledging that Petitioners had a right to contest their designation as enemy aliens under the Proclamation but contending that those claims must be brought in habeas in the district of confinement. Id. at *31–40 (Walker, J., concurring).
83. Respondents then sought a stay in the Supreme Court. The Court held that “AEA detainees must receive notice after the date of this order that they are subject to removal under the Act . . . within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief in the proper venue before such removal occurs.” Trump v. J.G.G., No. 24A931, 2025 WL 1024097, at *2 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025).
84. Despite the Supreme Court’s clear instructions, Respondents again attempted to remove individuals under the AEA with inadequate process. On April 16, within hours of a district court in the Northern District of Texas denying a TRO and deferring decision on class certification, the government gave detainees a Bluebonnet Detention Center in Texas an English-only form, not provided to any attorney, which nowhere mentioned the right to contest the designation or removal, much less explained how detainees could do so. ICE officers told detainees that they would be removed within 24 hours.
85. Petitioners’ counsel sought relief at the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court. Petitioners’ counsel also sought relief in this court, in the form of a request to expedite their TRO regarding notice. This Court held a hearing in which Respondents stated that they would not remove anyone that same day, but Respondents reserved the right to remove people under the AEA the following day.
86. At 12:51 a.m. EDT on Saturday, April 19., the Supreme Court directed the government not to remove any member of the putative class of detainees from the United States until further order of the Court.
87. On April 23, 2025, Respondents submitted a declaration in the Southern District of Texas, under seal, with information about the notice process that the government had for individuals designated for removal under the AEA. See Cisneros Decl., J.A.V. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-072 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 23, 2025), ECF No. 45, Exhibit D. That declaration and its accompanying exhibit were unsealed the next day. Oral Order, J.A.V. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-072 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2025). The declaration states that individuals are given 12 hours’ notice ahead of scheduled removal and that if they express an intent to file a habeas petition, they are given 24 hours to actually file that petition. Cisneros Decl. ¶ 11. The notice process is patently inadequate as a matter of due process.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
88. Petitioners and Plaintiffs bring this action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) on behalf of themselves and a class of all other persons similarly situated.
89. This Court has already certified a class of “All noncitizens in U.S. custody who are subject to the March 15, 2025, Presidential Proclamation entitled ‘Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua’ and its implementation.”
90. Petitioners and Plaintiffs seek to amend the class definition to: “All noncitizens who have been, are or will be subject to the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation entitled ‘Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua’ and/or its implementation.”
91. Petitioners further seek to certify the following subclasses under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2):
a. “CECOT Subclass”: All noncitizens in custody at the Terrorism Confinement Center (“CECOT”) in El Salvador who were, are, or will be subject to the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation entitled “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren De Aragua” and/or its implementation.
b. “Criminal Custody Subclass”: All noncitizens in criminal custody who were, are, or will be subject to the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation entitled “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren De Aragua” and/or its implementation.
92. Petitioners and Plaintiffs, together, seek to represent the class, and seek injunctive and declaratory relief for Claims I–VIII, as specified below.
93. Petitioners Frengel Reyes Mota, Andry Jose Hernandez Romero, J.A.B.V., M.A.O.R., G.A.A.A., and M.R.M. are currently detained in CECOT and also seek to represent the CECOT Subclass. They seek habeas, injunctive, and declaratory relief for Claims I–XIII, as specified below.
94. Petitioner T.C.I. is currently detained in criminal custody and also seeks to represent the Criminal Custody Subclass. He seeks habeas, injunctive, and declaratory relief for Claims I–IX, as specified below, in addition to Claims X–XIII, as specified below, insofar as the Criminal Custody Subclass face an imminent risk of removal and detention at CECOT or a facility with equivalent conditions.
95. Plaintiffs are the original Plaintiffs in J.G.G. v. Trump: J.G.G., G.F.F., J.G.O, W.G.H., and J.A.V. Because Plaintiffs have filed habeas actions in their districts of confinement and do not seek relief in this Court through the writ of habeas corpus, they continue to be designated as “Plaintiffs,” not “Petitioners.” Among other things, Plaintiffs continue to seek—as a matter of due process—meaningful notice of the government’s intent to remove them. See J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 24A931, 2025 WL 1024097, at *2 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025) (per curiam) (due process requires government to provide detainees notice that they are subject to removal “within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief in the proper venue”). Because this claim is a precondition to the effective exercise of habeas rights, it lies outside of habeas. In addition, Plaintiffs continue to advance their original claims in equity and under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Claims, infra.
96. The proposed class and subclasses satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2).
97. The proposed class and both subclasses satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) because they are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Besides the five originally named petitioners who were nearly removed on March 15, 2025, there are at least 137 individuals were actually removed to the CECOT prison on March 15 pursuant to the AEA. After those removals, on March 18, 2025, the government identified 54 members of TdA in detention, 32 in criminal custody and 172 on its nondetained docket. That means there were roughly nearly 400 people in the entire class as of mid-March 2025, of whom at least 137 were in the CECOT subclass and 32 in Criminal Custody subclass. The government also confirmed that it continues to monitor and identify more TdA members. On April 18, 2025, the government attempted to remove dozens more Venezuelan men pursuant to the AEA.
98. Joinder is also impracticable because class members are largely detained and unrepresented, in addition to being geographically spread out. Joinder is also impracticable because many in the proposed class and subclasses are pro se, indigent, have limited English proficiency, and/or have a limited understanding of the U.S. judicial system. Despite over 130 subclass members at CECOT, Respondents have not provided information about the individuals detained there and are holding them incommunicado, without any access to the outside world, let alone the ability to communicate with any existing or potential counsel. Due to their imprisonment and isolation from the world, the CECOT subclass members cannot practically bring their own challenges. Similarly, Respondents will not provide information about any of the class members in the United States, even to their immigration counsel. Because of the swift timeline for notice and removals, class and subclass members are not able to effectively seek judicial review on an individual basis.
99. The proposed class and both subclasses satisfy the commonality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). The members of the proposed class and subclasses are subject to a common practice: designation under the Proclamation and either the threat or actual summary removal pursuant to the AEA. The suit raises at least one question of law common to the entire class: what notice and process is due for those who are designated under the Proclamation. The suit also raises other questions of law common to members of the proposed class and both subclasses, including whether the Proclamation and its implementation violate the AEA, the INA, and the statutory protections for asylum seekers. Moreover, the subclasses share common questions of law and fact regarding the conditions of confinement at CECOT, and whether their current or imminent imprisonment there violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.
100. The proposed class and both subclasses satisfy the typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(3), because the claims of the representative Plaintiffs and Petitioners are typical of the claims of the class. Each proposed class member, including the Plaintiffs, has experienced the same principal injury (inability to challenge their designation), based on the same government practices (the implementation of the Proclamation without meaningful notice), which is unlawful as to the entire class. Each proposed CECOT subclass member, including the proposed CECOT subclass representatives, Frengel Reyes Mota, Andry Jose Hernandez Romero, J.A.B.V., M.A.O.R., G.A.A.A., and M.R.M., has experienced or faces the same principal injury (unlawful removal to CECOT), based on the same government practice (the Proclamation and its implementation), which is unlawful as to the entire subclass because it violates the AEA, the INA, the APA, and various provisions of the Constitution. Similarly, each proposed Criminal Custody subclass member, including the proposed Criminal Custody subclass representative, T.C.I., also faces the same principal injury (imminent removal to CECOT), based on the same government practice (the Proclamation and its implementation), which is unlawful as to the entire subclass because it violates the AEA, the INA, the APA, and various provisions of the Constitution.
101. The proposed class and both subclasses satisfy the adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a)(4). The representative Plaintiffs and Petitioners seek the same relief as the other members of the class, including a meaningful procedure for notice and opportunity to be heard that comports with due process. The representative Petitioners seek the same relief as the other members of both subclasses—among other things, an order declaring the Proclamation unlawful and an injunction preventing enforcement of the Proclamation and to facilitate their return to the United States. In defending their rights, Plaintiffs and Petitioners will defend the rights of all proposed class members and subclass members fairly and adequately.
102. Both the class and subclasses are represented by experienced attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union and the Democracy Forward Foundation. Proposed Class Counsel have extensive experience litigating class action lawsuits and other complex systemic cases in federal court on behalf of noncitizens.
103. The class and subclasses also satisfy Rule 23(b)(2). Respondents have acted (or will act) on grounds generally applicable to the class and subclasses by subjecting them to summary removal under the Proclamation rather than affording them the protection of immigration laws. Injunctive and declaratory relief is therefore appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Habeas, injunctive and declaratory relief is also appropriate with respect to both subclasses as a whole.
HARM TO PLAINTIFFS AND PETITIONERS
104. Countless Venezuelans fear imminent removal under the Proclamation based on flimsy allegations that they will have no change to rebut. And named Plaintiffs J.G.G., J.A.V., G.F.F., W.G.H. and J.G.O. all fear removal under the Proclamation because the government has previously attempted to remove them as alien enemies. While the named Plaintiffs as of today have obtained temporary relief in other proceedings, that relief is temporary and in the absence of it, they are at imminent risk of unlawful removal.
105. For the Plaintiffs, Petitioners, and putative class members who have not yet been removed to El Salvador, they face serious harm if they are removed to El Salvador, where they will be subject to egregious conditions at CECOT. Many Plaintiffs and Petitioners also fear return to Venezuela, where they have a well-founded fear of persecution.
106. Petitioner T.C.I. also fears removal under the Proclamation because the government has previously pressured him to sign a paper stating that he was a member of Tren de Aragua and subject to removal. He has not obtained any temporary relief and is at imminent risk of unlawful removal.
107. Petitioner T.C.I. also fears removal to Venezuela, where he will be targeted by gang members, as with many putative subclass members.
108. Petitioners Frengel Reyes Mota, Andry Jose Hernandez Romero, J.A.B.V., M.A.O.R., G.A.A.A., and M.R.M. are already facing serious harm after being removed to El Salvador, where they are currently subject to egregious conditions at CECOT.
CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Ultra Vires, Violation of 50 U.S.C. § 21
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
109. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
110. The AEA does not authorize the removal of noncitizens from the United States absent a “declared war” or a “perpetrated, attempted, or threatened” “invasion or predatory incursion” into the United States by a “foreign nation or government.” See 50 U.S.C. § 21. The Proclamation mandates Petitioners’ and Plaintiffs’ removal under the AEA where those preconditions have not been met, and Petitioners imprisoned at CECOT have already been removed under the AEA where those preconditions were not met.
111. The AEA also does not authorize the removal of noncitizens from the United States unless they “refuse or neglect to depart” from the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 21. The Proclamation mandates Petitioners’ and Plaintiffs’ removal under the AEA where those preconditions have not been met, and Petitioners have been removed under the AEA where those preconditions were not met.
112. The AEA Process, which was purportedly established pursuant to the authority of 50 U.S.C. § 21, was not authorized by that law.
113. The application of the AEA Process to Petitioners and Plaintiffs is therefore ultra vires.
114. The application of the AEA Process to Petitioners and Plaintiffs is contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
115. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
116. The INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., sets out the sole mechanisms established by Congress for the removal of noncitizens.
117. The INA provides that a removal proceeding before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a is “the sole and exclusive procedure” by which the government may determine whether to remove an individual, “[u]nless otherwise specified” in the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).
118. The AEA Process creates an alternative removal mechanism outside of the immigration laws set forth by Congress in Title 8.
119. The INA’s “exclusive procedure” and statutory protections apply to any removal of a noncitizen from the United States, including removals authorized by the AEA. Because the AEA Process provides for the removal of Petitioners and Plaintiffs without the procedures specified in the INA, it violates 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and the INA.
120. As a result, the application of the AEA to Petitioners and Plaintiffs, which will result or has resulted in their removal from the United States, is contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
121. In addition, by refusing to grant Petitioners and Plaintiffs access to the procedures specified in the INA, Respondents have withheld and unreasonably delayed actions mandated by the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1158, Asylum
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
122. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
123. The INA provides, with certain exceptions, that “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
124. Respondents’ application of the AEA Process to Petitioners and Plaintiffs prevents them from applying for asylum in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), and is therefore contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), Withholding of Removal
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
125. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
126. The “withholding of removal” statute, INA § 241(b)(3), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), bars the removal of noncitizens to a country where it is more likely than not that they would face persecution.
127. Respondents’ AEA Process and regulations violate the withholding of removal statute because they do not provide adequate safeguards to ensure that Petitioners and Plaintiffs are not returned to a country where it is more likely than not that they would face persecution. As a result, Respondents’ actions against Petitioners and Plaintiffs are contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
128. In addition, by refusing to grant Petitioners and Plaintiffs the procedural protections to which they are entitled, Respondents have withheld and unreasonably delayed actions mandated by the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
129. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
130. FARRA prohibits the government from returning a noncitizen to a country where it is more likely than not that he would face torture.
131. Respondents’ AEA Process and regulations violate FARRA because they do not provide adequate safeguards to ensure that Petitioners and Plaintiffs are not returned to a country where it is more likely than not that they would face torture. As a result, Respondents’ actions against Petitioners and Plaintiffs are contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
132. In addition, by refusing to grant Petitioners and Plaintiffs the procedural protections to which they are entitled, Respondents have withheld and unreasonably delayed actions mandated by the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents except Respondent Trump)
133. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
134. The APA provides that courts “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
135. Respondents’ actions are arbitrary and capricious. Respondents have failed to consider relevant factors in applying the AEA Process, including the risk of torture and other inhumane treatment at CECOT, and Venezuelans’ fear of persecution and torture in their home country. Respondents also relied on factors Congress did not intend to be considered, and offered no sufficient explanation for their decision to remove them from this country.
136. The subjection of Petitioners and Plaintiffs to the AEA Process is arbitrary and capricious because it also departs from existing agency policies prohibiting the return of individuals who fear persecution or torture, without providing a reasoned explanation for departing from these policies.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Ultra Vires, Violation of 50 U.S.C. § 22
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
137. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
138. The APA provides that courts “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
139. The AEA requires that noncitizens whose removal is authorized by the AEA, unless “chargeable with actual hostility, or other crime against the public safety,” be allowed the full time stipulated by treaty to depart or a reasonable time in which to settle their affairs before departing. See 50 U.S.C. § 22. The Proclamation denies Petitioners and Plaintiffs any time under Section 22 to settle their affairs, because it declares everyone subject to the Proclamation to be “chargeable with actual hostility” and to be a “danger to public safety,” without any kind of individualized determination.
140. The AEA Process thus contravenes 50 U.S.C. § 22 and is ultra vires.
141. The application of the AEA Process to Petitioners and Plaintiffs is contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Due Process Under the Fifth Amendment
(Class and Subclasses against All Respondents)
142. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
143. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
144. In denying Petitioners and Plaintiffs adequate notice and meaningful procedural protections to challenge their removal, the Proclamation violates due process.
145. The Proclamation also denies Petitioners and Plaintiffs the opportunity to voluntarily depart and any time to settle their affairs before departing and thus violates the due process.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Habeas Corpus
(Subclasses against All Respondents)
146. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
147. Detainees have the right to file petitions for habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention and raise other claims related to their detention or to the basis for their removal.
148. The ongoing or imminent detention of Petitioners under the Alien Enemies Act has violated, continues to violate, and will violate their right to habeas corpus. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Suspension Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Ultra Vires, Post-Removal Imprisonment in Violation of 50 U.S.C. § 21
(Subclasses against All Respondents)
149. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
150. When the AEA’s conditions have been met, the AEA authorizes a series of actions the executive branch may take with respect to alien enemies residing in the United States: in particular, alien enemies are liable to be “apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed.” 50 U.S.C. § 21. But the AEA does not authorize the detention of alien enemies after they have been removed from the United States.
151. The ongoing or imminent imprisonment of Petitioners in El Salvador, following their removal, contravenes the AEA and is ultra vires.
152. The ongoing or imminent imprisonment of Petitioners in El Salvador, following their removal, is contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Punitive Civil Detention in Violation of the Fifth Amendment
(Subclasses against All Respondents)
153. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
154. Detention under the auspices of the AEA, like other forms of immigration detention, is civil detention. Civil detention is subject to due process constraints and must therefore be justified by a regulatory, nonpunitive purpose. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 538-39 (1979). Those held in such detention have a due process right not to be subjected to any condition, practice, or policy that constitutes punishment.
155. Respondents are detaining or will imminently detain Petitioners at CECOT for the purpose of punishment and with the expressed intent to punish.
156. Respondents have identified no legitimate reason for transferring and holding detainees at the notorious CECOT prison in El Salvador, other than to deter future migration to the United States, induce self-deportation, and coerce people into giving up claims and accepting deportation. These are impermissible justifications for civil immigration detention.
157. Respondents’ ongoing or imminent detention of Petitioners at CECOT also subjects them to punitive conditions that violate their due process rights as civil detainees. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982).
158. Respondents’ ongoing or imminent detention of Petitioners at CECOT subjects them to harsher detention conditions than they would face in U.S. prisons and immigration detention facilities—hallmarks of punitive detention.
159. For these reasons, detention at CECOT constitutes unlawful punishment, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Criminal Punishment in Violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
(Subclasses against All Respondents)
160. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
161. Imprisonment at CECOT, based on unproven accusations of criminal conduct, constitutes criminal punishment in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Respondents’ intent to criminally punish Petitioners is plain from the circumstances of their confinement at CECOT and from Respondents’ own statements. Hallmarks of criminal punishment include a finding that a person committed acts in violation of a criminal law, the stigma inherent in such a determination, and a resulting deprivation of liberty.
162. Respondents have made or will imminently make summary determinations that Petitioners are “terrorists” and members of a “criminal organization,” with no due process.
163. Senior U.S. government officials, including President Trump, have made statements reiterating these accusations and conclusory findings that Petitioners are “criminals,” making their intent to punish clear and amplifying the resulting stigma.
164. Respondents have deprived or will imminently deprive Petitioners of their liberty, subjecting them to criminal detention at CECOT in some of the most punitive conditions imaginable.
165. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee fundamental protections in connection with criminal punishment, including the right to notice of the government’s allegations, the right to counsel, the right to trial by a jury, the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the protection against double jeopardy.
166. Respondents have not afforded Petitioners any of these protections, despite subjecting them to ongoing or imminent criminal punishment.
167. By the actions described above, Respondents have denied or will imminently deny Petitioners the process they are due with regard to their ongoing seizure and detention, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
168. By the actions described above, Respondents have denied or will imminently deny Petitioners the fundamental protections of the Sixth Amendment.
169. For these reasons, the ongoing or imminent imprisonment of Petitioners at CECOT constitutes criminal punishment that violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Conditions of Confinement in Violation of the Eighth Amendment
(Subclasses against All Respondents)
170. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.
171. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
172. Under the Eighth Amendment, Respondents must provide for Petitioners’ basic human needs, including food, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). Respondents must also avoid the use of excessive physical force.
173. In subjecting Petitioners to ill treatment, unsafe conditions, inadequate subsistence, inadequate medical care, and excessive physical force at CECOT, Respondents are violating or will imminently violate Petitioners’ Eighth Amendment rights to decent and humane treatment in criminal confinement.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioners and Plaintiffs respectfully pray this Court to:
a. Certify this action as a class action on behalf of the proposed class and subclasses, appoint the Petitioners and Plaintiffs as class representatives; Petitioners as subclass representatives; and undersigned counsel as class counsel;
b. Order Respondents to provide notice of AEA designation to Plaintiffs, Petitioners, and class counsel, and an opportunity to challenge such designation at least 30 days prior to the removal date;
c. Grant a writ of habeas corpus that (1) enjoins Respondents from removing Petitioners pursuant to the Proclamation or, in the event they have already been removed to CECOT, that orders Respondents to facilitate their return to the United States; and (2) enjoins Respondents from detaining Petitioners or otherwise regulating them pursuant to the Proclamation;
d. Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioners and Plaintiffs from the United States pursuant to the Proclamation;
e. Enjoin Respondents from detaining or otherwise regulating Petitioners and Plaintiffs pursuant to the Proclamation;
f. Declare unlawful the Proclamation and the AEA Process, including detention of Petitioners at CECOT;
g. Order Respondents to facilitate the return of the CECOT Subclass to the United States;
h. Award Plaintiffs’ counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and any other applicable statute or regulation; and
i. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and appropriate.
Dated: April 24, 2025
Noelle Smith
Oscar Sarabia Roman
My Khanh Ngo
Cody Wofsy
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
425 California Street, Suite 700
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 343-0770
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Lee Gelernt Lee Gelernt (D.D.C. Bar No. NY0408)
Daniel Galindo (D.D.C. Bar No. NY035)
Ashley Gorski
Patrick Toomey
Sidra Mahfooz
Omar Jadwat
Hina Shamsi (D.D.C. Bar No. MI0071)
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 549-2660
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Arthur B. Spitzer (D.C. Bar No. 235960) Scott Michelman (D.C. Bar No. 1006945)
Aditi Shah (D.C. Bar No. 90033136)*
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
529 14th Street, NW, Suite 722
Washington, D.C. 20045
(202) 457-0800
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
*Admission to DDC Bar pending
Somil B. Trivedi (D.C. Bar No. 1617967)
Bradley Girard (D.C. Bar No. 1033743)
Michael Waldman (D.C. Bar No. 414646)
Sarah Rich
Skye Perryman (D.C. Bar No. 984573)
Audrey Wiggins (DC Bar No. 482877)
Christine L. Coogle (DC Bar No. 1738913)
Pooja Boisture
DEMOCRACY FORWARD FOUNDATION
P.O. Box 34553
Washington, DC 20043
Phone: (202) 448-9090
Fax: (202) 796-4426
[email protected] [email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs
_______________
Notes:
1 Plaintiffs are the original Plaintiffs in J.G.G. v. Trump. Because Plaintiffs have filed habeas actions in their districts of confinement and do not seek relief in this Court through the writ of habeas corpus, they continue to be designated as “Plaintiffs,” not “Petitioners.” Petitioners-Plaintiffs (“Petitioners”) refer to the newly amended individuals who are designated under the Proclamation and detained in El Salvador or criminal custody in the United States. Petitioners are pursuing their claims through habeas in addition to APA and equity.
2 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential ... -de-aragua.