Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Gates

Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri May 02, 2025 1:06 am

Tren de Aragua in league with Maduro, Gabbard & Patel say, after 'illegal' classified leaks. While some leaks of classified docs say the notorious Tren de Aragua gang and Venezuela's strongman are not working together, contradicting President Trump's contention, but new info from the FBI and ODNI provides more evidence of the links between the gangsters and Nicolas Maduro.
by Jerry Dunleavy
Just the News.
Published: April 23, 2025 10:55pm
Updated: April 23, 2025 11:34pm
https://justthenews.com/government/secu ... classified

The leaders of the FBI and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) are insisting that the gang Tren de Aragua works in coordination with the regime of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro following “twisted” and “illegal” classified leaks which claimed that at least some spy agencies did not believe this to be the case.

ODNI's director, Tulsi Gabbard, and FBI Director Kash Patel were prompted to publicly argue that the Venezuelan gang — also called the Aragua Train or just TdA — is in fact linked to the Maduro regime after purported classified leaks in recent days. The leaks allegedly revealed the U.S. intelligence community’s National Intelligence Council cast doubt on the idea that TdA is cooperating with Venezuela’s socialist leader Maduro, the successor to dictator Hugo Chavez.


Leaks attempt to undermine Trump's stance

Over the weekend, the Washington Post cited unnamed “people familiar with the matter” when reporting that “the National Intelligence Council, drawing on the acumen of the U.S.’s 18 intelligence agencies, determined in a secret assessment early this month that the Venezuelan government is not directing an invasion of the United States by the prison gang Tren de Aragua.”

The outlet contended that “the intelligence product found that although there are some low-level contacts between the Maduro government and Tren de Aragua…the gang does not operate at the direction of Venezuela’s leader.”

The ODNI told the Post over the weekend that Trump "took necessary and historic action to safeguard our nation when he deported these violent Tren de Aragua terrorists” and that “now that America is safer without these terrorists in our cities, deep-state actors have resorted to using their propaganda arm to attack the President’s successful policies.”

Last month, the New York Times also cited unnamed officials familiar with the matter when reporting that a late February intelligence report “summarized the shared judgment of the nation’s spy agencies that the gang was not controlled by the Venezuelan government.” The outlet said that the intelligence assessment concluded that TdA “was not directed by Venezuela’s government or committing crimes in the United States on its orders.” The outlet said the intelligence agencies had a “moderate” confidence in their assessment, with “some supporting points put at ‘low’ confidence.”

An anonymous official reportedly told the Times that the assessment “also portrayed the gang as lacking the resources and being too disorganized — with little in the way of any centralized command-and-control — to be able to carry out any government orders” and that the assessment “says that while a handful of corrupt Venezuelan officials have ties to gang members, that does not amount to the gang’s being under the sway of the government as a whole.”


The leaks do not change ODNI's assessment

Gabbard said in a Monday evening tweet that “The weaponization of intelligence to undermine the President’s agenda is an assault on democracy. [!!!] Those behind this illegal leak of classified intelligence, twisted and manipulated to convey the exact opposite finding, will be held accountable under the full force of the law ][...]Rooting out this politicization of intelligence is exactly what President Trump campaigned on and what Americans overwhelmingly voted for. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence fully supports the assessment that the foreign terrorist organization, Tren De Aragua, is acting with the support of the Maduro Regime, and thus subject to arrest, detention, and removal as alien enemies of the United States.”

The Trump administration designated TdA as a foreign terrorist organization in February. Trump in March then invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) of 1798 in an executive order, and argued that members of the Venezuelan gang “unlawfully infiltrated the United States and are conducting irregular warfare and undertaking hostile actions against the United States” and that “TdA is closely aligned with, and indeed has infiltrated, the Maduro regime, including its military and law enforcement apparatus.”

A senior intelligence official who declined to be named told Just the News this week that there were a number of “facts based on intelligence that the illegal leakers and propaganda media conveniently did not include because it gets in the way of their biased narrative and attempt to deceive the American people.”

Gang provided with sanctuary

The senior intelligence official compared the Taliban’s protection of al-Qaeda to the Maduro regime’s facilitation of TdA.

The official told Just the News that examples include the U.S. going to war in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda because the Taliban government was providing Al-Qaeda sanctuary. The Taliban were never assessed to be directing Al-Qaeda’s attacks — they provided Al-Qaeda with sanctuary which enabled the Islamist terrorist attack on our country on 9/11.

The official also said that the Maduro regime clearly plays a similar role for TdA, resulting in armed TdA gangs violently seizing territory and entire apartment complexes in America, in addition to the rapes, murders, and human trafficking TdA is involved with.

The senior intelligence official who declined to be named told Just the News this week that “TdA leaders have historically been located and broadly benefited from conditions in Venezuela created by the Venezuelan government” and that “the Venezuelan government gives sanctuary to TdA, aiding and abetting their crimes and terrorist activities against the United States by enabling them to thrive.”

Venezuelan attorney general Tarek William claimed to El Pais this month that “Tren de Aragua was dismantled here” in Venezuela as he argued that the claims of links between the gang and the Maduro regime are “a fabrication intended to attack the Venezuelan government.” El Pais also noted that Saab is responsible for much of the repression against the Venezuelan opposition and citizens protesting against Maduro’s electoral fraud.

When announcing the arrest of more than two dozen TdA gang members on Monday, Attorney General Pam Bondi argued that “Tren de Aragua is not just a street gang — it is a highly structured terrorist organization that has destroyed American families with brutal violence, engaged in human trafficking, and spread deadly drugs through our communities."

The Justice Department also announced on Wednesday that it had charged an “alleged high-ranking member” of TdA, Jose Enrique Martinez Flores, with “conspiring to provide and providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization as well as conspiracy and distribution of cocaine in Colombia intended for distribution in the United States.”

DOJ criminal investigation into leaks

Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche said in a statement responding to the New York Times story that the DOJ was “opening a criminal investigation relating to the selective leak of inaccurate, but nevertheless classified, information from the Intelligence Community relating to Tren de Aragua" and that “we will not tolerate politically motivated efforts by the Deep State to undercut President Trump’s agenda by leaking false information onto the pages of their allies."

Gabbard announced on Wednesday that “I referred two intelligence community LEAKS to the Department of Justice for criminal referral, with a third criminal referral on its way, which includes the recent illegal leak to the Washington Post.”

The New York Times reported last month that “only one agency, the FBI, partly dissented” and that the bureau “maintained the gang has a connection to the administration of Venezuela’s authoritarian president, Nicolas Maduro, based on information the other agencies did not find credible.” The Washington Post reported over the weekend that the FBI “assessed a moderate level of cooperation between the gang and the Venezuelan government, two people familiar with the matter said.”

FBI points to TdA’s links to Maduro

FBI Director Patel responded to the stories on Sunday by tweeting that “the FBI assesses some members of the Maduro regime have links to TdA members who look to use those ties to advance their criminal objectives” and that “we stand by this assessment and consider TdA's presence a direct threat to our national security.”

“Tren de Aragua is an extremely violent, highly organized transnational gang,” Patel also said. "Together with our law enforcement partners, we are actively working to identify, disrupt, and dismantle their networks. We will not allow foreign-backed criminal organizations to take root in our communities.”

Retired Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn, who briefly served as Trump’s national security adviser during his first term, agreed with the FBI’s assessment on Twitter. “Tren de Aragua is a Foreign Terrorist organization directly backed by elements inside of the Venezuelan (VE) government,” Flynn tweeted in response. “The global alliance facing America today consists of a combination of nations and groups led by China. They’re aligned with Russia, North Korea, Iran, VE, radicalized Islamist terrorist organizations and an assortment of criminal enterprises. This is what America faces.”

Gabbard, Patel, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe all testified before the House Intelligence Committee in late March regarding TdA’s relationship with Maduro.

Rep. Joaquin Castro, D-Texas, asked the CIA chief, “Does the intelligence community assess that we are currently at war or being invaded by the nation of Venezuela?” Ratcliffe replied that “we have no assessment that says that.”

Castro asked the same question of Gabbard. She said that “there are varied assessments that came from different intelligence community elements” and that “I’ll defer to Director Patel to speak specifically to the FBI assessment.” But Castro did not seem interested in hearing from Patel.

“So you’re saying there are conflicting assessments that have come from the IC?” Castro asked.

Gabbard said that “that’s correct.” Castro replied that “we’ll take it up in closed session.”


The FBI has diverged with other intelligence agencies in the past

This is by no means the first time that the FBI has diverged from other spy agencies on intelligence assessments — the FBI was the first U.S. agency to conclude that COVID-19 likely emerged from a Wuhan lab, even as many other intelligence elements took the opposite view or remained on the fence.

Then-FBI Director Christopher Wray later confirmed that the FBI has long believed COVID-19 originated at a Chinese government lab. ODNI released in October 2021 a declassified version of the FBI’s arguments in a section titled, “The Case for the Laboratory-Associated Incident Hypothesis.”

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s National Center for Medical Intelligence assessed in the first half of 2020 that the lab leak hypothesis should not be dismissed as allies of Dr. Anthony Fauci wanted, but the defense scientists were reportedly blocked from sharing some of their findings with the FBI.

It was also revealed in 2023 that the Energy Department — home to advanced research facilities such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories — also believed with “low confidence” that the coronavirus started at a Wuhan lab.

Ratcliffe had testified to Congress in 2023 that the CIA and other spy agencies had enough evidence to get off the fence and to join the FBI and Energy Department in concluding that SARS-CoV-2 most likely originated at the Wuhan lab, and hinted that the U.S. intelligence community was holding back because of the significant ramifications such public conclusions would have for the U.S.-China relationship. Ratcliffe argued at the time that “a lab leak is the only explanation credibly supported by our intelligence, by science, and by common sense."

The CIA, now under Director Ratcliffe, revealed in January that "CIA assesses with low confidence that a research-related origin of the COVID-19 pandemic is more likely than a natural origin,” and at the same time, "that CIA continues to assess that both research-related and natural origin scenarios of the COVID-19 pandemic remain plausible."

“Hybrid criminal state”

Trump’s executive order in March was titled, “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren De Aragua.”

“TdA operates in conjunction with Cártel de los Soles, the Nicolas Maduro regime-sponsored, narco-terrorism enterprise based in Venezuela, and commits brutal crimes, including murders, kidnappings, extortion, and human, drug, and weapons trafficking,” Trump contended. “TdA has engaged in and continues to engage in mass illegal migration to the United States to further its objectives of harming United States citizens, undermining public safety, and supporting the Maduro regime’s goal of destabilizing democratic nations in the Americas, including the United States.”

Trump said: “Nicolas Maduro, who claims to act as Venezuela’s President and asserts control over the security forces and other authorities in Venezuela, also maintains close ties to regime-sponsored narco-terrorists. Maduro leads the regime-sponsored enterprise Cártel de los Soles, which coordinates with and relies on TdA and other organizations to carry out its objective of using illegal narcotics as a weapon to ‘flood’ the United States.”

“Over the years, Venezuelan national and local authorities have ceded ever-greater control over their territories to transnational criminal organizations, including TdA,” Trump added. “The result is a hybrid criminal state that is perpetrating an invasion and predatory incursion into the United States, and which poses a substantial danger to the United States.”

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt also argued in March that “a predatory incursion is absolutely what has happened with Tren de Aragua. They have been sent here by the hostile Maduro regime in Venezuela.”

“Our Founding Fathers knew exactly what they were doing, and it applies to a situation just like this,” Bondi also said last month in justifying Trump’s use of the Alien Enemies Act. “Tren de Aragua — they are a foreign arm of the Venezuelan government.”

The State Department issued a $15 million reward seeking the arrest of Maduro in 2020, and the department increased that to $25 million in January of this year.

Propaganda Venezuelan-style

When blocking the Trump administration’s further efforts to deport Venezuelan gang members, Judge James Boasberg contended in a March 15 court hearing that “I don't think the AEA provides a basis for removal under this proclamation” by Trump in part because he believed that “the terms nation and government do not apply to non-state actors like criminal gangs.”

The lawyers for the deported Venezuelans had argued to Boasberg earlier that day in court filings that “the Proclamation [by Trump] cannot plausibly assert that the Venezuelan government or the Maduro regime is itself perpetrating, attempting, or threatening an invasion or predatory incursions. Indeed, the Maduro regime disavows Tren de Aragua and is actively engaged in suppressing it.”

As evidence of this, they cited a January article by the Maduro regime-funded Telesur media outlet, which was titled, “Venezuela Dismantles Criminal Gang ‘Tren de Aragua’ in Security Operation.”

It has long been assessed that Telesur, funded by the Venezuelan government, exists to advance the interests of the far-left rulers of the country. The conservative Heritage Foundation assessed in 2005 that Telesur was “a new satellite TV network funded largely by Venezuela's authoritarian president Hugo Chavez” and said that “rattling Venezuela's democratic neighbors and legitimizing the region's leftist terror movements seems to be its real mission.”

Pg. 214, Project 2025, by The Heritage Foundation

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, once a model of democracy and a true U.S. ally, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela) has all but collapsed under the Communist regimes of the late Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. In the 24 years since Hugo Chavez was first elected Venezuelan president in 1999, the country has violently cracked down on pro-democracy citizens and organizations, shattered its once oil-rich economy, empowered domestic criminal cartels, and helped fuel a hemispheric refugee crisis. Venezuela has swung from being one of the most prosperous, if not the most prosperous, country in South America to being one of the poorest. Its Communist leadership has also drawn closer to some of the United States’ greatest international foes, including the PRC and Iran, which have long sought a foothold in the Americas. Indeed, Venezuela serves as a reminder of just how fragile democratic institutions that are not maintained can be. To contain Venezuela’s Communism and aid international partners, the next Administration must take important steps to put Venezuela’s Communist abusers on notice while making strides to help the Venezuelan people. The next Administration must work to unite the hemisphere against this significant but underestimated threat in the Southern Hemisphere.


The Boston Globe wrote in 2005 that Chavez “has the oil wealth to influence public opinion well beyond his country's borders.” The outlet wrote: “His government has given the network use of broadcast facilities and an estimated 70 percent of financing for a regional, 24-hour satellite news channel, Telesur, which began broadcasting Sunday. Supported by the leftist governments of Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, Telesur is being promoted as a Latin socialist answer to CNN.

"Telesur's critics have dubbed the channel TeleChavez, predicting it will be a mouthpiece for the president's vision of a regional revolution, all the more worrying to some at a time when Chavez is accused of curbing media freedoms at home.”

The Justice Department argued in response to Boasberg’s ruling last month that “contrary to the Court’s initial suppositions, TdA qualifies as a foreign ‘government’ for purposes of the AEA, given its intricate connections with the Maduro regime and its own existence as a de facto governing entity in parts of Venezuela.” The DOJ court filings contended that “given how significantly TdA has become intertwined in the fabric of Venezuela’s structures, it functions as a governing entity in Venezuela” and that “through those ties, TdA has become indistinguishable from the Venezuelan government.”

The Venezuelan government swings wildly between claiming it has defeated TdA and that TdA never even existed to begin with. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil tried to claim in April 2024 that TdA was nothing but a “fiction created by the international media.”

Venezuela's operational control of Tren de Aragua

Maria Corina Machado, a Venezuelan politician and a leader of the opposition against Maduro, said in a February interview reposted on X that Maduro sat atop the TdA gang: "Does anyone believe that Trump doesn't know that Nicolas Maduro is the leader of the Aragua Train?"

Machado told Donald Trump Jr. on his Triggered podcast in late February that "the Cartel of the Suns is linked to the Tren de Aragua… But we all know that the head of the Tren de Aragua is Maduro. The regime created, promoted, and funded the Tren de Aragua."

Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, also a Venezuelan politician and opposition leader who ran against Maduro in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, both endorsed Trump’s March executive order and Trump's assessment of the links between TdA and the Maduro regime.

“Nicolas Maduro, the tyrant oppressing Venezuela, also leads the criminal organizations Tren de Aragua and the Cartel de los Soles,” Machado and Urrutia said in a joint statement, according to Apple and Google Translate. “The TdA's rise in Venezuelan prisons, and its rapid expansion throughout the Americas, is explained by its ties to the autocratic and criminal regime headed by Maduro.”

The Maduro opponents called TdA “the regime's enforcer” which “poses a serious threat to the entire hemisphere.”

It was reported by Bloomberg this month that Machado has been “advocating for the U.S. to designate Maduro as the head of Tren de Aragua.”


The Miami Herald reported in March that “a small team of Venezuelans and former U.S. officials with deep connections to police and intelligence in the South American country has been providing information to the Trump administration about the number and identities of members of Tren de Aragua and other Venezuelan gangs headed to or already in the United States.”

The outlet said that this group, which had met with high-ranking Trump officials, made a presentation to his team ahead of his Jan. 20 inauguration “detailing links between the feared Tren de Aragua gang and the Nicolás Maduro regime, and provided official documents obtained from Venezuelan police agencies identifying 1,800 gang members believed to have been sent into the United States.”

Gary Berntsen — a former CIA station chief whose book "Jawbreaker" describes himself as “the CIA’s key commander coordinating the fight against the Taliban forces around Kabul” in 2001 — reportedly told the Herald that 300 of the Venezuelan gang members sent to the U.S. had received paramilitary training inside of Venezuela.

“The Venezuelan regime has assumed operational control of these guys [Tren de Aragua] and has trained 300 of them; they have given them paramilitary training, training them to fire weapons, on how to conduct sabotage, how to use crypto,” Berntsen told the outlet. “They have given them all like a four- to six-week course. They put these 300 guys through that course and that they were deploying them into the United States to 20 locations, to 20 separate states.”


Berntsen told American Greatness last month that the CIA didn’t have access to this information because the agency was not allowed to review it during the Biden era. “The CIA doesn’t have the information because they refused to look at it,” Berntsen said. “We tried to brief them about this three years ago, but they were directed by the Biden Administration to ignore it. And now those officials are trying to undermine President Trump.”

The CIA did not respond to a request for comment from Just the News.

As the U.S. tracks suspected Venezuelan gang members, a look at a a group that’s helping
by Antonio Maria Delgado
Miami Herald
March 21, 2025 1:59 PM
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation ... 47909.html

Image
A wanted poster for Hector Guerrero Flores, aka “Niño Guerrero,” identified by Venezuelan authorities as the leader of the Aragua Train.

A small team of Venezuelans and former U.S. officials with deep connections to police and intelligence in the South American country has been providing information to the Trump administration about the number and identities of members of Tren de Aragua and other Venezuelan gangs headed to or already in the United States.

The group, which has been meeting with high-ranking members of the administration, made a presentation to President Donald Trump’s team before he was inaugurated on Jan. 20, detailing links between the feared Tren de Aragua gang and the Nicolás Maduro regime, and provided official documents obtained from Venezuelan police agencies identifying 1,800 gang members believed to have been sent into the United States, three sources with knowledge of the situation told the Miami Herald.

Among those sent to the United States were 300 gang members who had received paramilitary training in Venezuela, said Gary Berntsen, a decorated former CIA station chief who headed the agency’s unit searching for Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.


“The Venezuelan regime has assumed operational control of these guys [Tren de Aragua] and has trained 300 of them; they have given them paramilitary training, training them to fire weapons, on how to conduct sabotage, how to use crypto,” Berntsen, one of the team members, said. “They have given them all like a four- to six-week course. They put these 300 guys through that course and that they were deploying them into the United States to 20 locations, to 20 separate states”.

Another team member, who requested anonymity to protect the identities of the team’s sources in Venezuela, said the group has had access to records from the police agencies of the South American country and that these were provided to the Trump administration, and that they have led to the identification and arrests of at least 800 Venezuelans who are believed to be either full-fledged members of Tren de Aragua or members of smaller affiliated gangs.

Logistics and money

The team of investigators, which for years have been exposing the threat to the U.S. posed by the Maduro regime, has in the past helped federal investigators in the U.S. target top members of the Caracas government accused by the U.S. justice system of running the Soles drug cartel and of high level corruption through different administrations.

The administration has also obtained data from law enforcement agencies from Latin American nations where Tren de Aragua members set up criminal operations before attempting to extend their reach into the United States. The gang’s presence has been blamed for a spike of violent crimes in those countries.

In the presentation to the Trump administration, the group claimed that Venezuelan intelligence services had provided logistics and money to hundreds of members of Tren de Aragua to enter the U.S.

The Tren de Aragua members were deliberately sent into the largest American cities to create problems for U.S. law enforcement agencies, the source told the Herald. But they “are not just criminals sent to cause havoc. They are soldiers sent in an asymmetric warfare operation against the United States,” the source speaking under condition of anonymity said.


Tren de Aragua members were also tasked with setting up drug distribution networks in major U.S. cities to fill the void created by the crackdown on the Mara Salvatrucha gang, also known as MS-13, which was severely weakened by the arrest of its leadership in El Salvador in 2022.

The Salvadoran gang had served as an important U.S. outlet for the drugs provided by Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, which according to U.S. law enforcement investigations is one of the top partners of the Venezuelan cartel allegedly headed by Maduro and his number two in the regime, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.

The group of unofficial Venezuelan investigators was able to have access to high-level Trump officials because they have for years assisted the U.S. justice system in some of the biggest cases about the involvement of Venezuelan regime officials in corruption and drug-trafficking operations. Those investigations have been going on for more than a decade and the information gathered by the team has at times been provided by Venezuelan military and police officials willing to covertly assist U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Last year, the U.S. government increased the rewards for the capture of Maduro and Cabello to $25 million each, the highest such rewards and the same amount offered at some point for top Sinaloa Cartel boss Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman and for Osama Bin Laden.

‘Oversized combat brigade’

One of the documents the group has provided to the administration, which the Miami Herald was able to obtain, contained the names of 1,281 Venezuelan alleged gang members, sometimes accompanied by photos and the criminal charges they had faced in the South American country. According to the group, some of the gang members were part of an estimated 20,000 inmates who have been released from Venezuelan prisons during Maduro’s tenure and who were told that they had to leave the country if they wanted to remain free.

The Salvadoran government has described people held in CECOT as “terrorists,” and has said that they “will never leave.” Human Rights Watch is not aware of any detainees who have been released from that prison.

-- Exhibit E, Case 1:25-cv-00072 Document 42-6 Filed on 04/16/25 in TXSD, DECLARATION OF JUANITA GOEBERTUS, DIRECTOR, AMERICAS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH


Information gathered by the team from sources inside the regime points to a plan that would place 5,000 gang members inside the United States, Berntsen said.

Run by the 300 gang members-turned-operatives, he said the people pose a dangerous threat to U.S. national security. “This is the equivalent of an oversized combat brigade dispersed through 20 different locations, but with thousands of people that would be able to communicate, move drugs, and do whatever they needed, and be able on hand to put pressure on the U.S. with violence in cities, and build out a massive criminal infrastructure in America,” he said.

Berntsen said the team became aware of the situation while conducting an investigation on a separate case. One of their sources told them of Maduro’s plans and they started gathering information and meeting with officials at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

At the time, however, the Biden administration was determined was [with?] negotiating with the Maduro regime and the team’s warnings appeared to have gone unheeded, he said. Although frustrated, the team felt it was important to continue moving forward with the case, he added.

“These are bad people. But we’re not going to just f---ing watch them take over our country. No, we’re not going to let them do that. I draw the line here,” Berntsen said.

The Tren de Aragua gang
, formed in the past decade in the notorious Tocorón prison in Venezuela’s Aragua state, has spread throughout the countries that border Venezuela and developed a reputation for being ruthless and fearless.

According to the presentation the group made to the administration, members of the gang in essence act as an armed branch and hit-man squad for the Soles drug cartel, which U.S. prosecutors have said is headed by Maduro himself and other high-ranking Venezuelan government officials.[/u][/i]

An organizational chart developed by the group for U.S. officials shows that Tren de Aragua leader Hector Guerrero Flores, aka “Niño Guerrero”, and his lieutenants, Yohan José Romero, aka “Johan Petrica”, and Giovanny San Vicente, aka “Giovanny,” report to cartel leaders, handling a number of illicit business including illegal mining and drug-trafficking operations.


In addition to the information provided by the team, the Trump administration has been receiving data provided by the police organizations from Peru, Chile, Costa Rica and Colombia, countries that had a large number of Tren de Aragua members, the source said.

State of emergency in Peru

The gang’s presence has been blamed for a surge in violence in these countries. On Monday, the Peruvian government declared Lima in a state of emergency, following the killing of a popular singer who was being extorted by criminals.

Peru’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism, Úrsula León, told the Spanish news service EFE on Thursday that the state of emergency had been necessary in light of the surge in violence primarily caused by Venezuelan criminals.

“There has been a high level of immigration of citizens from various countries, mainly in recent years from Venezuela due to the crisis that country has been experiencing. Of these, as I pointed out, many Venezuelan citizens who came to Peru have contributed greatly and continue to contribute, and are excellent, excellent people,” the minister said. However, he added, “a group arrived, and they have continued to arrive, people who did not respect rights; people who came with criminal records or people who entered the country illegally. And these generate this chaos.”

Although Tren de Aragua members originally moved to countries near Venezuela, they were later encouraged by their controllers in the Venezuelan government to head to the United States, the source in the group told the Herald.

“It became a sort of fun adventure for them,” the source said.
Unlike other Venezuelan migrants who have had to brave crossing the Darien Gap, the treacherous, predator-filled jungle on the border of Colombia and Panama, “these guys didn’t cross the jungle on foot,” the source said.

Often times they were transported by boat by the arrangements made by members of Maduro’s intelligence services from Colombia to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to Mexico, where they were handed over to smugglers known as coyotes belonging to the Sinaloa Cartel to make their way to the U.S.

The source said that the information provided to the Trump administration, along with the information shared by police agencies from other Latin American countries, has been used to search for the alleged gang members from the time Trump took office.

According to the source, the mugshots provided have proven to be particularly helpful for U.S. law enforcement agencies because some of the suspected gang members who entered illegally into the country have used fake names and forged Colombian documents.


The presentation made to administration officials about the dangers posed by the Venezuelan criminals may have inspired the proclamation issued by Trump last weekend to announce the U.S. would find and deport members of Tren de Aragua. Trump accused Maduro of “perpetrating an invasion of, and a predatory incursion into, the United States, which poses a substantial danger” to the country.

Tren de Aragua “operates in conjunction with Cartel de los Soles, the Nicolas Maduro regime-sponsored, narco-terrorism enterprise based in Venezuela, and commits brutal crimes, including murders, kidnappings, extortions, and human, drug, and weapons trafficking,” Trump said as he invoked wartime powers created in the 1798 Alien Enemy Act to assume the authority to expedite the mass deportation of Venezuelans in the U.S. suspected of being gang members.

The proclamation, added to Trump’s previous decision to suspend Temporary Protected Status for close to 348,000 Venezuelans and the decision to send 238 deported Venezuelans over the weekend to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador, has garnered the administration harsh criticism from Venezuelan community leaders and human-right activists, who accuse the president of using the presence of the gang members as an excuse to get rid of Venezuelan migrants.

The sources who have provided the administration with information about Tren de Aragua gang members were not able to confirm if all 238 Venezuelans sent to El Salvador were in fact criminals, but said that a significant number of them are [!]

“Most of those that were sent to El Salvador had criminal records, not necessarily from crimes committed in the United States but from the others countries from which they came,” the source said. “Among these was a group of gang members that had killed a lot of people in Peru before they were sent into the United States.”[!!!]


The Tren de Aragua gang operates as a loosely organized criminal syndicate, serving as an umbrella organization for smaller gangs specialized in all types of crimes, from kidnapping, extortion and drug-trafficking to prostitution, robbery and murders for hire.

Tons of cocaine

The team of investigators advising the Trump administration said that the formal members of the gang serve as organizational leaders of different cells that have recruited other Venezuelans in the U.S. cities they were sent to, but not all members of the new cells are necessarily considered to be official gang members.

This follows the organizational structure the gang implemented inside the Venezuelan prisons, where they recruited new members from the general population in order to have the numbers to rule the other inmates.

Another of the main themes of the presentation made for U.S. officials is that Tren de Aragua is directly controlled by the top leadership of the Soles cartel, which U.S. officials believe exports between 250 and 350 tons of cocaine per year, mainly to Europe and the United States.

The U.S. Justice Department has outstanding drug-trafficking indictments against Maduro and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who are accused with heading the Soles cartel. But the sources said other key figures in the Caracas regime actually control the gang, including Prisons Minister Iris Varela; Tachira state Gov. Fredy Bernal, and Jorge Rodríguez, president of the regime’s National Assembly.

Another key figure in the gang’s development is former Vice President Tarek El Aissami, who was a key member of the regime and the Soles cartel before he fell from grace and was jailed in Venezuela, according to the presentation prepared for Trump officials.

In his proclamation last week, Trump highlighted the alleged link between the Tren de Aragua gang, which he referred to as TdA, and the Maduro regime.

“TdA has engaged in and continues to engage in mass illegal migration to the United States to further its objectives of harming United States citizens, undermining public safety, and supporting the Maduro regime’s goal of destabilizing democratic nations in the Americas, including the United States,” Trump said.

“TdA is closely aligned with, and indeed has infiltrated, the Maduro regime, including its military and law enforcement apparatus.”


The InSight Crime investigative outlet released a report on the “Rise of the Criminal Hybrid State in Venezuela” in 2023, saying “Tren de Aragua has also received favors from the government of Nicolas Maduro [...] And besides Tren de Aragua, groups with different social and political goals, including colectivos, have also established similar hybrid governance systems due to collaboration with government institutions.”

The outlet said that one man whose son was detained in the TdA-controlled prison of Tocoron told them that the gang “maintains control of their communities and enforces the government’s will, much like colectivos, militant civilian groups that suppress political opposition.” A member of TdA reportedly told the outlet that “no one has any idea of the full parallel world that this represents” and that “there is a lot of government involvement.”

Jose Gustavo Arocha, a former lieutenant colonel in the Venezuelan military, told Fox News in December that Maduro was responsible for the TdA’s flourishing.

"We have to understand also something of the Tren de Aragua, the TdA. It's a state-sponsored Maduro regime organization," Arocha said. "The real boss of the Tren de Aragua is in Caracas, Venezuela. It is the Maduro regime, because they created TdA, and they use the TdA as a blackmail [tool] for any situation."

Arocha said the Maduro regime’s Directorate of Military Counterintelligence was deploying TdA as an asymmetrical warfare tool — meaning the use of unconventional tactics — to provide itself some "plausible deniability."

Ivan Duque, the former president of Colombia, said in January, “It's as simple as this: The Aragua Train is a criminal organization serving the Cartel of the Suns in Venezuela, that is, Maduro's narco-dictatorial regime. The Aragua Train killed [Venezuelan dissident Ronald] Ojeda in Chile, and everything points to Miraflores [the head office of the president of Venezuela]. Similarly, the Aragua Train is advancing criminal activities in the U.S. Simply put, Maduro's narco-dictatorial regime is exporting violence, crime, and drug trafficking.”

Former ICE Supervisory Special Agent Victor Avila also told The Daily Mail in March that TdA gang members “are directly connected to the Maduro regime in Venezuela — no question about it. … As a matter of fact, they're tied to Cartel de Los Soles, which Maduro is the head of. That in itself is enough to qualify them… I don't like to call them a ‘gang’ because they're a highly sophisticated network that goes all the way up to the Maduro regime.”

Franqui Flores and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores — Maduro’s nephews by marriage — were convicted in 2016 and sentenced to 18 years in 2017 for “conspiring to import cocaine into the United States.” They were later released by President Joe Biden in a prisoner exchange with Venezuela.

It was reported by Univision in 2017 that the DOJ seized secret communications from the Maduro nephews, and that “these WhatsApp conversations revealed how they discussed dismemberments (‘picados’), their relationship with Venezuelan criminal gangs like ‘El Tren de Aragua,’ the order to execute people, and the precise moment to do so."

The Heritage Foundation said in 2024 that “the conversations suggested that the TdA functions as enforcers or hitmen (sicarios) for the interests of the Maduro regime.”

Former Venezuelan VP designated a narcotics trafficker

Tareck El Aissami, a former top member of the Maduro regime, became the vice president of Venezuela under Maduro in January 2017. Trump’s executive order last month stated that “TdA grew significantly while Tareck El Aissami served as governor of Aragua between 2012 and 2017” and that “El Aissami is currently a United States fugitive facing charges arising from his violations of United States sanctions triggered by his Department of the Treasury designation.”

The Trump Treasury Department in 2017 named El Aissami a “Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking.”

Prosecutors for the Southern District of New York in 2019 charged El Aissami with criminal violations of the Kingpin Act. The State Department in 2020 also added a $10 million reward for his arrest.


The Maduro regime allegedly arrested El Aissami in April 2024 over claims of corruption.

The DOJ said in court filings last month that “TdA’s growth itself can be attributed to promotion via the actions of former Governor of Aragua Tareck El Aissami, who was later appointed Vice President in the Maduro regime.”

Jail break

The Treasury Department said last summer that “from its origins as a prison gang in Aragua, Venezuela, Tren de Aragua has quickly expanded throughout the Western Hemisphere in recent years.”

Trump has repeatedly argued that Maduro has purposely emptied jails in Venezuela for the purpose of sending the criminals into the United States, including in a speech last May where he said that “in Venezuela, their prisons have been emptied into the United States. Their criminals and drug dealers have been taken out of the cities and brought into the United States.”

Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector Intelligence Unit reportedly assessed that “information received indicates that the [i]Venezuelan government released criminals from prison and teamed them up with intelligence and counterintelligence agents to be deployed to the United States to conduct operations on selected targets,” according to a Breitbart report in November.[/i]

Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security advisor, said in a Tuesday interview on the Just the News, No Noise television show that “we know that Maduro is emptying out prisons” and that Maduro “has no problem with these gangs coming into our inner cities.”

TdA accused of murdering a Venezuelan dissident in Chile

Investigations of the assassination of a Venezuelan dissident inside Chile have also unearthed TdA links to Maduro. The Heritage Foundation released a lengthy report in late 2024 on TdA which included analysis on the links TdA gang member Walter Rodriguez Perez had with Maduro official El Aissami before Perez allegedly assassinated Venezuelan dissident Ronald Ojeda.

“The methodical, sophisticated, and targeted nature of the Ojeda assassination in Chile extends beyond known TdA foreign capabilities. The TdA can carry out targeted killings on their own, and they have done so in the past, but acquiring authentic Chilean police equipment, including helmets and bulletproof vests, employing countersurveillance techniques, and using technical countermeasures are well beyond the capabilities of a street gang,” the Heritage Foundation assessed, adding, “Walter Rodriguez Perez worked on El Aissami’s security detail in Aragua, making it very likely he was trained by Venezuela’s Military Counterintelligence Directorate (DGCIM). … These details highly suggest that the targeted assassination of Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda in Chile was a joint DGCIM/TdA operation.”

The Justice Department also weighed in on this in April by including analysis from a Trump immigration official.

“TdA’s most notorious alleged crime was the 2024 killing of Ronald Ojeda, a former Venezuelan army officer who conspired against Nicolas Maduro, the country’s authoritarian leader, then fled to Chile,” Marcos Charles, the acting assistant director of enforcement and removal operations for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, told Boasberg in court filings earlier this month. Suspected gang members dressed as Chilean police officers abducted Ojeda from his apartment. Days later, his body was found stuffed in a suitcase and buried in cement. The history reflects over a decade of savage criminal activity, vicious disregard for authority, and violent crimes which threaten the stability of order. TdA poses the same terrorizations in the United States as the origin countries from which they started – Venezuela, and now also to include Colombia, Peru and Chile.”

Maduro’s regime has denied involvement, and Venezuelan attorney general Tarek William Saab labeled the attack “a false flag operation that the Chilean State itself covered up.” The Miami Herald also reported in January that Chilean prosecutor Hector Barros, who led the investigation into TdA’s murder of Ojeda, found evidence implicating Cabello and the Maduro regime.

“We always said from the start that given the profile of the victim this was a political event. But the evidence that now exists in the investigation shows that this conclusion is no longer solely based on the victim’s profile. But that the payments [to the gang] were made by the Venezuelan government,” Barros told Chilevision, the outlet reported.

The Herald wrote, “Citing documents from the investigation of the prosecutor’s office, the TV channel reported that key evidence gathered by officials point to Cabello issuing the order to initially abduct Ojeda and later to carry out his execution. The Chilean prosecutor has gathered testimony claiming that Cabello issued the orders and made the payments through Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, a.k.a Niño Guerrero, the alleged head of Tren de Aragua.”

Maduro ally Diosdado Cabello attempted to claim without evidence in September 2024, that the U.S. had actually tried to use TdA to assassinate Maduro: “The United States knows how to carry out destabilization operations… Why don’t they stop them?” The State Department issued a $10 million bounty on Cabello in 2020, and increased it to $25 million in January 2025.

“Diosdado Cabello Rondón is currently Nicolás Maduro Moros’ so-called minister of interior, justice, and peace, having oversight over Venezuela’s police forces and prisons,” the U.S. State Department website says. “After Maduro fraudulently declared victory in the July 2024 presidential election despite evidence to the contrary, Maduro purported to appoint Cabello to this position.”

It was reported by Reuters that Chilean officials met with International Criminal Court representatives last month to hand over evidence about the murder of the Venezuelan dissident which they argued is relevant to an ongoing ICC investigation into alleged human rights abuses by Venezuelan government officials.

Chile's attorney general told Reuters that Ojeda's murder "doesn't have the characteristics of a normal crime." Valencia said that “all the evidence we have at this state of the investigation lets us conclude that a cell or group linked to the Tren de Aragua that was politically motivated that originated from an order of a political nature.”

U.S.’s long battle against Maduro and Venezuelan gangs

The Justice Department during the first Trump administration charged Maduro, Cabello, and other regime figures in March 2020 over their links to transnational gangs. The DOJ said that Maduro, Cabello, and the others “acted as leaders and managers” of the Cartel de Los Soles — the “Cartel of the Suns” — since the 1990s. The DOJ said that the cartel’s name “refers to the sun insignias affixed to the uniforms of high-ranking Venezuelan military officials.”

“Maduro Moros and the other charged Cartel members abused the Venezuelan people and corrupted the legitimate institutions of Venezuela — including parts of the military, intelligence apparatus, legislature, and the judiciary — to facilitate the importation of tons of cocaine into the United States,” the DOJ said in 2020. “The Cartel de Los Soles sought to not only enrich its members and enhance their power, but also to ‘flood’ the United States with cocaine and inflict the drug’s harmful and addictive effects on users in the United States.”

Then-Attorney General William Barr announced the narcoterrorism charges against Maduro for his role in facilitating the global drug trade in coordination with the Colombia-based terrorist group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — known as the FARC.

Barr said at the time that the U.S. expected to “eventually” gain custody of Maduro and his co-conspirators and made it clear that “we want these defendants captured so they can face justice in U.S. courts.”

The Biden-era Treasury Department sanctioned TdA as a transnational criminal organization in July 2024, arguing that the gang was “expanding throughout the Western Hemisphere and engaging in diverse criminal activities, such as human smuggling and trafficking, gender-based violence, money laundering, and illicit drug trafficking.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated TdA as a foreign terrorist organization in February, along with a number of other gangs and cartels such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the Sinaloa Cartel, and the New Generation Cartel of Jalisco.

“TdA is a transnational organization that originated in Venezuela with cells in Colombia, Peru, and Chile, with further reports of sporadic presence in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil,” the State Department said in its announcement. “This brutal criminal group has conducted kidnappings, extorted businesses, bribed public officials, authorized its members to attack and kill U.S. law enforcement, and assassinated a Venezuelan opposition figure.”

Maduro’s regime reportedly sent thousands of troops to the Tocoron prison — a key base of operations for TdA inside of Venezuela — in 2023, and claimed to regain control of the facility from the gang. The Maduro government claimed victory over the gang soon after.

InSight Crime is a non-profit organization that is a think tank and media outlet focusing on organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are connected to the U.S. government through funding, particularly from the U.S. State Department.

InSight Crime's mission is to deepen understanding and inform debate about organized crime and citizen security in the Americas. They provide reporting, analysis, data, investigations, and policy suggestions. Their work includes field investigations, where they speak to local sources, government officials, and even criminals themselves.
InSight Crime receives funding from various sources, including the U.S. State Department, the Open Society Foundations, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and corporate philanthropy. They are a hybrid of media, think tank, and academic research institution, with offices in Washington, D.C. and Medellín, Colombia.

In addition to government funding, InSight Crime's key funders include organizations like the British Embassy in Colombia, USAID, and the International Development Research Centre of Canada, as well as other funders.
InSight Crime's website provides more information on their work and funding.

-- by Google AI


An analysis by InSight Crime stated that “it is hard to see this operation as much more than political theater, certainly in the claim that it has dismantled the Tren de Aragua” because “the gang is still intact, its leadership free, and its outposts spread across Latin America unaffected by the operation.”
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri May 02, 2025 1:18 am

Venezuela’s Drug Cartel de los Soles: Myth or Reality?
by Josep Freixes
Colombiaone.com
January 3, 2025
https://colombiaone.com/2025/01/03/vene ... afficking/

Image
The Cartel de los Soles is a rumored Venezuela drug trafficking organization coordinated, says the US, by Nicolas Maduro’s inner circle. Credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, CC BY-SA 2.0 / Wikimedia.

In the complex web of international drug trafficking, Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Sun) is one of the most controversial entities. The shadowy group is an alleged drug cartel composed of and led by high-ranking Venezuelan government officials and members of the armed forces.

Various international entities, particularly the U.S. government, have accused the group of engaging in illegal activities. However, little evidence has been provided to support these allegations so far.

It is thought that the Venezuelan government, headed by President Nicolas Maduro, coordinates the so-called Cartel de los Soles, which is involved in a wide range of criminal operations including drug trafficking and money laundering. The cartel is also said to be led by one of Venezuela’s top government officials, the newly appointed Interior Minister and Vice President of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello.

The drug cartel is also believed to be connected with illegal armed groups outside of Venezuela, including the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas and the Italian and international mafia.

Origin of the cartel and drug trafficking in Venezuela

According to the U.S., the Cartel de los Soles dates back to the early 2000s, when Venezuela began to be targeted as an important transit country for drug trafficking to the U.S. and Europe. The name ‘Soles’ (‘suns’ in English) comes from the insignia that Venezuelan army generals and high-ranking officers wear on the epaulettes of their uniforms. The number of suns indicates an individual’s rank.

The alleged cartel was formed during the presidency of Hugo Chavez (1999-2013), during which military control over key state institutions significantly increased. Under the premise of protecting Venezuela’s sovereignty and fighting interference from abroad, drug trafficking networks were consolidated. This occurred particularly in the border regions with Colombia, close to areas controlled by Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The cartel soon started coordinating with these groups, which had been engaged in cocaine trafficking for decades.

Structure of the Cartel de los Soles drug trafficking ring

The Cartel de los Soles is not a hierarchical group with a single leader or centralized structure. Rather, it is a loose network of cells and actors from the Venezuelan government and security forces including high-ranking government officials, officers from the Armed Forces, and other key Chavista figures.

One of the most frequently mentioned alleged leaders is Diosdado Cabello. The former president of Venezuela’s National Constituent Assembly and a Chavismo strongman, Cabello is now the country’s Minister of the Interior. He is accused, along with other high-level government officials, of playing a central role in coordinating and facilitating the large-scale trafficking of drugs.

Cabello and the Venezuelan government categorically deny these accusations, claiming they are attempts by the U.S. to destabilize the country’s government. To date, no solid evidence has been provided to support the allegations against these high-profile individuals.

Cartel de los Soles: illegal activities in Venezuela

The Cartel de los Soles is allegedly involved in a wide range of criminal activities. These include coordinating the trafficking of cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to Central America and the Caribbean, and ultimately to the U.S. and Europe. Since the military controls ports and airports, as well as clandestine routes, it is able to facilitate the safe passage of cocaine shipments and approve the flights transporting the drug to other countries.

The cartel is also involved in extortion, money laundering, and smuggling of precious minerals. These activities have allowed the clandestine organization to accumulate significant financial and logistical resources, strengthening its power within Venezuela and protecting the network from international prosecution.

The armed forces in Venezuela have closely supported the Venezuelan government for the past 25 years. The involvement of individual members, and the institution as a whole, in public companies and other State structures began during the presidency of Hugo Chavez. This increased after Maduro came to power in 2013. Today, both the armed forces and the police are closely aligned with Maduro’s much-criticized authoritarian regime.

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The Cartel de los Soles is accused of working with Colombia’s ELN guerrilla group. Credit: Brasil de Fato, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 / Flickr.

US allegations and evidence

In recent years, the U.S. government has been one of the most insistent international actors attempting to expose the activities of the Cartel de los Soles. In March 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed formal charges against several high-ranking Venezuelan officials, including Maduro and Cabello. It accused them of being directly involved in the cartel’s operations, including narcoterrorism.

The U.S. bases its accusations on [ALLEGED] evidence and testimonies shared by deserters of the clan and former Venezuelan officials. The U.S. also says it has recordings, interceptions of communications, and intelligence data obtained through undercover operations that prove the Venezuelan government’s involvement in the cartel. In addition, it claims that the drug shipments it has seized in various countries have been traced back to routes controlled by the cartel.

Curveball (informant)
by Wikipedia

Accessed 5/1/25

Image
Rafid Ahmed Alwan
Born Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi
1968 (age 56–57)
Iraq
Nationality: German, French, former Iraqi citizen
Other names: Curveball
Alma mater: Baghdad University

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi (Arabic: رافد أحمد علوان الجنابي, Rāfid Aḥmad Alwān; born 1968), known by the Defense Intelligence Agency cryptonym "Curveball", is a German-French citizen who defected from Iraq in 1999, claiming that he had worked as a chemical engineer at a plant that manufactured mobile biological weapon laboratories as part of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. Alwan's allegations were subsequently shown to be false by the Iraq Survey Group's final report published in 2004.

Despite warnings from the German Federal Intelligence Service and the British Secret Intelligence Service questioning the authenticity of the claims, the US and British governments utilized them to build a rationale for military action in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, including in the 2003 State of the Union address, where the US President George W. Bush said, "We know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs", and US Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council, which contained a computer generated image of a mobile biological weapons laboratory. They were suggested to be mobile production trucks for artillery balloons. On 24 September 2002, the British government published its dossier on the former Iraqi leader's WMD with a personal foreword by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who assured readers Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had continued to produce WMD "beyond doubt".

On November 4, 2007, the US television news program 60 Minutes revealed Curveball's real identity. Former CIA official Tyler Drumheller summed up Curveball as "a guy trying to get his green card essentially, in Germany, and playing the system for what it was worth." Alwan lives in Germany, where he has been granted asylum.


In a February 2011 interview with British newspaper The Guardian, Alwan "admitted for the first time that he lied about his story, then watched in shock as it was used to justify the war."


Former General Hugo Carvajal and his double game in Venezuela

One of the most high-profile international attempts to uncover the [ALLEGED] cartel’s operations was the 2014 arrest in Aruba of General Hugo Carvajal, Venezuela’s former head of military intelligence. On the request of the U.S., Carvajal was taken into custody for drug trafficking, a move which was deemed illegal since he had a diplomatic passport. He was subsequently released and returned to Venezuela, where he received a hero’s welcome. He was considered a key member of the Clan de los Soles until 2019 when he withdrew his support for Maduro and left the country.

Carvajal spent years managing to avoid extradition to the U.S., including by living in hiding in Spain. In 2021, Spanish authorities finally arrested him. He accused the left-wing Spanish government, along with several progressive political leaders in Latin America, of being financed by Venezuela. Maduro’s government requested his extradition back to Caracas so that it could charge him for treason, amongst other crimes.

After considerable back-and-forth between the authorities of various countries, Carvajal was extradited to the U.S. in July 2023 to stand trial for drug trafficking and money laundering. He has since cooperated with authorities to expose the Venezuelan government’s involvement in the Cartel de los Soles.

Image
Former General Hugo Carvajal was accused by the United States of belonging to the Cártel de los Soles. He now plays a key role in exposing the Venezuelan authorities’ involvement in the criminal group. Credit: Hugo Carvajal, CC BY-SA 4.0 / Wikimedia.

Venezuela denies cartel’s existence and accuses US of defamation

The Venezuelan government has categorically denied the existence of the Cartel de los Soles and claims the accusations are part of a U.S.-led smear campaign that aims to justify military interventions and economic sanctions against Venezuela. Caracas maintains that the U.S.’ alleged evidence is unreliable and is based on testimonies that were paid for and manipulated.

Some international analysts also argue that while a drug trafficking network may well exist in Venezuela, the scale and structure of the Cartel de los Soles may be exaggerated for political reasons, particularly given ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela.

The Cartel de los Soles remains shrouded in a nebulous web of accusations, denials, and alleged evidence.
While the U.S. continues to push for legal action and sanctions against the alleged members of the group, the Venezuelan government continues to reject these accusations as an attempt by the U.S. to destabilize the country. The truth about the cartel, as with many high-level drug trafficking operations, exists in a gray area of different interests and motivations.

Whatever the truth is about the Cartel de los Soles, the Venezuelan people continue to suffer the consequences of their nation’s multidimensional crisis. Beyond the activities of the alleged State-run cartel, corruption, violent political repression, international sanctions and severe economic hardship continue to plague the country, which is now weathering a new crisis following the fraudulent re-election of President Maduro last July.

Image
Protesters in Venezuela demonstrate following the contested July 2024 presidential elections. Credit: Andresazp, CC BY-SA 2.0 / Wikimedia.
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri May 02, 2025 1:25 am

US intelligence contradicts Trump claims linking gang to Venezuelan government to speed deportations.
by MICHELLE L. PRICE and MARY CLARE JALONICK
apnews.com
Updated 7:56 AM MDT, April 18, 2025
https://apnews.com/article/trump-alien- ... 1028585483

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The relatives of Venezuelan migrants in the U.S. who were flown to a prison in El Salvador by the U.S. government who alleged they were members of the Tren de Aragua gang, protest outside of the United Nations building in Caracas, Venezuela, Wednesday, April 9, 2025. (AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos)

WASHINGTON (AP) — A new U.S. intelligence assessment found no coordination between Tren de Aragua and the Venezuelan government, contradicting statements that Trump administration officials have made to justify their invocation of the Alien Enemies Act and deporting Venezuelan migrants, according to U.S. officials.

The classified assessment from the National Intelligence Council, released this month, is more comprehensive and authoritative than an earlier intelligence product released Feb. 26 and reported last month by The New York Times, according to two U.S. officials familiar with the assessment. They were not authorized to address the matter publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

The new assessment draws input from the 18 agencies that comprise the intelligence community. It repeatedly stated that Tren de Aragua, a gang that originated in a prison in Venezuela, is not coordinated with or supported by the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro, or senior officials in the Venezuelan government. While the assessment found minimal contact between some members of the gang and low-level members of the Venezuelan government, there was a consensus that there was no coordination or directive role between gang and government.

The assessment provided support and extensive sourcing for those assertions, according to the officials. Of the 18 organizations that make up the U.S. government’s intelligence community, only one — the FBI — did not agree with the findings.


It is not uncommon for intelligence agencies to differ in their assessments on matters of great public interest. But the latest assessment was significant for its near unanimity.

Several years ago, under former Director Christopher Wray, the FBI assessed that the COVID-19 pandemic most likely originated from a lab leak, though that was hardly the uniform consensus. The position got recent support from a CIA assessment declassified in January.

Asked for comment, the White House shared a statement on Friday from the office of the director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard.

“President Trump took necessary and historic action to safeguard our nation when he deported these violent Tren de Aragua terrorists,” the statement said. “Now that America is safer without these terrorists in our cities, deep state actors have resorted to using their propaganda arm to attack the President’s successful policies.”

The assessment comes amid a court ruling on the Alien Enemies Act

The intelligence assessment’s findings come as the Supreme Court ruled last week that the Trump administration can use the Alien Enemies Act, a 1798 wartime law, to deport Venezuelan migrants — but that the migrants must get court hearings before they’re taken from the United States.

Tren de Aragua has been linked to a series of kidnappings, extortion and other crimes throughout the Western Hemisphere. Those activities are tied to a mass exodus of millions of Venezuelans as their country’s economy unraveled over the past decade.

The Alien Enemies Act was created to give the president wide powers to imprison and deport noncitizens in time of war. Until now, it has been used just three times, most recently eight decades ago during World War II to justify the detention of Japanese-American civilians.

The American Civil Liberties Union, which has filed legal challenges to the Trump administration’s use of the law, contends that Trump does not have the authority to use the Alien Enemies Act against a criminal gang rather than a recognized state.

Trump says Tren de Aragua ‘infiltrated’ Maduro government

President Donald Trump invoked the act in March, declaring in a proclamation that Tren de Aragua “is closely aligned with, and indeed has infiltrated, the Maduro regime, including its military and law enforcement apparatus.”

Attorney General Pam Bondi repeated that assertion Monday night in an interview on Fox News Channel. Bondi defended the invocation of the wartime law and called Tren de Aragua “a foreign arm of the Venezuelan government.”

“They are organized. They have a command structure. And they have invaded our country,” she said.

Last month, the Trump administration used the Alien Enemies Act to fly more than 130 men accused of being members of the gang to El Salvador, where the U.S. has paid for the men to be held in a notorious prison. The Venezuelans deported under the act received no opportunity to challenge the orders, and attorneys for many of the men have said there is no evidence they are gang members.

The Trump administration has argued that the gang has become an invading force and designated it, along with seven other crime groups, as “foreign terrorist organizations.”


The latest intelligence assessment was first reported Thursday by The Washington Post.

___

Associated Press writers David Klepper and Eric Tucker contributed to this report.

MICHELLE L. PRICE. Price covers the White House. She previously covered the 2024 presidential campaign and politics, government and other news in New York, Nevada, Utah and Arizona. She is based in Washington
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri May 02, 2025 1:33 am

US intelligence says Venezuela is not directing a gang invasion into America. Trump claims the opposite. National Intelligence Council finds that South American nation isn’t directing an invasion into US.
by Gustaf Kilander
in Washington, D.C.
Friday 18 April 2025 10:46 EDT
https://www.the-independent.com/news/wo ... 35728.html

President Donald Trump has long claimed that South American governments are sending violent gang members to the U.S. as a justification for his mass deportation efforts. But U.S. intelligence has found that that isn’t the case.

The National Intelligence Council, using findings from the 18 intelligence agencies, found in a secret assessment earlier this month that the Venezuelan government isn’t sending members of the prison gang Tren de Aragua to the U.S., according to The Washington Post.

The findings go against Trump’s rationale for the use of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to deport those suspected of being gang members. The legislation was most recently used during World War II to detain more than 110,000 Japanese Americans.


Invoking the legislation last month, Trump said - without providing evidence - that the prison gang was conducting an “invasion” of the U.S. “at the direction” of the government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Image
The US intelligence apparatus has determined that the Venezuelan government isn’t sending its gang members to America. However, President Donald Trump has claimed the opposite. (via REUTERS)

Using the Alien Enemies Act, the Trump administration sent planes filled with alleged gang members to El Salvador’s infamous megaprison in the face of a judge’s order to turn the planes around to give the detainees due process.

The assessment of the intelligence community ascertained that there are some contacts between Tren de Aragua and the Venezuelan government at the lower levels, but the gang doesn’t follow orders from Maduro. Similarly, The New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence found in February that the Venezuelan government doesn’t control the gang.

The National Intelligence Council, the nucleus of the U.S. intelligence community, reports to the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. The council consists of national intelligence officers with regional or topical expertise, and it delivers classified assessments intended to represent the view of all the spy agencies.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence told The Post that the assessment was made by “deep state actors” working with the press.


“President Trump took necessary and historic action to safeguard our nation when he deported these violent Tren de Aragua terrorists,” a statement to the paper said. “Now that America is safer without these terrorists in our cities, deep state actors have resorted to using their propaganda arm to attack the President’s successful policies.”

White House Communications Director Steven Cheung told The Post in a statement that Trump “is 100 percent committed to ensuring that terrorists and criminal illegal migrants are no longer a threat to Americans and their communities across the country.”

Image
Trump has ordered the deportation of thousands and has sent some to prisons in El Salvador. He recently met with the country’s President Nayib Bukele in the Oval Office (AFP/Getty)

Two people familiar with the assessment told the paper that the finding among the agencies was close to unanimous, apart from the FBI, which found that there’s a moderate level of cooperation between Tren de Aragua and the Venezuelan government.

The quarrel over Tren de Aragua’s connections to the Venezuelan government comes as the Trump administration engages in a standoff with the courts, which has concerned constitutional experts, Trump’s political adversaries, and even some other Republicans.

Under the Alien Enemies Act, the president has the power to remove foreign citizens from countries that are at war with the U.S. or who are engaging in a “predatory incursion” into American territory. Legal experts have said that the law requires that the invasion or incursion has to be connected to a foreign government.

As Trump invoked the law, he claimed that the gang is connected to the “Maduro regime.”

“TdA is undertaking hostile actions and conducting irregular warfare against the territory of the United States both directly and at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime in Venezuela,” the invocation states.


A Venezuela expert at the Atlantic Council think tank, Geoff Ramsey, told The Post that “The idea that Maduro is directing Tren de Aragua members and sending criminals to infiltrate the United States is ludicrous.”

“Tren de Aragua has become more like a brand that any group of carjackers from Miami down to Argentina can invoke to further their criminal activity, but there’s really no clear sense of hierarchy,” he added. “And the reality is that Tren de Aragua has not always gotten along with the Maduro government: We saw just a few years ago, the military in 2023, stormed a prison that Tren de Aragua controlled and allegedly carried out extrajudicial executions.”
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Fri May 02, 2025 2:55 am

Twenty years ago in Iraq, ignoring the expert weapons inspectors proved to be a fatal mistake
by Robert E. Kelley
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
9 March 2023
https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/ ... al-mistake

The U.S. bases its accusations on [ALLEGED] evidence and testimonies shared by deserters of the clan and former Venezuelan officials. The U.S. also says it has recordings, interceptions of communications, and intelligence data obtained through undercover operations that prove the Venezuelan government’s involvement in the cartel. In addition, it claims that the drug shipments it has seized in various countries have been traced back to routes controlled by the cartel.

-- Venezuela’s Drug Cartel de los Soles: Myth or Reality?, by Josep Freixes, Colombiaone.com, January 3, 2025


Image
Robert Kelley with scientists from the French Atomic Energy Commission’s military applications division (CEA-DAM), during inspections in Iraq, December 2002. Photo: Petr Pavlicek / IAEARobert Kelley with scientists from the French Atomic Energy Commission’s military applications division (CEA-DAM), during inspections in Iraq, December 2002. Photo: Petr Pavlicek / IAEA

‘Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here.’—David Kay, Head of the Iraq Survey Group, during testimony to the US Senate, 29 January 2004


The case for invading Iraq in March 2003 was built on three basic premises: that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that it was developing more of them; and that it was failing to comply with its disarmament obligations under a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions. All of these premises were based on scraps of unreliable information. None of them was true.

David Kay was one of the loudest voices outside the United States government advocating a new invasion of Iraq in the years and months leading to the second Gulf War. As a former nuclear inspector who had worked in Iraq in 1991, after the first Gulf War, he became a popular TV pundit and was even called to testify before Congress, talking up dubious claims about new Iraqi WMD programmes.

It was not surprising, then, that Kay should be chosen to head the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)—the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mission to find and disable those putative WMD programmes—once the US-led multinational coalition had toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime and turned Iraq into an occupied state.

The ISG found no WMD in Iraq, and returning to Congress to testify on 28 January 2004, Kay admitted ‘we were almost all wrong’. He blamed a lack of human agents inside Iraq in the months before the war, and analysts being under pressure to draw conclusions based on inadequate intelligence. True, the intelligence Kay and many others in Washington, DC, London and other capitals had chosen to listen to was inadequate and flawed. But there was plenty more information that they ignored, much of it coming from many weapons inspectors working inside Iraq—including US nuclear experts—under UN mandate for four months in 2002–2003.

Experts on the ground: the UN inspectors

I was in Iraq in those final months before the 2003 invasion as Deputy for Analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Team tasked with the nuclear side of the weapons inspections, while the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) worked in parallel, looking for biological and chemical weapons, as well as illicit missile programmes. We studied a few outstanding questions regarding the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme that had been discovered and dismantled in the early 1990s; we looked for new evidence and investigated leads and suspicions passed on to us by national governments; we inspected many sites and interviewed Iraqi scientists and officials in person; and we analysed the data. By early 2003 we knew at a very high level of confidence that there was no nuclear weapons effort of any kind in Iraq, and we were regularly passing this information back to the UN Security Council. We were not wrong.

I had been an IAEA inspector in Iraq in 1992–93. The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the IAEA Action Team carried out hundreds of person-days of inspections in Iraq. We discovered nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes and methodically destroyed them—even to the extent of blowing up entire factories and laboratories and bringing special nuclear materials out of the country. In the 1990s, the US, British, French, German and other governments freely provided excellent intelligence on where to look and what to look for. By 1998, even though Iraq had stopped cooperating with the inspections, there was general agreement that the Iraqi WMD programmes were completely dead, with only a few questions unanswered.

A major turning point in the US approach to Iraq was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. Al Qaeda, operating from Afghanistan, was identified as the source of the attacks, and the invasion of Afghanistan launched weeks later. The administration of new US President George W. Bush then tried, with very little credible evidence, to link Iraq to the attacks.
After intense campaigning led by the USA, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, ordering Iraq to immediately allow UNMOVIC and IAEA weapons inspectors back into the country in November of 2002. Aware that the war drums were beating, Iraq complied.

However, the Bush administration included many senior policy makers who had no use for the United Nations and made their distaste clear. As the months went by, we watched them repeat stories about Iraqi WMDs and covert WMD programmes that we knew to be false—and that we had even specifically debunked—in order to build public and diplomatic support for an invasion.

Two tales about centrifuges

One of the most best-known false narratives used to build the case for invasion concerned consignments of and tenders for aluminum tubes. In around 2001, CIA analyst ‘Joe’ noticed an attempt by Iraq to purchase high-strength aluminium tubes that he suspected could be used in building centrifuges to enrich uranium for weapons. The claims were soon investigated and dismissed within the US Intelligence Community and the subject died. UNSCOM and the IAEA had investigated earlier evidence in the 1990s of identical tubes that were already in Iraq in the thousands. Although they had a vague circumstantial similarity to tubes on export control lists, they were for conventional military use and experts had ruled out that they could be useful for centrifuges.

But suddenly, in September 2002, the same story leaked to the media and the old allegations were back.
Experts from the IAEA, the US National Laboratories and the EU pointed out that the tubes were identical to those used in Italian NATO-standard Medusa air-to-ground rockets that Iraq had started trying to reverse engineer in the 1980s for ground-to-ground use.

At around this time a friendly source leaked internal CIA correspondence to the IAEA showing that the CIA was completely aware that the tubes matched those used in Medusa rockets. Nevertheless, ‘Joe’ and his colleagues stuck to the centrifuge story. It was even repeated by President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address and by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his infamous February 2003 briefing to the UN Security Council aimed at demonstrating that Iraq was not complying with Resolution 1441—one of the most decisive moments in the build-up to war.

Image
US Secretary of State Colin Powell briefs the UN Security Council on claims about Iraqi WMD, 5 February 2003. He claimed: ‘What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence’ Photo: US Government/Wikimedia

One of several mistakes the CIA made was to only ask the US National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) to comment on whether the tubes could be for an Iraqi rocket. NGIC replied that ground-to-ground rockets did not need such high-specification tubes. They were apparently unaware of Iraq’s attempts to copy and repurpose the Medusa design. Had the Air Force Research Laboratory been brought in, it could have identified the tubes as suitable for Medusa rockets.

In Iraq, the weapons inspectors investigated the story in the field. The IAEA nuclear inspectors educated themselves thoroughly about small rockets. We also gained access from the Iraqis to every aspect of their rocket programme: procurement records, manufacturing, testing and military stockpiles. We thus easily identified the likely true purpose of the tubes—which was later confirmed by the Iraq Survey Group.

Centrifuges also featured in another piece of misinformation communicated by President Bush during this period. In an address to the nation in October 2002, President Bush showed satellite imagery of a repurposed facility at Al Furat, a former centrifuge manufacturing site from the Iraqi nuclear programme that was dismantled in 1991. He implied that this was evidence that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear programme, apparently unaware that UNMOVIC had free access to the site and had known for many years that it had been converted to a surface-to-air missile system repair facility. Satellite images could not determine this, but UNMOVIC could. By relying on old information and satellite images, and ignoring the reports of highly qualified eyewitnesses in the field, desk-bound analysts had once again come to an incorrect, but politically useful, conclusion.

The preferred sources

Kay’s lament that there were no human agents recruited in Iraq during the months leading up the war overlooked the fact that the USA and the IAEA put some of the most qualified analysts into the inspection teams. While ignoring the inspectors, the CIA and others in Washington were not only relying on obsolete data but also a few highly unreliable clandestine sources. These included an Iraqi defector, Rafid al-Janabi, known as Curveball. Curveball had been granted asylum by Germany in 2000 and made claims about Iraq having mounted facilities for manufacturing biological weapons in trucks that were moving around the country to escape detection. Germany’s federal intelligence service doubted his veracity. Nevertheless, when Germany passed on the source notes, US analysts took Curveballs’s stories at face value, without vetting them.

Curveball’s distortions were leaked to the public, in some cases by an ‘intelligence cell’ in the Pentagon staffed by people with no intelligence experience. This cell worked by cherry-picking items from raw intelligence that supported political positions—particularly Iraq’s supposed links to the 11 September attacks and the existence of WMD programmes. Curveball’s highly dubious claims were also repeated in Powell’s February 2003 Security Council briefing as established fact.

Another favoured defector source, whose stories leaked to the New York Times in 2001, was Adnan al Haideri. He claimed to have worked on a number of facilities that he believed were to be used for WMD development, in particular painting them with hard epoxy that would be easy to decontaminate. In fact, some of these locations were already known in the early 1990s and had been inspected. Nevertheless, the UN inspectors revisited the sites in 2002 and found them to be harmless.

It is also worth noting that much of the ‘intelligence’ favoured by the upper echelons in Washington came from the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was a dissident group headed by Ahmed Chalabi who was a fierce opponent of Saddam Hussein’s regime, was favoured by Iran and was determined to be the post-war leader of Iraq. His intelligence was largely unverifiable political stories and intrigues, supposedly from inside sources in Iraq.

Iraqi cooperation with the inspectors

Often overlooked is the highly cooperative attitude of the Iraqis during the inspections in 2002–2003. They saw clearly that they were being blamed for the 9/11 terrorist attacks and that there was likely to be a war and saw full cooperation as a last chance to prevent it. They negotiated reasonable terms for inspections by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in 2002 and 2003 and provided full access to people, places and information linked to nuclear activities.

An example of this cooperation concerned one of the highest-profile pieces of misinformation to emerge from Washington in the run-up to war. Claims started circulating in around 2000 that Iraq was seeking to import semi-processed uranium ore, called yellowcake, from Niger, and that this was for developing nuclear weapons. In fact, Iraq already had sufficient uranium stockpiled for peaceful uses had it wished to divert some for a weapons programme. Nevertheless, the claim was leaked to the media and cited in public statements by senior government figures, including President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address.

The source documents that the yellowcake story was based on were held back from the IAEA for several months, until someone in the US State Department passed them on unofficially in an attempt to undermine the CIA’s claims. It took the IAEA Iraq team leader only hours to demonstrate that the documents were crude forgeries. Iraq gave the IAEA inspectors full access to interviewees and records to confirm the story.


The inspectors’ unwelcome evidence

We soon came to realize that none of the findings of our inspections were making it back to the most important audience in the United States: US policy makers. I discussed this with a contact I had at the US mission in Vienna. He advised me to give up because ‘they don’t want to hear what you have to say’. ‘They’ were presumably all the people in the chain between us and the ultimate decision makers in Washington. As the weeks of inspections went by, the people in this chain, from the bottom to the top, evidently learned what kind of news would be welcomed by their superiors and what would not.

US organizations like the CIA, the National Photographic Interpretation Center and the Department of Energy (DOE) that had supplied the UN inspectors with solid intelligence in 1991 were now muzzled. We were receiving far more information and engagement from other governments. When we passed back our findings to US government sources through the UN, they were generally ignored.

The UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors were derided by the CIA and others as international flunkies unable to understand what Washington knew. In his State of the Union address, President Bush claimed that the Iraqi scientists we were interviewing were intelligence officers who had been coached in what to say—despite the fact that we knew some of their bona fides from inspections in the 1990s.
On the day we were told to pack up and leave Baghdad, as the bombing was about to start, I was preparing for a meeting with Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, the head of the Iraqi nuclear programme dismantled in 1991.

Analysts in the CIA and the ‘intelligence cell’ at the Pentagon no longer interacted with the inspectors and their findings. This was all the more remarkable that the UN inspectors were ignored given that a very large fraction of the new inspectors in 2002 came from the US military and the national nuclear weapons laboratories of the DOE. Most had been involved in earlier inspections. They had a broad grasp of the issues raised and solved in previous years. They had access to classified US intelligence and had many days’ experience in the field, first in the early 1990s, and then in 2002 and early 2003.

The CIA and Pentagon analysts also disregarded information from other branches of government, such as opinions on nuclear issues from experts in the DOE. Instead they were making faulty judgements based on data that was often decades old, trying to solve problems that had been resolved in the early 1990s, along with claims from unreliable defectors. Anything that did not align with their conclusions was ignored.
Politics, compliance and groupthink prevailed. It is sobering to think that one junior CIA analyst prevailed in the falsehood that aluminium tubes were for a nuclear weapons programme. His credentials to make the claims were virtually non-existent, yet he convinced colleagues and superiors that his interpretation was right and the DOE nuclear experts were wrong.

Who were ‘we’?

The claim by David Kay—'we were almost all wrong’—reflects how most people still think of the events of 2002–2003: as a story of faulty and inadequate intelligence, rather than robust and reliable intelligence information ignored.

The weapons inspectors had credibility that dwarfed that of Curveball and other defectors, who clearly had much to gain by fabricating intelligence about the Iraqi regime, as well as that of desk-bound analysts poring over out-of-date information and satellite photos.

The result of all this was a war that killed hundreds of thousands of people and fueled years of instability in Iraq and around the region. The CIA spent a billion dollars looking for Iraq’s non-existent WMD programmes in 2003–2004 only to find that UNMOVIC and the IAEA had got it almost perfectly right. A succession of later inquiries and commissions into the intelligence failings in Washington and London rarely asked why the UN weapons inspectors were ignored. So far the lesson seems to have been lost on the policy community. This should not happen again.

Robert E. Kelley is a Distinguished Associate Fellow at SIPRI

************************

Defector admits to WMD lies that triggered Iraq war
by Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd in Karlsruhe
Tue 15 Feb 2011 07.58 EST
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ ... s-iraq-war

• Man codenamed Curveball 'invented' tales of bioweapons
• Iraqi told lies to try to bring down Saddam Hussein regime
• Fabrications used by US as justification for invasion

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi: 'I would do whatever was possible' guardian.co.uk

The defector who convinced the White House that Iraq had a secret biological weapons programme has admitted for the first time that he lied about his story, then watched in shock as it was used to justify the war.

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed Curveball by German and American intelligence officials who dealt with his claims, has told the Guardian that he fabricated tales of mobile bioweapons trucks and clandestine factories in an attempt to bring down the Saddam Hussein regime, from which he had fled in 1995.

"Maybe I was right, maybe I was not right," he said. "They gave me this chance. I had the chance to fabricate something to topple the regime. I and my sons are proud of that and we are proud that we were the reason to give Iraq the margin of democracy."

The admission comes just after the eighth anniversary of Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations in which the then-US secretary of state relied heavily on lies that Janabi had told the German secret service, the BND. It also follows the release of former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld's memoirs, in which he admitted Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction programme.


The careers of both men were seriously damaged by their use of Janabi's claims, which he now says could have been – and were – discredited well before Powell's landmark speech to the UN on 5 February 2003.

The former CIA chief in Europe Tyler Drumheller describes Janabi's admission as "fascinating", and said the emergence of the truth "makes me feel better". "I think there are still a number of people who still thought there was something in that. Even now," said Drumheller.

In the only other at length interview Janabi has given he denied all knowledge of his supposed role in helping the US build a case for invading Saddam's Iraq.

In a series of meetings with the Guardian in Germany where he has been granted asylum, he said he had told a German official, who he identified as Dr Paul, about mobile bioweapons trucks throughout 2000. He said the BND had identified him as a Baghdad-trained chemical engineer and approached him shortly after 13 March of that year, looking for inside information about Saddam's Iraq.

"I had a problem with the Saddam regime," he said. "I wanted to get rid of him and now I had this chance."

He portrays the BND as gullible and so eager to tease details from him that they gave him a Perry's Chemical Engineering Handbook to help communicate.
He still has the book in his small, rented flat in Karlsruhe, south-west Germany.


"They were asking me about pumps for filtration, how to make detergent after the reaction," he said. "Any engineer who studied in this field can explain or answer any question they asked."

Janabi claimed he was first exposed as a liar as early as mid-2000, when the BND travelled to a Gulf city, believed to be Dubai, to speak with his former boss at the Military Industries Commission in Iraq, Dr Bassil Latif.

The Guardian has learned separately that British intelligence officials were at that meeting, investigating a claim made by Janabi that Latif's son, who was studying in Britain, was procuring weapons for Saddam.

That claim was proven false
, and Latif strongly denied Janabi's claim of mobile bioweapons trucks and another allegation that 12 people had died during an accident at a secret bioweapons facility in south-east Baghdad.

The German officials returned to confront him with Latif's version. "He says, 'There are no trucks,' and I say, 'OK, when [Latif says] there no trucks then [there are none],'" Janabi recalled.

He said the BND did not contact him again until the end of May 2002. But he said it soon became clear that he was still being taken seriously.

He claimed the officials gave him an incentive to speak by implying that his then pregnant Moroccan-born wife may not be able to travel from Spain to join him in Germany if he did not co-operate with them. "He says, you work with us or your wife and child go to Morocco."

The meetings continued throughout 2002 and it became apparent to Janabi that a case for war was being constructed. He said he was not asked again about the bioweapons trucks until a month before Powell's speech.

After the speech, Janabi said he called his handler at the BND and accused the secret service of breaking an agreement that they would not share anything he had told them with another country. He said he was told not to speak and placed in confinement for around 90 days.

With the US now leaving Iraq, Janabi said he was comfortable with what he did, despite the chaos of the past eight years and the civilian death toll in Iraq, which stands at more than 100,000.

"I tell you something when I hear anybody – not just in Iraq but in any war – [is] killed, I am very sad. But give me another solution. Can you give me another solution?

"Believe me, there was no other way to bring about freedom to Iraq. There were no other possibilities."
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Sat May 03, 2025 3:01 am

Project 2025 is bad. Its successor, Project Esther, plans for the Rapture.
by Nancy Kaffer
Detroit Free Press
April 30, 2025
https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/col ... 163504007/

You know who’s not worked up enough about antisemitism in the U.S.?

American Jews.

Or so claims the Heritage Foundation, the folks who brought you Project 2025, the manifesto President Donald Trump and unelected edgelord Elon Musk are using to dismantle the federal government.

Less well known is the conservative think tank’s other plan to reshape American society, Project Esther.

Where Project 2025 is a blueprint for dismantling an American government its authors believe is corrupted by Marxism and wokeness, Project Esther is a plan to fight what it says is widespread, organized antisemitism (informed by Marxism, natch) dedicated to the destruction of capitalism and American democracy.

Abetted by “the dangerous complacency” of American Jews, the authors write, antisemitic supporters of the terrorist group Hamas are not only driving protests against Israel’s military offensive in Gaza after the Oct. 7 attack, they've infiltrated American K-12 schools and universities, the liberal media, the cultural elite and the U.S. Army.

(Yes, the famously Marxist-Hamas U.S. Army ― one of Project 2025’s suggested reforms: “Audit the course offerings at military academies to remove Marxist indoctrination.”)


It’s a matter of existential urgency, Project Esther’s authors write, to “extirpate” this antisemitic web from U.S. society (that means “destroy completely”) by canceling visas, upping deportations, revoking university funding, reshaping academic curricula and marginalizing dissent.

Fighting antisemitism is unquestionably a worthy goal. But in Project Esther, antisemitism, as one Jewish activist described it, is a “smokescreen” for a modern take on McCarthyism, labeling legal immigrants and American-born citizens terrorist sympathizers and marginalizing them accordingly.

Like Project 2025, it makes no secret about what to expect: continued attacks on colleges and universities and America's identity as a nation of immigrants, further erosion of civil rights, due process and the rule of law ― which Jewish people I spoke to say is likely to place Jews in greater danger.

And Project Esther seems to have been constructed without the input of Jewish people or groups. While the Heritage Foundation claims that prominent Jewish organizations worked on Project Esther, when the publication Jewish Insider asked, the Jewish organizations and other groups Heritage named as partners denied the connection. That’s where this gets really weird — Project Esther aligns most closely with evangelical Christians who believe Israel is important not as a Jewish homeland, but because of the role it plays in the Rapture.


I know, I know. But stick with me, we'll get to all of it.

Smokescreen antisemitism

Because Project Esther’s essential premise is not actually true, its authors have to get creative.

Project Esther calls for the creation of a National Task Force to Combat Antisemitism, and invents from whole cloth two classifications, “Hamas Support Networks” and “Hamas Support Organizations," into which nearly anyone can be assigned.

Like college professors and students, and an "an active cabal of Jew-haters, Israel-haters, and America-haters in Washington" ― which seems to have included President Joe Biden, favorite right-wing targets U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib, U.S. Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Pramila Jayapal, but also U.S. Sens. Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders (both Jewish, with positions the authors find "both notorious and inexplicable") and U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren.

And pro-Palestinian protesters, of course ― Project Esther’s authors claim that it is impossible to voice support for Palestinians and opposition to Israel’s military offensive without supporting Hamas
, despite polls that show only 30% to 40% of Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories say they support Hamas.

Project Esther's authors speculate that “complacent” American Jews "may be blind and deaf to the manifestation of HSN-inspired antisemitism at home," or simply in "disbelief." Regardless, the authors conclude, American Jews have "not demonstrated a unified resolve against the HSN, its HSOs and their program of Jew-hatred and America-hatred."

While antisemitism is rising, this is hardly the way to combat it, said Howard Lupovitch, director of Wayne State University’s Cohn-Haddow Center for Judaic Studies.

"For the last 30 years of the 20th century, American Jews had the luxury of levels of antisemitism going down, and the luxury to think that trend was going to continue and that sympathy in the post-Holocaust world would confine it to margins of society and extreme voices," Lupovitch said. "It's only in the 21st century that American Jews have had to confront antisemitism in extreme forms ... When there’s a president who encourages violence, whose rhetoric is stoking this, who thrives on chaos, that did not help."

Political chaos, historically, has not served Jewish populations well.

“The rule of law is by definition not only good for Jews, but necessary for all minorities,” Lupovitch said. “Anything that’s going to undermine the rule of law is going to be bad for Jews, even if the people doing it, in the short term, are offering some kind of immediate gain. The erosion of the rule of law, society becoming more violent … even if Jews are not the target, eventually it reaches the Jews. I can’t think of a single exception to that.”

Project Esther’s assertion of complacency, said Lisa Tencer of Detroit Jews for Justice, ancestors fled pogroms in the USSR in the first part of the 19th Century, “is very insulting, it’s very paternalistic … and it’s infuriating as a Jewish person who has been thinking about antisemitism for a long time.”

The Heritage Foundation calls out left-wing antisemitism, like that espoused by some members of the protest movement, Lupavitch said, but ignores antisemitism on the right.

Like the 2017 Unite the Right rally, which President Donald Trump described as including some “very fine people”; the coded antisemitism of QAnon and the Proud Boys; the Tree of Life shooting in Pittsburgh; Musk’s apparent Nazi salutes, his exhortation to Germans for the nation to move past its post-World War II cultural self-examination and his eugenics-inflected approach to fatherhood; or the indelible fact that incidents of antisemitism rise during times of political polarization.

Tencer said Project Esther is “smokescreen antisemitism” ― using the pretext of combatting antisemitism to increase racialized fear and division and to further authoritarianism.

The document’s Hamas Support Networks and Hamas Support Organizations, Tencer said, are just one step of smokescreen antisemitism: “You have to create this confusion by blaming progressives, people of color, Muslims, while claiming to be the true defenders of Jews. It is this machine people are utilizing to create that division and fear and for their own power and gain.”

Divided communities, Tencer said, can’t organize.

"It’s the same machine that’s used to blame Black and brown people, and Muslims and the LGBTQ+ community,” she said. “First from recognizing that our struggles are connected, and that if one of us isn’t safe and free, none of us are, that antisemitism is distinct but connected to these forms of discrimination, and that the way we fight back is the core of our organization, building partnerships across distances.”

Lupovitch noted that a frequent target of Heritage Foundation ire is billionaire George Soros, a Jewish Holocaust survivor who spends copiously to support liberal and progressive causes. The conservative thinktank has dubbed Soros a “first-order threat” to American democracy: “I think this is sometimes lost on right-wing Jews," Lupovitch said. "An attack on Soros, even if his politics are different than yours, is an attack on you.”

Among some Jews, Lupovitch said, there's the sense that a person or organization that supports Israel cannot be antisemitic. But that's not so: “The next novel form of antisemitism will be the pro-Zionist antisemite. It’s a hard concept for people to grasp, a hard concept for Jews to grasp, because it’s a hard thing to wrap your head around."

Which brings us back to evangelical Christians, and the Heritage Foundation.

In a 2018 poll, 80% of evangelical Christians said their support for Israel was linked to end-times prophecies. Christian evangelicals tell pollsters they value Israel either because of a Biblical instruction to pay deference to the Jewish homeland, or because the Book of Revelation designates the presence of Jewish people in Israel as one condition for Jesus' second coming.

“I think many don’t realize the heart of this evangelical support isn’t driven by the protection of Jews, but is self-serving in that it’s trying to bring about the Rapture,”
Lupovitch said, who noted that he doesn’t believe all, or even most, evangelicals are antisemitic.

And that takes us to a very strange place.

Life in a Jack Chick tract

When I was a teenager knocking around the mall in Mobile, Alabama with my pals ― there wasn’t an awful lot to do in my hometown ― we’d occasionally get proselytized by fundamentalist Christians looking for unbelievers to convert.

Sometimes, if you got really lucky, they’d hand you a Jack Chick tract, one of those little comic books predicting death or mutilation for kids who drank, used drugs, played Dungeons & Dragons, listened to heavy metal or failed to accept Jesus Christ as their lord and savior. Nor was Jack Chick particularly fond of gay people, Catholics or women’s rights.

But the tract I found the most intriguing was one detailing the events leading up to the Rapture. The world would be engulfed in despair, corruption, immorality and perversion; the Antichrist would seize political power, creating a one-world government ruled from the Vatican, leading posthaste to the Mark of the Beast, the destruction of Israel, Armageddon, the Rapture and the Second Coming, the Lake of Fire, and so on.

Raised Presbyterian, a denomination more analytic than impassioned, I was fascinated by both the fervor and credulity of Jack Chick’s fundamentalist Christianity. Who, I wondered ― already jaded at 16 ― could be so naïve as to believe this nonsense?


Well.

Nancy Kaffer is the editorial page editor of the Detroit Free Press. Contact:[email protected]. Submit a letter to the editor at freep.com/letters, and we may publish it online and in print.
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Re: Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Ga

Postby admin » Sat May 03, 2025 5:59 am

Part 1 of 6

Image


https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/202 ... titutional

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PERKINS COIE LLP,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 25-716 (BAH)

Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No American President has ever before issued executive orders like the one at issue in this lawsuit targeting a prominent law firm with adverse actions to be executed by all Executive branch agencies but, in purpose and effect, this action draws from a playbook as old as Shakespeare, who penned the phrase: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, PART 2, act 4, sc. 2, l. 75. When Shakespeare’s character, a rebel leader intent on becoming king, see id. l. 74, hears this suggestion, he promptly incorporates this tactic as part of his plan to assume power, leading in the same scene to the rebel leader demanding “[a]way with him,” referring to an educated clerk, who “can make obligations and write court hand,” id. l. 90, 106. Eliminating lawyers as the guardians of the rule of law removes a major impediment to the path to more power. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371 n.24 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the import of the same Shakespearean statement to be “that disposing of lawyers is a step in the direction of a totalitarian form of government”).

The importance of independent lawyers to ensuring the American judicial system’s fair and impartial administration of justice has been recognized in this country since its founding era. In 1770, John Adams made the singularly unpopular decision to represent eight British soldiers charged with murder for their roles in the Boston Massacre and “claimed later to have suffered the loss of more than half his practice.” DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 68 (2001). “I had no hesitation,” he explained, since “Council ought to be the very last thing that an accused Person should want in a free Country,” and “the Bar ought . . . to be independent and impartial at all Times And in every Circumstance.” 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 293 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961). When the Bill of Rights was ratified, these principles were codified into the Constitution: The Sixth Amendment secured the right, in “all criminal prosecutions,” to “have the Assistance of Counsel for . . . defence,” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and the Fifth Amendment protected “the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right,” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).1 This value placed on the role of lawyers caught the attention of Alexis de Tocqueville, who in reflecting on his travels throughout the early United States in 1831 and 1832, insightfully remarked that “the authority . . . intrusted to members of the legal profession . . . is the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 301 (Henry Reeve trans., 2002) (1835).

The Supreme Court, too, has recognized the importance of lawyers to the functioning of the American judicial system, since “[a]n informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). This is so because Congress may legislate, the President may implement, and courts may adjudicate, “but only the lawyers can prepare and submit the great issues of human justice under law in such manner and form that courts, in the ultimate, may be effective.” Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1965). Absent their crucial independence, lawyers would “become nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment.” Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 138 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).

The instant case presents an unprecedented attack on these foundational principles. On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14230 (“EO 14230”), 90 Fed. Reg. 11781 (Mar. 11, 2025), entitled “Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP.”2 By its terms, this Order stigmatizes and penalizes a particular law firm and its employees—from its partners to its associate attorneys, secretaries, and mailroom attendants—due to the Firm’s representation, both in the past and currently, of clients pursuing claims and taking positions with which the current President disagrees, as well as the Firm’s own speech. In a cringe-worthy twist on the theatrical phrase “Let’s kill all the lawyers,” EO 14230 takes the approach of “Let’s kill the lawyers I don’t like,” sending the clear message: lawyers must stick to the party line, or else.3

Executive Order 14230 of March 6, 2025
Federal Register
Vol. 90, No. 46
Tuesday, March 11, 2025

March 6, 2025

Presidential Documents

Title 3—The President

Executive Order 14230 of March 6, 2025

Addressing Risks From Perkins Coie LLP


By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. Purpose. The dishonest and dangerous activity of the law firm Perkins Coie LLP (‘‘Perkins Coie’’) has affected this country for decades. Notably, in 2016 while representing failed Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS, which then manufactured a false ‘‘dossier’’ designed to steal an election. This egregious activity is part of a pattern. Perkins Coie has worked with activist donors including George Soros to judicially overturn popular, necessary, and democratically enacted election laws, including those requiring voter identification. In one such case, a court was forced to sanction Perkins Coie attorneys for an unethical lack of candor before the court.

In addition to undermining democratic elections, the integrity of our courts, and honest law enforcement, Perkins Coie racially discriminates against its own attorneys and staff, and against applicants. Perkins Coie publicly announced percentage quotas in 2019 for hiring and promotion on the basis of race and other categories prohibited by civil rights laws. It proudly excluded applicants on the basis of race for its fellowships, and it maintained these discriminatory practices until applicants harmed by them finally sued to enforce change.

My Administration is committed to ending discrimination under ‘‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’’ policies and ensuring that Federal benefits support the laws and policies of the United States, including those laws and policies promoting our national security and respecting the democratic process. Those who engage in blatant race-based and sex-based discrimination, including quotas, but purposefully hide the nature of such discrimination through deceiving language, have engaged in a serious violation of the public trust. Their disrespect for the bedrock principle of equality represents good cause to conclude that they neither have access to our Nation’s secrets nor be deemed responsible stewards of any Federal funds.

Sec. 2. Security Clearance Review. (a) The Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and all other relevant heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall immediately take steps consistent with applicable law to suspend any active security clearances held by individuals at Perkins Coie, pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.

(b) The Office of Management and Budget shall identify all Government goods, property, material, and services, including Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, provided for the benefit of Perkins Coie. The heads of all agencies providing such material or services shall, to the extent permitted by law, expeditiously cease such provision.

Sec. 3. Contracting. (a) To prevent the transfer of taxpayer dollars to Federal contractors whose earnings subsidize, among other things, racial discrimination, falsified documents designed to weaponize the Government against candidates for office, and anti-democratic election changes that invite fraud and distrust, Government contracting agencies shall, to the extent permissible by law, require Government contractors to disclose any business they do with Perkins Coie and whether that business is related to the subject of the Government contract.

(b) The heads of all agencies shall review all contracts with Perkins Coie or with entities that disclose doing business with Perkins Coie under subsection (a) of this section. To the extent permitted by law, the heads of agencies shall:

(i) take appropriate steps to terminate any contract, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, including the Federal Acquisition Regulation, for which Perkins Coie has been hired to perform any service;

(ii) otherwise align their agency funding decisions with the interests of the citizens of the United States; with the goals and priorities of my Administration as expressed in executive actions, especially Executive Order 14147 of January 20, 2025 (Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government); and as heads of agencies deem appropriate. Within 30 days of the date of this order, all agencies shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget an assessment of contracts with Perkins Coie or with entities that do business with Perkins Coie effective as of the date of this order and any actions taken with respect to those contracts in accordance with this order.

Sec. 4. Racial Discrimination. (a) The Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall review the practices of representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms for consistency with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including whether large law firms: reserve certain positions, such as summer associate spots, for individuals of preferred races; promote individuals on a discriminatory basis; permit client access on a discriminatory basis; or provide access to events, trainings, or travel on a discriminatory basis.

(b) The Attorney General, in coordination with the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and in consultation with State Attorneys General as appropriate, shall investigate the practices of large law firms as described in subsection (a) of this section who do business with Federal entities for compliance with race-based and sex-based non-discrimination laws and take any additional actions the Attorney General deems appropriate in light of the evidence uncovered.

Sec. 5. Personnel. (a) The heads of all agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide guidance limiting official access from Federal Government buildings to employees of Perkins Coie when such access would threaten the national security of or otherwise be inconsistent with the interests of the United States. In addition, the heads of all agencies shall provide guidance limiting Government employees acting in their official capacity from engaging with Perkins Coie employees to ensure consistency with the national security and other interests of the United States.

(b) Agency officials shall, to the extent permitted by law, refrain from hiring employees of Perkins Coie, absent a waiver from the head of the agency, made in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, that such hire will not threaten the national security of the United States.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

___________________________
Donald J. Trump

THE WHITE HOUSE

March 6, 2025


Using the powers of the federal government to target lawyers for their representation of clients and avowed progressive employment policies in an overt attempt to suppress and punish certain viewpoints, however, is contrary to the Constitution, which requires that the government respond to dissenting or unpopular speech or ideas with “tolerance, not coercion.” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 603 (2023). The Supreme Court has long made clear that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics . . . or other matters of opinion.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Simply put, government officials “cannot . . . use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression.” NRA v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 188 (2024).

That, however, is exactly what is happening here. For this reason, and those explained more fully below, Executive Order 14230 is unconstitutional, and the findings and instructions to Executive Branch agencies issued in its Sections 1 through 5 cannot be allowed to stand.

Accordingly, the government’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and for Expedited Judgment (“Gov’t’s MTD”), ECF No. 183, which seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 176, pursuant to “Fed. R. Civ. P. 8” and “Rule 12(b) & 56,” Gov’t’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss & for Expedited J. (“Gov’t’s Mem.”) at 3, 4, ECF No. 43, is denied.4 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief (“Pl.’s MSJ”), ECF No. 182, is granted.

To aid in review of this Memorandum Opinion, given its length required to address the multiple issues raised in the parties’ pending dispositive motions, an overview is provided. Part I reviews the relevant factual and procedural background of this case. Part II provides the legal standards governing consideration of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and the government’s motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment, under Rules 8, 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56.

Part III then turns to the substantive issues in dispute, which are discussed in three sections. Section A considers, and rejects, the following six arguments asserted by the government in support of dismissal of plaintiff’s claims challenging different parts of EO 14230, namely: (1) that the statements set out in the Order’s “Purpose” Section 1 are not contested; (2) that these same statements merely reflect government speech and not actionable findings; (3) that plaintiff’s challenges to the Order’s “Security Clearance Review” Section 2 are neither justiciable nor ripe; (4) that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Order’s “Contracting” Section 3 due to the failure to allege holding or performing specific work on any government contract; (5) that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Order’s “Racial Discrimination” Section 4 because the investigation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is not traceable to EO 14230; and (6) that plaintiff’s challenges to the Order’s “Personnel” Section 5 are not ripe because implementing guidance has not yet issued.

Section B addresses, in six parts, eight of plaintiff’s nine claims set out in the Amended Complaint, finding that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the following: (1) the claims of unconstitutional retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, in violation of the First Amendment, in Counts V and VII; (2) the claim of unconstitutional compelled disclosure, in violation of the First Amendment, in Count VI; (3) the claim of unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, in Count IV; (4) the claims that EO 14230 violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel of plaintiff’s clients, in Counts VIII and IX; (5) the claim of unconstitutional denial of due process of the law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, in Count II; and (6) the claim that EO 14230 is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, in Count III.5

Finally, Section C addresses plaintiff’s satisfaction of the requisite showings for the remedy sought of a declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief.

Part IV provides a brief conclusion summarizing the disposition of the pending motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant factual and procedural background for resolving the two pending motions is summarized below.

A. Perkins Coie LLP

Plaintiff Perkins Coie LLP (“plaintiff” or “Firm”) is a large international law firm, founded in 1912, that operates in the United States as a limited liability partnership. Pl.’s MSJ, Ex. 2, Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Dispute (“Pl.’s SMF”) ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 39-2 (citing Pl.’s MSJ, Ex. 3, Decl. of David J. Burman, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP, in Supp. of MSJ (“2nd Burman Decl.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 39-3).6 The Firm employs approximately 2,500 lawyers and business professionals, including roughly 1,200 lawyers, id. ¶¶ 3, 10 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8), and represents clients of all types, including large, medium, and small businesses, individuals, and other organizations, in federal and state courts around the country and in different tribunals around the world, id. ¶¶ 5, 7 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶¶ 5-6). The Firm has consistently been named as one of the 50 largest law firms in the United States, and the Firm and its attorneys have received regular recognition for excellence from various legal organizations. Id. ¶ 8 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 7). Current attorneys and alumni of the Firm come from all sides of the political spectrum and have worked in the government under administrations of both parties and reflect both major political party affiliations. Id. ¶¶ 12-14 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 9). Most Perkins Coie attorneys are not politically active. Id. ¶ 12 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 9).

At the time EO 14230 was issued, “approximately” 24 Perkins Coie employees held active security clearances, including “a dozen persons with former military or other public service backgrounds,” id. ¶ 89 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 36) and two who held clearances “in connection with their duties as military reservists,” id. ¶ 97 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 38). Some also received clearances in connection with legal representations of clients. Id. ¶ 89 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 36). Four of these individuals were not attorneys. Id. ¶ 98 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 38).

As part of their legal practice, Perkins Coie lawyers “necessarily interact with the federal government on behalf of their clients.” Id. ¶ 24 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 19). All nine of the Firm’s practice groups “intersect with the federal government in some way and include clients with business before the federal government,” id. ¶ 29 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 21); see also id. ¶¶ 36-56 (describing business before the federal government in each practice area); id. ¶¶ 57-59, 62-66 (describing pro bono work involving the government), and a “significant majority of the firm’s clients have matters that require Perkins Coie lawyers to interact with federal agencies,” id. ¶ 33 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 22). All of Perkins Coie’s top fifteen clients by revenue (representing collectively “almost a quarter of the firm’s revenue”), and many of the Firm’s other large clients currently hold contracts or subcontracts with the federal government and compete for such contracts. Id. ¶ 147 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 47). Perkins Coie also represents many of these companies “for legal matters completely unrelated to” government contracts. Id.

In addition to its legal work, Perkins Coie “has a longstanding and demonstrable commitment to fostering diversity and inclusion . . . within the firm, the legal profession and its community.” Id. ¶ 18 (citing 2nd Burman Decl., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF No. 39-3 at 29). The Firm runs a “Diversity & Inclusion Fellowship program” to which all first-year law students may apply. Id. ¶ 22 (citing 2nd Burman Decl., Ex. 2 at 3, ECF No. 39-3 at 38). In 2019, the Firm also adopted the “Mansfield Rule,” “which aims to diversify the leadership of large law firms by broadening the candidate pool for senior management positions.” Gov’t’s Opp’n to Pl.’s MSJ (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”), Ex. 1, Decl. of Richard Lawson, Deputy Associate Attorney General (“Lawson Decl.”), Ex. 3, Press Release, Perkins Coie, Perkins Coie Adopts Mansfield Rule to Boost Leadership Diversity (“Pl.’s 2019 Mansfield Press Release”) (Sept. 6, 2019), ECF No. 143-2 at 100 (page number refers to ECF header). To do so, the Mansfield Rule requires that participating firms “certify that women, lawyers of color, LGBTQ+ lawyers and lawyers with disabilities comprise at least 30 percent of the candidate pool for significant leadership roles, senior lateral openings and promotions.” Id.

B. Perkins Coie’s Representation of Various Clients Cited in EO 14230

In 2016, Marc Elias and other former members of a practice group within Perkins Coie, called the Political Law group, represented Hillary Clinton “in connection with her presidential campaign,” against Donald J. Trump. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 75 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 60); see also id. ¶ 71 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 21). As part of this representation, these former Perkins Coie attorneys engaged the services of opposition research firm Fusion GPS. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 75 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 60). Elias left Perkins Coie in 2021, Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 71, 75 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶¶ 21, 60), and none of the Firm’s attorneys involved in the engagement of Fusion GPS have been employed by the law firm for at least the past three years, id. ¶ 75; see also id. ¶ 95 (stating that no Perkins Coie employee who held a security clearance at the time EO 14230 was issued “had any involvement in the Fusion GPS matter” (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 41)). Another former Perkins Coie attorney, Michael Sussmann, who was not part of the Political Law group, had been retained, due to his cybersecurity experience, by the Clinton campaign after the campaign’s emails were hacked. Id. ¶ 76. After being indicted in 2021 by a Special Counsel, appointed during the first Trump Administration, Sussmann was acquitted, on May 31, 2022, of the charge “of lying to the FBI about links between the Trump Organization and Russia.” Id. (citation omitted). Sussmann also left Perkins Coie in 2021. Id.

In the 2020 presidential election, Perkins Coie “represented a number of clients opposing then-candidate Trump’s challenges” to the results of the election. Id. ¶ 77 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 33). The firm’s clients “prevailed in all but one of the challenges” brought by President Trump’s campaign. Id. During that same election cycle, Perkins Coie also represented a number of clients in voting rights cases, including cases in which the firm’s clients “were successful in defending existing laws against various legal challenges.” Id. ¶ 78 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 33). In general, Perkins Coie “has represented both party-affiliated and non-partisan clients in litigation over election laws,” much of which was defending state election procedures and actions taken by state officials. Id. ¶ 79; see also Gov’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, Gov’t’s Resp. to Pl.’s SMF (“Gov’t’s Resp. to Pl.’s SMF”) at 3, ECF No. 143-1 (noting that Pl.’s SMF ¶ 79 is undisputed). In 2021, three former Perkins Coie attorneys were sanctioned a total of $8,700 “in connection with a single duplicative motion to supplement the record in a Fifth Circuit appeal in a voting-rights case.” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 83 (citing Court Order, Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughs, No. 20-40643, ECF No. 127-1 (5th Cir. June 30, 2021)).

Perkins Coie’s representation of President Trump’s political opponent in the 2016 presidential campaign and representation of other clients in connection with election litigation has drawn President Trump’s attention and ire, as reflected in his public statements and his filing of a lawsuit against the Firm. Specifically, on March 24, 2022, then-former President Trump filed a lawsuit against 31 individuals and entities, including Perkins Coie, “alleging that [they] ‘maliciously conspired to weave a false narrative’” that the Trump campaign was colluding with Russia, including by “falsifying evidence, deceiving law enforcement, and exploiting access to highly-sensitive data sources,” among other allegations, and seeking over $24 million in damages. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 80 (quoting Compl., Trump v. Clinton et al., 2:22-cv-14102, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Fla.) (filed Mar. 24, 2022)). The lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice, less than six months later, on September 8, 2022, with the court finding that the lawsuit had “no merit.” Id. ¶ 81 (quoting Trump v. Clinton, 626 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2022)). As a result of this lawsuit, President Trump and one of his attorneys were sanctioned over $900,000 “for, among other things, bringing a frivolous case ‘in order to dishonestly advance a political narrative.’” Id. ¶ 82 (quoting Order, Trump v. Clinton et al., 2:22-cv-14102, ECF No. 302 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2023)).7

Plaintiff has provided copies of approximately twenty statements made by President Trump since the 2016 election—the authenticity of which are undisputed by the government—critically referencing the work of Perkins Coie and its former employees involved in the representation of his political opponent in the 2016 presidential campaign. See id. ¶¶ 100-18, 124-25, 138; see also Pl.’s MSJ, Ex. 4, Declaration of Christopher N. Manning, Partner, Williams & Connolly (“Manning Decl.”), Exs. 2-22, ECF No. 39-4. For instance, on October 19, 2017, Trump tweeted, “Workers of firm involved with the discredited and Fake Dossier take the 5th. Who paid for it, Russia, the FBI, or the Dems (or all)?” Manning Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 39-4 at 14. In two tweets posted on August 6, 2018, Trump stated:

“Collusion with Russia was very real. Hillary Clinton and her team 100% colluded with the Russians, and so did Adam Schiff who is on tape trying to collude with what he thought was Russians to obtain compromising material on DJT. We also know that Hillary Clinton paid through . . . a law firm, eventually Kremlin connected sources, to gather info on Donald Trump. Collusion is very real with Russia, but only with Hillary Clinton and the Democrats, and we should demand a full investigation.” Dan Bongino on @foxandfriends Looking forward to the new IG Report!


Id., Ex. 3 (“August 6, 2018, Trump Tweets”), ECF No. 39-4 at 16 (ellipsis in original, denoting break between two tweets). The demand for a “full investigation” could be read to cover plaintiff, among others.

President Trump’s statements and social media posts critical of Perkins Coie and its former lawyers, including Elias and Sussmann, continued in 2018. For instance, on November 9, 2018, Trump, speaking about an ongoing recount in a U.S. Senate election in Florida, told reporters:

[A]ll of a sudden, they’re finding votes out of nowhere. And Rick Scott, who won by – you know, it was close, but he won by a comfortable margin – every couple of hours it goes down a little bit. And then you see the people, and they were involved with that fraud of the fake dossier, the phony dossier. And I guess I hear they were somehow involved or worked with the GPS Fusion people, who have committed -- I mean, if you look at what they’ve done, you look at the dishonesty.


Id., Ex. 4, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure (“November 9, 2018, Trump Remarks”) at 5, ECF No. 39-4 at 19.8 The same day, he tweeted: “As soon as Democrats sent their best Election stealing lawyer, Marc Elias, to Broward County they miraculously started finding Democrat votes. Don’t worry, Florida – I am sending much better lawyers to expose the FRAUD!” Id., Ex. 5 (“November 9, 2018, Trump Tweet”), ECF No. 39-4 at 34.



Four years later, on May 31, 2022, Trump posted on Truth Social about Perkins Coie’s former employee, Sussmann, stating:

Our Legal System is CORRUPT, our Judges (and Justices!) are highly partisan, compromised or just plain scared, our Borders are OPEN, our Elections are Rigged, Inflation is RAMPANT, gas prices and food costs are “through the roof,” our Military “Leadership” is Woke, our Country is going to HELL, and Michael Sussmann is not guilty. How’s everything else doing? Enjoy your day!!!


Id., Ex. 10, ECF No. 39-4 at 56. On December 11, 2022, Trump posted on Truth Social an article titled “Elon Musk Calls Out Sussmann, Perkins Coie for ‘Attempt to Corrupt a Presidential Election.’” Id., Ex. 12 (“December 11, 2022, Trump Post”), ECF No. 39-4 at 60. On March 31, 2024, Trump posted another article on Truth Social, this one titled “Marc Elias Is Scared…And He Should Be.” Id., Ex. 16 (“March 31, 2024, Trump Post”), ECF No. 39-4 at 69.

Other posts have focused more generally on Perkins Coie. On September 6, 2023, then-candidate Trump posted on Truth Social: “They spied on my Campaign, Impeached me twice, had the Russia, Russia Hoax, the Fake Dossier Hoax, FISA Fraud, Election Fraud, the ‘No Collusion’ Mueller Hoax, and so much more. I was innocent on all counts. If I am elected, they will be brought to JUSTICE, something that Republicans have always been afraid to do.” Id., Ex. 53 (“September 6, 2023, Trump Post”), ECF No. 39-4 at 602. The reference to the “Fake Dossier Hoax” in this litany of perceived wrong-doing alludes to plaintiff’s work representing President Trump’s 2016 political opponent and thus obliquely identifies plaintiff as one of the targets to be “brought to JUSTICE” upon President Trump’s election to his current office.9 This promise of retribution was repeated publicly by President Trump. For instance, in a March 4, 2023, speech, then-candidate Trump said, “I am your warrior, I am your justice, and for those who have been wronged and betrayed, I am your retribution. I am your retribution.” Id., Ex. 14 at 29:53-30:04, ECF No. 39-4 at 64.

Plaintiff and its former employees’ work representing President Trump’s prior political opponent were ongoing targets throughout 2024 for criticism and his promises of retribution. On May 5, 2024, Trump posted on Truth Social:

Andrew McCarthy: “HILLARY CLINTON, RECIDIVIST ELECTION THEFT CONSPIRATOR…Regarding 1992, the Clinton campaign used a law firm as the intermediary for tens of thousands of dollars in payments to a private investigator (Jack Palladino) whose task was to obtain the silence of women who claimed to have had affairs with Bill Clinton…it turns out that this 1992 tactic – booking as legal fees what might euphemistically be called ‘research’ – was the blueprint for the 2016 Hillary Clinton campaign, in cahoots with the Democratic National Committee. They paid their law firm, Perkins Coie, which retained the research firm Fusion GPS and its contractor, former British spy Christopher Steele, to generate the farcical Steele dossier that was shared with the FBI, the State Department, and the media to smear Trump as a clandestine agent of the Kremlin


Id., Ex. 18, ECF No. 39-4 at 73. On September 7, 2024, and again on September 17, 2024, and October 25, 2024, in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election, Trump posted on Truth Social his intent, if elected, to investigate and prosecute “Lawyers” and others he perceived to be helping political opponents and “involved” in what he perceived to be “unscrupulous behavior”:

CEASE & DESIST: I, together with many Attorneys and Legal Scholars, am watching the Sanctity of the 2024 Presidential Election very closely because I know, better than most, the rampant Cheating and Skullduggery that has taken place by the Democrats in the 2020 Presidential Election. It was a Disgrace to our Nation! Therefore, the 2024 Election, where Votes have just started being cast, will be under the closest professional scrutiny and, WHEN I WIN, those people that CHEATED will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the Law, which will include long term prison sentences so that this Depravity of Justice does not happen again. We cannot let our Country further devolve into a Third World Nation, AND WE WON'T! Please beware that this legal exposure extends to Lawyers, Political Operatives, Donors, Illegal Voters, & Corrupt Election Officials. Those involved in unscrupulous behavior will be sought out, caught, and prosecuted at levels, unfortunately, never seen before in our Country.


Id., Exs. 20-22 (“Trump Cease & Desist Post”), ECF No. 39-4 at 77, 79, 81.

C. Perkins Coie’s Representation of Clients in Litigation Challenging Current Trump Administration Action

On February 6, 2025, Perkins Coie, representing a group of transgender military servicemembers pro bono, filed a lawsuit, Shilling v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-241 (W.D. Wash.), challenging Executive Order 14183, which banned transgender people from serving in the American military. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 84-85 (citation omitted).10 The court entered a preliminary injunction, on March 27, 2025, enjoining enforcement of this Executive Order nationwide. See Shilling v. United States, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 926866, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2025).11 No Perkins Coie employee who held an active security clearance at the time EO 14230 was issued was involved in this case. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 96 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 41).

D. Executive Order 14230

On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued EO 14230, entitled “Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781. In a televised signing ceremony, President Trump made clear his reasons for the Executive Order, stating about Perkins Coie: “This is an absolute honor to sign. What they’ve done is, it’s just terrible. It’s weaponization, you could say, weaponization against a political opponent, and it should never be allowed to happen again.” Manning Decl., Ex. 29, CSPAN Video of President Trump Signing Executive Orders at 5:27-40, ECF No. 39-4 at 133. On the same day, the White House released an accompanying fact sheet further explaining EO 14230 and the rationale for its issuance. Id., Ex. 28, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from Perkins Coie LLP, The White House (Mar. 6, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 131 [hereinafter EO 14230 Fact Sheet], also available online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-adresses-risks-from-perkins-coie-llp/.
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Part 2 of 6

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from Perkins Coie LLP
The White House
March 6, 2025

STOPPING ABUSES THAT UNDERMINE THE NATION: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order to suspend security clearances held by individuals at Perkins Coie LLP, pending a review of whether their access to sensitive information is consistent with the national interest.
Security clearances held by Perkins Coie LLP employees will be immediately suspended, pending a review of whether their access to sensitive information is consistent with the national interest.
o The Federal Government will halt all material and services, including sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) access provided to Perkins Coie LLP and restrict its employees’ access to government buildings.
o Federal Agencies will also refrain from hiring Perkins Coie LLP employees unless specifically authorized.
• To ensure taxpayer dollars no longer go to contractors whose earnings subsidize partisan lawsuits against the United States, the Federal Government will prohibit funding contractors that use Perkins Coie LLP.
o All Federal Government contracts with Perkins Coie LLP will undergo rigorous scrutiny, with agency heads directed to terminate engagements to the maximum extent permitted by law.
The practices of Perkins Coie LLP will be reviewed under Title VII to ensure compliance with civil rights laws against racial bias.
ENSURING GOVERNMENT SERVES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: President Trump’s Administration will not tolerate Perkins Coie LLP’s unethical and discriminatory actions that threaten our elections, military strength, and national security.
In 2016, Perkins Coie LLP hired Fusion GPS to manufacture a false “dossier” designed to steal an election while representing failed presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.
Perkins Coie LLP pushed debunked claims of secret Trump-Russia communications via Alfa Bank, with attorney Michael Sussmann indicted for lying to the FBI about this scheme.
Perkins Coie LLP has worked with activist donors, including George Soros, to judicially overturn enacted election laws, such as those requiring voter identification.
o A court was forced to sanction Perkins Coie attorneys for unethical lack of candor before the court.
Perkins Coie LLP has been accused of racially discriminating against its own attorneys, staff, and applicants.
o Perkins Coie has publicly announced racial percentage quotas for hiring and promotions, violating civil rights laws, and excluded applicants from fellowships based on race until lawsuits forced change.
Perkins Coie LLP hosted an FBI workspace, raising concerns about partisan misuse of sensitive data during investigations targeting President Trump.
Perkins Coie LLP has filed lawsuits against the Trump Administration, including one designed to reduce military readiness.
A RETURN TO ACCOUNTABILITY: President Trump is delivering on his promise to end the weaponization of government and protect the nation from partisan actors who exploit their influence.
• President Trump is refocusing government operations to their core mission—serving the citizens of the United States.
• President Trump signed an Executive Order to end the weaponization of the Federal Government on his first day in office after promising to “end forever the weaponization of government and the abuse of law enforcement against political opponents.
• President Trump revoked security clearances held by dozens of intelligence officials who falsely claimed in a 2020 letter, during the height of the U.S. presidential election season, that Hunter Biden’s laptop was tantamount to Russian disinformation.


In June, Giuliani asked me to accompany him to a lunch in New York with Vitaly Pruss, a Russian businessman who claimed to have deep connections to Burisma, including with Hunter Biden's business partner Devon Archer, and had recommended powerful people to Zlochevsky that he should put on the company's board. During this meeting, Pruss shared a story with us: He said earlier that year, while doing business related to Burisma, he had taken Hunter Biden to meet Kazakhstan's minister of foreign affairs, and that Biden had gotten substantially intoxicated with drugs and alcohol on this trip. While he was incapacitated, his laptop was compromised and copied by a representative of FSB (Russia's secret police) and members of Zlochevsky's team.

It's important to note that certain aspects of Pruss's story are verifiably true. This trip with Hunter Biden did happen, and his computer hard drives were taken and duplicated. But Pruss specified that while the contents of the laptop were personally embarrassing to Hunter Biden -- pictures of him doing drugs and surrounded by girls -- there was no evidence of financial crimes or any data on his laptop that suggested the illegal activities of any other kind, which is the sort of proof that Giuliani desperately needed. Pruss never mentioned anything about the hard drives containing criminal information, only the embarrassing images. It was not until Giuliani began disseminating the story of Hunter Biden's laptop that the idea of proof of financial and political crimes was introduced.


-- Written Statement of Lev Parnas, March 19, 2024


EO 14230 has six sections, five of which are challenged in this litigation. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 1 (describing the Order as consisting of Section 1 and “the operative sections . . . 2, 3, 4, and 5”); Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 127-31 (describing Sections 1 through 5 of the EO). Section 1, titled “Purpose,” makes a number of purported derogatory factual findings about plaintiff’s conduct, using such words as, in the first sentence, “dishonest and dangerous activity”; in the third sentence, “egregious activity”; in the fourth sentence, “unethical lack of candor”; in the fifth sentence, accusing the Firm of “racially discriminat[ing] against its own attorneys and staff, and against applicants,” which, in the tenth and last sentence, shows “disrespect for the bedrock principle of equality.” Based on these findings, the last sentence of Section 1 states they “represent[] good cause to conclude that they neither have access to our Nation’s secrets nor be deemed responsible stewards of any Federal funds,” as directed in the instructions to all Executive branch agencies that follow in the next sections of the Order. EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781. The government confirms that these are a presidential “finding” and that “everything else in the executive order that is being challenged, Sections 3 and . . . 5, fundamentally flow from that determination.” Tr. of Mar. 12, 2025, Hr’g (“TRO Hr’g Tr.”) at 35:9-12, ECF No. 22; see also Tr. of Apr. 23, 2025, Mots. Hearing (“Mots. Hr’g Tr.”) at 38:18-19, ECF No. 169 (government counsel confirming that Section 1 “would inform any agency that’s reviewing a security clearance,” as directed in Section 2).

Section 2, titled “Security Clearance Review,” consists of two parts. The first subsection orders the immediate suspension of any active security clearances held by any Perkins Coie employee “pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.” EO 14230 § 2(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781.12 This subsection, by its terms, covers all Perkins Coie employees, regardless of their role at the firm or the reasons for which they hold a clearance. Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 24:13-14 (government counsel confirming “we would interpret it[] as being that broad”).

The second subsection of Section 2 orders the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to “identify all Government goods, property, material, and services” currently provided “for the benefit of Perkins Coie,” and then directs the heads of agencies to “expeditiously cease” such provision. EO 14230 § 2(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781.13 The government has offered scope-limiting gloss on this subsection, pointing to both the instruction’s placement in Section 2 of the Order and the textual phrase “for the benefit of Perkins Coie.” In particular, the government suggests that, given the topic addressed in this subsection, the instructions contained therein should be construed as limited to goods, property, material, and services with “some general nexus to some national security issue,” Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 52:9-12; see also id. at 48:9-53:1, and, given the textual reference to plaintiff’s benefit, further limited to exclude the “types of goods and services . . . provided to the public more generally,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 11. Whatever the merits of the government’s post hoc interpretive limitations on the scope of subsection (b), however, these limitations did not appear in OMB’s implementation directions for this subsection. OMB’s March 7, 2025, Memorandum, sent to the heads of all executive departments and agencies, contained no text limiting the scope of this subsection to “Government goods, property, material, and services” that were national security-related or not otherwise provided to the public generally. Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 50:25-53:1; Manning Decl., Ex. 31, M-25-17, Memorandum from OMB Director Vought to Executive Department and Agency Heads Re: Implementation of the Executive Order on “Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP” (“OMB Implementation Mem.”), ECF No. 39-4 at 140.

Section 3 is titled “Contracting,” and has two subsections. EO 14230 § 3, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781-82. The first subsection directs all “Government contracting agencies” to require government contractors to “disclose any business they do with Perkins Coie and whether that business is related to the subject of the Government contract.” Id. § 3(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781.14 The next subsection provides instructions on what each agency must do with those government contractor disclosures. Specifically, all agency “heads” are directed to review all government contracts with either Perkins Coie or any entity that disclosed a business relationship with Perkins Coie. Id. § 3(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782.15 Pursuant to this review, agencies are directed to “terminate any contract . . . for which Perkins Coie has been hired to perform any service,” id. § 3(b)(i); see also EO 14230 Fact Sheet (“[T]he Federal Government will prohibit funding contractors that use Perkins Coie LLP.”), and “otherwise align” funding decisions with the administration’s priorities, EO 14230 § 3(b)(ii), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782; see also TRO Hr’g Tr. at 16:11-14 (plaintiff’s counsel reading Section 3 as “essentially say[ing] to these contractors” that, “[i]f you want to have government contracts, you cannot use this law firm”). To monitor progress on implementation of Section 3, all agencies are instructed to submit to OMB their assessment of any contracts with Perkins Coie or contractors doing business with Perkins Coie and “any actions taken with respect to those contracts in accordance with this order.” EO 14230 § 3(b)(ii), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782.

Section 4, titled “Racial Discrimination,” has two subsections. EO 14230 § 4, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782. The first subsection directs the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to “review the practices of representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms” to ensure compliance with employment laws, including specifically whether such firms “reserve certain positions, such as summer associate spots, for individuals of preferred races; promote individuals on a discriminatory basis; permit client access on a discriminatory basis; or provide access to events, trainings, or travel on a discriminatory basis.” Id. § 4(a);16 see also Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 58:6-59:19 (government counsel explaining that the Trump Administration considered appropriate subjects of investigation, law firms sending “certain racial, ethnic, and gender-based delegations to meet with clients,” to the exclusion of members of other groups, and “at very large venues, training conferences, professional associations where speakers are excluded on the basis of race and sex in order to have a certain composition on the panel”).

The second subsection directs the Attorney General to investigate, “in coordination with the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and in consultation with State Attorneys General as appropriate,” any such law firms that do business with the federal government to determine their compliance with “race-based and sex-based non-discrimination laws” and take any appropriate actions based on those investigations. EO 14230 § 4(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782.17 These Attorney General-led federal investigations could evaluate both federal and state discrimination laws, though government counsel suggested that consultation with state Attorneys General would most likely occur to investigate violations of state civil rights laws “pattern[ed]” closely after federal laws. Mots.’ Hr’g Tr. at 60:6-10; see also id. at 59:20-60:17.

Section 5, titled “Personnel,” has two subsections. EO 14230 § 5, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782. The first subsection instructs all agency “heads” to “provide guidance” on two action items: (1) “limiting official access from Federal Government buildings to employees of Perkins Coie” when “such access would threaten the national security” or “be inconsistent with the interests of the United States,” and (2) “limiting Government employees acting in their official capacity from engaging with Perkins Coie employees to ensure consistency with the national security and other interests of the United States,” id. § 5(a).18 Government counsel resisted reading these limitations “as going, necessarily, as far as” disallowing the Firm’s employees from “even talk[ing] to or speak[ing] with individuals,” and implied this was not such a big deal because, during COVID, “nobody was entering federal buildings; nobody was meeting; all access and all communications were handled via letter, email, phone calls.” TRO Hr’g Tr. at 55:15-22. Given the breadth of the term “engaging” used in Section 5 (a), however, he could not confirm that any one of these forms of communication with government officials would be permitted, since that is a decision left to the discretion of each agency head. Id. at 56:18-21, 57:15-18. To the extent that references to “national security” and “national interest” guide the exercise of agency heads’ discretion, plaintiff pointed out that “these agencies are already told what the outcome of their analysis is, because they have been told in Section 1 that working with Perkins Coie is not consistent with the national interest and not consistent with the administration and policies of this administration,” TRO Hr’g Tr. at 18:16-20, a fairly obvious point to which the government offered no response, see generally Gov’t’s Mem.; Gov’t’s Opp’n; Gov’t’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to the MTD (“Gov’t’s Reply”), ECF No. 147, other than to concede that the findings in Section 1 “would inform” these determinations “[w]here relevant,” Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 38:18-19, 23.

The second subsection forbids all federal agencies from hiring any employees of Perkins Coie without a waiver obtained from the relevant agency’s head, “in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.” Id. § 5(b);19 see also EO 14230 Fact Sheet (“Federal Agencies will also refrain from hiring Perkins Coie LLP employees unless specifically authorized.”). This broad text applies the federal hiring prohibition to all Perkins Coie employees, including, as plaintiff posits without dispute from the government, to “the people in the mail room, the IT director, and secretaries.” TRO Hr’g Tr. at 22:25-23-1. Finally, Section 6 provides “General Provisions” addressing the legal impact of the Executive Order on other applicable federal agency laws, regulations and authorities and instructs that “[t]his order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law.” EO 14230 § 6(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782. This instruction, by its express terms, bars implementation by any federal agency of any section of the Executive Order found to be unconstitutional and thereby not “consistent with applicable law.” Government counsel confirmed that the phrase “applicable law” would “necessarily incorporate an order from this Court,” Mots’ Hr’g Tr. at 16:9-13, and thus, should any permanent injunction be entered against EO 14230, no “executive agency would be able to move forward with trying to implement it,” id. at 15:11-18.

E. Immediate Impact of EO 14230

Federal agencies began implementing EO 14230 immediately following its issuance. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 135; Gov’t’s Resp. to Pl.’s SMF at 3 (conceding that “certain agencies” began immediately to implement the EO); see also Pl.’s SMF ¶ 137 (describing the initial steps taken by OMB to implement EO 14230); id. ¶ 140-43 (describing immediate steps taken by the EEOC). On March 7, 2025, the day after issuance of EO 14230, OMB Director Russell Vought sent a “MEMORANDUM TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES” about the Order’s implementation. OMB Implementation Mem. (capitalization in original). The memorandum directed that, “[i]n accordance with the direction provided by the President” in EO 14230, “[a]gencies must review all Government contracts and subcontracts with Perkins and Coie LLP, as well as provision to Perkins and Coie LLP of goods, property, material, and services, including any Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities,” which review should be completed, and results reported back to OMB, by April 5, 2025. Id.

That same day, a federal official refused to allow Perkins Coie attorneys to attend a scheduled meeting to discuss a pending matter before that agency. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 152 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 44). In another pending case, an attorney in the Department of Justice’s Criminal Fraud Section cancelled a previously scheduled meeting with Perkins Coie attorneys, citing the Order. Id. ¶ 162 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 45). Then, on March 17, 2025, Perkins Coie received an 11-page letter from the Acting EEOC Chair expressing “concern,” based on “public statements and court filings,” that the Firm’s hiring practices “may entail unlawful disparate treatment . . . or unlawful limiting, segregating, and classifying based . . . on race, sex, or other protected characteristics, in violation of Title VII,” and requesting extensive information, dating back in some instances for a decade, from the Firm about its hiring and promotion practices. Manning Decl., Ex. 34, Letter from Acting EEOC Chair Lucas Re: Review of Perkins Coie LLP’s Compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“EEOC Letter”) at 1-3, ECF No. 39-4 at 146.

Perkins Coie felt the impact of EO 14230 immediately not only from federal agencies but also from its clients. On the same day the Order was issued, one client, who had retained Perkins Coie for seven years and was represented by the Firm in seven open matters, “ended Perkins Coie’s representation of that client in any litigation before the relevant federal agency.” Id. ¶ 151 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 48). Another client, for whom Perkins Coie had performed substantial work totaling over $1 million in fees, hired another law firm when Perkins Coie lawyers were told they could not attend a meeting to discuss the matter (discussed above). Id. ¶ 152 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 44). On March 7, 2025, a major government contractor that Perkins Coie had represented for 35 years hired other counsel for two pending matters. Id. ¶ 153 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 48). That same day, another client of Perkins Coie since 2018 withdrew all work from the Firm, id. ¶ 154 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 48), as did a coalition of four other clients, id. ¶ 155 (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 48). These terminations of existing representations, each of which took place in the days immediately following the issuance of EO 14230, resulted in “significant” revenue loss for Perkins Coie.20

F. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on March 11, 2025, five days after President Trump issued EO 14230 in a televised signing ceremony. See Compl., ECF No. 1. The same day, plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) as to only Sections 1, 3 and 5 of EO 14230, Pl.’s Mot. for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Mot.”), ECF No. 2, and that motion was granted the next day, on March 12, 2025, following a hearing, see Min. Entry (Mar. 12, 2025); TRO Hr’g Tr. Shortly after the hearing concluded, a written order granting the requested TRO as to EO 14230’s Sections 1, 3 and 5, and explaining the injunction’s exact parameters was posted. Order (“TRO Order”), ECF No. 21. The parties were additionally directed to file a joint status report proposing a schedule to govern further proceedings in this case, and the government was directed to file a status report “describing the steps taken to ensure compliance with this Order and certifying compliance with its requirements.” Id.

On March 14, 2025, after the Court’s grant of the parties’ joint request for a one-day extension of time to file a proposed schedule, see Joint Mot. for Extension of Time, ECF No. 23; Min. Order (Mar. 13, 2025), the parties jointly proposed a schedule to move directly to an expedited dispositive motions briefing, Joint Status Report ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 25. The parties additionally agreed to a stay of discovery, id. ¶ 4, and “to extend the Temporary Restraining Order . . . until final judgment,” id. ¶ 5. In accord with the parties’ proposed schedule, the Court issued an order extending the temporary injunction “until final judgment is entered in this matter” and setting a schedule to govern the briefing of expedited dispositive motions. Order, ECF No. 26. That same day, the government submitted a status report describing initial steps taken to comply with the TRO. Gov’t’s Status Report, ECF No. 27. A second status report outlining additional steps taken by the government was filed on March 18, 2025. Gov’t’s Status Report, ECF No. 29.

The government’s second status report indicated that, while guidance was issued to all federal agencies directing them to “suspend and rescind any implementation or enforcement of Sections 1, 3, and 5 of Executive Order 14230, including any reliance on the statements in Section 1 of the Executive Order,” id. ¶ 2, agencies had not been directed to take the additional required step of immediately communicating “to every recipient of a request for disclosure of any relationship with Perkins Coie LLP or any person associated with the firm, made pursuant to Section 3(a) of Executive Order 14230, that such request is rescinded until further order of the Court,” TRO Order at 2; see also Gov’t’s Status Report, ECF No. 29. As a result, outstanding disclosure requests to government contractors made by any federal agency other than the seven named government agencies in this lawsuit, remained in place notwithstanding the broader scope of the TRO requirement beyond merely those named defendants, based on the fact that the United States was named as a defendant and defined, for purposes of the lawsuit, as constituting “all other agencies that are directed by [EO 14230] to take action respecting Perkins Coie.” Compl. ¶ 36.

This shortcoming in implementing fully the TRO prompted plaintiff to seek clarification of the scope of the TRO, see Pl.’s Mot. to Clarify, ECF No. 30, and alert the Court to the government’s more limited view of which federal agencies were subject to the TRO, with the concomitant obligation to rescind disclosure requests to government contractors for information about any business dealings with Perkins Coie. This motion was granted the following day, and the government was directed to provide an additional status report certifying compliance with the TRO, as clarified. Min. Order (Mar. 19, 2025). The government submitted two additional status reports regarding compliance with the TRO. Gov’t’s Status Report, ECF No. 31; Gov’t’s Suppl. Status Report, ECF No. 32.21

On March 21, the government moved to disqualify the undersigned Judge from this case, Gov’t’s Mot. to Disqualify Judge Beryl Howell, ECF No. 34, which motion was denied five days later, Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 914099 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2025). The parties subsequently briefed their dispositive motions in accordance with the parties’ jointly proposed schedule, which was adopted by the Court. See generally Pl.’s MSJ; Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Supp. of Pl.’s MSJ (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 39-1; Gov’t’s MTD; Gov’t’s Mem.; Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Defs.’ MTD (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 142; Gov’t’s Opp’n to Pl.’s MSJ (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 143; Gov’t’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to MTD (“Gov’t’s Reply”), ECF No. 147; Pl.’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s MSJ (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 148.22 To support its entitlement to summary judgment, plaintiff has supplied a fulsome evidentiary record amounting to over 950 pages, consisting of four expert reports, a representative sample of President Trump’s statements, dating back to 2017, critical of plaintiff and lawyers formerly associated with the Firm, contextual information about the targeting of other law firms by the Trump Administration since late February 2025, and the 148-page report submitted by Special Counsel Jack Smith to former Attorney General Merrick Garland. See generally Exhibits to Pl.’s MSJ; Pl.’s Opp’n; Pl.’s Reply. The government, for its part, has provided approximately 550 pages of its own Exhibits, the majority of which consists of the 306-page report of Special Counsel John Durham appointed during the first Trump Administration, but also includes information about diversity initiatives supported and adopted by plaintiff and about DOJ and EEOC’s investigations into diversity programs. See generally Exhibits to Gov’t’s Opp’n.23

A hearing was held on April 23, 2025, to consider both parties’ pending dispositive motions, which are now ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)


“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss it. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim at issue. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). When reviewing such a motion, the court must “assume that the complaint states a valid legal claim,” Huron v. Cobert, 809 F.3d 1274, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2016), and “accept the wellpleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor,” Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19). The court may also “consider materials outside the pleadings to determine [its] jurisdiction.” Id. at 856 n.7; see also West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“As necessary, [a court may] cull additional facts from other parts of the record.” (citing Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).

2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This rule “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). In addition, Rule 8(d) states that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Taken together, [those provisions] underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules,” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (cleaned up), and to “give the defendants fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Jones v. Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The purposes of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) overlap, but dismissal is proper under Rule 8 when the complaint is “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible” that a defendant cannot discern the plaintiff's claims. Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 670 n.9.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” but “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and “construe the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff,’” Langeman v. Garland, 88 F.4th 289, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Courts, however, “need not accept inferences . . . not supported by the facts set out in the complaint, nor must the court accept legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Hettinga, 677 F.4th at 476). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint and “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint,” as well as “matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original accepted, citation omitted).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Facts are only “‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under the governing law,” meaning that “factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Mayorga v. Merdon, 928 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))). A dispute is only “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “[i]n considering a motion for summary judgment, judges must ask themselves not whether they think ‘the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented,’ because that evidence is such that “the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff advances four overarching and successful constitutional challenges to Sections 1 through 5 of EO 14230, due to the collective import and impact of its purposes, findings and instructions to all Executive branch agencies. Specifically, the Complaint claims the Executive Order (1) violates the First Amendment rights of Perkins Coie and the Firm’s clients due to unlawful retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and compelled disclosures, Pl.’s Mem. at 10-21; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 126-56 (Counts V, VI, VII); (2) violates Perkins Coie’s rights to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, Pl.’s Mem. at 21-27; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 99-116 (Counts II and III); (3) violates the Firm’s clients’ right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Pl.’s Mem. at 27-31; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 157-68 (Counts VIII and IX); and (4) unconstitutionally denies equal protection of the law to Perkins Coie by singling the firm out for unfair treatment, Pl.’s Mem. at 37-38; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 117-25 (Count IV).24 Plaintiff additionally argues that each of the factors for permanent injunctive relief has been satisfied and Sections 1 through 5 of EO 14230 should therefore be permanently enjoined. Pl.’s Mem. at 38- 45.

The government, meanwhile, seeks dismissal of all nine counts of plaintiff’s complaint, on various grounds, predicated on the view that “[t]he law does not support Plaintiff’s claims as to Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and as to Section 5 specifically, Plaintiff’s claim is at best too early and, as any guidance will be consistent with the law, will eventually fail on the merits.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 3. In so moving, the government confusingly reads the nine counts in plaintiff’s complaint as each challenging separate sections of EO 14230, see, e.g., id. at 8 (asserting that “[o]nly Counts II and III . . . actually challenge Section 1” of the Order); Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3-4, and, on this basis, critiques the complaint as being “imprecise” and “severely handicap[ping] [its] and the Court’s ability to ascertain the particulars of Plaintiff’s challenges to the various sections of the Executive Order, including which allegations and claims in the Complaint pertain to which sections of the Executive Order.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 3.25 This reading of the Amended Complaint, however, is erroneous. Seven of its nine counts plainly challenge, collectively, all sections of EO 14230 as unlawful. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 101 (claiming, in Count II, that “[t]he Order interferes with . . . multiple . . . interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); id. ¶ 108 (claiming, in Count III, that “[t]he Order is unconstitutionally vague”); id. ¶ 124 (claiming, in Count IV, that “[t]he Order is . . . in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); id. ¶ 128 (claiming, in Count V, that “[t]he Order . . . constitute[s] viewpoint discrimination”); id. ¶ 155 (claiming, in Count VII, that “[t]he Order . . . violates the First Amendment”); id. ¶ 160 (claiming, in Count VIII, “[t]he Order” violates “the firm’s clients’ Sixth Amendment rights to counsel”); id. ¶ 168 (claiming, in Count IX, “[t]he Order[] violat[e]s” the Fifth Amendment right to counsel). In the remaining two counts, plaintiff also clearly identifies the sections subjected to challenge. See id. ¶ 142 (claiming, in Count VI, that “Section 3 of the Order is facially unconstitutional”); Pl.’s Mem. at 31 (indicating that Count I challenges “Sections 1, 2(b), 3, and 5”).

The government’s motion to dismiss is addressed first before turning to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

A. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss

The government argues that all plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for multiple alleged deficiencies, which are discussed in the government’s supporting memorandum by reviewing EO 14230 on a section-by-section basis.26 None of these arguments are persuasive. While the government organizes its briefing in a manner designed to mount a forceful defense of each section of the Order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) guides the assertion of defenses to “claim[s] for relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis supplied), as plaintiff correctly points out, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Thus, the normal form of analysis of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) requires review of each claim asserted to assess its sufficiency, but this is not how the government presented its arguments. To reduce redundancy, the sufficiency of each claim is considered as part of assessing whether plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the claims, in Part III.B. The general arguments raised by the government’s motion to dismiss—which arguments are only loosely tied, if at all, to specific procedural rules to test the sufficiency of the claims as pleaded— are addressed in this Part.

1. Plaintiff Contests Purported Findings in EO 14230’s Section 1.

The government blithely describes the statements set out in Section 1 of EO 14230 as “not seriously contested” and “matters of public record.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 7. This description is inaccurate. Plaintiff “vigorously contests” Section 1’s allegations of racial discrimination throughout the complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2; see, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 45 (stating that Plaintiff “does not, and did not” racially discriminate against its employees); id. ¶ 46 (contesting Section 1’s “false premise” that “promoting diversity in the legal profession” equates to illegal discrimination); id. ¶ 51 (calling Section 1’s allegations “false and disparaging”).

Moreover, to the extent that certain factual matters alluded to in Section 1 are not contested, see, e.g., Pl.’s SMF ¶ 83 (acknowledging three former Perkins Coie lawyers were sanctioned, in 2021, a total of $8,700 resulting from a duplicative motion filed in a voting rights appeal), plaintiff does challenge the use of these statements as a basis for the government actions directed in EO 14230, see, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 8 (challenging the Order as “not executive in nature,” id. ¶ 2, and stating that “[t]he principal claims made by the Order have already been raised in the proper forum and resolved by the branch of government with constitutional authority to do so,” id. ¶ 8); Pl.’s Mem. at 35 (arguing the Order impermissibly invades the judicial function, “given that federal courts already have adjudicated many of the President’s grievances referenced in the Order”).

The thrust of the government’s inaccurate characterization of Section 1’s statements as “undisputed” appears to be that these statements are immune from, or would survive, any factual or legal claims asserted by plaintiff, and therefore Section 1 must withstand any challenge lodged by plaintiff on any constitutional basis. This defense falls short on both procedural and legal grounds. As a factual matter, in the procedural posture of a motion to dismiss, the amended complaint’s allegations firmly disputing the veracity of the Section 1 statements are assumed to be true and any factual disputes may not be resolved on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See supra Part II.A.2. As a legal matter, Section 1’s statements setting out the “Purpose” of the Order are highly probative of the sufficiency of the claims of constitutional violations, as discussed more fully infra in Part III.B.1, and thus may certainly not be accepted as appropriate, let alone “straightforwardly legal,” as the government urges, Gov’t’s Mem. at 1.

2. EO 14230’s Section 1 Operates as Actionable Findings.

Discounting EO 14230’s Section 1 as merely a “preamble,” rather than an “operative section[],” Gov’t’s Mem. at 1, the government contends that Section 1’s statements “lay[] out the President’s concerns about the law firm Perkins Coie,” id. As such, the government argues that, though plaintiff “does not like what the current Administration thinks about Plaintiff,” id. at 13, the Firm may not “muzzl[e],” id. at 1, or “silence the Government’s own opinions,” id. at 13. On this basis, the government seeks dismissal of any of plaintiff’s claims challenging Section 1. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 13 (“Plaintiff has no right to silence the Government’s own opinions. Plaintiff’s claims asking this Court to do just that should be dismissed.”).

The government’s argument suggests that to the extent the Section 1 statements amount merely to President Trump’s protected speech, at least that section (and potentially the full Order) may not be enjoined. See id.; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 6-8; Gov’t’s Reply at 2-3. Not so. While government officials may, under the First Amendment, “share [their] views freely and criticize particular beliefs,” they may not “use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 188; see infra Part III.B.1. (addressing plaintiff’s viewpoint discrimination and retaliation claim). Courts may, therefore, properly “scrutinize” cases where “the application of state power” is called into question. Vullo, 602 U.S. at 188 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).

The government’s attempt to reframe this case as about governmental speech is subterfuge. Plaintiff has not sued at any point over the last almost decade when President Trump, either when serving in an official role as President or as a private citizen and political candidate, made derogatory statements about the Firm and its current or former employees. Exactly the opposite: then-former President Trump sued plaintiff, among others, for some of the same conduct described in the Section 1 statements, and plaintiff prevailed in that suit. See supra n.7 and associated text. The claims that the government seeks to dismiss in this lawsuit challenge the use of governmental power, not governmental speech. More specifically, plaintiff seeks to enjoin the use of the Section 1 statements by executive branch actors to justify adverse actions toward plaintiff, on grounds that actions based on those statements would constitute unlawful retaliation and other violations of plaintiff’s and its clients’ constitutional rights. See TRO Hr’g Tr. at 9:17-20 (plaintiff’s counsel expressly stating that plaintiff sought “instruction to departments, agenc[ies], and the administration that they are not to use Section 1’s findings as a direction for any interactions with Perkins Coie”); see also id. at 8:6-9:1.

Indeed, the government acknowledges that Section 1’s statements are more than mere governmental speech and form the basis for the Order’s “Purpose” and amount to findings by President Trump that guide implementation of the instructions that follow. See TRO Hr’g Tr. at 48:7-11 (government counsel confirming Section 1’s statements are “finding[s]”; id. at 48:12- 49:21 (government counsel indicating that the President had the power to make such findings and to direct resulting actions); Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 38:14-24 (government counsel conceding that the findings in Section 1 inform the determination of the “national interest”); Gov’t’s Mem. at 7 (describing Section 1 as “a brief factual explanation for the operational elements of the Executive Order”); Manning Decl., Ex. 55, Tr. of Mar. 28, 2025, Mot. Hr’g at 20:6-9, Jenner & Block LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 25-cv-916, ECF No. 10 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 39-4 at 610 (government counsel acknowledging, in a case involving a similar EO targeting Jenner & Block LLP, that “any member of the Executive . . . wrestling with how to implement [the EO] . . . would necessarily be resorting and looking at what was said in Section 1 to guide that decision”). The text of EO 14230 makes this explicit, stating that the Section 1 statements provide “good cause to conclude that” plaintiff should “neither have access to our Nation’s secrets nor be deemed responsible stewards of any Federal funds,” EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781, which conclusions are effectuated by the subsequent instructions in the Order, id. §§ 2-5, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781-82.

The TRO issued by this Court carefully skirted the President’s own free speech rights and neither treaded on those rights nor enjoined the President from making statements. Instead, the TRO enjoined the government from “using the statements” against plaintiff, plaintiff’s employees, or plaintiff’s clients or their employees. TRO Order at 1 (emphasis supplied). Put another way, plaintiff does not challenge “what the current Administration thinks about Plaintiff,” Gov’t’s Mem. at 13, but rather what the current Administration seeks to do to plaintiff based on that thinking.

Plaintiff does not seek, nor would this Court grant, an injunction to prevent President Trump from “shar[ing] [his] views” or “criticiz[ing] particular beliefs.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 188. At the same time, however, plaintiff may challenge “the application of state power” against plaintiff, id. (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 463), based on statements qualifying as “findings” used to justify an order with which Executive branch agencies must comply.
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Part 3 of 6

3. Plaintiff’s Challenges to EO 14230’s Section 2 Are Justiciable.

EO 14230’s Section 2(a) directs all “relevant heads of executive departments and agencies” “immediately [to] take steps consistent with applicable law to suspend any active security clearances held by individuals at Perkins Coie, pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.” EO 14230 § 2(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781. The government acknowledges that this suspension, by its terms, applies to all of plaintiff’s employees, lawyers and non-lawyers, regardless of their role at the Firm, the reason for grant or use of the clearance, or any other individual characteristics, such as the employee’s former or current military service. Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 23:22-24:14; see also 2nd Burman Decl. ¶¶ 36, 38 (explaining that two current Firm employees currently serve in the military reserves and “hold clearances in connection with their duties as military reservists” and twelve hold clearances due to “former military or other public service backgrounds”). In the government’s view, this section of the Order is “not judicially reviewable,” in light of “governing D.C. Circuit precedent,” and thus requires dismissal of plaintiff’s claims challenging Section 2. Gov’t’s Mem. at 14 (citing Lee v. Garland, 120 F.4th 880 (D.C. Cir. 2024)). The government’s argument, however, overreads Lee and ignores other precedents that lead to the opposite conclusion.

In Lee, the D.C. Circuit considered whether courts are barred “from considering constitutional challenges to adverse clearance decisions.” 120 F.4th at 887. The analysis examined the nature of decisions on individual security clearance applications, which require the weighing of “intangible qualities such as ‘loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment,’” id. at 893 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245, 40250 (Aug. 2, 1995)), and exercising “predictive judgment” about the individual’s ability to safeguard sensitive information, id. (quoting Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988)). These determinations, the Circuit explained, are “an inexact science at best,” requiring a “judgment call” made by experts, and thus are “committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible.” Id. (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 528-29). Invoking the Supreme Court’s holdings in Egan that “it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review the substance of such a judgment and . . . decide whether the agency should have been able to make the necessary affirmative prediction with confidence,” nor possible for nonexperts to “determine what constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk,” Egan, 484 U.S. at 529, the Circuit held that courts may not consider constitutional challenges to “Executive Branch decision[s] to deny or revoke a security clearance” of an individual, Lee, 120 F.4th at 891.

Importantly, the Lee decision did not disturb prior D.C. Circuit holdings making expressly clear that “[i]t is simply not the case that all security-clearance decisions are immune from judicial review.” Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1993). While “discretionary judgments regarding a particular employee’s security clearance” are unreviewable, examples of reviewable decisions include “the constitutionality of the methods” used to collect information and make the required determinations. Id. at 290. Other Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit opinions confirm that judicial review is available for claims that a general discriminatory policy governing security clearances exists. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602 (1988) (differentiating between a claim that a respondent was terminated “based on his homosexuality” and a claim “that a more pervasive discrimination policy exists . . . regarding all homosexuals” (emphasis in original)); Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (assuming, on remand in the same case, that a “blanket policy against homosexuals” would be unconstitutional); Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 875 F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Tatel, J., concurring) (“In my view, if [appellant] could show that the government has a policy or practice of treating Muslims or naturalized citizens differently, his equal protection claims, like the claims at issue in Greenberg, would not be barred by Egan.” (emphasis supplied)).

Considering the fuller context of binding precedents and where Lee fits comfortably within this jurisprudence, judicial review of the Order’s Section 2(a) is available in the instant case for at least four reasons. First, plaintiff seeks judicial review not of any individual security clearance decision, but of a publicly announced general policy governing security clearances for any member of a class of people—here, the class consists of employees of plaintiff—which policy plaintiff alleges is constitutionally suspect on multiple bases. This is directly analogous to seeking review of an alleged “discrimination policy,” Webster, 486 U.S. at 602, not based on any individualized assessments of any of the employees to whom the suspension applies. Lee addressed only a challenge to an individual “denial or revocation of security clearances,” 120 F.4th at 887, and does not foreclose review of challenges to general policies governing security clearances. Both Webster and Doe confirm that review of the latter types of claims is proper.

Second, because plaintiff challenges a general policy rather than an individual determination, judicial review would not require a court to wade into the issues animating the decision in Lee. For example, review of EO 14230 or similar general policies on the record here does not require an examination of any of the “intangible qualities” weighed in individual clearance decisions, Lee, 120 F.4th at 893; or second-guessing any of the “predictive judgment[s]” or “judgment call[s],” id. (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529), of the security clearance experts; or making any risk assessments, see Egan, 484 U.S. at 529. The D.C. Circuit made a similar observation in Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 767-68 (D.C. Cir. 2012), where the Circuit held that judicial review is only barred when “security clearance-related decisions made by trained Security Division personnel” are at issue, since these decisions involve “sensitive, predictive judgments,” but is not absolutely barred as to decisions made by other employees who do not make these types of expert judgments.

Third, related to the second reason, each case relied upon by the government in which the challenged individual security clearance decision was found to be non-justiciable involved a challenge to an individualized process conducted by expert agency examiners that included consideration of articulable findings directly pertinent to the individual with the clearance. In Lee, for instance, the plaintiff challenged the results of three specific polygraph examinations performed by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the failure of which examinations led to the revocation of his clearance. 120 F.4th at 884-85. After failing the first two exams and having his clearance revoked on that basis, he appealed this adverse decision to an expert body at DOJ, which ordered him to sit for a third exam. Id. After failing the third exam, he was fired. Id. at 885. Similarly, in Egan, a laborer at a naval facility in Washington state was denied a clearance and subsequently fired due to his undisclosed prior criminal convictions and his statements acknowledging past alcohol abuse. 484 U.S. at 520-21. The respondent in that case was given a chance to respond, and favorable material he provided was weighed by the experts against the material they had deemed unfavorable. Id. at 521-22. After an unsuccessful appeal of this decision, the respondent was removed from the job. Id. at 522.

The decisions in Lee and Egan are easily reconciled with those in Webster, Greenberg, and Rattigan. Where individual decisions are made by experts based on information specific to the individual, such as the results of polygraph examinations, see Lee, 120 F.4th at 884-85, or the weighing of both specific negative and favorable information about an individual, see Egan, 484 U.S. at 521, courts have no basis on which to redo the analysis or second-guess the decisions, see, e.g., Lee, 120 F.4th at 893 (explaining that review in such cases would “present . . . unmanageable questions” to courts). In circumstances like the instant case, however, no such process or apparent expertise was involved, and where the allegation is that a pervasive, class-wide discriminatory policy exists against some group of individuals, the questions involved do not create any need for courts to second-guess experts or weigh unmanageable standards.

Finally, and notably, Section 2(a) never invokes national security as the reason, or even one of multiple reasons, for the specific action directed to suspend and review security clearances held by plaintiff’s employees. See generally EO 14230 § 2, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781 (citing suspension “pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest” only (emphasis supplied)). When the government does not even claim that a general policy about security clearances was motivated by national security, judicial review of that policy could not threaten unduly entangling the judicial branch in questions of national security. Instead, the EO invokes “the national interest,” id., a concept seemingly far broader and more nebulous than threats to national security. When asked, government counsel was unable to define what exactly falls within the scope of “the national interest,” see, e.g., TRO Hr’g Tr. at 52:21-53:4, and the scope appears to be essentially unlimited, since disagreements about the benefits of diversity programs in hiring apparently qualify, see EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781 (stating that plaintiff’s alleged discrimination “represents good cause to conclude that they [should not] have access to our Nation’s secrets”); Gov’t’s Reply at 1 (complaining about plaintiff’s “aggressive DEI practices”). Finding any such government actions judicially unreviewable simply because the Executive branch invoked “the national interest” would represent a breathtaking expansion of executive power at the expense of the constitutionally mandated role of the judicial branch and the concomitant safeguards for the individual rights of Americans.

In sum, here, the issues on which plaintiff seeks judicial review are appropriate for the courts. Evaluating plaintiff’s challenge requires only the application of longstanding legal principles and constitutional interpretation—“the heartland of the judicial ken.” J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring). For instance, to resolve the claim that the suspension of, and announcement of an investigation into, all clearances held by plaintiff’s employees is unconstitutional retaliation for First Amendment activity, see infra Part III.B.1, the Court need only apply the test long articulated by the Supreme Court, asking first whether the “adverse action . . . [was] based on [a] forbidden motive,” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019), and second, whether any claimed “non-retaliatory grounds [were] in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences,” id. (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). The same is true for plaintiff’s claim of viewpoint discrimination. See, e.g., Vullo, 602 U.S. at 188 (stating that a government official “cannot . . . use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression”). As plaintiff persuasively argues, such questions “‘sound[] in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation’ and can be answered through ordinary judicial tools.” Pl.’s Mem. at 16 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012)).

Certainly, substantial discretion is given to the Executive branch in matters of national security. See, e.g., Lee, 120 F.4th at 891. Yet, this authority, “like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)). While the President may have the discretion to make substantive decisions on individual security clearances, see generally Lee, 120 F.4th 880, he may not apply a discriminatory policy to a group of individuals during the process of making such decisions, see Greenberg, 983 F.2d at 290, as plaintiff alleges occurred in the instant case. Since the questions raised in this case are proper for judicial review and determination, without requiring review of the sensitive individual determinations left to the Executive branch, the government’s blanket demand for dismissal of plaintiff’s challenges to EO 14230’s Section 2 for lack of justiciability fails.

The government also lodges a last gasp basis to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to Section 2 as “not ripe” and “premature for judicial consideration” because the clearances have been suspended pending “a further security clearance determination.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 16. This basis for dismissal also fails. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint describes the actions already effectuated by EO 14230, including, for example, the “Order’s threatened suspension of active security clearances held by Perkins Coie employees because the firm embraces programs and policies that espouse a belief in ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ makes it a violation of the firm’s First Amendment right of free expression.” Am. Compl. ¶ 149 (emphasis supplied). Such explicit threats tied to continuation of specified speech are not a speculative future harm. As the Supreme Court has held, “threat[s] of . . . coercion” intended “‘to achieve the suppression’ of disfavored speech” are sufficient to “violate[] the First Amendment.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 180 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)). The question presented here, whether the actions already taken in this case amount to such threats, is a “purely legal” issue that “will not be clarified by further factual development,” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 167 (2014) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985)), since the ultimate outcome of any “review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest,” EO 14230 Sec. 2(a)—whatever such “national interest” means—has no bearing on whether the threat of suspension and review made by the EO constitutes unlawful retaliation.

4. Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge EO 14230’s Section 3.

The government contends that plaintiff lacks standing to assert any claim challenging EO 14230’s Section 3, which directs all “Government contracting agencies” to “require Government contractors to disclose any business they do with Perkins Coie and whether that business is related to the subject of the Government contract.” EO 14230 § 3(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781; see Gov’t’s Mem. at 19-21. By its terms, the required disclosures include all business with Perkins Coie, whether relating to a federal government contract or not. This section further requires the “heads of all agencies” to “take appropriate steps to terminate any contract . . . for which Perkins Coie has been hired to perform any service,” id. § 3(b)(i), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782, and to “otherwise align their . . . funding decisions with the interests of the citizens of the United States” and “the goals and priorities” of the Trump Administration “as expressed in executive actions,” id. § 3(b)(ii). In case the implications of that somewhat murky language are unclear, the accompanying fact sheet helpfully clarifies the issue: “the Federal Government will prohibit funding contractors that use Perkins Coie LLP.” EO 14230 Fact Sheet.

The government seeks dismissal of any claim challenging Section 3 on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege any injury traceable to this section by not specifically alleging being party to any government contract or currently performing work on any government contract. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 19-21. This argument simultaneously misrepresents the scope of Section 3 and misreads plaintiff’s complaint, and thus may be easily dispatched. Whether plaintiff itself is directly a signatory to a federal government contract is immaterial if plaintiff sufficiently pleads injury-infact traceable to Section 3 and redressable by the injunctive relief requested by performing work for clients holding or seeking to hold federal government contracts. The Amended Complaint amply alleges facts to satisfy these standing prerequisites.

In response to the Order’s directives, for example, the Amended Complaint alleges that “several clients have already terminated, or have communicated that they are considering terminating, their legal engagements with Perkins Coie” “[ b]ecause of the Order . . . and risk of contract termination faced by clients with government contracts.” Am. Compl. ¶ 70 (emphasis supplied). The complaint further alleges that, in the short time between the issuance of the Order and the Court’s TRO, some of the firm’s clients “reported [receiving] very concerning messages from government officials directing them to report business with Perkins Coie, and others are concerned about that possibility.” Id. These allegations plainly plead injuries directly traceable to Section 3 and thus establish plaintiff’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of this provision.

5. Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge EO 14230’s Section 4.

The government also attacks plaintiff’s standing to challenge Section 4, contending that plaintiff cannot trace any alleged injury from the EEOC’s review of plaintiff to EO 14230’s Section 4, since the directed “‘review’ and ‘investigat[ion]’ of ‘the practices of representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms’ for consistency with civil rights laws, Gov’t’s Mem. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting EO 14230 § 4(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782), is “already what the EEOC is supposed to be doing,” id. (emphasis in original). To bolster this argument, the government cites Executive Order 14173, titled “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity,” 90 Fed. Reg. 8633 (Jan. 21, 2025) (“Anti-DEI EO”), issued on President Trump’s second day in office. This Anti-DEI EO directs, among other actions, federal agencies to “enforce civil rights laws and combat illegal private-sector DEI policies and practices.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 27 (citing EO 14173 §§ 2, 4(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 8633, 8635). According to the government, these already-existing requirements mean plaintiff cannot show that the “alleged retaliatory action[] ‘would not have been taken absent the alleged retaliatory motive.” Id. (alteration accepted) (quoting Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 477 (2022)).

The government’s reasoning that the Anti-DEI EO breaks the traceability of any harm from challenged Section 4, thereby obviating plaintiff’s standing to bring a challenge to EO 14230’s Section 4, proves too much and only highlights the logical fallacy in the government’s argument. As plaintiff points out, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 17-18, the fact that the EEOC may already have the statutory authorization and presidential mandate to conduct investigations, report to the President, and file charges, Gov’t’s Mem. at 26-27 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), -4(e), -5(b), and Anti- DEI EO), makes Section 4 “at most redundant, except insofar as it singles out [plaintiff] for opprobrium and punishment by all federal agencies,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 18. Section 4 focuses the EEOC on “representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms,” without expressly naming plaintiff, but the inclusion of this direction in an Order explicitly targeting plaintiff speaks volumes. In addition, the match-up in Section 1’s statements critiquing plaintiff’s hiring and promotion practices and Section 4’s descriptions of the “large” law firm practices the EEOC is directed to review, leaves little doubt that plaintiff is included on the EEOC’s targeted law firm list. The government concedes as much. Gov’t’s Mem. at 2 (“Section 4 directs the Attorney General and the Chair of the [EEOC] to review whether Perkins Coie and like employers are violating the civil rights laws.”).

The government further defends Section 4 on grounds that “[t]he EEOC is already required to make ‘report[s] . . . to the President . . . on the cause of and means of eliminating discrimination,’ including in any industry the President directs the EEOC to review.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 26 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(e), titled “Reports to Congress and the President,” that provides only for the EEOC to: (1) report annually “concerning the action it has taken and the moneys it has disbursed[,]” and (2) “make such further reports on the cause of and means of eliminating discrimination and such recommendations for further legislation as may appear desirable,” without anywhere authorizing the President to direct EEOC investigations). Even assuming the President has the authority the government claims to direct the EEOC to “review” certain industries, no authority is identified by the government—and the Court is aware of none—empowering the President to direct the EEOC to target specific businesses or individuals for an investigation. See generally id. at 26-27.

Moreover, the government identifies no authority allowing the President to direct the initiation of investigations without regard to extant statutory prerequisites requiring, for example, before the opening of an investigation, that a charge be filed with the Commission that is “in writing under oath or affirmation,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); see also Commissioner Charges, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/commissioner-charges#_edn4 (last visited May 1, 2025) (“Commissioner charges must be in writing, signed, and verified.” (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(a))). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the EEOC’s investigative authority is tied to charges filed with the Commission; unlike other federal agencies that possess plenary authority to demand to see records relevant to matters within their jurisdiction, the EEOC is entitled to access only to evidence ‘relevant to the charge under investigation.’” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64 (1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)). Government counsel acknowledges that no such charge meeting statutory prerequisites has been filed against plaintiff. Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 74:5-8 (“I don’t think that’s happened here.”); see also id. at 103:7-12 (plaintiff’s counsel noting that the request received from the EEOC “seemed very similar . . . to the type of request you would get after a charge, which would trigger all the rights that you get under congressionally delegated authority”). Yet, the inclusion of Section 4(a) in EO 14230 targeting only one law firm (plaintiff) implicitly claims all these powers for the President here—both presuming the President’s power is so extensive that he may direct the EEOC’s investigative attention and also override statutory prerequisites to initiate an EEOC investigation. These legally questionable assumptions about the scope of presidential power underpin the government’s effort to dismiss plaintiff’s claims challenging EO 14230’s Section 4 and only serve to confirm plaintiff’s showing of traceability of harm to this Order and support plaintiff’s standing to challenge Section 4.

In any event, the Amended Complaint describes actions already taken under the authority of EO 14230’s Section 4, see Am. Compl. ¶ 153 (discussing “[t]he threatened investigations into Perkin Coie’s hiring, retention, promotion, and training practices”), and alleges specific harm from those actions, id. ¶ 154 (detailing potential costs to plaintiff, in both money and firm resources, as well as reputational harm). For the same reasons already discussed, see supra Part III.A.3., plaintiff’s challenge to threats of investigation as, inter alia, unconstitutional retaliation and viewpoint discrimination may properly be considered.

6. Plaintiff’s Challenges to EO 14230’s Section 5 are Ripe.

The government argues that any challenge to EO 14230’s Section 5 must be dismissed as premature, since the exact contours of the restrictions that will be imposed on plaintiff and its employees to limit their “official access from Federal Government buildings” and their “engaging” with “Government employees acting in their official capacity,” EO 14230 § 5(a), are as yet unknown, pending the issuance of guidance to implement those two directives, Gov’t’s Mem. at 28-29 (“Plaintiff can only guess the degree to which agency heads will limit government access.”). As an initial matter, this ripeness argument does not apply to Section 5(b), which directs agencies to “refrain from hiring employees of Perkins Coie, absent a waiver from the head of the agency, made in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, that such hire will not threaten the national security of the United States.” EO 14230 § 5(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782. As the fact sheet further explains, this section means “Federal Agencies will . . . refrain from hiring Perkins Coie LLP employees unless specifically authorized,” EO 14230 Fact Sheet—no additional guidance needed. So, not even the government contends that any ripeness issue precludes review of Section 5(b).

As to Section 5(a), the government’s ripeness arguments are unavailing. The Order makes clear that, whatever the exact guidance ultimately issued, the access of employees of Perkins Coie to federal buildings and government employees will be “limit[ed]” as a result. EO 14230 § 5(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782; see also EO 14230 Fact Sheet (“The Federal Government will . . . restrict [plaintiff’s] employees’ access to government buildings.”). As alleged in the Amended Complaint, on at least two occasions in the days between issuance of EO 14230 and the TRO, federal employees cancelled meetings with plaintiff’s employees, citing the Order. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67- 68. Partially due to both the directive that access be limited and these cancellations, plaintiff lost multiple clients and representations. Id. ¶¶ 70-78. The government’s protestations that plaintiff’s challenges to Section 5 are too speculative are contradicted by these clear, tangible allegations of harm. Consequently, the government’s ripeness argument to obtain dismissal of plaintiff’s claims challenging Section 5 fail on this basis alone.

In addition, plaintiff persuasively argues that the mere threat of limited access, whatever the exact details of the final guidance may be, constitutes unconstitutional retaliation to suppress viewpoints with which the current presidential administration disagrees. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 20 (“Only indiscriminate retaliatory animus can explain” Section 5.). As previously explained, see supra Part III.A.3., threats of retaliation may be sufficient to constitute unconstitutional retaliation under the First Amendment, see infra Part III.B.1., regardless of the ultimate outcome of the threatened actions. Thus, the Court need not wait for the issuance of final guidance to review plaintiff’s claims. The substance of guidance adopted by each federal agency under the authority of Section 5 has no bearing on whether issuance of the threat of limited access to government buildings and officials was unlawful.

***

For the reasons outline above, each of the government’s general arguments for dismissal, whether construed to fall under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12(b)(1), or 12(b)(6), fail to withstand scrutiny. Moreover, as discussed next, each of Counts II through IX in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states a claim for relief, not only fully satisfying procedural rules requiring the denial of the government’s motion to dismiss but also entitling plaintiff to summary judgment in its favor.

B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Summary Judgment

The government denies that EO 14230 is designed to be “‘punitive’ or a ‘sanction’” and defends the Order as falling “within the bounds of established executive authority,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3, claiming that, here, “the Executive Branch [is] acting as contractor and employer, managing who it does business with and how, based on what it believes to be in the public interest,” id. at 5- 6. See also TRO Hr’g Tr. at 44:3-6 (government counsel stating, “I don’t think I would use the word ‘punitive.’ I would say have an impact and have caused an injury, certainly, to Perkins Coie”); Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 29:10-11 (government counsel stating, about Section 2, “we view this as not designed to punish. We view this as designed to fulfill the concerns that were laid out in Section 1”). By defending the Order as merely an exercise of procurement power, as either a contractor or employer, however, the government strains in two different directions, arguing, on one hand, that plaintiff lacks standing by not alleging “that the government is currently contracting for Plaintiff’s services, or that Plaintiff ever intends to bid for any government contract,” Gov’t’s Mem. at 21; see supra Part III.A.4, and nevertheless, on the other hand, that EO 14230 is merely “direct[ing] a review of Perkins to ensure that the Federal Government’s dealings with it are consistent with the national security of the United States and other public interests,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5. The fact is that the government has no relationship with Perkins Coie as either an employer or contractor and the Firm’s “dealings” with the government are because of clients represented effectively by Perkins Coie on matters that President Trump, his prior campaign or his current Administration, have taken a contrary position, stretching back nearly a decade.

Regardless of the government’s strained legal position to avoid this obvious fact, the government tries to dampen what it calls “all the furor generated in the press and elsewhere,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5, and the “level of hysteria,” id. at 10, by denying that the Order “is the Executive Branch . . . acting in its capacity as a sovereign to punish citizens for exercising their First Amendment Rights,” id. at 5. To believe this explanation requires ignoring the past and current factual context for, and the actual text and impact of, EO 14230, which targets plaintiff for adverse agency action when plaintiff is neither employed by nor a contractor with the government, see, e.g., Gov’t’s Mem. at 21 (arguing that no evidence in the record shows plaintiff is either employed by or contracts with the government), and, instead, is a law firm representing some clients disliked by the President, engaging in some litigation seeking results disliked by the President, and operating its business, in part, in a manner disliked by the President.

In any event, the government is no mere “contractor and employer” and may not act without regard to decades of binding precedent holding that the government’s exercise of power must conform to the limits imposed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 (recognizing that, even when the President acts “in the field of international relations,” where he has “plenary and exclusive power,” the President’s authority “must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution” (citation omitted)). Constitutional limits apply, even when, as here, the government defends its action as appropriate because of the government’s role as a contractor and employer. See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1996) (holding that the government, while acting as a contractor, may not “retaliate[] against a contractor . . . for the exercise of rights of political association or the expression of political allegiance”); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686 (1996) (subject to certain limitations, recognizing “the right of independent government contractors not to be terminated for exercising their First Amendment rights”); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 78 (1990) (holding that the government, while acting as an employer, may not “condition[] hiring decisions on political belief and association,” except in narrow compelling circumstances); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding, in a case involving the government acting as an employer, the government may not “deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech”).

Here, the Trump Administration’s blunt exercise of power in EO 14230 to target Perkins Coie for adverse actions by every Federal agency violates the Constitution in multiple ways, as detailed below by examining each of plaintiff’s claims.

1. EO 14230 Retaliates Against Plaintiff for First Amendment Protected Activities, Including Political Viewpoint and Statements Favoring Diversity and Inclusion.

“The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 605-06 (2021) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). As the Supreme Court has explained, the First Amendment protects the right of “all persons . . . to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands.” 303 Creative, 600 U.S. at 603.

“One obvious implication” of these First Amendment protections is that government officials may not “subject[] individuals to ‘retaliatory actions’ after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.” Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 595 U.S. at 474 (quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398); see also, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998) (“[T]he First Amendment bars retaliation for protected speech.”). Such “‘[o]fficial reprisal for protected speech . . . ‘threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.’” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256 (quoting Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588 n.10). This prohibition also extends to retaliation against individuals for the specific viewpoint expressed by their First Amendment protected activities, since the government may not “use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression,” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 188 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830), nor use threats of “‘legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve the suppression’ of disfavored speech,” id. at 189 (quoting Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 67). Retaliation and threats of retaliation to effectuate viewpoint discrimination “is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society.” Id. at 187. As the D.C. Circuit has observed, “[r]estrictions based on viewpoint are especially invidious,” since “[i]t is antithetical to a free society for the government to give ‘one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.’” Frederick Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978)); see also Ateba v. Leavitt, 133 F.4th 114, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“Viewpoint discrimination is an ‘egregious form of content discrimination,’ which occurs when a government regulation ‘targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.” (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829)). Ultimately, punishing or denying a benefit to an individual on the basis of “constitutionally protected speech or associations” violates the Constitution. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; see also, e.g., Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 595 U.S. at 474; Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398; Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 592.

In this case, plaintiff claims that EO 14230 targets the Firm for unconstitutional retaliation based on two different types of viewpoints expressed by plaintiff in the exercise of First Amendment protected activities. First, in Count V, plaintiff alleges that EO 14230 “single[s] out and punish[es] Perkins Coie for its association with, and advocacy on behalf of, the President’s political opponents in the 2016 and 2020 elections,” Am. Compl. ¶ 128, attributing those viewpoints to plaintiff and “retaliat[ing] against the firm on that basis,” id. ¶ 129. Second, in Count VII, plaintiff claims that EO 14230 unconstitutionally retaliates against plaintiff for “[s]tatements in [f]avor of [d]iversity and [i]nclusion.” Id. at 37 (header of Count VII); see also id. ¶¶ 144-56.

To prevail on these claims, plaintiff must show that (1) the Firm “engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment”; (2) EO 14230 “took some retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from speaking again”; and (3) there is “a causal link” between the protected First Amendment activity and “the adverse action taken against” the Firm. Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Here, no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to any of these three elements, and thus plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on Counts V and VII.

(a) First Element: Plaintiff Engaged in First Amendment Protected Activity.

EO 14230 openly acknowledges that plaintiff engaged in speech and other activities protected by the First Amendment. Section 1 of the Order, which sets out its “Purpose,” cites three reasons for the enumerated action items in Sections 2 through 5 that federal agencies are ordered to take against plaintiff: (1) the Firm’s representation of “Hillary Clinton” during the 2016 presidential election; (2) the Firm’s involvement in litigation against “election laws, including those requiring voter identification”; and (3) the Firm’s alleged discrimination in “hiring and promotion” and efforts to “purposefully hide the nature of” this alleged discrimination “through deceiving language.” EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781. The associated fact sheet adds a fourth: “Perkins Coie LLP has filed lawsuits against the Trump Administration,” which are also described as “partisan lawsuits against the United States.” EO 14230 Fact Sheet. These four reasons are the sole rationales provided for the issuance of EO 14230, see generally EO 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781-83; EO 14230 Fact Sheet, and each, on their face, implicate First Amendment protected activities.

i. Plaintiff’s Representation of Clients

The first, second, and fourth reasons reference the Firm’s representation of clients, namely: President Trump’s opponent in the 2016 presidential election, parties in election litigation, and parties challenging Trump Administration actions. Well-settled law establishes that “advocacy by . . . attorney[s] to the courts” falls within the category of “private . . . speech” protected by the First Amendment, Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 542-43; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion,” including litigation, which “is thus a form of political expression.”), meaning that plaintiff’s representation of a political opponent of the current President and involvement in election litigation and lawsuits against the Trump Administration explicitly qualifies as core First Amendment speech.27

Moreover, as part of plaintiff’s involvement in election litigation, EO 14230 further states that plaintiff “worked with” what is described as “activist donors,” specifically naming “George Soros,” in bringing these cases. EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781. This relationship explicitly invokes core First Amendment associational rights. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 430 (affirming “the right ‘to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas’” (quoting Patterson, 357 at 460)). So, too, does plaintiff’s representation of and association with President Trump’s former presidential opponent. See generally, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64-65, 68-71 (explaining a long line of Supreme Court cases protecting political association); id. at 69 (“Political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.” (alteration accepted) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (plurality opinion))).

Both EO 14230 and the accompanying fact sheet additionally make clear that President Trump and his administration disfavor the specific messages conveyed by plaintiff through involvement in these activities. For instance, the Order expresses disapproval of the election-related lawsuits litigated by plaintiff challenging actions supported by President Trump or his campaign, EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781 (describing the challenged laws as “necessary”), and with other lawsuits filed by plaintiff on behalf of its clients “against the Trump Administration” and “against the United States,” EO 14230 Fact Sheet (emphasis supplied). The Order also takes issue with plaintiff’s representation in the 2016 presidential election of President Trump’s political opponent and, as part of that representation, some of plaintiff’s former employees associated with an opposition research firm, Fusion GPS. See EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781; see also Pl.’s SMF ¶ 125 (quoting President Trump, immediately before signing EO 14230, criticizing plaintiff’s work “against a political opponent” (him) and stating that “it should never be allowed to happen again”). Finally, the fact sheet disparages plaintiff as “partisan” three separate times, EO 14230 Fact Sheet (referring to “partisan lawsuits,” unsubstantiated concerns about “partisan misuse” of information, and associating with “partisan actors who exploit their influence”), making explicit that those in power disagree with the political and litigation positions taken by clients of plaintiff.
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Part 4 of 6

ii. Plaintiff’s Statements about Diversity

As to the third reason—that plaintiff supposedly engages in unlawful discrimination—the record also demonstrates that this claim refers to plaintiff’s First Amendment protected speech in favor of diversity.

The government predicates the claim of discrimination on two items. First, the government cites a 2023 lawsuit challenging plaintiff’s summer fellowship program for first-year law students. Gov’t’s Mem. at 8 (citing Am. All. for Equal Rights v. Perkins Coie LLP, No. 3:23-cv-1877 (N.D. Tex.)). Plaintiff has explained that, after explicitly affirming the inclusive nature of the fellowship and confirming with the plaintiff in that lawsuit that the law student fellowships were open to all, the lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed, in October 2023. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 22-23. Indeed, the government concedes that plaintiff’s description of its fellowship program does “not contain discriminatory requirements.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 8 (citing Lawson Decl., Ex. 12, Stip. of Dismissal ¶¶ 3-4, Am. All. for Equal Rights, ECF No. 31 (filed Oct. 11, 2023), ECF No. 142-2 at 230); see also Gov’t’s Resp. to Pl.’s SMF at 2 (noting, in response to ¶¶ 22-23, that the government does not dispute that plaintiff’s current fellowship program is open to all first-year law students). Regardless of the merits of any claims asserted in the 2023 lawsuit or any alleged or even actual illegality in the former version of the fellowship program, this referenced lawsuit provides no support for the claim that plaintiff currently discriminates against any staff or applicants.

The government’s second proffered reason for the claim that plaintiff “racially discriminates,” EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781, is plaintiff’s 2019 announcement that the firm had adopted the Mansfield Rule, Gov’t’s Mem. at 10. This evidence is similarly unavailing to show the government had a non-speech basis for acting against plaintiff, for at least two reasons. First, the government specifically cites only plaintiff’s “public[] announce[ment]” about adopting the Mansfield Rule—not any evidence that plaintiff implemented the rule in any illegal, let alone even suspect, manner. Id.; see also Gov’t’s Opp’n at 17-19. To the extent the government relies only on plaintiff’s press release, the government thus explicitly acknowledges reacting only to plaintiff’s speech. See also EEOC Letter at 1 (stating the letter was prompted only by “public statements and court filings” made by plaintiff).

More generally, the Mansfield Rule expressly does not establish any hiring quotas or other illegally discriminatory practices, requiring only that participating law firms consider attorneys from diverse backgrounds for certain positions. See Pl.’s 2019 Mansfield Press Release. At the motions hearing, government counsel acknowledged that “[t]he way Mansfield works as far as doing the interviews maybe isn’t so problematic.” Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 68:17-18. While a scenario might exist where a law firm impermissibly strays from those commitments, the government has provided no evidence of any such deviation here, or any other evidence that plaintiff has engaged in any activity violative of any anti-discrimination law.28

Instead, the government’s briefing reveals the true motivation lurking behind the façade of discrimination allegations: the administration’s disapproval of plaintiff’s speech in favor of diversity. This revelation makes clear the pretextual nature of EO 14230’s cited reason regarding plaintiff’s purported discrimination. For instance, the government points to the Firm’s statements about efforts to “contribut[e] to the advancement of our historically underrepresented attorneys” and success in hiring “new partners who are women or attorneys of color.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 10 (quoting Lawson Decl., Ex. 2, Perkins Coie LLP: 2023 Vault Law Firm Diversity Survey at 7, ECF No. 143-2 at 10). Once again, however, the government provides no evidence to suggest that any of these statements show any suspect or illegal actions by plaintiff.

Even more probative of the fact that plaintiff’s speech is at issue is that the government argues that statements in the Amended Complaint “repeatedly assert[ing] [plaintiff’s] commitment to diversity” and showing “no apparent intention of backing away” somehow support the government actions targeting the Firm in the Order. Id. at 10-11 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 46, 146). This claim could only be true, however, if the actions taken in the Order were premised on plaintiff’s statements about diversity, since public statements supporting diversity, standing alone, as they do here, provide not even a scintilla of evidence of impropriety, let alone illegality. A fair reading of the record, and taking the government at its word, requires finding that the justification for EO 14230 stemming from plaintiff’s purported “racial discrimination” was motivated only by plaintiff’s First Amendment protected speech in support of diversity.

(b) Second Element: EO 14230 Takes Retaliatory Actions Sufficient to Chill Speech.

The second requirement for a retaliation claim, that plaintiff show the actions taken against the Firm were “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from speaking again,” Aref, 833 F.3d at 258, is satisfied by plaintiff’s showing of irreparable harm, and further bolstered by the reactions of plaintiff’s peer law firms. See infra Part III.C.1 (describing the significant loss of clients and revenue suffered by the Firm in the short time between the issuance of EO 14230 and the TRO in this case, as well as the potential for additional severe losses were the temporary injunction order lifted); see also TRO Hr’g Tr. at 44:3-6 (government counsel conceding that sections of EO 14230 “have an impact and have caused an injury, certainly, to Perkins Coie”).

Providing further support for this element are the reactions of other law firms to EO 14230 and similar Executive Orders. Eight days after issuing EO 14230 against plaintiff, on March 14, 2025, President Trump issued a similar Executive Order against the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. Manning Decl., Ex. 49, Exec. Order 14237 (“Paul, Weiss EO”), 90 Fed. Reg. 13039 (Mar. 20, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 588. The Paul, Weiss EO contained six sections, directing that the same actions be taken against Paul, Weiss as EO 14230 directs against plaintiff, compare Paul, Weiss EO, 90 Fed. Reg 13039-40, with EO 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781- 82, with one exception that Section 4 of the Paul, Weiss EO stated only that “[n]othing in this order shall be construed to limit the action authorized by section 4 of [EO] 14230 of March 6, 2025 (Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP),” Paul, Weiss EO § 4, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13040. Yet, the Paul, Weiss EO was revoked only seven days after its issuance when President Trump reached a “deal” with Paul, Weiss, under which agreement that law firm agreed to:

[A]dopt[] a policy of political neutrality with respect to client selection and attorney hiring; tak[e] on a wide range of pro bono matters representing the full political spectrum; commit[] to merit-based hiring, promotion, and retention . . .; dedicat[e] the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services during [President Trump’s] term in office . . .; and other similar initiatives.


Manning Decl., Ex. 50, Exec. Order 14244 (“Paul, Weiss Revocation Order”) § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. 13685, 13685 (Mar. 26, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 593. The fact that Paul, Weiss quickly negotiated a deal, including an agreement to provide “the equivalent of $40 million” in free legal work, rather than face the potential injuries of the similar Executive Order targeting that firm, see Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13685, demonstrates the coercive power of such targeting by the Trump Administration.

This conclusion is further confirmed by the reaction of additional peer law firms that chose to negotiate deals with the Trump White House to avoid being targeted by similar Executive Orders. See Manning Decl., Ex. 64, ECF 39-4 at 733 (President Trump announcing a deal with the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP on March 28, 2025, after that law firm “engaged proactively with the President and his team” to negotiate a deal though no Executive Order had been issued against that law firm); id., Ex. 59, ECF No. 39-4 at 721-22 (President Trump announcing a similar deal with the law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP on April 1, 2025, before an Executive Order had been issued against that firm).

President Trump referred to these deals being cut with law firms, in a speech on April 8, 2025, stating: “Have you noticed that lots of law firms have been signing up with Trump? $100 million, another $100 million, for damages that they’ve done. But they give you $100 million and then they announce, ‘We have done nothing wrong.’ And I agree, they’ve done nothing wrong. But what the hell, they’ve given me a lot of money considering they’ve done nothing wrong. And we’ll use some of those people, some of those great firms, and they are great firms too—they just had a bad moment.” Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1, Reply Decl. of Christopher N. Manning, Partner, Williams & Connolly (“2nd Manning Decl.”), Ex. 1 at 25:57-26:30, ECF No. 148-1 at 4.

The Trump White House is keeping track of the growing value in free legal work being promised by the law firms making the deals, as indicated by what occurred immediately after President Trump signed a similar Executive Order as EO 14230 targeting the law firm Susman Godfrey LLP, on April 9, 2025. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, Decl. of Ryan Scarborough, Partner, Williams & Connolly (“Scarborough Decl.”), Ex. 2, Exec. Order 14263 (“Susman EO”), 90 Fed. Reg. 15615 (Apr. 15, 2025), ECF No. 142-1 at 5. President Trump used the occasion to recount that the administration had “signed with many law firms, the ones that we thought were inappropriate,” and stated that “they went for some pretty big numbers.” Scarborough Decl., Ex. 1 (“Susman EO Remarks”) at 16:02-16:25, ECF No. 142-1 at 3. President Trump then asked Deputy White House Chief of Staff Steven Miller, “what’s the total right now Steve?” and Miller responded, “getting to close to, probably, six, 700 million now I would think. Multiple at 100 million, some at 125 million. So, the numbers are adding up. We’re going to be close to a billion soon.” Id. at 16:25- 16:40. As to the Susman EO he had just signed, President Trump then said, “this one, we’re just starting the process with this one.” Id. at 16:55-17:00.29 Whether President Trump’s focus on “the process” refers to enforcement of the Susman EO or that this Order was the opening gambit— akin to the Paul, Weiss EO followed by the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order—for deal negotiations, is unclear.

What is clear is that the Trump White House has publicly touted the negotiated deals reached with various law firms, and equally clear is that those deal-making firms have been spared, or had revoked, an Executive Order targeting them. That is the one clear benefit of the deal to the law firms, since other than the monetary value of the promised free legal work, the precise terms of each deal are somewhat fuzzy. The government, when asked, was unable to fill in basic details, for example, about whether the deal terms were written down or otherwise memorialized, the duration of the deals, or how recipients of the promised free legal work would be identified. Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 8:23-9:13 (government counsel saying “I can’t say anything more than . . . what I have read in the papers” about the law firm deals); id. at 9:19-10:3 (government counsel stating “I don’t have the answers” about duration of these deals); id. at 10:24-11:7, 11:18-22 (government counsel saying “I don’t have any insight on what, if any, mechanics are in play” to determine recipients of free legal work under the deals and repeating “I just don’t have that insight”).

Nevertheless, each additional deal provides further evidence to satisfy the second element of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, given that each of these firms, presumably possessing “ordinary firmness,” sought successfully to avoid being targeted by similar Executive branch actions, with each law firm committing the equivalent of $100 million or more as part of the price to do so. See also Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 86:14-18 (plaintiff’s counsel noting that these firms have “some of the most talented lawyers in the world with the most resources, and they chose silence”); Br. of Amici Curiae 504 Law Firms in Supp. of Pl.’s MSJ ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 78 (noting that EO 14230 and others like it “seek to cow every other firm . . . into submission” and explaining the “looming threat” that “any . . . representation challenging actions of the current administration (or even causes it disfavors) now brings with it the risk of devastating retaliation”); Br. of Amici Curiae Litigation Firms in Supp. of Pl.’s MSJ at 1, ECF No. 94 (“Lawyers cannot fearlessly represent causes or clients . . . if they fear government reprisal.”).

(c) Third Element: The Retaliation is Causally Linked to Plaintiff’s First Amendment Protected Activity.

Finally, the record is clear that EO 14230 is motivated by retaliation for plaintiff’s First Amendment protected activity. Resisting this conclusion, the government protests that EO 14230 does not retaliate against plaintiff for First Amendment activity but instead takes action “based on what it believes to be in the public interest.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 6. Here, however, these arguments are merely two sides of the same coin. The four reasons provided by the Order to justify targeting plaintiff all refer to President Trump’s objections to plaintiff’s protected speech and associations. Neither the Order nor the accompanying fact sheet provide any basis to find that plaintiff threatens the public interest or national interest other than the stated disagreements with plaintiff’s First Amendment protected activity. See generally EO 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781 (providing only the reasons already discussed to justify the Order); EO 14230 Fact Sheet (same). That plaintiff’s protected activities are the only reasons provided by the Order itself to justify the actions directed is strong evidence that the Order retaliates against plaintiff for engaging in those protected activities. Analysis of each section of the Order, as well as the context surrounding its issuance, only adds reasons to confirm this conclusion and further shows that the legal infirmity of retaliation permeates every section and sentence of EO 14230.

i. EO 14230’s Section 2

The record demonstrates that retaliation is the only plausible motive for the “Security Clearance Review” ordered in Section 2 in two additional ways. First, to the extent the government argues the security clearance directives were motivated by alleged national security concerns stemming from contacts with Fusion GPS in 2016, see Gov’t’s Opp’n at 9, plaintiff has no current employee who was involved in that engagement, and none of the attorneys involved have been employed by plaintiff for at least three years, Pl.’s SMF ¶ 75; Gov’t’s Resp. to Pl.’s SMF at 3 (not disputing ¶ 75). The government cannot credibly claim that targeting plaintiff’s current employees would remedy any national security concerns related to Fusion GPS when none of those employees were involved with Fusion GPS.

This is particularly true in light of the undisputed record in this case, which establishes, in plaintiff’s expert report from J. William Leonard, who worked in personnel security at the Department of Defense from 1973 to 2002, including serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for security and information operations, and Principal Director in that same office, that “a hallmark of the [security clearance review] process . . . is that it is an individualized one.” Pl.’s MSJ, Ex. 8, Expert Report of J. William Leonard, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dep’t of Defense personnel security officer (“Leonard Rep.”) ¶¶ 2-3, 30, ECF No. 39-8 (emphasis supplied). Mr. Leonard attests that “the granting, suspending, and revoking of security clearances is a highly individualized process that involves a close and detailed factual analysis of the individual in question,” id. ¶ 35 (emphasis supplied), where “Person A is never held accountable for the conduct of Person B, let alone are Persons 1 through 2,500 held accountable for the conduct of formerly-associated Person 2,501,” id. ¶ 44. Yet, accepting the government’s proffered reason—plaintiff’s previous dealings with Fusion GPS—as true, holding all of plaintiff’s current employees responsible for actions taken by individuals who have not been associated with the Firm for at least three years does exactly that. See Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 71, 75 (Elias left the Firm in 2021); id. ¶ 76 (same with Sussmann); see also id. ¶ 95 (stating that no Perkins Coie employee who held a security clearance at the time EO 14230 was issued “had any involvement in the Fusion GPS matter” (citing 2nd Burman Decl. ¶ 41)).

The conclusion that Section 2 engages in this type of punishment-by-association is further strengthened by President Trump’s admission, in a post on Truth Social on April 23, 2025, the day the parties appeared for a motions hearing in this case, that EO 14230’s actions against plaintiff were motivated by “the conduct of a specific member of this firm.” @RealDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Apr. 23, 2025, 9:35 AM), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrum ... 8306195784 [hereinafter Trump April 23, 2025, Post]. Since this statement confirms that the Order targeted the entire Firm because the President disliked the purported actions of one person, and thus strongly suggests that no firmwide national security concern exists, it points strongly to retaliation as the motivation for EO 14230, rather than any legitimate concerns about the Firm or its employees writ large.

Second, and tellingly, the Paul, Weiss EO contained a virtually identical security clearance review provision to the one at issue in this case. Compare EO 14230 § 2, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781, with Paul, Weiss EO § 2, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13039. As discussed, see supra Part III.B.1(b), the Paul, Weiss EO was revoked only seven days after its issuance when President Trump reached a “deal” with that firm. See generally Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, 90 Fed. Reg. 13685. While the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order summarized that firm’s agreement to, inter alia, “adopt[] a policy of political neutrality with respect to client selection and attorney hiring; tak[e] on a wide range of pro bono matters representing the full political spectrum; commit[] to merit-based hiring, promotion, and retention . . .; dedicat[e] the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services during [President Trump’s] term in office . . .; and other similar initiatives,” none of these agreed-upon policy or practice changes appear to explain or address how any national security concerns sufficient to warrant the Paul, Weiss EO could have changed so rapidly. Id. § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13685. The speed of the reversal and the rationale provided in the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, which focused only on agreements to advance policy initiatives of the Trump Administration, see id., further support the conclusion that national security considerations are not a plausible explanation for Section 2.

ii. EO 14230’s Section 3

As to Section 3 of the Order, the fact sheet says it all: plaintiff and its clients with government contracts are targeted because of plaintiff’s “partisan lawsuits.” EO14230 Fact Sheet. The retaliation for core First Amendment speech, see Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 542-43, and the viewpoint expressed by that advocacy, could not be stated more explicitly.

The government tries to defend Section 3 by insisting that plaintiff is acting as a “contractor [in] pressing these claims” challenging this part of the Order, and invoking Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 671 (1996). Gov’t’s Mem. at 22-23. This defense of Section 3 is doomed for two obvious reasons. First, plaintiff is not a government contractor, as the government concedes. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 21 (“Plaintiff never alleges that the government is currently contracting for Plaintiff’s services, or that Plaintiff ever intends to bid for any government contract.”).

Second, given that plaintiff is not a government contractor, and that plaintiff advances the First Amendment retaliation claims only as to itself and not on behalf of any of plaintiff’s clients, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 126-35 (claiming, in Count V, retaliation only against Perkins Coie); id. ¶¶ 144-56 (same in Count VII), the Supreme Court case relied upon by the government is simply inapplicable here. Umbehr involved a claim of unlawful retaliation brought by a contractor who alleged his contract to provide solid waste disposal services to a county had been cancelled due to his criticisms of the county and its Board of County Commissioners. 518 U.S. at 671-72. The Supreme Court held that “independent contractors are protected” against retaliation for First Amendment protected activities, id. at 673, but that the scope of this protection for government contractors is determined by balancing “the [government]’s legitimate interests as contractor, deferentially viewed,” against “the free speech interests at stake,” id. at 685; see also id. (describing the steps required for a contractor to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim under the balancing test). The government points to this balancing test and argues this test favors the government and justifies the actions directed in Section 3. Gov’t’s Mem. at 23. Yet, because plaintiff is not a government contractor and is instead is “a non-government-contractor law firm,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16 (emphasis in original), the balancing step is never reached here.30 Instead of a balancing test, the general rule governs, see supra Part III.B.1, namely, that “the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256 (citing Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 592).

iii. EO 14230’s Section 4

Section 4, by implication, directs the EEOC to investigate plaintiff, as the government has conceded. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 2 (recognizing that Section 4 directs “review [of] whether Perkins Coie and like employers are violating the civil rights laws”). Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, the EEOC’s “investigative authority is tied to charges filed with the Commission,” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 64, meaning that, with few exceptions not relevant here, “the EEOC is entitled to access only to evidence ‘relevant to the charge under investigation,’” id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)). See also McLane Co., Inc. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. 72, 75 (2017) (“The EEOC’s responsibilities ‘are triggered by the filing of a specific sworn charge of discrimination.’” (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 190 (1990))); EEOC v. Eberspaecher N. Am. Inc., 67 F.4th 1124, 1131 (11th Cir. 2023) (“The EEOC’s enforcement procedure begins with the filing of an administrative ‘charge’ alleging discrimination.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b))); id. (“‘In connection with any investigation of a charge,’ the EEOC ‘shall at all reasonable times have access to . . . any evidence’ that ‘relates to unlawful employment practices . . . relevant to the charge under investigation.’” (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a))); EEOC v. Centura Health, 933 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2019) (“When investigating charges of discrimination, the EEOC may obtain evidence that ‘relates to unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under investigation.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a))).31 Individual EEOC Commissioners are empowered to file a charge to begin an investigation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e), but this step must be taken “in writing under oath or affirmation” and may “not be made public by the Commission,” id. § 2000e-5(b).

EO 14230 ignores these and other statutory predicates to initiate an EEOC investigation, see supra Part III.A.5, and to date, so has the EEOC, see Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 74:5-8 (government counsel acknowledging that no charge has been filed); Pl.’s Mem. at 18 (“[N]o charge has been filed.”). Instead, on March 17, 2025, eleven days after EO 14230 was issued and six days after this lawsuit was filed, making clear that plaintiff did not intend to make a “deal” with President Trump, the Acting Chair of the EEOC sent an 11-page letter to plaintiff requesting information on plaintiff’s hiring and employment practices, see generally EEOC Letter, and posted publicly a press release that same day about the letter and others sent to 19 additional law firms, Manning Decl., Ex 35, ECF No. 39-4 at 357.

A legitimate investigation by the EEOC would follow the congressionally mandated process, with appropriate initiation procedures and compliance with statutorily mandated protections afforded to plaintiff. See Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 99:19-100:4 (plaintiff’s counsel noting that, under a formal EEOC investigation, plaintiff would have a number of rights, including “confidentiality” and “due process,” the latter of which would include “[n]otice, the right to be heard, evidentiary submissions, the right to have lawyers in the process, [and] the right to know what the charge is that you are going up against,” and further noting that “all of those things are absent here”); see also Eberspaecher N. Am., 67 F.4th at 1131-32 (reviewing the EEOC’s enforcement procedures, including relevant protections for the charged party). These hallmarks of a legitimate investigation are missing here, and the government makes no excuse for the EEOC simply ignoring these statutory requirements. By not following its own procedures, the EEOC has undermined the legitimacy of its own investigation, revealing this investigation of plaintiff to be a product of the retaliation ordered by EO 14230 rather than any legitimate investigative activity.

iv. EO 14230’s Section 5

The retaliatory nature of Section 5 is clear from its stunning overbreadth. Under this section, all agencies of the federal government are directed to limit the access of all of plaintiff’s employees—from attorneys to secretaries to mailroom attendants, no matter who they are (including some current reservists in the United States military, Pl.’s SMF ¶ 11)—to federal buildings and officials. EO 14230 § 5(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782 (directing “[t]he heads of all agencies” to “provide guidance limiting official access from Federal Government buildings to employees of Perkins Coie when such access would threaten the national security of or otherwise be inconsistent with the interests of the United States,” as well as guidance “limiting Government employees acting in their official capacity from engaging with Perkins Coie employees”); EO 14230 Fact Sheet.

The government’s protestations that “[w]e have no idea” what the eventual guidance will look like, Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 83:13-14, strain credulity, given the text of EO 14230, which directs agencies to “limit[]” access to buildings and government officials, EO 14230 § 5(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782, and the fact sheet, which says the government will “restrict” such access, EO 14230 Fact Sheet. These intentions were also laid bare in statements made by the White House Staff Secretary at a televised signing ceremony for a similar Executive Order targeting the law firm Susman Godfrey LLP. See Susman EO. The Susman EO contains a Section 5(a) virtually identical to Section 5(a) in EO 14230. Compare Susman EO § 5, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15616, with EO 14230 § 5(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782. In explaining the Susman EO to President Trump, the staff secretary stated that the Susman EO would “make sure they can’t access government resources, government buildings.” Scarborough Decl., Ex. 1 (“Susman EO Remarks”) at 15:45-15:59, ECF No. 142-1 at 3.

The government also downplays the impact of Section 5(a) by pointing to the text that limitations on plaintiff’s employees’ access to government buildings will apply “when such access would threaten the national security of or otherwise be inconsistent with the interests of the United States.” EO 14230 § 5(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782; see TRO Hr’g at 56:14-21, 24-25; 57:15-18. These limitations do not save this section because the outcome of any assessment of national security risks and United States’ “interests” are pre-determined by the findings in Section 1 and instructions in other parts of the Order. Indeed, the fact sheet confirms this point: “The Federal Government will . . . restrict [plaintiff’s] employees’ access to government buildings.” EO 14230 Fact Sheet. Sections 1 and 3 also make clear the President’s determination that interactions with plaintiff do not comport with his view of the national interest. See, e.g., EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781 (making purported findings about the “dishonest and dangerous” and “egregious activity” of plaintiff and thus finding “good cause to conclude that they neither have access to our Nation’s secrets nor be deemed responsible stewards of any Federal funds”); id. § 3(b)(i), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782 (determining that “any contract . . . for which Perkins Coie has been hired to perform any service” should be terminated); TRO Hr’g Tr. at 18:15-20 (plaintiff’s counsel explaining that “agencies are already told what the outcome of their analysis is, because they have been told in Section 1 that working with [plaintiff] is not consistent with the national interest and not consistent with the administration and policies of the administration.”).

Section 5(b) requires agencies to “refrain from hiring Perkins Coie LLP employees unless specifically authorized,” EO 14230 Fact Sheet, which requires receipt of “a waiver” from the head of two separate federal agencies, EO 14230 § 5(b), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11782. This provision is vague about whether this subsection applies only to employees leaving Perkins Coie directly for government service or more broadly to any former employee of the Firm for any duration. By imposing the burden of an explicit order to “refrain” from hiring any Perkins Coie employee for an Executive branch position, compounded by the extra burden of obtaining an affirmative waiver from two agency heads to effectuate such a hire, this subsection operates as a virtual government hiring ban on current and possibly any former Perkins Coie employees. The government offers absolutely no justification, let alone any legitimate government interest for this government action imposing such a sweeping hiring ban. See generally Gov’t’s Opp’n.

Again, particularly given that President Trump has confirmed the Order was motivated by “the conduct of a specific member of this firm,” Trump April 23, 2025, Post, the targeting of all the Firm’s employees for such access and hiring restrictions simply cannot be explained by any legitimate governmental purpose, leaving only retaliation as the obvious reason for the First Amendment protected speech and other activities with which EO 14230 takes issue.

v. President Trump’s Prior Statements about Perkins Coie

In addition to the text of EO 14230, President Trump’s repeated prior statements about plaintiff and lawyers formerly associated with the Firm provide probative context that informs assessment of the retaliatory purpose of the Order as a whole. Since 2017, President Trump has repeatedly attacked plaintiff and its former employees for representing clients involved in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, as well as the 2018 midterm election, see supra n.8 and associated text, accusing the Firm of involvement in “[c]ollusion” during the 2016 campaign, August 6, 2018, Trump Tweets; criticizing the Firm’s “dishonesty,” November 9, 2018, Trump Remarks at 5; accusing Marc Elias of “stealing” elections and engaging in election fraud, November 9, 2018, Trump Tweet; and sharing online articles claiming that plaintiff and Michael Sussmann tried to “[c]orrupt a Presidential Election,” December 11, 2022, Trump Post, as just some examples. President Trump’s nearly decade-long preoccupation with plaintiff’s election litigation and representation of Democratic political candidates, as well as his grievances about the Firm’s work in those client matters, are reflected in the purpose of the Order, which justifies the actions taken against plaintiff, in part, on the Firm’s representation of his political opponent during the 2016 presidential election and election law litigation, EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781, as well as the fact sheet, which takes issue with plaintiff’s “partisan lawsuits,” EO 14230 Fact Sheet.

That EO 14230 was issued as retribution for plaintiff’s work and President Trump’s grievances is further confirmed by President Trump’s statements during the 2024 presidential campaign, when he continued to attack plaintiff and its former lawyers, Marc Elias and Michael Sussmann, and explicitly promised to take some form of action if he were elected. In September 2023, for instance, President Trump inveighed against those who “spied on my Campaign, Impeached me twice, had the Russia, Russia Hoax, [sic], the Fake Dossier Hoax, FISA Fraud, Election Fraud, the ‘No Collusion’ Mueller Hoax, and so much more,” and proclaimed that, “[i]f I am elected, they will be brought to JUSTICE.” September 6, 2023, Trump Post. In March 2024, he shared an article on Truth Social titled, “Marc Elias is Scared…And He Should Be.” March 31, 2024, Trump Post. In the last two months of the campaign, Trump posted a message three separate times on Truth Social warning about “the rampant Cheating and Skullduggery that has taken place by the Democrats in the 2020 Presidential Election,” warning that “WHEN I WIN, those people that CHEATED will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the Law,” including “Lawyers, Political Operatives, Donors, Illegal Voters, and Corrupt Election Officials.” Trump Cease & Desist Post. These retaliation threats have now come to fruition against plaintiff, through the issuance of EO 14230, which outlines in the “Purpose” section some of these same longstanding grievances. See EO 14230 § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781; EO 14230 Fact Sheet. President Trump’s multi-year history of lodging public attacks critical of plaintiff, his promises during the 2024 campaign to act on his displeasure toward plaintiff if he won, and the subsequent issuance of EO 14230—which repeats many of the same attacks on plaintiff—further demonstrates that EO 14230 was issued to seek retribution against plaintiff for the Firm’s representation of clients in political campaigns or litigation, about which President Trump expressed disapproval, dating back to 2017. This purpose amounts to no more than unconstitutional retaliation for plaintiff’s First Amendment protected activity.

vi. President Trump’s Statements about Other Law Firms

As part of the evidence submitted in support of the retaliation claim, plaintiff has included evidence of actions taken by President Trump against other prominent law firms, positing that they, along with EO 14230, are part of a “campaign of retribution.” Pl.’s Mem. at 6. For instance, on February 25, 2025, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum targeting the law firm Covington & Burling LLP, ordering the immediate suspension of all active security clearances held by one named partner of that firm and “all members, partners, and employees of Covington & Burling LLP who assisted former Special Counsel Jack Smith during his time as Special Counsel, pending a review and determination of their roles and responsibilities, if any, in the weaponization of the judicial process.” Manning Decl., Ex. 45 (“Covington Memorandum”), ECF No. 39-4 at 578.32 President Trump had previously attacked Special Counsel Smith, who was appointed to investigate allegations that President Trump interfered with the lawful transfer of power following the 2020 presidential election and retained classified information following his presidency, as “Deranged” and the “worst” of the “Crooked Election Interference ‘Thugs’ from the DOJ,” in a post on Truth Social on July 30, 2023. Manning Decl., Ex. 44, ECF No. 39-4 at 576; id., Ex. 43, Final Report of the Special Counsel Under 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 at 1, ECF No. 39-4 at 401 (describing the scope of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation); see also id., Ex. 42, Tom Dreisbach, Trump Has Made More Than 100 Threats to Prosecute or Punish Perceived Enemies at 9, NPR (Oct. 22, 2024, 7:00 AM), ECF No. 39-4 at 382 (describing additional statements made by President Trump about Smith).

Similarly, on March 25, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order targeting the law firm Jenner & Block LLP (“Jenner”) with provisions substantially similar to EO 14230. Manning Decl., Ex. 52, Executive Order 14246 (“Jenner EO”), 90 Fed. Reg. 13997 (Mar. 28, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 598 (containing a “Background” section making statements and purported findings, Sections 2, 3, and 5 directing the same actions against Jenner as the corresponding sections in EO 14230, and Section 4 stating, “[n]othing in this order shall be construed to limit the action authorized by section 4 of [EO] 14230 of March 6, 2025 (Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP)”). Section 1 of the Jenner EO invoked, as part of the justification for the Order, the work of a former Jenner partner on the investigation of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, calling it a “partisan prosecution” and an “entirely unjustified investigation.” Id. § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13997; see also Manning Decl., Ex. 58, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from Jenner & Block, The White House (Mar. 25, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 715 (attacking the Jenner partner for, among other allegations, “dishonesty” and making an “overt demand that the federal government pursue a political agenda against President Trump”). At a televised signing ceremony for the Jenner EO, President Trump noted that the same Jenner partner “is the main culprit . . . with respect to this firm,” and criticized this partner as “a bad guy.” Manning Decl., Ex. 63, ECF No. 39-4 at 730.

On March 27, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order targeting the law firm Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (“WilmerHale”), id., Ex. 54, Executive Order 14250 (“WilmerHale EO”), 90 Fed. Reg. 14549 (Apr. 3, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 604, which, other than the background section, was virtually identical to the Jenner EO, compare id. with Jenner EO, 90 Fed. Reg. 13997. Section 1 of the WilmerHale EO criticized the firm for “reward[ing] Robert Mueller and” two of his colleagues “by welcoming them to the firm after they wielded the power of the Federal government to lead one of the most partisan investigations in American history.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 14549; see also Manning Decl., Ex. 57, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Risks from WilmerHale, The White House (Mar. 27, 2025), ECF No. 39-4 at 710 (containing similar statements about Mueller).

Viewed in conjunction with the facts and context of the instant case, the Covington Memorandum, Jenner EO, and WilmerHale EO support the plaintiff’s description of a “broader campaign,” Pl.’s Reply at 13, of President Trump using the power of the presidency to target individual lawyers and law firms associated with them based on personal dislike of their legal work—in other words, for retribution.

***

EO 14230, the accompanying fact sheet, and the context surrounding the Order’s issuance each express President Trump’s disapproval of plaintiff’s First Amendment activity and demonstrate that EO 14230 targeted plaintiff because the Firm expressed support for employment policies the President does not like, represented clients the President does not like, represented clients seeking litigation results the President does not like, and represented clients challenging some of the President’s actions, which he also does not like. That is unconstitutional retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, plain and simple. Plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on Counts V and VII.

2. EO 14230’s Section 3 Violates the First Amendment Associational Rights of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Clients by Compelled Disclosure.

Plaintiff contends that EO 14230’s Section 3, which directs all “Government contracting agencies” to “require Government contractors to disclose any business they do with Perkins Coie,” either related or not to the contractor’s government work, EO 14230 § 3(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781, violates the First Amendment rights of plaintiff and its clients to engage in private associations. Pl.’s Mem. at 20; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 21-23. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action,” and that a “vital relationship” exists “between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.” Bonta, 594 U.S. at 606-07 (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462).

Of course, plaintiff is a business of attorneys, at least some of whom litigate, see, e.g., Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 24-26, and in the normal course of litigation those attorneys necessarily engage in advocacy, satisfying the first requirement for constitutional protection. This advocacy is on behalf of plaintiff’s clients, who also have a fundamental First Amendment right in speaking and associating with counsel. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Schiffer, 204 F.3d 259, 264-66 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a government employee has “an interest in communicating with his attorney” under the First Amendment and reviewing the contours of that right); Mothershed v. Justs. of the Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We recognize that—at least as a general matter—the ‘right to hire and consult and attorney is protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, association and petition.” (quoting Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2000))); Denius, 209 F.3d at 953 (“The right to hire and consult an attorney is protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, association and petition.”); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The right to retain and consult with an attorney . . . implicates . . . clearly established First Amendment rights of association and free speech.”). This First Amendment right of counsel with their clients to consult and work together is akin to engaging in collective action that Supreme Court precedents firmly uphold. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971) (“[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (“[T]he freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.”); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (“A State could not . . . infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits.”); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 (1977) (“Underlying [the previous three cases] was the Court’s concern that the aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights and the means of effectuating them. This concern applies with at least as much force to aggrieved individuals as it does to groups.”).

To prevail in a challenge to the government’s compelled disclosure of a protected association, the government, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of meeting an exacting standard by showing “a substantial relationship between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest,” Bonta, 594 U.S. at 607 (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)), and, further, that the disclosure requirement is “narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest,” id. at 608; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 22 (pointing out that “the government must demonstrate” the standard is satisfied). Confusingly, the government identifies this standard but then ignores the fact that the burden is on the government to explain how the challenged government disclosure requirement satisfies the standard. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 22; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 21. Besides failing to acknowledge its burden, the government also makes zero effort to explain how EO 14230’s Section 3(a)’s disclosure requirement is substantially related to and serves a sufficiently important government purpose, and is narrowly tailored to do so, see generally Gov’t’s Mem., which is a heavy lift the government cannot support.

As already found, see supra Part III.B.1, the express purpose of EO 14230 and its action items for all Executive branch agencies to implement, including Section 3(a), amount to unconstitutional retaliation against plaintiff for First Amendment protected activity. The government, consequently, has no legitimate interests in the disclosures compelled by government contractors under Section 3(a), much less a sufficiently important one to satisfy exacting scrutiny.

Even were some government interest found to exist for such compelled disclosure by a particular government contractor due to the type or nature of the contract, Section 3(a) makes no such distinction and compels disclosure by all government contractors to any federal agency with which the contractor holds a contract—no matter whether the contract is for crucial classified military equipment costing millions of dollars per item delivered or for paper clips costing pennies, and no matter whether the disclosure of association with plaintiff had anything to do with a government contract. Thus, Section 3 is not narrowly tailored to any identifiable government interest in particular types of contracts, based on the nature of the goods or services provided to the government or even the amount of government funds committed. The government also cannot show that Section 3 is narrowly tailored to any legitimate goal with respect to monitoring contracts, since the Order requires disclosure of “any business” that contractors do with plaintiff—not merely business related to government contracts. EO 14230 § 3(a), 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781 (emphasis supplied). Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on Count VI.

3. EO 14230 Violates Plaintiff’s Right to Equal Protection of the Law.

The Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law is violated when government action treats someone “differently from others similarly situated and . . . there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). This type of so-called “class of one” claim may be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment when the alleged violation is committed by a state government actor, see, e.g., id. at 563, and under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, which prohibits denial of equal protection of the laws, when the alleged violation is committed by federal government actors, see, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976))). Of course, bringing a “class of one” claim does not literally require plaintiff to be the only one in the class, or only law firm, targeted. See Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 n.* (“[T]he number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal protection analysis.”). Instead, as plaintiff correctly observes, “[t]he key is that differential treatment is not based on ‘membership in a protected class’ but on arbitrary mistreatment or animus.” Pl.’s Mem. at 37 n.12 (quoting Franks v. Rubitschun, 312 Fed. App’x 764, 765-66 (6th Cir. 2009)).

Plaintiff alleges that the government must put forward a “plausible reason” for treating the Firm differently than other law firms, by “intentionally target[ing] Perkins Coie with extraordinary sanctions not levied on other, materially similarly situated firms or lawyers,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120- 21 (Count IV) (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993)), and by expressly justifying EO 14230 based on “ten-year-old allegations that courts have rejected and that involve partners whom Perkins Coie has not employed for several years,” id. ¶ 123, and “for representing clients in lawsuits that successfully struck down unconstitutional election laws and defeated challenges brought by President Trump or his allies to the results of the 2020 election,” id. The different treatment of plaintiff from others similarly situated is plain on the record. EO 14230 targeted plaintiff out of a crowd of similar law firms for punitive measures. Plaintiff posits that there is no need to “infer animus” in this case, Pl.’s Mem. at 37 (quoting Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013), since the text of EO 14230 and associated fact sheet makes obvious the Trump Administration’s animus toward plaintiff, which is only confirmed by other contextual evidence, including President Trump’s statements over nearly the past decade. This Court agrees. See supra Part III.B.1(c).

The government’s assertion that “[p]laintiff is not ‘similarly situated’ to other potential government contractors who do not engage in unlawful DEI practices,” Gov’t’s Mem. at 19, is not persuasive. As an initial matter, putting plaintiff in a class of “potential government contractors” is, at best, a stretch since the government itself argues that plaintiff has not pled facts to establish it is a current or prospective government contractor, Gov’t’s Mem. at 18-19, and, at worst, purposefully evasive, since plaintiff is counsel to government contractors, so appropriate comparators are other law firms, not contractors. Furthermore, the government has presented no evidence that plaintiff is engaged in any practices that amount to “unlawful” discrimination. See supra Part III.B.1(a). Even assuming the government believes, for instance, that adoption of the Mansfield Rule is somehow unlawful, despite the inconsistencies in that position with the government’s avowed goals, see supra n.28, plaintiff has been singled out among other signatory law firms to the Mansfield Rule for punishment. In the 2023-2024 period, more than 360 law firms achieved Mansfield Certification, including many of plaintiff’s peer law firms in the AmLaw 100. See Lawson Decl., Ex. 7, Press Release, More than 360 Law Firms Achieve Mansfield Certification for 2023-24, Marking a Double-Digit Increase in the Push for Leadership Diversity, Diversity Lab (Oct. 2, 2024), ECF No. 143-2 at 112. Plaintiff, however, was one of only a small number of firms singled out for differential treatment. The same is true of the Sponsors for Educational Opportunity (“SEO”) law fellowship program, which was raised in the letter from EEOC to the Firm shortly after the issuance of EO 14230 and the filing of this lawsuit, in accord with the Order’s Section 4(a). According to that letter, “[d]ozens of major law firms partner” with the SEO program, EEOC Letter at 5, but again, plaintiff was one of the few law firms plucked out and targeted for investigation.

The government has given no plausible explanation for the specific targeting of plaintiff as opposed to other signatories to the Mansfield Rule or the SEO Fellowship. See Mots. Hr’g Tr. at 69:16-21, 72:17-73:6. “Judges are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977) (Friendly, J.). Particularly in light of all of the other evidence of the specific targeting of plaintiff for retaliatory purposes, see supra Part III.B.1, the government’s explanation simply is not credible.

The most obvious reasons for EO 14230 and the differential treatment meted out to plaintiff compared to other law firms are articulated clearly in Section 1—to address and suppress conduct by the Firm that constitutes First Amendment protected activity disliked by President Trump. Thus, again, this record firmly supports the finding that EO 14230 serves no legitimate government interest, but only the interest of retaliation. Our Constitution leaves no room for the exercise of “purely personal and arbitrary power.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). “[S]ome objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group . . .—are not legitimate state interests.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985) (internal citation omitted; first ellipsis in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). Some of plaintiff’s current and former clients and employment practices are unpopular with President Trump and his administration—due to the speech and associations, real or perceived, reflected in those relationships and policies—and EO 14230 was issued to harm plaintiff. See supra Part III.B.1. Under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law, however, settling personal vendettas by targeting a disliked business or individual for punitive government action is not a legitimate use of the powers of the U.S. government or an American President. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count IV.
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