Teacher FORCED to QUIT AFTER Standing UP TO TRUMP’s America by Francis Maxwell MeidasTouch May 26, 2025
Sarah Inama, a public school teacher from Idaho, was forced to resign after complaints were made over a sign in her classroom that read "All are welcome here." Now she has a message for Donald Trump and the hatred he sowed throughout the American public. Francis Maxwell reacts.
Transcript
West Ada High School students walking out of class Thursday to show support for Louiswis and Clark middle school teacher Sarah Ayama after the district asked her to take down a poster that said everyone is welcome in this political environment mhm that is not acceptable um yeah I was told a couple things that everyone is welcome here is not something that everybody believes now I know this story is a little outside my wheelhouse regarding the topics that I cover on here but it's a story so absurd that I have to address it a teacher who had a quote "Everyone is welcome," sign up in her classroom was ordered to take it down because the district claims that these signs violate policy requiring classroom content to be neutral you heard me right a sign that says in this room everyone is welcomed important accepted respected encouraged valued equal is no longer considered to be a neutral expression in Donald Trump's America undoubtedly the apprehension is coming from the all lives matter pro-life crowd look in the face of everything that's happening it it takes guts for ordinary people to stand up against it but here's the thing so so so many people are like Sarah Enma for the past four years she's taught world civilization to sixth graders at Lewis and Clark Middle School in Meridian Idaho and like all teachers she decorates her classroom with motivational posters posters like this one that says "In this room everyone is welcome important accepted respected encouraged valued and equal." An even more straightforward one showing children's raised hands with the tagline "Everyone is welcome here." You have probably seen this kind of stuff a million times in kids' classrooms i know I have as a dad the kind of inspirational messages that are simply meant to tell students whoever you are you are in the right place you belong here shouldn't be controversial right so for 4 years these signs have survived SA's harassment nobody said a word about him that is till about a month ago my building administration came to me during my lunch period and told me that they needed to be taken down by the end of the day they told me that they were in violation of district policy because in today's political environment they're considered a personal opinion did they say somebody complained about them no i asked if anyone had complained about it them and they said "No we just want to protect you from that if that were to happen in this political environment." Mhm that is not acceptable um yeah I was told a couple things that everyone is welcome here is not something that everybody believes now the teacher in question Sarah Enama said school officials informed her that the signs were considered personal opinions in today's political climate that's right in Donald Trump's America saying that everyone is welcome in a classroom isn't welcome if that everyone happens to showcase different skin colors on the sign support our teachers support our teachers support our teachers dozens of West Ada students chanting for change i entered that classroom and I felt welcome i think everybody deserves here to also feel welcome several students even ones like Anukica who was in Sarah's class in middle school shared heartfelt stories about how teachers have positively impacted their lives who's welcome here everyone is welcome here vivien a junior at Renaissance High School sharing with the crowd how inclusive signs have made her feel welcome as an Asian-American student when we're able to make our education more diverse we make people feel more welcome i'm very glad to be here in protest of of this censorship and I will always be fighting for the side of diversity for the side of inclusivity all this after a sixth grade world civilization teacher at Lewis and Clark Middle School was told to take down these two signs district leadership stated that this ensures that classrooms remain neutral distraction-free spaces where students can focus on their academic success i had a student tell me she pointed to my sign and said "You know that might not be true other places but in this classroom that's a fact." Now the teacher initially complied but later put the signs back up believing that they represented core values of public education then district officials cited both internal policy and Idaho's dignity and non-discrimination in public education act as justification for their removal yeah let me just lame that up a little bit a sign that is inclusionary in its imagery is discriminatory got it it is a policy they updated after Idaho lawmakers passed a state law stating that critical race theory divides people and is contrary to the unity of the nation and the well-being of the state the team trying to cancel this classroom poster is in a kids classroom is led by the school district's chief academic officer Marcus Meyers and yes he says the problem here is the colors of the hands if there was a poster that just said everyone is welcome here black background white words would that do you think the team would have objected to that i don't think the team would have now that have been a team decision but I don't think the team would have and I say that because those exist in our schools i was gonna say you have things that are almost identical to this they just don't have multicoloring and then they don't have the hands that obviously are different shades of skin tone right going ranging from white all the way to black so the text by itself doesn't allow for interpretation okay that So that's school district chief academic officer Marcus Myers everyone is welcome here as long as you're not talking about you know everyone and as a result the story has gained traction online especially as the teacher in question here decided to step down from her position so not only are teachers undervalued and wofully underpaid in this country they're now just being forced out of their job because they dare seek to be inclusive all while for instance in Oklahoma high schools are now required to teach Trump 2020 election conspiracy theories as fact walters is not denying he altered the social studies standards to include students learn of potential discrepancies in the 2020 election absolutely there were changes made after it was paid for public comment but he is unwilling to acknowledge what three board members want that he failed to point out the changes or give them ample time to read themselves an email shows the board got the updated standards at 401 on Wednesday for a Thursday vote there are no differences between what you all were emailed what you all were presented that day and what was sent to the legislature i'm not a speed reader that was I apologize i think what was it 400 pages i was at that February meeting walters did pressure the board to vote that day indicating a legislative time crunch that was a misled so I feel deceived on that because here we are still talking about the standards and that time frame could have come and gone and we could have reviewed them brian Deathidge was the only dissenting vote pushing for more time to read michael Tenny assumed the standards were the same ones he originally read it never dawned on me so they wouldn't change them without telling the board i can't make you read i I listen I can't make you read i can't make you do the research before you vote legislators can vote yes or no or send the standards back to the board for changes if that happens Chris Vandenhind asked Walters to provide documents to justify his changes can you produce those first of all it's completely irrelevant part of the conversation you're looking you're looking at the individual that made the decision on what's in the standards i'm right here ultimately I make the decision on what's in the standards and what's not and Trump's education department is hellbent on overseeing cuts that would throw K12 and higher education into complete chaos especially for the students most relying on federal funding more often than not low-income students and students with disabilities as well as students who rely on federal financial aid to attend universities and colleges the war on education is here folks and this story may not have garnered the headlines as much as Trump saying Putin likes Melania more but a teacher being forced to resign for standing firm in the belief that at one point you'd imagine would be upheld as a basic human right in America everyone who comes to school to learn is welcome and should be treated that way is indicative of a country in severe danger of falling to an autocrat's way of life i just feel like as a teacher and I feel like probably a lot of teachers share this sentiment I would do anything to protect my students i love all of them unconditionally we protect them from danger quite literally would take a bullet for these students and this is the one small thing that I feel like I can do to speak out against this and stand up for them to protect them from being affected by racist sentiments affecting their classroom find it hard to grapple with the fact that the reason why this poster needs to come down is because there are people outside of our school that disagree with it love this video continue the conversation by following us on Instagram Midasouch and help us blow past 1 million followers
Judge Rules ANOTHER Trump Order Punishing Law Firms UNCONSTITUTIONAL; Delivers Message To ALL Firms by Glenn Kirschner May 27, 2025
Judge John Bates, a long-serving federal district court judge in Washington, DC, ruled that Trump's executive order punishing the law firm Jenner & Block was not only unconstitutional, but that Trump's actions were "doubly violative of the Constitution."
Transcript
[Glenn Kirschner] So friends judges continue to call out and rule against Donald Trump's violations of the Constitution let's talk about what Donald Trump is doing to law firms universities and two-year-olds because justice matters hey all Glen Kersner here okay friends first things first let me address the voice about a week ago now I tested positive for the flu and despite the doc prescribing me Tama flu and some other things I have had one hell of a time shaking this thing the flu ended up hitting me a lot harder than CO did but I've received so many nice wonderful gracious messages and notes and posts from so many of you asking if I was okay many of you saying "Hey Glenn uh where are the Daily Justice Matters videos?" And I really appreciate um all of your concern and your interest uh so I really wanted to try to get back in the saddle and start doing the daily videos again but you know this is going to be a daybyday proposition so I hope you'll bear with me through my voice sounding like this okay with that out of the way let's get to the topic of the day because Donald Trump is not acting like a legitimate president of the United States he's acting like a despot like a dictator like a tyrant i mean what else would you call a president who intentionally violates the constitutional rights of law firms of institutions of higher learning of 2-year-old American citizens day after day what would you call that president if not illegitimate let's turn to one of Donald Trump's most recent constitutional travesties and a new federal court ruling that calls him out for it this from NBC News headline Trump executive order targeting Jenner law firm unconstitutional judge rules and this from a judge who was appointed to the federal bench by President George W bush quote "This order like the others seeks to chill legal representation the Trump administration doesn't like," wrote Judge John Bates and that article begins "President Donald Trump's executive order against the Generan Block Law Firm is unlawful because it violates the First Amendment a judge ruled late Friday." Now friends I want to jump right to the opening salvo of Judge Bates new legal opinion and ruling and then I want to come back to this article and touch on a message that Judge Bates delivers to the law firms that refused to stand up to Donald Trump the firms that capitulated that bent a knee that offered him money in the form of legal services thinking that it would protect them from Trump's future tyrannical mistreatment but friends when you capitulate to a tyrant like when a kid willingly hands over his lunch money to a schoolyard bully that doesn't protect you it further endangers you have a look at the opening salvo of Judge Bates's opinion in the case of Jenner and Block LLP plaintiff versus the United States Department of Justice at all and others defendants memorandum opinion in our constitutional order few stars are as fixed as the principle that no official can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics and in our constitutional order few actors are as central to fixing that star as lawyers this case arises from one of a series of executive orders targeting law firms that in one way or another did not bow to the current presidential administration's political orthodoxy like the others in the series this order which takes aim at the global law firm Jenner and Block makes no bones about why it chose its target it picked Jenner because of the causes Jenner champions the clients Jenner represents and a lawyer Jenner once employed going after law firms in this way is doubly violative of the Constitution i mean what kind of a constitutional cannibal do you have to be for a federal court judge appointed by a Republican president to say "Your conduct Donald Trump is doubly violative of the Constitution." My editorial addition to Judge Bates order his order continues "Most obviously retaliating against firms for the views embodied in their legal work and thereby seeking to muzzle them going forward violates the First Amendment's central command that the government may not use the power of the state to punish or suppress disfavored expression." More subtle but perhaps more pernitious is the message the order sends to the lawyers whose unalloyed advocacy protects against governmental viewpoint becoming governmentimposed orthodoxy this order like the others seeks to chill legal representation the administration the Trump administration doesn't like thereby insulating the executive branch from the judicial check fundamental to the separation of powers it thus violates the constitution and the court will enjoin its operation in full now friends let's jump back to the article for just a minute because it talks about a message that Judge Bates seems to deliver to the law firms that decided to just lay down to give in the law firms that apparently thought they could pay their way into the good graces of the tyrant judge Bates noted that not every firm targeted by the Trump administration opted to sue seeming to critique those firms who threw in the towel and agreed to give the Trump administration free legal assistance this quote from the judge quote "Without ever receiving an executive order these firms preemptively bargained with the administration and struck deals sparing them the deals largely mirror Paul Weiss's though the price continues to rise instead of $40 million these firms have pledged $100 million or more in proono legal services the Trump administration has a hand in choosing Bates wrote and in public statements the president has floated the prospect of deploying the firms to work on the administration's own projects rather than traditional proono causes while acknowledging the firm's lack of wrongdoing but you know friends it's not just lawyers and law firms that Trump is cannibalizing trying to punish in violation of the Constitution it's also colleges and universities headline: judge temporarily blocks efforts to ban Harvard from enrolling foreign students a federal judge in Massachusetts on Friday blocked the Trump administration's effort to ban international students from Harvard University an unprecedented and unconstitutional tactic by the federal government as it tries to exert control over some of the nation's most elite campuses but you know what maybe you're not moved by Trump's attempted unlawful destruction of law firms but I'll bet you are and maybe you're not outraged by Trump's unconstitutional treatments of universities and its students but I'll bet you are what about two-year-old American citizens remember this headline federal judge says he has strong suspicion 2-year-old US citizen was deported with no meaningful process so friends to recap who is it that needs to stand up to the bully to the tyrant to the dictator well lawyers and law firms or anyone affiliated with lawyers and law firms colleges universities students or anyone affiliated with colleges universities and students and anyone who cares about the rights the safety the security of two year olds in America that's right friends everybody needs to stand up to the bully to the tyrant to the dictator because justice matters friends it's good to be back please stay safe please stay tuned and I look forward to talking with you all again tomorrow
Elon WRECKED AND HUMILIATED after DISASTER White House Stint by Suri Crowe MeidasTouch May 27, 2025
Elon Musk’s position in the Trump White House as a “special government employee,” may have come to an end, but the damage he inflicted will likely be calculated for years... And despite pillaging the U.S. government, as if it were his own personal piggy bank, Musk leaves with grievances and whining in a series of recent sit down interviews. Suri Crowe details his ridiculous pity party and cry fest.
Transcript
[Elon Musk] That would be unacceptable that's all that matters now let's move on okay well just one question well one question before we move on to other companies which is that I wonder if some of what you've has happened to Tesla in the last few months did you take it personally yes and did it make you regret any of or think twice about your political endeavors because it is I did I did what needed to be done uh the the violent antibody reaction um and I'm I'm not someone who's ever committed violence um and yet uh massive violence was committed against my companies massive violence was threatened against me who are these people why would they do that how wrong can they be they're on the wrong They're on the wrong side of history and that's an evil thing to do to go and damage some po innocent person's car to threaten to kill me what's wrong with these people i've not harmed anyone so something needs to be done about them and a number of them are going to prison and they deserve it more will you're referring to the attacks on Tesla showrooms but I think Yeah bullets into showrooms and burning down cars is unacceptable those people will go to prison and the people that funded them and organized them will also go to prison don't worry but wouldn't you come and you the unbelievable hubris of this man oh my god absolutely no accountability for his horrid actions or any self-reflection for the disasters he's created for his companies oh no no no it's everyone else's fault spoken like the true narcissistic sociopath that Elon Musk is hi my name is Siri Crow and you're watching the Meidas Touch Network you know I've never bought into the story that Elon Musk is autistic i think he's just a stone cold psychopath devoid of empathy a cold power-hungry sadist he's almost cartoonishly evil listen to his villainous laugh even pots they have pots thinks that his car is being vandalized because so many people despise him is on the level with the millions of people whom his actions have directly hurt andor killed musk's Doge gutting of USAD is already resulting in thousands of deaths in Africa and will according to multiple estimates from global agencies around the world kill millions of people via starvation or lack of medical care that USID used to provide so much for his life I've never harmed anyone yeah whatever Mr chainsaw here's what fellow billionaire and global philanthropist Bill Gates recently had to say about Musk in a brand new interview billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates telling the FT this quote "The picture of the world's richest man killing the world's poorest children is not a pretty one." The FT report says this quote Gates said Musk had cancelled grants to a hospital in Gaza province Mosambique that prevents women transmitting HIV to their babies in the mistaken belief that the US was supplying condoms to Hamas in Gaza in the Middle East quote I'd love for him to go in and meet the children that have now been infected with HIV because he cut that money bill Gates announced plans to step up where Trump and Musk have pulled away with plans to spend more than $200 billion on global health in the next 20 years gates also expanded on his comments in an interview with Steven Colbear last night watch i've been out in the field with the people who work for USCID and seen you know the brilliant work they do and how important that is uh unfortunately you know there was a weekend where it was decided they were criminals and they were put in the wood chipper uh and so we lost a lot of capacity there now we can get it back eventually Congress is the one who will have the final word on this uh and even I I'm not even sure the administration understands uh you know what's going on in the field uh because we do have for the first time in 25 years we have more children dying instead of it going down it's now going up and unless we reverse pretty quickly uh that'll be over a million additional deaths and you you you lay some of this at the feet of Doge and of course Elon Musk and I'm I hope I'm getting this even close here you said the picture of the world's richest man being involved in the death of the world's poorest is not a pretty one that's right well said well said elon Musk along with Donald Trump and America's nauseating set of greedy billionaires are white men failing upwards on steroids elon is a ketamine addicted drug freak who's never really invented anything by the way he bought other people's inventions and he's made the bulk of his billions of dollars of wealth off of US government contracts so Mr i'm cutting fraud and waste in the government is the biggest recipient of government handouts ever and he had no business putting his hands in the center of American power yet because of how deeply broken our American system and society is which rewards mediocre white men he was allowed to do that and it's such an indictment on our system of power a rich white man can literally get away with anything i mean look who's the president and yet in Elon's world as in Donald Trump's he's always the victim in government you are in this unique and unprecedented position of having billions of dollars worth of contracts with the federal government yourself mostly through SpaceX and also now an insider's knowledge of it because of Doge can you see that there is a conflict of interest or a potential conflict of interest in broad terms just through that very fact um I I don't think so actually there have been many advisers in uh throughout history and in the US government and others who have had economic interests um and I am simply an adviser i don't have formal power um and that's it uh the president can choose to uh accept my advice or not and uh that's that's how it goes um if there's a single contract that uh you know any of my companies have received that people think is somehow not uh was was awarded improperly um it would immediately be front page news um to say the least um and and if if if I didn't mention it certainly my competitors would elon Starlink by the way pushed out Verizon at the FAA and Verizon had a contract with the FAA to upgrade aviation systems in place since 2023 so this is a blatant conflict of interest and double dealing on Musk's part first of all you should be questioning why is there why are there racist laws in South Africa that's the first problem that's what you should be attacking um it's improper for there to be racist laws in South Africa um the whole whole idea with what Nelson Mandela who was a great man proposed was that all all races should be on equal footing in South Africa that's the right thing to do not to replace one set of racist laws with another set of racist laws which is utterly wrong and improv um so the that's that's the deal that all races should be treated equally um and there should be no preference given to one or the other uh whereas there are now 140 laws in South Africa that give u pre that basically um are give strong preference to to if if you're black South African and um not otherwise and so now I'm in this absurd situation where I was born in South Africa but cannot get a license to operate in Stalink because I'm not black well it looks like it looks like you looks like that's about to change i just asked you a question please answer does that seem right to you well those rules were designed to bring those rules were designed to bring about an era of more economic equality in South Africa and it looks like the government has found a way around those rules for you i ask you a question this is this is your interview everyone wants to hear from you ask you a question yes or no yes or no not for me to answer i have got a question for you about uh about your government work though and the amount of savings he's just a d I mean jerk he's demeaning this woman who did an exemplary job in front of hundreds of people at this Qatari economic uh forum but you can really get a flavor of the hateful way that Elon treats people whom he thinks are beneath him particularly women he's just a horrible human and South Africa where he's from had decades of oppression and death at the expense of black people known as apartheid the majority population that equity laws are trying to make right is for the black people there and yet even so it looks like Elon's going to get around these equity laws over in South Africa because he's what a very rich white man elon also made an appearance this earlier this week on CNBC um listen to this my question is more about your work at Doge for example was that worth it you know to the extent you are now Elon you are somewhat divisive figure 2 years ago but now you really are i mean there are people who love you but there are a lot of people who dislike you some of whom were your customers and I and I wonder was it worth the undertaking at Doge and everything else that you've done and how outspoken you've been in terms of the things you believe in to antagonize so many potential buyers andor users of things like a robo tax well I mean unfortunately what I've learned is that uh legacy media propaganda is very effective at uh making people believe things that aren't true what would an example of that be uh that I'm a Nazi for example and how many legacy media uh publications talk shows whatever uh try to claim that I was a Nazi because of some random hand gesture gesture at a rally where all I said was that my heart goes out to you and firstly let's just dispense with the lie that the legacy corporate media is ever pushing a liberal lefty narrative in fact it is quite the opposite they're typically pushing a fascist right-wing corporate narrative something we regularly report on here at the Midest Touch Network secondly Elon you are a Nazi this was no random hand gesture look at his face he's fully into it he did it twice he wanted to make sure we all got the FU in our faces as he and his fellow Nazi Donald Trump ascended to the heights of power and every authoritarian scholar and historian who saw that hand gesture called it exactly what it was a Nazi salute the gaslighting from this psychopath in his attempt to cry over himself is next effing level shut up Elon and as he slinks away from his formal position as a regular in Donald Trump's White House don't for a minute think that he didn't get exactly what he came for he shoved through billions of dollars in government contracts in huge conflicts of interest uh he escaped multiple investigations into his companies for violating safety regulations and rules he fired thousands of federal employees he collected millions of pieces of data on all of us and God knows what he's going to do with all of that he didn't really save the taxpayers any money at all his uh quote austerity cuts resulted in chaos and in many cases a lot of these government agencies having to go back and rehire people so they ended up spending ultimately more money we are less safe and less secure because of Trump and Elon Musk i mean for God's sakes just look at the NIH look at Newark airport where no one's even flying in right now because we literally don't have enough air traffic controllers to make the sky safe and what really struck me as I was putting this story together is just the repulsive greed of Elon Musk and the Trumpian billionaire cult class the Republicans just voted to pass a bill that will drive the poorest Americans into deeper poverty by raising their taxes the poor people's taxes and taking away their health care and food assistance that is a next level type of cruelty and it was done intentionally we do have for the first time in 25 years we have more children dying instead of it going down it's now going up and unless we reverse pretty quickly uh that'll be over a million additional deaths and you you you lay some of this at the feet of Doge and of course Elon Musk and I'm I hope I'm getting this even close here you said the picture of the world's richest man being involved in the death of the world's poorest is not a pretty one that's right well said you know say what you will about Bill Gates but he recently announced that he plans to give away 99% of his wealth in the next 20 years that is on top of the billions of dollars that he and his ex-wife Melinda French Gates have already given through their own Gates Foundation and many other philanthropies and according to Benzinga Gates and his former wife would have surpassed Elon Musk in wealth long ago had they not engaged in so much philanthropy and sold off the majority of their Microsoft stock they would have been the world's first trillionaires but no they chose a different path they chose to do good with their vast wealth this is in stark contrast to the gross greed we see now where Musk Trump Jeff Bezos Zuckerberg uh and all these others this club of clowns are just hoarding the bulk of the world's wealth while people are literally starving and dying because of lack of access to basic needs housing food and medical care and yet Americans decided to vote into power people who want to give these obscenely rich people bigger tax cuts while cutting off what tiny little benefits the poorest of us have so my take today is suck it Elon you crying white rich titty baby as the I hadock girls say the sooner the world moves on from you and your evil ilk the better off we will all be and I am praying that it is sooner than later thanks for watching you guys i hope to see you back here soon please follow me on my socials which will be linked in the description below and also join me over on Substack where I just launched a brand new Substack i would love to see you over there as well all right and as always peace love
I Am a Political Prisoner”: Immigrant Rights Activist Jeanette Vizguerra Speaks from ICE Jail By Amy Goodman Democracynow.org May 28, 202
We speak with the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Maria Hinojosa after she got extraordinary access to an ICE detention center in Colorado, where she interviewed the immigrant rights activist Jeanette Vizguerra. The undocumented mother of four was arrested by federal agents in Denver in March after she successfully fought multiple deportation efforts since 2009, including when she took sanctuary in a Denver church with her children in 2017. She received a stay of removal but returned to sanctuary in 2019 when it expired, then received additional stays under the Biden administration that also expired. She now finds herself in the sights of the Trump administration as it seeks to fulfill its goal of mass deportations of immigrants. “I am a political prisoner,” Vizguerra told Hinojosa. She “believes that she is not being held in immigrant detention because of her immigration status, but rather she is being held because of her words and because of her activism,” says Hinojosa.
Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: We begin today’s show looking at the case of Jeanette Vizguerra, a well-known immigrant rights activist, mother of four, detained in Denver in March. She’s being jailed at the Aurora ICE Processing Center, operated by the private prison company GEO Group, in Colorado.
In 2009, Jeanette Vizguerra successfully fought deportation following a routine traffic stop. Then, in 2017, during the first Trump administration, she was targeted for deportation and took sanctuary in the Unitarian church in Denver, living there with three of her young children. She received a stay of removal, but then, upon its expiration in 2019, returned to sanctuary. She received additional deportation stays during the Biden administration, but those eventually expired.
Her lawyers allege that Jeanette was detained in March in retaliation for speech that’s protected under the First Amendment. Jeanette Vizguerra is a longtime activist who worked as an SEIU labor organizer, volunteered with the Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition and the American Friends Service Committee, AFSC, and founded the activist organizations Dreamer’s Mothers in Action-Colorado, Abolish ICE Denver and Sanctuary for All.
In 2017, during the first Trump administration, I visited Jeanette Vizguerra at the First Unitarian Society Church in Denver, where she sought sanctuary, and talked to her.
AMY GOODMAN: Are you prepared for ICE to come in at any time?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] Yes. We have an internal plan here at the church, and not only at this church, also at the church where Ingrid is, who is at the other church in Mountain View. She has been in sanctuary for over three months. Both churches are part of the Metro Denver Sanctuary Coalition, and each church has its own emergency plan. I am also prepared. Before coming here, I prepared a family plan in case ICE were to go to my house. Part of the plan with my children was that one of them would be filming, and the other one would be calling people from a list that I gave them. And here, we have a similar plan. So I am prepared, and so are the people here. We hope that Donald Trump will respect these spaces. It would look wrong from a moral standpoint if he came after mothers who are just fighting for their families.
AMY GOODMAN: That was Jeanette Vizguerra eight years ago, in 2017.
Earlier this month, she was named one of this year’s recipients of the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award. It marks the first time the award has been given to someone in immigration detention.
Jeanette Vizguerra recently spoke to the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, Latino USA host Maria Hinojosa in a rare interview on camera from inside the ICE jail. In a moment, we’re going to play Jeanette Vizguerra in her own words, but first we turn to Maria Hinojosa, who’s joining us from Austin, Texas.
Maria, welcome back to Democracy Now! How did you get this interview? How often do you get to go into an ICE jail?
MARIA HINOJOSA: Good morning, Amy. Good morning, Juan, from Austin.
Look, when we got the news that we were going to be able to come inside the Aurora ICE Processing Center with a camera and a microphone, I couldn’t believe it, because I essentially have been banned from going inside immigrant detention facilities, because I’m one of the few who has been documenting this since about 2010 and showing what these places actually look like and what the treatment is like for people being held. So, when I heard that I was going to be allowed inside, of course, I immediately asked my producer, “What happened?”
It goes to the heart of Jeanette Vizguerra’s case. Jeanette Vizguerra believes that she is not being held in immigrant detention because of her immigration status, but rather she is being held because of her words and because of her activism. And so, what we understand is that when we made the request to come and interview her, and we were expecting a denial, her lawyer said, “If you deny Maria Hinojosa and Latino USA to come in and interview Jeannette Vizguerra, we can make this part of our case arguing on her First Amendment rights.” It was an absolute checkmate situation, where they had to, essentially, let us in with cameras, with microphones, to see Jeannette Vizguerra in the Aurora detention facility.
And see, Amy and Juan, you know, I’ve been visiting detention facilities for years, right? And I’ve been in maximum-security men’s prisons for years. I had to walk through — Amy and Juan, I had to walk through nine prison doors in order to get to where Jeanette was being seated inside a windowless room where we were going to do the interview. When I go into a maximum-security men’s prison, there are two doors, two prison doors. And yet, in an ICE detention facility run by privately held GEO Group, where a majority of the people being held there are not criminals, they are treated worse than in a maximum-security men’s prison. It was shocking. But I will say that Jeanette Vizguerra, though she is sick — she told us she has a stomach virus; she says many people are sick inside the detention facility — she appeared firm in our interview, that lasted one hour.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Maria, how would you compare Jeanette’s case to that of someone like Mahmoud Khalil, who was detained over his Palestinian rights activism, both clearly being targeted because of their speech?
MARIA HINOJOSA: Jeanette Vizguerra says that she is the Mahmoud Khalil of the immigrant rights and sanctuary rights movement. She believes that just like Mahmoud Khalil from Columbia University, where I’m a professor at Barnard College — she believes that he is being held and targeted because of his activism. She says, “The same thing is happening to me. I’m being held and targeted because of my activism.”
By the way, somebody senior in the comms department from the Department of Homeland Security said in a tweet, after Jeanette had been taken — said, actually, in tweet, “We will come and get you. Even if you have been named to Time magazine’s 100 most important people, we will come and get you.” So, she absolutely feels like she is being targeted. The ICE agent — one of the ICE agents who took her when she was apprehended in Colorado said to her, “We got you.” And according to Jeanette, he had her social media on his phone. So, Jeanette argues, her lawyers argue, that she has absolutely been targeted by this administration.
AMY GOODMAN: Maria, we’re going to hear Jeanette describe the situation in her own words, in her conversation with you. We’re talking to Maria Hinojosa, the host of Latino USA. Let’s go to an extended excerpt of that conversation that Jeanette Vizguerra had with you inside the privately run immigration jail in Aurora, Colorado.
MARIA HINOJOSA: Did you imagine that you would end up being the very specific target of a new Trump administration?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] I knew that if — well, in fact, many people, colleagues and friends, warned me, “Jeanette, you’re going to need to stay quiet. Have a plan for yourself. Don’t make noise, because they’re going to come after you.” So, what happened? Trump won. And the first time, when he signed the executive action removing sensitive locations, which, of course, I had helped create with the Sanctuary Foundation, the Sanctuary Coalition, and I was a national sanctuary leader, the media started reaching out to me. And I was like, “Should I do it or not?” Thinking about it, right? But at the same time, I sat my whole family down, and I told them, “We have to have a plan, because things are going to happen.” And…
MARIA HINOJOSA: So, in your head, when you were asking yourself, ”¿Lo hago o no lo hago?,” “Do I speak out, or do I not speak out?” after Trump had been reelected?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] I wondered about that, but then the first raid happened. I already had this feeling that something was in the air, that something was going on.
MARIA HINOJOSA: Was it a feeling of fear?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] I always have that kind of intuition that something is going to happen, that something is coming. I spoke with my colleagues, and I told them about a plan just in case. The day before, because I went to a march that Sunday — right before I was arrested — I made a call out to the community. In fact, I was able to give one last interview, where I said we are living in difficult times and that we also needed to have an escalation protocol, a way to better protect our community.
MARIA HINOJOSA: How many days after you made that speech on that Sunday, saying, “They are escalating. We have to escalate, too, as activists” — how many days after that were you detained?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] The next day.
MARIA HINOJOSA: Do you believe, Jeanette, that you specifically are being targeted because of your activism, because you speak out?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] Yes. And I found out that same day I was detained, because, well, the officer placed his phone down like this, and when he did, the screen lit up. And there it was, my social media, and a photo of my husband. I said to him, “Why are you monitoring my social media?” He said, “It’s public.” And another one responded, “We finally got you.”
MARIA HINOJOSA: So, what do you think … the Trump administration?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] They are trying to say that they have the power, that they have the resources, and that they will deport anyone, not just me, but anyone who is inconvenient. They want to send a message to other activists like me that they will suffer the same consequences. They want to silence us. They want to erase us from the map. But I’ve said it before, and I will say it again: It doesn’t matter where I am, whether I’m here or in my country, because I will have influence on a binational level. It doesn’t matter if I’m not physically here. I have my seeds here.
MARIA HINOJOSA: Do you believe that you are here because of political persecution?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] I am a political prisoner. I never thought I would become a political prisoner in the United States, a country where laws are supposedly respected, where freedom of speech is protected, where one supposedly has the right to speak out, to protest, to denounce injustice. That is what I am, a political prisoner. And not just me; there are others, too, because of their activism who are imprisoned right now.
MARIA HINOJOSA: Do you believe that you are the Mahmoud Khalil of the immigrant rights movement?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] We are in the same situation. We are in the same situation, and there are many of us.
MARIA HINOJOSA: When you say the words, “I am a political prisoner,” tell me what’s going on for you as you say those words about yourself right now in the year 2025.
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] In 2025, we are going back so many years. Like I say, we are heading toward a dictatorship, because they want to silence those of us who are raising our voices, those of us who are revolutionizing movements.
MARIA HINOJOSA: You say that you are here because you’re fighting for your First Amendment right. You say that you won’t be quiet no matter where you are, what country or what place that you’re being detained. So, in fact, what is your message to the world right now?
JEANETTE VIZGUERRA: [translated] My message to everyone who might watch this interview is that no leader who is making change will have a life free of suffering. All leaders suffer. All leaders face attempts to be silenced. All leaders face efforts to make us disappear. But thanks to everything we do, we achieve enormous changes out there. And right now the message to the community is: The people save the people. If you remain silent, we will not have change.
AMY GOODMAN: That’s Jeanette Vizguerra speaking to Latino USA host Maria Hinojosa. They are inside an ICE jail in Aurora, Colorado, run by GEO Group. Maria Hinojosa is still with us, speaking to us from Austin, Texas. Maria, she talks about all leaders suffer. In fact, in the rest of the interview — and we’ll link to it at democracynow.org, that you’ve posted on YouTube on video, and we’ll link to your Latino USA piece for radio — in the rest of it, she breaks down. Jeanette breaks down as she talks about her four children, her seeds. Can you talk about her strength and what she faces?
MARIA HINOJOSA: You know, Amy, it was really something to witness being inside the detention center. I actually call them “detention camps.” “Center” is just too neutral of a word. And to realize that even inside the detention facility, Jeanette continues to be an organizer. So, people are coming to her, and they’re asking her, “What should I do if I’m sick? You know, can I get in touch with this person, make a call?” She told me that the phones oftentimes are simply not working, which is extraordinary for people being held and not having access to phones. So, inside the detention camp, she is still helping people. And Jeanette is a consummate organizer and an activist. And journalists like us who do these interviews, we understand the amount of work it takes to be an activist and an organizer. It’s not simple.
And so, oftentimes in the interview, when I would ask Jeanette about her personal feelings, she would start talking about other people who were in a difficult situation, other people who she’s helped. And, Amy and Juan, I had to kind of ask her more than once to talk about herself. How does she feel being held away from her four children, three of whom were born in the United States? How does she feel emotionally?
And at the end of the interview, Amy, Jeanette did something which she rarely does. She does not like to show this part of herself. But she cried. And she told me that it is incredibly lonely to be inside and to have all of this pressure and to know that the whole world is watching her. But we were able to see a moment of vulnerability, because, al final de cuentas, ultimately, Jeanette Vizguerra is a mom who is an activist and who lives in Colorado for 30 years. So, she’s a human being. And that was part of our intention, was to hear from Jeanette and see her not just as a political prisoner, but as a mom and as a human being.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Maria, I wanted to ask about the broader issue of the last few months as immigration raids have been going on, especially agents of ICE picking people up outside of courthouses in various cities, and the advertising campaign that Homeland Security has been mounting, urging undocumented immigrants to self-deport.
MARIA HINOJOSA: You know, Juan, I look at my Instagram feed and — first thing in the morning, of course. And what do you see? You see stories about a baby, a 4-year-old, who could be dead in a matter of days if she is removed from this country. You see the story of a high schooler — I believe his name is Dylan — who went in, was following the law and the “process” legally, and then is taken right outside of a courthouse in New York City. You see the stories of men who are climbing — undocumented immigrants who are climbing trees in order to escape ICE, who are fully, like, in almost military garb, covering their faces. What are we supposed to call this, when you have masked agents with no identification taking people off streets and farms and corners and courthouses? You know, the question is, for those people who voted for Donald Trump: Are you satisfied? Does this make you feel like we are a better country because you’re seeing this? This is not sustainable.
And what Jeanette told me and kind of the new movement in terms of the sanctuary movement, which I’ve been covering since the 1980s — the new movement, the sanctuary movement, is not behind closed doors in a church. The new movement, the sanctuary movement, is people of conscience with American citizenship who can go and take the sanctuary movement to the streets. And this is where our country is going, Juan. It is a very desperate place, but then you see people like Jeanette Vizguerra, who — she’s holding her head high, even though she is in a very, very challenging situation in this ICE detention camp.
AMY GOODMAN: And I wanted to ask you about, well, related news, reports emerging of Trump’s so-called border czar Tom Homan earning at least $5,000 in fees for his consulting work for the private prison company GEO Group, which operates at least 16 jails or detention centers nationwide, a key contractor in carrying out Trump’s mass deportations. Homan has been at the head of Trump’s raids, mass detention, deportation agenda, and was acting director of ICE in the first Trump administration. And, yes, Jeanette Vizguerra is being held in a GEO Group jail. Maria?
MARIA HINOJOSA: And Tom Homan also served under Barack Obama. So, Tom Homan has been around for a long time. You know, I think that people who watch and listen to Democracy Now! are clear about the fact that you have privately run prisons. So you have a private prison industry that runs prisons and now actually is making their money — millions upon millions of dollars — by keeping people in a detention bed. That is how they make their profit. And if mass incarceration, because of activists, has decreased a little bit, mass detention is on the rise. The money that is going to be made by GEO, by CoreCivic, which used to be known as Corrections Corporation of America — they don’t want people to know that they are in the business of detention, so they just got rid of that name and call themselves CoreCivic. The American people need to understand that profit is being made by keeping a person in a detention bed. And how do they feel about this? And again, not just Tom Homan, but thousands of people are making money, making big bucks off of this. And this is totally distressing.
I’ll just tell you — I’ll give you one scene from the detention facility in Aurora. You walk into the entrance room, the kind of lobby area. Now, GEO is a billion-dollar company. You should have seen the pictures that they had on the wall in the little lobby area, trying to show that they are a great facility. You would expect from a multimillion-dollar corporation that they would have the best photographs about the best treatment that they’re offering. It was disgusting. They had a photograph of a wall of phones and said “expert communications available.” They had a picture of half of a basketball court, with all walls and just a skylight, this big. They’re like, “facilities for gymnastics and working out.” It was horrific, Amy. And so, this is what most people cannot get a chance to see, because they’re privately run, and they can just say, “We’re not going to let any reporters in ever,” and they can do that.
AMY GOODMAN: Maria Hinojosa, we want to thank you so much for being with us, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, founder of Futuro Media, host of Latino USA. We’ll link to the video and audio of your exclusive interview with the jailed immigrant rights activist Jeanette Vizguerra. We’ll also link to our interviews with Jeanette, the first time she went into sanctuary in 2017 in the Unitarian church in Denver. And we will continue to cover this story.
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Corporate Criminal”: Nadia Milleron, Whose Daughter Died in 737 Crash, Slams New DOJ-Boeing Deal By Amy Goodman Democracynow.org May 28, 2025
The Trump administration has reached a deal with the aerospace giant Boeing that will allow the company to pay $1.1 billion to avoid criminal prosecution for two deadly crashes of the company’s 737 MAX jet in 2018 and 2019, which together killed 346 people. Under the non-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, Boeing would pay fines and fund safety improvements while providing an additional $445 million for crash victims’ families, among other measures. The Justice Department says the deal is supported by many victims’ relatives, but some, like Nadia Milleron, say they want to keep pushing for a public reckoning in court. “We have a corporate criminal that committed the deadliest crime in U.S. history,” says Milleron, whose daughter Samya Rose Stumo was killed when Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, a Boeing 737 MAX, crashed in 2019. “Boeing is continuing to risk people’s lives.” Robert Weissman, the co-president of the consumer rights advocacy group Public Citizen, says the Trump administration’s deal with Boeing is another sign that it’s “soft on corporate criminals.”
Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.
We look now at a reported deal between the Trump administration and aerospace giant Boeing that will allow the company to pay $1.1 billion to avoid criminal prosecution for the two deadly crashes of the company’s 737 MAX jet in 2018 in Indonesia, and then in 2019 in Ethiopia, which killed together all 346 people on the two planes. The non-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department was announced Friday.
Under the deal, Boeing would pay fines and fund safety improvements and provide an additional $445 million for crash victims’ families. The DOJ said in a court filing Boeing would also agree to an independent, third-party compliance consultant, and the company’s board would be required to meet with families of the victims.
The DOJ claims about 110 victims’ families supported the deal, while a lawyer for other families promised to urge a judge to reject the deal, saying in a statement, quote, “This kind of non-prosecution deal is unprecedented and obviously wrong for the deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history.”
For more, we’re joined by Nadia Milleron. She is an aviation safety advocate whose daughter, Samya Rose Stumo, was killed along with 156 others when Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, a Boeing 737 MAX, crashed in 2019 in Ethiopia.
Nadia, welcome back to Democracy Now! I should also say you’re the niece of Ralph Nader and that your daughter was the grandniece of Ralph Nader. Talk about what your feelings are about this deal.
NADIA MILLERON: We have a corporate criminal that committed the deadliest crime in U.S. history, killing 346 people because of their fraud, lying to the FAA. And so, that corporate criminal wrote down a confession as part of the original DPA, the deferred prosecution agreement, and they said, “Yes, we did this. We lied to the FAA.” And then the judge said, “And those lies, that fraud, killed the 346 people.” And so, there would be no trial of any consequence. It would take a couple of minutes, because you already have a confession.
So, why are they letting off this corporate criminal, who continues to do the same behavior? The reason they violated the DPA is because they had so many violations against regulations and laws, and they were misrepresenting the safety of the plane. And then, just a few days before the deal ended, their term under the DPA, the deferred prosecution agreement, the Alaska Air blowout happened, and that showed the world — and the Department of Justice could not deny it — that Boeing was not taking care of their business. They were continuing their behavior to risk human life, just as they had done before.
So, we have a chance now. And we want the American people to stand up and say what it is that they believe, that they need to be defended by the Department of Justice, that the Department of Justice needs to take this to prosecution, that they should not give a pass to this corporate criminal, because Boeing is continuing to risk people’s lives.
And on June 23rd, the Department of Justice will presumably make a motion to dismiss before the judge in Fort Worth, Texas, Judge Reed O’Connor, and then we hope the judge will deny it. But the Department of Justice could always change their course before that time, and they should be urged to by the American people. And also, the judge can stand up for our population and passengers and crew on aircraft. And, in fact, we did appeal a previous ruling of his to the 5th Circuit in New Orleans, and the 5th Circuit said to Judge Reed O’Connor, “You look out for the public interest. You can do this. You can deny deals.” And he did deny the first deal that the Department of Justice tried to make with Boeing. He did deny it and say, “No, this is not good.” So they came up with a worse one. So, hopefully, he will deny it.
And, please, everybody, speak up, because what Pam Bondi is not seeing is that she or her loved ones can die on these defective planes. If you allow a company to keep making defective planes and to have no accountability or responsibility or consequences for their murders of all these people, then they’re going to keep going, and you can also die, and your loved ones can also die on that. She’s not immune from that. So, it’s really important to hold Boeing accountable.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Nadia, the Department of Justice said in its filing on Friday that 110 of the families of victims either supported the deal or did not oppose it. What’s your understanding of how the families of the victims are shaping up on this question?
NADIA MILLERON: So, many families in Indonesia never received previous payments from Boeing, so their lawyers, or whoever was in charge of those payments, they took the money. So, maybe those families are thinking that this is the only option for them to receive money. But that’s not the case. Judge Reed O’Connor, in adjudicating this case, can demand that Boeing pay them money. And that all should be straightened out. Whatever the reason is that they, in a second criminal action, didn’t receive their money that was due them, you know, that should be corrected. But it shouldn’t be corrected this way, by giving Boeing a pass for their crime.
In other words, what’s happening here, imagine somebody uses a machine gun and sprays down a bunch of people and kills them. OK, then they go to those victim families and say, “We’ll pay you money if you agree to a deal where I, as the murderer, don’t get prosecuted.” That doesn’t make any sense. That’s not a justice system. We shouldn’t allow that.
AMY GOODMAN: Nadia, before we go —
NADIA MILLERON: Most of the families agree that Boeing should be prosecuted. Two-thirds of the families agree.
AMY GOODMAN: Nadia, before we go, for our radio audience, you’re holding a picture of Samya next to your face, and behind you is pictures of so many of the victims. I wanted you just to remind us who Samya Rose Stumo was, why she was on that plane, one of so many stories, what, more than 300 people’s stories who died on those two MAX planes.
NADIA MILLERON: Well, most of the people on the Ethiopian plane were humanitarians. And Samya was a humanitarian going to Uganda. She was a happy warrior. She believed that data was power. And she knew that — she was tracking what the Gates Foundation, how their expenditures were happening in Uganda, and whether that money was really going to help real people. Samya would have saved so many people’s lives through healthcare in her lifetime. And we miss her terribly.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, Nadia Milleron, I want to thank you so much for being with us, aviation safety advocate whose daughter, Samya Rose Stumo, was killed along with 156 others on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. The Boeing 737 MAX crashed in 2019. In fact, Nadia Milleron ran for Congress from Massachusetts and is running again.
I want to bring into this conversation Rob Weissman, co-president of Public Citizen, who said this deal is, quote, “one of the most shocking lapses of criminal enforcement against a major corporation in memory. The Trump administration touts how it is tough on crime, but when it comes to the world’s most powerful institutions, it is an all-time patsy.” Rob Weissman, we also want to talk to you about the budget and that crypto dinner, and we only have a few minutes, but first respond to the DOJ’s deal holding Boeing not criminally responsible for the crashes.
ROBERT WEISSMAN: Right. Well, just to be clear about what happened, as Nadia was saying, Boeing entered a deal at the end of the first Trump administration, which itself was a sweetheart deal. They promised not to break the law again. They did. And now their reward is a deal that’s even softer than the original one that they entered into with the first Trump administration. It is unconscionable.
And it’s really useful to contrast this treatment of Boeing with the conversation you had in the first segment about what this administration is doing with undocumented people in this country. So, they’re criminalizing everyday people trying to get by, and they are historically soft on corporate criminals who are actually powerful and killing people. It is the most extreme contrast imaginable. It is the greatest abuse imaginable of the criminal justice system. And it’s what we’re going to be in for for the next three-and-a-half years, unless the people rise up and demand something really different.
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“Mt. Everest of Corruption”: Crypto Investors Buy Access to President; Trump Expands Bitcoin Holdings By Amy Goodman Democracynow.org May 28, 2025
We speak with Robert Weissman of Public Citizen about Donald Trump’s various conflicts of interest after Trump hosted a private dinner at his Virginia golf club for the 220 top buyers of his $TRUMP cryptocurrency. The Trump family has also announced it is expanding its holdings in cryptocurrencies, with the Trump tech startup set to raise $2.5 billion to invest in bitcoin. “There’s millions of losers for every few winners in the crypto game. Trump is rigging the rules to make sure he’s on the winning side, but regular people are going to be hurt,” says Weissman, who was among protesters outside Trump’s crypto dinner. He adds that the Trump family’s crypto business is part of an “overall authoritarian mission” to reward the rich and powerful by skirting the rules while bringing the full weight of the government down on immigrants, protesters and other voices of dissent.
Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, Rob, I want to go to another issue, about what’s being called “the Mount Everest of corruption,” how President Trump is personally profiting off the presidency through various crypto schemes. Last week, Trump hosted a private dinner at his Virginia golf club for the 220 top spenders on his $TRUMP memecoin. That’s one that has the dollar sign, then “Trump.” Altogether, the dinner attendees spent close to $400 million combined to gain access to Trump. I think it’s estimated it was about a $1 million-per-plate dinner.
This is Oregon Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley speaking at a protest outside.
SEN. JEFF MERKLEY: This is like the Mount Everest of corruption. Now, our founders were very worried about people buying influence with our country, because they knew you can’t have We the People government, if its government’s being sold to others.
AMY GOODMAN: This comes as the Trump family is continuing to expand its holdings in cryptocurrencies. On Tuesday, the parent company of Trump’s Truth Social platform announced plans to raise $2.5 billion to invest in bitcoin. The move could make the Trumps one of the largest corporate holders of bitcoin. So, Rob Weissman, if you can comment on all of this? You were outside that crypto dinner.
ROBERT WEISSMAN: Yeah, I was there with the senator. Today, JD Vance is going to be in Las Vegas talking to a crypto convention. The two Trump sons are going to be addressing that convention also. There is a swirl of money going around that has no precedent in all of American history. Trump and his family have estimated to have made $300 million or more dollars on crypto just in the first few months of the presidency. They’re likely to leave the four-year term having made billions cashing in on scams and fraud.
And it’s not just that it’s unethical. This corruption is part of an overall authoritarian mission. It is part of the non-prosecution system, where corporations are paying money, are sliding money to Trump through his crypto, to get excused from enforcement actions, including one of the biggest crypto holders in the country. It’s part of the authoritarian crackdown on immigration, where we see GEO Group, that you referenced before, trying to get money from the reconciliation bill we’re going to talk about in a second, which also previously employed Pam Bondi, the attorney general, as a consultant and lobbyist. There’s a combination of the corruption, the crackdown on undocumented people, the denial of speech and the massive giveaways to corporations that is all of a single story of this oligarchy and authoritarian move of the Trump administration.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Rob, there was a related issue in terms of the pardons that Trump has been issuing. The New York — the latest New York Times report shows that he pardoned a Paul Walczak, a nursing home executive who had pleaded guilty to tax crimes. And shortly after, Walczak’s mother attended a $1 million-per-person fundraising event at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate that promised face-to-face time with Trump. Here’s a guy who promised to drain the swamp and is actually putting the White House up for sale?
ROBERT WEISSMAN: It’s exactly what it seems. There’s a trucking company that bought some of the Trump meme. They didn’t buy enough, as it turned out, to get to the dinner, but they were explicit in their filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission that they were buying the currency to get access to the president to try to influence policy. That’s happening in broad daylight right now in Washington, D.C.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And in going back to this issue of the bitcoin, the reduced regulations on the bitcoin industry assure that all this money that’s being made, once Trump leaves office, very little of it will be able to be traced, isn’t it? That’s the big problem with bitcoin, that there’s no ability of any regulatory agency to follow where the money goes.
ROBERT WEISSMAN: Yeah, despite all the talk about how it’s going to transform the economy and rain wealth down on everybody, its single useful function has turned out to be for money laundering. And its other useful function is for scammers and grifters like the Trump family to manipulate markets, get rich. But when they’re getting rich, it is at the expense of losers. So, there’s millions of losers for every few winners in the crypto game. Trump is rigging the rules to make sure he’s on the winning side, but regular people are going to be hurt.
And as this system expands — and Congress is poised to let it expand right now — it’s really in danger of infecting the overall banking system. So, instead of being a small, weird grift that’s affecting millions of people, it may be something that actually introduces risk into the overall banking and financial system. And that itself is a product of all the money that crypto has spent on congressional races, including buying off some Democrats, who are now poised to vote for a bill legalizing some crypto operations that should not otherwise be legal.
AMY GOODMAN: You have in New York this developing story of two bitcoin bros arrested for kidnapping and torturing an Italian man in SoHo for weeks, holding him, torturing him to get his password. But I want to ask you, finally, about the budget, the GOP passing Trump’s sweeping budget bill that gives massive tax breaks to the rich while slashing spending for Medicaid, nutritional assistance, subsidies for clean energy, triggering massive cuts to Medicare. Rob, as we wrap up, how do you fit this into the level of the Mount Everest of corruption, what’s taking place? Now that bill is before the Senate.
ROBERT WEISSMAN: Right. So, this bill, if it moves forward, is going to be the biggest transfer of wealth in American history from regular people to the super rich. As you said, it’s going to be at the expense of clean energy, at the expense of giving billions of dollars to Pentagon contractors, including potentially Elon Musk, at the expense of billions of dollars for a police state immigration system, and at the expense of healthcare for millions of people. Why is it happening? It’s happening because of a corrupt political system where Republicans are trying to pay off their donors.
The most important thing for people to know about this, though, is it is not a done deal. There is a chance to stop this reconciliation package, this tax and budget package, from moving forward. Republicans are split among themselves about how to do it. And if there’s enough public pressure, this thing can be defeated. And it absolutely has to be defeated, because if it succeeds, it’s going to throw 14 million people off of healthcare, deny food assistance to millions more, and really make this country a less fair and just place, with painful consequences for many millions of Americans.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Rob, what do you advise, what does Public Citizen advise, as the — what Americans concerned about what is happening should be doing today?
ROBERT WEISSMAN: Well, this is not happening as fast as it may seem, the reconciliation thing, this tax and budget bill. It’s going to take months to get sorted out as the Republicans fight among themselves over tax breaks for whom or how vicious they want to be with their healthcare cuts. So there’s an opportunity for people to mobilize.
So, all the regular things of calling and emailing your members of Congress make a difference. And that’s true if you’ve got a Democratic member of Congress or a Republican member of Congress. There are going to be big national mobilizations around this. There’s going to be a big national mobilization under the banner of “No Kings” on June 14th. Those things, turning people out in the street, they’ve stopped the last effort in the first Trump administration to slash healthcare, and they can do it again this time. If we put enough people on the streets, put enough pressure on Congress, it will make a difference on this one.
AMY GOODMAN: June 14th is the day there will be a military parade in Washington, costing something like $20 million, President Trump’s 79th birthday?
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-916 (JDB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In our constitutional order, few stars are as fixed as the principle that no official “can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). And in our constitutional order, few actors are as central to fixing that star as lawyers.
This case arises from one of a series of executive orders targeting law firms that, in one way or another, did not bow to the current presidential administration’s political orthodoxy. Like the others in the series, this order—which takes aim at the global law firm Jenner & Block—makes no bones about why it chose its target: it picked Jenner because of the causes Jenner champions, the clients Jenner represents, and a lawyer Jenner once employed. Going after law firms in this way is doubly violative of the Constitution. Most obviously, retaliating against firms for the views embodied in their legal work—and thereby seeking to muzzle them going forward—violates the First Amendment’s central command that government may not “use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 188 (2024). More subtle but perhaps more pernicious is the message the order sends to the lawyers whose unalloyed advocacy protects against governmental viewpoint becoming government-imposed orthodoxy. This order, like the others, seeks to chill legal representation the administration doesn’t like, thereby insulating the Executive Branch from the judicial check fundamental to the separation of powers. It thus violates the Constitution and the Court will enjoin its operation in full.
Background
Jenner & Block is a 900-person litigation-focused law firm with offices in Chicago, Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Century City, San Francisco, and London. See Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [ECF No. 19-2] (“SUMF”) ¶¶ 1, 9. Its clients span a wide spectrum; what’s important to this case is that representing them requires frequently—dozens of times per month—appearing in federal court, entering federal buildings, interacting with federal employees, and the like. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 14–15, 18, 24, 26–27. Jenner also has a leading and diverse pro bono practice, having been rated the number one law firm for pro bono work by The American Lawyer 12 of the past 15 years. Id. ¶ 7.
As a prominent law firm, Jenner is no stranger to executive orders. But it has more experience representing their targets than being a target itself. Executive Order 14246 flipped the script. Issued on March 25, 2025 and titled “Addressing Risks from Jenner & Block,” Executive Order 14246 took aim at Jenner, singling out the firm for disfavored treatment. See 90 Fed. Reg. 13997 (Mar. 25, 2025) (“E.O.”) The order wastes no time saying why. Its first section begins by articulating the President’s view that many major law firms “take actions that threaten public safety and national security, limit constitutional freedoms, degrade the quality of American elections, or undermine bedrock American principles”—in large part “through their powerful pro bono practices.” E.O. § 1. Jenner, it says, is one such firm. According to the order, Jenner “undermine[s] . . . the interests of the United States” in three main ways: partisan case selection, pro bono representation the President dislikes, and past association with an attorney of whom the President disapproves. Id.
On partisanship, Section 1 accuses Jenner of “condon[ing] partisan ‘lawfare’” by “engag[ing] in obvious partisan representations to achieve political ends.” Id. It does not elaborate. On pro bono representation, Section 1 accuses Jenner of “support[ing] attacks against women and children based on a refusal to accept the biological reality of sex, and back[ing] the obstruction of efforts to prevent illegal aliens from committing horrific crimes and trafficking deadly drugs within our borders.” Id. Aside from its vague reference to Jenner’s “powerful pro bono practice[],” on this, too, the order is coy. Id. In context, however, the order refers to Jenner’s ongoing challenges to two other executive orders issued by this administration, one on behalf of transgender individuals and the other on behalf of asylum-seekers—both of which have resulted in favorable preliminary outcomes for Jenner’s clients. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 114–16; SUMF ¶¶ 66–69; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 20-1] (“MTD”) at 8 (confirming this understanding).1 And on attorney association, Section 1 laments that Jenner “was ‘thrilled’ to re-hire the unethical Andrew Weissmann.” E.O. § 1. Weissmann, a former federal prosecutor, was a partner at Jenner from 2006 to 2011 and from 2020 to 2021; he has not worked there since. See SUMF ¶ 58. In the interim, he served the federal government in various capacities, including investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election as a member of the team led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Id. ¶ 59. Weissmann’s participation on the Mueller team, plus his public criticism of President Trump—including, per Section 1, his “overt demand that the Federal Government pursue a political agenda against” President Trump, E.O. § 1, and his authorship of a nonfiction book critical of the President, SUMF ¶ 59—has drawn the President’s ire, see id. ¶¶ 60–62. And so Jenner’s relationship with Weissmann “is a concerning indictment of Jenner’s values and priorities.” E.O. § 1.
1 See PFLAG, Inc. v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 25-337 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2025); Refugee & Immigr. Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v. Noem, Civ. A. No. 25-306 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2025).
Separately (and briefly), the order accuses Jenner of “discriminat[ing] against its employees based on race and other categories prohibited by civil rights laws, including through the use of race-based ‘targets.’” E.O. § 1. Again, the order does not elaborate. An accompanying “fact sheet” says only: “Jenner has been accused of discriminating against its own employees on the basis of race and other categories.” Fact Sheet [ECF No. 19-23] at 2. Like the order itself, the fact sheet does not provide any evidence of the accusations or of their truth.
With that background set, the order’s four following sections direct action against Jenner with respect to security clearances (Section 2), government contracts (Section 3), antidiscrimination law enforcement (Section 4), and access to government buildings, personnel, and employment (Section 5).
Section 2, titled “Security Clearance Review,” instructs the Attorney General and other agency heads to “immediately take steps consistent with applicable law to suspend any active security clearances held by individuals at Jenner pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.” E.O. § 2(a). It also directs the Office of Management and Budget to “identify all Government goods, property, material, and services, including Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, provided for the benefit of Jenner,” and instructs agency heads to “expeditiously cease such provision.” E.O. § 2(b). The fact sheet makes clear that both actions are to happen “immediately.” Fact Sheet at 1.
Section 3, titled “Contracting,” seeks to end all contractual and subcontractual relationships connecting (however tenuously) Jenner and the federal government, in order “[t]o prevent the transfer of taxpayer dollars” to Jenner. E.O. § 3(a); see also Fact Sheet at 1 (“To ensure taxpayer dollars no longer go to contractors whose earnings subsidize activities not aligned with American interests.”). It instructs “Government contracting agencies” to “require Government contractors to disclose any business they do with Jenner and whether that business is related to the subject of the Government contract.” Id. With that information in hand, agency heads are to “review all contracts with Jenner or with entities that disclose doing business with Jenner,” “terminate any contract, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, . . . for which Jenner has been hired to perform any service,” and “otherwise align their agency funding decisions with the interests of the citizens of the United States.” E.O. § 3(b); see also Fact Sheet at 1 (“[T]he Federal Government will terminate contracts that involve Jenner.”).
Section 4, titled “Racial Discrimination,” is a bit more opaque. It instructs that the order shall not “be construed to limit the action authorized by section 4 of” an earlier executive order—one targeting Perkins Coie, another major law firm. E.O. § 4; see 90 Fed. Reg. 11781 (Mar. 6, 2025) (“Perkins Coie E.O.”). That order, in turn, instructed the chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to “review the practices of representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms for consistency with” antidiscrimination law. Perkins Coie E.O. § 4. Of course, it would be difficult to read this order to “limit” any action against Jenner. So the fact sheet confirms what Section 4 really means: “The practices of Jenner will be reviewed under Title VII to ensure compliance with civil rights laws against racial bias.” Fact Sheet at 2.2
2 The Perkins Coie order to which Section 4 refers has since been permanently enjoined. See Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Civ. A. No. 25-716 (BAH), 2025 WL 1276857, at *23–24, *49–51 (D.D.C. May 2,
Finally, Section 5, titled “Personnel,” takes aim at every Jenner employee. It instructs agency heads, “to the extent permitted by law, [to] provide guidance limiting official access [to] Federal Government buildings to employees of Jenner when such access would threaten the national security of or otherwise be inconsistent with the interests of the United States.” E.O. § 5(a). It instructs agency heads to “provide guidance limiting Government employees acting in their official capacity from engaging with Jenner employees, including but not limited to Andrew Weissmann”—not a Jenner employee, see SUMF ¶ 58—“to ensure consistency with the national security and other interests of the United States.” E.O. § 5(a). And it instructs agencies to “refrain from hiring employees of Jenner, including but not limited to Andrew Weissmann, absent a waiver from the head of the agency, made in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, that such hire will not threaten the national security of the United States.” E.O. § 5(b). The fact sheet confirms: “Federal Agencies will . . . refrain from hiring Jenner employees unless specifically authorized.” Fact Sheet at 1.
According to undisputed evidence in the record, the order quickly had its intended effect. Department of Justice lawyers instructed a Jenner client not to bring its counsel from Jenner to a meeting with the Department of Justice scheduled for April 3. SUMF ¶ 76. Many other clients have contacted Jenner with concerns about Jenner’s ability to represent them moving forward, “indicat[ing] that they will need to make decisions shortly” about their retention of the firm. Id. ¶¶ 74, 78. And more severe harms are in the offing. More than forty percent of Jenner’s revenue comes from government contractors, subcontractors, or affiliates, id. ¶ 83; the order puts that revenue at grave risk. 2025). Neither party suggests, however, that the Perkins Coie injunction would prevent Section 4 of this executive order from operating as intended.
Executive orders like this one have become something of a modus operandi for the President. Both before and after this order, the administration trained similar orders on other large law firms, including Covington & Burling; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP (“Paul Weiss”); Perkins Coie; WilmerHale; and Susman Godfrey.3 The orders follow the same recipe: other than personalized touches in their first sections, they generally direct the same adverse actions towards each firm and decry the threat each firm poses to national security and the national interest. It will not come as a spoiler that Jenner opted to sue. But not everyone did. Paul Weiss, for instance, negotiated. See Schmidt, Law Firm Bends in Face of Trump Demands, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2025) [ECF No. 19-16]; SUMF ¶ 49. The negotiation ended in “a remarkable change of course” from both Paul Weiss and the administration. 90 Fed. Reg. 13685 (Mar. 21, 2025) (“Second Paul Weiss E.O.”). According to the President, Paul Weiss “acknowledged the wrongdoing of its former partner” who, like Weissmann, had drawn the President’s anger, and agreed to “adopt[] a policy of political neutrality with respect to client selection and attorney hiring; tak[e] on a wide range of pro bono matters representing the full political spectrum; commit[] to merit-based hiring, promotion, and retention, instead of ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ policies”; and “dedicat[e] the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services,” id., “to support the Administration’s initiatives,” see Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 20, 2025, 3:10 PM) [ECF No. 19-17] at 2. In exchange, the administration revoked the executive order aimed at Paul Weiss. See Second Paul Weiss E.O. § 2.
3 See White House, Suspension of Security Clearances and Evaluation of Government Contracts (Feb. 25, 2025), https://perma.cc/8G3A-N82P (Covington); 90 Fed. Reg. 13039 (Mar. 14, 2025) (“First Paul Weiss E.O.”); 90 Fed. Reg. 11781 (Mar. 6, 2025) (Perkins Coie); 90 Fed. Reg. 14549 (Mar. 27, 2025) (WilmerHale); 90 Fed. Reg. 15615 (Apr. 15, 2025) (Susman Godfrey).
Other firms skipped straight to negotiations. Without ever receiving an executive order, these firms preemptively bargained with the administration and struck deals sparing them. The deals largely mirror Paul Weiss’s, though the price continues to rise: instead of $40 million, these firms have pledged $100 million or more in pro bono legal services the administration has a hand in choosing.4 And in public statements, the President has floated the prospect of deploying the firms to work on the administration’s own projects, rather than traditional pro bono causes, while acknowledging the firms’ lack of wrongdoing: “I agree, they’ve done nothing wrong,” the President said at a recent event. “[B]ut what the hell, they give me a lot of money considering they’ve done nothing wrong.” See Keith Goldberg, Trump Wants to Use Firms that Cut Deals for Coal Leases, Law360 (Apr. 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/8S72-2AJ5.5
Procedural History
Rather than negotiate, Jenner sued three days after the order’s issuance and sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) the same day. See Compl. [ECF No. 1]; Mot. TRO [ECF No. 2]. The complaint challenged the executive order in its entirety and raised 13 counts: violations of the First Amendment six times over; violations of due process thrice over; a violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ protections of the right to counsel; and a violation of the separation of powers. See Compl. ¶¶ 140–253.
4 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 28, 2025, 10:57 AM) [ECF No. 19-27] (Skadden Arps); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Apr. 1, 2025, 1:47 PM) [ECF No. 19-28] (Willkie Farr & Gallagher); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Apr. 2, 2025, 11:05 AM) [ECF No. 19-29] (Milbank).
5 In addition to Jenner, three firms have challenged similar executive orders in court. Each order has been either permanently enjoined, see Perkins Coie, 2025 WL 1276857, or temporarily enjoined in large part pending final resolution, see Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, Civ. A. No. 25-917 (RJL), 2025 WL 946979 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025); Temporary Restraining Order, Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, ECF No. 15, Civ. A. No. 25-1107 (LLA) (Apr. 15, 2025).
The TRO motion raised the same sweeping arguments but sought narrower relief more tailored to Jenner’s immediate harm, asking the Court to temporarily enjoin Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the order. See Mot. TRO at 3. Following a hearing held the same day, the Court largely obliged. The Court concluded that Jenner’s challenge would likely succeed because the order “retaliates against [Jenner] for its protected speech” and “constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination”—problems that were “magnified by the order’s additional Fifth and Sixth Amendment deficiencies” reflected in its attempts to undermine “the essential role that lawyers play in our polity.” TRO Hr’g Tr. [ECF No. 10] at 46, 48, 50. It then found that Jenner faced imminent and irreparable harm: the order’s economic impacts “threaten[ed] the existence of the firm,” id. at 51, and its constitutional impacts “deprive[d] Jenner of its First Amendment freedoms,” id. at 53 (citing Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). And the public interest and balance of the equities easily favored relief, as “the legal profession as a whole [was] watching and wondering” whether “the federal government [would] turn its unwanted attention to them next.” Id. at 54–55.
Accordingly, the Court entered a TRO restraining the defendants from enforcing Sections 3 or 5 of the executive order and from using the statements in Section 1 to punish Jenner, its clients, or its employees. See Order Granting TRO [ECF No. 9]. By consent of the parties, the TRO has remained in place pending final judgment. See Joint Status Report [ECF No. 13]. The defendants then moved to dismiss, while the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and a permanent injunction. See MTD; Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 19] (“MSJ”). The Court held a hearing on April 28, and now resolves the competing dispositive motions.
Standards
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss; Jenner filed a motion for summary judgment. The traditional difference between these two types of motions is the discovery that follows the one and enables the other. See Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[S]ummary judgment is premature unless all parties have ‘had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.’” (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986))). Here, though, both parties “agreed that they do not anticipate needing discovery,” see Joint Status Report, and the defendants submitted evidence of their own in response to Jenner’s motion for summary judgment, see Decl. of Richard Lawson [ECF No. 95-2]. Since the defendants have “responded to the submission of exhibits with evidence of [their] own,” Pintro v. Wheeler, 35 F. Supp. 3d 47, 52 n.5 (D.D.C. 2014), and had an opportunity “to either conduct discovery or come forward with additional evidence” to the extent they wished, Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court will construe the defendants’ motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.
That leaves the parties with dueling cross-motions for summary judgment. In that posture, each party receives the benefit of favorable factual inferences for purposes of the other party’s motion. See N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and either movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If it prevails, Jenner seeks a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. In addition to a meritorious case, securing a permanent injunction requires Jenner to have (1) irreparable injury that it will suffer absent injunctive relief; (2) no available remedy at law, such as monetary damages, adequate to compensate its injury; and (3) an upper hand considering the balance of hardships and the public interest. See Anatol Zukerman & Charles Krause Reporting, LLC v. USPS, 64 F.4th 1354, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (explaining that the inquiries into the balance of hardships and public interest merge when the government is the defendant).
I. The executive order violates Jenner’s First Amendment rights.
The challenged executive order targets Jenner for what it has said and thereby attempts to dampen what it might yet say. That is unconstitutional under any view of the First Amendment, but two additional features of this order magnify its offensiveness to the freedoms the First Amendment guarantees: its viewpoint discrimination and its targeting of lawyers in particular. And none of the order’s sections can be salvaged by the Executive Branch’s discretion in guarding the nation’s secrets (Section 2); in contracting (Section 3); in investigating discrimination (Section 4); or in landlording and hiring (Section 5).
A. The executive order retaliates for and seeks to silence Jenner’s protected speech.
Jenner’s primary claim—and its most straightforward winner—is the First Amendment retaliation claim. To prevail, Jenner “must show (1) that it engaged in protected conduct, (2) that the government took some retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from speaking again, and (3) that there exists a causal link between the exercise of a constitutional right and the adverse action taken against him.” Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). At prong three, “[t]he improper motive must be a but-for cause of the government action, meaning that the adverse action . . . would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Reps. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 45 F.4th 324, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The first two prongs are easy. Begin with an area of significant agreement: of the activity for which Section 1 denounces Jenner, nearly all enjoys robust First Amendment protection. This elementary and unchallenged point need not occupy much space. Jenner’s “partisan representations to achieve political ends,” E.O. § 1, is another way of saying courtroom advocacy on behalf of its chosen causes—that is, the very core of the First Amendment’s protection of “litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association.” In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978); see also, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Litigation itself is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.”), abrogated on other grounds by Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29–33 (1984).6 The same goes for Jenner’s pro bono representation of transgender people and asylum-seekers. See E.O. § 1 (“refusal to accept the biological reality of sex” and “obstruction of efforts to prevent illegal aliens from committing horrific crimes and trafficking deadly drugs”). Whether best captured by the “freedom of speech, petition or assembly,” this is precisely the sort of “vigorous advocacy . . . against governmental intrusion,” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963), that has long “made lawyerdom proud,” Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 4 (1952). As for Jenner’s employment of Weissmann, it is evidently Weissmann’s criticisms of the President and participation in a legitimate investigation of election interference that drew presidential disdain; and it is Jenner’s erstwhile association with Weissmann that extended that disdain to the firm. But Weissmann’s activity falls easily within the First Amendment’s muscular protection for “criticism of government and public officials,” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964), and that criticism can no more bring Jenner into the administration’s crosshairs than it can bring Weissmann himself into the administration’s crosshairs, cf. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Government cannot constitutionally punish individual or group advocacy of any position, unless it amounts to incitement to lawless action.”) And that criticism can no more bring Jenner into the administration’s crosshairs than it can bring Weissmann himself into the administration’s crosshairs, cf. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Government cannot constitutionally punish individual or group advocacy of any position, unless it amounts to incitement to lawless action.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
6 It matters not whether Jenner is in fact a “partisan” actor, or whether its litigation activity expresses its own views or simply channels the interests of its clients. What matters is the administration’s motive, whether resting on fact or falsehood. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U.S. 266, 271–73 (2016).
The second prong poses no more difficulty. Usually, figuring out whether retaliation would chill a speaker of ordinary firmness—and ascertaining just how much a speaker would have to trim her advocacy to avoid reprisal—requires some guesswork.7 Not here. The serial executive orders targeting law firms have produced something of an organic experiment, control group and all, for how firms react to the orders and how they might escape them. Over the course of that experiment, several firms of (presumably) ordinary firmness have folded rather than face similar executive orders. Indeed, it appears to take extraordinary firmness to resist. And the experiment has shown what folding entails: compromising speech. See, e.g., Second Paul Weiss E.O. § 1 (Paul Weiss agreeing to “adopt[] a policy of political neutrality,” accept pro bono matters “representing the full political spectrum,” and dedicate $40 million in pro bono services to causes of which the President approves). The third prong—the “causal link between the exercise of a constitutional right and the adverse action,” Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2016)—requires more analysis. Section 1 of the order leaves no question that there is some causal link, as that section proudly identifies Jenner’s protected activity as a reason—indeed, the primary reason—Jenner has earned 7 That said, the bar is not a high one. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[A]s the Supreme Court has noted, the First Amendment protects government employees from ‘even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . . when intended to punish her for exercising her free speech rights.” (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 n.8 (1990))). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 13 of 52 14 the President’s disdain. And the defendants make no attempt to dispel the impression that Section 1 leaves, as they in fact double down on Section 1’s accusations in their briefing. See, e.g., MTD at 8–9 (defendants highlighting that Jenner “does not and cannot seriously contest” that it “is providing pro bono representation in a challenge to the President’s executive order designed to protect children from chemical and surgical mutilation” or that it “hosted an event interviewing” Weissmann). To prevail on its retaliation claim, however, Jenner must show not only that its speech was a cause of the executive order but that it was a but-for cause. That requires showing that the order would not have issued “absent the retaliatory motive.” Comm. on Ways & Means, 45 F.4th at 340. If the defendants can point to unprotected activity that would have justified the same actions, then the factfinder at trial, not the Court at summary judgment, would have to resolve that credibility dispute. See, e.g., Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1994). This final showing is complicated by the one aspect of Section 1’s accusations the First Amendment leaves unprotected: discrimination. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976). So the defendants attempt to save sections 3 and 4 of the order by clinging to Jenner’s supposedly discriminatory employment practices, insisting that they would have taken the steps those sections direct even absent any retaliatory motive.8 And they attempt to save 8 This is a generous construction of the defendants’ argument. Apparently not eager to face a jury, they disclaim any “genuine issues of material fact that would necessitate a trial.” See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SUMF [ECF No. 95-1] at 1. So they style most of this argument not as a factual dispute but as a legal argument that the First Amendment disappears or retreats to mere rationality review so long as the defendants identify any non-retaliatory motive at all, leaving no need to assess the retaliatory motive. See MTD at 17. For this they cite McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which upheld against Establishment Clause challenge a state law requiring certain businesses to close on Sundays because the laws were justified by legitimate purposes like “providing a Sunday atmosphere of recreation, cheerfulness, repose and enjoyment.” Id. at 442, 448. There is a long answer and a short answer. The long answer would observe that McGowan says no such thing; that McGowan in fact concluded that the challenged Sunday-closure laws had evolved away from their religious origins, id. at 433–34; that they now held “a secular rather than [] a religious character” such that they no Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 14 of 52 15 Section 2’s security-clearance suspension by vague reference to national security, another facially legitimate motive. These are doubtful propositions given the order’s persistent emphasis on Jenner’s speech and comparatively scanty treatment of discrimination and security concerns. But this is summary judgment, and the Court is not a jury; it cannot weigh competing motives via word count. Instead, the Court must determine whether Jenner prevails as a matter of law. So it will investigate whether “non-retaliatory grounds are in fact []sufficient to provoke the adverse consequences” prescribed by any of the order’s sections. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).9 Keep in mind, however, that this is no run-of-the-mill retaliation case, for several reasons bearing mention. Although retaliation connotes retrospective punishment, its greatest danger lies in its prospective silencing effect: “The reason why . . . retaliation offends the Constitution is that longer bore any “relationship to establishment of religion,” id. at 444; and that it was only after concluding that “the core values of the Establishment Clause [were] not at stake,” Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 292 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1972), that the Supreme Court applied the rational-basis standard that the government so desires here, see Woodson v. Attorney General, 990 F.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (relying on McGowan to apply rational basis to an equal protection claim involving no fundamental right). The short answer is that the First Amendment is asked every day to shield speech against laws with legitimate purposes. The classic formulation of strict scrutiny in the First Amendment context, after all, asks whether a law is “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests”; intermediate scrutiny, too, compares the “important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech” to the amount of speech burdened. TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57, 67 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). A First Amendment that disappears in the face of governmental interests would be both impotent and foreign to American jurisprudence. So it will come as no surprise that the law is not as the defendants see it, and that the First Amendment is not so easily circumvented. In fact, “the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose” is not enough to save government action “which, on its face, discriminates based on content”—let alone viewpoint, which, as the Court will explain, this order does. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991); Frederick Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2023). 9 Jenner would have the Court skip this section-by-section analysis and view the order “as a single, integrated document.” Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Defs.’ MTD [ECF No. 94] at 23. The Court agrees that retaliatory motive infects the entire order and that the entire order—accounting for the array of tools it brings to bear against Jenner—is the relevant adverse action that must suffice to chill a speaker of ordinary firmness (though any of the sections would suffice standing alone). But it is difficult to discern whether non-retaliatory reasons justify the actions taken without analyzing the actions taken, and that requires a dive into each operative section. In any event, the Court is unpersuaded by Jenner’s contention that the order’s sections “are not severable,” id. at 22–23, because the President “intended the . . . order to stand or fall as a whole,” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999). The order directs a number of distinct actions, none of which depend on the others for their operation. So the President would likely have wanted as much of the order to survive as possible even if some of it must fall. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 15 of 52 16 it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998); see also, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . protect[s] unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression.”). That forward-looking threat looms especially large here, not only for other law firms but for Jenner itself. The administration has shown a repeated willingness to haggle, sending the message loud and clear that Jenner can spare itself—if it compromises its speech. So whereas retaliation usually punishes once and moves along, the retaliation here is ongoing and avoidable. In this context, retaliation amounts to something akin to the impermissible “scheme of informal censorship” that arises when government actors use the “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion to achieve the suppression of disfavored speech.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 188–89 (cleaned up). Such threats present an especially harmful sort of retaliation, analogous to (though less absolute than) the prior restraints that are “the most serious and the least tolerable” of all First Amendment violations. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). Then there is the fact that we deal here with lawyers. In this context, the forward-looking censorship scheme threatens not only the First Amendment but also the right to counsel’s promise of a conflict-free attorney “devoted solely to the interests of his client.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 86–87 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). A firm fearing or laboring under an order like this one feels pressure to avoid arguments and clients the administration disdains in the hope of escaping government-imposed disabilities. Meanwhile, a firm that has acceded to the administration’s demands by cutting a deal feels the same pressure to retain “the President’s ongoing approval.” Br. of Legal Ethics Profs. as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Pl. [ECF No. 113] at 6. Either way, the order pits firms’ “loyal[ty] to client interests” against a competing interest in Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 16 of 52 17 pleasing the President. See Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 811 F.3d 22, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Constitution shields clients from lawyers caught in such a “struggle to serve two masters.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). That this order targets lawyers magnifies its threat to the Constitution in other ways, too. Lawyers and the firms they comprise are not, it goes without saying, immune from the legitimate exercise of state power. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77–78 (1984). But neither is the Constitution blind to lawyers’ importance in upholding our democracy. Indeed, at least four constitutional amendments afford counsel-specific protection in view of the “foundation[al]” nature of the right to counsel. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012); see U.S. Const. amends. I, V, VI, XIV.10 This is because “[t]he right to sue and defend in the courts” is “the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government.” Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Our society has entrusted lawyers with something of a monopoly on the exercise of this foundational right—on translating real-world harm into courtroom argument. Sometimes they live up to that trust; sometimes they don’t. But in all events, their independence is essential lest they shrink into “nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment.” Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 138 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). For that reason, Executive Order 14246 implicates also the Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees of the “right to choose counsel without interference by officialdom.” Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144–46 (2006). Section 5 of the order in particular—with its threatened (and, in at least one case, consummated) bar of Jenner employees from, say, negotiating with 10 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152–53 (1990); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006); see also Perkins Coie, 2025 WL 1276857, at *41–43. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 17 of 52 18 federal prosecutors and agencies and even entering federal courthouses—could hamstring Jenner’s ability to represent its clients, and thus its clients’ right to choose Jenner without interference. So the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments speak in unison here, all eyeing skeptically the administration’s attempt “to stifle any voice” Jenner and its clients “might wish to raise before the courts in protest.” Am. Airways Charters, 746 F.2d at 876. Next, there is the interdependence of bench and bar. “An informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). So limitations on lawyers’ speech must be examined with care, as such limitations threaten not only the lawyers and their clients but also the ability of a coequal branch of government to function. Cf. Penson, 488 U.S. at 82 (noting that a lawyer’s failure “deprived the court of the assistance of an advocate” of its own).11 Official attempts to “draw lines around” lawyers’ advocacy and thereby “exclude from litigation those arguments and theories [the President] finds unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider” threaten a deep and irreparable rift in the constitutional order because they seek “to insulate the Government’s [acts] from judicial inquiry.” Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 546. When the government draws legal scrutiny, its response must be to defend itself in court, not to intimidate those who would force it to do so.12 11 Of course, there are certain contexts in which lawyers’ speech may be curtailed in ways that would be unacceptable outside, say, a courtroom. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (Op. of Rehnquist, C.J.) (“It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.”); id. at 1081–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Lawyers are officers of the court and, as such, may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally protected speech.”). This case presents nothing like the circumstances where the “right of lawyers to free speech” can “conflict” with “the right of litigants to fair trials.” Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975). Far from ensuring the integrity of the legal process, this order attempts to deter law firms from offering their services to disfavored clients and from making disfavored arguments. “[W]e should be extremely skeptical about any” action in this vein. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 187 (quoting Chicago Council of Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 258). 12 But see Presidential Memorandum, Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court (Mar. 22, 2025) (directing the Attorney General to, among other things, “review conduct by attorneys or their law firms in Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 18 of 52 19 Last, the order targets Jenner not merely for the fact of its speech but for the specific views it expresses thereby. It is Jenner’s “partisan representations,” its “support[]” and “back[ing]” for transgender people and asylum-seekers, and its tenuous connection to “a political agenda against me”—that is, against President Trump—that drew this executive order. E.O. § 1. The order thus engages in the “egregious form of content discrimination” known as “viewpoint discrimination,” making its inconsistency with the First Amendment “all the more blatant.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see also, e.g., Frederick Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“viewpoint discrimination is poison” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In short, the order raises constitutional eyebrows many times over. It punishes and seeks to silence speech “at the very center of the First Amendment,” Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991); does so via the most “egregious form of content discrimination—viewpoint discrimination,” Vidal v. Elster, 602 U.S. 286, 293 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted); all in an unacceptable attempt to “insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry,” Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 546. The remainder of this opinion will investigate whether the order—or any of its sections—can nevertheless survive. litigation against the Federal Government over the last 8 years” for purported “misconduct” and recommend responses “including reassessment of security clearances held by the attorney, termination of any contract for which the relevant attorney or law firm has been hired to perform services, or any other appropriate actions”). This is not the first time powerful government officials have attempted to silence lawyers and thereby cut off the courts as an avenue of redress for unconstitutional action. “In too many countries and instances to name, regimes have disbarred, prosecuted and jailed lawyers who dared to represent opposition figures or challenge government actions, with predictable results for the rule of law and the integrity of the legal profession.” Br. of Amici Curiae 807 Law Firms in Supp. of Pl. [ECF No. 105] at 4. And while most examples might come from abroad, there are also cautionary tales from within our borders—for instance, southern states’ targeting of civil rights lawyers during the civil rights movement and the ACLU’s initial reluctance to represent Fred Korematsu for fear of angering President Roosevelt. See Br. of Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law & Equality, et al. in Supp. of Pl. [ECF No. 104] at 2–3, 5–7; Br. of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund., Inc. in Supp. of Pl. [ECF No. 109] at 2–11. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 19 of 52 20 B. Section 2: Security Clearance Review. Section 2(a) directs the Attorney General and other relevant officials to “immediately take steps consistent with applicable law to suspend any active security clearances held by individuals at Jenner pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.” E.O. § 2(a). The fact sheet confirms that suspensions will happen “immediately.” Fact Sheet at 1. Suspensions will impact Jenner employees both in their work for Jenner and outside of it: three Jenner employees possess or are awaiting adjudication of security clearances in connection with ongoing military service unrelated to their work at the firm; at least six others hold clearances related to their work at the firm; and another is currently applying for a clearance to enable pro bono representation of a federal criminal defendant. SUMF ¶ 38–42. Jenner “regularly” handles cases that require access to classified information, including two currently underway. SUMF ¶ 81. This section’s directives have already begun to take effect and impact Jenner attorneys’ ability to represent criminal defendants. See Notice of Recent Development [ECF No. 137]. i. Jenner’s challenge to Section 2 is justiciable. Jenner’s challenge to this provision encounters an immediate obstacle: courts may not second-guess “an Executive Branch decision to deny or revoke a security clearance.” Lee v. Garland, 120 F.4th 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Such decisions, the D.C. Circuit held just last year, are non-justiciable political questions because they belong exclusively to the Executive Branch, id. at 891, and because they lack judicially manageable standards, turning as they do on “‘predictive judgments’ about whether individuals are likely to divulge sensitive information” and whether individuals possess “intangible qualities such as ‘loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment,’” id. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 20 of 52 21 at 893 (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. 40245, 40250 (Aug. 2, 1995)). “The grant of a security clearance to a particular employee,” in sum, is “a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call” bound up with “concerns of national security” and thus “committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). In the same breath, though, Lee made clear that a dispute is not rendered nonjusticiable “simply because it tangentially relates to a security clearance.” 120 F.4th at 892. For instance, the D.C. Circuit held justiciable constitutional challenges to the “methods used to gather information” for clearance decisions and thus reviewed an argument that the Fifth Amendment prohibited asking clearance applicants about their use of illegal drugs or their mental health. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1993). And the D.C. Circuit also held justiciable Title VII retaliation claims involving security-clearance revocation resulting from a government employee’s knowing provision of false information. Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In short, while the merits of any individual security clearance decision are unreviewable, courts may hear “constitutional claims arising from the clearance revocation process.” El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). This balance is not unique to the security clearance context. Courts may probe (if with a light touch) other processes that culminate in “non-justiciable . . . determinations,” such as the President’s assessment that a certain transaction “threatens to impair the national security of the United States” and thus must be blocked under the Defense Production Act of 1950. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 303, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Despite the sensitive national-security context and the concession that courts may not question the presidential determination that a transaction would threaten national security, the Ralls court held that it Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 21 of 52 22 could investigate the process behind the determination: “whether the Due Process Clause entitles” a would-be transactor “to have notice of, and access to, the evidence on which the President relied and an opportunity to rebut that evidence before he reaches his non-justiciable (and statutorily unreviewable) determinations”—a question the court answered in the affirmative. Id. at 314, 316; accord El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Section 2(a) is susceptible to characterization as either a merits determination or a process. In one sense, its immediate revocation of all security clearances held by Jenner employees is “an Executive Branch decision to . . . revoke a security clearance.” Lee, 120 F.4th at 891. On the other hand, it enacts what Jenner aptly dubs a “bespoke,” “Jenner-specific” “suspension-and-review process.” Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Defs.’ MTD [ECF No. 94] (“MTD Opp’n”) at 23, 25; see El-Ganayni, 591 F.3d at 183 (claim “that the decision to suspend and then revoke [a] security clearance was made in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights” was a reviewable process-based claim). At the first step, the order immediately revokes all clearances without individualized explanation, consideration, or opportunity to be heard; at the second, it permits reinstatement upon “a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.” E.O. § 2(a). Reviewing this process raises none of the concerns that make individual security-clearance determinations nonjusticiable. The immediate and blanket suspension involves no “predictive judgment[s]” about an “individual[’s]” threat to national security—indeed it doesn’t even permit them. See Lee, 120 F.4th at 893 (emphasis added) (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 528–29). And reviewing the suspension does not override decisions “made by trained Security Division personnel,” which is the only sort of decision the “absolute bar on judicial review Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 22 of 52 23 covers.” Rattigan, 689 F.3d at 768; see Egan, 484 U.S. at 529 (“[p]redictive judgment[s]” about who can be trusted with classified information “must be made by those with the necessary expertise”). Instead, Jenner only asks this Court to question the special suspend-then-review process the order imposes on a categorical basis. Refusing to do so would equally bless blanket security-clearance suspensions for all Muslims, Catholics, or disabled people. Cf. Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 875 F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Tatel, J., concurring) (a claim “that the government has a policy or practice of treating Muslims or naturalized citizens differently . . . , like the claims at issue in Greenberg, would not be barred”). The Constitution does not tolerate such judicial abdication. So Jenner’s claim does not ask a political question; it asks a legal one. Accord Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Civ. A. No. 25-716 (BAH), 2025 WL 1276857, at *19–22 (D.D.C. May 2, 2025) (reaching same conclusion). ii. Section 2(a) impermissibly aims to manipulate speech. On the merits, there’s no doubt that the President ordered the Jenner-specific process in retaliation for Jenner’s protected speech. But, given the national security importance of security clearances, that alone may not be enough to deem Section 2 unconstitutional. Any review of a security-clearance process must afford significant deference to the Executive’s assessment of what processes will best allow it to make the predictive national security judgments necessary. See Greenberg, 983 F.2d at 290. And for that reason, discriminating on the basis of speech and belief, verboten almost everywhere else, is routine in the security-clearance context. See, e.g., Lee, 120 F.4th at 893 (“Clearance decisions involve an assessment of intangible qualities such as ‘loyalty to the United States.’” (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. at 40250)); cf. Aref, 833 F.3d at 260–61 (permissible to consider a prisoner’s “language used during [a] prayer meeting” where it bore on Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 23 of 52 24 a “legitimate security interest” related to prisoner’s place of confinement). So the conclusion that Section 2 retaliates for speech doesn’t sting quite the same in this context as in others. Jenner’s challenge to Section 2, however, clears this additional hurdle. To begin, Section 2’s process implicates no national security concern to speak of. Security clearance decisions merit judicial deference because of their deep importance to the national security. See, e.g., Greenberg, 983 F.2d at 296 (Sentelle, J., concurring); Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (presumption of judicial review of agency action “runs aground when it encounters concerns of national security”); Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 498 F. Supp. 3d 104, 112 (D.D.C. 2020) (noting the “national security concerns animating” security clearance deference). But as far as national security justification, all the defendants have to offer is that Jenner’s “public praise for” and rehiring of Weissman after his “role in the Mueller investigation” shows a “national security nexus” supporting Section 2(a). Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 95] (“MSJ Opp’n”) at 6. This speech-based justification doesn’t even feign at national security, nor do the defendants articulate a cogent argument that it does. Weissmann hasn’t worked at Jenner in four years, and the defendants offer no reason that a firm’s “public praise for” a figure the administration dislikes could generate a national security need to subject every employee of that firm to a special (and skewed) security clearance review process.13 Note too that Section 2 permits reinstatement of Jenner employees’ security clearances only as consistent with “the national interest,” E.O. § 2(a)—a far broader term than national security, and something that Section 1 already concluded Jenner “undermine[s],” E.O. § 1. And if any doubt remains as to the sincerity of the invocation of national security, take a look at the Paul Weiss saga. Paul 13 Twenty-seven former high-level government officials agree that the order invokes “no valid national security concern” and that any gestures towards national security merely provide cover for a “punitive, retributive, ad hominem order.” See Br. of Former Senior Gov’t Officials as Amici Curiae Supp. Pl. [ECF No. 98] at 1–2. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 24 of 52 25 Weiss’s executive order imposed the same tailored process on its employees’ security clearances. See First Paul Weiss E.O. § 2. What it took to escape that process—denouncing a former partner, changing client selection and hiring practices, and pledging pro bono work to the President’s liking—had not even a glancing relationship to national security. Put simply, this blunderbuss of an order does not engage in the sort of “legitimate consideration of speech,” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012), that might sometimes be necessary to keep classified information in safe hands. Rather than ensuring that national secrets remain with those who will keep them, Section 2’s process “seek[s] to leverage” the Executive’s control over security clearances as a way to change speech. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2013). Section 2, in other words, is about using another lever in the President’s arsenal to extinguish speech he dislikes. Cf. id. at 218 (“This case is not about the Government’s ability to enlist the assistance of those with whom it already agrees. It is about compelling a grant recipient to adopt a particular belief as a condition of funding.”). The First Amendment forbids that sort of speech manipulation by the government, even in an arguably national security-related setting. iii. Section 2(b) violates the First Amendment. Section 2(b) received almost no attention from the parties and warrants only brief discussion here. It does either a great deal or very little. Either way it violates the First Amendment. Situated under the same “Security Clearance Review” heading as Section 2(a), Section 2(b) reads: The Office of Management and Budget shall identify all Government goods, property, material, and services, including Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, provided for the benefit of Jenner. The heads of agencies providing Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 25 of 52 26 such material or services shall, to the extent permitted by law, expeditiously cease such provision. E.O. § 2(b). Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs, are secure rooms used to view classified information. Construed broadly and out of context, this directive has a breathtaking sweep, as it could exclude Jenner from all government-provided “services” and “property.” (The Postal Service? The Library of Congress?) If understood in this manner, Section 2(b) would be more similar to Section 5 than to Section 2(a), and would violate the First Amendment as plainly as Section 5 violates it. See infra § I.E. Both parties, however, agree that Section 2(b) is best read much more narrowly and with its context in mind.14 On this reading, Section 2(b) revokes Jenner’s access to SCIFs and other similar mechanisms and materials of the security state. If this is so, Jenner’s challenge to Section 2(b) prevails for the same reasons its challenge to Section 2(a) prevails.
C. Section 3: Contracting. Section 3, recall, aims “[t]o prevent the transfer of taxpayer dollars to Federal contractors whose earnings subsidize, among other things, activities that are not aligned with American interests.” E.O. § 3(a). To achieve this goal, Section 3 prescribes three steps. The first ferrets out any contractual connection, however tenuous, between Jenner and the federal government by instructing “Government contracting agencies” to “require Government contractors to disclose any business they do with Jenner and whether that business is related to the subject of the Government contract.” Id. 14 See Tr. of Mots. Hr’g [ECF No. 118] at 20–21; Tr. of Mots. Hr’g, Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., ECF No. 169 at 50, Civ. A. No. 25-716 (Apr. 24, 2025). But see United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 581 (1971) (“We cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights.” (cleaned up) (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438)). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 26 of 52 27 The second step severs some of those connections and insinuates that agencies must sever the rest. Agency heads shall “terminate any contract . . . for which Jenner has been hired to perform any service.” Id. § 3(b)(i). Such contracts could involve Jenner as a government subcontractor or in a capacity adverse to the government, as many of Jenner’s government-contractor clients hire Jenner to “avoid or resolve contract disputes with the U.S. Government.” SUMF ¶ 25. The second step also calls for agency heads to “otherwise align their agency funding decisions with the interests of the citizens of the United States.” E.O. § 3(b)(ii). This instruction threatens to sever ties with contractors that do business with Jenner unrelated to their government work. The third step ensures follow-through. Within a month of the order, agencies were instructed to report back with “an assessment of contracts with Jenner or with entities that do business with Jenner . . . and any actions taken with respect to those contracts.” Id. i. Jenner has standing to challenge Section 3 and its challenge is ripe. The defendants first question Jenner’s standing to challenge Section 3. See MTD at 18. Standing “asks whether a case pairs a proper plaintiff with a proper defendant,” Indus. Energy Consumers of Am. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 1156, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring), requiring that Jenner (1) have suffered or be at imminent risk of suffering an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendants’ challenged conduct and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff, 23 F.4th 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). Jenner does not have any direct contracts with the federal government, see Tr. of Mots. Hr’g [ECF No. 118] at 28, so Section 3 operates on Jenner through third-party government contractors that have hired Jenner. Briefly stated, Jenner’s theory of standing is that government Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 27 of 52 28 contractors will jettison Jenner—both as to government contracts and as to unrelated ones—in an effort to keep their own government business. See MTD Opp’n at 30. Because approximately forty percent of Jenner’s revenue comes from representation of government contractors, subcontractors, or affiliates, SUMF ¶ 83, the loss of even a fraction of this business would inflict no small injury on Jenner. The defendants first argue that any fear of injury “at this point [is] purely speculative.” See MSJ Opp’n at 15. Though styled as a contention that Jenner’s challenge is unripe, the argument sounds more in imminence. Cf. Indus. Energy Consumers of Am., 125 F.4th at 1164–65 (Henderson, J., concurring) (discussing the interplay between Article III standing and prudential ripeness). Either way it is unpersuasive, as the threat Section 3 poses is clear and imminent. Before the TRO froze much of the order, Jenner’s clients, many of whom “hold significant government contracts and subcontracts,” began “requesting frequent updates about the Order’s status to evaluate whether the Firm can continue to represent them” and “indicated that they will need to make decisions shortly.” SUMF ¶ 74. In other words, they must decide “shortly” whether to keep their contracts and lose Jenner or keep Jenner and risk losing their contracts. Assuming they choose the former, Jenner will be injured imminently. But will they choose the former? Seizing on the standing doctrine’s general skepticism of “speculation about the decisions of independent” third-party actors, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013), the defendants also challenge standing’s second prong, arguing that Jenner cannot trace any forthcoming loss in business to the executive order, see MTD at 19; see also, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57–58, 72 (2024). The argument is peculiar in its self-deprecation. It requires the defendants to disclaim the order’s potency at accomplishing its stated aim: to prevent taxpayer dollars from flowing to government contractors “whose Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 28 of 52 29 earnings subsidize” Jenner’s purportedly unamerican activities. See E.O. § 3(a). The President, in other words, apparently believed Section 3 would cause Jenner “a classic pocketbook injury,” Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 598 U.S. 631, 636 (2023); his lawyers now say otherwise. On this, the Court agrees with the President. It is entirely predictable that, given the choice between keeping their contracts and keeping Jenner, government contractors will choose the former. This in any event is the rational choice; Jenner is doubtless a very able law firm, but plenty of able law firms come without the accompanying loss of government business. Thus, Jenner’s “theory of standing thus does not rest on mere speculation about the decisions of third parties; it relies instead on the predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019); see also, e.g., FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 383 (2024); Energy Future Coal. v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015); PFLAG, Inc. v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 25-337 (BAH), 2025 WL 685124, at *12 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2025). Once faced with the ultimatum Section 3 issues, self-preservation is the likely choice. And all that is just the cold economics. But economic injury is not the only sort the Constitution recognizes, and the injury to Jenner’s constitutional right to express itself without fear of government reprisal itself confers standing. As discussed below—and as made clear by other firms’ negotiations (and capitulations)—the mere existence of the order chills Jenner’s expression. Jenner has standing to challenge the order casting that chill. See Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603–04 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 589 F.3d 433, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 29 of 52 30 ii. Section 3 is not sustainable on unprotected grounds. On the merits, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vullo and less recent decision in Bantam Books govern—and defeat the defendants’ attempt to deflect a retaliation claim by pointing to accusations of racial discrimination. By promising to cancel all contracts for which Jenner has been hired to perform any service and threatening to cancel contracts with any entity that contracts with Jenner even on non-government matters, Executive Order 14246 does precisely what the Supreme Court said just last year is forbidden: it engages in “coercion against a third party to achieve the suppression of disfavored speech.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants try to escape Vullo by pointing out that the coercive weapon wielded here is different than the coercive weapon wielded there: Vullo flexed her regulatory might where the defendants simply flex their procurement power. This softer sort of governmental influence, the defendants believe, does not implicate the First Amendment because “when implementing Section 3 the government is acting as a private party, not as a sovereign,”15 see MSJ Opp’n at 8, and is not engaged in “punishment” but merely discretionary contract-selection, see MTD at 21. But the First Amendment binds the government not only “as sovereign” but also as “employer, educator, . . . licensor,” and more, Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 480–81 (2022), and the First Amendment does not concern itself only with “direct restraint or punishment,” Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950). “Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.” Id. 15 This quotation could be taken to mean that the defendants believe themselves entirely exempt from the strictures of the First Amendment (or, for that matter, nearly the whole of the Constitution) because when government agencies act as employers or contractors rather than as “sovereign,” they do not engage in state action. Such a suggestion would be frivolous and the defendants don’t really make it. But their tendency to veer into such untenable rhetoric might say something about the weakness of their position. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 30 of 52 31 Government manipulation need not be “heavy-handed” to be unconstitutional; the First Amendment protects as well against “more subtle governmental interference.” Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). It is for this reason that Vullo simply reiterated what had been established at least “[s]ix decades” prior when it announced “that a government entity’s ‘threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion’ against a third party ‘to achieve the suppression’ of disfavored speech violates the First Amendment.” 602 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)). So the government’s discretion in selecting its contractors is beside the point: “An ordinarily permissible exercise of discretion may become a constitutional deprivation if performed in retaliation for”—or to suppress—“the exercise of a First Amendment right.” Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). Thus, the government may regulate but it may not regulate in retaliation for speech. See Vullo, 602 U.S. at 190. The government may transfer prisoners but it may not transfer prisoners in retaliation for speech. Toolasprashad, 286 F.3d at 585. The government may tax but it may not tax based on speech’s content without withstanding strict scrutiny. Ark. Writers’ Proj., Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987). And the government may “terminate contracts” but it may not terminate contracts “in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677 (1996); see also, e.g., Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 595 U.S. at 477 (commenting that it is “easy to identify . . . a dismissal from governmental employment” as an impermissible adverse action under the First Amendment). It should go without saying, in other words, that the First Amendment is in the everyday business of doing just what the defendants say it may not: limiting government discretion. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 31 of 52 32 So the defendants fail to escape the First Amendment’s strictures. But even if the First Amendment applies, the defendants insist they did not violate it. They turn to their alternative explanation—that they seek to stem government funds from flowing not to a speaker but to a discriminator. Pointing out that government may avoid discriminatory employers when it procures contracts, cf. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 788, 790–92 & n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332–33 (D.C. Cir. 1996),16 the defendants insist that they would have taken the steps outlined in Section 3 even absent the retaliatory intent that infects the order. Though this case presents no occasion to determine the lawfulness of Jenner’s employment practices, it is worth pausing to examine the defendants’ bases, factual and legal, for accusing Jenner of discrimination. Factually there is very little. The order and accompanying fact sheet simply say Jenner has been “accused” of discrimination, and the materials the defendants submit in opposition to summary judgment show that Jenner participates in diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) programs in which a large slice of the nation’s private sector also participates. See Diversity Lab, More than 360 Law Firms Achieve Mansfield Certification for 2023–24, Marking a Double-Digit Increase in the Push for Leadership Diversity (Oct. 2, 2024) [ECF No. 95-2 at *110–15]. Legally there is not much more. The defendants point to no case holding such diversity initiatives illegal. Instead they expand the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023), beyond its own bounds. See MSJ Opp’n at 11. In fact they recognize as much, saying that they “raise[] legitimate legal issues of just how far DEI policies and programs can go and whether such policies cross the line into illegal discrimination.” MTD at 28. Whether or not 16 But see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2023). Note that Jenner is not a government contractor, making this premise potentially irrelevant. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 32 of 52 33 the defendants accurately predict the future of antidiscrimination law, the point is that they bank on their predictions of the future. The defendants thus seek unilaterally to effectuate their novel legal theory on untested factual accusations, all while evading the due process that would normally accompany such a step. Bantam Books and Vullo both rebuffed similar—indeed less ambitious—attempts to sidestep due process. First consider Bantam Books. The case involved a state commission tasked with investigating and recommending the prosecution of the distribution of obscene artwork to juveniles. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59–61 (1963). That goal did not implicate the First Amendment since, like discrimination, “‘obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press’ and may therefore be regulated.” Id. at 65 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). But the commission’s mode of enforcement was another story. The commission achieved its aims by sending letters to booksellers subtly threatening enforcement action if the sellers continued distributing books the commission had deemed obscene. Id. at 62–64. Booksellers, fearing the consequences, generally complied, and thus the commission enjoyed a handy tool to suppress speech. See id. at 63–64. The commission’s threats vested it with an authority inconsistent not only with the First Amendment, but also with the Fourteenth, whose promise of due process would otherwise have ensured that only unprotected content could be suppressed. The commission’s unilateral suppression of speech using “the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation,” id. at 67, gave it a shortcut to avoid the procedural protections that would normally attach: Herein lies the vice of the system. The Commission’s operation is a form of effective state regulation superimposed upon the State’s criminal regulation of Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 33 of 52 34 obscenity and making such regulation largely unnecessary. In thus obviating the need to employ criminal sanctions, the State has at the same time eliminated the safeguards of the criminal process. Criminal sanctions may be applied only after a determination of obscenity has been made in a criminal trial hedged about with the procedural safeguards of the criminal process. The Commission’s practice is in striking contrast, in that it provides no safeguards whatever against the suppression of nonobscene, and therefore constitutionally protected, matter. It is a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law. Id. at 69–70. The commission could not claim for itself the unchecked power to separate protected from unprotected speech and enforce that power using the “informal censorship” tool of threatened reprisal. Id. at 71. So too here, the government has simply decreed that Jenner discriminates without affording any due process. Now consider Vullo. In that case, a New York state official took aim at the National Rifle Association (“NRA”), a group whose pro-gun advocacy state officials disliked. See 602 U.S. at 180–81. The state official oversaw a department that regulates insurance companies doing business in New York, and she used her influence to “threaten enforcement actions against” insurance companies unless they disengaged commercially from the NRA. Id. at 181, 187. Crucially, the case involved conceded violations of law: the NRA contracted with an insurance company to offer insurance policies that all agree ran afoul of New York insurance law. Id. at 181–82, 187. Given those legal infirmities, the defendant argued—and the Second Circuit held—that when the official encouraged insurance companies to avoid business with the NRA she “was merely carrying out her regulatory responsibilities.” Id. at 186 (quoting NRA v. Vullo, 49 F.4th 700, 718–19 (2d Cir. 2022)). The Supreme Court didn’t buy it. To be sure, the defendant “was free to . . . pursue the conceded violations of New York insurance law.” Id. at 187. “She could not wield her power, however, to threaten enforcement actions against []regulated entities in order to punish or Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 34 of 52 35 suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy.” Id. That the NRA and its insurers had violated the law, in other words, did not give New York officials a blank check to disadvantage the NRA and its message—or to pursue violations of law outside the law enforcement process. Like the defendants Bantam Books and Vullo, the defendants here have identified a speaker they don’t like; have threatened action against third parties unless the third parties disassociate from the speaker; and have tried to evade First Amendment scrutiny by recasting their actions not as speech suppression but as law enforcement. Like the Supreme Court in Bantam Books and Vullo, this Court will not allow the defendants to evade the procedural protections that would normally attend law enforcement by instituting “a scheme of state censorship effectuated by extralegal sanctions.” Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 72. And make no mistake: like the plaintiffs in those cases, Jenner is entitled to due process. “Suspending a contractor is a serious matter.” Com. Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 133 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Thus “[a]n agency may not impose even a temporary suspension without providing the ‘core requirements’ of due process: adequate notice and a meaningful hearing.” Id.; see also, e.g., Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 982 F.2d 594, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Liff v. Off. of the Inspector Gen. for the U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 881 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2018). And if the government must provide due process before terminating a contractor of its own, surely it must do the same before blacklisting an entity from all its contractors’ Rolodexes—a more drastic move that precludes Jenner not only from government employment but from the forty percent of its business it gets from entities that themselves contract with the government. Whatever precise process is due, the executive order does not afford it: Sections 1 and 3, coupled with the fact Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 35 of 52 36 sheet’s unambiguous instruction that “contracts that involve Jenner” will be “terminate[d],” Fact Sheet at 1, preordain the outcome. So Section 3 is an act of retaliation not sustainable on non-speech grounds. Still, the analysis must go on, as government coercion of or retaliation for speech does not invariably violate the First Amendment. Consider government speech. When government speaks, it necessarily chooses viewpoints. Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 251–52 (2022). And being made up, in the end, of people, the government must be able to channel those viewpoints through employees; thus it may “impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.” United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995). That is, it may in some circumstances coerce its employees to speak as it wishes while on the job, on pain of dismissal. Relatedly, the government may make “viewpoint-based funding decisions” where it “use[s] private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.” Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 541 (discussing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). But the government may not “seek to leverage” its power—whether regulatory, spending, or otherwise—“to regulate speech” outside of those parameters. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. at 214–15. Jenner falls easily outside those parameters, as it could not be further from the sort of government mouthpiece or policymaker that would open it to government control of its speech. Even if Jenner contracted directly with the government, the government would have a heavy burden to bear. Cf. O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 (1996). But Jenner holds no direct government contracts. Instead, the harm to Jenner from Section 3 is to Jenner’s contracts with government contractors—some related to the government contracts, some not. See SUMF ¶¶ 84–85. And at this extra level of remove, Jenner becomes Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 36 of 52 37 even less like a government mouthpiece and “more like ordinary citizens whose viewpoints on matters of public concern the government has no legitimate interest in repressing.” Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 680; cf. Navab-Safavi v. Glassman, 637 F.3d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In fact, most of Jenner’s work for government contractors places Jenner adverse to the government: its Government Contracts and Grants practice “help[s] companies successfully avoid or resolve contract disputes with the U.S. Government.” SUMF ¶ 25. Section 3, then, employs retaliatory means against lawyers engaged in litigation opposing the government. A use of the procurement authority more offensive to the First Amendment is difficult to imagine. Cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 213 (2003) (explaining that the funding conditions in Legal Services Corporation offended the First Amendment because the job of the lawyers there was “to advocate against the Government, and there was thus an assumption that counsel would be free of state control”). In sum, Section 3 retaliates for speech the government has no business regulating. D. Section 4: Racial Discrimination. Section 4 is an odd section that, on its face, does nothing at all. The section reads in full: “Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the action authorized by section 4 of Executive Order 14230 of March 6, 2025 (Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP).” E.O. § 4. That order, in turn, instructed the chair of the EEOC to “review the practices of representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms for consistency with” antidiscrimination law. Perkins Coie E.O. § 4(a). As discussed, it would be difficult to read this order to “limit” any action against Jenner. So the fact sheet confirms what Section 4 really means: “The practices of Jenner will be reviewed under Title VII to ensure compliance with civil rights laws against racial bias.” Fact Sheet at 2. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 37 of 52 38 After briefly (and implausibly) protesting that Section 4 does “nothing,” see MTD at 25, the defendants turn again to standing—traceability and redressability in particular, id. at 26. They point out that Jenner was “subject to review by the EEOC” before the order and will remain subject to review no matter what this Court does. Id. But Jenner does not complain of being vulnerable to investigation on equal terms with the rest of the country. It objects to being a guaranteed subject of investigation because of its speech. That injury is easily traceable. And it is redressable by the order Jenner seeks: not immunity from investigation, but immunity from investigation “made pursuant to Section 4.” Proposed Order [ECF No. 132-1] at 3–4. The defendants’ merits defense parallels their standing objection. Per the defendants, Jenner cannot show that it wouldn’t have been subjected to an EEOC investigation “absent the retaliatory motive,” Comm. on Ways & Means, 45 F.4th at 340, because the EEOC investigates; that’s what it does. MSJ Opp’n at 17. But the defendants fail to offer any reason that would justify singling Jenner out for investigation aside from its speech. The defendants’ sole support for their belief that Jenner unlawfully discriminates is Jenner’s “adoption of the ‘Mansfield Rule,’” a certification process that seeks to “diversify the power structure of law firms and legal departments.” Id. at 12–14. Jenner is among more than 360 law firms that earned the Mansfield Certification in 2023–24. See [ECF No. 95-2 at *110]. So in this sense Jenner is entirely unremarkable. What is remarkable is the shared characteristic of the firms now threatened with EEOC investigations: speech the President dislikes. See Perkins Coie LLP, 2025 WL 1276857, at *36–37 (cataloging the President’s speech-based targeting of other firms). If Jenner discriminates, the EEOC will doubtless receive a charge to that effect, at which point it will be free, indeed obligated, to investigate. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64 Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 38 of 52 39 (1984) (“[T]he EEOC’s investigative authority is tied to charges filed with the Commission; unlike other federal agencies that possess plenary authority to demand to see records relevant to matters within their jurisdiction, the EEOC is entitled to access only to evidence ‘relevant to the charge under investigation.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8(a))); McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. 72, 75 (2017). But the President may not evade the “extensive regulation” governing EEOC proceedings, Am. Ctr. for Int’l Lab. Solidarity v. Fed. Ins. Co., 548 F.3d 1103, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and single out Jenner for investigation in retaliation for its speech. See, e.g., Sanders v. District of Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d 523, 535 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 67 (prohibiting the “threat of invoking legal sanctions” levied to suppress speech). After all, EEOC investigations can have “serious consequences for their targets.” Am. Ctr. for Int’l Lab. Solidarity, 548 F.3d at 1105. E. Section 5: Personnel. The order’s final operative section is perhaps its most sweeping. Section 5 seeks to keep all Jenner employees out of federal buildings, away from federal employees, and forever off the federal payroll. First, Section 5(a) instructs agency heads to “provide guidance limiting official access [to] Federal Government buildings to employees of Jenner when such access would threaten the national security of or otherwise be inconsistent with the interests of the United States” and to “provide guidance limiting Government employees acting in their official capacity from engaging with Jenner employees . . . to ensure consistency with the national security and other interests of the United States.” E.O. § 5(a). Section 5(b), meanwhile, instructs agencies to “refrain from hiring employees of Jenner . . . absent a waiver from the head of the agency, made in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, that such hire will not threaten the national security of the United States.” Id. § 5(b). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 39 of 52 40 i. Section 5 is ripe. The defendants primarily combat Jenner’s Section 5 challenge on ripeness grounds, arguing that the Court ought to hold off on enjoining Section 5 until guidance is issued. MTD at 28–29. Note at the outset that even this threshold argument does not apply to § 5(b)’s hiring ban, which takes effect immediately, no guidance needed. In any event, Jenner’s challenge to the entire section is ripe. Ripeness turns on “the fitness of the issues for judicial review and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Full Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” In re Al-Nashiri, 47 F.4th 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). The defendants point out that Section 5 may not play out “as anticipated”: [Section 5] calls for agency heads to provide guidance as to whether or when to limit Jenner employees from entering a government building; whether or when to limit Government employees from engaging Jenner personnel in their official capacity; whether or when to bar Jenner employees from being hired into government employment. MSJ Opp’n at 19.17 In one sense the defendants are right: just how devastating Section 5 is to Jenner’s ability to function remains to be seen. Without the anticipated guidance, we don’t know whether Jenner is in for the “nightmare” scenario, id.—barred from federal courthouses and post offices, from negotiating with federal prosecutors, and the like—or just a fitful night’s sleep. But this is a question of degree, nothing more. The order compels guidance not on “whether” to limit Jenner’s access to government buildings and officials but simply on how to do 17 “[W]hether or when to bar Jenner employees from being hired into government employment” is not in fact awaiting guidance; absent the TRO, that directive would have taken effect immediately. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 40 of 52 41 so. See E.O. § 5(a). The Court can imagine no exclusion of Jenner employees from federal buildings, no bar of Jenner employees from interacting with federal employees, and no federal hiring ban on Jenner employees that would pass constitutional muster. So, barring Executive Branch disobedience of the executive order, this is not a scenario in which the illegality “may not occur at all.” In re Al-Nashiri, 47 F.4th at 826. Indeed, it is occurring now. Department of Justice employees have already told a Jenner client that Jenner cannot attend meetings at the Department of Justice; by the time they reversed course following this Court’s TRO, the client had obtained substitute counsel. SUMF ¶ 76. In any event, the injury Jenner fears is not only one that will result from actual exclusion from government buildings. The injury is also the coercion it feels now to change its speech to avoid impending consequences; the mere fact that the defendants are weighing things like “limiting Government employees” from engaging with Jenner personnel, E.O. § 5(a), exemplifies the speech-based discrimination Jenner is experiencing. And the current injury extends, too, to the strong incentive the order gives Jenner’s clients and potential clients to choose other firms that can come and go from federal buildings as they please. In other words, “the mere existence of the Order” harms Jenner. See Reich, 57 F.3d at 1100. ii. Section 5 violates the First Amendment and threatens to violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The defendants have nearly nothing to say for Section 5 on the merits. That is not surprising. Even more than the order’s other sections, Section 5 is inexplicable by anything other than a pure desire to inflict pain on Jenner. Unlike Sections 3 and 4, whose adverse actions—terminating contractual ties and investigating employment practices—at least bear some purported (although ultimately failing) connection to suspicions of discrimination, the same cannot be said for Section 5. This section, which directs an astonishingly broad range of Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 41 of 52 42 actions against Jenner employees past, current, and future, has no plausible legitimate rationale and thus cannot stand. The order’s retaliatory nature suffices to deem it unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Still, a brief exploration of the order’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment deficiencies is worthwhile and fits nicely here because, while the full order threatens the protections afforded by those amendments, Section 5 does so most directly. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that a criminal defendant “have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense,” U.S. Const. amend. VI, embraces a defendant’s concomitant right “to choose who will represent him,” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). And the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee protects a civil litigant’s “right to choose counsel without interference by officialdom.” Am. Airways Charters, 746 F.2d at 872. While these rights are of course qualified—by “the authority of trial courts to establish criteria for admitting lawyers to argue before them” for one, see Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151, and the imperative of avoiding conflicts of interest for another, see Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162—at the very least they may not be deprived in an “arbitrary” manner, see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983); Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 837 F.2d 600, 618 (3d Cir. 1988). If Section 5 plays out as intended, it would arbitrarily stymie Jenner’s ability to represent its clients and, alongside it, Jenner’s clients’ rights to choose their lawyers. A lawyer without the ability to negotiate with federal agencies, appear in court, and the like is hardly a lawyer at all. Cf. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (“defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process” necessary “to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires”). Section 2’s security clearance process would also impose a similar Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 42 of 52 43 disability on Jenner in cases, civil and criminal, involving classified information. See SUMF ¶¶ 36–42, 81; Notice of Recent Development. And Section 3 penalizes Jenner clients for their choice of counsel by revoking government contracts. See Perkins Coie, 2025 WL 1276857, at *42. The Court need not determine whether these Fifth and Sixth Amendment problems are in fact Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, as the order’s incompatibility with the First Amendment suffices to invalidate it. And whereas the defendants’ Section 5 ripeness argument lacks merit with respect to the First Amendment, it might have a bit more meat with respect to Jenner’s right to counsel claims, as those claims might turn on the degree to which the contemplated “guidance” kneecaps Jenner’s ability to fulfill its obligations to its clients. But the Court would be remiss to let this opinion conclude without the observation that Executive Order 14246 at least threatens to metastasize from a violation of the First Amendment to a violation of others as well. II. The remaining factors support an injunction. Executive Order 14246 is an unconstitutional act of retaliation. Jenner therefore prevails on the merits and is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. To win a permanent injunction, however, Jenner still must show that no available remedy at law, such as monetary damages, is adequate to compensate its injury, and that the balance of hardships and the public interest support an injunction. See Anatol Zukerman, 64 F.4th at 1364 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391); Nken, 556 U.S. at 435 (balance of hardships and public interest inquiries merge when the government is the defendant). The defendants put forth no argument on these factors, and the Court concludes they are easily met. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 43 of 52 44 A. The order will cause Jenner irreparable harm not compensable at law. Absent court intervention, the order puts Jenner to a choice the Constitution protects it from having to make: change its speech or suffer a serious injury to its livelihood. If it opts for the former, it will suffer irreparable harm, as “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality op.)). If it opts for the latter, Jenner puts a large amount of income at grave risk, as every action directed by the order would strangle Jenner’s ability to attract and retain clients and personnel. Section 3 alone threatens the forty percent of Jenner’s income that comes from government contractors, subcontractors, or affiliates. See SUMF ¶ 83. Sections 2 and 5 will pile on top of that, making it impossible for Jenner to represent clients whose cases involve sensitive information or—as innumerable cases do—interacting with government employees and entering government buildings. And that’s just accounting for Jenner’s current clients; prospective clients will doubtless choose law firms without government-imposed disabilities and a government-inscribed scarlet letter, and prospective employees will doubtless choose law firms whose appearance on their resume will not bar them from future government employment. As 807 law firms tell the Court, an executive order like this one “would threaten the survival of any law firm.” Br. of Amici Curiae 807 Law Firms in Supp. of Pl. [ECF No. 105] at 2. Of course, economic injury traditionally is not irreparable, as what is lost can be returned. See Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But “significant” economic loss unrecoverable due to sovereign immunity can be irreparable. See Luokung Tech. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 538 F. Supp. 3d 174, 192 (D.D.C. 2021); cf. Dep’t of Educ. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 966, Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 44 of 52 45 968–69 (2025) (irreparable harm to the government where it was “unlikely to recover” funds it was ordered to disburse). That is so here: even if Jenner had a cause of action for damages, but see Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498 (2022) (no Bivens cause of action for First Amendment retaliation claim), sovereign immunity would bar their collection. Only a permanent injunction can prevent these significant harms. Jenner has thus established “irreparable injury that the proposed injunction would avert.” Taylor v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1995); accord Xiaomi Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., Civ. A. No. 21-280 (RC), 2021 WL 950144, at *10–11 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021) (“exodus of lucrative contracts” coupled with sovereign immunity supported irreparable harm); Luokung Tech. Corp., 538 F. Supp. 3d at 192–93 (“difficulty recruiting and retaining talent” supported irreparable harm). III. The equities and the public interest definitively favor an injunction. The defendants offer nothing on their side of the equities scale, perhaps because they have little. “[E]nforcement of an unconstitutional [order] is always contrary to the public interest.” Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).18 And Jenner’s side of the balance is much weightier, both as to Jenner itself and as to the greater public. This opinion has already outlined the grave harm the order will inflict on Jenner, but the harm extends well beyond this one firm. This case illustrates why “there is always a strong public interest in the exercise of free speech rights otherwise abridged by an unconstitutional” action. Pursuing Am.’s Greatness, 831 F.3d at 511. Retaliation 18 The Court admits to some brief hesitation in enjoining Section 2 given the national security implications of security clearances, but, as explained, this case implicates no national security concern at all. Cf. Luokong Tech. Corp., 538 F. Supp. 3d at 194–95 (recognizing the “undoubtedly important public interest[]” in national security but giving the interest little weight because the court was “skeptical that weighty national security interests are actually implicated” (quoting Xiaomi Corp., 2021 WL 950144, at *12)). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 45 of 52 46 against Jenner—and Covington & Burling, and Paul Weiss, and Perkins Coie, and WilmerHale, and Susman Godfrey—threatens retaliation against all. Cf. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U.S. 266, 273 (2016) (retaliatory action “against one . . . unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association of all” (cleaned up)). It casts a chill over the whole of the legal profession, leaving lawyers around the country weighing the necessity of vigorous representation against the peril of crossing the federal government. The order’s chilling effect is uniquely harmful for its focus on pro bono work. When law firms volunteer to represent vulnerable individuals and groups without pay, they embody the best of the profession. Cf. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The lawyer’s duty to provide professional assistance to the poor is part of the ancient traditions of the bar.”). This order and the others like it seek not only to prevent that noble undertaking but to manipulate it. The orders strongarm firms into redirecting their uncompensated services to work the President prefers—or even perhaps to work for the President himself. See Goldberg, Trump Wants to Use Firms that Cut Deals for Coal Leases, supra. So when this order retaliates for (and endeavors to steer) Jenner’s “powerful pro bono practice[],” E.O. § 1, it sullies a tradition that instructs lawyers to pursue ideals higher than profit. The public will suffer. And the chill does not end with the legal profession. As various amici point out, what the President does to the bar he can equally do to other pillars of our constitutional order—the press,19 non-governmental organizations,20 and more. Retaliatory action against one profession 19 See Amicus Br. of Sixty Media Orgs. & Press Freedom Advocs. [ECF No. 107] at 9 (“[T]he press and their attorneys[] are logical next targets of these tactics.”); see also Associated Press v. Budowich, Civ. A. No. 25-532 (TNM), 2025 WL 1039572, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction to end viewpoint discrimination in access to Oval Office press pool events). 20 See Br. of Amici Curiae 24 NGOs [ECF No. 102] at 1–2 (this “unvarnished viewpoint discrimination against law firms sends a clear message to Amici: Do not challenge the President or you will be next”). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 46 of 52 47 thus “tells the others that they engage in protected activity at their peril.” Heffernan, 578 U.S. at 273. A republic overcast with such a pervasive chill would not long endure, “for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). IV. Scope of injunction. Having concluded that a permanent injunction must issue, the questions remain against whom and in what form. On the first, the defendants urge the Court to dismiss the United States as a defendant and enjoin only the individually named agency and official defendants; the Court holds otherwise. On the second, Jenner urges the Court not only to enjoin enforcement of the order’s operative sections (2–5), but also to enjoin any future governmental actions inspired by the order’s derogatory findings in Section 1; the Court declines to do so. i. The United States is a proper defendant. Jenner’s complaint named a great many defendants. See Compl. ¶¶ 32–79. It did not, however, name every agency and agency head subject to the executive order; instead it added as a defendant the “United States of America,” “to ensure that the relief ordered by the Court will apply on a government-wide basis, including to federal agencies that are not specifically listed as Defendants.” Id. ¶ 79. The defendants object to the inclusion of the United States as a defendant. They insist that Jenner may sue federal officials tasked with implementing the order but may not sue the United States because it “retain[s] [its] immunity against all suits in federal court.” MTD at 32 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (cleaned up).21 And they see in the inclusion of the United States a ploy 21 The defendants also suggest that Jenner may not sue an “agency” because, like the government, it too enjoys sovereign immunity. See MTD at 32 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146). The defendants’ failure to move to dismiss the many agency defendants named in this case betrays their halfhearted belief in that argument. Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 47 of 52 48 to “enjoin the President by another name,” id. at 34, in derogation of the judiciary’s general reluctance to bring its injunctive powers to bear directly against the President rather than against a subordinate official, see McCray v. Biden, 574 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–11 (D.D.C. 2021). The argument makes a hash of two distinct principles, but it is answered by reference to one statute. The first principle is sovereign immunity, which shields governments (state and federal) from suit absent waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). This principle has no application here. As the defendants themselves appear to recognize, the United States has waived sovereign immunity for purposes of suits just like this one, in which an entity “suffering legal wrong because of agency action” seeks “relief other than money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not.” (quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); MTD at 32–33. The second principle is the separation of powers, which counsels courts to avoid enjoining the President. See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This principle, too, has no application here because Jenner has not sued the President. Instead it has sued, in addition to “subordinate officials,” id., the United States. To see why this is permissible, look again to 5 U.S.C. § 702, which provides that “[t]he United States may be named as a defendant in any” action to which the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies, “and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States.” See also § 703 (“[T]he action for judicial review may be brought against the United States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate officer.”); Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 48 of 52 49 Section 702 does require Jenner eventually to list the individual federal officers it seeks to enjoin; it just need not do so in the caption of the complaint. The statute insists “[t]hat any mandatory or injunctive decree” resulting from a lawsuit against the United States “shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Jenner has complied, attaching to its proposed injunction a lengthy list of agencies and agency heads subject to the executive order. See Proposed Order at 7–20. And Jenner has standing to obtain an injunction against those agencies and agency heads for the same reasons it has standing to challenge the order generally. The defendants offer no reason that harm from these additional agencies is any more speculative than harm from the agencies named as defendants. ii. The Court will not enjoin future actions taken pursuant to Section 1. It should be clear by now that, in this case, the Court will enjoin any actions taken pursuant to the order’s operative sections, Sections 2 through 5. Section 6’s boilerplate language aside, that leaves Section 1. Section 1 does not direct any action. It represents instead something of a screed airing the President’s grievances with Jenner. In the executive order as issued, the screed played an essential role: it both supplied a rationale for Sections 2 through 5 and answered any questions those operative sections purported to leave open, like whether engaging with Jenner is in the “national interest.” But once this opinion and the accompanying order issue, the executive order will no longer stand. Sections 2 through 5 will not direct agencies to ask the questions Section 1 largely answers. And shorn of its enforcement mechanisms, Section 1 is nothing more than the Executive Branch “say[ing] what it wishes.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 187. Jenner has no more right to Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 49 of 52 50 silence the Executive Branch than the Executive Branch has to silence Jenner: the government is “free to criticize” Jenner all it wants “in the hopes of persuading others” through “the merits and force of [its] ideas, the strength of [its] convictions, and [its] ability to inspire.” Id. at 187–88. It simply may not back up that criticism with “the power of the State.” Id. at 188; see also, e.g., Kennedy v. Warren, 66 F.4th 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[P]ublic officials may criticize practices that they would have no constitutional ability to regulate, so long as there is no actual or threatened imposition of government power or sanction.”). Recognizing Section 1’s status as government speech, Jenner does not exactly seek to enjoin it. See MTD Opp’n at 24. But Jenner fears further action pursuant to Section 1, and so seeks to enjoin federal officials “from using or considering in any way or for any purpose the statements laid out in Section 1.” Proposed Order at 2. The Court is very sympathetic to Jenner’s request. The President has displayed a great deal of animosity towards Jenner. Further adverse actions would not be shocking—and could very well offend the Constitution as plainly as Executive Order 14246 does. And the defendants’ own conduct during this litigation does not ease the concern: even in complying with the TRO, the defendants persisted in disparaging Jenner, implied that federal agencies may “decide with whom to work” notwithstanding the First Amendment, and “reserve[d] the right to take all necessary and legal actions” against Jenner. See Memorandum from Pamela Bondi, Att’y Gen., & Russell Vought, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies [ECF No. 21-1]. Rather than leave the possibility open, Jenner would prefer to head it off at the pass. But such a step would require the Court to enjoin all uses of Section 1 “in the abstract,” “apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm to [Jenner’s] interests.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009). Neither standing doctrine nor equity Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 50 of 52 51 generally permits such judicial prophylaxis. Jenner lacks standing to challenge hypothetical future actions taken pursuant to Section 1; unlike actions taken pursuant to Sections 2 through 5, these are purely “conjectural or hypothetical” because agencies have not been instructed to take them. See Anatol Zukerman, 64 F.4th at 1362 (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983)). With no standing to challenge such actions, the injunction shrinks accordingly, as a “remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produce[s] the injury in fact.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)). And equitable principles provide the same thing standing doctrine demands, as an injunction may not issue “without adequate proof of a threatened injury.” Taylor, 56 F.3d at 1508. Whether best viewed as a shortcoming of standing, ripeness, or a “basis in equity for an injunction,” the guesswork entailed in enjoining all future uses of the sentiments expressed in Section 1 would exceed the Court’s proper role. See id.; Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 133–34 (2020). If this conclusion results in more federal action taken against Jenner, those actions could very well be equally unconstitutional. But Article III requires this Court to place its faith in future courts to prevent harm from befalling Jenner if and when that occurs. At this juncture, the Court cannot take that role for itself. Conclusion Jenner raises many more claims of unconstitutionality. These present interesting, difficult, and potentially meritorious questions about the scope of presidential power and more. What has been said here of the First Amendment (and in passing of the Fifth and Sixth), however, is sufficient to declare Executive Order 14246 unlawful and enjoin its operation, eliminating the need to explore those other questions. So the Court need not break new ground: Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 51 of 52 52 Executive Order 14246 violates settled First Amendment law and its operation must be enjoined in full. Jenner’s motion for summary judgment is granted; the defendants’ motion is denied. A separate order will issue. /s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Dated: May 23, 2025 Case 1:25-cv-00916-JDB Document 138 Filed 05/23/25 Page 52 of 52
Federal court strikes down Trump’s tariffs on countries around the world. The U.S. Court of International Trade ruled unanimously that the president overstepped his powers in imposing the tariffs on dozens of trading partners, most of which he’s since paused. by Doug Palmer, Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein Politico 05/28/2025 07:15 PM EDT https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/2 ... s-00373843
[x] U.S. President Donald Trump holds up a chart while announcing new "reciprocal" tariffs on more than 60 trading partners during an event in the Rose Garden at the White House on April 2, 2025 in Washington, DC. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
A federal court has struck down President Donald Trump’s tariffs on dozens of countries, saying his effort to justify them with broad claims of national emergencies exceeded his legal authority.
The unanimous ruling of a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of International Trade strikes a blow to one of the central planks of Trump’s economic agenda at a time he is seeking to use tariffs as leverage to strike trade deals around the world.
“Today’s court order is a victory not just for Oregon, but for working families, small businesses, and everyday Americans. President Trump’s sweeping tariffs were unlawful, reckless, and economically devastating,” said Oregon’s Attorney General Dan Rayfield, who filed one of the lawsuits challenging Trump’s tariffs, along with 11 other state attorneys general. “We brought this case because the Constitution doesn’t give any president unchecked authority to upend the economy. This ruling reaffirms that our laws matter, and that trade decisions can’t be made on the president’s whim.”
The court’s ruling also means that the government may have to pay back duties it has already collected. “Anybody that has had to pay tariffs so far will be able to get them refunded,” said Ilya Somin, a professor of law at George Mason University, who helped argue a case against the tariffs brought by several small businesses.
The Justice Department quickly filed an appeal, setting the stage for more legal arguments over the extent of Trump’s tariff authorities. Ultimately, the case could end up at the Supreme Court.
Trump had justified his imposition of tariffs on dozens of countries based on declarations of national emergencies related to fentanyl trafficking and the threat of persistent trade deficits. Trump also imposed retaliatory tariffs on countries that responded in kind.
The court found that the federal law that authorizes the president to impose tariffs, embargoes and sanctions in response to national emergencies — the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 — “does not authorize the President to impose unbounded tariffs.”
“The Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariff Orders exceed any authority granted to the President by IEEPA to regulate importation by means of tariffs,” the New York-based federal court, which hears cases on trade laws, said in its opinion.
The court nullified Trump’s executive orders imposing 25 percent duties on Canadian and Mexican products and a 20 percent tariff on Chinese products in response to a purported national emergency on drug trafficking. It also struck down a 10 percent tariff imposed on all U.S. trading partners to address trade deficits, as well as Trump’s paused “reciprocal” tariffs of between 20 and 50 percent on 60-odd trading partners, which are now scheduled to go into effect on July 9 if foreign governments can’t reach a deal with the White House before then.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brett Shumate, in arguments last week before the CIT, said a ruling that barred Trump from collecting the tariffs would “kneecap” the president’s efforts to strike new trade deals between now and July 8, including with leading trading partners such as Japan, India and the European Union.
“An injunction would be extremely disruptive while the president is in the middle of foreign negotiations with other countries about trade deficits and about the fentanyl crisis,” Shumate added.
It’s the latest legal rejection for Trump on a centerpiece of his policy agenda. Federal judges have blocked key planks of his mass deportation agenda, restricted efforts to dismantle several federal agencies and slowed efforts to mass terminate federal employees from some agencies.
A spokesperson for the White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The Wednesday evening ruling covers a case brought by V.O.S. Selections, a New York-based wine company, and several other small businesses, and a separate case filed by Oregon and 11 other Democrat-led states challenging the constitutionality of Trump’s actions. It was delivered by a three-judge panel that included Obama appointee Gary Katzmann, Reagan appointee Jane Restani and Trump appointee Timothy Reif. No specific judge was identified as the author of the court’s opinion.
But Trump could also attempt to impose the same tariffs under other laws, said Nazak Nikakhtar, who worked on trade issues at the Commerce Department during the first Trump administration and is now a partner at the law firm Wiley Rein. “The president still has ample authority to impose reciprocal tariffs, just through other legal means,” Nikakhtar said.
The ruling also does not affect other tariffs Trump has imposed, such as those under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the president to levy new duties on national security grounds. Trump used the provision in March to widen existing steel and aluminum tariffs and slap a 25 percent duty on foreign auto imports. The administration has launched several other Section 232 investigations that could lead to future tariffs on semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and a number of other products.
That process is slower, however, requiring the administration to first conduct a national security review and solicit public comment before moving forward with the duties. Using the emergency law allowed the White House to act much more quickly.
“Enacting broad-based tariffs via IEEPA was always legally risky, but to enjoin them is surprising and an immense relief for importers at the moment,” said Scott Lincicome, the director of economics at the Cato Institute, a free market think tank. “The big question is whether it will hold up on appeal.”
Several other suits challenging Trump’s tariffs have been filed in federal district courts around the country, including one brought by the state of California and another by members of the Blackfeet Nation tribe who live in Montana and Canada.
Earlier this month, a judge in Florida ordered a case brought by a local paper products company to be transferred to the CIT and a judge in another case filed in the District Court for Washington heard oral arguments on Tuesday.
The Justice Department has been pressing to move all of the cases to the CIT in New York, arguing that it was established by Congress to hear cases involving tariffs and had exclusive jurisdiction. However, any hopes it may have had for a more sympathetic reception in the CIT than in the federal district courts evaporated on Wednesday.
Megan Messerly, Hassan Kanu and Ari Hawkins contributed to this report.
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Trump TARIFFS declared UNLAWFUL by Court!!! MeidasTouch May 28, 2025
MeidasTouch host Ben Meiselas reports on the stunning ruling by a federal court striking down Donald Trump’s tariffs against the world.
Transcript
a federal court has just declared Donald Trump's tariffs to be illegal an injunction has just issued blocking Donald Trump's ability to impose these tariffs against the world that he did on what he called liberation day which I call great recession or liquidation day donald Trump uh purported to invoke powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 alleging that there was this national emergency to take these in essence dictatorial powers to impose these tariffs on every single country but this federal court just struck it down and said "Donald Trump you are not allowed to do that you are permanently enjoined blocked from issuing your tariffs." A massive blow to Donald Trump i want to go through this order with you as only we do here on the Midas Touch Network not just give you the headline but really break it down which court issued it what was their analysis how do they break down what the actual powers are of a president to impose tariff versus the requirement that Congress be the actual body that legislate in this area why was Donald Trump violating the law so let's break it all down so what was the name of the federal court that issued this order it's called the United States Court of International Trade they actually have exclusive jurisdiction over issues regarding you guessed it international trade interestingly it is a three judge panel uh and all three of these federal judges all agreed and what's called a procurium opinion which means they basically all agreed didn't even have to necessarily even sign it saying that we all agree clearly Donald Trump does not have this power so let's go through the order and let me explain to you what these judges held this is disastrous news for Donald Trump and good news for the United States Constitution so here's the order the Constitution assigns Congress the exclusive powers to lay and collect taxes duties impost and excises and to regulate commerce with foreign nations and it cites the United States Constitution Article 1 Section 8 clauses 1 and three the question in the two cases before this court is whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 the EA delegates these powers to the president in the form of authority to impose unlimited tariffs on goods from nearly every country in the world the court does not read the EA to confer such unbounded authority and sets aside the challenge tariffs imposed there under now who was the uh individual or organizations that filed this well you had a company called VO Selections Inc Plastic Services and Products Inc and then this was also joined because this was a combined case by states like the state of Oregon Arizona the state of Colorado Connecticut Delaware and others these was this was a consolidated case of companies that were impacted and harmed and also by states that were impacted and harmed and the court found there was standing to sue so after citing the constitution the court gives a little bit more detail and it says the following and this is what's important that you all know what our constitution says cuz we are we have a constitution in the United States and this is what we've always been saying on the Midas Touch Network just because Donald Trump claims these powers it doesn't mean he has them here's what the Constitution says while Congress may not transfer to another branch powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative Congress may confer substantial discretion to implement and enforce the laws thus courts have consistently upheld statutory delegations as long as Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the authority is directed to conform this reflects the idea that in modern government the legislative process would frequently bog down would be bogged down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad of situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for each situation then it goes into tariffs early in the nation's history tariffs were a key means by which the federal government raised money to pay wages and to fund the national debt and it goes on to say "The revenue raising purpose of tariffs has declined significantly since the ratification of the 16th amendment in 19313 permitting the imposition of income taxes 1913 since then and with the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of the global economic landscape tariffs have served more diverse purposes including restricting the importation of certain goods protecting American industry and leveraging negotiations with foreign counterparts as global economic relations grew in volume and complexity Congress saw a need for specialized nonpartisan assistance in administering tariffs congress accordingly passed legislation creating the United States Tariff Commission later renamed the United States International Trade Commission to provide the this assistance the commission shall have the power to investigate the tariff relations between the United States and foreign countries commercial treaties the volume of importations compared with domestic production and consumption and conditions causes and effects relating to competition of foreign industries with those of the United States the ITC is responsible for maintaining the United States harmonized tariff schedule the HTSUS which sets tariff rates for all merchandise imported into the United States the HTSUS itself is indeed a statute but is not published physically in the United States Code congress's enactment of the HTSUS provided that its term shall be considered to be statutory provisions of law for all purposes and it says "In addition to forming the ITC Congress has responded to the growing complexity of global economic relations by delegating trade authority to the president these delegations have included clear limitations that retain legislative power over the imposition of these types of duties." And then it says "However there are certain emergency authority." And then it talks about one such emergency authority that in 1974 the United States Customs Court the predecessor to the United States Court of International Trade heard a challenge to President Nixon's imposition of a supplemental duty on all dutyable merchandise imported into the United States the US Customs Court construed this law so as to preserve constitutionality and held that the TWEA precludes the president from laying the supplemental duties provided in this case by President Nixon and it went on to say how this EA was ultimately created and it says "Shortly after this decision and following a review by Senate by a Senate bipartisan special committee Congress reformed the president's emergency powers as part of this reform Congress cabin the president's powers under the TWWA to wartime twwa is amended by striking out or doing other period of national emergency declared by the president in the text proceeding sub paragraph A congress also enacted a new statute the EA to confer upon the president a new set of authorities for use in times of a national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of this TWWA and subject to more procedural limits and it goes on to site what is the EA it provides that the president may investigate regulate or prohibit any transaction in foreign exchange transfers of credit payments between by and through or to any bank institution to the extent that such transfer or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or n or nation or thereof the importing or exporting of currency or securities by any person or with respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States b investigate block during the pendency of an investigation regulate direct and compel nullify void prevent or prohibit any acquisition holding withholding use transfer withdrawal transportation importation or exportation of or dealing in or exercising any right power or privilege with respect to or transaction involving any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has any interest by any person or with respect to any property property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States i I the EA further provides that those authorities may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose so then it explains how Donald Trump then expanded this idea of a national emergency to basically include everything that was going on with the world in Europe in Canada in China and elsewhere and Trump said "We have a national emergency with every single country." And the federal court said "No you don't." Underlying the issues in this case is the notion that powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments because of the Constitution's express allocation of tariff power to Congress we do not read the EA to delegate an unbounded tariff authority to the president we instead read the EPA's provision to impose meaningful limits on any such authority it confers two are relevant here first section 1702's delegation of a power to regulate importation read in light of its legislative history and Congress's enactment of a more narrow non-emergency legislation at the very least does not authorize the president to impose unbounded tariffs the worldwide and retaliatory tariffs lack any identifiable limits and thus fall outside the scope of section 1702 and second the EA's limited authorities may be exercised only to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared and may not be exercised for any other purpose as to these tariffs they do not meet that condition and they fall outside of its scope let's just go to the conclusion right here the court holds for the foregoing reasons the EA does not authorize any of the worldwide retaliatory tariffs the worldwide tariffs exceed any authority granted to Trump by the EA to regulate importation by means of tariffs the tariffs fail because they do not deal with the threats set forth in those orders this conclusion entitles the plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law as the court further finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact summary judgment will enter against the United States the challenge tariff orders will be vacated and their operation permanently enjoined meaning their operation is over it's stopped it's done trump is not allowed to tariff the way he did unlawful against the whole world immediately done now Donald Trump is going to appeal this right away but this is a massive a massive blow to Donald Trump i can't emphasize enough how big this order is right here blocking Donald Trump from implementing his tariffs under the EA the United States Court of International Trade the three judge panel unanimously has so concluded a massive blow to Donald Trump we'll keep you posted with more here on the Midas Touch Network
Update 19: On May 26, Judge Murphy rejected DHS’s bid to undo a ruling that it unlawfully deported six men, formerly held in ICE custody, without giving them a fair chance to seek protection from torture. The men are now detained at a U.S. military base in Djibouti. The court noted that DHS had previously agreed it could comply with the court’s proposed process, but then reversed course. Update 20: On May 27, the government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the district court's Apr. 18 preliminary injunction.
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC. v. TRUMP (1:25-cv-01674) District Court, District of Columbia Last Updated: May 28, 2025, 9:32 p.m. Assigned To: Randolph Daniel Moss
1. May 27, 2025. COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 405 receipt number ADCDC-11713620) filed by ROARING FORK PUBLIC RADIO, INC., COLORADO PUBLIC RADIO, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC., KUTE, INC.. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Summons, # 7 Summons, # 8 Summons, # 9 Summons, # 10 Summons, # 11 Summons)(Estrada, Miguel) (Attachment 1 replaced on 5/27/2025) (zmtm). (Entered: 05/27/2025)