Part 2 of 2
68. KSUT was founded by the Southern Ute Indian Tribe in 1976 as one of only eight
Tribal radio stations in the country. It has been an independent, non-profit corporation since 1986.
Since 1998, KSUT has broadcast two complementary and comprehensive programming
services—Four Corners Public Radio and Tribal Radio—from its studios in Ignacio, Colorado.
KSUT serves 14 communities in the Four Corners region, including Durango, Silverton, Cortez,
Mancos, and Pagosa Springs, Colorado; Aztec, Bloomfield and Farmington, New Mexico; and
four distinct Federally Recognized Tribes including the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe, and portions of the Navajo Nation and Jicarilla Apache Nation. KSUT airs news,
eclectic music, entertainment, storytelling, and documentary programming.
69. KSUT’s coverage area encompasses approximately 27,000 square miles of mostly
rural land. For most of its coverage area, KSUT is the only public radio station available and the
only available source of free, reliable local and regional news and information.
70. KSUT has been an NPR Member station since 1984. It chooses to air NPR’s
programming because it is high-quality, affordable, and resonates with KSUT’s listeners. On
weekdays, NPR’s programming accounts for seven hours of daily content aired on Four Corners
Public Radio and four hours of daily content on Tribal Radio.
71. Each of the Local Member Stations receives federal funding from the Corporation
in the form of Community Service Grants (CSGs). For Fiscal Year 2025, approximately $210,000
of Aspen Public Radio’s operating revenue comes from CSG funds, comprising approximately
10.8 percent of its budget. Approximately $1.4 million of CPR’s operating revenue comes from
CSG funds, comprising approximately six percent of its budget. $333,000 of KSUT’s operating
revenue comes from CSG funds, comprising approximately 19 percent of its budget.
72. Each of the Local Member Stations pays programming and membership fees to
NPR in part with restricted CSG funds they receive from the Corporation—that is, with funds that
must be used to acquire or produce programming that is distributed nationally and serves the needs
of national audiences. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(3)(A)(iii)(III).
73. Each of the Local Member Stations is also a stakeholder in the nation’s public radio
interconnection system and relies on the PRSS to distribute content from public radio producers.
The Local Member Stations also rely on the PRSS infrastructure to distribute critical emergency
alerts. Like all Interconnected Stations, the Local Member Stations pay fees to NPR for its
management and operation of the PRSS.
President Trump and his Administration Attack NPR and Threaten Retaliation74. Since his first term in office, President Trump has repeatedly expressed his
disagreement with the editorial decisions reflected in the speech and viewpoints of programming
offered by NPR and PBS. For example, on January 26, 2020, President Trump promoted a socialmedia
post claiming that NPR was a “big-government, Democrat Party propaganda operation,”
and questioning “Why does NPR still exist?”5
75. On March 25, 2025, President Trump announced in a press conference that he
would “love to” defund NPR and PBS because of his belief that they are “biased.”6
76. On March 27, 2025, President Trump wrote on social media: “NPR and PBS, two
horrible and completely biased platforms (Networks!), should be DEFUNDED by Congress,
IMMEDIATELY. Republicans, don’t miss this opportunity to rid our Country of this giant SCAM,
both being arms of the Radical Left Democrat Party. JUST SAY NO AND, MAKE AMERICA
GREAT AGAIN!!!”7
77. On April 1, 2025, President Trump wrote on social media: “REPUBLICANS
MUST DEFUND AND TOTALLY DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM NPR & PBS, THE
RADICAL LEFT ‘MONSTERS’ THAT SO BADLY HURT OUR COUNTRY!”8
78. On April 10, 2025, President Trump wrote on social media: “NO MORE
FUNDING FOR NPR, A TOTAL SCAM! … THEY ARE A LIBERAL DISINFORMATION
MACHINE. NOT ONE DOLLAR!!!”9
79. On April 14, 2025, the White House issued a press release entitled “The NPR, PBS
Grift Has Ripped Us Off for Too Long.”10 In it, the White House accused NPR and PBS of
“spread[ing] radical, woke propaganda disguised as ‘news,’” and provided a list of purported
“examples of the trash that passes for ‘news’ at NPR and PBS.”
80. On April 15, 2025, Director Vought stated during an interview that NPR and PBS’s
journalism “is not just left-wing indoctrination” but “is worse than that,” and accused NPR and
PBS of “dividing on the basis of wokeism.”11
The Administration Purports to Fire Three CPB Board Members
and Assert Control over CPB81. On the evening of April 28, 2025, the White House’s Deputy Director of
Presidential Personnel, Trent Morse, emailed three of the Corporation’s Board members the
following message:
On behalf of President Donald J. Trump, I am writing to inform you that your position on
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is terminated effective immediately.
Thank you for your service.
Complaint ¶¶ 34-35, Corporation for Public Broadcasting v. Trump, No. 25-cv-1305, Dkt. 1
(D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2025).
82. The following day, the Corporation, its unanimous Board, and the three purportedly
terminated Board members sued to challenge the attempted removal. Id.; see also Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Corporation for Public Broadcasting v. Trump, Dkt.
2 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2025). That suit remains pending.
83. Also on April 29, 2025, Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) officials
emailed the remaining two Board members requesting a meeting to “discuss getting a DOGE team
assigned to the organization.” Reply at 24, Corporation for Public Broadcasting v. Trump, Dkt.
12 (D.D.C. May 9, 2025); see also Reply Ex. A, Supplemental Declaration of Evan Slavitt ¶ 12,
Dkt. 12-1.
84. The Corporation has averred that, at the time of the Administration’s purported
termination of three of its Board members, the Corporation “was negotiating the extension” of its
current “PRSS Interconnection grant [with NPR]”— which “expires on September 30, 2025”—
“for an additional $35,962,000 using funds that Congress has already appropriated for that specific
purpose.” Reply at 20, Corporation for Public Broadcasting v. Trump, Dkt. 12; see also Reply
Ex. A, Supplemental Declaration of Evan Slavitt ¶¶ 35-36, Dkt. 12-1. According to the
Corporation, “[i]f the PRSS Interconnection Grant is not extended, the PRSS system will cease
operations and the resulting effects will be catastrophic.” Id.
President Trump Issues the Executive Order Purporting to Terminate All Funding to NPR
and PBS Based on the Content and Perceived Viewpoint of Their Speech85. On May 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14290, titled “Ending
Taxpayer Subsidization of Biased Media” (the Order), which purports to direct federal agencies as
well as the Corporation to stop NPR and PBS from receiving any federal funding.
86. Section 1 of the Order announces that its purpose is to terminate federal funding to
NPR and PBS based on the perceived viewpoint of some their programming: It alleges that
“neither entity presents a fair, accurate, or unbiased portrayal of current events.” Order § 1; see
also id. § 2(a) (funding termination is necessary to “ensure that Federal funding does not support
biased and partisan news coverage”).
87. Section 1 admits that the Order is motivated by a desire to abrogate the Public
Broadcasting Act and appropriations legislation by executive fiat: “[T]oday the media landscape
is filled with abundant, diverse, and innovative news options. Government funding of news media
in this environment is not only outdated and unnecessary but corrosive to the appearance of
journalistic independence.” Id. § 1.
88. Section 1 states that the President “therefore” instructs the Corporation “and all
executive departments and agencies” to “cease Federal funding for NPR and PBS.” Id.
89. Section 2 of the Order purports to direct the Corporation to terminate funding
streams that benefit NPR and PBS. First, it states that the “CPB Board shall cease direct funding
to NPR and PBS, consistent with my Administration’s policy to ensure that Federal funding does
not support biased and partisan news coverage. The CPB Board shall cancel existing direct
funding to the maximum extent allowed by law and shall decline to provide future funding.” Id.
§ 2(a). Second, it states that the CPB Board “shall [cease to] provide indirect funding to NPR and
PBS, including by ensuring that [local public stations] do not use Federal funds for NPR and PBS.”
Id. § 2(b). The CPB Board shall do this, the Order states, by revising its 2025 Eligibility Criteria
“to prohibit direct or indirect funding of NPR and PBS” by June 30, 2025. Id. The Order further
states that “the CPB Board shall take all other necessary steps to minimize or eliminate its indirect
funding of NPR and PBS.” Id.
90. Section 2 of the Order also appears to dictate that no CPB money shall go to any
public broadcasting station that acquires NPR or PBS content even with non-CPB money. It
provides that, “[t]o the extent permitted” by the 2024 Eligibility Criteria “and applicable law,” the
CPB Board shall “prohibit parties subject to [those criteria] from funding NPR or PBS after the
date of this order.” Id.
91. Section 3 of the Order concerns sources of funding other than the Corporation. It
directs “[t]he heads of all agencies” to “identify and terminate, to the maximum extent consistent
with applicable law, any direct or indirect funding of NPR and PBS.” Order § 3(a). The heads of
agencies shall then review any remaining funding for compliance with the terms of the grant,
contract, or other funding instrument under which the funding is received. Id. § 3(b).
92. A “Fact Sheet” and press release, which the White House published accompanying
the Order, confirm that the Order is motivated by a hostility toward the perceived viewpoints
expressed by NPR and PBS. The “Fact Sheet,” headlined “President Donald J. Trump Ends the
Taxpayer Subsidization of Biased Media,” alleges that “NPR and PBS have fueled partisanship
and left-wing propaganda with taxpayer dollars.” Fact Sheet. It then lists specific news coverage
and editorial choices with which the President disagrees, ranging from coverage of the Covid-19
pandemic to content featured on Valentine’s Day. Id.
93. The press release, entitled “President Trump Finally Ends the Madness of NPR,
PBS,” accuses NPR and PBS of “spread[ing] radical, woke propaganda disguised as ‘news.’”
Expanding on the “Fact Sheet,” the press release contains nineteen bullets and sub-bullets
cataloguing (and mischaracterizing) news and other content by NPR and PBS exemplifying the
types of editorial decisions that prompted the issuance of the Order.
94. As evidenced by the President’s statements leading up to the Order, the documents
accompanying it, and the text of the Order itself, the sole, express basis of the Order is the
President’s disapproval of the content of the speech and news reporting of NPR and PBS.
The Order’s Immediate Consequences for NPR and the Local Member Stations95. The Order purports to direct the Corporation “and all executive departments and
agencies” to cease providing any direct or indirect funding to NPR or PBS.
96. Just one day after President Trump issued the Executive Order, the NEA terminated
a grant award to NPR.
97. This termination confirms that NEA is complying with the Order and has rendered
NPR ineligible to apply for grants going forward.
98. The Order purports to require the Corporation to revoke grants already awarded to
NPR and to preclude NPR from receiving such grants in the future, jeopardizing a critical source
of funding used (among other things) to protect journalists working in war zones and maintain
resiliency of the PRSS, the nation’s public radio distribution system.
99. By basing its directives on the content and perceived viewpoints expressed in
NPR’s programming, the Order puts NPR on notice that, if it is ever to receive federal funding
again, it must adapt its journalistic and editorial choices to suit the government’s preferences.
100. The Order further purports to require the Corporation to prohibit local stations from
using CPB grants to acquire NPR’s programming, notwithstanding a statutory requirement that
stations must use “restricted” funds to acquire or produce programming that is distributed
nationally and serves the needs of national audiences. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(3)(A)(iii)(III).
101. The Order would therefore force local stations to redirect those funds to acquire
different national programming—in contravention of their own editorial choices—and to take
additional, non-federal funds out of their budgets to continue acquiring NPR’s programming.
102. As noted above, each of the Local Member Stations receives significant grant funds
from the Corporation, ranging between $210,000 and $1.4 million for Fiscal Year 2025. Some of
that funding must be used by the Local Member Stations to acquire or produce national
programming. All of the Local Member Stations use some portion of that funding to acquire NPR
programming. By prohibiting the Local Member Stations from using those funds in that manner,
the Order directly interferes with their journalistic and expressive independence and their editorial
choices—requiring them to use grant funds received from the Corporation to acquire different
national programming rather than NPR programming. If Local Member Stations wish to continue
airing NPR’s programming, they would have to use funds obtained from other sources.
103. More broadly, the Order puts the Local Member Stations and other public radio
stations that air NPR programming on notice that the government disapproves of their editorial
choices and will seize any available opportunities to retaliate if they continue to air NPR
programming.
104. The loss of all direct funding from CPB and the loss (or significant decline) of
revenue from local stations would be catastrophic for NPR. As described above, NPR’s direct
grants from CPB are used to support vital journalistic endeavors and to support the Public Radio
Satellite System—which serves as an essential public safety mechanism. NPR also receives
approximately $100 million annually from local public radio stations in fees, including the Local
Member Stations, constituting nearly a third of NPR’s operating budget.
105. After the Order was issued, the Corporation released a statement explaining that
“CPB is not a federal executive agency subject to the President’s authority” and that “Congress
directly authorized and funded CPB to be a private nonprofit corporation wholly independent of
the federal government.” Corporation for Public Broadcasting, “Statement Regarding Executive
Order on Public Media” (May 2, 2025).12 The Corporation noted that, in creating CPB, “Congress
expressly forbade ‘any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise
any direction, supervision, or control over educational television or radio broadcasting, or over
[CPB] or any of its grantees or contractors.’” Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 398(c)).
106. However, the President has already purported to remove three of the Corporation’s
five Board members, and the Executive Branch under his direction has unequivocally taken the
position that the President can remove any Board member at any time and for any reason. See generally Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
Corporation for Public Broadcasting v. Trump, Dkt. 11 (D.D.C. May 6, 2025). Indeed, during
hearings regarding the Corporation’s motions for a temporary restraining order and for a
preliminary injunction, counsel for the government has repeatedly left open the possibility that the
President could attempt to install new Board members without the required advice and consent of
the Senate. 4/29/25 Tr. at 11-12 and 5/14/25 Tr. at 47-49, Corporation for Public Broadcasting v.
Trump. See also Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 7-19, Aviel v. Gor, No. 25-5105
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (asserting that the President’s Article II authority empowers him to
unilaterally appoint “acting” Board members to the Inter-American Foundation after firing all
existing Board members, notwithstanding a statutory requirement that Board members must be
confirmed by the Senate); id. at 19-20 (arguing in the alternative that if the President cannot
appoint acting Board members, he must be permitted to fire the Foundation’s president directly).
The Administration’s efforts to “assign[]” DOGE officials to the Corporation further demonstrate
its intent to exert control over the Corporation’s functions.
107. To the extent CPB does not comply with the Order’s directives, the Order appears
to direct the Treasury Department (or any agency or instrumentality that may need to act in any
capacity or to any extent to fulfill the mandates of the Act) to withhold appropriated funds from
CPB because to disburse them would constitute “indirect funding of NPR and PBS” in violation
of Section 3(a) of the Order.
CLAIMS
COUNT 1
Lack of Constitutional and Statutory Authority
(APA and Equitable Causes of Action—Ultra Vires)108. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.
109. The President’s power to issue the Order, and any executive official’s power to
implement it, “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). But Congress, through the
Public Broadcasting Act, has expressly prohibited the actions directed by the Order—and no
provision of the Constitution allows the President to override Congress’s will.
110. The Act prohibits any “department, agency, officer, or employee of the United
States” from “exercis[ing] any direction, supervision, or control over public telecommunications,
or over the Corporation or any of its grantees or contractors, or over the charter of bylaws of the
Corporation, or over the curriculum, program of instruction, or personnel of any . . . public
telecommunications entity.” 47 U.S.C. § 398(a). The Act further makes clear that the Corporation
is “not . . . an agency or establishment of the United States Government” and that its Board
members are not “officers or employees of the United States. Id. §§ 396(b), (d)(2).
111. The Order nevertheless purports to issue commands to the Corporation—including
that it cease all direct funding of NPR and PBS; prohibit local public radio and television stations
from acquiring NPR or PBS programming; and amend its Eligibility Criteria to effectuate the
Order’s directives.
112. The Order further violates provisions of the Act that require the Corporation to fund
local public stations in accordance with eligibility criteria that serve specific statutory objectives.
See 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(6)(B).
113. Moreover, the Order violates the Act by prohibiting the Corporation from funding
NPR’s management and operation of the PRSS, notwithstanding the Act’s requirement that the
Corporation “shall” distribute designated Satellite Interconnection Funds to “the national entity”
that public radio stations “designate for satellite interconnection purposes.” Id. § 396(k)(10)(D)(i).
114. The Order also violates statutes governing the NEA’s grant-making functions. In
particular, the NEA is required to ensure that “artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria
by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). By
unilaterally dictating that NPR cannot be eligible to receive any federal grants, the Order precludes
NPR from competing for grants from NEA based on its “artistic excellence and merit,” in violation
of the statute.
115. The President has no authority under the Constitution to take such actions. On the
contrary, the power of the purse is reserved to Congress, and the President has no inherent authority
to override Congress’s will on domestic spending decisions. By unilaterally imposing restrictions
and conditions on funds in contravention of Congress, the Order violates the Separation of Powers
and the Spending Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
116. Plaintiffs have an equitable cause of action to enjoin “violations of federal law by
federal officials,” including to enjoin “unconstitutional actions.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Ctr., 575 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2015); see Am. School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 110 (1902). Judicial “[r]eview for ultra vires acts rests on the longstanding principle that if an
agency action is unauthorized by the statute under which [the agency] assumes to act, the agency
has violate[d] the law and the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief.” Nat’l Ass’n of
Postal Supervisors v. U.S. Postal Serv., 26 F.4th 960, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (alterations in original;
internal quotations omitted). When a “statutory provision plainly delineates the outer limits of
agency authority and Congress has not expressly precluded judicial review,” plaintiffs have a cause
of action to enjoin ultra vires acts. Id. at 971. Moreover, with respect to the individual federalofficial
Defendants, “suits for specific relief against officers of the sovereign allegedly acting
beyond statutory authority or unconstitutionally are not barred by sovereign immunity.” Pollack
v. Hogan, 703 F.3d 117, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted).
117. To the extent that the Executive Order is implemented via final agency action,
including through the NEA’s termination of NPR’s grants, those actions also are reviewable under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, for lack of statutory authority and
violations of the Constitution.
118. The Court should therefore declare that the Order is ultra vires, enjoin Defendants
from implementing it, and vacate any agency action implementing the Order.
COUNT 2
Violation of the First Amendment—Retaliation
(APA and Equitable Causes of Action—Ultra Vires)119. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.
120. “The Framers designed the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to protect
the ‘freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think.’” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600
U.S. 570, 584 (2023) (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660-61 (2000)). “The
Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public
affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). “Suppression” of the press therefore
“muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately
selected to improve our society and keep it free.” Id.
121. While government officials have their own right to speak and to “do so forcefully,”
they cannot “use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression.” Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 188 (2024). In particular, “the First Amendment prohibits
government officials from retaliating against individuals for engaging in protected speech.”
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. 87, 90 (2018).
122. Yet retaliation is the Order’s plain purpose. The Order’s text and the materials that
accompanied it make unmistakably clear that the Order is intended to—and does—retaliate against
NPR because of its protected speech.
123. To demonstrate that unlawful retaliation has occurred, a plaintiff must show that
“(1) [it] engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took some
retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from
speaking again; and (3) a causal link between the exercise of a constitutional right and the adverse
action taken against him.” Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
omitted).
124. NPR and the Local Member Stations have engaged in protected speech by airing
content produced or distributed by NPR, including the specific content listed in the Fact Sheet and
press release.
125. There can be no doubt the Order—which seeks to halt all direct and indirect funding
from CPB to NPR, precludes NPR from applying for any federal grants from any federal agency
in the future, and threatens CPB funding to the Local Member Stations—is an adverse action that
would chill an ordinary speaker. The Order also poses a threat to local public radio stations,
including the Local Member Stations, that they will incur official sanctions for airing NPR content.
In so doing, the Order will doubtless result in broader “‘self-censorship’ of speech that could not
be proscribed,” particularly by organizations that receive government funds, and will thereby
“discourage the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate that the First Amendment is intended
to protect.’” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 75, 78 (2023) (quoting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50
(1988) (“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of
the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”).
126. The “causal link” between NPR’s and the Local Member Stations’ protected speech
and the Order’s punitive actions is spelled out by the Order itself and the materials that
accompanied it. The Order seeks to sanction NPR because it is purportedly “biased” and because
the President dislikes the content of certain of its programming.
127. Plaintiffs have an equitable cause of action to enjoin “unconstitutional actions” by
federal officials. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 327.
128. To the extent that the Executive Order is implemented via final agency action, those
actions also are reviewable under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, for violations of the Constitution.
129. The Court should therefore declare that the Order is ultra vires, enjoin Defendants
from implementing it, and vacate any agency action implementing the Order.
COUNT 3
Violation of the First Amendment—Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
(APA and Equitable Causes of Action—Ultra Vires)130. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.
131. “At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that
viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society.” Vullo, 602 U.S.
at 187. See also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 156 (2015) (viewpoint
discrimination is a “‘more blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content discrimination’” (quoting
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. Because the Order imposes a viewpoint-based burden on NPR’s
and the Local Member Stations’ exercise of their First Amendment rights, it is per se
unconstitutional. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 156.
132. Congress is not obligated to support independent public radio with federal funds.
But the government cannot “‘deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected . . . freedom of speech’. . . .” United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210
(2003) (citation omitted). To put it another way, government funding decisions cannot
constitutionally “be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own
interest.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001). The Order does just that. It
aims to silence NPR’s speech because the President dislikes the balance of viewpoints expressed
in NPR’s programming.
133. By effectuating its retaliatory and viewpoint discriminatory aims through the
Corporation and local public radio stations, the Order also engages in precisely the kind of thirdparty
coercion that the Supreme Court recently affirmed is unlawful. “[T]he government violate[s]
the First Amendment through coercion of a third party” when its conduct, “viewed in context,
could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish
or suppress the plaintiff’s speech.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at 191. Here, the Order purports to issue a
direct command to the Corporation that it cease all direct and indirect funding of NPR. It further
seeks to coerce local public radio stations, including the Local Member Stations, by threatening
them with the loss of funds if they continue to exercise their editorial discretion in ways disfavored
by the Administration.
134. The Order likewise subjects the Local Member Stations to viewpoint-based
discrimination by dictating that federal funds cannot be used to acquire NPR’s programming. At
the outset, the Order would impose significant burdens on the Local Member Stations by requiring
them to segregate funds and prove to the government’s satisfaction that no CPB grants are being
used to acquire NPR’s programming. But the Order goes further: by decreeing that CPB funds
designated for acquiring national programming cannot be used to acquire NPR’s programming,
the Order would force the Local Member Stations to alter their own editorial choices and acquire
national programming from elsewhere to align with the government’s preferred viewpoints. But
the First Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing
speech by some but not others.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. Moreover, as the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held, the “‘exercise of editorial control and judgment’” is protected by the
First Amendment, and “‘governmental regulation’” cannot supplant “the ‘crucial process’ of
editorial choice.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 728-29 (quoting Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 258 (1974)). It is hard to conceive of a more blatant scheme to regulate the exercise of
editorial discretion by Executive fiat.
135. The Order’s insistence that it is only intended to eliminate supposed “bias” in
NPR’s programming does not salvage it. On the contrary, it proves the Order serves no legitimate
government interest. “The government may not, in supposed pursuit of better expressive balance,
alter a private speaker’s own editorial choices about the mix of speech it wants to convey.” Moody,
603 U.S. at 734. “In case after case, the Court has barred the government from forcing a private
speaker to present views it wished to spurn in order to rejigger the expressive realm.” Id. at 733.
136. Plaintiffs have an equitable cause of action to enjoin “unconstitutional actions” by
federal officials. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 327.
137. To the extent that the Executive Order is implemented via final agency action, those
actions also are reviewable under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, for violations of the Constitution.
138. The Court should therefore declare that the Order is ultra vires, enjoin Defendants
from implementing it, and vacate any agency action implementing the Order.
COUNT 4
Violation of First Amendment—Freedom of Association
(APA and Equitable Causes of Action—Ultra Vires)139. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.
140. By purporting to direct the Corporation to restrict funds for local public radio
stations that choose to affiliate with NPR, the Order further infringes on NPR’s and those stations’
freedom of association.
141. The Supreme Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). Government action that “may have
the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny” under the First
Amendment. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See also, e.g.,
303 Creative, 600 U.S. at 586 (the First Amendment protects the right to speak, and, “[e]qually,
the First Amendment protects acts of expressive association”).
142. By directing the Corporation to prohibit local public radio stations that receive
federal funding from expending funds to become an NPR Member Station or to otherwise acquire
NPR’s programming, the Order cuts at the heart of NPR’s and those public radio stations’ freedom
to associate with one another for expressive purposes.
143. Further, the Interconnected Stations, which include but are not limited to NPR
Member Stations, have designated NPR to manage and operate the PRSS on their behalf. The
Order, including by directing the Corporation to cease federal funding to NPR, interferes with the
right of NPR and the Interconnected Stations to associate with one another.
144. The Order seeks to force local public radio stations to cut existing ties with NPR to
remain eligible to receive federal funding, including Corporation grants. And local public radio
stations may have to incur significant burdens to ensure they segregate non-federal funds to acquire
NPR’s programing or undertake other burdensome measures to demonstrate compliance with the
Order’s directives. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337, 339 (government restriction that
“necessarily reduce[d] the quantity of expression” was “a ban on speech,” and potential alternative
means of expression through a political action committee did “not alleviate the First Amendment
problems” because of the associated burdens).
145. The Order’s interference with freedom of association among news media entities
only compounds its fundamental incompatibility with the First Amendment. NPR and its Member
stations are partners in newsgathering and reporting, and NPR regularly airs reporting from its
Member stations. The Order constitutes a governmental veto over the programming choices of
public radio stations—threatening those stations with the loss of funds if they choose to air
programming from a speaker that the government has decreed is off-limits.
146. Plaintiffs have an equitable cause of action to enjoin “unconstitutional actions” by
federal officials. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 327.
147. To the extent that the Executive Order is implemented via final agency action, those
actions are also reviewable under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, for violations of the Constitution.
148. The Court should therefore declare that the Order is ultra vires, enjoin Defendants
from implementing it, and vacate any agency action implementing the Order.
COUNT 5
Violation of the Due Process Clause
(APA Equitable Causes of Action—Ultra Vires)149. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.
150. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
151. The Order violates the Due Process Clause because it purports to order the
Corporation to terminate all direct and indirect funding to NPR, in disregard of NPR’s substantial
reliance interests in its continued eligibility for such funding. Furthermore, by directing the
Corporation to terminate funding needed by NPR to operate the PRSS, the Order impedes NPR’s
ability to perform its contractual obligations and agreements with Interconnected Stations. In so
doing, the Order deprives NPR of property rights with no pre-deprivation notice or meaningful
opportunity to be heard.
152. NPR has a protected property interest in its continued eligibility to receive federal
funding from the Corporation and from local public radio stations that receive grants from the
Corporation. A “statutory entitlement” is a property right under the Due Process Clause, see
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), as is “[l]egitimate and reasonable reliance on a
promise from the state,” Forgue v. City of Chicago, 873 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotations omitted). Property rights “protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives”; that reliance “must not be arbitrarily undermined.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
153. The degree of pre-deprivation process to which someone is entitled under the Due
Process Clause “depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the
governmental interest in summary adjudication.” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263; see Nat’l Council of
Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 205-08 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affording due process
prior to government action depriving organization of “protected property right”).
154. The sudden loss of all federal funding, including PRSS funding, as well as fees
from local public radio stations that otherwise would acquire programming from NPR would be
catastrophic to NPR. As described above, NPR receives about 31 percent of its total operating
revenue through fees from local public radio stations, including its Member stations, and additional
millions of dollars from CPB to support NPR’s coverage of particular issue areas, such as the
ongoing war in Ukraine. NPR relies on CPB grants to support essential functions, and without
federal funding, NPR would need to shutter or downsize collaborative newsrooms and rural
reporting initiatives and, at the same time, also eliminate or scale back critical national and
international coverage that serves the entire public radio system and is not replicable at scale on
the local level. Loss of all revenue from local public radio stations would dramatically harm NPR’s
ability to execute its journalistic mission.
155. Conversely, the government has no legitimate interest in summary termination of
NPR’s ability to receive federal funding and funding from public broadcasters. Year after year,
Congress has reauthorized funding for the Corporation knowing that a portion of that funding was
destined for NPR. If NPR continues to receive Congressionally appropriated funds while the
Government’s accusations are orderly adjudicated, the government will not seriously suffer harm.
156. Given NPR’s weighty interest in avoiding the loss of its property rights relative to
the government’s non-existent interest in abrogating those rights, NPR was entitled to meaningful
pre-deprivation process, including notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 267-68. NPR indisputably did not receive such process.
157. Moreover, the Order independently violates the Due Process Clause because it is
void for vagueness. “A law is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages
seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 72 F.4th
1286, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). The vagueness doctrine serves to ensure
that “regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly,” and to
require “precision and guidance . . . so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or
discriminatory way.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). “When speech
is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does
not chill protected speech.” Id. at 253-54; see also Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (courts will apply a “particularly stringent vagueness and fair-notice test” where an adverse
action “implicates important First Amendment rights” (brackets and internal quotations omitted)).
158. The Order punishes NPR because, in the government’s view, NPR does not
“present[] a fair, accurate, or unbiased portrayal of current events.” Order § 1. NPR did not have
adequate notice that its journalistic activities would subject it to such punishment. Nor does the
Order—which carries the implicit threat of additional adverse consequences for NPR and its Local
Member Stations if their programming deviates from the government’s view of what is “fair” or
“unbiased” in the future—provide any semblance of sufficient notice. Whether reporting is “fair”
or “unbiased” inevitably will depend on the eye of the beholder, making the Order “so standardless
that it . . . encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Woodhull, 72 F.4th at 1303.
159. Plaintiffs have an equitable cause of action to enjoin “unconstitutional actions” by
federal officials. Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 327.
160. To the extent that the Executive Order is implemented via final agency action, those
actions also are reviewable under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, for violations of the Constitution.
161. The Court should therefore declare that the Order is ultra vires, enjoin Defendants
from implementing it, and vacate any agency action implementing the Order.
PRAYER FOR RELIEFFor these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request an order:
162. Declaring that Executive Order 14290 and all actions implementing it are unlawful
and unconstitutional;
163. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining the Defendants from implementing or
seeking to enforce Executive Order 14290;
164. Declaring that the National Endowment for the Arts may not withhold funding from
NPR on the basis of Executive Order 14290;
165. Declaring that the Corporation may not withhold funding from NPR on the basis of
Executive Order 14290;
166. Declaring that the Corporation may not withhold funding from the Local Member
Stations or condition their receipt of funding on the basis of Executive Order 14290;
167. Vacating any final agency action implementing Executive Order 14290;
168. Entering judgment in favor of Plaintiffs;
169. Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorney’s fees in accordance with
law; and
170. Issuing any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: May 27, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Miguel A. Estrada
Miguel A. Estrada (D.D.C. Bar No. 456289)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1700 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-4504
(202) 955-8500
[email protected]Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. (D.D.C. Bar No.
420440)
Katie Townsend (D.D.C. Bar No. 1026115)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
(213) 229-7000
[email protected][email protected]Elizabeth A. Allen (Pro Hac Vice Application
Pending)
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC.
1111 North Capitol Street, NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 513-2000
[email protected]Counsel for Plaintiff
National Public Radio, Inc.
Steven D. Zansberg (Pro Hac Vice Application
Pending)
Zansberg Beylkin LLC
100 Fillmore Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80206
(303) 564-3669
[email protected]Counsel for Plaintiffs Roaring Fork Public
Radio, Inc. d/b/a Aspen Public Radio,
Colorado Public Radio, and KUTE, Inc. d/b/a
KSUT Public Radio