USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinations

USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinations

Postby admin » Sun Oct 06, 2024 1:55 am

Part 1 of 7

https://ia600501.us.archive.org/6/items ... .252.0.pdf

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL NO. 23-cr-257 (TSC)

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS

The defendant asserts that he is immune from prosecution for his criminal scheme to overturn the 2020 presidential election because, he claims, it entailed official conduct. Not so. Although the defendant was the incumbent President during the charged conspiracies, his scheme was fundamentally a private one. Working with a team of private co-conspirators, the defendant acted as a candidate when he pursued multiple criminal means to disrupt, through fraud and deceit, the government function by which votes are collected and counted—a function in which the defendant, as President, had no official role. In Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), the Supreme Court held that presidents are immune from prosecution for certain official conduct— including the defendant’s use of the Justice Department in furtherance of his scheme, as was alleged in the original indictment—and remanded to this Court to determine whether the remaining allegations against the defendant are immunized. The answer to that question is no. This motion provides a comprehensive account of the defendant’s private criminal conduct; sets forth the legal framework created by Trump for resolving immunity claims; applies that framework to establish that none of the defendant’s charged conduct is immunized because it either was unofficial or any presumptive immunity is rebutted; and requests the relief the Government seeks, which is, at bottom, this: that the Court determine that the defendant must stand trial for his private crimes as would any other citizen.

This motion provides the framework for conducting the “necessarily factbound” immunity analysis required by the Supreme Court’s remand order. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340. It proceeds in four parts.

Section I provides a detailed statement of the case that the Government intends to prove at trial. This includes the conduct alleged in the superseding indictment, as well as other categories of evidence that the Government intends to present in its case-in-chief. This detailed statement reflects the Supreme Court’s ruling that presidential immunity contains an evidentiary component, id., which should be “addressed at the outset of a proceeding,” id. at 2334.

Section II sets forth the legal principles governing claims of presidential immunity. It explains that, for each category of conduct that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed, this Court should first determine whether it was official or unofficial by analyzing the relevant “content, form, and context,” id. at 2340, to determine whether the defendant was acting in his official capacity or instead “in his capacity as a candidate for re-election.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Where the defendant was acting “as office-seeker, not office-holder,” no immunity attaches. Id. (emphasis in original). For any conduct deemed official, the Court should next determine whether the presumption of immunity is rebutted, which requires the Government to show that “applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no ‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.’” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2331-32 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982)).

Section III then applies those legal principles to the defendant’s conduct and establishes that nothing the Government intends to present to the jury is protected by presidential immunity. Although the defendant’s discussions with the Vice President about “their official responsibilities” qualify as official, see Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2336, the Government rebuts the presumption of immunity. And all of the defendant’s remaining conduct was unofficial: as content, form, and context show, the defendant was acting in his capacity as a candidate for reelection, not in his capacity as President. In the alternative, if any of this conduct were deemed official, the Government could rebut the presumption of immunity.

Finally, Section IV explains the relief sought by the Government and specifies the findings the Court should make in a single order—namely, that the defendant’s conduct set forth in Section I is not immunized, and that as a result, the defendant must stand trial on the superseding indictment and the Government is not prohibited at trial from using evidence of the conduct described in Section I.

I. Factual Proffer

When the defendant lost the 2020 presidential election, he resorted to crimes to try to stay in office. With private co-conspirators, the defendant launched a series of increasingly desperate plans to overturn the legitimate election results in seven states that he had lost—Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (the “targeted states”). His efforts included lying to state officials in order to induce them to ignore true vote counts; manufacturing fraudulent electoral votes in the targeted states; attempting to enlist Vice President Michael R. Pence, in his role as President of the Senate, to obstruct Congress’s certification of the election by using the defendant’s fraudulent electoral votes; and when all else had failed, on January 6, 2021, directing an angry crowd of supporters to the United States Capitol to obstruct the congressional certification. The throughline of these efforts was deceit: the defendant’s and co-conspirators’ knowingly false claims of election fraud. They used these lies in furtherance of three conspiracies: 1) a conspiracy to interfere with the federal government function by which the nation collects and counts election results, which is set forth in the Constitution and the Electoral Count Act (ECA); 2) a conspiracy to obstruct the official proceeding in which Congress certifies the legitimate results of the presidential election; and 3) a conspiracy against the rights of millions of Americans to vote and have their votes counted.

At its core, the defendant's scheme was a private criminal effort. In his capacity as a candidate, the defendant used deceit to target every stage of the electoral process, which through the Constitution, ECA, and state laws includes the states' notification to the federal government of the selection of their representative electors based on the popular vote in the state; the meeting of those electors to cast their votes consistent with the popular vote; and Congress's counting of the electors' votes at a certification proceeding. As set forth in detail below, the defendant worked with private co-conspirators, including private attorneys CC1 CC2 CC3 [DELETE] and CC5 and private political operatives CC6 and PI. The defendant also relied heavily on private agents, such as his Campaign employees and volunteers, like Campaign Manager P2 Deputy Campaign Manager P3 Senior Campaign Advisor P4 and Campaign operative P5.

In this section, the Government sets forth detailed facts supporting the charges against the defendant,1 before addressing in the next section why none of this conduct is subject to immunity under the Supreme Court's decision in Trump. The conduct set forth below includes the defendant's formation of the conspiracies leading up to and immediately following the 2020 presidential election; certain information regarding his knowledge that there had not been outcome-determinative fraud in the election as he persistently claimed; and his increasingly desperate efforts to use knowingly false claims of election fraud to disrupt the electoral process. The Government does not consider any of the following conduct to be subject to immunity for the reasons set forth in Section III.

A. Formation of the Conspiracies

Although his multiple conspiracies began after election day in 2020, the defendant laid the groundwork for his crimes well before then. Leading into the election, the defendant laid the groundwork for his crimes well before then. Leading into the election, the defendant's private and Campaign advisors, including P6 (then a private citizen) and P2 (the defendant's Campaign manager), informed him that it would be a close contest and that it was unlikely to be finalized on election day -- in part because of the time needed to process large numbers of mail-in ballots prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic.2 They also told the defendant that the initial returns on election night be misleading -- that is, that he might take an early lead in the vote count that would diminish as mail-in ballots were counted bec ause his own supporters favored in-person voting, while supporters of his opponent, Joseph R. Biden, favored mail-in ballots.3

Privately, the defendant told advisers -- including P6 Campaign personnel, P7 [DELETE] (a White House staffer and Campaign volunteer), and P8 (the Vice President's Chief of Staff) -- that in such a scenario, he would simply declare victors before all the ballots were counted and any winner was projected.4 Publicly, the defendant began to plant the seeds for that false declaration. In the months leading up to the election leading up to the election, he refused to say whether he would accept the election results, insisted that he could lose the election only because of fraud, falsely claimed that mail-in ballots were inherently fraudulent, and asserted that only votes counted by election day were valid. For instance:

• In an interview on July 19, 2020, when asked repeatedly if he would accept the results of the lection, the defendant said he would “have to see” and “it depends.”5
• On July 30, despite having voted by mail himself earlier that year, the defendant suggested that widespread mail-in voting provided cause for delaying the election, tweeting, “With Universal Mail-In Voting (not Absentee Voting, which is good), 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in history. It will be a great embarrassment to the USA. Delay the Election until people can properly, securely and safely vote???”6
• In an interview on August 2, the defendant claimed, without any basis, that “[t]here is no way you can go through a mail-in vote without massive cheating.”7
• At a campaign event in Wisconsin on August 17, the defendant told his supporters, “[t]he only way we’re going to lose this election is if the election is rigged, remember that. It’s the only way we’re going to lose this election, so we have to be very careful.”8
• In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention on August 24, the defendant said that “[t]he only way they can take this election away from us is if this is a rigged election.”9  
• On October 27, during remarks regarding his campaign, the defendant said, “[i]t would be very, very proper and very nice if a winner were declared on November 3rd, instead of counting ballots for two weeks, which is totally inappropriate, and I don’t believe that that’s by our laws. I don’t believe that. So we’ll see what happens.”10The defendant said this despite—or perhaps because—his private advisors had informed him that it was unlikely that the winner of the election would be declared on November 3.

By October 2020, P1 a private political advisor who had worked for the defendant's 2016 presidential campaign, began to assist with the defendant's re-election effort. Three days before election day, P1 described the defendant's plan to a private gathering of supporters: "And what Trump's going to do is just declare victory. Right? He's going to declare victory. That doesn't mean he's the winner, he's just going to say he's the winner"11 After explaining that Biden's supporters favored voting by mail, P1 stated further, "And so they're going to have a natural disadvantage and Trump's going to take advantage of it -- that's our strategy. He's going to declare himself a winner."12

Immediately following election day on November 3, the defendant did exactly that. As his private and Campaign advisors had predicted to him, in certain states, the defendant took an early lead on election day that began to erode. At approximately 11:20 p.m., Fox News projected that Biden would prevail in the state of Arizona, and according to Campaign advisor P4 he and the defendant were shocked and angry at this development.13 As election day turned to November 4, the contest was too close to project a winner, and in discussions about what the defendant should show restraint while counting continued.14 Two private advisors, however, advocated a different course: CC1 and CC6 suggested that the defendant just declare victory.15 And at about 2:20 a.m., the defendant gave televised remarks to a crowd of his campaign supporters in which he falsely claimed, without evidence or specificity, that there had been fraud in the election and that he had won: "This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this election. We did win this election."16

In the immediately post-election period, while the defendant claimed fraud without proof, his private operatives sought to create chaos, rather than seek clarity, at polling places where states were continuing to tabulate votes. For example, on November 4, P5 -- A Campaign employee, agent, and co-conspirator of the defendant -- tried to sow confusion when the ongoing vote count at the TCF Center in Detroit, Michigan, looked unfavorable for the defendant. There, when a colleague at the TCF Center told P5 "We think [a batch of votes heavily in Biden's favor is] right," 17 P5 responded, "find a reason it isn't," "give me options to file litigation," and "even if ithis [sic]."18 When the colleague suggested that there was about to be unrest reminiscent of the Brooks Brothers Riot,19 a violent effort to stop the vote count in Florida after the 2000 presidential election, P5 responded, "Make them riot" and "Do it!!!"20 The defendant's Campaign operatives and supporters used similar tactics at other tabulation centers, including in Philadelphia, | Pennsylvania,21 and the defendant sometimes used the resulting confrontations to falsely claim that his election observers were being denied proper access, thus serving as a predicate to the defendant's claim that fraud must have occurred in the observers' absence. 22

Contrary to the defendant's public claims of victory immediately following election day, his advisors informed him that he would likely lose. On November 7, in a private Campaign meeting that included P2, P3, P4 and White House staffer P9 who came to serve as a conduit for information from the Campaign to the defendant, Campaign staff told the defendant that he had only a slim chance of prevailing in the election, and that any potential success was contingent on the defendant winning all ongoing vote counts or litigation in Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin.23 Within a week of that assessment, on November 13, the defendant's Campaign conceded its litigation in Arizona24 -- meaning that based on his Campaign advisors' previous assessment, the defendant had lost the election.

That same day, in an implicit acknowledgment that he had no lawful way to prevail, the defendant sidelined the existing Campaign staff responsible for mounting his legal election challenges. Prom P2 and P3 and others who were telling the defendant the truth that he did not want to hear -- that he had lost -- the defendant turned to CC1, a private attorney who was willing to falsely claim victory and spread knowingly false claims of election fraud.

As the defendant placed alternating phone calls to P3 and CC1 throughout November 13,25 P1 informed CC6, another private Campaign advisor, of the change, writing, "Close hold don't tell anyone Trump just fired P3 and put CC1 in charge" and "You are to report to CC1 26. WhenCC6 asked if P2 was "gone too?", P1 replied that "[t]hey all report to CC1 and that P1 had made a recommendation directly that if CC1 was not in charge this thing is over[.] Trump is in to the end."27 The next day, consistent with P1 description, the defendant announced his staff change by Tweet, writing, "I look forward to CC1 spearheading the legal effort to defend OUR RIGHT to FREE and FAIR ELECTIONS! CC1, P10, P11, CC3, and P12 a truly great team, added to our other wonderful lawyers and representatives!" 28

B. The Defendant Knew that His Claims of Outcome-Determinative Fraud Were False

Following election day and throughout the charged conspiracies, the defendant, his coconspirators, and their agents spread lies that there had been outcome-determinative fraud in the election and that he had actually won. These lies included dozens of specific claims that there had been substantial fraud in certain states, such as that large numbers of dead, non-resident, non-citizen, or otherwise ineligible voters had cast ballots, or that voting machines had changed votes for the defendant to voters for Biden. And the defendant and co-conspirators continued to make these unsupported, objectively unreasonable, and ever-changing claims even after they had been publicly disproven or after advisors had directly informed the defendant that they were untrue.

The evidence demonstrates that the defendant knew his fraud claims were false because he continued to make those claims even after his close advisors -- acting not in an official capacity but in a private or Campaign-related capacity -- told him they were not true. These advisors included P9 the White House staffer and Campaign conduit, and Pence, the defendant's running mate.

P9's relationship with the defendant began before P9 worked for him in the White House. P9 had known P13, the defendant's son-in-law, since P13 was a child, and through P13 met P14 and then the defendant. 29 P9 was one of several attorneys who represented the defendant in his first impeachment trial in the Senate in 2019 and 2020, including presenting argument on the Senate floor on January 27, 2020. 30 P9 began working in the White House as an Assistant to the President in August 2020. 30 In October 2020, P9 became interested in learning more about the defendant's Campaign, and in early November 2020, after he began interfacing with Campaign staff, P9 consulted with the White House Counsel's Office to ensure he complied with any applicable laws regarding Campaign activity. 31 Thereafter, and throughout the post-election period, P9 became a conduit of information from the Campaign to the defendant, and over the course of the conspiracies, P9 told the defendant the unvarnished truth about his Campaign legal team and the claims of fraud that they and the defendant were making. Examples of these instances include:

• P9 repeatedly gave the defendant his honest assessment that CC1 could not mount successful legal challenges to the election. For instance, when the defendant told P9 that he was going to put CC1 in charge of the Campaign's legal efforts but pay him only if he succeeded, P9 told the defendant he would never have to pay CC1 anything; 32 in response, the defendant laughed and said, "we'll see." 33 Thereafter, in Oval Office meetings with the defendant, CC1 and others, in which CC1 made speculative claims, P9 told CC1 -- in front of the defendant -- that CC1 would be unable to prove his allegations in a courtroom. 34 In a separate private conversation, when P9 reiterated to the defendant that CC1 would he unable to prove his false fraud allegations, the defendant responded, "The details don't matter." 35

• In the post-election period, P9 also took on the role of updating the defendant on a near-daily basis on the Campaign's unsuccessful efforts to support any fraud claims. 36 P9 told the defendant that the Campaign was looking into his fraud claims, and had even hired external experts to do so, but could find no support for them. He told the defendant that if the Campaign took to court, they would get slaughtered, because the claims are all "bullshit." 37 P9 was privy to the findings of the two expert consulting firms the Campaign retained to investigate fraud claims -- C1 and C2 -- and discussed with the defendant their debunkings on all major claims. 38 For example, P9 told the defendant that Georgia's audit disproved claims that C3 had altered votes. 39

In the post-election time period, Pence -- the defendant's own running mate, who he had directed to assess fraud allegations -- told the defendant that he had seen no evidence of outcome- determinative fraud in the election. 40 This was in one of the many conversations the defendant and Pence had as running mates, in which they discussed their shared electoral interests. Pence gradually and gently tried to convince the defendant to the lawful results of the election, even if it meant they lost. These conversations included:

• A conversation on November 4 in which the defendant asked Pence to "study up" claims of voter fraud in states that they had won together in 2016 to whether they could bring legal challenges as candidates in those states. 41 Pence described the conversation as follows: "Well, I think, I think it was broadly. It was just look at all of it. Let me know what you think. But he told me that the Campaign was going to fight, was going to go to court and make challenges .... And then he just said we're going to fight this and take a look at it. Let me know what you think.42

• A call between the defendant and Pence on November 7, the day that media organizations began to project Biden as the winner of the election. Pence "tried to encourage" the defendant "as a friend," reminding him, "you took a dying political party and gave it a new lease on life." 43

• A November 11 meeting among the defendant, Pence, Campaign staff, and some White House staff during which Pence asked when most of the lawsuits would be resolved ("when does this come to a head?") and the Campaign staff responded, the ''week after Thanksgiving." 44

• A November 12 meeting among the defendant Pence, Campaign staff, and some White House staff during which, Pence recalls, the "Campaign lawyers gave a sober and somewhat pessimistic report on the state of election challenges." 45

• A private lunch on November 12 in which Pence reiterated a face-saving option for the defendant: "don't concede but recognize process is over." 46

• A private lunch on November 16 in which Pence tried to encourage the defendant to accept the results of the election and run again in 2024, to which the defendant responded, "I don't know, 2024 is so far off." 47

• A November 23 phone call in which the defendant told Pence that the defendant's private attorney, P76, was not optimistic about the election challenges. 48

• A December 21 private lunch in which Pence "encouraged" the defendant "not to look at the election 'as a loss -- just an intermission.'" This was followed later in the day by a private discussion in the Oval Office in which the defendant asked Pence, "what do you think we should do?" Pence said, "after we have exhausted every legal process in the courts and Congress, if we still came up short, [the defendant] should 'take a bow.'" 49

• Discussions in which Pence apprised the defendant of conversations he had had with governors in Arizona and Georgia in the context of "election challenges," in which Pence had called the governors "simply to gather information and share it with the president," 50 and in which the governors did not report evidence of fraud in the elections in their states and explained that they could not take actions to convene their states' legislatures. 51

But the defendant disregarded P9 and Pence in the same way that he disregarded dozens of court decisions that unanimously rejected his and his allies' legal claims, and that he disregarded officials in the targeted states -- including those in his own party -- who stated publicly that he had lost and that his specific fraud allegations were false. 52 Election officials, for instance. issued press releases and other public statements to combat the disinformation that the defendant and allies were spreading. 53 At one point long after the defendant had begun spreading false fraud claims, P15, a White House staffer traveling with the defendant, overheard him tell family members that "it doesn't matter if you won or lost the election. You still have to fight like hell." 54

The defendant and his co-conspirators also demonstrated their deliberate disregard for the truth -- and thus their knowledge of falsity -- when they repeatedly changed the numbers in their baseless fraud allegations from day to day. At trial, thee Government will introduce several instances of this pattern, in which the defendant and conspirators' lies were proved by the fact that they made up figures from whole cloth. One example concerns the defendant and conspirators' claims about non-citizen voters in Arizona. The conspirators started with the allegation that 36,000 non-citizens voted in Arizona; 55 five days later, it was "beyond credulity that a few hundred thousand didn't vote"; 56 three weeks later, "the bare minimum [was] 40 or 50,000. The reality is about 250,000"; 57 days after that, the assertion was 32,000; 58 and ultimately, the conspirators landed back where they started, at 36,000 -- a false figure that they never verified or corroborated. 59

Ultimately, the defendant's steady stream of disinformation in the post-election period culminated in the speech he gave at a privately-funded, privately-organized rally at the Ellipse on the morning of January 6, 2021, in advance of the official proceeding in which Congress was to certify the election in favor of Biden.60 In his speech, the defendant repeated the same lies about election fraud in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin that had been publicly, or directly, debunked.61 The defendant used these lies to inflame and motivate the large and angry crowd of his supporters to march to the Capitol and disrupt the certification proceeding.62

C. The Defendant Aimed Deceit at the Targeted States to Alter Their Ascertainment and Appointment of Electors

Shortly after election day, the defendant began to target the electoral process at the state level by attempting to deceive state officials and to prevent or overturn the legitimate ascertainment and appointment of Biden’s electors. As President, the defendant had no official responsibilities related to the states’ administration of the election or the appointment of their electors, and instead contacted state officials in his capacity as a candidate. Tellingly, the defendant contacted only state officials who were in his political party and were his political supporters, and only in states he had lost. The defendant’s attempts to use deceit to target the states’ electoral process played out in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as across these and other states that used certain voting machines. In addition to the following evidence of the defendant’s conduct during the charged conspiracies, at trial the Government will elicit testimony from election officials from the targeted states to establish the objective falsity—and often, impossibility—of the defendant’s fraud claims. Notably, although these election officials would have been the best sources of information to determine whether there was any merit to specific allegations of election fraud in their states, the defendant never contacted any of them to ask.

1. Arizona

The defendant was on notice that there was no evidence of widespread election fraud in Arizona within a week of the election. On November 9, for instance, two days after news networks projected that Biden had won, the defendant called Arizona Governor P16 to ask him what was happening at the state level with the presidential vote count in Arizona. 63 At that point, though Fox News had projected that Biden had won the state, several other news outlets -- including ABC, NBC, CNN, and the New York Times -- had not yet made a projection. 64 P16 walked the defendant through the margins and the votes remaining to be counted, which were primarily from Pima County, which favored Biden, and Maricopa County, which was split. 65 P16 described the situation to the defendant as "the ninth inning, two outs, and [the defendant] was several runs down."66 The defendant also raised claims of election fraud, and P16 asked the defendant to send him supporting evidence. 67 Although the defendant said he would -- stating, "we're packaging it up" -- he never did.68 Shortly thereafter, on November 13, Campaign Manager told the defendant directly that a false fraud claim that had been circulating -- that a substantial number of non-citizens had voted in Arizona -- was false. 69 The same day, as noted previously, Campaign attorneys conceded in court that the remaining election lawsuit in Arizona was moot.

The defendant and CC1 continued to try to influence P16. For example, CC1 tried to contact P16 on November 22 -- the same day the defendant and reached out to the Arizona Speaker of the House, as described below.70 And on November 30, the day P16 signed the Arizona certificate of ascertainment formally declaring Biden's electors as the legitimate electors for Arizona, P16 received a call from the defendant and Pence.71 P16 advised them that Arizona had certified the election; when the defendant brought up fraud claims, P16 -- eager to see the evidence -- again asked the defendant to provide it, but the defendant never did. 72 Instead, later that evening and into the following morning, the defendant repeatedly publicly attacked P16 (as well as Georgia Governor P17) on Twitter, re-tweeting posts by others, such as "Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans like P17 and P16 73; "Watching the Arizona hearings and then watching Gov. P16 sign those papers, why bother voting for Republicans if what you get is P16 and P17 74; "P17 'My state ran the most corrupt election in American history.' P16 'Hold my beer,"75; and "Why is P16 still pretending he's a member of the Republican Party after he just certified fraudulent election results in Arizona that disenfranchised millions of Republicans?"76

The defendant and co-conspirators also attempted to use false fraud claims to convince political allies in the Arizona state legislature to ignore the popular vote and appoint illegitimate electors. On November 22, the defendant and CC1 called P18 the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives. 77 CC1 did most of the talking. 78 During the call, the defendant and CC1 levied multiple false fraud claims -- including of non-citizen, non-resident, and dead voters that affected the defendant's race -- and asked P18 to use them as a basis to call the state legislature into session to replace Arizona's legitimate electors with illegitimate ones for the defendant. 79 When voiced his deep skepticism, said, "well, you know, we're all kind of Republicans and we need to be working together." 80 P18 refused, and asked CC1 to provide evidence supporting his fraud claims. 81 CC1 never did. 82

Indeed, CC1 met with P18 person approximately a week later and still had nothing to back up his claims . On November 30, CC1, P12 and others arrived in Arizona for a "hotel healing" -- an unofficial meeting with Republican legislators -- during which they promoted false fraud allegations. 83 In a meeting the day after the hearing, when state legislators pressed CC1 and P12 for evidence to support their claims, conceded that even on that late date, "[w]e don't have the evidence, but we have lots of theories."84 When the legislators were frustrated that CC1 had no support for his claims and asked him tough questions, CC1 expressed surprise at the way he was being treated, stating "Man, I thought we were all Republicans. . . . [T]his is a little more hostile a reception. I'm amazed at the reception I'm getting here." 85

On December 4, P18 released a public statement in which he explained that he did not have the authority to use the legislature "to reverse the results of the election" and that doing so would constitute an attempt "to nullify the people's vote based on unsupported theories of fraud." 86 P18 made clear that he was disappointed with the legitimate election results because he "voted for President Trump and worked hard to reelect him" but would not ''violate current law to change the outcome of a certified election."87 On Twitter, P19 a Campaign staffer who worked with CC6 attacked P18 for his statement, writing that P18 "is intentionally misleading the people of Arizona to avoid the inevitable." The defendant re-tweeted P19's false post and praised her. 88

A month later, just two days before January 6, CC2 -- another of the defendant's private attorneys and a co-conspirator -- called P18 and P18 counsel, P20 and urged one last time to use the legislature to decertify Arizona's legitimate electors and overturn the valid election results. 89 When P18 told CC1 that there was no evidence of substantial fraud in Arizona, and that he could not legally call the legislature into session, CC2 was undeterred. He conceded that he "[didn't] know enough about the facts on the ground" regarding fraud in Arizona, and said P18 should nonetheless falsely claim that he had the authority to convene the legislature and "let the courts sort it out."90 P18 again refused. 91

In the post-election period, P18 was harassed; on several occasions, individuals gathered outside P18 home with bullhorns and screamed and honked their vehicle horns to create noise. 92 Once, an individual in visible possession of a pistol and wearing a t-shirt in support of a militia group came onto P18 property and screamed at him. 93 At the time of these events, P18's daughter was at home and was very ill, and the noise caused her "disruption and angst." 94

2. Georgia

The defendant had early notice that his claims of election fraud in Georgia were false. Around mid-November, Campaign advisor P4 told the defendant that his claim that a large number of dead people had voted in Georgia was false. 95 The defendant continued to press the claim anyway, including in a press appearance on November 29, when he suggested that a large enough number of dead voters had cast ballots to change the outcome of the election in Georgia.96

Four days later, on December 3, CC1 orchestrated a presentation to a Judiciary Subcommittee of the Georgia State Senate. 97 In the morning in advance of it, CC1 had spoken to the defendant on the phone for almost twenty minutes.98 And at the hearing, CC1 arranged for co-conspirators and agents to repeat the false dead voter claim. The claim was so patently false that everyone around the defendant knew it: during the hearing, Chief of Staff P 21 and P9 exchanged text messages on their personal phones confirming that a Campaign attorney, P22, had verified that CC1 claim of more than 10,000 dead voters was false and that the actual number was around 12 and could not be outcome-determinative. 99

During the subcommittee hearing, the conspirators also set in motion a sensational and dangerous lie about election workers at State Farm Arena that would result in the defendant's supporters harassing and threatening those workers. First, P23, one of the defendant's private attorneys, claimed that more than 10,000 dead people had voted in Georgia. 100 Next, P24, an agent of the defendant, played misleading excerpts of closed-circuit camera footage from State Farm Arena and insinuated that it showed election workers committing misconduct -- counting "suitcases" of illegal ballots.101 Lastly, based on the false fraud allegations, CC2 who had already been engaged as a private lawyer for the defendant but did not disclose that at the hearing -- encouraged the Georgia legislators to decertify the state's legitimate electors. 102

While the hearing was ongoing, the defendant simultaneously amplified the misinformation about the State Farm Arena election workers, falsely tweeting, "Wow! Blockbuster testimony taking place right now in Georgia. Ballot stuffing by Dems when Republicans were forced to leave the large counting room. Plenty more coming, but this alone leads to an easy win of the State!" 103 He did this just after re-tweeting two of his Campaign account's Tweets that promoted the false claim about election workers at State Farm Arena. 104

Over the next week, the claim of misconduct at State Farm Arena was disproven publicly as well as directly to the defendant. The day after the hearing, P25, the Chief Operating Officer of the Georgia Secretary of State's Office, posted a Tweet explaining that Secretary of State officers had watched the video in its entirety and confirmed that it showed "normal ballot processing." 105 P25 again forcefully debunked the conspirators' claim about the State Farm video in a press conference on December 7, explaining at length the election workers' innocent conduct depicted in the closed-circuit camera footage and stating:

And what's really frustrating is the President's attorneys had this same videotape. They saw the exact same things the rest of us could see. And they chose to mislead state senators and the public about what was on that video. I'm quite sure that they will not characterize the video if they by to enter it into evidence because that's the kind of thing that could lead to sanctions because it is obviously untrue. They knew it was untrue and they continue to do things like this. 106


On December 8, the defendant called Georgia Attorney General P26. 107 P26 had advance notice that the topic of the call was Texas v. Pennsylvania, an election lawsuit in which Texas was suing other states -- including Georgia -- to attempt to prevent the certification of the election. 108 U.S. Senator P27 told P26 that the defendant had heard that P26 was "whipping," or lobbying, other state attorneys general against filing amicus briefs in support of Texas. 109 P26 was not lobbying against the suit, and told P27 so, P27 asked P26 if he would speak with the defendant about it, and P26 agreed. 110 Shortly thereafter, the defendant called P26 and immediately raised Texas v. Pennsylvania, saying, "I hope you're not talking to your AGs and encouraging them not to get on the lawsuit." 111 P26 told the defendant that he was not affirmatively calling other state attorneys general, but that if they called him, he was telling them what he was seeing in his state -- which was something that the defendant probably did not want to hear: P26 was just not seeing evidence of fraud in Georgia. 112 The defendant nonetheless raised various fraud claims. P26 told him that state authorities had investigated the State Farm Arena allegations and found no wrongdoing, and that he thought another claim the defendant raised about Coffee County, Georgia, had been similarly resolved, but would check. 113 The defendant asked P26 to look at them again "because we're running out of time." 114 P26 tried to steer the call to an end by thinking the defendant and telling him that he had voted for him twice and appreciated the defendant, to which the defendant responded, "Yeah, I did a hell of a job, didn't I?"115 At one point, the defendant raised with P26 the impending run-off election for Georgia's U.S. Senate seats and how important it was to re-elect P27 and P28 116 The day after the call, the defendant -- in his private capacity as a candidate for president -- intervened in support of Texas v. Pennsylvania; his attorney for that matter was CC2. 117

On the same day as the defendant's call with P26 the defendant's Campaign staff acknowledged that the State Farm Arena claim was unsupported, emailing one another about the fact that television networks may decline to run Campaign advertisements promoting it. In frustration regarding the claim and others like it, P4 -- who spoke with the defendant on a daily basis and had informed him on multiple occasions that various fraud claims were false -- wrote, "When our research and campaign legal team can't back up any of the claims made by am Elite Strike Force Legal Team, you can see why we're 0-32 on am cases. I'll obviously hustle to help on all fronts, but it's tough to own any of this when it's all just conspiracy shit beamed down from the mothership."118

On December 10, however, CC1 further perpetuated the false State Farm Arena claim when he appeared at another hearing, this one before the Georgia House of Representatives' Government Affairs Committee. During it, he displayed some of the same footage as had been used in the December 3 hearing that had been debunked in the interim by Georgia officials, and nonetheless claimed that it showed "voter fraud right in front of people's eyes."119 He then named two election workers -- P29 and her mother, P30 -- and baselessly accused them of "quite obviously surreptitiously passing around USB ports as if they are vials of heroin or cocaine," and suggested that they were criminals whose "places of work, their homes, should have been searched for evidence of ballots, for evidence of USB ports, for evidence of voter fraud."120 As these false claims about P30 and P29 spread, the women were barraged by racist death threats. In the years since, they have spoken about the effect of the defendant and coconspirators' lies about them; as P30 explained in an interview with congressional investigators, "when someone as powerful as the President of the United States eggs on a mob, that mob will come. They came for us with their cruelty, their threats, their racism, and their hats. They haven't stopped even today." 121 Indeed, to this day, the defendant has never stopped falsely attacking P30 and P29. Although none of the false claims against them were ever corroborated, the defendant has continued to levy them on social media, including when the defendant attacked P30 in January 2023 just after her testimony to congressional investigators was made public. 122

Throughout the post-election period, the defendant used Twitter to publicly attack Georgia Governor P17 with particular aggression. In the thirty-five days between November 30, 2020, and January 3, 2021, the defendant tweeted critically about P17 by name or title, more than forty times. These tweets included the ones also attacking P16 described above, as well as others particular to P17 like, "Why won't Governor @P17, the hapless Governor of Georgia, use his emergency powers, which can be easily done, to overrule his obstinate Secretary of State, and do a match of signatures on envelopes. It will be a 'goldmine' of fraud, and we will easily WIN the state"123; "I will easily & quickly win Georgia if Governor @P17, or the Secretary of State permit a simple signature verification. Has not been done and will show large scale discrepancies. Why are these two 'Republicans' saying no? If we win Georgia, everything else falls in place!"124; "The Republican Governor of Georgia refuses to do signature verification, which would give us an easy win. What's wrong with this guy? What is he hiding?" 125; and "How does Governor @P17 allow certification of votes without verifying signatures and despite the recently released tape of ballots being stuffed? His poll numbers have dropped like a rock. He is finished as governor!"126

In the post-election period, the defendant also made false claims in court about fraud in Georgia -- unsuccessfully. For example, in Trump v. Kemp , a federal lawsuit in which the defendant sued Georgia's Governor and Secretary of State, the defendant signed a verification of fraud allegations that he and his attorney on the case, CC2 knew was inaccurate. P9 spoke with the defendant and CC2 in late December regarding the proposed verification. First, he told CC2 and another private attorney, P31 that they could not have the defendant sign it because they could not verify any of the facts.127 And P9 told the defendant that any lawyer that signed the complaint that the verification supported would get disbarred. 128 acknowledged this problem in an email on December 31 to P32 lead counsel for the defendant as candidate in Trump v. Kemp, and another private attorney, writing that in the time since the defendant signed a previous verification in the case, he "had been made aware that some of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the experts) has been inaccurate" and that signing a new affirmation "with that knowledge (and incorporation by reference) would not be accurate."129 Nonetheless, on December 31, the defendant signed the verification, and caused it to be filed. 130

On January 2, Georgia Secretary of State P33 appeared on Fox News and said that various rumors of election fraud were false, and the defendant had lost in Georgia:

Our office has been very busy with what I call the rumor whack-a-mole. Every day, a rumor will pop up and then we whack it down. What we do is, we basically whack it down with the truth. And people can't handle the truth sometimes because they're very disappointed in the results. And I get that. I voted for President Trump also, but at the end of the day, we did everything we could. We did an audit of the race; President Trump still lost. Then we did a full recount; President Trump still lost ... we had a safe, secure process. 131


P33 like P17 had been on the receiving end of the defendant's Tweets. These included: "Why isn't the @GASecofState P33 a so-called Republican, allowing us to look at signatures on envelopes for verification? We will find tens of thousands of fraudulent and illegal votes"; "RINOS @ P17 @ P34 & Secretary of State P33 will be solely responsible for the potential loss of our two GREAT Senators from Georgia, @ P27 and @ P28. Won't call a Special Session or check for Signature Verification! People are ANGRY!;" and "Georgia, where is signature verification approval? What do you have to lose? Must move quickly! @ P17 @ P34 @GaSecofState." 132

Shorty after seeing the interview, the defendant set up a call with P33 to discuss his pending private lawsuit, Trump v. Kemp, in was a named defendant. 133 For this reason, P33 at first hoped to avoid speaking with the defendant but ultimately acquiesced because the defendant was persistent in seeking to set it up. 134 Also because of the pending lawsuit, arranged for his general counsel, to participate. 135 Joining the defendant on the call were Chief of Staff P21 and three private attorneys -- P32 and P36 counsel of record in Trump v. Kemp and the attorneys whom CC2 had emailed about the defendant's false verification, and P31 whom P21 introduced on the call as someone "who is not the attorney of record but has been involved."

The defendant began the call with an animated monologue in which he argued that he had won the election in Georgia, saying, "Okay, thank you very much. Hello P33 and P35 and everybody. We appreciate the time and the call. So we've spent a lot of time on this, and if we could just go over some of the numbers, I think it's pretty clear that we won. We won very substantially, uh, Georgia."136 Throughout the call, the defendant continued to state that he had won and referenced Biden's margin of victory that he needed to overcome to prevail in the state, including by asserting that "I just want to find 11,780 votes." 137 He did not reference other elections on the same ballot. After the defendant's opening salvo, P33 stated, "Well, I listened to what the President has just said. President Trump, we've had several lawsuits, and we've had to respond in court to the lawsuits and the contentions. We don't agree that you have won."138

The defendant raised multiple false claims of election fraud, each of which P33 refuted in turn. When the defendant attacked P30 called her a "professional vote scammer and hustler, 139 and mentioned her dozens of times throughout the call, P33 said, "You're talking about the State Farm video. And I think it's extremely unfortunate that CC1 or his people, they sliced and diced that video and took it out of context." 140 He then offered the defendant a link to a video disproving the claim, to which the defendant responded, "I don't care about a link, I don't need it. I have a much, I have a much better link." 141 When the defendant claimed that 5,000 dead people had voted in Georgia, said, "Well, Mr. President, the challenge you have is the data you have is wrong ... The actual number were two. Two. Two people that were dead that voted. And so that's wrong, that was two." 142 When the defendant claimed that thousands of out-of-state voters had cast ballots, P33 counsel, P35 responded, "We've been going through each of those as well, and those numbers that we got, that Ms. P31 was just saying, they're not accurate." 143

At one point, the defendant became frustrated after both P33 and P35 explained repeatedly that his claims had been investigated and were not true and stated, "And you're gonna to find that they are -- which is totally illegal -- it's, it's, it's more illegal for you than it is for them because, you know what they did and you're not reporting it. That's a criminal, you know, that's a criminal offense. And you know, you can 't let that happen. That's a big risk to you and to P35 your lawyer. That's a big risk." 144 The call ended with P35 stating that he would coordinate with the lawyer representing P33 office in the private lawsuit and get together with P32 as agreed earlier in the call. 145

The day after the call, on January 3, the defendant falsely tweeted, "I spoke to Secretary of State P33 yesterday about Fulton County and voter fraud in Georgia. He was unwilling, or unable, to answer questions such as the 'ballots under table' scam, ballot destruction, out of state 'voters ', dead voters, and more. He has no clue!" 146 P33 promptly responded in a Tweet of his own: "Respectfully, President Trump: What you're saying is not true. The truth will come out." 147
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Mon Oct 07, 2024 2:45 am

Part 2 of 7

3. Michigan

On November 20, three days before Michigan's Governor signed a certificate of ascertainment appointing Biden's electors based on the popular vote, the defendant met with P37 and P37 Michigan's Senate Majority Leader and Speaker of the House, at the Oval Office. 148 The defendant initiated the meeting by asking RNC Chairwoman P39 to reach out to P38 and gauge his receptivity to a meeting. 149 The defendant also asked P39 to participate in the meeting, but P39 told him that she had consulted with her attorney and that she could not be involved in a meeting with legislators because it could be perceived as lobbying. 150 After P39 made the first contact, on November 18, the defendant reached out to P37 and P38 to extend an invitation. 151 The same day that he contacted P37 and P38 the defendant issued a false Tweet: "In Detroit, there are FAR MORE VOTES THAN PEOPLE. Nothing can be done to cure that giant scam. I win Michigan!" 152

When the defendant called P37 and P38 to invite them to the White House, he did not provide the topic of the meeting, but he did ask about allegations of fraud in the election in Michigan. 153 The legislators told him that they and the Michigan legislature were examining the allegations.154 Both P37 and P38 and assumed that the defendant wanted to see them to discuss claims of election fraud, and they wanted to be firm that they had not seen evidence that would change the outcome of the election. 155 For this reason, and to avoid talking only about election fraud, they prepared materials to raise regarding COVID-19, and planned in advance to release a statement once the meeting was over that said that the legislators were unaware of information that would change the outcome of the election. 156

Over the course of the meeting, the defendant dialed in both P39 --despite her request not to participate -- and CC1 157 P21 was present for some, but not all, of the meeting. 158 After some small talk with the legislators in the Oval Office, the defendant raised various fraud claims, including that he had lost Michigan because of fraud or misconduct in Wayne County, where Detroit is located. 159 P37 corrected the defendant and told him that he had lost primarily because in two routinely Republican counties, the defendant had underperformed with educated females, and if he had received the same number of votes there as the two winning local sheriffs, he likely would have won Michigan. 160 P37 could tell by the defendant's body language that he was not happy to hear P37 assessment. 161 Notably, the defendant only raised fraud claims to the extent that they affected the outcome in his own race, not those for other offices in Michigan. 162

CC1 participation came after the legislators assured the defendant that they were looking into fraud claims; the defendant dialed CC1 into the meeting and said, "CC1 tell them what's going on." CC1 then launched into a fraud monologue. 163 Finally, P37 interrupted and asked, "So when are you going to file a lawsuit in Michigan?" -- a question that CC1 ignored and did not answer. l64

Immediately after the meeting, P37 and P38 released a public statement in which they stated that they had "not yet been made aware of any information that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan." 165 On November 21, the defendant acknowledged P37 and P38 statement when he tweeted, "This is true, but much different than reported by the media" and implicitly conceded that he had not provided evidence of fraud yet when he added, "We will show massive and unprecedented fraud!" 166 Days later, the defendant's Campaign declined to request a state-wide recount in Michigan, for which it would have had to pay unless the recount succeeded in changing the outcome of the election. 167

Despite failing to establish any valid fraud claims, CC1 followed up with P37 and P38 and and attempted to pressure them to use the Michigan legislature to overturn the valid election results. On December 4, CC1 sent a message to P38 claiming that Georgia was poised to do so (based on CC1 and CC2 false advocacy there in the December 3 hearing) and asked P38 for help: "Looks like Georgia may well hold some factual hearings and change the certification under Art II sec 1 cl 2 of the Constitution. As CC2 explained they don't just have the right to do it but the obligation . . . . Help me get this done in Michigan." 168 On December 7, CC1 attempted to send P37 a message (though failed because he typed the wrong number into his phone): "So I need you to pass a joint resolution from the Michigan legislature that states that, * the election is in dispute, * there's an ongoing investigation by the Legislature, and * the Electors sent by Governor Whitmer are not the official Electors of the State of Michigan and do not fall within the Safe Harbor deadline of Dec 8 under Michigan law." 169 Campaign operative P5 was involved in the drafting of this message with the assistance of P41 who was associated with the defendant's Campaign efforts in Michigan. 170 The following day, CC1 shared the draft with the defendant, sending it to his executive assistant, P42 by email. 171

These efforts failed. On December 14, the day that duly-appointed electors across the country met and cast their electoral votes, P37 and P38 issued public statements confirming that the defendant had lost Michigan and the legislators still had not received evidence of outcome-determinative fraud in their state. 172 P37 public statement included, "[W]e have not received evidence of fraud on a scale that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan." 173 P38 stated, in part:

We've diligently examined these reports of fraud to the best of our ability ... I fought hard for President Trump. Nobody wanted him to win more than me. I think he's done an incredible job. But I love am republic, too. I can't fathom risking our norms, traditions and institutions to pass a resolution retroactively changing the electors for Trump, simply because some think there may have been enough widespread fraud to give him the win. That's unprecedented for good reason. And that's why there is not enough support in the House to cast a new slate of electors. I fear we'd lose our country forever. This truly would bring mutually assured destruction for every future election in regards to the Electoral College. And I can't stand for that. I won't. 174


On January 3, the defendant's Campaign publicly posted P37 phone number, and attempted to post P38 (but erred by one digit), in a Tweet urging, "Contact Speaker P38 & Senate Majority Leader P37!" 175 P37 received four thousand text messages in two hours, forcing him to get a new phone number. 176

4. Nevada

On November 17, in Law v. Whitmer, agents of the defendant in Nevada filed suit, claiming "substantial irregularities, improprieties, and fraud" in the presidential election, including based on machines used in ballot signature matching and votes by non-resident and dead voters. 177 The defendant approved a press conference by his surrogates announcing the suit. 178

On November 19, P43 the RNC Chief Counsel, sent an email to P44, an RNC spokesperson, warning about inaccuracies in the suit: "Just FYI that I don't believe the claims in the contest regarding dead voters, those voting from out-of-state, etc. are substantiated. We are working with the campaign on a data matching project and those numbers are going to be a lot lower than what the NV people have come up with. They are also targeting am military voters. To be frank, the contest has little chance of succeeding. Happy to discuss this stuff if you want more info." 179 P44 then sent a copy of P43 email from her personal email account of P45 to the personal email account of P45, one of the defendant's White House staffers who also volunteered for the Campaign. 180

Notwithstanding the RNC Chief Counsel 's warning, the defendant re-tweeted and amplified news of the lawsuit on November 24, calling it "Big News!" that a Nevada Court had agreed to hear it. 181 But the defendant did not similarly promote the fact that within two weeks, on December 4, the Nevada District Court dismissed Law v. Whitmer, finding in a detailed opinion that "there is no credible or reliable evidence that the 2020 General Election in Nevada was affected by fraud," including through the signature-match machines, and that Biden won the election in the state. 182 Four days later, on December 8, Nevada's Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the District Court's decision, noting that despite its "earlier order asking appellants to identify specific findings with which they take issue, appellants have not pointed to any unsupported factual findings, and we have identified none." 183 Later, in his Ellipse speech on January 6, the defendant repeated multiple claims explicitly rejected by Nevada courts. 184

On December 18, the Nevada Secretary of State's Office released a "Facts vs. Myths" document to combat disinformation that the defendant and others were propagating about the election, including false claims that the Secretary of State's Office had not investigated claims of fraud even though it had ''been presented with evidence of wide-spread fraud" -- to which the Office responded, "While we are pursuing action in a number of isolated cases, we have yet to see any evidence of wide-spread fraud." 185 The "Facts vs. Myths" document also stated publicly that courts had universally rejected fraud claims: "Four separate cases were heard by Nevada judges including the NV Supreme Court. After examining records presented, each case was discounted due to a lack of evidence." 186

5. Pennsylvania

Two days after the election, on November 6, the defendant called the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Republican Party -- the entity responsible for supporting Republican candidates in the commonwealth at the federal, state, and local level. 187 P46 had a prior relationship with the defendant, including having represented him in litigation in Pennsylvania after the 2016 presidential election. 188 The defendant asked P46 how, without fraud, he had gone from winning Pennsylvania on election day to trailing in the days afterward. 189 Consistent with what Campaign staff already had told the defendant, P46 confirmed that it was not fraud; it was that there were roughly 1,750,000 mail-in ballots still being counted in Pennsylvania, which were expected to be eighty percent for Biden.190 Over the following two months, the defendant spread false claims of fraud in Pennsylvania anyway.

In early November, in a Campaign meeting, when the defendant suggested that more people in Pennsylvania voted than had checked in to vote, Deputy Campaign Manager P3 corrected him. 191 Around the same time, Philadelphia City Commissioner P46 appeared on television and stated that there was no evidence of widespread fraud in Philadelphia. 192 After seeing the interview, the defendant targeted tweeting, "A guy named P46, a Philadelphia Commissioner and so-called Republican (RINO), is being used big time by the Fake News Media to explain how honest things were with respect to the Election in Philadelphia. He refuses to look at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty. We win!" 193 As a result of the defendant's attack, threats that already was receiving became more targeted and detailed -- and included his address and the names of his family members. 194

On the defendant's behalf, CC1 too spread patently false claims about Pennsylvania. On November 25, CC1 and P12 attended an unofficial hearing with Republican state legislators in a Gettysburg hotel conference room. 195 The defendant called in, claimed to have been watching, and demanded that the election in Pennsylvania "has to be turned around." 196 During the event, CC1 falsely stated that Pennsylvania issued 1.8 million absentee ballots and received 2.5 million in return. 197 The claim was rooted in an obvious error -- the comparison of the number of ballots sent out in the primary election to the number of ballots received in the general election. After seeing CC1 make this claim, P43, the RNC's Chief Counsel, tweeted publicly, "This is not true." 198 In the following days, Campaign staff internally confirmed that CC1 was lying; when one Campaign staffer wrote in an email that claim was "just wrong" and "[t]here's no way to defend it," P3 responded, "We have been saying this for a while. It's very frustrating." 199 Likewise, in late November or December, P9 informed the defendant directly that a claim CC1 was spreading, that "Pennsylvania received 700,000 more mail-in ballots than were mailed out," was "bullshit" and explained the error. 200

P43 followed up on his public Tweet in a private email on November 28 to P44 the RNC spokesperson, expressing his concern about CC1 and P12 spread of disinformation: "I'm really not trying to give you a hard time but what CC1 and P12 are doing is a joke and they are getting laughed out of court. It's setting us back in our fight for election integrity and they are misleading millions of people who have wishful thinking that the president is going to somehow win this thing." 201 When CC1 learned of P43 Tweet and email, on November 28, he called P43 and left a threatening voicemail, stating, "I really do need an explanation for what you said today because if there isn't a good one, you should resign. Got it? So call me or I'll call the boss and get you to resign. Call me. It'd be better for you if you do." 202 CC1 also contacted RNC Chairwoman P39 to demand that P43 be fired, and thereafter P43 was relieved of his duties as RNC Chief Counsel. 203

On December 3, four Republican leaders of the Pennsylvania legislature issued a public letter stating that the General Assembly lacked the authority to overturn the popular vote and appoint its own slate of electors, and that doing so would violate the state Election Code and Constitution. 204 P48 -- an agent of the defendant who worked closely with CC1 -- issued a Tweet showing the four legislators' names and signatures and wrote, "These are the four cowardice Pennsylvania legislators that intend to allow the Democrat machine to #StealtheVote! #Cowards #Liars #Traitors" while linking to the legislators' Twitter accounts.205 On Sunday December 6, at 12:56 a.m., from the White House residence -- having just returned from a political rally in Valdosta, Georgia -- the defendant re-tweeted and amplified P48 post. 206

6. Wisconsin

On November 29, a recount that the defendant's Campaign had petitioned and paid for confirmed that Biden had won in Wisconsin -- and increased the defendant's margin of defeat. 207 On December 14, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the Campaign's election lawsuit there. 208 As a result, on December 21, Wisconsin's Governor signed a certificate of final determination confirming the prior certificate of ascel1airunent that established Biden's electors as the valid electors for the state. 209

In response, the defendant issued a series of Tweets attacking P49 the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice who had written the majority opinion rejecting his Campaign's lawsuit and advocating that the Wisconsin legislature overturn the valid election results:

Two years ago, the great people of Wisconsin asked me to endorse a man named P49 for State Supreme Court Justice, when he was getting destroyed in the Polls against a tough Democrat Candidate who had no chance of losing. After my endorsement, P49 easily won! WOW, he just voted against me in a Big Court Decision on voter fraud (of which there was much!), despite many pages of dissent from three highly respected Justices. One thing has nothing to do with another, but we ended up losing 4-3 in a really incorrect ruling! Great Republicans in Wisconsin should take these 3 strong decisions to their State Legislators and overturn this ridiculous State Election. We won in a LANDSLIDE! 210


After the defendant's Tweet, the state marshals responsible for P49 safety arranged to provide P49 with additional police protection based on social media traffic and other threatening communications. 211

7. Voting Machines in Multiple States

Throughout the post-election period, the defendant and co-conspirators repeatedly made claims about the security and accuracy of voting machines across multiple states, despite the fact that they were on notice that the claims were false. As early as November 12, for instance, the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National Association of State Election Directors, and other coordinated federal, state, and private entities issued a public statement declaring that the 2020 election was "the most secure in American history" and that there was "no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised." 212

On November 14, in the Tweet announcing that CC1 was to lead his Campaign legal efforts, the defendant also named CC3 a private attorney who was fixated on voting machine claims, and P10, another private attorney. 213 Two days later, on November 16, on the defendant's behalf, executive assistant P42 sent CC3 and other private attorneys an email, titled "From POTUS," attaching a document containing bullet points critical of C3, a company that manufactured voting machines used in certain states, and writing, "See attached -- Please include as is, or almost as is, in lawsuit." 214 CC3 responded nine minutes later, writing, "IT MUST GO IN ALL SUITS IN GA AND PA IMMEDIATELY WITH A FRAUD CLAIM THAT REQUIRES THE ENTIRE ELECTION TO BE SET ASIDE in those states and machines impounded for non-partisan professional inspection." 215

On November 17, P50, the director of the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), publicly tweeted that a group of private election security experts concluded that claims of computer-based election fraud "either have been unsubstantiated or are technically incoherent." 216

Two days later, on November 19, CC1, CC3, P10 and others held a press conference at the RNC headquarters, on behalf of the defendant and his Campaign. 217 During it, CC3 made false and factually impossible claims regarding C3 and the integrity of the Country's election infrastructure. 218 That night, Fox News television personality P51 stated on air that because of CC3 incendiary comments about voting machines, he had invited her on his television program. He further stated, "[ b]ut she never sent us any evidence, despite a lot of requests, polite requests. Not a page. When we kept pressing, she got angry and told us to stop contacting her. When we checked with others around the Trump Campaign, people in positions of authority, they told us CC3 has never given them any evidence either ... she never demonstrated that a single actual vote was moved illegitimately by software from one candidate to another. Not one." 219

The defendant saw his private attorneys' RNC press conference and P51 discussion of CC3 and he acknowledged to P4 that CC3 had appeared "unhinged" in the press conference. 220 On November 20, the day after the press conference, the defendant made a similar comment to P7 and P45, two White House staffers who also volunteered for his Campaign. 221 In casual conversation after another meeting had ended, the defendant told P7 and P45 that P51 had "eviscerated" or "destroyed" CC3. 222 The defendant then had a call with CC3 on speaker phone, while P7 and P45 listened in, and mentioned the P51 segment to CC3. 223 While CC3 responded, the defendant placed the call on mute and to P7 and P45 mocked and laughed at nCC3 called her claims "crazy," and made a reference to the science fiction series Star Trek when describing her allegations. 224 In the same time period, when P9 told the defendant that CC3 claims were unreliable and should not be included in lawsuits, the defendant agreed that he had not seen anything to substantiate CC3 allegations. 225

On November 22, notwithstanding the defendant's Tweet from eight days prior announcing CC3 involvement, CC1 issued a statement on behalf of the Campaign distancing the defendant from CC3, "CC3 is practicing law on her own. She is not a member of the Trump Legal Team. She is also not a lawyer for the President in his personal capacity." 226 Nonetheless, the defendant continued to support and publicize knowingly false claims. For example, within days of CC1 statement, the defendant promoted a lawsuit that CC3 was about to file, tweeting on November 24, "BREAKING NEWS: @ CC3 says her lawsuit in Georgia could be filed as soon as tomorrow and says there's no way there was anything but widespread election fraud. #MAGA #AmericaFirst #Dobbs." 227 CC3 filed a lawsuit the next day against the Governor of Georgia falsely alleging "massive election fraud" accomplished through C3 election software and hardware. 228 The defendant again promoted the lawsuit in a Tweet. 229 The lawsuit was dismissed within two weeks, on December 7. 230

On November 29, P50, who was no longer the CISA Director, appeared on the television program 60 Minutes. 231 P50 stated that he was confident that the election had been secure and "that there was no manipulation of the vote on the machine count side." 232 In response, the defendant tweeted publicly about P50 appearance: "@60Minutes never asked us for a comment about their ridiculous, one sided story on election security, which is an international joke. Our 2020 Election, from poorly rated C3 to a Country FLOODED with unaccounted for Mail-In ballots, was probably our least secure EVER!" 233 A few days later, P10 appeared on a radio program as the defendant's agent and said that because of P50's comments to promote confidence in the security of the election infrastructure, P50 "should be drawn and quartered. Taken out at dawn and shot." 234 Thereafter, P50 was subjected to death threats. 235 In a press conference on December 1 that the defendant acknowledged watching, 236 P25, a Georgia election official, decried P10 and the defendant's public statements spreading disinformation and said that if they did not stop, "someone is going to get killed." 237

On December 1, Attorney General P52 stated publicly that the Justice Department had not seen evidence of fraud sufficient to change the election results. 238 With respect to voting machines, he said, "There's been one assertion that would be systemic fraud and that would be the claim that machines were programmed essentially to skew the election results. And the DHS and DOJ have looked into that, and so far, we haven't seen anything to substantiate that." 239 CC1, and P12 immediately issued a formal Campaign statement attacking P52 and the Justice Department, writing, "With all due respect to the Attorney General, there hasn't been any semblance of a Department of Justice Investigation ... his opinion appears to be without any knowledge or investigation of the substantial irregularities and evidence of systemic fraud."

In mid-December, the defendant spoke with RNC Chairwoman P39 and asked her to publicize and promote a private report that had been released on December 13 that purported to identify flaws in the use of C3 machines in Antrim County, Michigan. 241 P39 refused, telling the defendant that she already had discussed the report with P38, Michigan's Speaker of the House, who had told her that the report was inaccurate. 242 P39 conveyed to the defendant P38 exact assessment: the report was "fucking nuts." 243

On January 2, during the defendant's call with Georgia Secretary of State P33 said of false claims regarding voting machines, "I don't believe that you're really questioning the C3 machines. Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent re-tally of all the ballots, and compared them to what the machines said and came up with virtually the same result. Then we did the recount, and we got virtually the same result. So I guess we can probably take that off the table." 244 In response, the defendant falsely claimed that "in other states, we think we found tremendous corruption with C3 machines, but we'll have to see." 245

At the Ellipse on January 6, the defendant and co-conspirators who spoke at the rally continued to make unsubstantiated and false claims about C3 machines. CC1 claimed that in the U.S. Senate run-off election in Georgia the day before, "the votes were deliberately changed by the same algorithm that was used in cheating President Trump and Vice President Pence." 246 CC2 continued the false attack: "We now know because we caught it live last time in real time, how the machines contributed to that fraud. . . . They put those ballots in a secret folder in the machines sitting there waiting, until they know how many they need. And then the machine after the close of polls, we now know who's voted. And we know who hasn't. And I can now in that machine match those unvoted ballots with an unvoted voter and put them together in the machine. We saw it happen in real time last night and it happened on November 3rd as well." 247 In his own speech, the defendant again raised the false specter of "the highly troubling matter of C3 and lied about machines flipping votes from the defendant to Biden and an "astronomical and astounding" error rate in the machines' ballot scanning. 248

D. The Defendant Organized and Caused His Electors to Submit Fraudulent Certificates Creating the False Appearance That States Submitted Competing Electoral Slates

By late November 2020, every effort -- both legitimate and illegitimate -- that the defendant had made to challenge the results of the election had been unsuccessful. The defendant, his Campaign, and their allies had lost or withdrawn one election lawsuit after another in the seven targeted states. And the defendant and co-conspirators' efforts to overturn the legitimate vote count through a pressure campaign on state officials, and through false claims made directly to state legislators in formal or pseudo-hearings, continued to fail. So in early December, the defendant and his co-conspirators developed a new plan regarding the targeted states that the defendant had lost (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin): to organize the people who would have served as the defendant's electors had he won the popular vote, and cause them to sign and send to Pence, as President of the Senate, certifications in which they falsely represented themselves as legitimate electors who had cast electoral votes for the defendant. Ultimately, the defendant and his co-conspirators would use these fraudulent electoral votes -- mere pieces of paper without the lawful imprimatur of a state executive -- to falsely claim that in his ministerial role presiding over the January 6 certification, Pence had the authority to choose the fraudulent slates over the legitimate ones, or to send the purportedly "dueling" slates to the state legislatures for consideration anew.

The fraudulent elector plan's arc and obstructive purpose is reflected in a series of memoranda drafted in late November and early December by an attorney who volunteered to assist the defendant's Campaign in lawsuits challenging the election in Wisconsin. 249 Beginning with a memorandum drafted on November advocated that the defendant's elector nominees in Wisconsin meet and cast votes on the date required by the ECA (in 2020, December 14) in the event that an ongoing recount in the state reversed the defendant's loss there. 250 But this course of action -- which CC5 Wisconsin memorandum presented as a contingency plan to preserve the possibility that the defendant's electors' votes be counted at the January 6 certification proceeding if he prevailed in the Wisconsin litigation and won the state -- quickly transformed into a corrupt strategy to overturn the legitimate election results. 251 CC5 revealed this obstructive plan in two additional memoranda, dated December 6, 252 and December 9, 253 which proposed that the defendant's elector nominees in six of the targeted states -- all but New Mexico, a state the defendant lost by more than ten percent of the popular vote, sparsely referenced in his false claims of voter fraud, and did not envision challenging at the inception of the elector scheme 254 -- meet on December 14, sign fraudulent certifications, and send them to the Vice President to manufacture a fake controversy during the January 6 congressional certification.

The defendant personally set the fraudulent elector plan in motion in early December, ensured that it was carried out by co-conspirators and Campaign agents in the targeted states, and monitored its progress. By December 5, the defendant was starting to think about Congress's role in the election process; for the first time, he mentioned to Pence the possibility of challenging the election results in the House of Representatives. 255 In the same call, Pence told the defendant that the Georgia Bureau of Investigation was investigating their race. 256

On December 6, the same day that CC5 put the plan on paper, 257 the defendant and CC2 called RNC Chairwoman P39 out of the blue. 258 P39 did not know CC2 and the defendant introduced him to P39 by saying that he was a professor and lawyer; thereafter, CC2 was the primary speaker during the conversation. 259 CC2 told P39 that he and the defendant wanted the RNC "to help the campaign assemble the electors in the states where we had legal challenges, or litigation that was ongoing. . in case any of that litigation changed the result of a state so that it would meet the constitutional requirement of electors meeting." 260 When the call ended, P39 immediately called P3 one of the defendant's deputy Campaign managers, and relayed her conversation with the defendant and CC2 261 After P3 assured P39 that the Campaign was "on it," P39, called the defendant back and told him so. 262 On the same day, from his personal email account, P21 forwarded to Campaign staff CC5 November 18 memorandum and wrote, "We just need to have someone coordinating the electors for states.,,263 And the following day, on the evening of December 7, sent a text message stating in pat1, "I have lawyers assigned in each state working on Dec 14 electors meeting and what they need. I will send you a list." 264

The defendant's co-conspirators worked with his Campaign staff, and used his pre-election Campaign apparatus, to execute the fraudulent elector plan. 265 The defendant communicated with CC1 and CC2 about the plan, 266 and they in turn communicated with CC6 and CC5. 267 Ultimately, P5, P19, and other Campaign staff and agents helped carry out CC5 plans. 268

On December 8, CC5 spoke on the phone with P53 269, a private attorney whom CC1 and CC6 had identified as a contact for the plan in Arizona. 270 Following the call, P53 recounted the conversation in an email:

I just talked to the gentleman who did that memo, CC5. His idea is basically that all of us (GA, WI, AZ, PA, etc.) have our electors send in their votes (even though the votes aren't legal under federal law -- because they're not signed by Governor); so that members of Congress can fight about whether they should be counted on January 6th. (They could potentially argue that they're not bound by federal law because they're Congress and make the law, etc.) Kind of wild/creative - I'm happy to discuss. My comment to him is that I guess there's no harm in it, (legally at least) -- i.e. we would just be sending in "fake" electoral votes to Pence so that "someone" in Congress can make an objection when they stal1 counting votes, and start arguing that the "fake" votes should be counted. 271


On December 9, CC6 contacted P39 for assistance with a request from CC5 for "a list of our electors in each state and copies of the cel1ificates sent in 4 years ago." 272 P39 responded that Campaign employees were already assisting in the effort and referred CC6 to P3. 273 The next day, at CC1's direction, CC5 generated directions to the electors in all of the targeted states except for Wisconsin (which had already received his memos) and New Mexico (which he had not yet been asked to do) on how best to mimic the manner in which valid electors were required by state law to gather and vote, along with fraudulent certificates of vote for the defendant's electors to sign. 274

The day before the defendant's electors were scheduled to meet and sign fraudulent certificates of vote, the defendant asked Campaign advisor P4 for an update on the elector plan and directed P4 to issue a statement, and CC1 asked P4 to participate in a messaging conference call. 275 P4 discussed these developments in a text thread with P3 Campaign Staffer P54 and P9. After P4 proposed a communications plan for the Campaign on the elector vote, P9 wrote to P3. "I'll call soon and we'll talk with boss." 276 The participants then discussed to whom a Campaign statement could be attributed. P3 wrote, "Here's the thing the way this has morphed it's a crazy play so I don't know who wants to put their name on it." 277 P4 then shared with those on the text thread the invitees to the call CC1 was convening -- CC1, CC6, P12, P19, P55 and P56 and derogatorily referred to them as the "Star Wars bar," meaning a motley assortment of characters, and in this case specifically ones whose professional competence P4 doubted and whom he personally would not choose to hire. 278 P9 responded, "Certifying illegal votes." 279 Thereafter, the text participants collectively agreed that no message would go out under their names because they "can't stand by it." 280 In the midst of these text messages, P9, P4 and P3 had a nineteen-minute phone call with the defendant. 281

In practice, the fraudulent elector plan played out somewhat differently in each targeted state. In general, the co-conspirators deceived the defendant's elector nominees in the same way that the defendant deceived and CC2 deceived P39 by falsely claiming that their electoral votes would be used only if ongoing litigation were resolved in the defendant's favor. 282 A select few of the defendant's agents and elector nominees, however, had insight into the ultimate plan to use the fraudulent elector certificates to disrupt the congressional certification on January 6. 283 In several states, the defendant, his co-conspirators, and agents were unable to convince all of the defendant's elector nominees to participate. 284 P57 for instance, a former U.S. Representative and U.S. Attorney and one of the defendant's elector nominees in Pennsylvania who opted out of the plan, told the state party vice chair trying to organize the defendant's electors that he would not participate because the plan did not follow the proper process and was illegal. 285 When electors like P57 declined, the conspirators and agents had to recruit substitutes willing to go along with the plan. 286 Other electors who participated based on the conspirators' false assurances that their votes were only a contingency were later surprised to learn that they were used on January 6 -- and would not have agreed to participate if the conspirators had been truthful about their plan. 287

In Pennsylvania, the defendant's elector nominees' concern about the propriety of the plan presented a problem for the conspirators. In text messages that P5 and CC6 exchanged on December 11 into the early morning hours of December 12, P5 told CC6 that P46, the state Republican Party Chairman whom the defendant had called shortly after the election 288 -- "is winding up the electors. Telling them if the[y] sign the petition they could be prosecuted. Need a counter argument or someone has to call him and tell him to stop." 289 CC6 responded, "Have someone who knows him call him to tell him to stop." 290 P5 replied, "That's the plan. PA is squishy right now. Going to need a call with CC1 tomorrow." 291

On December 12, CC1, CC5, CC6 and others held a conference call organized by the Campaign to placate the defendant's Pennsylvania electors. 292 CC1 falsely assured them that their cel1ificates of vote would be used only if the defendant succeeded in litigation. 293 During the call, some of the defendant's conspirators and agents exchanged text messages expressing frustration at the electors' concerns. 294 P5 wrote, "Whoever selected this slate should be shot." P12 responded, "These people are making this so much more complicated than it needs to be omg" and "We couldn't have found 20 people better than this???" P5 agreed, writing, "We need good substitutes." 295 When the possibility arose that the electors' certificates of vote include conditional language making clear that they were not yet the duly-appointed electors, P5 wrote, "The other States are signing what CC5 prepared -- if it gets out we changed the language for PA it could snowball." 296

On December 13, the eve of when the electors were to meet, the defendant was preoccupied with preventing the certification of the electoral vote. He tweeted: "Swing States that have found massive VOTER FRAUD, which is all of them, CANNOT LEGALLY CERTIFY these votes as complete & correct without committing a severely punishable crime. Everybody knows that dead people, below age people, illegal immigrants, fake signatures, prisoners, and many others voted illegally. Also, machine 'glitches' (another word for FRAUD), ballot harvesting, non-resident voters, fake ballots, 'stuffing the ballot box', votes for pay, roughed up Republican Poll Watchers, and sometimes even more votes than people voting, took place in Detroit, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. In all Swing State cases, there are far more votes than are necessary to win the State, and the Election itself. Therefore, VOTES CANNOT BE CERTIFIED. THIS ELECTION IS UNDER PROTEST!" 297

Ultimately, the Pennsylvania electors insisted upon using conditional language in their elector certificates to avoid falsely certifying that they were duly-appointed electors. 298 And in New Mexico -- the state that CC5's memoranda did not even address 299 -- the defendant's Campaign filed a pretextual lawsuit just minutes before the fraudulent electors met so that there was litigation pending at the time of the vote. 300 Notwithstanding obstacles, the defendant and his co-conspirators successfully organized his elector nominees and substitutes to gather on December 14 in the targeted states, cast fraudulent electoral votes on his behalf, and send those fraudulent votes to Washington, D.C., in order to falsely claim at the congressional certification that certain states had sent competing slates of electors. 301

When possible, the defendant and co-conspirators tried to have the fake electoral votes appear to be in compliance with state law governing how legitimate electors vote. 302 For example, the co-conspirators knew that some states required that the duly-appointed electors meet and cast their votes in the state capitol building. 303 To make it seem like they had complied with this requirement, state officials were enlisted to provide the fraudulent electors with access to state capitol buildings so that they could gather and vote there. 304 In many cases, however, the conspirators and fraudulent electors were unable to comply with state law for legitimate electors. 305 For example, Pennsylvania law required the Governor to give notice whenever an elector was substituted, but the conspirators could not arrange for the Governor to give notice when P46 and others opted out and had to be replaced. 306 Thereafter, CC5 and others brainstormed fake excuses for their failure to follow state law, writing, "maybe we can use Covid 19 as an excuse for the Governor not giving notice." 307

Then, on December 14 -- the date that duly-appointed electors across the country met to cast their votes, and when the defendant's fraudulent electors in seven states mimicked them -- P39 followed up with the defendant. 308 When she received an internal RNC email titled "Electors Recap - Final," which summarized the day's activities with respect to electors and included a list of six "contested" states in which the defendant's electors voted, she forwarded it to the defendant's executive assistant, P42 who responded, "It's in front of him!" 309 P39 also called the defendant to tell him that she had sent him the update, 310 and she spoke spoke to CC1 shortly before CC1 spoke to the defendant. 311

At the same time that the defendant's fraudulent electors were preparing to gather and cast fraudulent votes, the defendant's co-conspirators began planning how to use the fraudulent votes to overturn the election results at the January 6 certification. On December 13, CC5 sent CC1 a memorandum that envisioned a scenario in which Pence would use the fraudulent slates as a pretext to claim that there were dueling slates of electors from the targeted states and negotiate a solution to defeat Biden. 312 On the same day, the defendant resumed almost daily direct contact with P1 who maintained a podcast that disseminated the defendant's false fraud claims. 313 On December 14, P1 podcast focused on spreading lies about the defendant's fraudulent electors-including the false claim that their votes were merely a contingency in the event the defendant won legal challenges in the targeted states. 314

On December 16, CC5 traveled to Washington with a group of private attorneys who had done work for the defendant's Campaign in Wisconsin for a photo opportunity with the defendant in the Oval Office. 315 During the encounter, the defendant complained about Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice P49 who two days earlier had cast the deciding vote in rejecting the defendant's election challenge in the state. 316 As the group was leaving, the defendant spoke directly -- and privately -- to CC5. 317

As late as early January, the conspirators attempted to keep the full nature of the fraudulent elector plan secret. On January 3, for instance, in a private text message exchange, CC6 wrote to CC5 "Careful with your texts on text groups. No reason to text things about electors to anyone but CC2 and me." CC5 responded, "K," and CC6 followed up, "I'm probably a bit paranoid haha." CC5 wrote, "A valuable trait. 318
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Fri Oct 11, 2024 2:06 am

Part 3 of 7

E. The Defendant Attempted to Persuade Pence to Reject Votes Cast by Duly Appointed Electors and Choose the Defendant's Fraudulent Ones

As the defendant's various attempts to target the states failed, and the January 6 congressional certification approached, the defendant and co-conspirators turned their attention to Pence, who as President of the Senate presided over the certification proceeding. In service of a new plan -- to enlist Pence to use his role to fraudulently alter the election results at the January 6 certification proceeding -- the defendant and his co-conspirators again used deceit. They lied to Pence, telling him that there was substantial election fraud and concealing their orchestration of the plan to manufacture fraudulent elector slates, as well as their intention to use the fake slates to attempt to obstruct the congressional certification. And they lied to the public, falsely claiming that Pence had the authority during the certification proceeding to reject electoral votes, send them back to the states, or overturn the election -- and that Pence agreed he had these boundless powers. With these lies, the defendant created the tinderbox that he purposely ignited on January 6.

The defendant first publicly turned his sights toward January 6 in the early morning hours of December 19. At 1:42 a.m., the defendant posted on Twitter a copy of a report falsely alleging fraud and wrote, " . . . Statistically impossible to have lost the 2020 Election. Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!" 319 When CC5 learned about the Tweet, he sent a link about it to another of the Wisconsin attorneys who had met with the defendant in the Oval Office on December 16 and wrote, "Wow. Based on 3 days ago, I think we have unique understanding of this." 320 Later on December 19, the defendant called Pence and told him of plans for a rally on January 6 and said that he thought it would be a "big day" and good to have lots of their supporters in town. 321

The defendant and his co-conspirators recognized that Pence, by virtue of his ministerial role presiding over the January 6 congressional certification, would need to be a key part of their plan to obstruct the certification proceeding. On December 23, in a memorandum drafted with CC5 assistance, CC2 outlined a plan for Pence to "gavel" in the defendant as the winner of the election based on the false claim that "7 states have transmitted dual slates of electors to the President of the Senate," and proposed that Pence announce that "because of the ongoing disputes in the 7 States, there are no electors that can be deemed validly appointed in those States." 322 CC2 emphasized concealment, writing that "the main thing here" was that Pence act without "asking for permission -- either from a vote of the Joint Session or from the Court." 323

CC2 memorandum stood in stark contrast to concessions he had previously made about the Vice President's lack of authority in the certification proceeding. Two months earlier, on October 11, he had written to a colleague that neither the Constitution nor the ECA provided the Vice President with discretion in the counting of electoral votes or permitted him to "make the determination on his own." 324 And just one day earlier, on December 22, when asked by other private attorneys to provide views on a draft complaint that would, if filed, have raised the issue of the Vice President's authority on January 6, CC2 had recommended that the complaint not be filed. 325 He wrote that "the risk of getting a court ruling that Pence has no authority to reject the Biden-certified ballots [is] very high."326

On the evening of December 23, andCC1 shared CC2 and CC5 plan with the defendant, the defendant publicly re-tweeted a document called "Operation Pence Card," which, like CC2's memorandum, advocated that Pence block the lawful certification of the legitimate electoral votes.327 Also on December 23, CC2 emailed P42 asking to speak to the defendant "to update him on our overall strategic thinking." 328 The following day, December 24, the defendant called CC2 and they spoke for forty minutes. 329 Then on December 25, CC5 proposed in a text message to CC2 and CC6 that Pence permit an unlimited filibuster of the certification, in violation of the ECA, and ultimately gavel in the defendant as president. 330 When CC2 asked, "Is Pence really likely to be on board with this?" CC6 responded, "Let's keep this off text for now." 331

From that point on, the conspirators plotted to manipulate Pence. CC1, CC2, CC6 and P1 worked in concert to enlist Pence to act unlawfully, and to rachet up public pressure from the defendant's supporters that he do so. The defendant began to directly and repeatedly pressure Pence at the same time that he continued summoning his supporters to amass in Washington, D.C., on the day of the congressional certification. On December 25, when Pence called the defendant to wish him a Merry Christmas, the defendant raised the certification and told Pence that he had discretion in his role as President of the Senate. 332 Pence emphatically responded, "You know I don't think I have the authority to change the outcome." 339 The next day, the defendant tweeted, "Never give up. See everyone in D.C. on January 6th." 334 He also tweeted false fraud claims: "Time for Republican Senators to step up and fight for the Presidency, like the Democrats would do if they had actually won. The proof is irrefutable! Massive late night mail-in ballot drops in swing states, shifting the ballot boxes (on video), double voters, dead voters, fake signatures, illegal immigrant voters, banned Republican vote watchers, MORE VOTES THAN ACTUAL VOTERS (check out Detroit & Philadelphia), and much more. The numbers are far greater than what is necessary to win the individual swing states, and cannot even be contested. Courts are bad, the FBI and 'Justice' didn't do their job, and the United States Election System looks like that of a third world country. Freedom of the press has been gone for a long time, it is Fake News, and now we have Big Tech (with Section 230) to deal with. But when it is all over, and this period of time becomes just another ugly chapter in our Country's history, WE WILL WIN!!!" 335

On December 28, CC2, CC5 and CC6 exchanged text messages in which CC2 expressed concern that Gohmert v. Pence -- a lawsuit filed the day before that asserted that Pence had discretion to choose electoral votes during the certification proceeding -- would prompt a federal court to publicly reject, and thus preclude, the plan that the conspirators were advancing in private. 336 Thereafter, at 11:00 a.m. on January 1, the defendant called Pence to berate him because he had learned that Pence had filed a brief opposing the relief sought in Gohmert. 337 When Pence explained, as he had before, that he did not believe that he had the power under the Constitution to decide which votes to accept, the defendant told him that "hundreds of thousands" of people "are gonna hate your guts" and "people are gonna think you're stupid," and berated him pointedly, "You're too honest." 338 Immediately before the call, the defendant had spoken separately to CC1 (from 10:06 a.m. to 10:14 a.m.) and P1 (from 10:36 a.m. to 10:46 a.m.), and late that afternoon, the defendant spoke separately with P1, CC2 and CC1. 339 Within hours of the call with Pence, the defendant reminded supporters to travel to Washington for the certification proceeding, tweeting, "The BIG Protest Rally in Washington, D.C., will take place at 11:00 A.M. on January 6th. Locational details to follow. StopTheSteal!" 340

The next day, on January 2, CC1, CC2 and CC6 appeared on P1 podcast. 341 When P1 asked whether the January 6 certification would be "a climactic battle," responded that "a lot of that depends on the courage and the spine of the individuals CC2 involved." 342 The defendant spoke shortly after his appearance on the podcast. 343 That afternoon, CC6 worked to arrange a meeting among the defendant, CC2 and Pence in order to enlist Pence to misuse his role as President of the Senate at the certification proceeding. 344 When CC6 texted P1 about the meeting, P1, who had just finished a phone call with the defendant -- reiterated that the defendant wanted Pence "briefed" by CC2 immediately. 345 Thereafter, the defendant called Pence, informing him "that he had spent the day speaking to a secretary of state, state legislators, and members of Congress." 346 (As described supra pp. 29-31, the defendant spoke with Georgia Secretary of State, P33 the same day.) On the call with Pence, the defendant said he had learned that a U.S. Senator was going to propose a ten-day delay in the certification proceeding, and told Pence, "you can make the decision" to delay the count for ten days. 347 The defendant then referred Pence to CC2 for the first time and asked if Pence would meet with him. 348

On January 3, the defendant again told Pence that at the certification proceeding, Pence had the absolute right to reject electoral votes and the ability to overturn the election. 349 Pence responded that he had no such authority, and that a federal appeals court had rejected a lawsuit making that claim the previous day. 350 Then, the defendant took to Twitter to again falsely claim that fraud had permeated the election: "Sorry, but the number of votes in the Swing States that we are talking about is VERY LARGE and totally OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE! Only the Democrats and some RINO'S would dare dispute this - even though they know it is true!" 351 The same day, CC2 circulated a second memorandum that included a new plan under which, in violation of the ECA, the Vice President would send the elector slates to the state legislatures to determine which slate to count. 352

The meeting that CC6 had organized so that the defendant and CC2 could enlist Pence to reject Biden's legitimate electoral votes was scheduled late in the afternoon of January 4. 353 In advance of the meeting, CC1, CC2, CC6 and P1 gathered at the Willard Hotel near the White House, and from there, CC1 called and spoke with the defendant. 354 When CC2 arrived at the White House for the meeting, P9 confronted CC2 about the legal basis for his proposal. 355 P9 went line by line through CC2's second memo, and CC2 conceded that no court would support it; in response, in response, P9 warned CC2 that pressing his admittedly unlawful plan would cause "riots in the streets." 356 P9 then spoke to the defendant, telling him that the theory that CC2 and others were promoting would not work, and that CC2 had acknowledged that it was "not going to work"; the defendant responded, "other people disagree" but did not identify those other people. 357 P9 also pointed out to the defendant that CC2's theory regarding a strategic Democratic plan to subvert the election was inconsistent with other allegations that had been floating around about C3 and foreign interference. 358

The meeting among the defendant, CC2, Pence, and Pence staffers P8 and P58 began around 4:45 p.m. 359 No one from the defendant's White House Counsel's Office attended. 360 During the meeting, the defendant asked CC2 to explain his plan to Pence. 361 CC2 resented two options: Pence could unilaterally decide objections to electors, or alternatively, in the plan that CC2 had devised the prior day, Pence could send the elector slates to the targeted states' legislatures to determine which electors' votes should be counted. 362 In the defendant's presence, in response to Pence's questioning, CC2 admitted that the ECA forbade what he proposed and that no one had tested CC2's new plan to send elector slates to state legislatures for review. 363 Nonetheless, the defendant repeatedly expressed a preference that Pence unilaterally reject valid elector slates. 364

Throughout the meeting, the defendant repeated his knowingly false fraud claims as a purported basis for Pence to act illegally. Pence's five pages of contemporaneous notes from the meeting reflect that the defendant said, "when there's fraud the rules get changed"; "bottom line -- won every state by 100,000s of votes"; "this whole thing is up to MP"; "has to do w/you -- you can be bold"; and "r[igh]t to do whatever you want to do." 365 The meeting concluded with Pence -- firm and clear -- telling the defendant "I 'm not seeing this argument working." 366 Nonetheless, the defendant requested that Pence's staff meet with CC2 again to discuss further, and Pence agreed. 367

The conspirators were undeterred. Immediately after leaving the White House, CC2 gathered with CC6 and P1 back at the Willard Hotel. 368 Over the days that followed, these conspirators strategized on could influence Pence through the Vice President's counsel, and normalized the unlawful plan by discussing it on P1 podcast. 369 Meanwhile, the defendant continued to pressure Pence publicly.

For his part, immediately upon leaving the meeting with Pence, the defendant traveled to Dalton, Georgia, to speak at a political rally at the invitation of two U.S. Senators engaged in run-off elections there. 370 During his political speech, the defendant promoted many of the same falsehoods that he previously had been informed were untrue. He said, "they're not taking the White House. We're gonna fight like hell, I'll tell you right now," and remarked, "I hope Mike Pence comes through for us, I have to tell you. I hope that our great Vice President, our great Vice President comes through for us . . . Of course, if he doesn't come through, I won' t like him quite as much." 371 He also used the Dalton Campaign speech as a call to action to his own supporters, telling the crowd that " [ i]f you don't fight to save your country with everything you have, you 're not going to have a country left," 372 and demanded that his supporters take action to prevent what he falsely called "the outright stealing of elections, like they're trying to do with US," 373 emphasizing, we "can't let that happen." 374

The next morning, on January 5, the defendant spoke on the phone with P1. 375 Less than two hours later, on his podcast, P1 said in anticipation of the January 6 certification proceeding, "All Hell is going to break loose tomorrow." 376

Also on the morning of January 5, CC2 participated in a federal court hearing in Trump v. Kemp, 377 the Georgia lawsuit against P17 and P33 in which the defendant had signed a false verification days earlier. 378 CC2, on the defendant's behalf, asked the federal court to decertify the presidential election in Georgia and declare that the state legislature may choose the state's electors. 379 During the hearing, the federal court denied the relief requested. 380

Immediately following the federal court's rejection of the legal basis for the conspirators' plan, CC2 went to the meeting that the defendant had requested that Pence's staff, P58 and P8 take. 381 At the outset, CC2 changed his tack and advocated that Pence simply reject the Biden electors outright. 382 This was contrary to his primary recommendation the day before for Pence to send the slates to the state legislatures, but consistent with the preference the defendant had expressed. 383 CC2 made additional concessions during this meeting. For example, CC2 agreed that the Supreme Court would unanimously reject his proposed action, consistent historical practice since the Founding was that the Vice President never asserted authority to reject electors, no reasonable person would want the Constitution read that way because the office would never switch political parties, no state legislature appeared poised to try to change its electors, and if Democrats were to claim the same authority, CC2 would not credit it. 384 P58 expressed to CC2 that the defendant's plan would result in a "disastrous situation" where the election might "have to be decided in the streets." 385 Having failed to enlist P58 in the criminal conspiracy, CC2 told him that the "team" was going to be "really disappointed." 386 The "team," in fact, was disappointed; after CC2 updated CC1 on the meeting, CC6 confirmed to P1 that the "Pence lawyer -- that is, P58 was "totally against us," prompting P1 to respond, "Fuck his lawyer." 387 That same day, CC2 received an email confirming what he already had admitted to P58 no chamber of any legislature in any state, including Arizona, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, was requesting that its electoral votes be returned to the state for review. 388

Meanwhile, CC5 who had traveled to Washington as directed by the defendant's public messages, obtained duplicate originals of the fraudulent certificates signed by the defendant's fraudulent electors in Michigan and Wisconsin, which they believed had not been delivered by mail to the President of the Senate or Archivist. 389 CC5 received these duplicates from Campaign staff and surrogates, who flew them to Washington at private expense. 390 He then hand-delivered them to staffers for a U.S. Representative at the Capitol as part of a plan to deliver them to Pence for use in the certification proceeding. 391

The defendant did not leave the pressure campaign to his co-conspirators; he redoubled his own efforts. On January 5 at 11:06 a.m., shortly before CC2 meeting with III the defendant tweeted, "The Vice President has the power to reject fraudulently chosen electors,,392 and designate the defendant as the winner of the electoral college vote. That afternoon, the defendant met privately with Pence in the Oval Office. 393 During the meeting, the defendant once again told Pence, "I think you have the power to decertify." 394 When Pence was unmoved, the defendant threatened to criticize him publicly ("I'm gonna have to say you did a great disservice"); 395 this concerned P8 to whom Pence had relayed the defendant's threat, to the point that he alerted Pence's Secret Se1vice detail. 396 Next still, the defendant initiated a phone call with Pence, P8, P58, CC2 and one or two other private attorneys -- likely including CC1 and again raised the scenario of the Vice President sending the elector slates to state legislatures. 398 P58 again pointed out that such a strategy violated the ECA, and Pence reaffirmed that he did not believe he had the authority to do so. 399 Shortly after the call that evening, at 5:43 p.m., the defendant tweeted, "I will be speaking at the SAVE AMERICA RALLY tomorrow on the Ellipse at 11AM Eastern. Arrive early - doors open at 7AM Eastern. BIG CROWDS!"400

The defendant continued his pressure campaign on Pence that evening. After a New York Times article that night detailed the afternoon's private conversation in which Pence had rejected the defendant's demand to act unlawfully, the defendant directed P4 to issue a statement rebutting it and approved the statement at 9:28 p.m. 401 Minutes later, the defendant called Pence and told him, "you gotta be tough tomorrow." 402 After concluding the call with Pence, the defendant sequentially spoke to P1 followed by bCC2. 405. Then, at around 10:00 p.m. that night, the defendant issued the public statement, which read "the Vice President and I are in total agreement that the Vice President has the power to act" 404 -- a statement that the defendant knew was a lie from Pence's repeated and firm rejections of his efforts, but that gave false hope to the defendant's supporters arriving in the city at the defendant's request, and maximized pressure on Pence.

F. The Defendant Caused Unlawful Conduct on January 6 and Tried to Take Advantage of the Riot that Ensued

The defendant continued his intense pressure campaign against the Vice President into the early morning hours of January 6. Around 1:00 a.m., the defendant tweeted, falsely: "If Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it must be). Mike can send it back!" 405 At 8:17 a.m., as the supporters he had summoned to the city gathered near the White House, 406 the defendant again falsely tweeted about the certification: "States want to connect their votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it, Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!" 407

Later that morning, CC5 worked with another attorney for the defendant, who contacted a U.S. Senator to ask him to obtain the fraudulent Wisconsin and Michigan documents from the U.S. Representative's office and hand-deliver them to the Vice President. 408 When one of the U.S. Senator's staffers contacted a Pence staffer by text message to arrange for delivery of what the U.S. Senator's staffer had been told were "[a]ltemate slate[s] of electors for MI and WI because [the] archivist didn't receive them," Pence's staffer rejected them. 409

At 11:15 a.m., shortly before traveling to the Ellipse to speak to his supporters, the defendant called Pence and made one last attempt to induce him to act unlawfully in the upcoming session. 410 When Pence again refused, and told the defendant that he intended to make a statement to Congress before the certification proceeding confirming that he lacked the authority to do what the defendant wanted, the defendant was incensed. 411 He decided to re-insert into his Campaign speech at the Ellipse remarks targeting Pence for his refusal to misuse his role in the certification. 412 And the defendant set into motion the last plan in furtherance of his conspiracies: if Pence would not do as he asked, the defendant needed to find another way to prevent the certification of Biden as president. So on January 6, the defendant sent to the Capitol a crowd of angry supporters, whom the defendant had called to the City 413 and inundated with false claims of outcome-determinative election fraud, to induce Pence not to certify the legitimate electoral votes and to obstruct the certification. 414

At the Ellipse Campaign rally, CC1 and CC2 and spoke just before the defendant. In his rally speech, CC1 sought to cloak the conspiracies in an air of legitimacy, assuring the defendant's supporters that "every single thing that has been outlined as the plan for today is perfectly legal," 415 and introducing CC2 as a "preeminent constitutional scholar[]" who would further explain this plan. 416 He falsely claimed that legislatures in five states were "begging" to have their electoral ballots returned. 417 CC1 then asserted that Pence could "decide on the validity of these crooked ballots" 418 and told the crowd, "[l]et's have trial by combat." 419 CC2 in his speech, claimed that Pence must send electoral votes to state legislatures for "the American people [to] know whether we have control of the direction of our government or not," 420 and decried that "[w]e no longer live in a self-governing republic if we can 't get the answer to this question." 421

When the defendant took the stage at the Ellipse rally to speak to the supporters who had gathered there at his urging, he knew that Pence had refused, once and for all, to use the defendant's fraudulent electors' certificates. The defendant also knew that he had only one last hope to prevent Biden's certification as President: the large and angry crowd standing in front of him. So for more than an hour, the defendant delivered a speech designed to inflame his supporters and motivate them to march to the Capitol. 422

The defendant told his crowd many of the same lies he had been telling for months -- publicly and privately, including to the officials in the targeted states -- and that he knew were not true. In Arizona, he claimed, more than 36,000 ballots had been cast by non-citizens. 423 Regarding Georgia, the defendant repeated the falsehood that more than 10,300 dead people voted, 424 and he raised the publicly disproven claims about fraud by election workers at State Farm Arena. 425 He made baseless allegations of dead voters in Nevada and Michigan and false claims about illegally counted votes in Wisconsin. 426 And in Pennsylvania, he claimed that there were hundreds of thousands more ballots counted than there had been voters. 427

The defendant also lied to his rally supporters when he claimed that certain states wanted to reconsider or recertify their duly appointed electors. For instance, he said, "By the way, Pennsylvania has now seen all of this. They didn't know because it was so quick. They had a vote. They voted. But now they see all this stuff, it's all come to light. Doesn't happen that fast. And they want to recertify their votes. They want to recertify. But the only way that can happen as if Mike Pence agrees to send it back. Mike Pence has top agree to send it back." 428 In response to this lie about Pennsylvania, the defendant's crowd began to chant, "Send it back! Send it back!" 429

The defendant gave his supporters false hope that Pence would take action to change the results of the election and claimed that Pence had the authority to do so. He falsely told the crowd that Pence could still "do the right thing" 430 and halt the certification, and he extemporized lines about the Vice President through the speech, including the indirect threat, "Mike Pence, I hope you're gonna stand up for the good of our Constitution and for the good of our country. And if you're not, I'm gonna be very disappointed in you. I will tell you right now. I'm not hearing good stories." 431

The defendant galvanized his supporters by painting the stakes as critical and assuring them that "history [was] going to be made."432 He made clear that he expected his supporters to take action, telling them regarding his loss of the election that "we're not going to let that happen," 433 calling on them to "fight" 434 and to "take back" 435 their country through strength, while suggesting that legal means were antiquated or insufficient to remedy the purported fraud, because "[w]hen you catch somebody in a fraud, you 're allowed to go by very different rules." 436 Throughout the speech -- from as early as about fifteen minutes into it and twice in its final lines -- the defendant directed his supporters to go to the Capitol and suggested that he would go with them. 437

The overall impact of the defendant's speech -- particularly in light of months of statements and Tweets falsely claiming election fraud and following on the heels of CC1 and CC2 speeches -- was to fuel the crowd's anger. For instance, when the defendant told his supporters that "[w]e will not let them silence your voices. We're not going to let it happen," 438 the crowd chanted, "Fight for Tnuup," in response. 439 When the defendant soon after told supporters that "we're going to walk down to the Capitol," 440 that they would "never take back our country with weakness," 441 and that they had "to show strength and [had] to be strong," 442 members of the crowd shouted, "Invade the Capitol building!" and, "Take the Capitol!" 443

Thousands of the defendant's supporters obeyed his directive and marched to the Capitol, 444 where the certification proceeding began around 1:00 p.m. 445 Minutes earlier, Pence had issued a public statement explaining that his role as President of the Senate did not include "unilateral authority to determine which electoral votes should be counted and which should not." 446 On the floor of the House of Representatives, Pence opened the certificates of vote and certificate of ascertainment from Arizona, consistent with the ECA. After an objection from a Senator and Representative, the House and Senate retired to their separate chambers to debate it. 447

Outside of the Capitol building, a mass of people -- including those who had traveled to Washington and the Capitol at the defendant's direction -- broke through barriers cordoning off the Capitol grounds and advanced on the building. 448 Among these was CC5 who had attended the defendant's speech from the Washington Monument, marched with the crowd to the Capitol, and breached the restricted area surrounding the building. 449 A large portion of the crowd at the Capitol -- including rioters who violently attacked law enforcement officers trying to secure the building -- wore clothing and carried items bearing the defendant's name and Campaign slogans, leaving no doubt that they were there on his behalf and at his direction. 450

Beginning at about 1:30 p.m., the defendant settled in the dining room off of the Oval Office. He spent the afternoon there reviewing Twitter on his phone, 451 while the dining room television played Fox News' contemporaneous coverage of events at the Capitol. 452

At 2:13 p.m., the crowd at the Capitol broke into the building, and forced the Senate to recess. 453 Within minutes, staffers fled the Senate chamber carrying the legitimate electors' physical certificates of vote and certificates of ascertainment. 454 Next to the Senate chamber, a group of rioters chased a U.S. Capitol Police officer up a flight of stairs to within forty feet of where Pence was sheltering with his family. 455 As they did so, the rioters shouted at the officer, in search of public officials, "Where the fuck they at? Where the fuck they counting the votes at? Why are you protecting them? You're a fucking traitor." 456 On the other side of the Capitol, the House was also forced to recess. 457

Fox News’s coverage of events at the Capitol included, at about 2:12 p.m., reports of the Capitol being on lockdown and showed video footage of large crowds within the restricted area surrounding the Capitol; much of the crowd was wearing clothing and carrying flags evidencing their allegiance to the defendant. 458 At about 2:20 p.m., video of crowds on the Capitol lawn and West Terrace were shown alongside a chyron stating, “CERTIFICATION VOTE PAUSED AS PROTESTS ERUPT ON CAPITOL HILL.” 459 At 2:21 p.m., an on-the-street reporter interviewed an individual marching from the Ellipse to the Capitol who claimed to have come to Washington “because President Trump told us we had something big to look forward to, and I believed that Vice President Pence was going to certify the electorial [sic] votes and, or not certify them, but I guess that’s just changed, correct? And it’s a very big disappointment. I think there’s several hundred thousand people here who are very disappointed. But I still believe President Trump has something else left.” 460 And at approximately 2:24 p.m., Fox News reported that a police officer may have been injured and that “protestors . . . have made their way inside the Capitol.” 461

At 2:24 p.m., Trump was alone in his dining room when he issued a Tweet attacking Pence and fueling the ongoing riot: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!” 462 That afternoon, at the Capitol, a rioter used a bullhorn to read the defendant’s Tweet about the Vice President aloud to the crowd trying to gain entry to the building. 463 The defendant issued the incendiary Tweet about Pence despite knowing—as he would later admit in an interview in 2023—that his supporters “listen to [him] like no one else.” 464

One minute later, at 2:25 p.m., the Secret Service was forced to evacuate Pence to a secure location. 465 At the Capitol, throughout the afternoon, members of the crowd chanted, “Hang Mike Pence!” 466; “Where is Pence? Bring him out!” 467; and “Traitor Pence!” 468 Several rioters in those chanting crowds wore hats and carried flags evidencing their allegiance to the defendant. In the years since January 6, the defendant has refused to take responsibility for putting Pence in danger, instead blaming Pence. On March 13, 2023, he said, “Had Mike Pence sent the votes back to the legislatures, they wouldn’t have had a problem with Jan. 6, so in many ways you can blame him for Jan. 6. Had he sent them back to Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona, the states, I believe, number one, you would have had a different outcome. But I also believe you wouldn’t have had ‘Jan. 6’ as we call it.” 469

Rioters—again, many bearing pro-Trump paraphernalia indicating their allegiance— breached the Senate chamber, 470 rifled through the papers on the Senators’ desks, 471 and stood on the dais where Pence had been presiding just minutes earlier. 472 On the House side, rioters watched as police evacuated lawmakers from the House chamber, smashing glass windows surrounding a locked door that stood between them and the fleeing Members and staffers. 473 At least one rioter recorded video showing Members being evacuated while the growing crowd screamed at the Capitol Police officers guarding the locked door to the House Speaker's Lobby. 474

Some of the worst violence of the day took place outside of the Capitol on the Lower West Terrace -- the side of the building facing the Ellipse where the defendant had given his speech. There, scaffolding placed in anticipation of the January 20 Inauguration created a tunnel leading to a set of double glass doors into the center of the Capitol building. After rioters had forced their way onto restricted Capitol grounds and past the temporary barriers, including layers of snow fencing and bike racks, they attacked the law enforcement officers trying to protect the building with flag poles, bear spray, stolen police riot shields, and other improvised weapons. 475 Of his time defending the Capitol, one Metropolitan Police Department Officer said:

I feared for my life from the moment 1 got into that -- we were walking into the crowd, when the Capitol Police officer was leading us into the front line. And especially when I got sprayed in the middle of the crowd. I -- at that point, honestly, I thought, this is it. Yeah, multiple times ... You know, you're getting pushed, kicked, you know, people are throwing metal bats at you and all that stuff. 1 was like, yeah, this is fucking it. 476


The officer described that the rioters he encountered at the Capitol were wearing both "tactical gear" and "Trump paraphernalia" and appeared to be acting out of "pure, sheer anger." 477

In the years after January 6, the defendant has reiterated his support for and allegiance to rioters who broke into the Capitol, calling them "patriots" 478 and "hostages," 479 providing them financial assistance, 480 and reminiscing about January 6 as "a beautiful day." 481 At a rally in Waco, Texas, on March 25, 2023, the defendant started a tradition he has repeated several times -- opening the event with a song called "Justice for All," recorded by a group of charged -- and in many cases, convicted -- January 6 offenders known as the "January 6 Choir" and who, because of their dangerousness, are held at the District of Columbia jai1. 482 At the Waco Rally, of the January 6 Choir, the defendant said, "our people love those people, they love those people." 483 The defendant has also stated that if re-elected, he will pardon individuals convicted of crimes on January 6. 484

On the evening of January 6, the defendant and CC1 attempted to exploit the violence and chaos at the Capitol by having CC1 call Senators and attempt to get them to further delay the certification. 485 At around 7:00 p.m., CC1 placed calls to five U.S. Senators and one U.S. Representative. 486 CC6 attempted to confirm phone numbers for Members of Congress whom the defendant had directed to call. 487 In a voicemail that CC1 intended for one Senator, CC1 said, "I'm calling you because I want to discuss with you how they're trying to rush this hearing and how we need you, our Republican friends, to try to just slow it down so we can get these legislatures to get more information to you. And I know they're reconvening at eight tonight, but the only strategy we can follow is to object to numerous states and raise issues so that we can get ourselves into tomorrow -- ideally until the end of tomorrow." 488 He then asked the Senator to "object to every state" to "give us the opportunity to get the legislators who are very, very close to pulling their votes." This concession -- that legislatures had not yet asked to review their slates -- stood in contrast to CC1 and the defendant's lies at the Ellipse that they already had. 489 Next, in a voicemail intended for another Senator, CC1 told more lies. 490 He falsely claimed that Pence's decision not to use the defendant's fraudulent electors' certificates had been surprising, and that in light of the surprise, "we could use a little time so that the state legislatures can prepare even more to come to you and say, 'Please give this back to us for a while so we can fix it." 491 CC1 then repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud, including that non-citizens had voted in Arizona and an outcome-determinative number of underage voters had cast ballots in Georgia. 492

Although the attack on the Capitol successfully delayed the certification for approximately six hours, the House and Senate resumed the Joint Session at 11:35 p.m. 493 But the conspirators were not done. Within ten minutes, at 11:44 p.m., CC2 who earlier that day wrote to P58 that "[t]he 'siege' is because YOU and your boss did not do what was necessary" -- emailed P58 again and urged him to convince Pence to violate the law, writing, "I implore you to consider one more relatively minor violation [of the ECA] and adjourn for 10 days to allow the legislatures to finish their investigations, as well as to allow a full forensic audit of the massive amount of illegal activity that has occurred here." 494

At 3:41 a.m. on January 7, as President of the Senate, Pence announced the certified results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Biden. 495
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Sun Oct 13, 2024 2:40 am

Part 4 of 7

II. Legal Framework

In Trump, the Supreme Court held that former presidents are immune from prosecution for core official acts, enjoy at least a rebuttable presumption of immunity for other official acts, and have no immunity for unofficial acts, and remanded to this Court for further proceedings consistent with its holding. 144 S. Ct. at 2327, 2332, 2347. This section sets forth the applicable legal principles and then Section III applies them to the categories of conduct that the superseding indictment alleges and that the Government intends to prove at trial in order to demonstrate that none of the defendant's conduct is immunized.

In Trump, the Supreme Court announced the principles that govern a former President's claim of constitutional immunity from federal criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court divided presidential acts into three categories: (1) core presidential conduct that Congress has no power to regulate and for which a former President has absolute immunity; (2) other official presidential acts for which the President has at least presumptive immunity; and (3) unofficial conduct for which the President has no immunity. Id. at 2327, 2331-32. With respect to the first category of core official conduct, when the President’s authority to act is “‘conclusive and preclusive,’” Congress may not regulate his actions, and the President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution. Id. at 2327 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Applying those principles to the original indictment, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant is “absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials” and his “threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General.” Id. at 2335. The superseding indictment omits those allegations, and the Supreme Court did not find that any other conduct alleged in the original indictment implicated “conclusive and preclusive” presidential authority. See id. at 2335-40.

The threshold question here, then, is whether the defendant can carry his burden to establish that his acts were official and thus subject to presumptive immunity. Id. at 2332; see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (noting that for immunity doctrines, “the burden is on the official claiming immunity to demonstrate his entitlement”). Official conduct includes acts taken within the “‘outer perimeter’ of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are ‘not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.’” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2333 (quoting Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 13). But consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Blassingame, the Supreme Court suggested that a President who speaks “as a candidate for office or party leader”— as the defendant did here—does not act in his official, presidential capacity. Id. at 2340. As the D.C. Circuit explained, a President acting as a “candidate for re-election” is, to that extent, not carrying out an official responsibility. Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 17; accord id. at 5 (“When a sitting President running for re-election speaks in a campaign ad or in accepting his political party’s nomination at the party convention, he typically speaks on matters of public concern. Yet he does so in an unofficial, private capacity as office-seeker, not an official capacity as office-holder. And actions taken in an unofficial capacity cannot qualify for official-act immunity.”) (emphasis in original). To assess whether a presidential action constitutes an “official” act, courts must apply an “objective analysis” that focuses on the “‘content, form, and context’” of the conduct in question. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011)). A President’s motives for undertaking the conduct and the fact that the conduct is alleged to have violated a generally applicable law are not relevant considerations. Id. at 2333-34.

If a President’s actions constitute non-core official presidential conduct, he is at least presumptively immune from criminal prosecution for that conduct. 144 S. Ct. at 2328, 2331; id. at 2332 (reserving whether “this immunity is presumptive or absolute . . . [ b]ecause we need not decide that question today”). The Government can overcome that presumptive immunity by demonstrating that “applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no ‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.’” Id. at 2331-32 (quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754). Just as the inquiry into whether conduct is official or unofficial is “necessarily factbound,” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340, with “[t]he necessary analysis [being] . . . fact specific,” id. at 2339, so too should be the inquiry into whether any “presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances,” id. at 2337. The analysis should first identify the specific alleged act at issue, and then determine whether criminal liability for the act intrudes on a relevant Executive Branch authority or function, taking care not to “conceive[] of the inquiry at too high a level of generality.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (reversing district court in civil immunity case). Such an approach recognizes that Executive authority has limits—boundaries imposed by constitutional text, the separation of powers, and precedent—and that application of criminal law to the President’s official conduct does not per se intrude impermissibly on Executive Branch authority and functions. Cf. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2327 (“If the President claims authority to act but in fact exercises mere ‘individual will’ and ‘authority without law,’ the courts may say so.”) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring)).

These principles for assessing whether the conduct alleged in the superseding indictment is immune apply equally to evidence. The Government may not introduce evidence of immunized official conduct against a former President at a trial, even to prove that the former President committed a crime predicated on unofficial conduct. Id. at 2340-41.

III. None of the Allegations or Evidence Is Protected by Presidential Immunity

At its core, the defendant’s scheme was a private one; he extensively used private actors and his Campaign infrastructure to attempt to overturn the election results and operated in a private capacity as a candidate for office. To the limited extent that the superseding indictment and proffered evidence reflect official conduct, however, the Government can rebut the presumption of immunity because relying on that conduct in this prosecution will not pose a danger of intrusion on the authority or functions of the Executive Branch. Below, the Government categorizes the conduct outlined in Section I and provides “content, form, and context” for this Court to determine that the defendant’s conduct was private or that, in the alternative, any presumptive immunity is rebutted “under the circumstances.” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2337. This analysis is necessarily fact-intensive, and all of the Government’s analysis below is based on the unique facts and circumstances of this case.

This section first addresses the defendant’s interactions with Pence, because in Trump, the Supreme Court held that when the defendant conversed with Pence about “their official responsibilities,” the conduct was official. 144 S. Ct. at 2336. Accordingly, the Government explains below why any presumptive immunity as to the defendant’s official conduct regarding Pence is rebutted. Other than the specific official conduct related to Pence that the Supreme Court held to be official, none of the defendant’s other actions were official. This section categorizes that conduct and provides the “content, form, and context” that establishes its unofficial nature. These categories are: a) the defendant’s interactions, as a candidate, with state officials; b) the defendant’s efforts, as a candidate, to organize fraudulent electors; c) the defendant’s public speeches, Tweets, and other public statements as a candidate; d) the defendant’s interactions, as a candidate, with White House staff; and e) other evidence of the defendant’s knowledge and intent. Lastly, even if these categories of conduct and evidence were to be deemed official, the Government can rebut the attendant presumption of immunity as described below.

A. The Defendant’s Interactions with Pence

The only conduct alleged in the original indictment that the Supreme Court held was official, and subject to at least a rebuttable presumption of immunity, was the defendant’s attempts to lie to and pressure Vice President Pence to misuse his role as President of the Senate at the congressional certification. The Supreme Court stated that “[w]henever the President and Vice President discuss their official responsibilities, they engage in official conduct,” and further explained that because Pence’s role at the certification was “a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice President,” the defendant was “at least presumptively immune from prosecution for such conduct.” 144 S. Ct. at 2336. Accordingly, unlike all of the other threshold determinations that the Court will have to make about whether the defendant’s conduct alleged in the superseding indictment was official, with respect to the defendant’s conversations with Pence about Pence’s official role at the certification proceeding, the Court can skip to the second step: whether the Government can rebut the presumption of immunity that the Supreme Court held applies to such conversations. Because the Executive Branch has no role in the certification proceeding—and indeed, the President was purposely excluded from it by design—prosecuting the defendant for his corrupt efforts regarding Pence poses no danger to the Executive Branch's authority or functioning.

As described below, the Government also intends to introduce at trial evidence regarding conversations between the defendant and Pence in which they did not discuss Pence's official responsibilities as President of the Senate and instead acted in their private capacities as running mates. And the Government intends to elicit at trial evidence about a Pence staffer's conversations with co-conspirator Those conversations were unofficial and therefore not immune.

1. The defendant's interactions with Pence as the President of the Senate were official, but the rebuttable presumption of immunity is overcome

The superseding indictment and the Government's trial evidence include the defendant's attempts to influence Pence's "oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate." Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2337. These conversations included one-on-one conversations between the defendant and Pence (see, e.g., supra pp. 49, 63-65, 72-74, describing conversations on December 5 and 25, 2020, and January 1, 3, 5, and 6, 2021 496), as well as conversations in which the defendant included private actors, such as co-conspirator CC2 in his attempts to convince Pence to participate in the conspiracies (see, e.g. , supra pp. 66-67 and 71-72, describing conversations on January 4 and 5, 2021).

The Supreme Court held that discussions between the defendant and Pence concerning Pence's role at the certification proceeding qualify as official conduct, and therefore are subject to a rebuttable presumption of immunity, because they involved “the President and the Vice President discuss[ing] their official responsibilities.” Id. at 2336. Those discussions qualify as official because “[p]residing over the January 6 certification proceeding at which Members of Congress count the electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice President.” See id. at 2336; U.S. Const. Art. I, § 3, cl. 4. The discussions at issue did not pertain to Pence’s role as President of the Senate writ large, however, but instead focused only on his discrete duties in presiding over the certification proceeding—a process in which the Executive Branch, by design, plays no direct role. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2337. A prosecution involving the defendant’s efforts to influence Pence in the discharge of this particular duty, housed in the Legislative Branch, would not “pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Id.

The Executive Branch has no authority or function to choose the next President. Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 17. To the contrary, the Constitution provides that the States will appoint electors to vote for the President and Vice President. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. And all States have chosen to make such appointments based on the ballots cast by the people in their respective states. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578, 581 (2020). “The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes,” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 4, but the Executive Branch has no direct role in that process. The next step in the process established by the Constitution similarly provides no role for the Executive Branch: the House and Senate meet in joint session, with the President of the Senate present to “open all the certificates” of the state-appointed electors in the presence of the House and Senate, for them to be counted. U.S. Const. Amend. XII. “The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed.” Id. Only if the state-appointed electors have failed to make a choice, i.e., no candidate has such a majority, does the choice fall to the House of Representatives, who, voting by state delegation, “choose immediately, by ballot,” from the three presidential candidates receiving the most electoral votes. Id. There, too, the Executive Branch plays no role in the process.

The exclusion of the Executive Branch reflects fundamental constitutional principles. The “executive Power” is “vested in a President” only for “the Term of four Years,” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and it transfers to his successor, by operation of law, “at noon on the 20th day of January,” U.S. Const. Amend. XX. Permitting the incumbent President to choose his own successor—or, worse still, to perpetuate himself in power—would contradict the entire constitutional system that the Framers created. “In free Governments,” Benjamin Franklin explained, “the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors [and] sovereigns.” 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 120 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). A government could not be considered a “genuine republic,” Madison argued, unless “the persons administering it,” including the President, “be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments” for a “definite period.” The Federalist No. 39 (J. Madison). Thus, while the Framers recognized “the necessity of an energetic Executive,” they justified and checked his power by ensuring that he always retained “a due dependence on the people.” The Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton); see Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 223-24 (2020). The Framers further recognized that while regular elections would serve as “the primary control on the government,” “experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions” as well. The Federalist No. 51 (J. Madison).

Some of those precautions are reflected in the design of the Electoral College itself. “[W]ary of ‘cabal, intrigue, and corruption,’” the Framers “specifically excluded from service as electors ‘all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the president in office.’” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2339 (quoting The Federalist No. 68 (A. Hamilton)). They were keenly aware, as Justice Story later explained, that “an ambitious candidate” could hold out “the rewards of office, or other sources of patronage,” in an effort “to influence a majority of votes; and, thus, by his own bold and unprincipled conduct, to secure a choice, to the exclusion of the highest, and purest, and most enlightened men in the country.” Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1450, at 314 (1833 ed.). To guard against that possibility, Article II provides that “no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. As a leading early American commentator observed, these limitations serve “to prevent the person in office, at the time of the election, from having any improper influence on his re-election, by his ordinary agency in the government.” See 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law *276 (8th ed. 1854).

The Constitution’s structure further reflects the Framers’ considered choice to exclude the incumbent President from playing a role in choosing the next President. The Constitution reflects an abiding concern that governmental “power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it,” not least to protect against “the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate.” The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison); see Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 273 (1991) (“The abuses by the monarch recounted in the Declaration of Independence provide dramatic evidence of the threat to liberty posed by a too powerful executive.”). The Framers therefore designed a system of separated powers in part to ensure that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison).

The defendant’s charged conduct directly contravenes these foundational principles. He sought to encroach on powers specifically assigned by the Constitution to other branches, to advance his own self-interest and perpetuate himself in power, contrary to the will of the people. As such, applying a criminal prohibition to the defendant’s conduct would not pose any danger of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch; rather, it would advance the Constitution’s structural design to prevent one Branch from usurping or impairing the performance of the constitutional responsibilities of another Branch. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699- 702 (1997).

History confirms that presidents have never understood their wide-ranging duties to encompass any direct role in the function of collecting, counting, and certifying the results of a presidential election. As President Lincoln explained in 1864, “[ b]y the Constitution and laws the President is charged with no duty in the conduct of a presidential election in any State,” and “[ i]f any election shall be held, and any votes shall be cast in the State of Tennessee for President and Vice President of the United States, it will belong, not to the military agents, nor yet to the Executive Department, but exclusively to another department of the Government, to determine whether they are entitled to be counted, in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 8 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 71-72 (1953). When Congress later sent to Lincoln for his signature a “Joint resolution declaring certain States not entitled to representation in the electoral college,” Lincoln signed the resolution “in deference to the view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation to him,” but “disclaim[ed] all right of the Executive to interfere in any way in the matter of canvassing or counting electoral votes.” House Special Committee, Counting Electoral Votes, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 44-13, at 229-230 (1877). The Government is aware of no contrary evidence, including of any President, other than the defendant, seeking to influence his Vice President in the discharge of his duties as President of the Senate in presiding over the joint session. The absence of any such historical tradition is reinforced by the fact that in 22 of the 59 certification proceedings the Vice President has not presided at all. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Ministerial Role of the President of the Senate in Counting Electoral Votes: A Post-January 6 Perspective, 21 U.N.H. L. REV. 369, 402 & App’x 1 (2023).

When it comes to the certification proceeding specifically, not only has the President been deliberately excluded from the process, but the Vice President’s role, as President of the Senate, is highly circumscribed and ministerial in nature. The Twelfth Amendment gives the President of the Senate no substantive role in determining how to count the votes of the electors appointed by the states. Rather, it provides only that he “shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates,” and then shifts to the passive voice: “and the votes shall then be counted.” Nothing in the Constitution remotely suggests that the single individual serving as President of the Senate would have the momentous responsibility to decide which votes to count and how they should be counted. Indeed, as Pence himself explained on January 6, 2021, giving the President of the Senate such a role “would be entirely antithetical to the [Constitution’s] design.”497 And, removing any possible doubt, “Congress has legislated extensively to define the Vice President’s role in the counting of the electoral votes,” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2337 (citing 3 U.S.C. § 15), and it has never provided any substantive role for the Vice President, instead assigning the resolution of disputes to the two Houses of Congress.498 Moreover, Congress has now made explicit—echoing and reaffirming constitutional tradition and practice—that, with limited exceptions of no relevance to this case, “the role of the President of the Senate while presiding over the joint session shall be limited to performing solely ministerial duties,” 3 U.S.C. § 15(b)(1). He “shall have no power to solely determine, accept, reject, or otherwise adjudicate or resolve disputes over the proper certificate of ascertainment of appointment of electors, the validity of electors, or the votes of electors.” Id. § 15(b)(2). 499 Because the Vice President’s role is and has always been ministerial, rather than substantive or discretionary, it is difficult to imagine an occasion in which a President would have any valid reason to try to influence it. As such, criminalizing a President’s efforts to affect the Vice President’s role as the President of the Senate overseeing the certification of Electoral College results would not jeopardize an Executive Branch function or authority.

Critically, applying a criminal prohibition to the discrete and distinctive category of official interactions between the President and Vice President alleged in this case would have no effect— chilling or otherwise—on the President’s other interactions with the Vice President that implicate Executive Branch interests. The President would still be free to direct the Vice President in the discharge of his Executive Branch functions, such as “presid[ing] over . . . cabinet meetings,” engaging in “diplomacy and negotiation,” or performing any other presidential duties that the President chooses to delegate. See Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2336 (internal quotation marks omitted). The President would likewise still be free to advise the Vice President on how to “advance the President's agenda in Congress," by casting tiebreaking votes on legislation or nominations. Id. at 2337. None of these legitimate Executive Branch functions would be chilled or affected at all.

Lastly, the fact that the defendant regularly included other private actors, such as his private attorney and co-conspirator CC2 in some conversations to attempt to pressure Pence (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 75-76; supra pp. 66-67, 71-72) strengthens the conclusion that prosecuting the defendant for his actions using CC2 to help recruit Pence into the conspiracies does not infringe on any Executive Branch authority or function. As set forth in Section I, private co-conspirators worked to schedule the January 4 meeting at which CC2 attempted to pressure Pence. Although White House Counsel P59 was invited to the meeting, when he arrived to attend, the defendant explicitly excluded him from it-meaning that the only attorney attending the meeting for the defendant was his privately-retained counsel. In P59 telling, when P59 arrived at the Oval Office for the meeting, the defendant "said words . .. indicating he didn't want me at the meeting." 500 It is hard to imagine stronger evidence that conduct is private than when the President excludes his White House Counsel and only wishes to have his private counsel present.

Next, the phone call on January 5 that the defendant and CC2 made to Pence, P58 and P8 was the result of the private co-conspirators' failure to convince P58 and P8 to do as CC2 urged in the meeting on the morning of January 5 that P58 and P8 took at the defendant's request. The defendant 's decision to include private actors in the conversations with Pence about his role at the certification makes even more clear that there is no danger to the Executive Branch's functions and authority, because the CC2 conversations had no bearing on any Executive Branch prerogative. Instead, all of this conduct objectively benefitted the defendant in his private capacity as a candidate. The Court should therefore find the presumption of immunity to be rebutted. And because the presumption is rebutted, any participant in the meeting or phone call -- including Pence, P58 and P8 can testify about it at trial.

2. The defendant's interactions with Pence as a running mate were unofficial

At trial, as indicated supra pp. 12-14, the Government intends to introduce evidence of private phone calls or in-person meetings (which occasionally included Campaign staff) that the defendant had with Pence in their unofficial capacities, as running mates in the post-election period. These conversations were not described in the original indictment nor analyzed by the Supreme Court in its opinion, nor are they described in the superseding indictment. In these conversations, the defendant and Pence discussed their electoral prospects, election-related litigation, and the possibility of the defendant running again in 2024 if his legal challenges failed. For example, Pence "tried to encourage" the defendant "as a friend," when news networks projected Biden as the winner of the election; on other occasions, softly suggested the defendant "recognize [the] process is over" even if he was unwilling to concede; and encouraged the defendant to consider running for election again in 2024. Although the defendant and Pence naturally may have touched upon arguably official responsibilities that were tangential to their election prospects-for instance, whether the federal government should begin its logistical transition to prepare for a different Administration 501 -- the overall context and content of the conversations demonstrate that they were primarily frank exchanges between two candidates on a shared ticket, and the Government does not intend to elicit testimony about any peripheral discussion of arguably official responsibilities. See Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 17 ("[A] President acts in a private, unofficial capacity when engaged in re-election campaign activity."); see also United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 488 n. 7 (1979) (in the Speech or Debate context, when an act contains both protected legislative components and non-protected components, the correct course is to "excis[e] references to legislative acts, so that the remainder of the evidence would be admissible"). Together, these discussions show the defendant and Pence considering advice from their shared Campaign advisors, weighing electoral strategies, and grappling with their loss. Both men had something to gain by winning re-election, making more notable the persistence of Pence's suggestions on how to accept the results of the election without losing face.

Even if the Court determines that these conversations were official, however, the Government can rebut the presumption of immunity because the use of this evidence poses no risk to Executive Branch prerogatives. The content of the conversations at issue -- the defendant and Pence's joint electoral fate and how to accept the election results -- have no bearing on any function of the Executive Branch. See Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 4 ("The Office of the Presidency as an institution is agnostic about who will occupy it next.").

3. P58 one-on-one interactions with CC2 were unofficial

Pence staffer P58 also participated in a January 5 meeting with CC2 and P8 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 78a; supra pp. 69-70) and on January 6 engaged in a lengthy email exchange with CC2 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 99; supra p. 85). These interactions were outside of the defendant's presence, and the latter was a series of emails. These conversations were not official, within the meaning of Trump, since the defendant was not involved and did not otherwise direct P58 actions, and because of the other information above describing CC2 inherently private role.

B. The Defendant's Interactions, in his Capacity as a Candidate, with Officials in the Targeted States

1. The interactions at issue were unofficial


At trial, the Government will introduce evidence that the defendant, in his capacity as a candidate, contacted state elected officials to use false claims of election fraud to induce their assistance with the charged conspiracies at the point in the electoral process in which the states ascertain electors. These communications included calls to P16, the Governor of Arizona; a meeting with Michigan legislators at the White House; a call to P18, the Speaker of the Arizona State House; a call to P26, the Attorney General of Georgia; and a call to P33, the Georgia Secretary of State. The contacts, sometimes in person and sometimes by phone, were part of a single course of conduct aimed at lying to and influencing these state officials to alter the results of the election in the defendant's favor. In each conversation, the defendant raised false claims of election fraud when pressing the state officials, often asking them to take steps to prevent or overturn the ascertainment of Biden's legitimate electors. And in each case, the state officials informed the defendant that they had not seen the fraud he was claiming had occurred in their state. Notably, all of these elected officials were the defendant's fellow Republicans; he made no efforts to contact the equivalent individuals holding the same offices in Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, or Wisconsin, all of whom were Democrats. Most importantly, as with the defendant's plan regarding the fraudulent elector slates, as President, he had no official role in the process by which states appointed and ascertained their presidential electors. See 144 S. Ct. at 2353 (Barrett, J., concurring) ("The President has no authority over state legislatures or their leadership, so it is hard to see how prosecuting him for crimes committed when dealing with the Arizona House Speaker would unconstitutionally intrude on executive power."). The content, form, and context of the defendant's interactions with these state officials firmly establish that his conduct was unofficial.

a. Calls to P16 (supra pp. 17-18)

The defendant called P16 then the Governor of Arizona, on or about November 9. 502 The defendant's call to P16 was unofficial and undertaken as a candidate. Throughout the call, the defendant was engaged in partisan electioneering. His comments focused on the vote count in Arizona in his particular race, and on the margins and allegations of fraud that could potentially benefit him personally as a candidate. P16, in turn, responded by giving the defendant his assessment of the defendant's electoral prospects in Arizona -- prospects that were dim. 503 The defendant did not ask about the vote counts for, or claim fraud existed in, any race other than his own. And he raised fraud claims in this context -- about whether he could still win Arizona -- not in the larger context of election integrity. The defendant claimed that he would deliver evidence of election fraud to P16 then did not. 504 The call was a surprise to P16 and unusually short and to the point for the defendant, who usually liked to chat. 505 In contrast, according to P16 this call contained little conversation or pleasantries and was solely focused on the vote count in the Presidential race and the defendant's fraud claims. 506

This call must also be considered in the context of the conspirators' additional pressure campaign on P16. On other occasions, CC1 tried to reach P16 but P16 declined to accept the calls. 507 And on November 30, the day P16 signed the certificate of ascertainment declaring Biden's electors the legitimate ones for Arizona, the defendant (joined by Pence) again again called P16 again raised fraud claims, and again failed to substantiate them. 508 When P16 failed to do as the defendant demanded, after the call, the defendant attacked P16 publicly through Twitter. 509

Each of these communications with P16 was unofficial. The defendant engaged in them all in his capacity as a candidate, in an attempt to elicit P16 support in re-installing him as president.

b. Meeting with Michigan legislators (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 36; supra pp. 31-34)

The defendant's November 20 Oval Office meeting with Michigan state legislators was private in nature. During the meeting, the defendant raised claims of election fraud in the state related specifically and only to his own election, and the legislators explained that the defendant had lost not because of fraud but because he had underperformed with educated female voters. 510 Although the meeting took place in the Oval Office -- as did many unofficial Campaign meetings in which the defendant participated in the post-election period 511 -- a close examination of all of the other circumstances surrounding the meeting makes clear that it was a Campaign meeting.

The defendant originally initiated the meeting through RNC Chairwoman P39, a private and partisan actor, and then followed up himself with P37 and P38 -- both fellow Republicans and strong political supporters of the defendant. 512 Cf. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340 (suggesting the President acts in an unofficial capacity when acting as "pat1y leader"). Although the defendant did not specify the topic of the meeting in advance, both and assumed -- correctly -- that the defendant wanted to see them to discuss claims of election fraud related to his own race. 513 Notably, the defendant did not include in the meeting invitation other Michigan officials who held positions more relevant to the election and certification -- the Governor and Secretary of State -- but who were not Republicans. 514

At the time, public interest and alarm were piqued by news that the defendant was meeting with legislators from a state where there were pending election disputes and where the Governor had not yet signed a certificate of ascel1aitunent, and the White House declined to state the topic of the meeting. 515 During a press conference on the morning of November 20, White House Press Secretary P60 was asked about the meeting and claimed, "This is not an advocacy meeting. There will be no one from the Campaign there. He routinely meets with lawmakers from all across the country." 516

P60 claim was false. Over the course of the meeting, the defendant dialed in both P39 despite her request not to participate -- and CC1. 517 The defendant's Chief of Staff, P21 was present for at least part of the meeting. 518 But besides P21 who separate from his Chief of Staff duties assisted the defendant with Campaign-related logistics, 519 no other Executive Branch staff joined the meeting; in fact, according to P9 he and White House Counsel P59 wanted no part of it. 520 As P37 and P38 had expected, the defendant was focused on his own vote count in Michigan and on claims of fraud that related only to him. 521 CC1, a private Campaign attorney, then dominated the rest of the meeting with a monologue of false fraud claims. 522

The only reason that there were topics of conversation other than the defendant's claims of election fraud in his race was because the legislators, on their own initiative, brought them up, including presenting the defendant with a letter on COVID that they had prepared specifically to have something to talk about other than the defendant's unsupported election fraud claims 523 -- an official portion of the meeting about which the Government does not intend to elicit testimony at trial. The legislators then took photos with the defendant, and the meeting ended; afterward, P21 took the group on a tour of the White House. 524

As planned, after the meeting, P37 and P38 released their statement that publicly disclaimed evidence of outcome-determinative fraud in the election in Michigan. 525 The statement also specified that P37 and P38 had raised with the defendant issues related to Michigan's need for federal funds to fight COVID. 526 When the defendant responded to the legislators' public statement in a Tweet, the private nature of that message, sent as a candidate seeking to overturn the results of his own election -- "We will show massive and unprecedented fraud!" -- further demonstrates the private nature of the meeting it concerned. 527 In addition, it was one of six retweets and replies the defendant sent over an approximately thirteen-minute period, all of which were focused on allegations of election fraud in his own race. 528 Notably, the defendant did not conduct similar meetings in this period with legislators in states where he had won or even where he had lost by large margins, nor did he seek a meeting with the Michigan officials-the Governor and Secretary of State -- who could have provided him with information about the integrity of the election. 529

As further context establishing the private nature of this meeting, it was the opening volley of a larger pressure campaign on the same Michigan legislators by the defendant, his coconspirators, and his Campaign. For example, days after this meeting, CC1 sent text messages intended to urge P37 and P38 to help overturn the results in Michigan. 530 In the same time period, the Campaign publicized contact information for P37 and P38 (although the number published was wrong) and encouraged the defendant's supporters to flood their phone lines with complaints. 531

c. Call with P18 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 19; supra p. 19)

The defendant's call to P18 on November 22, 2020, also was unofficial. 532 Along with his private attorney, the defendant made the call in his capacity as a candidate and pressured P18 on electoral matters over which neither the defendant -- nor even P18 had an official role.

The context of the call makes its unofficial nature clear. The defendant placed the call to P18 along with CC1, his lead Campaign attorney, and no White House officials participated in the call. 533 In fact, CC1 did most of the talking. 534 The defendant and CC1 were singularly focused on fraud claims that affected only the defendant, and did not raise any other races in Arizona. 535 And the content of the call confirmed it was unofficial: the defendant and his private attorney asked P18 the defendant's political ally, to take steps to replace Arizona's legitimate electors with illegitimate ones for the defendant -- a step that necessarily only affected the defendant's race, out of all the races on the same ballot. 536

The call must also be viewed in the larger context of the pressure campaign the defendant and his co-conspirators put on P18 and other Arizona officials. Immediately after speaking to P18, the defendant and CC1 spoke to Arizona State Senate President P61. 537 A week later, during the "hotel hearing," CC1 and P12 failed to bring the promised evidence and instead admitted "[w]e don't have the evidence, but we have lots of theories." 538 See supra p. 19. When P18 publicly announced that he would not take extralegal action on the defendant's behalf, P19 and the defendant attacked P18 on Twitter. 539 Then, days before January 6, CC2 made another attempt to convince to act in contravention of the law and his principles. 546 And just as was done with the Michigan legislators, the defendant's Campaign and P1 publicized contact information for P18 and P61, in an attempt to pressure them to undertake the same actions the defendant and co-conspirators had asked them privately to perform. 541 P18, like others who publicly opposed the defendant's efforts, was harassed and threatened. 542

d. Call to P26 (supra pp. 23-24)

The defendant's call on December 8 to P26, the Georgia Attorney General, also was private. He undertook it to speak with P26 about Texas v. Pennsylvania, a lawsuit filed by the Texas Attorney General against Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin seeking to prevent those states from certifying their election results in favor of Biden based on a claim that the manner in which those states had administered their elections had violated the Constitution. 543

The defendant's interest in Texas v. Pennsylvania was personal and private; the lawsuit dealt only with the election for the offices of President and Vice President, not the myriad other races on the same ballots. Indeed, the day after his call with P26, the defendant -- in his personal capacity and with the assistance of co-conspirator CC2 as his private attorney -- intervened in the suit 544 and in so doing "affirmatively communicated to the Supreme Court (and the public) that he was acting and speaking in that matter in his 'personal capacity' as a candidate for reelection." Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 16.

The defendant initiated the call with P26 after a political intermediary laid the groundwork for it, and immediately raised the lawsuit, which was the principal topic of conversation on the call. 545 Based on P26's estimate and the Presidential Daily Diary, the call lasted about ten minutes and the defendant placed it at night from his private residence in the White House. 546 In fact, shortly before speaking with P26, the defendant had spoken with P62, the Texas Attorney General who had filed the lawsuit, 547 and immediately after speaking with P26, the defendant called P63, the Missouri Attorney General who authored an amicus brief supporting the lawsuit that sixteen other state attorneys general joined. 548

The speed of the filing of the defendant's intervention brief the following day echoed what he told P26: he was "running out of time," 549 presumably because landmark dates in the electoral process, like December 14 and January 6, were fast approaching. Lastly, the defendant and P26 also spoke about the importance of their fellow Republican party members, Senators P27 and P28, winning their pending election -- further making clear this call was unofficial. 550

e. Call to P33 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 33; supra pp. 28-31)

The defendant's January 2 call to P33 was unofficial and is not subject to immunity; its content, form, and context make clear that the defendant undertook it as a candidate and plaintiff in a private lawsuit in which P33 was a defendant.

P21 has said that the purpose of the call was to discuss the lawsuit, 551 and he acted accordingly during it. At the outset of the call, P21 made introductions of all the participants on the defendant's behalf -- P32, P35 and P31 552 -- all of whom were affiliated with the Campaign's litigation efforts, which the defendant brought in his capacity as a candidate for President of the United States. 553

Throughout the call, the defendant and his advisors approached the conversation through his role as a candidate and with a focus on his private lawsuit. For instance, in an apparent reference to individuals retained for his private lawsuit, the defendant claimed, "We're going to have an accurate number over the next two days with certified accountants. But an accurate number will be given, but it's, it's in the fifties of thousands, and that's people that went to vote and they were told they can't vote because they've already been voted for". 554 Some of his false claims of fraud paralleled claims made in Campaign lawsuits, such as that of a substantial number of dead and non-resident voters -- for example, in Trump v. Raffensperger, a state court case whose complaint was appended to the federal suit Trump v. Kemp, the defendant's complaint asserted that 4,926 out-of-state voters had cast ballots, while on the call the defendant cited the number 4,925. 555 And he deferred to his private attorneys at multiple points throughout the conversation. For instance, after P33 told the defendant, "the challenge that you have is the data you have is wrong," the defendant turned to P31 and asked, "Well, P31, how do you respond to that?" 556 At one point, P21 interjected and invoked the Campaign's litigation, asking whether "we can find some kind of agreement ... to find a path forward that's less litigious." 557 And near the end of the call, P32, the defendant's lead counsel in the lawsuit against P33, requested "to sit down with your office, and we can do it through purposes of compromise just like this phone call" to review data. 558 P33 counsel, P35, responded that P32's cited numbers were inaccurate, but agreed to meet with him. 559

The defendant's call to P33 was purely a private one, which he undertook as a candidate and the plaintiff in a lawsuit. Indeed, a federal district court has concluded that the P33 call was a Campaign call rather than official business; when P21 sought removal to federal court of his criminal case in Fulton County, Georgia, a court in the Northern District of Georgia issued an order declining to assume jurisdiction because P21 had failed to meet his burden of showing that his role in the call was official rather than unofficial. See Georgia v. Meadows, 692 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2023), aff'd 88 F. 4th 1331, 1349 (11th Cir. 2023) (petition for cert. filed) ('[DELETE]'s participation in the call reflected a clear attempt to further Trump's private litigation interests .... ") (emphasis in original)); see also Arizona v. Meadows, No. CV-24-02063-PHX-JJT, 2024 WL 4198384, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2024) (similarly denying [DELETE]'s notice of removal to federal court of a criminal case in Arizona related to the defendant’s fraudulent elector plan on the basis that [DELETE]'s conduct in furtherance of the plan charged by the State “is unrelated to official duties”).

2. Even if the defendant’s contacts with state officials were official, the Government can rebut the presumption of immunity

Although the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue in Trump, it described the basis for concluding that using the defendant’s conduct of lying to and pressuring state officials to change the legitimate vote in a criminal prosecution would not intrude on Executive Branch functions or authority:

Indeed, the Constitution commits to the States the power to “appoint” Presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544 (1934). “Article II, § 1’s appointments power,” we have said, “gives the States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, absent some other constitutional constraint.” Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578, 588–589 (2020). By contrast, the Federal Government’s role in appointing electors is limited. Congress may prescribe when the state-appointed electors shall meet, and it counts and certifies their votes. Art. II, § 1, cls. 3, 4. The President, meanwhile, plays no direct role in the process, nor does he have authority to control the state officials who do. And the Framers, wary of “cabal, intrigue and corruption,” specifically excluded from service as electors “all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the president in office.” The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (A. Hamilton); see Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.


144 S. Ct. at 2339. Under the Constitution, the Executive Branch has no constitutionally assigned role in the state-electoral process. To the contrary, the constitutional framework excludes the President from that process to protect against electoral abuses. See supra p. 93. Accordingly, applying federal criminal law to the defendant’s use of fraud to interfere with electoral processes carried out by the states does not intrude on Executive Branch authority or functions. Rather, it ensures that the President’s conduct remains consistent with the Constitution’s allocation of that authority to the States, while in no way impairing his ability to “encourage [state officials] to act in a manner that promotes the President's view of the public good." 144 S. Ct. at 2338. The President remains free, for instance, to urge state officials to institute measures to combat a pandemic or make arrangements to provide emergency relief. This case does not remotely implicate such official conduct. What neither the President nor any other candidate may do is further his private campaign for office by using fraudulent means to have state officials certify him as winner of a presidential election despite the will of the voters. Accordingly, applying criminal penalties to that conduct will not intrude on any Executive Branch authority or function.
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Tue Oct 15, 2024 6:19 am

Part 5 of 7

C. The defendant's efforts, as a candidate, to organize fraudulent electors

1. The conduct at issue was unofficial


The defendant's conduct with respect to the elector scheme is inherently private, and not subject to immunity. See 144 S. Ct. at 2353 n.2 (Barrett, J., concurring in part) ("Sorting private from official conduct sometimes will be difficult -- but not always. Take the President's alleged attempt to organize alternative slates of electors. In my view, that conduct is private and therefore not entitled to protection."). The President of the United States has no official responsibilities related to the organization or voting of electors in the various states -- by virtue of the Constitution, that process takes place in the states according to the laws and procedures set forth by each state. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § I , d. 2. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the defendant initially conceded that the plan to submit fraudulent electors directed by the defendant and CC1 was not official. Tr. of Oral Argument at 29-30; Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2338. The Government nonetheless sets forth here the context, form, and content of the defendant's private contacts with RNC Chairwoman P39 in furtherance of the fraudulent elector plan because the defendant conversely suggested in the same oral argument that he will argue that those efforts were official. See 144 S. Ct. at 2338.

The defendant had two relevant contacts with P39 first, he and co-conspirator CC2 called P39 on December 6 to ask her to ensure that the effort was properly coordinated (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 53; supra p. 50), and second, on the evening of December 14, P39 emailed the defendant through his executive assistant, P42, to inform him that the fraudulent electors had cast votes as he had directed (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 66; supra p. 57).

The defendant and CC2 call to P39 on December 6 was private. The defendant placed the call along with CC2, a private attorney and co-conspirator, to P39, the Chairwoman of a political organization whose objective was to elect a broad set of Republicans at the federal and state level, including the defendant and other allied candidates. 560 CC2 was acting in his capacity as a private attorney for the defendant; on the same day, CC2 emailed with several other private attorneys and wrote, "This is huge -- and hugely important. Let's make sure the various state electors are aware of the absolute necessity of meeting on the 14th, casting their votes, and otherwise complying with the transmittal requirements of federal law." 561 Finally, the content of the call was likewise unofficial. The defendant and CC2 asked P39 to work with the Campaign, to ensure that the fraudulent electors were properly organized, which she agreed to do -- and did, as is clear from her further contacts with CC1 and CC6 regarding the plan. 562

P39 email to the defendant on December 14 was likewise a private communication; P39 simply forwarded the defendant an RNC communication summarizing the electoral vote to inform him that the private task the defendant had given her was complete, and P42 confirmed that she had relayed the message by writing, "It's in front of him!" 563 As discussed infra pp. 145-147, when a White House staffer facilitates unofficial conduct by relaying private, political communications, the private action is not converted to an official one simply because an Executive Branch aide helps carry it out.

2. Even if the conduct were deemed official, the Government could rebut the presumption of immunity

In any event, even if the defendant's efforts to convene fraudulent electors could be considered official, the prescription would be rebutted because "a President has no legal authority -- and thus no official capacity -- to influence how the States appoint their electors," and accordingly, there is "no plausible argument for barring prosecution of that alleged conduct." Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2353 n. 2 (Barrett, J., concurring in part). "[W]hile Congress has a limited role [in the appointment of Presidential electors], the President has none." Id. Accordingly, applying the criminal law to the defendant's "alleged attempt to organize alternative slates of electors," while properly viewed as prosecution for private conduct, see id., implicates no authority or functions of the Executive Branch -- and therefore including such conduct in the defendant's prosecution poses no danger of intruding on Executive Branch authority or functions. No federal executive function is impaired by applying criminal law to the alleged conduct of privately organizing fraudulent slates of electors.

D. The Defendant’s Public Speeches, Tweets, and Other Public Statements as a Candidate

1. The statements at issue were unofficial


Merely because the President is speaking to the public—even on “matters of public concern”—does not automatically render the communication official. Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 19-20. Instead, what matters is “whether the President is speaking (or engaging in conduct) in an official capacity as office-holder or instead in an unofficial capacity as officer-seeker,” id. at 19, as determined by “content, form, and context,” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340. Starting before the election and lasting until January 6, the defendant at various times communicated publicly not as President but as a candidate for office. These communications included public Campaign speeches, Tweets, and other public statements and comments. The defendant’s communications that the Government has alleged in the superseding indictment and described in Section I were all made in his capacity as a candidate and are not official.

a. Speeches

The defendant made a number of speeches as a candidate, rather than as an office-holder. See 144 S. Ct. at 2339-40 (“There may . . . be contexts in which the President, notwithstanding the prominence of his position, speaks in an unofficial capacity—perhaps as a candidate for office or party leader.”). The superseding indictment cites, and the Government plans to use at trial, two: the defendant’s Campaign speech at a political rally in Dalton, Georgia, on January 4, 2021, and his Campaign speech at a political rally on the Ellipse on January 6, 2021.

i. Dalton, Georgia, on January 4, 2021 (supra p. 68)

In his capacity as a candidate, the defendant traveled to Dalton, Georgia, on January 4 at the invitation of two Republican U.S. Senators who were competing in a run-off election the following day to retain their seats. The RNC paid for the event. 564

The White House's records, including the trip binder that White House staff prepared for the event and that includes a schedule and manifests, further confirm the private nature of the Dalton speech. 565 The defendant was the only Executive Branch participant in the event -- other attendees were federal and state elected officials, the Chairman of the Georgia Republican Party, and the founder of Bikers for Trump. 566 The trip binder included a Hatch Act disclaimer stating that "employees of the Federal Government may not use their official title or position when participating in a political event." 567 Its description of the "event" to which the defendant was traveling was "Remarks at Victory Rally." 568 Similarly, the Presidential Daily Diary from that day describes that "[t]he President made remarks at the Georgia Senate Victory Rally." 569 This nomenclature -- the use of the phrase "Victory Rally" -- is significant. "Victory" necessitates one political candidate or party defeating another, and rallies are the kinds of events that candidates hold to excite their supporters and garner votes.

Moreover, the defendant's Campaign sent numerous fundraising emails before, during, and after the speech, confirming the event's private nature. In a January 4 email around 3:00 p.m., the Campaign sent a fundraising email with the subject line "EPIC Rally in 6 HOURS," that began, "President Trump is heading to GEORGIA for a RALLY with Senators P28 and P27. This rally is going to be EPIC and will show the Nation that REAL Americans, like YOU, are fired up and ready to FIGHT to keep our Republican Senate Majority. The Senate Runoff Election is TOMORROW, and it's going to take the support of Patriots from all around the Nation if we're going to WIN BIG and SAVE America from the Radical Left." 570 Later, at 9:21 p.m., the Campaign sent a fundraising email (in the name of the defendant's son) that began, "My father is on stage RIGHT NOW in Georgia rallying with Senators and to DEFEND our Senate Republican Majority. Are YOU watching?" 571 The email reminded voters that "The Senate Runoff Election is TOMORROW and YOU are the only one who can stop ["the Left"] from taking over." 572 Another email at 10:41 p.m. (sent in the name of the defendant) began, "I just stepped off stage after speaking at an EPIC Victory Rally in Georgia with Senators P28 and P27. The energy of the American People was UNMATCHED and I know we're going to WIN BIG tomorrow."573

Finally, the content of the Dalton speech confirms its unofficial nature. The defendant began by telling the crowd, "Tomorrow, each of you is going to vote in one of the most important runoff elections in the history of our country . . . . You're going to get everyone you know. You're going to show up to the polls in record numbers. You got to swamp them, and together, we're going to defeat the Democrat extremists and deliver a thundering victory to P27. And someone that has really been a star in Washington, P27. 574 He also used the speech to pressure Pence. 575 Much of the speech then veered into the defendant's principal claims of fraud and irregularities in the presidential election, but he occasionally returned to the theme of the following day's election, including discussion of the Democratic candidates. 576

ii. The Ellipse on January 6, 2021 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 86; supra pp. 75-78)

The "content and context" of the Ellipse rally, including the people involved in "organizing the rally," Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340, demonstrate that it too consisted of non-official conduct. The Ellipse rally -- named the Save America Rally or the March for Trump -- was planned and executed by private political supporters, including Women For America First (WFAF), a 501 (c)(4) organization that advocated for the defendant's reelection in advance of election day in 2020 and throughout the post-election time period. 577 Cf. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340 ("Knowing . . . who was involved in ... organizing the rally[] could be relevant to the classification" of the Ellipse speech as official or unofficial.). The Ellipse rally was originally planned to take place at Freedom Plaza, but after WFAF began to plan the rally independent of the defendant, P64, a private fundraiser for the defendant, contacted WFAF to discuss moving the event to the Ellipse and featuring the defendant as a guest. 578 The organizers and planners of the event were almost exclusively private individuals, with minimal involvement by White House advance staff. The United States Secret Service, which is charged with the President's protection at all times, even during unofficial events, considered the rally to be "a campaign event." 579 The rally was completely funded by a $2.1 million private donation by P65, a grocery chain heiress. 580 This private funding, while not dispositive, is a strong indicator that the event was unofficial. P66, the rally organizer who had the most direct contact with the defendant, was an employee of the defendant's Campaign until December 31, 2020, and after that, a private citizen. 581 And in public statements since leaving office, the defendant has said repeatedly that he "had nothing to do with" the rally "other than they asked me to make a speech. I showed up for a speech." 582

For weeks leading up to the event, the defendant promoted it on Twitter using the word "rally" -- a word that the defendant, on his Twitter account, reserved almost exclusively for political and Campaign events. As with the trip binder for the Dalton remarks, the defendant's trip binder for the Ellipse speech also reinforces the private nature of the event. Although it does not include the same Hatch Act disclaimer -- perhaps because the event, in contrast to the Dalton rally, was not for the benefit of another political candidate -- it describes the event as the defendant's "Remarks at the Save America Rally" -- using a word, "rally," that reflected an unofficial, Campaign-related event. 583

The defendant's White House employees understood the rally and the defendant's speech at it to be a private, unofficial exercise and acted accordingly. Consistent with the Hatch Act's requirement that officials within the Executive Branch (other than the President or Vice President) must refrain from using their official authority for partisan political purposes, see 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1), on the morning of the rally, an email from White House photographer P67 on which P45 was copied, provided "[a] reminder today is a political event." 584 Likewise, the defendant's White House speechwriting staff understood that the speech was a political, unofficial one and used their personal devices and personal email accounts to do most of the drafting and fact-checking for the defendant's Ellipse speech, though some last revisions to the speech on the morning of January 6 occurred over White House email. 585 And officials in the White House Counsel's Office who customarily reviewed the defendant's official remarks pointedly did not review the Ellipse speech because it was an unofficial Campaign speech. 586 Similarly, the White House website in the moments after the defendant's speech at the rally made no mention of it -- instead, the official webpage touted official accomplishments like COVID vaccines and peace in the Middle East. 587 By contrast, the speech was advertised heavily by the defendant's Campaign Twitter account, which also repeatedly posted clips of the event in progress and afterward. 588

The day-of-logistics of the Save America Rally further indicate its private nature. No other Executive Branch officials spoke. Instead, other speakers included WFAF officials, the defendant's political allies, two U.S. Representatives, and the defendant 's co-conspirators and private attorneys, CC1 and CC2. 589

Moreover, the defendant's appearance was consistent with a Campaign rally, not an official event. The crowd at the rally consisted of the defendant's political supporters, who held signs and wore clothing bearing the defendant's Campaign slogans. 590 And the manner in which the defendant took the stage at the rally was also consistent with his Campaign rallies: instead of entering as a military band played Hail to the Chief, as he might at an official presidential event, the defendant entered and exited the Ellipse speech to the songs he had used throughout his Campaign (Lee Greenwood's "God Bless the U.S.A." and the Village People's "Y.M.C.A." 591).

Tellingly, the significant similarities with the defendant's Dalton Campaign speech 592 confirm that the Ellipse speech 593 -- delivered just two days later-was private, partisan electioneering. The defendant covered many of the same topics and told many of the same lies about fraud in only his election -- in some cases, using the exact same words. For instance:

• The defendant, as a candidate, falsely claimed he had won the election (Dalton at GA 1102: "I ran two elections. I won both of them. Second one, much more successful than the first." Ellipse at GA 1115: "I've been in two elections; I won them both, and the second one I won much bigger than the first.").

• The defendant, as a candidate and the leader of a political party, implored political supporters to pressure Pence (Dalton at GA 1090: "I hope Mike Pence comes through for us, I have to tell you. I hope that our great Vice President, our great Vice President comes through for us. He's a great guy. Of course, if he doesn't come through, I won't like him quite as much." Ellipse at GA 1116: "I hope Mike is going to do the right thing. I hope so. I hope so. Because if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election.").

• The defendant, as a candidate and the leader of a political party, attacked a fellow party member who had been insufficiently subservient (Dalton at GA 1104: Georgia Governor P17 was an "incompetent governor." Ellipse at GA 1125: P17 was "one of the dumbest governors in the United States.").

• The defendant, who in his capacity as a candidate had suffered personal legal defeats in his private, election-related litigation at the Supreme Com1, attacked it (Dalton at GA 1095: "I'm not happy with the Supreme Court. They are not stepping up to the plate. They're not stepping up." Ellipse at GA 1125: "I'm not happy with the Supreme Court. They love to rule against me.").

• The defendant, as a candidate, made myriad false claims regarding fraud in the presidential election, including:

o Arizona

• Non-citizens cast 36,000 votes (Dalton at GA 1106: "In Arizona, more than 36,000 votes were cast by non-citizens." Ellipse at GA 1134: "Over 36,000 ballots were illegally cast by non-citizens."); and
• There were more ballots than voters (Dalton at GA 1106: “There were 11,000 more ballots than there were voters.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “11,600 more ballots and votes were counted, more than there were actual voters.”).

o Georgia

• There were more than 10,000 dead voters (Dalton at GA 1103: “We were up. 10,315 ballots were cast by individuals whose name and date of birth matches a Georgia resident who died in 2020 prior to the election. Then your wacky secretary of state said two people, two people.” Ellipse at GA 1133-1134: “Over 10,300 ballots in Georgia were cast by individuals whose names and dates of birth match Georgia residents who died in 2020 and prior to the election.”);

• More than 2,500 ineligible felons voted (Dalton at GA 1103: “2,506 ballots were cast by individuals whose name and date of birth matches an incarcerated felon in a Georgia prison. Maybe they aren’t all there, but they did a lot of work. I paid a lot of money to a lot of people. I can tell you that.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “More than 2,500 ballots were cast by individuals whose names and dates of birth match incarcerated felons in Georgia prison—people who are not allowed to vote.”);

• Thousands of unregistered people voted (Dalton at GA 1103: “4,502 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who do not appear on the state’s voter rolls.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “More than 4,500 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who do not appear on the state’s own voter rolls.”);

• More than 18,000 voters used vacant addresses (Dalton at GA 1103: “18,325 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who registered to vote using an address listed as vacant according to the postal service.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “Over 18,000 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who registered to vote using an address listed as ‘vacant,’ according to the Postal Service.”);

• At least 88,000 ballots were illegally backdated (Dalton at GA 1103: “At least 86,880 ballots were cast by people whose registrations were illegally backdated.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “At least 88,000 ballots in Georgia were cast by people whose registrations were illegally backdated.”);

• Underage voters cast 66,000 ballots (Dalton at GA 1103: “66,000 votes in Georgia were cast by people under the legal voting age.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “66,000 votes—each one of these is far more than we need. 66,000 votes in Georgia were cast by individuals under the legal voting age.”); and

• 15,000 voters had moved out of the state before the election (Dalton at GA 1103: “At least 15,000 ballots were cast by individuals who moved out of the state prior to the November 3rd election, or maybe they moved back in.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “And at least 15,000 ballots were cast by individuals who moved out of the state prior to November 3rd election. They say they moved right back. They moved right back. Oh, they moved out; they moved right back. Okay. They missed Georgia that much. I do. I love Georgia. But it’s a corrupt system.”).

o Michigan

• 17,000 ballots were cast by dead people (Dalton at GA 1106: “An estimated 17,000 ballots were cast by dead people.” Ellipse at GA 1135: “More than 17,000 Michigan ballots were cast by individuals whose names and dates of birth match people who were deceased.”).

o Nevada

• Signature verification machines were flawed (Dalton at GA 1106: “In Clark County, Nevada, over 130,000 ballots, this is far, just so you know, all these numbers, these are far more than we need, were processed on machines where the signature matching threshold was intentionally lowered to a level that you could sign your name, ‘Santa Claus,’ and it wouldn’t pick it up.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “In Clark County, Nevada, the accuracy settings on signature verification machines were purposely lowered before they were used to count over 130,000 ballots.”); and

• There were tens of thousands of double votes (Dalton at GA 1106: “More than 42,000 people in Nevada double voted.” Ellipse at GA 1134: “There were also more than 42,000 double votes in Nevada.”).

o Pennsylvania

• The Commonwealth had more votes than voters (Dalton at GA 1105: “In Pennsylvania, there were 205,000 more ballots cast than there were voters.” Ellipse at GA 1127: “So, in Pennsylvania, you had 205,000 more votes than you had voters.”);

• 8,000 dead people voted (Dalton at GA 1106: “Pennsylvania also had an estimated 8,000 dead voters.” Ellipse at GA 1127: “Over 8,000 ballots in Pennsylvania were cast by people whose names and dates of birth match individuals who died in 2020 and prior to the election.”);

• 14,000 out-of-state voters voted (Dalton at GA 1106: “14,000 ballots illegally cast by out of state voters.” Ellipse at GA 1127: “Over 14,000 ballots were cast by out-of-state voters. So these are voters that don’t live in this state.”);

• 400,000 absentee ballots appeared after the election (Dalton at GA 1106: “There’s an unexplained 400,000 vote discrepancy between the number of mail-in ballots in Pennsylvania sent out reported on November 2nd, 2020, and the number reported on November 4th. They can’t explain it. 400,000 previously unreported mail-in ballots, magically appeared. They couldn’t explain it. And all of a sudden they just happened to find 400,000. That’s a lot of people.” Ellipse at GA 1128: “The day before the election, the state of Pennsylvania reported the number of absentee ballots that had been sent out, yet this number was suddenly and drastically increased by 400,000 people. It was increased—nobody knows where it came from—by 400,000 ballots one day after the election.”); and

• Tens of thousands of ballots were received back before they were mailed out (Dalton at GA 1106: “55,000 ballots received back before they were even sent.” Ellipse at GA 1128: “And more than 60,000 ballots in Pennsylvania were reported received back—they got back—before they were ever supposedly mailed out. In other words, you got the ballot back before you mailed it, which is also logically and logistically impossible. Right?”).

o Wisconsin

• Hundreds of illegal drop boxes were used (Dalton at GA 1105: “In Wisconsin over 90,000 ballots were illegally harvested. Can’t do that. Not allowed to. Through so-called human drop boxes and over 500 illegal unmanned drop boxes were put out statewide.” Ellipse at GA 1131: “In Wisconsin, corrupt Democrat-run cities deployed more than 500 illegal, unmanned, unsecured drop boxes, which collected a minimum of 91,000 unlawful votes.”); and

• 170,000 invalid absentee votes were counted (Dalton at GA 1105: “Over 170,000 absentee votes were counted that are blatantly illegal under Wisconsin law and should never have been included in the tally.” Ellipse at GA 1131: “Over 170,000 absentee votes were counted in Wisconsin without a valid absentee ballot application. So they had a vote, but they had no application, and that’s illegal in Wisconsin.”).

The defendant’s language throughout the speech was that of a candidate focused on his reelection. He claimed that he would not concede, that he received more votes than he had four years earlier, that the election was over by 10:00 p.m. on election night, and that he wanted to goback eight weeks to fix the election result. Significantly, he made many of these statements at the beginning of the speech, framing the themes for the rest of the speech. 594

In addition, although countless federal, state, and local races also were on the same ballots as the defendant on election day—including those of every sitting member of the House of Representatives, even those on whom the defendant was counting to object at the congressional proceeding—the defendant focused only on his own race, the election for President, and only on allegations favoring him as a candidate in targeted states he had lost. 595 He claimed his “election victory” was “stolen,” that he would not “concede,” and that “with only three of the seven states in question, we win the presidency of the United States.” 596 He framed the claims of election fraud in terms of his own election and the margin of victory in his own race, and he spoke to his political supporters using the pronoun “we”—showing that he was speaking not to all citizens, but only to his own voters. 597 Finally, the defendant repeatedly aimed accusations at Biden, his principal opponent in the election contest, as would a candidate. 598

b. Tweets

One of the tools the defendant used for partisan political advantage—and in furtherance of the charged conspiracies—was his personal Twitter account. He used his Twitter account to undermine public confidence in the electoral system, spread false claims of election fraud, attack those speaking the truth that the defendant had lost the election, exhort supporters to travel to Washington for the certification proceeding, and marshal his supporters’ anger at, and pressure on, Pence. As described below, an objective analysis of “content, form, and context,” id. at 2340, establishes that the select Tweets that the Government intends to offer at trial were unofficial.

As an initial matter, the defendant sent, or directed the sending of, all Tweets and re-Tweets from @realDonaldTrump, the personal Twitter account that the defendant started long before assuming the presidency. 599 The defendant began tweeting from @realDonaldTrump in May 2009. Throughout his campaign for the presidency in 2016, the defendant used this Twitter account for electioneering purposes; he even announced the selection of Pence as his Vice Presidential nominee over Twitter. 600 Since the end of his term in office, the defendant again has used the account for private purposes. During his presidential term, the defendant sometimes used the @realDonaldTrump account to tweet about official business, including regarding COVID relief and vaccines, legislation in Congress, and Executive Branch business. But he also regularly used the account to post on unambiguously private matters—for example, when he posted a picture of himself golfing with Jack Nicklaus and Tiger Woods at the Trump National Golf Club in Jupiter, Florida, and re-tweeted a Trump Organization post about the Trump New York hotel being “named the #1 ‘Best Hotel in the World!’” 601

The Supreme Court’s decision in Lindke v. Freed, 144 S. Ct. 756, 769 (2024), confirms that a public official’s personal social-media account can be used for both personal and public business, and—consistent with Trump—that a fact-specific inquiry is required to discern into which category a post falls. In conducting the necessary Tweet-by-Tweet analysis, context and content matter. Simply because a Tweet relates to a matter of public concern does not automatically transform it into an official communication. In Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 20, the D.C. Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that any and all of the President's communications are immune official acts whenever they involve a matter of public concern. The D.C. Circuit recognized that the "integrity of the 2020 election" was a matter of public concern, but if the defendant spoke about that issue "in his personal capacity as a candidate for reelection rather than in his official capacity as President," it was unofficial speech not shielded by immunity. Id. Thus, when a court consults "content and context" to inform the official-act inquiry, see Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340, a claim that all Tweets concerning election integrity were official must fail.

An analysis of the @realDonaldTrump account during the time period of the charged conspiracies demonstrates that the defendant frequently used the account to advance his unofficial objectives as a candidate. Of the more than 1,200 Tweets, the vast majority were related to the 2020 presidential election. For example, he announced over Twitter that CC1 and others were taking over his Campaign legal team, and he repeatedly used the platform to espouse false claims of election fraud and promote political rallies on his behalf. 602 P45, the defendant's Deputy Chief of Staff and the only person other than the defendant with control over the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account, acknowledged that he sometimes consulted with Campaign personnel about material he was going to post on the account, that he worked as a volunteer for the defendant's Campaign at the same time that he served as Deputy Chief of Staff, and that he did not differentiate between his official and Campaign duties and when he would send Tweets on the account for Campaign purposes as a Campaign volunteer. 603

A review of the defendant’s official @POTUS45 account presents a relevant contrast. The defendant used this institutional account primarily to re-tweet other accounts like the @realDonaldTrump account, as well as @WhiteHouse. There were 74 Tweets from the @POTUS45 account during the charged conspiracies. 604 None of them include the defendant’s election-related claims or his election challenges. 605 The last four Tweets in the account, which the Government cites here to show context, were re-Tweets of Tweets from @realDonaldTrump regarding January 6. 606 These include two Tweets that the defendant issued on the afternoon of January 6 purportedly asking individuals to support law enforcement and “stay” peaceful; notably, the @POTUS45 account archive does not include the defendant’s Twitter pressure campaign against Pence, such as the 2:24 p.m. Tweet on January 6. 607

Below, the Government analyzes the “content, form, and context,” id. at 2340, of various categories of the defendant’s Tweets. All of these categories consist of unofficial Tweets.

i. Tweets, as candidate, casting doubt on election integrity

As described in Section 1, the defendant attempted to discourage mail-in voting and undermine confidence in the election results to prepare to declare victory even if he lost. See, e.g., supra p. 6. Just as his public statements casting doubt on the election were unofficial, so too were the analogous Tweets that the defendant posted in his capacity as a candidate. The context of these Tweets confirms this conclusion. The defendant issued the Tweets in advance of election day, in the midst of his campaign for re-election; furthermore, he made them while his own Campaign advisors were warning him that Biden supporters were much more likely to use mail-in voting, the very method the defendant attempted to discourage. In addition, the Tweets' content further reinforces their private nature; they show the defendant taking a partisan electioneering position on an issue rather than proposing any official measures to address a problem that the defendant claimed existed.

ii. Tweets making false claims of election fraud

The superseding indictment alleges that the defendant repeated and widely disseminated false claims of election fraud. See, e.g., Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 §§ 12, 14. One of the ways that he did so was by Tweet, constantly, day in and day out. Examples of the kinds of Tweets that the Government intends to use at trial are set forth throughout Section 1, in which the defendant falsely claimed victory and outcome-determinative election fraud in targeted states. See e.g., supra pp. 22-23, 32, 45, 55-56, 62-63.

These kinds of Tweets all shared common internal characteristics that establish their unofficial nature. The defendant used the language of a candidate when he spoke in terms of his personal electoral victory ("I win!" or "We win!"). 608 He divided his audience between personal allies who supported his election challenges and enemies who did not, dismissing the latter as "RINOs" (shorthand for Republicans in Name Only) or "the Democrats." 609 And he focused only on fraud claims that would affect his own election and was fixated on his own margin of victory ("far more votes than are necessary to win"). 610

iii. Tweets and re-Tweets attacking those speaking the truth about the election

On multiple occasions, the defendant issued a Tweet, or re-tweeted an agent's Tweet, in order to attack individuals who had spoken out publicly to defend the integrity of the 2020 presidential election and reassure the public that there had not been outcome-determinative fraud. These instances include: on November 11, the defendant attacked Philadelphia City Commissioner P47 after he dispelled fraud claims in a television interview that the defendant saw; 611 on November 29, the defendant issued a Tweet attacking P50 when he appeared on 60 Minutes, 612 on December 6, the defendant re-tweeted a post by his agent, P19 attacking Arizona House Speaker P18 for a public announcement that the defendant had not presented Arizona legislators with any evidence of outcome-determinative fraud and that the Arizona legislature could not overturn election results based on unsupported theories of fraud; 613 again on December 6, the defendant re-tweeted a post by his agent, P48 labeling four Republican state legislators "cowards" after they issued a public announcement that they could not overturn the popular vote and appoint their own electors; 614 and on December 21, the defendant attacked Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice P49 for ruling against him. 615

(a) P47 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 41; supra p. 38)

After P47 then a Philadelphia City Commissioner, gave a television interview on November 11 and made clear that he had not seen evidence of fraud there, the defendant issued a Tweet attacking P47 in partisan terms. The defendant called P47 a "so called Republican (RINO)" and finished the Tweet with "We win!" 616 In so doing, the defendant was acting as a candidate frustrated that a member of his political patty refused to perpetuate the lies the defendant was promoting to advance his personal political interests.

(b) P50 (supra pp. 45)

On November 29, when 60 Minutes aired an interview with P50 formerly the CISA director, defending the integrity of the election, the defendant tweeted an attack on the television program and C3 and claimed that the 2020 election was "probably our least secure EVER!" 617 These complaints about C3 and mail-in ballots echoed others which the defendant was making regularly as a candidate only in states in which he had lost the election. 618 He also issued the Tweet between two other Tweets in which he was speaking as a candidate. Thirty minutes before the P50 Tweet, the defendant used his @realDonaldTrump account to discuss Campaign litigation -- specifically, he wrote, "We have some big things happening in our various litigations on the Election Hoax. Everybody knows it was Rigged. They know Biden didn't get more votes from the Black community than Obama, & certainly didn't get 80,000,000 votes. Look what happened in Detroit, Philadelphia, plus!" 619 And within twenty minutes of the P50 Tweet, the defendant issued another Tweet about 60 Minutes, this time asking whether the "Fake News" program was paying attention to a Tweet that the defendant then linked to by P68 -- then a private citizen -- who in turn was publicizing what he characterized as a Campaign litigation victory on the defendant's behalf by co-conspirator CC3 in litigation in Georgia. 620

The defendant's Tweet regarding 60 Minutes and P50 was unofficial. The Campaign litigation-focused Tweets surrounding it demonstrate that the "us" whom the defendant claims 60 Minutes never consulted was the defendant's Campaign, not his Administration.

(c) P18 (DELETE) and Pennsylvania legislators (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 §§ 21, 43; supra pp. 20, 40)

In the early morning hours on December 6, upon returning from a Campaign speech in Valdosta, Georgia, the defendant re-tweeted a December 4 Tweet from P19 who was working with the Campaign and CC6 to overturn the election results 621 -- attacking Arizona House Speaker P18 after P18 released a public statement that he had not seen evidence of election fraud and could not take action to overturn the election results in Arizona. 622 Just four minutes earlier, the defendant had written "Thank you P19!" 623 while re-tweeting another of P19 Tweets that read, "President Trump is back on the campaign trail today!!! America is the best country on earth and @realDonaldTrump is the greatest President!" 624

On the same day, December 6, the defendant also re-tweeted a Tweet by P48, an agent of the defendant who was working closely with CC1. 625 Tweet attacked four Pennsylvania legislators who, like P18 had issued a public statement that they could not overturn the valid election results. The defendant re-tweeted P48 post without comment. 626

Both of the defendant's re-tweets on December 6 were unofficial. At the time, both P19 and P48 were, at a minimum, private agents of the defendant who were working to overturn the election results in his favor. P19 and P48 original Tweets were in service of that objective -- they were attempting to pressure state officials to take extralegal actions to replace their states' duly-ascertained electors with the defendant's fraudulent ones. The defendant's re-posting of these private Tweets was similarly private.

P49 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 46; supra

On December 21, when Wisconsin's Governor signed a certificate of final determination confirming that Biden had won the state based on the resolution by the Wisconsin Supreme Court of a lawsuit in Biden's favor, the defendant took to Twitter to attack Justice P49 who had written the majority opinion that ruled against him. 627 The defendant claimed -- falsely -- that he had endorsed P49 in his election for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and implied that the endorsement had caused P49 to win. 628 The defendant then encouraged "Republicans in Wisconsin" to go "to their State Legislators and overturn this ridiculous State Election. We won in a LANDSLIDE!" 629 The entire context of the defendant's Tweet about his fictitious endorsement of P49 his encouragement of Wisconsin Republicans to lobby their legislators, and his claim at the end that "We won" -- demonstrates that the Tweet as a whole was partisan, personal, and unofficial.

(e) Governor P16, Governor P17, and Secretary of State P33 (supra pp. 18, 26-31)

Throughout the post-election period, the defendant used his status and power as the head of a political party to bring political pressure to bear on fellow Republicans, including Arizona Governor P16, Georgia Governor P17, and Georgia Secretary of State P33. In the Tweets, the defendant assailed the three elected officials because they refused to take extralegal actions to benefit him personally, suggested that they would suffer politically if they did not do as he asked, and repeatedly suggested that they were "RINOs" and not real Republicans. The defendant launched these public attacks both as "a candidate for office" and as "a party leader," Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340, and they were thus unofficial.

iv. Tweets exhorting individuals to travel to Washington, D.C., for the Save America Rally (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 §§ 68, 72, 79(b); supra pp. 60, 64, 71-73)

Beginning on December 19, and continuing through early January, the defendant used the @realDonaldTrump account to promote the private, campaign-style Ellipse rally at which he spoke on the morning of January 6. Indeed, some of the defendant's Tweets from this account were retweeted and amplified by the defendant's Campaign Twitter account. 630 The defendant's multiple Tweets on this topic 631 included his initial message that there would be a "[ b]ig protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!" 632 In turn, that Tweet linked to a document drafted by P69 that had nothing to do with P69 official duties as a White House trade advisor, but rather constituted unofficial political activity by a Campaign volunteer who the Office of Special Counsel already had determined to have violated the Hatch Act on numerous occasions by attacking the defendant's opponent during the lead up to the 2020 presidential election. 633 For the reasons described supra pp. 118-126 that make clear that the Ellipse rally was a private event, and the defendant's remarks there unofficial, his Tweets as a candidate promoting the event were unofficial.

v. Tweets regarding Pence's role on January 6 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 §§ 69, 79(a), 82; supra pp. 61, 71-73)

As the defendant set his sights on using Pence's role as President of the Senate to overturn the election results at the January 6 certification proceeding, concurrent with his direct efforts to pressure Pence, the defendant began to issue Tweets falsely claiming that Pence could use his ministerial position to benefit the defendant as a candidate. For instance, on December 23, the defendant re-tweeted a Tweet by a Campaign surrogate named P70, who had posted a facially fake White House memorandum titled "Operation 'PENCE' CARD," which falsely claimed that Pence could unilaterally disqualify legitimate electors. 634 The defendant issued similar Tweets as the certification grew closer, including posting on January 5 that "[t]he Vice President has the power to reject fraudulently chosen electors." 635 And twice on the morning of January 6, before his speech at the Ellipse rally, the defendant tweeted again about Pence. First, at I:00 a.m., the defendant wrote, "[ i]f Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it must be). Mike can send it back!" 636 He again focused on Pence's role in the certification at 8:17 a.m. when he wrote, "States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!" 637

The context and content of these Tweets establish that they were unofficial. Through the Tweets, the defendant was using the political pressure of his supporters and social media followers to convince Pence to take an action to benefit the defendant as a candidate and help him overturn the results of the election. As discussed supra pp. 91-96, the defendant played no official role in the congressional certification proceeding and was not using his Tweets about Pence’s role to advance any Executive Branch or governmental interest. Likewise, the defendant had no role in whether state legislatures might take action regarding their own electoral slates (though his claim that these legislatures were poised to do so was also false). And the defendant’s language throughout the Tweets is that of a candidate seeking to win an election, including stating to his political supporters that if Pence “comes through for us, we will win the Presidency” and “All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN.” 638

The private and Campaign nature of the Tweets is further confirmed when viewed in the context of the defendant’s increasing desperation as even his unlawful path to remain in power narrowed. When the defendant re-tweeted the “Operation Pence Card” Tweet on December 23, the defendant knew that he had lost the legitimate electoral college vote and had begun summoning supporters to Washington for the Ellipse rally on January 6. 639 When he tweeted on January 5 that Pence had the power to reject fraudulent electors, Pence already had “told him many times” that Pence did not believe he had such power—including as recently as the day before. 640 And in the early morning hours of January 6, when the defendant again tweeted publicly that Pence should exceed his authority as President of the Senate when counting electoral votes, the defendant’s personal desperation was at its zenith: he was only hours from the certification proceeding that spelled the end.
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Tue Oct 22, 2024 3:42 am

Part 6 of 7

vi. The defendant's 2:24 p.m. Tweet on January 6 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 94; supra pp. 80-81)

The defendant's 2:24 p.m. Tweet aimed at Vice President Pence was unofficial. The defendant personally posted the Tweet on the afternoon of January 6 at a point when he already understood that the Capitol had been breached, writing: "Mike Pence didn't have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!" 641

The defendant's actions and knowledge in the hours leading up to this Tweet provide helpful context. First, the evening before, on January 5, the defendant had dictated a Tweet to P45 as he listened to the angry crowd gathered outside the White House. 642 That Tweet shows that the defendant understood that his gathering supporters, who were angry and believed his false claims that the election had been stolen, were a powder keg. At 5:05 p.m., he tweeted: "Washington is being inundated with people who don't want to see an election victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they won't take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!" 643

Thereafter, the defendant continued to fixate on preventing the certification proceeding. As described above, he tweeted about it at 1:00 a.m. on January 6 and again at 8:17 a.m. 644 After the 8:17 a.m. Tweet, the defendant worked on his remarks for the Ellipse and planned to include language explicitly putting pressure on Pence regarding the certification until advisors prevailed on him not to. 645 At 11:15 a.m., the defendant called Pence and tried one last-ditch effort to convince him to fraudulently reject or return Biden's legitimate electors. 646 Pence was resolute and unmoved, and the defendant was furious. 647 Immediately after the call, the defendant directed that the original language targeting Pence be reinserted in his prepared remarks for the Ellipse rally. 648

The defendant then went to the Ellipse and delivered a falsehood-laden speech to his angry supporters. He purposely singled out Pence by claiming that Pence had the power to overturn the election results and-though the defendant stood at the podium with full knowledge that Pence would not do so -- gave the crowd false hope that Pence might exercise that power. 649 The defendant told the crowd to act, stating, we "can't let it happen" and then directed his supporters, who were angry and motivated by his speech, to march to the Capitol. 650

Instead of marching with his supporters as he said he would, the defendant returned to the White House. 651 He went to the dining room next to the Oval Office and began to watch television coverage of the events at the Capitol. 652 Although the Government does not intend to use at trial evidence of the defendant's discussions with White House staff during this time period, it provides necessary context: when news broke that rioters had breached the Capitol, the defendant's advisors -- including P59, Deputy White House Counsel P71 and P9, urged the defendant to issue a calming message and make efforts to stop the riot. 653 The defendant refused, responding that the people at the Capitol were angry because the election had been stolen. 654 Eventually, all of the defendant' s staffers left him alone in the dining room. 655 Fox News continued to report on the growing crisis at the Capitol. 656

It was at that point -- alone, watching news in real time, and with knowledge that rioters had breached the Capitol building -- that the defendant issued the 2:24 p.m. Tweet attacking Pence for refusing the defendant's entreaties to join the conspiracy and help overturn the results of the election. 657 One minute later, the Secret Service was forced to evacuate Pence to a secure location in the Capitol. 658 This was roughly ninety minutes after Pence had announced publicly that he would not act unlawfully to overturn the election; 659 the certification proceeding was underway; 660 and the first breach of the Capitol building had occurred minutes before, at 2:12 p.m. 661 At that point, the defendant's only hope to disrupt the certification proceeding and retain power was through his angry supporters. The defendant further revealed the private nature of his desperate conduct as a candidate, rather than a President, in an exchange (that the Government does not plan to use at trial) he had with aide P15 shortly after the 2:24 p.m. Tweet. Upon receiving a phone call alerting him that Pence had been taken to a secure location, P15 rushed to the dining room to inform the defendant in hopes that the defendant would take action to ensure Pence's safety. Instead, after P15 delivered the news, the defendant looked at him and said only, "So what?" 662

The private, unofficial nature of the 2:24 p.m. Tweet contrasts with two other Tweets the defendant sent during the following hour and a video message he sent two hours later, and which the Government does not intend to introduce at trial. Only after advisors had again urged the defendant to calm matters at the Capitol, 663 the defendant at 2:38 p.m. posted, "Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful! " 664 As the violence at the Capitol nonetheless escalated, the defendant at 3:13 p.m. posted, "I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order -- respect the Law and am great men and women in Blue. Thank you!" 665 And after those Tweets failed to disperse the rioters, and after still more demands from his staff that he do more to stop the riot, the defendant at 4:17 p.m. tweeted a video message in which he finally asked those at the Capitol—whom he described as “very special” people that he “love[d]”— to leave the Capitol, while also claiming that “[w]e had an election that was stolen from us.” 666 He sent a Tweet at 6:01 p.m. that conveyed a similar sentiment: “These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!” 667

The defendant at least has an argument—though he issued the 2:38 p.m. and 3:13 p.m. Tweets only after being harangued by his staff while he adamantly refused to do anything at all— that he was addressing a matter of public safety as President (the riot at the Capitol). Likewise, in the 4:17 p.m. message, the defendant, while still focused on his election loss, asked rioters to evacuate the breached Capitol, and foreshadowed the sentiment in his 6:01 p.m. Tweet when he said to “[g]o home with love & in peace.” 668 By contrast, in the 2:24 p.m. Tweet, the defendant focused solely on the Vice President’s role in the certification of the presidential election results— a matter of intense personal concern to the defendant as a candidate for office. Even assuming that topic constituted a “matter[] of public concern,” Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 14, the defendant’s 2:24 p.m. Tweet reflected speech made “in an unofficial, private capacity as office-seeker, not an official capacity as office-holder.” Id. at 5.

Given all of this context, the 2:24 p.m. Tweet was unofficial. When the defendant sent it, he knew that what he had asked Pence to do, and that he claimed would “protect our Country and our Constitution,” was contrary to the ECA; that no state was poised to “certify a corrected set of facts;” that a large crowd of his political supporters had gathered in Washington at his urging; that these supporters were angry and believed his false claims that the election had been stolen; that he had called them to action through his Ellipse speech, in which he told them that Pence might still do as he wished and directed these supporters to march to the Capitol; and that his supporters had done so and had breached the Capitol building.

The defendant also knew what his advisors were forcefully urging him to do as President: issue a message to quell the emergency at the Capitol. Instead, the defendant refused repeatedly until his advisors gave up and left him alone in the dining room. It was then that the defendant issued the 2:24 p.m. Tweet, as a candidate communicating to his angry supporters that Pence had let him—and them—down. The content of the 2:24 p.m. Tweet was not a message sent to address a matter of public concern and ease unrest; it was the message of an angry candidate upon the realization that he would lose power. And unlike the defendant’s later Tweets that day, the defendant was not asking the individuals at the Capitol to “remain peaceful,” leave the building, or “go home.”

c. Other public statements

By virtue of his status as a candidate for re-election, the defendant occasionally made public statements—whether in response to questions or otherwise. Examples of such statements set forth in Section I are the defendant’s statements in advance of the election to seed public doubt in the outcome (supra p. 6), the defendant’s televised election night remarks to his supporters (supra pp. 7-8), and the defendant's telephonic endorsement of CC1 false allegations at the Gettysburg "hotel hearing" (supra p. 39).

Each of the defendant's cited public statements was made in his capacity as a candidate. His pre-election statements, for instance, were made in contexts like the Republican National Convention or in the midst of statements about political polling. 669 His election night remarks were made to a room of his supporters and were about his status as a candidate in the pending election. 670 And his contribution to the Gettysburg "hotel hearing" was to call in by dialing one of his private attorneys, who broadcast his personal message by holding her phone to the microphone so that he could make statements supporting those of his private attorneys. 671 In sum, the defendant made all of these contents as a candidate for office, and was speaking about his own election. They were unofficial.

2. In the alternative, any official portions of the defendant's public speeches, Tweets, or statements should be excised

Alternatively, if segregable portions of the speeches, Tweets, or statements are found to be presumptively immune official conduct, the first alternative would be to excise them from the speeches, allowing the Government to rely on the unofficial statements in those speeches.

The D.C. Circuit has long recognized that district courts have "discretionary power to delete objectionable portions" of evidence "where appropriate," United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and the Supreme Court has approved of that practice in the context of statements that contain protected legislative acts along with unprotected acts under the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause, see United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 488 n.7 (1979) (approving practice of “excising references to legislative acts, so that the remainder of the evidence would be admissible”); see also Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 523 (3d Cir. 1985) (“even where a conversation includes a discussion of both legislative acts and non-legislative acts, the conversation can be examined and the immunized aspects of the conversation deleted”). This is a familiar practice across a range of legal contexts. See, e.g., Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 653 (2023) (upholding use of a redacted statement to avoid constitutional concerns); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) (“Through in limine procedure, [trial courts] should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.”); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. - MDL No. 1869, 34 F.4th 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (relying on Lemonakis). Redaction of any statements ultimately found to be immune, while admitting the significant remaining unofficial content, would resolve any constitutional questions under Trump.

To the extent that excision does not resolve any arguable immunity claim, then even if the defendant’s conduct in these speeches, Tweets, and statements can be nudged across the line from Campaign conduct to official action, it is so heavily intertwined with Campaign-related conduct that prosecuting it does not pose a danger to any Executive Branch function or authority. Because the defendant bears the burden in the first instance of proving that conduct was official so as to qualify for presumptive immunity, the Government in its reply brief will address any specific arguments the defense makes regarding the speeches, Tweets, and statements discussed here.


E. The Defendant's Interactions, in his Capacity as a Candidate, with White House Staff

1. The interactions at issue were unofficial


White House staffers witnessed or engaged in private, unofficial communications with the defendant. These staffers included P9, the White House Senior Advisor who acted as a conduit between the defendant and the Campaign; P45 and P7 who both volunteered for the Campaign while working in the White House; P15 a staffer who witnessed a pertinent private remark by the defendant; and P42, the defendant's executive assistant.

Federal law confirms that the defendant's Campaign-related conversations with these White House staffers were unofficial. The Hatch Act permits certain White House staffers to engage in political activity while on duty, see 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1), but prohibits them from using their "official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election," 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1). These staffers can thus wear two hats. They can work in their private capacity to advance the interests of a political candidate, including while on official duty, or they can work in their official capacity to carry out Executive Branch responsibilities -- but they may not wear both hats at the same time. Accordingly, when the defendant's White House staff participated in political activity on his behalf as a candidate, they were not exercising their official authority or carrying out official responsibilities. And when the President, acting as a candidate, engaged in Campaign-related activities with these officials or in their presence, he too was not engaging in official presidential conduct. 672

Precedent from the D.C. Circuit further confirms that the defendant was not engaging in official presidential conduct when he spoke with White House staffers about Campaign matters. In In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit recognized that senior White House personnel may serve as the President’s agents in a personal capacity to act as a conduit for unofficial information from a private party. The D.C. Circuit held that while the President’s communications with his personal attorney are “fully protected by the absolute attorney-client privilege,” id. at 1283, a White House lawyer “cannot rely on a government attorney-client privilege to shield evidence from the grand jury,” id. at 1281. But a White House lawyer may invoke the President’s personal attorney-client privilege when he acts as “an intermediary” to convey unofficial information from the President to his personal attorney. Id. As the court explained, a President must often “rely on aides” to communicate with personal advisors, such as his personal attorneys, and the involvement of those aides does not alter the personal nature of the underlying communication. Id. at 1281-82. Similarly in this case, the transmission of a private Campaign communication by or to the defendant through a White House employee serving as an intermediary did not render that communication official and thereby shield it from use in a criminal trial against the defendant.

In sum, just as the President can at times act “in an unofficial capacity”—including as “a candidate for office or party leader,” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340—so too can the Executive Branch staff around him. Simply because a staffer holds a title in the Executive Branch and interacts with the President does not mean that the interaction is necessarily official. See Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 14 (noting “the settled understanding that immunity is based on ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” (quoting Clinton, 520 U.S. at 695)). When the individuals listed below interacted with the defendant in the circumstances described in Section I, those conversations were unofficial.

a. P9

From August 2020 through the end of the defendant's administration. P9 was an Assistant to the President without a defined portfolio. 673 More importantly for the Court's purposes, during the charged conspiracies, P9 served as a conduit of information from the Campaign to the defendant and discussed Campaign matters with the defendant. These actions were, consistent with In re Lindsey, unofficial.

As part of its immunity analysis, the Court should consider multiple different interactions involving P9, none of which bear on his official White House responsibilities: (1) a November 13 phone call in which the defendant told P9 he was going to put CC1 in charge of the Campaign's legal efforts under an agreement where the defendant only would pay if CC1 were successful, and P9 guaranteed the defendant he never would have to pay (supra pp. 11-12); (2) a November conversation with the defendant regarding CC3 (supra p. 44); (3) an undated conversation in which he told the defendant that CC1 fraud allegations could never be proved in court and the defendant responded, "the details don't matter" (supra pp. 12-13); (4) a November or December 2020 conversation in which P9 explained to the defendant why one of his fraud claims was "bullshit" (supra p. 13); (5) a late December exchange with the defendant regarding the verification CC2 wanted him to sign in Trump v. Kemp (supra p. 27); (6) a January 4, 2021, conversation P9 had with CC2 (ECF No. 226 § 77; supra p. 66), after which (DELETE) reported to the defendant that CC2 had admitted his plan was "not going to work" (supra p. 66); and (7) a variety of occasions on which P9 reported to the defendant that his Campaign and its hired experts had found various election fraud claims to be unsupported (supra p. 12).

Section I also includes actions by P9 that do not reflect any presidential conduct because the defendant was not involved. These include December 3 text messages that P9 exchanged with P21 regarding CC1 false fraud claims at a Georgia legislative hearing (ECF No. 226 § 26(a); supra pp. 21-22), and December 13 text messages P9 exchanged with Campaign personnel regarding the fraudulent elector scheme (ECF No. 226 § 60; supra pp. 52-53).

The content of each of P9 communications with the defendant enumerated above involve the defendant's Campaign, including the status and viability of the defendant's fraud claims, the quality of the advice the defendant was receiving from his Campaign advisors, his litigation and electoral prospects, and the legality and practicality of CC2's proposal that Pence reject Biden's legitimate electors at the certification proceeding. None of the communications pertain to general election policy issues or considerations, Justice Department criminal investigations, Executive Branch functions, or any other presidential responsibilities.

As context for all these communications, the Court should consider P9's relationship with the defendant, his role in the White House, and his interactions with the Campaign. P9's relationship with the defendant and his family pre-existed his position in the White House, and P9 represented the defendant in his impeachment trial. P9 did not have a defined portfolio, and worked on matters related to the Justice Department, including the Portland riots and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, as well as Middle East issues and pardons. 674 The Government does not intend to elicit specific information about communications P9 had with the defendant regarding his official duties.

P9 was not acting in an official capacity during the conversations enumerated above, but as a conduit for information from the Campaign. P9's contact with the Campaign began in October 2020, when he asked Campaign staffers P3 and P72 for a tutorial on campaign basics and operations. 675 He continued to talk to P3 and P72 leading up to the election to understand different electoral college win/loss scenarios. 676 Shortly thereafter, in early November 2020, P9 asked P77, who handled ethics issues in the White House Counsel's Office, for permission to engage with the Campaign, and thereafter P9 began frequent contact with Campaign staff. 677 Several days after the election, P9, went to the Campaign headquarters in Virginia for the first time, while P2, CC1, P56, CC3, P10, P48 and P12 were there too. 678 As discussed supra p. 9, on November 7 -- likely the same day he went to the Campaign headquarters -- P9 joined Campaign staffers, including P2, P3, and P4 at the White House to discuss with the defendant the fact that networks that morning had projected Biden as the winner of the election. 679 The Campaign staff and P9 told the defendant his chance of victory was slim. 680 P9 also participated in various Oval Office meetings with the defendant, Pence, White House staff, Campaign officials, and P39. 681

The defendant heard and mentioned, to P9 and others, various fraud allegations throughout the post-election period, sometimes from his outside attorneys like CC1 or CC3. Consistent with this, P9 asked P3 and P72 if certain fraud allegations were accurate, so that he could challenge information provided to the defendant by people like CC1, CC3 and P12. 682 P9 also began interacting on a near-daily basis with P22, a Campaign staffer who P73 told P9 he could trust. 683 The Campaign, in turn, hired two outside firms -- CC1 and CC22 to investigate fraud allegations. 684 P9 told the defendant that people external to the Campaign were hired to look into fraud allegations. 685

Overall, P9 served as a conduit of day-to-day information between P22 and the defendant during the post-election period. P22 testified that around the time that CC1 was named to lead legal efforts, "I was introduced to P9 ... and I started predominately reporting to P9. 686 He elaborated thatP9 "started to call me more and more. It would be, you know, once every couple of days that then it was kind of every day for a period of time that I was talking to P9. 687 With this information, on a daily basis, P9 attempted to debunk the false fraud allegations in the White House. For example, after watching P74 testify in a December 10, 2020, hearing in Georgia, P9 reached out to P22. 688 Through this channel, P9 learned about C1 and C2 uniform findings -- that no substantial fraud allegations were supported -- essentially in real time. 689 P9 also participated in calls with C1 and had the number of one of its managing directors, P75 in his cell phone; some of those calls occurred at the White House. 690 P9 directly passed the information to the defendant. 691

P9 had other contact regarding initiatives by the Campaign or its outside attorneys. For example P9 was on a call with the defendant and CC2 on December 9 regarding the defendant's motion, in his capacity as a candidate, to intervene in Texas v. Pennsylvania. 692 Separately, P9 spoke to the defendant about the lawsuit, and explained how the legal system worked and that the Campaign -- not the Justice Department or FBI -- was responsible for filing election challenge lawsuits. 693

Throughout these conversations, even if P9 could be understood to have been acting in an official capacity -- which he was not -- rather than a Campaign one, the defendant was himself acting in his private capacity as a candidate. The defendant was asking for P9 view on various strategic decisions he was making regarding his Campaign and his private attorneys, and he was getting reports from P9 on information related to actual and potential election challenges important to his candidacy and private Campaign. All of this context establishes both that P9 wore two hats -- one official, one private -- and that the defendant interacted with P9 in these conversations as a candidate rather than as President. The interactions between the defendant and P9 that the Government intends to introduce at trial were thus all private.

b. P45

P45 served as Assistant to the President and White House Deputy Chief of Staff. 694 He also volunteered his time for Campaign work, including traveling to political rallies with the defendant and posting pictures and videos. 695 The Government will elicit from P45 at trial that he was the only person other than the defendant with the ability to post to the defendant's Twitter account, that he sent tweets only at the defendant's express direction, and that P45 did not send certain specific Tweets, including one at 2:24 p.m. on January 6, 2021. 696 He also will generally describe the defendant's Twitter knowledge and habits, including that the defendant was "very active on his Twitter account" "paid attention to how his tweets played with his followers," "was very engaged in watching the news," and "knew how to read the replies and see all the replies of what people were saying and doing which ... led to where he would retweet things," and that any Tweet sent "between 5 or 6 a.m. until 9 or 10 a.m." and after "9 or 10 p.m." generally was the defendant personally sending out the Tweet, as opposed to having P45 do it. None of this proposed testimony on P45's part constitutes evidence of an official act. General information about access to the defendant's Twitter account, as well as P45's testimony that P45 did or did not issue a particular Tweet, is unrelated to any particular official act by the defendant.

c. P7

P7 was an Assistant to the President and a volunteer for the Campaign. 697 She will testify about two specific sets of conversations: (1) a handful of conversations in which the defendant, in advance of the election, said that he would simply declare victory (supra p. 5); and (2) an unprompted statement in which the defendant remarked, in a private moment, claims were "crazy" (supra p. 44).

Regarding the pre-election conversations, P7 has testified that COVID's expected effect on the election, and in particular the anticipated phenomenon that the defendant would take an early lead in some states based on the election day vote that would dissipate as mail-in ballots were counted, was discussed among Campaign personnel and dual-hat White House staffers who simultaneously volunteered for the Campaign. 698 In that context, the defendant told P7 and others words to the effect of, "We'll just declare victory." 699 Regarding the defendant's statement about CC3, P7 will testify about a November 20 phone call in which the defendant mocked and laughed at CC3 and called her allegations -- that he adopted and amplified -- "crazy." 700

In all of these interactions, the defendant was interacting as a candidate with P7, not as President. With respect to his pre-election comments about declaring victory, the context of the conversations indicates that the defendant was responding in real time to information that Campaign staff provided him on private matters. Similarly, the November 20 conversation among the defendant, P7 and P45 regarding CC3 was also a Campaign conversation. P7 and P45, two staffers who volunteered for the Campaign while working in the White House, were informally discussing with the defendant developments in his Campaign -- namely that one of his private attorneys had been a source of public embarrassment. The defendant then dialed his private attorney, CC3, and made the comment about her claims with her on the muted phone line. The defendant was not seeking advice from White House staffers; he was making fun of his private attorney in the presence of Campaign volunteers.

c. P15

P15 was an Assistant to the President and Director of Oval Office Operations. 701 At trial, the Government will elicit from P15 that he witnessed an unprompted comment that the defendant made to his family members in which the defendant suggested that he would fight to remain in power regardless of whether he had won the election. Specifically, following the 2020 election while aboard Marine One, the defendant told his wife, daughter, P14, and son-in-law P13, "It doesn't matter if you won or lost the election. You still have to fight like hell." See supra p. 14-15. 702 P15 happened to overhear this comment, but was not participating in the conversation. 703

This statement is plainly private. It was exclusively about the election and the defendant's determination, as a candidate, to remain in power whether he won or lost. The defendant made the comment to his family members, who campaigned on his behalf and served as private advisors (in addition to any official role they may have played). The fact that it was overheard by P15, a White House staffer, does not convert it to an official communication.

d. P42

To a limited extent, the allegations in the superseding indictment and the Government's evidence involve P42 involve the defendant's executive assistant in the White House. Section I describes multiple instances in which P42 received emails intended for the defendant or sent emails on the defendant's behalf. These instances include: P42 sending to a group of private attorneys, including CC3, an email with the subject "From POTUS", directing the private attorneys to include material critical of C3 in private lawsuits (see supra pp. 42); P42, receiving from CC1 an email for the defendant providing a copy of the message CC1 had drafted to exert pressure on Michigan Senate Majority Leader P37 (see supra p. 34); P42, receiving from P39, the RNC's "Elector Recap" email to put in front of the defendant (see supra p. 57); and P42, receiving an email from CC2 on December 23 asking to update the defendant on "overall strategic thinking" on the defendant's status as a candidate (see supra p. 61).

None of these actions by P42, in which she was merely facilitating communications between the defendant and his private attorneys or private political allies, constitute the defendant's official conduct. P42 regularly facilitated the defendant's purely private matters, including communications with his children about his Thanksgiving travel. 704 The defendant's reliance on P42 to pass messages to and from personal advisors, friends, and family does not render the underlying private communications official. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 128 1-82.

2. Even if this evidence were deemed official, the Government could rebut any presumption of immunity

Even if an "official" gloss were applied to the defendant's conversations with White House staff pertaining solely to the President's chances as a candidate to successfully challenge the election results, the use of such evidence would not intrude on Executive Branch functions or authority. "The Office of the Presidency as an institution is agnostic about who will occupy it next." Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 4. Whatever blurring of the lines might exist between candidate conduct and official conduct in conversations that the President may conduct with his immediate staff, introducing evidence of conversations with dual-hat White House staff members -- those who function in both a Campaign-related capacity and an official advisory capacity -- when they are speaking to the President in his capacity as a candidate or in their Campaign-related capacity does not impede decision-making on matters entrusted to the Executive Branch. The Supreme Court required that its rebuttal analysis focus on Executive Branch authority and functions -- not merely on anything that the President might say or do while at the White House. Here, the Executive Branch has no authority or function in the certification of the next President. Accordingly, the use of evidence of White House staffers' Campaign-capacity discussions with the President about how to challenge state election results -- challenges brought in his capacity as a candidate -- does not risk impairing the constitutional role of the Executive Branch.

F. Other Evidence of the Defendant's Knowledge and Intent

The Government intends to introduce at trial additional evidence to prove the defendant's knowledge and intent. These include (1) public statements by federal officials that the defendant did not direct be made (specifically, public statements by Attorney General P52 and CISA Director P50 about the lack of election fraud and foreign interference); (2) evidence that the defendant was reviewing Twitter and watching television throughout the afternoon of January 6; and (3) the defendant's post-Administration statements. None of this evidence will involve testimony from the defendant's Executive Branch staff about his official actions.

1. The evidence at issue was unofficial

a. Statements by federal officials

i. P52 (supra p. 46)


In a public statement issued on December 1, 2020, Attorney General P52 said that the Department of Justice had not seen evidence of fraud sufficient to change the election results, and that claims that voting machines had skewed election results were unsubstantiated. 705 P52 decided to make his statement without informing the defendant in advance. 706 He prepared the statement because he had been watching the defendant repeat claims of election fraud publicly despite direct knowledge, from P52 and others, that they were false, and P52 was growing more and more frustrated by the defendant's actions. 707 On November 29, P52 saw the defendant appear on the Maria Bartiromo Show and claim, among other false things, that the Justice Department was "missing in action" and had ignored evidence of fraud. 708 P52 decided it was time to speak publicly in contravention of the defendant's false claims, set up a lunch with a reporter for the Associated Press, and made his statement -- all without infol1ning or seeking pel1nission from the defendant. The same day, on behalf of the Campaign, CC1 and P12 issued a statement attacking P52 for his comments. 709 In the days that followed, P1 acknowledged and criticized P52's statement during his podcast, asking rhetorically "is P52 reading the same things we're reading?" and prompting guest CC6 to comment that "the DOJ has not been following up on these leads as far as we know right now. That statement seemed to be very premature . ... [T]here's no way one can look at this election in these states and say that it was done properly." 710

P52's statement is not an official act by the defendant. Trump treats only the defendant's own acts as potentially immune, see, e.g. , 144 S. Ct. at 2338, consistent with the "justifying purposes of the immunity" -- "to ensure that the President can undertake his constitutionally designated functions effectively, free from undue pressures or distortions," id. at 2332 (internal quotation marks omitted). The immunity that the Supreme Court recognized thus does not imply that acts by other government officials can qualify as presidential acts. More to the point, P52 statement does not reveal any official action by the defendant because P52 did not give his public statement at the defendant's direction or even with his knowledge. To the contrary, if the defendant had been aware of what P52 intended to do he undoubtedly would have instructed P52 not to make the statement; when the defendant learned of P52's statement, he was so angry that P52 tendered his resignation and, momentarily, the defendant accepted -- until P9 and P59 prevailed upon the defendant to calm down and convinced P52 to delay his departure. 711 The Government does not intend to introduce evidence that implies that P52 or his deputies refuted the defendant's fraud claims to him directly; instead, the Government intends to introduce P52 statement and CC1 Campaign response to it, as well as P1's recognition and repetition of P52's statement.

ii. P50 (supra pp. 42-43)

On November 17, CISA Director P50 tweeted a link to an open letter by 59 election security experts and touted it in an effort to promote public confidence in the election's infrastructure. 712 This was similar to what P50 had done five days earlier on November 12, when he had publicized the joint statement CISA issued with the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National Association of State Election Directors, and other organizations declaring the 2020 election to be "the most secure in American history" and that there was "no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised." 713 On November 17, P50 promoted the expert report on his own initiative and, as he later learned, contrary to the defendant's wishes; the defendant promptly fired P50 the same day, by Tweet. 714 The Government does not intend to introduce any evidence about the defendant's removal of P50. Rather, as with P52's public statement, P50's public Tweets were not official actions by the defendant and thus are not protected by presidential immunity.

b. The defendant's use of Twitter and television on January 6 (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 226 § 92; supra p. 79)

Forensic evidence from the defendant's iPhone and observations by witnesses otherwise testifying about unofficial acts will establish that upon his return from the Ellipse, throughout the afternoon on January 6, the defendant sat in the dining room by the Oval Office, where he used his phone to review Twitter and watched the television, which was turned on and displaying news coverage of the riot at the Capitol. 715

As explained in the Government's expert notice, ECF No. 183, an FBI Computer Analysis Response Team forensic examiner can testify as to the news and social media applications downloaded on the defendant's phone, 716 and can describe the activity occurring on the phone throughout the afternoon of January 6. 717 The phone 's activity logs show that the defendant was using his phone, and in particular, using the Twitter application, consistently throughout the day after he returned from the Ellipse speech. 718

In addition, P9 719 P15 720 and P45 each of whom are, as described supra pp. 147-154, 156, otherwise expected to testify about the defendant's unofficial acts -- will offer the objective observation that during the afternoon of January 6, the television in the defendant's dining room, where he spent the day, was on and hilled into news programs that were covering in real time the ongoing events at the Capitol. In turn, the Government will introduce the authenticated coverage showing what Fox News was playing in real time while the defendant sat in the room with the television on. This evidence is particularly relevant to the defendant's knowledge at the time he issued the 2:24 p.m. Tweet, which, as described above, was unofficial.

None of this evidence involves testimony about an act by the defendant at all, and it shows what social media and news the defendant privately reviewed in service of issuing a private Tweet. The Government will not elicit testimony from the defendant' s staffers about his official deliberations, reactions to social media or television, or official actions taken in response. The defendant's review of social media and television news -- under these particular circumstances -- was no different from that of any other citizen or candidate and therefore was unofficial.

c. The defendant's post-Administration statements (supra pp. 81, 83)

As the Government identified in its Rule 404(b) notice, ECF No. 174-1 at 8-9, the Government will introduce some of the defendant's numerous statements that post-date his time as President in which he has blamed Pence and approved of the actions of his supporters who breached the Capitol and obstructed the certification proceeding, 722 thus providing evidence of his intent on January 6.

The defendant's endorsement of the violent actions of his supporters on January 6, and his sentiment that they were justified in threatening Pence -- all made while the defendant was a private citizen after the end of his term in office -- are probative of his intent during the charged conspiracies. The Government intends to offer them as evidence of the defendant's intent on January 6, not as evidence of his official acts.  
2. Even if this evidence were deemed official, the Government could rebut any presumption of immunity

The use of the evidence regarding former Attorney General P52 and CISA Director P50 would not intrude on Executive Branch authority or functions because the federal officials' statements reflected those officials' positions, knowledge, and expertise -- not presidential acts or direction. The President is the "the only person who alone composes a branch of government," Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2329 (citation omitted), but Congress structures the Executive Branch and assigns manifold specific duties to subordinate officers who in turn execute the law. The President is responsible to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, see U.S. Canst. Art. 2, § 3, but that does not mean that every executive official is at all times performing presidential acts. Allowing the Government to introduce evidence of these independent actions and public statements of subordinate officials in the Executive Branch, not taken at the direction of the President, does not intrude on the authority or functions of the Executive Branch. Nothing in Trump dictates such an outcome that would effectively bar any Executive Branch employee from providing evidence against a President who committed crimes in his private capacity. Put concretely, allowing these independent acts of Executive Branch officials to be used in the prosecution would not chill any Presidential conduct, and thus any presumption of immunity is overcome.

The same is true for testimony by White House staff about the President’s review of Twitter or his watching public events on television. Assuming for the moment that the President sometimes acts in an official capacity when watching television or reviewing Twitter, no statute or constitutional provision addresses the matter, and using evidence of his activity that virtually all citizens engage in—i.e., checking their social-media feeds and watching television—does not intrude on any authority or functions of the Executive Branch.

IV. Conclusion

Based on a “fact-bound analysis,” for the reasons explained above, the Court should determine that the conduct described in the factual proffer of Section I of this motion is not subject to presidential immunity. As part of this determination, the Court should specify four determinations, and do so in a single order: (1) that the Government has rebutted the presumption of immunity attached to the defendant’s official communications with the Vice President (see supra pp. 49, 63-67, 77-74; ECF No. 226 ¶¶ 11(c), 67, 70-78, 80, 82, and 84); and (2) that the remaining conduct described in Section I (that is, conduct other than the official communications with the Vice President) was not official, and, in the alternative, that the Government has rebutted any presumptive immunity for any of the remaining conduct that the Court finds to be official. The Government requests alternative rulings regarding rebuttal for all conduct the Court finds to be unofficial, to buttress the Court’s record, ensure thorough and efficient appellate review, and minimize the risk of successive rounds of interlocutory appeal.

Furthermore, based on the determination that all the conduct described in Section I is not immune from prosecution, and because Section I encompasses all the allegations in the superseding indictment, the Court should further specify: (3) that the defendant is subject to trial on the superseding indictment; and (4) that the Government is not prohibited at trial from using evidence of the conduct described in Section I, subject at a later date to non-immunity based objections and this Court’s admissibility rulings under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Respectfully submitted,
JACK SMITH
Special Counsel
/s/ Molly Gaston
Molly Gaston
Thomas P. Windom
Senior Assistant Special Counsels
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Room B-206
Washington, D.C. 20530
admin
Site Admin
 
Posts: 37493
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Tue Oct 22, 2024 3:44 am

Part 7 of 7
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Notes:

1 Section I represents the Government’s efforts to provide the Court and the defendant with all of the categories of evidence that it may offer in its case-in-chief at trial. It does not include citations to every potential exhibit, nor does it account for any additional evidence that may be developed before trial.

2 GA 501-510 (DELETE) GA 591-599 (DELETE) GA 246-247 (DELETE)

3. GA 501-512 (DELETE) GA 591-599 (DELETE) GA 246-249 (DELETE) GA 132-153 (DELETE)

4. GA 505-507 (DELETE) GA 250-255 (DELETE) GA 588-589 (DELETE)

5 GA 1968 at 37:20 (Video of Trump Interview with Chris Wallace 07/19/2020).

6 See https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/12 ... 0389558273 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 07/30/2020).

7 See Donald Trump Interview Transcript with Jonathan Swan of Axios on HBO, Rev (Aug. 3, 2020) https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/do ... xios-onhbo.

8 GA 1943 at 57:33 (Video of Oshkosh Rally 08/17/2020).

9 GA 1951 at 22:08 (Video of RNC Speech 08/24/2020).

10 GA 1927 at 3:11-3:28 (Video of Donald J. Trump Statement 10/27/2020).

11 GA 1886 at 0:00 (DELETE).

12 Id. at 0:20 (DELETE).

13 GA 376-380 at 70-74 (DELETE).

14 GA 600-602 (DELETE); GA 610-614 (DELETE); GA 380-383 (DELETE); GA 128-130(DELETE); GA 161 (DELETE); GA 370 (DELETE).

15 GA 154 (DELETE); GA 600 (DELETE); GA 181-182 (DELETE).

16 GA 1974 at 7:44 (Video of White House Speech 11/04/2020).

17 GA 968-996 (DELETE).

18 Id.

19. Id.

20. Id.

21 GA 997-999 (DELETE).

22 GA 774-775 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/06/2020); GA 776, https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/13 ... 9443080192 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/07/2020.

23 GA 155-158 (DELETE)

24 GA 1001 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc v. Hobbs Hearing Transcript 11/13/2020); GA 1002-1003 (Minute entry and order dismissing Donald J Trump for President, Inc. v. Hobbs).

25 GA 731-734 (DELETE)

26 GA 1004 (DELETE)

27 Id.

28 GA 784-785 (Donald 1. Tromp Tweet 11/14/2020).

29 GA 699 (DELETE)

30 671 (DELETE)

31 GA 672-673; GA 686 (DELETE)

32 GA 205 (DELETE)

33 Id.

34 GA 198-204 (DELETE)

35 GA 715, 718 (DELETE)

36 GA 213-214 (DELETE)

37 GA 718 (DELETE)

38 GA 715-721 (DELETE); GA 207-213 (DELETE)

39 GA 211-212 (DELETE)

40 GA 414-420 (DELETE)

41 GA 412-413 (DELETE)

42. GA 413-414 (DELETE)

43. GA 421 (DELETE). See GA 1016 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 430).

44. GA 1036 (DELETE); GA 1034-1035 (DELETE)  

45. GA 422-424 (DELETE). See GA 1017 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 431).

46. GA 1037 (DELETE).

47. GA 425-426 (DELETE). See GA 1018 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 432).

48. GA 430 (DELETE); GA 736 (DELETE).

49. GA 442-448 (DELETE). See GA 1020-1022 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 437- 439).

50 GA 1039 (DELETE). See GA 1018 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 432).

51 GA 427-429, GA 431-435 439). See GA 1018 (Pence, So Help Me God, p. 432).

52 GA 1040 (Joint Statement 11/20/2020); GA 1041 (Statement 12/04/2020).

53 See, e.g., GA 1043 (Letter to Maricopa County voters 11/17/2020); GA 838 (Arizona Governor's Tweet 12/01/2020); GA 1041 (Arizona Legislator's Statement 12/04/2020); GA 1044- 1046 (Georgia Secretary of State News Release 10/23/2020); GA 1047-1048 (Georgia Secretary of State News Release 11/5/2020); GA 1947 (Video of Georgia Press Conference 11/06/2020); GA 1959 (Video of Georgia Press Conference 11/09/2020); GA 1960 (Video of Georgia Press Conference 11/12/2020); GA 1049-1050 (Georgia Secretary of State News Release 11/18/2020); GA 1051-1052 (Georgia Secretary of State News Release 11/19/2020); GA 1053-1054 (Georgia Secretary of State News Release 12/07/2020); GA 1946 (Video of Georgia News Conference 12/07/2020); GA 1948 (Video of Georgia Press Conference 12/16/2020); GA 1055-1057 (Georgia Secretary of State News Release 12/29/2020); GA 1949 (Video of Georgia Secretary of State Interview with Cavuto 01/02/2021); GA 1958 (Video of Georgia Press Conference 01/04/2021); GA 1058-1059 (Michigan Secretary of State web page 11/06/2020); GA 1040 (Michigan Legislators' Joint Statement 11/20/2020); GA 1060-1062 (Michigan Attorney General and Secretary of State News Release 12/14/2020); GA 1063-1064 (Michigan Secretary of State web page 12/17/2020); GA 1065 (Michigan Secretary of State web page 12/18/2020); GA 1066 (Michigan Secretary of State web page); GA 1907 (Video of Michigan Clerk's Statement); GA 1068-1070 (New Mexico Secretary of State News Release 12/14/2020); GA 1953 (Video of P47 Interview with CNN l1/11/2020); GA 822 P47 Tweet 11/27/2020); GA 1071-1072 (Pennsylvania Department of State Public Response Statement 12/29/2020); GA 1073-1076 (Wisconsin Elections Commission web page 11/05/2020); GA 1077-1081 (Wisconsin Elections Commission web page 11/10/2020); GA 1082-1087 (Wisconsin Elections Commission web page).

54 GA308 [DELETE]

55 GA 1890 at 20:46 (Common Sense with [DELETE] 11/25/2020).

56 GA 1906 at 2:06:25 (Video of Arizona Hotel Hearing 11/30/2020).

57 GA 1980 at 18:52 [DELETE].

58 GA 1981 at 35:19 [DELETE]

59 GA 1106 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021); GA 1134 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

60 GA 1114-1141 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021); GA 1142 [DELETE].

61 GA 1126-1129, GA 1131-1136 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

62 GA 1140 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

63 GA 656-658 (DELETE); GA 727 (DELETE)

64 See, e.g., Democrats flip Arizona as Biden, Kelly score key election wills, Fox NEWS, Nov. 3, 2020, available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6206934979001; Dan Merica, Biden carries Arizona, flipping a longtime Republican stronghold, CNN.COM, Nov. 13, 2020, available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/ 12/politics/biden-wins-arizona/index.html; Luis Ferre-Sadurni et al., Biden flips Arizona, further cementing his presidential victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/us/b ... zona.html; Election Latest: Biden Projected Winner in Arizona, NBC 4 NEW YORK, Nov. 12, 2020, available at https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politic ... d-leaders- about-virus/2718671/.

65 GA 667 (DELETE).

66 Id.

67 GA 657 (DELETE)

68 Id.

69 603-608 (DELETE).

70 GA 661 (DELETE).

71 GA 658 (DELETE).

72 GA 658, GA 667-668 (DELETE).

73 GA 840 (Trump Twitter Archive 11/30/2020).  

74 GA 833-834 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/30/2020).

75 GA 831-832 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/30/2020).

76 GA 839 (Trump Twitter Archive 12/01/2020.

77 GA 735 (DELETE); GA 21-22 (DELETE).

78 See GA 30 (DELETE).

79 GA 22-24 (DELETE)

80 GA 28 (DELETE).

81 GA 22-33 (DELETE).

82 GA 25 (DELETE).

83 GA 1906 at 56:19 (Video of Arizona Hotel Heating 11/30/2020).

84 GA 36 (DELETE).

85 GA (DELETE).

86 1041-1042 (DELETE) STATEMENT 12/04/2020.

87 GA 1042 Statement 12/04/2020).

88 GA 854-855 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020); GA 852-853 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

89 GA 37-44 (DELETE); GA 408-409 (DELETE).

90 GA 1144 (DELETE).

91 GA 41-42 (DELETE).

92 GA 45-47 (DELETE).

93 GA 46-47 (DELETE).

94 GA 47 (DELETE).

95 GA 388-390 (DELETE).

96 GA 1969 at 22:43-23:51 (Video of Trump Interview with Maria Bartiromo 11/29/2020).

97 GA 1934 (Video of Georgia Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing 12/03/2020).

98 GA 739 at 1 (DELETE).

99 ECF No. 226 §26(a); GA 1146 (DELETE); see also GA 364-365 (DELETE).

100 GA 1934 at 30:54 (Video of Georgia Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing 2/03/2020); GA 1146 (DELETE).

101 GA 1934 at 34:06 (Video of Georgia Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing 12/03/2020); ECF No. 226 §26(b).

102 GA 1934 at 4:44:05 (Video of Georgia Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing 12/03/2020).

103 GA 846-847 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/03/2020).

104 GA 845, GA 1893 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/03/2020); GA 844, GA 1894 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/03/2020).

105 GA 848 (P25) Tweet 12/04/2020).

106 GA 1933 at 8:43 (Video of Georgia Secretary of State Press Conference 12/07/2020).

107 GA 742 (DELETE).

108 GA 61-62 (DELETE).

109 GA 62 (DELETE).

110 GA 61-62 (DELETE).

111 GA 64 (DELETE).

112 Id.

113 GA 65-66 (DELETE).

114 GA 66 (DELETE) (2023).

115 GA 67 (DELETE).

116 Id.

117 Mot. to Intervene, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-0-155 (S. Ct. Dec. 9, 2020).

118 GA 1147 (DELETE).

119 GA 1932 at 1:37:18-1:48:33 (Video of Georgia House Committee Hearing 12/10/2020).

120 GA 1932 at 1:57:10-1:58:00 (Video of Georgia House Committee Hearing 12/10/2020).

121 GA 171 (DELETE).

122 GA 966 (Donald J. Trump Truth Social Post 01/03/2023); GA 964 (Donald J. Trump Truth Social Post 01/02/2023); GA 965 (Donald J. Trump Truth Social Post 01/03/2023).

123 GA 829-830 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/30/2020).

124 GA 850-851 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/05/2020).

125 GA 857, GA 859 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/07/2020).

126 GA 864 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/10/2020).

127 GA 238-239 (DELETE).

128 GA 239 (DELETE).

129 GA 1152 (DELETE)

130 Complaint at 33-34, Trump v. Kemp , No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2020), ECF No. 1.

131 GA 1949 at 3:22 (Video of P33. Interview with Cavuto 01/02/2021).

132 GA 813-814 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/24/2020); GA 862-863 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/08/2020); GA 865-866 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/11 /2020).

133 GA 367-368 (DELETE); Complaint at 33-34. Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2020), ECF No. 1.

134 GA 514 (DELETE).

135 GA 514-515 (DELETE).

136 GA 1154 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

137 GA 1165 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

138 GA 1157 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

139 GA 1155 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

140 GA 1160 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

141 GA 1161 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

142 GA 1159 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

143 GA 1162 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

144 GA 1165 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

145 GA 1172-1173 (Tr. of P33 Call 01/02/2021).

146 GA 919-920 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/03/2021).

147 GA 925 (P33 Tweet 01/03/2021).

148 GA 555-557, 565 (DELETE); GA 15 (DELETE).

149 GA 70-71 (DELETE).

150 GA 330-337 (DELETE).

151 GA 556-557 (DELETE).

152 GA 797-798 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/18/2020).

153 GA 556-557 (DELETE).

154 GA 558 (DELETE).

155 GA 74-78 (DELETE).

156 GA 75 (DELETE).

157 GA 330-227 (DELETE); GA 82 (DELETE); GA 560-561 (DELETE).

158 GA 361-362 (DELETE).

159 GA 562-564 (DELETE).

160 GA 564 (DELETE).  

161 GA 563-465 (DELETE).

162 GA 560-571 (DELETE); GA 70-94 (DELETE).

163 GA 575 (DELETE); GA 567-569 (DELETE).

164 GA 569 (DELETE); GA 575 (DELETE).

165 GA 1040 (DELETE) Joint Statement 11/20/2020); GA 94-95 (DELETE).

166 GA 799-800 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/21/2020.

167 GA 49-53 (DELETE); GA 15-19 (DELETE).

168 GA 1175 (DELETE).

169 GA 1177 (DELETE); GA 1178-1187 (DELETE).

170 GA 1188 (DELETE). 171 GA 1189 (DELETE).  

172 GA 1190-1192 (DELETE) Press Releases 12/14/2020).

173 GA 1191 (DELETE) Press Releases 12/14/2020).

174 GA 1192 (DELETE) Press Releases 12/14/2020).

175 GA 917 (Team Trump Tweet 01/03/2021); GA 918 (Team Trump Tweet 01/03/2021).

176 GA 573-574, 576-577 (DELETE).

177 Complaint at 1, Law v. Whitmer, No. 200C001631B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Nov. 17, 2020) available at: https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-conten ... laint.pdf; GA 1963 (Video of Trump Campaign Press Conference 11/17/2020).

178 GA 1193-1194 (DELETE).  

179 GA 1195 (DELETE).

180 GA 1196-1197, 1195 (DELETE).

181 GA 817-818 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/24/2020).

182 Order at 13-24, 28-34, Law v. Whitmer, No. 200C001631B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020) available at: https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 11/Law-v-Gloria-OrderGranting-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf.

183 Law v. Whitmer, 136 Nev. 840 (Nev. 2020).

184 Compare Order at 18-20, Law v. Whitmer, No. 200C00163 1B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020) available at: https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 11/Law-v-Gloria-OrderGranting-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf (finding no support for claims of double ballots, non-resident, and deceased voters) with GA 1134-1135 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021) ("There were also more than 42,000 double votes in Nevada"; "1,500 ballots were cast by individuals whose names and dates of birth match Nevada residents who died in 2020 prior to November 3rd election. More than 8,000 votes were cast by individuals who had no address and probably didn't live there.").

185 GA 1198 (Nevada Facts vs. Myths 12/18/2020).

186 GA 1199 (Nevada Facts vs. Myths 12/18/2020).

187 GA 618-619 (DELETE); GA 723-724 (DELETE).

188 GA 616-617 (DELETE).

189 GA 619-620 (DELETE).

190 GA 620 (DELETE).

191 GA 159 (DELETE).

192 GA 1953 at 2:20-4:13 (Video of P47 Interview with CNN 11/11/2020.

193 GA 777-778 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/11/2020.

194 GA 550-551 (DELETE).

195 GA 1945 (Video of Pennsylvania Hotel Hearing 11/25/2020).

196 GA 1945 at 2:06:23-2:07:23 (Video of Pennsylvania Hotel Hearing 11/25/2020).

197 GA 1945 at 2:21:30-2:21:53 (Video of Pennsylvania Hotel Hearing 11/25/2020).

198 GA 819 (P43 Tweet 11/25/2020).

199 GA 1203-1206 (DELETE).  

200 GA 721 (DELETE); GA 1207-1208 (DELETE).

201 GA 1209 (DELETE).

202 GA 1976 (DELETE).

203 GA 1210-1214 (DELETE); GA 1215 (DELETE); GA 342-346 (DELETE).

204 GA 1222-1223 (Letter from Pennsylvania Legislators 12/03/2020); GA 173 (DELETE).

205 GA 849 (DELETE Tweet 12/04/2020).

206 GA 856, 858 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

207 GA 1224-1225 (Wisconsin Order for Recount 11/19/2020); GA 1226 (Wisconsin Statement of Canvass 11/30/2020); Trump v. Biden, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 633 (Wis. 2020).

208 Trump v. Biden, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 633 (Wis. 2020).

209 GA 1235 (Wisconsin Certificate of Ascertainment 11/03/2020).

210 GA 875, GA 876, GA 877, GA 880, GA 879, and GA 878 (Donald J. Trump Tweets 12/21/2020).

211 GA 184-186, GA 188-189 (DELETE).

212 GA 1236 (Election Security Joint Statement 11/12/2020).

213 GA 784-785 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/14/2020).

214 GA 1238-1239 (DELETE).

215 GA 1240 (DELETE).

216 GA 790 (P50 Tweet 11/17/2020).

217 GA 1950 (Video of RNC Press Conference 11/19/2020).

218 GA 1950 at 38:58-52:34 (Video of RNC Press Conference 11/19/2020).

219 GA 1972 at 9:18-10:02 (Video Show of P51 Show 11/19/2020).

220 GA 391-392 (DELETE).

221 GA 248-249 (DELETE); GA 528 (DELETE).

222 GA 258-259 (DELETE).

223 GA 256-259 (DELETE).

224 GA 258-260 (DELETE).

225 GA 206 (DELETE).

226 GA 1241 (Trump Campaign Statement 11/22/2020).  

227 GA 815-816 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/24/2020).

228 Complaint at 2, Pearson v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-4809 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. I.

229 GA 820-821 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/26/2020).

230 Transcript of Mots. Hr'g at 41-44, Pearson v. Kemp, (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2020), ECF No. 79.

231 GA 1940 (Video of P50 on 60 Minutes 11/29/2020).

232 GA 1940 at 4:14-4:19 (Video of P50 on 60 Minutes 11/29/2020).

233 GA 825-826 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/29/2020).

234 GA 1887 (Audio of P10 on 11/30/2020).

235 GA 295-296 (DELETE).

236 GA 841-842 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/01/2020.

237 GA 1961 at 3:32-3:55 (Video of P25 Press Conference 12/01/2020.

238 GA 12-13 (DELETE).

239 GA 1242-1243 (Email from Comms Alert 12/01/2020).

240 GA 1244 (Trump Campaign Press Release 12/01/2020).

241 GA 338-339 (DELETE).

242 GA 339-341 (DELETE).

243 Id.

244 GA 1889 at 15:58-16:27 (Audio of Trump P33. Call 01/02/2021).

245 GA 1889 at 16:32-1 7:26 (Audio of Trump P33. Call 01/02/2021).

246 GA 1928 at 2:22:41-2:23:07 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

247 GA 1928 at 2:25:25-22:26:56 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

248 GA 1136 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

249 GA 1 245-1246 (DELETE); GA 1247-1248 (DELETE).

250 GA 1249-1255 (CC5 memo 11/18/2020).

251 GA 1256-1259 (DELETE).

252 GA 1260-1265 (CC5 memo on 12/06/2020).

253 GA 1266-1270 (CC5 memo on 12/09/2020).

254 GA 1271 (DELETE); GA 1272 (New Mexico Certificate of Ascertainment); GA 1273-1282 (DELETE).

255 GA 1283-1284 (DELETE); GA 436-437 (DELETE); GA 1019 (Pence, So Help Me God, p. 433).

256 1283-1284 (DELETE); GA 438-439 (DELETE).

257 GA 1260-1265 (CC5 memo 12/06/2020).

258 GA 323-325 (DELETE).

259 GA 324-325 (DELETE).

260 GA 325 (DELETE).

261 GA 325-327 (DELETE).

263 GA 326-327 (DELETE).

264 GA 1286-1287 (DELETE).

265 GA 1288-1290 (DELETE); GA 1247 (DELETE).

266 GA 1291-1295 (DELETE).

267 GA 1296-1299 (DELETE); GA 1300-1309 (DELETE).

268 GA 1312-1317 (DELETE); GA 1318-1320 (DELETE); GA 1321-1324 (DELETE).

269 GA 1296-1299 (DELETE).

270 GA 1325 (DELETE).

271 GA 1296-1299 (DELETE).

272 GA 1326-1327 (DELETE).

273 GA 1288-1290 (DELETE).

274 GA 1328 (DELETE); GA 1310-1311 (DELETE); GA 1321-1324 (DELETE); GA 1334-1335 (DELETE); GA 1336-1338 (DELETE); GA 1339-1341 (DELETE); to (DELETE); GA 1342-1344 (DELETE); GA 1345-1346 (DELETE).

275 GA 1300 (DELETE); GA 394-395 (DELETE).

276 GA 1301 (DELETE).

277 GA 1304 (DELETE).

278 GA 1305-1306 (DELETE); GA 396-397 (DELETE).

279 GA 1306 (DELETE).

280 GA 1308 (DELETE).

281 GA 744 (DELETE).

282 GA 1347-1349 (DELETE); GA 1350-1356 (DELETE) 2020); GA 97-98 (DELETE); GA 517-518 (DELETE).

283 GA 1188 at 3:15-4:32 (DELETE) 2020); GA 1296-1299 (DELETE).

284 See, e.g., GA 625-633 (DELETE); GA 320-321 (DELETE); GA 265(DELETE); GA 1362-1365 (Fraudulent "Georgia's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1372-1373 (Fraudulent "Michigan's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1383-1389 (Fraudulent "Pennsylvania's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President").

285 GA 320-321 (DELETE).

286 GA 519-520 (DELETE) 024).

287 GA 164-165 (DELETE); GA 522-523 (DELETE); GA 488-495 (DELETE).

288 GA 618-619 (DELETE); GA 723-724, GA 726 (DELETE).

289 GA 1318 (DELETE).

290 GA 1319 (DELETE).

291 Id.

292 GA 1394-1398 (DELETE); GA 1399 (DELETE).

293 GA 743 (DELETE); GA 1400 (DELETE); GA 621 (DELETE).

294 GA 1407 (DELETE).

295 GA 1407-1408 (DELETE).

296 GA 1408 (DELETE).

297 GA 867-872 (Donald J. Trump Tweets 12/13/2020).

298 GA 1407-1408 (DELETE); GA 1409-1410 (DELETE); GA 1411-1412 (DELETE); GA 1413-1415 (DELETE); GA 622-625 (DELETE); GA 1273-1282 (DELETE).

300 GA 1417-1419 (DELETE).

301 GA 1420-1424 (Fraudulent "Arizona's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1357-1368 (Fraudulent "Georgia's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1369- 1379 (Fraudulent "Michigan's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1425-1444 (Fraudulent "Nevada's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1445-1450 (Fraudulent ''New Mexico's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1380-1393 (Fraudulent "Pennsylvania's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1451-1457 (Fraudulent "Wisconsin's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President"); GA 1458-1472 (DELETE).

302 GA 1266-1270 (CC5 memo 12/09/2020)

303 GA 1268-1270 (CC5 memo 12/09/2020).

304 GA 1473-1475 (DELETE); GA 1458-1472 (DELETE); GA 1476 (DELETE).

305 GA 1458-1472 (DELETE).

306 GA 1270 (CC5 memo 12/09/2020); GA 1390 (Fraudulent "Pennsylvania's Electoral Votes for President and Vice President").

307 GA 1477-1482 (DELETE).

308 GA 328-329 (DELETE).

309 Id; see also GA 1483-1484 (DELETE).

310 GA 329 (DELETE).

311 GA 745 (DELETE); GA 1485 (DELETE).

312 GA 1486 (DELETE); GA 1487-1493 (DELETE).

313 See, e.g., GA 744 (DELETE); GA 749 (DELETE); GA 750 (DELETE); GA 751 (DELETE); GA 753 (DELETE); GA 756 (DELETE); GA 758-759 (DELETE); GA 763 (DELETE); GA 764 (DELETE); GA 765 (DELETE); GA 768, 770 (DELETE); GA 771 (DELETE).

314 GA 1979 (DELETE).

315 GA 1494 (DELETE); GA 1495 (DELETE); GA 1498-1500 (DELETE); GA 746 (DELETE); GA 747-748 (DELETE); GA 100-101 (DELETE).

316 GA 497-498 (DELETE).

317 GA 498-500 (DELETE).

318 GA 1501-1502 (DELETE).

319 GA 873-874 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/19/2020).

320 GA 1504 (DELETE).

321 GA 440-441 (DELETE); GA 1020 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 437).

322 GA 1506-1508 (DELETE); GA 1509 (DELETE); GA 1510-1512 (DELETE); GA 1513-1515 (DELETE).


323 GA 1515 (DELETE).

324 GA 1517 (DELETE).

325 GA 1521 (DELETE).

326 Id.

327 GA 1005 (DELETE); GA 752, 754 (DELETE); GA 1523 (DELETE); GA 883 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/23/2020); GA 449 (DELETE); GA 1022-1023 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 439); see also GA 1524-1527 (DELETE).

328 GA 1528 (DELETE).



329 GA 755 (DELETE).

330 GA 1529 (DELETE).

331 Id.

332 GA 450-452 (DELETE); GA 1024-1025 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 441-42).

333 Id.

334 GA 886-887 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/26/2020).

335 GA 888-895 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/26/2020).

336 GA 1530-1531 (DELETE).

337 GA 453 (DELETE); GA 1026-1027 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 446-47); GA 758 (DELETE).

338 GA 1026 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 446).  

339 GA 757-760 (DELETE).

340 GA 905-906 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021).

341 GA 1981 (DELETE).

342 GA 1981 at 24:56-25:40 (DELETE).

343 GA 761-762 (DELETE).

344 GA 1006-1008, 1011-1014 (DELETE).

345 GA 763 (DELETE); GA 1007 (DELETE).

346 GA 1027 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 447); GA 1532-1533 (DELETE).

347 Id.

348 Id.

349 GA 454-456 (DELETE); GA 1534-1536 (DELETE).

350 Id.

351 GA 926-927 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/03//2021).

352 GA 1537-1543 (DELETE).

353 GA 1007-1012 (DELETE); GA 766 (DELETE).

354 GA 1904 at row 909 (DELETE); GA 1011 (DELETE); GA 765 (DELETE); GA 1544-1546(DELETE); GA 1547-1548 (DELETE).

355 GA 215-221 (DELETE); G1 1901 at row 5745 (DELETE); GA 766 (DELETE).

356 GA 215-218 (DELETE).

357 GA 219-223 (DELETE).

358 GA 224 (DELETE)

359 GA 766 (DELETE); GA 274-275 (DELETE).

360 GA 120-121 (DELETE).

361 GA 276-277 (DELETE); GA 579-580 (DELETE).

362 GA 276-277 (DELETE); GA 580-585 (DELETE).

363 GA 1028-1029 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 450-51); GA 278-279 (DELETE).

364 GA 277 (DELETE); GA 582-584 (DELETE).

365 GA 1549-1553 (DELETE).

366 GA 280-281 (DELETE).

367 GA 1028-1029 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 450-51).

368 GA 1011-1013 (DELETE).

369 GA 766 (DELETE); GA 1011-1014 (DELETE); GA 1559 (DELETE); GA 1983 at 36:55-37:43 (DELETE); GA 1984 at 9:09-9:55 (DELETE).

370 GA 767 (DELETE); GA 930-931 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/04/2021).

371 GA 1090 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

372 GA 1096 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

373 GA 1090 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

374 GA 1096 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

375 GA 768 (DELETE).

376 GA 1984 at 29:00-29:50 (DELETE).

377 Transcript of Mots. Hr'g, Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2021), ECF No. 21.

378 Complaint at 33-34, Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Dec/ 31, 2021), ECF No. 1; GA 1152 (DELETE).  

379 Transcript of Mots. Hr'g at 29-34, Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2021), ECF No. 21.  

380 Transcript of Mots. Hr'g at 55-56, Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2021), ECF No. 21.

381 GA 1563 (DELETE).

382 GA 283-284 (DELETE); GA 1939 at 1:20:00-1:21:30 (Video of Select Committee Testimony 06/16/2022); GA 1564 (DELETE).

383 GA 283-284 (DELETE); GA 1939 at 1:20:00-1:21:30 (Video of Select Committee Testimony 06/16/2022); GA 1564 (DELETE).

384 GA 1939 at 56:53-57:36, 1:05:59-1:07:02; 1:21:55-1:29:50 (Video of Select Committee Testimony 06/16/2022); GA 267-272 (DELETE).  

385 GA 1939 at 1:26:01-1:26:32 (Video of Select Committee Testimony 06/16/2022).

386 GA 289-290 (DELETE).

387 GA 1014 (DELETE).

388 GA 1565-1567 (DELETE).

389 GA 1568-1574 (DELETE); GA 1575 (DELETE); GA 1576-1580 (DELETE); GA 1581-1582 (DELETE); GA 1583-1585 (DELETE); GA 1586-1589 (DELETE); GA 1590-1593 (DELETE); GA 1595-1596 (DELETE).

390 GA 1601-1607 (DELETE); GA 1608 (DELETE).

391 GA 1583-1585 (DELETE); GA 1586-1589 (DELETE); GA 1595-1596 (DELETE).

392 GA 934-935 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

393 GA 461-462 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021); GA 1031-1032 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 453-54).

394 GA 461, 463 (DELETE); GA 1031-1032 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 453-54); GA 1656 (DELETE).

395 GA 461, 463-470 (DELETE); GA 1031-1032 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 453-54); GA 1656 (DELETE).

396 GA 586-587 (DELETE).

397 GA 1657 (DELETE); GA 1215 (DELETE); GA 1658 (DELETE); GA 1659 (DELETE).

398 GA 282-288 (DELETE).

399 Id.  

400 GA 938-939 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

401 GA 769 (DELETE); GA 1660-1661 (DELETE); GA 1662 (DELETE); GA 384-386 (DELETE).

402 GA 770 (DELETE); GA 1033 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 455).

403 GA 770 (DELETE).

404 GA 1663 (Donald J. Trump Campaign Statement 01/05/2021).

405 GA 940-941 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

406 GA 1929 at 02:16:45 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

407 GA 942-943 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

408 GA 1664 (DELETE); GA 55-56 (DELETE); GA 102-103 (DELETE); GA 262-263 (DELETE).

409 GA 1665-1666 (DELETE); GA 1667 (DELETE).

410 GA 359 (DELETE).

411 GA 371-373 (DELETE); GA 227-228 (DELETE); GA 471-472 (DELETE); GA 1668-1669(DELETE).

412 GA 405-406 (DELETE); GA 1670 (DELETE); GA 638-642 (DELETE); GA 1680 (DELETE); GA 1681 (DELETE); GA 231 (DELETE); GA 371 (DELETE).

413 See e.g., GA 886-887 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/26/2020); GA 897-898 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/27/2020); GA 899-900 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/30/2020); GA 905-906 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021); GA 907-908 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021); GA 913-914, GA 1891 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021); GA 928-929 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/04/2021); GA 932-933 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021); GA 938-939 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

414 See GA 1928 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

415 GA 1928 at 2:19:27 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

416 GA 1928 at 2:19:40 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

417 GA 1928 at 2:20:13 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

418 GA 1928 at 2:22:10 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

419 Id.

420 GA 1928 at 2:27:08 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

421 GA 1928 at 2:27:21 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

422 GA 1928 at 3:31:20-4:42 :50 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

423 GA 1134 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).  

424 GA 1133-1134 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

425 GA 1133 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

426 GA 1131 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

427 GA 1127, 1137 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

428 GA 1128 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

429 GA 1896 at 5:10 (Rallygoer Video 10/06/2021).

430 GA 1116 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

431 Compare GA 1133 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021) with GA 1683 (Ellipse Rally Teleprompter speech excerpt).

432 GA 1122 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

433 GA 1116 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

434 See, e.g., GA 1120, 1140 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

435 Id.

436 GA 1137 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

437 GA 1120, 1140, 1141 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

438 GA 1116 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

439 GA 1897 at 3:18 (Rallygoer Video 01/06/2021).

440 GA 1120 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

441 Id.

442 Id.

443 GA 1898 at 00:19 (Rallygoer Video 01/06/2021.)

444 See, e.g., GA 1930 at 1:09:30 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021); GA 1942 (Video of March to Capitol 01/06/2021); GA 1941 at 02:10-2:33 (Video of March to Capitol 01/06/2021).

445 GA 1937 at 20:47 (Video of House Floor 01/06/2021).

446 GA 1685 (Pence Dear Colleague Letter 01/06/2021).

447 GA 1937 at 26:24 (Video of House Floor 01/06/2021).

448 See, e.g. , GA 1915 at 3:25 Riot 01/06/2021).

449 GA 1687 (DELETE); GA 1688 (DELETE); GA 1689 (DELETE); GA 1690 (DELETE); GA 1583-1585 (DELETE).

450 GA 1912 at 56:56 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021); GA 1924 at 38:48 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021); GA 1918 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021); GA 1919 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021); GA 1921 at 04:30 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021); see also GA 2-3 (DELETE).

451 GA 1902 (DELETE).

452 GA 168-169 (DELETE); GA 292 -293 (DELETE); GA 540, 541-544 (DELETE); GA 232, 236 (DELETE).  

453 GA 1957 at 1:04-1:25 (Video of Senate Wing Door CCTV 01/06/2021; GA 1954 at 44:16 (Video of Senate Floor 01/06/2021).

454 United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 21-cr-37, ECF No. 93 at 38-39 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022) (Trial Tr. 05/24/2022).

455 GA 1923 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021; GA 177-178 (DELETE).

456 GA 175 (DELETE); see also GA 176, 179 (DELETE); GA 1916 at 00:50 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

457 GA 1937 at 1:34:00 (Video of House Floor 01/06/2021.

458 GA 1931 at 12:12 (Video of Fox News Coverage 01/06/2021).

459 GA 1931 at 20:11 (Video of Fox News Coverage 01/06/2021).

460 GA 1931 at 21:47 (Video of Fox News Coverage 01/06/2021).

461 GA 1931 at 24:05–24:17 (Video of Fox News Coverage 01/06/2021).

462 GA 946-947 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 546 (DELETE).

463 GA 1922 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

464 GA 1693 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023).

465 GA 1944 (Video of Pence Evacuation 01/06/2021).

466 GA 1914 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

467 GA 1911 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

468 GA 1910 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

469 Isaac Arnsdorf and Maeve Reston, Trump claims violence he inspired on Jan. 6 was Pence’s fault, Wash. Post, (Mar. 13, 2023, 8:09 p.m.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics ... ence-iowa/.

470 GA 1956 (Video of Senate Gallery Doors CCTV 01/06/2021).

471 GA 1955 at 16:20 (Video of Senate Floor 01/06/2021).

472 GA 1955 at 29:15 (Video of Senate Floor 01/06/2021).

473 GA 1938 at 00:05 (Video of House Floor 01/06/2021); GA 1905 (Video inside Capitol Building 01/06/2021).

474 GA 1936 at 06:18 (Video of House Chamber Doors 01/06/2021).

475 GA 1920 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021); GA 1917 at 54:30 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

476 GA 5-6 (DELETE)

477 GA 4 (DELETE).

478 GA 1973 at 16:52 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023); GA 1962 at 48:29 (Video of Trump at Faith and Freedom Coalition 06/17/2022); GA 1971 (Video of Trump Interview 02/01/2022).

479 GA 1935 at 35:50, 01:16:16 (Video of Greensboro Rally 03/02/2024).

480 GA 1966 at 09:30 (Video of Trump Interview 09/01/2022).

481 GA 1967 at 45:18 (Video of Trump Interview 08/23/2023); GA 1692 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023).

482 GA 1973 at 03:00 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023). See, e.g., United States v. Jordan Robert Mink, 21-cr-25 (D.D.C. 2023); United States v. Ronald Sandlin, 21-cr-88 (D.D.C. 2022); United Stales v. Barton Shively, 21-cr-151 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. Julian Khater, 21-cr-222 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. James McGrew, 21-cr-398 (D.D.C. 2022).

483 GA 1973 at 06:02 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023).

484 GA 1971 at 15:51 (Video of Trump Interview with Schmitt 02/01/2022).

485 GA 1904 at row 1383 (DELETE); GA 1696 (DELETE).

486 GA 1697 (DELETE); GA 1401-1406 (DELETE); GA 1698-1701 (DELETE).

487 GA 1702 (DELETE).

488 GA 1977 (DELETE).

489 GA 1928 at 2:20:13, 3:37:54 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021.

490 GA 1975 (DELETE).

491 Id.

492 Id.

493 GA 1703 (Congressional Record 01/06/2021).

494 GA 1705-1709 (DELETE).

495 GA 1925 at 19:14, 20:34 (Video of Congress Joint Session 01/06/2021); GA 1704 at 41 (Congressional Record 01/06/2021).

496 The Government's factual proffer also describes a conversation between the defendant and Pence on December 19 -- the same day that the defendant issued his "will be wild!" Tweet calling supporters to Washington -- in which the defendant told Pence that it would be good to have lots of their supporters in town on January 6. See supra pp. 60. At trial, the Government intends to use this unofficial portion of the conversation, held between running mates, but not Pence's a reference to the certification proceeding on January 6. GA 440-441 (DELETE); GA 1020 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 437). See infra p. 145-146.

497 GA 1685 (Pence Dear Colleague Letter 01/06/2021).

498 Legislation confirming the ministerial nature of that role dates to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, Pub. L. 49-90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887). See 3 U.S.C. §§ 15-18 (2020 ed.) (assigning all power to resolve vote-counting disputes to the two Houses of Congress, while assigning to the President of the Senate only the ministerial duties of “presiding,” “preserv[ing] order,” “open[ing] . . . the certificates,” “call[ing] for objections,” and “announc[ing] the state of the vote” after receiving the results from the tellers).

499 Section 15 of Title 3 was amended in the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022, Pub. L. 117- 328, 136 Stat. 4459, 5237-40 (2022), in response to the defendant’s conduct here, to eliminate any doubt that the President of the Senate’s role at the joint session is ministerial. And because the rebuttal analysis is necessarily prospective in nature, the current version of Section 15 supplies the relevant measure, in this context, of “the Vice President’s role in the counting of electoral votes,” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2337.

500 GA 120-121 (DELETE).

501 See, e.g., GA 1037 (DELETE); GA 425-426 DELETE). See GA 1018 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 432).

502 GA 656-658 (DELETE); GA 727 (DELETE).

503 See GA 656-658 (DELETE). See also GA 667 (DELETE).

504 GA 657 (DELETE).

505 Id.

506 Id.

507 GA 661 (DELETE).

508 GA 658-659, 667-668 (DELETE).

509 GA 831-834 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/30/2020); GA 835-836, GA 1892 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/30/2020).

510 GA 563-564 (DELETE).

511 See, e.g., GA 723, 725 (DELETE); GA 728-730 (DELETE); GA 732 (DELETE); GA 737-738 (DELETE); GA 732 (DELETE); GA 737-738 (DELETE); GA 739-740 (DELETE); GA 746 (DELETE).

512 GA 69-71 (DELETE); GA 555-557 (DELETE).

513 GA 556-559 (DELETE).

514 GA 559-561 (DELETE); GA 71-74 (DELETE).

515 GA 1712 (Email from the White House Press Office 11/20/2020).

516 Id. (Email from the White House Press Office 11/20/2020).

517 GA 330-337 (DELETE); GA 82 (DELETE); GA 560-561 (DELETE).

518 GA 560 (DELETE); GA 361-362 (DELETE).

519 GA 348-358 (DELETE).

520 GA 560 (DELETE); GA 348-354 (DELETE); GA 685 (DELETE).

521 GA 560-571 (DELETE); GA 74-84 (DELETE).

522 GA 567-569 (DELETE).

523 GA 75, 80-81 (DELETE); GA 559, 561-562 (DELETE).

524 GA 348-358 (DELETE); GA 562 (DELETE).

525 GA 75, 94-95 (DELETE); GA 1040 (Joint Statement 11/20/2020).

526 Id. (Joint Statement 11/20/2020).

527 GA 799-800 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/21/2020.

528 GA 801-802 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/22/2020); GA 803-804 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/22/2020); GA 805-806 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/22/2020); GA 807-808 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/22/2020); GA 809-810 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/22/2020); GA 811-812 (Donald J. GA 913-914 (Team Trump Tweet 01/03/2021).

529 GA 559-561 (DELETE); GA 71-74 (DELETE).

530 GA 1175 (DELETE); GA 1177 (DELETE).

531 GA 913-914 (Team Trump Tweet 01/03/2021).

532 GA 735 (DELETE); GA 21-22 (DELETE).

533 GA 21-22 (DELETE).


534 GA 22-31 (DELETE).

535 Id.

536 GA 22-25, 32-34 (DELETE).

537 GA 735 (DELETE).

538 GA 36 (DELETE).

539 GA 854-855 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020); GA 852-853 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

540 GA 37-44 (DELETE).

541 GA 915 (Team Trump Facebook Post 01/02/2021); GA 916 (Team Trump Tweet 01/02/2021); GA 1982 at 22:00 (DELETE); see also GA 1713-1715 (DELETE).

542 GA 45-47 (DELETE).

543 GA 61-64 (DELETE); Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-O-155 (S. Ct. Dec. 7, 2020).

544 Mot. to Intervene, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-O-155 (S. Ct. Dec. 9, 2020).

545 GA 64 (DELETE).

546 GA 67 (DELETE); GA 742 (DELETE).

547 GA 742 (DELETE); Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-O-155 (S. Ct. Dec. 7, 2020).

548 GA 742 (DELETE); Brief of Missouri et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-O-155 (S. Ct. Dec. 7, 2020).

549 GA 66 (DELETE).

550 GA 67 (DELETE).

551 GA 367-368 (DELETE).

552 GA 1154 (Tr. of Call 01/02/2021).

553 Complaint at 1, Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2020), ECF No. 1.

554 GA 1154 (Tr. of Call 01/02/2021).

555 Complaint at 19, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV343255 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020) available at: Trump v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-5310 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2020), ECF No. 1-1 at 12-79.

556 GA 1159 (Tr. of Call 01/02/2021).

557 GA 1157 (Tr. of Call 01/02/2021).

558 GA 1170 (Tr. of Call 01/02/2021).

559 GA 1170-1171 (Tr. of Call 01/02/2021).

560 GA 323-325 (DELETE).

561 GA 1716-1717 (DELETE).
562 GA 323-325 (DELETE); GA 1286-1287 (DELETE); GA 1326-1327 (DELETE); GA 1288-1290 (DELETE).

563 GA 328-329 (DELETE); GA 1483-1484 (DELETE).

564 GA 1718-1724 (DELETE); GA 1725-1729 (DELETE); GA 1730-1732 (DELETE); GA 1733-1736 (DELETE); GA 1743 (DELETE); GA 1744 (DELETE); GA 1747 (DELETE); GA 1739 (DELETE).

565 GA 1751-1755 (DELETE).

566 GA 1752 (DELETE).

567 Id.

568 Id.

569 GA 767 (DELETE).

570 See, e.g., GA 1759-1762 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021); GA 1763-1765 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021); GA 1766-1767 (DELETE); GA 1768-1771 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021).

571 See, e.g. , GA 1772-1775 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021); GA 1776-1778 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021); GA 1779-1780 (DELETE); GA 1781-1784 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021).

572 Id.

573 See, e.g., GA 1785-1788 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021); GA 1789-1791 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021); GA 1792-1793 (DELETE); GA 1794-1797 (Campaign Fundraising email 01/04/2021).

574 GA 1089 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

575 GA 1090 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

576 GA 1091 (Dalton Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

577 GA 299-300 (DELETE); GA 485-486 (DELETE); GA 653 (DELETE); GA 1801-1802 (DELETE).

578 GA 301-302 (DELETE); GA 1804 (DELETE).

579 GA 399-403 (DELETE). (DELETE), then the Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office of the Secret Service elaborated that the defendant's protective detail "wasn't getting information [about the rally] from their counterparts at the White House staff because this was not a staff-driven event. This was a campaign driven event." GA 399.

580 GA 645-652 (DELETE); GA 1142 (DELETE); GA 1805-1818 (DELETE); GA 1895 (DELETE); GA 1819-1822 (DELETE).

581 GA 483-484 (DELETE).

582 Riley Hoffman, Read: Harris-Trump presidential debate transcript (Sept. 10, 2024, 11:58 PM), available at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/harris- ... 113560542; see also GA 1692 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023).

583 GA 1827-1832 (DELETE).

584 GA 1833 (DELETE); GA 539 (DELETE);

585 See GA 636 (DELETE); GA 191-192 (DELETE); GA 1834-1843 (DELETE); GA 1681(DELETE).

586 GA 105 (DELETE); GA 476-477 (DELETE).

587 See The White House Home Page (screenshot), WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 6, 2021) https://web.archive.org/web/20210106154 ... house.gov/.

588 GA 954 (Team Trump Facebook Post 01/06/2021; GA 955 (Team Trump Facebook Post 01/06/2021); GA 956 (Team Trump Facebook Post 01/06/2021); GA 957 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 958 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 959 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 960 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 961 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 962 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 963 (Team Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

589 GA 1928 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

590 See GA 1913 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021); GA 1908 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021).

591 Compare KJRH-TV Tulsa, President Trump arrives at White House, YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j7u50bMdl8A with GA 1928 at 3:28:50 and 4:42:55 (Video of Ellipse Rally 01/06/2021.

592 See GA 1088 (Dalton Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/04/2021).

593 See GA 1114 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

594 GA 1118-1119 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

595 GA 1122, 1126-1136 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

596 GA 1115, 1122 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

597 GA 1115, 1132-1133, 1136 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

598 GA 1119, 1133, 1135 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

599 GA 525-527 (DELETE); GA 534 (DELETE).

600 GA 411 (DELETE); see https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/ 753965070003109888?lang=en (Donald J. Trump Tweet 07/15/2016).

601 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/10 ... 2756744192 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 02/02/2019); https://x.com/realdonaldtrump/status/11 ... 0505938946 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 09/12/2019).

602 GA 784-785 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/14/2020); GA 786-787 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/14/2020); GA 944-945 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021); GA 881-882 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/22/2020); GA 884-885 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/23/2020); GA 905-906 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021); GA 938-939 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

603 GA 526-532 (DELETE).

604 GA 1899 (Spreadsheet of @POTUS45 Tweets).

605 Id. (Spreadsheet of @POTUS45 Tweets).

606 Id. (Spreadsheet of @POTUS45 Tweets). The four re-Tweets are: on January 5, “Antifa is a Terrorist Organization, stay out of Washington. Law enforcement is watching you very closely! @DeptofDefense @TheJusticeDept @DHSgov @DHS_Wolf @SecBernhardt @SecretService @FBI”; on January 6, “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay Peaceful” and “I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order – respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!”; and on January 7, a link to a speech the defendant gave on that date about the events of the previous day.

607 Compare id. (Spreadsheet of @POTUS45 Tweets) with GA 946-947 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

608 See, e.g., GA 772-773 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/05/2020; GA 774-775 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11 /06/2020); GA 797-798 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/18/2020); GA 850-851 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/05/2020).

609 See, e.g. , GA 777-778 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/11/2020; GA 860-861 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/07/2020); GA 782-783 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/13/2020); GA 795-796 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/17/2020); GA 881-882 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/22/2020).

610 GA 909-910 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/0112021); GA 911-912 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021).

611 GA 1953 at 2:20-4:13 (Video of Interview with CNN 11/11/2020; GA 777-778 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/11/2020.  

612 GA 825-826 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/29/2020).

613 GA 854-855 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

614 GA 856, 858 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

615 GA 875-880 (Donald J. Trump Tweets 12/21/2021).

616 GA 777-778 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/11/2020).

617 GA 825-826 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/29/2020).

618 See, e.g., GA 867-872 (Donald J. Trump Tweets 12/13/2020).

619 GA 823-824 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/29/2020).

620 GA 827-828 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/29/2020). A week later, the court dismissed the lawsuit, stating that the plaintiffs "essentially ask the Com1 for perhaps the most extraordinary relief ever sought in any Federal Court in connection with an election. They want this Court to substitute its judgment for that of two-and-a-half million Georgia voters who voted for Joe Biden, and this I am unwilling to do." Pearson v. Kemp, 1:20-cv-4809, ECF No. 79 at 43 (N.D. Ga.) (Tr. of 12/7/2020 Hrg.).

621 See generally, e.g., GA 1848-1850 (DELETE).

622 GA 854-855 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

623 GA 852-853 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

624 Id. (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

625 GA 856, 858 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020). See, e.g., GA 1851-1852 (DELETE).

626 GA 856, 858 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/06/2020).

627 GA 1233-1235 (Wisconsin Certificate of Ascertainment 11/30/2020 and Certificate of Final Determination 12/21/2020; Trump v. Biden, 394 Wis. 2d 629 (Wis. 2020); GA 875-880 (Donald J. Trump Tweets 12/21/2020.

628 Id. (Donald J. Trump Tweets 12/21/2020); GA 187-188 (DELETE). Although the defendant did not endorse Justice P49 as he claimed, he did endorse a congressional candidate with the surname P49 from another midwestern state. https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/12 ... 4210595842.

629 GA 877, 880 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/21/2020).

630 See, e.g., GA 896 (Team Trump Retweet of Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/26/2020); GA 901 (Team Trump Retweet of Donald J. Trump 12/30/2020); GA 902 (Team Trump Retweet of Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/30/2020); GA 534 (DELETE).

631 GA 886-887 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/26/2020; GA 897-898 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/27/2020); GA 899-900 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/30/2020); GA 903-904 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021); GA 905-906 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 1/01/2021); GA 913-914, 1891 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/01/2021); GA 921-922 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/03/2021); GA 923-924 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/03/2021); GA 928-929 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/04/2021); GA 932-933 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021); GA 938-939 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

632 GA 873-874 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/19/2020).

633 Id. (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/19/2020; GA 1853-1865 (Report of Prohibited Political Activity Under the Hatch Act 11/18/2020).

634 GA 883 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/23/2020); GA 449 (DELETE); GA 1022-1023 (Pence, So Help Me God p. 439-40); see also GA 1524-1527 (DELETE).

635 GA 934-395 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

636 GA 940-941 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

637 GA 942-943 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

638 Id.; GA 940-941 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

639 GA 873-874 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 12/19/2020).

640 GA 457-460 (DELETE).

641 GA 946-947 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

642 GA 535-538 (DELETE).

643 GA 936-937 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/05/2021).

644 GA 940-941 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021; GA 942-943 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

645 GA 1680 (DELETE); GA 638-642 (DELETE).

646 GA 471-472 (DELETE); GA 1668-166 (DELETE).

647 GA 471-472 (DELETE); GA 1668-1669 (DELETE); GA 225-230 (DELETE).

648 GA 1681 (DELETE); GA 405-406 (DELETE); GA 1670-1679 (DELETE).

649 See GA 1114-1141 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

650 See GA 1140-1141 (Ellipse Rally Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

651 GA 1866 (DELETE); GA 168 (DELETE).

652 GA 541-544 (DELETE); GA 232, GA 236 (DELETE).

653 GA 479 (DELETE) (advisors told the defendant that "[t]here's a riot, and there are people inside the Capitol Building"); GA 122 (DELETE) (recalling telling the defendant "that someone's gotten into the Capitol"); GA 232-234 (DELETE); GA 168-169 (DELETE).

654 GA 547-548 (DELETE); GA 232-234 (DELETE); GA 123 (DELETE).

655 GA 546 (DELETE).

656 GA 1931 (Video of Fox News Coverage 01/06/2021).  

657 GA 546 (DELETE); GA 646-947 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

658 473-474 (DELETE); GA 1944 (Video of Pence Evacuation 01/06/2021).

659 GA 1684-1686 (Pence Dear Colleague Letter 01/06/2021); GA 1867-1868 (DELETE).

660 GA 1937 (Video of House Floor 01/06/2021); GA 1954 (Video of Senate Floor 01/06/2021).

661 GA 1957 at 00:40-1:25 Video of Senate Wing Door CCTV 01/06/2021); GA 1909 at 00:15- 1:10 (Video of Capitol Riot 01/06/2021).

662 GA 310-317 (DELETE).

663 GA 124-125 (DELETE) ("both P71 and I went down and told him you got to tell people get out of the Capitol, the people who were breaching the Capitol"); GA 232 (DELETE) ("And I said, we need to tell everyone to get the fuck out of the Capitol, right now."); GA 237 (DELETE) (P71 and P59 "argued ... to the president, you have to tell people to get out, right now, as well. P71 for the first time I'd ever heard him raise his voice, yelled at the president ... He said, you need to tell them now; you're destroying your legacy; you're destroying everything anyone's ever worked for; you got to tell these people to get out of the Capitol, immediately."); GA 480 (DELETE) ("I think we were probably, at that point, encouraging the President that he needed to come out and say something, he needed to condemn this and say something about it.").

664 GA 948-949 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

665 GA 950-951 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

666 GA 1952 (Video of Rose Garden Speech 01/06/2021); GA 1868 (Rose Garden Speech Draft Tr. 01/06/2021).

667 GA 952-953 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 01/06/2021).

668 There are, however, strong arguments that all of these Tweets were unofficial. For example, in some of them, the defendant misleadingly suggested that the already-violent crowd should “[s]tay” or “remain” “peaceful” while failing to urge or direct those unlawfully at the Capitol to leave, as his advisors had urged him to do. He also used the messages to recognize the rioters at the Capitol as his own supporters, calling them “WE” and telling them that they were “very special” and that he loved them. And even as early as the afternoon of January 6, when violence still raged at the Capitol, the defendant justified and revered the rioters’ lawless actions on his behalf when he tweeted that “[t]hese are the things and events that happen” and to “[r]emember this day forever!”

669 GA 1951 at 22:08-22:18 (Video of RNC Speech 08/24/2020); GA 1927 at 2:50-3:28 (Video of Donald J. Trump Statement 10/27/2020).

670 GA 1974 (Video of White House Speech 11/04/2020).

671 GA 1945 at 2:06:23-2:07:23 (Video of Pennsylvania Hotel Hearing 11/25/2020).

672 Indeed, at least two of the witnesses -- P9 and P45 consulted with the White House Counsel's Office about their ability to engage with the Campaign, demonstrating that they understood their roles with respect to the Campaign were distinct from their White House roles.

673 GA 671 (DELETE).

674 GA 671, 697 (DELETE); GA 700 (DELETE).

675 GA 671-672 (DELETE).

676 GA 672-673 (DELETE).

677 GA 673, 686 (DELETE).

678 GA 673 (DELETE).

679 GA 196-197 (DELETE).

681 See, e.g., GA 683-684 (DELETE).

682 GA 673 (DELETE); GA 710 (DELETE).  

683 GA 704 (DELETE); GA 715 (DELETE).

684 GA 715 (DELETE).

685 GA 716 (DELETE).

686 GA 58 (DELETE).

687 GA 59 (DELETE)

688 GA 719 (DELETE).

689 GA 715, 719 (DELETE).

690 GA 719, 721 (DELETE).

691 GA 717-718 (DELETE).  

692 GA 713 (DELETE).

693 GA 687 (DELETE).

694 GA 526 (DELETE).

695 528-529 (DELETE).

696 GA 527 (DELETE); GA 545 (DELETE).

697 GA 241-244 (DELETE).

698 GA 246-249 (DELETE).

699 GA 250-253 (DELETE).

700 GA 258 (DELETE).

701 GA 307 (DELETE); GA 304-305 (DELETE).

702 GA 308 (DELETE).

703 GA 309 (DELETE).

704 GA 1904 at row 1151 (DELETE) (11/17/2020, "Hi (DELETE)! Your dad is going to stay in DC for thanksgiving -- just wanted to let you know! from P42 to (DELETE), row 1765, 1153 (11/16/2020, "Has DJT solidified his Thanksgiving plans" from P73 to P42, she responded, "As of earlier today, FLOTUS wants to stay up here and POTUS is on board, as of now").

705 GA 1242-1243 (Email from Comms Alert 12/01/2020).

706 GA 12-13 (DELETE).

707 GA 8-10 (DELETE).

708 GA 10 (DELETE).

709 GA 1244 (Trump Campaign Press Release 12/01/2020).

710 GA 1978 at 11:56-12:04, 32:06-33:16 (DELETE).

711 GA 107-113 (DELETE); GA 115-119 (DELETE).

712 GA 790 (Tweet 11/17/2020).

713 GA 779 (Tweet 11/12/2020); GA 1236-1237 (Election Security Joint Statement 11/12/2020).

714 GA 791 -794 (Donald J. Trump Tweet 11/17/2020).

715 GA 1869-1871 (DELETE).

716 GA 1900 (DELETE).

717 GA 1872-1885 (DELETE).

718 GA 1902 (DELETE) Phone.); (DELETE).

719 GA 232-236 (DELETE).

720 GA 318 (DELETE).

721 GA 541-543 (DELETE).

722 See, e.g., GA 1970 at 17:37 (Video of Trump Interview 07/10/2021); GA 1926 at 1:15:30 (Video of Conroe Rally 01/29/2022); GA 1971 at 15:51, 16:42 (Video of Trump Interview 02/01/2022); GA 1962 at 48:29 (Video of Trump at Faith and Freedom Coalition 06/17/2022); GA 1966 at 09:30 (Video of Trump Interview 09/01/2022); GA 1973 at 43:07 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023); GA 1694 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023); GA 1964 (Video of Trump Campaign Statement 2024); GA 1967 at 45:18 (Video of Trump Interview 08/23/2023); GA 1965 at 56: 10, 57:11 (Video of Trump Interview on Meet the Press 09/17/2023); GA 1935 at 35:50, 01:16:16 (Video of Greensboro Rally 03/02/2024); GA 967 (Donald J. Trump Truth Social Post 03/11/2024); Isaac Arnsdorf and Maeve Reston, Trump claims violence he inspired on Jan. 6 was Pence 's fault, WASH. POST, (Mar. 13, 2023, 8:09 p.m.), https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/13/trump-pence-iowa/.
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Tue Oct 22, 2024 6:11 am

Who’s Who in Jack Smith’s Immunity Brief
by Adam Klasfeld
October 4, 2024

Special Counsel Jack Smith’s massive legal brief detailing former President Donald Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election does not take elaborate sleuthing to decode.

Many of the redacted names inside the 165-page filing contain the specific job titles, like those of Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, and other unmistakable public officials. Others reference specific social media posts or other public records that unmask the figures hidden behind the black lines.

This resource details all that is publicly known about the more than 80 redacted names, a veritable “Who’s Who” of the people who either supported, witnessed, or opposed what prosecutors call “a conspiracy against the rights of millions of Americans to vote and have their votes counted.”

The Unindicted Co-Conspirators

The first five figures branded in Trump’s indictment as his alleged co-conspirators have been previously known, but now, all six have been confirmed.

Note-1: Ex-Department of Justice official Jeff Clark, who was formerly CC4, was dropped in the superseding indictment as a co-conspirator following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. Vance.

Note-2: P5 is also labeled a “co-conspirator” in this brief. This is not novel; the DOJ categorized the individual as such in an earlier brief (see prior analysis at Just Security).

They are:

(CC1) Rudy Giuliani: The former New York City mayor tried to overturn Trump’s defeat across the country, including through a federal lawsuit in Pennsylvania
[pp. 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 30, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70, 71, 74, 77, 83, 84, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 113, 121, 128, 134, 145, 149, 150, 151, 152, 157, 159, 160]
(CC2) John Eastman: The author of the so-called “coup memos”
[pp. 4, 20, 22, 24, 27, 29, 34, 47, 50, 51, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 85, 90, 97, 99, 107, 113, 121, 149, 150, 153, 157]
(CC3) Sidney Powell: The driving force behind the so-called “Kraken” lawsuits seeking to overturn election results in four states
[pp. 4, 10, 42, 43, 44, 66, 133, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156]
(CC5) Kenneth Chesebro: The alleged architect of Trump’s false electors scheme
[pp. 4, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, 73, 78]
(CC6) Boris Epshteyn: For more than a year, reporters have speculated — but not confirmed — Epshteyn’s identity as the final alleged co-conspirator in Trump’s indictment, but Jack Smith’s latest brief eliminates all doubt by identifying him as a guest of Steve Bannon’s podcast “War Room” on Jan. 2, 2021, four days before the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
[pp. 4, 7, 9, 10, 20, 51, 52, 54, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 70, 83, 113, 133, 159]

The Companies

The brief also thinly veils the identities of three companies that became debunkers of false election-fraud conspiracy theories (Simpatico and Berkley Group) or a lightning rod for false election-fraud conspiracy theories (Dominion). They are:

(C1) Simpatico Software Systems: The first of two firms that the Trump campaign hired to detect wide scale fraud in the 2020 presidential election — but which instead debunked such claims. The company’s president, Ken Block, publicly confirmed “C1” is Simpatico on social media.
[pp. 12, 152]
(C2) Berkeley Research Group: The second of two firms that the Trump campaign hired to detect wide scale fraud in the 2020 presidential election — but which instead debunked such claims.
[pp. 12, 152]
(C3) Dominion Voting Systems: One of two voting machine companies subjected to false conspiracy theories that they flipped votes from Trump to Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election, and the only one that operated in Georgia.
[pp. 12, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 66, 132, 156]

The Others

Except for one exception (P5), the other figures listed in Jack Smith’s legal brief are not accused of being Trump’s co-conspirators. Some individuals witnessed Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election; some opposed them; and others may have assisted them in ways that were unprosecuted or did not rise to the level of an alleged co-conspirator. We have declined to name anyone whose identity is strongly suspected, but which we believed could not be confirmed with the available details. Many identifications were confirmed through specific job titles listed in court papers; others required additional context through extrinsic evidence. If you have information to make definitive identifications, please send tips to [email protected].

The guide below matches the numbers with the names, when available, and the details in the brief that identify them:

(P1) Steve Bannon: The brief alludes to Bannon’s incendiary comments on his podcast “War Room,” particularly his warning of a “climactic battle” coming on Jan. 6, 2021, during an episode that aired four days earlier.
[pp. 4, 7, 9, 10, 58, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 107, 159, 160]
(P2) Bill Stepien: Trump’s then-campaign manager
[pp. 4, 5, 9, 10, 17, 63, 151]
(P3) Justin Clark: Trump’s then-deputy campaign manager
[pp. 4, 9, 38, 39, 50, 52, 53, 151, 152]
(P4) Jason Miller: Trump’s senior campaign advisor
[pp. 4, 7, 9, 21, 25, 43, 52, 53, 72, 128, 151]
Update (P5) The Washington Post identifies this Trump campaign operative — also described as his “agent” and “co-conspirator” – as Michael Roman. He allegedly replied “Make them riot” and “Do it” when the former president’s supporters got restive outside of a Detroit polling facility in November 2020, according to the brief. (See also DOJ’s Dec. 2023 brief involving this individual.)
[pp. 4, 8, 51, 54, 55]
(P6) This individual, said to be one of Trump’s private advisers or campaign advisers, was a private citizen when Trump allegedly said that he would declare victory before the votes were counted.
[p. 5]
(P7) Trump allegedly mocked Sidney Powell in front of this White House staffer in the position of Assistant to the President who also volunteered for the campaign, calling Powell’s election fraud claims “crazy”
[pp. 5, 43, 44, 147, 154, 155]
(P8) Mark Short: Vice President Mike Pence’s chief of staff
[pp. 5, 66, 69, 71, 97, 98, 99]
(P9) Eric Herschmann: One of Trump’s first impeachment attorneys, Herschmann was a White House lawyer, whose biography is detailed at length in the brief, including his longtime friendship with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner
[pp. 9, 11, 12, 14, 22, 27, 39, 44, 52, 53, 66, 104, 141, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 160, 162]
(P10) Joseph diGenova: A redacted Trump tweet reveals the identity of the ex-Trump lawyer
[pp. 10, 42, 43, 45, 151]
(P11) Victoria Toensing: A redacted Trump tweet reveals the identity of the ex-Trump lawyer
[p. 10]
(P12) Jenna Ellis: A redacted Trump tweet reveals the identity of the ex-Trump lawyer
[pp. 10, 19, 39, 46, 52, 55, 106, 151, 152, 159]
(P13) Jared Kushner: Trump’s son-in-law
[pp. 11, 156]
(P14) Ivanka Trump: Trump’s daughter
[pp. 11, 156]
(P15) Nick Luna: Trump’s White House Director of Oval Office Operations
[pp. 15, 142, 147, 156, 162]
(P16) Former Gov. Doug Ducey (R): Then-governor of Arizona
[pp. 17, 18, 26, 100, 101, 102, 135]
(P17) Gov. Brian Kemp (R): Governor of Georgia
[pp. 18, 26, 27, 28, 68, 122, 135]
(P18) Former Rep. Rusty Bowers (R): Then-speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives
[pp. 19, 20, 21, 100, 106, 107, 131, 133, 134]
(P19) Christina Bobb: The Trump campaign staffer’s tweet attacking Bowers is quoted in the brief
[pp. 20, 51, 52, 107, 131, 133, 134]
(P20) Rep. Rusty Bowers’s legal counsel: Two days before Jan. 6, 2021, John Eastman called then-Arizona House Speaker Bowers and this person — Bowers’s attorney — in an attempt to decertify the state’s electors.
[p. 20]
(P21) Mark Meadows: White House chief of staff
[pp. 22, 29, 32, 50, 104, 109, 110, 150]
(P22) This Trump campaign attorney debunked Rudy Giuliani’s claim that more than 10,000 dead people voted in Georgia
[pp. 22, 152]
(P23) Ray Smith III: This private attorney for Trump falsely claimed more than 10,000 dead people voted in Georgia at the state’s Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearing in testimony that is time-stamped in the prosecution’s legal brief (see minute 30:54)
[p. 22]
(P24) Jackie Pick: This figure, described as Trump’s “agent,” presented misleading footage to the George State Senate smearing election workers Shaye Moss and Ruby Freeman with false claim they were engaged in fraud
[p. 22]
(P25) Gabriel Sterling: The chief operating officer from the Georgia Secretary of State’s office
[pp. 23, 45]
(P26) Chris Carr: Attorney general of Georgia
[pp. 23, 24, 25, 100, 107, 108]
(P27) Sen. David Perdue (R-Ga.): Trump’s tweet praising Georgia’s then-incumbent senator appears in redacted form in the brief
[pp. 23, 24, 28, 108, 117, 118]
(P28) Sen. Kelly Loeffler (R-Ga.): Trump’s tweet praising Georgia’s then-incumbent senator appears in redacted form in the brief
[pp. 24, 28, 108, 117, 118]
(P29) Shaye Moss: One of the Georgia election workers Giuliani defamed before the Georgia legislature
[pp. 25, 26]
(P30) Ruby Freeman: Her mother, also a Georgia election worker
[pp. 25, 26, 29]
(P31) Cleta Mitchell: The Trump attorney’s appearance on the call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger is quoted in the brief
[pp. 27, 29, 30, 109, 110]
(P32) Kurt Hilbert: The former president’s counsel of record in Trump v. Kemp
[pp. 27, 29, 31, 109, 110]
(P33) Sec. Brad Raffensperger (R): Georgia secretary of state
[pp. 28, 29, 30, 31, 46, 47, 64, 68, 100, 109, 110, 135]
(P34) Former Lt. Gov. Geoffrey Duncan (R): Trump’s redacted tweet attacking the former lieutenant governor of Georgia confirms his identity in the brief
[p. 28]
(P35) Ryan Germany: The secretary’s general counsel appears in the passage of the transcript of the infamous Trump-Raffensperger phone call, which can be seen in redacted form in the brief
[pp. 29, 30, 110]
(P36) Alex Kaufman: Meadows introduced “Alex” at the outside of the Raffensperger call described in the brief
[pp. 29, 109]
(P37) Former Sen. Mike Shirkey (R): Michigan’s former Senate Majority Leader—and Trump pressure campaign target
[pp. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 103, 104, 105, 157]
(P38) Former Rep. Lee Chatfield (R): Michigan’s former speaker of the House of Representatives—and Trump pressure campaign target
[pp. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 46, 50, 103, 104, 105]
(P39) Ronna McDaniel: Then-RNC chairwoman
[pp. 31, 32, 40, 46, 51, 53, 57, 58, 103, 112, 113, 151, 157]
(Note: There is no P40 in the brief.)
(P41) A Michigan campaign associate
[p. 34]
(P42) Molly Michael: Trump’s executive assistant
[pp. 42, 57, 61, 113, 114, 147, 156, 157]
(P43) Justin Riemer: The RNC’s then-chief counsel
[pp. 36, 39, 40]
(P44) An RNC spokesperson
[pp. 36, 39]
(P45) Dan Scavino: Trump dictated a tweet to his then-social media chief, in an account in the brief that matches congressional testimony and public reporting
[pp. 36, 43, 44, 120, 139, 147, 154, 155, 162]
(P46) Lawrence Tabas: Chairman of the Pennsylvania Republican Party
[pp. 37, 38, 54, 57]
(P47) Al Schmidt: Trump attacked Schmidt, a then-Philadelphia City Commissioner and fellow Republican, on Twitter over his refusal to help overturn the election results
[pp. 14, 38, 131, 132]
(P48) Bernie Kerik: The ex-NYPD commissioner’s tweet attacking Pennsylvania lawmakers appears in redacted form in the brief
[pp. 40, 131, 134, 151]
(P49) Brian Hagedorn: Trump complained, in a tweet reproduced in the brief, about this conservative Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice who cast the deciding vote by joining the liberals in rejecting Trump’s election lawsuit
[pp. 41, 59, 132, 134, 135]
(P50) Chris Krebs: Trump assailed his then-cybersecurity czar (head of CISA) for deeming the 2020 election the “most secure” in history
[pp. 42, 43, 45, 131, 132, 133, 158, 160, 161, 163]
(P51) Tucker Carlson: The ex-Fox News personality’s scorn for conspiracy theorist lawyer Sidney Powell makes an appearance in the legal brief
[p. 43]
(P52) Bill Barr: Trump’s attorney general found no evidence of outcome-determinative fraud in the 2020 presidential election
[pp. 46, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163]
(P53) Jack Wilenchik: This attorney’s email about Kenneth Chesebro’s false-electors plan appears in public reporting and the legal brief
[p. 51]
(P54) This Trump campaign staffer discussed the false electors scheme on a text message thread with Jason Miller and Eric Herschmann.
[pp. 52, 154]
(P55) This figure was a member of the legal team Rudy Giuliani had been convening, which Jason Miller derisively dubbed the “Star Wars bar”
[p. 52]
(P56) Another member of the “Star Wars bar”
[pp. 52, 151]
(P57) Former Rep. Tom Marino (R-Penn): Then- Pennsylvania congressman and former U.S. Attorney who opted out of Trump’s false electors scheme
[p. 53]
(P58) Greg Jacob: Then VP Pence’s general counsel whose heated email exchange with John Eastman on Jan. 6, 2021 blamed him for the “siege” became public years before being quoted in the brief
[pp. 66, 69, 70, 71, 85, 97, 98, 99]
(P59) Pat Cipollone: Trump’s White House counsel urged the president to calm the riot
[pp. 97, 104, 141, 142, 160]
(P60) Kayleigh McEnany: Then-White House press secretary
[p. 103]
(P61) Former Sen. Karen Fann (R-Ariz.): Arizona’s then-state senate president
[pp. 106, 107]
(P62) Ken Paxton: Texas Attorney General behind a lawsuit to overturn Trump’s defeats in four other states
[p. 108]
(P63) Eric Schmitt: Missouri Attorney General who authored an amicus brief supporting Paxton’s lawsuit
[p. 108]
(P64) Caroline Wren: Trump’s private fundraiser who helped plan the rally at the Ellipse
[p. 118]
(P65) Julie Fancelli: Described in the brief as a “grocery story heiress,” Fancelli is a conservative donor who played a key role in the “Stop the Steal” rally and is a daughter of the founder of Publix
[p. 119]
(P66) Ellipse rally organizer who had the most contact with the defendant and was employee of the Campaign until Dec. 31, 2020 and after that a private citizen
[p. 119]
(P67) Shealah Craighead: Trump’s White House photographer
[p. 120]
(P68) Michael Flynn: Trump’s former National Security Advisor’s tweet supporting the election-denialist lawsuit is cited in the brief
[p. 133]
(P69) Peter Navarro: Trump’s then-trade advisor’s report on alleged voting irregularities appears in the brief
[p. 136]
(P70) Ivan Raiklin: A tweet by this “Campaign surrogate” appears in the brief
[p. 137]
(P71) Patrick Philbin: Trump’s deputy White House counsel, who urged Trump to send a calming message to stop the riot
[p. 141, 142]
(P72) Matt Morgan: Former White House lawyer Eric Herschmann’s deposition before the Jan. 6th Select Committee names Morgan as the Trump campaign staffer who gave him a tutorial on campaign basics and operations
[p. 151, 152]
(P73) This individual assured Herschmann that he could trust P22, a campaign attorney with whom Herschmann interacted with on a “near daily basis”
[p. 152, 157]
(P74) This person testified at a hearing in Georgia on Dec. 10, 2020
[p. 152]
(P75) Herschmann had the contact information of this managing director of a company on his phone
[p. 153]
(P76) This private attorney for Trump was “not optimistic” about the election challenges, according to Pence
[p. 13]
(P77) This person “handled ethics issues in the White House Counsel’s office”

Thanks to Clara Apt for substantial efforts preparing the unredacted document, and to Pooja Shah for technical guidance.
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Thu Oct 24, 2024 12:47 am

https://ia600501.us.archive.org/6/items ... .252.0.pdf

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL NO. 23-cr-257 (TSC)

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS

The defendant asserts that he is immune from prosecution for his criminal scheme to overturn the 2020 presidential election because, he claims, it entailed official conduct. Not so. Although the defendant was the incumbent President during the charged conspiracies, his scheme was fundamentally a private one. Working with a team of private co-conspirators, the defendant acted as a candidate when he pursued multiple criminal means to disrupt, through fraud and deceit, the government function by which votes are collected and counted—a function in which the defendant, as President, had no official role. In Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), the Supreme Court held that presidents are immune from prosecution for certain official conduct— including the defendant’s use of the Justice Department in furtherance of his scheme, as was alleged in the original indictment—and remanded to this Court to determine whether the remaining allegations against the defendant are immunized. The answer to that question is no. This motion provides a comprehensive account of the defendant’s private criminal conduct; sets forth the legal framework created by Trump for resolving immunity claims; applies that framework to establish that none of the defendant’s charged conduct is immunized because it either was unofficial or any presumptive immunity is rebutted; and requests the relief the Government seeks, which is, at bottom, this: that the Court determine that the defendant must stand trial for his private crimes as would any other citizen.

This motion provides the framework for conducting the “necessarily factbound” immunity analysis required by the Supreme Court’s remand order. Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2340. It proceeds in four parts.

Section I provides a detailed statement of the case that the Government intends to prove at trial. This includes the conduct alleged in the superseding indictment, as well as other categories of evidence that the Government intends to present in its case-in-chief. This detailed statement reflects the Supreme Court’s ruling that presidential immunity contains an evidentiary component, id., which should be “addressed at the outset of a proceeding,” id. at 2334.

Section II sets forth the legal principles governing claims of presidential immunity. It explains that, for each category of conduct that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed, this Court should first determine whether it was official or unofficial by analyzing the relevant “content, form, and context,” id. at 2340, to determine whether the defendant was acting in his official capacity or instead “in his capacity as a candidate for re-election.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Where the defendant was acting “as office-seeker, not office-holder,” no immunity attaches. Id. (emphasis in original). For any conduct deemed official, the Court should next determine whether the presumption of immunity is rebutted, which requires the Government to show that “applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no ‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.’” Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2331-32 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982)).

Section III then applies those legal principles to the defendant’s conduct and establishes that nothing the Government intends to present to the jury is protected by presidential immunity. Although the defendant’s discussions with the Vice President about “their official responsibilities” qualify as official, see Trump, 144 S. Ct. at 2336, the Government rebuts the presumption of immunity. And all of the defendant’s remaining conduct was unofficial: as content, form, and context show, the defendant was acting in his capacity as a candidate for reelection, not in his capacity as President. In the alternative, if any of this conduct were deemed official, the Government could rebut the presumption of immunity.

Finally, Section IV explains the relief sought by the Government and specifies the findings the Court should make in a single order—namely, that the defendant’s conduct set forth in Section I is not immunized, and that as a result, the defendant must stand trial on the superseding indictment and the Government is not prohibited at trial from using evidence of the conduct described in Section I.

I. Factual Proffer

When the defendant lost the 2020 presidential election, he resorted to crimes to try to stay in office. With private co-conspirators, the defendant launched a series of increasingly desperate plans to overturn the legitimate election results in seven states that he had lost—Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (the “targeted states”). His efforts included lying to state officials in order to induce them to ignore true vote counts; manufacturing fraudulent electoral votes in the targeted states; attempting to enlist Vice President Michael R. Pence, in his role as President of the Senate, to obstruct Congress’s certification of the election by using the defendant’s fraudulent electoral votes; and when all else had failed, on January 6, 2021, directing an angry crowd of supporters to the United States Capitol to obstruct the congressional certification. The throughline of these efforts was deceit: the defendant’s and co-conspirators’ knowingly false claims of election fraud. They used these lies in furtherance of three conspiracies: 1) a conspiracy to interfere with the federal government function by which the nation collects and counts election results, which is set forth in the Constitution and the Electoral Count Act (ECA); 2) a conspiracy to obstruct the official proceeding in which Congress certifies the legitimate results of the presidential election; and 3) a conspiracy against the rights of millions of Americans to vote and have their votes counted.

At its core, the defendant's scheme was a private criminal effort. In his capacity as a candidate, the defendant used deceit to target every stage of the electoral process, which through the Constitution, ECA, and state laws includes the states' notification to the federal government of the selection of their representative electors based on the popular vote in the state; the meeting of those electors to cast their votes consistent with the popular vote; and Congress's counting of the electors' votes at a certification proceeding. As set forth in detail below, the defendant worked with private co-conspirators, including private attorneys [RUDY GIULIANI] [JOHN EASTMAN] [SIDNEY POWELL] [DELETE] and [KENNETH CHESEBRO] and private political operatives [BORIS EPSHTEYN] and PI. The defendant also relied heavily on private agents, such as his Campaign employees and volunteers, like Campaign Manager [BILL STEPIEN, TRUMP THEN-CAMPAIGN MANAGER] Deputy Campaign Manager [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] Senior Campaign Advisor [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] and Campaign operative [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE].

In this section, the Government sets forth detailed facts supporting the charges against the defendant,1 before addressing in the next section why none of this conduct is subject to immunity under the Supreme Court's decision in Trump. The conduct set forth below includes the defendant's formation of the conspiracies leading up to and immediately following the 2020 presidential election; certain information regarding his knowledge that there had not been outcome-determinative fraud in the election as he persistently claimed; and his increasingly desperate efforts to use knowingly false claims of election fraud to disrupt the electoral process. The Government does not consider any of the following conduct to be subject to immunity for the reasons set forth in Section III.

A. Formation of the Conspiracies

Although his multiple conspiracies began after election day in 2020, the defendant laid the groundwork for his crimes well before then. Leading into the election, the defendant laid the groundwork for his crimes well before then. Leading into the election, the defendant's private and Campaign advisors, including [TRUMP CAMPAIGN ADVISOR, SAID TRUMP WOULD DECLARE VICTORY BEFORE VOTES COUNTED] (then a private citizen) and [BILL STEPIEN, TRUMP THEN-CAMPAIGN MANAGER] (the defendant's Campaign manager), informed him that it would be a close contest and that it was unlikely to be finalized on election day -- in part because of the time needed to process large numbers of mail-in ballots prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic.2 They also told the defendant that the initial returns on election night be misleading -- that is, that he might take an early lead in the vote count that would diminish as mail-in ballots were counted bec ause his own supporters favored in-person voting, while supporters of his opponent, Joseph R. Biden, favored mail-in ballots.3

Privately, the defendant told advisers -- including [TRUMP CAMPAIGN ADVISOR, SAID TRUMP WOULD DECLARE VICTORY BEFORE VOTES COUNTED] Campaign personnel, [ASSISTANT TO PRES., TO WHOM TRUMP SAID SIDNEY POWELL’S ELECTION FRAUD CLAIMS WERE “CRAZY”] [DELETE] (a White House staffer and Campaign volunteer), and [MARK SHORT, MIKE PENCE CHIEF OF STAFF] (the Vice President's Chief of Staff) -- that in such a scenario, he would simply declare victors before all the ballots were counted and any winner was projected.4 Publicly, the defendant began to plant the seeds for that false declaration. In the months leading up to the election leading up to the election, he refused to say whether he would accept the election results, insisted that he could lose the election only because of fraud, falsely claimed that mail-in ballots were inherently fraudulent, and asserted that only votes counted by election day were valid. For instance:

• In an interview on July 19, 2020, when asked repeatedly if he would accept the results of the lection, the defendant said he would “have to see” and “it depends.”5
• On July 30, despite having voted by mail himself earlier that year, the defendant suggested that widespread mail-in voting provided cause for delaying the election, tweeting, “With Universal Mail-In Voting (not Absentee Voting, which is good), 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in history. It will be a great embarrassment to the USA. Delay the Election until people can properly, securely and safely vote???”6
• In an interview on August 2, the defendant claimed, without any basis, that “[t]here is no way you can go through a mail-in vote without massive cheating.”7
• At a campaign event in Wisconsin on August 17, the defendant told his supporters, “[t]he only way we’re going to lose this election is if the election is rigged, remember that. It’s the only way we’re going to lose this election, so we have to be very careful.”8
• In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention on August 24, the defendant said that “[t]he only way they can take this election away from us is if this is a rigged election.”9
• On October 27, during remarks regarding his campaign, the defendant said, “[i]t would be very, very proper and very nice if a winner were declared on November 3rd, instead of counting ballots for two weeks, which is totally inappropriate, and I don’t believe that that’s by our laws. I don’t believe that. So we’ll see what happens.”10The defendant said this despite—or perhaps because—his private advisors had informed him that it was unlikely that the winner of the election would be declared on November 3.

By October 2020, [STEVE BANNON] a private political advisor who had worked for the defendant's 2016 presidential campaign, began to assist with the defendant's re-election effort. Three days before election day, [STEVE BANNON] described the defendant's plan to a private gathering of supporters: "And what Trump's going to do is just declare victory. Right? He's going to declare victory. That doesn't mean he's the winner, he's just going to say he's the winner"11 After explaining that Biden's supporters favored voting by mail, [STEVE BANNON] stated further, "And so they're going to have a natural disadvantage and Trump's going to take advantage of it -- that's our strategy. He's going to declare himself a winner."12

Immediately following election day on November 3, the defendant did exactly that. As his private and Campaign advisors had predicted to him, in certain states, the defendant took an early lead on election day that began to erode. At approximately 11:20 p.m., Fox News projected that Biden would prevail in the state of Arizona, and according to Campaign advisor [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] he and the defendant were shocked and angry at this development.13 As election day turned to November 4, the contest was too close to project a winner, and in discussions about what the defendant should show restraint while counting continued.14 Two private advisors, however, advocated a different course: [RUDY GIULIANI] and [BORIS EPSHTEYN] suggested that the defendant just declare victory.15 And at about 2:20 a.m., the defendant gave televised remarks to a crowd of his campaign supporters in which he falsely claimed, without evidence or specificity, that there had been fraud in the election and that he had won: "This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this election. We did win this election."16

In the immediately post-election period, while the defendant claimed fraud without proof, his private operatives sought to create chaos, rather than seek clarity, at polling places where states were continuing to tabulate votes. For example, on November 4, [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] -- A Campaign employee, agent, and co-conspirator of the defendant -- tried to sow confusion when the ongoing vote count at the TCF Center in Detroit, Michigan, looked unfavorable for the defendant. There, when a colleague at the TCF Center told [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] "We think [a batch of votes heavily in Biden's favor is] right," 17 [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] responded, "find a reason it isn't," "give me options to file litigation," and "even if ithis [sic]."18 When the colleague suggested that there was about to be unrest reminiscent of the Brooks Brothers Riot,19 a violent effort to stop the vote count in Florida after the 2000 presidential election, [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] responded, "Make them riot" and "Do it!!!"20 The defendant's Campaign operatives and supporters used similar tactics at other tabulation centers, including in Philadelphia, | Pennsylvania,21 and the defendant sometimes used the resulting confrontations to falsely claim that his election observers were being denied proper access, thus serving as a predicate to the defendant's claim that fraud must have occurred in the observers' absence. 22

Contrary to the defendant's public claims of victory immediately following election day, his advisors informed him that he would likely lose. On November 7, in a private Campaign meeting that included [BILL STEPIEN, TRUMP THEN-CAMPAIGN MANAGER], [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER], [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] and White House staffer [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] who came to serve as a conduit for information from the Campaign to the defendant, Campaign staff told the defendant that he had only a slim chance of prevailing in the election, and that any potential success was contingent on the defendant winning all ongoing vote counts or litigation in Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin.23 Within a week of that assessment, on November 13, the defendant's Campaign conceded its litigation in Arizona24 -- meaning that based on his Campaign advisors' previous assessment, the defendant had lost the election.

That same day, in an implicit acknowledgment that he had no lawful way to prevail, the defendant sidelined the existing Campaign staff responsible for mounting his legal election challenges. Prom [BILL STEPIEN, TRUMP THEN-CAMPAIGN MANAGER] and [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] and others who were telling the defendant the truth that he did not want to hear -- that he had lost -- the defendant turned to [RUDY GIULIANI], a private attorney who was willing to falsely claim victory and spread knowingly false claims of election fraud.

As the defendant placed alternating phone calls to [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] and [RUDY GIULIANI] throughout November 13,25 [STEVE BANNON] informed [BORIS EPSHTEYN], another private Campaign advisor, of the change, writing, "Close hold don't tell anyone Trump just fired [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] and put [RUDY GIULIANI] in charge" and "You are to report to [RUDY GIULIANI] 26. When[BORIS EPSHTEYN] asked if [BILL STEPIEN, TRUMP THEN-CAMPAIGN MANAGER] was "gone too?", [STEVE BANNON] replied that "[t]hey all report to [RUDY GIULIANI] and that [STEVE BANNON] had made a recommendation directly that if [RUDY GIULIANI] was not in charge this thing is over[.] Trump is in to the end."27 The next day, consistent with [STEVE BANNON] description, the defendant announced his staff change by Tweet, writing, "I look forward to [RUDY GIULIANI] spearheading the legal effort to defend OUR RIGHT to FREE and FAIR ELECTIONS! [RUDY GIULIANI], [JOSEPH DIGENOVA], [VICTORIA TOENSING], [SIDNEY POWELL], and [JENNA ELLIS] a truly great team, added to our other wonderful lawyers and representatives!" 28

B. The Defendant Knew that His Claims of Outcome-Determinative Fraud Were False

Following election day and throughout the charged conspiracies, the defendant, his coconspirators, and their agents spread lies that there had been outcome-determinative fraud in the election and that he had actually won. These lies included dozens of specific claims that there had been substantial fraud in certain states, such as that large numbers of dead, non-resident, non-citizen, or otherwise ineligible voters had cast ballots, or that voting machines had changed votes for the defendant to voters for Biden. And the defendant and co-conspirators continued to make these unsupported, objectively unreasonable, and ever-changing claims even after they had been publicly disproven or after advisors had directly informed the defendant that they were untrue.

The evidence demonstrates that the defendant knew his fraud claims were false because he continued to make those claims even after his close advisors -- acting not in an official capacity but in a private or Campaign-related capacity -- told him they were not true. These advisors included [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] the White House staffer and Campaign conduit, and Pence, the defendant's running mate.

[ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER]'s relationship with the defendant began before [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] worked for him in the White House. [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] had known [JARED KUSHNER], the defendant's son-in-law, since [JARED KUSHNER] was a child, and through [JARED KUSHNER] met [IVANKA TRUMP] and then the defendant. 29 [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] was one of several attorneys who represented the defendant in his first impeachment trial in the Senate in 2019 and 2020, including presenting argument on the Senate floor on January 27, 2020. 30 [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] began working in the White House as an Assistant to the President in August 2020. 30 In October 2020, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] became interested in learning more about the defendant's Campaign, and in early November 2020, after he began interfacing with Campaign staff, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] consulted with the White House Counsel's Office to ensure he complied with any applicable laws regarding Campaign activity. 31 Thereafter, and throughout the post-election period, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] became a conduit of information from the Campaign to the defendant, and over the course of the conspiracies, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told the defendant the unvarnished truth about his Campaign legal team and the claims of fraud that they and the defendant were making. Examples of these instances include:

• [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] repeatedly gave the defendant his honest assessment that [RUDY GIULIANI] could not mount successful legal challenges to the election. For instance, when the defendant told [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] that he was going to put [RUDY GIULIANI] in charge of the Campaign's legal efforts but pay him only if he succeeded, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told the defendant he would never have to pay [RUDY GIULIANI] anything; 32 in response, the defendant laughed and said, "we'll see." 33 Thereafter, in Oval Office meetings with the defendant, [RUDY GIULIANI] and others, in which [RUDY GIULIANI] made speculative claims, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told [RUDY GIULIANI] -- in front of the defendant -- that [RUDY GIULIANI] would be unable to prove his allegations in a courtroom. 34 In a separate private conversation, when [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] reiterated to the defendant that [RUDY GIULIANI] would he unable to prove his false fraud allegations, the defendant responded, "The details don't matter." 35

• In the post-election period, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] also took on the role of updating the defendant on a near-daily basis on the Campaign's unsuccessful efforts to support any fraud claims. 36 [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told the defendant that the Campaign was looking into his fraud claims, and had even hired external experts to do so, but could find no support for them. He told the defendant that if the Campaign took to court, they would get slaughtered, because the claims are all "bullshit." 37 [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] was privy to the findings of the two expert consulting firms the Campaign retained to investigate fraud claims -- [SYMPATICO SOFTWARE SYSTEMS] and [BERKELELY RESEARCH GROUP] -- and discussed with the defendant their debunkings on all major claims. 38 For example, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told the defendant that Georgia's audit disproved claims that [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] had altered votes. 39

In the post-election time period, Pence -- the defendant's own running mate, who he had directed to assess fraud allegations -- told the defendant that he had seen no evidence of outcome- determinative fraud in the election. 40 This was in one of the many conversations the defendant and Pence had as running mates, in which they discussed their shared electoral interests. Pence gradually and gently tried to convince the defendant to the lawful results of the election, even if it meant they lost. These conversations included:

• A conversation on November 4 in which the defendant asked Pence to "study up" claims of voter fraud in states that they had won together in 2016 to whether they could bring legal challenges as candidates in those states. 41 Pence described the conversation as follows: "Well, I think, I think it was broadly. It was just look at all of it. Let me know what you think. But he told me that the Campaign was going to fight, was going to go to court and make challenges .... And then he just said we're going to fight this and take a look at it. Let me know what you think.42

• A call between the defendant and Pence on November 7, the day that media organizations began to project Biden as the winner of the election. Pence "tried to encourage" the defendant "as a friend," reminding him, "you took a dying political party and gave it a new lease on life." 43

• A November 11 meeting among the defendant, Pence, Campaign staff, and some White House staff during which Pence asked when most of the lawsuits would be resolved ("when does this come to a head?") and the Campaign staff responded, the ''week after Thanksgiving." 44

• A November 12 meeting among the defendant Pence, Campaign staff, and some White House staff during which, Pence recalls, the "Campaign lawyers gave a sober and somewhat pessimistic report on the state of election challenges." 45

• A private lunch on November 12 in which Pence reiterated a face-saving option for the defendant: "don't concede but recognize process is over." 46

• A private lunch on November 16 in which Pence tried to encourage the defendant to accept the results of the election and run again in 2024, to which the defendant responded, "I don't know, 2024 is so far off." 47

• A November 23 phone call in which the defendant told Pence that the defendant's private attorney, [TRUMP ATTORNEY “NOT OPTIMISTIC” ABOUT ELECTION CHALLENGES], was not optimistic about the election challenges. 48

• A December 21 private lunch in which Pence "encouraged" the defendant "not to look at the election 'as a loss -- just an intermission.'" This was followed later in the day by a private discussion in the Oval Office in which the defendant asked Pence, "what do you think we should do?" Pence said, "after we have exhausted every legal process in the courts and Congress, if we still came up short, [the defendant] should 'take a bow.'" 49

• Discussions in which Pence apprised the defendant of conversations he had had with governors in Arizona and Georgia in the context of "election challenges," in which Pence had called the governors "simply to gather information and share it with the president," 50 and in which the governors did not report evidence of fraud in the elections in their states and explained that they could not take actions to convene their states' legislatures. 51

But the defendant disregarded [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] and Pence in the same way that he disregarded dozens of court decisions that unanimously rejected his and his allies' legal claims, and that he disregarded officials in the targeted states -- including those in his own party -- who stated publicly that he had lost and that his specific fraud allegations were false. 52 Election officials, for instance. issued press releases and other public statements to combat the disinformation that the defendant and allies were spreading. 53 At one point long after the defendant had begun spreading false fraud claims, [NICK LUNA], a White House staffer traveling with the defendant, overheard him tell family members that "it doesn't matter if you won or lost the election. You still have to fight like hell." 54

The defendant and his co-conspirators also demonstrated their deliberate disregard for the truth -- and thus their knowledge of falsity -- when they repeatedly changed the numbers in their baseless fraud allegations from day to day. At trial, thee Government will introduce several instances of this pattern, in which the defendant and conspirators' lies were proved by the fact that they made up figures from whole cloth. One example concerns the defendant and conspirators' claims about non-citizen voters in Arizona. The conspirators started with the allegation that 36,000 non-citizens voted in Arizona; 55 five days later, it was "beyond credulity that a few hundred thousand didn't vote"; 56 three weeks later, "the bare minimum [was] 40 or 50,000. The reality is about 250,000"; 57 days after that, the assertion was 32,000; 58 and ultimately, the conspirators landed back where they started, at 36,000 -- a false figure that they never verified or corroborated. 59

Ultimately, the defendant's steady stream of disinformation in the post-election period culminated in the speech he gave at a privately-funded, privately-organized rally at the Ellipse on the morning of January 6, 2021, in advance of the official proceeding in which Congress was to certify the election in favor of Biden.60 In his speech, the defendant repeated the same lies about election fraud in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin that had been publicly, or directly, debunked.61 The defendant used these lies to inflame and motivate the large and angry crowd of his supporters to march to the Capitol and disrupt the certification proceeding.62

C. The Defendant Aimed Deceit at the Targeted States to Alter Their Ascertainment and Appointment of Electors

Shortly after election day, the defendant began to target the electoral process at the state level by attempting to deceive state officials and to prevent or overturn the legitimate ascertainment and appointment of Biden’s electors. As President, the defendant had no official responsibilities related to the states’ administration of the election or the appointment of their electors, and instead contacted state officials in his capacity as a candidate. Tellingly, the defendant contacted only state officials who were in his political party and were his political supporters, and only in states he had lost. The defendant’s attempts to use deceit to target the states’ electoral process played out in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as across these and other states that used certain voting machines. In addition to the following evidence of the defendant’s conduct during the charged conspiracies, at trial the Government will elicit testimony from election officials from the targeted states to establish the objective falsity—and often, impossibility—of the defendant’s fraud claims. Notably, although these election officials would have been the best sources of information to determine whether there was any merit to specific allegations of election fraud in their states, the defendant never contacted any of them to ask.

1. Arizona

The defendant was on notice that there was no evidence of widespread election fraud in Arizona within a week of the election. On November 9, for instance, two days after news networks projected that Biden had won, the defendant called Arizona Governor [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] to ask him what was happening at the state level with the presidential vote count in Arizona. 63 At that point, though Fox News had projected that Biden had won the state, several other news outlets -- including ABC, NBC, CNN, and the New York Times -- had not yet made a projection. 64 [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] walked the defendant through the margins and the votes remaining to be counted, which were primarily from Pima County, which favored Biden, and Maricopa County, which was split. 65 [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] described the situation to the defendant as "the ninth inning, two outs, and [the defendant] was several runs down."66 The defendant also raised claims of election fraud, and [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] asked the defendant to send him supporting evidence. 67 Although the defendant said he would -- stating, "we're packaging it up" -- he never did.68 Shortly thereafter, on November 13, Campaign Manager told the defendant directly that a false fraud claim that had been circulating -- that a substantial number of non-citizens had voted in Arizona -- was false. 69 The same day, as noted previously, Campaign attorneys conceded in court that the remaining election lawsuit in Arizona was moot.

The defendant and [RUDY GIULIANI] continued to try to influence [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)]. For example, [RUDY GIULIANI] tried to contact [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] on November 22 -- the same day the defendant and reached out to the Arizona Speaker of the House, as described below.70 And on November 30, the day [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] signed the Arizona certificate of ascertainment formally declaring Biden's electors as the legitimate electors for Arizona, [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] received a call from the defendant and Pence.71 [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] advised them that Arizona had certified the election; when the defendant brought up fraud claims, [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] -- eager to see the evidence -- again asked the defendant to provide it, but the defendant never did. 72 Instead, later that evening and into the following morning, the defendant repeatedly publicly attacked [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] (as well as Georgia Governor [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)]) on Twitter, re-tweeting posts by others, such as "Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans like [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] and [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] 73; "Watching the Arizona hearings and then watching Gov. [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] sign those papers, why bother voting for Republicans if what you get is [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] and [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] 74; "[GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] 'My state ran the most corrupt election in American history.' [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] 'Hold my beer,"75; and "Why is [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] still pretending he's a member of the Republican Party after he just certified fraudulent election results in Arizona that disenfranchised millions of Republicans?"76

The defendant and co-conspirators also attempted to use false fraud claims to convince political allies in the Arizona state legislature to ignore the popular vote and appoint illegitimate electors. On November 22, the defendant and [RUDY GIULIANI] called [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives. 77 [RUDY GIULIANI] did most of the talking. 78 During the call, the defendant and [RUDY GIULIANI] levied multiple false fraud claims -- including of non-citizen, non-resident, and dead voters that affected the defendant's race -- and asked [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] to use them as a basis to call the state legislature into session to replace Arizona's legitimate electors with illegitimate ones for the defendant. 79 When voiced his deep skepticism, said, "well, you know, we're all kind of Republicans and we need to be working together." 80 [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] refused, and asked [RUDY GIULIANI] to provide evidence supporting his fraud claims. 81 [RUDY GIULIANI] never did. 82

Indeed, [RUDY GIULIANI] met with [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] person approximately a week later and still had nothing to back up his claims . On November 30, [RUDY GIULIANI], [JENNA ELLIS] and others arrived in Arizona for a "hotel healing" -- an unofficial meeting with Republican legislators -- during which they promoted false fraud allegations. 83 In a meeting the day after the hearing, when state legislators pressed [RUDY GIULIANI] and [JENNA ELLIS] for evidence to support their claims, conceded that even on that late date, "[w]e don't have the evidence, but we have lots of theories."84 When the legislators were frustrated that [RUDY GIULIANI] had no support for his claims and asked him tough questions, [RUDY GIULIANI] expressed surprise at the way he was being treated, stating "Man, I thought we were all Republicans. . . . [T]his is a little more hostile a reception. I'm amazed at the reception I'm getting here." 85

On December 4, [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] released a public statement in which he explained that he did not have the authority to use the legislature "to reverse the results of the election" and that doing so would constitute an attempt "to nullify the people's vote based on unsupported theories of fraud." 86 [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] made clear that he was disappointed with the legitimate election results because he "voted for President Trump and worked hard to reelect him" but would not ''violate current law to change the outcome of a certified election."87 On Twitter, [CHRISTINA BOBB] a Campaign staffer who worked with [BORIS EPSHTEYN] attacked [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] for his statement, writing that [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] "is intentionally misleading the people of Arizona to avoid the inevitable." The defendant re-tweeted [CHRISTINA BOBB]'s false post and praised her. 88

A month later, just two days before January 6, [JOHN EASTMAN] -- another of the defendant's private attorneys and a co-conspirator -- called [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] and [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] counsel, [REP. RUSTY BOWERS’S LEGAL COUNSEL] and urged one last time to use the legislature to decertify Arizona's legitimate electors and overturn the valid election results. 89 When [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] told [RUDY GIULIANI] that there was no evidence of substantial fraud in Arizona, and that he could not legally call the legislature into session, [JOHN EASTMAN] was undeterred. He conceded that he "[didn't] know enough about the facts on the ground" regarding fraud in Arizona, and said [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] should nonetheless falsely claim that he had the authority to convene the legislature and "let the courts sort it out."90 [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] again refused. 91

In the post-election period, [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] was harassed; on several occasions, individuals gathered outside [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] home with bullhorns and screamed and honked their vehicle horns to create noise. 92 Once, an individual in visible possession of a pistol and wearing a t-shirt in support of a militia group came onto [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)] property and screamed at him. 93 At the time of these events, [FORMER REP. RUSTY BOWERS (R)]'s daughter was at home and was very ill, and the noise caused her "disruption and angst." 94

2. Georgia

The defendant had early notice that his claims of election fraud in Georgia were false. Around mid-November, Campaign advisor [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] told the defendant that his claim that a large number of dead people had voted in Georgia was false. 95 The defendant continued to press the claim anyway, including in a press appearance on November 29, when he suggested that a large enough number of dead voters had cast ballots to change the outcome of the election in Georgia.96

Four days later, on December 3, [RUDY GIULIANI] orchestrated a presentation to a Judiciary Subcommittee of the Georgia State Senate. 97 In the morning in advance of it, [RUDY GIULIANI] had spoken to the defendant on the phone for almost twenty minutes.98 And at the hearing, [RUDY GIULIANI] arranged for co-conspirators and agents to repeat the false dead voter claim. The claim was so patently false that everyone around the defendant knew it: during the hearing, Chief of Staff P 21 and [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] exchanged text messages on their personal phones confirming that a Campaign attorney, [TRUMP CAMPAIGN ATTORNEY WHO DEBUNKED RUDY GIULIANI’S CLAIM OF DEAD PEOPLE VOTING IN GA.], had verified that [RUDY GIULIANI] claim of more than 10,000 dead voters was false and that the actual number was around 12 and could not be outcome-determinative. 99

During the subcommittee hearing, the conspirators also set in motion a sensational and dangerous lie about election workers at State Farm Arena that would result in the defendant's supporters harassing and threatening those workers. First, [RAY SMITH III, PRIVATE ATTORNEY FOR TRUMP CLAIMED DEAD PEOPLE VOTED IN GA.], one of the defendant's private attorneys, claimed that more than 10,000 dead people had voted in Georgia. 100 Next, [JACKIE PICK, TRUMP’S “AGENT” PRESENTED FOOTAGE TO GA. STATE SENATE & SMEARED SHAYE MOSS AND RUBY FREEMAN], an agent of the defendant, played misleading excerpts of closed-circuit camera footage from State Farm Arena and insinuated that it showed election workers committing misconduct -- counting "suitcases" of illegal ballots.101 Lastly, based on the false fraud allegations, [JOHN EASTMAN] who had already been engaged as a private lawyer for the defendant but did not disclose that at the hearing -- encouraged the Georgia legislators to decertify the state's legitimate electors. 102

While the hearing was ongoing, the defendant simultaneously amplified the misinformation about the State Farm Arena election workers, falsely tweeting, "Wow! Blockbuster testimony taking place right now in Georgia. Ballot stuffing by Dems when Republicans were forced to leave the large counting room. Plenty more coming, but this alone leads to an easy win of the State!" 103 He did this just after re-tweeting two of his Campaign account's Tweets that promoted the false claim about election workers at State Farm Arena. 104

Over the next week, the claim of misconduct at State Farm Arena was disproven publicly as well as directly to the defendant. The day after the hearing, [GABRIEL STERLING, COO GA. SECTY. STATE], the Chief Operating Officer of the Georgia Secretary of State's Office, posted a Tweet explaining that Secretary of State officers had watched the video in its entirety and confirmed that it showed "normal ballot processing." 105 [GABRIEL STERLING, COO GA. SECTY. STATE] again forcefully debunked the conspirators' claim about the State Farm video in a press conference on December 7, explaining at length the election workers' innocent conduct depicted in the closed-circuit camera footage and stating:

And what's really frustrating is the President's attorneys had this same videotape. They saw the exact same things the rest of us could see. And they chose to mislead state senators and the public about what was on that video. I'm quite sure that they will not characterize the video if they by to enter it into evidence because that's the kind of thing that could lead to sanctions because it is obviously untrue. They knew it was untrue and they continue to do things like this. 106


On December 8, the defendant called Georgia Attorney General [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.]. 107 [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] had advance notice that the topic of the call was Texas v. Pennsylvania, an election lawsuit in which Texas was suing other states -- including Georgia -- to attempt to prevent the certification of the election. 108 U.S. Senator [SEN. DAVID PERDUE (R. GA.)] told [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] that the defendant had heard that [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] was "whipping," or lobbying, other state attorneys general against filing amicus briefs in support of Texas. 109 [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] was not lobbying against the suit, and told [SEN. DAVID PERDUE (R. GA.)] so, [SEN. DAVID PERDUE (R. GA.)] asked [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] if he would speak with the defendant about it, and [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] agreed. 110 Shortly thereafter, the defendant called [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] and immediately raised Texas v. Pennsylvania, saying, "I hope you're not talking to your AGs and encouraging them not to get on the lawsuit." 111 [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] told the defendant that he was not affirmatively calling other state attorneys general, but that if they called him, he was telling them what he was seeing in his state -- which was something that the defendant probably did not want to hear: [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] was just not seeing evidence of fraud in Georgia. 112 The defendant nonetheless raised various fraud claims. [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] told him that state authorities had investigated the State Farm Arena allegations and found no wrongdoing, and that he thought another claim the defendant raised about Coffee County, Georgia, had been similarly resolved, but would check. 113 The defendant asked [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] to look at them again "because we're running out of time." 114 [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] tried to steer the call to an end by thinking the defendant and telling him that he had voted for him twice and appreciated the defendant, to which the defendant responded, "Yeah, I did a hell of a job, didn't I?"115 At one point, the defendant raised with [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] the impending run-off election for Georgia's U.S. Senate seats and how important it was to re-elect [SEN. DAVID PERDUE (R. GA.)] and [SEN. KELLY LOEFFLER (R. GA] 116 The day after the call, the defendant -- in his private capacity as a candidate for president -- intervened in support of Texas v. Pennsylvania; his attorney for that matter was [JOHN EASTMAN]. 117

On the same day as the defendant's call with [CHRIS CARR, ATTORNEY GEN. GA.] the defendant's Campaign staff acknowledged that the State Farm Arena claim was unsupported, emailing one another about the fact that television networks may decline to run Campaign advertisements promoting it. In frustration regarding the claim and others like it, [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] -- who spoke with the defendant on a daily basis and had informed him on multiple occasions that various fraud claims were false -- wrote, "When our research and campaign legal team can't back up any of the claims made by am Elite Strike Force Legal Team, you can see why we're 0-32 on am cases. I'll obviously hustle to help on all fronts, but it's tough to own any of this when it's all just conspiracy shit beamed down from the mothership."118

On December 10, however, [RUDY GIULIANI] further perpetuated the false State Farm Arena claim when he appeared at another hearing, this one before the Georgia House of Representatives' Government Affairs Committee. During it, he displayed some of the same footage as had been used in the December 3 hearing that had been debunked in the interim by Georgia officials, and nonetheless claimed that it showed "voter fraud right in front of people's eyes."119 He then named two election workers -- [SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] and her mother, [RUBY FREEMAN, MOTHER OF SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] -- and baselessly accused them of "quite obviously surreptitiously passing around USB ports as if they are vials of heroin or cocaine," and suggested that they were criminals whose "places of work, their homes, should have been searched for evidence of ballots, for evidence of USB ports, for evidence of voter fraud."120 As these false claims about [RUBY FREEMAN, MOTHER OF SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] and [SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] spread, the women were barraged by racist death threats. In the years since, they have spoken about the effect of the defendant and coconspirators' lies about them; as [RUBY FREEMAN, MOTHER OF SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] explained in an interview with congressional investigators, "when someone as powerful as the President of the United States eggs on a mob, that mob will come. They came for us with their cruelty, their threats, their racism, and their hats. They haven't stopped even today." 121 Indeed, to this day, the defendant has never stopped falsely attacking [RUBY FREEMAN, MOTHER OF SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] and [SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI]. Although none of the false claims against them were ever corroborated, the defendant has continued to levy them on social media, including when the defendant attacked [RUBY FREEMAN, MOTHER OF SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] in January 2023 just after her testimony to congressional investigators was made public. 122

Throughout the post-election period, the defendant used Twitter to publicly attack Georgia Governor [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] with particular aggression. In the thirty-five days between November 30, 2020, and January 3, 2021, the defendant tweeted critically about [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] by name or title, more than forty times. These tweets included the ones also attacking [FORMER GOV. DOUG DUCEY (R)] described above, as well as others particular to [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] like, "Why won't Governor @[GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)], the hapless Governor of Georgia, use his emergency powers, which can be easily done, to overrule his obstinate Secretary of State, and do a match of signatures on envelopes. It will be a 'goldmine' of fraud, and we will easily WIN the state"123; "I will easily & quickly win Georgia if Governor @[GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)], or the Secretary of State permit a simple signature verification. Has not been done and will show large scale discrepancies. Why are these two 'Republicans' saying no? If we win Georgia, everything else falls in place!"124; "The Republican Governor of Georgia refuses to do signature verification, which would give us an easy win. What's wrong with this guy? What is he hiding?" 125; and "How does Governor @[GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] allow certification of votes without verifying signatures and despite the recently released tape of ballots being stuffed? His poll numbers have dropped like a rock. He is finished as governor!"126

In the post-election period, the defendant also made false claims in court about fraud in Georgia -- unsuccessfully. For example, in Trump v. Kemp , a federal lawsuit in which the defendant sued Georgia's Governor and Secretary of State, the defendant signed a verification of fraud allegations that he and his attorney on the case, [JOHN EASTMAN] knew was inaccurate. [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] spoke with the defendant and [JOHN EASTMAN] in late December regarding the proposed verification. First, he told [JOHN EASTMAN] and another private attorney, [CLETA MITCHELL, TRUMP ATTORNEY] that they could not have the defendant sign it because they could not verify any of the facts.127 And [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told the defendant that any lawyer that signed the complaint that the verification supported would get disbarred. 128 acknowledged this problem in an email on December 31 to [KURT HILBERT, TRUMP ATTORNEY IN TRUMP V. KEMP] lead counsel for the defendant as candidate in Trump v. Kemp, and another private attorney, writing that in the time since the defendant signed a previous verification in the case, he "had been made aware that some of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the experts) has been inaccurate" and that signing a new affirmation "with that knowledge (and incorporation by reference) would not be accurate."129 Nonetheless, on December 31, the defendant signed the verification, and caused it to be filed. 130

On January 2, Georgia Secretary of State [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] appeared on Fox News and said that various rumors of election fraud were false, and the defendant had lost in Georgia:

Our office has been very busy with what I call the rumor whack-a-mole. Every day, a rumor will pop up and then we whack it down. What we do is, we basically whack it down with the truth. And people can't handle the truth sometimes because they're very disappointed in the results. And I get that. I voted for President Trump also, but at the end of the day, we did everything we could. We did an audit of the race; President Trump still lost. Then we did a full recount; President Trump still lost ... we had a safe, secure process. 131


[SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] like [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] had been on the receiving end of the defendant's Tweets. These included: "Why isn't the @GASecofState [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] a so-called Republican, allowing us to look at signatures on envelopes for verification? We will find tens of thousands of fraudulent and illegal votes"; "RINOS @ [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] @ [FORMER LT. GOV. GEOFFREY DUNCAN (R) (GA.)] & Secretary of State [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] will be solely responsible for the potential loss of our two GREAT Senators from Georgia, @ [SEN. DAVID PERDUE (R. GA.)] and @ [SEN. KELLY LOEFFLER (R. GA]. Won't call a Special Session or check for Signature Verification! People are ANGRY!;" and "Georgia, where is signature verification approval? What do you have to lose? Must move quickly! @ [GOV. BRIAN KEMP (R)] @ [FORMER LT. GOV. GEOFFREY DUNCAN (R) (GA.)] @GaSecofState." 132

Shorty after seeing the interview, the defendant set up a call with [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] to discuss his pending private lawsuit, Trump v. Kemp, in was a named defendant. 133 For this reason, [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] at first hoped to avoid speaking with the defendant but ultimately acquiesced because the defendant was persistent in seeking to set it up. 134 Also because of the pending lawsuit, arranged for his general counsel, to participate. 135 Joining the defendant on the call were Chief of Staff [MARK MEADOWS] and three private attorneys -- [KURT HILBERT, TRUMP ATTORNEY IN TRUMP V. KEMP] and [ALEX KAUFMAN, INTRO’D BY MARK MEADOWS, ON THE RAFFENSPERGER CALL] counsel of record in Trump v. Kemp and the attorneys whom [JOHN EASTMAN] had emailed about the defendant's false verification, and [CLETA MITCHELL, TRUMP ATTORNEY] whom [MARK MEADOWS] introduced on the call as someone "who is not the attorney of record but has been involved."

The defendant began the call with an animated monologue in which he argued that he had won the election in Georgia, saying, "Okay, thank you very much. Hello [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] and [RYAN GERMANY, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER’S GENL. COUNSEL] and everybody. We appreciate the time and the call. So we've spent a lot of time on this, and if we could just go over some of the numbers, I think it's pretty clear that we won. We won very substantially, uh, Georgia."136 Throughout the call, the defendant continued to state that he had won and referenced Biden's margin of victory that he needed to overcome to prevail in the state, including by asserting that "I just want to find 11,780 votes." 137 He did not reference other elections on the same ballot. After the defendant's opening salvo, [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] stated, "Well, I listened to what the President has just said. President Trump, we've had several lawsuits, and we've had to respond in court to the lawsuits and the contentions. We don't agree that you have won."138

The defendant raised multiple false claims of election fraud, each of which [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] refuted in turn. When the defendant attacked [RUBY FREEMAN, MOTHER OF SHAYE MOSS, GA. ELECTION WORKER DEFAMED BY GIULIANI] called her a "professional vote scammer and hustler, 139 and mentioned her dozens of times throughout the call, [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] said, "You're talking about the State Farm video. And I think it's extremely unfortunate that [RUDY GIULIANI] or his people, they sliced and diced that video and took it out of context." 140 He then offered the defendant a link to a video disproving the claim, to which the defendant responded, "I don't care about a link, I don't need it. I have a much, I have a much better link." 141 When the defendant claimed that 5,000 dead people had voted in Georgia, said, "Well, Mr. President, the challenge you have is the data you have is wrong ... The actual number were two. Two. Two people that were dead that voted. And so that's wrong, that was two." 142 When the defendant claimed that thousands of out-of-state voters had cast ballots, [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] counsel, [RYAN GERMANY, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER’S GENL. COUNSEL] responded, "We've been going through each of those as well, and those numbers that we got, that Ms. [CLETA MITCHELL, TRUMP ATTORNEY] was just saying, they're not accurate." 143

At one point, the defendant became frustrated after both [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] and [RYAN GERMANY, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER’S GENL. COUNSEL] explained repeatedly that his claims had been investigated and were not true and stated, "And you're gonna to find that they are -- which is totally illegal -- it's, it's, it's more illegal for you than it is for them because, you know what they did and you're not reporting it. That's a criminal, you know, that's a criminal offense. And you know, you can 't let that happen. That's a big risk to you and to [RYAN GERMANY, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER’S GENL. COUNSEL] your lawyer. That's a big risk." 144 The call ended with [RYAN GERMANY, BRAD RAFFENSPERGER’S GENL. COUNSEL] stating that he would coordinate with the lawyer representing [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] office in the private lawsuit and get together with [KURT HILBERT, TRUMP ATTORNEY IN TRUMP V. KEMP] as agreed earlier in the call. 145

The day after the call, on January 3, the defendant falsely tweeted, "I spoke to Secretary of State [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] yesterday about Fulton County and voter fraud in Georgia. He was unwilling, or unable, to answer questions such as the 'ballots under table' scam, ballot destruction, out of state 'voters ', dead voters, and more. He has no clue!" 146 [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] promptly responded in a Tweet of his own: "Respectfully, President Trump: What you're saying is not true. The truth will come out." 147
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Re: USA v Trump: Government's Motion for Immunity Determinat

Postby admin » Thu Oct 24, 2024 12:47 am

3. Michigan

On November 20, three days before Michigan's Governor signed a certificate of ascertainment appointing Biden's electors based on the popular vote, the defendant met with [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] Michigan's Senate Majority Leader and Speaker of the House, at the Oval Office. 148 The defendant initiated the meeting by asking RNC Chairwoman [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] to reach out to [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] and gauge his receptivity to a meeting. 149 The defendant also asked [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] to participate in the meeting, but [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] told him that she had consulted with her attorney and that she could not be involved in a meeting with legislators because it could be perceived as lobbying. 150 After [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] made the first contact, on November 18, the defendant reached out to [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] to extend an invitation. 151 The same day that he contacted [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] the defendant issued a false Tweet: "In Detroit, there are FAR MORE VOTES THAN PEOPLE. Nothing can be done to cure that giant scam. I win Michigan!" 152

When the defendant called [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] to invite them to the White House, he did not provide the topic of the meeting, but he did ask about allegations of fraud in the election in Michigan. 153 The legislators told him that they and the Michigan legislature were examining the allegations.154 Both [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] and assumed that the defendant wanted to see them to discuss claims of election fraud, and they wanted to be firm that they had not seen evidence that would change the outcome of the election. 155 For this reason, and to avoid talking only about election fraud, they prepared materials to raise regarding COVID-19, and planned in advance to release a statement once the meeting was over that said that the legislators were unaware of information that would change the outcome of the election. 156

Over the course of the meeting, the defendant dialed in both [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] --despite her request not to participate -- and [RUDY GIULIANI] 157 [MARK MEADOWS] was present for some, but not all, of the meeting. 158 After some small talk with the legislators in the Oval Office, the defendant raised various fraud claims, including that he had lost Michigan because of fraud or misconduct in Wayne County, where Detroit is located. 159 [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] corrected the defendant and told him that he had lost primarily because in two routinely Republican counties, the defendant had underperformed with educated females, and if he had received the same number of votes there as the two winning local sheriffs, he likely would have won Michigan. 160 [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] could tell by the defendant's body language that he was not happy to hear [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] assessment. 161 Notably, the defendant only raised fraud claims to the extent that they affected the outcome in his own race, not those for other offices in Michigan. 162

[RUDY GIULIANI] participation came after the legislators assured the defendant that they were looking into fraud claims; the defendant dialed [RUDY GIULIANI] into the meeting and said, "[RUDY GIULIANI] tell them what's going on." [RUDY GIULIANI] then launched into a fraud monologue. 163 Finally, [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] interrupted and asked, "So when are you going to file a lawsuit in Michigan?" -- a question that [RUDY GIULIANI] ignored and did not answer. l64

Immediately after the meeting, [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] released a public statement in which they stated that they had "not yet been made aware of any information that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan." 165 On November 21, the defendant acknowledged [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] statement when he tweeted, "This is true, but much different than reported by the media" and implicitly conceded that he had not provided evidence of fraud yet when he added, "We will show massive and unprecedented fraud!" 166 Days later, the defendant's Campaign declined to request a state-wide recount in Michigan, for which it would have had to pay unless the recount succeeded in changing the outcome of the election. 167

Despite failing to establish any valid fraud claims, [RUDY GIULIANI] followed up with [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] and and attempted to pressure them to use the Michigan legislature to overturn the valid election results. On December 4, [RUDY GIULIANI] sent a message to [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] claiming that Georgia was poised to do so (based on [RUDY GIULIANI] and [JOHN EASTMAN] false advocacy there in the December 3 hearing) and asked [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] for help: "Looks like Georgia may well hold some factual hearings and change the certification under Art II sec 1 cl 2 of the Constitution. As [JOHN EASTMAN] explained they don't just have the right to do it but the obligation . . . . Help me get this done in Michigan." 168 On December 7, [RUDY GIULIANI] attempted to send [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] a message (though failed because he typed the wrong number into his phone): "So I need you to pass a joint resolution from the Michigan legislature that states that, * the election is in dispute, * there's an ongoing investigation by the Legislature, and * the Electors sent by Governor Whitmer are not the official Electors of the State of Michigan and do not fall within the Safe Harbor deadline of Dec 8 under Michigan law." 169 Campaign operative [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] was involved in the drafting of this message with the assistance of [MI. CAMPAIGN ASSOC.] who was associated with the defendant's Campaign efforts in Michigan. 170 The following day, [RUDY GIULIANI] shared the draft with the defendant, sending it to his executive assistant, [MOLLY MICHAEL, TRUMP EXEC. ASSIST.] by email. 171

These efforts failed. On December 14, the day that duly-appointed electors across the country met and cast their electoral votes, [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] and [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] issued public statements confirming that the defendant had lost Michigan and the legislators still had not received evidence of outcome-determinative fraud in their state. 172 [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] public statement included, "[W]e have not received evidence of fraud on a scale that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan." 173 [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] stated, in part:

We've diligently examined these reports of fraud to the best of our ability ... I fought hard for President Trump. Nobody wanted him to win more than me. I think he's done an incredible job. But I love am republic, too. I can't fathom risking our norms, traditions and institutions to pass a resolution retroactively changing the electors for Trump, simply because some think there may have been enough widespread fraud to give him the win. That's unprecedented for good reason. And that's why there is not enough support in the House to cast a new slate of electors. I fear we'd lose our country forever. This truly would bring mutually assured destruction for every future election in regards to the Electoral College. And I can't stand for that. I won't. 174


On January 3, the defendant's Campaign publicly posted [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] phone number, and attempted to post [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] (but erred by one digit), in a Tweet urging, "Contact Speaker [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] & Senate Majority Leader [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER]!" 175 [FORMER SEN. MIKE SHIRKEY (R)), MI. FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER] received four thousand text messages in two hours, forcing him to get a new phone number. 176

4. Nevada

On November 17, in Law v. Whitmer, agents of the defendant in Nevada filed suit, claiming "substantial irregularities, improprieties, and fraud" in the presidential election, including based on machines used in ballot signature matching and votes by non-resident and dead voters. 177 The defendant approved a press conference by his surrogates announcing the suit. 178

On November 19, [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] the RNC Chief Counsel, sent an email to [RNC SPOKESPERSON], an RNC spokesperson, warning about inaccuracies in the suit: "Just FYI that I don't believe the claims in the contest regarding dead voters, those voting from out-of-state, etc. are substantiated. We are working with the campaign on a data matching project and those numbers are going to be a lot lower than what the NV people have come up with. They are also targeting am military voters. To be frank, the contest has little chance of succeeding. Happy to discuss this stuff if you want more info." 179 [RNC SPOKESPERSON] then sent a copy of [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] email from her personal email account of [DAN SCAVINO, TRUMP’S THEN-SOCIAL MEDIA CHIEF] to the personal email account of [DAN SCAVINO, TRUMP’S THEN-SOCIAL MEDIA CHIEF], one of the defendant's White House staffers who also volunteered for the Campaign. 180

Notwithstanding the RNC Chief Counsel 's warning, the defendant re-tweeted and amplified news of the lawsuit on November 24, calling it "Big News!" that a Nevada Court had agreed to hear it. 181 But the defendant did not similarly promote the fact that within two weeks, on December 4, the Nevada District Court dismissed Law v. Whitmer, finding in a detailed opinion that "there is no credible or reliable evidence that the 2020 General Election in Nevada was affected by fraud," including through the signature-match machines, and that Biden won the election in the state. 182 Four days later, on December 8, Nevada's Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the District Court's decision, noting that despite its "earlier order asking appellants to identify specific findings with which they take issue, appellants have not pointed to any unsupported factual findings, and we have identified none." 183 Later, in his Ellipse speech on January 6, the defendant repeated multiple claims explicitly rejected by Nevada courts. 184

On December 18, the Nevada Secretary of State's Office released a "Facts vs. Myths" document to combat disinformation that the defendant and others were propagating about the election, including false claims that the Secretary of State's Office had not investigated claims of fraud even though it had ''been presented with evidence of wide-spread fraud" -- to which the Office responded, "While we are pursuing action in a number of isolated cases, we have yet to see any evidence of wide-spread fraud." 185 The "Facts vs. Myths" document also stated publicly that courts had universally rejected fraud claims: "Four separate cases were heard by Nevada judges including the NV Supreme Court. After examining records presented, each case was discounted due to a lack of evidence." 186

5. Pennsylvania

Two days after the election, on November 6, the defendant called the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Republican Party -- the entity responsible for supporting Republican candidates in the commonwealth at the federal, state, and local level. 187 [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY] had a prior relationship with the defendant, including having represented him in litigation in Pennsylvania after the 2016 presidential election. 188 The defendant asked [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY] how, without fraud, he had gone from winning Pennsylvania on election day to trailing in the days afterward. 189 Consistent with what Campaign staff already had told the defendant, [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY] confirmed that it was not fraud; it was that there were roughly 1,750,000 mail-in ballots still being counted in Pennsylvania, which were expected to be eighty percent for Biden.190 Over the following two months, the defendant spread false claims of fraud in Pennsylvania anyway.

In early November, in a Campaign meeting, when the defendant suggested that more people in Pennsylvania voted than had checked in to vote, Deputy Campaign Manager [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] corrected him. 191 Around the same time, Philadelphia City Commissioner [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY] appeared on television and stated that there was no evidence of widespread fraud in Philadelphia. 192 After seeing the interview, the defendant targeted tweeting, "A guy named [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY], a Philadelphia Commissioner and so-called Republican (RINO), is being used big time by the Fake News Media to explain how honest things were with respect to the Election in Philadelphia. He refuses to look at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty. We win!" 193 As a result of the defendant's attack, threats that already was receiving became more targeted and detailed -- and included his address and the names of his family members. 194

On the defendant's behalf, [RUDY GIULIANI] too spread patently false claims about Pennsylvania. On November 25, [RUDY GIULIANI] and [JENNA ELLIS] attended an unofficial hearing with Republican state legislators in a Gettysburg hotel conference room. 195 The defendant called in, claimed to have been watching, and demanded that the election in Pennsylvania "has to be turned around." 196 During the event, [RUDY GIULIANI] falsely stated that Pennsylvania issued 1.8 million absentee ballots and received 2.5 million in return. 197 The claim was rooted in an obvious error -- the comparison of the number of ballots sent out in the primary election to the number of ballots received in the general election. After seeing [RUDY GIULIANI] make this claim, [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL], the RNC's Chief Counsel, tweeted publicly, "This is not true." 198 In the following days, Campaign staff internally confirmed that [RUDY GIULIANI] was lying; when one Campaign staffer wrote in an email that claim was "just wrong" and "[t]here's no way to defend it," [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] responded, "We have been saying this for a while. It's very frustrating." 199 Likewise, in late November or December, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] informed the defendant directly that a claim [RUDY GIULIANI] was spreading, that "Pennsylvania received 700,000 more mail-in ballots than were mailed out," was "bullshit" and explained the error. 200

[JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] followed up on his public Tweet in a private email on November 28 to [RNC SPOKESPERSON] the RNC spokesperson, expressing his concern about [RUDY GIULIANI] and [JENNA ELLIS] spread of disinformation: "I'm really not trying to give you a hard time but what [RUDY GIULIANI] and [JENNA ELLIS] are doing is a joke and they are getting laughed out of court. It's setting us back in our fight for election integrity and they are misleading millions of people who have wishful thinking that the president is going to somehow win this thing." 201 When [RUDY GIULIANI] learned of [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] Tweet and email, on November 28, he called [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] and left a threatening voicemail, stating, "I really do need an explanation for what you said today because if there isn't a good one, you should resign. Got it? So call me or I'll call the boss and get you to resign. Call me. It'd be better for you if you do." 202 [RUDY GIULIANI] also contacted RNC Chairwoman [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] to demand that [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] be fired, and thereafter [JUSTIN RIEMER, RNC THEN-CHIEF COUNSEL] was relieved of his duties as RNC Chief Counsel. 203

On December 3, four Republican leaders of the Pennsylvania legislature issued a public letter stating that the General Assembly lacked the authority to overturn the popular vote and appoint its own slate of electors, and that doing so would violate the state Election Code and Constitution. 204 [BERNIE KERICK, EX-NYPD COMMISSIONER, ATTACKED PA. LAWMAKERS] -- an agent of the defendant who worked closely with [RUDY GIULIANI] -- issued a Tweet showing the four legislators' names and signatures and wrote, "These are the four cowardice Pennsylvania legislators that intend to allow the Democrat machine to #StealtheVote! #Cowards #Liars #Traitors" while linking to the legislators' Twitter accounts.205 On Sunday December 6, at 12:56 a.m., from the White House residence -- having just returned from a political rally in Valdosta, Georgia -- the defendant re-tweeted and amplified [BERNIE KERICK, EX-NYPD COMMISSIONER, ATTACKED PA. LAWMAKERS] post. 206

6. Wisconsin

On November 29, a recount that the defendant's Campaign had petitioned and paid for confirmed that Biden had won in Wisconsin -- and increased the defendant's margin of defeat. 207 On December 14, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the Campaign's election lawsuit there. 208 As a result, on December 21, Wisconsin's Governor signed a certificate of final determination confirming the prior certificate of ascel1airunent that established Biden's electors as the valid electors for the state. 209

In response, the defendant issued a series of Tweets attacking [BRIAN HAGEDORN, CONSERVATIVE WI. SUPREME CT. JUSTICE, TRUMP CRITICIZED FOR REJECTING TRUMP ELECTION LAWSUJIT] the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice who had written the majority opinion rejecting his Campaign's lawsuit and advocating that the Wisconsin legislature overturn the valid election results:

Two years ago, the great people of Wisconsin asked me to endorse a man named [BRIAN HAGEDORN, CONSERVATIVE WI. SUPREME CT. JUSTICE, TRUMP CRITICIZED FOR REJECTING TRUMP ELECTION LAWSUJIT] for State Supreme Court Justice, when he was getting destroyed in the Polls against a tough Democrat Candidate who had no chance of losing. After my endorsement, [BRIAN HAGEDORN, CONSERVATIVE WI. SUPREME CT. JUSTICE, TRUMP CRITICIZED FOR REJECTING TRUMP ELECTION LAWSUJIT] easily won! WOW, he just voted against me in a Big Court Decision on voter fraud (of which there was much!), despite many pages of dissent from three highly respected Justices. One thing has nothing to do with another, but we ended up losing 4-3 in a really incorrect ruling! Great Republicans in Wisconsin should take these 3 strong decisions to their State Legislators and overturn this ridiculous State Election. We won in a LANDSLIDE! 210


After the defendant's Tweet, the state marshals responsible for [BRIAN HAGEDORN, CONSERVATIVE WI. SUPREME CT. JUSTICE, TRUMP CRITICIZED FOR REJECTING TRUMP ELECTION LAWSUJIT] safety arranged to provide [BRIAN HAGEDORN, CONSERVATIVE WI. SUPREME CT. JUSTICE, TRUMP CRITICIZED FOR REJECTING TRUMP ELECTION LAWSUJIT] with additional police protection based on social media traffic and other threatening communications. 211

7. Voting Machines in Multiple States

Throughout the post-election period, the defendant and co-conspirators repeatedly made claims about the security and accuracy of voting machines across multiple states, despite the fact that they were on notice that the claims were false. As early as November 12, for instance, the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National Association of State Election Directors, and other coordinated federal, state, and private entities issued a public statement declaring that the 2020 election was "the most secure in American history" and that there was "no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised." 212

On November 14, in the Tweet announcing that [RUDY GIULIANI] was to lead his Campaign legal efforts, the defendant also named [SIDNEY POWELL] a private attorney who was fixated on voting machine claims, and [JOSEPH DIGENOVA], another private attorney. 213 Two days later, on November 16, on the defendant's behalf, executive assistant [MOLLY MICHAEL, TRUMP EXEC. ASSIST.] sent [SIDNEY POWELL] and other private attorneys an email, titled "From POTUS," attaching a document containing bullet points critical of [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS], a company that manufactured voting machines used in certain states, and writing, "See attached -- Please include as is, or almost as is, in lawsuit." 214 [SIDNEY POWELL] responded nine minutes later, writing, "IT MUST GO IN ALL SUITS IN GA AND PA IMMEDIATELY WITH A FRAUD CLAIM THAT REQUIRES THE ENTIRE ELECTION TO BE SET ASIDE in those states and machines impounded for non-partisan professional inspection." 215

On November 17, [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY], the director of the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), publicly tweeted that a group of private election security experts concluded that claims of computer-based election fraud "either have been unsubstantiated or are technically incoherent." 216

Two days later, on November 19, [RUDY GIULIANI], [SIDNEY POWELL], [JOSEPH DIGENOVA] and others held a press conference at the RNC headquarters, on behalf of the defendant and his Campaign. 217 During it, [SIDNEY POWELL] made false and factually impossible claims regarding [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] and the integrity of the Country's election infrastructure. 218 That night, Fox News television personality [TUCKER CARLSON] stated on air that because of [SIDNEY POWELL] incendiary comments about voting machines, he had invited her on his television program. He further stated, "[ b]ut she never sent us any evidence, despite a lot of requests, polite requests. Not a page. When we kept pressing, she got angry and told us to stop contacting her. When we checked with others around the Trump Campaign, people in positions of authority, they told us [SIDNEY POWELL] has never given them any evidence either ... she never demonstrated that a single actual vote was moved illegitimately by software from one candidate to another. Not one." 219

The defendant saw his private attorneys' RNC press conference and [TUCKER CARLSON] discussion of [SIDNEY POWELL] and he acknowledged to [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] that [SIDNEY POWELL] had appeared "unhinged" in the press conference. 220 On November 20, the day after the press conference, the defendant made a similar comment to [ASSISTANT TO PRES., TO WHOM TRUMP SAID SIDNEY POWELL’S ELECTION FRAUD CLAIMS WERE “CRAZY”] and [DAN SCAVINO, TRUMP’S THEN-SOCIAL MEDIA CHIEF], two White House staffers who also volunteered for his Campaign. 221 In casual conversation after another meeting had ended, the defendant told [ASSISTANT TO PRES., TO WHOM TRUMP SAID SIDNEY POWELL’S ELECTION FRAUD CLAIMS WERE “CRAZY”] and [DAN SCAVINO, TRUMP’S THEN-SOCIAL MEDIA CHIEF] that [TUCKER CARLSON] had "eviscerated" or "destroyed" [SIDNEY POWELL]. 222 The defendant then had a call with [SIDNEY POWELL] on speaker phone, while [ASSISTANT TO PRES., TO WHOM TRUMP SAID SIDNEY POWELL’S ELECTION FRAUD CLAIMS WERE “CRAZY”] and [DAN SCAVINO, TRUMP’S THEN-SOCIAL MEDIA CHIEF] listened in, and mentioned the [TUCKER CARLSON] segment to [SIDNEY POWELL]. 223 While [SIDNEY POWELL] responded, the defendant placed the call on mute and to [ASSISTANT TO PRES., TO WHOM TRUMP SAID SIDNEY POWELL’S ELECTION FRAUD CLAIMS WERE “CRAZY”] and [DAN SCAVINO, TRUMP’S THEN-SOCIAL MEDIA CHIEF] mocked and laughed at n[SIDNEY POWELL] called her claims "crazy," and made a reference to the science fiction series Star Trek when describing her allegations. 224 In the same time period, when [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] told the defendant that [SIDNEY POWELL] claims were unreliable and should not be included in lawsuits, the defendant agreed that he had not seen anything to substantiate [SIDNEY POWELL] allegations. 225

On November 22, notwithstanding the defendant's Tweet from eight days prior announcing [SIDNEY POWELL] involvement, [RUDY GIULIANI] issued a statement on behalf of the Campaign distancing the defendant from [SIDNEY POWELL], "[SIDNEY POWELL] is practicing law on her own. She is not a member of the Trump Legal Team. She is also not a lawyer for the President in his personal capacity." 226 Nonetheless, the defendant continued to support and publicize knowingly false claims. For example, within days of [RUDY GIULIANI] statement, the defendant promoted a lawsuit that [SIDNEY POWELL] was about to file, tweeting on November 24, "BREAKING NEWS: @ [SIDNEY POWELL] says her lawsuit in Georgia could be filed as soon as tomorrow and says there's no way there was anything but widespread election fraud. #MAGA #AmericaFirst #Dobbs." 227 [SIDNEY POWELL] filed a lawsuit the next day against the Governor of Georgia falsely alleging "massive election fraud" accomplished through [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] election software and hardware. 228 The defendant again promoted the lawsuit in a Tweet. 229 The lawsuit was dismissed within two weeks, on December 7. 230

On November 29, [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY], who was no longer the CISA Director, appeared on the television program 60 Minutes. 231 [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY] stated that he was confident that the election had been secure and "that there was no manipulation of the vote on the machine count side." 232 In response, the defendant tweeted publicly about [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY] appearance: "@60Minutes never asked us for a comment about their ridiculous, one sided story on election security, which is an international joke. Our 2020 Election, from poorly rated [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] to a Country FLOODED with unaccounted for Mail-In ballots, was probably our least secure EVER!" 233 A few days later, [JOSEPH DIGENOVA] appeared on a radio program as the defendant's agent and said that because of [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY]'s comments to promote confidence in the security of the election infrastructure, [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY] "should be drawn and quartered. Taken out at dawn and shot." 234 Thereafter, [CHRIS KREBS, THEN-CYBERSEC. CZAR, WHO CALLED ELECTION “MOST SECURE” IN HISTORY] was subjected to death threats. 235 In a press conference on December 1 that the defendant acknowledged watching, 236 [GABRIEL STERLING, COO GA. SECTY. STATE], a Georgia election official, decried [JOSEPH DIGENOVA] and the defendant's public statements spreading disinformation and said that if they did not stop, "someone is going to get killed." 237

On December 1, Attorney General [BILL BARR] stated publicly that the Justice Department had not seen evidence of fraud sufficient to change the election results. 238 With respect to voting machines, he said, "There's been one assertion that would be systemic fraud and that would be the claim that machines were programmed essentially to skew the election results. And the DHS and DOJ have looked into that, and so far, we haven't seen anything to substantiate that." 239 [RUDY GIULIANI], and [JENNA ELLIS] immediately issued a formal Campaign statement attacking [BILL BARR] and the Justice Department, writing, "With all due respect to the Attorney General, there hasn't been any semblance of a Department of Justice Investigation ... his opinion appears to be without any knowledge or investigation of the substantial irregularities and evidence of systemic fraud."

In mid-December, the defendant spoke with RNC Chairwoman [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] and asked her to publicize and promote a private report that had been released on December 13 that purported to identify flaws in the use of [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] machines in Antrim County, Michigan. 241 [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] refused, telling the defendant that she already had discussed the report with [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.], Michigan's Speaker of the House, who had told her that the report was inaccurate. 242 [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] conveyed to the defendant [FORMER REP. LEE CHATFIELD (R), MI. FORMER SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP.] exact assessment: the report was "fucking nuts." 243

On January 2, during the defendant's call with Georgia Secretary of State [SEC. BRAD RAFFENSPERGER (R), GA. SECTY. STATE] said of false claims regarding voting machines, "I don't believe that you're really questioning the [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] machines. Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent re-tally of all the ballots, and compared them to what the machines said and came up with virtually the same result. Then we did the recount, and we got virtually the same result. So I guess we can probably take that off the table." 244 In response, the defendant falsely claimed that "in other states, we think we found tremendous corruption with [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] machines, but we'll have to see." 245

At the Ellipse on January 6, the defendant and co-conspirators who spoke at the rally continued to make unsubstantiated and false claims about [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] machines. [RUDY GIULIANI] claimed that in the U.S. Senate run-off election in Georgia the day before, "the votes were deliberately changed by the same algorithm that was used in cheating President Trump and Vice President Pence." 246 [JOHN EASTMAN] continued the false attack: "We now know because we caught it live last time in real time, how the machines contributed to that fraud. . . . They put those ballots in a secret folder in the machines sitting there waiting, until they know how many they need. And then the machine after the close of polls, we now know who's voted. And we know who hasn't. And I can now in that machine match those unvoted ballots with an unvoted voter and put them together in the machine. We saw it happen in real time last night and it happened on November 3rd as well." 247 In his own speech, the defendant again raised the false specter of "the highly troubling matter of [DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS] and lied about machines flipping votes from the defendant to Biden and an "astronomical and astounding" error rate in the machines' ballot scanning. 248

D. The Defendant Organized and Caused His Electors to Submit Fraudulent Certificates Creating the False Appearance That States Submitted Competing Electoral Slates

By late November 2020, every effort -- both legitimate and illegitimate -- that the defendant had made to challenge the results of the election had been unsuccessful. The defendant, his Campaign, and their allies had lost or withdrawn one election lawsuit after another in the seven targeted states. And the defendant and co-conspirators' efforts to overturn the legitimate vote count through a pressure campaign on state officials, and through false claims made directly to state legislators in formal or pseudo-hearings, continued to fail. So in early December, the defendant and his co-conspirators developed a new plan regarding the targeted states that the defendant had lost (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin): to organize the people who would have served as the defendant's electors had he won the popular vote, and cause them to sign and send to Pence, as President of the Senate, certifications in which they falsely represented themselves as legitimate electors who had cast electoral votes for the defendant. Ultimately, the defendant and his co-conspirators would use these fraudulent electoral votes -- mere pieces of paper without the lawful imprimatur of a state executive -- to falsely claim that in his ministerial role presiding over the January 6 certification, Pence had the authority to choose the fraudulent slates over the legitimate ones, or to send the purportedly "dueling" slates to the state legislatures for consideration anew.

The fraudulent elector plan's arc and obstructive purpose is reflected in a series of memoranda drafted in late November and early December by an attorney who volunteered to assist the defendant's Campaign in lawsuits challenging the election in Wisconsin. 249 Beginning with a memorandum drafted on November advocated that the defendant's elector nominees in Wisconsin meet and cast votes on the date required by the ECA (in 2020, December 14) in the event that an ongoing recount in the state reversed the defendant's loss there. 250 But this course of action -- which [KENNETH CHESEBRO] Wisconsin memorandum presented as a contingency plan to preserve the possibility that the defendant's electors' votes be counted at the January 6 certification proceeding if he prevailed in the Wisconsin litigation and won the state -- quickly transformed into a corrupt strategy to overturn the legitimate election results. 251 [KENNETH CHESEBRO] revealed this obstructive plan in two additional memoranda, dated December 6, 252 and December 9, 253 which proposed that the defendant's elector nominees in six of the targeted states -- all but New Mexico, a state the defendant lost by more than ten percent of the popular vote, sparsely referenced in his false claims of voter fraud, and did not envision challenging at the inception of the elector scheme 254 -- meet on December 14, sign fraudulent certifications, and send them to the Vice President to manufacture a fake controversy during the January 6 congressional certification.

The defendant personally set the fraudulent elector plan in motion in early December, ensured that it was carried out by co-conspirators and Campaign agents in the targeted states, and monitored its progress. By December 5, the defendant was starting to think about Congress's role in the election process; for the first time, he mentioned to Pence the possibility of challenging the election results in the House of Representatives. 255 In the same call, Pence told the defendant that the Georgia Bureau of Investigation was investigating their race. 256

On December 6, the same day that [KENNETH CHESEBRO] put the plan on paper, 257 the defendant and [JOHN EASTMAN] called RNC Chairwoman [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] out of the blue. 258 [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] did not know [JOHN EASTMAN] and the defendant introduced him to [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] by saying that he was a professor and lawyer; thereafter, [JOHN EASTMAN] was the primary speaker during the conversation. 259 [JOHN EASTMAN] told [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] that he and the defendant wanted the RNC "to help the campaign assemble the electors in the states where we had legal challenges, or litigation that was ongoing. . in case any of that litigation changed the result of a state so that it would meet the constitutional requirement of electors meeting." 260 When the call ended, [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] immediately called [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] one of the defendant's deputy Campaign managers, and relayed her conversation with the defendant and [JOHN EASTMAN] 261 After [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] assured [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] that the Campaign was "on it," [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR], called the defendant back and told him so. 262 On the same day, from his personal email account, [MARK MEADOWS] forwarded to Campaign staff [KENNETH CHESEBRO] November 18 memorandum and wrote, "We just need to have someone coordinating the electors for states.,,263 And the following day, on the evening of December 7, sent a text message stating in pat1, "I have lawyers assigned in each state working on Dec 14 electors meeting and what they need. I will send you a list." 264

The defendant's co-conspirators worked with his Campaign staff, and used his pre-election Campaign apparatus, to execute the fraudulent elector plan. 265 The defendant communicated with [RUDY GIULIANI] and [JOHN EASTMAN] about the plan, 266 and they in turn communicated with [BORIS EPSHTEYN] and [KENNETH CHESEBRO]. 267 Ultimately, [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE], [CHRISTINA BOBB], and other Campaign staff and agents helped carry out [KENNETH CHESEBRO] plans. 268

On December 8, [KENNETH CHESEBRO] spoke on the phone with [JACK WILENCHIK] 269, a private attorney whom [RUDY GIULIANI] and [BORIS EPSHTEYN] had identified as a contact for the plan in Arizona. 270 Following the call, [JACK WILENCHIK] recounted the conversation in an email:

I just talked to the gentleman who did that memo, [KENNETH CHESEBRO]. His idea is basically that all of us (GA, WI, AZ, PA, etc.) have our electors send in their votes (even though the votes aren't legal under federal law -- because they're not signed by Governor); so that members of Congress can fight about whether they should be counted on January 6th. (They could potentially argue that they're not bound by federal law because they're Congress and make the law, etc.) Kind of wild/creative - I'm happy to discuss. My comment to him is that I guess there's no harm in it, (legally at least) -- i.e. we would just be sending in "fake" electoral votes to Pence so that "someone" in Congress can make an objection when they stal1 counting votes, and start arguing that the "fake" votes should be counted. 271


On December 9, [BORIS EPSHTEYN] contacted [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] for assistance with a request from [KENNETH CHESEBRO] for "a list of our electors in each state and copies of the cel1ificates sent in 4 years ago." 272 [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] responded that Campaign employees were already assisting in the effort and referred [BORIS EPSHTEYN] to [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER]. 273 The next day, at [RUDY GIULIANI]'s direction, [KENNETH CHESEBRO] generated directions to the electors in all of the targeted states except for Wisconsin (which had already received his memos) and New Mexico (which he had not yet been asked to do) on how best to mimic the manner in which valid electors were required by state law to gather and vote, along with fraudulent certificates of vote for the defendant's electors to sign. 274

The day before the defendant's electors were scheduled to meet and sign fraudulent certificates of vote, the defendant asked Campaign advisor [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] for an update on the elector plan and directed [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] to issue a statement, and [RUDY GIULIANI] asked [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] to participate in a messaging conference call. 275 [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] discussed these developments in a text thread with [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] Campaign Staffer [TRUMP CAMPAIGN STAFFER DISCUSSED FALSE ELECTOR SCHEME ON TEXT MSG. THREAD] and [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER]. After [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] proposed a communications plan for the Campaign on the elector vote, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] wrote to [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER]. "I'll call soon and we'll talk with boss." 276 The participants then discussed to whom a Campaign statement could be attributed. [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] wrote, "Here's the thing the way this has morphed it's a crazy play so I don't know who wants to put their name on it." 277 [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] then shared with those on the text thread the invitees to the call [RUDY GIULIANI] was convening -- [RUDY GIULIANI], [BORIS EPSHTEYN], [JENNA ELLIS], [CHRISTINA BOBB], [RUDY GIULIANI ATTORNEY, MEMBER OF “STAR WARS BAR”] and [ANOTHER MEMBER OF “STAR WARS BAR”] and derogatorily referred to them as the "Star Wars bar," meaning a motley assortment of characters, and in this case specifically ones whose professional competence [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] doubted and whom he personally would not choose to hire. 278 [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER] responded, "Certifying illegal votes." 279 Thereafter, the text participants collectively agreed that no message would go out under their names because they "can't stand by it." 280 In the midst of these text messages, [ERIC HERSCHMANN, WHITE HOUSE LAWYER], [JASON MILLER, TRUMP SENIOR CAMPAIGN ADVISOR] and [JUSTIN CLARK, TRUMP THEN-DEPUTY CAMPAIGN MANAGER] had a nineteen-minute phone call with the defendant. 281

In practice, the fraudulent elector plan played out somewhat differently in each targeted state. In general, the co-conspirators deceived the defendant's elector nominees in the same way that the defendant deceived and [JOHN EASTMAN] deceived [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] by falsely claiming that their electoral votes would be used only if ongoing litigation were resolved in the defendant's favor. 282 A select few of the defendant's agents and elector nominees, however, had insight into the ultimate plan to use the fraudulent elector certificates to disrupt the congressional certification on January 6. 283 In several states, the defendant, his co-conspirators, and agents were unable to convince all of the defendant's elector nominees to participate. 284 [FRMR. REP. TOM MARINO (R. PA.), THEN-PA CONGRESSMAN OPTED OUT OF FALSE ELECTOR SCHEME] for instance, a former U.S. Representative and U.S. Attorney and one of the defendant's elector nominees in Pennsylvania who opted out of the plan, told the state party vice chair trying to organize the defendant's electors that he would not participate because the plan did not follow the proper process and was illegal. 285 When electors like [FRMR. REP. TOM MARINO (R. PA.), THEN-PA CONGRESSMAN OPTED OUT OF FALSE ELECTOR SCHEME] declined, the conspirators and agents had to recruit substitutes willing to go along with the plan. 286 Other electors who participated based on the conspirators' false assurances that their votes were only a contingency were later surprised to learn that they were used on January 6 -- and would not have agreed to participate if the conspirators had been truthful about their plan. 287

In Pennsylvania, the defendant's elector nominees' concern about the propriety of the plan presented a problem for the conspirators. In text messages that [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] and [BORIS EPSHTEYN] exchanged on December 11 into the early morning hours of December 12, [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] told [BORIS EPSHTEYN] that [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY], the state Republican Party Chairman whom the defendant had called shortly after the election 288 -- "is winding up the electors. Telling them if the[y] sign the petition they could be prosecuted. Need a counter argument or someone has to call him and tell him to stop." 289 [BORIS EPSHTEYN] responded, "Have someone who knows him call him to tell him to stop." 290 [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] replied, "That's the plan. PA is squishy right now. Going to need a call with [RUDY GIULIANI] tomorrow." 291

On December 12, [RUDY GIULIANI], [KENNETH CHESEBRO], [BORIS EPSHTEYN] and others held a conference call organized by the Campaign to placate the defendant's Pennsylvania electors. 292 [RUDY GIULIANI] falsely assured them that their cel1ificates of vote would be used only if the defendant succeeded in litigation. 293 During the call, some of the defendant's conspirators and agents exchanged text messages expressing frustration at the electors' concerns. 294 [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] wrote, "Whoever selected this slate should be shot." [JENNA ELLIS] responded, "These people are making this so much more complicated than it needs to be omg" and "We couldn't have found 20 people better than this???" [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] agreed, writing, "We need good substitutes." 295 When the possibility arose that the electors' certificates of vote include conditional language making clear that they were not yet the duly-appointed electors, [MICHAEL ROMAN, TRUMP CAMPAIGN OPERATIVE, SAID “MAKE THEM RIOT” AT DETROIT POLLING PLACE] wrote, "The other States are signing what [KENNETH CHESEBRO] prepared -- if it gets out we changed the language for PA it could snowball." 296

On December 13, the eve of when the electors were to meet, the defendant was preoccupied with preventing the certification of the electoral vote. He tweeted: "Swing States that have found massive VOTER FRAUD, which is all of them, CANNOT LEGALLY CERTIFY these votes as complete & correct without committing a severely punishable crime. Everybody knows that dead people, below age people, illegal immigrants, fake signatures, prisoners, and many others voted illegally. Also, machine 'glitches' (another word for FRAUD), ballot harvesting, non-resident voters, fake ballots, 'stuffing the ballot box', votes for pay, roughed up Republican Poll Watchers, and sometimes even more votes than people voting, took place in Detroit, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. In all Swing State cases, there are far more votes than are necessary to win the State, and the Election itself. Therefore, VOTES CANNOT BE CERTIFIED. THIS ELECTION IS UNDER PROTEST!" 297

Ultimately, the Pennsylvania electors insisted upon using conditional language in their elector certificates to avoid falsely certifying that they were duly-appointed electors. 298 And in New Mexico -- the state that [KENNETH CHESEBRO]'s memoranda did not even address 299 -- the defendant's Campaign filed a pretextual lawsuit just minutes before the fraudulent electors met so that there was litigation pending at the time of the vote. 300 Notwithstanding obstacles, the defendant and his co-conspirators successfully organized his elector nominees and substitutes to gather on December 14 in the targeted states, cast fraudulent electoral votes on his behalf, and send those fraudulent votes to Washington, D.C., in order to falsely claim at the congressional certification that certain states had sent competing slates of electors. 301

When possible, the defendant and co-conspirators tried to have the fake electoral votes appear to be in compliance with state law governing how legitimate electors vote. 302 For example, the co-conspirators knew that some states required that the duly-appointed electors meet and cast their votes in the state capitol building. 303 To make it seem like they had complied with this requirement, state officials were enlisted to provide the fraudulent electors with access to state capitol buildings so that they could gather and vote there. 304 In many cases, however, the conspirators and fraudulent electors were unable to comply with state law for legitimate electors. 305 For example, Pennsylvania law required the Governor to give notice whenever an elector was substituted, but the conspirators could not arrange for the Governor to give notice when [LAWRENCE TABAS, CHAIR PENN. REPUB. PARTY] and others opted out and had to be replaced. 306 Thereafter, [KENNETH CHESEBRO] and others brainstormed fake excuses for their failure to follow state law, writing, "maybe we can use Covid 19 as an excuse for the Governor not giving notice." 307

Then, on December 14 -- the date that duly-appointed electors across the country met to cast their votes, and when the defendant's fraudulent electors in seven states mimicked them -- [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] followed up with the defendant. 308 When she received an internal RNC email titled "Electors Recap - Final," which summarized the day's activities with respect to electors and included a list of six "contested" states in which the defendant's electors voted, she forwarded it to the defendant's executive assistant, [MOLLY MICHAEL, TRUMP EXEC. ASSIST.] who responded, "It's in front of him!" 309 [RONNA MCDANIEL, THEN-RNC CHAIR] also called the defendant to tell him that she had sent him the update, 310 and she spoke spoke to [RUDY GIULIANI] shortly before [RUDY GIULIANI] spoke to the defendant. 311

At the same time that the defendant's fraudulent electors were preparing to gather and cast fraudulent votes, the defendant's co-conspirators began planning how to use the fraudulent votes to overturn the election results at the January 6 certification. On December 13, [KENNETH CHESEBRO] sent [RUDY GIULIANI] a memorandum that envisioned a scenario in which Pence would use the fraudulent slates as a pretext to claim that there were dueling slates of electors from the targeted states and negotiate a solution to defeat Biden. 312 On the same day, the defendant resumed almost daily direct contact with [STEVE BANNON] who maintained a podcast that disseminated the defendant's false fraud claims. 313 On December 14, [STEVE BANNON] podcast focused on spreading lies about the defendant's fraudulent electors-including the false claim that their votes were merely a contingency in the event the defendant won legal challenges in the targeted states. 314

On December 16, [KENNETH CHESEBRO] traveled to Washington with a group of private attorneys who had done work for the defendant's Campaign in Wisconsin for a photo opportunity with the defendant in the Oval Office. 315 During the encounter, the defendant complained about Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice [BRIAN HAGEDORN, CONSERVATIVE WI. SUPREME CT. JUSTICE, TRUMP CRITICIZED FOR REJECTING TRUMP ELECTION LAWSUJIT] who two days earlier had cast the deciding vote in rejecting the defendant's election challenge in the state. 316 As the group was leaving, the defendant spoke directly -- and privately -- to [KENNETH CHESEBRO]. 317

As late as early January, the conspirators attempted to keep the full nature of the fraudulent elector plan secret. On January 3, for instance, in a private text message exchange, [BORIS EPSHTEYN] wrote to [KENNETH CHESEBRO] "Careful with your texts on text groups. No reason to text things about electors to anyone but [JOHN EASTMAN] and me." [KENNETH CHESEBRO] responded, "K," and [BORIS EPSHTEYN] followed up, "I'm probably a bit paranoid haha." [KENNETH CHESEBRO] wrote, "A valuable trait. 318
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