PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

That's French for "the ancient system," as in the ancient system of feudal privileges and the exercise of autocratic power over the peasants. The ancien regime never goes away, like vampires and dinosaur bones they are always hidden in the earth, exercising a mysterious influence. It is not paranoia to believe that the elites scheme against the common man. Inform yourself about their schemes here.

Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:00 pm

CHAPTER 9: THE TYPE-PROBLEM IN BIOGRAPHY

As one might almost expect, the province of biography also yields its contribution to the problem of psychological types. Chiefly we have to thank the natural science method of Wilhelm Ostwald [1] who was able, by means of a biographical comparison of certain outstanding natural scientists, to establish a typical psychological antithesis, which he termed the classic and romantic types [2] "While the former", says Ostwald, "is characterized by the well-rounded perfection of each individual achievement, and at the same time by a rather withdrawn nature whose personal effect upon his environment is but slight, the romanticist stands out by reason of the very opposite characters. His quality lies not so much in the perfecting of individual work as in the variety and telling originality of numerous achievements that follow each other in rapid succession; in addition, the effect he exercises upon his contemporaries is, as a rule, immediate and impressive ... It must also be pointed out that the rapidity of mental reaction is the decisive criterion of the particular type to which the scientist belongs. Pioneers who possess great reactive rapidity are the 'romantics,' while those with slower mental reactions are the 'classics' (pp. 44 fl.). The classic produces slowly, as a rule, only bringing forth the ripest fruit of his mind relatively late in life" (p. 89). A never-failing characteristic of the classic type, according to Ostwald, is the "absolute need to stand without error or blemish in the public eye" (p. 94). "As a compensation for his lack of personal influence, the classic type is assured an all the more potent effect with his writings" (p. 100).

This effect, however, seems also to be beset with limitations, as the following case, quoted by Ostwald from the biography of Helmholtz, testifies. A propos Helmholtz's mathematical researches concerning the effect of induction-shocks, Du Bois-Raymond writes to the scientist: "You should devote yourself -- and please don't take this amiss -- much more carefully to the problem of how to abstract yourself from your own standpoint of science, so that you may understand the standpoint of one who, as yet, knows nothing about the matter, or what it is you want to discuss." To which Helmholtz replies: "And as to the paper, I really took great pains this time in the presentation of my material, and I imagined that, at last, I might be satisfied with it." Whereat Ostwald observes: "He is quite oblivious of the problem from the reader's point of view, because, true to his 'classic' type, he is writing for himself, i.e. he presents the material in a way that seems to him indisputable, while the rest do not matter at all." What Du Bois-Raymond writes in the same letter to Helmholtz is extremely characteristic: "I have read both the treatise and the summary several times without understanding what you have actually done, or the way you did it. Finally, I myself discovered your method, and I am now gradually beginning to understand your presentation."

For the classic type this case is true to the life, for he seldom or never succeeds "in kindling souls of like nature with his own" (p. 100), a thoroughly typical event, which shows that the influence ascribed to him through writing is, as a rule, largely posthumous, i.e. it appears only in the subsequent discovery of his writings, as in the case of Robert Mayer. Moreover, his writings often seem to lack any convincing, inspiring, or directly personal appeal, since, ultimately, writing is just as much a personal expression as conversation or lecturing. The influence the classic type transmits through writing depends not so much, therefore, upon the externally stimulating qualities of his writings as upon the circumstance that these are all that finally remain of him, and that only from these can the man's actual achievement subsequently be reconstructed. For it seems to be a fact, which is also alluded to in Ostwald's description, that the classic seldom communicates what he is doing and the way he does it, but only what he arrives at, quite regardless of the fact that his public possesses no inkling of his route. It would seem that his way and method of work are of less importance to the classic just because they are most intimately linked up with his personality, which is something he always keeps in the background.

Ostwald compares his two types with the four ancient temperaments (p. 372) with special reference to the peculiarity of slow or rapid reactions, which in his view seems to be fundamental. The slow reaction corresponds with the phlegmatic and the melancholic temperaments, the quick reaction with the sanguine and the choleric. He regards the sanguine and the phlegmatic as the normal middle types, whereas the choleric and the melancholic seem to him morbid exaggerations of the basic character.

If one glances through the biographies of Humphry Davy and Liebig upon the one hand, and of Robert Mayer and Faraday upon the other, one cannot but perceive that the former are both distinctly "romantic" and sanguinely-choleric, while the latter are just as clearly "classic" and phlegmatically-melancholic. This observation of Ostwald's seems to me entirely convincing, since the four antique temperaments were most probably constructed from the same principle of experience as that upon which Ostwald has also established the classic and romantic types. The four temperaments are obviously differentiated from the standpoint of affectivity, i.e. the manifest affective reactions. This classification is, however, superficial from the psychological standpoint, for it judges exclusively from the outer appearance. According to this ancient division, the man whose behaviour is outwardly peaceful and inconspicuous belongs to the phlegmatic temperament. He passes as 'phlegmatic', and is, thereupon, classified among the phlegmatics. But, in reality, he may conceivably be all this yet no 'phlegmatic', but on the contrary a' deeply sensitive, even passionate, nature, in whom emotion pursues the inward course, wherewith the intensest inner excitement expresses itself through the greatest outward calm.

Jordan's type-conception takes this fact into account. He judges not merely from the surface impression, but from a rather deeper grasp of human nature. Ostwald's fundamental marks of distinction, like the antique temperamental divisions, depend chiefly upon the external impression. His romantic type is characterized by the presence of a quick outward reaction. Whereas the classic type reacts just as quickly maybe, but within.

As one reads the Ostwald biographies, one sees at once that the romantic type corresponds with the extravert, while the classic with the introvert. Humphry Davy and Liebig are perfect examples of the extraverted type, just as Robert Mayer and Faraday are model introverts. The outward reaction is characteristic of the extravert, just as the inner reaction distinguishes the introvert. The extravert has no especial difficulty in his personal manifestations; he asserts his presence almost involuntarily, because in obedience to his whole nature he strives to transvey himself into the object. He easily gives himself to the world about him, and in a form necessarily comprehensible and, therefore, acceptable to his world. The form is, as a rule, pleasing, but, in any case, intelligible, even when it is unpleasing. For, as a result of his quick reaction and discharge, both valuable and worthless contents will be transveyed into the object, winning manners hand-in-hand with forbidding thoughts and affects. But from this quick unloading and transference there is less elaboration of his contents, which are, therefore, easy to understand; so that, even from the mere fleeting apposition of immediate expressions, a shifting succession of images is produced which clearly present to the public eye the ways and means by which the investigator has attained his result.

The introvert, on the other hand, who reacts almost entirely within, does not, as a rule, divest himself of his reactions. (Affect-explosions excepted). He suppresses his reactions, which, however, can be just as quick as those of the extravert. They do not play on the surface -- hence the introvert may easily give the impression of slowness. Since immediate reactions are always strongly personal, the extravert cannot choose but exhibit his personality. The introvert, on the other hand, hides his personality, because he suppresses his immediate reactions. 'Feeling-into' is not his aim, nor the transference of his contents into the object, but rather abstraction from the object. Hence, instead of immediately divesting himself of his .reactions, he prefers to make a long internal elaboration of them, before finally bringing forth a prepared result. His constant effort is to free his result, as far as possible, from personal elements, to present it clearly differentiated from every personal relation. His contents, the matured fruit of prolonged inner labour, emerge into the outer world in the most completely abstracted and depersonalized form. Accordingly, they are also difficult to understand, because the public lacks all knowledge of the preliminary steps, or the kind of route by which the investigator reaches his result. A personal relation to his public is also lacking, because the introvert in suppressing himself shrouds his personality from the public eye. But often enough it is just the personal. relationship which brings about the understanding that was denied to mere intellectual apprehension. This circumstance must constantly be borne in mind when judgment is made upon an introvert's development. As a rule, one is ill-informed about the introvert, because his real self is not visible. His incapacity for immediate outward reactions occludes his personality. Hence, to the public eye, his life provides ample scope for the play of phantastic interpretations and projections, should he ever chance -- by virtue of his achievements -- to become the object of general interest.

The observation of Ostwald that "early mental maturity is characteristic of the romantic", needs, therefore, to be somewhat modified. The romantic is certainly able to display his prematurity, but the' classic', although perhaps equally mature, may conceal his products within himself, not designedly of course, but from an inability for immediate expression. As a result of deficient differentiation of feeling, the introvert exhibits a certain awkwardness, a real infantilism in the personal relation, i.e. in that element which the Englishman calls 'personality'. His personal manifestations are so uncertain and vague, and he himself is so sensitive in this respect, that he dares to reveal himself to his circle only with what, in his own eyes, is an apparently finished product. He also prefers to let his product speak for him, instead of personally interceding on its behalf.

The natural result of such an attitude means a considerably delayed appearance upon the world's stage; so frequently is this so, that the introvert might easily be described as late in maturing. Such a superficial judgment, however, wholly ignores the fact that the infantilism of the seemingly early matured and outwardly differentiated extravert is simply within, in his relation to his inner world. In the early matured extravert this fact is only subsequently revealed, in some moral immaturity, for instance, or, as is so often the case, in an astonishing infantilism of thought.

As a rule, the romantic has more favourable opportunities for development and growth than the classic, a fact which Ostwald justly observes. He makes a visible and convincing appearance before his public, allowing his personal importance to be recognized immediately through his external reactions. In this way many valuable relations are quickly established, which enrich his work and give breadth (p. 374) to its development.

The classic, on the other hand, remains hidden; his lack of personal relations limits any extension of his sphere of work, but thereby his activity gains in depth and his labour has lasting value.

Both types possess enthusiasm, but, while that which fills the extravert's heart overflows from his mouth, the introvert's lips are sealed by the enthusiasm that moves him within. Kindling no flame of enthusiasm in the world about him, he even lacks a circle of colleagues of equal calibre. Even had he, too, the impelling desire to impart his knowledge, his laconic expression, as also the mystified lack of comprehension it produces in his public, would deter him from further communications; for it very frequently happens that no one believes he has anything extraordinary to give. His expression, his 'personality' appear commonplace to the superficial judgment, while not infrequently the romantic immediately appears 'interesting' and understands the art of encouraging this impression by every sort of means, whether permissible or not. This differentiated capacity for expression provides a suitable background for impressive ideas, besides being an accommodating assistance in helping the deficient understanding of his public over the interstices of his thinking.

Ostwald's emphasis upon the successful and brilliant academic activities of the romantic is, therefore, entirely expressive of this type. The romantic feels himself into his pupils and knows the right word at the right moment. But the classic is held to his own thoughts and problems, and thus is blind to his pupils' difficulties in understanding. Speaking of the classic Helmholtz, Ostwald remarks (p. 377):

"In spite of his prodigious learning, comprehensive experience, and richly creative mind, he was never a good teacher: his reactions never came instantaneously, but only after a certain lapse of time. Confronted by a pupil's question in the laboratory, he would promise to think it over, and only after several days would he bring the answer; this turned out to be so remote from the situation of the pupil that only in the rarest cases was it possible for the latter to discover any connection between the difficulty he had felt and the well-rounded theory of a general problem subsequently expounded by the teacher. Thus, not only was the immediate help lacking upon which every beginner very largely relies, but also that guidance commensurate with the pupil's personality by which he may gradually develop from the natural dependence of the beginner to the complete mastery of his chosen branch of science. All such defects have their immediate source in the inability of the teacher to react directly as the need of the pupil presents itself, his reactions demanding so much time for their expected and desired operation that their very effect is lost."


Ostwald's explanation of this as the result of the slowness of the introvert's reaction seems to me inadequate. There is no sort of proof that Helmholtz possessed a low reactive rapidity. He merely reacted inwardly rather than outwardly. Because the pupil was not felt-into, as it were, the latter's need was dark to him. His attitude is wholly bent upon his thoughts; hence instead of the personal wish of the pupil, he reacts to the thoughts the pupil's question has excited in himself, and this he does so rapidly and fundamentally that he at once divines a further connection which, at the moment, he is incapable of appraising and rendering back in an abstract and finely elaborated form. This is not because his thinking is too slow, but because it is objectively impossible to seize in a moment the entire dimensions of the problem divined and give it a ready formula. Naturally, not observing that the pupil has no inkling of such a problem he firmly believes he has an important problem to deal with, and not merely an extremely simple and, to him, trivial piece of advice which could be given in a moment, if only he could allow himself to see what the pupil was waiting for to enable him to get on with his work. But as an introvert he has not felt-into the other's psychology; he has only felt-into his own theoretical problems, his inner world, where he goes on spinning the threads of the theoretical problem taken from the pupil -- threads which are certainly germane to the probleri1 but not to the pupil's momentary need. Naturally, from the academic standpoint, this peculiar attitude of the introverted teacher is very unsuitable, quite apart from the unfavourable personal impression it engenders. He gives an impression of slowness, singularity, even thick-headedness; on which account he is very often under-estimated, not only by the larger public but also by his own smaller circle of colleagues, until one day his work and ideas are eventually followed up, elaborated, and translated by later investigators.

Gauss, the mathematician, had such a distaste for teaching that he informed each individual student who reported himself that, in all probability, his course of lectures would not take place, hoping by this means to unburden himself of the necessity of giving them. That teaching was so painful to him, .as Ostwald justly observes, lay in the "necessity of pronouncing definite scientific results in his lectures without having previously established and elaborated every detail of the text. To be obliged to communicate his results to others without such elaboration may have felt to him as though he were exhibiting himself before strangers in his night-shirt" (p. 380). With this observation Ostwald touches a very essential point, namely the above-mentioned disinclination of the introvert, for any part of himself, other than quite impersonal communications, to reach the surrounding world.

Ostwald emphasizes the fact that, as a rule, the romantic is compelled to bring his career to. a close at a comparatively early stage on account of increasing exhaustion. He is also disposed to attribute this fact to his greater reactive rapidity. Since this concept of mental reactive rapidity is, in my view, still remote from the region of scientific fact, and since no proof is, as yet, forthcoming, neither is it susceptible of proof that the external reaction takes place more rapidly than the internal, it seems to me that the earlier exhaustion of the extraverted discoverer must be essentially related to the external reaction peculiar to his type. He begins to publish very early, becomes rapidly famous, and soon develops an intensive activity, both academically and as a publicist; he cultivates personal relationships among a very wide circle of friends and acquaintances and, in addition to all this, he takes an unusual interest in the development of his pupils. The introverted pioneer begins to publish later; his works succeed one another at longer intervals, and are mostly sparing in expression; repetitions of a theme are avoided, except where something entirely new can be brought into them. The pithy and laconic style of his scientific communications, which frequently omit all information concerning the way he has traversed or the material elaborated, hinders any general understanding or acceptance of his works; and so he remains unknown. His distaste for teaching does not bring him pupils; he is so little known that any relations with a larger circle of acquaintances is precluded; as a rule, therefore, he lives a retired life, not from necessity merely but also from choice. Thus he escapes the danger of spending himself too lavishly. His inner reactions lead him constantly back to the circumscribed tracts of his research activities; these in themselves are very exacting, proving as time goes on so deeply exhausting as to permit of no incidental expenditure of energy on behalf of acquaintances or pupils. There is the additional circumstance that the manifest success of the romantic is also a vitalizing and invigorating factor, but this is very often denied the classic, so that he is forced to seek his only satisfaction in the perfecting of his work of research. In the light of these considerations, the relatively premature exhaustion of the romantic genius seems to me to depend more upon the external reaction than upon the higher reactive rapidity.

Ostwald does not regard his type division as absolute, in the sense that every investigator can be shown forthwith to belong to one or other type. He is, however, of the opinion "that the really great men" can generally be included quite definitely in one or other end-group, while the "average people" much more frequently represent the middle position in respect to reactive rapidity (pp. 372 ff.). In conclusion, I would like to observe that the Ostwald biographies contain material which though partial, has a very valuable bearing on the psychology of the types, and strikingly exhibits the coincidence of the romantic with the extraverted type, and the classic with the introverted.

_______________

Notes:

1. Ostwald, Grosse Manner, iii, iv (Leipzig, 1910);

2. l.c., p. 44.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:02 pm

Part 1 of 4

CHAPTER 10: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPES

A. INTRODUCTION


IN the following pages I shall attempt a general description of the types, and my first concern must be with the two general types I have termed introverted and extraverted. But, in addition, I shall also try to give a certain characterization of those special types whose particularity is due to the fact that his most differentiated function plays the principal role in an individual's adaptation or orientation to life. The former I would term general attitude types, since they are distinguished by the direction of general interest or libido movement, while the latter I would call function-types.

The general-attitude types, as I have pointed, out more than once, are differentiated by their particular attitude to the object. The introvert's attitude to the object is an abstracting one; at bottom, he is always facing the problem of how libido can be withdrawn from the object, as though an attempted ascendancy on the part of the object had to be continually frustrated. The extravert, on the contrary, maintains a positive relation to the object. To such an extent does he affirm its importance that his subjective attitude is continually being orientated by, and related to the object. Au fond, the object can never have sufficient value; for him, therefore, its importance must always be paramount.

The two types are so essentially different, presenting so striking a contrast, that their existence, even to the uninitiated in psychological matters becomes an obvious fact, when once attention has been drawn to it. Who does not know those taciturn, impenetrable, often shy natures, who form such a vivid contrast to these other open, sociable, serene maybe, or at least friendly and accessible characters, who are on good terms with all the world, or, even when disagreeing with it, still hold a relation to it by which they and it are mutually affected.

Naturally, at first, one is inclined to regard such differences as mere individual idiosyncrasies. But anyone with the opportunity of gaining a fundamental knowledge of many men will soon discover that such a far-reaching contrast does not merely concern the individual case, but is a question of typical attitudes, with a universality far greater than a limited psychological experience would at first assume. In reality, as the preceding chapters will have shown, it is a question of a fundamental opposition; at times clear and at times obscure, but always emerging whenever we are dealing with individuals whose personality is in any way pronounced. Such men are found not only among the educated classes, but in every rank of society; with equal distinctness, therefore, our types can be demonstrated among labourers and peasants as among the most differentiated members of a nation. Furthermore, these types over-ride the distinctions of sex, since one finds the same contrasts amongst women of all classes. Such a universal distribution could hardly arise at the instigation of consciousness, i.e. as the result of a conscious and deliberate choice of attitude. If this were the case, a definite level of society, linked together by a similar education and environment and, therefore, correspondingly localized, would surely have a majority representation of such an attitude. But the actual facts are just the reverse, for the types have, apparently, quite a random distribution. In the same family one child is introverted, and another extraverted.

Since, in the light of these facts, the attitude-type, regarded as a general phenomenon having an apparently random distribution, can be no affair of conscious judgment or intention, its existence must be due to some unconscious, instinctive cause. The contrast of types, therefore, as a universal psychological phenomenon, must in some way or other have its biological precursor.

The relation between subject and object, considered biologically, is always a relation of adaptation, since every relation between subject and object presupposes mutually modifying effects from either side. These modifications constitute the adaptation. The typical attitudes to the object, therefore, are adaptation processes. Nature knows two fundamentally different ways of adaptation, which determine the further existence of the living organism; the one is by increased fertility, accompanied by a relatively small degree of defensive power and individual conservation; the other is by individual equipment of manifold means of self-protection, coupled with a relatively insignificant fertility. This biological contrast seems not merely to be the analogue, but also the general foundation of our two psychological modes of adaptation. At this point a mere general indication must suffice; on the one hand, I need only point to the peculiarity of the extravert, which constantly urges him to spend and propagate himself in every way, and, on the other, to the tendency of the introvert to defend himself against external claims, to conserve himself from any expenditure of energy directly related to the object, thus consolidating for himself the most secure and impregnable position.

Blake's intuition did not err when he described the two forms as the "prolific" and the "devouring" [1]. As is shown by the general biological example, both forms are current and successful after their kind; this is equally true of the typical attitudes. What the one brings about by a multiplicity of relations, the other gains by monopoly.

The fact that often in their earliest years children display an unmistakable typical attitude forces us to assume that it cannot possibly be the struggle for existence, as it is generally understood, which constitutes the compelling factor in favour of a definite attitude. We might, however, demur, and indeed with cogency, that even the tiny infant, the very babe at the breast, has already an unconscious psychological adaptation to perform, inasmuch as the special character of the maternal influence leads to specific reactions in the child. This argument, though appealing to incontestable facts, has none the less to yield before the equally unarguable fact that two children of the same mother may at a very early age exhibit opposite types, without the smallest accompanying change in the attitude of the mother. Although nothing would induce me to underestimate the well-nigh incalculable importance of parental influence, this experience compels me to conclude that the decisive factor must be looked for in the disposition of the child. The fact that, in spite of the greatest possible similarity of external conditions, one child will assume this type while another that, must, of course, in the last resort he ascribed to individual disposition. Naturally in saying this I only refer to those cases which occur under normal conditions. Under abnormal conditions, i.e. when there is an extreme and, therefore, abnormal attitude in the mother, the children can also be coerced into a relatively similar attitude; but this entails a violation of their individual disposition, which quite possibly would have assumed another type if no abnormal and disturbing external influence had intervened. As a rule, whenever such a falsification of type takes place as a result of external influence, the individual becomes neurotic later, and a cure can successfully be sought only in a development of that attitude which corresponds with the individual's natural way.

As regards the particular disposition, I know not what to say, except that there are clearly individuals who have either a greater readiness and capacity for one way, or for, whom it is more congenial to adapt to that way rather than the other. In the last analysis it may well be that physiological causes, inaccessible to our knowledge, play a part in this. That this may be the case seems to me not improbable, in view of one's experience that a reversal of type often proves exceedingly harmful to the physiological well-being of the organism, often provoking an acute state of exhaustion.

B. The Extraverted Type

In our descriptions of this and the following type it will be necessary, in the interest of lucid and comprehensive presentation, to discriminate between the conscious and unconscious psychology. Let us first lend our minds to a description of the phenomena of consciousness.

(I) THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Everyone is, admittedly, orientated by the data with which the outer world provides him; yet we see that this may be the case in a way that is only relatively decisive. Because it is cold out of doors, one man is persuaded to wear his overcoat, another from a desire to become hardened finds this unnecessary; one man admires the new tenor because all the world admires him, another withholds his approbation not because he dislikes him but because in his view the subject of general admiration is not thereby proved to be admirable; one submits to a given state of affairs because his experience argues nothing else to be possible, another is convinced that, although it has repeated itself a thousand times in the same way, the thousand and first will be different. The former is orientated by the objective data; the latter reserves a view, which is, as it were, interposed between himself and the objective fact. Now, when the orientation to the object and to objective facts is so predominant that the most frequent and essential decisions and actions are determined, not by subjective values but by objective relations, one speaks of an extraverted attitude. When this is habitual, one speaks of an extraverted type. If a man so thinks, feels, and acts, in a word so lives, as to correspond directly with objective conditions and their claims, whether in a good sense or ill, he is extraverted. His life makes it perfectly clear that it is the objective rather than the subjective value which plays the greater role as the determining factor of his consciousness. He naturally has subjective values, but their determining power has less importance than the external objective conditions. Never, therefore, does he expect to find any absolute factors in his own inner life, since the only ones he knows are outside himself. Epimetheus-like, his inner life succumbs to the external necessity, not of course without a struggle; which, however, always ends in favour of the objective determinant. His entire consciousness looks outwards to the world, because the important and decisive determination always comes to him from without. But it comes to him from without, only because that is where he expects it. All the distinguishing characteristics of his psychology, in so far as they do not arise from the priority of one definite psychological function or from individual peculiarities, have their origin in this basic attitude. Interest and attention follow objective happenings and, primarily those of the immediate environment. Not only persons, but things, seize and rivet his interest. His actions, therefore, are also governed by the influence of persons and things. They are directly related to objective data and determinations, and are, as it were, exhaustively explainable on these grounds. Extraverted action is recognizably related to objective conditions. In so far as it is not purely reactive to environmental stimuli, its character is constantly applicable to the actual circumstances, and it finds adequate and appropriate play within the limits 'of the objective situation. It has no serious tendency to transcend these bounds. The same holds good for interest: objective occurrences have a well-nigh inexhaustible charm, so that in the normal course the extravert's interest makes no other claims.

The moral laws which govern his action coincide with the corresponding claims of society, i.e. with the generally valid moral view-point. If the generally valid view were different, the subjective moral guiding line would also be different, without the general psychological habitus being in any way changed. It might almost seem, although it is by no means the case, that this rigid determination by objective factors would involve an altogether ideal and complete adaptation to general conditions of life. An accommodation to objective data, such as we have described, must, of course, seem a complete adaptation to the extraverted view, since from this standpoint no other criterion exists. But from a higher point of view, it is by no means granted that the standpoint of objectively given facts is the normal one under all circumstances. Objective conditions may be either temporarily or locally abnormal. An individual who is accommodated to such conditions certainly conforms to the abnormal style of his surroundings, but, in relation to the universally valid laws of life, he is, in common with his milieu, in an abnormal position. The individual may, however, thrive in such surroundings, but only to the point when he, together with his whole milieu, is destroyed for transgressing the universal laws of life. He must inevitably participate in this downfall with the same completeness as he was previously adjusted to the objectively valid situation. He is adjusted, but not adapted, since adaptation demands more than a mere frictionless participation in the momentary conditions of the immediate environment. (Once more I would point to Spitteler's Epimetheus). Adaptation demands an observance of laws far more universal in their application than purely local and temporary conditions. Mere adjustment is the limitation of the normal extraverted type. On the one hand, the extravert owes his normality to his ability to fit into existing conditions with relative ease. He naturally pretends to nothing more than the satisfaction of existing objective possibilities, applying himself, for instance, to the calling which offers sound prospective possibilities in the actual situation in time and place. He tries to do or to make just what his milieu momentarily needs and expects from him, and abstains from every innovation that is not entirely obvious, or that in any way exceeds the expectation of those around him. But on the other hand, his normality must also depend essentially upon whether the extravert takes into account the actuality of his subjective needs and requirements; and this is just his weak point, for the tendency of ms type has such a strong outward direction that even the most obvious of all subjective facts, namely the condition of his own body, may quite easily receive inadequate consideration. The body is not sufficiently objective or 'external,' so that the satisfaction of simple elementary requirements which are indispensable to physical well-being are no longer given their place. The body accordingly suffers, to say nothing of the soul. Although, as a rule, the extravert takes small note of this latter circumstance, his intimate domestic circle perceives it all the more keenly. His loss of equilibrium is perceived by himself only when abnormal bodily sensations make themselves felt.

These tangible facts he cannot ignore. It is natural he should regard them as concrete and 'objective', since for his mentality there exists only this and nothing more -- in himself. In others he at once sees "imagination" at work. A too extraverted attitude may actually become so regardless of the subject that the latter is entirely sacrificed to so-called objective claims; to the demands, for instance, of a continually extending business, because orders lie claiming one's attention or because profitable possibilities are constantly being opened up which must instantly be seized.

This is the extravert's danger; he becomes caught up in objects, wholly losing himself in their toils. The functional (nervous) or actual physical disorders which result from this state have a compensatory significance, forcing the subject to an involuntary self-restriction. Should the symptoms be functional, their peculiar formation may symbolically express the psychological situation; a singer, for instance, whose fame quickly reaches a dangerous pitch tempting him to a disproportionate outlay of energy, is suddenly robbed of his high tones by a nervous inhibition. A man of very modest beginnings rapidly reaches a social position of great influence and wide prospects, when suddenly he is overtaken by a psychogenic state, with all the symptoms of mountain-sickness. Again, a man on the point of marrying an idolized woman of doubtful character, whose value he extravagantly overestimates, is seized with a spasm of the aesophagus, which forces him to a regimen of two cups of milk in the day, demanding his three-hourly attention. All visits to his fiancee are thus effectually stopped, and no choice is left to him but to busy himself with his bodily nourishment. A man who through his own energy and enterprise has built up a vast business, entailing an intolerable burden of work, is afflicted by nervous attacks of thirst, as a result of which he speedily falls a victim to hysterical alcoholism.

Hysteria is, in my view, by far the most frequent neurosis with the extraverted type. The classical example of hysteria is always characterized by an exaggerated rapport with the members of his circle, and a frankly imitatory accommodation to surrounding conditions. A constant tendency to appeal for interest and to produce impressions upon his milieu is a basic trait of the hysterical nature. A correlate to this is his proverbial suggestibility, his pliability to another person's influence. Unmistakable extraversion comes out in the communicativeness of the hysteric, which occasionally leads to the divulging of purely phantastic contents; whence arises the reproach of the hysterical lie.

To begin with, the 'hysterical' character is an exaggeration of the normal attitude; it is then complicated by compensatory reactions from the side of the unconscious, which manifests its opposition to the extravagant extraversion in the form of physical disorders, whereupon an introversion of psychic energy becomes unavoidable. Through this reaction of the unconscious, another category of symptoms arises which have a more introverted character. A morbid intensification of phantasy activity. belongs primarily to this category. From this general characterization of the extraverted attitude, let us now turn to a description of the modifications, which the basic psychological functions undergo as a result of this attitude.

(II) THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

It may perhaps seem odd that I should speak of an 'attitude of the unconscious'. As I have already sufficiently indicated, I regard the relation of the unconscious to the conscious as compensatory. The unconscious, according to this view, has as good a claim to an 'attitude' as the conscious.

In the foregoing section I emphasized the tendency to a certain one-sidedness in the extraverted attitude, due to the controlling power of the objective factor in the course of psychic events. The extraverted type is constantly tempted to give himself away (apparently) in favour of the object, and to assimilate his subject to the object. I have referred in detail to the ultimate consequences of this exaggeration of the extraverted attitude, viz. to the injurious suppression of the subjective factor. It is only to be expected, therefore, that a psychic compensation of the conscious extraverted attitude will lay especial weight upon the subjective factor, i.e. we shall have to prove a strong egocentric tendency in the unconscious. Practical experience actually furnishes this proof. I do not wish to enter into a casuistical survey at this point, so must refer my readers to the ensuing sections, where I shall attempt to present the characteristic attitude of the unconscious from the angle of each function-type. In this section we are merely concerned with the compensation of a general extraverted attitude; I shall, therefore, confine myself to an equally general characterization of the compensating attitude of the unconscious.

The attitude of the unconscious as an effective complement to the conscious extraverted attitude has a definitely introverting character. It focuses libido upon the subjective factor, i.e. all those needs and claims which are stifled or repressed by a too extraverted conscious attitude. It may be readily gathered from what has been said in the previous section that a purely objective orientation does violence to a multitude of subjective emotions, intentions, needs, and desires, since it robs them of the energy which is their natural right. Man is not a machine that one can reconstruct, as occasion demands, upon other lines and for quite other ends, in the hope that it will then proceed to function, in a totally different way, just as normally as before. Man bears his age-long history with him; in his very structure is written the history of mankind.

The historical factor represents a vital need, to which a wise economy must respond. Somehow the past must become vocal, and participate in the present. Complete assimilation to the object, therefore, encounters the protest of the suppressed minority, elements belonging to the past and existing from the beginning. From this quite general consideration it may be understood why it is that the unconscious claims of the extraverted type have an essentially primitive, infantile, and egoistical character. When Freud says that the unconscious is "only able to wish", this observation contains a large measure of truth for the unconscious of the extraverted type. Adjustment and assimilation to objective data prevent inadequate subjective impulses from reaching consciousness. These tendencies (thoughts, wishes, affects, needs, feelings, etc.) take on a regressive character corresponding with the degree of their repression, i.e. the less they are recognized, the more infantile and archaic they become. The conscious attitude robs them of their relatively disposable energy-charge, only leaving them the energy of which it cannot deprive them. This remainder, which still possesses a potency not to be under-estimated, can be described only as primeval instinct. Instinct can never be rooted out from an individual by any arbitrary measures; it requires the slow, organic transformation of many generations to effect a radical change, for instinct is the energic expression of a definite organic foundation.

Thus with every repressed tendency a considerable sum of energy ultimately remains. This sum corresponds with the potency of the instinct and guards its effectiveness, notwithstanding the deprivation of energy which made it unconscious. The measure of extraversion in the conscious attitude entails a like degree of infantilism and archaism in the attitude of the unconscious. The egoism which so often characterizes the extravert's unconscious attitude goes far beyond mere childish selfishness; it even verges upon the wicked and brutal. It is here we find in fullest bloom that incest-wish described by Freud. It is self-evident that these things are entirely unconscious, remaining altogether hidden from the eyes of the uninitiated observer so long as the extraversion of the conscious attitude does not reach an extreme stage. But wherever an exaggeration of the conscious standpoint takes place, the unconscious also comes to light in a symptomatic form, i.e. the unconscious egoism, infantilism, and archaism lose their original compensatory characters, and appear in more or less open opposition to the conscious attitude. This process begins in the form of an absurd exaggeration of the conscious standpoint, which is aimed at a further repression of the unconscious, but usually ends in a reductio ad absurdum of the conscious attitude, i.e. a collapse. The catastrophe may be an objective one, since the objective aims gradually become falsified by the subjective. I remember the case of a printer who, starting as a mere employee, worked his way up through two decades of hard struggle, till at last he was the independent possessor of a very extensive business. The more the business extended, the more it increased its hold upon him, until gradually every other interest was allowed to become merged in it. At length he was completely enmeshed in its toils, and, as we shall soon see, this surrender eventually proved his ruin. As a sort of compensation to his exclusive interest in the business, certain memories of his childhood came to life. As a child he had taken great delight in painting and drawing. But, instead of renewing this capacity for its own sake as a balancing side-interest, he canalized it into his business and began to conceive 'artistic' elaborations of his products. His phantasies unfortunately materialized: he actually began to produce after his own primitive and infantile taste, with the result that after a very few years his business went to pieces. He acted in obedience to one of our 'civilized ideals', which enjoins the energetic man to concentrate everything upon the one end in view. But he went too far, and merely fell a victim to the power of his subjective infantile claims.

But the catastrophic solution may also be subjective, i.e. in the form of a nervous collapse. Such a solution always comes about as a result of the unconscious counterinfluence, which can ultimately paralyse conscious action. In which case the claims of the unconscious force themselves categorically upon consciousness, thus creating a calamitous cleavage which generally reveals itself in two ways: either the subject no longer knows what he really wants and nothing any longer interests him, or he wants too much at once and has too keen an interest -- but in impossible things. The suppression of infantile and primitive claims, which is often necessary on "civilized" grounds, easily leads to neurosis, or to the misuse of narcotics such as alcohol, morphine, cocaine, etc. In more extreme cases the cleavage ends in suicide.

It is a salient peculiarity of unconscious tendencies that, just in so far as they are deprived of their energy by a lack of conscious recognition, they assume a correspondingly destructive character, and as soon as this happens their compensatory function ceases. They cease to have a compensatory effect as soon as they reach a depth or stratum that corresponds with a level of culture absolutely incompatible with our own. From this moment the unconscious tendencies form a block, which is opposed to the conscious attitude in every respect; such a block inevitably leads to open conflict.

In a general way, the compensating attitude of the unconscious finds expression in the process of psychic equilibrium. A normal extraverted attitude does not, of course, mean that the individual behaves invariably in accordance with the extraverted schema. Even in the same individual many psychological happenings may be observed, in which the mechanism of introversion is concerned. A habitus can be called extraverted only when the mechanism of extraversion predominates. In such a case the most highly differentiated function has a constantly extraverted application, while the inferior functions are found in the service of introversion, i.e. the more valued function, because the more conscious, is more completely subordinated to conscious control and purpose, whilst the less conscious, in other words, the partly unconscious inferior functions are subjected to conscious free choice in a much smaller degree.

The superior function is always the expression of the conscious personality, its aim, its will, and its achievement, whilst the inferior functions belong to the things that happen to one. Not that they merely beget blunders, e.g. lapsus linguae or lapsus calami, but they may also breed half or three-quarter resolves, since the inferior functions also possess a slight degree of consciousness. The extraverted feeling type is a classical example of this, for he enjoys an excellent feeling rapport with his entourage, yet occasionally opinions of an incomparable tactlessness will just happen to him. These opinions have their source in his inferior and subconscious thinking, which is only partly subject to control and is insufficiently related to the object; to a large extent, therefore, it can operate without consideration or responsibility.

In the extraverted attitude the inferior functions always reveal a highly subjective determination with pronounced egocentricity and personal bias, thus demonstrating their close connection with the unconscious. Through their agency the unconscious is continually coming to light. On no account should we imagine that the unconscious lies permanently buried under so many overlying strata that it can only be uncovered, so to speak, by a laborious process of excavation. On the contrary, there is a constant influx of the unconscious into the conscious psychological process; at times this reaches such a pitch that the observer can decide only with difficulty which character-traits are to be ascribed to the conscious, and which to the unconscious personality. This difficulty occurs mainly with persons whose habit of expression errs rather on the side of profuseness. Naturally it depends very largely also upon the attitude of the observer, whether he lays hold of the conscious or the unconscious character of a personality. Speaking generally a judging observer will tend to seize the conscious character, while a perceptive observer will be influenced more by the unconscious character, since judgment is chiefly interested in the conscious motivation of the psychic process, while perception tends to register the mere happening. But in so far as we apply perception and judgment in equal measure, it may easily happen that a personality appears to us as both introverted and extraverted, so that we cannot at once decide to which attitude the superior function belongs. In such cases only a thorough analysis of the function qualities can help us to a sound opinion. During the analysis we must observe which function is placed under the control and motivation of consciousness, and which functions have an accidental and spontaneous character. The former is always more highly differentiated than the latter, which also possess many infantile and primitive qualities. Occasionally the former function gives the impression of normality, while the latter have something abnormal or pathological about them.

(III) THE PECULIARITIES OF THE BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS IN THE EXTRAVERTED ATTITUDE

1. Thinking


As a result of the general attitude of extraversion, thinking is orientated by the object and objective data. This orientation of thinking produces a noticeable peculiarity.

Thinking in general is fed from two sources, firstly from subjective and in the last resort unconscious roots, and secondly from objective data transmitted through sense perceptions.

Extraverted thinking is conditioned in a larger measure by these latter factors than by the former. Judgment always presupposes a criterion; for the extraverted judgment, the valid and determining criterion is the standard taken from objective conditions, no matter whether this be directly represented by an objectively perceptible fact, or expressed in an objective idea; for an objective idea, even when subjectively sanctioned, is equally external and objective in origin. Extraverted thinking, therefore, need not necessarily be a merely concretistic thinking -- it may equally well be a purely ideal thinking, if, for instance, it can be shown that the ideas with which it is engaged are to a great extent borrowed from without, i.e. are transmitted by tradition and education. The criterion of judgment, therefore, as to whether or no a thinking is extraverted, hangs directly upon the question: by which standard is its judgment governed -- is it furnished from without, or is its origin subjective? A further criterion is afforded by the direction of the thinker's conclusion, namely, whether or no the thinking has a preferential direction outwards. It is no proof of its extraverted nature that it is preoccupied with concrete objects, since I may be engaging my thoughts with a concrete object, either because I am abstracting my thought from it or because I am concretizing my thought with it. Even if I engage my thinking with concrete things, and to that extent could be described as extraverted, it yet remains both questionable and characteristic as regards the direction my thinking will take; namely, whether in its further course it leads back again to objective data, external facts, and generally accepted ideas, or not. So far as the practical thinking of the merchant, the engineer, or the natural science pioneer is concerned, the objective direction is at once manifest. But in the case of a philosopher it is open to doubt, whenever the course of his thinking is directed towards ideas. In such a case, before deciding, we must further enquire whether these ideas are mere abstractions from objective experience, in which case they would merely represent higher collective concepts, comprising a sum of objective facts; or whether (if they are clearly not abstractions from immediate experience) they may not be derived from tradition or borrowed from the intellectual atmosphere of the time. In the latter event, such ideas must also belong to the category of objective data, in which case this thinking should also be called extraverted.

Although I do not propose to present the nature of introverted thinking at this point, reserving it for a later section, it is, however, essential that I should make a few statements about it before going further. For if one considers strictly what I have just said concerning extraverted thinking, one might easily conclude that such a statement includes everything that is generally understood as thinking. It might indeed be argued that a thinking whose aim is concerned neither with objective facts nor with general ideas scarcely merits the name 'thinking '. I am fully aware of the fact that the thought of our age, in common with its most eminent representatives, knows and acknowledges only the extraverted type of thinking. This is partly due to the fact that all thinking which attains visible form upon the world's surface, whether as science, philosophy, or even art, either proceeds direct from objects or flows into general ideas. On either ground, although not always completely evident it at least appears essentially intelligible, and therefore relatively valid. In this sense it might be said that the extraverted intellect, i.e. the mind that is orientated by objective data, is actually the only one recognized.

There is also, however -- and now I come to the question of the introverted intellect -- an entirely different kind of thinking, to which the term "thinking" can hardly be denied: it is a kind that is neither orientated by the immediate objective experience nor is it concerned with general and objectively derived ideas. I reach this other kind of thinking in the following way. When my thoughts are engaged with a concrete object or general idea in such a way that the course of my thinking eventually leads me back again to my object, this intellectual process is not the only psychic proceeding taking place in me at the moment. I will disregard all those possible sensations and feelings which become noticeable as a more or less disturbing accompaniment to my train of thought, merely emphasizing the fact that this very thinking process which proceeds from objective data and strives again towards the object stands also in a constant relation to the subject. This relation is a conditio sine qua non, without which no think ing process whatsoever could take place. Even though my thinking process is directed, as far as possible, towards objective data, nevertheless it is my subjective process, and it can neither escape the subjective admixture nor yet dispense with it. Although I try my utmost to give a completely objective direction to my train of thought, even then I cannot exclude the parallel subjective process with its all-embracing participation, without extinguishing the very spark of life from my thought. This parallel subjective process has a natural tendency, only relatively avoidable, to subjectify objective facts, i.e. to assimilate them to the subject.

Whenever the chief value is given to the subjective process, that other kind of thinking arises which stands opposed to: extraverted thinking, namely, that purely subjective orientation of thought which I have termed introverted. A thinking arises from this other orientation that is neither determined by objective facts nor directed towards objective data -- a thinking; therefore, that proceeds from subjective data and is directed towards subjective ideas or facts of a subjective character. I do not wish to enter more fully into this kind of thinking here; I have merely established its existence for the purpose of giving a necessary complement to the extraverted thinking process, whose nature is thus brought to a clearer focus.

When the objective orientation receives a certain predominance, the thinking is extraverted. This circumstance changes nothing as regards the logic of thought -- it merely determines that difference between thinkers which James regards as a matter of temperament. The orientation towards the object, as already explained, makes no essential change in the thinking function; only its appearance is altered. Since it is governed by objective data, it has the appearance of being captivated by the object, as though without the external orientation it simply could not exist. Almost it seems as though it were a sequela of external facts, or as though it could reach its highest point only when chiming in with some generally valid idea. It seems constantly to be affected by objective data, drawing only those conclusions which substantially agree with these. Thus it gives one the impression of a certain lack of freedom, of occasional short-sightedness, in spite of every kind of adroitness within the objectively circumscribed area. What I am now describing is merely the impression this sort of thinking makes upon the observer, who must himself already have a different standpoint, or it would be quite impossible for him to observe the phenomenon of extraverted thinking. As a result of his different standpoint he merely sees its aspect, not its nature; whereas the man who himself possesses this type of thinking is able to seize its nature, while its aspect escapes him. Judgment made upon appearance only cannot be fair to the essence of the thing -- hence the result is depreciatory. But essentially this thinking is no less fruitful and creative than introverted thinking, only its powers are in the service of other ends. This difference is perceived most clearly when extraverted thinking is engaged upon material, which is specifically an object of the subjectively orientated thinking. This happens, for instance, when a subjective conviction is interpreted analytically from objective facts or is regarded as a product or derivative of objective ideas. But, for our 'scientifically' orientated consciousness, the difference between the two modes of thinking becomes still more obvious when the subjectively orientated thinking makes an attempt to bring objective data into connections not objectively given, i.e. to subordinate them to a subjective idea. Either senses the other as an encroachment, and hence a sort of shadow effect is produced, wherein either type reveals to the other its least favourable aspect. The subjectively orientated thinking then appears quite arbitrary, while the extraverted thinking seems to have an incommensurability that is altogether dull and banal. Thus the two standpoints are incessantly at war.

Such a conflict, we might think, could be easily adjusted if only we clearly discriminated objects of a subjective from those of an objective nature. Unfortunately, however, such a discrimination is a matter of impossibility, although not a few have attempted it. Even if such a separation were possible, it would be a very disastrous proceeding, since in themselves both orientations are one-sided, with a definitely restricted validity; hence they both require this mutual correction. Thought is at once sterilized, whenever thinking is brought, to any great extent, under the influence of objective data, since it becomes degraded into a mere appendage of objective facts; in which case, it is no longer able to free itself from objective data for the purpose of establishing an abstract idea. The process of thought is reduced to mere 'reflection', not in the sense of 'meditation', but in the sense of a mere imitation that makes no essential affirmation beyond what was already visibly and immediately present in the objective data. Such a thinking-process leads naturally and directly back to the objective fact, but never beyond it; not once, therefore, can it lead to the coupling of experience with an objective idea. And, vice versa, when this thinking has an objective idea for its object, it is quite unable to grasp the practical individual experience, but persists in a more or less tautological position. The materialistic mentality presents a magnificent example of this.

When, as the result of a reinforced objective determination, extraverted thinking is subordinated to objective data, it entirely loses itself, on the one hand, in the individual experience, and proceeds to amass an accumulation of undigested empirical material. The oppressive mass of more or less disconnected individual experiences produces a state of intellectual dissociation, which, on the other hand, usually demands a psychological compensation. This must consist in an idea, just as simple as it is universal, which shall give coherence to the heaped-up but intrinsically disconnected whole, or at least it should provide an inkling of such a connection. Such ideas as "matter" or "energy" are suitable for this purpose. But, whenever thinking primarily depends not so much upon external facts as upon an accepted or second-hand idea, the very poverty of the idea provokes a compensation in the form of a still more impressive accumulation of facts, which assume a one-sided grouping in keeping with the relatively restricted and sterile point of view; whereupon many valuable and sensible aspects of things automatically go by the board. The vertiginous abundance of the so-called scientific literature of to-day owes a deplorably high percentage of its existence to this misorientation.

2. The Extraverted Thinking Type

It is a fact of experience that all the basic psychological functions seldom or never have the same strength or grade of development in one and the same individual. As a rule, one or other function predominates, in both strength and development. When supremacy among the psychological functions is given to thinking, i.e. when the life of an individual is mainly ruled by reflective thinking so that every important action proceeds from intellectually considered motives, or when there is at least a tendency to conform to such motives, we may fairly call this a thinking type. Such a type can be either introverted or extraverted. We will first discuss the extraverted thinking type.

In accordance with his definition, we must picture a man whose constant aim -- in so far, of course, as he is a pure type -- is to bring his total life-activities into relation with intellectual conclusions, which in the last resort are always orientated by objective data, whether objective facts or generally valid ideas. This type of man gives the deciding voice -- not merely for himself alone but also on behalf of his entourage -- either to the actual objective reality or to its objectively orientated, intellectual formula. By this formula are good and evil measured, and beauty and ugliness determined. All is right that corresponds with this formula; all is wrong that contradicts it; and everything that is neutral to it is purely accidental. Because this formula seems to correspond with the meaning of the world, it also becomes a world-law whose realization must be achieved at all times and seasons, both individually and collectively. Just as the extraverted thinking type subordinates himself to his formula, so, for its own good, must his entourage also obey it, since the man who refuses to obey is wrong -- he is resisting the world-law, and is, therefore, unreasonable, immoral, and without a conscience. his moral code forbids him to tolerate exceptions; his ideal must, under all circumstances, be realized; for in his eyes it is the purest conceivable formulation of objective reality, and, therefore, must also be generally valid truth, quite indispensable for the salvation of man. This is not from any great love for his neighbour, but from a higher standpoint of justice and truth. Everything in his own nature that appears to invalidate this formula is mere imperfection, an accidental miss-fire, something to be eliminated on the next occasion, or, in the event of further failure, then clearly a sickness.

If tolerance for the sick, the suffering, or the deranged should chance to be an ingredient in the formula, special provisions will be devised for humane societies, hospitals, prisons, colonies, etc., or at least extensive plans for such projects. For the actual execution of these schemes the motives of justice and truth do not, as a rule, suffice; they still devolve upon real Christian charity, which has more to do with feeling than with any intellectual formula. 'One really should' or 'one must' figure largely in this programme. If the formula is wide enough, this type may play a very useful role in social life, either as a reformer or a ventilator of public wrongs or a purifier of the public conscience, or as the propagator of important innovations. But the more rigid the formula, the more does he develop into a grumbler, a crafty reasoner, and a self-righteous critic, who would like to impress both himself and others into one schema.

We have now outlined two extreme figures, between which terminals the majority of these types may be graduated.

In accordance with the nature of the extraverted attitude, the influence and activities of such personalities are all the more favourable and beneficent, the further one goes from the centre. Their best aspect is to be found at the periphery of their sphere of influence. The further we penetrate into their own province, the more do the unfavourable results of their tyranny impress us. Another life still pulses at the periphery, where the truth of the formula can be sensed as an estimable adjunct to the rest. But the further we probe into the special sphere where the formula operates, the more do we find life ebbing away from all that fails to coincide with its dictates. Usually it is the nearest relatives who have to taste the most disagreeable results of an extraverted formula, since they are the first to be unmercifully blessed with it. But above all the subject himself is the one who suffers most -- which brings us to the other side of the psychology of this type.

The fact that an intellectual formula never has been and never will be discovered which could embrace the abundant possibilities of life in a fitting expression must lead -- where such a formula is accepted -- to an inhibition, or total exclusion, of other highly important forms and activities of life. In the first place, all those vital forms dependent upon feeling will become repressed in such a type, as, for instance, aesthetic activities, taste, artistic sense, the art of friendship, etc. Irrational forms, such as religious experiences, passions and the like, are often obliterated even to the point of complete unconsciousness. These, conditionally quite important, forms of life have to support an existence that is largely unconscious. Doubtless there are exceptional men who are able to sacrifice their entire life to one definite formula; but for most of us a permanent life of such exclusiveness is impossible. Sooner or later -- in accordance with outer circumstances and inner gifts -- the forms of life repressed by the intellectual attitude become indirectly perceptible, through a gradual disturbance of the conscious conduct of life. Whenever disturbances of this kind reach a definite intensity, one speaks of a neurosis. In most cases, however, it does not go so far, because the individual instinctively allows himself some preventive extenuations of his formula, worded, of course, in a suitable and reasonable way. In this way a safety-valve is created.

The relative or total unconsciousness of such tendencies or functions as are excluded from any participation in the conscious attitude keeps them in a relatively undeveloped state. As compared with the conscious function they are inferior. To the extent that they are unconscious, they become merged with the remaining contents of the unconscious, from which they acquire a bizarre character. To the extent that they are conscious, they only play a secondary role, although one of considerable importance for the whole psychological picture.

Since feelings are the first to oppose and contradict the rigid intellectual formula, they are affected first by this conscious inhibition, and upon them the most intense repression falls. No function can be entirely eliminated -- it can only be greatly distorted. In so far as feelings allow themselves to be arbitrarily shaped and subordinated, they have to support the intellectual conscious attitude and adapt themselves to its aims. Only to a certain degree, however, is this possible; a part of the feeling remains insubordinate, and therefore must be repressed. Should the repression succeed, it disappears from consciousness and proceeds to unfold a subconscious activity, which runs counter to conscious aims, even producing effects whose causation is a complete enigma to the individual. For example, conscious altruism, often of an extremely high order, may be crossed by a secret self-seeking, of which the individual is wholly unaware, and which impresses intrinsically unselfish actions with the stamp of selfishness. Purely ethical aims may lead the individual into critical situations, which sometimes have more than a semblance of being decided by quite other than ethical motives. There are guardians of public morals or voluntary rescue-workers who suddenly find themselves in deplorably compromising situations, or in dire need of rescue. Their resolve to save often leads them to employ means which only tend to precipitate what they most desire to avoid. There are extraverted idealists, whose desire to advance the salvation of man is so consuming that they will not shrink from any lying and dishonest means in the pursuit of their ideal. There are a few painful examples in science where investigators of the highest esteem, from a profound conviction of the truth and general validity of their formula, have not scrupled to falsify evidence in favour of their ideal. This is sanctioned by the formula; the end justifieth the means. Only an inferior feeling-function, operating seductively and unconsciously, could bring about such aberrations in otherwise reputable men.

The inferiority of feeling in this type manifests itself also in other ways. In so far as it corresponds with the dominating positive formula, the conscious attitude becomes more or less impersonal, often, indeed, to such a degree that a very considerable wrong is done to personal interests. When the conscious attitude is extreme, all personal considerations recede from view, even those which concern the individual's own person. His health is neglected, his social position deteriorates, often the most vital interests of his family are violated -- they are wronged morally and financially, even their bodily health is made to suffer -- all in the service of the ideal. At all events personal sympathy with others must be impaired, unless they too chance to be in the service of the same formula. Hence it not infrequently happens that his immediate family circle, his own children for instance, only know such a father as a cruel tyrant, whilst the outer world resounds with the fame of his humanity. Not so much in spite of as because of the highly impersonal character of the conscious attitude, the unconscious feelings are highly personal and oversensitive, giving rise to certain secret prejudices, as, for instance, a decided readiness to misconstrue any objective opposition to his formula as personal ill-will, or a constant tendency to make negative suppositions regarding the qualities of others in order to invalidate their arguments beforehand -- in defence, naturally, of his own susceptibility. As a result of this unconscious sensitiveness, his expression and tone frequently becomes sharp, pointed, aggressive, and insinuations multiply. The feelings have an untimely and halting character, which is always a mark of the inferior function. Hence arises a pronounced tendency to resentment. However generous the individual sacrifice to the intellectual goal may be, the feelings are correspondingly petty, suspicious, cross-grained, and conservative. Everything new that is not already contained in the formula is viewed through a veil of unconscious hatred, and is judged accordingly. It happened only in the middle of last century that a certain physician, famed for his humanitarianism, threatened to dismiss an assistant for daring to use a thermometer, because the formula decreed that fever shall be recognized by the pulse. There are, of course, a host of similar examples.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:03 pm

Part 2 of 4

Thinking which in other respects may be altogether blameless becomes all the more subtly and prejudicially affected, the more feelings are repressed. An intellectual standpoint, which, perhaps on account of its actual intrinsic value, might justifiably claim general recognition, undergoes a characteristic alteration through the influence of this unconscious personal sensitiveness; it becomes rigidly dogmatic. The personal self-assertion is transferred to the intellectual standpoint. Truth is no longer left to work her natural effect, but through an identification with the subject she is treated like a sensitive darling whom an evil-minded critic has wronged. The critic is demolished, if possible with personal invective, and no argument is too. gross to be used against him. Truth must be trotted out, until finally it begins to dawn upon the public that it is not so much really a question of truth as of her personal procreator.

The dogmatism of the intellectual standpoint, however, occasionally undergoes still further peculiar modifications from the unconscious admixture of unconscious personal feelings; these changes are less a question of feeling, in the stricter sense, than of contamination from other unconscious factors which become blended with the repressed feeling in the unconscious. Although reason itself offers proof, that every intellectual formula can be no more than a partial truth, and can never lay claim, therefore, to autocratic authority; in practice, the formula obtains so great an ascendancy that, beside it, every other standpoint and possibility recedes into the background. It replaces all the more general, less defined, hence the more modest and truthful, views of life. It even takes the place of that. general view of life which we call religion. Thus the formula becomes a religion, although in essentials it has not the smallest connection with anything religious. Therewith it also gains the essentially religious character of absoluteness. It becomes, as it were, an intellectual superstition. But now all those psychological tendencies that suffer under its repression become grouped together in the unconscious, and form a counter-position, giving rise to paroxysms of doubt. As a defence against doubt, the conscious attitude grows fanatical. For fanaticism, after all, is merely overcompensated doubt. Ultimately this development leads to an exaggerated defence of the conscious position, and to the gradual formation of an absolutely antithetic unconscious position; for example, an extreme irrationality develops, in opposition to the conscious rationalism, or it becomes highly archaic and superstitious, in opposition to a conscious standpoint imbued with modern science. This fatal opposition is the source of those narrow-minded and ridiculous views, familiar to the historians of science, into which many praiseworthy pioneers have ultimately blundered. It not infrequently happens in a man of this type that the side of the unconscious becomes embodied in a woman.

In my experience, this type, which is doubtless familiar to my readers, is chiefly found among men, since thinking tends to be a much more dominant function in men than in women. As a rule, when thinking achieves the mastery in women, it is, in my experience, a kind of thinking which results from a prevailingly intuitive activity of mind.

The thought of the extraverted thinking type is positive, i.e. it produces. It either leads to new facts or to general conceptions of disparate experimental material. Its judgment is generally synthetic. Even when it analyses, it constructs, because it is always advancing beyond the analysis to a new combination, a further conception which re-unites the analysed material in a new way or adds something further to the given material. In general, therefore, we may describe this kind of judgment as predicative. It is, in any case, characteristic that it is never absolutely depreciatory or destructive, but always substitutes a fresh value for one that is demolished. This quality is due to the fact that thought is the main channel into which a thinking-type's energy flows. Life steadily advancing shows itself in the man's thinking, so that his ideas maintain a progressive, creative character. His thinking neither stagnates, nor is it in the least regressive. Such qualities cling only to a thinking that is not given priority in consciousness. In this event it is relatively unimportant, and also lacks the character of a positive vital activity. It follows in the wake of other functions, it becomes Epimethean, it has an 'esprit de l'escalier' quality, contenting itself with constant ponderings and broodings upon things past and gone, in an effort to analyse and digest them. Where the creative element, as in this case, inhabits another function, thinking no longer progresses: it stagnates. Its judgment takes on a decided inherency-character, i.e. it entirely confines itself to the range of the given material, nowhere overstepping it. It is contented with a more or less abstract statement, and fails to impart any value to the experimental material that was not already there.

The inherency-judgment of such extraverted thinking is objectively orientated, i.e. its conclusion always expresses the objective importance of experience. Hence, not only does it remain under the orientating influence of objective data, but it actually rests within the charmed circle of the individual experience, about which it affirms nothing that was not already given by it. We may easily observe this thinking in those people who cannot refrain from tacking on to an impression or experience some rational and doubtless very valid remark, which, however, in no way adventures beyond the given orbit of the experience. At bottom, such a remark merely says 'I have understood it; -- I can reconstruct it.' But there the matter also ends. At its very highest, such a judgment signifies merely the placing of an experience in an objective setting, whereby the experience is at once recognized as belonging to the frame.

But whenever a function other than thinking possesses priority in consciousness to any marked degree, in so far as thinking is conscious at all and not directly dependent upon the dominant function, it assumes a negative character. In so far as it is subordinated to the dominant function, it may actually wear a positive aspect, but a narrower scrutiny will easily prove that it simply mimics the dominant function, supporting it with arguments that unmistakably contradict the laws of logic proper to thinking. Such a thinking, therefore, ceases to have any interest for our present discussion. Our concern is rather with the constitution of that thinking which cannot be subordinated to the dominance of another function, but remains true to its own principle. To observe and investigate this thinking in itself is not easy, since, in the concrete case, it is more or less constantly repressed by the conscious attitude. Hence, in the majority of cases, it first must be retrieved from the background of consciousness, unless in some unguarded moment it should chance to come accidentally to the surface. As a rule, it must be enticed with some such questions as 'Now what do you really think?' or, again, 'What is your private view about the matter?' Or perhaps one may even have to use a little cunning, framing the question something like this: 'What do you imagine, then, that I really think about the matter?' This latter form should be chosen when the real thinking is unconscious and, therefore, projected. The thinking that is enticed to the surface in this way has characteristic qualities; it was these I had in mind just now when I described it as negative. Its habitual mode is best characterized by the two words 'nothing but'. Goethe personified this thinking in the figure of Mephistopheles. It shows a most distinct tendency to trace back the object of its judgment to some banality or other, thus stripping it of its own independent significance. This happens simply because it is represented as being dependent upon some other commonplace thing. Wherever a conflict, apparently essential in nature, arises between two men, negative thinking mutters 'Cherchez la femme'. When a man champions or advocates a cause, negative thinking makes no inquiry as to the importance of the thing, but merely asks 'How much does he make by it?' The dictum ascribed to Moleschott: "Der Mensch ist, was er isst" ("Man is what he eats") also belongs to this collection, as do many more aphorisms and opinions which I need not enumerate.

The destructive quality of this thinking as well as its occasional and limited usefulness, hardly need further elucidation. But there still exists another form of negative thinking, which at first glance perhaps would scarcely be recognized as such: I refer to the theosophical thinking which is to-day rapidly spreading in every quarter of the globe, presumably as a reaction phenomenon to the materialism of the epoch now receding. Theosophical thinking has an air that is not in the least reductive, since it exalts everything to transcendental and world-embracing ideas. A dream, for instance, is no longer a modest dream, but an experience upon 'another plane'. The hitherto inexplicable fact of telepathy is very simply explained by 'vibrations' which pass from one man to another. An ordinary nervous trouble is quite simply accounted for by the fact that something has collided with the astral body. Certain anthropological peculiarities of the dwellers on the Atlantic seaboard are easily explained by the submerging of Atlantis, and so on. We have merely to open a theosophical book to be overwhelmed by the realization that everything is already explained, and that 'spiritual science' has left no enigmas of life unsolved. But, fundamentally, this sort of thinking is just as negative as materialistic thinking. When the latter conceives psychology as chemical changes taking place in the cell-ganglia, or as the extrusion and withdrawal of cell-processes, or as an internal secretion, in essence this is just as superstitious as theosophy. The only difference lies in the fact that materialism reduces all phenomena to our current physiological notions, while theosophy brings everything into the concepts of Indian metaphysics. When we trace the dream to an overloaded stomach, the dream is not thereby explained, and when we explain telepathy as 'vibrations', we have said just as little. Since, what are 'vibrations'? Not only are both methods of explanation quite impotent -- they are actually destructive, because by interposing their seeming explanations they withdraw interest from the problem, diverting it in the former case to the stomach, and in the latter to imaginary vibrations, thus preventing any serious investigation of the problem. Either kind of thinking is both sterile and sterilizing. Their negative quality consists in this: it is a method of thought that is indescribably cheap; there is a real poverty of productive and creative energy. It is a thinking taken in tow by other functions.

3. Feeling

Feeling in the extraverted attitude is orientated by objective data, i.e. the object is the indispensable determinant of the kind of feeling. It agrees with objective values. If one has always known feeling as a subjective fact, the nature of extraverted feeling will not immediately be understood, since it has freed itself as fully as possible from the subjective factor, and has, instead, become wholly subordinated to the influence of the object. Even where it seems to show a certain independence of the quality of the concrete object, it is none the less under the spell of traditional or generally valid standards of some sort. I may feel constrained, for instance, to use the predicate 'beautiful' or 'good', not because I find the object 'beautiful' or 'good' from my own subjective feeling, but because it is fitting and politic so to do; and fitting it certainly is, inasmuch as a contrary opinion would disturb the general feeling situation. A feeling-judgment such as this is in no way a simulation or a lie -- it is merely an act of accommodation. A picture, for instance, may be termed beautiful, because a picture that is hung in a drawing-room and bearing a well-known signature is generally assumed to be beautiful, or because the predicate 'ugly' might offend the family of the fortunate possessor, or because there is a benevolent intention on the part of the visitor to create a pleasant feeling-atmosphere, to which end everything must be felt as agreeable. Such feelings are governed by the standard of the objective determinants. As such they are genuine, and represent the total visible feeling-function.

In precisely the same way as extraverted thinking strives to rid itself of subjective influences, extraverted feeling has also to undergo a certain process of differentiation, before it is finally denuded of every subjective trimming. The valuations resulting from the act of feeling either correspond directly with objective values or at least chime in with certain traditional and generally known standards of value. This kind of feeling is very largely responsible for the fact that so many people flock to the theatre, to concerts, or to Church, and what is more, with correctly adjusted positive feelings. Fashions, too, owe their existence to it, and, what is far more valuable, the whole positive and wide-spread support of social, philanthropic, and such like cultural enterprises. In such matters, extraverted feeling proves itself a creative factor. Without this feeling, for instance, a beautiful and harmonious sociability would be unthinkable. So far extraverted feeling is just as beneficent and rationally effective as extraverted thinking. But this salutary effect is lost as soon as the object gains an exaggerated influence. For, when this happens, extraverted feeling draws the personality too much into the object, i.e. the object assimilates the person, whereupon the personal character of the feeling, which constitutes its principal charm, is lost. Feeling then becomes cold, material, untrustworthy. It betrays a secret aim, or at least arouses the suspicion of it in an impartial observer. No longer does it make that welcome and refreshing impression the invariable accompaniment of genuine feeling; instead, one scents a pose or affectation, although the egocentric motive may be entirely unconscious.

Such overstressed, extraverted feeling certainly fulfils .. aesthetic expectations, but no longer does it speak to the heart; it merely appeals to the senses, or -- worse still -- to the reason. Doubtless it can provide aesthetic padding for a situation, but there it stops, and beyond that its effect is nil. It has become sterile. Should this process go further, a strangely contradictory dissociation of feeling develops; every object is seized upon with feeling valuations, and numerous relationships are made which are inherently and mutually incompatible. Since such aberrations would be quite impossible if a sufficiently emphasized subject were present, the last vestige of a real personal standpoint also becomes suppressed. The subject becomes so swallowed up in individual feeling processes that to the observer it seems as though there were no longer a subject of feeling but merely a feeling process. In such a condition feeling has entirely forfeited its original human warmth, it gives an impression of pose, inconstancy, unreliability, and in the worst cases appears definitely hysterical.

4. The Extraverted Feeling-Type

In so far as feeling is, incontestably, a more obvious peculiarity of feminine psychology than thinking, the most pronounced feeling-types are also to be found among women. When extraverted feeling possesses the priority we speak of an extraverted feeling-type. Examples of this type that I can call to mind are, almost without exception, women. She is a woman who follows the guiding-line of her feeling. As the result of education her feeling has become developed into an adjusted function, subject to conscious control. Except in extreme cases, feeling has a personal character, in spite of the fact that the subjective factor may be already, to a large extent, repressed. The personality appears to be adjusted in relation to objective conditions. Her feelings correspond with objective situations and general values. Nowhere is this more clearly revealed than in the so-called 'love-choice'; the 'suitable' man is loved, not another one; he is suitable not so much because he fully accords with the fundamental character of the woman -- as a rule she is quite uninformed about this -- but because he meticulously corresponds in standing, age, capacity, height, and family respectability with every reasonable requirement. Such a formulation might, of course, be easily rejected as ironical or depreciatory, were I not fully convinced that the love-feeling of this type of woman completely corresponds with her choice. It is genuine, and not merely intelligently manufactured. Such' reasonable' marriages exist without number, and they are by no means the worst. Such women are good comrades to their husbands and excellent mothers, so long as husbands or children possess the conventional psychic constitution. One can feel 'correctly', however, only when feeling is disturbed by nothing else. But nothing disturbs feeling so much as thinking. It is at once intelligible, therefore, that this type should repress thinking as much as possible. This does not mean to say that such a woman does not think at all; on the contrary, she may even think a great deal and very ably, but her thinking is never sui generis; it is, in fact, an Epimethean appendage to her feeling. What she cannot feel, she cannot consciously think. 'But I can't think what I don't feel', such a type said to me once in indignant tones. As far as feeling permits, she can think very well, but every conclusion, however logical, that might lead to a disturbance of feeling is rejected from the outset. It is simply not thought. And thus everything that corresponds with objective valuations is good: these things are loved or treasured; the rest seems merely to exist in a world apart.

But a change comes over the picture when the importance of the object reaches a still higher level. As already explained above, such an assimilation of subject to object then occurs as almost completely to engulf the subject of feeling. Feeling loses its personal character -- it becomes feeling per se; it almost seems as though the personality were wholly dissolved in the feeling of the moment. Now, since in actual life situations 'constantly and successively alternate, in which the feeling-tones released are not only different but are actually mutually contrasting, the personality inevitably becomes dissipated in just so many different feelings. Apparently, he is this one moment, and something completely different the next -- apparently, I repeat, for in reality such a manifold personality is altogether impossible. The basis of the ego always remains identical with itself, and, therefore, appears definitely opposed to the changing states of feeling. Accordingly the observer senses the display of feeling not so much as a personal expression of the feeling-subject as an alteration of his ego, a mood, in other words. Corresponding with the degree of dissociation between the ego and the momentary state of feeling, signs of disunion with the self will become more or less evident, i.e. the original compensatory attitude of the unconscious becomes a manifest opposition. This reveals itself, in the first instance, in extravagant demonstrations of feeling, in loud and obtrusive feeling predicates, which leave one, however, somewhat incredulous: They ring hollow; they are not convincing. On the contrary, they at once give one an inkling of a resistance that is being overcompensated, and one begins to wonder whether such a feeling-judgment might not just as well be entirely different. In fact, in a very short time it actually is different. Only a very slight alteration in the situation is needed to provoke forthwith an entirely contrary estimation of the selfsame object. The result of such an experience is that the observer is unable to take either judgment at all seriously. He begins to reserve his own opinion. But since, with this type, it is a matter of the greatest moment to establish an intensive feeling rapport with his environment, redoubled efforts are now required to overcome this reserve. Thus, in the manner of the circulus vitiosus, the situation goes from bad to worse. The more the feeling relation with the object becomes overstressed, the nearer the unconscious opposition approaches the surface.

We have already seen that the extraverted feeling type, as a rule, represses his thinking, just because thinking is the function most liable to disturb feeling. Similarly, when thinking seeks to arrive at pure results of any kind, its first act is to exclude feeling, since nothing is calculated to harass and falsify thinking so much as feeling-values. Thinking, therefore, in so far as it is an independent function, is repressed in the extraverted feeling type. Its repression, as I observed before, is complete only in so far as its inexorable logic forces it to conclusions that are incompatible with feeling. It is suffered to exist as the servant of feeling; or more accurately its slave. Its backbone is broken; it may not operate on its own account, in accordance with its own laws. Now, since a logic exists producing inexorably right conclusions, this must happen somewhere, although beyond the bounds of consciousness, i.e. in the unconscious. Pre-eminently, therefore, the unconscious content of this type is a particular kind of thinking. It is an infantile, archaic, and negative thinking.

So long as conscious feeling preserves the personal character, or, in other words, so long as the personality does not become swallowed up by successive states of feeling, this unconscious thinking remains compensatory. But as soon as the personality is dissociated, becoming dispersed in mutually contradictory states of feeling, the identity of the ego is lost, and the subject becomes unconscious. But, because of the subject's lapse into the unconscious, it becomes associated with the unconscious thinking - function, therewith assisting the unconscious thought to occasional consciousness. The stronger the conscious feeling relation, and therefore, the more 'depersonalized,' it becomes, the stronger grows the unconscious opposition. This reveals itself in the fact that unconscious ideas centre round just the most valued objects, which are thus pitilessly stripped of their value. That thinking which always thinks in the 'nothing but' style is in its right place here, since it destroys the ascendancy of the feeling that is chained to the object.

Unconscious thought reaches the surface in the form of irruptions, often of an obsessing nature, the general character of which is always negative and depreciatory. Women of this type have moments when the most hideous thoughts fasten upon the very objects most valued by their feelings. This negative thinking avails itself of every infantile prejudice or parallel that is calculated to breed doubt in the feeling-value, and it tows every primitive instinct along with it, in the effort to make 'a nothing but' interpretation of the feeling. At this point, it is perhaps in the nature of a side-remark to observe that the collective unconscious, i.e. the totality of the primordial images, also becomes enlisted in the same manner, and from the elaboration and development of these images there dawns the possibility of a regeneration of the attitude upon another basis.

Hysteria, with the characteristic infantile sexuality of its unconscious world of ideas, is the principal form of neurosis with this type.

5. Recapitulation of Extraverted Rational Types

I term the two preceding types rational or judging types because they are characterized by the supremacy of the reasoning and the judging functions. It is a general distinguishing mark of both types that their life is, to a large extent, subordinated to reasoning judgment. But we must not overlook the point, whether by 'reasoning' we are referring to the standpoint of the individual's subjective psychology, or to the standpoint of the observer, who perceives and judges from without. For such an observer could easily arrive at an opposite judgment, especially if he has a merely intuitive apprehension of the behaviour of the observed, and judges accordingly. In its totality, the life of this type is never dependent upon reasoning judgment alone; it is influenced in almost equal degree by unconscious irrationality. If observation is restricted to behaviour, without any concern for the domestic interior of the individual's consciousness, one may get an even stronger impression of the irrational and accidental character of certain unconscious manifestations in the individual's behaviour than of the reasonableness of his conscious purposes and motivations. I, therefore, base my judgment upon what the individual feels to be his conscious psychology. But I am prepared to grant that we may equally well entertain a precisely opposite conception of such a psychology, and present it accordingly. I am also convinced that, had I myself chanced to possess a different individual psychology, I should have described the rational types in the reversed way. from the standpoint of the unconscious -- as irrational, therefore. This circumstance aggravates the difficulty of a lucid presentation of psychological matters to a degree not to be underestimated, and immeasurably increases the possibility of misunderstandings. The discussions which develop from these misunderstandings are, as a rule, quite hopeless, since the real issue is never joined, each side speaking, as it were, in a different tongue. Such experience is merely one reason the more for basing my presentation upon the subjective conscious psychology of the individual, since there, at least, one has a definite objective footing, which completely drops away the moment we try to ground psychological principles upon the unconscious. For the observed, in this case, could undertake no kind of co-operation, because there is nothing of which he is not more informed than his own unconscious. The judgment would entirely devolve upon the observer -- a certain guarantee that its basis would be his own individual psychology, which would infallibly be imposed upon the observed. To my mind, this is the case in the psychologies both of Freud and of Adler. The individual is completely at the mercy of the arbitrary discretion of his observing critic -- which can never be the case when the conscious psychology of the observed is accepted as the basis. After all, he is the only competent judge, since he alone knows his own motives.

The reasonableness that characterizes the conscious management of life in both these types, involves a conscious exclusion of the accidental and non-rational. Reasoning judgment, in such a psychology, represents a power that coerces the untidy and accidental things of life into definite forms; such at least is its aim. Thus, on the one hand, a definite choice is made among the possibilities of life, since only the rational choice is consciously accepted; but, on the other hand, the independence and influence of those psychic functions which perceive life's happenings are essentially restricted. This limitation of sensation and intuition is, of course, not absolute. These functions exist, for they are universal; but their products are subject to the choice of the reasoning judgment. It is not the absolute strength of sensation, for instance, which turns the scales in the motivation of action, but judgment. Thus, in a certain sense, the perceiving-functions share the same fate as feeling in the case of the first type, or thinking in that of the second. They are relatively repressed, and therefore in an inferior state of differentiation. This circumstance gives a particular stamp to the unconscious of both our types; what such men do consciously and intentionally accords with reason (their reason of course), but what happens to them corresponds either with infantile, primitive sensations, or with similarly archaic intuitions. I will try to make clear what I mean by these latter concepts in the sections that follow. At all events, that which happens to this type is irrational (from their own standpoint of course). Now, since there are vast numbers of men whose lives consist in what happens to them more than in actions resulting from reasoned intention, it might conceivably happen, that such a man, after careful analysis, would describe both our types as irrational. We must grant him, however, that only too often a man's unconscious makes a far stronger impression upon one than his conscious, and that his actions often have considerably more weight and meaning than his reasoned motivations.

The rationality of both types is orientated objectively, and depends upon objective data. Their reasonableness corresponds with what passes as reasonable from the collective standpoint. Subjectively they consider nothing rational save what is generally considered as such. But reason is also very largely subjective and individual. In our case this share is repressed -- increasingly so, in fact, the more the significance of the object is exalted. Both the subject and subjective reason, therefore, are always threatened with repression; and, when it descends, they fall under the tyranny of the unconscious, which in this case possesses most unpleasant qualities. We have already spoken of its thinking. But, in addition, there are primitive sensations, which reveal themselves in compulsive forms, as, for instance, an abnormal compulsive pleasure-seeking in every conceivable direction; there are also primitive intuitions, which can become a positive torture to the individuals concerned, not to mention their entourage. Everything disagreeable and painful, everything disgusting, ugly, and evil is scented out or suspected, and these as a rule only correspond with half-truths, than which nothing is more calculated to create misunderstandings of the most poisonous kind. The powerful influence of the opposing unconscious contents necessarily brings about a frequent interruption of the rational conscious government, namely, a striking subservience to the element of chance, so that, either by virtue of their sensational value or unconscious significance, accidental happenings acquire a compelling influence.

6. Sensation

Sensation, in the extraverted attitude, is most definitely conditioned by the object. As sense-perception, sensation is naturally dependent upon the object. But, just as naturally, it is also dependent upon the subject; hence, there is also a subjective sensation, which after its kind is entirely different from the objective. In the extraverted attitude this subjective share of sensation, in so far as its conscious application is concerned, is either inhibited or repressed. As an irrational function, sensation is equally repressed, whenever a rational junction, e.g. thinking or feeling, possesses the priority, i.e. it can be said to have a conscious function, only in so far as the rational attitude of consciousness permits accidental perceptions to become conscious contents; in short, realizes them. The function of sense is, of course, absolute in the stricter sense; for example, everything is seen or heard to the farthest physiological possibility, but not everything attains that threshold value which a perception must possess in order to be also apperceived. It is a different matter when sensation itself possesses priority, instead of merely seconding another function. In this case, no element of objective sensation is excluded and nothing repressed (with the exception of the subjective share already mentioned). Sensation has a preferential objective determination, and those objects which release the strongest sensation are decisive for the individual's psychology. The result of this is a pronounced sensuous hold to the object. Sensation, therefore, is a vital function, equipped with the potentest vital instinct. In so far as objects release sensations, they matter; and, in so far as it lies within the power of sensation, they are also fully accepted into consciousness, whether compatible with reasoned judgment or not. As a function its sole criterion of value is the strength of the sensation as conditioned by its objective qualities. Accordingly, all objective processes, in so far as they release sensations at all, make their appearance in consciousness. It is, however, only concrete, sensuously perceived objects or processes which excite sensations in the extraverted attitude; exclusively those, in fact, which everyone in all times and places would sense as concrete. Hence, the orientation of such an individual corresponds with purely concrete reality. The judging, rational functions are subordinated to the concrete facts of sensation, and, accordingly, possess the qualities of inferior differentiation, i.e. they are marked by a certain negativity, with infantile and archaic tendencies. The function most affected by the repression, is, naturally, the one standing opposite to sensation, viz. intuition, the function of unconscious perception.

7. The Extraverted Sensation Type

No other human type can equal the extraverted sensation-type in realism. His sense for objective facts is extraordinarily developed. His life is an accumulation of actual experience with concrete objects, and the more pronounced he is, the less use does he make of his experience. In certain cases the events of his life hardly deserve the name 'experience'. He knows no better use for this sensed 'experience' than to make it serve as a guide to fresh sensations; anything in the least 'new' that comes within his circle of interest is forthwith turned to a sensational account and is made to serve this end. In so far as one is disposed to regard a highly developed sense for sheer actuality as very reasonable, will such men be esteemed rational. In reality, however, this is by no means the case, since they are equally subject to .the sensation of irrational, chance happenings, as they are to rational behaviour.

Such a type -- the majority are men apparently -- does not, of course, believe himself to be 'subject' to sensation. He would be much more inclined to ridicule this view as altogether inconclusive, since, from his standpoint, sensation is the concrete manifestation of life-it is simply the fulness of actual living. His aim is concrete enjoyment, and his morality is similarly orientated. For true enjoyment has its own special morality, its own moderation and lawfulness, its own unselfishness and devotedness. It by no means follows that he is just sensual or gross, for he may differentiate his sensation to the finest pitch of aesthetic purity without being the least unfaithful, even in his most abstract sensations, to his principle of objective sensation. Wulfen's Cicerone des rucksichtlosen Lebensgenusses is the unvarnished confession of a type of this sort. From this point of view the book seems to me worth reading.

Upon the lower levels this is the man of tangible reality, with little tendency either for reflection or commanding purpose. To sense the object, to have and if possible to enjoy sensations, is his constant motive. He is by no means unlovable; on the contrary, he frequently has a charming and lively capacity for enjoyment; he is sometimes a jolly fellow, and often a refined aesthete. In the former case, the great problems of life hinge upon a good or indifferent dinner; in the latter, they are questions of good taste. When he 'senses', everything essential has been said and done. Nothing can be more than concrete and actual; conjectures that transcend or go beyond the concrete are only permitted on condition that they enhance sensation. This need not be in any way a pleasurable reinforcement, since this type is not a common voluptuary; he merely desires the strongest sensation, and this, by his very nature, he can receive only from without. What comes from within seems to him morbid and objectionable. In so far as he thinks and feels, he always reduces down to objective foundations, i.e. to influences coming from the object, quite unperturbed by the most violent departures from logic. Tangible reality, under any conditions, makes him breathe again. In this respect he is unexpectedly credulous. He will, without hesitation, relate an obvious psychogenic symptom to the falling barometer, while the existence of a psychic conflict seems to him a fantastic abnormality. His love is incontestably rooted in the manifest attractions of the object. In so far as he is normal, he is conspicuously adjusted to positive reality -- conspicuously, because his adjustment is always visible. His ideal is the actual; in this respect he is considerate. He has no ideals related to ideas -- he has, therefore, no sort of ground for maintaining a hostile attitude towards the reality of things. and facts. This expresses itself in all the externals of his life. He dresses well, according to his circumstances; he keeps a good table for his friends, who are either made comfortable or at least given to understand that his fastidious taste is obliged to impose certain claims upon his entourage. He even convinces one that certain sacrifices are decidedly worth while for the sake of style.

But the more sensation predominates, so that the sensing subject disappears behind the sensation, the more unsatisfactory does this type become. Either he develops into a crude pleasure-seeker or he becomes an unscrupulous, designing sybarite. Although the object is entirely indispensable to him, yet, as something existing in and through itself, it is none the less depreciated. It is ruthlessly violated and essentially ignored, since now its sole use is to stimulate sensation. The hold upon the object is pushed to the utmost limit. The unconscious is, accordingly, forced out of its metier as a compensatory function and driven into open opposition. But, above all, the repressed intuitions begin to assert themselves in the form of projections upon the object. The strangest conjectures arise; in the case of a sexual object, jealous phantasies and anxiety-states play a great role. More acute cases develop every sort of phobia, and especially compulsive symptoms. The pathological contents have a remarkable air of unreality, with a frequent moral or religious colouring. A pettifogging captiousness often develops, or an absurdly scrupulous morality coupled with a primitive, superstitious and 'magical' religiosity, harking back to abstruse rites. All these things have their source in the repressed inferior functions, which, in such cases, stand in harsh opposition to the conscious standpoint; they wear, in fact, an aspect that is all the more striking because they appear to rest upon the most absurd suppositions, in complete contrast to the conscious sense of reality. The whole culture of thought and feeling seems, in this second personality, to be twisted into a morbid primitiveness; reason is hair-splitting sophistry -- morality is dreary moralizing and palpable Pharisaism -- religion is absurd superstition -- intuition, the noblest of human gifts, is a mere personal subtlety, a sniffing into every corner: instead of searching the horizon, it recedes to the narrowest gauge of human meanness.

The specially compulsive character of the neurotic symptoms represent the unconscious counterweight to the laisser aller morality of a purely sensational attitude, which, from the standpoint of rational judgment, accepts without discrimination, everything that happens. Although this lack of basic principles in the sensation-type does not argue an absolute lawlessness and lack of restraint, it at least deprives him of the quite essential restraining power of judgment. Rational judgment represents a conscious coercion, which the rational type appears to impose upon himself of his own free will. This compulsion overtakes the sensation-type from the unconscious. Moreover, the rational type's link to the object, from the very existence of a judgment, never means such an unconditioned relation as that which the sensation-type has with the object. When his attitude reaches an abnormal one-sidedness, he is in danger of falling just as deeply into the arms of the unconscious as he consciously clings to the object. When he becomes neurotic, he is much harder to treat in the rational way, because the functions to which the physician must appeal are in a relatively undifferentiated state; hence little or no trust can be placed in them. Special means of bringing emotional pressure to bear are often needed to make him at all conscious.

8. Intuition

Intuition as the function of unconscious perception is wholly directed upon outer objects in the extraverted attitude. Because, in the main, intuition is an unconscious process, the conscious apprehension of its nature is a very difficult matter. In consciousness, the intuitive function is represented by a certain attitude of expectation, a perceptive and penetrating vision, wherein only the subsequent result can prove, in every case, how much was 'perceived-into', and how much actually lay in the object.

Just as sensation, when given the priority, is not a mere reactive process of no further importance for the object, but is almost an action which seizes and shapes the object, so it is with intuition, which is by no means a mere perception, or awareness, but an active, creative process that builds into the object just as much as it takes out. But, because this process extracts the perception unconsciously, it also produces an unconscious effect in the object. The primary function of intuition is to transmit mere images, or perceptions of relations and conditions, which could be gained by the other functions, either not at all, or only by very roundabout ways. Such images have the value of definite discernments, and have a decisive bearing upon action, whenever intuition is given the chief weight; in which case, psychic adaptation is based almost exclusively upon intuition. Thinking, feeling, and sensation are relatively repressed; of these, sensation is the one principally affected, because, as the conscious function of sense, it offers the greatest obstacle to intuition. Sensation disturbs intuition's clear, unbiased, naive awareness with its importunate sensuous stimuli; for these direct the glance upon. the physical superficies, hence upon the very things round and beyond which intuition tries to peer. But since intuition, in the extraverted attitude, has a prevailingly objective orientation, it actually comes very near to sensation; indeed, the expectant attitude towards outer objects may, with almost equal probability, avail itself of sensation. Hence, for intuition really to become paramount, sensation must to a large extent be suppressed. I am now speaking of sensation as the simple and direct sense-reaction, an almost definite physiological and psychic datum. This must be expressly established beforehand, because, if I ask the intuitive how he is orientated, he will speak of things which are quite indistinguishable from sense-perceptions. Frequently he will even make use of the term 'sensation'. He actually has sensations, but he is not guided by them per se, merely using them as directing-points for his distant vision. They are selected by unconscious expectation. Not the strongest sensation, in the physiological sense, obtains the crucial value, but any sensation whatsoever whose value happens to become considerably enhanced by reason of the intuitive's unconscious attitude. In this way it may eventually attain the leading position, appearing to the intuitive's consciousness indistinguishable from a pure sensation. But actually it is not so.

Just as extraverted sensation strives to reach the highest pitch of actuality, because only thus can the appearance of a complete life be created, so intuition tries to encompass the greatest possibilities, since only through the awareness of possibilities is intuition fully satisfied. Intuition seeks to discover possibilities in the objective situation; hence as a mere tributary function (viz. when not in the position of priority) it is also the instrument which, in the presence of a hopelessly blocked situation, works automatically towards the issue, which no other function could discover. Where intuition has the priority, every ordinary situation in life seems like a closed room, which intuition has to open. It is constantly seeking outlets and fresh possibilities in external life. In a very short time every actual situation becomes a prison to the intuitive; it burdens him like a chain, prompting a compelling need for solution. At times objects would seem to have an almost exaggerated value, should they chance to represent the idea of a severance or release that might lead to the discovery of a new possibility. Yet no sooner have they performed their office, serving intuition as a ladder or a bridge, than they appear to have no further value, and are discarded as mere burdensome appendages. A fact is acknowledged only in so far as it opens up fresh possibilities of advancing beyond it and of releasing the individual from its operation. Emerging possibilities are compelling motives from which intuition cannot escape and to which all else must be sacrificed.

9. The Extraverted Intuitive Type

Whenever intuition predominates, a particular and unmistakable psychology presents itself. Because intuition is orientated by the object, a decided dependence upon external situations is discernible, but it has an altogether different character from the dependence of the sensational type. The intuitive is never to be found among the generally recognized reality values, but he is always present where possibilities exist. He has a keen nose for things in the bud pregnant with future promise. He can never exist in stable, long-established conditions of generally acknowledged though limited value: because his eye is constantly ranging for new possibilities, stable conditions have an air of impending suffocation. He seizes hold of new objects and new ways with eager intensity, sometimes with extraordinary enthusiasm, only to abandon them cold-bloodedly, without regard and apparently without remembrance, as soon as their range becomes clearly defined and a promise of any considerable future development no longer clings to them. As long as a possibility exists, the intuitive is bound to it with thongs of fate. It is as though his whole life went out into the new situation. One gets the impression, which he himself shares, that he has just reached the definitive turning point in his life, and that from now on nothing else can seriously engage his thought and feeling. However reasonable and opportune it may be, and although every conceivable argument speaks in favour of stability, a day will come when nothing will deter him from regarding as a prison, the self-same situation that seemed to promise him freedom and deliverance, and from acting accordingly. Neither reason nor feeling can restrain or discourage him from a new possibility, even though it may run counter to convictions hitherto unquestioned. Thinking and feeling, the indispensable components of conviction, are, with him, inferior functions, possessing no decisive weight; hence they lack the power to offer any lasting resistance to the force of intuition. And yet these are the only functions that are capable of creating any effectual compensation to the supremacy of intuition, since they can provide the intuitive with that judgment in which his type is altogether lacking. The morality of the intuitive is governed neither by intellect nor by feeling; he has his own characteristic morality, which consists in a loyalty to his intuitive view of things and a voluntary submission to its authority. Consideration for the welfare of his neighbours is weak. No solid argument hinges upon their well-being' any more than upon his own. Neither can we detect in him any great respect for his neighbour's convictions and customs; in fact, he is not infrequently put down as an immoral and ruthless adventurer. Since his intuition is largely concerned with outer objects, scenting out external possibilities, he readily applies himself to callings wherein he may expand his abilities in many directions. Merchants, contractors, speculators, agents, politicians, etc., commonly belong to this type.

Apparently this type is more prone to favour women than men; in which case, however, the intuitive activity reveals itself not so much in the professional as in the social sphere. Such women understand the art of utilizing every social opportunity; they establish right social connections; they seek out lovers with possibilities only to abandon everything again for the sake of a new possibility.

It is at once clear, both from the standpoint of political economy and on grounds of general culture, that such a type is uncommonly important. If well-intentioned, with an orientation to life not purely egoistical, he may render exceptional service as the promoter, if not the initiator of every kind of promising enterprise. He is the natural advocate of every minority that holds the seed of future promise. Because of his capacity, when orientated more towards men than things, to make an intuitive diagnosis of their abilities and range of usefulness, he can also 'make' men. His capacity to inspire his fellow-men with courage, or to kindle enthusiasm for something new, is unrivalled, although he may have forsworn it by the morrow. The more powerful and vivid his intuition, the more is his subject fused and blended with the divined possibility. He animates it; he presents it in plastic shape and with convincing fire; he almost embodies it. It is not a mere histrionic display, but a fate.

This attitude has immense dangers -- all too easily the intuitive may squander his life. He spends himself animating men and things, spreading around him an abundance of life -- a life, however, which others live, not he. Were he able to rest with the actual thing, he would gather the fruit of his labours; yet all too soon must he be running after some fresh possibility, quitting his newly planted field, while others reap the harvest. In the end he goes empty away. But when the intuitive lets things reach such a pitch, he also has the unconscious against him. The unconscious of the intuitive has a certain similarity with that of the sensation-type. Thinking and feeling, being relatively repressed, produce infantile and archaic thoughts and feelings in the unconscious, which may be compared with those of the countertype. They likewise come to the surface in the form of intensive projections, and are just as absurd as those of the sensation-type, only to my mind they lack the other's mystical character; they are chiefly concerned with quasi-actual things, in the nature of sexual, financial, and other hazards, as, for instance, suspicions of approaching illness. This difference appears to be due to a repression of the sensations of actual things. These latter usually command attention in the shape of a sudden entanglement with a most unsuitable woman, or, in the case of a woman, with a thoroughly unsuitable man; and this is simply the result of their unwitting contact with the sphere of archaic sensations. But its consequence is an unconsciously compelling tie to an object of incontestable futility. Such an event is already a compulsive symptom, which is also thoroughly characteristic of this type. In common with the sensation-type, he claims a similar freedom and exemption from all restraint, since he suffers no submission of his decisions to rational judgment, relying entirely upon the perception of chance possibilities. He rids himself of the restrictions of reason, only to fall a victim to unconscious neurotic compulsions in the form of oversubtle, negative reasoning, hair-splitting dialectics, and a compulsive tie to' the sensation of the object. His conscious attitude, both to the sensation and the sensed object, is one of sovereign superiority and disregard. Not that he means to be inconsiderate or superior -- he simply does not see the object that everyone else sees; his oblivion is similar to that of the sensation-type -- only, with the latter, the soul of the object is missed. For this oblivion the object sooner or later takes revenge in the form of hypochondriacal, compulsive ideas, phobias, and every imaginable kind of absurd bodily sensation.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:06 pm

Part 3 of 4

10. Recapitulation of Extraverted Irrational Types

I call the two preceding types irrational for reasons already referred to; namely, because their commissions and omissions are based not upon reasoned judgment but upon the absolute intensity of perception. Their perception is concerned with simple happenings, where no selection has been exercised by the judgment. In this respect both the latter types have a considerable superiority over the two judging types. The objective occurrence is both law-determined and accidental. In so far as it is law-determined, it is accessible to reason; in so far as it is accidental, it is not. One might reverse it and say that we apply the term law-determined to the occurrence appearing so to our reason, and where its regularity escapes us we call it accidental. The postulate of a universal lawfulness remains a postulate of reason only; in no sense is it a postulate of our functions of perception. Since these are in no way grounded upon the principle of reason and its postulates, they are, of their very nature, irrational. Hence my term 'irrational' corresponds with the nature of the perception-types. But merely because they subordinate judgment to perception, it would be quite incorrect to regard these types as unreasonable. They are merely in a high degree empirical; they are grounded exclusively upon experience, so exclusively, in fact, that as a rule, their judgment cannot keep pace with their experience. But the functions of judgment are none the less present, although they eke out a largely unconscious existence. But, since the unconscious, in spite of its separation from the conscious subject, is always reappearing on the scene, the actual life of the irrational types exhibits striking judgments and acts of choice, which take the form of apparent sophistries, cold-hearted criticisms, and an apparently purposeful selection of persons and situations. These traits have a rather infantile, or even primitive, stamp; at times they are astonishingly naive, but at times also inconsiderate, crude, or outrageous. To the rationally orientated mind, the real character of such people might well appear rationalistic and purposeful in the bad sense. But this judgment would be valid only for their unconscious, and, therefore, quite incorrect for their conscious psychology, which is entirely orientated by perception, and because of its irrational nature is quite unintelligible to the rational judgment. Finally, it may even appear to a rationally orientated mind that such an assemblage of accidentals, hardly deserves the name 'psychology.' The irrational type balances this contemptuous judgment with an equally poor impression of the rational; for he sees him as something only half alive, whose only aim in life consists in fastening the fetters of reason upon everything living, and wringing his own neck with criticisms. Naturally, these are gross extremes; but they occur.

From the standpoint of the rational type, the irrational might easily be represented as a rational of inferior quality; namely, when he is apprehended in the light of what happens to him. For what happens to him is not the accidental -- in that he is master -- but, in its stead, he is overtaken by rational judgment and rational aims. This fact is hardly comprehensible to the rational mind, but its unthinkableness merely equals the astonishment of the irrational, when he discovers someone who can set the ideas of reason above the living and actual event. Such a thing seems scarcely credible to him. It is, as a rule, quite hopeless to look to him for any recognition of principles in this direction, since a rational understanding is just as unknown and, in fact, tiresome to him as the idea of making a contract, without mutual discussion and obligations, appears unthinkable to the rational type.

This point brings me to the problem of the psychic relation between the representatives of the different types. Following the terminology of the French school of hypnotists, the psychic relation among the more modern psychiatrists is termed 'rapport'. Rapport chiefly consists in a feeling of actual accord, in spite of recognised differences. In fact, the recognition of existing differences, in so far as they are common to both, is already a rapport, a feeling of accord. If we make this feeling conscious to a rather high degree in an actual case, we discover that it has not merely the quality of a feeling that cannot be analysed further, but it also has the nature of an insight or cognitional content, representing the point of agreement in a conceptual form. This rational presentation is exclusively valid for the rational types; it by no means applies to the irrational, whose rapport is based not at all upon judgment but upon the parallelism of actual living events. His feeling of accord is the common perception of a sensation or intuition. The rational would say that rapport with the irrational depends purely upon chance. If, by some accident, the objective situations are exactly in tune, something like a human relationship takes place, but nobody can tell what will be either its validity or its duration. To the rational type it is often a very bitter thought that the relationship will last only just so long as external circumstances accidentally produce a mutual interest, This does not occur to him as being especially human, whereas it is precisely in this situation that the irrational sees a humanity of quite singular beauty. Accordingly each regards the other as a man destitute of relationships, upon whom no reliance can be placed, and with whom one can never get on decent terms. Such a result, however, is reached only when one consciously tries to make some estimate of the nature of one's relationships with one's fellow-men. Although a psychological conscientiousness of this kind is by no means usual, yet it frequently happens that, notwithstanding an absolute difference of standpoint, a kind of rapport does take place, and in the following way. The one assumes with unspoken projection that the other is, in all essential points, of the same opinion as himself, while the other divines or senses an objective community of interest, of which, however, the former has no conscious inkling and whose existence he would at once dispute, just as it would never occur to the latter that his relationship must rest upon a common point-of-view. A rapport of this kind is by far the most frequent; it rests upon projection, which is the source of many subsequent misunderstandings.

Psychic relationship, in the extraverted attitude, is always regulated by objective factors and outer determinants. What a man is within has never any decisive significance. For our present-day culture the extraverted attitude is the governing principle in the problem of human relationship; naturally, the introverted principle occurs, but it is still the exception, and has to appeal to the tolerance of the age.

C. THE INTROVERTED TYPE

(I) THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF CONSCIOUSNESS


As I have already explained in section A (I) of the present chapter, the introverted is distinguished from the extraverted type by the fact that, unlike the latter, who is prevailingly orientated by the object and objective data, he is governed by subjective factors. In the section alluded to I mentioned, inter alia, that the introvert interposes a subjective view between the perception of the object and his own action, which prevents the action from assuming a character that corresponds with the objective situation. Naturally, this is a special case, mentioned by way of example, and merely intended to serve as a simple illustration. But now we must go in quest of more general formulations.

Introverted consciousness doubtless views the external conditions, but it selects the subjective determinants as the decisive ones. The type is guided, therefore, by that factor of perception and cognition which represents the receiving subjective disposition to the sense stimulus. Two persons, for example, see the same object, but they never see it in such a way as to receive two identically similar images of it. Quite apart from the differences in the personal equation and mere organic acuteness, there often exists a radical difference, both in kind and degree, in the psychic assimilation of the perceived image. Whereas the extraverted type refers pre-eminently to that which reaches him from the object, the introvert principally relies upon that which the outer impression constellates in the subject. In an individual case of apperception, the difference may, of course, be very delicate, but in the total psychological economy it is extremely noticeable, especially in the form of a reservation of the ego. Although it is anticipating somewhat, I consider that point of view which inclines, with Weininger, to describe this attitude as philautic, or with other writers, as autoerotic, egocentric, subjective, or egoistic, to be both misleading in principle and definitely depreciatory. It corresponds with the normal bias of the extraverted attitude against the nature of the introvert. We must not forget -- although extraverted opinion is only too prone to do so -- that all perception and cognition is not purely objective: it is also subjectively conditioned. The world exists not merely in itself, but also as it appears to me. Indeed, at bottom, we have absolutely no criterion that could help us to form a judgment of a world whose nature was unassimilable by the subject. If we were to ignore the subjective factor, it would mean a complete denial of the great doubt as to the possibility of absolute cognition. And this would mean a rechute into that stale and hollow positivism which disfigured the beginning of our epoch -- an attitude of intellectual arrogance that is invariably accompanied by a crudeness of feeling, and an essential violation of life, as stupid as it is presumptuous. Through an overvaluation of the objective powers of cognition, we repress the importance of the subjective factor, which simply means the denial of the subject. But what is the subject? The subject is man -- we are the subject. Only a sick mind could forget that cognition must have a subject, for there exists no knowledge and, therefore, for us, no world where 'I know' has not been said, although with this statement one has already expressed the subjective limitation of all knowledge.

The same holds good for all the psychic functions: they have a subject which is just as indispensable as the object. It is characteristic of our present extraverted valuation that the word 'subjective' occasionally rings almost like a reproach or blemish; but in every case the epithet 'merely subjective' means a clangorous weapon of offence, destined for that daring head, that is not unceasingly convinced of the unconditioned superiority of the object. We must, therefore, be quite clear as to what meaning the term 'subjective' carries in this investigation. As the subjective factor, then, I understand that psychological action or reaction which, when merged with the effect of the object, makes a new psychic fact. Now, in so far as the subjective factor, since oldest times and among all peoples, remains in a very large measure identical with itself-since elementary perceptions and cognitions are almost universally the same -- it is a reality that is just as firmly established as the outer object. If this were not so, any sort of permanent and essentially changeless reality would be altogether inconceivable, and any understanding with posterity would be a matter of impossibility. Thus far, therefore, the subjective factor is something that is just as much a fact as the extent of the sea and the radius of the earth. Thus far, also, the subjective factor claims the whole value of a world-determining power which can never, under any circumstances, be excluded from our calculations. It is the other world-law, and the man who is based upon it has a foundation just as secure, permanent, and valid, as the man who relies upon the object But, just as the object and objective data remain by no means always the same, inasmuch as they are both perishable and subject to chance, the subjective factor is similarly liable to variability and individual hazard. Hence its value is also merely relative. The excessive development of the introverted standpoint in consciousness, for instance, does not lead to a better or sounder application of the subjective factor, but to an artificial subjectification of consciousness, which can hardly escape the reproach 'merely subjective'. For, as a countertendency to this morbid subjectification, there ensues a de-subjectification of consciousness in the form of an exaggerated extraverted attitude which richly deserves Weininger's description "misautic". Inasmuch as the introverted attitude is based upon a universally present, extremely real, and absolutely indispensable condition of psychological adaptation, such expressions as 'philautic', 'egocentric', and the like are both objectionable and out of place, since they foster the prejudice that it is invariably a question of the beloved ego. Nothing could be more absurd than such an assumption. Yet one is continually meeting it when examining the judgments of the extravert upon the introvert. Not, of course, that I wish to ascribe such an error to individual extraverts; it is rather the present generally accepted extraverted view which is by no means restricted to the extraverted type; for it finds just as many representatives in the ranks of the other type, albeit very much against its own interest. The reproach of being untrue to his own kind is justly leveled at the latter, whereas, this, at least, can never be charged against the former.

The introverted attitude is normally governed by the psychological structure. theoretically determined by heredity, but which to the subject is an ever present subjective factor. This must not be assumed, however, to be simply identical with the subject's ego, an assumption that is certainly implied in the above mentioned designations of Weininger; it is rather the psychological structure of the subject that precedes any development of the ego. The really fundamental subject, the Self, is far more comprehensive than the ego, because the former also embraces the unconscious, while the latter is essentially the focal point of consciousness. Were the ego identical with the Self, it would be unthinkable that we should be able to appear in dreams in entirely different forms and with entirely different meanings. But it is a characteristic peculiarity of the introvert, which, moreover, is as much in keeping with his own inclination as with the general bias, that he tends to confuse his ego with the Self, and to exalt his ego to the position of subject of the psychological process, thus effecting that morbid subjectification of consciousness, mentioned above, which so alienates him from the object.

The psychological structure is the same. Semon has termed it 'mneme' [2], whereas I call it the 'collective unconscious'. The individual Self is a portion, or excerpt, or representative, of something universally present in all living creatures, and, therefore, a correspondingly graduated kind of psychological process, which is born anew in every creature. Since earliest times, the inborn manner of acting has been called instinct, and for this manner of psychic apprehension of the object I have proposed the term archetype. I may assume that what is understood, by instinct is familiar to everyone. It is another matter with the archetype. This term embraces the same idea as is contained in 'primordial image' (an expression borrowed from Jakob Burckhardt), and as such I have described it in Chapter xi of this book. I must here refer the reader to that chapter, in particular to the definition of 'image'.

Before the beginning of the Saturn Period the virgin spirits who are now man, were in the World of Virgin Spirits, and were "All-conscious" as God in who (not from whom), they were differentiated. They were not "self" conscious however. The attainment of that faculty is partly the object of evolution which plunges the virgin spirits into a sea of matter of gradually increasing density which eventually shuts it from the All-consciousness. Thus, in the Saturn Period the virgin spirits were immersed in the World of Divine Spirit and encased in the tiniest film of that substance which they partially penetrated by the help of the Lords of Flame.

In the Sun Period the virgin spirit was plunged into the denser World of Life Spirit and more effectively blinded to the All-consciousness by a second veil of the substance of the World of Life Spirit. Still, by the help of the Cherubim it partially penetrated this second veil also. The feeling of the Oneness of All was not lost either, for the World of Life Spirit is still a universal World common to and inter-penetrating all the planets of a Solar System.

In the Moon Period, however, the virgin spirits take a further dip into the still denser matter of the Region of Abstract Thought, and here the most opaque of its veils, the human spirit, is added. Henceforth the All-consciousness of the virgin spirit is lost. It can no longer penetrate its veils, look outwards and perceive others, so it is forced to turn its consciousness inwards and there it finds its self, as the Ego, separated and apart from all others.

Thus the virgin spirit is encased in a threefold veil, and as its outermost veil, the human spirit, effectively blinds it to the oneness of Life, it becomes the Ego by entertaining the illusion of separateness contracted during involution. Evolution will gradually dissolve the illusion, bring back the All-consciousness, and Self-consciousness will have been added.

-- The Rosicrucian Cosmo-Conception, by Max Heindel


The archetype is a symbolical formula, which always begins to function whenever there are no conscious ideas present, or when such as are present are impossible upon intrinsic or extrinsic grounds. The contents of the collective unconscious are represented in consciousness in the form of pronounced tendencies, or definite ways of looking at things. They are generally regarded by the individual as being determined by the object -- incorrectly, at bottom -- since they have their source in the unconscious structure of the psyche, and are only released by the operation of the object. These subjective tendencies and ideas are stronger than the objective influence; because their psychic value is higher, they are superimposed upon all impressions. Thus, just as it seems incomprehensible to the introvert that the object should always be decisive, it remains just as enigmatic to the extravert how a subjective standpoint can be superior to the objective situation. He reaches the unavoidable conclusion that the introvert is either a conceited egoist or a fantastic doctrinaire. Recently he seems to have reached the conclusion that the introvert is constantly influenced by an unconscious power-complex. The introvert unquestionably exposes himself to this prejudice; for it cannot be denied that his definite and highly generalized mode of expression, which apparently excludes every other view from the outset, lends a certain countenance to this extraverted opinion. Furthermore, the very decisiveness and inflexibility of the subjective judgment, which is superordinated to all objective data, is alone sufficient to create the impression of a strong ego-centricity. The introvert usually lacks the right argument in presence of this prejudice; for he is just as unaware of the unconscious, though thoroughly sound presuppositions of his subjective judgment, as he is of his subjective perceptions. In harmony with the style of the times, he looks without, instead of behind his own consciousness for the answer. Should he become neurotic, it is the sign of a more or less complete unconscious identity of the ego with the Self, whereupon the importance of the Self is reduced to nil, while the ego becomes inflated beyond reason. The undeniable, world-determining power of the subjective factor then becomes concentrated in the ego, developing an immoderate power claim and a downright foolish egocentricity. Every psychology which reduces the nature of man to unconscious power instinct springs from this foundation. For example, Nietzsche's many faults in taste owe their existence to this subjectification of consciousness.

(II) THE UNCONSCIOUS ATTITUDE

The superior position of the subjective factor in consciousness involves an inferiority of the objective factor. The object is not given that importance which should really belong to it. Just as it plays too great a role in the extraverted attitude, it has too little to say in the introverted. To the extent that the introvert's consciousness is subjectified, thus bestowing undue importance upon the ego, the object is placed in a position which in time becomes quite untenable. The object is a factor of undeniable power, while the ego is something very restricted and transitory. It would be a very different matter if the Self opposed the object. Self and world are commensurable factors; hence a normal introverted attitude is just as valid, and has as good a right to existence, as a normal extraverted attitude. But, if the ego has usurped the claims of the subject, a compensation naturally develops under the guise of an unconscious reinforcement of the influence of the object. Such a change eventually commands attention, for often, in spite of a positively convulsive attempt to ensure the superiority of the ego, the object and objective data develop an overwhelming influence, which is all the more invincible because it seizes upon the individual unawares, thus effecting an irresistible invasion of consciousness. As a result of the ego's defective relation to the object -- for a will to command is not adaptation -- a compensatory relation to the object develops in the unconscious, which makes itself felt in consciousness as an unconditional and irrepressible tie to the object. The more the ego seeks to secure every possible liberty, independence, superiority, and freedom from obligations, the deeper does it fall into the slavery of objective facts. The subject's freedom of mind is chained to an ignominious financial dependence, his unconcernedness of action suffers now and again, a distressing collapse in the face of public opinion, his moral superiority gets swamped in inferior relationships, and his desire to dominate ends in a pitiful craving to be loved. The chief concern of the unconscious in such a case is the relation to the object, and it affects this in a way that is calculated to bring both the power illusion and the superiority phantasy to utter ruin. The object assumes terrifying dimensions, in spite of conscious depreciation. Detachment from, and command of, the object are, in consequence, pursued by the ego still more violently. Finally, the ego surrounds itself by a regular system of safeguards (Adler has ably depicted these) which shall at least preserve the illusion of superiority. But, therewith, the introvert severs himself completely from the object, and either squanders his energy in defensive measures or makes fruitless attempts to impose his power upon the object and successfully assert himself. But these efforts are constantly being frustrated by the overwhelming impressions he receives from the object. It continually imposes itself upon him against his will; it provokes in him the most disagreeable and obstinate affects, persecuting him at every step. An immense, inner struggle is constantly required of him, in order to 'keep going.' Hence psychoasthenia is his typical form of neurosis, a malady which is characterized on the one hand by an extreme sensitiveness, and on the other by a great liability to exhaustion and chronic fatigue.

An analysis of the personal unconscious yields an abundance of power phantasies coupled with fear of the dangerously animated objects, to which, as a matter of fact, the introvert easily falls a victim. For a peculiar cowardliness develops from this fear of the object; he shrinks from making either himself or his opinion effective, always dreading an intensified influence on the part of the object. He is terrified of impressive affects in others, and is hardly ever free from the dread of falling under hostile influence. For objects possess terrifying and powerful qualities for him -- qualities which he cannot consciously discern in them, but which, through his unconscious perception, he cannot choose but believe in. Since his conscious relation to the object is relatively repressed, its exit is by way of the unconscious, where it becomes loaded with the qualities of the unconscious. These qualities are primarily infantile and archaic. His relation to the object, therefore, becomes correspondingly primitive, taking on all those peculiarities which characterize the primitive object-relationship. Now it seems as though objects possessed magical powers. Strange, new objects excite fear and distrust, as though concealing unknown dangers; objects long rooted and' blessed by tradition are attached to his soul as by invisible threads; every change has a disturbing, if not actually dangerous aspect, since its apparent implication is a magical animation of the object. A lonely island where only what is permitted to move moves, becomes an ideal. Auch Einer, the novel by F. Th. Vischer, gives a rich insight into this side of the introvert's psychology, and at the same time shows the underlying symbolism of the collective unconscious, which in this description of types I am leaving on one side, since it is a universal phenomenon with no especial connection with types.

(III) PECULIARITIES OF THE BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS IN THE INTROVERTED ATTITUDE

1. Thinking


When describing extraverted thinking, I gave a brief characterization of introverted thinking, to which at this stage I must make further reference. Introverted thinking is primarily orientated by the subjective factor. At the least, this subjective factor is represented by a subjective feeling of direction, which, in the last resort, determines judgment. Occasionally, it is a more or less finished image, which to some extent, serves as a standard. This thinking may be conceived either with concrete or with abstract factors, but always at the decisive points it is orientated by subjective data. Hence, it does not lead from concrete experience back again into objective things, but always to the subjective content. External facts are not the aim and origin of this thinking, although the introvert would often like to make it so appear. It begins in the subject, and returns to the subject, although it may undertake the widest flights into the territory of the real and the actual. Hence, in the statement of new facts, its chief value is indirect, because new views rather than the perception of new facts are its main concern. It formulates questions and creates theories; it opens up prospects and yields insight, but in the presence of facts it exhibits a reserved demeanour. As illustrative examples they have their value, but they must not prevail. Facts are collected as evidence or examples for a theory, but never for their own sake. Should this latter ever occur, it is done only as a compliment to the extraverted style. For this kind of thinking facts are of secondary importance; what, apparently, is of absolutely paramount importance is the development and presentation of the subjective idea, that primordial symbolical image standing more or less darkly before the inner vision. Its aim, therefore, is never concerned with an intellectual reconstruction of concrete actuality, but with the shaping of that dim image into a resplendent idea. Its desire is to reach reality; its goal is to see how external facts fit into, and fulfil, the framework of the idea; its actual creative power is proved by the fact that this thinking can also create that idea which, though not present in the external facts, is yet the most suitable, abstract expression of them. Its task is accomplished when the idea it has fashioned seems to emerge so inevitably from the external facts that they actually prove its validity.

But just as little as it is given to extraverted thinking to wrest a really sound inductive idea from concrete facts or ever to create new ones, does it lie in the power of introverted thinking to translate its original image into an idea adequately adapted to the facts. For, as in the former case the purely empirical heaping together of facts paralyses thought and smothers their meaning, so in the latter case introverted thinking shows a dangerous tendency to coerce facts into the shape of its image, or by ignoring them altogether, to unfold its phantasy image in freedom. In such a case, it will be impossible for the presented idea to deny its origin from the dim archaic image. There will ding to it a certain mythological character that we are prone to interpret as 'originality', or in more pronounced cases as mere whimsicality; since its archaic character is not .transparent as such to specialists unfamiliar with mythological motives. The subjective force of conviction inherent in such an idea is usually very great; its power too is the more convincing, the less it is influenced by contact with outer facts. Although to the man who advocates the idea, it may well seem that his scanty store of facts were the actual ground and source of the truth and validity of his idea, yet such is not the case, for the idea derives its convincing power from its unconscious archetype, which, as such, has universal validity and everlasting truth. Its truth, however, is so universal and symbolic, that it must first enter into the recognized and recognizable knowledge of the time, before it can become a practical truth of any real value to life. What sort of a causality would it be, for instance, that never became perceptible in practical causes and practical results?

This thinking easily loses itself in the immense truth of the subjective factor. It creates theories for the sake of theories, apparently with a view to real or at least possible facts, yet always with a distinct tendency to go over from the world of ideas into mere imagery. Accordingly many intuitions of possibilities appear on the scene, none of which however achieve any reality, until finally images are produced which no longer express anything externally real, being 'merely' symbols of the simply unknowable. It is now merely a mystical thinking and quite as unfruitful as that empirical thinking whose sole operation is within the framework of objective facts. Whereas the latter sinks to the level of a mere presentation of facts, the former evaporates into a representation of the unknowable, which is even beyond everything that could be expressed in an image. The presentation of facts has a certain incontestable truth, because the subjective factor is excluded and the facts speak for themselves. Similarly, the representing of the unknowable has also an immediate, subjective, and convincing power, because it is demonstrable from its own existence. The former says 'Est, ergo est' ('It is; therefore it is'); while the latter says 'Cogito, ergo cogito' ('I think; therefore I think'). In the last analysis, introverted thinking arrives at the evidence of its own subjective being, while extraverted thinking is driven to the evidence of its complete identity with the objective fact. For, while the extravert really denies himself in his complete dispersion among objects, the introvert, by ridding himself of each and every content, has to content himself with his mere existence. In both cases the further development of life is crowded out of the domain of thought into the region of other psychic functions which had hitherto existed in relative unconsciousness. The extraordinary impoverishment of introverted thinking in relation to objective facts finds compensation in an abundance of unconscious facts. Whenever consciousness, wedded to the function of thought, confines itself within the smallest and emptiest circle possible -- though seeming to contain the plenitude of divinity -- unconscious phantasy becomes proportionately enriched by a multitude of archaically formed facts, a veritable pandemonium of magical and irrational factors, wearing the particular aspect that accords with the nature of that function which shall next relieve the thought-function as the representative of life. If this should be the intuitive function, the 'other side' will be viewed with the eyes of a Kubin or a Meyrink. If it is the feeling-function, there arise quite unheard of and fantastic feeling-relations, coupled with feeling-judgments of a quite contradictory and unintelligible character. If the sensation-function, then the senses discover some new and never-before experienced possibility, both within and without the body. A closer investigation of such changes can easily demonstrate the reappearance of primitive psychology with all its characteristic features. Naturally, the thing experienced is not merely primitive but also symbolic; in fact, the older and more primeval it appears, the more does it represent the future truth: since everything ancient in our unconscious means the coming possibility.

Under ordinary circumstances, not even the transition to the 'other side' succeeds -- still less the redeeming journey through the unconscious. The passage across is chiefly prevented by conscious resistance to any subjection of the ego to the unconscious reality and to the determining reality of the unconscious object. The condition is a dissociation -- in other words, a neurosis having the character of an inner wastage with increasing brain-exhaustion -- a psychoasthenia, in fact.

2. The Introverted Thinking Type

Just as Darwin might possibly represent the normal extraverted thinking type, so we might point to Kant as a counter-example of the normal introverted thinking type. The former speaks with facts; the latter appeals to the subjective factor. Darwin ranges over the wide fields of objective facts, while Kant restricts himself to a critique of knowledge in general. But suppose a Cuvier be contrasted with a Nietzsche: the antithesis becomes even sharper.

The introverted thinking type is characterized by a priority of the thinking I have just described. Like his extraverted parallel, he is decisively influenced by ideas; these, however, have their origin, not in the objective data but in the subjective foundation. Like the extravert, he too will follow his ideas, but in the reverse direction: inwardly not outwardly. Intensity is his aim, not extensity. In these fundamental characters he differs markedly, indeed quite unmistakably from his extraverted parallel. Like every introverted type, he is almost completely lacking in that which distinguishes his counter type, namely, the intensive relatedness to the object. In the case of a human object, the man has a distinct feeling that he matters only in a negative way, i.e., in milder instances he is merely conscious of being superfluous, but with a more extreme type he feels himself warded off as something definitely disturbing. This negative relation to the object -- indifference, and even aversion -- characterizes every introvert; it also makes a description of the introverted type in general extremely difficult. With him, everything tends to disappear and get concealed. His judgment appears cold, obstinate, arbitrary, and inconsiderate, simply because he is related less to the object than the subject. One can feel nothing in it that might possibly confer a higher value upon the object; it always seems to go beyond the object, leaving behind it a flavour of a certain subjective superiority. Courtesy, amiability, and friendliness may be present, but often with a particular quality suggesting a certain uneasiness, which betrays an ulterior aim, namely, the disarming of an opponent, who must at all costs be pacified and set at ease lest he prove a disturbing element. In no sense, of course, is he an opponent, but, if at all sensitive, he will feel somewhat repelled, perhaps even depreciated. Invariably the object has to submit to a certain neglect; in worse cases it is even surrounded with quite unnecessary measures of precaution. Thus it happens that this type tends to disappear behind a cloud of misunderstanding, which only thickens the more he attempts to assume, by way of compensation and with the help of his inferior functions, a certain mask of urbanity, which often presents a most vivid contrast to his real nature. Although in the extension of his world of ideas he shrinks from no risk, however daring, and never even considers the possibility that such a world might also be dangerous, revolutionary, heretical, and wounding to feeling, he is none the less a prey to the liveliest anxiety, should it ever chance to become objectively real. That goes against the grain. When the time comes for him to transplant his ideas into the world, his is by no means the air of an anxious mother solicitous for her children's welfare; he merely exposes them, and is often extremely annoyed when they fail to thrive on their own account. The decided lack he usually displays in practical ability, and his aversion from any sort of rec1ame assist in this attitude., If to his eyes his product appears subjectively correct and true, it must also be so in practice, and others have simply got to bow to its truth. Hardly ever will he go out of his way to win anyone's appreciation of it, especially if it be anyone of influence. And, when he brings himself to do so, he is usually so extremely maladroit that he merely achieves the opposite of his purpose. In his own special province, there are usually awkward experiences with his colleagues, since he never knows how to win their favour; as a rule he only succeeds in showing them how entirely superfluous they are to him. In the pursuit of his ideas he is generally stubborn, head-strong, and quite unamenable to influence. His suggestibility to personal influences is in strange contrast to this. An object has only to be recognized as apparently innocuous for such a type to become extremely accessible to really inferior elements. They lay hold of him from the unconscious. He lets himself be brutalized and exploited in the most ignominious way, if only he can be left undisturbed in the pursuit of his ideas. He simply does not see when he is being plundered behind his back and wronged in practical ways: this is because his relation to the object is such a secondary matter that he is left without a guide in the purely objective valuation of his product. In thinking out his problems to the utmost of his ability, he also complicates them, and constantly becomes entangled in every possible scruple. However clear to himself the inner structure of his thoughts may be, he is not in the least clear where and how they link up with the world of reality. Only with difficulty can he persuade himself to admit that what is clear to him may not be equally clear to everyone. His style is usually loaded and complicated by all sorts of accessories, qualifications, saving clauses, doubts, etc., which spring from his exacting scrupulousness. His work goes slowly and with difficulty. Either he is taciturn or he falls among people who cannot understand him; whereupon he proceeds to gather further proof of the unfathomable stupidity of man. If he should ever chance to be understood, he is credulously liable to overestimate. Ambitious women have only to understand how advantage may be taken of his uncritical attitude towards the object to make an easy prey of him; or he may develop into a misanthropic bachelor with a childlike heart. Then, too, his outward appearance is often gauche, as if he were painfully anxious to escape observation; or he may show a remarkable unconcern, an almost childlike naivete. In his own particular field of work he provokes violent contradiction, with which he has no notion how to deal, unless by chance he is seduced by his primitive affects into biting and fruitless polemics. By his wider circle he is counted inconsiderate and domineering. But the better one knows him, the more favourable one's judgment becomes, and his nearest friends are well aware how to value his intimacy. To people who judge him from afar he appears prickly, inaccessible, haughty; frequently he may even seem soured as a result of his anti-social prejudices. He has little influence as a personal teacher, since the mentality of his pupils is strange to him. Besides, teaching has, at bottom, little interest for him, except when it accidentally provides him with a theoretical problem. He is a poor teacher, because while teaching his thought is engaged with the actual material, and will not be satisfied with its mere presentation.

With the intensification of his type, his convictions become all the more rigid and unbending. Foreign influences are eliminated; he becomes more unsympathetic to his peripheral world, and therefore more dependent upon his intimates. His expression becomes more personal and inconsiderate and his ideas more profound, but they can no longer be adequately expressed in the material at hand. This lack is replaced by emotivity and susceptibility. The foreign influence, brusquely declined from without, reaches him from within, from the side of the unconscious, and he is obliged to collect evidence against it and against things in general which to outsiders seems quite superfluous. Through the subjectification of consciousness occasioned by his defective relationship to the object, what secretly concerns his own person now seems to him of chief importance. And he begins to confound his subjective truth with his own person. Not that he will attempt to press anyone personally with his convictions, but he will break out with venomous and personal retorts against every criticism, however just. Thus in every respect his isolation gradually increases. His originally fertilizing ideas become destructive, because poisoned by a kind of sediment of bitterness. His struggle against the influences emanating from the unconscious increases with his external isolation, until gradually this begins to cripple him. A still greater isolation must surely protect him from the unconscious influences, but as a rule this only takes him deeper into the conflict, which is destroying him within.

The thinking of the introverted type is positive and synthetic in the development of those ideas which in ever increasing measure approach the eternal validity of the primordial images. But, when their connection with objective experience begins to fade, they become mythological and untrue for the present situation. Hence this thinking holds value only for its contemporaries, just so long as it also stands in visible and understandable connection with the known facts of the time. But, when thinking becomes mythological, its irrelevancy grows until finally it gets lost in itself. The relatively unconscious functions of feeling, intuition, and sensation, which counterbalance introverted thinking, are inferior in quality and have a primitive, extraverted character, to which all the troublesome objective influences this type is subject to must be ascribed. The various measures of self-defence, the curious protective obstacles with which such people are wont to surround themselves, are sufficiently familiar, and I may, therefore, spare myself a description of them. They all serve as a defence against 'magical' influences; a vague dread of the other sex also belongs to this category.

3. Feeling

Introverted feeling is determined principally by the subjective factor. This means that the feeling-judgment differs quite as essentially from extraverted feeling as does the introversion of thinking from extraversion. It is unquestionably difficult to give an intellectual presentation of the introverted feeling process, or even an approximate description of it, although the peculiar character of this kind of feeling simply stands out as soon as one becomes aware of it at all. Since it is primarily controlled by subjective pre-conditions, and is only secondarily concerned with the object, this feeling appears much less upon the surface and is, as a rule, misunderstood. It is a feeling which apparently depreciates the object; hence it usually becomes noticeable in its negative manifestations. The existence of a positive feeling can be inferred only indirectly, as it were. Its aim is not so much to accommodate to the objective fact as to stand above it, since its whole unconscious effort is to give reality to the underlying images. It is, as it were, continually seeking an image which has no existence in reality, but of which it has had a sort of previous vision. From objects that can never fit in with its aim it seems to glide unheedingly away. It strives after an inner intensity, to which at the most, objects contribute only an accessory stimulus. The depths of this feeling can only be divined -- they can never be clearly comprehended. It makes men silent and difficult of access; with the sensitiveness of the mimosa, it shrinks from the brutality of the object, in order to expand into the depths of the subject. It puts forward negative feeling-judgments or assumes an air of profound indifference, as a measure of self-defence.

Primordial images are, of course, just as much idea as feeling. Thus, basic. ideas such as God, freedom, immortality are just as much feeling-values as they are significant as ideas. Everything, therefore, that has been said of the introverted thinking refers equally to introverted feeling, only here everything is felt while there it was thought. But the fact that thoughts can generally be expressed more intelligibly than feelings demands a more than ordinary descriptive or artistic capacity before the real wealth of this feeling can be even approximately presented or communicated to the outer world. Whereas subjective thinking, on account of its unrelatedness, finds great difficulty in arousing an adequate understanding, the same, though in perhaps even higher degree, holds good for subjective feeling. In order to communicate with others it has to find an external form which is not only fitted to absorb the subjective feeling in a satisfying expression, but which must also convey it to one's fellowman in such a way that a parallel process takes place in him. Thanks to the relatively great internal (as well as external) similarity of the human being, this effect can actually be achieved, although a form acceptable to feeling is extremely difficult to find, so long as it is still mainly orientated by the fathomless store of primordial images. But, when it becomes falsified by an egocentric attitude, it at once grows unsympathetic, since then its major concern is still with the ego. Such a case never fails to create an impression of sentimental self-love, with its constant effort to arouse interest and even morbid self-admiration. Just as the subjectified consciousness of the introverted thinker, striving after an abstraction of abstractions, only attains a supreme intensity of a thought-process in itself quite empty, so the intensification of egocentric feeling only leads to a contentless passionateness, which merely feels itself. This is the mystical, ecstatic stage, which prepares the way over into the extraverted functions repressed by feeling. Just as introverted thinking is pitted against a primitive feeling, to which objects attach themselves with magical force, so introverted feeling is counterbalanced by a primitive thinking, whose concretism and slavery to facts passes all bounds. Continually emancipating itself from the relation to the object, this feeling creates a freedom, both of action and of conscience, that is only answerable to the subject, and that may even renounce all traditional values. But so much the more does unconscious thinking fall a victim to the power of objective facts.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:08 pm

Part 4 of 4

4. The Introverted Feeling Type

It is principally among women that I have found the priority of introverted feeling. The proverb 'Still waters run deep' is very true of such women. They are mostly silent, inaccessible, and hard to understand; often they hide behind a childish or banal mask, and not infrequently their temperament is melancholic. They neither shine nor reveal themselves. Since they submit the control of their lives to their subjectively orientated feeling, their true motives generally remain concealed. Their outward demeanour is harmonious and inconspicuous; they reveal a delightful repose, a sympathetic parallelism, which has no desire to affect others, either to impress, influence, or change them in any way. Should this outer side be somewhat emphasized, a suspicion of neglectfulness and coldness may easily obtrude itself, which not seldom increases to a real indifference for the comfort and well-being of others. One distinctly feels the movement of feeling away from the object. With the normal type, however, such an event only occurs when the object has in some way too strong. an effect. The harmonious feeling atmosphere rules only so long as the object moves upon its own way with a moderate feeling intensity, and makes no attempt to cross the other's path. There is little effort to accompany the real emotions of the object, which tend to be damped and rebuffed, or to put it more aptly, are 'cooled off' by a negative feeling-judgment. Although one may find a constant readiness for a peaceful and harmonious companionship, the unfamiliar object is shown no touch of amiability, no gleam of responding warmth, but is met by a manner of apparent indifference or repelling coldness. One may even be made to feel the superfluousness of one's own existence. In the presence of something that might carry one away or arouse enthusiasm, this type observes a benevolent neutrality, tempered with an occasional trace of superiority and criticism that soon takes the wind out of the sails of a sensitive object. But a stormy emotion will be brusquely rejected with murderous coldness, unless it happens to catch the subject from the side of the unconscious, i.e. unless, through the animation of some primordial image, feeling is, as it were, taken captive. In which event such a woman simply feels a momentary laming, invariably producing, in due course, a still more violent resistance, which reaches the object in his most vulnerable spot. The relation to the object is, as far as possible, kept in a secure and tranquil middle state of feeling, where passion and its intemperateness are resolutely proscribed. Expression of feeling, therefore, remains niggardly and, when once aware of it at all, the object has a permanent sense of his undervaluation. Such, however, is not always the case, since very often the deficit remains unconscious; whereupon the unconscious feeling-claims gradually produce symptoms which compel a more serious attention.

A superficial judgment might well be betrayed, by a rather cold and reserved demeanour, into denying all feeling to this type. Such a view, however, would be quite false; the truth is, her feelings are intensive rather than extensive. They develop into the depth. Whereas, for instance, an extensive feeling of sympathy can express itself in both word and deed at the right place, thus quickly ridding itself of its impression, an intensive sympathy, because shut off from every means of expression, gains a passionate depth that embraces the misery of a world and is simply benumbed. It may possibly make an extravagant irruption, leading to some staggering act of an almost heroic character, to which, however, neither the object nor the subject can find a right relation. To the outer world, or to the blind eyes of the extravert, this sympathy looks like coldness, for it does nothing visibly, and an extraverted consciousness is unable to believe in invisible forces.

Such misunderstanding is a characteristic occurrence in the life of this type, and is commonly registered as a most weighty argument against any deeper feeling relation with the object. But the underlying, real object of this feeling is only dimly divined by the normal type. It may possibly express its aim and content in a concealed religiosity anxiously shielded from profane eyes, or in intimate poetic forms equally safeguarded from surprise; not without a secret ambition to bring about some superiority over the object by such means. Women often express much of it in their children, letting their passionateness flow secretly into them.

Although in the normal type, the tendency, above alluded to, to overpower: or coerce the object once openly and visibly with the thing secretly felt, rarely plays a disturbing role, and never leads to a serious attempt in this direction, some trace of it, none the less, leaks through into the personal effect upon the object, in the form of a domineering influence often difficult to define. It is sensed as a sort of stifling or oppressive feeling which holds the immediate circle under a spell. It gives a woman of this type a certain mysterious power that may prove terribly fascinating to the extraverted man, for it touches his unconscious. This power is derived from the deeply felt, unconscious images; consciousness, however, readily refers it to the ego, whereupon the influence becomes debased into personal tyranny. But, wherever the unconscious subject is identified with the ego, the mysterious power of the intensive feeling is also transformed into banal and arrogant ambition, vanity, and petty tyranny. This produces a type of woman most regrettably distinguished by her unscrupulous ambition and mischievous cruelty. But this change in the picture leads also to neurosis.

So long as the ego feels itself housed, as it were, beneath the heights of the unconscious subject, and feeling reveals something higher and mightier than the ego, the type is normal. The unconscious thinking is certainly archaic, yet its reductions may prove extremely helpful in compensating the occasional inclinations to exalt the ego into the subject. But, whenever this does take place by dint of complete suppression of the unconscious reductive thinking-products, the unconscious thinking goes over into opposition and becomes projected into objects. Whereupon the now egocentric subject comes to feel the power and importance of the depreciated object. Consciousness begins to feel 'what others think'. Naturally, others are thinking all sorts of baseness, scheming evil, and contriving all sorts of plots, secret intrigues, etc. To prevent this, the subject must also begin to carry out preventive intrigues, to suspect and sound others, to make subtle combinations. Assailed by rumours, he must make convulsive efforts to convert, if possible, a threatened inferiority into a superiority. Innumerable secret rivalries develop, and in these embittered struggles not only will no base or evil means be disdained, but even virtues will be misused and tampered with in order to play the trump card. Such a development must lead to exhaustion. The form of neurosis is neurasthenic rather than hysterical; in the case of women we often find severe collateral physical states, as for instance anaemia and its sequelae.

5. Recapitulation of Introverted Rational Types

Both the foregoing types are rational, since they are founded upon reasoning, judging functions. Reasoning judgment is based not merely upon objective, but also upon subjective, data. But the predominance of one or other factor, conditioned by a psychic disposition often existing from early youth, deflects the reasoning function. For a judgment to be really reasonable it should have equal reference to both the objective and the subjective factors, and be able to do justice to both. This, however, would be an ideal case, and would presuppose a uniform development of both extraversion and introversion. But either movement excludes the other, and, so long as this dilemma persists, they cannot possibly exist side by side, but at the most successively. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, an ideal reason is impossible. A rational type has always a typical reasonal variation. Thus, the introverted rational types unquestionably have a reasoning judgment, only it is a judgment whose leading note is subjective. The laws of logic are not necessarily deflected, since its onesidedness lies in the premise. The premise is the predominance of the subjective factor existing beneath every conclusion and colouring every judgment. Its superior value as compared with the objective factor is self-evident from the beginning. As already stated, it is not just a question of value bestowed, but of a natural disposition existing before all rational valuation. Hence, to the introvert rational judgment necessarily appears to have many nuances which differentiate it from that of the extravert. Thus, to the introvert, to mention the most general instance, that chain of reasoning which leads to the subjective factor appears rather more reasonable than that which leads to the object. This difference, which in the individual case is practically insignificant, indeed almost unnoticeable, effects unbridgeable oppositions in the gross; these are the more irritating, the less we are aware of the minimal standpoint displacement produced by the psychological premise in the individual case. A capital error regularly creeps in here, for one labours to prove a fallacy in the conclusion, instead of realizing the difference of the psychological premise. Such a realization is a difficult matter for every rational type, since it undermines the apparent, absolute validity of his own principle, and delivers him over to its antithesis, which certainly amounts to a catastrophe.

Almost more even than the extraverted is the introverted type subject to misunderstanding: not so much because the extravert is a more merciless or critical adversary, than he himself can easily be, but because the style of the epoch in which he himself participates is against him. Not in relation to the extraverted type, but as against our general occidental world-philosophy, he finds himself in the minority, not of course numerically, but from the evidence of his own feeling. In so far as he is a convinced participator in the general style, he undermines his own foundations, since the present style, with its almost exclusive acknowledgment of the visible and the tangible, is opposed to his principle. Because of its invisibility, he is obliged to depreciate the subjective factor, and to force himself to join in the extraverted overvaluation of the object. He himself sets the subjective factor at too low a value, and his feelings of inferiority are his chastisement for this sin. Little wonder, therefore, that it is precisely our epoch, and particularly those movements which are somewhat ahead of the time, that reveal the subjective factor in every kind of exaggerated, crude and grotesque form of expression. I refer to the art of the present day.

The undervaluation of his own principle makes the introvert egotistical, and forces upon him the psychology of the oppressed. The more egotistical he becomes, the stronger his impression grows that these others, who are apparently able, without qualms, to conform with the present style, are the oppressors against whom he must guard and protect himself. He does not usually perceive that he commits his capital mistake in not depending upon the subjective factor with that same loyalty and devotion with which the extravert follows the object. By the undervaluation of his own principle, his penchant towards egoism becomes unavoidable, which, of course, richly deserves the prejudice of the extravert. Were he only to remain true to his own principle, the judgment of 'egoist' would be radically false; for the justification of his attitude would be established by its general efficacy, and all misunderstandings dissipated.

6. Sensation

Sensation, which in obedience to its whole nature is concerned with the object and the objective stimulus, also undergoes a considerable modification in the introverted attitude. It, too, has a subjective factor, for beside the object sensed there stands a sensing subject, who contributes his subjective disposition to the objective stimulus. In the introverted attitude sensation is definitely based upon the subjective portion of perception. What is meant by this finds its best illustration in the reproduction of objects in art. When, for instance, several painters undertake to paint one and the same landscape, with a sincere attempt to reproduce it faithfully, each painting will none the less differ from the rest, not merely by virtue of a more or less developed ability, but chiefly because of a different vision; there will even appear in some of the paintings a decided psychic variation, both in general mood and in treatment of colour and form. Such qualities betray a more or less influential co-operation of the subjective factor. The subjective factor of sensation is essentially the same as in the other functions already spoken of. It is an unconscious disposition, which alters the sense-perception at its very source, thus depriving it of the character of a purely objective influence. In this case, sensation is related primarily to the subject, and only secondarily to the object. How extraordinarily strong the subjective factor can be is shown most clearly in art. The ascendancy of the subjective factor occasionally achieves a complete suppression of the mere influence of the object; but none the less sensation remains sensation, although it has come to be a perception of the subjective factor, and the effect of the object has sunk to the level of a mere stimulant. Introverted sensation develops in accordance with this subjective direction. A true sense-perception certainly exists, but it always looks as though objects were not so much forcing their way into the subject in their own right as that the subject were seeing things quite differently, or saw quite other things than the rest of mankind. As a matter of fact, the subject perceives the same things as everybody else, only he never stops at the purely objective effect, but concerns himself with the subjective perception released by the objective stimulus. Subjective perception differs remarkably from the objective. It is either not found at all in the object, or, at most, merely suggested by it; it can, however, be similar to the sensation of other men, although not immediately derived from the objective behaviour of things. It does not impress one as a mere product of consciousness -- it is too genuine for that. But it makes a definite psychic impression, since elements of a higher psychic order are perceptible to it. This order, however, does not coincide with the contents of consciousness. It is concerned with presuppositions, or dispositions of the collective unconscious, with mythological images, with primal possibilities of ideas. The character of significance and meaning clings to subjective perception. It says more than the mere image of the object, though naturally only to him for whom the subjective factor has some meaning. To another, a reproduced subjective impression seems to suffer from the defect of possessing insufficient similarity with the object; it seems, therefore, to have failed in its purpose. Subjective sensation apprehends the background of the physical world rather than its surface. The decisive thing is not the reality of the object, but the reality of the subjective factor, i.e. the primordial images, which in their totality represent a psychic mirror-world. It is a mirror, however, with the peculiar capacity of representing the present contents of consciousness not in their known and customary form but in a certain sense sub specie aeternitatis, somewhat as a million-year old consciousness might see them. Such a consciousness would see the becoming and the passing of things beside their present and momentary existence, and not only that, but at the same time it would also see that Other, which was before their becoming and will be after their passing hence. To this consciousness the present moment is improbable. This is, of course, only a simile, of which, however, I had need to give some sort of illustration of the peculiar nature of introverted sensation. Introverted sensation conveys an image whose effect is not so much to reproduce the object as to throw over it a wrapping whose lustre is derived from age-old subjective experience and the still unborn future event. Thus, mere sense impression develops into the depth of the meaningful, while extraverted sensation seizes only the momentary and manifest existence of things.

7. The Introverted Sensation Type

The priority of introverted sensation produces a definite type, which is characterized by certain peculiarities. It is an irrational type, inasmuch as its selection among occurrences is not primarily rational, but is guided rather by what just happens. Whereas, the extraverted sensation- type is determined by the intensity of the objective influence, the introverted type is orientated by the intensity of the subjective sensation-constituent released by the objective stimulus. Obviously, therefore, no sort of proportional relation exists between object and sensation, but something that is apparently quite irregular and arbitrary. Judging from without, therefore, it is practically impossible to foretell what will make an impression and what will not. If there were present a capacity and readiness for expression in any way commensurate with the strength of sensation, the irrationality of this type would be extremely evident. This is the case, for instance, when the individual is a creative artist. But, since this is the exception, it usually .happens that the characteristic introverted difficulty of expression also conceals his irrationality. On the contrary, he may actually stand out by the very calmness and passivity of his demeanour, or by his rational self-control. This peculiarity, which often leads the superficial judgment astray, is really due to his unrelatedness to objects. Normally the object is not consciously depreciated in the least, but its stimulus is removed from it, because it is immediately replaced by a subjective reaction, which is no longer related to the reality of the object. This, of course, has the same effect as a depreciation of the object. Such a type can easily make one question why one should exist at all; or why objects in general should have any right to existence, since everything essential happens without the object. This doubt may be justified in extreme cases, though not in the normal, since the objective stimulus is indispensable to his sensation, only it produces something different from what was to be surmised from the external state of affairs. Considered from without, it looks as though the effect of the object did not obtrude itself upon the subject. This impression is so far correct ,inasmuch as a subjective content does, in fact, intervene from the unconscious, thus snatching away the effect of the object. This intervention may be so abrupt that the individual appears to shield himself directly from any possible influence of the object. In any aggravated or well-marked case, such a protective guard is also actually present. Even with only a slight reinforcement of the unconscious, the subjective constituent of sensation becomes so alive that it almost completely obscures the objective influence. The results of this are, on the one hand, a feeling of complete depreciation on the part of the object, and, on the other, an illusory conception of reality on the part of the subject, which in morbid cases may even reach the point of a complete inability to discriminate between the real object and the subjective perception. Although so vital a distinction vanishes completely only in a practically psychotic state, yet long before that point is reached subjective perception may influence thought, feeling, and action to an extreme degree, in spite of the fact that the object is clearly seen in its fullest reality. Whenever the objective influence does succeed in forcing its way into the subject -- as the result of particular circumstances of special intensity. or because of a more perfect analogy with the unconscious image -- even the normal example of this type is induced to act in accordance with his unconscious model. Such action has an illusory quality in relation to objective reality, and therefore has a very odd and strange character. It instantly reveals the anti-real subjectivity of the type. But, where the influence of the object does not entirely succeed, it encounters a benevolent neutrality, disclosing little sympathy, yet constantly striving to reassure and adjust. The too-low is raised a little, the too-high is made a little lower; the enthusiastic is damped, the extravagant restrained; and the unusual brought within the 'correct' formula: all this in order to keep the influence of the object within the necessary bounds. Thus, this type becomes an affliction to his circle, just in so far as his entire harmlessness is no longer above suspicion. But, if the latter should be the case, the individual readily becomes a victim to the aggressiveness and ambitions of others. Such men allow themselves to be abused, for which they usually take vengeance at the most unsuitable occasions with redoubled stubbornness and resistance. When there exists no capacity for artistic expression, all impressions sink into the inner depths, whence they hold consciousness under a spell, removing any possibility it might have had of mastering the fascinating impression by means of conscious expression. Relatively speaking, this type has only archaic possibilities of expression for the disposal of his impressions; thought and feeling are relatively unconscious, and, in so far as they have a certain consciousness, they only serve in the necessary, banal, everyday expressions. Hence as conscious functions, they are wholly unfitted to give any adequate rendering .of the subjective perceptions. This type, therefore, is uncommonly inaccessible to an objective understanding; and he fares no better in the understanding of himself.

Above all, his development estranges him from the reality of the object, handing him over to his subjective perceptions, which orientate his consciousness in accordance with an archaic reality, although his deficiency in comparative judgment keeps him wholly unaware of this fact. Actually he moves in a mythological world, where men animals, railways, houses, rivers, and mountains appear partly as benevolent deities and partly as malevolent demons. That thus they appear to him never enters his mind, although their effect upon his judgments and acts can bear no other interpretation. He judges and acts as though he had such powers to deal with; but this begins to strike him only when he discovers that his sensations are totally different from reality. If his tendency is to reason objectively, he will sense this difference as morbid; but if, on the other hand, he remains faithful to his irrationality, and is prepared to grant his sensation reality value, the objective world will appear a mere make-belief and a comedy. Only in extreme cases, however, is this dilemma reached. As a rule, the individual acquiesces in is isolation and in the banality of the reality, which, however, he unconsciously treats archaically.

His unconscious is distinguished chiefly by the repression of intuition, which thereby acquires an extraverted and archaic character. Whereas true extraverted intuition has a characteristic resourcefulness, and a 'good nose' for every possibility in objective reality, this archaic, extraverted intuition has an amazing flair for every ambiguous, gloomy, dirty, and dangerous possibility in the background of reality. In the presence of this intuition the real and conscious intention of the object has no significance; it will peer behind every possible archaic antecedent of such an intention. It possesses, therefore, something dangerous, something actually undermining, which often stands in most vivid contrast to the gentle benevolence of consciousness. So long as the individual is not too aloof from the object, the unconscious intuition effects a wholesome compensation to the rather fantastic and over credulous attitude of consciousness. But as soon as the unconscious becomes antagonistic to consciousness, such intuitions come to the surface and expand their nefarious influence: they force themselves compellingly upon the individual, releasing compulsive ideas about objects of the most perverse kind. The neurosis arising from this sequence of events is usually a compulsion neurosis, in which the hysterical characters recede and are obscured by symptoms of exhaustion.

8. Intuition

Intuition, in the introverted attitude, is directed upon the inner object, a term we might justly apply to the elements of the unconscious. For the relation of inner objects to consciousness is entirely analogous to that of outer objects, although theirs is a psychological and not a physical reality. Inner objects appear to the intuitive perception as subjective images of things, which, though not met with in external experience, really determine the contents of the unconscious, i.e. the collective unconscious in the last resort. Naturally, in their per se character, these contents are not accessible to experience, a quality which they have in common with the outer object. For just as outer objects correspond only relatively with our perceptions of them, so the phenomenal forms of the inner object are also relative; products of their (to us) inaccessible essence and of the peculiar nature of the intuitive function. Like sensation, intuition also has its subjective factor, which is suppressed to the farthest limit in the extraverted intuition, but which becomes the decisive factor in the intuition of the introvert. Although this intuition may receive its impetus from outer objects, it is never arrested by the external possibilities, but stays with that factor which the outer object releases within.

Whereas introverted sensation is mainly confined to the perception of particular innervation phenomena by way of the unconscious, and does not go beyond them, intuition represses this side of the subjective factor and perceives the image which has really occasioned the innervation. Supposing, for instance, a man is overtaken by a psychogenic attack of giddiness. Sensation is arrested by the peculiar character of this innervation-disturbance, perceiving all its qualities, its intensity, its transient course, the nature of its origin and disappearance in their every detail, without raising the smallest inquiry concerning the nature of the thing which produced the disturbance, or advancing anything as to its content. Intuition, on the other hand, receives from the sensation only the impetus to immediate activity; it peers behind the scenes, quickly perceiving the inner image that gave rise to the specific phenomenon, i.e. the attack of vertigo, in the present case. It sees the image of a tottering man pierced through the heart by an arrow. This image fascinates the intuitive activity; it is arrested by it, and seeks to explore every detail of it. It holds fast to the vision, observing with the liveliest interest how the picture changes, unfolds further, and finally fades. In this way introverted intuition perceives all the background processes of consciousness with almost the same distinctness as extraverted sensation senses outer objects. For intuition, therefore, the unconscious images attain to the dignity of things or objects. But, because intuition excludes the co-operation of sensation, it obtains either no knowledge at all or at the best a very inadequate awareness of the. innervation-disturbances or of the physical effects produced by the unconscious images. Accordingly, the images appear as though detached from the subject, as though existing in themselves without relation to the person. Consequently, in the above-mentioned example, the introverted intuitive, when affected by the giddiness, would not imagine that the perceived image might also in some way refer to himself. Naturally, to one who is rationally orientated, such a thing seems almost unthinkable, but it is none the less a fact, and I have often experienced it in my dealings with this type.

The remarkable indifference of the extraverted intuitive in respect to outer objects is shared by the introverted intuitive in relation to the inner objects. Just as the extraverted intuitive is continually scenting out new possibilities, which he pursues with an equal unconcern both for his own welfare and for that of others, pressing on quite heedless of human considerations, tearing down what has only just been established in his everlasting search for change, so the introverted intuitive moves from image to image, chasing after every possibility in the teeming womb of the unconscious, without establishing any connection between the phenomenon and himself. Just as the world can never become a moral problem for the man who merely senses it, so the world of images is never a moral problem to the intuitive. To the one just as much as to the other, it is an aesthetic problem, a question of perception, a 'sensation'. In this way, the consciousness of his own bodily existence fades from the introverted intuitive's view, as does its effect upon others. The extraverted standpoint would say of him: 'Reality has no existence for him; he gives himself up to fruitless phantasies'. A perception of the unconscious images, produced in such inexhaustible abundance by the creative energy of life, is of course fruitless from the standpoint of immediate utility. But, since these images represent possible ways of viewing life, which in given circumstances have the power to provide a new energic potential, this function, which to the outer world is the strangest of all, is as indispensable to the total psychic economy as is the corresponding human type to the psychic life of a people. Had this type not existed, there would have been no prophets in Israel.

Introverted intuition apprehends the images which arise from the a priori, i.e. the inherited foundations of the unconscious mind. These archetypes, whose innermost nature is inaccessible to experience, represent the precipitate of psychic functioning of the whole ancestral line, i.e. the heaped-up, or pooled, experiences of organic existence in general, a million times repeated, and condensed into types. Hence, in these archetypes all experiences are represented which since primeval time have happened on this planet. Their archetypal distinctness is the more marked, the more frequently and intensely they have been experienced. The archetype would be -- to borrow from Kant -- the noumenon of the image which intuition perceives and, in perceiving, creates.

Since the unconscious is not just something that lies there, like a psychic caput mortuum, but is something that coexists and experiences inner transformations which are inherently related to general events, introverted intuition, through its perception of inner processes, gives certain data which may possess supreme importance for the comprehension of general occurrences: it can even foresee new possibilities in more or less clear outline, as well as the event which later actually transpires. Its prophetic prevision is to be explained from its relation to the archetypes which represent the law-determined course of all experienceable things.

9. The Introverted Intuitive Type

The peculiar nature of introverted intuition, when given the priority, also produces a peculiar type of man, viz. the mystical dreamer and seer on the one hand, or the fantastical crank and artist on the other. The latter might be regarded as the normal case, since there is a general tendency of this type to confine himself to the perceptive character of intuition. As a rule, the intuitive stops at perception; perception is his principal problem, and -- in the case of a productive artist -- the shaping of perception. But the crank contents himself with the intuition by which he himself is shaped and determined. Intensification of intuition naturally often results in an extraordinary aloofness of the individual from tangible reality; he may even .become a complete enigma to his own immediate circle. If an artist, he reveals extraordinary, remote things in his art, which in iridescent profusion embrace both the significant and the banal, the lovely and the grotesque, the whimsical and the sublime. If not an artist, he is frequently an unappreciated genius, a great man 'gone wrong', a sort of wise simpleton, a figure for 'psychological' novels.

Although it is not altogether in the line of the introverted intuitive type to make of perception a moral problem, since a certain reinforcement of the rational functions is required for this, yet even a relatively slight differentiation of judgment would suffice to transfer intuitive perception from the purely aesthetic into the moral sphere. A variety of this type is thus produced which differs essentially from its aesthetic form, although none the less characteristic of the introverted intuitive. The moral problem comes into being when the intuitive tries to relate himself to his vision, when he is no longer. satisfied with mere perception and its aesthetic shaping and estimation, but confronts the question: What does this mean for me and for the world? What emerges from this vision in the way of a duty or task, either for me or for the world? The pure intuitive who represses judgment or possesses it only under the spell of perception never meets this question fundamentally, since his only problem is the How of perception. He, therefore, finds the moral problem unintelligible, even absurd, and as far as possible forbids his thoughts to dwell upon the disconcerting vision. It is different with the morally orientated intuitive. He concerns himself with the meaning of his vision; he troubles less about its further aesthetic possibilities than about the possible moral effects which emerge from its intrinsic significance. His judgment allows him to discern, though often only darkly, that he, as a man and as a totality, is in some way inter-related with his vision, that it is something which cannot just be perceived but which also would fain become the life of the subject. Through this realization he feels bound to transform his vision into his own life. But, since he tends to rely exclusively upon his vision, his moral effort becomes one-sided; he makes himself and his life symbolic, adapted, it is true, to the inner and eternal meaning of events, but unadapted to the actual present-day reality. Therewith he also deprives himself of any influence upon it, because he remains unintelligible. His language is not that which is commonly spoken -- it becomes too subjective. His argument lacks convincing reason. He can only confess or pronounce. His is the I voice of one crying in the wilderness'.

The introverted intuitive's chief repression falls upon the sensation of the object. His unconscious is characterized by this fact. For we find in his unconscious a compensatory extraverted sensation function of an archaic character. The unconscious personality may, therefore, best be described as an extraverted sensation-type of a rather low and primitive order. Impulsiveness and unrestraint are the characters of this sensation, combined with an extraordinary dependence upon the sense impression. This latter quality is a compensation to the thin upper air of the conscious attitude, giving it a certain weight, so that complete 'sublimation' is prevented. But if, through a forced exaggeration of the conscious attitude, a complete subordination to the inner perception should develop, the unconscious becomes an opposition, giving rise to compulsive sensations whose excessive dependence upon the object is in frank conflict with the conscious attitude. The form of neurosis is a compulsion-neurosis, exhibiting symptoms that are partly hypochondriacal manifestations, partly hypersensibility of the sense organs and partly compulsive ties to definite persons or other objects.

10. Recapitulation of Introverted Irrational Types

The two types just depicted are almost inaccessible to external judgment. Because they are introverted and have in consequence a somewhat meagre capacity or willingness for expression, they offer but a frail handle for a telling criticism. Since their main activity is directed within, nothing is outwardly visible but reserve, secretive- ness, lack of sympathy, or uncertainty, and an apparently groundless perplexity. When anything does come to the surface, it usually consists in indirect manifestations of inferior and relatively unconscious functions. Manifestations of such a nature naturally excite a certain environmental prejudice against these types. Accordingly they are mostly underestimated, or at least misunderstood. To the same degree as they fail to understand themselves -- because they very largely lack judgment -- they are also powerless to understand why they are so constantly undervalued by public opinion. They cannot see that their outward-going expression is, as a matter of fact, also of an inferior character. Their vision is enchanted by the abundance of subjective events. What happens there is so captivating, and of such inexhaustible attraction, that they do not appreciate the fact that their habitual communications to their circle express very little of that real experience in which they themselves are, as it were, caught up. The fragmentary and, as a rule, quite episodic character of their communications make too great a demand upon the understanding and good will of their circle; furthermore, their mode of expression lacks that flowing warmth to the object which alone can have convincing force. On the contrary, these types show very often a brusque, repelling demeanour towards the outer world, although of this they are quite unaware, and have not the least intention of showing it. We shall form a fairer judgment of such men and grant them a greater indulgence, when we begin to realize how hard it is to translate into intelligible language what is perceived within. Yet this indulgence must not be so liberal as to exempt them altogether from the necessity of such expression. This could be only detrimental for such types. Fate itself prepares for them, perhaps even more than for other men, overwhelming external difficulties, which have a very sobering effect upon the intoxication of the inner vision. But frequently only an intense personal need can wring from them a human expression.

From an extraverted and rationalistic standpoint, such types are indeed the most fruitless of men. But, viewed from a higher standpoint, such men are living evidence of the fact that this rich and varied world with its overflowing and intoxicating life is not purely external, but also exists within. These types are admittedly one-sided demonstrations of Nature, but they are an educational experience for the man who refuses to be blinded by the intellectual mode of the day. In their own way, men with such an attitude are educators and promoters of culture. Their life teaches more than their words. From their lives, and not the least from what is just their greatest fault, viz. their incommunicability, we may understand one of the greatest errors of our civilization, that is, the superstitious belief in statement. and presentation, the immoderate overprizing of instruction by means of word and method. A child certainly allows himself to be impressed by the grand talk of its parents. But is it really imagined that the child is thereby educated? Actually it is the parents' lives that educate the child -- what they add thereto by word and gesture at best serves only to confuse him. The same holds good for the teacher. But we have such a belief in method that, if only the method be good, the practice of it seems to hallow the teacher. An inferior man is never a good teacher. But he can conceal his injurious inferiority, which secretly poisons the pupil, behind an excellent method or an equally brilliant intellectual capacity. Naturally the pupil of riper years desires nothing better than the knowledge of useful methods, because he is already defeated by the general attitude, which believes in the victorious method. He has already learnt that the emptiest head, correctly echoing a method, is the best pupil. His whole environment not only urges but exemplifies the doctrine that all success and happiness are external, and that only the right method is needed to attain the haven of one's desires. Or is the life of his religious instructor likely to demonstrate that happiness which radiates from the treasure of the inner vision? The irrational introverted types are certainly no instructors of a more complete humanity. They lack reason and the ethics of reason, but their lives teach the other possibility, in which our civilization is so deplorably wanting.

11. The Principal and Auxiliary Functions

In the foregoing descriptions I have no desire to give my readers the impression that such pure types occur at all frequently in actual practice. They are, as it were, only Galtonesque family-portraits, which sum up in a cumulative image the common and therefore typical characters, stressing these disproportionately, while the individual features are just as disproportionately effaced. Accurate investigation of the individual case consistently reveals the fact that, in conjunction with the most differentiated function, another function of secondary importance, and therefore of inferior differentiation in consciousness, is constantly present, and is a relatively determining factor.

For the sake of clarity let us again recapitulate: The products of all the functions can be conscious, but we speak of the consciousness of a function only when not merely its application is at the disposal of the will, but when at the same time its principle is decisive for the orientation of consciousness. The latter event is true when, for instance, thinking is not a mere esprit de rescalier, or rumination, but when its decisions possess an absolute validity, so that the logical conclusion in a given case holds' good, whether as motive or as guarantee of practical 'action, without the backing of any further evidence. This absolute sovereignty always belongs, empirically, to one function alone, and can belong only to one function, since the equally independent intervention of another function would necessarily yield a different orientation, which would at least partially contradict the first. But, since it is a vital condition for the conscious adaptation-process that constantly clear and unambiguous aims should be in evidence, the presence of a second function of equivalent power is naturally forbidden. This other function, therefore, can have only a secondary importance, a fact which is also established empirically. Its secondary importance consists in the fact that, in a given case, it is not valid in its own right, as is the primary function, as an absolutely reliable and decisive factor, but comes into play more as an auxiliary or complementary function. Naturally only those functions can appear as auxiliary whose nature is not opposed to the leading function. For instance, feeling can never act as the second function by the side of thinking, because its nature stands in too strong a contrast to thinking. Thinking, if it is to be real thinking and true to its own principle, must scrupulously exclude feeling. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that individuals certainly exist in whom thinking and feeling stand upon the same level, whereby both have equal motive power in consciousness. But, in such a case, there is also no question of a differentiated type, but merely of a relatively undeveloped thinking and feeling. Uniform consciousness and unconsciousness of functions is, therefore, a distinguishing mark of a primitive mentality.

Experience shows that the secondary function is always one whose nature is different from, though not antagonistic to, the leading function: thus, for example, thinking, as primary function, can readily pair with intuition as auxiliary, or indeed equally well with sensation, but, as already observed, never with feeling. Neither intuition nor sensation are antagonistic to thinking, i.e. they have not to be unconditionally excluded, since they are not, like feeling, of similar nature, though of opposite purpose, to thinking -- for as a judging function feeling successfully competes with thinking -- but are functions of perception, affording welcome assistance to thought. As soon as they reached the same level of differentiation as thinking, they would cause a change of attitude, which would contradict the tendency of thinking. For they would convert the judging attitude into a perceiving one; whereupon the principle of rationality indispensable to thought would be suppressed in favour of the irrationality of mere perception. Hence the auxiliary function is possible and useful only in so far as it serves the leading function, without making any claim to the autonomy of its own principle.

For all the types appearing in practice, the principle holds good that besides the conscious main function there is also a relatively unconscious, auxiliary function which is in every respect different from the nature of the main function. From these combinations well-known pictures arise, the practical intellect for instance paired with sensation, the speculative intellect breaking through with intuition, the artistic intuition which selects and presents its images by means of feeling judgment, the philosophical intuition which, in league with a vigorous intellect, translates its vision into the sphere of comprehensible thought, and so forth.

A grouping of the unconscious functions also takes place in accordance with the relationship of the conscious functions. Thus, for instance, an unconscious intuitive-feeling attitude may correspond with a conscious practical intellect, whereby the function of feeling suffers a relatively stronger inhibition than intuition. This peculiarity, however, is of interest only for one who is concerned with the practical psychological treatment of such cases. But for such a man it is important to know about it. For I have frequently observed the way in which a physician, in the case for instance of an exclusively intellectual subject, will do his utmost to develop the feeling function directly out of the unconscious. This attempt must always come to grief, since it involves too great a violation of the conscious standpoint. Should such a violation succeed, there ensues a really compulsive dependence of the patient upon the physician, a 'transference' which can be amputated only by brutality, because such a violation robs the patient of a standpoint -- his physician becomes his standpoint. But the approach to the unconscious and to the most repressed function is disclosed, as it were, of itself, and with more adequate protection of the conscious standpoint, when the way of development is via the secondary function -- thus in the case of a rational type by way of the irrational function. For this lends the conscious. standpoint such a range and prospect over what is possible and imminent that consciousness gains an adequate protection against the destructive effect of the unconscious. Conversely, an irrational type demands a stronger development of the rational auxiliary function represented in consciousness, in order to be sufficiently prepared to receive the impact of the unconscious.

The unconscious functions are in an archaic, animal state. Their symbolical appearances in dreams and phantasies usually represent the battle or coming encounter of two animals or monsters.

_______________

Notes:

1. William Blake, Marriage of Heaven and Hell.

2. Semon, Mneme, translated by Louis Simon (London: Allen & Unwin).
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:08 pm

Part 1 of 4

CHAPTER 11: DEFINITIONS

IT may perhaps seem superfluous that I should add to my text a chapter dealing solely with definitions. But wide experience warns me that, in psychological work especially, one cannot proceed too cautiously when dealing with concepts and expressions; for nowhere do such lamentable conceptual divergences occur, as in the province of psychology, creating only too frequently the most obstinate misunderstandings. This drawback is due not only to the fact that the science of psychology is still in its infancy; but there is also the difficulty that the material of experience, the object of scientific consideration, cannot be displayed in concrete form, as it were, to the eyes of the reader. The psychological investigator is always finding himself obliged to make use of extensive, and in a sense indirect, description for the presentation of the reality he has observed.. Only in so far as elementary facts are accessible to number and measure can there be any question of a direct presentation. But how much of the actual psychology of man can be witnessed and observed as mensurable facts? Such facts do exist, in the realm of psychology; indeed my Association Studies have, I think, demonstrated [1] that highly complicated psychological phenomena are none the less accessible to methods of measure. But anyone who has probed more deeply into the nature of psychology, demanding something more of it than science in the wretchedly prescribed limits of a natural science method is able to yield, will also have realized that an experimental method will never succeed in doing justice to the nature of the human soul, nor will it ever trace even an approximately faithful picture of the complicated psychic phenomena.

But, when we leave the realm of mensurable facts, we are dependent upon concepts, which have now to assume the office of measure and number. That precision which exact measurements lend to the observed fact can be replaced only by the precision of the concept. Unfortunately, however, as is only too familiar to every investigator and worker in this field, current psychological concepts are involved in such uncertainty and ambiguity that mutual understanding is almost impossible. One has only to take the concept 'feeling', for instance, and attempt to visualize everything that this idea contains, to get some sort of notion of the variability and ambiguity of psychological concepts. Nevertheless this concept does express something characteristic that is certainly inaccessible to rule and number and yet conceivably existing. One cannot simply resign oneself, as Wundt does in his physiological psychology, to a mere denial of the validity of such facts as essential basic phenomena, whereby they are either replaced by elementary facts or again resolved into such. For by so doing a primary element of psychology is entirely lost.

In order to escape the drawback this overvaluation of the natural science method involves, one is obliged to have recourse to well-defined concepts. But, before we could arrive at such concepts, the collaboration of many would be needed; i.e. the consensus gentium, so to speak, would have to be invoked. But since this is not within the immediate range of possibility, the individual pioneer must at least strive to give his concepts some fixity and precision; and this is best achieved by so elucidating the meaning of the concepts he employs as to put everyone in a position to see what he means by them.

It is in response to this need that I now propose to discuss my principal psychological concepts in alphabetical order, and I must take this opportunity of requesting the reader to refer to these interpretations in every case of doubt. It must, of course, be understood that with these interpretations and definitions I merely wish to establish the sense in which I myself employ the concepts; far be it from me to affirm that such an application is the only possible one under all circumstances, or even the absolutely correct interpretation.

1. Abstraction, as the word already implies, is the drawing out or isolation of a content (e.g. a meaning or general character, etc.) from a connection, containing other elements, whose combination as a totality is something unique or individual, and therefore inaccessible to comparison. Singularity, uniqueness, and incomparability are obstacles to cognition, hence to the cognitive tendency the remaining elements, though felt to be essentially bound up with the content, must appear irrelevant.

Abstraction, therefore, is that form of mental activity which releases the essential content or fact from its connection with irrelevant elements; it distinguishes it from them, or, in other words, differentiates it. (v. Differentiation). In its wider sense, everything is abstract that is separated from its connection with non-appertaining elements.

Abstraction is an activity belonging to psychological functions in general. There is a thinking which abstracts, just as there is abstracting feeling, sensation, and intuition. (v. these concepts). Abstracting-thinking brings into relief a content that is distinguished from other irrelevant elements by its intellectual, logical qualities. Abstracting-feeling does the same with a content characterized by feeling; similarly with sensation and intuition. Hence, not only are there abstract thoughts but also abstract feelings, which latter are defined by Sully as intellectual, aesthetic, and moral. [2] Nahlowsky adds the religious feeling to these. Abstract feelings would, in my view, correspond with the 'higher' or 'ideal' feelings of Nahlowsky [3]. I put abstract feelings on the same line as abstract thoughts. Abstract sensation would be aesthetic as distinguished from sensual sensation (v. Sensation), and abstract intuition would be symbolical as opposed to phantastical intuition. (v. Phantasy, and Intuition).

In this work, the concept of abstraction is linked up with the idea of the psycho-energic process involved in it. When I assume an abstracting attitude towards an object, I do not let the object affect me in its totality, but I distinguish a portion of it from its connections, at the same time excluding the irrelevant parts. My purpose is to rid myself of the object as a single and unique whole, and to extract only a portion of it. Awareness of the whole undoubtedly takes place, but I do not plunge myself into this awareness; my interest does not flow out into the totality, but withdraws itself from the object as a whole, bringing the abstracted portion into myself, i.e. into my conceptual world, which is already prepared or constellated for the purpose of abstracting a part of the object. (It is only by virtue of a subjective constellation of concepts that I possess the power of abstracting from the object). 'Interest' I conceive as that energy=libido (v. Libido), which I bestow upon the object as value, or which the object draws from me, even maybe against my will or unknown to myself. I visualize the abstracting process, therefore, as a withdrawal of libido from the object, or as a back flow of value from the object to a subjective, abstract content. Thus, for me, abstraction has the meaning of an energic depreciation of the object. In other words, abstraction can be expressed as an introverting libido-movement.

I call an attitude (v. Attitude) abstracting when it is both introverting and at the same time assimilates to already prepared abstract contents in the subject a certain essential portion of the object. The more abstract a content, the more unrepresentable it is. I adhere to Kant's view, which maintains that a concept is the more abstract, "the more it excludes the differences of things" [4], in the sense that abstraction at its highest level is absolutely removed from the object, thereby attaining the extreme limit of unrepresentability. It is this abstraction which I term the idea (v. Idea). Conversely, an abstraction that still possesses representability or obviousness is a concrete (v. Concretism) concept.

2. Affect. -- By the term affect we understand a state of feeling characterized by a perceptible bodily innervation on the one hand and a peculiar disturbance of the ideational process on the other [5]. I use emotion as synonymous with affect. I distinguish -- in contrast to Bleuler (v. Affectivity) -- feeling from affect, in spite of the fact that no definite demarcation exists, since every feeling, after attaining a certain strength, releases physical innervations, thus becoming an affect. On practical grounds, however, it is advisable to discriminate affect from feeling, since feeling can be a disposable function, whereas affect is usually not so. Similarly, affect is clearly distinguished from feeling lily quite perceptible physical innervations, while feeling for the most part lacks them, or their intensity is so slight that they can only be demonstrated by the finest instruments, as for example the psycho-galvanic phenomenon [6]. Affect becomes cumulative through the sensation of the physical innervations released by it. This perception gave rise to the James-Lang. theory of affect, which would make bodily innervations wholly responsible for affects. As opposed to this extreme view, I regard affect as a psychic feeling-state on the one hand, and as a physiological innervation-state on the other; each of which has a cumulative, reciprocal effect upon the other, i.e. a component of sensation is joined to the reinforced feeling, through which the affect is approximated more to sensation (v. Sensation), and differentiated essentially from the state of feeling. Pronounced affects, i.e. affects accompanied by violent physical innervation, I do not assign to the province of feeling but to the realm of the sensation function (v. Function).

3. Affectivity is a concept coined by Bleuler. Affectivity designates and embraces "not only the affects proper, but also the slight feelings or feeling-tones of pain and pleasure." [7] On the one hand, Bleuler distinguishes from affectivity all sensations and other bodily perceptions, and, on the other, such feelings as may be regarded as inner perception-processes (e.g. the 'feeling' of certainty or probability) [8] or indistinct thoughts or discernments (pp. 13 ff.).

4. Anima. -- v. Soul.

5. Apperception is a psychic process by which a new content is articulated to similar already-existing contents in such a way as to be understood, apprehended, or clear [9]. We discriminate active from passive apperception; the former is a process by which the subject of himself, from his own motives, consciously and attentively apprehends a new content and assimilates it to another content standing in readiness; the latter is a process in which a new content from without (through the senses) or from within (from the unconscious) presses through into consciousness, and, to a certain extent, compels attention and apprehension upon itself. In the former case, the accent of activity lies with the ego; in the latter, with the obtruding new content.

6. Archaism: With this term, I designate the ancient character of psychic contents and functions. By this I do not mean archaistic, i.e. imitated antiquity, as exhibited for instance in the later Roman sculpture or the nineteenth century 'Gothic', but qualities which have the character of survival. All those psychological traits can be so described which essentially correspond with the qualities of primitive mentality. It is clear that archaism primarily clings to the phantasies of the unconscious, i.e. to such products of unconscious phantasy-activity as reach consciousness. The quality of the image is archaic when it possesses unmistakable mythological parallels [10]. The analogy-associations of unconscious phantasy are archaic, as is their symbolism (v. Symbol). The relation of identity with the object (v. Identity), or "participation mystique" (q.v.) is archaic. Concretism of thought and feeling is archaic. Compulsion and inability for self-control (being carried away) are also archaic. That condition in which the psychological functions are fused or merged one into the other (v. Differentiation) is archaic -- the fusion, for instance, of thinking with feeling, feeling with sensation, or feeling with intuition. Furthermore, the coalescence of parts of a function ('audition coloriee'), ambitendency and ambivalency (Bleuler), i.e. the state of fusion with its counterpart, e.g. positive with negative feeling, is also archaic.

7. Assimilation is the absorption or joining up of a new conscious content to already prepared subjective material [11], whereby the similarity of the new content with the waiting subjective material is specially emphasized, even to the prejudice of the independent quality of the new content [12]. Fundamentally, assimilation is a process of apperception (v. Apperception), which, however, is distinguished from pure apperception by this element of adjustment to the subjective material. It is in this sense that Wundt says [13]: "This method of acquisition (viz. assimilation) stands out most obviously in representations where the assimilating elements arise through reproduction and the assimilated material through a direct sense-impression. For then the elements of memory-images are transferred, as it were, into the outer object, which is especially the case when the object and the reproduced elements differ so considerably from each other that the completed sense-perception appears as an illusion, deceiving us as to the actual nature of things."

I employ assimilation in a somewhat broader sense, namely as the adjustment of object to subject in general, and with it I contrast dissimilation, which represents the adjustment of subject to object, and a consequent estrangement of the subject from himself in favour of the object, whether it be an external object or a 'psychological' or inner object, as for instance an idea.

8. Attitude (Einstellung): This concept is a relatively recent acquisition to psychology. It originated with Muller and Schumann [14]. Whereas Kulpe [15] defines attitude as a predisposition of the sensory or motor centres to a definite stimulation or persistent impulse, Ebbinghaus [16] conceives it in a wider sense as a phenomenon of exercise, introducing an air of the customary into the individual act which deviates from the customary. Our use of the concept proceeds from Ebbinghaus' conception of attitude. For us, attitude is a readiness of the psyche to act or to react in a certain direction. It is precisely for the psychology of complex psychic phenomena that the concept is so important, since it provides an expression for that peculiar psychological phenomenon wherein we find certain stimuli exercising a powerful effect on one occasion, while their effect is either weak or wholly absent on another. To have a certain attitude means to be ready for something definite, even though this definite something is unconscious, since having an attitude is synonymous with an a priori direction towards a definite thing, whether this be present in consciousness or not. The state of readiness, which I conceive attitude to be, always consists in the presence of a certain subjective constellation, a definite combination of psychic factors or contents, which will either determine action in this or that definite direction, or will comprehend an external stimulus in this or that definite way. Active apperception (q.v.) is impossible without an attitude. An attitude always has an objective; this can be either conscious or unconscious, since in the act of apperceiving a new content a prepared combination of contents unfailingly emphasizes those qualities or motives which appear to belong to the subjective content. Hence a selection or judgment takes place which excludes the irrelevant. As to what is, and what is not, relevant is decided by the already orientated combination or constellation of contents. Whether the attitude's objective be conscious or unconscious is immaterial to its selective effect, since the choice is already given a priori through the attitude, and therefore follows automatically. It is useful, however, to distinguish between conscious and unconscious, since the presence of two attitudes is extremely frequent, the one conscious and the other unconscious. Which means to say that the conscious has a preparedness of contents different from that of the unconscious. This duality of attitude is particularly evident in neurosis.

There is a certain kinship between the concept of attitude and the apperception concept of Wundt, though with this difference, that the idea of apperception includes the process of relating the already prepared content to the new content to be apperceived, while the concept of attitude relates exclusively to the subjectively prepared content. Apperception is, as it were, the bridge which connects the already present and prepared content with the new content, the attitude being, in a sense, the end-pier or abutment of the bridge upon the one bank, while the new content represents the abutment upon the other bank. Attitude signifies an expectation, an expectation always operates selectively -- it gives direction. The presence of a strongly toned content in the field of consciousness forms (sometimes together with other contents) a certain constellation which is synonymous with a definite attitude, because such a conscious content favours the perception and apperception of everything similar, and inhibits the dissimilar. It creates an attitude corresponding with it. This automatic phenomenon is an essential cause of the onesidedness of conscious orientation. It would lead to a complete loss of equilibrium if there were no self-regulating, compensatory (q.v.) function in the psyche to correct the conscious attitude. Thus in this sense the duality of the attitude is a normal phenomenon, which plays a disturbing role only when conscious onesidedness becomes excessive.

As ordinary attention, the attitude can be either a relatively unimportant subsidiary phenomenon or a general principle determining the whole psyche. From disposition, environmental influence, education, general experience, or conviction a constellation of contents may be habitually present, continually moulding a certain attitude which may operate even down to the most minute details of life. Every man who has a special sense of the unpleasant side of life will naturally have an attitude of constant readiness for the disagreeable. This excessive conscious attitude is counterbalanced by an unconscious attitude for pleasure. The oppressed individual has a conscious attitude that always anticipates oppression; he selects this factor in experience; everywhere he scents it out; and in so doing his unconscious attitude makes for power and superiority.

The total psychology of the individual even in its various basic characters is orientated by the nature of his habitual attitude. In spite of the fact that general psychological laws are operative in every individual, they cannot be said to be characteristic of the individual, since the nature of their operation varies completely in accordance with the nature of the general attitude. The general attitude is always a resultant of all the factors that can have an essential influence upon the psyche, such as inborn disposition, education, milieu-influences, experience of life, insight and convictions gained through differentiation (q.v.), collective ideas, etc. Without the absolutely fundamental importance of attitude, there would be no question of the existence of an individual psychology. But the general attitude effects such immense displacements of energy, and so modifies the relations between individual functions, that resultants are produced which frequently bring the validity of general psychological laws into question. In spite of the fact, for instance, that a certain measure of activity is held to be indispensable for the sexual function both on physiological and psychological grounds, individuals certainly exist who, without injury to themselves, i.e. without pathological phenomena and without any demonstrable restriction of productive power, can, to a very great extent, dispense with it; while, in other cases, quite insignificant deprivations or disturbances in this region may involve very considerable general consequences. How potent individual differences can be is seen perhaps most clearly in questions of likes and dislikes. Here practically all rules go by the board. What is there, in the last resort, which has not at one time given man pleasure, while at another has caused him pain? Every instinct, every function can be subordinated to other instincts and functions and act as a servant. The ego or power-instinct can make sexuality its serviceable subject, or sexuality make use of the ego. Thinking may over-run everything else, or feeling swallow up thinking and sensation, all in obedience to the attitude.

Au fond, the attitude is an individual phenomenon and is inaccessible to the scientific method of approach. In actual experience, however, certain attitude-types can be discriminated in so far as certain psychic functions can also be differentiated. When a function habitually predominates, a typical attitude is thereby produced. In accordance with the nature of the differentiated function, constellations of contents take place which create a corresponding attitude. Thus there exist a typical thinking, a feeling, a sensational, and an intuitive attitude. Besides these purely psychological attitude-types, whose number might possibly be increased, there are also social types, namely, those for whom a collective idea expresses the brand. They are characterized by the various '-isms'. These collective attitudes are, at all events, very important in certain .cases, even outweighing in significance the purely individual attitude.

9. Collective: All those psychic contents I term collective which are peculiar not to one individual, but to many, at the same time, i.e. either to a society, a people, or to mankind in general. Such contents are the "mystical collective ideas" ("representations collectives") of the primitive described by Levy-Bruhl [17]; they include also the general concepts of right, the State, religion, science, etc., current among civilized man. It is not only concepts and ways of looking at things, however, which must be termed collective, but also feelings. Levy-Bruhl shows that for the primitives collective ideas also represent collective feelings. By virtue of this collective feeling value he also terms the "representations collectives", "mystiques", since these representations are not merely intellectual but also emotional [18]. With civilized peoples, collective feelings are also bound up with certain collective ideas, such for example as the idea of God, justice, fatherland, etc. The collective character does not merely cling to individual psychic elements, it also involves whole functions (q.v.). Thus, for instance, thinking can have the character of a wholly collective function, in so far as it possesses a generally valid quality, when, for example, it agrees with the laws of logic. Feeling can also be a wholly collective function, in so far as it is identical with the general feeling, when, in other words, it corresponds with general expectations or with the general moral consciousness. In the same way, that sensation or manner of sensing, and that intuition, are collective which are peculiar to a large group of men at the same time. The antithesis of collective is individual (q.v.).

10. Compensation means a balancing or supplementing. This concept was actually introduced [19] into the psychology of the neuroses by Adler [20]. He understands by it a functional adjustment of the feeling of inferiority by a compensating psychological system, comparable to the compensating development of organs in organic inferiority [21]. Thus Adler says: "For these inferior organs and organ-systems the struggle with the outer world begins with the release from the maternal organism, a struggle which must necessarily break out and declare itself with greater violence than ever occurs in the more normally developed apparatus. At the same time, however, the foetal character provides an enhanced possibility for compensation and overcompensation, increases the capacity for adaptation to ordinary and extraordinary resistances, and ensures the formation of new and higher forms and achievements." [22] The neurotic's inferiority-feeling, which according to Adler corresponds aetiologically with an organ-inferiority, brings about an "auxiliary construction" [23]; in other words, a compensation, which consists in the setting-up of a fiction to balance the inferiority. The fiction or "fictitious guiding line" is a psychological system which seeks to convert the inferiority into a superiority. This conception gains significance in the undeniable existence -- for we have all experienced it -- of a compensating function in the sphere of psychological processes. It corresponds with a similar function in the physiological sphere, namely, the self-regulation or self-direction of the living organism.

Whereas Adler restricts his concept of compensation to a mere balancing of the feeling of inferiority, I conceive it as a general functional adjustment, an inherent self-regulation of the psychic apparatus [24]. In this sense, I regard the activity of the unconscious (q.v.) as a compensation to the onesidedness of the general attitude produced by the function of consciousness. Psychologists often compare consciousness to the eye: we speak of a visual-field and of a focal point of consciousness. The nature of consciousness is aptly characterized by this simile: only a few contents can attain the highest grade of consciousness at the same time, and only a limited number of contents can be held at the same time in the conscious field. The activity of the conscious is selective. Selection demands direction. But direction requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant. On occasion, therefore, a certain onesidedness of the conscious orientation is inevitable. The contents that are excluded and inhibited by the chosen direction sink into the unconscious, where by virtue of their effective existence they form a definite counterweight against the conscious orientation. The strengthening of this counterposition keeps pace with the intensification of the conscious onesidedness until finally a noticeable tension is produced. This tension involves a certain inhibition of the conscious activity which can assuredly be broken down by increased conscious effort. But as time goes on, the tension becomes so acute that the inhibited unconscious contents begin to break through into consciousness in the form of dreams and spontaneous images. The more onesided the conscious attitude, the more antithetic are the contents arising from the unconscious, so that we may speak of a real opposition between the conscious and the unconscious; in which case, compensation appears in the form of a contrasting function. Such a case is extreme. Compensation by the unconscious is, as a rule, not so much a contrast as a levelling up or supplementing of the conscious orientation. In dreams, for instance, the unconscious may supply all those contents which are constellated by the conscious situation, but which are inhibited by conscious selection, although a knowledge of them would be quite indispensable to a complete adaptation.

In the normal condition the compensation is unconscious, i.e. it performs an unconscious regulation of conscious activity. In the neurotic state the unconscious appears in such strong contrast to the conscious that compensation IS disturbed. The aim of analytical therapy, therefore, is to make the unconscious contents conscious in order that compensation may be reestablished.

11. Concretism: By this term I understand a definite peculiarity of thought and feeling which represents the antithesis to abstraction. The actual meaning of concrete is 'grown together'. A concretely-thought concept is one that has grown together or coalesced with other concepts. Such a concept is not abstract, not isolated, and independently thought, but always impure and related. It is not a differentiated concept, but is still embedded in the sense-conveyed material of perception. Concretistic thinking moves among exclusively concrete concepts and views; it is constantly related to sensation. Similarly concretistic feeling is never free from sensuous relatedness.

Primitive thinking and feeling are exclusively concretistic; they are always related to sensation. The thought of the primitive has no detached independence, but clings to the material phenomenon. The most he 'can do is to raise it to the level of analogy. Primitive feeling is always equally related to the material phenomenon. His thought and feeling depend upon sensation and are only faintly differentiated from it. Concretism, therefore, is an archaism (q.v.). The magical influence of the fetish is not experienced as a subjective state of feeling, but sensed as a magical effect. This is the concretism of feeling. The primitive does not experience the idea of divinity as a subjective content, but the sacred tree is the habitat -- nay, even the deity himself. This is concretism of thinking. With civilized man, concretism of thought consists in the inability to conceive of anything which differs from the immediately obvious external facts, or in the inability to discriminate subjective feeling from the sense-given object.

Concretism is a concept which falls under the more general concept of "participation mystique" (q.v.). Just as "participation mystique" represents a fusion of the individual with outer objects, so concretism represents a mixing-up of thought and feeling with sensation. It is a state of concretism when the object of thinking and feeling is at the same time also an object of sensation. This coalescence prevents a differentiation of thought and feeling, anchoring both functions within the sphere of sensation, i.e. sensuous relatedness; accordingly they can never be developed into pure functions, but must always remain the mere retainers of sensation. The result of this is a predominance of the factor of sensation in the psychological orientation. (Concerning the importance of the factor of sensation v. Sensation; Types).

The disadvantage of concretism is the subjection of function to sensation. Because sensation is the perception of physiological stimuli, concretism either rivets the function to the sphere of sense or constantly leads it back there. The effect of this is a sensual subjection of the psychological functions, favouring the influence of external facts at the expense of individual psychic autonomy. From the standpoint of the recognition of facts, this orientation is, of course, valuable, but from the standpoint of the interpretation of facts and their relation to the individual it is definitely prejudicial. Concretism produces a state where facts gain the paramount importance, thereby suppressing the individuality and its freedom in favour of the objective process. But since the individual is not only determined by physiological stimuli, but also by factors which may even be opposed to the external fact, concretism effects a projection of these inner factors into the outer fact, thus provoking an almost superstitious overvaluation of mere facts, as is precisely the case with the primitive. A good example of this is seen in Nietzsche, whose concretism of feeling resulted in an excessive valuation of diet; the materialism of Moleschott is a similar instance ("Man is what he eats"). An example of the superstitious overvaluation of facts is also provided by the hypostasizing of the concept of energy in the monism of Ostwald.

12. Consciousness: By consciousness I understand the relatedness of psychic contents to the ego (v. Ego) in so far as they are sensed as such by the ego [25]. In so far as relations are not sensed as such by the ego, they are un- conscious (q.v.). Consciousness is the function or activity [26] which maintains the relation of psychic contents with the ego,. Consciousness is not identical with psyche, since, in my view, psyche represents the totality of all the psychic contents, and these are not necessarily all bound up directly with the ego, i.e. related to it in such a way that they take on the quality of consciousness. There exist a great many psychic complexes and these are not all, necessarily, connected with the ego [27].

13. Constructive: This concept is used by me in an equivalent sense to synthetic, almost in fact as an illustration of the latter concept. Constructive means 'building up'. I employ 'constructive' and 'synthetic', in describing a method that is opposed to the reductive [28]. The constructive method is concerned with the elaboration of unconscious products (dreams, phantasies, etc.). It takes the unconscious product as a basis or starting point, as a symbolical (q.v.) expression, which, stretching on ahead as it were, represents a coming phase of psychological development [29]. In this connection, Maeder actually speaks of a prospective function of the unconscious, which half playfully anticipates the future psychological development [30]. Adler, too, recognises an anticipatory function of the unconscious [31]. It is obvious that the product of the unconscious must not be regarded as a finished thing, a sort of end-product; for in this case it would be dispossessed of every practical significance. Even Freud allows the dream a teleological role as the "guardian of sleep" [32], although for him its prospective function is essentially restricted to "wishes". The practical character of unconscious tendencies, however, cannot be disputed a priori, if we are to accept the analogy with other psychological or physiological functions. We conceive the product of the unconscious, therefore, as an expression orientated to a goal or purpose, but characterizing the objective in symbolical metaphor [33].

In accordance with this conception, the constructive method of interpretation is not so much concerned with the basic sources underlying the unconscious product, or with the mere raw materials as such, as it is with the aim to raise the symbolical product to a general and comprehensible expression [34]. The free associations of the unconscious product are thus considered with a view to a psychological objective and not from the standpoint of derivation. They are viewed from the angle of future action or inaction; their relation to the conscious situation is thereby scrupulously considered, for with the compensatory conception of the unconscious its activity has an essentially supplementary significance for the conscious situation. Since it is now a question of an anticipatory orientation, the actual relation to the object does not loom so large as in the reductive procedure, which is preoccupied with the actual past relations with the object. It is much more a question of the subjective attitude, in which the object merely signifies a sign of the subjective tendencies. The aim of the constructive method, therefore, is the production of a meaning from the unconscious product which is definitely related to the subject's future attitude .. Since, as a rule, the unconscious has the power of shaping only symbolical expressions, the constructive method seeks to elucidate the symbolically expressed meaning in such a way that a correct indication is supplied. to the conscious orientation, whereby the subject may discover that harmony with the unconscious which his future action requires.

Thus, just as no psychological method of interpretation is based exclusively upon the association-material of the analysant, the constructive method also makes use of certain comparative material. And, just as the reductive interpretation employs parallels drawn from biological, physiological, literary, folk-lore, and other sources, the constructive treatment of the intellectual problem is dependent upon philosophical parallels, while the intuitive problem is referred to parallels in mythology and the history of religion.

The constructive method is necessarily individualistic, since a future collective attitude is developed only through the individual. The reductive method is, on the contrary, collective, since it leads back from the individual case to general basic attitudes or facts. The constructive method can be directly applied also by the subject upon his own material. In this latter case it is an intuitive method, devoted to the elucidation of the general meaning of an unconscious product. This elucidation succeeds through an associative (hence not actively apperceptive; q.v.) articulation of wider material, which so enriches and deepens the symbolical expression of the unconscious that it eventually attains a degree of clarity through which it can become comprehensible to consciousness. Through this enriching of the symbolical expression it becomes interwoven with more universal associations, and is therewith assimilated.

14. Differentiation means the development of differences, the separation of parts from a whole. In this work I employ the concept chiefly in respect to psychological functions. So long as one function is still so merged with one or more of the other functions -- as for example thinking' with feeling, or feeling with sensation, etc. -- as to be quite unable to appear alone, it is in an archaic (q.v.) state, and therefore undifferentiated, i.e. it is not separated out as a special part from the whole having its own independent existence. An undifferentiated thinking is incapable of thinking apart from other functions, i.e. it is constantly mixed up with sensations, feelings, or intuitions; such thinking may, for instance, become blended with sensations and phantasies, as exemplified in the sexualization (Freud) of feeling and thinking in neurosis. The undifferentiated function is also commonly characterized by the qualities of ambivalency and ambitendency [35], i.e. every positive brings with it an equally strong negative, whereby characteristic inhibitions spring up in the application of the undifferentiated function. Such a function suffers also from a fusing together of its individual parts; thus an undifferentiated faculty of sensation, for instance, is impaired through an amalgamation of the separate spheres of sensation ("audition coloriee"), and undifferentiated feeling through confounding hatred with love. Just so far as a function is wholly or mainly unconscious is it also undifferentiated, i.e. it is not only fused together in its parts but also merged with other functions.

Differentiation consists in the separation of the selected function from other functions, and in the separation of its individual parts from each other. Without differentia- tion direction is impossible, since the direction of a function is dependent upon the isolation and exclusion of the irrelevant. Through fusion with what is irrelevant, direction becomes impossible; only a differentiated function proves itself capable of direction.

15. Dissimilation: v. Assimilation.

16. Ego: By ego, I understand a complex of representations which constitutes the centrum of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a very high degree of continuity and identity. Hence I also speak of an ego-complex [36].

The ego-complex is as much a content as it is a condition of consciousness (q.v.), since a psychic element is conscious to me just in so far as it is related to my ego-complex. But, inasmuch as the ego is only the centrum of my field of consciousness, it is not identical with the totality of my psyche, being merely a complex among other complexes. Hence I discriminate between the ego and the Self, since the ego is only the subject of my consciousness, while the Self is the subject of my totality: hence it also includes the unconscious psyche. In this sense the Self would be an (ideal) factor which embraces and includes the ego. In unconscious phantasy the Self often appears as a super-ordinated or ideal personality, as Faust in relation to Goethe and Zarathustra to Nietzsche. In the effort of idealization the archaic features of the Self are represented as practically severed from the 'higher' Self, as in the figure of Mephisto with Goethe or in that of Epimetheus with Spitteler. In the Christian psychology the severance is extreme in the figures of Christ and the devil or Anti-christ; while with Nietzsche Zarathustra discovers his shadow in the 'ugliest man'.

17. Emotion-- v. Affect. 541

18. Enantiodromia means 'a running counter to'. In the philosophy of Heraclitus [37] this concept is used to designate the play of opposites in the course of events, namely, the view which maintains that everything that exists goes over into its opposite. "From the living comes death, and from the dead, life; from the young, old age; and from the old, youth; from waking, sleep j and from sleep, waking; the stream of creation and decay never stands still." [38] "Construction and destruction, destruction and construction -- this is the norm which rules in every circle of natural life from the smallest to the greatest. Just as the cosmos itself emerged from the primal fire, so must it return once more into the same -- a double process running its measured course through vast periods, a drama eternally re-enacted." [39]

This is the enantiodromia of Heraclitus in the words of qualified interpreters. There are abundant sayings from the mouth of Heraclitus himself which express the same view. Thus he says:

"Even Nature herself striveth after the opposite, bringing harmony not from like things, but from contrasts."

"When they are born, they prepare to live, and therewith to suffer death."

"For souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth. From the earth cometh water, and from water soul."

"Everywhere mutual exchange; the All in exchange for fire, and fire in exchange for the All, just as gold for wares and wares for gold."

In a psychological application of his principle Heraclitus says:

"Let ye never lack riches, O Ephesians, lest your depravity cometh to the light." [40]

I use the term enantiodromia to describe the emergence of the unconscious opposite, with particular relation to its chronological sequence. This characteristic phenomenon occurs almost universally wherever an extreme, onesided tendency dominates the conscious life; for this involves the gradual development of an equally strong, unconscious counterposition, which first becomes manifest in an inhibition of conscious activities, and subsequently leads to an interruption of conscious direction. A good example of enantiodromia is seen in the psychology of Saul of Tarsus and his conversion to Christianity; as also in the story of the conversion of Raymond Lully; [41] in the Christ-identification of the sick Nietzsche with his deification and subsequent hatred of Wagner; in the trans formation of Swedenborg from scholar into seer, etc.

19. Extraversion means an outward-turning of the libido (q.v.). With this concept I denote a manifest relatedness of subject to object in the sense of a positive movement of subjective interest towards the object. Everyone in the state of extraversion thinks, feels, and acts in relation to the object, and moreover in a direct and clearly observable fashion, so that no doubt can exist about his positive dependence upon the object. In a sense, therefore, extraversion is an outgoing transference of interest from the subject to the object. If it is an intellectual extraversion, the subject thinks himself into the object; if a feeling extraversion, then the subject feels himself into the object. The state of extraversion means a strong, if not exclusive, determination by the object. One should speak of an active extraversion when deliberately willed, and of a passive extraversion when the object compels it, i.e. attracts the interest of the subject of its own accord, even against the latter's intention. Should the state of extraversion become habitual, the extraverted type (v. Type) appears.

20. Feeling (Fuhlen): I count feeling among the four basic psychological functions. I am unable to support the psychological school that regards feeling as a secondary phenomenon dependent upon "presentations" or sensations, but in company with Hoffding, Wundt, Lehmann, Kulpe, Baldwin, and others, I regard it as an independent function sui generis. [42]

Feeling is primarily a process that takes place between the ego and a given content, a process, moreover, that imparts to the content a definite value in the sense of acceptance or rejection ('like' or 'dislike'); but it can also appear, as it were, isolated in the form of 'mood', quite apart from the momentary contents of consciousness or momentary sensations. This latter process may be causally related to previous conscious contents, though not necessarily so, since, as psychopathology abundantly proves, it can take origin equally well from unconscious contents. But even the mood, whether it be regarded as a general or only a partial feeling, signifies a valuation; not, however, a valuation of one definite, individual, conscious content, but of the whole conscious situation at the moment, and, once again, with special reference to the question of acceptance or rejection.

Feeling, therefore, is an entirely subjective process, which may be in every respect independent of external stimuli, although chiming in with every sensation [43]. Evert an 'indifferent' sensation possesses a 'feeling tone', namely, that of indifference, which again expresses a certain valuation. Hence feeling is also a kind of judging, differing, however, from an intellectual judgment, in that it does not aim at establishing an intellectual connection but is solely concerned with the setting up of a subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection. The valuation by feeling extends to every content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may be. When the intensity of feeling is increased an affect (v. Affect) results, which is a state of feeling accompanied by appreciable bodily innervations. Feeling is distinguished from affect by the fact that it gives rise to no perceptible physical innervations, i.e. just as much or as little as the ordinary thinking process.

Ordinary 'simple' feeling is concrete (q.v.), i.e. it is mixed up with other function-elements, frequently with sensation for instance. In this particular case we might term it affective, or (as in this book, for instance) feeling-sensation, by which a well-nigh inseparable blending of feeling with sensation elements is to be understood. This characteristic fusion is universally present where feeling is still an undifferentiated function, hence most evidently in the psyche of a neurotic with a differentiated thinking.

Although feeling is an independent function in itself, it may lapse into a state of dependence upon another function, upon thinking, for instance; whereby a feeling is produced which is merely kept as an accompaniment to thinking, and is not repressed from consciousness only in so far as it fits in with the intellectual associations.

It is important to distinguish abstract feeling from ordinary concrete feeling. For, just as the abstract concept (v. Thinking) does away with the differences of the things embraced in it, so abstract feeling, by being raised above the differences of the individual feeling-values, establishes a 'mood', or state of feeling, which embraces and therewith abolishes the different individual values. Thus, just as thinking marshals the conscious contents under concepts, feeling arranges them according to their value. The more concrete the feeling, the more subjective and personal the value it confers; but the more abstract it is, the more general and objective is the value it bestows. Just as a completely abstract concept no longer coincides with the individuality and peculiarity of things, only revealing their universality and indistinctness, so too the completely abstract feeling no longer coincides with the individual instant and its feeling quality but only with the totality of all instants and their indistinctness. Accordingly, feeling like thinking is a rational function, since, as is shown by experience, values in general are bestowed according to the laws of reason, just as concepts in general are framed after the laws of reason.

Naturally the essence of feeling is not characterized by the foregoing definitions: they only serve to convey its external manifestations. The conceptual capacity of the intellect proves incapable of formulating the real nature of feeling in abstract terms, since thinking belongs to a category quite incommensurable with feeling. In fact, no basic psychological function whatsoever can be completely expressed by any other one. This circumstance is responsible for the fact that no intellectual definition will ever be able to render the specific character of feeling in any adequate measure. The mere fact that feelings are classified adds nothing to the understanding of their nature, because even the most. exact classification will be able to yield only that intellectually seizable content to which or with which feelings appear connected, but without thereby apprehending the specific nature of feeling. Thus, however many varying and intellectually seizable classes of contents there may be, just as many feelings can be differentiated, without ever arriving at an exhaustive classification of feelings themselves; because, beyond every possible class of contents accessible to the intellect, there still exist feelings which are beyond intellectual classification. The very idea of a classification is intellectual and therefore incommensurable with the nature of feeling. Hence, we must content ourselves with our attempts to define the limits of the concept.

The nature of a feeling-valuation may be compared with intellectual apperception as an apperception of value. An active and a passive feeling-apperception can be distinguished. The passive feeling-act is characterized by the fact that a content excites or attracts the feeling; it compels a feeling-participation on the part of the subject. The active feeling-act, on the contrary, confers value from the subject -- it is a deliberate evaluation of contents in accordance with feeling and not in accordance with intellectual intention. Hence active feeling is a directed function, an act of will, as for instance loving as opposed to being in love. This latter state would be undirected, passive feeling, as, indeed, the ordinary colloquial term suggests, since it describes the former as activity and the latter as a condition. Undirected feeling is feeling-intuition. Thus, in the stricter sense, only the active, directed feeling should be termed rational: the passive is definitely irrational, since it establishes values without voluntary participation, occasionally even against the subject's intention.

When the total attitude of the individual is orientated by the function of feeling, we speak of a feeling-type (v. Type).

21. Feeling-into (Einfuhlung) is an introjection (q.v.) of the object into the ego. For the fuller description of the concept of feeling-into, see text of Chapter vii (v. also Projection).

22. Function: By psychological function I understand a certain form of psychic activity that remains theoretically the same under varying circumstances. From the energic standpoint a function is a phenomenal form of libido (q.v.) which theoretically remains constant, in much the same way as physical force can be considered as the form or momentary manifestation of physical energy. I distinguish four basic functions in all, two rational and two irrational -- viz. thinking and feeling, sensation and intuition. I can give no a priori reason for selecting just these four as basic functions; I can only point to the fact that this conception has shaped itself out of many years' experience.

I differentiate these functions from one another, because they are neither mutually relatable nor mutually reducible. The principle of thinking, for instance, is absolutely different from the principle of feeling, and so forth. I make a capital distinction between this concept of function and phantasy-activity, or reverie, because, to my mind, phantasying is a peculiar form of activity which can manifest itself in all the four functions.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:14 pm

Part 2 of 4

In my view, both will and attention are entirely secondary psychic phenomena.

23. Idea: In this work the concept of idea is sometimes used to designate a certain psychological element intimately connected with what I term image (q.v.). The image may be either personal or impersonal in its origin. In the latter case, it is collective and is distinguished by mythological qualities. I then term it primordial image. When, on the contrary, it has no mythological character, i.e. lacks the Intuitive qualities and is merely collective, I speak of an idea. Accordingly I employ the term idea as something which expresses the meaning of a primordial image that has been abstracted or detached from the concretism of the image. In so far as the idea is an abstraction, it has the appearance of something derived, or developed, from elementary factors, a product of thinking. This is the sense, as something secondary and derived, in which it is regarded by Wundt [44] and many others. Since, however, the idea is merely the. formulated meaning of a primordial image in which it was already symbolically represented, the essence of the idea is not merely derived, or produced, but, considered psychologically, it has an a priori existence as a given possibility of thought-connections in general. Hence, in accordance with its nature (not with its formulation), the idea is an a priori existing and determining psychological factor. In this sense Plato sees the idea as a primordial image of things, while Kant defines it as the "archetype of the use of the mind"; hence it is a transcendent concept which, as such, transcends the limit of experience able things [45]. It is a concept demanded by reason, "whose object can never be met with in experience" [46]. Kant says:

"For, although we are bound to say of transcendent reasonal concepts. They are only ideas, yet are we in no way justified in regarding them. as superfluous and unreal. For, although no object can be determined by them, nevertheless fundamentally and unperceived they can serve the mind as canons for its extended and harmonious use, whereby it discerns no object more acutely than it would according to its own concepts, yet is guided in this discernment in a better and broader approach. Not to mention the fact that they may, perhaps, bring about a transition from natural ideas to practical concepts, even providing moral ideas with a certain associative texture of the speculative findings of reason". [47]


Schopenhauer says:

"By idea I understand every definite and established grade of the objectification of will, in so far as it is a thing-in-itself and, therefore, removed from multiplicity; such grades, moreover, are related to individual things as their eternal forms or prototypes".
[48]


With Schopenhauer, however, the idea is plastic in character, because he conceives it wholly in the sense of what I describe as primordial image; it is, however, indiscernible to the individual, revealing itself only to the "pure Subject of cognition", which is raised above will and individuality (§ 49).

Hegel completely hypostasizes the idea, and gives it the attribute of the only real existence. It is "the concept, the reality of the concept and the one-ness of both". [49] It is" eternal generation". [50]

Lasswitz regards the idea as a "law indicating the direction, in which our experience should develop". It is the " most certain and supreme reality". [51]

With Cohen, the idea is the "self-consciousness of the concept", the "foundation" of being [52].

I do not wish to multiply further evidence to establish the primary nature of the idea. These quotations should sufficiently demonstrate that the idea is conceived also as a fundamental, a priori existent factor. It possesses this latter quality from its antecedent, the primordial, symbolical image (q.v.). Its secondary nature of an abstract and derived entity it receives from the rational elaboration to which the primordial image is subjected before it is made suitable for rational usage. Inasmuch as the primordial image is a constant autochthonic psychological factor repeating itself in all times and places, we might also, in a certain sense, say the same of the idea, although, on account of its rational nature, it is much more subject to modification. by rational elaboration, which in its turn is strongly influenced by time and circumstance. It is this rational elaboration which gives it formulations corresponding with the spirit of the time. A few philosophers, by virtue of its derivation from the primordial image, ascribe a transcendent quality to it; this does not really belong to the idea as I conceive it, but rather to the primordial image, about which a timeless quality clings, established as it is from all time as an integral and inherent constituent of the human mind. Its quality of independence is derived also from the primordial image which was never made and is constantly present, appearing so spontaneously in perception that we might also say it strives independently towards its own realization, since it is sensed by the mind as an actively determining power. Such a view, however, is not general, but presumably a question of attitude (v. Chap. vii). The idea is a psychological factor which not only determines thought but, in the form of a practical idea, also conditions feeling. As a general rule, however, I only employ the term idea, either when I am speaking of the determination of thought in a thinking-type, or when denoting the determination of feeling in a feeling-type. On the other hand, it is terminologically correct to speak of determination by the primordial image, when we are dealing with an a priori determination of an undifferentiated function.

The dual nature of the idea, as something that is at the same time both primary and secondary, is responsible for the fact that the expression is occasionally used promiscuously with 'primordial image'. For the introverted attitude the idea is the primum movens; for the extraverted, it is a product.

24. Identification: This term connotes a psychological process in which the personality is either partially or totally dissimilated (v. Assimilation) from itself. Identification is an estrangement of the subject from himself in favour of an object in which the subject is, to a certain extent, disguised. For example, identification with the father practically signifies an adoption of the ways and manners of the father, as though the son were the same as the father and not a separate individual. Identification is distinguished from imitation by the fact that identification is an unconscious imitation, whereas imitation is a conscious copying.

Imitation is an indispensable expedient for the developing personality of youth. It has a beneficial effect so long as it does not merely serve as a means of accommodation, thus hindering the development of a suitable individual method. Similarly, identification may be progressive in so far as the individual way is not yet available. But, whenever a better individual possibility presents itself, identification manifests its pathological character by proving henceforth just as great a hindrance as before it was unwittingly supporting and beneficial. For now it has a dissociating influence, dividing the subject into two mutually estranged personalities. Identification is not always related to persons but also to things (for instance, a spiritual movement, or a business, etc.) and to psychological functions. In fact, the latter case is particularly important (cf. Chap. ii.). Identification, in such a case, leads to the formation of a secondary character, whereby the individual is so identified with his most developed function that he is very largely or even wholly removed from his original character-foundation, so that his real individuality goes into the unconscious. This is nearly always the rule with men who possess one differentiated function. It is, in fact, a necessary transitional stage on the way to individuation.

Identification with the parents or nearest members of the family is a normal phenomenon, in so far as it coincides with the a priori or pre-existing familial identity. In such a case, it is better not to speak of identification but of identity, a term which corresponds with the actual matter of fact. For identification with members of the family is t9 be distinguished from identity by the fact, that it is not given as an a priori fact, but arises secondarily only through the following process: -- As the individual is developing out of the original familial identity, his process of adaptation and development brings him upon an obstacle which cannot immediately be mastered; a damming-up of libido, accordingly, takes place and gradually seeks a regressive outlet. The regression brings about a revivification of earlier states, among others the state of familial identity. The identification with the members of the family corresponds with this regressive revival of a state of identity which has actually almost been overcome. Every identification with persons takes place in this way. Identification has always a purpose, namely, to obtain an advantage, push aside an obstacle, or solve a task after the manner of another individual.

25. Identity: I use the term identity in the case of a psychological equality. It is always an unconscious phenomenon, since a conscious equality would necessarily involve the consciousness of two similar things -- hence immediately presupposing a separation of subject and object, whereby the phenomenon of identity would be already resolved. Psychological identity presupposes its unconsciousness. It is' a characteristic of the primitive mentality, and is the actual basis of "participation mystique", which, in reality, is merely a relic of the original psychological non-differentiation of subject and object -- hence of the primordial unconscious state. It is, therefore, a characteristic of the early infantile mental condition. Finally, it is also a characteristic of the unconscious content in adult civilized man, which, in so far as it has not become a conscious content, remains permanently in the state of identity with objects. From an identity with the parents proceeds the identification (q.v.) with them j similarly, the possibility of projection and introjection (q.v.) depends upon identity. Identity is primarily an unconscious equality with the object. It is neither an assumption of equality nor an identification, but an a priori equality which has never appeared as an object of consciousness. Upon identity is founded the naive presumption that the psychology of one man is the same as that of another, that the same motive is universally valid, that what is agreeable to me must also be obviously pleasurable for others, and that what is immoral to me must also be immoral for others, and so forth. This state of identity is responsible also for the almost universal desire to correct in others what most demands change in oneself. Upon identity rests the possibility of suggestion and psychic contamination. Identity appears. with special distinctness in pathological cases, as for instance in paranoic delusions of 'influencing' and persecution, where the patient's own subjective contents are presumed, as a matter. of course, to proceed from others. But identity means also the possibility of a conscious collectivism and a conscious social attitude, which found their loftiest expression in the Christian ideal of brotherly love.

26. Image: When I speak of image in this book, I do not mean the psychic reflection of the external object, but a concept essentially derived from a poetic figure of speech; namely, the phantasy-image, a presentation which is only indirectly related to the perception of the external object. This image depends much more upon unconscious phantasy-activity, and as the product of such activity it appears more or less abruptly in consciousness, somewhat in the nature of a vision or hallucination but without possessing the pathological character of similar products occurring in a morbid clinical picture. The Image has the psychological character of a phantasy-presentation, and never the quasi-real character of hallucination, i.e. it never take's the place of reality, and its character of 'inner' image always distinguishes it from sensuous reality. As a rule, it lacks all projection into space, although in exceptional cases it can also appear to a certain extent externalized.

Such a mode of appearance must be termed archaic (q.v.) when it is not primarily pathological, though in no way does this do away with its archaic character. Upon the primitive level, i.e. in the mentality of the primitives, the inner image is easily projected into space as a visual or auditory hallucination without being a pathological phenomenon.

Although, as a rule, no reality-value belongs to the image, its significance for the psychic life is often thereby enhanced, i.e. a greater psychological value clings to it, representing an inner 'reality' which occasionally far outweighs the physical importance of 'external' reality. In such a case, the orientation of the individual is concerned less with adaptation to reality than with an adaptation to the inner claims.

The inner image is a complex factor, compounded of the most varied material from the most varied sources. It is no conglomerate, however, but an integral product, with its own autonomous purpose. The image is a concentrated expression of the total psychic situation, not merely, nor even pre-eminently, of unconscious contents pure and simple. It undoubtedly does express the contents of the unconscious, though not the whole of its contents in general, but merely those momentarily constellated. This constellation is the product of the specific activity of the unconscious on the one hand, and of the momentary conscious situation on the other: this always stimulates the activity of associated subliminal material at the same time as it also inhibits the irrelevant. Accordingly the image is. equally an expression of the unconscious as of the conscious situation of the moment. The interpretation of its meaning, therefore, can proceed exclusively neither from the unconscious nor from the conscious, but only from their reciprocal relation.

I term the image primordial [53]when it possesses an archaic character. I speak of its archaic character when the image is in striking unison with familiar mythological motives. In this case it expresses material primarily derived from the collective unconscious (q.v.), while, at the same time, it indicates that the momentary conscious situation is influenced not so much from the side of the personal as from the collective.

A personal image has neither archaic character nor collective significance, but expresses contents of the personal unconscious and a personally conditioned, conscious situation.

The primordial image (elsewhere also termed the 'archetype' [54]) is always collective, i.e. it is at least common to entire nations or epochs. In all probability the most important mythological motives are common to all times and races; I have, in fact, demonstrated a whole series of motives from Grecian mythology in the dreams and phantasies of thoroughbred negroes suffering from mental disorders [55].

The primordial image is a mnemic deposit, an imprint ("engramm" -- Semon), which has arisen through a condensation of innumerable, similar processes. It is primarily a precipitate or deposit, and therefore a typical basic form of a certain ever-recurring psychic experience. As a mythological motive, therefore, it is a constantly effective and continually recurring expression which is either awakened, or appropriately formulated, by certain psychic experiences. The primordial image, then, is the psychic expression of an anatomically and physiologically determined disposition. If one supports the view that a definite anatomical structure is the product of environmental conditions upon living matter, the primordial image in its constant and universal distribution corresponds with an equally universal and continuous external influence, which must, therefore, have the character of a natural law. In this way, the myth could be related to Nature (as, for instance, the solar myths to the daily rising and setting of the sun, or to the equally obvious seasonal changes). But we should still be left with the question as to why the sun, for instance, with its obvious changes, should not appear frank and unveiled as a content of the myth. The fact that the sun, or the moon, or meteorological processes do, at least, appear allegorized, points, however, to an independent collaboration of the psyche, which in this case can be no mere product or imitation of environmental conditions. Then whence this capacity of the psyche to gain a standpoint outside sense-perception? Whence its capacity for achieving something beyond or different from the verdict of the senses? We are forced to assume, therefore, that the given brain-structure does not owe its particular nature merely to the effect of surrounding conditions, but also and just as much to the peculiar and autonomous quality of living matter, i.e. to a fundamental law of life. The given constitution of the organism, therefore, is on the one hand a product of outer conditions, while on the other it is inherently determined by the nature of living matter. Accordingly, the primordial image is just as undoubtedly related to certain manifest, ever-renewing and therefore constantly effective Nature-processes as it is to certain inner determinants of the mental life and to life in general. The organism confronts light with a new formation, the eye, and the psyche meets the process of Nature with a symbolical image, which apprehends the nature-process just as the eye catches the light. And in the same way as the eye bears witness to the peculiar and independent creative activity of living matter, the primordial image expresses the unique and unconditioned creative power of the mind.

Through the questions, answers, and E-meter readings, the auditor seeks to identify the student's "n-grams" or "engrams." These "engrams" are negative feelings, attitudes, or incidents that act as blockages preventing people from realizing their full potential and living life to the fullest. Since Scientology holds the view people actually have lived many past lives over millions of years they carry "engrams" accumulated during those past lives as well as some from their present ones. Once the auditor identifies an "engram" the auditor and the student work to surface and eliminate it. The goal is to identify and eliminate all the student's engrams so he or she can achieve the state of "clear."

-- Opinion, Larry Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of California, 1989


In Dianetics: MSMH and elsewhere, Hubbard declares that the engram and only the engram causes aberration and psychosomatic illness. An engram is a moment of "unconsciousness" containing physical pain or painful emotion. Most engrams were prenatal, so Hubbard taught, and he goes to fanciful and quite ridiculous lengths to illustrate how a prenatal engram is caused. There is no medical or other rational justification for his wild theories, and most of them are quite contrary to medical knowledge and to reason.

-- Report of the Board of Enquiry Into Scientology, by Kevin Victor Anderson, Q.C., 1965


The primordial image, therefore, is a recapitulatory expression of the living process. It gives a co-ordinating meaning both to the sensuous and to the inner mental perceptions, which at first appear without either order or connection; thereby liberating psychic energy from its bondage to sheer uncomprehended perception. But it also links up the energies, released through the perception of stimuli, to a definite meaning, which serves to guide action along the path which corresponds with this meaning. It loosens unavailable, dammed-up energy, since it always refers the mind to Nature, transforming sheer natural instinct into mental forms.

The primordial image is the preliminary stage of the idea (q.v.) its maternal soil. By detaching from it that concretism which is peculiar and necessary to the primordial image, the reason develops the concept -- i.e. the idea -- which, moreover, is distinguished from every other concept by the fact that it is not only given by experience but is actually inferred as underlying all experience. The idea possesses this quality from the primordial image, which as the expression of a specific cerebral structure also imparts a definite form to every experience.

The degree of psychological efficacy belonging to the primordial image is determined by the attitude of the individual. When the general attitude is introverted as a result of the withdrawal of libido from the outer object, a reinforcement of the inner object or idea naturally takes place. This produces a very intensive development of ideas along the line unconsciously traced out by the primordial image. In this way the primordial image indirectly reaches the surface. The further course of intellectual development leads to the idea, which is merely the primordial image at the stage of intellectual formulation. Only the development of the counter-function can take the idea further, i.e. when once the idea is apprehended intellectually, it strives to become effective in life. Hence it attracts feeling, which, however, in such a case is much less differentiated, and therefore more concretistic, than thinking. Thus the feeling is impure, and because undifferentiated, is still fused with the unconscious. Hence the individual is unable to reconcile feeling so-constituted with the idea. In such a case, the primordial image, appearing in symbolic form in the inner field of vision, embraces, by virtue of its concrete nature, the feeling existing in an undifferentiated, concrete state; but at the same time, by virtue of its intrinsic significance, it also embraces the idea, of which indeed it is the mother -- thus reconciling idea with feeling. Hence the primordial image appears in the role of mediator, once again proving its redeeming efficacy, a power it has always possessed in the various religions. What Schopenhauer says of the idea, therefore, I would prefer to apply to the primordial image, since the idea -- as I have elsewhere observed under 'Idea' -- should not be regarded as something wholly and unconditionally a priori, but also as something derived and developed from antecedents. When, therefore, in the following excerpt I am quoting the words of Schopenhauer, I must ask the reader to replace the word 'idea' in the text by 'primordial image': he will then be able to understand my meaning: [56]

"The idea is never known by the individual as such, but only by the man who is exalted above all willing and above all individuality to the pure Subject of knowledge: thus it is attainable only by the genius, or by the man who has achieved mainly through the works of genius an elevation of his pure gift of cognition into a temper akin to genius: it is, therefore, not absolutely, but only conditionally, communicable, since the idea conceived and reproduced in an artistic creation, for instance, only appeals to every man according to his intellectual powers", etc.

"The idea is unity split up into multiplicity by virtue of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension."

"The concept is like an inanimate vehicle, in which the things one deposits lie side by side, but from which no more can be taken out than was put in: the idea, on the contrary, develops within the man who has embraced it conceptions which in relation to its homonymous concept are new: it is like a living, self-developing organism endowed with creative force, bringing forth something that was never put into it."


Schopenhauer clearly discerned that the 'idea', i.e. the primordial image according to my definition, cannot be reached in the way that a concept or' idea' is established ('idea' according to Kant corresponds with a "concept derived from notions" [57]), but that there pertains to it an element quite foreign to the formulating reason, rather like Schopenhauer's "temper akin to genius", which simply means a stare of feeling. For one only reaches the primordial image from the idea because of the fact that the way leading to the idea is carried on over the summit of the idea into the counter-function, feeling.

The primordial image has advantage over the clarity of the idea in its vitality. It is a self-living organism, "endowed with creative force"; for the primordial image is an inherited organization of psychic energy, a rooted system, which is not only an expression of the energic process but also a possibility for its operation. In a sense, it characterizes the way in which the energic process from earliest time has always run its unvarying course, while at the same time enabling a perpetual repetition of the law-determined course to take place; since it provides just that character of apprehension or psychic grasp of situations which continually yields a further continuation of life. It is, therefore, the necessary counterpart of instinct, which is an appropriate form of action also presupposing a grasp of the momentary situation that is both purposeful and suitable. This apprehension of the given situation is vouchsafed by the a priori existing image. It represents the practicable formula without which the apprehension of a new state of affairs would be impossible.

27. Individual ('unique-being'): The psychological individual is characterized by its peculiar, and in certain respects, unique psychology. The peculiar character of the individual psyche appears less in its elements than in its complex formations.

The psychological individual, or individuality, has an a priori unconscious existence, but it exists consciously only in so far as a consciousness of its peculiar nature is present, i.e. in so far as there exists a conscious distinctiveness from other individuals.

The psychic individuality is also given a priori as a correlate of the physical individuality, although, as ob served, it is at first unconscious. A conscious process of differentiation (q.v.) is required to bring the individuality to consciousness, i.e. to raise it out of the state of identity with the object. The identity of the individuality with the object is synonymous with its unconsciousness. There is no psychological individual present if the individuality is unconscious, but merely a collective psychology of consciousness. In such a case, the unconscious individuality appears identical with the object, i.e. projected upon the object. The object, in consequence, possesses too great a value and is too powerful a determinant.

28. Individuality: By individuality I understand the peculiarity and singularity of the individual in every psychological respect. Everything is individual that is not collective, everything in fact that pertains only to one and not to a larger group of individuals. Individuality can hardly be described as belonging to the psychological elements, but rather to their peculiar and unique grouping and combination (v. Individual.)

29. Individuation: The concept of individuation plays no small role in our psychology. In general, it is the process of forming and specializing the individual nature; in particular, it is the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general, collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality.

Individuation is, to this extent, a natural necessity, inasmuch as its hindrance, by an extensive or actually exclusive leveling to collective standards, involves a definite injury to individual vital activity. But individuality, both physically and physiologically, is already given; hence it also expresses itself psychologically. An essential check to the individuality, therefore, involves an artificial mutilation. It is at once clear that a social group consisting of deformed individuals cannot for long be a healthy and prosperous institution since only that society which can preserve its internal union and its collective values, while at the same time granting the greatest possible freedom to the individual, has any prospect of enduring vitality. Since the individual is not only a single, separate being but, by his very existence, also presupposes a collective relationship, the process of individuation must clearly lead to a more intensive and universal collective solidarity, and not to mere isolation.

The psychological process of individuation is clearly bound up with the so-called transcendent function (q.v.), since it alone can provide that individual line of development which would be quite unattainable upon the ways dictated by the collective norm (v. Symbol).

Under no circumstances can individuation be the unique goal of psychological education. Before individuation can be taken for a goal, the educational aim of adaptation to the necessary minimum of collective standards must first be attained. A plant which is to be brought to the fullest possible unfolding of its particular character must first of all be able to grow in the soil wherein it is planted.

Individuation always finds itself more or less in opposition to the collective norm, since it means a separation and differentiation from the general, and a building up of the particular; not, however, a particularity especially sought, but one with an a priori foundation in the psyche. The opposition to the collective norm, however, is only apparent, since on closer examination the individual stand point is found to be differently orientated, but not antagonistic to the collective norm. The individual way can never be actually opposed to the collective norm, because the opposite to the latter could only be a contrary norm. But the individual way is never a norm. A norm arises out of the totality of individual ways, and can have a right to existence, and a beneficial effect, only when individual ways, which from time to time have a need to orientate to a norm, are already in existence. A norm serves no purpose when it possesses absolute validity. An actual conflict with the collective norm takes place only when an individual way is raised to a norm, which, moreover, is the fundamental aim of extreme individualism. Such a purpose is, of course, pathological and entirely opposed to life. It has, accordingly, nothing to do with individuation, which, though certainly concerned with the individual by-path, precisely on that account also needs the norm for its orientation towards society, and for the vitally necessary solidarity of the individual with society. Hence individuation leads to a natural appreciation of the collective norm, whereas to an exclusively collective orientation of life the norm becomes increasingly superfluous: whereupon real morality goes to pieces. The more completely a man's life is moulded and shaped by the collective norm, the greater is his individual immorality.

Individuation is practically the same as the development of consciousness out of the original state of identity (v. Identity). Hence it signifies an extension of the sphere of consciousness, an enriching of the conscious psychological life.

30. Inferior Function: This term is used to denote the function that remains in arrear in the process of differentiation. For experience shows that it is hardly possible -- owing to the inclemency of general conditions -- for anyone to bring all his psychological functions to simultaneous development. The very conditions of society enforce a man to apply himself first and foremost to the differentiation of that function with which he is either most gifted by Nature, or which provides his most effective means for social success. Very frequently, indeed as a general rule, a man identifies himself more or less completely with the most favoured, hence the most developed, function. It is this circumstance which gives rise to psychological types. But, as a consequence of such a one-sided process of development, one or more functions necessarily remain backward in development. Such functions, therefore, may be fittingly termed 'inferior' in the psychological, though not in the psycho-pathological, sense, since these retarded functions are in no way morbid but merely backward as compared with the more favoured function. As a rule, therefore, the inferior function normally remains conscious, although in neurosis it lapses either partially or principally into the unconscious. For, inasmuch as too great a share of the libido is intercepted by the favoured function, the inferior function undergoes a regressive development, i.e. it returns to its earlier archaic state, therewith becoming incompatible with the conscious and favoured function. When a function that should normally be conscious relapses into the unconscious, the specific energy adhering to this function is also delivered over to the unconscious. A natural function, such as feeling, possesses its own inherent energy: it is a definitely organized living system, which, under no circumstances, can be wholly robbed of its energy.

Through the unconscious condition of the inferior function, its energy-remainder is transferred into the unconscious; whereupon the unconscious becomes unnaturally activated. The result of such activity is a production of phantasy at a level corresponding with the archaic, sub merged condition, to which the inferior function has now sunk. Hence an analytical release of such a function from the unconscious can take place only by retrieving those same unconscious phantasy-images which have come to life through the activation of the unconscious function. The process of making such phantasies conscious also brings the inferior function to consciousness, thus providing it with a new possibility of development.

31. Instinct: When I speak of instinct, whether in this work or elsewhere, I therewith denote what is commonly understood by this word: namely, an impulsion towards certain activities. The impulsion can proceed from an outer or an inner stimulus, which releases the instinctive mechanism either psychically, or through organic roots which lie outside the sphere of psychic causality. Every psychic phenomenon is instinctive which proceeds from no cause postulated by the will, but from dynamic impulsion, irrespective of whether such impulsion has its origin directly in organic, therefore extra-psychic, sources, or is essentially conditioned by the energies whose actual release is effected by the purpose of the will -- with the qualification, in the latter case, that the resulting product exceeds the effect intended by the will. According to my view, all those psychic processes over whose energies the conscious has no disposal come within the concept of instinct [58]. Thus, according to this view, affects (q.v.) belong to the instinctive processes just as much as to the processes of feeling (v. Feeling). Psychic processes which, under ordinary circumstances, are functions of the will (thus entirely subject to conscious control), can, in abnormal cases, become instinctive processes through a linking up with unconscious energy. This phenomenon always occurs whenever the conscious sphere is restricted either by repressions of incompatible contents or where, as a result of fatigue, intoxication, or pathological cerebral processes in general, an "abaissement du niveau mentale" (Janet) takes place -- where, in a word, the conscious either does not yet control or no longer commands the most strongly toned processes.

Those processes, which were once conscious in an individual but which have gradually become automatized, I might term automatic instead of instinctive processes. Normally, they do not even behave as instincts, since under normal circumstances they never appear as impulsions. They do that only when they receive a tributary of energy which is foreign to them.

32. Intellect: I call directed thinking (q.v.), intellect.

33. Introjection: This term was introduced by Avenarius [59] to correspond with projection. The transveying therewith intended, of a subjective content into an object is, however, just as well expressed by the concept of projection. It would, therefore, be as well to retain the term 'projection' for this process. Ferenczi has now defined the concept of introjection as the opposite of 'projection', namely, as an 'indrawing' of the object within the subjective circle of interest, while 'projection' means a translation of subjective contents into the object [60]. "Whereas the paranoic expels from his ego emotions which have become disagreeable, the neurotic helps himself to as large a portion of the outer world as his ego can ingest, and makes this an object of unconscious phantasies." The former mechanism is projection, the latter introjection. Introjection is a sort of "diluting process", an "expansion of the circle of interest". According to Ferenczi, introjection is also a normal process. Psychologically, therefore, it is a process of assimilation (q.v.), while projection is a process of dissimilation. Introjection signifies an adjustment of' the object to the subject, while projection involves a discrimination of the object from the subject, by means of a subjective content transveyed into the object.

Introjection is an extraverting process, since for this adjustment to the object a 'feeling-into', or possession of, the object is necessary.

A passive and an active introjection may be discriminated: to the former belong the transference-processes in the treatment of the neuroses and, in general, all cases in which the object exercises an unconditional attraction upon the subject; while 'feeling-into', regarded as a process of adaptation, should belong to the latter form.

34. Introversion means a turning inwards of the libido (q.v.), whereby a negative relation of subject to object is expressed. Interest does not move towards the object, but recedes towards the subject. Everyone whose attitude is introverted thinks, feels, and acts in a way that clearly demonstrates that the subject is the chief factor of motivation while the object at most receives only a secondary value. Introversion may possess either a more intellectual or more emotional character, just as it can be characterized by either intuition or sensation. Introversion is active, when the subject wills a certain seclusion in face of the object; it is passive when the subject is unable to restore again to the object the libido which is streaming back from it. When introversion is habitual, one speaks of an introverted type (v. Type).

35. Intuition (from intueri =to look into or upon) is, according to my view, a basic psychological function (v. Function). It is that psychological function which transmits perceptions in an unconscious way. Everything, whether outer. or inner objects or their associations, can be the object of this perception. Intuition has this peculiar quality: it is neither sensation, nor feeling, nor intellectual conclusion, although it may appear in any of these forms. Through intuition anyone content is presented as a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at. Intuition is a kind of instinctive apprehension, irrespective of the nature of its contents. Like sensation (q.v.) it is an irrational (q.v.) perceptive function. Its contents, like those of sensation, have the character of being given, in contrast to the 'derived' or 'deduced' character of feeling and thinking contents. Intuitive cognition, therefore, possesses an intrinsic character of certainty and conviction which enabled Spinoza to uphold the 'scientia intuitiva' as the highest form of cognition. [61] Intuition has this quality in common with sensation, whose physical foundation is the ground and origin of its certitude. In the same way, the certainty of intuition depends upon a definite psychic matter of fact, of whose origin and state of readiness, however, the subject was quite unconscious.

Intuition appears either in a subjective or an objective form: the former is a perception of unconscious psychic facts whose origin is essentially subjective; the latter is a perception of facts which depend upon subliminal perceptions of the object and upon the thoughts and feelings occasioned thereby.

Concrete and abstract forms of intuition may be distinguished according to the degree of participation on the part of sensation. Concrete intuition carries perceptions which are concerned with the actuality of things, while abstract intuition transmits the perceptions of ideational associations. Concrete intuition is a reactive process, since it follows directly from the given circumstances; whereas abstract intuition, like abstract sensation, necessitates a certain element of direction, an act of will or a purpose. In common with sensation, intuition is a characteristic of infantile and primitive psychology. As against the strength and sudden appearance of sense-impression it transmits the perception of mythological images, the precursors of ideas (q.v.).

Intuition maintains a compensatory function to sensation, and, like sensation, it is the maternal soil from which thinking and feeling are developed in the form of rational functions. Intuition is an irrational function, notwithstanding the fact that many intuitions may subsequently be split up into their component elements, whereby their origin and appearance can also be made to harmonize with the laws of reason. Everyone whose general attitude is orientated by the principle of intuition, i.e. perception by way of the unconscious, belongs to the intuitive type [62] (v. Type).

According to the manner in which intuition is employed, whether directed within in the service of cognition and inner perception or without in the service of action and accomplishment, the introverted and extraverted intuitive types can be differentiated.

In abnormal cases a well-marked coalescence with, and an equally great determination by, the contents of the collective unconscious declares itself: this may give the intuitive type an extremely irrational and unintelligible appearance.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

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Part 3 of 4

36. Irrational: As I make use of this term it does not denote something contrary to reason, but something outside the province of reason, whose essence, therefore, is not established by reason.

Elementary facts belong to this category, e.g. that the earth has a moon, that chlorine is an element, that the greatest density of water is found to be 4.0 centigrade. An accident is also irrational in spite of the fact that it may sustain a subsequent rational explanation.

The irrational is a factor of existence which may certainly be pushed back indefinitely by an increasingly elaborate and complicated rational explanation, but in so doing the explanation finally becomes so extravagant and overdone that it passes comprehension, thus reaching the limits of rational thought long before it can ever span the whole world with the laws of reason. A completely rational explanation of an actually existing object (not one that is merely postulated) is a Utopian ideal. Only an object that has been postulated can also be completely explained on rational grounds, since it has never contained anything beyond what was postulated by rational thinking. empirical science also postulates rationally. limited objects, since its deliberate exclusion of the accidental allows no consideration of the real object as a whole; hence empirical observation is always limited to that same portion of the object which has been selected for rational consideration. Thus, both thinking and feeling as directed functions are rational. When these functions are concerned not with a rationally determined choice of objects, or with the qualities and relations of objects, but with the incidental perceptions which the real object never lacks, they at once lose the quality of direction, and therewith something of their rational character, because they accept the accidental. They begin to be irrational. That thinking or feeling which is directed according to accidental perceptions, and is therefore irrational, is either intuitive or sensational. Both intuition and sensation are psychological functions which achieve their functional fulfilment in the absolute perception of occurrences in general. Hence, in accordance with their nature, their attitude must be set towards every possibility and what is absolutely accidental j they must, therefore, entirely forgo rational direction. Accordingly I term them irrational functions, in contrast to thinking and feeling, which reach perfection only when in complete accord with the laws of reason.

Although the irrational, as such, can never become the object of a science, nevertheless for a practical psychology it is of the greatest importance that the irrational factor should be correctly appraised. For practical psychology stirs up many problems that altogether elude the rational solution and can be settled only irrationally, i.e. they can be solved only in a way that has no correspondence with the laws of reason. An exclusive presumption or expectation that for every conflict there must also exist a possibility of rational adjustment may well prove an insurmountable obstacle to a real solution of an irrational character. (v. Rational).

37. Libido: In my view, this concept is synonymous with psychic energy [63]. Psychic energy is the intensity of the psychic process -- its psychological value. By this I do not mean to imply any imparted value, whether moral, aesthetic, or intellectual; the psychological value is simply conditioned by its determining power, which is manifested in definite psychic operations ('effects'). Neither do I understand libido as a psychic force, a misunderstanding that has led many critics astray. I do not hypostasize the concept of energy, but employ it as a concept denoting intensity or value. The question as to whether or no a specific psychic force exists has nothing to do with the concept of libido.

Frequently I employ the expression libido promiscuously with 'energy'. My justification for calling psychic energy libido has been fully gone into in the works referred to in the footnote.

38. The Objective Plane: When I speak of interpretation upon the objective plane, I am referring to that view of a dream or phantasy by which the persons or conditions 'appearing therein are referred to objectively real persons or conditions; whereas I speak of the subjective plane (q.v.) when the persons and conditions appearing in a dream are referred exclusively to subjective elements. The Freudian view of the dream moves almost exclusively upon the objective level, inasmuch as dream-wishes are interpreted as referring to real objects, or are related to sexual processes which fall within the physiological, and therefore extra-psychological, sphere.

39. Orientation: This term is used to denote the general principle of an attitude (q.v.). Every attitude is orientated by a certain point-of-view, no matter whether that point-of-view be conscious or unconscious. A so-called power-attitude is orientated by the view-point of ego-power exerted against oppressive influences and conditions. A thinking attitude is orientated by the principle of logic as its supreme law; a sensational attitude by the sensuous perception of given facts.

40. "Participation Mystique": This term originates with Levy-Bruhl [64]. It connotes a peculiar kind of psychological connection with the object wherein the subject is unable to differentiate himself clearly from the object to which he is bound by an immediate relation that can only be described as partial identity. This identity is based upon an a priori one-ness of subject and object. "Participation mystique", therefore, is a vestigial remainder of this primordial condition. It does not apply to the whole subject-object relation, but only to certain cases in which the phenomenon of this peculiar relatedness appears. It is, of course, a phenomenon that is best observed among the primitives; but it occurs not at all infrequently among civilized men, although not with the same range or intensity. Among civilized peoples it usually happens between persons -- and only seldom between a person and thing. In the former case it is a so-called state of transference, in which the object (as a general rule) obtains a sort of magical, i.e. unconditional, influence over the subject. In the latter case it is a question of a similar influence on the part of a thing, or else a kind of identification with a thing or the idea of a thing.

41. Phantasy: By phantasy I understand two different things, namely, (1) phantasm and (2) Imaginative activity. In my writings the context always shows which of these meanings is intended. When the term is used to denote phantasm, it represents a complex that is distinguished from other complexes by the fact that it corresponds with no actual external state of affairs. Although a phantasm may originally be based upon the memory-images of actual experiences, its content corresponds with no external reality; it is merely the output of the creative psychic activity, a manifestation or product of the combination of psychic elements. In so far as psychic energy can be submitted to voluntary direction, phantasy may also be consciously and deliberately produced, as a whole or at least in part. In the former case, it is merely a combination of conscious elements. But such a case is only an artificial experiment of purely theoretical importance. In actual everyday psychological experience, phantasy is either released by an expectant, intuitive attitude, or appears as an involuntary irruption of unconscious contents into consciousness.

We must differentiate between active and passive phantasy. Active phantasies are called forth by intuition, i.e. by an attitude directed to the perception of unconscious contents in which the libido immediately invests al1 the elements emerging from the unconscious, and, by means of association with parallel material, brings them to definition and plastic form. Passive phantasies without any antecedent or accompanying intuitive attitude appear from. the outset in plastic form in the presence of a wholly passive attitude on the part .of the cognizing subject. Such phantasies belong to the category of psychic "automatismes" (Janet). Naturally these latter can occur only as the result of a relative dissociation of the psyche, since their occurrence presupposes the withdrawal of an essential sum of energy from conscious control with a corresponding activation of unconscious material. Thus the vision of Saul presupposes an unconscious acceptance of Christianity, though the fact had escaped his conscious insight.

It is probable that passive phantasy always springs from an unconscious process antithetically related to consciousness, but one which assembles approximately the same amount of energy as the conscious attitude, whence also its capacity for breaking through the latter's resistance.

Active phantasy, on the contrary, owes its existence not merely to a one-sided, intensive, and antithetic unconscious process, but just as much to the propensity of the conscious attitude for taking up the indications or fragments of relatively lightly-toned unconscious associations, and developing them into complete plasticity by association with paral1el elements. In the case of active phantasy, then, it is not necessarily a question of a dissociated psychic state, but rather of a positive participation of consciousness.

Whereas the passive form of phantasy not infrequently bears the stamp of morbidity or at least some trace of abnormality, active phantasy belongs to the highest form of psychic activity. For here, in a converging stream, flow the conscious and unconscious personality of the subject into a common and reconciling product. A phantasy thus framed may be the supreme expression of the unity of an individual; it may even create the individual by the consummate expression of its unity. (Cf. Schiller's concept of the "aesthetic disposition"). As a general rule, passive phantasy is never the expression of an individuality that has achieved unity, since, as already observed, it presupposes a considerable degree of dissociation, which in its turn can result only from an equally strong opposition between the conscious and the unconscious. Hence the phantasy that breaks through into consciousness as the result of such a state, can never be the perfected expression of a united individuality, but only the prevailing standpoint of the unconscious personality. The life of St. Paul is a good example of this: his conversion to the Christian faith corresponded with an acceptance of the hitherto unconscious standpoint and a repression of his previous anti-Christian point of view, which latter soon became noticeable in his hysterical fits. Hence, passive phantasy must always require a conscious criticism, if it is not to substantiate the one-sided standpoint of the unconscious antithesis. Whereas active phantasy, as the product, on the one hand of a conscious attitude which is not opposed to the unconscious, and, on the other, of unconscious processes which do not maintain an antithetic so much as a compensatory relation to consciousness, does not require this criticism, but merely understanding.

As with the dream (which is merely passive phantasy) a manifest and a latent meaning must be distinguished also in phantasy. The former results from the immediate perception of the phantasy-image, and the immediate statement of the complex represented by the phantasy. Frequently, however, the manifest meaning hardly deserves the name, although it is always far more developed in phantasy than in the dream; probably this arises from the fact that the dream-phantasy usually requires no particular energy wherewith to make an effective opposition to the feeble resistance of the sleeping consciousness; whence it also follows that few antagonistic and only rather slight compensatory tendencies can obtain representation. Waking phantasy, on the other hand, must command a considerable sum of energy in order to overcome the inhibition proceeding from the conscious attitude.

Hence, for this to take place, the unconscious antithesis must already be very important before its entrance into consciousness can become possible. If it consisted only in vague and hardly seizable indications, it would never be able so to divert conscious attention (conscious libido) upon itself as effectually to interrupt the associated continuity of consciousness. Hence the unconscious content is dependent upon a very strong inner connection, which reveals itself in a manifest meaning. The manifest meaning always has the character of a plastic and concrete process, which, on account of its objective unreality, can never satisfy the conscious demand for understanding. Hence another signification, in other words, an interpretation, or latent meaning, has to be sought. Although the existence of a latent meaning of phantasy is by no means certain, and although nothing stands in the way of an eventual challenge of the whole possibility of a latent meaning, yet the demand for a satisfying understanding is motive enough for a thorough-going investigation. This investigation of the latent meaning may be purely causal, inquiring into the psyc1).ologicalcauses of the existence of the phantasy. Such an interrogation leads, on the one hand, to the more remote causes of the phantasy in the distant past, and, on the other, to the substantiation of the instinctive forces which, from the energic standpoint, must be made accountable for the existence of the phantasy. As is well known, Freud has made a specially intensive elaboration of this method. It is this method of interpretation to which I have applied the term reductive. The justification of a reductive view is immediately visible; it is also thoroughly intelligible that this method of interpreting psychological realities contains something which for a certain temperament is sufficiently satisfying to obviate any further claims for deeper understanding. If a man has uttered a cry for help, such a fact is adequately and satisfactorily explained whl;:nit is shown that the man in question was in instant danger of life. If a man dreams of a lavishly-spread table, and it is shown that he went to bed hungry, a satisfactory explanation of his dream is provided. Or supposing a man who has repressed his sexuality, ill the manner of a medieval saint, has sexual phantasies, this fact is sufficiently explained by a reduction to his repressed sexuality.

If, however, we were to explain the vision of St. Peter by dwelling upon the fact that he, "being an-hungered", had received an invitation from the unconscious to eat animals that were "unclean", or that the eating of the unclean beasts merely signified the fulfilment of a forbidden desire -- with such an explanation we would still go empty away. Neither would our demand find any fuller satisfaction if, for instance, we were to trace the vision of Saul to his repressed envy of the role played by Christ among his fellow-countrymen which brought about his identification with Christ. Both explanations may contain some glimmering of truth, yet they stand in no sort of relation to the real psychology of the two apostles, conditioned as this was by the history and atmosphere of that time. Such an explanation is both too simple and too cheap. We cannot discuss the history of the world as though it were a problem of physiology or a mere personal 'chronique scandaleuse'. That would be altogether too limited a standpoint: Hence, we are compelled very considerably to extend our conception of the latent meaning of phantasy. First of all in its causal aspect, for the psychology of the individual can never be exhaustively explained from himself: a clear recognition is also needed of the way in which his individual psychology is conditioned by contemporary history and circumstances. It is not merely a physiological, biological, or personal problem, but also a question of contemporary history. In fine, no psychological fact can ever be exhaustively explained from its causality alone, since, as a living phenomenon, it is always indissolubly bound up with the continuity of the vital process, so that on the one side it is always something that is, and on the other it is also becoming, and therefore always creative. The psychological moment is Janus-faced -- it looks both backwards and forwards. Because it is becoming, it also prepares for the future event. Were this not so, intentions, aims, the setting-up of goals, the forecasting or divining of the future would be psychological impossibilities. If, when a man expresses an opinion, we merely relate this circumstance to the fact that at some previous time someone else has also expressed a view, such an explanation is, practically, quite inadequate; for its real understanding, not merely do we wish to know the cause of his action but also what he intends by it, what are his aims and purposes, what does he hope to achieve by it. And usually, when we also know that, we are willing to rest satisfied. In everyday life, we immediately and quite instinctively insert a purposive standpoint into the explanation; indeed, very often we appraise the purposive point-of-view as the decisive one, completely overlooking the strictly causal motive; clearly, in instinctive recognition of the essentially creative factor of the psyche. If we so act in everyday experience, a scientific psychology must also take this circumstance into account, and not rely exclusively upon the strictly causal standpoint originally taken over from natural science; for it also has to consider the purposive nature of the psychic product.

When we find everyday experience establishing the purposive orientation of the conscious content beyond any sort of doubt, we have absolutely. no grounds to assume, in the absence of experience to the contrary, that this may not also be the case with the content of the unconscious. My experience gives me no reason at all to dispute the purposive orientation of unconscious contents; on the contrary, the cases in which a satisfactory interpretation could alone be attained through the introduction of the purposive standpoint are in the majority. Suppose, for example, we were again to consider the vision of Saul, but this time from the angle of the Pauline world mission, and were now to reach the conclusion that Saul, though a conscious persecutor of Christians, had unconsciously adopted the Christian standpoint, that he was finally brought to avow it by the increasing predominance and final irruption of the unconscious standpoint, and that his unconscious personality was constantly striving towards this goal in an instinctive apprehension of the necessity and importance of such an act. To me this seems a more adequate explanation of the real significance of the event than a reductive interpretation to personal motives, albeit these latter doubtless cooperated in one form or another, since the 'all-too-human' is never lacking. Similarly, the indication given in the Acts of the Apostles of a purposive interpretation of the Vision of St. Peter is far more satisfying than a merely physiological and personal conjecture.

To sum up, we may say that phantasy needs to be understood both causally as well as purposively. With the causal explanation it appears as a symptom of a physiological or personal condition, the resultant of previous occurrences; whereas, in the purposive interpretation, phantasy appears as a symbol, which seeks with the help of existing material a clear and definite goal; it strives, as it were, to distinguish or lay hold of a certain line for the future psychological development. Active phantasy being the principal attribute of the artistic mentality, the artist is not merely a representer: he is also a creator, hence essentially an educator, since his works have the value of symbols that trace out the line of future development.

Whether the actual social validity of the symbol is more general or more restricted depends upon the quality or vital capacity of the creative individuality. The more abnormal the individual, i.e. the less his general fitness for life, the more limited he will be. the common social value of the symbols he produces, although their value may be absolute for the individuality in question. One has no right to dispute the existence of the latent meaning of phantasy, unless we also cling to the view that the general Nature-process contains no satisfying meaning. But natural science has developed the meaning of the Nature-process into the form of natural laws. These, admittedly, are human hypotheses advanced in explanation of the Nature-process. But, only in so far as we have ascertained that the proposed law actually coincides with the objective process, are we justified in speaking of a meaning of the natural occurrence. Just so far, therefore, as we have succeeded in demonstrating a law-abiding principle in phantasy, are we also justified in speaking of a meaning of the same. But the disclosed meaning is satisfying, or in other words the demonstrated regularity deserves the name, only when it adequately renders the nature of phantasy.

There is a law-abiding regularity in the Nature-process, and also a regularity of the Nature-process. It is certainly law-determined and regular that one dreams when one sleeps; but there is no sort of law-determined principle that affirms anything about the nature of the dream. Its nature is a mere condition of the dream. The demonstration of a physiological source of the phantasy is a mere condition of its existence, not a law of its nature. The law of phantasy as a psychological phenomenon can only be a psychological law.

We now come to the second point of our explanation o{ the concept of phantasy, viz. imaginative activity.

Imagination is the reproductive, or creative, activity of the mind generally, though not a special faculty, since it may come into play in all the basic forms of psychic activity, whether thinking, feeling, sensation, or intuition. Phantasy as imaginative activity is, in my view, simply the direct expression of psychic vital activity: it is energy merely appearing in consciousness in the form of images or contents, just as physical energy also reveals itself as a definite physical state wherein sense organs are stimulated in physical ways. For as every physical state -- from the energic standpoint -- is merely a dynamic system, so, too, a psychic content -- regarded energically -- is merely a dynamic system appearing in consciousness. Hence from this standpoint one may affirm that phantasy in the form of phantasm is merely a definite sum of libido which cannot appear in consciousness in any other way than in the form of an image. Phantasm is an 'idee-force '. Phantasy as imaginative activity is identical with the course of the energic psychic process.

42. Power-complex: I occasionally use this term as denoting the total complex of all those ideas and strivings whose tendency it is to range the ego above other influences, thus subordinating all such influences to the ego, quite irrespective of whether they have their source in men and objective conditions, or spring from one's own subjective impulses, feelings, and thoughts.

43. Projection signifies the transveying of a subjective process into an object. It is the opposite of introjection (q.v.). Accordingly, projection is a process of dissimilation wherein a subjective content is estranged from the subject and, in a sense, incorporated in the object. There are painful, incompatible contents of which the subject unburdens himself by projection, just as there are also positive values which for some reason are uncongenial to the subject; as, for instance, the consequences of self-depreciation. Projection is based upon the archaic identity (q.v.) of subject and object, but the term is used only when the necessity has already arisen for resolving the identity with the object. This necessity arises when the identity is disturbing, i.e. when, through the absence of the projected content, the process of adaptation is materially prejudiced, so that the restoration of the projected content becomes desirable to the subject. From this moment the hitherto partial identity maintains the character of projection. This expression, therefore, denotes a state of identity which has become noticeable, and, therefore, the object of criticism, whether it be the self-criticism of the subject or the objective criticism of another.

We may discriminate between passive and active projection. The former is the customary form of every pathological and many normal projections; it springs from no purpose and is a purely automatic occurrence. The latter form is an essential constituent of the act of 'feeling-into'. Feeling-into (q.v.), as a whole, is a process of introjection, since it serves to bring the object into an intimate relation with the subject. In order to establish this relation, the subject detaches a content (a feeling, for instance) from himself; he then transveys it into, therewith animating, the object, which he thus relates to the subjective sphere.

The active form of projection, however, is also an act of judgment which aims at a separation of subject and object. In this case a subjective judgment is detached from the subject as a valid statement of the case, and is transveyed into the object; by so doing the subject distinguishes himself from the object. Accordingly, projection is a process of introversion, since, in contrast to introjection, it leads not to a linking-up and assimilation but to a differentiation and separation of subject from object. Hence it plays a leading part in paranoia, which usually ends in a total isolation of the subject.

44. Rational: The rational is the reasonable, that which accords with reason. I conceive reason as an attitude whose principle is to shape thought, feeling, and action in accordance with objective values. Objective values are established by the average experience of external facts on the one hand, and of inner psychological facts on the other. Such experiences, however, could represent no objective 'value' if 'valued' as such by the subject; for this would already amount to an act of reason. But the reasoning attitude, which permits us to declare as valid objective values in general, is not the work of the individual subject, but the product of human history.

Most objective values -- and reason itself among them -- are firmly established complexes handed down to us through the ages, to the organization of which countless generations have laboured with the same necessity with which the nature of the living organism, in general, reacts to the average and constantly recurring conditions of the environment, confronting them with corresponding function-complexes -- as, for instance, the eye, which so perfectly corresponds with the nature of light. We might, therefore, speak of a pre-existing, metaphysical world-reason, if, as Schopenhauer has already pointed out, the reaction of the living organism that corresponds with average external influence were not the indispensable condition of its existence. Human reason, therefore, is merely the expression of human adaptability to the average occurrence which has gradually become deposited in solidly organized complexes, constituting our objective values. Thus the laws of reason are those laws which rule and designate the average' correct' or adapted attitude. Everything is rational which harmonizes with these laws, and everything irrational (q.v.) which contravenes them.

Thinking and feeling are rational functions in so far as they are decisively influenced by the motive of reflection. They attain their fullest significance when in fullest possible accord with the laws of reason. The irrational functions, on the contrary, are such as aim at pure perception, e.g. intuition and sensation; because, as far as possible, they are forced to dispense with the rational (which pre-supposes the exclusion of everything that is outside reason) in order to be able to reach the most complete perception of the whole course of events.

45. Reductive ('leading back'): I employ this expression to denote that method of psychological interpretation which regards the unconscious product not from the symbolic point of view, but merely as a semiotic expression, a sort of sign or symptom of an underlying process. Accordingly, the reductive method treats the unconscious product in the sense of a leading-back to the elements and basic processes, irrespective of whether such products are reminiscences of actual events, or whether they arise from elementary processes affecting the psyche. Hence, the reductive method is orientated backwards (in contrast to the constructive method; q.v.), whether in the historical sense or in the merely figurative sense of a tracing back of complex and differentiated factors to the general and elementary. The methods both of Freud and of Adler are reductive, since in both cases there is a reduction to elementary processes either of wishing or striving, which in the last resort are infantile or primitive. Hence the unconscious product necessarily acquires the value of a merely figurative or unreal expression, for which the term 'symbol' (q.v.) is really not applicable.

The effect of reduction as regards the real significance of the unconscious product is disintegrating, since it is either traced back to its historical antecedents, and so robbed of its intrinsic significance, or it is once again reintegrated into the same elementary process from which it arose.

46. Self : -- v. Ego.

47. Sensation: According to my conception, this is one of the basic psychological functions (v. Function). Wundt also reckons sensation among the elementary psychic phenomena [65].

Sensation, or sensing, is that psychological function which transmits a physical stimulus to perception. It is, therefore, identical with perception. Sensation must be strictly distinguished from feeling, since the latter is an entirely different process, although it may, for instance, be associated with sensation as 'feeling-tone'. Sensation is related not only to the outer stimuli, but also to the inner, i.e. to changes in the internal organs.

Primarily; therefore, sensation is sense-perception, i.e. perception transmitted via the sense organs and 'bodily senses' (kinaesthetic, vaso-motor sensation, etc.). On the one hand, it is an element of presentation, since it transmits to the presenting function the perceived image of the outer object; on the other hand, it is an element of feeling, because through the perception of bodily changes it lends the character of affect to feeling, (v. Affect). Because sensation transmits physical changes to consciousness, it also represents the physiological impulse. But it is not identical with it, since it is merely a perceptive function.

A distinction must be made between sensuous, or concrete, and abstract sensation. The former includes the forms above alluded to, whereas the latter designates an abstracted kind of sensation, i.e. a sensation that is separated from other psychological elements. For concrete sensation never appears as 'pure' sensation, but is always mixed up with presentations, feelings, and thoughts. Abstract sensation, on the contrary, represents d. differentiated kind of perception which might be termed 'aesthetic' in so far as it follows its own principle and is as equally detached from every admixture of the differences of the perceived object as from the subjective admixture of feeling and thought, thus raising itself to a degree of purity which is never attained by concrete sensation. The concrete sensation of a flower, for instance, transmits not only the perception of the flower itself, but also an image of the stem, leaves, habitat, etc. It is also directly mingled with the feelings of pleasure or dislike which the sight of it provokes, or with the scent-perceptions simultaneously excited, or with thoughts concerning its botanical classification.

Abstract sensation, on the other hand, immediately picks out the most salient sensuous attribute of the flower, as for instance its brilliant redness, and makes it the sole or at least the principal content of consciousness, entirely detached from all the other admixtures alluded to above. Abstract sensation is mainly suited to the artist. Like every abstraction, it is a product of the differentiation of function: hence there is nothing primordial about it. The primordial form of the function is always concrete, i.e. blended (v. Archaism, and Concretism). Concrete sensation as such is a reactive phenomenon, while abstract sensation, like every abstraction, is always linked up with the will, i.e. the element of direction. The will that is directed towards the abstraction of sensation is both the expression and the activity of the aesthetic sensational attitude.

Sensation is a prominent characteristic both in the child and the primitive, in so far as it always predominates over thinking and feeling, though not necessarily over intuition. For I regard sensation as conscious, and intuition as unconscious, perception. For me, sensation and intuition represent a pair of opposites, or two mutually compensating functions, like thinking and feeling. Thinking and feeling as independent functions are developed, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, from sensation (and equally, of course, from intuition as the necessary counterpart of sensation).

In so far as sensation is an elementary phenomenon, it is something absolutely given, something that, in contrast to thinking and feeling, is not subject to the laws of reason. I therefore term it an irrational (q.v.) function, although reason contrives to assimilate a great number of sensations into rational associations.

A man whose whole attitude is orientated by the principle of sensation belongs to the sensation type (v. Types). Normal sensations are proportionate, i.e. their value approximately corresponds with the intensity of the physical stimulus. Pathological sensations are disproportionate, i.e. either abnormally weak or abnormally strong: in the former case they are inhibited, in the latter exaggerated. the inhibition is the result of the predominance of another function; the exaggeration proceeds from an abnormal amalgamation with another function, e.g. a blending with a still undifferentiated feeling or thinking function. In such a case, the exaggeration of sensation ceases as soon as the function with which sensation is fused is differentiated in its own right.

The psychology of the neuroses yields extremely illuminating examples o( this, where, for instance, a strong sexualization (Freud) of other functions very often prevails, i.e. a blending of sexual sensation with other functions.

48. Soul (anima): I have found sufficient cause, in my investigations into the structure of the unconscious, to make a conceptual distinction between the soul and the psyche. By the psyche I understand the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious as well as unconscious; whereas by soul, I understand a definitely demarcated function-complex that is best characterized as a 'personality'. In order to describe more exactly what I mean by this, I must introduce still remoter points of view-such, in particular, as the phenomena of somnambulism, of character-duplication, of dissociation of personality, the investigation of which is primarily due to French research, and which has enabled us to recognize the possibility of a plurality of personalities in one and the same individual [66].

It is at once evident that such a plurality of personalities can never appear in a normal individual; but the possibility of a dissociation of personality which these cases represent must also exist, at least potentially, within the range of normality. And, as a matter of fact, a moderately acute psychological observation can succeed without much difficulty in proving at least the traces of character-splitting in the normal individual. For example, we have only to observe a man rather closely under varying circumstances, to discover that a transition from one milieu to another brings about a striking alteration in his personality, whereby a sharply-outlined and distinctly changed character emerges. The proverbial expression 'angel abroad, and devil at home' is a formulation of the phenomenon of character-splitting derived from everyday experience. A definite milieu demands a definite attitude. Corresponding with the duration or frequency with which such a milieu-attitude is demanded, the more or less habitual it becomes. Great numbers of men of the educated classes are obliged to move in two, for the most part totally different, milieux -- viz. in the family and domestic circle and in the world of affairs. These two totally different environments demand two totally different attitudes, which, in proportion to the degree of identification (q.v.) of the ego with the momentary attitude, produce a duplication of character. In accordance with social conditions and necessities, the social character is orientated, on the one hand by the expectations or obligations of the social milieu, and on the other by the social aims and efforts of the subject. The domestic character is, as a rule, more the product of the subject's laissez-aller indolence and emotional demands; whence it frequently happens that men who in public life are extremely energetic, bold, obstinate, wilful, and inconsiderate appear good-natured, mild, accommodating, even weak, when at home within the sphere of domesticity. Which, then, is the true character, the real personality? This is a question it is often impossible to answer.

This brief consideration will show that, even in the normal individual, character-splitting is by no means an impossibility. We are, therefore, perfectly justified in treating the question of dissociation of personality also as a problem of normal psychology. According to my view then -- to pursue the discussion -- the above question should be met with a frank avowal that such a man has no real character at all, i.e. he is not individual (q.v.) but collective (q.v.), i.e. he corresponds with general circumstances and expectations. Were he an individual, he would have but one and the same character with every variation of attitude. It would not be identical with the momentary attitude, neither could it nor would it prevent his individuality from finding expression in one state just as clearly as in another. He is an individual, of course, like every being; but an unconscious one. Through his more or less complete identification with the attitude of the moment, he at least deceives others, and also often himself, as to his real character. He puts on a mask, which he knows corresponds with his conscious intentions, while it also meets with the requirements and opinions of his environment, so that first one motive then the other is in the ascendant. This mask, viz. the ad hoc adopted attitude, I have called the persona, [67] which was the designation given to the mask worn by the actors of antiquity. A man who is identified with this mask I would call "personal" (as opposed to "individual").

Both the attitudes of the case considered above are collective personalities, which may be simply summed up under the name "persona" or "personae". I have already suggested above that the real individuality is different from both. Thus, the persona is a function-complex which has come into existence for reasons of adaptation or necessary convenience, but by no means is it identical with the individuality. The function-complex of the persona is exclusively concerned with the relation to the object.

The relation of the individual to the outer object must be sharply distinguished from the relation to the subject. By the subject I mean those vague, dim stirrings, feelings, thoughts, and sensations which have no demonstrable flow towards the object from the continuity of conscious experience, but well up like a disturbing, inhibiting, or at times beneficent, influence from the dark inner depths, from the background and underground of consciousness which, in their totality, constitute one's perception of the unconscious life. The subject, conceived as the 'inner' object, is the unconscious. There is a relation to the inner object, viz. an inner attitude, just as there is a relation to the outer object, viz. an outer attitude. It is quite intelligible that this inner attitude, by reason of its extremely intimate and inaccessible nature, is far less widely known than the outer attitude, which is immediately perceived by everyone. Nevertheless, the task of making a concept of this inner attitude does not seem to me impossible. All those so-called accidental inhibitions, fancies, moods, vague feelings, and fragments of phantasy, which occasionally harass and disturb the accomplishment of concentrated work, not to mention the repose of the most normal of men, and which evoke rational explanations either in the form of physical causes or reasons of like nature, usually have their origin, not in the reasons ascribed to them by consciousness, but in the perceptions of unconscious processes, which, in fact, they are. Among such phenomena, dreams also naturally belong: these are admittedly liable to be accounted for by such external and superficial causes as indigestion, sleeping on one's back, and the like, in spite of the fact that such explanations never withstand a searching criticism. The attitude of individual men to these things is extremely variable. One man will not allow himself to be disturbed in the smallest degree by his inner processes -- he can, as it were, ignore them entirely; while another is in the highest degree subject to them: at the first waking-moment some phantasy or other, or a disagreeable feeling, spoils his temper for the whole day; a vague, unpleasant sensation suggests the idea of a secret malady, or a dream leaves him with a gloomy foreboding, although in other ways he is by no means superstitious. To others, again, these unconscious stirrings have only a very episodic access, or only a certain category of them come to the surface. For one man, perhaps, they have never yet appeared. to consciousness as anything worth thinking about, while for another they are a problem of daily brooding. The one values them physiologically, or ascribes them to the conduct of his neighbours; another finds in them a religious revelation.

These entirely different ways of dealing with the stir rings of the unconscious are just as habitual as the attitudes to the outer object. The inner attitude, therefore, corresponds with just as definite a function-complex as the outer attitude. Those cases in which the inner psychic processes appear to be entirely overlooked are lacking a typical inner attitude just as little as those who constantly overlook the outer object and the reality of facts lack a typical outer attitude. The persona of these latter, by no means infrequent, cases has the character of unrelatedness, or at times even a blind inconsiderateness, which frequently yields only to the harshest blows of fate. Not seldom, it is just those individuals whose persona is characterized by a rigid inconsiderateness and absence of relations who possess an attitude to the unconscious processes which suggests a character of extreme susceptibility. As they are inflexible and inaccessible outwardly, so are they weak, flaccid, and determinable in relation to their inner processes. In such cases, therefore, the inner attitude corresponds with an inner personality diametrically opposed and different from the outer. I know a man, for instance, who without pity blindly destroyed the happiness of those nearest to him, and yet he would interrupt his journey when travelling on important business just to enjoy the beauty of a forest scene glimpsed from the carriage window. Cases of this kind are doubtless familiar to everyone; it is needless therefore to enumerate further examples. With the same justification as daily experience furnishes us for speaking of an outer personality are we also justified in assuming the existence of an inner personality. The inner personality is the manner of one's behaviour towards the inner psychic processes; it is the inner attitude, the character, that is turned towards the unconscious. I term the outer attitude, or outer character, the persona, the inner attitude I term the anima, or soul. In the same degree as an attitude is habitual, is it a more or less firmly welded function-complex, with which the ego may be more or less identified. This is plastically expressed in language: of a man who has an habitual attitude towards certain situations, we are accustomed to say: He is quite another man when doing this or that. This is a practical demonstration of the independence of the function-complex of an habitual attitude; it is as though another personality had taken possession of the individual, as 'though another spirit had entered into him'. The same autonomy as is so often granted to the outer attitude is also claimed by the soul or inner attitude. One of the most difficult of all educational achievements is this task of changing the outer attitude, or persona. But to change the soul is just as difficult, since its structure tends to be just as firmly welded as is that of the persona. Just as the persona is an entity, which often appears to constitute the whole character of a man, even accompanying him practically without change throughout his entire life, so the soul is also a definitely circumscribed entity, with a character which may prove unalterably firm and independent. Hence, it frequently offers itself to characterization and description.

As regards the character of the soul, my experience confirms the validity of the general principle that it maintains, on the whole, a complementary relation to the outer character. Experience teaches us that the soul is wont to contain all those general human qualities the conscious attitude lacks. The tyrant tormented by bad dreams, gloomy forebodings, and inner fears, is a typical figure. Outwardly inconsiderate, harsh, and unapproachable, he is inwardly susceptible to every shadow, and subject to every fancy, as though he were the least independent, and the most impressionable, of men. Thus his soul contains those general human qualities of suggestibility and weakness which are wholly lacking in his outer attitude, or persona. Where the persona is intellectual, the soul is quite certainly sentimental. That the complementary character of the soul is also concerned with the sex-character is a fact which can no longer 'seriously be doubted. A very feminine woman has a masculine soul, and a very manly man a feminine soul. This opposition is based upon the fact that a man, for instance, is not in all things wholly masculine, but has also certain feminine traits. The more manly his outer attitude, the more will his womanly traits be effaced; these then appear in the soul. This circumstance explains why it is that the very manly men are most subject to characteristic weaknesses; their attitude to the unconscious has a womanly weakness and impressionability. And, vice versa, it is often just the most womanly women who, in respect of certain inner things, have an extreme intractableness, obstinacy, and wilfulness; which qualities are found in such intensity only in the outer attitude of men. These are manly traits, whose exclusion from the womanly outer attitude makes them qualities of the soul. If, therefore, we speak of the anima of a man, we must logically speak of the animus of a woman, if we are to give the soul of a woman its right name. Whereas logic and objective reality commonly prevail in the outer attitude of man, or are at least regarded as an ideal, in the case of woman it is feeling. But in the soul the relations are reversed: inwardly it is the man who feels, and the woman who reflects. Hence man's greater liability to total despair, while a woman can always find comfort and hope; hence man is more liable to put an end to himself than woman. However prone a woman may be to fall a victim to social circumstances, as in prostitution for instance, a man is equally delivered over to impulses from the unconscious in the form of alcoholism and other vices.

As regards the general human characters, the character of the soul may be deduced from that of the persona. Everything which should normally be in the outer attitude, but is decidedly wanting there, will invariably be found in the inner attitude. This is a basic rule, which my experience has borne out again and again. But, as regards individual qualities, nothing can be deduced about them in this way. We can be certain only that, when a man is identical with his persona, the individual qualities are associated with the soul. It is this association which gives rise to the symbol, so often appearing in dreams, of the soul's pregnancy; this symbol has its source in the primordial image of the hero-birth. The child that is to be born signifies the individuality, which, though existing, is not yet conscious. Hence in the same way as the persona, which expresses one's adaptation to the milieu, is as a rule strongly influenced and shaped by the milieu, so the soul is just as profoundly moulded by the unconscious and its qualities. Just as the persona, almost necessarily, takes on primitive traits in a primitive milieu, so the soul assumes the archaic characters of the unconscious as well as its prospective, symbolic character. Whence arise the 'pregnant' and 'creative' qualities of the inner attitude. Identity with the persona automatically conditions an unconscious identity with the soul, because, when the subject or ego is not differentiated from the persona, it can have no conscious relation to the processes of the unconscious. Hence it is these processes: it is identical with them. The man who is unconditionally his outer role therewith delivers himself over unquestioningly to the inner processes, i.e. he will even frustrate his outer role by absolute inner necessity, reducing it ad absurdum (enantiodromia; q.v.). A steady holding to the individual line is thereby excluded, and his life runs its course in inevitable opposition. Moreover, in such a case the soul is always projected into a corresponding, real object, with which a relation of almost absolute dependence exists. Every reaction proceeding from this object has an immediate, inwardly arresting effect upon the subject. Tragic ties are frequently formed in this way (v. Soul-image).

49. Soul-Image: The soul-image is a definite image (q.v.) among those produced by the unconscious. Just as the persona, or outer attitude, is represented in dreams by the images of certain persons who possess the outstanding qualities of the persona in especially marked form, so the soul, the inner attitude of the unconscious, is similarly represented by definite persons whose particular qualities correspond with those of the soul. Such an image is called a 'soul-image'. Occasionally these images are quite unknown or mythological figures. With men the soul, i.e. the anima, is usually figured by the unconscious in the person of a woman; with women it is a man. In every case where the individuality is unconscious, and therefore associated with the soul, the soul-image has the character of the same sex. In all those cases in which an identity with the persona (v. Soul) is present, and the soul accordingly is unconscious, the soul-image is transferred into a real person. This person is the object of an intense love or an equally intense hatred (possibly even fear). The influence of such a person has the character of something immediate and absolutely compelling, since it always evokes an affective response. The affect depends upon the fact that a real conscious adaptation to the object who represents the soul-image is impossible. Because the objective relation is alike impossible and non-existent, the libido gets dammed up and explodes in a release of affect. Affects always occur where there is a failure of adaptation. A conscious adaptation to the object who represents the soul-image is impossible only when the subject is unconscious of the anima. Were he conscious of it, it could be distinguished from the object, whose immediate effects might then be resolved, since the potency of the object depends upon the projection of the soul-image.

For a man, a woman is best fitted to be the bearer of his soul-image, by virtue of the womanly quality of his soul; similarly a man, in the case of a woman. Wherever an unconditional, or almost magical, relation exists between the sexes, it is always a question of projection of the soul-image. Since such relations are common, just as frequently must the soul be unconscious, i.e. great numbers of men must be unaware of how they are related to the inner psychic processes. Because such unconsciousness goes always hand in hand with a correspondingly complete identification with the persona (v. Soul), it clearly follows that the latter also must occur very frequently. This accords with reality; for, as a matter of fact, large numbers of men are wholly identified with their outer attitude, and therefore have no conscious relation to their inner processes. But the converse may also happen; namely, where the soul-image is not projected, but remains with the subject; whereupon an identification with the soul is liable to result just in so far as the subject is himself convinced that his manner of behaviour to his inner processes is also his unique and actual character. In such a case, the unconsciousness of the persona results in its projection upon an object, more especially of the same sex, thus providing a foundation for many cases of more or less admitted homosexuality, and of father-transferences in men or mother-transferences in women. Such cases are always persons with defective external adaptation and comparative unrelatedness, because the identification with the soul begets an attitude with a predominant orientation towards the inner processes, whereby the object is deprived of its determining influence.

Whenever the soul-image is projected, an unconditional, affective tie to the object appears. If it is not projected, a relatively unadapted state results, which Freud has partially described as narcissism. The projection of the soul-image offers a release from a too great preoccupation with the inner processes, in so far as the behaviour of the object harmonizes with the soul-image. The subject is thus enabled to live his persona, and to develop it further. In the long run, however, the object will scarcely be able to correspond consistently with the soul-image, although many women succeed, by constantly disregarding their own lives, in representing their husband's soul-image for a very considerable time. The biological, feminine instinct assists them in this. A man may unconsciously do the same for his wife, only he is thereby prompted to deeds which, for good or evil, finally exceed his powers. In his case, also, the biological masculine instinct is an assistance.

If the soul-image is not projected, a thoroughly morbid differentiation of the relation to the unconscious gradually develops. The subject is increasingly overwhelmed by unconscious contents, which his defective relation to the object makes him powerless to organize, or to put to any sort of use. Obviously, such contents as these very seriously prejudice the relation to the object. These attitudes only represent, of course, the two extremes, between which the more normal attitudes are to be found. The normal man, as we know, is not distinguished by any special clarity, purity, or depth, in the matter of psychological phenomena, but commonly inclines to a certain indistinctness in such matters. In men with a good-natured and inoffensive outer' attitude, the soul-image, as a rule, has a rather malevolent character. A good literary example of this is the demonic woman who accompanies Zeus in Spitteler's "Olympischer Fruhling." For the idealistic woman, a depraved man is often a bearer of the soul-image; hence the 'salvation phantasy' so frequent in such cases. The same thing often happens with men, where the prostitute is surrounded with the halo of a soul crying for succour.

50. Subjective Plane: By interpretation upon the subjective plane, I understand that conception of a dream or phantasy in which the persons or conditions appearing therein are related to subjective factors entirely belonging to the subject's own psyche. It is common knowledge that the image of an object existing in our psyche is never exactly like the object, but at most only similar. Although admittedly brought about through sense-perceptions and their apperception, it is actually the product of processes inherent in the psyche whose activity the object merely stimulates.. Experience shows that the evidence of our senses very largely coincides with the qualities of the object, but our apperception is subject to well-nigh incalculable subjective influences, which render the correct knowledge of a human character extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, such a complex psychic factor as is presented by a human character offers only a very slight field for pure sense perception. Its cognition also demands 'feeling-into', reflection, and intuition. The final judgment that issues from these complex factors is always of very doubtful value; necessarily, therefore, the image we form of a human object is, to a very large extent, subjectively conditioned. Hence, in practical psychology we should be well advised to differentiate the image or imago of a man quite definitely from his real existence. Not infrequently as a result of its extremely subjective origin, an imago is actually more an image of a subjective function-complex than of the object itself.

In the analytical treatment of unconscious products, therefore, it is essential that the imago shall not immediately be assumed to be identical with the object; it is wiser to regard it as an image of the subjective relation to the object. This is what is meant by the consideration of a product upon the subjective plane.

The treatment of an unconscious product upon this plane results in the presence of subjective judgments and tendencies of which the bearer is made the object. When, therefore, an object-imago appears in an unconscious product, it is not definitely concerned with the real object per se, but just as much, possibly even more, with a subjective function-complex (v. Soul-image).

The application of meaning upon this plane yields us a comprehensive psychological explanation, not only of dreams but also of literary works, in which the individual figures represent relatively autonomous function-complexes in the psyche of the poet.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

Postby admin » Tue Oct 06, 2015 10:15 pm

Part 4 of 4

51. Symbol: The concept of a symbol should, in my view, be strictly differentiated from that of a mere sign. Symbolic and semiotic interpretations are entirely different things. In his book Ferrero [68] does not speak of symbols in the strict sense, but of signs. For instance, the old custom of handing over a sod of turf at the sale of a piece of land, might be described as 'symbolic' in the vulgar use of the word; but actually it is purely semiotic in character. The piece of turf is a sign, or token, representing the whole estate. The winged wheel worn by the railway employees is not a symbol of the railway, but a sign that distinguishes the personnel of the railway. But the symbol always presupposes that the chosen expression is the best possible description, or formula, of a relatively unknown fact; a fact, however, which is none the less recognized or postulated as existing. Thus, when the winged-wheel badge of the railway employee is explained as a symbol, it is tantamount to saying that the man has to do with an unknown entity whose nature cannot be differently or better expressed than by a winged wheel. Every view which interprets the symbolic expression as an analogous or abbreviated expression of a known thing is semiotic. A conception which interprets the symbolic expression as the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing which cannot conceivably, therefore, be more clearly or characteristically represented is symbolic. A view which interprets the symbolic expression as an intentional transcription or transformation of a known thing is allegoric. The explanation of the Cross as a symbol of Divine Love is semiotic, since Divine Love describes the fact to be expressed better and more aptly than a cross, which can have many other meanings. Whereas that interpretation of the Cross is symbolic which puts it above all imaginable explanations, regarding it as an expression of an unknown and as yet incomprehensible fact of a mystical or transcendent, i.e. psychological character, which simply finds its most striking and appropriate representation in the Cross.

In so far as a symbol is a living thing, it is the expression of a thing not to be characterized in any other or better way. The symbol is alive only in so far as it is pregnant with meaning. But, if its meaning is born out of it, i.e. if that expression should be found which formulates the sought, expected, or divined thing still better than the hitherto accepted symbol, then the symbol is dead, i.e. it possesses only a historical significance. We may still go on speaking of it as a symbol, under the tacit assumption that we are speaking of it as it was before its better expression had been born from it. The way in which St Paul and the early mystical speculators handle the symbol of the Cross shows that for them it was a living symbol which represented the inexpressible in an unsurpassable way.

For every esoteric explanation the symbol is dead, since through esoterism it has been brought to a better expression (at least ostensibly), whereupon it merely serves as a conventional sign for associations which are more completely and better known elsewhere. Only for the exoteric standpoint is the symbol always living. An expression that stands for a known thing always remains merely a sign and is never a symbol. It is, therefore, quite impossible to make a living symbol, i.e. one that is pregnant with meaning, from known associations. For what is thus manufactured never contains more than was put into it. Every psychic product, in so far as it is the best possible expression at the moment for a fact as yet unknown or only relatively known, may be regarded as a symbol, provided also that we are prepared to accept the expression as designating something that is only divined and not yet clearly conscious.

Inasmuch as every scientific theory contains a hypothesis, and therefore an anticipatory designation of a fact still essentially unknown, it is a symbol. Furthermore, every psychological phenomenon is a symbol when we are willing to assume that it purports, or signifies, something different and still greater, something therefore which is withheld from present knowledge. This assumption is absolutely possible to every consciousness which is orientated to the deeper meaning of things, and to the possibilities such an attitude enfolds. Such an assumption is impossible only for this same consciousness when it has itself contrived an expression, merely to contain or affirm just as much as the purpose of its creation intended, as for example a mathematical term. For another consciousness, however, this restriction does not exist at all. It can also conceive the mathematical term as a symbol of an unknown psychic fact concealed within the purpose of its production, in so far as this fact is demonstrably unknown to the man who created the semiotic expression, and therefore could not be the object of any conscious use.

Whether a thing is a symbol or not depends chiefly upon the attitude of the consciousness considering it; as for instance, a mind that regards the given fact not merely as such but also as an expression of the yet unknown. Hence it is quite possible for a man to produce a fact which does not appear in the least symbolic to himself, although profoundly so to another. The converse is also possible. There are undoubtedly products whose symbolical character not merely depends upon the attitude of the considering consciousness, but manifests itself spontaneously in a symbolical effect upon the regarding subject. Such products are so fashioned that they must forfeit every sort of meaning, unless the symbolical one is conceded them. As a pure actuality, a triangle in which an eye is enclosed. is so meaningless that it is impossible for the observer to regard it as mere accidental trifling. Such a figure immediately conjures up a symbolical conception of it. This effect is supported either by a frequent and identical occurrence of the same figure, or by a particularly careful and arresting manner of production which is the actual expression of a particular value placed upon it.

Symbols that are without the spontaneous effect just described are either dead, i.e. outstripped by a better formulation, or else products whose symbolical nature depends exclusively upon the attitude of the observing consciousness. This attitude that conceives the given phenomenon as symbolic may be briefly described as the symbolical attitude. It is only partially justified by the behaviour of things; for the rest, it is the outcome of a definite view of life endowing the occurrence, whether great or small, with a meaning to which a certain deeper value is given than to pure actuality. This view of things stands opposed to another view, which lays the accent upon pure actuality, and subordinates meaning to facts. For this latter attitude there can be no symbol at all, wherever the symbolism depends exclusively upon the manner of consideration. But even for such an attitude symbols also exist: namely, those that prompt the observer to the conjecture of a hidden meaning. An image of a god with the head of a bull can certainly be explained as a human body with a bull's head. But this explanation could scarcely hold the scales against the symbolic interpretation, since the symbol is too arresting to be entirely overlooked. A symbol that seems to obtrude its symbolical nature need not be alive. Its effect may be wholly restricted, for instance, to the historical or philosophical intellect. It merely arouses intellectual or aesthetic interest. But a symbol really lives only when it is the best and highest possible expression of something divined but not yet known even to the observer. For under these circumstances it provokes unconscious participation. It advances and creates life. As Faust says: "How differently this token works upon me!"

The living symbol shapes and formulates an essential unconscious factor, and the more generally this factor prevails, the more general is the operation of the symbol; for in every soul it touches an associated chord. Since, on the one hand the symbol is the best possible expression of what is still unknown -- an expression, moreover, which cannot be surpassed for the given epoch -- it must proceed from the most complex and differentiated contemporary mental atmosphere. But since, on the other hand, the living symbol must embrace and contain that which relates a considerable group of men for such an effect to be within its power, it must contain just that which may be common to a large group of men. Hence, this can never be the most highly differentiated or the highest attainable, since only the very few could attain to, or understand it; but it must be something that is still so primitive that its omnipresence stands beyond all doubt. Only when the symbol comprises this something, and brings it to the highest possible expression, has it any general efficacy. Therein consists the potent and, at the same time, redeeming effect of a living, social symbol.

All that I have now said concerning the social symbol holds good for the individual symbol. There are individual psychic products, whose manifest symbolic character at once compels a symbolical conception. For the individual, they possess a similar functional significance as the social symbol for a larger human group. Such products, however, never have an exclusively conscious or unconscious source, but proceed from a uniform co-operation of both. Purely conscious products are no more convincingly symbolic, per se, than purely unconscious products, and vice versa; it devolves, therefore, upon the symbolical attitude of the observing consciousness to endow them with the character of a symbol. But they may equally well be conceived as mere causally conditioned facts, in much the same sense as one might regard the red exanthema of scarlet fever as a 'symbol' of the disease. In such a case, of course, it is correct to speak of a 'symptom', not of a symbol. In my view, therefore, Freud is justified, when, from his standpoint, he speaks of symptomatic [69], rather than symbolical actions; since, for him, these phenomena are not symbolic in the sense here defined, but are symptomatic signs of a definite and generally known underlying process. There are, of course, neurotics who regard their unconscious products, which are primarily morbid symptoms, as symbols of supreme importance. Generally, however, this is not the case. On the contrary, the neurotic of to-day is only too prone to regard a product that may actually be full of significance, as a 'symptom'.

The fact. that there are two distinct and mutually contradictory views, eagerly advocated on either side, concerning the meaning and the meaninglessness of things, can only show that processes clearly exist which express no particular meaning, being in fact mere consequences, or symptoms; while there are other processes which bear within them a hidden meaning, processes which have not merely arisen from something, but also tend to become something, and are therefore symbols. It is left to our judgment and criticism to decide whether the thing we are dealing with is a symptom or a symbol.

The symbol is always a creation of an extremely complex nature, since data proceeding from every psychic function have entered into its composition. Hence its nature is neither rational nor irrational. It certainly has one side that accords with reason, but it has also another side that is inaccessible to reason; for not only the data of reason, but also the irrational data of pure inner and outer perception, have entered into its nature. The prospective meaning and pregnant significance of the symbol appeals just as strongly to thinking as to feeling, while its peculiar plastic imagery when shaped into sensuous form stimulates sensation just as much as intuition. The living symbol cannot come to birth in an inert or poorly-developed mind, for such a man will rest content with the already existing symbols offered by established tradition. Only the passionate yearning of a highly developed mind, for whom the dictated symbol no longer contains the highest reconciliation in one expression, can create a new symbol. But, inasmuch as the symbol proceeds from his highest and latest mental achievement and must also include the deepest roots of his being, it cannot be a one-sided product of the most highly differentiated mental functions, but must at least have an equal source, in the lowest and most primitive motions of his psyche. For this co-operation of antithetic states to be at all possible, they must both stand side by side in fullest conscious opposition. Such a condition necessarily entails a violent disunion with oneself, even to a point where thesis and antithesis mutually deny each other, while the ego is still forced to recognize its absolute participation in both. But, should there exist a subordination of one part, the symbol will be disproportionately the product of the other, and in corresponding degree will be less a symbol than a symptom, viz. the symptom of a repressed antithesis. But, to the extent in which a symbol is merely a symptom, it also lacks the redeeming effect, since it fails to express the full right to existence of every portion of the psyche, constantly calling to mind the suppression of the antithesis, although consciousness may omit to take this into account.

But, when the opposites are given a complete equality of right, attested to by the ego's unconditioned participation in both thesis and antithesis, a suspension of the will results; for the will can no longer be operative while every motive has an equally strong counter-motive by its side. Since life cannot tolerate suspension, a damming up of vital energy results, which would lead to an insupportable condition from the tension of the opposites did not a new reconciling function arise which could lead above and beyond the opposites. It arises naturally, however, from the regression of the libido effected by its damming up. Since progress is made impossible by the total disunion of the will, the libido streams backwards, the stream flows back as it were to its source, i.e. the suspension and inactivity of the conscious brings about an activity of the unconscious where all the differentiated functions have their common, archaic root, and where that promiscuity of contents exists of which the primitive mentality still exhibits numerous remainders.

Through the activity of the unconscious, a content is unearthed which is constellated by thesis and antithesis in equal measure, and is related to both in a compensatory (q.v.) relation. Since this content discloses a relation to both thesis and antithesis, it forms a middle territory, upon which the opposites can be reconciled. Suppose, for example, we conceive the opposition to be sensuality versus spirituality; then, by virtue of its wealth of spiritual associations, the mediatory content born from the unconscious offers a welcome expression to the spiritual thesis, and by virtue of its plastic sensuousness it embraces the sensual antithesis. But the ego rent between thesis and antithesis finds in the uniting middle territory its counterpart, its reconciling and unique expression, and eagerly seizes upon it, in order to be delivered from its division. Hence, the energy created by the tension of the opposites flows into the mediatory expression, protecting it against the conflict of the opposites which forthwith begins both about it and within, since both are striving to resolve the new expression in their own specific sense. Spirituality tries to make something spiritual out of the unconscious. expression, while sensuality aims at something sensual; the one wishing to create science and art from the new expression, the other sensual experience. The resolution of the unconscious product into either is successful only when the incompletely divided ego clings rather more to one side than the other.

Should one side succeed in resolving the unconscious product, it does not fall alone to that side, but the ego goes with it; whereupon an identification of the ego with. the most-favoured function (v. Inferior Function) inevitably follows. This results in a subsequent 'repetition of the process of division upon a higher plane. But if, through the resoluteness of the ego, neither thesis nor antithesis can succeed in resolving the unconscious product, this is sufficient demonstration that the unconscious expression is superior to both sides.

The steadfastness of the ego and the superiority of the mediatory expression over thesis and antithesis are to my mind correlates, each mutually conditioning the other. It would appear at times as though the fixity of the inborn individuality were the decisive factor, at times as though the mediatory expression possessed a superior force prompting the ego to absolute steadfastness. But, in reality, it is quite conceivable that the firmness and certainty of the individuality on the one hand, and the superior force' of the mediatory product on the other, are merely tokens of one and the same fact. When the mediatory product is preserved in this way, it fashions a raw product which is for construction, not for dissolution, and which becomes a common object for both thesis and antithesis; thus it becomes a new content that governs the whole attitude, putting an end to the division, and forcing the energy of the opposites into a common channel. The suspension of life is, therewith, abolished, and the individual life can compass a greater range with new energy and new goals.

In its totality I have named the process just described the transcendent function, and here I am not using the term 'function' in the sense of a basic function, but rather as a complex-function compounded of other functions, neither with 'transcendent' do I wish to designate any metaphysical quality, but merely the fact that by this function a transition is made possible from the one attitude to the other. The raw material, when elaborated by the thesis and antithesis, which in its process of formation reconciles the opposites, is the living symbol. In the essential rawness of its material, defying time and dissolution, lies its prospective significance, and in the form which its crude material receives through the influence of the opposites, lies its effective power over all the psychic functions.

Indications of the foundations of the symbol-forming process are to be found in the scanty records of the initiation-period experienced by founders of religions, e.g. Jesus and Satan, Buddha and Mara, Luther and the Devil, Zwingli and his previous worldly life; also Goethe's conception of the rejuvenation of Faust through the contract with the Devil. Towards the end of Zarathustra we find a striking example of the suppression of the antithesis in the figure of the" ugliest man ".

52. Synthetic: (v. Constructive).

53. Thinking: This I regard as one of the four basic psychological functions (v. Function). Thinking is that psychological function which, in accordance with its own laws, brings given presentations into conceptual connection. It is an apperceptive activity and, as such, must be differentiated into active and passive thought-activity. Active thinking is an act of will, passive thinking an occurrence. In the former case, I submit the representation to a deliberate act of judgment; in the latter case, conceptual connections establish themselves, and judgments are formed which may even contradict my aim -- they may lack all harmony with my conscious objective, hence also, for me, any feeling of direction, although by an act of active apperception I may subsequently come to a recognition of their directedness. Active thinking would correspond, therefore, with my idea of directed thinking. [70] Passive thinking was inadequately characterized in my previous work as "phantasying" [71]. To-day I would term it intuitive thinking.

To my mind, a simple stringing together of representations, such as is described by certain psychologists as associative thinking [72] is not thinking at all, but mere presentation. The term 'thinking' should, in my view, be confined to the linking up of representations by means of a concept, where, in other words, an act of judgment prevails, whether such act be the product of one's intention or not.

The faculty of directed thinking, I term intellect: the faculty of passive, or undirected, thinking, I term intellectual intuition. Furthermore, I describe directed thinking or intellect as the rational (q.v.) function, since it arranges the representations under concepts in accordance with the presuppositions of my conscious rational norm. Undirected thinking, or intellectual intuition, on the contrary is, in my view, an irrational (q.v.) function, since it criticizes and arranges the representations according to norms that are unconscious to me and consequently not appreciated as reasonable. In certain cases, however, I may recognize subsequently that the intuitive act of judgment also corresponds with reason, although it has come about in a way that appears to me irrational.

Thinking that is regulated by feeling, I do not regard as intuitive thinking, but as thought dependent upon feeling; it does not follow its own logical principle, but is subordinated to the principle of feeling. In such thinking the laws of logic are only ostensibly present; in reality they are suspended in favour of the aims of feeling.

54. Transcendent Function. -- (v. Symbol).

55. Type: A type is a specimen, or example, which reproduces in a characteristic way the character of a species or general class. In the narrower meaning used in this particular work, a type is a characteristic model of a general attitude (q.v.) occurring in many individual forms. From a great number of existing or possible attitudes I have, in this particular research, brought four into especial relief; namely, those that are primarily orientated by the four basic psychological functions (v. Function) viz. thinking, feeling, intuition, and sensation. In so far as such an attitude is habitual, thus lending a certain stamp to the character of the individual, I speak of a psychological type. These types, which are based upon the root-functions and which one can term the thinking, the feeling, the intuitive, and the sensational types, may be divided into two classes according to the quality of the respective basic function: viz. the rational and the irrational. The thinking and the feeling types belong to the former. The intuitive and the sensational to the latter, (v. Rational; Irrational). A further differentiation into two classes is permitted by the preferential movements of the libido, namely introversion and extraversion (q.v.). All the basic types can belong equally well to the one or the other class, according to the predominance of introversion or extraversion in the general attitude. A thinking type may belong either to the introverted or the extraverted class, and the same holds good for any other type. The differentiation into rational and irrational types is another point of view, and has nothing to do with introversion and extraversion.

In two previous contributions upon the theory of types [73] I did not differentiate the thinking and feeling from the introverted and extraverted types, but identified the thinking type with the introverted, and the feeling with the extraverted. But a more complete investigation of the material has shown me that we must treat the introversion and the extraversion types as superordinated categories to the function types. Such a division, moreover, entirely corresponds with experience, since, for example, there are, undoubtedly two sorts of feeling-types, the attitude of one being orientated more by his feeling-experience, the other more by the object.

56. Unconscious: The concept of the unconscious is for me an exclusively psychological concept, and not a philosophical concept in the metaphysical sense. In my view, the unconscious is a psychological boundary-concept, which covers all those psychic contents or processes which are not conscious, i.e. not related to the ego in a perceptible way. My justification for speaking of the existence of unconscious processes at all is derived purely and solely from experience, and in particular from psychopathological experience, where we have undoubted proof that, in a case of hysterical amnesia, for instance, the ego knows nothing of the existence of extensive 'psychological complexes, and in the next moment a simple hypnotic procedure is enough to bring the lost contents to complete reproduction.

From thousands of such experiences we may claim a certain justification for speaking of the existence of unconscious psychic contents. The question as to the state in which an unconscious content exists, when not attached to consciousness, is withheld from every possibility of cognition. It is, therefore, quite superfluous to hazard conjectures about it. Conjectures concerning cerebration and the whole physiological process, etc., really belong to such phantasies. It is also quite impossible to specify the range of the unconscious, i.e. what contents it embraces. Only experience can decide such questions. We know by experience that conscious contents can become unconscious through loss of their energic value. This is the normal process of 'forgetting'. That these contents do not simply get lost beneath the threshold of consciousness we know from the experience that occasionally, under suitable conditions, they can again emerge from their submersion after a decade or so, e.g. in dreams or under hypnosis in the form of cryptamnesia [74], or through the revival of associations with the forgotten content.

Furthermore, experience teaches us that conscious contents can fall beneath the threshold of consciousness through 'intentional forgetting', without a too considerable depreciation of value -- what Freud terms the repression of a painful content. A similar effect is produced by the dissociation of the personality, or the disintegration of consciousness, as a result of a violent affect or nervous shock or through the dissolution of the personality in schizophrenia. (Bleuler).

Similarly, we know from experience that sense-perceptions which, either because of their slight intensity or because of the deviation of attention, do not attain to conscious apperception, none the less become psychic contents through unconscious apperception, which again may be demonstrated by hypnosis, for example. The same thing may happen with certain conclusions and other combinations which remain unconscious on account of their too slight energy-content, or because of the deflection of attention. Finally, experience also teaches us that there exist unconscious psychic associations -- for instance, mythological images -- which have never been the object of consciousness, and hence must proceed wholly from unconscious activity.

To this extent experience gives us certain directing-points for our assumption of the existence of unconscious contents. But it can affirm nothing as to what the unconscious content may possibly be. It is idle to hazard guesses about it, because what the whole unconscious content could be is quite incalculable. What is the furthest limit of a subliminal sense-perception? Is there any sort of measurement either for the extent or the subtlety of unconscious combinations? When is a forgotten content totally effaced? To such questions there is no answer.

Our experience hitherto of the nature of unconscious contents permits us, however, to make a certain general division of them. We can distinguish a personal unconscious, which embraces all the acquisitions of the personal existence -- hence the forgotten, the repressed, the subliminally perceived, thought and felt. But, in addition to these personal unconscious contents, there exist other contents which do not originate in personal acquisitions but in the inherited possibility of psychic functioning in general, viz. in, the inherited brain-structure. These are the mythological associations -- those motives and images which can spring anew in every age and clime, without historical tradition or migration. I term these contents the collective unconscious. Just as conscious contents are engaged in a definite activity, the unconscious contents -- so experience teaches us -- are similarly active. Just as certain results or products proceed from conscious psychic activity, there are also products of unconscious activity, as for instance dreams and phantasies. It is vain to speculate upon the share that consciousness takes in dreams. A dream presents itself to us: we do not consciously produce it. Conscious reproduction, or even the perception of it, certainly effects a considerable alteration in it, without, however, doing away with the basic fact of the unconscious source of the productive activity.

The functional relation of the unconscious processes to consciousness we may describe as compensatory (q.v.), since experience proves that the unconscious process pushes subliminal material to the surface that is constellated by the conscious situation -- hence all those contents which could not be lacking in the picture of the conscious situation if everything were conscious. The compensatory function of the unconscious becomes all the more manifest, the more the conscious attitude maintains a one-sided standpoint; this is confirmed by abundant examples in the realm of pathology.

57. Will: I regard as will that sum of psychic energy which is disposable to consciousness. In accordance with this conception, the process of the will would be an energic process that is released by conscious motivation. A psychic process, therefore, which is conditioned by unconscious motivation I would not include under the concept of the will. Will is a psychological phenomenon that owes its existence to culture and moral education, and is, therefore, largely lacking in the primitive mentality.

_______________

Notes:

1. Jung, Studies in Word Association: transl. by M. D. Eder (London: Heinemann).

2. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii, ch. 16.

3. Nahlowsky, Das Gefuhlsleben, p. 48.

4. Kant, Logic, § 6.

5. Cf. Wundt, Grundzeichnungen der physiolog. Psychologie, 5te Aufl. III, pp. 209 ff.

6. Fere, Note sur des modifications de la resistance electrique, etc. (Comptes-Rendus de la Societe de Biologie, 1888, pp. 217 ff.)

Veraguth, Das Psychogalvanische Reflexphamomen (Monatsschr. f. Psych. u. Neurol., XXI, p. 387)

Jung, On Psychophysical Relations, etc. (Journal of Abnormal Psychology, i, 247)

Binswanger, On Psychogalvanic Phenomenon in Assoc. Experiments (Jung, Studies in Word Association, p. 446)

7. Bleuler, Affektivitat, Suggestibitat, Paranoia (1906), p. 6.

8. Which in reality are intuitions.

9. Cf. Wundt, Grundzuge der physiolog. Psychologie, i, 322.

10. Cf. Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious.

11. Wundt, Logic, i. 20.

12. Cf. Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologie, 2te Aufl., p. 104.

13. Wundt, Grundzuge d. physiolog. Psychol. iii, 529.

14. Pflugers Archiv, vol. 45, 37.

15. Grundz. d. Psychol., p. 44.

16. Ibid., i, 681 ff.

17. Levy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures, pp. 27 ff.

18. Ibid., pp. 28 ff.

19. Allusions to the theory of compensation, originally inspired by Anton are also to be found in Gross.

20. Adler, The Neurotic Constitution: transl. by Gluck and Lind. (London: Kegan Paul & Co.)

21. Adler, Studie uber Minderwertigkeit von Organen. 1907.

22. The Neurotic Constitution, p. 7.

23. Ibid., p. 14.

24. Jung, Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, 2nd edn., pp. 278 ff. (London: Bailliere)

25. Natorp, Einleitung in der Psych., p. II. Also Lipps, Leitfaden der Psych., p. 3.

26. Cf. Riehl (z. Einf. in die Phil., 161), who regards consciousness as both "activity" and "process".

27. Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox.

28. Jung, Content of the Psychoses (Collected Papers, 2nd edn., ch. xiii, p. 312)

29. A detailed example of this is to be found in Jung, Psych. and Path. of so-called Occult Phenomena (Collected Papers, 2nd edn.)

30. Maeder, The Dream Problem (Monograph Series. Nervous and Mental Disease Pub. Co., New York)

31. Adler, The Neurotic Constitution

32. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams.

33. Silberer, Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism: transl. by Dr. S. E. Jelliffe (London, Kegan Paul & Co.) pp. 149 ff., expresses himself in a similar sense in his formulation of anagogic significance.

34. Jung, The Psychology of Unconscious Processes (Collected Papers, 2nd Ed.)

35. Bleuler, Die Negative Suggestibilitat (Psych. Neur. Wochenschr., 1904, 27-28).

Idem, Zur Theorie des Schizophrenen Negativismus (Psych. Nettr. Wochenschr., 1910, 18-21).

Idem, Leltrbuch der Psychiatrie, pp. 92, 285.

36. Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox.

37. Stobaeus, Ekl. i, 58: " Image Image."

38. Zeller, History of Greek Philosophy: transl. by S. F. Alleyne, vol. ii, p. 17 (London: Longmans & Co.)

39. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, vol. i: transl. by Laurie Magnus, p. 64 (London: Murray, 1901)

40. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 2te Aufl., i, 79 (1907).

41. 'Doctor Illuminatus' (1234-1315), who as a soldier was notorious for his debaucheries, but later entirely changed his way of life and became a crusader against the Moslems.

42. For the history both of the theory and concept of feeling compare: Wundt, Grundz. d. Physiolog. Psych. Idem, Grundr. d. Psychol., pp. 35 ff.

Nahlowsky, Das Gefuhlsleben in seinen wesentlichen Erscheinungen.

Ribot, Psychologie der Gefuhle.

Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefuhlslebens.

Villa, Einleitung in d. Psych. d. Gegenwart, pp. 208 ff.

43. On the distinction between feeling and sensation compare Wundt, Grundz. d. phys. Psychol., i, pp. 350 ff.

44. Wundt, Phil. Stud., vii, 13.

45. Critique of Pure Reason: transl. by F. Max Muller (London: Macmillan, 1881).

46. Logic, p. 140.

47. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 285.

48. World as Will and Idea, transl. by Haldane and Kemp, vol. i, par. 25 (London: Kegan Paul & Co.)

49. Aesthetik, i, 138.

50. Logic, iii, pp. 242 ff.

51. Wirklichkeit, pp. 152, 154.

52. Logik, pp. 14, 18.

53. Following an expression used by J. Burckhardt. Cf. also Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 41.

54. Jung, Instinct and the Unconscious (Journal of Psychology, vol. x, I).

55. A remarkable example of an archaic image is quoted in Jung, Psychol. of the Unconscious, p. 108.

56. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, vol. i, § 49.

57. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.

58. Cf. Jung, Instinct and the Unconscious (Journal of Psychology, vol. x, I)

59. Menschl. Weltbegr., pp. 25ff.

60. Ferenczi, Introjection and Transference (Contributions to Psycho- Analysis: transl. by E. Jones. Boston: R. Badger).

61. Similarly Bergson.

62. The merit of having discovered the existence of this type is due to Miss M. Moltzer.

63. Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 127. Idem, The Conception and the Genetic Theory of Libido, Pt. ii, ch. 2, p. 139.

64. Levy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures (Paris, 1912).

65. For the history of the concept of sensation compare:

Wundt, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie, i, pp. 350 ff.

Dessoir, Geschichte der neuern deutschen Psychologie.

Villa, Einleitung in die Psychologie der Gegenwart.

v. Hartmann, Die moderne Psychologie.

66. Azam, Hypnotisme -- Double Conscience. Paris, 1887.

Morton Prince, The Dissociation of a Personality. 1906.

Landmann, Die Mehrheit geistiger Personlichkeiten in einem Individuum. 1894.

Ribot, Die Personlichkeit. 1894.

Flournoy, Des Indes a la planete Mars. 1900.

Jung, On the Psychology and Pathology of so-called Occult Phenomena (Collected Papers, 2nd edn.)

67. Jung, The Conception of the Unconscious (Collected Papers, 2nd edn., p. 457).

68. Ferrero, Les lois psychologiques du symbolisme, 1895.

69. Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life.

70. Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 14.

71. Ibid, p. 19.

72. James, Text-book of Psychology, p. 464 (Landau: Longmans & Co.).

73. Jung, Contribution a l'etude des types psychologiques (Arch. de Psychologie, T. xvi, p. 152)

Idem, The Psychology of Unconscious Processes (Collected Papers, 2nd edn., p. 354)

74. Cf. Flournoy, Des Indes a la planete Mars. 1900.

Idem, Nouvelles Observations sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie (Arch. de Psychologie, T. i, p. 101)

Jung, On the Psych. and Path. of so-called Occult Phenomena (Collected Papers)

75.
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Re: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES by C. G. Jung

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CONCLUSION

IN our age, which has witnessed the 'liberte, egalite, fraternite' achieved by the French Revolution extending into a wide social movement, that not only pulls down or exalts political rights to a general and uniform level but thinks it is able to do away with unhappiness by means of external regulations and social levelling -- in such an age it is indeed a thankless task to speak of the complete dissimilarity of the elements which compose the nation. Although it is certainly a fine thing that every man should stand equal before the law, that every man should have his political vote, and that no man through inherited social position and privilege should unjustly over-reach his brother, nevertheless it is distinctly less beautiful when the notion of equality is extended to other provinces of life. A man must needs have a very clouded vision or must regard human society from a very misty distance, to cherish the view that a uniform distribution of happiness can be won through a uniform regulation of life. Such a man must already be somewhat deluded if he can really cling to the notion, for instance, that the same amount of income, or the same external opportunities of life, must possess approximately the same significance for all. But what would such a legislator do with all those for whom life's greatest possibility lies not without, but within? Were he just, he would have to give at least twice as much to one man as to another, since to the one it means much, to the other little. This difficulty of the psychological differences of men, this most necessary factor in providing the vital energy of a human society no social legislation will surmount. It may well serve a useful purpose, therefore, to speak of the heterogeneity of men. These differences involve such different claims to happiness that even the most consummate legislation could never give them approximate satisfaction. No general external form could be devised, however equitable and just it might appear, that would not involve injustice for one or other human type. That, in spite of this fact, every kind of enthusiast -- political, social, philosophical and religious -- is at work endeavouring to find those general and uniform external conditions I which shall signify a more general opportunity for happiness, seems to me to be linked up with a general attitude to life too exclusively orientated by external facts. It is not possible to do more than touch upon this far-reaching question here, since it is not the province of this work to handle such a task. We are here concerned only with the psychological problem; and the fact of the different typical attitudes is a problem of the first order, not only for psychology but also for all those departments of science and life in which human psychology plays a decisive role. It is, for instance, an immediately intelligible fact to an ordinary human intelligence that every philosophy, that is not just a mere history of philosophy, depends upon a personal psychological pre-condition. This pre-condition may be of a purely individual nature, and moreover would ordinarily be so regarded, if a true psychological criticism existed at all. Because it has always been taken for granted, we have thereby overlooked the fact that what we regarded as individual prejudice was certainly not so under all circumstances; since the standpoint of the philosopher in question often boasted a very imposing following. His standpoint was acceptable to these men not because they echoed him without thinking, but because it was something they could fully understand and appreciate. Such an understanding would be quite impossible if the standpoint of the philosopher were merely individually determined, for it is quite certain in that case that he would neither be fully understood nor even tolerated. The peculiar character of the standpoint which is understood and appreciated by his following must, therefore, correspond with a typical personal attitude, which in the same or similar form finds many representatives in human society. As a rule, the partisans of either side attack each other merely externally, always seeking out the joints in their opponent's individual armour. Such a dispute, as a rule, bears little fruit. It would be of considerably greater value if the contest were transferred to the psychological realm, whence it actually originates. Such a transposition would soon reveal the fact that many different kinds of psychological attitudes exist, each of which has a right to existence, although necessarily leading to the setting up of incompatible theories. As long as one tries to settle the dispute by forms of external compromise, one merely satisfies the modest claims of shallow minds that have never yet glowed with the passion of a principle. But a real understanding can, in my view, be reached only when the inherent diversity of the psychological pre-conditions is recognised.

It is a fact, which is constantly and overwhelmingly apparent in one's practical work, that a man is well-nigh incapable of comprehending and giving full sanction to any other standpoint than his own. In smaller things a prevailing superficiality, a none too frequent indulgence and tolerance, and an equally rare goodwill, may help to build a bridge over the chasm which lack of understanding makes between man and man. But, in more important matters and especially those wherein the ideal of the type is in question, an understanding seems, as a rule, to be beyond the limits of possibility. Strife and misunderstanding are, assuredly, constant requisites for the tragi-comedy of human life, but it is none the less undeniable that the advance of civilization has led from the right of the strongest to the establishment of laws, and therewith to the creation of a court of justice and a standard of rights which are superordinated above the contending parties.

It is my conviction that a basis for the adjustment of conflicting views could be found in the recognition of types of attitude, not however of the mere existence of such types but also of the fact that every man is so imprisoned in his type that he is simply incapable of a complete understanding of another standpoint, Without a recognition of this far-reaching demand a violation of the other's standpoint is practically inevitable. Just as parties in dispute forgathering before the law refrain from direct violence, and confide their mutual claims to the justice of the law and the impartiality of the judge, so each type, conscious of his own predilection, must abstain from casting indignities, suspicions, and depreciatory valuations upon his opposing type. Through a consideration of the problem of typical attitudes, and the presentation of it in a certain form and outline, I aspire to guide my readers to a contemplation of this picture of the manifold possibilities of viewing life, in the hope that in so doing I may contribute a small share to the-knowledge of the almost infinite variations and gradations of individual psychology. No one, I trust, will draw the conclusion from my description of the types that I believe the four or eight types which I describe to be the only ones that might ever occur. That would be a grave misconception, for I have no sort of doubt that the various attitudes one meets with can also be considered and classified from other points of view. Indeed, this actual investigation contains not a few indications of such other possibilities, as, for instance, a division according to the factor of activity. But, whatever may serve as a criterion for the establishment of types, a comparison of various forms of habitual attitudes will invariably lead to the setting up of an equal number of psychological types.

However easy it may be to regard the various existing attitudes from angles other than the one here adopted, it would certainly be difficult to adduce evidence against the existence of psychological types. I have no doubt at all that my opponents will be at some pains to eliminate .the question of types from the scientific agenda, since, for every theory of complex psychic processes that makes any pretence to general validity, the type-problem must, to say the least, be a very unwelcome obstacle. Following the analogy of every natural science theory, which also presupposes one and the same fundamental nature, every theory of complex psychic processes presupposes a uniform human psychology. But in the case of psychology there is the peculiar condition that, in the making of its concepts, the psychic process is not merely the object but at the same time also the subject. If, therefore, one assumes, that in every individual case the subject is one and the same, it can also be assumed that the subjective process of the making of concepts is also invariably one and the same. That this is not so, however, is most impressively demonstrated by the very existence of the most diverse views upon the nature of complex psychic processes. Naturally, a new theory is prone to assume that all other views have been wrong, and, as a rule, this is solely due to the fact that the author has a different subjective view from that of his predecessors. He does not reflect that the psychology he sees is his psychology, and, in the best case, the psychology of his type. He, therefore, supposes that there can only be one true interpretation of the psychic process which is the object of his investigation, namely that which agrees with his type. All the other views -- I might almost say all the seven other views -- which, after their kind, are just as true as his, are for him merely errors. In the interest of the validity of his own theory, therefore, he will feel a lively and humanly understandable repugnance to the establishment of types of human psychology, since therewith his conception loses, for instance, seven-eighths of its value as truth. For then, besides his own theory, he would have to regard seven other theories of the same process as equally true, or grant to at least a second theory a value equal to his own.

I am quite convinced that a Nature-process which is largely independent of human psychology, and therefore ,can only be an object for it, can have but one true explanation. But I am equally convinced that a complex psychic process which cannot be subjected to any objective registering apparatus can necessarily only uphold that explanation which, as subject, it itself produces, i.e. the author of the concept can produce only such a concept as corresponds with the psychic process he is endeavouring to explain. But the concept can correspond only when it coincides with the process to be explained in the thinking subject himself. If the process to be explained had neither any sort of existence in the author himself nor any analogy to it, he would be faced by a complete enigma, whose explanation he would have to leave to the man who himself experienced the process. How a vision comes about, I can never bring into experience by any objective apparatus j thus I can explain its origin only as I understand it. In this 'as I understand it', however, there lies the predilection, for at best my explanation proceeds from the way the process of a vision is presented to myself. But who gives me the right to assume that in everyone else the process of the vision has an identical, or even a .similar, presentation?

With apparent justice, one will instance the universal homogeneity of human psychology in every age and clime as an argument in favour of this universality of the subjectively conditioned judgment. I am myself so profoundly convinced of this homogeneity of the human psyche that I have actually embraced it in the concept of the collective unconscious, as a universal and homogeneous substratum whose homogeneity extends even into a worldwide identity or similarity of myths and fairy-tales; so that a negro of the Southern States of America dreams in the motives of Grecian mythology, and a Swiss grocer's apprentice repeats in his psychosis, the vision of an Egyptian Gnostic.

From this fundamental uniformity, however, an equally great dissimilarity of the conscious psyche stands out in· all the bolder relief. What immeasurable distances lie between the consciousness of a primitive, a Themistoclean Athenian, and a modern European! What a difference between the consciousness of the learned professor and. that of his spouse!! What, in any case, would our world of to-day be like if there existed a uniformity of consciousness? No, the notion of a uniformity of the conscious psyche is an academic chimera, doubtless simplifying the task of a University lecturer when facing his pupils, but shrinking to nothing in the face of reality. Quite apart from the diversity of the individual whose innermost nature is sundered from his neighbour by stellar distances, the types, as classes of individuals, are themselves to a very large extent different one from another, and to the existence of types the diversities of general conceptions must be ascribed.

In order to discover the uniformity of the human psyche I must descend into the very foundations of consciousness. Only there do I find wherein all are alike. When I found a theory upon that which connects all, I explain the psyche from what is its foundation and origin. But, in so doing, my explanation entirely omits that factor which consists in its historical or individual differentiation. With such a theory, I ignore the psychology of the conscious psyche. Therewith I actually deny the whole other side of the psyche, namely, its differentiation from the primordial germinal state. I practically reduce man to his phylogenetic prototype, or I disintegrate him into his elementary processes; and, when I would reconstruct him out of this reduction, in the former case an ape would emerge, and in the latter an accumulation of elementary processes whose interplay would merely yield an aimless and meaningless reciprocal activity.

Doubtless the explanation of the psychic phenomenon upon the basis of homogeneity is not only possible, but also completely justified. But if I wish to develop the picture of the psyche in its completeness, I must keep in mind the fact of the diversity of psyches, since the conscious individual psyche belongs just as much to the general picture of psychology as does its unconscious foundation. Hence, in my construction of concepts, I am equally justified in starting out from the fact of differentiated psyches, and in considering the same process which I previously considered from the angle of its uniformity, although now from the standpoint of differentiation. This naturally leads me to a view that is radically opposed to the former one. Everything which in that view was left out of account as an individual variant here becomes important as a starting-point for further differentiations; and everything which there contained a special value as homogeneous now appears to me worthless, because merely collective. In t-his view I shall always be on the look-out for the objective aimed at, and never for the source whence things come; whereas in the former view I never troubled myself about the goal, but merely about the origin. I can, therefore, explain one and the same psychic process by two antagonistic and mutually exclusive theories, concerning neither of which am I in a position to maintain that it is wrong, since the rightness of the one is proved by the uniformity of the psyche, while the truth of the other is manifested by its dissimilarity.

But here, both for the lay public and for the scientific world, begins that immense difficulty, which the perusal of my earlier book (Psychology of the Unconscious) so aggravated, that, on account of it, many otherwise able minds became utterly confounded (as witnessed by their precarious criticisms). For there I attempted to present in concrete material the one view just as much as the. other. But since reality, as we all know, neither consists in nor adheres to theories, there is in both these views, which we are bound to regard as severed, a common living something which, shimmering multi-coloured in the soul, combines and sanctions both. Each is a product of the past and carries a future meaning, and of neither can it be ascertained with certainty whether it be merely the end or holds as well a new beginning. For everyone who thinks there exists but one true explanation of a psychic process, this vitality of the psychic content, which necessitates two opposite theories, is a matter for despair, especially if he should be a lover of simple and uncomplicated truths, incapable maybe of thinking both at the same time.

On the other hand, I am not convinced that, with these two ways of regarding the psyche, the reductive and the constructive as I once called them [1], the possibilities are exhausted. On the contrary, I believe that other equally 'true' explanations of the psychic process can still be advanced, just as many in fact as there are types. Moreover, such explanations will agree just as well, or just as ill, with one another as the types themselves in their personal relations. Should, therefore, the existence of typical differences of human psyches be granted, and I confess I can see no reason why it should not be granted, the scientific theorist is confronted with the disagreeable dilemma of either allowing severally mutually contradictory theories of the same process to exist side by side, or of making an attempt that is doomed from the outset to found a sect which claims for itself the only correct method and the only true theory. The former possibility encounters not only the above-mentioned extraordinary difficulty of a duplicated and inherently antagonistic thought operation, but also collides with one of the first principles of intellectual morality:' 'principia explicandi non sunt multiplicanda -- praeter necessitatem', The necessity of a plurality of explanations, however, in the case of a psychological theory is definitely granted, since, unlike any other natural science theory, the object of psychological explanation is of like nature with the subject: one psychological process has to explain another. This serious difficulty has already driven thinking minds to remarkable subterfuges, as, for instance, the assumption of an 'objective mind' which could stand outside psychology and, hence, be able to regard objectively its own psyche; or the similar assumption, that the intellect is a faculty which can also stand outside itself and regard itself. With these and similar expedients that Archimedean, extra-terrestrial point is to be created by means of which the intellect shall raise itself from its own hinges. I can understand the profound human need for comfort and ease, but I do not understand why truth should bend to this need. I also understand that, aesthetically, it would be far more satisfactory if, instead of the paradox of mutually contra- dictory explanations, we could reduce the psychic process to the simplest possible, instinctive foundation, and be at rest, or if we could credit it with a metaphysical goal of redemption, and find peace in that hope.

But whatever we strive to fathom with our intellect will end in paradox and relativity, if, indeed, it be honest work and not' a mere petitio principii in the service of comfort and convenience. That intellectual apprehension of the psychic process must lead to paradox and relativity is simply unavoidable, for the reason that the intellect is only one among divers psychic functions which Nature intends to serve man in the construction of his objective images. We should not pretend to understand the world only by the intellect; we apprehend it just as much by feeling. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is, at best, only the half of truth, and must. if it be honest, also come to an understanding of its inadequacy.

To deny the existence of types is of little use in face of the fact of their existence. In view of their existence, therefore, every theory of the psychic processes must submit to be valued in its turn as a psychic process, and, moreover, as the expression of an existing and recognized type of human psychology. Only from such typical presentations can the materials be gathered whose cooperation shall bring about the possibility of a higher synthesis.

_______________

Notes:

1. Jung, Contents of the Psychoses (Collected Papers).
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