CHAPTER II. 'USAGE IS HIGHEST DHARMA.' The aphorism 'Usage is highest dharma' occurs in Verse 108 of the First Lecture of Manu, and is thus amplified and explained by the words next following: — '(It is) mentioned in the Vedas and approved by tradition; therefore a prudent twice-born (man) should ever be intent on this. A Brahman who has fallen away from usage gets not the fruit of the Veda; but (if he be) attached to usage, he enjoys the full fruit. Thus devotees, having seen (that) the course of dharma is according to usage, comprehend usage to be the final root of all austerity.' See Burnell's Manu.
Verse 107 states, in brief, the subject-matter of the whole book. 'In this (treatise) dharma is fully declared, also the good and bad qualities of actions; likewise, also, the perpetual usages of the four castes.'
Then, verses 111-18 give a more extensive account of the contents of the work, the last of which are declared to be 'the eternal dharma of countries, castes, families; also the dharmas of heretics (and) of guilds.'
Taking this whole passage as it stands, there can be no doubt, it seems to me, that the author of Manu (or whoever may have written the first lecture thereof, by way of a preface to the work) considered that for all human beings, whether regarded as individuals, or as joined together in companies or nations, and whether Brahmans, women, Cudras, heretics, or barbarians, the long established usage peculiar to each individual (or aggregate) constitutes highest dharma, for each his (or its) own.
The question then arises, What is dharma? And the answer is, that this phrase or expression cannot be satisfactorily rendered in English, inasmuch as it represents a primitive concept, wholly foreign (and indeed incomprehensible) to the modern English mind. And it is for this reason Burnell has in some places in Manu left the phrase untranslated. In a note to p. 40 of my Prospectus I have attempted to give a rough explanation of it in the following words: —
This mysterious word has been greatly misunderstood. It would seem to be connected with a root signifying to 'hold,' and possibly may mean the inherent efficacy of acts, that holds up a man through life. Dharma is not at all comparable with our 'virtue'' (manliness), or with our 'duty'; still less does it resemble our 'law.' According to Haradatta (see Max Muller, An. Sus. Lit., 101), 'dharma (virtue) is the quality of the individual self, which arises from action, leads to happiness and final beatitude, and is called apurva, supernatural.' According to Narada, in the good old times men conformed themselves to dharma alone, and then there was no room for vyavahara, or mere ordinary business. When the corruption of morals bred avarice, hatred, and the like, vyavahara necessarily came into existence. See V. N. Mandlik, Introd. Hindu Law, lxx.
I have lately had my attention drawn to a curious and difficult passage in the Mahabharata (Vanaparva, 246), which seems to throw some light on the meaning of 'dharma,' as used in the text under notice, and in Manu generally. According to the translation now being published by Protap Chundra Roy (Calcutta), Savitri is made to say that: 'They who have not their souls under control acquire no dharma by leading the four successive modes of life, viz. celibacy with study, domesticity (dharmam), retirement into the woods, and renunciation of the world. That which is called dharmam is said to consist of vijnanam (true knowledge). The wise, therefore, have declared dharmam to be the foremost of all things, and not the passage through the four successive modes. By practising the duties of even one of these four modes agreeably to the directions of the wise, we have attained to dharmam, and, therefore, we do not desire the second or the third mode, viz. celibacy with study or renunciation. It is for this, again, that the wise have declared dharmam to be the foremost of all things.' The meaning of the passage (briefly) seems to be that Savitri, who is endeavouring to rescue her husband from the clutches of Yama, argues thus: True religious merit cannot be attained by those who do not control their souls; on the other hand, it is attained by those who properly pass through even one of the four successive modes: I and my husband have so passed through one of them, namely, domesticity, and therefore we have no need to pass through another. Here, then, 'dharma' seems to stand by itself for (1) general merit, (2) the special merit of domesticity, and (3) true religious merit — the foremost of all things. And this last is said to consist in 'vijnana,' true knowledge.
It would seem to be not improbable that as in this passage so in Manu three kinds or degrees of 'dharma' are intended to be spoken of. Thus, for example, in VIII. 9, true religious merit obviously is intended. The text is: 'For a man performing the dharma declared by revelation and tradition obtains fame here and after his death extreme happiness.' With this compare II. 13: 'A knowledge of dharma is ordained for men not given up to wealth and pleasure; of those who would know dharma the Veda (is) the supreme authority.' Also II. 1: 'Learn the dharma which is followed by the learned (and) good, by those ever free from spite and passions, (and) which is acknowledged by the mind.'
On the other hand, we have in I. 115 the special dharma of gambling, and in 114 that of women; whilst in I. 99, and other texts, ordinary dharma is meant.
The connection of dharma (in its highest sense) with vijnana, true knowledge, is illustrated by the name of the author of the Mitaksara, Vijnanecvara or Vijnana Yogi. And Anquetil Duperron (Leg. Orient. p. 92) tells us that Vijnanecvarudu was the name of a Telugu King, 'who had collected the laws of which is composed the book of right,' i.e. (it is to be presumed) the Vijnanecvariyam.
The word dharma would seem to be connected with the Greek Themis, the Anglo-Saxon Deman, the English Doom, and other cognate words. And in some respects it agrees exactly with Themis, e.g. in denoting what is meet and right because established by immemorial usage, as opposed to statute law. Themis personified is the goddess of law and order, the patroness of existing rights, and Dharma may mean much the same. Themis also is used for punishment, and so is Dharma.
According to Talboys Wheeler (History of India, iii. 212 et seq.) 'the edicts of Priyadarsi inculcate goodness, virtue, kindness, and religion, as summed up in the one emphatic term Dharma.''
On the other hand, the Kama-sutra (see below p. 134) regards dharma as obedience to the castras in the matter of sacrifices and the like.
Perhaps, on the whole, 'blessedness,' as having in it a decided religious tincture, would come as near as any other word to the meaning of dharma in the passage under notice. But, having indicated in a rough general way what ordinarily it denotes and connotes, I shall prefer to leave the word untranslated.
Usage 'is highest dharma,' which again consists in true knowledge, and 'the prudent twice-born man will ever be intent on this.' Where, then, is 'usage to be found? An answer is afforded by Manu I. 108, quoted above. Other constituents of dharma are mentioned in II. 12: 'The Veda, tradition, good custom, and what is pleasing to one's self, that (the wise) have plainly declared to be the fourfold definition of dharma.'' Evidently, usage is to be discovered by searching the Veda and dharmacastras (see II. 10), and one's own conscience.
But it is only a twice-born man who can so discover his usage and dharma: Cudras, and women, and all others must look elsewhere for information.This is rendered sufficiently plain by a consideration of the following circumstances.
The so called Code of Manu begins with the statement that the Seers come to Manu, and ask him to tell them 'truly in order the rules of all the castes, and of all the castes that arise between (them).' And (as Burnell points out) 'Medhatithi says these laws refer to only the Brahmans, Ksatriyas, and Vaicyas, not to the Cudras. Confer IV. 80, 81, from which it is evident that this is correct. Medhatithi might have quoted the Apastamba dharmasutra (i. I. 5) to the same effect, also verse 91 of this lecture.'
Whereas Manu is represented (in I. 107) to have declared in this treatise 'the perpetual usages of the four castes,' I, 91 declares specifically: 'One duty the Lord assigned to a Cudra — service to those (before mentioned) classes without grudging.'
And IV. 80, 81 run as follows: — 'One may not give advice to a Cudra, nor (give him) the remains (of food), or (of) butter that has been offered. And one may not teach him the law, or enjoin upon him religious observances. For he who tells him the law, and he who enjoins upon him (religious observances), he indeed, together with that (Cudra), sinks into the darkness of the hell called Asamvrtta.' And in his note thereon Burnell says that, according to Medhatithi, advice means here in regard to the Cudra's conduct, not simply friendly advice. Whilst the commentators affirm that, where the author of Manu does seem to give advice to Cudras, it is only to family servants that he gives it. And similarly X. 126, says: 'There is not any commission of sin in a Cudra, and he ought not to receive the initiation; he has no authority in respect to a rule of right, and no restraint in consequence of a rule of right.'
It appears clearly from several passages in the Satapatha-Brahmana (translated by Eggeling) that, before its publication, the Brahmans and Ksatriyas had firmly established themselves in positions high above that of the Vaicyas, or ordinary clans; and that, whilst the Ksatriya preyed on the Vaicya, the Brahman attached himself to, and lived upon, the Ksatriya. Thus, Vol. I. 82 shows the Ksatriya to be the oppressor of the Vaicya; I. 94 that the former was served by the latter; II. 66 that the former lived on the latter; II. 228 that the people must go down before the Ksatriya; whilst II. 270 essays to prove (by the story of Varuna and Mitra) the necessity of a king who desires success, always having with him a Brahman to speed his deed. For Mitra, or intelligence, is the Brahman, and Varuna the nobility. The priesthood is the conceiver, and the noble is the doer.
This alliance between the King and the priest seems, at all events in theory, never to have been abandoned. And, whether we look at the Smrti or the drama, at the Kama-sutra or the Gentoo Code, we shall everywhere find, I imagine, abundant indications of the two privileged classes keeping apart from and lording it over the masses.
Indeed, judging from the materials at my disposal, I should suppose that Sanskrit works generally have been composed for the two first classes alone: mainly, of course, for the Brahmans. It is no doubt owing to the exclusion of Cudras and women, and the lower classes generally, 'from immediate access to the more original sources of information' that the epics and similar compositions were intended for their edification, as is pointed out by Sayana in his commentary on the Black Yajur Veda. See Burnell, Introduction to Manu, p. xxiii.
For Cudras, women, and heretics, therefore, and practically for almost all but virtuous Brahmans and kings, Manu has no information to give as to their proper conduct in life, other than that 'usage is highest dharma'; and it only remains for them to ascertain, each for himself, as best he may, what his own particular usage may be. The twice-born man, as we have already seen, is to search the scriptures and his own conscience for his usage; and in order to facilitate such search for the future, the author of Manu gives his reader some information as to usage in respect to sundry matters, such, e.g. as partition.
But, he does not say that this information is in any degree obligatory on all twice-born men: or that the 'recollections' (Smrtis) of other writers like himself are to be ignored. On the contrary, he expressly says that the Veda is the supreme authority for those who would know dharma (II. 13); and that there may be opposite texts in the Veda, each of which is dharma because each was declared by the wise (II. 14). Where, therefore, the author 'reminds' readers of what is in accord with one of two opposite texts in the Veda, another author may remind his readers of what is in accord with the other; and what each says will be right, and (in certain circumstances) proper to be followed.
Thus, admittedly, divergences of excellent usage are to be looked for in different countries. And, if it be asked where may the best usage be found? answer is made by II. 17, 18: 'The (country) which is between the divine rivers Sarasvati and Drsadvati, that land, fixed by the gods, (the wise) call Brahmavarta. What custom of the (four) castes (and) the mixed castes has been handed down by course of succession in that country, that is called good custom.' The next verse gives the names of four countries that are 'next' to the best, that is (according to the commentators), inferior. And then comes the important declaration: 'All men in the world should learn their own proper behaviour from a Brahman born in that country,' i.e. Brahmavarta.
So far, therefore, the author of Manu teaches three things: (1) Dharma depends upon usage, which is to be found in both Cruti and Smrti, ultimately, of course, and mainly in the former. See below, p. 133. (2) The best usage is that of the Brahmavarta country. (3) All twice-born men should learn their usage from a Brahman born in that country.
As we have seen above, it is clear that the expression 'all men in the world' must be limited in the first place to the twice-born. A further limitation seems to be intended by II. 7, 8, which point out that a 'learned man' should certainly be firm in his own dharma, because 'a man performing the dharma declared by revelation and tradition obtains fame here and after his death extreme happiness.'
I gather from this that the author writes almost entirely for a small class of learned men, principally Brahmans, and solely for their spiritual benefit. If they learn each his own proper usage or dharma (blessedness) from a duly qualified teacher like himself, they will obtain eternal happiness.
In this view of the aim and object of the author of Manu, 'law' as we understand the phrase, or (as I have defined it) 'an aggregate of rules of conduct that courts of justice habitually recognise and enforce,' is not to be looked for in his teachings. If, here and there, we find in Manu what looks like the setting of a law proper, we should regard it as a mere recommendation to the wise to follow the established and best usage of Brahmavarta, rather than a command to any to do or forbear from some act. And thus to treat the Manava-dharma-castra as a religious essay on usage, rather than as a code of positive law, is to act entirely in accordance with the history of the work as ingeniously constructed by Burnell in his Introduction thereto. According to him, this castra (or treatise) on dharma most probably, almost certainly, was published by some Panjab Brahman about the year 500 A.D., under the Calukya sovereign Pulakeci, at Kalyanapuri, with the object of popularising Brahman teaching, and particularly of instructing the king of a Mleccha (or beyond the pale) country as to the right mode of making all men do their religious duty. And it was called 'Manava,' not from the mythic sage Manu, but from the Brahman gotra called 'Manava'; and by way of compliment to the Calukyas, who claimed to be 'Manavyas.'
Burnell thinks that the work was also 'intended for practical use in the tribunals,' though not in the way supposed by English lawyers, being 'essentially a religious book, and not, as in England, and most of Europe, a profane treatise on mere law. The ordeals mentioned are all, e.g. religious ceremonies.'
The only text of Manu cited by Burnell in support of his proposition, that it was also intended for practical use in the tribunals, is VIII. 3, which runs as follows, namely: 'Day by day (he should judge) separately (cases) under the eighteen titles by reasons (drawn) from local usage and the treatises.' Now, the word for 'treatises' here is 'castra,' which (according to the note) means a body of teaching on a subject, whether ascribed to divine or human origin; and it seems to me to be very doubtful whether it may not mean here the Vedic compositions, generally, rather than the Manava-d.-c and other Smrtis. For, in verse 8 of the same Lecture it is declared that the King should determine suits 'relying on the eternal law'; and in verse 11 it is declared that the three assessors of his deputy should be 'learned in the Veda'; which (it will be remembered) is stated in II. 13 to be 'the supreme authority 'of those who would know dharma. I do not forget, of course, that, according to II. 6-12, tradition, as embodied in the dharmacastras, is one of the constituents of dharma. Still, I cannot help thinking that we cannot safely infer from VIII. 3 that the author intended his work for 'practical use in the tribunals.'
In connection with this point, VII. 43 may be consulted with profit. It is to the effect that the King should learn the Vedas from those who know them, as also policy, logic, and knowledge of self: 'but business from the people.' This text agrees with VIII, 41: 'A king knowing dharma should cause his own dharma to be established, after making careful inspection of the dharma of the different castes and country folks, and of the dharma of the (different) guilds, and of the dharma of the (different) families.' This must not be supposed to mean that the King is to set aside the dharmas of the castes, &c., but that he is to ratify and confirm, or (as Jones renders it) 'establish them,' as his own. Compare Gautama XI. 12-22, which declares amongst other things that the King should learn the state of affairs from those who (in each class) have authority, and decide accordingly. And Narada (II. 17, cl. 1-4) speaks of separate laws for heretics, traders, companies, quarrels between father and son, &c. In quarrels between gamblers, other gamblers are to be consulted, and decide (II. 16, cl. 4).
Taking these and other texts together, I venture to think that the intention of the author of Manu probably was to declare that the King, in judging, whilst taking his general views of usage and dharma from learned Brahmans, should (wherever necessary) take his views of any special usage or dharma applicable to the particular case, from lay persons, such as merchants, cultivators, headmen, and others capable of informing his mind. See below, pp. 88-91, and 119. However this may have been, it is quite certain that Medhatithi, in commenting (about the year 1000?) on the above quoted text, VIII. 41, observes that the dharmas of the castes and others are to be regarded, 'if they are not repugnant to the law (dharma?) given by tradition.' And Kulluka (of the fifteenth century?) said the same. Whilst the Smrticandrika (of the thirteenth century?) is supposed by Professor Jolly (at p. 34) to show as distinctly as possible that the Smrti is to be placed above custom (Acara).
As regards the commentators, it is to be observed in the first place that their assumption is distinctly opposed to the introductory statement of Manu (1. 118), that 'Manu has declared in this treatise the eternal dharma of countries, castes, families; also the dharmas of heretics (and) of guilds.' Manu can be said to have declared these dharmas only in the sense of declaring their existence, and (by implication) their propriety; and if they exist, they must necessarily be separate from, and, in a measure, opposed to, the dharma of the twice-born.
Certainly, the author of Manu did not pretend to teach the dharmas of heretics, and Mlecchas, and outcastes generally. And, as a fact, he has not taught the dharmas of guilds and families; but as certainly he has recognised and proclaimed their existence. Then, take the very important text, VIII. 46: 'Whatever may be practised by good and virtuous men of the twice-born castes, let (the king) cause that to be ordained (as law), if it does not conflict with (the laws of) districts, families, (and) castes.' Surely we have here the strongest possible recognition of the validity of the usage of any district, or family, or caste, that may happen (or seem) to be 'opposed' to the usage declared in the Smrtis. Medhatithi would appear to have been struck by this, since he contradicts another commentator who tries to explain away the obvious meaning of this highly important text; whilst Kulluka would refer it to settling a lawsuit.
It is possible that the (apparently) unwarrantable opinions of Medhatithi and Kulluka, and the author of the Smrticandrika and others, upon usage may be accounted for upon the following hypothesis. If, as would seem to be by no means improbable, they should be taken to have been thinking, not of the general dharmas of whole countries and classes, but of the case of a special acara (or custom) of twice-born men, as the thing opposed to the Smrtis; and as being opposed, not to general teaching of the Smrtis, but to special directions covering the particular case — if this view of their opinion is to be taken, no great difficulty would, I think, be occasioned in practice by what they have said.
The words of the text in the Smrticandrika upon which Professor Jolly relies, as refuting the argument in my View (at pp. 115-17) upon the question of usage versus law, are not given; but, from what the learned professor says, I gather that, logically, it is not in itself of great weight, and should not be construed as practically stultifying the author, who immediately afterwards gives the world a whole chapter of decadharma (country dharma), obviously as a specimen of the exceptional dharmas intended by Manu and other Smrtis to be upheld.
The argument subsequently put forward by Professor Jolly appears to me to be quite unsustainable. It is to the effect that we are to be obliged by the following 'climax,' established in a preceding chapter of the Smrticandrika. The Veda, where opposed to the Smrti, must prevail. And both of them must overrule custom (Acara), or a verdict of an assembly of learned Brahmans.
In the first place, as I have shown above, the author of Manu expressly provides for the case of two (apparently) contradictory texts of the Veda; and (by implication) he also provides for the case of a text of a Smrti (apparently) contradicting a text of the Veda. For, such contradictory text must necessarily be a 'recollection' of an eternally existing but forgotten text of the Veda, and therefore equally good and valid with the other text. Then 'custom' (Acara) is, I take it, to be distinguished, and broadly, from the dharmas of countries, &c. Its very juxtaposition with 'a verdict of an assembly' would seem to further limit it to a special custom of a small body of men, probably learned men, supposed to have deviated by chance from the established path.
In all this nothing, it seems to me, forbids the supposition that, where precise words of a Smrti give information as to right usage, and a few learned men have adopted a course different from the recommended course, one seeking to do right should preferably follow the Smrti; and that the rational and beneficent declarations of Manu, touching the dharmas of countries, &c., are not to be understood as being in fact limited by words not expressed, and which virtually destroy the whole force of such declarations.
A further development of the meaning of the aphorism 'Usage is highest dharma' is to be found in Manu VII. 201-3, which shows that the proper course for a conquering king to adopt towards the conquered country is (amongst other things) to worship its gods and righteous Brahmans; to appoint one of its inhabitants its ruler, giving him 'precise directions'; and to 'make authoritative their laws as declared.' He was not to set to work to destroy their usages, as being in his opinion inexpedient and immoral: he was to do precisely what Her Majesty the Queen did in her proclamation (referred to above in the introductory chapter) of November 1, 1858. And, similarly, the Yajnavalkya Smrti (I. 342) says: — Of a newly subjugated territory the monarch shall preserve the social and religious usages, also the judicial system and the state of classes as they already obtain. See, too, Vishnu III. 42; and below, p. 107.
The Province of Madras, of course, was never conquered by an Arya monarch; but surely the above directions of Manu are applicable in spirit to the case of that country, if Manu as a whole is to be in any degree, or for any purpose, applied thereto. For, no doubt, the whole of the Madras Province was more or less under the sway of the Calukya dynasty, for whose special instruction (according to Burnell) the Manava-d.-c. was composed; and both as being a conquered country, and as being a mleccha (outcaste or barbarous) country, it must have been entitled many centuries ago to have its own peculiar dharma established by its overlord.
And hence it is that Ellis, that admirable inquirer and observer, was enabled to declare unhesitatingly that the Brahmans never fully introduced the law of their Smrtis into the South, and, though they succeeded in abolishing the Jaina faith, were compelled to wink at many inveterate practices of the people of South India. (Transactions Madras Lit. Soc. Part I.)
According to Manu, 'usage is highest dharma,' as well for the most virtuous Brahman as for the lowest outcaste or most inveterate heretic; only, whereas the Brahman is to find his dharma mainly by searching the Cruti and Smrti, wherein his usage is fully described, others, less fortunate, must be content to follow the customs of their respective tribes. Custom, as Professor Jolly admits (at p. 36), was never replaced by the Smrtis. And, if it is true, as he thinks, that custom 'occupied a subordinate position in the eyes of the Brahmans, except so far as it had been, and was constantly being, embodied in the authoritative works of the Smrti writers,' it must be remembered that, as a body, the Brahmans have troubled themselves only about the usage of Brahmans, not at all about the usage of non-Brahmans, who constitute the great bulk of the population of Madras. In remarking on the important passage of Gautama referred to above, Professor Jolly says (at p. 35): 'Similar rules occur in other Smrtis. But it is nowhere asserted that, in case of a conflict between custom and the Smrti, the Smrti may be overruled.' I have, however, pointed out that Manu VIII. 46, asserts this very thing in most distinct terms. And I trust that I have done something towards making it clear that a special aim of Manu is to teach those concerned that 'usage is highest dharma'; not only for the privileged classes, for whose benefit alone its author wrote, but also for the irresponsible masses, who ordinarily require no law for their guidance, except, of course, the criminal.
In conclusion, I must call attention to the danger of assuming that, because certain writers of law treatises have declared a usage to be extinct or prohibited, therefore such usage in fact has died out. Take the case of niyoga (levirat). Manu certainly (in IX. 59) gives as valid the approved rule for performing it, before expressing strong disapproval of the practice: and by numerous subsequent texts, e.g. IX. 146, 167, 190, sanctions the practice. But Brhaspati declares that it is prohibited in the present (Kali) age. Brihaspati, also known as Guru, is a Hindu god. In the ancient Vedic scriptures of Hinduism, Brihaspati is a deity associated with fire, and the word also refers to a rishi (sage) who counsels the devas (gods). In some later texts, the word refers to the largest planet of the solar system, Jupiter, and the deity is associated with the planet as a Navagraha.SageBrihaspati appears in the Rigveda (pre-1000 BCE), such as in the dedications to him in the hymn 50 of Book 4; he is described as a sage born from the first great light, the one who drove away darkness, is bright and pure, and carries a special bow whose string is Rta or "cosmic order" (basis of dharma). His knowledge and character is revered, and he is considered Guru (teacher) by all the Devas. In the Vedic literature and other ancient texts, sage Brihaspati is also called by other names such as Bramanaspati, Purohita, Angirasa (son of Angiras) and Vyasa; he is sometimes identified with god Agni (fire). His wife is Tara (or goddess who personifies the stars in the sky).
The reverence for sage Brihaspati endured through the medieval period, and o
ne of the many Dharmasastras was named after him. While the manuscripts of Brihaspati Smriti (Bṛhaspatismṛti) have not survived into the modern era, its verses were cited in other Indian texts. Scholars have made an effort to extract these cited verses, thus creating a modern reconstruction of Bṛhaspatismriti. Jolly and Aiyangar have gathered some 2,400 verses of the lost Bṛhaspatismṛti text in this manner. Brihaspati Smriti was likely a larger and more comprehensive text than Manusmriti, and the available evidence suggests that the discussion of the judicial process and jurisprudence in Brihaspati Smriti was often cited.
Brihaspati sutrasBrihaspati sutras, also called the Barhaspatya sutras, is an ancient Sanskrit text named after its author Brihaspati, known for its theories of materialism and anti-theism. Its tenets are at the foundation of the Charvaka school of non-orthodox Indian philosophy. The Brihaspati Sutras manuscript has been lost to history or yet to be found. However, the text is quoted in other Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina texts, and this secondary literature has been the source for reconstructing the Brihaspati sutras partially.
Some scholars suggest that Brihaspati sutras are named after Brihaspati in the Vedas, but other scholars dispute this theory because the text rejects the Vedas.-- Brihaspati, by Wikipedia
And later writers (it is said) without exception assume that niyoga is quite obsolete and impossible. Nevertheless, Marco Polo tells us that when he travelled in India 'a man takes his brother's wife, and all the people of India have this custom.' And, further, he tells us that the King, having five hundred wives of his own, forcibly took to himself the wife of his brother, who discreetly made no opposition to his will. Then, Mandelslo, who travelled in India in 1638, says (at p. 56) of the Vishnu sect: 'They have this particular custom in this sect, that they permit not the women to burn themselves with their husbands, but they oblige them to perpetual widowhood, even though the husband died before the consummation of the marriage. It is not long since that, among them, the younger brother was obliged to marry his elder brother's widow, to raise up seed to him; but this custom is abolished by an express law, which condemns the woman to celibate.' And doubtless the writer of the monograph on the Vaishnava Tottiyans of Madura, quoted at p. 141 of my View, had niyoga in view when he spoke of their priests compelling unwilling wives to consort with their husbands' brothers and near kinsmen. It is not at all unlikely, it seems to me, that niyoga in different forms may still survive among some of the non-Brahman castes of South India. Anyhow, it must be dangerous to assume the contrary. It is generally known that a peculiar system of marriage prevails in Tibet—a plurality not of wives but of husbands. The cases of polyandry are; first, when several brothers take the same woman as their wife at the same time; second, when two or more men not brothers, marry the same woman by mutual agreement; and thirdly, when a woman, already married to one man, gains influence over her husband, and, with his consent, marries another in addition. In case the mother of a family dies, either the father or the son takes a new spouse, who becomes at the same time the wife of the other male members of the family without infringing the law of the country. They are quite insensible to the shame of this dissolute condition of matrimonial relations, which can scarcely be even imagined by people with a civilised moral sense; and yet there do exist some restrictions: marriage of brothers with sisters, or between cousins, is not only censured by the public as immoral, but also prohibited by the law as criminal.
-- Three Years in Tibet, by Shramana Ekai Kawaguchi
This chapter as a whole will be found to be admirably illustrated by some texts remarked on below, pp. 146-7.