5 Nicaragua: From low-intensity warfare to low-intensity democracy
1 Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy, " Foreign Affairs, 66 (1988), no. 5, p. 919.
2 Cited in Penny Lernoux, "The Struggle for Nicaragua's Soul: A Church in Revolution and War, " Sojourners, May 14, 1989, p. 23. Neuhaus was a founding member of the conservative Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD), which helped promote US policy toward Nicaragua in the 1980s.
3 Peter Rodman, Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs. Cited in Robinson, A Faustian Bargain, p. 25. This work will be referred to simply as AFB in subsequent notes for this chapter.
4 Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 16.
5 A penetrating overview of this period is Bradford E. Burns, Patriarch and Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798-1858 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
6 Karl Bermann, Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States since 1848 (Boston: South End, 1986), p. 16. This is an excellent analysis of USNicaragua relations in historical perspective.
7 For an in-depth study of the Zelaya period, see Oscar Rene Vargas, La Revolucion que Inicio el Progreso: Nicaragua 1893-1909 (Managua: Ecotextura/ Consa, 1990).
8 Bermann, Big Stick, p. 141.
9 For an account of this spate of elections, see Oscar Rene Vargas, Elecciones en Nicaragua, 1912-1932: (Analisis socio-politico) (Managua: Fundacion Manolo Morales, 1989).
10 The definitive biography of Sandino and his movement is Gregorio SeIser, Sandino (New York: Monthly Review, 1981).
11 Cited in Bermann, Big Stick, p. 213.
12 Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty (New York: Maryknoll, 1977), is the classic work on the National Guard.
13 There is no direct evidence of such involvement. However, the circumstantial evidence suggests the historical record is still undetermined. For discussions on the possible US role, see Bermann, Big Stick, pp. 221-222, and Seiser, Sandino, pp. 174-179.
14 There are many works on the Somoza dynasty. See, e.g., Bernard Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981).
15 Cited in Bermann, Big Stick, p. 219.
16 Ibid., p. 247. See also Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino (Boulder: Westview, 1981), p. 89.
17 For these details, see Millett, Guardians, pp. 200, 252; Tom Barry, Debrah Preusch, and Beth Wood, Dollars and Dictators (New York: Grove, 1983), pp. 66--73; George Black, Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua (London: Zed, 1981), pp. 47-48.
18 See, e.g., Victor Blumer Thomas, The Political Economy of Central America since 1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jaime Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1975).
19 See Kent Norsworthy, Nicaragua: A Country Guide (Albuquerque: The Resource Center, 1990), pp. 78, 193 n. 18; See also Black, Triumph, pp. 28-41, 68-70; Thomas, Political Economy, pp. 150-225.
20 Cited in Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, p. 162.
21 For discussion, see William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, David and Goliath: The US War Against Nicaragua (New York: Monthly Review, 1987), ch.7.
22 Jaime Wheelock, EI Gran Desafio (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1983), p. 26.
23 A detailed chronicle of events leading to the 1979 Sandinista revolution is Black, Triumph. For an insider's account of the elite opposition, see Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Diario Politico (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1990), posthumous.
24 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, pp. 79, 86.
25 For details, see Bermann, Big Stick, pp. 261-272.
26 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, pp. 93, 107.
27 See ibid., pp. 151-159, for these details.
28 Cited in Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, March 24, 1994.
29 Literature on the revolution's economic and social programs is vast. On agrarian reform, see, e.g., Joseph Collins, et al., Nicaragua: What Difference Could a Revolution Make: Food and Farming in the New Nicaragua (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1985); La reforma agraria en Nicaragua 1979-1989: cifras y referencias documentales (Managua: CIERA, 1989). On the world-recognized Sandinista literacy crusade, see Valerie Miller, Between Struggle and Hope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade (Boulder: Westview, 1985). For an account of the revolution's health programs, see Richard Garfield and Glen Williams, Health and Revolution: The Nicaraguan Experience (London: Oxfam, 1989). For general description of post-1979 economic democratization, and social and cultural achievements, see Norsworthy, Nicaragua; Thomas Walker (ed.), Nicaragua: The First Five Years (New York: Praeger, 1985).
30 For discussion on democracy in Nicaragua between 1979 and 1990, see, e.g., Jose Luis Coraggio, Nicaragua: Revolucion y Democracia (Mexico: Editorial Linea, 1985); Gary Ruchwarger, People in Power: Forging a Grassroots Democracy in Nicaragua (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1987); Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost, Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
31 On the 1984 elections and US strategy toward them, see, among others, William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, "Elections and U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, " Latin American Perspectives, 12 (1985), no. 2, 22-24; John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (eds.), Elections and Democracy in Central America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 232-257.
32 Vanden and Prevost, Democracy and Socialism, p. 19.
33 [bid. See also Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988; Ruchwarger, People in Power.
34 For this type of critique, see Carlos Vilas, La Revolucion Sandinista: Liberacion nacional y transformaciones sociales en Centroamerica (Buenos Aires: Editorial Legasa, 1984). Vilas's is a brilliant study; I differ with him on the "scope conditions" under which the revolutionary project should be assessed.
35 Works on the US war against Nicaragua are numerous. See, e.g., Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath; Thomas Walker (ed.), Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview, 1987); Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End, 1988); Kornbluh, Nicaragua.
36 The $447.69 million figure is from US congressional reports reproduced in Norsworthy, Nicaragua, p. 176. For breakdown on the $2 billion figure, see Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, pp. 86-94.
37 For these details, see ibid., pp. 1OG-102, 123-124, 161-163.
38 AFB, p. 36.
39 For more details, see AFB and Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, ch. 7.
40 This section draws heavily from AFB. Readers interested in original sources are referred to that volume, which contains a hundred pages of notes and reproduced US government documentation.
41 Ibid., p. 28.
42 Ibid., pp. 28, 195 n. 6.
43 Ibid., pp. 29-30/ 196, nn. 11-15.
44 These figures are drawn from the National Endowment for Democracy's Annual Reports, 1984 through 1992. The 1984-1991 spending is described and analyzed, item by item, in AFB.
45 For these citations, see ibid, p. 48.
46 Ibid., p. 49.
47 For the detailed account of the formation by US officials of the UNO coalition, see ibid., pp. 47-65.
48 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
49 Ibid.
50 For these citations and more details, see ibid., pp. 52-53.
51 Ibid., p. 52
52 For these details, see ibid., p. 53.
53 See ibid., pp. 58-60.
54 For summaries of Obando y Bravo's US ties, and on his role in the anti- Sandinista campaign, see Irene Selser, Cardenal Obando (Managua: Centro de Estudios Ecumenicos, 1989); Robinson and Norsworthy, David and Goliath, pp. 208-219, 241-248.
55 Status Report on the Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance in Central America, Report on Phase III, May 1-August 31, 1989, Agency for international Development, September 17, 1989, Washington, D.C. This money was used for establishing a national logistical network of communications and transportation for his archdiocese.
56 For these details, see AFB, pp. 59-60.
57 For details and analysis, see ibid., pp. 60-65, 67-89.
58 Ibid, pp. 114-115.
59 Ibid, p. 62.
60 According to Peter Montgomery, "1980-1990: The Reagan Years, " Common Cause Magazine, November 1990, p. 12, Bush spent a total of $70 million in public and private funds.
61 For these details, see AFB, pp. 63-65.
62 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
63 For details, see ibid., pp. 69-70.
64 Ibid., p. 70.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 See ibid., p. 71.
68 For example, see Orlando Nunez, "La ideologia como Fuerza Material, y La Juventud como Fuerza Ideologica, " in Estado y Clases Sociales en Nicaragua (Managua: CIERA, 1982).
69 AFB, p. 72.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 74.
72 Ibid.
73 "Political and Social Action Project, Nicaragua, " Delphi International Group, undated document obtained through the FOIA.
74 AFB, p. 75
75 Ibid.
76 See Holly Sklar, "US Wants to Buy Nicaragua's Elections - Again, " Zeta, November 1989, 39-40.
77 AFB, p. 76.
78 Ibid.
79 For discussion on propaganda and the communications media in US policy towards Nicaragua, see sources listed in ibid., p. 211, n. 61.
80 Ibid, p. 78.
81 See ibid., p. 78, and discussion and sources listed in pp. 211-212, n. 61, 63-65.
82 For details, see sources in ibid., p. 212, n. 65.
83 Ibid., p. 79.
84 For details, see ibid.
85 For documentation on the CIA connection, see sources listed in ibid., p. 212, n. 70.
86 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
87 Ibid., p. 87.
88 The most exhaustive analysis of pre-electoral polls is William A. Barnes, "Rereading the Nicaraguan Pre-Election Polls, " in Vanessa Castro and Gary Prevost (eds.), The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and Their Aftermath (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992). See also AFB, pp. 87-89.
89 See, e.g., ibid., p. 104.
90 Ibid., p. 105.
91 For details on this aid package, and Contra activity during the electoral process, see ibid., pp. 134-140.
92 Ibid., p. 137.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 For these statistics, and for an overall analysis of the rural aspects of the electoral process, see Vanessa Castro, Resultados Electorales en el Sector Rural (Managua: Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia, 1990).
97 Alvin H. Bernstein, "Political Strategies in Coercive Diplomacy and Limited War, " in Lord and Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare, p. 146.
98 Norsworthy, Nicaragua, p. 67.
99 Cited in AFB, p. 141.
100 See White House statement, November 8, 1989, released by the Office of the Press Secretary.
101 AFB, pp. 143-144.
102 For details, see ibid., p. 144.
103 See Vanden and Prevost, Democracy and Socialism, pp. 142-143.
104 Paul Oquist, "The Sociopolitical Dynamics of the 1990 Elections" in Castro and Prevost (eds.), 1990 Elections, p. 29.
105 "Recibi al Pais en un Profundo Abismo, " La Jornada (Mexico), June 25, 1993, 1.
106 On post-revolutionary Nicaragua and US activities therein, see, among others, Oscar Rene Vargas, A donde va Nicaragua: perspectivas de una revolucion latinoamericana (Managua: Ediciones Nicarao, 1991); William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, "The Nicaraguan Revolution Since the Elections, " CrossRoads, no. 6 January 1991), 21-27; Midge Quandt, "U.S. Aid to Nicaragua: Funding the Right, " Z Magazine, November 1991, 47- 51; George R. Vickers and Jack Spence, "Two Years After the Fall, " World Policy Journal, Summer 1992, 533-562.
107 For discussion on the FSLN and the popular organizations after the elections, see Midge Quandt, Unbinding the Ties: The Popular Organizations and the FSLN in Nicaragua (Washington, D.C.: Nicaragua Network Education Fund, 1992).
108 Remark made during an April 5, 1990 press conference, cited in "Family Frictions, " Ba"icada Internacional, no. 320 (April 12, 1990), p. 3.
109 Agency for International Development, "Country Development Strategy Statement: U.S.AID/Nicaragua 1991-1996, " Washington, D.C. June 14, 1991, pp. 62-63.
110 For the $541 million figure, see AID, "Strategy Statement, " resource table, appearing on an unnumbered page following the last numbered page (63). See also: AID, "Nicaragua: A Commitment to Democracy, Reconciliation, and Reconstruction" ("Fact Sheet" prepared for reporters and the public, March 1990); AID, "Economic Assistance Strategy for Central America, 1991-2000, " Washington, D.C. January 1991. For detailed analysis, see the excellent studies by two Nicaraguan economists: Angel Saldomando, El retorno de la AID, caso de Nicaragua: condicionalidad y reestructuracion conservadora (Managua, Ediciones CRIES, 1992); Adolfo Acevedo Vogl, Nicaragua y el FMI: el pozo sin fondo del ajuste (Managua: Ediciones CRIES, 1993). Also see interview with Saldomando, "U.S.AID's Strategy in Nicaragua, " Envio, no. 142 (May 1993), 23-31.
111 AFB, p. 164.
112 For details, see ibid., pp. 164, 237 nn. 7-10.
113 Vargas, A donde va Nicaragua.
114 AFB, p. 163.
115 AID, "Strategy Statement, " pp. 47-48.
116 AID, "Strategy Statement, " pp. 15-16, 45.
117 For details on the AID textbooks, see Quandt, "U.S. Aid to Nicaragua."
118 AFB, pp. 165-166.
119 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 46.
120 AFB, p. 166.
121 See NED Annual Reports, 1990-1992. For the television program, see 1992 Report, 75.
122 AFB, p. 166.
123 Quandt, "U.S. Aid to Nicaragua."
124 Ibid.
125 Saldomando interview, "U.S.AID's Strategy in Nicaragua, " pp. 26-27.
126 William 1. Robinson, "AID to Nicaragua: Some Things Aren't What They Seem, " In These Times, October 24-30, 1990.
127 See Roberto Larios, "Bowing Before Financial Organizations, " Ba"icada Internacional, nos. 367-8 (Nov.-Dec. 1993), pp. 8-9.
128 Anne Larson, "Foreign Debt: Where Have All the Dollars Gone?, " Envio, no. 143 (June 1993), 4-10.
129 For these details and statistics, see Larson, "Foreign Debt."
130 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 39.
131 See ibid., resource table; Saldomando, El retorno, p. 97, and pp. 88-89 for a listing of the new private banks and their principal board members.
132 Ibid., p. 92.
133 Larios, "Bowing Before Financial Organizations."
134 "Why Social Conflict, " Envio, no. 138 (Jan.-Mar. 1993), p. 18.
135 Larios, "Bowing Before Financial Organizations."
136 See, e.g., AID, "Strategy Statement"; AID, "Economic Assistance Strategy." For further discussion of this general model for the Caribbean Basin, see, e.g., H. Rodrigo Jauberth Rojas et al., La triangulacion Centroamerica- Mexico-EUA: una oportunidad para el desarrollo y la paz? (Managua: Ediciones CRIES, 1991).
137 See "Welcome to the Free Trade Zone, " Envio, no. 150, 27-33.
138 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 25.
139 Saldomando, El retorno, pp. 74-78.
140 See, e.g., ibid., p. 80.
141 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 20.
142 See, e.g., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary Spokesman, "Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, " press release, April 2, 1993, which outlines strict conditions imposed by the Clinton administration for the release of frozen US funds, including a purging of Sandinistas from the government, the dismissal of army chief Humberto Ortega (a Sandinista) and other high-level EPS officials.
143 For an explanation of this doctrine, as described by Humberto Ortega, see interview with Ortega in Barricada [Managua j, December 29, 1992, 1.
144 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 63.
145 There is considerable literature on these measures and debate on whether they were necessary or in the popular interests. See, e.g., Richard Stahler-Sholk, "Stabilization, Destabilization., and the Popular Classes in Nicaragua, 1979-1988, " Latin American Research Review, 25 (1990), no. 3, 55-88. For a summary, see AFB, pp. 141-144.
146 "Why Social Conflict, " 18.
147 Ibid.
148 Susanne Andersson, "New National Health Care Policy: Undercover Privatization, " Barricada Internacional, no. 367-8, (Nov.-Dec. 1993), 12-13.
149 For discussion on the debate in the FSLN and in the left in Latin America, see, e.g., Gary Prevost, "The FSLN in Opposition, " in Castro and Prevost (eds.), 1990 Elections; Vargas, A donde va Nicaragua; William I. Robinson, "The Sao Paulo Forum: Is There a New Latin American Left?, " Monthly Review (1992), no. 7, 1-12.
150 AID, "Strategy Statement, " p. 8.
6 Haiti: The "practically insolvable problem" of establishing consensual domination
1 Cited in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 62-63.
2 Steve Meacham, "Popular Power in Haiti, " Forward Motion (1991), no. 3, p.23.
3 General works in English on which I draw include: Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988); Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel (Boulder: Westview, 1989); Paul Fanner, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage, 1994); James Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers (New York: Blackwell, 1987); Mats Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Rod Prince, Haiti: Family Business (London: Latin American Bureau, 1985); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review, 1990); Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti since Duvalier (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).
4 See, e.g., the classic study in English on the Haitian revolution, C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Random House, 1963), p. ix.
5 Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 33. The Heinls' exhaustive historical account, like earlier colonial historical logs, is steeped in racism and ethnocentric assumptions. The Haitians are not only "primitive" and exhibit some mystical "psyche, " but are a people inexplicably incapable of resolving their own problems since they do not fit the Eurocentric logic of the observers.
6 For analysis, see James, Black Jacobins.
7 Cited in Prince, Family Business, p. 32.
8 Prince, Family Business, pp. 13-14.
9 Although space constraints preclude discussion, in reality a "pure" peasant economy never existed in Haiti, and has rarely existed in human history. The peasant economy was highly stratified, an amalgamation of subsistence production and semi-feudal rural production relations, in which large holders were in turn "articulated" to capitalist production relations via marketing in the world economy through a commercial bourgeoisie and a state bureaucracy. See, e.g., Trouillot, State against Nation.
10 See, e.g., Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 17, 21.
11 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 18; Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, pp. 48-55.
12 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review, 1967).
13 These statistics are summarized in Prince, Family Business, pp. 1-4, 43, 53-55.
14 For details, see Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 172.
15 Cited in Schmidt, United States Occupation, p. 48.
16 Fritz Longchamp and Worth Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency and Dictatorship: Hope for Haiti, " Covert Action Information Bulletin, no. 36 (Spring 1991), 54-58, at p. 55.
17 Schmidt, The United States Occupation, p. 31.
18 Ibid., p. 103, Emily Greene Balch, Occupied Haiti (New York: The Writers Publishing Co., 1927).
19 As cited in Paul W. Drake, "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912- 1932, " in Lowenthal (ed.) Exporting Democracy, p. 25.
20 Schmidt, United States Occupation, p. 145.
21 Ibid., pp. 108-112.
22 For these details, see ibid., pp. 37-40, 48-52; Paul H. Douglas, "Political History of the Occupation, " in Balch, Occupied Haiti, pp. 18-21 and Douglas, "Economic and Financial Aspects, " in ibid., pp. 44-46, 54-56.
23 E. G. Balch, "Public Order, " in ibid., p. 130.
24 E. G. Balch, "Charges of Abuses in Haiti, " in ibid., p. 125.
25 Ibid., pp. 123-127; Schmidt, United States Occupation, pp. 86-91, 100-102.
26 Ibid., pp. 86-91; Trouillot, State against Nation, pp. 104-108.
27 Noirism was in turn a Haitian version of Negritude, an anti-colonial ideology of the disenfranchised African middle class in French colonies who took over the reins of direct government from departing white administrators in new neo-colonial states.
28 On US support for Duvalier's electoral bid, see Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, pp. 94-95.
29 Wilentz, Rainy Season, p. 42.
30 See Abbott, The Duvaliers, for graphic descriptions of Duvalierist terror, and pp. 184 and 234, respectively, for the specific statistics.
31 Note that vodoun is alternatively spelled vodun, voudou, and voodoo. Vodoun, a blend of African animist religions and Catholicism, developed during the colonial period as a means of uniting people and organizing resistance, both spiritual and worldly. The US occupation force, mulatto governments, and the conservative Catholic Church hierarchy had long tried forcibly to suppress it. The Machiavellian Duvalier, on the other hand, won support by encouraging voudoun as a source of black pride and practiced the religion himself, and was able to incorporate many houngans into the Macoute network. For discussion, see Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, pp. 9-22.
32 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 87.
33 Ibid., pp.108-111.
34 Ibid., pp. 93, 105, 114; Prince, Family Business, pp. 26-27, 36, 38; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 62, 78.
35 Ibid., p. 42.
36 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 163; Prince, Family Business, p. 31; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 55, 57.
37 See ibid., pp. 68-69. Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, p. 100, estimates that total U.S. economic aid to the Duvalier regime between 1957 and 1986 was about $900 million.
38 See, e.g., Prince, Family Business, pp. 43-46; Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, various chapters; Tom Barry, Beth Woods, and Deb Preusch, The Other Side of Paradise: Foreign Control in the Caribbean (New York: Grove Press, 1984), pp. 330-341.
39 For analyses of the CBI and the arrival of the global economy in the Caribbean, see Kathy McAfee, Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean (Boston: South End 1991);Barry, et al., Other Side of Paradise.
40 Prince, Family Business, pp. 47-51.
41 Cited in Barry, et at., Other Side of Paradise, p. 336.
42 See Prince, Family Business, pp. 48, 72. Prince notes that Haitian workers in the free-trade zone showed to be just as productive as those working in core countries, which belies the argument that lower wages in the Third World are a result of lower productivity.
43 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 176.
44 The World Bank report is cited in Noam Chomsky, Year 501 (Boston, South End, 1993), pp. 206-207; the AID report in Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, p. 127.
45 For instance, Duvalier official Clemard Joseph Charles, who had established the local Commercial Bank and also served as Jean-Claude's "bagman, " in charge of managing the Duvaliers' Swiss bank accounts, was also on the boards of fourteen major transnational corporations operating in Haiti, among them General Electric, Siemens, Schuckerwerke, and Toyota Motors. See Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 182.
46 Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency, " pp. 56-57.
47 Truillot, State against Nation, pp. 218-219.
48 While the old-style dictatorships of the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti demonstrate both these flaws of authoritarianism, Chile, with its "bureaucratic- authoritarian regime" under Pinochet, provided technical and administrative efficiency but demonstrated the second failing, generating mass resistance to dictatorship that threatens the social order.
49 Prince, Family Business, p. 71.
50 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 305; Wilentz, Rainy Season, p. 39. The US Embassy-Namphy conspiracy to remove Duvalier is detailed in Abbott, The Duvaliers, pp. 285-293, 302-314, 321-333.
51 Ibid., pp. 287, 292-293.
52 Ibid., pp. 299-300.
53 Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 112.
54 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 306.
55 Ibid., p. 308; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 119.
56 Ibid., p. 121.
57 Ibid., p. 176.
58 Americas Watch/National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (New York/Washington, February 1993), pp. 3-4.
59 Abbott, The Duvaliers, p. 305.
60 Ibid., p. 335; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, pp. 123, 128, 140-142.
61 See Thomas Carothers, "The Reagan Years: The 1980s, " in Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy, p. 113.
62 Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking With Dependency, " p. 57.
63 "Assistance for Democracy Act of 1986, " Report 99-722, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, July 30, 1986, p. 21. Of the $4 million, $2.8 million was disbursed before a November 1987 suspension of military aid, according to Trouillot, State against Nation, p. 222.
64 ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 161; Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, p.123.
65 See, e.g., Tim Weiner, "Key Haitian Leaders Said to Have Been in CIA's Pay, " New York Times, November 1, 1993, A-I; Tim Weiner, "CIA Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade, " New York Times, November 14, 1993, A-I.
66 Ibid.
67 See, e.g., eyewitness accounts by Abbott in The Duvaliers, esp. p. 320. See also Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 125.
68 For a discussion of these parties, see Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, pp. 154-157.
69 See Weiner, "CIA Formed Haitian Unit."
70 Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency, " p. 57. For details and eyewitness descriptions of the repression under the National Government Council, see Wilentz, Rainy Season, and Abbott, The Duvaliers, esp. pp. 331-367.
71 Wilentz, Rainy Season, p. 358.
72 For details on Adams and his activities, see Longchamp and Cooley-Prost, "Breaking with Dependency, " p. 54.
73 Ibid.
74 On the formation of these and other broad democratic coalitions, see Michael S. Hooper, "The Monkey's Tail Still Strong, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 21 (1987), no. 3, 24-31; Wilentz, Rainy Season, esp. pp. 209-211, 233; Mark V. Aristide and Laurie Richardson, "Profiles of the Popular Currents, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, 32-33; Mark V. Aristide and Laurie Richardson, "Haiti's Popular Resistance, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, 30-36.
75 For descriptions of these peasant federations, see Silencing a People, pp. 9-26. See also Robert E. Maguire, "The Peasantry and Political Change in Haiti, " Caribbean Affairs, 4 (1991), no. 2, 1-18.
76 Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
77 In The Rainy Season, Wilentz, who as a reporter in Port-au-Prince held numerous interviews with U.S. Embassy officials, amply documents this distrust and hostility. See, e.g., pp. 11, 114-115, 120, 128, 129, 220-221, 390.
78 For summaries, see NED Annual Reports, 1985-1990; Resource Center, "Populism, Conservatism, and Civil Society in Haiti, " The NED Backgrounder, 1 (1992), no. 2; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti. This booklet contains summaries and reprints of sections of several AID documents released to the Washington Office on Haiti through the FOIA.
79 AID, "Democracy Enhancement Project (521-0236) Project Paper, " Washington, D.C., June 20, 1991, reproduced in part in Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, p. 7.
80 See, e.g., letter from Berlanger to NED officer Marc F. Plattner, December 2, 1985, obtained through the FOIA.
81 See "Haitian International Institute for Research and Development -(IHRED), Proposal to Conduct Forums for the Promotion and Development of Democracy in Haiti, " January 1989, released through the FOIA.
82 See NED Annual Reports, 1987-1990.
83 NED Annual Report, 1987, p. 57.
84 Memo from US Embassy in Port-au-Prince to NDI regarding party-building workshops, August 1986, obtained through the FOIA.
85 See, e.g., Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 139.
86 "The 1990 Elections in Haiti, " report of the electoral observation mission sponsored by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, undated, p. 30.
87 See the following four documents obtained through the FOIA: "NRIIA Final Program Report: NED Grant #90-132.0 Haiti, AID Funds, Project Title: Democratic Institution Development and Election Observation, " undated; "Grant Agreement Between the National Endowment for Democracy, Incorporated, and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, NED Grant No. 90-132.0, " undated; "National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Quarterly Report to the National Endowment for Democracy (July 1 - September 30, 1991), " October 31, 1991; "Haiti Aid, Grant Number: 90-132.0, Program Title: Political Party Development." Regarding the 1990 electoral results, see Washington Office on Haiti, "Report on the Elections of December 16, 1990, " Washington, D.C. March 1991; "The 1990 Elections in Haiti."
88 See Abbott, The Duvaliers, pp. 254-255; Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p.127.
89 Ibid.
90 The businessman was Vernon Gentry, cited in a commentary he published, "State Department Rebuffed in Haiti, " Times of the Americas (Washington, D.C.), December 26, 1990, 25.
91 Cited in Americas Watch, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and Physicians for Human Rights, Return to the Darkest Days: Human Rights in Haiti Since the Coup (New York: Americas Watch, December, 1991), pp.16-17.
92 See "Toward a New Future: Emerging Democracy in Haiti, " Haiti Backgrounder (1991), no. 1 (published by Third World Reports, Cambridge, Mass.)
93 Resource Center, "Populism"; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, p. 7.
94 See Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, p. 7, and the following documents obtained through the FOIA: America's Development Foundation (ADF) summary of proposal to NED, February 13, 1991; "National Endowment for Democracy/Haiti Election, America's Development Foundation Civic Education Proposals, " undated; "Quarterly Program Report, National Endowment for Democracy Haiti Elections, Grants # 90-121.0, 90-122.0, 90-123.0, 90-124.0, 90-129.1, October 1, 1990 - December 31, 1990."
95 See Resource Center, "Populism, "; Allan Ebert, "Haiti and the AIFLD: A Burden Removed ... A Burden Renewed, " National Reporter, Summer 1986, 19-21. Ebert documents how, in the wake of Duvalier's departure, the AIFLD dispatched a delegation to Haiti to set up a full-time office and work closely with the FOS.
96 Weiner, "Key Haitian Leaders."
97 See "FY 1990 Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights Program Summary, " Agency for International Development, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
98 Meacham, "Popular Power in Haiti, " p. 24.
99 See Washington Office on Haiti, "Report on the Elections"; "The 1990 Elections in Haiti."
100 See, e.g., Xavier Gorostiaga, "La avalancha haitiana, " Pensamiento Propio, March 1991, 1-3.
101 Cited in William I. Robinson, "The Tragic History of the Haitian Republic, " Notisur, Latin America Data Base, Latin America Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, vol. 2, no. 2 January 22, 1992).
102 See Washington Office on Haiti, "Update on Haiti, " Washington, D.C., April 18, 1991.
103 Ibid.; Barbara Briggs and Charles Kernaghan, "The U.S. Economic Agenda: A Sweatshop Model of Development, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, 37-40.
104 Amy Wilentz, "Haiti: The September Coup, " Reconstruction (1992), no. 4, p.103.
105 See Kim Ives, "The Unmaking of a President, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 27 (1994), no. 4, p. 17.
106 The list is cited and discussed in Niki Joseph, "Haiti: The Long March to Popular Democracy, " CrossRoads, no. 15 (November 1991); Also, the New York Times, October 13, 1991, A-I reported that individual enlisted soldiers and policemen were paid as much as $5, 000 each to support the coup.
107 Prince, Family Business, pp. 51, 57.
108 However, there might well have been covert involvement which has not - and may never - become public knowledge.
109 See, e.g., Allan Nairn, "Our Man in FRAPH: Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries, " The Nation, 259 (1994), 458-461.
110 E.g., U.S. ambassador Alvin Adams, in the days prior to the coup, had presented a number of Haitian army demands to Aristide officials in a coercive diplomacy tactic to place pressure on Aristide to cede a greater quota of power to adversaries in and out of the armed forces and to take measures that would strengthen the state's coercive apparatus. See Notimex news dispatch, datelined Mexico City, February 3, 1992, "Aristide Adviser Charges U.S. Involved in Coup, " reproduced in FBI5-LAT- 92-023, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1992.
111 See "Mobilizing Resources for Development, " International Policy Report (Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C.), May 1992; Briggs and Kernaghan, "The U.S. Economic Agenda."
112 See Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc, p. 146; Bellegarde-Smith, Breached Citadel, p. 135;Trouillot, State against Nation.
113 AID, "Democracy Enhancement Project (521-0236), Project Paper, Project Summary, " 1-8, reprinted in Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, appendix.
114 For these citations and details, see Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, pp. 8-9.
115 Ibid., p. 12.
116 On US policy between 1991 and 1994, see, among others, John Canham- Clyne, "U.S. Policy on Haiti: Selling Out Democracy, " Covert Action Quarterly, no. 48 (Spring 1994), 4-9, 52-56; Ives, "Unmaking of a President"; Farmer, Uses of Haiti; James Ridgewood (ed.), The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis (Washington D.C.: Essential Books/Azul Editions, 1994).
117 New York Times, October 7, 1991, A-I.
118 See, among others, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Haiti: A Human Rights Nightmare (Washington, D.C./New York, 1992); Amnesty International, Haiti - The Human Rights Tragedy: Human Rights Violations since the Coup (New York, January 1992).The Washington Office on Haiti ("Human Rights in Haiti, " Washington, D.C., January 1992) documented that the military committed an average of twenty-four rights violations per month under Aristide. Under the regime of Gen. Prosper Avril (September 1988- March 1990), the average was seventy-three per month, and under former provisional president Ertha Pascal Truillot (March 1990-February 1991), fifty-nine per month. Independent reports, while praising his government's record, also criticized Aristide for failing to condemn, and for speeches which seemed to encourage, mass mobilizations and sometimes direct violent attacks against former Duvalierists, Macoutes, and representatives of the wealthy elite. Although space constraints preclude discussion, at play was the contradiction between the formal structures of representative democracy (dysfunctional as they were) - Le., a government structure that could constitutionally block basic social change in Haiti - and popular democracy. Whether unarmed "intimidation, " via mass mobilization, of a privileged minority, such as took place under Aristide, or the blocking by that historically privileged minority of social change to the benefit of an historically oppressed and exploited majority, is the greater "human rights violation, " is a matter of dispute. Besides, the documentation indicates that Aristide's "inflammatory speeches" were themselves taken out of context and distorted by US officials for the purpose of discrediting him and justifying US policy. See, e.g., Wilentz, 'The September Coup, " p. 102; Anne-Christine D'Adesky, "Haiti, Pere Lebrun in Context, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 2S ( 1991), no. 3, 7-9.
119 "CIA Report on Aristide False, Newspaper Says, " Washington Post, December 2, 1993, A-18; James Carroll, "The CIA Can be a Poor Judge of Character, " Boston Globe, October 26, 1993, A-I.
120 Ives, "'Unmaking of a President, " p. 38.
121 The document, titled "Memo from Consultant to the U.S. Embassy in Portau- Prince, " was reproduced in Ridgewood (ed.), Haiti Files, pp. 104-107.
122 See Howard French, "U.S. Presses Ousted Haitian Chief to Negotiate a Return from Exile, " New York Times, June 27, 1992, A-I.
123 Ives, '''Unmaking of a President, " p. 29. Also see, e.g., Haitian Information Bureau, "Subverting Democracy, " Multinational Monitor, March 1994, 13-15.
124 See, e.g., Lawyers Committee, Human Rights Nightmare, Amnesty International, Human Rights Tragedy; Human Rights Watch/Americas, National Coalition of Haitian Refugees, Terror Prevails in Haiti, reproduced in Ridgewood (ed.), Haiti Files.
125 Americas Watch, et al., Return to the Darkest Days, as cited in Chomsky, Year 501, p. 212.
126 See, e.g., Paul Quinn-Judge, "Haitians Trained After Coup, " Boston Globe, December 6, 1993, A-I.
127 New York Times, September 27, 1992, A-I.
128 See, e.g., Americas Watch/National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Half the Story: The Skewed U.S. Monitoring of Repatriated Haitian Refugees (New York: Americas Watch, June 1992); Emma D. Navajas, "Haitian Interdiction: An Overview of U.S. Policy and Practice, " Migration World, 20 (1991/ 2), no. 1, 38-41; Bill Frelick, "Haitians at Sea: Asylum Denied, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 26 (1992), no. 1, 34-39.
129 Nairn, "Our Man in FRAPH, " p. 458.
130 See, e.g., ibid.
131 General Accounting Office, "Summary of Shipments to Haiti After November 20, 1991, Compliance with the OAS Recommended Embargo, " report no. B-248828, 1994; Charles Kernaghan, "Skirting the Embargo, " Multinational Monitor, March 1994, pp. 16-17.
132 These figures are cited in "Haiti: U.S. Trade With Haiti Increases, Despite Embargo, " Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, March 10, 1994, and also in Kernaghan, "Skirting the Embargo, " pp. 16-17. U.S. officials justified these exemptions by arguing that the embargo had brought great suffering to the poor. These same officials rejected similar arguments that poor, innocent civilians were the victims of embargoes against Cuba, Iraq, and other countries.
133 "U.S. AID/Haiti Democracy Factsheet, " September 2, 1993, reprinted in Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, pp. 14-15. For analysis of post-coup political aid programs, see also Haitian Information Bureau, "Subverting Democracy, " Multinational Monitor, March 1994, pp. 13-15; Canham-Clyne, "U.S. Policy on Haiti."
134 See, e.g., Haitian Information Bureau, "Subverting Democracy:' pp. 13-15; Cooley-Prost, Democracy Intervention in Haiti, pp. 14-15; Canham-Clyne, "US Policy on Haiti."
135 For analysis of the invasion and its relation to "democracy promotion" intervention, see, among others, William I. Robinson, "Haiti: Behind the Occupation is Washington's Elusive Goal of Stabilizing Elite Rule," Notisur, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, vol. 4, no. 37 (October 7, 1994); Jane Regan, "A,I.D.ing U.S. Interests in Haiti, " Covert Action Quarterly, no. 51 (Winter 1994-95); Kim Ives, "The Second U.S. Occupation, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 28 (1995), no. 4, 6-10.
136 Ernest H. Preeg, "The Haitian Challenge in Perspective, " in Georges Fauriol (ed.), The Haitian Challenge: U.S. Policy Considerations (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 2. Preeg was U.S. ambassador to Haiti from 1981 to 1983, and was then transferred to Manila, where he partook in the "transition" in that country.
137 The company official was Charles McKay, as quoted in "Massive Foreign Assistance Expected to Pour Into Haiti, " Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico vol. 9, no. 39 (October 20, 1994).
138 Cited in Allan Nairn, "Occupation Haiti: The Eagle is Landing, " The Nation, 259 (1994), no. 7, 344.
139 Ibid.
140 Cited in ibid.
141 AID, "U.S.AID/Haiti Briefing Book, " Washington, D.C., November 1994.
142 See, e.g., "Massive Foreign Assistance Expected to Pour into Haiti"; "Haiti: U.s. Plan for Economic Recovery Depends Heavily on Private Sector Reactivation, " Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico vol. 10, no. 18 (May 4, 1995); Douglas Farah, "$1.2 billion to Build Haiti from Scratch, " Washington Post, October 21, 1994, A-I. On the details of the neo-liberal program, see "Republique d'Haiti Strategy for Social and Economic Reconstruction, " and "Statement by Hon. Mark Schneider, World Bank Informal Donors Meeting, August 26, 1994, " reproduced as Annexes Band A, respectively, in AID, "U.S.AID/Haiti Briefing Book."
143 Regan, " A.I.D.ing U.S. Interests, " p. 12.
144 Cited in Ives, 'Second U.s. Occupation, " p. 10.
145 Regan, " A.I.D.ing U.S. Interests, " p. 13.
146 See, e.g., "Haiti: New Prime Minister Names Cabinet as First Step in Socioeconomic Reconstruction," Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, vol. 9, no. 42 (November 10, 1994).
147 Catherine S. Manegold, "Aristide Picks a Prime Minister with Free-Market Ideas, " New York Times, October 25, 1994, A-I.
148 For details, see Regan, "A.I.D.ing U.S. Interests, " p. 11; Nairn, "Occupation Haiti."
149 Establishing precise figures for these programs is difficult because they were so extensive, overlapping and handled by numerous public and quasi-private agencies, and budgets were constantly being redrawn. The $85 million figure is cited in "Statement by Hon. Mark Schneider, " p. 4. See also AID, "U.S.AID/Haiti Elections Factsheet, March 10, 1995"; Voices for Haiti, "A Report on U.S. Elections Assistance to Haiti, " Washington, D.C., June 1995; AID, Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs, "Fact Sheet: Haiti Recovery Program, " Washington D.C, undated, distributed to journalists in mid-October 1994. Apart from overt but nearly-impossible-to-track political aid, the Clinton administration approved a $5 million CIA covert program for unspecified "political activities." See Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Reportedly Taking a Role in Haiti, " New York Times, September 28, 1994, A-7.
150 Cited in Regan, "A.I.D.ing U.S. Interests, " p. 12.
151 Cited in "A Democracy Made of Cardboard, " Briefing (Haiti Support Group), no. 12 (April 1995), p. 1, reprinted in Haitian News and Resource Service, Washington Office on Haiti, Washington, D.C., April-June 1995.
152 Cited in Nairn, "Occupation Haiti, " p. 348.
153 Ives, "'Unmaking of a President, " pp. 17, 23.
154 Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (New York, Monthly Review, 1969).
155 Jean Casimir (interview), "Haiti After the Coup, " World Policy Journal, 9 (1992), 354, 357.
156 J. P. Slavin, "Haiti: The Elite's Revenge, " NACLA Report on the Americas, 25 (1991), no. 3, 4.
157 Casimir, "Haiti After the Coup, " p. 354.
158 Ibid., p. 352.
159 Further discussion is not possible here, but note that this fact poses a challenge to both the transnational elite project and to popular leaders and leftist intellectuals who have argued that formal state power in the new world order is no longer necessary.