'Trying to Derive the utmost Advantage from it in the Zionist Sense'
The Zionist leadership still had to face one last internal battle over the Ha'avara and their general stance toward the Nazis. Jabotinsky and his Revisionists had split off from the WZO, but a remnant of his followers -- now called the Judenstaat Partei (Jewish State Party) -- had stayed loyal to the WZO and still demanded repudiation of the Transfer. Several journalists described the short but ferocious debate at the 1935 Congress. The Canadian Zionist reported that:
A vote was taken and resulted in Mr. Grossman's motion [for a debate on whether the Anglo-Palestinian Bank had caused the arrest of picketers who had protested the use of German cement] being defeated. Whereupon there were loud derisive cries of 'Heil Hitler!' on the part of some of Mr. Grossman's supporters. This caused pandemonium. [149]
Paul Novick, the editor of the American Communist daily newspaper, the Morgen Freiheit, related that the 'Histadrut delegates answered in kind, shouting towards the Judenstaat people: ''Schuschnigg agents" (meaning agents of Italo-Austrian Fascism).' [150]
The Executive's policy toward Hitler had stout defenders at the Congress. A theoretical defence was presented by Moshe Shertok, who had succeeded Arlosoroff as the organisation's Political Secretary (their equivalent to Foreign Minister). The man who later became the second Prime Minister of Israel sternly told the delegates, and the listening Jewish world, that they just had to realise that:
The Jewish people had no greater hope for success in the struggle for existence than through the upbuilding of Eretz Israel, and they must, therefore, be willing to draw the consequences. They imitated the protests and boycotts practised by other peoples, but forgot that those measures were expressions of the force possessed by those peoples, whereas the Zionist movement had yet to create such a force for itself. [151]
Beyond the Congress some of the most important propagandists of the WZO's strategy were the shliachim or emissaries sent out worldwide by the Labour Zionists in Palestine. Enzo Sereni, another graduate of the accommodationist Italian movement, had been the emissary in Germany in 1931-2, but he had done nothing to either mobilise the German Jews or assist the SPD in their fight against the Nazis. Sereni was one of those who saw Hitler as a scourge driving Jewry toward Zionism. He once informed Max Ascoli, an Italian anti-Fascist activist, that 'Hitler’s anti Semitism might yet lead to the salvation of the Jews'. [152] At the Lucerne Congress he was the vigorous exponent of the primacy of Palestine:
We have nothing to be ashamed of in the fact that we used the persecution of the Jews in Germany for the upbuilding of Palestine. That is how our sages and leaders of old have taught us… to make use of the catastrophes of the Jewish population in the Diaspora for upbuilding. [153]
But by far the best example of the leadership's unwillingness to resist the Nazis was Weizmann's statement:
The only dignified and really effective reply to all that is being inflicted upon the Jews of Germany is the edifice erected by our great and beautiful work in the Land of Israel… Something is being created that will transform the woe we all suffer into songs and legends for our grand-children. [154]
The presidium manoeuvred to keep any serious discussion of resistance off the Congress floor, and Wise's name was struck from the speakers' list for fear that he would denounce Hitler. He threatened to walk out of the Congress if he was not allowed to speak and, as the Congress knew they could not afford to have the most famous Zionist in America walk out on such a controversial issue, they finally gave way and let him speak. He duly got up, said that he was opposed to Hitler -- hardly a statement that would have attracted attention in most other company -- and sat down. He and Abba Hillel Silver had never really done much more than talk about boycott, and by 1935 there was nothing in America that remotely resembled an effective boycott organisation. In practice, they had no alternative programme for effective resistance; now, primarily focusing on Palestine as a refuge for German Jewry, they capitulated to Weizmann and endorsed the Ha’avara, and after the Lucerne Congress there were no longer any serious differences between them and the international movement. In the end the only official protest against Hitlerism made by the assembly was a half-day cancellation of one of their sessions, a meaningless gesture.
Weizmann had little real difficulty getting the Congress formally to endorse the Ha'avara, but the opposition was able to curb one of its activities. A Ha'avara subsidiary, the Near and Middle East Commercial Corporation (NEMICO), had been set up to solicit new customers for Germany throughout the Middle East. The Egyptian Zionist Federation had threatened to expose the scandal if the world organisation did not put a stop to it, and in the interests of preserving the larger scheme the leadership reluctantly had to sacrifice the NEMICO operation.
The capitulation of the Americans did nothing to quieten Jewish opposition elsewhere. Press criticism was immediate. London's World Jewry, then the best Zionist magazine in the English language, excoriated their own World Congress: 'Dr Weizmann went as far as to state that the only dignified reply the Jews could give was a renewed effort for the upbuilding of Palestine. How terrifying the proclamation of the Congress President must have sounded in the ears of Herren Hitler, Streicher and Goebbels!' [155]
The unofficial Zionist press in Britain shared the growing public feeling that war with Hitler was inevitable, and it could not understand the total lack of serious discussion of Nazism at the Congress. The magazine's correspondent described the meeting as strangely depressing: 'We have an agenda more suitable for a board of directors of a limited liability company than for a national conclave with the national destiny in its hands.' [156] Even the Jewish Chronicle, always the mouthpiece of the Jewish establishment, complained in the same vein: 'the proceedings were almost as dull as a debate on the Colonial Office in the House of Commons on a Friday morning'. [157] It felt compelled to condemn the decision on the Ha'avara:
The spectacle is puzzling to the world, whose sympathy we bespeak and disheartening to Jews for whom the boycott is one of the few weapons to their hand and who now see themselves deserted by the Movement which they most have a right to claim as an ally in their fight. [158]
In America the opposition to the Ha'avara was particularly intense in the garment industry trade unions, with their hundreds of thousands of Jewish workers. Most of the Jewish labour leaders had always looked upon Zionism with contempt. Many of them were from Russia and knew about the fateful Herzl-Plevhe meeting and how their old enemy Zubatov had backed the Poale Zionists against the Bund. As far as they were concerned the Ha'avara was just Zionism up to its old tricks, and in December 1935 Baruch Charney Vladeck, the Chairman of the Jewish Labor Committee, and himself an ex-Bundist from Poland, debated Berl Locker, the organisational head of the Palestinian Poale Zion, before an overflow crowd in New York.
Locker was compelled to take a defensive position, insisting that the agreement was purely in the interest of the German Jews. Besides, he argued, they would have brought the goods into the country on their own if there were no treaty. Why, if it had not been for the pact, he maintained, the situation would have been far worse in this regard: 'Palestine was presented by a fait accompli… The Transfer agreement prevents the country from being flooded with German merchandise, since goods come in only as there is need of them.' [159]
Vladeck was not to be put off by Locker's obvious subterfuge, and he continued the attack. In New York the local Labour Zionists were simultaneously supporting the boycott in the United States while apologising for the Ha'avara in Palestine, and the old Bundist ridiculed their attempt to run with the fox and hunt with the hounds:
You may argue from now till Doomsday, but this is double bookkeeping of the most flagrant sort. That nobody should break the boycott but the Jews of Palestine! And nobody deal with Germany but the Zionist organisation!… It is my contention that the main purpose of the Transfer is not to rescue the Jews from Germany but to strengthen various institutions in Palestine… Palestine thus becomes the official scab-agent against the boycott in the Near East… When the news of the Transfer Agreement first came out… Berl Locker said: 'Not a single Zionist agency has the slightest connection with the Transfer'… From this I can conclude in only one vein: The Transfer Agreement is a blot on the Jews and on the world. [160]
If the majority of Jews did oppose the Ha'avara as treason, there was one at least who was willing to go on record as complaining that Weizmann and his friends were not going far enough. Gustav Krojanker, whose views on the Nazis were discussed in Chapter 3, was now one of the leaders of the Hitachdut Olei Germania (the German Immigrants Association in Palestine), and in 1936 the association published his pamphlet, The Transfer: A Vital Question of the Zionist Movement. To him Zionism was stark calculation, nothing more, and he was more than willing to draw the logical conclusions already inherent in the Zionist-Nazi pact. He claimed to see Nazism and the opportunities it opened up for Zionism in the authentic Herzlian manner:
His survey of the situation was devoid of any futile grudge-bearing; he perceived two political factors -- an organisation of the Jewish people on the one side, and the countries concerned on the other. They were to be partners in a pact.
Krojanker berated the leadership for not having the courage to formally endorse the Ha'avara back in 1933. To him this was merely a capitulation to what he considered the 'Diaspora mentality'. He wanted them to go much further:
The Zionist Movement should have endeavoured… to influence the German Government to enter into a statesmanlike treaty, accepting the situation and trying to derive the utmost advantage from it in the Zionist sense.
He insisted that the necessary next step was to help the Nazis break the boycott in Europe itself through an extension of the Ha'avara. Germany 'might even be ready to conclude agreements -- if we… prepared to extend the ''Ha'avara'' system to other countries'. [161] But the WZO leadership needed no such coaching from Krodanker. He did not know that, secretly, they had already decided to do just that and now, in March 1936, Siegfried Moses's negotiations had finally created the International Trade and Investment Agency (INTRIA) bank in London to organise sales of German products directly in Britain itself. [162] The Nazis had to content themselves with the satisfaction of the further demoralisation of the boycott forces, as fear of Jewish and general British hostility to boycott -- scabbing made it impossible for INTRIA to go so far as to allow British currency to come directly into German hands. Instead, the goods were bought in Germany for marks and their value was credited to Jewish capitalists needing the £1,000 entry fee required of over-quota immigrants into Palestine. Zionist-Nazi trade relations continued to develop in other spheres as well. In 1937, 200,000 crates of the 'Golden Oranges' were shipped to Germany, and 1/2 million more to the Low Countries under the swastika flag. [163] Even after Kristallnacht -- 11 November 1938, the terrible night of the broken glass, when the Nazis finally unleashed the brownshirts to smash Jewish stores -- the manager of Ha'avara Ltd, Werner Felchenfeld, continued to offer reduced rates to would-be users of Nazi boats. His only concern was to reassure the squeamish that 'competition with British vessels does not arise, as this transfer arrangement is valid for citrus being shipped to Dutch and Belgian ports, British ports being expressly excluded'. [164]
'What Matters in a Situation of this sort is a People's Moral Stance'
Of course it was the Nazis who were the prime gainers from Ha'avara. Not only did it help them push out a few extra Jews, but it was of immense value abroad, providing the perfect rationale for all those who still wanted to continue trading with the Germans. In Britain, Sir Oswald Mosley's newspaper, the Blackshirt, loved it:
Can you beat that! We are cutting off our nose to spite our face and refuse to trade with Germany in order to defend the poor Jews. The Jews themselves, in their own country, are to continue making profitable dealings with Germany themselves. Fascists can't better counter the malicious propaganda to destroy friendly relations with Germany than by using this fact. [165]
The final evaluation of the WZO's role during the Holocaust cannot be made until the other interrelationships between the Zionists and the Nazis are properly dealt with; however, a preliminary appraisal of Ha'avara can now be safely attempted. All excuses that it saved lives must be strictly excluded from serious consideration. No Zionist in the 1930s thought that Hitler was going to try to exterminate the Jews of either Germany or Europe, and no one tried to defend Ha'avara during its operation in those terms.
CHAPTER FIVE: The 'Lethal Chamber' in Eugenic Thought
As we have seen, before the First World War, and in some circles until well into the interwar period, eugenics -- literally, 'well born' or 'good stocks' -- was the height of sophisticated, 'progressive' thought. Across Europe, the novels and plays of the period, such as H. G. Wells's The New Machiavelli (1911) and George Bernard Shaw's Man and Superman (1905), are suffused with the language of race-regeneration and fears of physical deterioration. In Arthur Schnitzler's novel, The Road to the Open (1908), Berthold Stauber, a young and enthusiastic Viennese Jewish physician, tells his father, the humane Dr Stauber, that 'You need only consider, father, that the most honest and consistent social hygiene would have the direct result of annihilating diseased people, or at any rate excluding them from all enjoyment of life, and I don't deny that I have all kinds of ideas tending in that way which may seem cruel at the first glance.' He went on to say that 'You needn't be afraid, father, that I shall begin straight away to preach the murder of the unhealthy and superfluous. But theoretically that's certainly what my programme leads to.' Although primarily a conservative ideology, both left and right were attracted to eugenic proposals. These ranged, from 'positive' measures such as the encouragement of 'hygienic marriage', that is, marriage between two people of good stock, to 'negative' measures such as sterilisation or segregation in order to ensure that the unfit, feeble-minded and morally degenerate did not have children. In this chapter I will consider eugenics in general, before concentrating on one aspect of its rhetoric which to a post-Second World War audience is perhaps even more shocking than it was to an Edwardian one....
It is true that the Nazi path to the gas chamber was a twisted one, a path which (once the actual murder process started) began with the face-to-face shootings of the Einsatzgruppen (the mobile killing squads which accompanied the Wehrmacht into the Soviet Union), 'progressed' through the gas-vans of Serbia and Chelmno, and then into the carbon monoxide gas chambers of the Operation Reinhard death camps (Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka), based on those used in the 'euthanasia' programme, before ending with the most technologically sophisticated version in Auschwitz, the zyklon B gas chamber.
As if this history, which is well known, were not horrific enough in itself, it seems that we must question the extent to which such a thing was, in fact, unimaginable to the minds of civilised Europeans. For in the English literature on eugenics there existed for some forty years before the Holocaust a notion -- the 'lethal chamber' -- which can be differentiated from the Nazi gas chambers 'only' in the fact that the English versions never went into operation. In the rest of this chapter I will defend this claim, and think about whether the time difference between the first mention of the 'lethal chamber' in England and the operation of the Nazi gas chambers in occupied Poland confounds normal historiographical suppositions of change over time, and whether the English idea and the German actualisation of it are in any way related.
-- Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain, by Dan Stone
To the end, Schnitzler remained convinced that there are no universal panaceas or quick solutions to a problem like anti-Semitism, which is so deeply rooted in the human psyche. Neither socialism, Zionism, liberal assimilation, conversion or Jewish self-rejection were likely to eliminate Jewish insecurities or put an end to real persecution, delegitimization or attempts at annihilation. Only a painfully slow process of enlightenment and self-critical reflection could, in Schnitzler's somewhat pessimistic view, eventually bring about an improvement. Political activism -- including Herzl's Promethean Zionism -- remained fundamentally alien to him.
-- Playwright Arthur Schnitzler Was Everything His Friend Theodor Herzl Hoped to Be, by Robert Wistrich
The excuse was that it saved wealth, not lives. In fact, at the very best, it directly helped a few thousand Jews with money, by allowing them to enter Palestine after the British quotas had been allocated and indirectly it provided an opportunity for others by boosting the Palestinian economy. But every genuine opponent of Nazism understood that once Hitler had taken power and had German Jewry in his claws, the struggle against him could not possibly be curbed by an over-concern for their fate; they were essentially prisoners of war. The battle still had to go on. Naturally no one wished those unfortunates any more grief than necessary, but to have brought the campaign against Nazism to a standstill out of concern for the German Jews would only have accelerated Hitler's further march into Europe.
Some sadistic characters I’ve encountered have even lied about or exaggerated adverse circumstances in their background to engender sympathy and to make their innate heartlessness seem more understandable and even palatable. And most of these individuals actually come from unremarkable backgrounds and simply see themselves as superior to those whom they perceive as weaker. In their disgust of weakness and desire to feel superior, they take a sordid delight in belittling, demeaning, and torturing others. It simply makes them feel good to make someone else feel bad. And to make others feel small and ineffectual makes them feel large and powerful. All of the research over the past several years on bullying in schools bears out all I’ve been saying here. Within the traditional models, bullies used to be seen as “cowards underneath,” compensating for feelings of low-esteem by bullying only the weak and steering clear of the strong. I always thought such views were flawed, and now, thanks to some good research, we now know better. Bullies simply like to hurt people and target those they perceive as weaker, not only because such folks make easy targets, but also because bullies have a natural internal revulsion to such personalities. And when a young bully gets chronologically older but still hasn’t grown any emotionally, what you’re likely to get is a sadistic-aggressive personality of one degree of severity or another.
It’s dangerous to think there’s any way to be truly safe in any kind of relationship with a sadistic-aggressive personality or immune from the effects of their abuse. Some folks tell themselves they have sufficient strength to endure the torment they experience. Others allow themselves to think that as long as they’re appeasing their sadist, they’re safe. But even though sadists have much more respect for strength than they do for perceived weakness, there’s really no way to be completely safe with them or to be unaffected by the psychological damage they can inflict. And sometimes sadists develop a special fascination with a particular “target,” taking a sense of “ownership” over that target and exacerbating the risk associated with trying to break free of their grip. Moreover, sadists can have other aggressive personality traits as well, making them even more dangerous (sadistic predatory aggressives [alt: sadistic psychopaths] are without question the most dangerous people on the planet). So it’s very important to recognize these personalities early on and do your very best to stay clear of them.
-- Demeaning as a Lifestyle: The Sadistic Aggressive, by Dr. Simon
While the WZO was busy saving the property, or, more properly, a piece of the property of the German Jewish bourgeoisie, the '£1,000 people', thousands of Germans -- including many Jews -- were fighting in Spain, against Hitler's own Condor Legion and Franco's Fascist army. The Ha'avara certainly assisted the Nazis in that it demoralised Jews, some of whom were Zionists, by spreading the illusion that it was possible to come to some sort of modus vivendi with Hitler. It also demoralised non-Jews to know that a world-wide Jewish movement was prepared to come to terms with its enemy. Certainly the Ha'avara removed the million-strong Zionist movement from the front line of anti-Nazi resistance. The WZO did not resist Hitler, but sought to collaborate with him and, as can be seen in the proposals of Arlosoroff and Weizmann for a liquidation bank, only Nazi unwillingness to extend their linkage prevented the development of an even greater degree of co-operation. Those Zionists, as with World Jewry, who tried to oppose Hitler, must also be severely faulted for their own failure to create an effective Jewish, or even Zionist, boycott machine, but at least they must be credited with some moral stature in that they tried to do something to attack the Nazis. By comparison Weizmann, Shertok and their co-thinkers lose our respect, even if we only set them against their Zionist critics and ignore all other Jewish opinion. At best, it can be said of Weizmann and his ilk that they were the equivalent of Neville Chamberlain; moral and political failures. After the war and the Holocaust, a contrite and remorseful Nahum Goldmann, mortified at his own shameless role during the Hitler epoch, wrote of a dramatic meeting he had with the Czech Foreign Minister, Edvard Benes, in 1935. Goldmann's vivid account of Benes's warning to the Jews says all that will ever need to be said on the Ha'avara and the abject failure of the WZO to resist the Nazis:
'Don't you understand', he shouted, 'that by reacting with nothing but halfhearted gestures, by failing to arouse world public opinion and take vigorous action against the Germans, the Jews are endangering their future and their human rights all over the world?'… I knew Benes was right… in this context success was irrelevant. What matters in a situation of this sort is a people's moral stance, its readiness to fight back instead of helplessly allowing itself to be massacred. [166]
_______________
Notes:
114. Carl Voss, 'Let Stephen Wise Speak for Himself', Dimensions in American Jewry (Fall 1968), p. 37.
115. Moshe Gottlieb, 'The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the American Jewish Community, 1933-1941', PhD thesis, Brandeis University 1967, p. 160.
116. Meyer Steinglass, 'Emil Ludwig before the Judge', American Jewish Times, (April 1936), p. 35.
117. 'Palestine and the Press', New Palestine (11 December 1933), p. 7.
118. Chaim Bialik, 'The Present Hour', Young Zionist (London, May 1934), p.6.
119. Abraham Jacobson, 'The Fundamentals of Jewish Nationalism,' New Palestine (3 April 1936), p. 3.
120. David Yisraeli, 'The Third Reich and the Transfer Agreement', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. Vl (1971), p. 131.
121. Ibid.
122. 'Palestine Drive to Continue', Israel 's Messenger (Shanghai, 1 May 1933), p. 2.
123. Werner Braatz, 'German Commercial Interests in Palestine: Zionism and the Boycott of German Goods, 1933-1934', European Studies Review (October 1979), p. 500.
124. Yisraeli, 'The Third Reich and the Transfer Agreement', p. 132.
125. 'Dr Arlosoroff's Plan', Jewish Economic Forum (London, 1 September 1933), p. 9
126. Chaim Arlosoroff, 'What can Palestine offer to the German Jew?', Labor Palestine ( June 1933), p. 9.
127. Yitzhak Lufban, 'Arlosoroff's Last Period', Labor Palestine (June 1934), p.6.
128. 'Zionist Congress in Prague', Zionist Record (South Africa, 1 September 1933), p. 5.
129. 'The 18th Zionist Congress', NewJudaea (London, September 1933), p. 193.
130. Jewish Daily Bulletin (29 August 1933), p. 4.
131. 'Zionist Congress Votes Inquiry Commission for Palestine Terrorist Groups', Jewish Daily Bulletin (1 September 1933), p. 4.
132. Mark Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety, p. 212.
133. David Rosenthal, 'Chaim Arlosoroff 40 Years Later', Jewish Frontier (August 1974), p. 23.
134. 'Reflections', Palestine Post (14 November 1938), p. 6.
135. Yehuda Bauer, My Brother's Keeper, p. 129.
136. 'Justification of the Zionist Congress', Zionist Record (South Africa, 4 October 1933), p. 5.
137. Moshe Beilenson, 'The New Jewish Statesmanship', Labor Palestine (February 1934), pp. 8-10.
138. 'Untermyer, Rabbi Silver Denounce Deals Reported Negotiated with Germany', Jewish Daily Bulletin (30 August 1933), p. 4.
139. 'The Palestine Orange Agreement', Jewish Weekly News (Melbourne, 10 November 1933), p. 5.
140. Clarence Streit, 'League Aid Asked for German Jews', New York Times (9 September 1933), p.5.
141. 'Dr Stephen Wise on Policy of World Jewry', World Jewry (London, 24 August 1934), p. 395.
142. Braatz, 'German Commercial Interests in Palestine', p.504.
143. Chaim Weizmann, 'To Arthur Ruppin', 3 July 1935, in Barnett Litvinoff. (ed.), The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Letters, vol. XVI, p. 464.
144. Ibid., pp. 465-6.
145. Arthur Ruppin, The Jews in the Modern World (1934), pp. 256-7.
146. Nahum Goldmann, Autobiography, p. 112.
147. Ruppin, Jews in the Modern World, p. xiii.
148. Weizmann, 'To Lewis Namier', 1 October 1933, Letters, vol. XVI, p. 54.
149. 'Nineteenth Congress Report', Canadian Zionist (September 1935), p. 8.
150. Paul Novick, Zionism Today (1936), p. 4.
151. 'Executive Defines its Policies in Reply to Opposition', New Palestine (20 September 1935), p. 24.
152. Ruth Bondy, The Emissary: A Life of Enzo Sereni, p. 141.
153. Novick, Zionism Today, p. 5.
154. Barnett Litvinoff, Weizmann - Last of the Patriarchs, p. 182.
155. 'Kiddush Hashem', World Jewry (6 September 1935), p. 1.
156. 'Has Congress a Message to Deliver?', World Jewry, (30 August 1935), p. 1.
157. 'Reflections on the Zionist Congress', Jewish Chronicle (London, 20 September 1935), p. 24.
158. 'Zionists close their Ranks', Jewish Chronicle (London, 6 September 1935), p. 9
159. 'Debating the Issues of the Transfer', Call of Youth (January 1936), pp. 3-12.
160. Ibid., pp. 34.
161. Gustav Krojanker, The Transfer: A Vital Question of the Zionist Movement, pp. 7-10 and 15.
162. Bauer, My Brother's Keeper, p. 129.
163. 'Reflections', Palestine Post (14 November 1938), p. 6.
164. Werner Felchenfeld, 'Citrus on German Ships', Palestine Post (Letters) (17 November 1938), p. 6.
165. 'Blackshirts Peeved at Reich-Zion Trade', Jewish Daily Bulletin (6 February 1935), p.5.
166. Goldmann, Autobiography, p. 148.